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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vasanthdev2004 1dfe275e50 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-10-25 19:37:43 +05:30
Vasanth T 5d080ef46b test(tui): pin the cwd in tests that assert text is absent from the view (#1170)
* test(tui): pin the cwd in tests that assert text is absent from the view

Nine tests built their model with an empty Options.Cwd, so newModel took
the package directory and the title bar showed the developer's real
branch and checkout path. Each then asserted that some text was absent
from the whole view, and failed wherever that branch or path happened to
contain it: TestSuggestionOverlayRenders on a branch with /model in its
name, TestSuggestionOverlayCapsRowsWithoutMoreText on a branch or path
containing "more" or "compact", the provider wizard tests on "offline",
"chatgpt" or "gpt-4.1", and so on.

They now pin Options.Cwd to isolatedCwd, a path that does not exist, so
no branch is read and the path is the same on every machine. A guard
test checks that isolatedCwd stays outside any git checkout.

* test(tui): make isolatedCwd fully qualified and absent by construction

The fixed /workspace/zero path could exist on some machine, a dev
container for one, and newModel would then read whatever is there. On
Windows it was also only drive-relative: \workspace\zero is not a fully
qualified path.

isolatedCwd is now a child of the home TestMain isolates that nothing
creates, so it is fully qualified, absent and outside any checkout on
every platform, and the title bar shows ~/not-a-checkout everywhere. A
t.TempDir path would have put the user name and the test name into the
view. The guard test checks all three properties.

* test(tui): clear the branch in view-test models instead of trusting the cwd

isolatedCwd is a child of the isolated home, which lives under the
temporary directory. With TMPDIR inside a checkout, gitBranch walks up
from that absent path to the checkout and puts its branch in the title
bar, so the guard failed on an ordinary branch and a colliding branch
broke the nine view tests again.

newViewTestModel now builds those models: it sets the isolated cwd and
clears the branch after construction, since no path can promise there
is no checkout above it. The guard keeps only what a path can promise
(fully qualified and absent), and a new test puts the home inside a
checkout on feat/model-picker and checks that neither that branch nor
the real checkout path reaches the view.

* test(tui): assert no checkout path reaches the view in the enclosing-checkout test

The test checked the branch strings and that the isolated cwd shows,
but a view could show both the isolated cwd and a real checkout path
without failing it. It now also asserts that neither the enclosing
checkout nor the directory the tests run from appears in the view.
2026-10-22 06:52:51 -07:00
Vasanth T 1d233c0a9b test(modelregistry): clear ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH in the models.dev tests (#1169)
The variable turns off both the models.dev fetch and the cached overlay,
and four tests in modelsdev_test.go inherited it from the shell. With it
set, TestRefreshModelsDevCacheRejectsBadBodyWithoutClobbering and
TestDefaultModelEntriesAppliesFreshCache fail, and
TestCachedModelsDevProvidersIgnoresStaleCache and
TestCachedModelsDevProvidersRequiresOptIn pass without reaching the
check they are named for: the nil they expect comes from the variable.

Clear it in each of them, as the two sibling refresh tests already do.
2026-10-21 07:33:36 -07:00
Vasanth T de1443b2ed fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to hono 4.13.13 (#1171)
GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 (moderate): hono's serveStatic decodes the request
path a second time, so middleware on static paths can be bypassed.
Versions 4.12.4 to 4.13.10 are affected and main pins 4.13.9 through
tuistory, which release packaging installs as a local-control helper.

npm update takes hono to 4.13.13, inside every range that asks for it.
package.json is unchanged and nothing else in the lock moves.
2026-10-21 07:12:22 -07:00
Felix-Ayush 84c1b15540 fix(oauth): reuse the crash-safe secret store and sync encrypted publications (#1165)
* fix(oauth): use the crash-safe secret store and sync token publications

The encrypted-file OAuth backend carried its own AES-GCM secret implementation that had drifted from internal/securefile: a crash during first login left <secret>.lock behind and every later Save timed out instead of reclaiming it, and the secret and token blobs were published without fsync.\n\nUse securefile.Crypter with an opt-in publication directory so the secret still publishes through the sandbox-denied .secret.publish directory, add file and directory barriers to the encrypted token blob, and extend securefile with the publication directory plus destination-directory sync.\n\nMove the concurrent-creation and wrong-sized-secret coverage to securefile, add a stale-lock regression through the OAuth store, and test publication-dir use, sync ordering, sync-failure preservation, and retry after a failed secret sync. The stale-lock test fails on the previous code.

* test(oauth): cover post-rename directory-sync failures

The existing failure tests inject a file sync error before the rename. Add coverage for a destination-directory barrier failure after the token or secret has been atomically replaced: the write must report the error and the newly published bytes must remain readable. Also cover the corresponding securefile secret path, including its expected size.

* fix(securefile): never clobber a newer lock when restoring a reclaimed one

reclaimStaleLock could rename a lock that had just been replaced, then restore the quarantined copy with os.Rename, replacing a third holder's new lock. Both holders could then publish different secrets for the same file. Restore with O_CREATE|O_EXCL and discard the quarantined copy when the destination is already held.

Extend the directory-sync failure test to prove a later caller actually loads the published secret, not just its size. Add restore tests for the free and already-held cases.
2026-10-21 18:41:38 +08:00
Vasanth T 6393a90ed6 fix: bump Go to 1.26.10 for GO-2026-6809 (#1168)
govulncheck now reports GO-2026-6809 (crypto/x509 distrusts compromised
intermediate certificates) against Go 1.26.9, reachable through
daemon.WriteFrame, so Security & Code Health fails on main and on every
open PR. It is fixed in 1.26.10.

CI and release builds read the toolchain from go.mod. The stated
source-build minimum in README.md, README_ZH.md and docs/INSTALL.md
moves with it.
2026-10-21 16:37:49 +08:00
Vasanth T cd3e0b0a9f test(cli): isolate the exec image tests from the models.dev refresh (#1161)
runExec starts a background models.dev download unless
ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH is set. TestRunExecImageAttachmentHistory moved
the user directories into a TempDir by hand but left the fetch on, so a
5.7 MB download landed in the TempDir while its cleanup ran, and the
macOS runner failed with "unlinkat ... directory not empty". The two
older image tests had no isolation and fetched into the real user cache.

Use isolateCLIUserState in all three, which also points the cache path
into the fixture and turns the fetch off.
2026-10-18 10:08:09 +08:00
Felix-Ayush aa9ba8412e fix(tools): grep stops where a file's line breaks stop (#1160)
* fix(tools): grep stops where a file's line breaks stop

scanGrepFile treated EOF after a trailing line break - and an empty file -
as the START of another line, and handed the matcher an empty line one
number past the real content. Every pattern that matches an empty string
then reported a match on a line no reader sees:

  a.txt holds "x\n"; grep pattern "^$"
    -> a.txt:2:           (grep -c '' GNU-style reports no such line)
  same file, pattern ".*", count mode
    -> "2 matches found"  (one real line, one phantom)
  an empty file, pattern "^$"
    -> a.txt:1:           (the file has no lines at all)

read_file and the file tracker's countLines already state the rule the
scan violated: "the trailing newline does not open a line", and an empty
file has no lines. The scan now stops there too, so anchored and
empty-matching patterns can only match the lines the content carries.

Real matches, numbering, count-per-hit accounting for non-empty patterns,
file mode, glob and symlink handling are unchanged.

* test(tools): make the grep line-number parity test catch the phantom

The parity test matched only "needle", a pattern that cannot match the
empty line the old EOF branch invented, so its absence-of-line-4
assertion passed on the code being fixed. The pattern now also matches an
empty line, and the expected output is asserted exactly: on the pre-fix
scanner the same run reported

    grep = "a.txt:2: needle two\na.txt:4: ",
        want exactly the line read_file numbers 2

so the phantom is visible right beside the real line, and the test is
about the numbering claim it states. Also gofmt-aligns the case table
that made the CI formatting check fail.
2026-10-18 10:07:34 +08:00
Felix-Ayush a97db8832f fix(redaction): redact credentials whose trigger a greedy span swallowed (#1158)
Two credentials glued end to end share one recovering property: the second
one's trigger prefix is where redaction can re-anchor. For fixed-length
bodies that anchor is exact (AKIA{16} stops at the next key), which is the
case the anchored end-chaining always covered. For unbounded bodies it
isn't: github's [A-Za-z0-9]{36,} body eats the literal "ghp" of the token
glued behind it, so the first match ends PAST the second trigger, the scan
that re-anchors at the span end finds nothing there, and the second
credential leaves the output as +_bbbb... / .eyJzdWIi... plaintext:

  RedactString("ghp_aaa..36a..ghp_bbb..36b..")
    -> "[REDACTED]_bbbb......"   (second token's body printed in full)
  RedactString(jwtA+jwtB)
    -> "[REDACTED].eyJzdWIiOiI5ODc2...SA" (second token's payload+sig)

The same holds across shapes (a github key directly feeding "sk-ant-..."
through its body) and for three tokens in one run.

redactAdjacent now follows the run a match starts: at each boundary it
re-binds the match at the EARLIEST trigger occurrence inside the span that
stills validates as its shape (the head before the trigger must match the
anchored pattern exactly, and the run chained from the trigger must reach
past the span, so a mid-body lookalike and a mid-span cut that recovers
nothing leave the span alone), and continues under whichever shape matched
the swallowed trigger. Candidate examination is capped at
maxTriggerOccurrences per span so body spam of trigger lookalikes costs
what the span costs, and the first validating cut wins.

End-chaining for fixed-length bodies, single-credential shapes, custom
replacement templates, and the split path's announced no-op-for-contiguous
text guarantee are all unchanged; the regression tests pin the glued pairs
that previously leaked plus the AWS chaining and lone-token cases.
2026-10-18 10:07:04 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 3ad039e937 docs(mcp): drop the duplicated publishAdapterLaunch paragraph
The paragraph describing publishAdapterLaunch appeared twice: once above
launchedOnce, where it described the wrong closure, and once above
publishAdapterLaunch itself. Keep the second.
2026-10-17 18:03:42 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 3123b8d36e Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-10-17 17:27:06 +05:30
Vasanth T ef4da1323f fix(workspaceindex): import gitsafe under the Twigpine module path (#1153)
#1149 was opened before #1105 moved the module to github.com/Twigpine/zero
and merged right after it, so its two imports of internal/gitsafe still
used the old path. Nothing provides github.com/Gitlawb/zero any more, so
main stopped building at 2ffe1831.
2026-10-17 16:59:52 +08:00
zzucs 1e848492e5 fix(sessions): preserve image attachment summaries on resume (#1152)
* fix(sessions): preserve image attachment summaries on resume

Persist TUI-compatible attachment counts for ACP and exec user events.
Restore readable markers in live history, session replay and resumed
prompts without storing or resending historical image data.

Cover image-only and mixed prompts, restart recovery, malformed metadata
and the aborted-turn boundary with regression tests.

Fixes #1135

* fix(workspaceindex): follow the current module path

Use github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/gitsafe in the ignore scanner and its
tests. The upstream module rename preceded the scanner's gitsafe change,
leaving these two imports on the old path and preventing the rebased tree
from compiling.

* fix(sessions): count only images accepted by the model

Take ACP and exec attachment counts after the vision capability gate,
matching the TUI's persisted attachment semantics. Update the ignored-image
regressions to require zero saved images and no historical image marker.

Refs #1135
2026-10-17 16:59:21 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 a1d4ac3b9a chore: follow the Twigpine module path
main moved the module to github.com/Twigpine/zero in #1105. Rename this
branch's imports to match, including the two in internal/workspaceindex
that main itself still carries until #1153 lands.
2026-10-17 11:27:59 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 0899b1132e Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-10-17 11:27:58 +05:30
Vasanth T 2ffe1831b0 fix(workspaceindex): run Scan's git calls through gitsafe (#1149)
* fix(workspaceindex): run Scan's git calls through gitsafe

Scan asks git for ignored paths on every turn with its own gitCommand, which
turned off core.fsmonitor and dropped the repository-location variables but
still let a clean filter or diff driver from the repository's own config run
during status. It now goes through gitsafe, like the TUI and the scratch-file
warning: hooks are off as well, and a repository whose config defines a filter
or diff command takes the non-git path. The status call also passes
--ignore-submodules=dirty.

Scan makes two git calls, so gitsafe gains Check, which reads the repository
config once and builds several commands from it. Command is now Check plus one
command, and each command gets its own copy of the environment.

* test(workspaceindex): pin Scan's fallback when gitsafe refuses the repository

A repository whose own config defines a filter or diff command is refused by
gitsafe, and Scan then takes the non-git path. Scan reaches gitsafe.Check
through a package variable now, so a test can stand in for such a repository
without configuring one that names a command, and
TestScanFallsBackWhenGitsafeRefusesTheRepository checks both sides: with git
consulted, .gitignore decides and the fixed list does not apply; refused, the
fixed list applies and .gitignore is not read.
2026-10-17 07:14:03 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5.5 13e2596b2e chore: move repository references to Twigpine/zero (#1105)
Update the Go module path, imports, install scripts, docs, workflows,
packaging and action defaults from Gitlawb/zero to Twigpine/zero. The npm
scope (already @twigpine/zero on main, with its @gitlawb/zero migration
notes), LICENSE, action author, the OpenGateway provider and historical
CHANGELOG links are unchanged.

The X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo header keeps Gitlawb/zero: it is what
AIMLAPI sees for attribution, so changing it needs a maintainer's yes.
docs/INSTALL.md keeps `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/...`, because
every tagged release so far declares that module path. The Homebrew
formula comment names the Twigpine/homebrew-tap tap.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-17 07:13:21 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment 8c4e759798 feat(sandbox): support self-exec pattern to eliminate separate helper binary (#946)
* feat(sandbox): support self-exec pattern to eliminate separate helper binary

Linux sandboxing previously required distributing a separate 'zero-linux-sandbox'
binary and looking it up on PATH.

This wires an internal '__sandbox-helper' entrypoint directly in cmd/zero/main.go
and configures findLinuxSandboxHelperCommand to fallback to os.Executable(),
enabling single-binary zero distributions with fully functional sandboxing.

* fix(sandbox): prefer PATH helper before self-exec fallback

Colocated zero-linux-sandbox stays first. A standalone helper on PATH
is used next. Self-exec of the main zero binary is only the last
fallback, so an installed helper is not ignored.

* feat(sandbox): clean formatting in main.go and add self-exec unit tests

* feat(sandbox): insert __sandbox-helper verb in bwrap plan for self-exec binary

* fix(sandbox): drive Linux selection from the self-exec helper resolver

Availability and command-plan construction now share the same helper
resolution and keep the __sandbox-helper prefix on the backend, so a
main-only install with bwrap reaches native sandboxing.

* fix(sandbox): self-exec only the zero main binary, not test binaries

* fix(sandbox): carry standalone vs self-exec identity into the inner bwrap plan

A versioned physical helper (zero-linux-sandbox-v1) must not receive
__sandbox-helper. The inner plan uses an explicit SelfExec flag, threaded
from argv, instead of guessing from filepath.Base.

* docs(install): describe self-exec as the last helper fallback

Self-execution runs only when neither a colocated nor a PATH
zero-linux-sandbox is available.

* docs(install): state colocated, PATH, then self-exec helper order

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-10-16 14:09:28 +08:00
github-actions[bot] d597f0e095 chore(main): release 0.11.0 (#1146)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-16 11:28:23 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment ce2fcffaf1 perf(redaction): add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings (#945)
* perf(redaction): add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings

Evaluating cascading regular expressions across every log line, tool output,
and session event incurred ~23 µs and 51 heap allocations even on strings with
zero secrets.

This introduces fast-path substring checks before invoking expensive regex
substitutions, yielding a 70x speedup and 0 B/op heap allocation on clean
strings.

* test(redaction): lengthen ghp_ fixtures and cover conditional gates

GitHub classic tokens need 36 characters after ghp_. Benchmarks and
shape tests now use a matching fixture. A table-driven test checks each
fast-path gate, including near-misses and case-insensitive Authorization.

* perf(redaction): structure triggered patterns and avoid allocation in header case checks

* test(redaction): cover secret-header and URL-password gates

Keep the redaction marker literal after url.URL rewrites userinfo, so
callers still see [REDACTED] instead of a percent-encoded form.

* fix(redaction): unescape only the generated URL password

A path or query that already contains the encoded redaction marker
must stay encoded. Only the userinfo password is rewritten in the
clear [REDACTED] form.

* fix(redaction): re-escape URL username after parse

Username() is decoded. Re-encoding with url.User keeps control bytes
out of the redacted URL so a %0AAuthorization userinfo cannot inject
a header after the header pass.

* fix(redaction): fail closed on password URLs without a host

* test(redaction): isolate query-gate coverage from assign and text secrets

* fix(redaction): fold Unicode U+017F and U+212A in containsCaseInsensitive

Go (?i) regular expressions apply Unicode simple case folding, where U+017F (ſ) folds to 's' and U+212A (K) folds to 'k'. Teach containsCaseInsensitive to fold these runes to ASCII lowercase with zero allocations so case-insensitive header gates cannot be bypassed by Unicode-folded equivalents.

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-10-15 21:15:42 +08:00
Kevin Codex 61b09364f0 feat(providers): add Concentrate provider preset (#1147)
* feat(providers): add Concentrate provider preset

Register Concentrate (https://api.concentrate.ai/v1) as an
OpenAI-compatible catalog provider. Concentrate is already listed in the
README Partners section; this adds the provider itself.

- models.dev has no Concentrate provider, so the id `concentrate` and the
  key name CONCENTRATE_API_KEY match OpenClaude's Concentrate
  integration. `Concentrate AI`, `concentrate.ai` and `concentrate-ai`
  resolve to it.
- Default model deepseek-v4-flash-0731: the dated id behind the
  deepseek-v4-flash alias that OpenClaude uses. Concentrate's /v1/models
  keeps the rolling name only in `aliases`, and onboarding keeps the
  default selected only when it matches a live id, so an alias default
  made setup land on the first model in the list (claude-fable-5).
- Curated models: deepseek-v4-flash-0731 (default), deepseek-v4-pro,
  kimi-k3 and glm-5.3. Context windows (1,048,576 each), tool calling and
  thinking support come from Concentrate's public /v1/models.
- Regression test: a Concentrate-shaped live list must contain the
  preset's default model.
- README and README_ZH: key line and setup command.

* test(providers): prove the Concentrate default check runs on the live list

The regression test passed whenever the default model was in the result,
and the curated fallback also contains it. Assert that the mock served
/v1/models and that the result includes claude-fable-5, a model only the
live response lists, so a silent fall back to the curated catalog fails.
2026-10-15 21:14:16 +08:00
fchengyan d1a0d048ee fix(cli): let providers subcommands run with no active provider (#1143)
* fix(cli): let providers subcommands run with no active provider

`zero providers list`, `use`, `remove` and `rename` exited 3 with
`no active provider configured: active provider "" not found` as soon as the
environment supplied more than one provider and config.json had no active
provider: normalizeProvidersWithOptions only elects an active provider by
itself when there is exactly one, and resolveCommandCenterConfig treated the
resulting error as fatal, so the command stopped before doing anything. A
base URL without a key counts as a second provider too (applyProviderEnv
builds a profile from a base URL alone).

The resolver already returns the successfully normalized list alongside
ErrNoActiveProvider, and the interactive TUI already falls back to a usable
entry from it in runInteractiveTUIWithSetup. Do the same here instead of
failing, so these subcommands can answer for providers that only come from
the environment.

Also pin the four env-derived provider tests to a fixed environment and a
temporary user config. They set OPENAI_API_KEY but resolved through the real
resolver against the developer's own config.json and ambient provider
variables, so they failed on any machine that also exported another provider
variable and whose user config had no active provider.

Adds regression coverage for the two-env-provider case: `providers list`
must report every detected provider and `use`/`remove`/`rename` must give
their usual env-derived answer. Verified against the fix (pass) and with the
fix reverted (exit 3, `active provider "" not found`).

Fixes #1130

* refactor(cli): report the configured active provider, not an elected one

Provider-management subcommands answer for the SAVED configuration, while
the TUI's recovery path answers "what can I run with". Adopting
firstUsableProvider in resolveCommandCenterConfig conflated the two: with
two env-derived providers it made `providers current`/`list` present a
provider that `zero exec` would still refuse to run with, and a
base-URL-only profile failed `providers list` because the election demands
a credential. Return the resolver's partial config untouched instead, so
nothing is reported as active when nothing is selected.

Also removes the OAuth store read this path picked up with firstUsableProvider.

Adds assertions that `current` shows nothing selected, `list` marks nothing
active, `use --json` leaves activeProvider empty, plus a base-URL-only case.

* fix(cli): scope the no-active-provider exception to provider management

Returning the resolver's partial config made `zero config` exit 0 with a
partial summary, contradicting the resolver's documented headless contract:
`zero config` / `zero exec` still fail with the actionable message and only
the interactive TUI recovers from a missing active provider. Split the
helper so only issue #1130's commands — `providers list`/`current` and the
unpersisted `use`/`remove`/`rename` reporters — tolerate the state; `zero
config`, `detect`, `models` and `check` keep failing as before.

Also pin the OAuth store in providerEnvSetupDeps: summarizeConfig reads
OAuth login state through the default store, so a developer's stored login
could flip these assertions. Point ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH at a temp file
and force ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file so an ambient keyring setting cannot pull
the OS keychain in either.
2026-10-15 15:40:43 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão c88c77bf70 fix(workspaceindex): skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only (#1117)
* fix(workspaceindex): skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only

Scan has a fixed file budget, and build output (Cargo target/, Python
virtualenvs, caches) could exhaust it before real source was reached:
repo-map reported truncation and ranked fingerprint files above code.

Inside a git work tree, Scan now asks git for the ignored set
(`git status --porcelain=v1 -z --ignored=matching .`), so the repo's own
.gitignore, nested ignore files, info/exclude and core.excludesFile all
apply, including names no fixed list anticipates (.locust_env/). Outside
a work tree, or when git is missing, older than 2.16, fails, or exceeds
5s, a fixed list of common build/cache directory names stands in.

ShouldSkipDir is unchanged: glob, grep, list_directory and path
autocomplete share it and must keep seeing target/, .venv/ and friends.
The lookup runs with GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0 so a per-turn scan never takes
.git/index.lock next to a concurrent git command.

Fixes #1108

* fix(workspaceindex): skip a rename's original-path field when parsing status

In `git status --porcelain=v1 -z`, a rename or copy record is followed by one
more NUL field holding the original path, with no XY prefix. The parser
inspected every field, so an original name beginning with "!! " read as an
ignored entry: after `git mv "!! a" b`, a tracked file "a" disappeared from
Scan.

Move the parsing into parseIgnoredStatus, which consumes that field for R or C
in either status column, and test it directly and end to end.

* fix(workspaceindex): disable repo fsmonitor and force untracked-files=normal for status

Scan's git status lookup must not run a repository's core.fsmonitor hook or fail
when status.showUntrackedFiles=no would reject --ignored=matching.

* fix(workspaceindex): ignore inherited git repository location

Git exports GIT_DIR and GIT_WORK_TREE to hooks. With those pointing at
another repository, Scan kept .locust_env/lib/x.py, which root's own
.gitignore excludes.

* fix(workspaceindex): quote the fsmonitor hook path in the regression

On Windows, sh treats an unquoted backslash path as escapes, so the hook
ran and the marker the test stats was never created. Require a status
without the override to create that marker first.

* fix(workspaceindex): pass the fsmonitor hook path to git with forward slashes

Smoke (windows-latest) failed TestGitIgnoredPathsDisablesRepoFsmonitor
because core.fsmonitor was set to a backslash script path. Git for Windows
hands that value to sh, which consumes the separators, so the hook never
runs and the marker is never created. The test now stores a quoted forward-slash
path. The product code is unchanged.
2026-10-15 15:34:28 +08:00
Vasanth T 640d936bfb fix(tui,cli): stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls (#1133)
* fix(tui,cli): stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls

Zero runs git status and git diff on its own: the TUI's files sweep at
startup and after each command, its pull request diffstat, and the
scratch-file warning after a run. A repository's own config can name
programs those commands run (core.fsmonitor on every status, hooks when
the index is rewritten, clean filters and diff drivers assigned through
.gitattributes), so a workspace unpacked from an archive ran its own code
on the first turn, although Zero refuses the same workspace's project
hooks and plugins until the user trusts it.

internal/gitsafe builds those commands with core.fsmonitor and
core.hooksPath turned off and GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0, and drops the
repository-location variables git exports to hooks, using the same
environment for its config check and for the command. A repository whose
own config, or per-worktree config when extensions.worktreeConfig is on,
defines a filter or diff driver command is refused, and the callers
already treat that like a directory that is not a repository. The status
and diff calls also pass --ignore-submodules=dirty, because a submodule's
own config is not checked.

* test(gitsafe): keep the real-git setup off an inherited GIT_DIR

The setup helper in TestCommandAgainstRealGit ran git with the inherited
environment, so from a hook, or a shell that exports GIT_DIR or
GIT_WORK_TREE, git init and git config would act on the repository those
name instead of the temporary one. It now uses the same environment as
Command, and the test sets both variables to a decoy repository and checks
after each setup step that the decoy was not touched.
2026-10-15 15:33:32 +08:00
Kevin Codex 8e363fcaa5 fix(npm): wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps (#1145)
* fix(npm): wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps

npm applies a publish asynchronously: `npm publish` returns once the upload
is accepted, and the version appears later. In the 0.10.0 release the
@twigpine/zero wrapper appeared 9 seconds after publish-packages.sh stopped
checking for it, and the last platform payload about ten minutes after its
upload. Two things went wrong:

- The wrapper became visible before four of its five platform payloads, so
  installs in that window resolved aliases that 404 and fell back to the
  GitHub-release download. Ordering the uploads does not order what npm
  shows.
- The final `latest` check gave up after 25 seconds and failed the job even
  though every publish landed, which also skipped the @gitlawb/zero steps
  until a re-run.

publish-packages.sh now waits until npm shows every platform version before
it publishes the wrapper, then waits until `latest` is the wrapper version.
One deadline bounds the waits (ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_WAIT_TIMEOUT, default 30
minutes). On timeout it fails before the wrapper goes out and says what npm
never showed. These lookups treat an error as "not yet", unlike the skip
decision, which still stops on anything but E404.

The test fake can now apply a publish only after a number of later lookups,
and records which aliased versions were missing when the wrapper was
published. Against the script as released in v0.10.0, the two new tests fail
the way the release did: the job exits 1 although everything landed, and the
wrapper goes out while its platform payload is not visible.

The two release steps that published 0.10.0 once more as @gitlawb/zero have
done their job and are removed; docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md and the comments that
pointed at them now describe what happened. The Go and wrapper handling of
the old name stays, since only a build installed under it can trigger it.

* fix(npm): validate the publish wait settings, and correct the legacy publishing claim

ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_WAIT_TIMEOUT went into Bash arithmetic as typed. A leading
zero reads as octal (0600 waited 384 seconds), and 08 is an arithmetic error
that, in a script, does not stop it: Bash prints the error, leaves the
deadline unset and carries on, so the run only died at its first wait, after
the platform payloads were published. A negative timeout ended the wait
before it started, and a bad ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_RETRY_DELAY only failed at the
first sleep, also after publishing began.

Both settings are now checked before anything is published: whole seconds
only, converted with 10# so a leading zero is decimal, bounded before the
conversion, and capped (timeout 86400, delay 600). A bad value fails with
the variable's name.

TestPublishPackagesReadsTheWaitTimeoutAsDecimal makes the script wait, which
is where the old code broke: against the reviewed script it publishes the
platform payload and then exits 1 on "08: value too great for base".
TestPublishPackagesRejectsAnInvalidWaitSetting covers -5, abc, 1e3, an
over-range and an overflowing timeout, and a non-numeric delay; the old
script published with five of them and crashed on the sixth with
"abc: unbound variable".

docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md said nothing could publish @gitlawb/zero again.
Removing the trusted publisher stops this workflow; a maintainer could
still publish by hand, and the doc now says that.
2026-10-15 13:30:11 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 856919bcaa chore(main): release 0.10.0 (#1061)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-15 12:14:04 +08:00
Vasanth T 883e5bec24 fix(sessions): keep a session lease for the life of the process, not of the Store (#1144)
A session's lease file lived in the Store that took it, so once that Store
was unreachable the garbage collector closed the file, and closing it drops
the lock. That made TestForkAndChildHoldTheParentTheyAreCreatedFrom fail on
main whenever a collection ran before its dry-run prune. It can also happen
in an exec run: PrepareExec takes the calling or forked session's lease on a
Store the run never touches again, so the parent's lease can disappear part
way through and a prune in another terminal could remove it.

Leases now belong to the process, as Hold documents. Every Store holding a
session shares one lease file in a process-wide table, and the file is
unlocked and closed only when the last Store holding it releases it.
2026-10-15 12:05:04 +08:00
Kevin Codex 530563a0bb feat(npm): publish as @twigpine/zero (#1142)
* feat(npm): publish as @twigpine/zero

The npm package moves from @gitlawb/zero to @twigpine/zero, and everything
that finds Zero's GitHub repository by name now names Twigpine/zero.

Package name
- package.json, the lockfile and release-please use @twigpine/zero.
  `repository` names Twigpine/zero: npm checks provenance against it, so a
  publish from this repo with the old URL fails with E422. The homepage is
  zero.twigpine.com.
- The name lives in package.json only. build-platform-packages.mjs names the
  wrapper, platform versions, alias names and alias targets from it, and
  bin/zero.js reads its own package.json for the alias it resolves and for
  every reinstall hint. The Go constant npmPackageName is held equal to
  package.json by a test.

Repository defaults
- The update check (DefaultRepository), install.sh, install.ps1, the npm
  wrapper's fallback downloader, and the GitHub Action's zero-repo default
  all used Gitlawb/zero. That name now belongs to an unrelated GitHub org, and
  these paths download and run what they find there, so they point at
  Twigpine/zero. Docs, README and issue-template links follow. The Go module
  path (and so `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/...`) is unchanged here.

Publishing
- The two inline publish steps become scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh, which
  reads the name from the assembled payloads, refuses to start when the
  wrapper's aliases do not match the platform payloads, skips versions
  already on the registry (so re-running a half-finished job is safe), and
  publishes with --ignore-scripts. The dist-tag rules are unchanged.
  internal/npmwrapper/publish_test.go runs it against a fake registry.

Docs explain the switch for existing installs: uninstall @gitlawb/zero first,
because both packages own the `zero` bin and npm refuses the second (EEXIST).

* feat(npm): publish 0.10.0 once more as @gitlawb/zero to point users at the new name

Deprecating @gitlawb/zero alone would strand every existing npm install.
0.9.0's `zero upgrade` runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`; with
nothing newer under that name npm installs nothing, prints no deprecation
warning (it only warns when it installs something), and Zero then reports
"updated via npm to 0.10.0" while staying on 0.9.0.

So this release goes out once more under the old name, as a bridge:

- The publish job assembles the same verified artifacts a second time with
  the new `build-platform-packages.mjs --package-name @gitlawb/zero` and
  publishes them with publish-packages.sh, after the @twigpine/zero publish.
  A gate runs it only while @gitlawb/zero's latest is still 0.9.0 (or is
  this version, on a re-run), so it happens once.
- The build knows its name from the package.json beside it. The Go side
  reports InstallMethodNpmLegacy: `zero upgrade` refuses with the switch
  steps before any release check (so it works offline too), and
  `zero update --check` adds them whether or not an update is out.
- bin/zero.js prints the same steps after zero exits (the TUI would hide a
  notice printed first), only when stderr is a terminal, and not for
  `update`/`upgrade`, which print it themselves.
- Updating from 0.9.0 now installs a real version, so npm also shows the
  deprecation message.

The steps say to uninstall @gitlawb/zero before installing @twigpine/zero:
both own the `zero` bin, npm refuses the second install with EEXIST, and a
forced install loses the bin when the old package is later removed (checked
against npm 11.16).

docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md has the maintainer runbook: bootstrap and trust the new
package, retarget the old one's trusted publisher for the bridge, then
deprecate @gitlawb/zero, revoke its publisher, and delete the bridge steps.

* fix(npm): only skip a publish when npm says the version is not there

publish-packages.sh treated any failed `npm view <name>@<version>` as "not
published". A transient network, auth or registry error on the re-run that the
skip exists for therefore published a version that was already out, and npm
rejected it with EPUBLISHCONFLICT; with the registry unreachable it published
blind. npm 11 reports every kind of missing (no such package, no such version,
including platform versions) as E404, so only E404 now means "not published".
Any other failure is retried three times and then stops the job before it
publishes anything, with npm's own error shown.

The test fake now answers a missing version with E404 the way npm does (it
returned an empty success before), and can fail lookups with a network error.
The two new tests fail on the old lookup: one with EPUBLISHCONFLICT after
transient failures, the other by publishing while the registry is unreachable.

Also renames the unused retry variable in the legacy-name gate step to `_`
(shellcheck SC2034), matching the script.
2026-10-15 11:05:51 +08:00
Vasanth T c56a4c4e6e fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to patched shell-quote (#1131)
shell-quote 1.9.0 is inside the range GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv covers
(>= 1.8.4, < 1.11.0). It reaches the lock through tuistory,
@opentui/react and react-devtools-core, which asks for ^1.6.1, so
refreshing the lock moves it to 1.12.0 without touching package.json.
Release packaging installs the local-control helpers from this lock,
so the old version shipped in the helper tree.
2026-10-15 10:13:27 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão 300cf6275f fix(acp): persist token usage events for ACP sessions (#1137)
* fix(acp): persist token usage events for ACP sessions

ACP turns never set agent.Options.OnUsage, so provider token counts were
dropped on the floor. zero exec and the TUI persist the same counts as
session usage events, and `zero usage report` totals those events, which
left every editor-driven ACP session at zero requests and zero tokens.

runTurn now queues each report through usage.EventUsagePayload, the same
writer exec uses for a non-escalating run, and commits it in the turn's
existing buffered batch under the session id. A hard run failure still
returns before persistTurn, so that turn's usage is dropped with its
history. StopCancelled stays a successful outcome and keeps the usage
already reported. session/load and session/resume still skip event types
other than messages, compaction, and tools, so the restored prompt and
the wire replay do not gain a usage channel. ACP has no model escalation,
so the payload has no "model" key and no prompt, tool argument, or other
raw input.

This sits beside the permission-mode field persisted on the session
(#1134). It does not change the ACP wire protocol, exec, the TUI, or the
report reader.

Refs #1118

* test(acp): pin cancel, resume, and payload shape for usage events

The persistence test showed that a successful turn records token counts,
and the hard-failure test showed that an aborted turn records nothing.
Neither one locked the two edges that are easy to get backwards.

A client cancel is a StopCancelled outcome, not a hard failure, so the
tokens the provider already reported stay in the session log. session/load
and session/resume read that same log; the replay and the next prompt
must still be the conversation, with no usage payload on the wire and no
token counts folded into the resumed prompt. The persisted JSON is also
checked to be token-count keys only, so a prompt or tool argument cannot
ride along in the usage record.

Refs #1118
2026-10-15 09:44:28 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão 106c0b77f9 test(cli): pin sandbox policy golden temp roots (#1139)
* test(cli): pin sandbox policy golden temp roots

TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields compared the
policy snapshot to a fixed golden after stripping only the temp roots
NewScope keeps. NewScope drops a candidate that sits inside an earlier one,
while the JSON (built with a nil scope) still lists it, so a TMPDIR inside
/tmp — or TMP inside TEMP on Windows — survived normalization and failed
the golden. Pin the variables that path reads (TMPDIR on Unix, TEMP and TMP
on Windows) and cover a nested temp dir that is not inside the earlier
candidate, so the normalizer removes it instead of leaving it in the JSON.

Refs #1121

* test(cli): run the golden against an ambient nested temp dir

The nested golden created its temp dir in the package working directory and
failed when that path sat inside /tmp, so a checkout under /tmp could not
run it and the test wrote into the source tree. Stage the issue's shape
first — TMPDIR inside /tmp, or TMP inside TEMP — then let the pin override
those variables. Directories come from t.TempDir. If the nested shape cannot
be built, skip.

Refs #1121
2026-10-15 09:21:16 +08:00
zzucs 846d30f57f test(cli): give the local adoption probe a test-sized timeout (#1136)
* test(cli): give the local adoption probe a test-sized timeout

TestLocalAdoptionSavesAndReloadsEligibleModel relied on the 400ms
defaultLocalProbeTimeout, which treats a slow probe as "runtime not running"
and silently drops the candidate; under -race on a busy runner one slow
loopback round trip can exceed it and empty the detection result. Pass a
5-second test deadline instead. The production default is unchanged and stays
covered by TestDetectLocalRuntimesAppliesDefaultTimeout.

Refs #1132

* test(cli): correct the timeout-coverage note on the adoption probe

TestDetectLocalRuntimesAppliesDefaultTimeout pins the probe timeout with an
explicit 20ms deadline, so it covers timeout enforcement rather than the
400ms production default. Reword the comment accordingly; no assertion or
production behavior changes.

Addresses the CodeRabbit finding on #1136.
2026-10-14 22:31:06 +08:00
zzucs bb96206c27 fix(acp): persist the session permission mode across restarts (#1134)
ACP kept the permission mode in memory only: both mode doors called setMode,
registerSession always started at PermissionModeAuto, and nothing wrote the
mode to the session store, so session/load and session/resume returned a
plan/ask session as auto after a restart.

Save the mode next to the model on both doors, store first so a failed write
fails the request instead of leaving disk behind memory, and restore it through
registerSession. A session with no saved mode (written before this change)
keeps auto; a saved value outside auto/ask/plan never comes back weaker than
ask, and unsafe stays unreachable over ACP.

Refs #1125
2026-10-14 22:30:25 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 e0fb65f003 test(sessions): run the session lock test on Windows and add a cross-process one (#1115)
* test(sessions): run the session lock test on Windows and add a cross-process one

TestSessionFileLockSerializesAcrossStores was skipped on Windows with
"flock semantics differ on windows", so the LockFileEx path in
filelock_windows.go was never exercised by a test on the platform that
uses it. LockFileEx locks are per handle, which is what the test relies
on, so the skip was unnecessary: remove it.

Also add a helper-process test (same pattern as lockutil's) proving the
session lock blocks a different process and is released by the OS when
the holder exits without unlocking.

Both fail on Windows when the lock is replaced by a no-op.

Fixes #1104

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(sessions): keep the session lock alive in the helper process

The helper discarded the unlock closure returned by lockSession, which is the only reference to the open lock file/handle. GC finalization could close it while the helper waits on stdin, releasing the OS lock early and making the cross-process test pass for the wrong reason. Retain the closure and runtime.KeepAlive it after io.Copy, as the lockutil helper does.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:29:36 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5.5 a3d4edef8f test(tui): isolate user home, config and cache dirs for the TUI tests (#1114)
* test(tui): isolate user home, config and cache dirs for the TUI tests

newModel reads <user config>/zero/commands/*.md, and the package has 500+
newModel calls with no isolation, so a developer's own slash commands and
state leaked into the TUI tests (and tests could write to real user
directories), against the AGENTS.md "Hermetic tests" rule.

Add testutil.IsolateUserDirs, which points HOME, USERPROFILE, APPDATA,
LOCALAPPDATA and the XDG_* roots at a temp dir (covering Linux, macOS and
Windows), and call it from a TestMain in internal/tui. Per-test t.Setenv
overrides still win.

Refs #1103

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(testutil): fail closed when user dir isolation cannot be applied

IsolateUserDirs now returns an error when any Setenv fails, rolling back
the variables it had already redirected, and its restore func reports
restoration failures. The TUI TestMain exits non-zero when isolation,
restoration or removal of the temp root fails, and the helper test
restores the inherited XDG_DATA_HOME via t.Setenv before clearing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(testutil): cover partial-redirect rollback and compare physical paths

Make Setenv injectable so a test can let HOME be redirected and fail the
next variable, proving IsolateUserDirs rolls back a variable it really
changed (the NUL-root case fails on the first call and cannot).

Add testutil.PathWithin, which resolves the existing part of each path
with EvalSymlinks before the containment check, and use it in both the
helper test and the TUI hermetic test so symlinked temp dirs and Windows
short names cannot cause false results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:28:58 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a195e8848c fix(tui): stop held peer message Allow/Deny from deadlocking Update (#1111)
The peer approval prompt's decide closure called runtimeMessageSink from
inside Update. The sink ends in program.Send, which blocks on bubbletea's
unbuffered message channel; the only reader is the event loop that is
running Update, so answering a held cross-session message hung the TUI.

Give pendingPermissionPrompt a decideCmd that returns a tea.Cmd yielding
the peerDecisionMsg, and have resolvePermissionWithReason return it
instead of calling the sink. Tests now drive the decision through the
returned command and a blocking sink, which hangs on the old code.

Fixes #1099

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:28:03 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a0979fb756 test(tools): poll for listening address in foreground server test (#1110)
TestExecCommandForegroundServerReturnsSessionAndServesHTTP parsed the
helper's listening address from the first exec_command result only, with
a 500 ms yield. On a loaded Windows runner the helper had not printed its
address yet, so the test failed even though the session was running.

Poll the session with write_stdin until the address appears (20 s
deadline), and register the cleanup before the address check so the
server is stopped on early failure too.

Fixes #1097

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:21:12 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 433653b873 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-10-14 15:42:52 +05:30
Kevin Codex 4dc603f622 refactor(config): drop the unreachable SetNotify wrapper (#1128)
SetNotify was kept in #1001 as a thin replace-form wrapper over
UpdateNotify for existing tests, but every product surface (the CLI
`zero config notify` and the TUI /notify picker) calls UpdateNotify's
merge form directly, so the advisory deadcode job reports it as
unreachable. Move the replace helper into writer_test.go as the
unexported setNotify, keep every test it served unchanged in behaviour,
and point the two CLI doc comments at UpdateNotify.

`make deadcode` no longer lists internal/config; the other advisory
findings in that job are pre-existing and untouched.
2026-10-14 16:45:00 +08:00
4d2e9f0d08 fix(config): sync atomic config replacements (#1093)
* fix(config): sync atomic config replacements

Persist temporary config contents before rename, then sync the parent directory on platforms that support it. Return persistence failures and cover ordering, cleanup, and pre/post-replacement failure states.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#1087

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd7-47fc-76eb-82d3-3f6c25384912
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(config): sync new config directories and relax unopenable dir sync

Sync each directory entry created by MkdirAll into its parent so a crash
cannot lose the config directory after a successful first write.

Treat a config directory that cannot be opened as best-effort durable,
matching the sessions store's syncDir; only a failed Sync or Close is
reported, since the rename has already replaced the file.

Check the temp file is closed with Seek instead of Stat: on Windows,
File.Stat on a closed file returns "The handle is invalid" rather than
os.ErrClosed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(config): report directory-open failures except for write-only directories

syncConfigDir treated every os.Open failure as success, so a caller could
acknowledge a save whose directory barrier was never reached (Copilot
review, PR #1093). Keep the maintainer-requested best effort for a
directory the user can write but not read, as in the sessions store, and
return every other open failure.

TestSyncConfigDir now expects os.ErrNotExist for a missing directory on
non-Windows hosts; it fails on the previous code with
"missing directory: error = <nil>, want file does not exist".

* fix(config): create the config directory durably on the lock path and roll back failed barriers

Every exported mutator acquires the config lock before it writes, and the
lock file is a sibling of the config, so lockConfigFile's MkdirAll was what
created the config directory on a first write. writeConfigData then found
nothing missing and never synced the new entries into their parents, so a
locking mutator could report success without the directory creation being
durable (CodeRabbit review, PR #1093).

A failed parent sync also left the newly created directories in place: a
retry found nothing missing, skipped the barrier, and reported success.

Route both creation sites through one helper, ensureConfigDir. It creates
each missing component with os.Mkdir so it knows exactly what it created,
syncs each new entry into its parent deepest first, and on any barrier
failure removes only the directories this call created, deepest first,
with os.Remove so a directory another process has populated survives. A
failed rollback is joined into the error, never swallowed. A component
that appeared between the lookup and the Mkdir is not rolled back but its
parent is still synced.

Regression coverage:
- TestLockingMutatorSyncsCreatedDirectories drives UpdateNotify on a
  missing nested directory, asserts the parent syncs happen before the
  lock file exists, that a failed barrier rolls the directories back, and
  that the retry re-runs the barrier. On the previous code it fails with
  "error = <nil>, want injected sync failure" because the lock path
  bypassed the barrier entirely.
- TestWriteConfigDataRollsBackOnlyCreatedDirectories asserts a failed
  barrier removes the created directories but keeps a pre-existing
  directory and its file, and that a directory populated by another
  process is kept and the failed rollback reported. On the previous code
  it fails with "must be removed after a failed parent sync: <nil>".

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 16:39:10 +08:00
Kevin Codex 1335ca6671 feat(providers): add GMI Cloud provider preset and partner listing (#1127)
Register GMI Cloud (https://api.gmi-serving.com/v1) as an
OpenAI-compatible catalog provider and add it to the README Partners
section.

- The catalog id `gmicloud` matches the models.dev provider id, so the
  remote model catalog resolves without a mapping. `gmi-cloud`,
  `GMI Cloud` and `gmi` resolve to it.
- Reads GMI_API_KEY (the name in GMI's docs) and GMICLOUD_API_KEY (the
  name models.dev uses).
- Defaults to Qwen/Qwen3.8-Max. The curated list is Qwen 3.8 Max and
  Flash (GMI's partner models), then DeepSeek V4 Pro and Flash. All four
  are served by GMI's /v1/models.
- README and README_ZH: key line, setup command, and the partner logo in
  light and dark variants under docs/assets/.

Verified live with a GMI key: `zero providers check gmicloud
--connectivity` passes, and `zero exec` completes a read-then-write task
on both Qwen 3.8 models.
2026-10-14 12:55:29 +08:00
Fabio Tavares LeitãoandClaude Sonnet 5.5 ddc45f2c81 feat(providers): opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments (#1106)
* feat(providers): opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments

The shared HTTP transport waits at most 120s for a response header. A local
model server that has to load a large model can take longer than that to
produce the first byte (measured 1-5 minutes on a throttled local Ollama), so
an otherwise-alive request is aborted.

Add ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT, mirroring ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT: a Go
duration or a bare number of seconds; "0", "off", "none" or "disabled" remove
the limit; an unparseable or non-positive value falls back to the default
instead of removing the limit. The default stays 120s, so nothing changes for
anyone who does not set the variable. The constant and the resolver sit next to
the idle-timeout equivalents in providerio.

Checked against a throttled local Ollama: ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT=5s
fails at ~6.4s, =300s succeeds at ~223s (a request that would have hit the
120s ceiling).

Refs #1038

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142QEjA7eEFcdXTpcTmcAZk

* fix(providers): keep the 120s header timeout when bare seconds overflow

A value such as 36028797018963968 passes strconv.Atoi and wraps to zero
when multiplied by time.Second, which would disable the default. Values
that do not fit in time.Duration stay on the default.

* fix(providers): keep timeout defaults when bare seconds overflow

ResolveStreamIdleTimeout multiplied bare seconds by time.Second the same way the header timeout did, so a large count wrapped to zero and disabled the watchdog. Both resolvers now share a bounds-checked conversion.

* fix(providers): apply the header timeout when the shared client is taken

The stall-hardened transport baked ResponseHeaderTimeout in at package init, so a later ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT never reached the real client and the 120s check depended on the env at init. Each resolved value now keeps its own transport, and a slow header proves that transport enforces it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-13 12:49:55 +08:00
Lortu | AEGIS Core eebb384676 feat(runtime): add process-local per-model RPM admission limits (#1116)
* feat(runtime): add process-local per-model RPM admission limits

* fix(config): preserve model RPM through provider fallback

* test(config): pin provider-command RPM cap precedence

* style(config): gofmt provider-command RPM test
2026-10-13 10:15:11 +08:00
Kevin Codex 39d6560137 docs(readme): add Trendshift badges and Partners section (#1126)
Add three Trendshift badges under the tagline (#1 Go repository of the
day, #3 Go repository of the week, #3 on GitHub Trending) and a Partners
section listing Twigpine, Xiaomi MiMo, Novita AI, Concentrate, and Exa,
following the layout used in the OpenClaude README. README_ZH.md gets
the same badge row and a matching section.

The Novita, Concentrate, and Exa logos are vendored under docs/assets
with light and dark variants. The Twigpine and Xiaomi MiMo logos are
loaded from their own sites, as OpenClaude does; Twigpine switches to
its dark variant under a dark color scheme.
2026-10-13 09:40:10 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp bb3346a828 fix(execution): reserve process capacity before launching (#1092)
Reject starts when all slots are live or reserved, prune only completed history, and release reservations on launch failure. Keep live processes tracked even after failed termination. Add concurrent admission and real-process regressions for #1085.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd5-eb93-74c9-a1ac-5b140edaf973

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:03:04 +08:00
HazyLabandhazyhaar ac5fe0d218 fix(security): harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters (#1066)
* fix(security): harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters

- sandbox: recognize POSIX short-option clusters in shellCommandFlag (ZERO-ESC-02)
  Extract payload commands behind combined short flags (-ec, -lc, -xc) and long
  --command in dashCPayload and shellDashCPayload, preventing destructive
  subcommands from bypassing recursive AST inspection and auto-allowing execution.
- tools: anchor write_file and edit_file to *os.Root descriptor (ZERO-TRAV-01)
  Use openScopedWriteRoot and commitRootedFileContents to traverse parents relative
  to the root descriptor handle, eliminating residual TOCTOU directory swaps.
- tools: harden format_on_write against untrusted execution and secret leakage
  Pass --no-config to prettier to disable dynamic JS config execution, reject
  formatter binaries resolved inside the workspace (formatterBinaryInWriteRoots),
  and scrub credential-bearing environment variables before running formatters.

* fix(security): stop shell flag parsing at dash-dash and verify root descriptor identity

Stop recursing into shell `-c` payloads for tokens that follow the `--`
separator, which marks positional operands rather than options, in both
shellDashCPayload (text detector) and dashCPayload (AST analyzer). This
prevents `bash -- -ec '...'` from being classified on a command the shell
never runs as a command string.

Verify the identity of the *os.Root descriptor returned by openScopedWriteRoot
against a pre-open os.Stat of the resolved root, closing the check-to-use
window opened by os.OpenRoot re-resolving the path. A root substituted for a
symlink or a different directory is refused and the descriptor closed.

Regression tests fail on the unfixed code:
- TestShellDashCPayloadStopsAtDashDash, TestDetectInteractiveCommandAllowsNonInteractive
- TestAnalyzeCommand (`bash -- -ec ...` must stay non-interactive/non-destructive)
- TestOpenScopedWriteRootRejectsSubstitutedRoot

Bureau: desk-pr-1066

* fix(tools): relax symlink resolution error handling on host formatters and clean up test directory

* fix(security): anchor write preimage on root descriptor and report skipped formatters

---------

Co-authored-by: hazyhaar <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:02:17 +08:00
zzucs 0c6f179a84 fix(tools): hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under root (#1063)
* fix(tools): hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under the workspace root

On Windows a leading-slash POSIX path is not absolute, so read tools joined
it under the workspace root and surfaced a raw GetFileAttributesEx error.
Append a Windows-only hint naming the host OS and the workspace root when such
a path is missing, so the model switches to a workspace-relative path instead
of retrying the same shape.

Guidance only: which path is opened, confinement errors, and write-path
resolution are unchanged. All read tools share the annotated resolver.

Refs #972

* test(tools): keep the Windows path hint wiring test hermetic

The cross-platform wiring test used a fixed "/home/..." request, but
resolveScopedReadPathForGOOS injects only the annotation GOOS: on Unix the
request is host-absolute, so root was ignored and the test read state it did
not own. Build the request from t.TempDir() instead - joined under root on
Windows, anchored in root on Unix - and resolve an existing file under that
tree to prove the resolution stayed in test-owned storage. The native Windows
end-to-end test is unchanged.

Addresses the P2 finding on #1063.

* fix(tools): reject mixed-separator UNC paths in the Windows hint

Windows treats both separators as valid, so a second leading separator in
either position (/\server\share, /\?\C:...) is the same UNC or device-style
prefix as //. looksLikePosixAbsolutePath excluded only the literal "//", so a
missing mixed-separator target was misreported as a POSIX path resolved under
the workspace root. Exclude either separator byte and cover both mixed forms
in the shape and annotation tables.

Addresses the P3 finding on #1063.
2026-10-12 15:01:44 +08:00
feb992757c fix(tui): bound live dictation regions (#985)
* fix(tui): bound live dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve user edits across dictation partials

* fix(tui): reanchor stale dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): bound live dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve user edits across dictation partials

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): reanchor stale dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve dictation separators after reanchoring

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a07cfc-4f4e-773c-b42e-6229ef568a01
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): reject Unicode whitespace in browser title origins

Cover encoded whitespace before permission translation and through wire payloads. Pin parent reasoning-effort forwarding at the specialist resume call site.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a097c8-242d-732f-bf6e-7321d8cf732c
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Anandan <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:01:09 +08:00
Vasanth T 23c27e0778 feat(sessions): add zero sessions prune, which never removes a session another process has open (#1089)
* feat(sessions): prune old sessions, never one another process has open

Store.Prune removes sessions last updated before a cutoff of at least a
day, and reports what it removed, what it kept and why, and what failed.
A dry run makes the same decisions and removes nothing.

A session holds no lock between writes, so nothing told a prune in one
terminal that another terminal still had the session open. Each session
now has a lease file: a process that writes a session, or loads it
through the rehydrated reads the TUI, exec --resume and ACP use to
continue one, holds a shared lock on it for its lifetime, and prune
takes it exclusively and leaves alone any session it cannot get. On
Windows the lease file is opened with FILE_SHARE_DELETE so a held lease
never blocks removing the directory.

Prune also keeps every ancestor of a session that stays, since Lineage
and Tree fail on a missing ancestor, removes descendants before their
ancestors, re-checks each session under its lease and write lock, and
removes the metadata first so a removal that fails part way leaves
nothing that looks like a session.

Part of #971.

* feat(cli): add zero sessions prune, with a retention setting read from user config only

`zero sessions prune --older-than 30d` removes sessions last updated
before the cutoff, `--dry-run` lists what it would remove and why it
keeps the rest, and `--json` prints the report. The cutoff is days or a
Go duration and never under a day. Without --older-than, prune uses
sessions.retentionDays; with neither it refuses and says how to set one,
so nothing is removed unless asked for.

sessions.retentionDays is read straight from the user config file.
Sessions belong to the user rather than to a repository, so a project's
.zero/config.json cannot choose what prune deletes, and no resolver
merge copies the setting from anywhere.

Closes #971.

* test(sessions): a dry run reports a session another process has open as kept

* test(sessions): pin the dry run for undated sessions and the lease a new session takes

* test(sessions): report every failure when a session is written while pruning

* docs(readme): list sessions prune in the Chinese README as well

* fix(sessions): a fork or child holds its parent, and is refused while prune holds it

A lease is taken best effort, so a fork whose parent prune held at that
moment went ahead: the rehydrated read in exec --fork could not hold the
parent, Fork read it anyway, and the fork was created under a parent
prune was removing. Fork and CreateChild now take the parent's lease
themselves before reading it, and refuse when prune holds it, so the
parent of a session being created is never removed under it.

* docs(sessions): say that nothing calls Release yet, and what it is for

* fix(sessions): let go of the lease before removing a pruned session's directory

lease.lock is deleted with the rest of the session while prune still
holds it. Where a delete only takes effect once the last handle closes
(Windows without POSIX delete semantics: older builds, or FAT and exFAT
volumes), prune's own handle kept the directory from being empty, so
the removal failed and left an empty directory behind. Prune now closes
the lease after session.lock is gone and before the directory goes.

* test(cli): an empty --older-than is a usage error, not the retention setting

* fix(sessions): refuse to continue a session prune holds, rather than read it without the lease

A resume that started while prune held the session could not take the
lease, read the session anyway, and went on to use one prune was free to
remove: a read changes nothing prune checks again. The rehydrated read
behind the TUI resume, exec --resume and --fork, and ACP session/load
and session/resume now fails with ErrPruning at that moment, and none of
the three falls back to a raw read on it. ACP load stays best effort
about a history it cannot read, but not about this one. Writes are
unchanged: a write lands under session.lock, where prune checks the
session again.

Prune takes the lease through the new Store.HoldExclusive, which the
TUI and ACP tests use to hold a session the way prune does.

* test(sessions): a lease that cannot be taken keeps the session, and does not stop a resume

Prune fails closed when it cannot take a session's lease at all, so a
process whose own hold fails the same way can carry on: prune cannot
remove the session either. Refusing there instead would stop resume
and fork wherever locking does not work, for people who never prune.

* fix(sessions): keep a parent forked after the plan, and refuse sessions removed under a caller

Three gaps jatmn found in the prune lease rules.

A fork made after prune's plan, by a process that has since exited,
was not in the plan, so its old parent was removed and the fork was
left under a missing ancestor. Once prune holds a parent exclusively it
now looks for sessions the plan did not see that name it as parent,
and keeps it if there is one.

Store.Create with a ParentSessionID, which exec --calling-session-id
and spec implementations use, did not hold the parent at all. It now
holds it the way Fork and CreateChild do, and all three refuse a
parent whose directory is still there without its metadata: prune
removes the metadata first and unlinks lease.lock after it, so a lease
taken at that moment lands on a fresh lease file and proves nothing.

A resume, exec --resume or --fork, or ACP load that picked a session a
moment before prune removed it could take a fresh lease and read the
session as empty. HoldToContinue now holds the picked session and
requires its metadata, and those callers go through it. The
rehydrated read on its own still reads a missing session as empty.

* fix(sessions): make a dry run decide at removal time like a real prune

A dry run appended every planned session to Removed without calling
pruneSession, so none of the checks made once a session is held for removal
ran: the second lease check, the re-read of the last update, and the scan for
a child created after the plan. On the same disk, a dry run could list a
session that a real run keeps.

pruneSession now takes a dry-run flag, makes every one of those checks under
the same locks, and stops before removing anything. The prune command reports
a session a dry run could not check as such, not as one it could not remove.
2026-10-12 14:26:29 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 e09c43e20a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant
# Conflicts:
#	internal/cli/app.go
#	internal/mcp/registry.go
2026-10-12 11:29:26 +05:30
Kevin Codex 2c418fc8ff fix: unbreak main CI (cron claim tests, Go 1.26.9) (#1124)
* test(cron): pass the history limit in the claim tests

#1094 added a limit argument to cron.Store.Runs. #1090 merged shortly
after from a branch that predated it, so its two new tests in
cron_claim_test.go still called Runs with only the job id and the
internal/cli test package stopped compiling on main:

    internal/cli/cron_claim_test.go:111:38: not enough arguments in call to stores[0].Runs
        have (string)
        want (string, int)

That failed vet and every job that runs go test. Pass 0, which selects
the default MaxRunHistory cap, as the other callers in this package do.

* fix: bump Go to 1.26.9 for stdlib vulnerability fixes

govulncheck reports ten reachable standard-library vulnerabilities on
Go 1.26.6, all fixed in 1.26.9: GO-2026-6603, 6605, 6610, 6611, 6612,
6613 and 6617 in net/http, GO-2026-6608 in net/textproto, GO-2026-6607
in crypto/tls, and GO-2026-6604 in os (Windows only).

CI and release workflows read the toolchain from go.mod, so the go
directive is the only version to change. Update the stated source-build
minimum in the READMEs and install guide to match.
2026-10-12 10:46:27 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 571af701bd fix(mcp): refresh OAuth tokens for discovered endpoints and registered clients (#1113)
Login discovers the token endpoint (RFC 9728 / 8414) and may obtain a
client_id/client_secret through dynamic registration, but persisted none
of it. Refresh read only the config-file OAuthConfig, which is empty for
the standard `auth: oauth` setup, so every expired access token failed
with "no token endpoint configured for refresh" and required a new
`zero mcp oauth login`.

Store the discovered token endpoint (and whether it was server-advertised)
and the dynamically registered client on the token, and fall back to them
in Refresh. Explicit config still wins, and values already in config are
not copied into the store. A stored endpoint is re-validated before use:
the shared https/loopback rule always, and for a server-advertised
endpoint the same public-network policy and pinned client Login used. The
refreshed token keeps the stored fields so later refreshes keep working.

Fixes #1101

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:58:49 +08:00
2eb9d94fac fix(cron): preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete (#1090)
* fix(cron): preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete

Let claimFire own schedule state and increment the current fire count under the store lock. Abort completion writes on read errors rather than restoring a stale snapshot.

Cover adjacent slots in both completion orders using independent stores, including failed executions, duplicate claim rejection, and unreadable completion state.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#962

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dc9c-8bc2-72cc-ad0b-6c64e3578df8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): avoid stale next-run summary on persist failure

Report the next run as unknown when completion state cannot be persisted, as requested in review. Extend the existing corrupt-state regression to verify the summary.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-0c9c-753c-9afc-45f9c1082c17
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:56:39 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 eefa978f61 fix(daemon): do not retry workers that finished with a final exit code (#1112)
The pool stopped retrying only on exit 0 or ExitPermanent (76), so the
other codes `zero exec` uses to say a run is over (2 usage, 3 provider,
4 incomplete, 130 interrupted) were treated as crashes and retried up to
MaxAttempts with backoff. Exit 4 means the agent already ran, so each
retry repeated its side effects, re-billed the provider and appended a
second run to the same session stream.

Treat those four codes as final: return the worker's exit code with
ErrPermanent. Crash-type exits (1, signals) and launch/read errors still
retry.

Fixes #1100

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:55:55 +08:00
Shubham bea2230633 chore: remove unused test exports and dead shell-highlight/theme/upstream helpers (#1096) 2026-10-12 09:55:24 +08:00
Marlowe df67edec13 fix(redaction): redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end (#1095)
* fix(redaction): redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end

Two AWS keys with no separator between them (AKIA...AKIA...) only had the
first redacted: the leading \b in the secret patterns sees a word character
on the left of the second key and misses it.

Apply each textSecretPattern via a helper that also retries at every redacted
span end with a \b-stripped, start-anchored variant of the pattern, so a
credential starting exactly where the previous one ended is still caught.
Chained runs (three or more glued credentials) are followed to the end. A
mid-word occurrence that does not abut a redacted span still does not match.

Extracted from #1075 per Vasanthdev2004's suggestion on #969; #1067 remains
the fix for the RedactString leak.

* Address CodeRabbit critical: bound redactAdjacent span-chaining loop

The outer loop re-read len(spans) while the inner loop appended chained
spans to the same slice, so appended spans were re-chained and the span
count grew exponentially on long glued-key runs (RedactString handles
untrusted content). Bound the loop to the original match count and add a
regression test with 64 glued AWS keys asserting 64 markers promptly.
2026-10-12 09:54:52 +08:00
42eb6ab5fb fix(cron): bound run history and read recent records from the tail (#1094)
* fix(cron): bound run history and read recent records from the tail

Retain the newest 1,000 outcomes under the job lock and publish complete history snapshots. Add bounded reverse reads and regression coverage for legacy logs, failures, and concurrent stores.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#1086

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd6-ad63-74d8-8396-45573c57dcec
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): skip oversized legacy history records

Discard entire oversized lines during bounded tail reads so compaction can record new outcomes without weakening atomic publication. Cover exact size boundaries and oversized first, middle, and unterminated final records.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e861-ebee-7764-be1d-e67517cd914c
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): append the outcome when the history log cannot be replaced

On Windows the atomic replace of runs.jsonl fails while another process
holds the log open, which dropped every outcome for as long as it stayed
open. Keep the replace, and only when it fails append the record on a
fresh line. The leading newline terminates any unterminated tail; the
blank line it may leave is already skipped by readRuns. Zero's own
readers take the job lock, so they never observe a partial append.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): preserve the history DACL and append only on sharing violations

Compacting runs.jsonl renamed a temporary file over it, which on Windows
replaced a DACL applied to the log with the job directory's inherited
one. Publish through ReplaceWithRetry so the log keeps its descriptor.

Fall back to appending only when the replace fails with a Windows
sharing or lock violation, the error a reader holding the log open
produces. Any other failure, such as a persistent access denial, is
returned so a log that can never be replaced cannot grow past the
retention limit. fsutil.IsSharingOrLockViolation exposes the existing
classifier, gated to Windows because errno 32 and 33 mean EPIPE and EDOM
elsewhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:45:29 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp 8a68660161 fix(daemon): bound pending sessions and prune on completion (#1091)
Reject excess unfinished sessions before registration and dispatch, independently of retained history. Release admission and prune on every terminal path.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcbe-87ec-74e6-bdd0-6341b0c26d9a

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:40:41 +08:00
Vasanth T ab018b3098 fix(daemon): stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity (#1088)
* test(daemon): stop what a worker left running after it was reaped

A daemon worker is launched into its own process group, but Kill and the
Cancel hook pass its PID to background.TerminateProcess, which looks the
group up again with Getpgid when it signals. Once the worker has exited
and been waited, that lookup fails, only the dead PID is signalled, and a
child the worker left running survives. This pins the case with a shell
worker that backgrounds a sleep and exits: after the wait, Kill and the
Cancel hook must still stop the sleep.

Committed ahead of the fix so CI shows it failing on the current
behaviour on Linux and macOS.

* fix(daemon): stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity

Kill and the Cancel hook now go through background.TerminateCommandGroup,
which signals the group the worker was launched into (ConfigureChild-
ProcessGroup's Setpgid) instead of rediscovering it from the PID, so a
worker that has exited, or on Darwin one that is still a zombie, no longer
leaves its children running. It is TerminateCommand without the reap:
the pool waits on its workers itself and exec.Cmd calls Cancel from
inside Wait, so reaping there would be a second Wait.

On Windows it is the same tree kill, with the process handle pinned while
it runs. A command that has already been waited cannot be pinned; that
now reports os.ErrProcessDone, which exec.Cmd's Cancel contract treats
as nothing to cancel, instead of the unexported "already released" error.

Fixes #861
2026-10-12 09:38:26 +08:00
1697b7a5ce fix(tui): show provider ownership in Recent and Favorites (#1083)
* fix(tui): show provider ownership in recent and favorite models

Display saved provider names in mixed-provider picker groups and include them in row sizing. Preserve provider-grouped rows and selection values.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#840

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0d8e9-d346-71f9-bdac-4ac762d810a5
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): label mixed-group rows with the provider Enter uses

Recent and Favorites rows labeled their owner from recent history, but
selection falls back to the active provider when that owner was renamed
or removed, so the label could name a provider that would not be used.
Derive the label from the same decision selection makes
(modelPickerSwitchOwner) and store it on the row as OwnerLabel.

Cap the owner prefix at 20 cells so an unbounded profile name cannot
consume the model name once the overlay reaches its 76-column maximum.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): distinguish abbreviated model picker owners

Budget owner cues against the rendered row width, preserve model names, and distinguish abbreviated saved profiles with numbered suffix cues. Show the highlighted full owner as a wrapped key before selection. Cover shared-prefix and shared-suffix owners, narrow terminals, Favorites, and Enter routing.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve model labels when owner cues cannot fit

Split owner cues onto a second line when the model needs the row width. Check the actually rendered row before suppressing the full owner key, so owner text hidden inside a clipped model label cannot hide that key.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): fit multiline model rows and mouse targets

Fit the model picker item window to its rendered viewport height and share that window with mouse hit-testing. Account for group headers and two-line rows so clicking either line selects the correct model and the keyboard-selected item remains visible.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:37:30 +08:00
Vasanth T 6b5852dc18 fix(sandbox): say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded (#1082)
* fix(sandbox): say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded

Only `zero doctor` and `zero sandbox policy` reported a degraded sandbox, so
a TUI session or a `zero exec` run went ahead with the native sandbox
effectively off and nobody saw it. Both now say so once, before the first
prompt or tool call, naming the downgrade reason: exec on stderr next to
the grant migration notice, the TUI as a system notice when it opens.

The line comes from the session's own engine through Backend.BuildPlan,
the plan `zero sandbox policy` prints, so the notice and the command that
explains it cannot describe two different sandboxes. Only the degraded
level speaks: a disabled sandbox is the user's choice, and the unelevated
Windows tier still enforces the write jail.

Exec tests that expect a quiet stderr now compare against the notice this
host prints under the default policy, since they run on the host's own
backend and a Linux runner without the helper is degraded while macOS and
Windows are not.

Fixes #1041

* fix(sandbox): say so when the nesting markers skip wrapping

With ZERO_SANDBOXED and ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND set, BuildCommandPlan passes
every command through unwrapped on the word of an outer sandbox nothing
verifies (#727). The notice came from Backend.BuildPlan, which does not
model that path, so a native backend reported full enforcement and a
session started with the markers ran every command unwrapped in silence.
The engine's notice now mirrors the runner and names the markers and the
unverified outer sandbox. A disabled sandbox still says nothing.

hostSandboxNotice builds its expectation through the engine too, and the
tests that pin the notice clear the markers so a suite run inside a Zero
sandbox does not change their answer.

* fix(tui): say the startup notices again when a session is resumed

/resume rebuilds the transcript from an empty one, so the startup notices
went with the old transcript and the session it switched to ran under a
degraded sandbox without a word. The model keeps the notices and puts
them back first, before the resume summary. Rewind and compaction stay in
the same session and keep the notice in the scrollback above their
divider.

Also pins why the notice can be decided once, at startup: grants made
during a session only open the network or add allow and deny paths,
never the mode, and every mode but disabled already needs the platform
sandbox, so no grant reaches a degraded command plan the startup notice
missed, and a deny path the backend cannot enforce is refused instead.

* fix(tui): say the startup notices again when /new opens a session

/new cleared the transcript and added only its own note, so the new
session started under a degraded sandbox without a word, the same gap
/resume had. It now puts the notices back first, the way /resume does.
/clear stays in the same session and, like rewind and compaction, keeps
the notice in the scrollback above its divider.

* fix(modelregistry): start no background refresh when the fetch is turned off

The TUI and exec each started a goroutine that called
RefreshModelsDevCache, which reads ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH and the
cache path when it runs. A test that turned the fetch off through
t.Setenv could finish and have the setting restored before that
goroutine ran, and the refresh would then fetch into the developer's
real cache. StartModelsDevRefresh reads the setting before starting
anything, so with the fetch off no refresh exists to outlive the test.

* test(cli): keep the degraded-notice tests out of the developer's user state

runExecWithSandbox and the TUI launch test left the sandbox grant store
and the models.dev cache at their defaults, so they read the
developer's sandbox-grants.json and could migrate it, and could refresh
the real models cache. Both now run under isolateCLIUserState, and both
join TestCLILaunchHelpersLeaveUserStateAlone so the isolation is pinned
for each of them.

* fix(cli): stop exec when the degraded-sandbox notice cannot be written

The notice goes out before any tool runs, and before MCP servers and
plugins start through the same sandbox, but a failed write to stderr
was ignored, so the run went ahead with reduced isolation and no
warning delivered. It now stops with exitCrash, the way the image and
reasoning-effort notices in the same function already do.
2026-10-12 09:36:52 +08:00
Vasanth T aa52040498 fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to patched hono and @hono/node-server (#1080)
The lock pinned hono 4.12.27 and @hono/node-server 1.19.14 through
tuistory 0.10.0, and npm audit reports advisories against both. tuistory
already declares ^4.11.7 and ^1.19.9, so the patched releases fit the
existing ranges: hono 4.13.9 and @hono/node-server 1.19.17. package.json
is unchanged.

npm also re-syncs the lock's root entry with package.json, which main had
already changed without regenerating the lock: license MIT, android in
os, and no install script.
2026-10-12 09:33:58 +08:00
Vasanth T 547330197b fix(oauth): give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown (#1079)
* fix(oauth): give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown

The loopback OAuth callback server was written out three times: the shared
oauth.LoopbackListener, MCP's Login and OpenRouter's login. Each ended with
Shutdown under a one-second deadline, and Shutdown only closes idle
connections. A client that has sent part of a request header is not idle, so it
survived the deadline, and its goroutine and the Serve goroutine stayed alive
after the flow returned (#1028).

#1051 fixed that for LoopbackListener (a header read bound, force-close when
Shutdown runs out of time, and a join on Serve) and left the other two exactly
as they were, because each was its own copy.

The lifecycle now lives once, in oauth.CallbackServer, with #1051's behavior
unchanged: ReadHeaderTimeout of 5s, Shutdown within 1s, Close() on a missed
deadline, and Close returning only after Serve has. LoopbackListener uses it
through an unexported constructor that keeps its ConnState test hook, and MCP's
Login and OpenRouterLogin use StartCallbackServer, which both packages could
already import.

Each call site gets a regression test that stalls a raw client mid-header ahead
of the real callback and then requires the stalled connection to be closed once
the login returns. The ordering does the synchronising: the stalled client is
dialled before the real callback, Serve accepts in order, and the login cannot
finish until the real callback has been served, so no sleep is involved.

Fixes #1028

* test(oauth): pin the callback server's header bound and its join on Serve

Two of the three things CallbackServer does had no test that noticed their
removal, the same as when #1051 introduced them on LoopbackListener: the
five-second header read bound, and Close waiting for the Serve goroutine.

The header test stalls a client mid-header and never calls Close, so it can
only pass on ReadHeaderTimeout; the bound is a package var so the test can
shorten it. It synchronises on StateNew. Go reports StateActive only after a
request read returns, and a stalled header read returns only when the header
timeout fires, so a helper waiting for StateActive depended on the bound under
test and turned its removal into a SETUP INVALID instead of a failure.

The join test uses the case where the join matters: with no connections open,
Shutdown closes the listener and returns at once, so without the join Close can
return before Serve does. Without it the test failed 10 runs out of 10.
2026-10-12 09:33:10 +08:00
Vasanth T 7f11491078 fix(acp): publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only (#1078)
* fix(acp): publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only

session/load registered a fully promptable session for any session kind,
including the child, side and spec sub-runs that every other resume path
refuses through sessions.IsResumableKind: the TUI, exec sessions, the exec CLI,
and ACP's own session/resume. So a sub-run could be opened and continued as a
standalone conversation through ACP and nowhere else, with whatever its parent
run relied on about that sub-run's lifecycle no longer true.

Load has a real render-only use, a client rebuilding a transcript it can scroll,
so it still loads those sessions and still replays their history. What changes
is that the session it publishes for a non-resumable kind is marked read-only,
and session/prompt refuses it with an invalid-params error that says why.
runTurn is reached only from session/prompt, so that one gate covers every way a
turn can run; set_mode and the config options only change settings.

The flag is decided at first registration and never changes. Resume refuses a
non-resumable kind before it registers anything, and session/new always creates
a standalone session, so the only path that can publish one of these ids is
load, which now publishes it read-only.

TestACPResumeAppliesStandaloneSessionKindPolicy claimed "session/load should
retain render-only access", but its prompt check ran before the load, so it only
proved the refused resume never registered the session. It now prompts after the
load as well. TestACPLoadPublishesSubRunsReadOnly checks every kind in both
directions, so a gate that refused everything would fail on the resumable kinds,
with a setup guard that the table agrees with IsResumableKind.

Fixes #1045

* test(acp): require resumable sessions to be promptable after load, not merely unrefused

TestACPLoadPublishesSubRunsReadOnly decided the outcome from the error text:
"refused as view-only" was false for any error other than the view-only one, so
a regular or fork session whose prompt failed for some other reason still
passed. With every writable prompt made to fail with an internal error, the old
test stayed green. Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR.

Resumable sessions now have to prompt successfully. For the sub-run kinds the
decision is the RPC code, and the message is checked only to tell the view-only
refusal apart from other invalid-params errors such as an unknown session id.
2026-10-12 09:32:40 +08:00
Marlowe 0324c1d410 fix(mcp): forward image tool results on the existing image channel (#1077)
* fix(mcp): forward image tool results on the existing image channel

Recreated from Gitlawb/zero#1012 (approved but unmerged).
Original: euxaristia/zero:feat/823-forward-mcp-images

* test(mcp): pin the pre-decode encoded cap and MIME sniffing guards

Adds the two reviewer-requested tests for the untrusted-input boundary:
- TestOverCapEncodedPayloadIsRejectedBeforeDecoding: a payload one byte
  over EncodedLen(MaxImageBytes) is rejected and the decoder is never
  called, so a hostile server cannot force arbitrary decode work.
- TestDeclaredMimeTypeDisagreeingWithSniffedBytesIsDropped: an HTML
  payload declared as image/png is sniffed from its bytes and dropped
  rather than forwarded to the provider as an image.

Both mutations (removing the cap, trusting the declared mimeType) were
verified to turn their test red locally.
2026-10-12 09:31:17 +08:00
Marlowe b9ef1d271a fix(agent): retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch (#1076)
* fix(agent): retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch

Recreated from Gitlawb/zero#1014 (approved but unmerged).
Original: euxaristia/zero:fix/973-mid-stream-transport-retry

* Address CodeRabbit nit: add Unix ECONNABORTED needle to shouldReconnect

midStreamAbortNeedles claims to be a subset of shouldReconnect but listed
'software caused connection abort' (the Unix/macOS ECONNABORTED text),
which shouldReconnect did not match. Add the needle alongside the other
abort phrases, and cover it in TestShouldReconnectClassification.
2026-10-12 09:30:19 +08:00
Vasanth T 9520f2bad7 fix(search): redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty (#1073)
* fix(search): redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty

`zero search --json` prints Hit.Session straight to stdout and redactMetadata
covered ten of its string fields. Filling every string-kinded field of
sessions.Metadata with a credential and walking the result names twenty that
came back carrying it: SessionKind, Tag, RootSessionID, AgentName, TaskID,
SpawnedFromEventID, SpecID, SpecFilePath, SpecStatus, SpecDraftModelID,
SpecDraftReasoning, SpecUserComment, SpecRejectReason, SpecSourceSessionID,
SpecImplSessionID, and the five on the Goal (Objective, Status, StatusReason,
CreatedAt, UpdatedAt).

The ones carrying the most free text are the ones a hand-kept list is least
likely to reach: SpecUserComment and SpecRejectReason are review text the user
typed, SpecDraftReasoning is the model's own prose, and Goal.Objective and
Goal.StatusReason are however the goal was phrased.

Goal is redacted through a copy. Metadata is passed by value but Goal is a
pointer inside it, so redacting in place would edit the session the caller still
holds, and a search would quietly rewrite the live record it was only asked to
report on.

TestRedactMetadataCoversEveryTextField walks the struct rather than repeating
the list, so a string field added to Metadata or Goal later fails on the day it
lands. It carries a SETUP INVALID guard that the chosen secret is a shape
RedactString actually recognizes, since otherwise every leg would pass
vacuously, and a second guard that the walk visited any fields at all.

* test(search): make the metadata coverage guard recurse, so nesting cannot slip past it

The first version of the guard walked only the direct string fields of
sessions.Metadata and hand-allocated the Goal beside it. That left it with the
blind spot it exists to close: a nested struct or pointer field added later
would arrive empty, the walk would find nothing in it, and the test would pass
while the new field went out unredacted. Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR.

Filling is now recursive through structs, pointers and slices, allocating what
it finds nil, and the walk is its mirror. The test compares the two counts, so a
shape one traversal understands and the other does not fails as SETUP INVALID
rather than passing quietly.

Both helpers fail rather than skip on a kind they do not understand. A field the
guard cannot populate is a field it is not guarding, and saying so at the point
it is added is the whole value of having it.
2026-10-12 09:29:36 +08:00
Vasanth T e2d18c50f0 test(config,tui): stop two tests reading the developer's environment and checkout path (#1072)
`go test ./...` is red on a developer machine and green in CI, for two tests
that take an input from the machine rather than from the test.

TestResolveReportsExplicitMaxTurns left ResolveOptions.Env nil on four of its
five cases, and a nil Env means "read the real process environment" (envValue).
Any one of the ten variables the resolver reads is enough to break it. With
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL exported, applyProviderEnv synthesizes a second, keyless
"anthropic" profile from a base URL on its own, the single-provider shortcut in
normalizeProviders no longer applies because there are now two, and Resolve
returns `no active provider configured: active provider "" not found` before the
test reaches its assertion. Measured one variable at a time against a clean
environment, all ten fail the same test: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,
ANTHROPIC_MODEL, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_MODEL, GEMINI_API_KEY,
GOOGLE_API_KEY, ZERO_PROVIDER and ZERO_MAX_TURNS.

The cases now state an empty environment instead of no environment, which is
what they meant, and the test exports three hostile values itself so it proves
that rather than relying on the machine it runs on being clean. Reverting either
changed case fails the test on a clean environment too, so this cannot regress
silently on CI.

TestAltScreenTranscriptScrollKeepsFooterFixed asserted the branch survives in
the title bar at width 90 while leaving Options.Cwd empty, so newModel took the
real working directory. The outcome is not a monotonic function of that path's
length, which is why this took a measurement rather than a guess. The title bar
picks the widest candidate that fits: workspace carries branch and path, cwdOnly
carries the path alone, compactLeft carries the branch alone. At width 90 with
this branch, a cwd of up to 52 bytes keeps both, 53 to 74 falls to path-only and
drops the branch, and 75 or more falls again to branch-only and restores it. The
test failed from a checkout whose package path is 74 bytes and passed from one
at 80; CI sits at 40. Cwd is now pinned, which also stops newModel reading the
real repository for a branch the test overwrites anyway.

No production code changes. The resolver's nil-Env contract and the header's
candidate ladder are both deliberate; only the tests were leaning on them.
2026-10-12 09:28:11 +08:00
Vasanth T e20b762426 fix(redaction): redact credentials split by an invisible character (#1067)
* fix(redaction): redact credentials split by an invisible character

Every shape matcher in RedactString describes a contiguous run of body
characters, and none of their classes admits a control or format character.
One NUL or ESC dropped into the body of a key therefore ended the match and
both fragments were emitted untouched. Whoever read that output next saw the
original key back, because nothing about those characters was ever displayed:
a terminal eats the escape, a log viewer or JSON consumer strips the control
byte, and a copy-paste drops both.

The matchers now also run over a copy with those characters removed, and the
spans they find are mapped back so the replacement covers the original bytes,
separators included. Emitting the compacted copy would hand the caller a
different string than the one they passed in, and leaving a separator behind
would read as two secrets where there was one.

Written against the character classes rather than the two bytes in the report,
because every other Cc and Cf character behaves the same way: BEL, backspace,
DEL, the C1 controls, zero-width space and joiner, word joiner, BOM and soft
hyphen all split a key on main. Tab, newline and carriage return are
deliberately excluded and a test says so: they are real text structure, a
credential broken across a line is visible to whoever reads it rather than
hidden from them, and stripping them would let one match span a line break and
replace unrelated lines.

Text with no such character takes exactly the path it took before, decided by
a byte scan that allocates nothing, so the common case is unchanged at 51
allocations. Text that carries control characters and no credential pays for
one compacted copy and a second pattern pass.

Fixes #969

* test(redaction): assert the exact output around a malformed byte

The malformed-UTF8 legs only asked whether the key was gone, so a decoder that measured an invalid byte as the three bytes of U+FFFD still passed: the replacement covered the secret and moved its edges onto the bytes beside it. They now assert the whole string. One leg also records that an invalid byte is not one of the invisible separators, on the same ground as tab and newline: it decodes to U+FFFD and is drawn.

* fix(redaction): keep credential boundaries while matching across invisible characters

The split-credential pass compacted every Cc and Cf character out of the whole
string before matching, which removed delimiters as well as filler. Two things
followed. A whole credential written after a NUL lost the word boundary the
shape matchers open with, so "prefix<NUL>AKIA...<ESC>..." stopped redacting even
though the unsplit "prefix<NUL>AKIA..." has always redacted. And with the
delimiter between two credentials gone, the unbounded JWT shapes ran out of the
first key and through the header of the next, replacing both with one marker and
exposing the second token's payload and signature. The same reach consumed
ordinary prose written after a key.

Three changes, one rule: a separator is filler inside a credential and a
delimiter outside one, and the difference comes from the source rather than from
the compacted copy.

The pass now runs after the contiguous matchers instead of before them, over
what they left, and never across a replacement. A whole credential is claimed by
its own strict match, so neighbours stay separate and the delimiter between them
survives. The shape matchers used here drop their leading word boundary, and the
byte before the match's original start is what has to be a non-word byte, so a
key after a NUL redacts and a key glued to the end of a word still does not.

The offset table is gone with them. It carried a start and an end for every
source byte, which is sixteen bytes per byte of input on a 64-bit build, and
RedactString is handed whole command output and notification bodies with no
bound in front of it. Only the endpoints of actual matches are resolved now, in
one walk. On a 4 MiB input with a split key, the split path allocated 223.6 MB
before this change and 154.9 MB after, against 146.3 MB for the same text with
no separator in it.

Tests cover a delimiter in front of a split key against its unsplit verdict at
every kind of leading byte, each supported shape placed in front of a JWT with
each class of separator, text immediately behind a key, a caller-supplied
replacement made of word characters, and the allocation ceiling.

* fix(redaction): match split credentials with gap-tolerant shapes on the original text

CodeRabbit found a bypass in the compaction approach:
"xAKIA<NUL>AKIAIOSF<SOH>ODNN7EXAMPLE" leaked while its unsplit counterpart
redacts. With the separators removed first, the leftmost AWS match began at the
decoy AKIA, was then rejected for the "x" in front of it, and had already
consumed the start of the real key, so the real key was never considered. The
ordinary-prose version is any word ending in "sk" followed by a hyphen, "ask-"
or "task-", ahead of a split OpenAI key.

Resuming the scan one byte after each rejection would close that but is
quadratic for the greedy shapes on text like "ask-ask-ask-..." with one NUL in
it. So the boundary goes back inside the pattern instead. Each shape is rewritten
through regexp/syntax so a run of separators may sit between any two characters
it consumes, but never before the first, and matched against the ORIGINAL text
with its leading \b intact. RE2 then judges the word boundary against the real
neighbour in one linear pass, and there is no compaction and no offset mapping.
The separator class is generated from the same Unicode tables as
splitSecretSeparator.

Two further cases came out of rerunning the seeded differential against main:

- The shapes are matched independently and the union of their spans replaced.
  Applied one after another, a split key's unbounded body ran on across a
  separator into a following JWT, stopped at its first dot, and left the JWT
  shape nothing to match, exposing its payload and signature.
- A second pass, ungated, catches a credential glued onto a split one, which
  gains its word boundary only once the first is replaced. It is often whole
  itself, so its region can hold no separator by then.

On 6,000 control-free inputs the output is byte-for-byte main's. On 6,000 with
invisible characters, 147 outputs still hold a known credential once those are
removed, against 2112 on main; 140 of the 147 leak on main too when the input is
unsplit, and the remaining 7 are the one limit now written into the header
comment: a split key whose first fragment is a complete credential on its own,
with another credential glued onto its tail.

* fix(redaction): keep two split credentials of one shape apart

Matches of one pattern never overlap, so when a split credential's body ran
on through the separator after it, a following credential of the same shape
could not start a match of its own. A JWT body stops at the next token's
first dot and a classic GitHub body at its underscore, so two split JWTs
side by side left the second one's payload and signature in the clear.
A match the OpenAI filter rejects spans what it ran into as well, so a
split key after kebab-case prose was rejected with the prose and printed.

When a match runs through a separator run into a position where the same
shape matches again and reaches at least as far, that credential is taken
on its own, and the first is cut at the separators when it is a complete
match by itself. Each piece is filtered on its own. Candidates are tried
latest first and only where the shape's literal prefix follows the
separators, at most eight per match, so the pass stays linear.

The header comment now says plainly that the rest of a key whose front
part is complete alone stays visible, and drops a stale sentence from
before the shapes were matched independently.

* fix(redaction): recognise the next credential when its prefix is split too

The run-on search looked for a shape's literal prefix contiguously after
the separators, so a token split inside its first few characters was never
seen as a new start and its payload leaked again. The prefix is now matched
with gaps allowed between its characters, the way the shapes are. The new
test splits the second token's header at every character, which also
pins that the bounded search is spent only where a credential can begin.

* fix(redaction): take one run-on step per match, not the whole chain

Following a run-on from the second credential into a third, and on to the
end of the chain, did that walk again from every match inside the chain,
which is quadratic: a megabyte of split JWTs back to back allocated about
seventeen gigabytes and ran for ten minutes. Each match now separates only
the credential it ran into. The scan's own next match starts inside that
credential and takes the following step, so a chain is still covered, and
in chains of three or more the markers after the first pair can join.

A test bounds the allocation on a chain of split JWTs; the linear pass uses
about forty times the input and the walk used far more.
2026-10-12 09:24:15 +08:00
Gaurav Bhatia 7f8e5f08bb feat(notify): make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable (#1001)
* feat(notify): make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable

The notify system existed but was silent unless the user hand-edited
config.json, with no UI surface to discover or change it.

- resolver: fall back to mode=both, focusMode=unfocused when the notify
  block is missing or empty (Fixes #579)
- tui: add /notify slash command with popup picker, mirroring /theme;
  explicit choices persist via config.SetNotify
- cli: add `zero config notify` to read/update/reset the preference
  (--mode, --focus, --reset, --json)
- config: add SetNotify writer using the existing atomic-write helper,
  validating against the same vocab the resolver accepts

The TUI effectiveTUINotifyMode default (empty -> both) now matches the
resolver. exec_test.go seeds notify.mode=off where a test asserted
silent stderr, which the old empty-default implicitly provided.

* fix(notify): apply review feedback from CodeRabbit

- cli: omitted --mode/--focus flags now preserve the current resolved
  value instead of wiping it (--reset remains the only clearing path);
  aligns the CLI with the TUI's mode-only preservation behavior
- tui: reject /notify inputs with more than two tokens instead of
  silently accepting them
- tui: apply /notify choices to the live notifier via the new
  notify.Notifier.Configure, so the change takes effect on the next
  permission prompt in the same session (the previous message claimed
  this but only the persisted value was updated)
- notify: add Notifier.Configure (mutex-guarded policy swap that
  preserves sinks, focus state, and the writer)
- tests: mode-only/focus-only CLI preservation, live-notifier apply,
  trailing-argument rejection, Configure immediate-effect + sink
  retention

* fix(notify): read cfg under the lock in Notify

Configure (334c688) made cfg mutable at runtime, but Notify still read
n.cfg.Mode before acquiring n.mu — a data race with a concurrent
Configure. Move the mode check inside the critical section and copy cfg
to a local for all reads.

Regression test TestConfigureConcurrentWithNotify runs Configure
concurrently with Notify; verified it reports DATA RACE on the unfixed
code and passes after the fix (go test -race -count=5).

* fix(notify): keep defaults out of the resolver; preserve the user's own values

Addresses the maintainer review (Vasanthdev2004) on PR #1001. All three
findings share one root cause: the resolved config was treated as if it
were the user's choice.

- resolver: no longer defaults notify.mode/focusMode. The TUI's
  effectiveTUINotifyMode already maps empty -> both on its own, so the
  permission-prompt alert still works out of the box, while headless
  `zero exec` stays byte-identical to base (no BEL/OSC-9 on stderr under
  -o json), the exec empty-stderr fixture is restored, and the
  ZERO_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL sink is not armed by an implicit default.
- cli: `zero config notify` seeds omitted fields from the user's own
  file (new config.UserNotify), never from the resolved view — a
  project config's mode:off can no longer be copied into the user's
  global config, and blank stays blank instead of pinning today's
  default as an explicit choice. --reset remains the only clearing path.
- tui: /notify mode-only changes preserve the focus stored in the
  user's own file (blank stays blank); the /notify picker enumerates the
  full 4x3 mode x focus space so every valid pair is a row, the current
  pair is always preselected, and Enter can never commit a setting the
  user did not choose. State view reads the stored pair.
- tests: the three regressions from the review — exec writes nothing to
  stderr on a clean run (fixture restored + resolver empty-default
  test), a ProjectConfigPath test proving project notify cannot leak
  into the user file, and Enter on an open picker from a pair outside
  the old curated list (off, always) keeps the setting unchanged.

* fix(cli): zero config notify no longer requires a configured provider

The command resolved the full config (providers included) before
touching notification settings, so a fresh user with no provider hit
ErrNoActiveProvider and could not read, set, or reset their notify
preference — the exact first-run user this feature targets (CodeRabbit
review, PR #1001).

The command manages a user preference, so it now talks only to the
user's own config file (config.UserNotify / config.SetNotify) and never
runs config resolution. Display reports the user's stored values — a
project config that overrides notify for one repo is not shown here,
matching the write path's source-of-truth from the maintainer review.

* fix(notify): separate live session policy from persisted user preference

Addresses the review from jatmn (PR #1001). The three notification
states — stored user file, resolved startup pair, live session — are
distinct contracts and must not be conflated:

- handleNotifyCommand now keeps two focus values per update: the LIVE
  focus (in-session, initialized from the resolved pair, so a project's
  focus rule keeps applying) feeds the notifier's Configure and the
  status line; the PERSISTED focus seeds from the user's own file
  (config.UserNotify), so a mode-only /notify writes the mode while the
  user's focus value — blank included — is preserved and project values
  never leak into the global file.
- /notify list reports the live pair (model fields), not the stored
  file, which can legitimately disagree under a project override.
- the /notify picker preselects the live pair; committing a row is an
  explicit choice, so Enter on the preselected row keeps the setting.
- /notify list requires exactly one token, matching /theme, /effort,
  and /style (rejects "/notify list junk").
- shell completions: config gained a notify child with its flags
  (--mode/--focus/--reset/--json), plus a completion-tree assertion for
  both contexts so new CLI surfaces cannot go stale.
- help/copy pass: the CLI help now describes the stored global
  notification preference controlling BOTH the completion and
  needs-input alerts, --reset as returning the TUI to its effective
  default (headless unconfigured stays silent), lists all three focus
  values in /notify usage, and drops the stale "resolver default"
  wording from effectiveTUINotifyMode and the command doc.
- tests: contract-matrix coverage with the three states deliberately
  disagreeing (blank user file + project-resolved off/focused) asserting
  list/picker/preselection/Enter, mode-only and explicit-pair updates on
  both live and persisted sides, and restart precedence; the SA4006
  lint hits are resolved by asserting the returned live model.

lint-static: 0 issues. Affected suites green under -race; the only
remaining local failures are the known environment flakes
(TestRunAuthOpenRouterSavesMintedKey on macOS keychain under a
sanitized env, and TestLoadProviderCommand* 5s subprocess timeouts
under full-suite load — both pass in isolation and fail identically on
clean origin/main here).

* fix(notify): close the remaining review findings (isolation, races, fidelity)

Addresses the third review round (PR #1001) as one boundary pass:

- BTW isolation: /notify mutations and the picker are now behind the
  existing btwCommandUnavailable guard (like /theme), because the side
  conversation shares the parent's notifier pointer — an unblocked
  /notify off inside BTW reconfigured the parent and wrote the global
  file while only the side's display changed. /notify list stays
  available. Regression: side-conversation attempt then return, checking
  the parent's actual notification output and the stored preference.
- Serialization: new UpdateNotify runs read-merge-write as ONE
  transaction under a cross-process advisory lock (flock/LockFileEx on a
  .lock file beside the config, credstore's pattern), so two concurrent
  partial updates (--mode off vs --focus always) cannot interleave and
  silently undo each other's explicit change. The CLI and the TUI's
  mode-only persistence both go through it; the TUI's stale pre-read of
  the stored focus is gone (the merge reads under the lock). Verified
  0/30 lost updates driving the real binary with two concurrent
  processes per round; a goroutine-level regression test asserts both
  explicit fields survive.
- Fidelity: notification writes now edit ONLY the notify member's bytes
  (setNotifyJSONObject, on the existing byte-preserving JSON editor),
  so unrelated values survive with their explicit presence intact —
  including tools.deferThreshold: 0 and MCP disabled: false, which the
  typed serializer's omitempty cannot round-trip, and keys FileConfig
  does not model at all. A reset removes the notify member instead of
  leaving a {} husk.
- Startup recovery: Resolve's ErrNoActiveProvider partial result now
  carries the parsed non-provider fields (notify, sandbox, tools, ...),
  and the setup-recovery branch that clears the resolved config keeps
  the notify block — a stored explicit mode:off no longer resurrects
  alerts through the provider-recovery path. Regression: stale
  activeProvider + stored off/always through recovery asserts the
  launched TUI receives the opt-out, not the both/unfocused default.
- docs nits: zero config --help now describes both alert classes; the
  two remaining "resolver default" wordings updated.

lint-static: 0 issues. Affected packages green under -race (the only
local failure is the known TestRunAuthOpenRouterSavesMintedKey macOS
keychain flake, which fails identically on clean origin/main here).

* fix(config): notify reset removes every duplicate notify member

A hand-edited config may contain duplicate notify members (JSON decoders
tolerate them; the last occurrence wins). The reset path removed only
the final member, so an earlier block survived and became the effective
preference on the next decode — `zero config notify --reset` reported
success while the old value still applied (CodeRabbit review, PR #1001).

Loop the removal until no notify member remains, mirroring
setPetPreferenceJSON's duplicate handling. The replace path still edits
the LAST member, which is the one a decoder treats as effective, so an
earlier duplicate stays inert there.

Regression TestSetNotifyResetRemovesEveryDuplicateNotifyMember verifies
the reset-orphaned failure output on the pre-fix code and passes after;
it also pins the no-op reset and the last-member-replace behavior.

* fix(config): join UpdateNotify release error; restore main's test surface

CodeRabbit pass on the rebased head, three findings:

- UpdateNotify discarded the advisory-lock release error while every
  other writer joins it into the result (errors.Join). A failed unlock
  would leave later config updates blocked while the caller is told
  success. Now named-result + deferred Join, matching SetPet et al.
- The rebase had resolved model_test.go by taking the pre-rebase file,
  which silently dropped every test upstream added or changed since the
  fork point (composer blink/cursor suite, beginRun run-details,
  scrim-preserves-semantic-colors, session payload, Termux burst, ...).
  Rebuilt the file from origin/main plus only this branch's own additions
  (TestEffectiveTUINotifyMode), so main's newer assertions are back:
  the stale scrim assertion now expects semantic ANSI preservation, and
  the removed TestBeginRunResetsSidebarHidden stays removed exactly as
  upstream had already replaced it with TestBeginRunKeepsRunDetailsClosed.

* fix(tui): restore pickerTheme's transcript append; pin the picker failure path

Rebase regression (Vasanthdev2004, PR #1001): resolving the choosePicker
conflict attached the shared transcript-append line to the new
pickerNotify case, so the pickerTheme case lost it — a theme choice
whose preference could not be saved fell out with the session theme
changed and nothing reported, while the /theme text path kept its line,
so no test went red. Restore main's line in the pickerTheme case.

New regression TestThemePickerAppendNoteOnFailedSave drives the exact
reported shape: UserConfigPath under a regular file (the write must
fail), a pickerTheme item, choosePicker, and the could-not-save note
asserted in the transcript. Verified it fails on the pre-fix code with
the reviewer's own repro output and passes after.

Also restores the TestEffectiveTUINotifyMode comment to the post-review
wording (the default lives in the TUI, not config.Resolve, so headless
runs stay silent); the model_test.go rebuild had pulled the older
pre-notify phrasing back in.

* test(tui): restore the default palette after the picker regression test

Vasanthdev2004 follow-up (PR #1001): handleThemeCommand applies its
theme to the package-level zeroTheme, so TestThemePickerAppendNoteOnFailedSave
left dracula installed and the next palette-sensitive test
(TestFocusedPermissionSelectedRowUsesSelectionTintNotBrandChip) read
dracula's selection tint instead of the default. One line, the package's
existing convention: defer applyTheme(themeDark, true), as every other
theme-committing test already does. Verified the tint test fails in
sequence before the defer and the full internal/tui suite passes under
-race after.

* fix(tui): label the effective-default notify mode as "(default)"

jatmn round (PR #1001): the TUI printed the effective default mode as a
bare "both" while the new CLI labeled the same configuration "mode:
(default)" — the two first-party surfaces contradicted each other, and a
user could not tell whether "both" was stored or effective. Focus
already labeled its built-in default ("unfocused (default)"); mode now
mirrors it.

The model keeps the RAW configured mode (notifyConfiguredMode) alongside
the effective one, so state output can distinguish "both because the user
chose both" from "both because nothing is configured" — clearing to the
raw value when an explicit choice is made. effectiveModeLabel renders the
(default) tag on the /notify list card and the /notify change line, the
same wording the CLI read path uses. No defaults are persisted; resolver
and headless behavior untouched.

Regression TestNotifyStateLabelsEffectiveDefaultMode pins the contract:
unconfigured shows "both (default)", explicit stored "both" renders bare,
an explicit /notify bell choice renders bare in both the change line and
later state. Verified it fails on the pre-fix code and passes after.

* fix(config): one lock authority; full-replace across duplicate notify keys

jatmn round (PR #1001), two findings plus one documented precedence:

- UpdateNotify took a SECOND lock primitive over the same config.json.lock.
  On Windows its LockFileEx range did not overlap lockutil's, so notify
  writes could race provider/theme/credential/MCP writes and silently
  discard them; on every platform it also bypassed the established
  no-follow path checks and the bounded wait. Delete filelock_unix.go /
  filelock_windows.go entirely and use the existing lockConfigFileFn
  authority every other mutator already shares. New regression
  TestUpdateNotifyRacesExistingConfigMutatorWithoutLoss holds notify vs
  SetTheme and requires both acknowledged edits to survive; the real
  binary also races 30/30 clean cross-process on the shared lock.

- setNotifyJSONObject replaced only the last duplicate notify member, but
  Go's decoder MERGES the fields of duplicate members into one struct, so
  a replacement omitting a field inherited it from an earlier duplicate
  ({"notify":{"mode":"off"},"notify":{"focusMode":"focused"}} +
  SetNotify({FocusMode:"always"}) left mode "off" effective). The
  nonempty path now removes every duplicate and inserts the replacement
  fresh — full replace semantics, nothing inherited. UpdateNotify's
  partial merge is unaffected (it seeds omitted fields before the edit).
  Regression TestSetNotifyReplacementInheritsNoFieldFromEarlierDuplicate,
  verified failing on the pre-fix editor and passing after.

- zero config notify --reset combined with --mode/--focus now documents
  its precedence: --reset wins, explicit values are ignored (the help
  previously did not define the combination).

* fix(config): replace single notify member in place; reserve wipe for duplicates

Vasanthdev2004 review note (PR #1001, non-blocking): the duplicate-key fix
ran remove-and-reinsert for EVERY notify write, including the ordinary
single-member file — insertJSONMember appends after the last member, so
every /notify toggle moved the notify key to the end of the config object
and collapsed its formatting while everything around kept theirs.
Nothing was lost (member order carries no meaning), but a byte-preserving
write should not reformat what it need not touch.

setNotifyJSONObject now counts notify members first: exactly one is a
positional value replace (key stays where the user put it, surrounding
bytes untouched); two or more keeps the remove-every-duplicate-and-insert
path, where Go's field-merging decode would otherwise let an earlier
block leak fields into the replacement. Regression
TestSetNotifySingleMemberReplacedInPlace asserts exact bytes through an
in-place replace, verified failing on the over-eager version and passing
after; the duplicate regression and the whole config suite stay green.
2026-10-12 09:23:37 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 066a3a2ff0 test(mcp): bound the stream Wait in the Close tests
An open, empty stream blocks Wait forever, which is the defect these tests
pin, so against the old Close they hung until the test binary timed out
instead of failing. Wait now runs behind a bound that reports the stream
open and closes it so the waiting goroutine returns.
2026-09-24 14:56:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b868a92290 fix(hooks,mcp): one owner for a vetoing hook's notice, and close the disclosure stream through its Once
A beforeTool hook that vetoed while carrying an enforcement notice put the
notice on two channels: Dispatch appended it to DispatchOutcome.Notices and
blockReason folded it into Reason as well. The one consumer made up for it
by dropping every notice whose text appeared in the reason, which also
dropped an earlier hook's disclosure whenever the blocking hook's output
quoted it. Reason now carries the hook's words only, and the veto result
takes every notice from the typed slice, the same owner hookMessage already
defers to.

Runtime.Close read the disclosure stream field directly. That raced a first
StartupDisclosureStream call, and a Close that came before any call closed
nothing, so a later caller got a fresh, open stream subscribed to launches
from a runtime that was already gone. Close now publishes through the same
Once, as an empty stream when nobody had asked for one, and closes it.

Tests: the launch-state and veto tests assert the typed slice and that the
reason carries no copy; the veto result is checked for the blocker's own
notice and for an earlier notice the reason quotes; a command that launched
and failed keeps its disclosure; the never-launched MCP check reads the
carried notices instead of the error text, which never included them.
2026-09-24 14:31:26 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 daf9b8c65d fix(acp): persist tool results through the shared session contract
The ACP agent spelled its own tool-result payload and wrote result.Output.
After the output/notice split that field is the undecorated text, and the
payload had no notices field, so the enforcement disclosure was dropped at
the moment of persisting. The live tool_call_update for the same result
showed it, and session/load then replayed the sandboxed command as if
nothing had constrained it. Fixing the live translation could not reach
this: the text was already gone on disk.

The payload builder moves from internal/tui to internal/agent, beside
ToolResult, because it now has three writers and only one of them is a
terminal. The TUI keeps its unexported helpers as thin delegates, exec calls
the agent function directly, and ACP persists through the same function. A
TUI resume of an ACP-written session therefore gets the typed notices and the
undecorated card body like any other.

The ACP reader restores the disclosure as what it was, typed notices beside
undecorated text, so toolCallResult composes it exactly once. The stored
output already has the notices composed in, so tools gains the inverse of
WithEnforcementNotices next to it; text that was never decorated passes
through unchanged and still gets its notice. displayPreview is deliberately
not read there: it is a card body, and the live ACP update sends the model
text.

The regression runs a real turn through the production OnToolResult
callback, loads the session in a fresh agent, and requires the replayed
update to equal the live one with the notice exactly once, including for a
command that printed nothing. Reported by jatmn.
2026-09-21 13:27:39 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 c022e6afe7 test(sandbox): pin the ownership order at the runner's earliest refusal
The previous version used an unsupported sandbox level, which is refused in the
level switch, so moving the join down to just above that switch still counted
one call and the test passed. A DenyRead profile on a restricted-token tier is
refused before the switch, so a join below any check now reads as not having
happened.
2026-09-19 11:55:56 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 c1b4e27749 fix(sandbox): hold the child kill job for the process lifetime, and test it from outside
Two problems with the ownership this branch added, both mine.

The handle was closed in a defer. This process is a MEMBER of the job it
creates, so closing the last handle to it is the kill: the defer fired during
runWindowsSandboxCommand's own return and terminated the helper before its exit
code could be handed back. Every sandboxed command reported 0 however it really
ended, refusals included. Measured three ways in one process: no job exits 42,
join and hold exits 42, join and close exits 0. The handle is now held for the
process lifetime, which is what the guarantee was built on in the first place:
process exit is what releases it.

The regression tested it from inside the process that owns it. It called
joinWindowsChildKillJob in the test binary and then closed the handle, so it
terminated the test binary. `go test` printed "ok" and exited 0 with the
assertions never reached, and the 51 tests that had not run yet were silently
dropped: 315 of them completed where skipping this one test gave 366. Everything
is driven out of process now, through the test binary re-executed as a stand-in
for the command helper, parked in the create-to-resume window with a real
suspended child on the real production join.

On top of that the coverage review asked for:

- cancellation and deadline expiry both driven through execution.Runner's
  captured path over the sandbox Engine, the wiring hooks and plugins use, with
  the call required to return bounded AND the child required to be gone
- the control without the job, which reproduces the orphan and the blocked
  caller, so the two above cannot pass for an unrelated reason
- the exit code of the production runner, and that it takes ownership before it
  refuses a command
- cleanup that owns the child independently of every assertion

Reported by @jatmn.
2026-09-19 11:52:30 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 937631a4ea Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-09-19 11:39:40 +05:30
Anandan 99721c762f fix(providers): send stable session headers to OpenCode (#1060) 2026-09-16 07:58:40 +08:00
Fayupable dcf229fecd refactor(tests): replace duplicated wait-for helpers with testutil.WaitFor (#1039)
Fixes #1023
2026-09-15 13:16:54 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 3fae0de2ea chore(main): release 0.9.0 (#1059)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 13:05:02 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 4ba112a0eb chore(main): release 0.9.0 (#958)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 12:59:18 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 9d8059cd49 Merge origin/main into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant
Keeps the typed enforcement notices and the Base* accessors this branch
introduced, and carries main's FileDiffs from #999 alongside them in both
ToolResult constructions; the ACP translation keeps composing the disclosure
through ModelOutput while building main's content slice.
2026-09-15 10:29:08 +05:30
euxaristiaandeuxaristia b76c764b77 fix(providerio): close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR (#1058)
* fix(providerio): close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR

OpenRouter and other HTTP/2 backends can silently reset or drop connections
that sit idle in Go's client connection pool across user turns. When a
subsequent turn reuses the stale connection, it fails on stream connect with
PROTOCOL_ERROR.

Launch a background idle connection closer on non-darwin platforms to evict
idle pooled connections on a 30-second interval, forcing fresh handshakes
after idle pauses while preserving connection reuse across fast agent turns.

Refs #1057

* test(providerio): poll for idle connection eviction with bounded deadline

Replace the fixed 60ms sleep in TestStartIdleConnCloserClosesIdleConnections
with a 2-second bounded polling loop to avoid test flakes under heavy CI
load or under the race detector.

Refs #1057

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 12:58:58 +08:00
Anandan d73ec81e2d feat(tui): interactive terminal attach for tty exec sessions (#1055)
* feat(execution): add a stdin-only write for interactive processes

* feat(tui): attach overlay for interactive terminal sessions

* feat(tui): add /attach for interactive terminal sessions

* feat(tools): point the model at tty sessions for interactive prompts

* feat(tui): open the terminal automatically for tty exec sessions

* feat(tools): tell the model to keep polling while the user types

* feat(tui): give attached terminal sessions the full viewport

* feat(tools): route sudo through an escalated tty session

* fix(tui): route the auto-attach tick to its run

* fix(tui): defer auto-attach while another view owns the screen

* fix(tui): keep bracketed-paste framing for attached sessions

* fix(tools): let tty sessions run interactive commands

* fix(tui): capture the auto-attach baseline before the exec starts
2026-09-15 08:40:47 +08:00
Vladimir Babin 2479d946c1 fix(mcp): reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response (#1054)
* fix(mcp): reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response

networkClient.request matched the decoded POST body to the in-flight call on
id alone, so a server that answered tools/call with a method-bearing frame
produced an empty, error-free result. Apply the same isRequestOrNotification
guard the SSE paths already use and return a protocol error naming the method.

Fixes #1050

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): describe the unexpected frame by method, not as a request

A method-bearing frame without an id is a notification, so the error
should not call it a request.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:40:10 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu d76f7f6931 ci: run the action-summary test suite in zero-action-smoke (#1053)
Motivation: scripts/action-summary.mjs is invoked by the composite
action in action.yml on every action run, and ships with a 12-test
suite in scripts/action-summary.test.mjs. Neither the action-smoke
workflow nor the main Go-focused ci.yml executed that suite, and the
action-smoke workflow's paths filters did not even include those two
script files, so a change to the helper or its tests triggered no CI
job at all.

Approach: add scripts/action-summary.mjs and
scripts/action-summary.test.mjs to both the pull_request and push
paths filters in .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml, and add a
Setup Node (actions/setup-node, node-version 24, matching the pin
already used in release-artifacts.yml) step followed by a
`node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` step in the validate
job, ahead of the existing action.yml validation steps.

Validation:
- `node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` passes locally: 12/12
  tests pass (Node v22.23.1; repo engines field requires >=18, CI pins
  24).
- Broke an assertion in a scratch copy of the test file outside the
  repo and reran `node --test`: 1 test failed and the process exited
  non-zero, confirming the new CI step actually gates on failures as
  the issue requires.
- `python3 -c "import yaml; yaml.safe_load(...)"` confirms the edited
  workflow YAML still parses.
- Confirmed .github/workflows/ci.yml has no Node step (Go-only
  pipeline), so zero-action-smoke.yml is the correct integration
  point.
- Base branch CI (upstream/main) is currently green.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1030

Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:39:40 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu 37d69c96ce ci: disable persisted checkout credentials on release workflows (#1052)
Motivation:
release-artifacts.yml's three actions/checkout steps (ordinary checkout,
workflow-dispatch requested-ref checkout, and the npm-publish job
checkout) and pr-auto-review.yml's single checkout step all leave
persist-credentials at its default, so the workflow token stays in the
job's local git config for every later step, including build/test/package
steps that never need it. ci.yml and zero-action-smoke.yml already
disable this. Neither modified file runs git push/commit/tag: the GitHub
Release publish step supplies its own explicit GH_TOKEN, and npm
publishing uses OIDC trusted publishing, so removing the persisted
credential changes no behavior.

Approach:
Add `persist-credentials: false` to each of the four checkout steps,
matching the exact convention already used in ci.yml/zero-action-smoke.yml.

Validation:
- go build ./... and go vet ./... pass.
- gofmt -l . reports nothing.
- go test ./internal/installtest/... passes.
- actionlint on both changed files reports only two pre-existing shellcheck
  warnings in release-artifacts.yml (SC2016, SC2034) that are unrelated to
  this diff and were confirmed present before the change as well (verified
  by stashing and re-running actionlint against the original files).
- A live GitHub Actions run of the release/publish workflows was not
  reproducible locally; this change only disables a default the workflows
  never rely on, so no functional change is expected.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1029

Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:39:05 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu 176f5a242b fix(oauth): force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline (#1051)
* fix(oauth): force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline

Motivation:
LoopbackListener.Close shuts the callback server down with a 1-second
context and discards the result. http.Server.Shutdown only closes idle
connections, so a client that sends a partial request header and never
finishes it counts as active; Shutdown blocks out the full deadline,
times out, and Close returns while that connection and its Serve
goroutine remain open indefinitely. This is a loopback-only (127.0.0.1),
short-lived, single-use server, so the impact is a resource leak past
the end of the flow, not a remote vulnerability or crash.

Approach:
- add a ReadHeaderTimeout to the server so a stalled request header is
  bounded on its own;
- follow a timed-out or otherwise failed Shutdown with server.Close()
  to forcibly tear down any connection still open past the deadline;
- join the Serve goroutine (via a done channel) before Close returns,
  so its completion is observable instead of left dangling.

internal/mcp/oauth.go and internal/provideroauth/openrouter.go build
their own loopback servers with the same pattern; they are left
untouched here to keep this change scoped to the file the issue's
reproduction demonstrates.

Validation:
- go build ./internal/oauth/... and go vet ./internal/oauth/...: clean.
- gofmt -l internal/oauth/: clean (make fmt-check clean repo-wide).
- go test ./internal/oauth/... -race -v -count=1: all pass, including
  three new tests (TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection,
  TestLoopbackCloseIsIdempotent,
  TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback).
- Confirmed TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection fails
  against the pre-fix loopback.go (with the new test kept) and passes
  with the fix applied.
- Full repo go build ./..., go vet ./..., and go test ./... pass.
- Could not run make lint-static (golangci-lint) locally: it needs a
  very large dependency download and the local environment ran out of
  disk space fetching it. That check is continue-on-error (advisory)
  in .github/workflows/ci.yml, not a required gate.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1028
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

* test(oauth): synchronize loopback regression tests instead of sleeping

TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection relied on a fixed
100ms sleep to let Serve accept a connection before sending a stalled
header; under load this could fail or silently skip the force-close
path it's meant to exercise. Use an http.Server.ConnState hook (via a
new unexported newLoopbackListener, set before Serve starts to avoid
a race) to wait for the real StateNew signal instead.

TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback measured
Close's elapsed time without joining its http.Get goroutine or
draining/closing the response body; join it first so the timing
starts from a connection that's actually back to idle.

Also register t.Cleanup(l.Close) in both tests so a Fatalf between
construction and the existing explicit Close doesn't leak the
listener's Serve goroutine.

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:37:58 +08:00
Anandan 9e609c5242 feat(exec): default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling (#1049)
* feat(config): report whether the tool-turn budget was explicitly set

ResolvedConfig.MaxTurns is ambiguous today: a configured 80 and the
built-in default 80 are indistinguishable, so a caller that wants a
different default cannot tell "user chose this" from "nobody set it".
FileConfig now records at each merge gate (config files, provider
command, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, CLI overrides) when a source supplies a
positive maxTurns, and Resolve surfaces it as MaxTurnsSet.

* feat(exec): default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling

The shared 80-turn default is sized for the TUI, where the user can
say "continue" and the run resumes. Headless exec has nobody to do
that, so benchmark evals truncated at 80 turns mid-implementation.
An unset budget now resolves to MaxTurnsCeiling for exec only; any
explicit source (flag, mode preset, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, config file) and
exec-profile budgets keep their precedence. The TUI default is
unchanged.

* test(cli,config): cover the headless turn-budget default

* refactor(cli): extract the headless turn-budget decision
2026-09-15 08:37:09 +08:00
Anandan 2f531178f6 feat(tui): richer /resume session browser (#1047)
* feat(tui): support an optional detail line on picker rows

Add a faint second line under picker items so richer surfaces can show
secondary metadata (project, model, size) without crowding the label.
The line renders on the selection band, joins the search haystack, and
only appears at medium width and above; detail rows halve the visible
window so the overlay keeps its height, and mouse hit-testing maps a
click on either line to the same item.

* feat(tui): show project, model, and size under /resume rows

Each session row now carries a detail line with the project directory
(~-contracted), the model that ran it, and its event count, plus a
status chip for forks and tagged sessions. The line also joins the
filter haystack, so searching by project path or model name works.
Narrow terminals keep the existing single-line list.

* feat(tui): show relative last-activity age in /resume rows

Replace the absolute timestamp column with relative age ("2h ago",
"12d ago") so recency reads at a glance; distant history still shows
the calendar date. Also adds coverage for the detail line: rendering
at wide vs narrow tiers, status chips, and filtering by model.

* refactor(tui): drop the event count from /resume detail rows

Event count is an internal metric — the detail line now carries just
project, model, and the status chip, which are the fields that
actually discriminate sessions.

* fix(tui): sanitize session metadata before it reaches picker rows

Persisted titles (--session-title, /rename) and other metadata can
legally contain newlines; a stray line would break the picker's fixed
row geometry and misalign mouse hit-testing. Reuse sanitizeCardField
for the label and detail line, and cover the detail-line click path.

* fix(tui): strip carriage returns from rendered session metadata

A \r in a persisted title or model id rewinds the cursor to column 0
and overwrites the row. Fold it into sanitizeCardField alongside the
existing newline handling, and cover it in the picker test.

* fix(tui): pad picker detail lines on the selection band

The detail line only painted its text, so the selection highlight
stopped at the end of the text instead of spanning the row like the
label line above it. Pad the remainder with the row surface.

* test(tui): cover carriage returns in sanitizeCardField

* fix(tui): drop all control runes from rendered session metadata

The picker detail line newly renders cwd, model id, and tag, and any
of them can legally carry ESC/CSI/OSC/BEL/BS/VT/NEL bytes — a project
directory name containing \x1b[2J would repaint the terminal when the
picker opens. sanitizeCardField now maps line separators and tabs to
spaces and drops every remaining control rune, matching the package's
other sanitizers; this also closes the same hole for titles, which
predates the detail line.

* fix(tui): include exactly-30-day sessions in the relative-age branch
2026-09-15 08:36:37 +08:00
Vasanth T 3b43c43eca fix(sandbox): keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from (#1040)
* fix(sandbox): keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from

FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT refuses a reparse point at the final path
component and resolves every component above it, which is right for a path
the operator named and not enough for one this package derived. The
write-root carveouts are derived: <root>/.git/hooks and <root>/.git/config
are constructed from a root, and <root>/.git is a name an unprivileged
workspace writer can create before setup runs. mklink /J needs no
privilege, so a junction there had the apply open <junction-target>/hooks,
an ordinary directory with nothing wrong about its final component, and
zero sandbox setup wrote a deny ACE on it as Administrator, outside the
workspace.

A derived entry now carries the root it came from, and the apply requires
the object it finally holds to still live under it. The check is on the
handle rather than the name: GetFinalPathNameByHandle answers where the
open object actually is, and both sides go through it so the spelling
normalizes the same way. Materialization is checked before it creates,
since os.MkdirAll follows the same reparse points.

Deliberately not a refusal of every reparse point on the path. Above the
write root the path is the operator's, who may keep a workspace under a
junction or a mapped directory; only the tail the sandbox appended is held
strict.

Closes #1024

* fix(sandbox): reject the reparse ancestor itself before materializing

The pre-create check asked where the deepest existing ancestor lives, and
a junction answers with its own path: the open does not follow a
final-component reparse point, so <root>/.git came back as <root>/.git and
matched. os.MkdirAll does follow it. What disqualifies that ancestor is
that it IS a reparse point, not where it reports living.

Found by reverting the check and watching the test still pass, which said
the guard was doing nothing rather than that the test was weak. Pinned
against the function now, because through the whole apply the create is
made and then removed on the failure path, so the filesystem afterwards
looks identical either way. The plan wiring gets its own test for the same
reason: every apply-level case here hands the group an anchor directly, so
none of them would notice the builder never setting one.

* fix(sandbox): anchor only the carveouts that are under the root, and put the DACL back

Two from review, both right.

ReadOnlySubpaths is a profile field an operator can set to any path, and one
placed outside the write root is a configuration that works today; anchoring
it unconditionally turned that into a containment refusal. Only paths
lexically under the root are anchored now, which is where the derived
carveouts are anyway, and anything else keeps the final-component guard it
always had.

The successful-apply tests left their deny ACE in place, so t.TempDir could
fail to remove the tree. Restoring the snapshot exposed the sharper half:
the ACE denied the group the test runs as, which revoked its own WRITE_DAC
and left the rollback unable to reopen the target. The tests deny a group
this process is not a member of instead, which is what a capability SID is
in production, and roll back afterwards.

* test(sandbox): check the plan anchoring on every platform, out-of-root case included

The plan builder is cross-platform and its anchor tests were in a Windows-only
file, so nothing checked the wiring on Linux or macOS. Moved beside the other
BuildWindowsACLPlan tests, with the case review raised: an out-of-root
ReadOnlySubpath stays unanchored, and an in-root one is still held to its
write root.

* test(sandbox): give the cross-platform anchor tests native paths

Moving these beside the other BuildWindowsACLPlan tests made them run on
Linux and macOS, where their Windows path literals stop meaning what they
say: pathWithinRoot is filepath.Rel underneath, a backslash is an ordinary
character off Windows, and C:\workspace\.git\hooks is then one component
that is not under C:\workspace, so every anchor came back empty. The
neighbouring tests get away with such literals because they only compare
strings they built the same way and never ask whether one contains another.

Paths are built with filepath.Join from temp roots now, so the containment
question is asked in the separator the running platform actually uses.
2026-09-15 08:35:54 +08:00
KRATOS faec8ee201 feat(acp): emit structured file changes in tool updates (#999)
* feat(tools): retain bounded structured file diffs

* feat(acp): emit structured file changes in tool updates

* fix(acp): harden structured file diff transport

* fix(tools): reject unsafe rich diff previews

* fix(acp): preserve safe rich diff semantics

* fix(tools): bind structured diffs to committed changes

* fix(acp): preserve structured diff identity

* fix(tools): close rich diff race gaps

* fix(tools): report partial patch paths from workspace

* fix(tools): finalize structured diff evidence

* fix(tools): separate unverified patch writes

* test(tools): cover failed formatter recovery

* fix(acp): serialize file deletions as nullable diffs

* fix(tools): recreate files after formatter failure

* test(acp): require nullable diff fields on wire
2026-09-15 08:31:39 +08:00
Vasanthdev2004 7dfdbcb686 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into HEAD 2026-09-13 20:01:17 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f1ff15eb94 fix(sandbox): give the suspended child an owner that outlives a killed helper
Creating the child suspended is what makes the launch report trustworthy: the
fact is published before the child can execute, so an absent report means
nothing ran. It also creates a state the helper's ordinary unwind does not
cover. Between CreateProcessAsUser and ResumeThread the child exists, holds the
inherited stdin/stdout/stderr handles, and can run nothing.

Hook and plugin commands reach the helper through Engine.CommandContext, which
uses the default exec.CommandContext cancellation, so a timeout or a cancel
kills the helper outright. It never reaches terminateSuspendedWindowsChild, its
defers, or the resume. Windows does not terminate a child because its parent
died, so the suspended process survives holding the pipe write ends and a
parent still reading them waits on a process that will never write and never
exit.

The helper now joins a job object with JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE
before any child can exist, so every child created afterwards inherits
membership at creation and there is no window where one is alive and unowned.
Terminating the helper closes the last handle and the kernel does the killing,
which is the only mechanism that survives the helper being killed rather than
unwound. A failure to create the job is not fatal: it costs the guarantee, not
the sandbox.

Deliberately not fixed with exec.Cmd.WaitDelay in the parent. That releases the
caller while the orphan keeps running and keeps the pipes, trading a visible
hang for an invisible leak; it is a reasonable backstop, not the fix.

The regression drives the real kernel: join the job, create a suspended child,
close the last handle the way a terminated helper would, and require the child
to be gone. With a plain job instead, the child outlives it.

Reported by @jatmn.
2026-09-13 20:01:10 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 eb3bbb2f12 fix(sandbox): drop the Windows denyRead trade notice now that denyRead is refused
Since #1006 a Windows profile with denyRead is rejected before setup or token creation on both restricted-token tiers, so there is no run left for the notice to describe. Keeping it meant a plan could carry a note saying reads are denied and writes unconfined while the runner refused to start that plan at all: two statements about one fact, disagreeing.

Removed: windowsDenyReadWarnings and its host indirection, denyReadDiagnosticWarnings and the append into the execution request warnings, the plan-notes append in the command-plan funnel, and the two predicates that only served it (windowsRestrictedTokenWillRun, willBuildWindowsRestrictedToken). The three test files that pinned the producer go with it.

CommandPlan.Notes now has no producer in the tree. The channel from plan notes into Enforcement.Notices stays, since it is what hooks, plugins and MCP read, and the end-to-end pin that reached it through the real producer is replaced by a fixture-plan test so deleting that one line still fails somewhere. The comment in loop.go that justified skipping the rebudget on the strength of that one producer now says so.

Closes the last part of #869, which #1006 settled by refusal.
2026-09-12 10:35:51 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 9e09d0a7e6 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/windows-restricted-sid-invariant 2026-09-12 10:15:56 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f984082c82 test(sandbox): pin the retraction, and the fallback when it cannot be written
The unwind test asserted the report was removed on a resume failure, which
is the contract this branch just replaced: absence is what a normal cleanup
leaves too, so it does not revoke a launch a live reader already saw. It
now asserts an explicit false, with a companion for the case where the
retraction write itself fails and the file is discarded after all.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 33f62e7f94 fix(sandbox,execution): let a failed resume revoke the launch it published
The report is published before ResumeThread, so the fact is readable while
the child has executed nothing. A live poll landing in that window latched
it, and the latch outlived the file: the terminal read finds the report
cleaned away and restores what was observed, so a child that never became
runnable was reported as launched and its write-jail trade disclosed as if
it had been made.

Deleting the report on that path cannot fix it, because deletion is also
what a normal cleanup does and the restore exists for exactly that. The
helper now retracts with an explicit false, which is the one answer that
outranks a latch, and the manager repeats the observation while the command
runs instead of caching it. Silence still changes nothing, so a genuine
launch still survives its own cleanup.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 8535e4a6b1 fix(sandbox): unwind the launch report when the suspended child cannot resume
The report is published before ResumeThread so the inherited-pipe race is
closed, and that ordering stays. But a failure between the publish and the
resume reaped a process that had executed nothing while leaving a report on disk
saying a child launched. AppliedEnforcementNotices gates on that report and
ResolveChildLaunched treats it as authoritative, so the operator would have been
told a write-jail trade applied to a child that never became runnable.

The comment above the publish already claimed the stronger invariant, that every
failure between creation and resume leaves "no child launched" true for the
parent. The code held it only for failures before the write.

publishThenResume now owns the sequence: the published flag it returns is true
only when the child actually resumed, so a resume failure hands the deferred
close a false and the report is removed. The docstring on the terminate helper
now distinguishes the pre-publish path, where nothing was written, from the
post-publish pre-resume path, where the record has to be taken back.

Reported by jatmn.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 6bce7d3883 fix(agent,hooks): give afterTool the same typed-notice contract as beforeTool
beforeTool was moved onto the typed EnforcementNotices slice and afterTool was
left folding its notices into the prose feedback, so the same fact had two
writers on the normal tool tail: the typed slice, which every surface composes
through ModelOutput and HumanDisplay, and the hook feedback block appended to the
body. Both carry the identical fixed deny_read string, so a hook running under
the same token shape as the tool it follows made the model see the disclosure
twice, and a bash or exec card show it in the amber furniture and again in the
body. Neither half existed on the merge base; this branch introduced both.

hookMessage now returns the hook's own stdout or stderr and nothing else.
dispatchAfterTool returns its notices alongside that output, and the loop merges
them into the result through the same finalization beforeTool uses, with the same
order and dedupe. A veto's Reason still carries its notice inline, because that
field is prose that reaches a person on its own.

Ordinary afterTool validator output is untouched: a formatter diff or vet warning
still arrives as feedback in the body, which is what an afterTool hook asked for.
A silent hook that exists only to disclose a token trade now reaches the typed
slice instead of becoming model input.

The hooks tests that asserted the disclosure through hookMessage now assert it on
Notices and additionally that it does NOT ride along in Messages, so the property
they protected is unchanged and its carrier moved with it.

Reported by jatmn.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 3b7c741480 fix(agent): keep a beforeTool enforcement notice typed through the result
A successful beforeTool hook's disclosure was folded into result.Output as hook
prose. That reached the provider, which reads the output, and reached nothing
else.

Every interactive surface builds its enforcement furniture from the typed
EnforcementNotices slice, and for an edit or a write the card renders
Display.Preview instead of Output. So on exactly the results where something was
written, the operator saw the diff and no disclosure at all, collapsed and
expanded, and the session payload persisted that same omission for the restored
card. The model was told the token had been weakened and the person was not.

The notice now merges into the typed slice at one finalization point that the
normal path, the hook veto and the retry denial all return through, so no return
path can reopen the loss. Ordering is the hook's disclosures ahead of the tool's
own, exact repeats dropped, so a surface rendering the slice shows each one once.
Nothing is written into Output as well: decoration has one owner per surface, or
the disclosure appears twice. ModelOutput, HumanDisplay, the card renderer and
session serialization keep the ownership they already had.

Hook notices are third-party text on a path that bypasses the registry's
redaction boundary, so the merge scrubs them the way appendHookFeedback did while
they travelled as prose, and reports it so Redacted stays accurate.

The joiner that folded notices in with afterTool feedback is gone with its last
caller. afterTool output was never enforcement data and still arrives as prose.

Reported by jatmn.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b11a8a6231 test(sandbox): fail the deny_read disclosure tests when the producer disappears
Three positive-path tests skipped when the manager came back with an unwrapped
plan. Nothing about those fixtures is an environment prerequisite: they pin GOOS,
an available native backend, command wrapping and an explicit executable, so an
unwrapped result is not a machine that cannot run the test, it is the producer
whose disclosure they exist to check having gone away. CI would have reported all
of the deny_read disclosure coverage passing after the real route disappeared,
and the hand-built predicate tests would have stayed green with it because they
start from CommandPlan{Wrapped: true}.

They now fail through one shared assertion that names the wrapping state, the
target backend and the enforcement level.

The fixtures were also still reading the real machine in one place.
windowsSandboxInitialized stats the per-host setup marker and BuildCommandPlan
consults it, so a box where `zero sandbox setup` has run resolved these requests
at native enforcement while every CI runner got unelevated. The plan came out
wrapped either way, which is why nothing failed, but the level being asserted
against was whichever machine ran it. Both fixtures now pin it.

Reported by jatmn.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 105e955fa6 test(mcp): pin the StartupNotices launch gate at the carrier
The gate is redundant today: every route that reaches StartupNotices has already
settled the decision positive through the handshake confirmation, so removing it
left every test passing. Unfalsifiable code is a stop signal, so it is pinned
directly rather than left as an unchecked claim.

It stays because the redundancy is on the safe side. An edit that moves or loses
the confirmation makes this return nothing rather than announce a confinement on
the strength of the helper having started.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 67de11f0ad fix(mcp): gate the success-path disclosure on the launch decision too
connectAndList reads client.StartupNotices() on the success path and hands the
result straight to the disclosure sources, with no launch check anywhere in
between. For a wrapped plan those notices were recorded because cmd.Start
returned, which is the HELPER starting: the one thing the report exists because
it does not prove. The answer happened to be right, since a completed handshake
does imply the child ran, but by coincidence rather than by rule, while the
failure path beside it was already asking the adapter.

Found by falsifying: dropping the handshake confirmation left every test passing,
because the success disclosure never consulted the decision at all.

StartupNotices now goes through the same decision as the sink and the error, so
one rule covers all three carriers.

The ordering test also asserts the failure disclosure travels through the ERROR,
not only the sink. Registration merges the two, so a sink-only assertion passed
while the decision was taken before the adapter settled and the failure the
operator reads carried nothing.

ChildLaunchTracker gets its own tests, because the rule that a negative read is
not remembered is invisible through the MCP paths: they each ask once, at a point
where the answer is already terminal. Pinned where the rule lives instead.
2026-09-09 11:25:07 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2f8dc76666 fix(execution,mcp,sandbox): settle the launch decision before caching a no
The cross-process launch report has three states, not two: not settled yet,
settled with no child, and child created. An absent file, the empty file the
adapter opens before launching, a half-written one and a decode error are all the
first state. Collapsing them to "no child" is a claim about a process that may be
running at that instant, and every consumer was making that collapse on its own
and compensating for the timing separately, which is why fixing one presentation
site kept exposing the next.

Three changes, one contract.

The Windows helper now creates the sandboxed child with CREATE_SUSPENDED and
resumes it only after the report is published. The child inherits the MCP pipes,
so created runnable it could answer initialize, emit a malformed response or close
stdout before the helper was next scheduled, and a parent reading the report then
saw the empty file and cached "no child" about a server already running
unconfined. It also closes the second manifestation: publishing could fail AFTER a
runnable child had begun making external changes, and reaping it afterwards does
not undo the work it did. A suspended child has executed nothing, so every failure
between creation and resume terminates a process that never ran and the missing
report is then true.

ChildLaunchTracker is the settlement rule, at the adapter boundary where every
consumer can share it. It caches a launch and never an absence: a negative read
stays provisional until the answer is terminal. Two things make it terminal.
Confirm, when the consumer observed the child itself, and Settle, when the adapter
process has exited. Settle runs from Cleanup, before the report file is deleted,
so reading the evidence and destroying it are one step rather than a race the
consumer has to win.

The MCP client uses both. A successful initialize response is Confirm: the adapter
speaks no MCP and the child is created suspended, so a well-formed response can
only have come from the requested server. On the failing exit the decision now
comes after Close instead of before it, because Close waits out the adapter and
cleanup settles with the report still on disk. Asking first asked an adapter that
may be between creating the child and recording it, and the connect timeout ends
the attempt exactly there.

The existing fixture writes the finished report during PrepareExecution, before
the helper command starts, so every ordering above is over before the parent
looks. The new tests drive a real helper process that publishes at a controlled
point: after answering the handshake, after failing it, and not at all.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 886567fe19 docs(agent): record why the notice delivery path needs no rebudget 2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b16971f5c3 fix(mcp): gate the initialization-error disclosure on the confirmed child
For an adapter-owned launch, cmd.Start proves only that the sandbox helper
started. It can then fail setup-marker validation, ACL application, network
validation, token construction, or CreateProcessAsUser without ever creating
the requested MCP server. The launch sink made that distinction; the
initialize-error path did not, and carried the planned notices out
unconditionally. The operator was told a server had run without write
confinement when no server had run at all.

The adapter-gated path was also dead on that same route. client.Close runs the
plan cleanup, which deletes the report file, and it ran before
publishAdapterLaunch read it, so a wrapped server that really did launch and
then failed its handshake published nothing either. Two competing definitions
of applied enforcement, and both were wrong in opposite directions.

connectStdio now resolves the launch fact once, through
execution.ResolveChildLaunched, memoized, and reads it before Close so the
evidence still exists. The sink and the error carrier consume that one answer.
The success path is unchanged: a completed handshake is independent proof the
child existed, and gating it on a mis-written report would suppress a true
disclosure. Direct stdio and bwrap are unaffected, since an unwrapped plan
resolves as launched exactly as before.

Regressions drive RegisterTools with no ClientFactory, so the real connectStdio
runs, and with a preparer whose cleanup deletes the report the way the Windows
plan does. A helper reporting no child, and one that wrote no report at all,
disclose nothing while still being recorded as skipped; a helper that reports
the child discloses exactly once.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 03ee13e480 fix(execution): observe the adapter's launch while the process is still running
The Windows helper publishes childLaunched immediately after
CreateProcessAsUser creates the restricted child, and only then waits for it.
ProcessManager read that report exclusively in the post-Wait goroutine, so for
the entire live lifetime of a retained wrapped session the report was the zero
value. The first exec_command reply and every write_stdin poll resolved
Launched=false and disclosed nothing, while the fact sat readable on disk. A
watcher, or a retained session nobody polls to completion, would never be told
the write jail had been traded away.

The launch fact is a monotonic lifecycle transition, not terminal process data.
managedProcess now observes it once, latches it, and hands it out on live
results as well as the terminal one. markDone will not overwrite a latched
launch with a terminal read, because the plan's cleanup has already removed the
report file by then on some orderings.

Only the positive is promoted. An absent, partial, or undecodable report, and a
helper that failed before it created the child, all leave the live result
exactly as before: not confirmed, nothing disclosed. Latching false or
surfacing a read error from the live read would let a mid-flight poll rewrite a
running command into a setup failure. Direct commands and bwrap are untouched:
the read is gated on the plan being adapter-owned, so an unwrapped plan does no
extra work.

Regressions drive the real ProcessManager with a real child that publishes the
way the helper does and then stays alive: a live start and a live poll both
disclose, a helper that reported no child stays silent, and a report published
mid-flight is observed on the next poll.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b69ff6733d docs(hooks): state the property the notice accumulation actually holds 2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 4ccdab8f08 fix(agent,hooks): deliver only the beforeTool enforcement notice, on every exit
Delivering DispatchOutcome.Messages for a successful beforeTool hook fixed the
silent disclosure and overshot. hookMessage builds that slice by folding the
enforcement notice together with the hook's ordinary stdout, or stderr when
stdout is empty, because afterTool validators want both. So every successful
hook's routine logging, large diagnostics, and whatever text the hook happened
to process became a standing input channel into the next model request. main is
silent for a successful hook.

DispatchOutcome now carries Notices separately: only the disclosures, one entry
per notice, accumulated across every hook that ran. Messages keeps its old
meaning and its old consumer.

The notices are also accumulated BEFORE the veto short-circuit, because they
describe something that already happened. Dispatch stops at the first veto, so
a hook that ran under the weakened token ahead of the vetoing one used to leave
its disclosure in the audit record and nowhere else. Two exits after the hook
runs now share one finalization helper with the normal tail: the veto result,
and a denied, cancelled or ungrantable unsandboxed retry. The blocking hook's
own notices are already inside its reason, so they are not repeated.

The regression that expected `go version` stdout to reach the provider was
locking in the wrong behaviour and is replaced. One hook run now emits both a
notice and ordinary output, and the test asserts the notice arrives exactly
once while the output stays silent, driven through Run and asserted on what the
provider received. A second test covers the veto path. Falsified by delivering
Messages again, by returning the veto result without the notices, and by
dropping the accumulation ahead of the veto.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 600bbc4c44 fix(agent): drop the deprecated runtime.GOROOT fallback from the hook regression
Smoke (windows-latest) failed lint on cc85f2ee: SA1019, runtime.GOROOT has been
deprecated since Go 1.24. The fallback was copied from an older test and was
never needed here, since the test cannot run without a go binary anyway. Skipping
when one is not on PATH is the honest answer.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b8d344d48c fix(agent): deliver a successful beforeTool hook's output to the model
executeToolCall inspected the beforeTool DispatchOutcome only when Blocked was
true, so a hook that ran fine and produced output put it in the audit record and
on no surface anyone could see. A beforeTool process that ran under the weakened
DenyRead token said so to nobody; only vetoes and afterTool feedback reached the
model.

Its messages now ride out on the tool result, the same delivery afterTool
feedback already uses, ahead of that feedback and without displacing it. Blank
messages contribute nothing, so a run with no hook output stays silent rather
than appending an empty header, and veto behaviour is untouched.

The regression drives the real Run loop with a real hook process and asserts on
what the provider received on the next turn; dropping the capture fails it on
that assertion. A unit test on the joining helper passed with the capture
removed, so it could not have caught this.

sessionStart and sessionEnd still discard their outcomes. Routing those needs a
delivery surface that does not exist in agent.Options today, and choosing one is
a product decision rather than a mechanical fix, so it is raised on the PR
instead of invented here.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2176c98271 fix(cli): give the late MCP disclosure and startup output one owner of stderr
Joining the pump at stop bounded writes to the pump's lifetime but said nothing
about the overlap. Headless and interactive startup keep writing plugin, trust,
peer, provider, trace and validation output to the same caller-supplied writer
for the whole time the pump is live, and Run accepts an arbitrary io.Writer: a
plain bytes.Buffer corrupts under concurrent use, and even a concurrency-safe
terminal writer interleaves logical lines. A mutex private to the pump could not
fix that, because the foreground writes do not go through it.

reportMCPStartupDisclosures now returns a guarded view of the caller's writer
alongside stop, and both startup paths adopt it for the rest of startup, so the
pump and the foreground path take the same lock. Machine-readable stdout is
untouched and the stop-before-TUI boundary is unchanged.

The regression is deterministic rather than hopeful: a writer that parks inside
Write holds the foreground message there while the late launch resolves and the
pump tries to print, and it counts concurrent entries. Removing the lock from the
guarded writer fails it on that count; the test also asserts stop drains the
final notice exactly once and that the foreground message is not lost.
2026-09-09 11:25:06 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 0ae48e400d fix(execution,sandbox,mcp,tools): one launch fact, applied by every launcher
The adapter-owned child-launch contract was interpreted only by
Runner.ExecuteCaptured. bash, exec_command/ProcessManager and durable stdio MCP
each copied a subset of the prepared state and decided launch independently, so
the same false disclosure survived in every path the earlier fix did not touch:
a Windows helper that starts and then fails during marker, ACL, network, SID,
token or CreateProcessAsUser setup still promoted the planned DenyRead notice
even though no restricted child ever existed.

ResolveChildLaunched is now the single answer: the adapter's report wins in both
directions, an adapter that owns the fact and stays silent means not launched,
and anything else keeps the caller's own observation, which is correct for a
direct command and for bwrap. The captured runner, bash, and the exec_command
conversion all call it. ProcessManager carries the ownership bit into
ProcessResult so the retained write_stdin shape has it too, where the helper can
be returned before it has even attempted the inner launch. connectStdio keeps
prepared.Report and the ownership bit and no longer publishes at cmd.Start for a
wrapped plan; it publishes once the adapter confirms, on both ways the attempt
can end, which is also where an attempt abandoned at the connect timeout lands.

Separately, the helper no longer drops ownership of a child it created. The
report file is claimed BEFORE CreateProcessAsUser, so a failure to obtain the
side channel happens while there is still nothing to own, and a failure to
publish afterwards terminates and reaps the child instead of returning while it
runs with nobody waiting on it and the parent free to start a second one. A
report that was never published is removed, so a truncated file cannot be read
back as a launch.

The regression drives the production conversion rather than the shared helper:
asserting the launch again fails it on three property assertions naming the
notice it wrongly disclosed.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 47d6ab7015 fix(execution,sandbox): confirm the restricted child launched, not the Windows helper
For a Windows restricted-token plan the command the runner starts is the sandbox
helper, not the requested executable, so exec.Cmd.Process becomes non-nil as soon
as the ordinary helper process starts. Setup-marker validation, unelevated ACL
application, network-policy validation, capability and offline SID construction,
restricted-token creation and CreateProcessAsUser all happen inside that helper
and can each return without creating the requested process. On those paths
AppliedEnforcementNotices still reported that reads were denied as requested,
when the only thing that ran was the unsandboxed adapter.

The fact belongs to whoever sees the transition. AdapterReport gains
ChildLaunched, which the helper writes to the adapter-owned report file at the
moment CreateProcessAsUser succeeds, and the runner believes over its own
observation. A plan whose adapter owns the fact is marked, and silence from that
adapter now means not launched rather than falling back to the wrapper's start,
so a missing report cannot be read as proof that enforcement applied. The mark is
per adapter, not plan.Wrapped: a bwrap plan is wrapped too and reports only
denials, and treating its silence as "no child" would drop the disclosure from
every successful Linux sandbox run.

Direct, unwrapped commands are unchanged, since the process the runner starts is
the requested one. The report file is created with O_EXCL under the per-user temp
directory, so a name another local user pre-created makes the helper fail rather
than supply the fact the parent reads back.

The regression drives both sides: a helper that runs and never creates the child
discloses nothing, an adapter that owns the fact and says nothing discloses
nothing, a restricted child that starts and then exits non-zero discloses exactly
once, and a direct command keeps its own observation. Ignoring the reported fact,
or removing the fail-closed branch, fails it on the notice it wrongly disclosed.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 591874f1f8 fix(mcp,cli): hand late launch disclosures to the output owner, not a retained callback
ReportStartupDisclosures took the CLI's presentation function and invoked it
from whichever goroutine resolved the launch. For a server still inside
cmd.Start when registration gave up, that is the abandoned connect goroutine,
so the write to stderr happened off the output owner's goroutine and could
arrive after runExec had returned or after Bubble Tea had taken the alt screen.
The regression added with it demonstrated the bug rather than catching it: it
raced bytes.Buffer.String under -race.

The runtime owns the fact that a process started; it does not own anyone's
writer. StartupDisclosureStream carries the disclosures as typed events and the
caller drains them on the goroutine that owns stderr: the set known at
registration is printed before the reporter returns, keeping server order, and
later arrivals are printed by a single pump. The returned stop ends delivery,
joins the pump and flushes what is queued, so no write outlives the caller's
ownership. A disclosure arriving after stop is dropped, which is the defined
answer to what close does with pending delivery.

Headless defers stop so it runs before the runtime is closed. The interactive
path calls it on the line before deps.runTUI, so a launch resolving later is
dropped instead of writing raw text over the alt screen. Runtime.Close also
ends delivery, so a launch that resolves after the runtime is gone has nowhere
defined to land.

Removing the join reintroduces the original data race; removing the close lets
a post-stop launch write to the abandoned writer, failing the new regression on
the bytes it wrote.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b619016f08 fix(mcp,tui): deliver the launch fact once, and persist one payload shape
Two findings, one contract: a fact that outlives the consumer that first
looked for it.

The retained launch sink stopped a late cmd.Start from being lost, but a value
nobody re-reads is still a lost disclosure. Both production reporters sampled
StartupDisclosures once, right after RegisterTools returned, and a stdio
attempt abandoned at the connect timeout could still be inside Start at that
moment. The process then ran under the reduced write confinement, the reaper
closed its client, and the operator saw the skipped-server warning and never
the disclosure. The previous regression masked this by polling
StartupDisclosures by hand after release rather than exercising a reporter.

The sink is now an event as well as a value. Runtime.ReportStartupDisclosures
reports servers whose notices were known at commit immediately, in server
order, and subscribes every other server's sink; a subscriber whose launch has
already happened runs before subscribe returns, otherwise it runs from
publishLaunch, and either way exactly once. Servers that never start never
publish, so prepare, pipe and Start failures stay silent, and network servers
contribute nothing. reportMCPStartupDisclosures uses the push form and keeps
the pull form for a runtime that lacks it. The new test drives the REAL
reporter against a REAL runtime: reporting before release prints nothing,
release prints the notice exactly once. Reverting the reporter to pull-only
fails it with "disclosed 0 time(s), want exactly 1".

The headless session writers built their own payload with decorated output
only, while the TUI writer stored typed notices and an undecorated body. Both
append to the same store the TUI resumes from, so a CLI-written long collapsed
result restored into the TUI had no body to carry the decorated text and no
notice furniture to draw it: the disclosure the run had shown was gone.
tui.ToolResultSessionPayload is now the one owner and the CLI delegates to it;
the one field the CLI had added on its own, truncated, moves into the shared
shape so it is not lost. A tui test restores the CLI's exact bytes into a
collapsed card and asserts the notice exactly once; a cli test asserts the
delegation, since reverting it leaves the tui test green and fails the cli one
on the notice, the body and the truncated flag.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 60a1452eeb fix(mcp): keep the launch fact alive past the registration bound
The settle grace is only another timeout. When it expires, registration reaps
the abandoned attempt in the background and returns, but the process can still
be inside cmd.Start at that moment. It then starts under the reduced write
confinement, publishes to its sink, and nobody is left who can say so: the
reaper closes the late client, and Runtime had already frozen its disclosures
into a snapshot taken during the serial commit. Startup reported such a server
only as skipped.

Registration is bounded and a launch is not, so the two cannot share a
lifetime. The sink already carries the authoritative fact and outlives the
attempt; Runtime now retains it per server and StartupDisclosures reads through
it instead of copying out of it. A server whose notices were known at commit
never re-reads its sink, and entries stay in server order, so repeated reads
cannot duplicate or reorder anything.

Nothing else moves: pre-launch failures still publish nothing and stay silent,
network servers still launch no process, and the reaper still closes the late
client.

The existing regression releases its launch at 120ms, deliberately inside the
250ms grace, so it only proved the grace covered that interval. The new test
releases strictly after the bound, asserts the disclosure was legitimately
absent beforehand, and asserts a second read does not duplicate it. Reverting
StartupDisclosures to the snapshot fails the new test and leaves the in-grace
one passing, which is the point: the old shape could not see this.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 98fdb3e8e5 fix(tui): let the typed notice own the card's disclosure
The enforcement disclosure reached the card in two forms: typed
EnforcementNotices, which the card renders as its own furniture, and
ModelOutput, which has the notice composed into the text. toolResultDetail
returned the undecorated Display.Preview when one existed and fell back to the
decorated ModelOutput when one did not, so every result without a preview drew
the warning twice: once in the notice lines and once at the top of the body.

That is every bash and exec card and every error card. The existing regression
used a rich-preview edit result, which selects the one representation that
masks the path.

Give the body one owner. toolResultDetail now returns the base text, and the
card decorates once. agent.ToolResult gains BaseModelOutput and BaseDisplay
mirroring tools.Result, so a surface that renders the typed notice has a
canonical accessor to build from rather than re-deriving it, and ModelOutput
and HumanDisplay are expressed in terms of them so the base is computed once.

The durable path had the same mismatch: the payload stores the decorated output
beside the typed notices, and restoration used that output as the body whenever
no distinct preview was stored. The undecorated body is now always written when
it differs, and restoration keys on the field being PRESENT rather than
non-empty, because a command that printed nothing under an enforced profile has
an empty body and a real notice.

Tests cover live and restored, success and error, and assert that the notice
and the underlying output each appear exactly once. Reverting toolResultDetail
alone fails all of them.
2026-09-09 11:25:05 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 fc06cc6aaa fix(mcp): synchronize the timeout with a start that is still completing
connectStdio publishes only once cmd.Start has returned, and the timeout branch
sampled the sink the instant it fired. Those interleave: the sample reads
empty, the result commits with no notice, and the background reaper closes the
late client without being able to amend a commit that has already happened. A
process that started under reduced write confinement is then never represented
in StartupDisclosures.

Wait briefly for the abandoned attempt to say whether it had started, before
concluding it had not. cancel() has already fired, so an attempt that never
reached Start fails fast and the grace costs nothing; only one that did start
can still be inside Start, and it publishes on the way out. A test asserts that
the never-started case is not delayed, so the grace cannot quietly become a
startup cost.

The window itself is microseconds wide and cannot be hit from a test seam: an
attempt to widen it with a slow second server failed, because every per-server
goroutine returns at its own timeout and nothing holds wg.Wait open. So the
tests drive the contract instead, a start that lands after the timeout but
inside the grace, which is the case the synchronization exists to catch.

The serial phase also re-reads the sink for an index whose result carried no
notices, as a second net that costs nothing.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b44d56f2b2 fix(tools): carry bash's real launch state into the shared outcome
execExecutionOutcome is shared between exec_command and bash, and it set
Launched unconditionally. That is true for exec_command, where a start failure
returns an errorResult before an execution outcome is ever built, and it is not
true for bash, which hands EVERY Run error to the same conversion: a missing
executable and a context cancelled before os.StartProcess both arrive here with
a prepared plan and no child.

So a bash command that never created a process reported the DenyRead token
trade as applied. Measured before the fix: Launched=true, ChildLaunched()=true,
and one applied enforcement notice for a command that did not exist.

Observe it where it is known instead. exec.Cmd sets Process only once
os.StartProcess has succeeded, so bash captures that at the Run boundary and
threads it through withBashExecution; exec_command sets it true at its own call
site, with the reason written down rather than assumed.

The regressions drive the real tool rather than constructing an outcome, since
the bug was exactly that the constructed shape and the real one disagreed.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 6bf5a86b7f fix(mcp): keep the launch disclosure when registration times out
A stdio server that started and then hung in initialize or tools/list was
abandoned at the connect timeout and recorded as skipped, with nothing said
about the confinement its process ran under. The notices left connectStdio
only on the returned client or the returned error, and an abandoned attempt
produces neither before the serial commit phase is over. The reaper that
collects it later runs after that phase, so it cannot contribute without
breaking the deterministic ordering the phase exists to provide.

Publish the launch fact at Start instead, on a sink carried in the context, and
read it in the timeout branch. Launch and connection usability are separate
facts with separate lifetimes, which is the distinction that was missing.

Carried on the context rather than in the factory signature so an injected or
third-party factory that knows nothing about it still works and simply
discloses nothing.

A timeout before Start stays silent, since the sink is only ever published to
after Start returns. That placement is load-bearing, so it is pinned by a test
that drives the real connectStdio with an executable that cannot start: moving
the call one line up leaves the registry-level tests green while every failed
launch begins claiming the trade.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 e2ac98b906 test(sandbox): fail when the current-user SID prerequisite cannot be read
currentUserSIDForTest swallowed the GetTokenUser error and returned empty,
and its one caller guarded on the result being non-empty. On a machine where
the call fails, the assertion ran against nothing and the test reported a
pass.

The check exists to catch the restricted token keying itself to the very SID
it has to be stricter than, which is the whole point of the shape, so failing
to read the prerequisite is a failure rather than a silent skip. Confirmed
both directions with a simulated unreadable SID: the old shape passes, this
one fails naming what it could not read.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b60359e2d6 fix(tools): measure the model output the enforcement notices are part of
The notices are prepended to the model view on the way out, so a disclosed
result costs more context than result.Output alone. The outcome diagnostics
measured the bare output, which undercounts every disclosed call, and the
undercount scales with the notice rather than being fixed slack. A short
command output measures 13 bytes against the 114 the model is handed.

Measure the canonical text instead. ModelView stays the bare output on
purpose: ModelOutput prepends the notices itself, so storing them here would
send them twice, and a test pins that too.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f889b7e3b3 fix(tui): show the enforcement disclosure in cards and after resume
The notice was prepended to ModelOutput, which toolResultRowText carries into
row.text, and toolCardHead is handed row.text. But the head renders the action
and the target, so the notice went nowhere. Every result with a rich preview,
which is every edit and write card, rendered with no disclosure at all,
collapsed or expanded.

Resume lost it too. The session payload carried the notice only inside the
"output" string, and the restored card is rebuilt from displayPreview, which
never had it.

Carry the notices as their own field on the row, persist and restore them
alongside changedFiles, and render them above the body on all three card
paths. Shown collapsed as well as expanded: a trade the operator has to expand
a card to discover has not been disclosed.

Kept out of row.detail deliberately. That field is parsed as a diff by the
files panel and rendered line by line by the file view, so prefixing it with
the notice would have been the shorter fix and would have corrupted both. A
test pins the diff stats against exactly that.

The render cache keys on the notices for the same reason. It distinguished
them already, but only through row.text, and that incidental coupling is what
hid the notice from the card to begin with.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 e0e8db306e fix(sandbox): gate the DenyRead diagnostic on the resolved plan
BackendPlan derived the DenyRead warning from request.Backend and the
requested profile. request.Backend is always the AVAILABLE backend, so on a
Windows host it stays the restricted-token backend with NativeIsolation set
even when the resolution disables sandboxing outright.

With deny_read configured and --sandbox forbid, the plan resolves to
enforcement disabled and target none, builds no token and enforces no read
rule, and `zero sandbox policy` still reported that the write jail had been
traded for read denial. The reassuring half was the false one: it claimed
reads were denied as requested on a run that denies nothing.

The execution path already keyed this on the resolved plan through
windowsRestrictedTokenWillRun. Split the request-side half of that predicate
into willBuildWindowsRestrictedToken and reuse it for the diagnostic, so both
describe the plan that will run rather than the backend that happens to be
installed.

plan.Wrapped stays with the execution caller rather than moving into the
shared predicate. It is the produced execution state and the request cannot
speak for it, so folding it in would buy symmetry by handing the execution
path back a bug the request-side checks alone cannot catch. A test pins that
split.
2026-09-09 11:25:04 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f62ae776c9 fix(tools): derive command notices from applied execution state, not the plan
addSandboxMeta writes the plan's notices at plan time, before anything runs, and
finalizeToolOutcome promoted them into the user-visible disclosure
unconditionally. That claims a token trade for a command that may never have
started, which is the same substitution the hooks and plugins paths already
stopped making.

The promotion now comes from the execution outcome when there is one, so it
follows the recorded launch state and the planned notices together. The plan
metadata is untouched and stays as diagnostics, since what was intended is still
worth having in the record, and a tool with no execution outcome still promotes
from metadata rather than silently losing its disclosure.

execExecutionOutcome states that its outcomes describe a started process rather
than leaving it to be inferred: a command that could not be started returns an
error result before reaching it.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 427df5fdb9 fix(mcp): carry the launch disclosure through an initialize failure
connectStdio records the notices once cmd.Start returns, which is the right
moment, but the initialize failure path closes and discards the client. The
client was the only carrier, so a server that started, did filesystem work and
then failed its handshake told the operator it was unavailable and never that it
had already run without the write jail.

A launched process is a fact about the past: once Start has succeeded the
disclosure is true whatever the handshake does next. The failure now carries it
out, and registration recovers it from the error, so the fact no longer dies
with the connection it was attached to. A connect that never launched still
discloses nothing.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 22c9194bce fix(execution): record launch state instead of inferring it from the outcome kind
OutcomeKind is not a launch-state field, and reading it as one was wrong in both
directions. The adapter report is read AFTER Run, so a child that really ran and
then produced an unreadable report is rewritten to a setup failure and the
disclosure was dropped although it applied. And a context already cancelled
before os.StartProcess still selects a cancellation, so the disclosure was
claimed for a process that never existed.

ExecuteCaptured now records whether an OS process was created, taken from the
only thing that knows: exec.Cmd sets Process only once os.StartProcess has
succeeded. That is false for a missing executable and for a context cancelled
before Start, and true for anything that ran, including a later timeout or
cancellation. Report decoding can now fail after launch without rewriting the
historical launch fact.

The plugins test that asserted the kind decides was encoding the defect, so it
now expresses the recorded-fact contract instead, including the two shapes the
kind gets wrong.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 85526b4978 fix(cli): report MCP startup disclosures from headless exec
`zero exec` registers workspace MCP servers through the same sandbox-backed
runner interactive startup uses, so a stdio server here can launch under the
weakened token and serve the whole run. Only the TUI reported the disclosure, so
every text, JSON, stream-JSON and --list-tools caller was told nothing about the
enforcement trade for a process that was already running.

Reported immediately after registration, before --list-tools and before the
first result, since both return early. On stderr, which is where the
skipped-server and trust notices already go, so stdout framing is untouched; the
regression asserts the JSON and stream-JSON output still parses.

The test isolates HOME, APPDATA, LOCALAPPDATA and the XDG roots. Without that it
builds a sandbox engine against the real config dir, triggers the one-time grant
migration there, and the notice surfaces on a later test's stderr, failing
whichever test happens to assert an empty one. That moves between runs and reads
as flakiness rather than as contamination.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 1ee7aa762a fix(mcp): collect startup disclosures in the serial phase, and keep them past a failed start
Two defects in the disclosure collection, both found by jatmn.

The append ran inside the per-server goroutine, so it raced the shared slice
header: entries could be lost or overwritten, and whichever survived were
ordered by completion time rather than by server. The comment directly above
promises that the concurrent phase touches no shared state and that the serial
phase is therefore deterministic, and this broke both halves of it. The notices
now travel on the indexed connectResult and are committed in the serial loop, in
server order. Reproduced with 32 simultaneous servers under -race before the fix.

The disclosure was also reachable only through the client, so a server that
started, did filesystem work, and then failed initialize or tools/list lost the
fact when that path closed the client and returned nil. The operator was told the
server was unavailable and not that the process had already run without the write
jail. connectAndList returns the notices separately now, so they survive the
failure that discards the client. A factory error still discloses nothing,
because nothing launched.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 4f8aa57314 fix(mcp,hooks): carry the enforcement fact to the durable consumers
A hook audit record kept an exit code, stdout and stderr, and the notice is
deliberately in none of those. Once the dispatch result was gone, nothing could
tell an audit or recovery reader that a hook had run under the weakened DenyRead
token. AuditResult carries the notices typed and omitempty, so historical
records read back unchanged and an ordinary hook writes what it wrote before.

An MCP stdio server's launch is the same shape one level up. connectStdio
received the prepared command and kept only the command and its cleanup, so a
server started under the weakened token served the whole session with nothing
able to say so, and no later tool result could recover it because the fact
describes startup rather than any response. The client keeps the applied
enforcement, recorded after Start returns so a prepare failure or a missing
executable claims nothing, registration collects it per server, and startup
states it once next to the skipped-server warnings. Network servers launch no
local process and report nothing.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 76e5e35a1c fix(execution): one launch-state decision, and disclose it on the MCP boundary
Enforcement.Notices is PLANNED: it describes the shape a command was prepared to
run under, and planning is not proof that anything ran. Hooks copied the field
straight out, so a sandbox setup failure or a missing executable told the
operator the write jail had been traded away for a child that never existed.
Outcome.AppliedEnforcementNotices now makes that call once, where the outcome
kind is known, and hooks and plugins both use it; the plugin-local copy of the
rule is gone. A new pre-launch outcome kind is classified in one place instead
of being disclosed by whichever consumer was not updated.

MCP tools/call serialized Result.Output directly. That was a complete value
before this branch and is not one now: Output holds the undecorated base text
and ModelOutput is the model-facing projection. An affected Windows command
reached an MCP client with its ordinary output and no statement about the token
shape it ran under.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 cd76c67050 fix(acp,cli): carry the enforcement notice to the consumers the projection left behind
Making agent.ToolResult store the undecorated model text plus the typed notices
was right, but I only audited the consumers that render to a terminal. Three
others read the raw field and lost the disclosure the moment that change
landed.

ACP sends the tool result straight to its client, so an ACP client saw the
output with the warning removed, on the one surface that has no other way to
learn the sandbox narrowed what the command could do.

Both headless session writers persisted the raw field, and replay reads that
value directly into the transcript without rebuilding a ToolResult, so a
warning visible during the original run vanished from resumed and compacted
context with nothing failing to say so. Those two writers also spelled the same
payload separately and had already drifted, since the stream writer used the
accessor; they now share one helper.

The rule is that presentation and durable consumers both go through
ModelOutput, because the accessor is the only thing that composes the text with
the notices.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 081aabdbc4 fix(agent): carry one canonical representation of a tool result across the projection
executeToolCall copied the already-rendered ModelOutput/HumanDisplay into
agent.ToolResult while also copying the typed EnforcementNotices slice, so the
same disclosure lived in two places with no contract between them. It renders
once today only because the outcome arrives finalized and the agent accessor
then reads Outcome.ModelView rather than the stored field, which also means the
stored field disagreed with the outcome it came from. A result reaching the
accessor without a finalized outcome would have shown the notice twice.

Split the undecorated base out into BaseModelOutput/BaseDisplay and have the
projection store that. Decoration now happens in exactly one place, the
accessors, and the stored text agrees with the finalized outcome.
2026-09-09 11:25:03 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 0b646ad7f9 test(sandbox): pin the notice projection itself, not just its consumers
Every other notice assertion in this PR hands a constructor a Notices slice and
checks it comes out the other side. That proves the consumers and never the
producer: deleting the one line in EnforcementFor that puts plan.Notes into
Enforcement.Notices left every notice test in the repo green, and that line is
the entire reason hooks, plugins and MCP see anything at all.

This starts from a plan the manager built rather than a literal, so the chain
from profile through plan.Notes to Enforcement.Notices is covered end to end,
with a silent-plan case so it cannot be satisfied by a field that is never
empty. It fails with the projection removed.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 4e2231e5de fix(plugins,hooks): carry the disclosure through every post-launch outcome
Two more places the notice was dropped, both the same shape as the last round:
one path assembles the result and another path, taken under different
circumstances, rebuilds it from fewer fields.

A plugin that timed out or was cancelled took invoke's error branch, which
constructed a result from status, output and metadata alone. The child had
already launched under the non-WRITE_RESTRICTED token, so the disclosure was
still true of it, and the model saw only the timeout.

The launched-or-not question is answered once now, in
execPluginCommandWithExecution where the outcome kind is known, rather than at
each constructor. A setup failure or a missing executable started nothing and
carries no notice; everything past launch does, however it ended. Every return
in invoke now carries whatever that decision produced, so the disclosure cannot
depend on which branch runs.

A vetoing beforeTool hook took the blocking branch, which builds
DispatchOutcome.Reason through blockReason and returns immediately, never
reaching hookMessage. Reason is the field the agent turns into the
model-visible result, so a hook that blocked an action while running without
write confinement said only that it blocked. blockReason composes the notices
now; blockCause keeps the wording it had.

No double render: blockedByHookResult reads Reason only, and the advisory path
reads Messages only, so the two channels stay separate.

The hook regression drives Dispatch rather than calling blockReason with a
hand-built commandResult, because a test that assembles the shape it expects
proves the consumer and not the producer. Both fail with their fix reverted.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f7814819cb fix(sandbox,plugins,hooks): disclose the write-jail trade where it actually happens
Two halves of the same disclosure, neither of which reached a user.

The predicate keyed on request.CommandWrapped, read as "something already
wrapped this, so we are re-entrant". That is the opposite of what the field
means: BuildExecutionRequest sets it TRUE for exactly the native and unelevated
requests that buildPlatformCommandPlan then routes to
windowsRestrictedTokenCommandPlan. So the notice was suppressed on every plan
that builds the restricted token and fired on none of them. Every real
file_system.deny_read execution got the non-WRITE_RESTRICTED token and was told
nothing.

It keys on the produced plan's Wrapped state now, which is the resulting
execution state and cannot be read backwards: the direct plan sets it false, the
restricted-token plan sets it true, and both arrive through the same funnel.

The old test passed because its hand-built request left CommandWrapped false,
which is a shape no real execution has, and the whole cluster around it did the
same by passing an empty CommandPlan. Those are rewritten to be plan-based, and
the new regression drives the manager so the request carries the state the
transition actually produces. One of its silent cases named the misreading
outright and is gone.

The second half: plugin and hook results discarded Outcome.Enforcement.Notices.
Both projections copied stdout, stderr and an exit code out of the structured
outcome and dropped the rest, so once the predicate above is fixed a plugin tool
or a hook runs under the weakened token and still says nothing. Both carry the
notices now, plugins onto Result.EnforcementNotices and hooks into the surfaced
message, prepended so a hook that prints nothing still discloses. Covered on
both paths with an assertion that the notice appears exactly once.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 5c64cef7f6 fix(sandbox,tools): make the DenyRead disclosure reach a human, and project enforcement once
Three findings from review.

The disclosure went into Result.Meta and stopped there. That looked like the
established channel because sandbox_downgrade_reason travels the same way, and
it is not one: nothing in production reads those keys, ModelOutput and
HumanDisplay never consult Meta, and the durable history drops it. A Windows
user configuring deny_read could take the non-WRITE_RESTRICTED token, lose write
confinement, and see nothing but ordinary command output. It is a field on the
canonical result now, surfaced by both accessors, so every surface reads it
through one contract. Prepended rather than appended, because the output budget
trims from the end and a disclosure that survives only on short results is not
one. The metadata copy stays for integrations reading the result JSON.

Promoted at finalizeToolOutcome, the single seam every tool result crosses,
rather than at each construction site. Setting it where results are built would
have been a third hand-maintained projection of the same fact, which is how it
went missing from the generic adapter to begin with.

That generic adapter is the second finding. PrepareExecution built
execution.Enforcement by hand for the wrapper hooks, plugins and MCP processes
go through, while exec_command built the same struct by hand for the tool path,
so Notices reached one and not the other. Both go through EnforcementFor now,
which copies the slice defensively.

And the notice claimed a trade nobody had made. The predicate asked only about
the host, the backend and DenyRead, so a disabled sandbox or a re-entrant
command, both of which take the direct unwrapped plan while still carrying the
Windows backend and profile, were told the write jail was gone. Neither half was
true there: no restricted token is created and deny-read is not enforced either.
It is keyed on the resolved execution state now, with the disabled, degraded,
already-wrapped, no-platform-sandbox and no-backend cases covered as explicit
silent cases.

My own fixture from the previous round was one of the things that had to change:
it named the backend without the fields that make a plan wrapped, so it was
asserting against a request that would never have produced a token.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 55621d2176 fix(sandbox): disclose the DenyRead write-jail trade on the execution path
The warning this PR added was reachable only from BackendPlan, which is what
`zero sandbox policy` and `zero sandbox check` render. A real tool call takes a
different path: the resolved profile becomes a CommandPlan, and the Windows
runner picks the token shape from that profile alone. DenyRead being non-empty
drops WRITE_RESTRICTED, which is the shape #869 is about. So an operator could
approve file_system.deny_read for one command, lose the workspace write jail,
and never see the disclosure, because it lived on a diagnostic view they had no
reason to run.

The notice is derived in withSandboxExecutionMetadata rather than at each
caller. That is the single funnel every plan passes through, including the
Windows one, so an execution caller cannot be added that quietly misses it. It
travels on CommandPlan.Notes, reaches the tool boundary as the sandbox_notices
metadata key alongside the downgrade reason that already goes that way, and
reaches the typed execution path as Enforcement.Notices.

The policy and check warning stays as the diagnostic view.

Covered in both directions and at both layers: a plan resolved with DenyRead
carries the notice and an ordinary profile carries none, and the tool metadata
gains the key only when there is something to say. Dropping the derivation fails
the plan test, dropping the emission fails the metadata test.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 915e1df103 test(sandbox): fail rather than skip when the DenyRead token loses the World SID 2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 3bfd898bfc test(sandbox): pin the remedies the unelevated ACL failure offers
The message advertised `--sandbox forbid`, an option that does not
exist, and it survived because nothing drove the branch. The text was
only ever correct by inspection, and inspection is what missed it.

Route the apply through a seam so a test can fail it, then assert what
the operator actually reads: the cause is still wrapped, the option that
does not exist never returns, and both surviving remedies are named.
Restoring the old wording fails the test on both counts.

Also assert the failure does not record the applied-plan marker. That
marker is what makes later commands skip the re-apply, so recording it
here would turn one refusal into a sandbox that silently stops applying
its ACLs entirely.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 c4905d296b fix(sandbox): stop advertising a sandbox override that does not exist
The unelevated ACL failure told the reader to re-run with `--sandbox
forbid`. There is no such option: SandboxPreferenceForbid is an internal
engine state with no flag behind it, so following the advice produced an
unknown option and left them stuck on a failure they had just been told
how to clear. A recovery instruction that does not work costs more than
no instruction, because the reader spends time discovering it is wrong.

Point at the real way out instead: turn the sandbox off in the user
config, which is honored from global config only. The elevated-setup
remedy beside it was already correct and stays.

Reported by jatmn against the same string on #640. It predates both
branches, having arrived with the unelevated fallback tier in #427.
2026-09-09 11:25:02 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 93f9505b72 fix(sandbox): only warn about the DenyRead token trade on a Windows host
The warning fired on any plan targeting the Windows backend, including one built
somewhere else, which broke the smoke job on macOS and ubuntu.

credentialDenyReadPaths returns empty ON Windows and populates itself from the
host everywhere else, so a Windows-targeted plan built on a Linux runner carries
that machine's credential paths and drew a warning about a token nothing would
ever build. TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback asserts a Windows
plan has no warnings, and it only ever builds Windows plans from another host.

Gating on the host is more accurate rather than merely convenient: this describes
a token the Windows command runner will build, and that runner only runs on
Windows. Behaviour on a real Windows host is unchanged, which is why local
testing missed it.

The host is read through a var so both sides stay testable anywhere, matching
windowsSandboxInitialized. Added a regression test for the case that actually
broke, and mutation-verified it: dropping the gate fails it for linux and darwin.
2026-09-09 11:25:01 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 6a4eff21a2 fix(sandbox): guard the Windows write-jail invariant and disclose the DenyRead trade
#865 removed the World SID from the WRITE_RESTRICTED token, which is what makes
the write jail hold: every principal carries Everyone, so while it was a
restricting SID the write half of the check passed for free on any
Everyone-writable path. That fix had no CI protection. The only test covering it
sits behind ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1 and no workflow sets that variable, so a
rebase or refactor restoring the unconditional World SID goes green. #640's
branch conflicts on exactly that hunk.

CreateRestrictedToken works unelevated against the caller's own token, so the
invariant can be checked in an ordinary unit test. Added four:

- the WRITE_RESTRICTED token must not carry the World SID (this fails against a
  reverted #865, verified by mutation)
- neither token shape may carry Users, Authenticated Users, INTERACTIVE, BATCH,
  Administrators, SYSTEM, SERVICE, NETWORK, or the user's own SID. #869 names
  these as the ones that would reopen the same class of bypass
- the capability SID must be present, so a token with an empty list cannot pass
  by having no keys at all
- the non-WRITE_RESTRICTED shape still carries the World SID, which documents the
  open gap rather than asserting the end state. It skips with a note if that
  stops being true, so whoever closes #869 is told to replace it

Second half: the trade was invisible. Setting denyRead selects the token shape
without WRITE_RESTRICTED, and nothing told the person who set it that they had
given up write confinement to get read-deny. The plan now carries a warning
saying so, keyed off the same field the runner reads and scoped to the Windows
restricted-token backend, so the default posture stays quiet. Zero never
populates denyRead on Windows itself, so this only reaches users who configured
it.

This does NOT close #869. Closing it needs a read-side grant that is not a
universal group (AppContainer, or the per-workspace principals in #808), which
is a different piece of work. What changes here is that the fixed shape can no
longer regress silently, and the unfixed shape no longer looks enforced.

Refs #869, #865, #612, #640
2026-09-09 11:25:01 +05:30
875 changed files with 37569 additions and 3645 deletions

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+3 -3
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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Questions and setup help
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
about: Ask in Discussions Q&A. Include zero --version, your OS, provider/model, and zero doctor output for setup problems.
- name: Feature ideas
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
about: Propose and discuss ideas in Discussions before opening a PR (Zero is in controlled development, see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not here. This form is for the step after that: an idea that gained traction in Discussions,
or one a maintainer asked to have tracked as an issue. Please link the discussion below.
Do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
+1
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
+28 -55
View File
@@ -34,12 +34,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || inputs.ref == '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout requested ref
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.ref != '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
@@ -97,19 +100,21 @@ jobs:
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes @gitlawb/zero to npm: first the five platform payloads (versions
# of the SAME package at suffixed versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the
# native binary + vendored helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose
# optionalDependencies alias those platform versions. Platform versions MUST
# publish first — the wrapper pins them exactly, so the reverse order would
# open a window where installs resolve aliases that 404. See
# docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
# Publishes the npm package named in package.json (@twigpine/zero): first
# the five platform payloads (versions of the SAME package at suffixed
# versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the native binary + vendored
# helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose optionalDependencies alias those
# platform versions. Platform versions MUST publish first — the wrapper pins
# them exactly, so the reverse order would open a window where installs
# resolve aliases that 404. See docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file + the npm-publish
# environment as a trusted publisher, and provenance is then generated
# automatically. npm checks provenance against package.json `repository`,
# so that must name this repository. Note npm only allows configuring a
# trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so a new package name starts
# with a one-time manual `npm publish` of an empty 0.0.0 placeholder.
# Because the platform payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse
# that single trusted-publisher configuration.
publish-npm:
@@ -122,13 +127,15 @@ jobs:
# maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
environment:
name: npm-publish
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@twigpine/zero
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
# No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
# .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
@@ -196,47 +203,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Assemble npm packages
run: node scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs --artifacts-dir dist/artifacts --out-dir dist/npm
# Platform versions are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version
# (X.Y.Z-linux-x64), so they must never publish under the default
# `latest` dist-tag — that would make `npm install @gitlawb/zero`
# deliver a platform payload as the CLI. Publish them under a dedicated
# tag and assert `latest` survived before the wrapper goes out.
- name: Publish platform packages to npm
# Platform payloads first under the `platform` dist-tag, then the wrapper,
# with the `latest` dist-tag checked before and after (platform versions
# are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version and must never become
# `latest`). npm applies publishes asynchronously, so the script waits
# until npm shows every platform version before the wrapper goes out,
# and until `latest` moves after it. Versions already on the registry
# are skipped, so "Re-run failed jobs" is safe after a partial publish.
- name: Publish npm packages
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
for dir in dist/npm/platforms/*/; do
echo "publishing ${dir}"
(cd "$dir" && npm publish --access public --tag platform)
done
# Tolerate a failed lookup (registry lag, or no latest tag yet on a
# bootstrap publish): under set -e a bare failure here would abort
# AFTER the platform payloads went out, leaving no wrapper and a
# re-run that fails on republishing existing versions. An empty
# value falls through the guard below.
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
case "$latest" in
"${version}-"*)
echo "::error::dist-tag latest points at platform version ${latest} — a platform publish clobbered it. Fix the dist-tag before the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "dist-tag latest is ${latest} (unchanged by platform publishes)."
- name: Publish wrapper to npm
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
(cd dist/npm/wrapper && npm publish --access public)
# Confirm the wrapper owns `latest` (retry: registry metadata can lag
# a publish by a few seconds).
for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
if [ "$latest" = "$version" ]; then
echo "dist-tag latest is ${version}."
exit 0
fi
sleep 5
done
echo "::error::dist-tag latest is ${latest}, expected ${version} after the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
run: scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh dist/npm
+12
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@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
push:
branches:
@@ -12,6 +14,8 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
permissions:
@@ -27,6 +31,14 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 24
- name: Run action-summary test suite
run: node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- name: Parse action.yml and assert documented inputs
shell: bash
run: |
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.8.0"}
{".":"0.11.0"}
+119
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,125 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.11.0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/compare/v0.10.0...v0.11.0) (2026-10-15)
### Features
* **providers:** add Concentrate provider preset ([#1147](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1147)) ([61b0936](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/61b09364f0f45b0fa8aebaf0a6c3d1c55dbe01c3))
### Bug Fixes
* **cli:** let providers subcommands run with no active provider ([#1143](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1143)) ([d1a0d04](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/d1a0d048ee2c1e7cbfb75160ec4c9f099f3c4472))
* **npm:** wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps ([#1145](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1145)) ([8e363fc](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/8e363fcaa5d51bf5b5b244692dc61bf8d4ae8799))
* **tui,cli:** stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls ([#1133](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1133)) ([640d936](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/640d936bfbe00c4cd3017ca35fb7b5c15d91a1c5))
* **workspaceindex:** skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only ([#1117](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1117)) ([c88c77b](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/c88c77bf701039dca01d9786bf5648d779c949b3))
### Performance Improvements
* **redaction:** add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings ([#945](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/945)) ([ce2fcff](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ce2fcffaf10d8e8c8c5a13e06fd7809f09fc9867))
## [0.10.0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/compare/v0.9.0...v0.10.0) (2026-10-15)
### Features
* **notify:** make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable ([#1001](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1001)) ([7f8e5f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f8e5f08bb83371ce16cc54c97ab032a010026cf))
* **npm:** publish as @twigpine/zero ([#1142](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1142)) ([530563a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/530563a0bb58d3cbadceb97b3ee234ef763124df))
* **providers:** add GMI Cloud provider preset and partner listing ([#1127](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1127)) ([1335ca6](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1335ca6671023ecda81a3cfaae7e9f2ff5d6e0de))
* **providers:** opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments ([#1106](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1106)) ([ddc45f2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ddc45f2c8152fdd04b45dc11ed20d246fe7740a5))
* **runtime:** add process-local per-model RPM admission limits ([#1116](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1116)) ([eebb384](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eebb384676fb567acc1f5a20dcbb17df8a03dc42))
* **sessions:** add zero sessions prune, which never removes a session another process has open ([#1089](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1089)) ([23c27e0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/23c27e0778e3af54c04b8749d1eda846d3253f4e))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** persist the session permission mode across restarts ([#1134](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1134)) ([bb96206](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb96206c2781e846fd13437113eec5790afe9c81)), closes [#1125](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1125)
* **acp:** persist token usage events for ACP sessions ([#1137](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1137)) ([300cf62](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/300cf6275f8c94f06da3f00197d21cb8771842d9)), closes [#1118](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1118)
* **acp:** publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only ([#1078](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1078)) ([7f11491](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f11491078662b2d389c278f3ce5d41d956670c4))
* **agent:** retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch ([#1076](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1076)) ([b9ef1d2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/b9ef1d271aa6ebc6d9adad2ef4ff0d695bb40da5))
* **config:** sync atomic config replacements ([#1093](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1093)) ([4d2e9f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/4d2e9f0d08472f7304652ef7896df587e1cc6c21))
* **cron:** bound run history and read recent records from the tail ([#1094](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1094)) ([42eb6ab](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/42eb6ab5fbe4ae9037f1f4cd42a00243c456a22e))
* **cron:** preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete ([#1090](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1090)) ([2eb9d94](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2eb9d94fac56d91d749ea4f96edcf1c87f79b48c))
* **daemon:** bound pending sessions and prune on completion ([#1091](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1091)) ([8a68660](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/8a68660161b04ce9668363faa14ff72c9fbad223))
* **daemon:** do not retry workers that finished with a final exit code ([#1112](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1112)) ([eefa978](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eefa978f6183332b7416c70c25242bcdfba1a75c)), closes [#1100](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1100)
* **daemon:** stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity ([#1088](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1088)) ([ab018b3](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ab018b3098b5cb103cf8f90b8698d32a6687bdf7)), closes [#861](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/861)
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched hono and @hono/node-server ([#1080](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1080)) ([aa52040](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/aa52040498e012c41d5e8f6027a91c18eff861d4))
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched shell-quote ([#1131](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1131)) ([c56a4c4](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/c56a4c4e6e598504ab417e8cc4f5ab8d69f1b42f))
* **execution:** reserve process capacity before launching ([#1092](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1092)) ([bb3346a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb3346a82883c19ed8815fe1e874f54950711d69))
* **mcp:** forward image tool results on the existing image channel ([#1077](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1077)) ([0324c1d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0324c1d4103328eb90cb24a0b582dba335255b5c))
* **mcp:** refresh OAuth tokens for discovered endpoints and registered clients ([#1113](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1113)) ([571af70](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/571af701bd3d8dfaf40f87b5b112b25e7def5b29)), closes [#1101](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1101)
* **oauth:** give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown ([#1079](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1079)) ([5473301](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/547330197b20ece591e077e876a4b8ffd015cb6e))
* **providers:** send stable session headers to OpenCode ([#1060](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1060)) ([99721c7](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/99721c762f37cd43ac511007a5f51d1846df959e))
* **redaction:** redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end ([#1095](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1095)) ([df67ede](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/df67edec13345b73a85327adc003cacc7bdd8009))
* **redaction:** redact credentials split by an invisible character ([#1067](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1067)) ([e20b762](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/e20b7624261cef8336a8eb0fbdd44d536ad77fc2))
* **sandbox:** say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded ([#1082](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1082)) ([6b5852d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/6b5852dc18bb256af1f25745697c2f2e3ea6f112))
* **search:** redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty ([#1073](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1073)) ([9520f2b](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/9520f2bad7e09ce4a8d0d42be7ce77d2ae928ddd))
* **security:** harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters ([#1066](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1066)) ([ac5fe0d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ac5fe0d21849b0f74af428dd3ca12e3b80a8b7aa))
* **sessions:** keep a session lease for the life of the process, not of the Store ([#1144](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1144)) ([883e5be](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/883e5bec24dac791d1d60618c7f4927f4659b687))
* **tools:** hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under root ([#1063](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1063)) ([0c6f179](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0c6f179a8443d4dfdfbbefe5cc6caf11c2a525f0))
* **tui:** bound live dictation regions ([#985](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/985)) ([feb9927](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/feb992757c582c68f0397e070e206d4bf07071e1))
* **tui:** show provider ownership in Recent and Favorites ([#1083](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1083)) ([1697b7a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1697b7a5ce948e781877cdbe9223adac62c3fde6))
* **tui:** stop held peer message Allow/Deny from deadlocking Update ([#1111](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1111)) ([a195e88](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/a195e8848cec1a27b4fe1789ecc572b943c32186)), closes [#1099](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1099)
* unbreak main CI (cron claim tests, Go 1.26.9) ([#1124](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1124)) ([2c418fc](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2c418fc8ff6763de16703128f372fe526fddd331))
## [0.9.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.8.0...v0.9.0) (2026-09-15)
### Features
* **acp:** add standard session list and resume ([#914](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/914)) ([c1937df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c1937dfac72e6ad0e5ade6e48e2d9c17d9c3e5d6))
* **acp:** emit structured file changes in tool updates ([#999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/999)) ([faec8ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/faec8ee2017fdd6d0c2c347add892cb73eb413d7))
* **acp:** surface safe browser tool metadata ([#1000](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1000)) ([a6ec043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a6ec0435e36b9bea9793b2fd97f2ecd30e3a0f9b))
* **exec:** default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling ([#1049](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1049)) ([9e609c5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9e609c52420fd322f047fc238c04ac81dd623fdd))
* **tui:** interactive terminal attach for tty exec sessions ([#1055](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1055)) ([d73ec81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d73ec81e2d3facb5377bc9ad0fe2aa314628a0c0))
* **tui:** offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation ([#1019](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1019)) ([91d921f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91d921f4c5b8289a9e437f786218f1b48f2add5a))
* **tui:** richer /resume session browser ([#1047](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1047)) ([2f53117](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2f531178f614e587b629e4f81e0470adda647fbd))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make configured MCP tools callable ([#1003](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1003)) ([7f5e5af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f5e5af7bbdbe5bb4d91706146072d461c0234a4))
* **agent:** stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host ([#1017](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1017)) ([f909266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f9092668a832ea73a69551f0ea2df4f6eaf356df))
* **background:** treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited ([#981](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/981)) ([1aacf38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1aacf38b727d31b5ca09949316d6afa8292aec46))
* **config:** lock config read-modify-write across processes ([#960](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/960)) ([b04fe96](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b04fe96e9ef3f2deda4fb2a972270300629079d2))
* **config:** preserve unknown top-level fields ([#984](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/984)) ([488def6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/488def68dcc6d36701fdf171e94a74a436b090fc))
* **daemon:** publish status files atomically ([#949](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/949)) ([9001421](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90014210d2ada2e3d61f4eca5087d3f35a3c4b8b))
* **installtxn:** put back an install a killed commit left behind ([#997](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/997)) ([2837f5e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2837f5efb38dcd3c69771b0ba31565f98a206120))
* let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard ([#1025](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1025)) ([1e4db7c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1e4db7c6643ca7e2c3d8e4b8b30371cfbe43561e))
* **lockutil:** use kernel-held advisory locks ([#950](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/950)) ([6fe0d1e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fe0d1edcdbadea6d566800fbcca739c1cd54ea1))
* **mcp:** discover OAuth through protected resource metadata ([#991](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/991)) ([1b5db17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1b5db1765672820caac1684b168c9898b5ba3593))
* **mcp:** reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response ([#1054](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1054)) ([2479d94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479d946c15dbf74ee3c04a637e97181d1786f08))
* **oauth:** force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline ([#1051](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1051)) ([176f5a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/176f5a242b754a86ea4c7121a8dcc1c0d72cf2e4))
* **oauth:** Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries ([#1007](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1007)) ([275e248](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/275e2486695338ce38193a6e3319f8b6a9a5c33c))
* **providerio:** close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR ([#1058](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1058)) ([b76c764](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b76c764b77926891aa67163e6605a2d8540aacaa))
* **providers:** register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime ([#550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/550)) ([79fa142](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/79fa1422ef1a3691b93342788453ebc284d57f9c))
* **redaction:** split camelCase keys in normalizeKey ([#994](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/994)) ([08fbea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/08fbea7a3221d2061d88038924f90a4cba9af1ac))
* **sandbox:** keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from ([#1040](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1040)) ([3b43c43](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3b43c43eca968c8619adadc81fcc1a17e220216a))
* **sandbox:** keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead ([#1006](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1006)) ([0207f2b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0207f2b2697149a73ecc89a5ab5db0bd665f1911))
* **sandbox:** Make WSL backend tests deterministic. ([#948](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/948)) ([e59bf78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e59bf78cabc2703678778b904c27c8bc8ef82bc8))
* **sandbox:** protect worktree git pointers ([#805](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/805)) ([f30f550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f30f550e6037c53f8521ba2d59c984ae6c574917))
* **sandbox:** refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's ([#911](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/911)) ([7acac7a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7acac7acee65565e25089f2a7b5813c086ce65eb))
* **sessions:** carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt ([#1016](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1016)) ([6ae8396](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6ae8396f0282a5f18a431f0c0ef1a272ecc2ca2b))
* **sessions:** render resume context fields in key order ([#1043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1043)) ([da244bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da244bcbfcfa05e414567ac0acc3cf8ba745ad7d))
* **specialist:** keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed ([#1009](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1009)) ([aadb4a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aadb4a27e9cdb41e774e8e1a8f23cf9c2fb50db2))
* **swarm:** stop original member before handoff ([#957](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/957)) ([0021475](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0021475d4c58c91911098f414795512cf60a0b56))
* **tools:** an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb ([#908](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/908)) ([1649008](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1649008506da0e675431dc056251a01891b15cc8))
* **tools:** make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file ([#956](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/956)) ([2749447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2749447cdce4ae5dd333538b36fa919b80ecc66d))
* **tools:** reject fuzzy edits with drifted content ([#983](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/983)) ([8b3d1b1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8b3d1b1597b04bfa6d4bc7f912abc13ca80a6298))
* **tools:** say when format-on-write ran out of time ([#1044](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1044)) ([6937a30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6937a309cf00825572210a7610a1f3ea8b74c2f9))
* **tui:** move voice capture to Ctrl+Space ([#968](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/968)) ([eeea330](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/eeea3308fed38b37b203522624babaf2f30df91f))
* **update:** keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records ([#979](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/979)) ([a3852ba](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a3852bac595e06c5d3ca9da22212b281b8796802))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input cap… ([#532](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/532)) ([6645f97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6645f9744b37dda4d52ecc4631578d62cefc89de))
* **providers:** parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs ([#955](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/955)) ([d6b25fc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d6b25fc3039a6b7d72a5703a87a097449792b102))
* reduce startup and turn overhead ([#932](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/932)) ([1fde941](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1fde941803c4295c11a4a14559f3c5217d1a9e69))
## [0.8.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0) (2026-08-21)
+5 -5
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ reports, feature requests, reproduction details, logs, and discussion on existin
issues.
Questions and setup help belong in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions) (see
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions) (see
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md)), not in the issue tracker. Feature ideas start in the
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
[Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
an idea that gains traction there is the path to an approved issue and,
eventually, an accepted PR.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ There are three primary ways to contribute:
1. Open a bug report with clear reproduction steps.
2. Propose a feature in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior. A feature-request
issue is filed only after the idea gains traction there or a maintainer asks
for one.
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Clear bug reports are the most useful way to help the project during this phase.
## Submitting a Feature Request
Feature requests start as a thread in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not as an issue. The feature-request issue form exists for the step AFTER that:
when an idea has gained traction in Discussions or a maintainer has asked for an
issue to track it. Whether in the discussion or the eventual issue, please
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ contribution phase.
General questions, setup help, and "is this a bug or my config" uncertainty all
go to
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
If you are unsure whether a proposed code change is appropriate, raise it in
Discussions Ideas or on the relevant issue first and ask. Please keep discussion
focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
+124 -20
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,15 @@
<p align="center"><strong>A terminal coding agent you own.</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.10+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.10+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
@@ -23,6 +29,70 @@ zero exec "fix the failing test in ./pkg"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## Partners
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## Why Zero
- **Use the model you want.** Bring OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, OpenRouter,
@@ -46,7 +116,7 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
@@ -60,26 +130,38 @@ matching GitHub Release whenever it is missing. Windows on ARM runs the x64
build under emulation. See [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md) for
how the package is put together.
Installed Zero as `@gitlawb/zero`? The package moved to `@twigpine/zero` in
0.10.0 and the old name gets no further releases. Both packages provide the
`zero` command, so quit any running `zero`, then remove the old package first:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
Your config, sessions, and logins are kept; they live outside the package. For
Bun, pnpm, and yarn, see [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero).
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.10+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -91,17 +173,18 @@ If you are testing before the first public release, build from source:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
On Linux, build the sandbox helper too if you want native sandboxing:
On Linux, native sandboxing needs Bubblewrap. The main `zero` binary re-executes
itself as the helper when `zero-linux-sandbox` is absent. A separate helper next
to `zero` or on `PATH` still takes precedence:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # optional
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`
(`~/.local/bin` is a good default). macOS does not need an extra helper binary.
Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as their sandbox helper; release
archives still ship standalone Windows helper executables.
Put `zero` on `PATH` (`~/.local/bin` is a good default). macOS does not need an
extra helper binary. Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as their
sandbox helper; release archives still ship standalone Windows helper executables.
More install details: [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md).
@@ -133,6 +216,8 @@ export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
@@ -155,6 +240,18 @@ To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
To configure GMI Cloud directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
To configure Concentrate directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
@@ -313,7 +410,7 @@ zero context context-budget report
zero repo-map deterministic repository map
zero repo-info local repository summary
zero search | find search local session history
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, and rewind sessions
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, rewind, and prune sessions
zero spec manage spec-mode drafts
zero specialist manage specialist subagents
zero skills manage markdown instruction skills
@@ -331,6 +428,13 @@ zero update --check check for newer releases
zero upgrade download, verify, and install the latest release
```
Cron keeps the newest 1,000 run outcomes per job in `runs.jsonl`. Each new run
atomically replaces the history with the retained tail; existing larger histories
are trimmed on their next run. Archive the file before that run if you need older
outcomes. This retention does not delete session directories or reset fire counts.
Malformed records and legacy lines of 1 MiB or more are skipped when reading or
compacting history; new records of that size are rejected.
## Extending Zero
### Project and personal instructions
@@ -442,19 +546,19 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
Real-time chat happens on the [Discord server](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn).
Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
| Category | Use it for |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
For a good Q&A answer fast, include `zero --version`, your OS and install
method, the provider/model in use, and `zero doctor` output. See
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md). Bugs belong in
[issues](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
[issues](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never a public thread.
## Contributing
+109 -16
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,15 @@
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.10+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.10+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
@@ -21,6 +27,70 @@ zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 合作伙伴
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio、Atomic Chat,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
@@ -35,32 +105,41 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
npm 包是一个小型包装器,其平台构建(Linux 和 macOS 的 x64/arm64、Windows 的 x64,包含浏览器/终端控制辅助工具)作为可选依赖直接从 npm registry 安装——没有安装脚本,也不会从 npm 之外下载任何内容。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的行为完全一致,无需任何信任或批准步骤。跳过可选依赖的安装(`--omit=optional`)也能工作:只要二进制文件缺失,包装器就会从对应的 GitHub Release 下载。Windows on ARM 通过模拟运行 x64 构建。详见 [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md)。
之前通过 `@gitlawb/zero` 安装过 Zero?从 0.10.0 起,npm 包已迁移到 `@twigpine/zero`,旧包名不再发布新版本。两个包都提供 `zero` 命令,所以请先退出正在运行的 `zero`,再卸载旧包:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
配置、会话和登录信息都会保留,它们存放在包之外。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的命令见 [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.6+。
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.10+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -71,14 +150,14 @@ go run ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
在 Linux 上,如果你需要原生沙箱,还需要构建沙箱辅助程序:
在 Linux 上,原生沙箱需要 Bubblewrap。主程序 `zero` 在找不到 `zero-linux-sandbox` 时会以自身作为辅助进程重新执行。同目录或 PATH 上的独立 helper 仍优先:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # 可选
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
```
将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
将 `zero` 放在 `PATH` 上(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
更多安装细节:[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
@@ -106,6 +185,8 @@ export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
@@ -114,6 +195,18 @@ export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
要直接配置 GMI Cloud,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
要直接配置 Concentrate,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama、LM Studio 或 [Atomic Chat](https://atomic.chat) 桌面应用,
然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。使用 Atomic Chat 时,请先加载模型并启用
本地 OpenAI 兼容 API(默认地址为 `http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1`),再选择 `atomic-chat-local`。
@@ -218,7 +311,7 @@ zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉、回滚和清理会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
@@ -281,14 +374,14 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
实时交流在 [Discord 服务器](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn) 进行。
提问、安装帮助、想法和分享都在
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
| 分类 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
## 贡献
+5 -5
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
## Questions, setup help, configuration
Ask in [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions). Use
[Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) so answers can
Ask in [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions). Use
[Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) so answers can
be marked and found by the next person.
The fastest way to a useful answer is to include:
@@ -18,19 +18,19 @@ The fastest way to a useful answer is to include:
## Bugs
If Zero does something wrong (crashes, wrong output, broken behavior), file a
[bug report](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/new/choose). If you are not
[bug report](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/new/choose). If you are not
sure whether it is a bug or a setup problem, start in Discussions and we will
promote it to an issue if it is one.
## Feature ideas
Start a thread in
[Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas). Zero is
[Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas). Zero is
in controlled development (see CONTRIBUTING.md), so discussing an idea first is
also the path to getting a PR accepted.
## Security issues
Never file a public issue or discussion. Report privately via
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new)
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/security/advisories/new)
(see SECURITY.md).
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: ZERO
description: >-
Run the ZERO coding agent headlessly in a GitHub workflow. ZERO is
model- and provider-agnostic: you supply the provider and API key as inputs.
author: Gitlawb
author: Twigpine
branding:
icon: terminal
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ inputs:
zero-repo:
description: Repository to install the ZERO release from (owner/repo).
required: false
default: Gitlawb/zero
default: Twigpine/zero
outputs:
exit-code:
+63 -13
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,63 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeSync } from 'node:fs';
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
const CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME = '@twigpine/zero';
// The npm package moved from @gitlawb/zero to @twigpine/zero in 0.10.0. That
// release was also published once under the old name, so 0.9.0's `zero
// upgrade` and anyone still installing the old name land on a working build
// that says where the package went (docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). Nothing is
// published under the old name after that.
const LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME = '@gitlawb/zero';
// The npm name this wrapper was published under, read from its own
// package.json so the name lives in one place. The platform payload alias and
// every reinstall hint below derive from it.
function readPackageName(root) {
try {
const { name } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
if (typeof name === 'string' && name !== '') return name;
} catch {
// An unreadable manifest must not stop the CLI from launching.
}
return CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME;
}
const packageName = readPackageName(packageRoot);
// Same note as legacyPackageSwitchMessage in internal/update/installmethod.go.
// Uninstalling first is the only safe order: both packages own the `zero` bin,
// so npm refuses to install the new one over the old (EEXIST), and forcing it
// lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin.
function legacyPackageNotice() {
return (
`[zero] Zero has moved to ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME} on npm, and ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME} gets no further releases.\n` +
'To keep getting updates, quit zero and run:\n' +
` npm uninstall -g ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
` npm install -g ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
'Uninstall first: both packages provide the `zero` command. With bun, pnpm or yarn, use its global remove and add commands instead.\n'
);
}
// Printed when the wrapper exits rather than before zero starts, because the
// TUI takes over the screen and would hide anything printed first. Only on a
// terminal, so scripts that capture stderr see nothing new. `zero update` and
// `zero upgrade` print the same note themselves.
if (packageName === LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME && !['update', 'upgrade'].includes(process.argv[2])) {
process.on('exit', () => {
if (process.stderr.isTTY || process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_TTY === '1') {
// Synchronous: an exit handler cannot wait for an asynchronous write.
writeSync(2, legacyPackageNotice());
}
});
}
function zeroBinaryName(platform = process.platform) {
return platform === 'win32' ? 'zero.exe' : 'zero';
}
@@ -81,10 +133,10 @@ function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
return (
'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
` bun pm trust ${packageName} (project install)\n` +
` bun pm -g trust ${packageName} (global install)\n` +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
` "trustedDependencies": ["${packageName}"]\n` +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
);
@@ -93,14 +145,14 @@ function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
function buildFromSourceParagraph() {
return (
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
'https://github.com/Twigpine/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
);
}
function missingBinaryContextParagraph() {
return (
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
`Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of ${packageName}\n` +
`(${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.'
);
}
@@ -113,7 +165,7 @@ function missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript) {
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
` npm install -g ${packageName}\n` +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
@@ -182,12 +234,12 @@ function missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) {
);
}
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// The platform payload is a version of this same package, installed under an
// npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
// resolve and we fall through to the downloader.
function platformPackageBinary() {
const aliasedName = `@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
const aliasedName = `${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
let manifestPath;
try {
manifestPath = createRequire(import.meta.url).resolve(`${aliasedName}/package.json`);
@@ -227,8 +279,6 @@ function downloadMissingBinary(packageRoot) {
});
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
function resolveNativeBinary() {
const fromPlatformPackage = platformPackageBinary();
if (fromPlatformPackage) return fromPlatformPackage;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
const (
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
func TestParseArgsUsesCliAndEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// taskOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench tasks` subcommand: the reproducible
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// turnOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench turn` subcommand: the per-turn
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/review"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/review"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/release"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/release"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+5 -1
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,13 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/cli"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/cli"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == sandbox.LinuxSandboxHelperSubcommand {
os.Exit(sandbox.RunLinuxSandboxHelper(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr))
}
os.Exit(cli.Run(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.task }}
provider: openai
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
| `github-token` | no | `${{ github.token }}` | Token used to post a PR comment. Requires `pull-requests: write`. |
| `working-directory` | no | `${{ github.workspace }}` | Directory to run ZERO in. |
| `zero-version` | no | (action ref → `latest`) | ZERO release version/tag to install, e.g. `v1.2.3` or `latest`. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Gitlawb/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Twigpine/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
## Outputs
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
with:
prompt: |
Investigate this issue and propose a fix.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
id: zero
with:
prompt-file: .github/zero/upgrade-deps.md
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ jobs:
- **Least-privilege tokens.** Grant only the permissions the workflow needs
(`contents: write` to edit files, `pull-requests: write` to comment). The
default `GITHUB_TOKEN` is scoped to the repository.
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Gitlawb/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Twigpine/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
workflow run uses a known ZERO version. `zero-version` lets you pin the
installed binary independently of the action ref.
- **Linux and macOS runners** are supported; Windows runners are rejected with a
+78 -30
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ blessed one.
| Method | Command | Self-update |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
| npm | `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
| npm | `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
| `go install` | `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest` | rerun the command |
| Source | `go build -o zero ./cmd/zero` | rebuild |
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Release and verify its checksum.
## npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
@@ -56,15 +56,47 @@ cannot write to keeps failing — rerun the install or the command below with
sufficient permissions). To trigger the fetch manually:
```bash
node "$(npm root -g)/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
node "$(npm root -g)/@twigpine/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
```
### Moving from @gitlawb/zero
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0. From 0.10.0 it is
`@twigpine/zero`, and the old name gets no further releases.
Both packages provide the `zero` command, so npm refuses to install the new
one while the old one is installed (`EEXIST`). Forcing it is worse: a later
uninstall of the old package removes the shared `zero` command. Quit any
running `zero` (on Windows a running `zero.exe` cannot be removed), then
uninstall the old package before installing the new one:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
With another package manager, the same two steps:
```bash
bun remove -g @gitlawb/zero && bun add -g @twigpine/zero
pnpm remove -g @gitlawb/zero && pnpm add -g @twigpine/zero
yarn global remove @gitlawb/zero && yarn global add @twigpine/zero
```
Config, sessions, logins, and plugins live in your user config and home
directories, not in the package, so they carry over unchanged.
0.10.0 was also published once as `@gitlawb/zero`, so an old install that
updates lands on a working build. That build prints these steps when `zero`
exits in a terminal, and `zero upgrade` and `zero update --check` print them
too.
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
From a checkout:
@@ -89,7 +121,7 @@ scripts/install.sh --install-dir "$HOME/bin"
Defaults:
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `~/.local/bin/zero`
@@ -100,7 +132,7 @@ Requirements: Bash, `curl` or `wget`, `tar`, and `shasum` or `sha256sum`.
Install the latest release:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
From a checkout:
@@ -123,7 +155,7 @@ powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -InstallDir "$env:U
Defaults:
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
@@ -134,13 +166,13 @@ archives through its `ubi` backend, so there is nothing extra to publish and no
registry in the middle:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero
```
Pin a version the same way you would any other tool:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/[email protected]
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/[email protected]
```
Updates come from `mise upgrade`. `zero upgrade` also works, because a
@@ -153,13 +185,19 @@ describe a version that is no longer on disk. Prefer `mise upgrade`.
go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest
```
This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.6+ and it does not go through the
Every release so far declares the module path `github.com/Gitlawb/zero`, so
`go install` has to use that path; `github.com/Twigpine/zero/cmd/zero@latest`
fails with "module declares its path as" until a release is tagged with the new
module path.
This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.10+ and it does not go through the
release archives. Two consequences worth knowing before you pick it:
- On Linux you also need the sandbox helper, which is a separate binary and is
not installed by this command. See
- On Linux, Bubblewrap is still required for native sandboxing. Zero resolves
the helper in this order: an executable `zero-linux-sandbox` next to `zero`,
then `PATH`, then self-exec of the main binary. Standalone helpers remain
optional and preferred. See
[Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds](#sandbox-helpers-for-source-builds).
Without it, native sandboxing is unavailable.
- `zero upgrade` treats the result as a standalone install and will replace the
binary with a release build rather than rebuilding from source. If you chose
`go install` deliberately, rerun it instead.
@@ -169,7 +207,7 @@ macOS and Windows need no extra helper.
## From Source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -180,25 +218,32 @@ Build a local binary:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.10+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
Release archives include the platform sandbox helpers. If you build directly
from source, build the helpers you need:
Release archives include the platform sandbox helpers. A source build of the
main `zero` binary is enough for Linux native sandboxing. Zero resolves the
helper in this order:
Linux:
1. an executable `zero-linux-sandbox` next to `zero`
2. then `PATH`
3. then self-exec of the main binary
Bubblewrap must still be installed. Standalone helpers remain optional and
preferred.
A separate helper remains supported if it sits next to `zero` or on `PATH`:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # optional
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`, for example
`~/.local/bin`. `zero-seccomp` is kept as a compatibility wrapper; the sandbox
helper applies the Unix-socket filter itself when that sandbox option is enabled.
Linux native sandboxing also requires Bubblewrap to be installed.
Put `zero` on `PATH`, for example `~/.local/bin`. `zero-seccomp` is kept as a
compatibility wrapper; the sandbox helper applies the Unix-socket filter itself
when that sandbox option is enabled.
macOS uses the system sandbox and does not need an extra helper binary.
@@ -213,7 +258,7 @@ seccomp filter on Android:
pkg install golang
# Build Zero for Android
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=android GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o zero ./cmd/zero
@@ -302,7 +347,10 @@ See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
overwriting a binary a package manager owns leaves that manager describing a
version that is no longer there:
- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` for you.
- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` for you. An install of
the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses instead and prints the steps in
[Moving from @gitlawb/zero](#moving-from-gitlawbzero): that name gets no
further releases, so npm would only reinstall the same version.
- **Homebrew**: refuses, and tells you to run `brew upgrade zero`. Replacing the
keg binary directly would be reverted by the next `brew upgrade` or
`brew reinstall`.
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# Local per-model completion limits
Add `modelRPM` to the existing Zero config file:
```json
{"modelRPM": {"gpt-4.1": 30, "claude-sonnet-4.5": 15}}
```
Keys resolve through the model registry; custom IDs match exactly after trimming
whitespace. Missing keys and zero mean unlimited. Negative limits and conflicting
aliases are configuration errors. Project config may add or tighten a user cap,
but cannot relax it. Changes take effect on the next Zero process start.
For `zero exec` and interactive agent turns, admission happens immediately before
the wrapped turn session's `Stream`. N admissions fit in any sliding 60-second
window; N+1 returns a local rate-limit error before entering that method. The
error reports when a slot expires. Exec uses its existing provider-error exit
code plus a local-limit hint. There is no sleep or hidden retry. Failed admitted
requests still consume a slot.
Sessions and model switches share a limiter in one process. Separate processes
have independent windows; restarting clears them. This is not an account-wide
cap. It counts Stream admissions, not all HTTP requests: setup/prewarm,
compaction, provider-internal retries, discovery and direct calls outside that
boundary are not counted. No TPM, cost budgets, persistence, cross-process
coordination or new runtime/Python dependency is introduced.
+77 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# npm packaging
How `@gitlawb/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
How `@twigpine/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/postinstall.mjs`,
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`, or the npm-publish steps of
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
## Goals
A `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
A `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
- No `EBADENGINE` warnings — ours or from any package in the dependency tree.
- No install scripts anywhere in the tree, so npm's `allow-scripts` gating,
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ The model is the one used by Codex, esbuild, and Biome: a tiny wrapper package
plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
```
@gitlawb/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @gitlawb/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-win32-x64
@twigpine/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @twigpine/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-win32-x64
```
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@gitlawb/zero` package**,
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@twigpine/zero` package**,
published at suffixed versions (`0.4.0-linux-x64`) and referenced through
`npm:` aliases in `optionalDependencies`. One package name means one npm
trusted-publisher configuration — no new publish credentials per platform.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
### Binary resolution in `bin/zero.js`
1. Resolve `@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
1. Resolve `@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
it. This wins over any previously downloaded copy — the platform version is
pinned to the wrapper release.
2. Fall back to a binary previously downloaded next to the wrapper.
@@ -103,10 +103,22 @@ dependencies of the wrapper:
platform binary (plus the musl variant on linux, which its launcher detects
at runtime) — about 65 MB saved per platform package.
### One package name
The npm name lives in `package.json` and nothing else repeats it:
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` names the wrapper, the platform
versions, the alias names, and the alias targets from it, and `bin/zero.js`
reads its own `package.json` to derive the alias it resolves. The Go side
needs the name as a constant (`npmPackageName` in
`internal/update/installmethod.go`), and a test holds it equal to
`package.json`.
## Publishing rules (release pipeline)
These are the invariants `release-artifacts.yml` must hold. Breaking the first
one is user-visible immediately.
one is user-visible immediately. `scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh` implements
them, and `internal/npmwrapper/publish_test.go` runs it against a fake
registry.
1. **Platform versions must never become `latest`.** `0.4.0-linux-x64` is a
semver *prerelease* of `0.4.0`; publishing it without an explicit
@@ -118,20 +130,67 @@ one is user-visible immediately.
bootstrap publish) — a missing value must not abort the job between the
platform and wrapper publishes, which would strand a half-published
release.
2. **Platform versions publish before the wrapper.** The wrapper's
`optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing the wrapper
first would create a window where installs resolve aliases that 404.
2. **Platform versions are on the registry before the wrapper.** The
wrapper's `optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing
the wrapper first would create a window where installs resolve aliases
that 404. Ordering the uploads is not enough: npm applies a publish
asynchronously, and in 0.10.0 a platform version appeared ten minutes
after its upload returned, after the wrapper. The publish script waits
until npm shows every platform version before it publishes the wrapper,
and waits the same way for `latest` afterwards (up to 30 minutes in all).
3. **Exact-version pinning.** The wrapper at `X.Y.Z` references platform
versions `X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>` exactly — never ranges — so a wrapper
and its binaries can never skew.
and its binaries can never skew. The publish script refuses to start when
the wrapper's aliases do not match the platform payloads beside it.
4. All publishes go through the existing npm OIDC trusted-publishing flow and
the `npm-publish` environment gate; no tokens. Because the platform
payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse the single
trusted-publisher configuration.
trusted-publisher configuration. npm checks provenance against
`package.json` `repository`, so it must name the repository the workflow
runs in.
5. **Re-runs are safe.** A version already on the registry is skipped rather
than republished, so re-running a job that failed between the platform and
wrapper publishes finishes the release. Only npm's E404 counts as "not
published"; a lookup that fails any other way is retried and then stops the
job before anything is published.
`zero update` keeps working unchanged: it detects an npm install by finding a
`package.json` named `@gitlawb/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
`package.json` named `@twigpine/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`.
## The move from `@gitlawb/zero`
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0 and as `@twigpine/zero`
from 0.10.0. There is no in-place migration: both packages own the `zero`
bin, so npm refuses to install one over the other (`EEXIST`), and forcing it
lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin. The user
has to uninstall the old package and install the new one, in that order.
Deprecating the old package alone would not have reached existing users.
0.9.0's `zero upgrade` runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`; with
nothing newer under that name, npm reinstalls nothing, prints no deprecation
warning (it only warns when it installs something), and Zero reports the
update as done. So 0.10.0 was published once more under the old name, as a
bridge:
- The release job assembled the same verified artifacts a second time with
`build-platform-packages.mjs --package-name @gitlawb/zero` and published
them with the same script, after the `@twigpine/zero` publish. The steps
that did this ran once and have been removed from `release-artifacts.yml`.
- The bridge build knows its name from the `package.json` beside it. The Go
binary reports it as `InstallMethodNpmLegacy`: `zero upgrade` refuses
with the switch steps instead of reinstalling it, and `zero update --check`
adds them. `bin/zero.js` prints the same steps after `zero` exits, on a
terminal only. This handling stays in the code, since only a build
installed under the old name ever triggers it.
- Updating from 0.9.0 installs that bridge build, so npm also shows the
deprecation message.
`@gitlawb/zero` is deprecated on every version and no longer has a trusted
publisher, so this release workflow cannot publish it again; another version
would take a maintainer publishing by hand. Its versions stay on the
registry: existing installs resolve their platform payload through them, so
they must never be unpublished.
## Runbook: bumping the vendored helpers
+10 -9
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
Run this checklist when a PR changes npm distribution files such as
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`,
Go build or release tooling, or the npm `bin` wrapper.
`scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh`, Go build or release tooling, or the npm
`bin` wrapper.
## Required Checks
@@ -37,24 +38,24 @@ path:
```bash
# platform-package path
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero
cp -R dist/npm/platforms/zero-<platform>-<arch> \
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
# first-run download fallback (delete the platform package first)
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
```
## Checklist
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@gitlawb/zero`), version,
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@twigpine/zero`), version,
`bin.zero` entry, and NO `scripts` entries — the published package must be
free of lifecycle scripts (see NPM_PACKAGING.md).
- `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` emits platform payloads whose
`package.json` is `@gitlawb/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`package.json` is `@twigpine/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`os`/`cpu`, contains the executable binary and the vendored `helpers/` tree
with regular-file (non-symlink) `.bin` shims, and a wrapper payload with no
scripts, no dependencies, and the full five-alias `optionalDependencies`
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Zero.
## User Docs
- [Install](INSTALL.md)
- [Local per-model completion limits](MODEL_RPM.md)
- [Update flow](UPDATE.md)
- [OAuth logins and subscription-backed providers](oauth-subscriptions.md)
+8 -4
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ downloads, verifies, and installs it.
```bash
zero update --check
zero update --check --json
zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
zero update --check --repo Twigpine/zero
zero update --check --target windows-x64
zero upgrade
@@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
`--apply` installs the update in place:
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`. An install
of the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses, without a release check, and
prints the steps to switch to `@twigpine/zero` (see
[INSTALL.md](INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)); `--check` prints them
too.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
optional sandbox helpers.
@@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
- `--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
since applying always installs onto the current machine.
- `--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` and
install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` and
takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
`--check` there.
- `--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ Endpoint resolution order:
1. `--endpoint`
2. `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL`
3. `--repo`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Twigpine/zero/releases/latest`
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
+3
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 80 80" width="80" height="80">
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
module github.com/Twigpine/zero
go 1.26.6
go 1.26.10
require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
+213 -45
View File
@@ -13,16 +13,18 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providercatalog"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/usage"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Deps are the ZERO capabilities the ACP Agent drives. The CLI fills these with
@@ -106,6 +108,14 @@ type acpSession struct {
restrictModels bool
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
// readOnly marks a session published by session/load for a kind that is
// not resumable (a child, side or spec sub-run). Load still replays its
// transcript, which is the render-only use a client needs, but a prompt
// would continue the sub-run as a standalone conversation, which every
// other resume path refuses (sessions.IsResumableKind). Set once when the
// session is first registered and never changed, so it is read without mu.
readOnly bool
}
// NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
@@ -204,7 +214,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
}
sess, _ := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil, model, models, restrictModels)
sess, _ := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil, model, models, restrictModels, false, agent.PermissionModeAuto)
return NewSessionResult{
SessionID: sess.id,
ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
@@ -301,6 +311,12 @@ func (a *Agent) activatePersistedSession(ctx context.Context, p LoadSessionParam
if operation == persistedSessionResume && historyErr != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "restore session history: "+historyErr.Error())
}
// Load stays best effort about a history it cannot read, but not about one
// prune holds: publishing it would leave the client using a session prune may
// be removing, one this process could not hold open.
if errors.Is(historyErr, sessions.ErrPruning) {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, historyErr.Error())
}
model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
@@ -311,7 +327,10 @@ func (a *Agent) activatePersistedSession(ctx context.Context, p LoadSessionParam
models = append(models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: persistedModel, Name: persistedModel})
}
}
sess, existed := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history, model, models, restrictModels)
// Resume has already refused a non-resumable kind above, so only load can
// reach here with one, and it publishes that session for viewing only.
readOnly := !sessions.IsResumableKind(meta.SessionKind)
sess, existed := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history, model, models, restrictModels, readOnly, restoredPermissionMode(meta.PermissionMode))
if existed {
_, messages, historyWarning, historyErr = a.refreshSessionHistory(sess, requireHistoryLog)
if operation == persistedSessionResume && historyErr != nil {
@@ -433,6 +452,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionPrompt(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
if sess.readOnly {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "session is not resumable, so it was loaded for viewing only and cannot be prompted: "+p.SessionID)
}
// Serialize turns for this session so two prompts can't interleave history or
// fight over the single cancel slot. session/cancel still works concurrently
@@ -506,7 +528,32 @@ func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string,
queue := func(input sessions.AppendEventInput) {
pendingEvents = append(pendingEvents, input)
}
queue(messageEvent("user", userText))
visionCache := make(map[string]bool)
var visionCacheMu sync.Mutex
supportsVision := func(modelID string) bool {
modelID = strings.TrimSpace(modelID)
if modelID == "" {
return false
}
visionCacheMu.Lock()
defer visionCacheMu.Unlock()
if cached, ok := visionCache[modelID]; ok {
return cached
}
supported := a.modelSupportsVision(ctx, resolved.Provider, modelID)
visionCache[modelID] = supported
return supported
}
effectivePrompt := userText
if len(images) > 0 && !supportsVision(resolved.Provider.Model) {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("Model %s does not support image input; ignoring %d prompt image(s).", resolved.Provider.Model, len(images))
note.text("[zero] " + msg + "\n\n")
effectivePrompt = fmt.Sprintf("[Note: %s]\n\n%s", msg, userText)
images = nil
}
// Match the TUI: only images actually sent to the model enter history.
attachments := sessions.MessageAttachments{Images: len(images)}
queue(messageEvent("user", userText, attachments))
opts := agent.Options{
Cwd: sess.cwd,
@@ -519,8 +566,15 @@ func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string,
DeferThreshold: workspace.DeferThreshold,
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
Images: images,
SupportsVision: supportsVision,
OnText: note.text,
OnReasoning: note.thought,
// Persist token usage the same way `zero exec` does, so `zero usage report`
// sees ACP sessions too. It joins the turn's buffered batch: a hard run
// failure that aborts the turn drops its usage together with its history.
OnUsage: func(u agent.Usage) {
queue(usageEvent(u))
},
OnToolCall: func(call agent.ToolCall) {
queue(toolCallEvent(call))
note.toolCall(call)
@@ -537,10 +591,10 @@ func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string,
},
}
agentPrompt := buildPrompt(sess.snapshotHistory(), userText)
agentPrompt := buildPrompt(sess.snapshotHistory(), effectivePrompt)
result, runErr := a.deps.RunAgent(ctx, agentPrompt, provider, opts)
if result.FinalAnswer != "" {
queue(messageEvent("assistant", result.FinalAnswer))
queue(messageEvent("assistant", result.FinalAnswer, sessions.MessageAttachments{}))
}
reason, stopErr := stopReasonFor(result, runErr)
if stopErr != nil {
@@ -561,7 +615,7 @@ func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string,
// one file write, which is the contiguity restored here — not a disk
// transaction, and not a promise about crashes mid-fsync. Reported by @jatmn.
persistenceErr := a.persistTurn(sess.id, pendingEvents)
sess.appendHistory(turnRecord{user: userText, assistant: result.FinalAnswer})
sess.appendHistory(turnRecord{user: attachments.WithContent(userText), assistant: result.FinalAnswer})
a.warnPersistence(
note,
"save session history",
@@ -649,7 +703,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetMode(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, e
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.ModeID)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
sess.setMode(mode)
if err := a.updateMode(sess, mode); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
return SetSessionModeResult{}, nil
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
@@ -685,7 +741,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.Value)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
sess.setMode(mode)
if err := a.updateMode(sess, mode); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.Value)
@@ -727,6 +785,35 @@ func (a *Agent) updateModel(sess *acpSession, model string, restrictModels bool)
return nil
}
// updateMode persists the mode BEFORE applying it, so a failed write fails the
// request instead of leaving disk behind memory; the same order updateModel
// uses. The caller holds sess.turnMu (both mode doors take it and it is not
// reentrant, so this must not lock it again); the write under turnMu briefly
// blocks that session's prompts, which is what makes the store authoritative.
func (a *Agent) updateMode(sess *acpSession, mode agent.PermissionMode) error {
if _, err := a.deps.Store.UpdateMode(sess.id, string(mode)); err != nil {
return RPCError(codeInternalError, "save mode selection: "+err.Error())
}
sess.setMode(mode)
return nil
}
// restoredPermissionMode maps a persisted mode onto the modes ACP offers. A
// session written before modes were persisted has none and keeps the historical
// auto default. A stored value outside the three is never allowed to come back
// weaker than ask, and unsafe can never be reached because ACP refuses to set
// it in the first place.
func restoredPermissionMode(saved string) agent.PermissionMode {
switch mode := agent.PermissionMode(strings.TrimSpace(saved)); mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
return mode
case "":
return agent.PermissionModeAuto
default:
return agent.PermissionModeAsk
}
}
func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var p CancelParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
@@ -844,10 +931,23 @@ func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sessionID string, inputs []sessions.AppendEventInput
return err
}
func messageEvent(role, content string) sessions.AppendEventInput {
func messageEvent(role, content string, attachments sessions.MessageAttachments) sessions.AppendEventInput {
payload := map[string]any{"role": role, "content": content}
if role == "user" && (attachments.Images > 0 || attachments.Documents > 0) {
payload["attachments"] = attachments
}
return sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventMessage,
Payload: map[string]any{"role": role, "content": content},
Payload: payload,
}
}
// usageEvent records one provider usage report in the same persisted shape the
// exec runtime writes (usage.EventUsagePayload is the single writer).
func usageEvent(u agent.Usage) sessions.AppendEventInput {
return sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventUsage,
Payload: usage.EventUsagePayload(u),
}
}
@@ -862,16 +962,25 @@ func toolCallEvent(call agent.ToolCall) sessions.AppendEventInput {
}
}
// toolResultEvent persists a tool result through the ONE session contract every
// writer shares, agent.ToolResultSessionPayload.
//
// This used to spell its own payload and wrote result.Output. After the
// output/notice split that field is the UNDECORATED text, and nothing else in
// the payload carried the enforcement notices, so the disclosure was dropped at
// the moment of persisting. The live tool_call_update for the same result had
// shown it (toolResultContent reads ModelOutput), and then session/load
// replayed the call with the sandbox's narrowing gone. Fixing only the live
// translation could not reach this: the text was already lost on disk.
//
// The session store is shared with the TUI and headless exec, so the same
// payload is also what lets a TUI resume of an ACP-written session draw the
// notice as card furniture, from the typed field and the undecorated body.
// Reported by @jatmn.
func toolResultEvent(result agent.ToolResult) sessions.AppendEventInput {
return sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventToolResult,
Payload: map[string]any{
"toolCallId": result.ToolCallID,
"name": result.Name,
"status": result.Status,
"output": result.Output,
"changedFiles": append([]string(nil), result.ChangedFiles...),
},
Type: sessions.EventToolResult,
Payload: agent.ToolResultSessionPayload(result),
}
}
@@ -908,9 +1017,20 @@ func (a *Agent) loadHistory(sessionID string, requireHistoryLog bool) ([]turnRec
// enough: rehydration substitutes the compaction event in place of the events
// it replaced, so a loop that skips everything but EventMessage would drop the
// summary exactly as before. It is projected below. Reported by @jatmn.
//
// The session was picked from its metadata a moment ago. Make sure it is
// still there, and held, before restoring it: see sessions.HoldToContinue.
if err := a.deps.Store.HoldToContinue(sessionID); err != nil {
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
events, eventLogPresent, err := a.deps.Store.ReadRehydratedEventsWithPresence(sessionID)
var rehydrateWarning error
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrPruning) {
// Not a rehydration failure: the raw read would continue the session
// without holding it while zero sessions prune may be removing it.
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
rehydrateWarning = err
events, eventLogPresent, err = a.deps.Store.ReadEventsWithPresence(sessionID)
if err != nil {
@@ -988,14 +1108,16 @@ func (a *Agent) loadHistory(sessionID string, requireHistoryLog bool) ([]turnRec
continue
}
var msg struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Attachments sessions.MessageAttachments `json:"attachments"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg) != nil {
continue
}
switch msg.Role {
case "user":
msg.Content = msg.Attachments.WithContent(msg.Content)
messages = append(messages, persistedMessage{eventID: persistedMessageIdentity(sessionID, e), role: msg.Role, content: msg.Content})
if havePending {
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser})
@@ -1031,13 +1153,14 @@ func replayToolUpdate(event sessions.Event) *ToolCallUpdate {
return nil
}
var payload struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Arguments string `json:"arguments"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Output string `json:"output"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changedFiles"`
Name string `json:"name"`
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Arguments string `json:"arguments"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Output string `json:"output"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changedFiles"`
EnforcementNotices []string `json:"enforcementNotices"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &payload) != nil {
return nil
@@ -1057,12 +1180,27 @@ func replayToolUpdate(event sessions.Event) *ToolCallUpdate {
if status == "" {
status = tools.StatusOK
}
// THE DISCLOSURE IS RESTORED AS WHAT IT WAS: typed notices beside undecorated
// text, so toolCallResult composes it the way it did live and the client
// sees it exactly once. The stored output already has the notices composed
// in (that is the shared contract, because output is the provider-facing
// text), so handing it to ModelOutput together with the typed field would
// draw the disclosure twice, and dropping the typed field would make this
// reader depend on every writer having decorated the text. Taking the
// notices back off the front covers both: a record whose output was never
// decorated comes through unchanged and still gets its notice.
//
// displayPreview is deliberately not read. It is the card body for a
// terminal, and the ACP wire has no card: the live update sends the model
// text, so a replay that sent the preview instead would not match it.
notices := append([]string(nil), payload.EnforcementNotices...)
upd := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: id,
Name: payload.Name,
Status: status,
Output: payload.Output,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), payload.ChangedFiles...),
ToolCallID: id,
Name: payload.Name,
Status: status,
Output: tools.WithoutEnforcementNotices(payload.Output, notices),
EnforcementNotices: notices,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), payload.ChangedFiles...),
})
return &upd
}
@@ -1153,14 +1291,15 @@ func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
// session is returned rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its mode/model.
// The bool reports that case so persisted activation can re-read and apply disk
// history under turnMu. history is set BEFORE first publication so no concurrent
// prompt can read a half-initialized session.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord, model string, models []SessionConfigOptionValue, restrictModels bool) (*acpSession, bool) {
// prompt can read a half-initialized session. mode is the session's initial
// permission mode: auto for a new session, the restored value for load/resume.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord, model string, models []SessionConfigOptionValue, restrictModels bool, readOnly bool, mode agent.PermissionMode) (*acpSession, bool) {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
return existing, true
}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, model: model, models: models, restrictModels: restrictModels, history: history}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: mode, model: model, models: models, restrictModels: restrictModels, history: history, readOnly: readOnly}
a.sessions[id] = sess
return sess, false
}
@@ -1305,3 +1444,32 @@ func sameWorkspace(left, right string) bool {
}
return os.SameFile(leftInfo, rightInfo)
}
func (a *Agent) modelSupportsVision(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, modelID string) bool {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(modelID)
if trimmed == "" {
return false
}
if a.deps.DiscoverModels != nil {
if discovered, err := a.deps.DiscoverModels(ctx, profile); err == nil {
for _, dm := range discovered {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(dm.ID), trimmed) {
if len(dm.InputModalities) > 0 {
for _, mod := range dm.InputModalities {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(mod), "image") {
return true
}
}
return false
}
break
}
}
}
}
reg, _ := modelregistry.DefaultRegistry()
if entry, known := reg.Resolve(trimmed); known {
return entry.Supports(modelregistry.ModelCapabilityVision)
}
return modelregistry.SupportsVision(reg, trimmed)
}
+397 -8
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package acp
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -17,13 +19,13 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// fakeProvider streams a canned assistant message and ends the turn — enough to
@@ -847,6 +849,48 @@ func TestACPRunTurnClosesWorkspaceAfterSuccessAndFailure(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestACPWiresSupportsVision(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
var captured agent.Options
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
captured = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
deps.DiscoverModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: "custom-vision", InputModalities: []string{"text", "image"}},
{ID: "custom-text", InputModalities: []string{"text"}},
}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
var promptRes PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{
{Type: "text", Text: "hello"},
},
}, &promptRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if captured.SupportsVision == nil {
t.Fatal("SupportsVision was not wired into agent.Options")
}
if !captured.SupportsVision("custom-vision") {
t.Fatal("SupportsVision(custom-vision) = false, want true")
}
if captured.SupportsVision("custom-text") {
t.Fatal("SupportsVision(custom-text) = true, want false")
}
}
// TestACPRejectsInvalidCwd confirms session/new fails when the workspace root
// resolver rejects the client cwd (e.g. filesystem root).
func TestACPRejectsInvalidCwd(t *testing.T) {
@@ -916,7 +960,11 @@ func TestACPHardTurnFailureDoesNotCommitHistory(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("failed question")},
SessionID: created.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{
TextBlock("failed question"),
ImageBlock(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("failed image")), "image/png"),
},
}, &PromptResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("hard RunAgent failure was reported as a successful turn")
}
@@ -1251,6 +1299,85 @@ func TestACPResumeAppliesStandaloneSessionKindPolicy(t *testing.T) {
}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load should retain render-only access: %v", err)
}
// The check above only showed the refused resume never registered the
// session. Load does register it, so the prompt that matters is the one
// AFTER the load: render-only means the transcript can be read and the
// sub-run cannot be continued.
err = h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("must stay closed after load")},
}, &PromptResult{})
if !errors.As(err, &rpcErr) || rpcErr.Code != codeInvalidParams {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt after load of a %s session = %v, want invalid params", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
// LOAD PUBLISHES A SUB-RUN FOR VIEWING, NOT FOR CONTINUING. Every other resume
// path (the TUI, exec sessions, the exec CLI, and ACP's own session/resume)
// refuses a kind sessions.IsResumableKind rejects. session/load has a real
// render-only use, a client rebuilding a transcript it can scroll, so it keeps
// loading those sessions; what it must not do is publish one that accepts a
// prompt, because the prompt would carry on a child, side or spec sub-run as a
// standalone conversation. Checked in both directions, so a gate that refused
// everything would fail on the resumable kinds.
func TestACPLoadPublishesSubRunsReadOnly(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
kind sessions.SessionKind
readOnly bool
}{
{name: "regular", kind: ""},
{name: "fork", kind: sessions.SessionKindFork},
{name: "child", kind: sessions.SessionKindChild, readOnly: true},
{name: "side", kind: sessions.SessionKindSide, readOnly: true},
{name: "spec draft", kind: sessions.SessionKindSpecDraft, readOnly: true},
{name: "spec impl", kind: sessions.SessionKindSpecImpl, readOnly: true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := !sessions.IsResumableKind(tc.kind); got != tc.readOnly {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: IsResumableKind(%q) disagrees with this table (readOnly=%v), so the cases no longer mean what they say", tc.kind, tc.readOnly)
}
deps := testDeps(t)
workspace := t.TempDir()
created, err := deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{
SessionID: "load-" + strings.ReplaceAll(tc.name, " ", "-"), Cwd: workspace, SessionKind: tc.kind,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace,
}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load of a %s session: %v", tc.name, err)
}
err = h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("continue")},
}, &PromptResult{})
// A resumable session has to be genuinely promptable, not merely "not
// refused as view-only": any other failure would hide a broken
// writable path behind a passing test.
if !tc.readOnly {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt after load of a %s session = %v, want success", tc.name, err)
}
return
}
// The decision is the RPC code; the message only distinguishes the
// view-only refusal from other invalid-params errors such as an
// unknown session id.
var rpcErr *rpcError
if !errors.As(err, &rpcErr) || rpcErr.Code != codeInvalidParams {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt after load of a %s session = %v, want invalid params", tc.name, err)
}
if !strings.Contains(rpcErr.Message, "loaded for viewing only") {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt after load of a %s session was refused for another reason: %v", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
@@ -2418,3 +2545,265 @@ func payloadString(payload any, key string) string {
value, _ := decoded[key].(string)
return value
}
// Load is best effort about a history it cannot read, but a session that zero
// sessions prune holds is refused by load and resume alike, and not published:
// this process could not hold it open while prune may be removing it.
func TestACPLoadAndResumeAreRefusedWhilePruneHoldsTheSession(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
cwd := t.TempDir()
meta, err := deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: cwd})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
// Created by an earlier process, which has since exited.
deps.Store.Release(meta.SessionID)
release, locked, err := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{RootDir: deps.Store.RootDir}).HoldExclusive(meta.SessionID)
if err != nil || !locked {
t.Fatalf("take the lease the way prune does: locked=%v, %v", locked, err)
}
defer release()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: meta.SessionID, Cwd: cwd, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "locked by zero sessions prune") {
t.Errorf("session/load while prune holds the session: err = %v, want it refused", err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{SessionID: meta.SessionID, Cwd: cwd, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &ResumeSessionResult{}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "locked by zero sessions prune") {
t.Errorf("session/resume while prune holds the session: err = %v, want it refused", err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: meta.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("carry on")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a session refused while prune held it was still promptable")
}
}
// Activation reads the session's metadata before it restores the history. A
// session prune removes in between is refused as removed, which activation then
// refuses to publish for load as well as resume, instead of restoring it as an
// empty conversation.
func TestACPLoadHistoryRefusesASessionRemovedAfterItWasPicked(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
meta, err := deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
deps.Store.Release(meta.SessionID)
dir := filepath.Join(deps.Store.RootDir, meta.SessionID)
if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, sessions.MetadataFile)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
a := &Agent{deps: deps}
if _, _, _, err := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID, false); !errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrPruning) {
t.Errorf("load history of a session prune is removing: err = %v, want it refused", err)
}
if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, _, _, err := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID, false); !errors.Is(err, sessions.ErrPruning) {
t.Errorf("load history of a session prune removed: err = %v, want it refused", err)
}
}
func TestACPPromptUnsupportedModelDropsImagesAndNotifies(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.DiscoverModels = func(ctx context.Context, p config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: "fake-model", InputModalities: []string{"text"}},
}, nil
}
var capturedOpts agent.Options
var capturedPrompt string
deps.RunAgent = func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
capturedPrompt = prompt
capturedOpts = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "Answered without images"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var initRes InitializeResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodInitialize, InitializeParams{ProtocolVersion: ProtocolVersion}, &initRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialize: %v", err)
}
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
rawPng := "\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake-image-bytes"
b64Png := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(rawPng))
var promptRes PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{
TextBlock("look at this image"),
ImageBlock(b64Png, "image/png"),
},
}, &promptRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if promptRes.StopReason != StopEndTurn {
t.Fatalf("stopReason = %q, want %q", promptRes.StopReason, StopEndTurn)
}
got := drainTextUntil(t, h.updates, func(text string) bool {
return strings.Contains(text, "does not support image input")
})
if !strings.Contains(got, "Model fake-model does not support image input; ignoring 1 prompt image(s).") {
t.Fatalf("streamed text = %q, want drop notice", got)
}
if len(capturedOpts.Images) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("captured %d images, want 0 (images should be withheld)", len(capturedOpts.Images))
}
if !strings.Contains(capturedPrompt, "[Note: Model fake-model does not support image input; ignoring 1 prompt image(s).]") {
t.Fatalf("captured prompt = %q, want prompt note", capturedPrompt)
}
}
func TestACPSessionPrompt_SupportsVisionMemoizedPerRun(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
var discoverCount int
var discoverMu sync.Mutex
deps.DiscoverModels = func(ctx context.Context, p config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
discoverMu.Lock()
discoverCount++
discoverMu.Unlock()
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: "fake-model", InputModalities: []string{"text", "image"}},
}, nil
}
deps.RunAgent = func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
if !opts.SupportsVision(opts.Model) {
t.Error("expected SupportsVision to report true")
}
}
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "Done"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var initRes InitializeResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodInitialize, InitializeParams{ProtocolVersion: ProtocolVersion}, &initRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialize: %v", err)
}
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
discoverMu.Lock()
discoverCount = 0
discoverMu.Unlock()
rawPng := "\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake-image-bytes"
b64Png := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(rawPng))
var promptRes PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{
TextBlock("look at this"),
ImageBlock(b64Png, "image/png"),
},
}, &promptRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if promptRes.StopReason != StopEndTurn {
t.Fatalf("stopReason = %q, want %q", promptRes.StopReason, StopEndTurn)
}
discoverMu.Lock()
count := discoverCount
discoverMu.Unlock()
if count != 1 {
t.Fatalf("DiscoverModels was called %d times, want exactly 1 call (memoized per run)", count)
}
}
func TestACPEndToEndImagePromptSupportedModel(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.DiscoverModels = func(ctx context.Context, p config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: "discovered-vision-model", InputModalities: []string{"text", "image"}},
}, nil
}
deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "discovered-vision-model"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{
Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Name: "fake", Model: model},
MaxTurns: 4,
}, nil
}
var capturedOpts agent.Options
var capturedPrompt string
deps.RunAgent = func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
capturedPrompt = prompt
capturedOpts = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "I can see the image!"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var initRes InitializeResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodInitialize, InitializeParams{ProtocolVersion: ProtocolVersion}, &initRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialize: %v", err)
}
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
rawPng := []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nreal-png-bytes")
b64Png := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(rawPng)
var promptRes PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{
TextBlock("analyze this image"),
ImageBlock(b64Png, "image/png"),
},
}, &promptRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if promptRes.StopReason != StopEndTurn {
t.Fatalf("stopReason = %q, want %q", promptRes.StopReason, StopEndTurn)
}
if len(capturedOpts.Images) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("captured %d images, want 1", len(capturedOpts.Images))
}
if capturedOpts.Images[0].MediaType != "image/png" {
t.Fatalf("mediaType = %q, want image/png", capturedOpts.Images[0].MediaType)
}
if !bytes.Equal(capturedOpts.Images[0].Data, rawPng) {
t.Fatalf("image bytes mismatch: got %v, want %v", capturedOpts.Images[0].Data, rawPng)
}
if strings.Contains(capturedPrompt, "does not support image input") {
t.Fatalf("prompt unexpectedly contains refusal note: %q", capturedPrompt)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
// ---- an offered option is an acceptable answer ----
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const persistedNotice = "least-privilege notice: read access was narrowed"
func mustRawPayload(t *testing.T, payload map[string]any) json.RawMessage {
t.Helper()
encoded, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return encoded
}
func toolUpdateText(update ToolCallUpdate) string {
var text strings.Builder
for _, part := range update.Content {
if part.Content != nil {
text.WriteString(part.Content.Text)
}
}
return text.String()
}
// nextToolResultUpdate returns the next tool_call_update, skipping the
// tool_call that announces it.
func nextToolResultUpdate(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, updates <-chan ToolCallUpdate, stage string) ToolCallUpdate {
t.Helper()
for {
select {
case update := <-updates:
if update.SessionUpdate == UpdateToolCallUpdate {
return update
}
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatalf("%s: the tool result update never arrived", stage)
}
}
}
// A DISCLOSURE SHOWN LIVE HAS TO SURVIVE BEING WRITTEN DOWN.
//
// enforcement_notice_test.go pins the live translation: toolResultContent reads
// ModelOutput, so a connected ACP client sees the sandbox's narrowing. That was
// the only half fixed. The turn also persists each result, and the persisted
// payload was spelled by hand in this package with result.Output, which after
// the output/notice split is the undecorated text, and with no notices field at
// all. The disclosure was gone from disk, so session/load replayed a sandboxed
// command as if nothing had constrained it.
//
// This runs a real turn, so the result reaches the store through the same
// OnToolResult callback production uses, then loads the session in a fresh
// agent and reads the replayed update. It fails if only translate.go is fixed,
// which is the state it was written against. Reported by @jatmn.
func TestACPReloadedToolResultCarriesTheEnforcementNoticeOnce(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
output string
}{
{name: "a command with output", output: "the command output"},
// An enforced command that printed nothing still has a disclosure, and
// an empty body is where a reader that falls back to the decorated text
// draws it twice.
{name: "a command that printed nothing", output: ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
call := agent.ToolCall{ID: "call-sandboxed", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{"command":"ls"}`}
opts.OnToolCall(call)
opts.OnToolResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: tc.output,
EnforcementNotices: []string{persistedNotice},
})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
workspace := t.TempDir()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
live := newHarness(t, deps)
var created NewSessionResult
if err := live.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
if err := live.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("list the files")}}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
liveText := toolUpdateText(nextToolResultUpdate(t, ctx, live.tools, "live"))
if count := strings.Count(liveText, persistedNotice); count != 1 {
t.Fatalf("premise: the live update carries the notice %d times, want 1:\n%s", count, liveText)
}
live.stop()
loader := newHarness(t, deps)
defer loader.stop()
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
replayed := toolUpdateText(nextToolResultUpdate(t, ctx, loader.tools, "replay"))
if count := strings.Count(replayed, persistedNotice); count != 1 {
t.Errorf("the replayed result carries the notice %d times, want exactly 1:\n%s", count, replayed)
}
if replayed != liveText {
t.Errorf("the replayed result does not match what the client saw live\nlive: %q\nreplayed: %q", liveText, replayed)
}
})
}
}
// THE ACP WRITER IS THE SHARED CONTRACT, NOT A COPY OF IT. The session store is
// the one the TUI and headless exec also write to and resume from, so a payload
// spelled here by hand is a third representation waiting to drift. It already
// had: it was the only writer with no notices and no undecorated body.
func TestToolResultEventIsTheSharedSessionPayload(t *testing.T) {
result := agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "call-1",
Name: "bash",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "the command output",
EnforcementNotices: []string{persistedNotice},
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go"},
}
event := toolResultEvent(result)
if event.Type != sessions.EventToolResult {
t.Fatalf("event type = %q", event.Type)
}
if want := agent.ToolResultSessionPayload(result); !reflect.DeepEqual(event.Payload, want) {
t.Fatalf("the ACP payload is not the shared one\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", event.Payload, want)
}
payload, ok := event.Payload.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("payload is %T", event.Payload)
}
if notices, _ := payload["enforcementNotices"].([]string); len(notices) != 1 || notices[0] != persistedNotice {
t.Errorf("typed notices were not persisted: %#v", payload["enforcementNotices"])
}
if body, present := payload["displayPreview"]; !present || body != "the command output" {
t.Errorf("the undecorated body was not persisted: %#v (present=%v)", body, present)
}
}
// A record can reach the reader in either shape, and both have to come out as
// one disclosure: output with the notices already composed in, which is what
// every current writer stores, and output left undecorated beside the typed
// field, which a reader must not answer by dropping the notice.
func TestReplayedToolResultComposesTheNoticeOnceForEitherStoredShape(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
output string
want string
}{
{name: "output stored decorated", output: persistedNotice + "\n\nthe command output", want: persistedNotice + "\n\nthe command output"},
{name: "output stored undecorated", output: "the command output", want: persistedNotice + "\n\nthe command output"},
{name: "decorated and otherwise empty", output: persistedNotice, want: persistedNotice},
{name: "undecorated and empty", output: "", want: persistedNotice},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
update := replayToolUpdate(sessions.Event{Type: sessions.EventToolResult, Payload: mustRawPayload(t, map[string]any{
"toolCallId": "call-1", "name": "bash", "status": "ok",
"output": tc.output, "enforcementNotices": []string{persistedNotice},
})})
if update == nil {
t.Fatal("the stored result was not replayed")
}
if got := toolUpdateText(*update); got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("replayed text = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
// And a stored result with no notices is replayed as it was written.
plain := replayToolUpdate(sessions.Event{Type: sessions.EventToolResult, Payload: mustRawPayload(t, map[string]any{
"toolCallId": "call-2", "name": "bash", "status": "ok", "output": "plain output",
})})
if plain == nil || toolUpdateText(*plain) != "plain output" {
t.Errorf("an ordinary stored result changed on replay: %+v", plain)
}
}
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package acp
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// AN ACP CLIENT MUST SEE THE DISCLOSURE THE TUI SEES.
//
// agent.ToolResult stores the UNDECORATED model text alongside the typed
// enforcement notices; ModelOutput is what composes them. Reading .Output
// directly compiles and looks right, and silently drops the notice for every
// ACP client, which is the one surface with no other way to learn the sandbox
// narrowed what the command could do.
func TestToolResultContentCarriesTheEnforcementNotice(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "least-privilege notice: read access was narrowed"
result := agent.ToolResult{
Name: "bash",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "the command output",
EnforcementNotices: []string{notice},
}
content := toolResultContent(result)
if len(content) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no content produced for a successful tool result")
}
var text strings.Builder
for _, part := range content {
if part.Content != nil {
text.WriteString(part.Content.Text)
}
}
got := text.String()
if count := strings.Count(got, notice); count != 1 {
t.Errorf("the notice appears %d times, want exactly 1:\n%s", count, got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "the command output") {
t.Errorf("the underlying output was lost:\n%s", got)
}
}
// And a result with no notice is unchanged, so the accessor is not adding
// anything to ordinary output.
func TestToolResultContentLeavesAnOrdinaryResultAlone(t *testing.T) {
result := agent.ToolResult{
Name: "bash",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "plain output",
}
content := toolResultContent(result)
if len(content) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no content produced")
}
if content[0].Content == nil {
t.Fatal("content block missing")
}
if got := content[0].Content.Text; got != "plain output" {
t.Errorf("ordinary output = %q, want it untouched", got)
}
}
+181
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
package acp
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestACPImageAttachmentHistory(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
text string
images int
withoutVision bool
want string
}{
{name: "image only", images: 1, want: "[1 image]"},
{name: "text and images", text: "compare these", images: 2, want: "compare these [2 images]"},
{name: "ignored by model", images: 1, withoutVision: true, want: ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.DiscoverModels = func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
modalities := []string{"text", "image"}
if tc.withoutVision {
modalities = []string{"text"}
}
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "fake-model", InputModalities: modalities}}, nil
}
type observedTurn struct {
prompt string
images int
}
turns := make(chan observedTurn, 8)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, prompt string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
turns <- observedTurn{prompt: prompt, images: len(opts.Images)}
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "received"}, nil
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const imageData = "image-history-bytes-not-for-storage"
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(imageData))
var blocks []ContentBlock
if tc.text != "" {
blocks = append(blocks, TextBlock(tc.text))
}
for range tc.images {
blocks = append(blocks, ImageBlock(encoded, "image/png"))
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: blocks}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
live := <-turns
wantLiveImages := tc.images
if tc.withoutVision {
wantLiveImages = 0
}
if live.images != wantLiveImages {
t.Fatalf("live images = %d, want %d", live.images, wantLiveImages)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || len(events) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("read completed turn: events=%+v err=%v", events, err)
}
var user struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Attachments struct {
Images int `json:"images"`
} `json:"attachments"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(events[0].Payload, &user); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if user.Role != "user" || user.Content != tc.text || user.Attachments.Images != wantLiveImages {
t.Errorf("stored user event = %s, want original text and attachments.images=%d", events[0].Payload, wantLiveImages)
}
for _, event := range events {
if bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte(encoded)) || bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte(imageData)) {
t.Errorf("image data leaked into session event: %s", event.Payload)
}
}
followUp := func(t *testing.T, client *clientHarness) {
t.Helper()
if err := client.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("what did I send?")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got := <-turns
if want := "User: " + tc.want + "\n"; !strings.Contains(got.prompt, want) {
t.Errorf("seeded prompt missing user history %q: %q", want, got.prompt)
}
if got.images != 0 {
t.Errorf("historical images reattached: %d", got.images)
}
}
followUp(t, h)
h.stop()
// Fresh agents and stores reproduce a process restart, with no shared
// in-memory history to hide a missing attachment in the event log.
for _, method := range []string{MethodSessionLoad, MethodSessionResume} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
restoredDeps := deps
restoredDeps.Store = sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{RootDir: deps.Store.RootDir})
loader := newHarness(t, restoredDeps)
defer loader.stop()
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, method, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if method == MethodSessionLoad {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
if update.SessionUpdate != UpdateUserMessageChunk || update.Content.Text != tc.want {
t.Errorf("replayed user = %+v, want %q", update, tc.want)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal("user turn was not replayed")
}
} else {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
t.Errorf("resume replayed transcript: %+v", update)
default:
}
}
followUp(t, loader)
})
}
})
}
}
func TestACPAttachmentHistoryReadsExistingSessionMessages(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
meta, err := deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{SessionID: "attachment-compatibility", Cwd: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for i, payload := range []string{
`{"role":"user","content":"old text"}`,
`{"role":"user","content":"","attachments":{"images":1,"documents":2}}`,
`{"role":"user","content":"still text","attachments":{"images":-1,"documents":1.5}}`,
`{"role":"assistant","content":"answer","attachments":{"images":1}}`,
} {
if _, err := deps.Store.AppendEvent(meta.SessionID, sessions.AppendEventInput{Type: sessions.EventMessage, Payload: json.RawMessage(payload)}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("append message %d: %v", i, err)
}
}
a := &Agent{deps: deps}
_, messages, _, err := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := []string{"old text", "[1 image] [2 documents]", "still text", "answer"}
if len(messages) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("messages = %+v", messages)
}
for i, text := range want {
if messages[i].content != text {
t.Errorf("message %d = %q, want %q", i, messages[i].content, text)
}
}
}
+213
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// captureAgentOptions makes every turn record the agent.Options it was built
// with, so a test can assert the permission mode the next prompt actually runs
// with rather than only what the wire reports.
func captureAgentOptions(deps *Deps) *agent.Options {
var captured agent.Options
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
captured = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
}
return &captured
}
func newHarnessT(t *testing.T, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
t.Cleanup(h.stop)
return h
}
func mustCall(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, h *clientHarness, method string, params any, result any) {
t.Helper()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, method, params, result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", method, err)
}
}
// restartHarness replaces the live agent with a fresh one over the same store,
// which is the process restart the persisted mode has to survive.
func restartHarness(t *testing.T, h *clientHarness, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h.stop()
return newHarnessT(t, deps)
}
func modeOptionValue(t *testing.T, options []SessionConfigOption) string {
t.Helper()
for _, option := range options {
if option.ID == configIDMode {
return option.CurrentValue
}
}
t.Fatalf("no mode config option in %+v", options)
return ""
}
func assertModeReported(t *testing.T, result LoadSessionResult, want agent.PermissionMode) {
t.Helper()
if result.Modes == nil || result.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("modes = %+v, want currentModeId %q", result.Modes, want)
}
if got := modeOptionValue(t, result.ConfigOptions); got != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("mode config option = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestACPModePersistsAcrossRestartLoadAndResume(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want plan", meta.PermissionMode)
}
// LOAD after a restart: the response must report the stored mode, and the
// next prompt must actually run with it.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModePlan)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("continue")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
t.Fatalf("after load, agent.Options.PermissionMode = %q, want plan", captured.PermissionMode)
}
// RESUME after another restart reports the same.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var resumed ResumeSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &resumed)
assertModeReported(t, resumed, agent.PermissionModePlan)
}
func TestACPModePersistsViaSetConfigOption(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk),
}, &configured)
if got := modeOptionValue(t, configured.ConfigOptions); got != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q, want ask", got)
}
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want ask", meta.PermissionMode)
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
}
// TestACPModeRestoreFallback pins the restore boundary: no stored value keeps
// the historical auto default, and a stored value outside the three offered
// modes must never come back weaker than ask (and never unsafe).
func TestACPModeRestoreFallback(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
seed string // "" means metadata written before modes were persisted
want agent.PermissionMode
}{
{name: "unset keeps auto", want: agent.PermissionModeAuto},
{name: "ask preserved", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unknown falls back to ask", seed: "bogus", want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unsafe never restored", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
if tc.seed != "" {
if _, err := deps.Store.UpdateMode(created.SessionID, tc.seed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed mode: %v", err)
}
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, tc.want)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("go")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("next prompt PermissionMode = %q, want %q", captured.PermissionMode, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode pins the store-first order: when the
// mode cannot be saved the request fails and the live session is untouched.
func TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
// Remove the metadata file so UpdateMode fails but the live session stays
// promptable (turn persistence only warns when the file is gone).
metadataPath := filepath.Join(deps.Store.RootDir, created.SessionID, sessions.MetadataFile)
if err := os.Remove(metadataPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove metadata: %v", err)
}
err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
var rpcErr *rpcError
if !errors.As(err, &rpcErr) || rpcErr.Code != codeInternalError {
t.Fatalf("set_mode with an unsavable mode = %v, want internal error", err)
}
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("still auto")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModeAuto {
t.Fatalf("failed set_mode changed the live mode: PermissionMode = %q, want auto", captured.PermissionMode)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
// permission.go maps ZERO's permission prompt model onto ACP's
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
func escalationRequest(escalates bool) agent.PermissionRequest {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
func TestBuildPermissionOptions(t *testing.T) {
+53 -11
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,13 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// translate.go maps ZERO's agent events onto ACP session/update payloads. The
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ func browserToolDetails(name string) (*BrowserToolDetails, bool) {
}
}
const zeroBrowserMetaKey = "github.com/Gitlawb/zero/browser"
const zeroBrowserMetaKey = "github.com/Twigpine/zero/browser"
// attachBrowserToolDetails stores ZERO's browser descriptor in ACP's reserved
// extension channel. Keeping this in one helper prevents start, result, and
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ func browserToolTitle(command, rawArgs string) string {
}
// browserTitleTextSafe validates text after URL parsing has decoded escaped
// UTF-8 in the host. Valid UTF-8 alone is not presentation-safe: control,
// UTF-8 in the host. Valid UTF-8 alone is not presentation-safe: whitespace, control,
// format/bidi, and line/paragraph separator runes can reorder or split the
// permission label shown to a user. The execution URL remains unchanged.
func browserTitleTextSafe(text string) bool {
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ func browserTitleTextSafe(text string) bool {
return false
}
for _, r := range text {
if unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
if unicode.IsSpace(r) || unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
return false
}
}
@@ -246,22 +247,63 @@ func toolCallResult(result agent.ToolResult) ToolCallUpdate {
}
func toolResultContent(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallContent {
text := strings.TrimRight(result.Output, "\n")
content := make([]ToolCallContent, 0, 1+len(result.FileDiffs))
// ModelOutput, not the raw field. agent.ToolResult stores the undecorated
// model text alongside the typed enforcement notices, and the accessor is
// what composes the two; reading Output directly sends an ACP client the
// output with the disclosure missing.
text := strings.TrimRight(result.ModelOutput(), "\n")
if text == "" {
text = result.Display.Summary
}
if text == "" {
return nil
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
}
return []ToolCallContent{ToolContent(TextBlock(text))}
content = append(content, ToolContent(TextBlock(text)))
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
}
func appendToolResultDiffs(content []ToolCallContent, diffs []tools.FileDiff) []ToolCallContent {
for _, diff := range diffs {
if !filepath.IsAbs(diff.Path) || (!diff.OldExists && !diff.NewExists) {
continue
}
var oldText *string
if diff.OldExists {
old := diff.OldText
oldText = &old
}
var newText *string
if diff.NewExists {
updated := diff.NewText
newText = &updated
}
content = append(content, ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: diff.Path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText})
}
return content
}
func toolResultLocations(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallLocation {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if strings.TrimSpace(f) == "" {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
seen := make(map[string]bool, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, diff := range result.FileDiffs {
path := diff.Path
if path == "" || seen[path] {
continue
}
seen[path] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: path})
}
// FileDiff.Path is canonical absolute path data while ChangedFiles is
// normally workspace-relative. Without the trusted workspace root these
// coordinate systems cannot be correlated safely: a suffix match would let
// /workspace/sub/a.go consume the fallback for a distinct root a.go. The
// shared seen set deduplicates only identities already exactly comparable.
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if f == "" || seen[f] {
continue
}
seen[f] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: f})
}
return locs
+201 -5
View File
@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func browserDescriptor(t *testing.T, update ToolCallUpdate) BrowserToolDetails {
@@ -223,6 +224,9 @@ func TestBrowserPermissionTitlesMirrorSafeToolArguments(t *testing.T) {
func TestBrowserOpenTitlesRejectDecodedUnicodePresentationControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"https://safe.example%C2%A0evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%83evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E3%80%80evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%AEevil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%81%A6evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%C2%85evil.test/path",
@@ -242,6 +246,9 @@ func TestBrowserOpenTitlesRejectDecodedUnicodePresentationControls(t *testing.T)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if title := browserToolTitle("open", string(args)); title != "browser open" {
t.Errorf("unsafe origin accepted before permission translation: %q", title)
}
updates := []ToolCallUpdate{
toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "start", Name: "browser_open", Arguments: string(args)}),
permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "permission", ToolName: "browser_open", Args: map[string]any{"url": rawURL}}),
@@ -300,21 +307,26 @@ func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
ok := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "tc1",
Name: "edit_file",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "applied\n",
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", ""},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before\n", NewText: "after\n"}},
})
if ok.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCallUpdate || ok.Status != ToolStatusCompleted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected ok result: %+v", ok)
}
if len(ok.Content) != 1 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
if len(ok.Content) != 2 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected content: %+v", ok.Content)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 1 || ok.Locations[0].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("blank changed files should be dropped, got %+v", ok.Locations)
if diff := ok.Content[1]; diff.Type != "diff" || diff.Path != path || diff.OldText == nil || *diff.OldText != "before\n" || diff.NewText == nil || *diff.NewText != "after\n" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected diff content: %+v", diff)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 2 || ok.Locations[0].Path != path || ok.Locations[1].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("unproven absolute/relative aliases must both remain visible, got %+v", ok.Locations)
}
failed := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "tc2", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "boom"})
@@ -323,6 +335,190 @@ func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestToolCallDiffJSONDistinguishesEmptyFilesAndDeletion(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "empty.txt")
content := appendToolResultDiffs(nil, []tools.FileDiff{
{Path: path, OldExists: false, NewExists: true, NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before"},
})
if len(content) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("diff content = %#v", content)
}
for index, diff := range content {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(diff)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if wire["path"] != path {
t.Fatalf("wire diff %d = %s", index, encoded)
}
switch index {
case 0:
oldText, present := wire["oldText"]
if !present || oldText != nil || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("create diff = %s, want null oldText and empty newText", encoded)
}
case 1:
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("empty replacement diff = %s", encoded)
}
case 2:
newText, present := wire["newText"]
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || !present || newText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deletion diff = %s, want oldText and null newText", encoded)
}
}
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsPreserveDistinctPathIdentities(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
rootPath := filepath.Join(root, "a.go")
nestedPath := filepath.Join(root, "sub", "a.go")
diff := func(path string) tools.FileDiff {
return tools.FileDiff{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
diffs []tools.FileDiff
want []string
}{
{name: "both rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath), diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "root rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "nested rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")},
FileDiffs: tc.diffs,
})
if len(locations) != len(tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
for index := range tc.want {
if locations[index].Path != tc.want[index] {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestToolCallResultPreservesWhitespaceInFilePaths(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := " report.txt "
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].Path != absolutePath {
t.Fatalf("diff content path = %#v, want %q", update.Content, absolutePath)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want exact paths %q and %q", update.Locations, absolutePath, relativePath)
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsDeduplicateOnlyExactPaths(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{path, path},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}},
})
if len(locations) != 1 || locations[0].Path != path {
t.Fatalf("exact duplicate locations = %#v", locations)
}
}
func TestDeletedFileEmitsDiffAndKeepsLocations(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := "deleted.go"
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || *update.Content[0].OldText != "before" || update.Content[0].NewText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deleted file diff = %#v, want oldText with null newText", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("deleted file locations = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultEmitsOnlyRedactedFileDiffs(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt")
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "token=" + secret, NewText: "safe",
}}})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusError, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || strings.Contains(*update.Content[0].OldText, secret) {
t.Fatalf("ACP content leaked unredacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsSemanticallyUnchangedRedactedDiff(t *testing.T) {
oldSecret := "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
newSecret := "ghp_9876543210ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{
ChangedFiles: []string{"credentials.txt"},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credentials.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "token=" + oldSecret, NewText: "token=" + newSecret,
}},
})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK,
ChangedFiles: scrubbed.ChangedFiles, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs,
})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP emitted semantically unchanged redacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 1 || update.Locations[0].Path != "credentials.txt" {
t.Fatalf("ACP path fallback = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsDefaultIgnorableSplitSecretsOnEitherSide(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-ant-api03-AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGG"
for name, separator := range map[string]string{
"combining grapheme joiner": "\u034f",
"variation selector": "\ufe0f",
} {
for _, side := range []string{"old", "new"} {
t.Run(name+" "+side, func(t *testing.T) {
obfuscated := secret[:20] + separator + secret[20:]
diff := tools.FileDiff{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "safe old", NewText: "safe new",
}
if side == "old" {
diff.OldText = obfuscated
} else {
diff.NewText = obfuscated
}
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff}})
if !scrubbed.Redacted || len(scrubbed.FileDiffs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registry boundary retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", scrubbed)
}
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP content retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", update.Content)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestPlanUpdateAndStatus(t *testing.T) {
upd := planUpdate([]tools.PlanItem{
{Content: "step a", Status: "completed"},
+24 -3
View File
@@ -284,9 +284,30 @@ type ToolCallContent struct {
// type == "content"
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
// type == "diff"
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText *string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
}
// MarshalJSON preserves ACP's discriminated content union. A diff always has
// path, while nullable oldText/newText distinguish creation, deletion, and an
// existing file replaced with empty content. Other content variants omit all
// diff fields rather than serializing irrelevant nulls.
func (content ToolCallContent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
if content.Type == "diff" {
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Path string `json:"path"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText"`
NewText *string `json:"newText"`
}{
Type: content.Type, Path: content.Path, OldText: content.OldText, NewText: content.NewText,
})
}
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
}{Type: content.Type, Content: content.Content})
}
func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
+309
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// `zero exec` persists every provider usage report as a session usage event, so
// `zero usage report --session <id>` can total a run. The ACP agent did not set
// OnUsage, which dropped the token counts of every ACP session. A turn with two
// provider requests (a tool round trip) must leave two usage events, in the shape
// the usage report reads, next to the turn's messages.
func TestACPPromptPersistsProviderUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1300, OutputTokens: 21, CachedInputTokens: 900})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("count my tokens")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type usagePayload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
CachedInputTokens int `json:"cachedInputTokens"`
}
var got []usagePayload
messages := 0
for _, event := range events {
switch event.Type {
case sessions.EventUsage:
var payload usagePayload
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", event.Payload, err)
}
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
got = append(got, payload)
case sessions.EventMessage:
messages++
}
}
want := []usagePayload{
{PromptTokens: 1200, CompletionTokens: 34, TotalTokens: 1234},
{PromptTokens: 1300, CompletionTokens: 21, TotalTokens: 1321, CachedInputTokens: 900},
}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
for i := range want {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("usage event %d = %+v, want %+v", i, got[i], want[i])
}
}
if messages != 2 {
t.Fatalf("message events = %d, want the user and assistant messages of the turn", messages)
}
}
// Usage joins the turn's buffered batch, so a hard run failure that aborts the
// turn leaves nothing durable, exactly as it does for the turn's messages.
func TestACPHardTurnFailureDropsItsUsageWithTheTurn(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 500, OutputTokens: 5})
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("failing turn")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("hard RunAgent failure was reported as a successful turn")
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(events) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("aborted turn left durable events: %+v", events)
}
}
// StopCancelled is a successful ACP outcome: the turn commits. Tokens the
// provider already reported were spent, so they stay in the session log even
// though the client cancelled. A hard error (the test above) is the path that
// drops them.
func TestACPCancelledTurnKeepsReportedUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, context.Canceled
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 80, OutputTokens: 3})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "partial"}, context.Canceled
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("cancelled turn")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancelled turn returned an RPC error: %v", err)
}
if result.StopReason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", result.StopReason, StopCancelled)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
usageEvents := 0
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type != sessions.EventUsage {
continue
}
usageEvents++
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
var payload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if payload.PromptTokens != 80 || payload.CompletionTokens != 3 || payload.TotalTokens != 83 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled-turn usage = %+v, want 80/3/83", payload)
}
}
if usageEvents != 1 {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %d, want the one report from the cancelled turn", usageEvents)
}
}
// Usage events sit in the same log session/load and session/resume read, but
// history reconstruction skips them. The wire replay stays the conversation,
// and the next turn's prompt stays the conversation: token counts never become
// context and never cross the ACP wire.
func TestACPLoadAndResumeIgnoreUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
const userLine = "unique-acp-user-line"
const answer = "unique-acp-answer"
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
workspace := t.TempDir()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock(userLine)},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
h.stop()
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sawUsage := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == sessions.EventUsage {
sawUsage = true
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
}
}
if !sawUsage {
t.Fatal("session log has no usage event to ignore")
}
loader := newHarness(t, deps)
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
var replayed []string
for {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
replayed = append(replayed, update.Content.Text)
case <-time.After(150 * time.Millisecond):
goto drained
}
}
drained:
loader.stop()
if len(replayed) != 2 || replayed[0] != userLine || replayed[1] != answer {
t.Fatalf("session/load replay = %#v, want the user line and the answer only", replayed)
}
for _, text := range replayed {
if strings.Contains(text, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(text, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("session/load replayed usage onto the wire: %q", text)
}
}
var gotPrompt string
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, prompt string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, _ agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
gotPrompt = prompt
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "continued"}, nil
}
resumer := newHarness(t, deps)
defer resumer.stop()
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &ResumeSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/resume: %v", err)
}
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("carry on")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resumed session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, userLine) || !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, answer) {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt = %q, want the prior conversation", gotPrompt)
}
if strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt contains persisted usage: %q", gotPrompt)
}
}
// usagePayloadAllowedKeys is the non-escalating EventUsagePayload shape. ACP
// has no model escalation, and the writer must not grow a prompt, tool
// argument, or other raw field.
var usagePayloadAllowedKeys = map[string]bool{
"promptTokens": true,
"completionTokens": true,
"totalTokens": true,
"cachedInputTokens": true,
"cacheWriteTokens": true,
"reasoningTokens": true,
}
func assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t *testing.T, payload json.RawMessage) {
t.Helper()
var raw map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", payload, err)
}
if len(raw) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("usage payload is empty: %s", payload)
}
for key := range raw {
if !usagePayloadAllowedKeys[key] {
t.Fatalf("usage payload key %q is not a token count: %s", key, payload)
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func enabledSelfCorrector(t *testing.T) *SelfCorrector {
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
+160
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// The tool's own disclosure and the afterTool hook's are the SAME STRING, which
// is the real case: both come from the fixed Windows deny_read warning, so a hook
// running under the same token shape as the tool it follows reports exactly what
// the tool reported.
const sharedEnforcementNotice = "least-privilege notice"
const afterToolChatter = "vet-found-nothing"
// sharedNoticeHookPreparer runs a hook that prints ordinary output and carries
// the same enforcement notice the tool carries.
type sharedNoticeHookPreparer struct{}
func (sharedNoticeHookPreparer) PrepareExecution(_ context.Context, _ execution.Request) (execution.PreparedCommand, error) {
var command *exec.Cmd
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = exec.Command("cmd.exe", "/c", "echo "+afterToolChatter)
} else {
command = exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", "echo "+afterToolChatter)
}
return execution.PreparedCommand{
Command: command,
Enforcement: execution.Enforcement{Notices: []string{sharedEnforcementNotice}},
}, nil
}
func afterToolNoticeDispatcher(t *testing.T) *hooks.Dispatcher {
t.Helper()
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.after-tool", Event: hooks.EventAfterTool, Matcher: "notice_projection", Command: "vet", Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
Execution: execution.NewRunner(sharedNoticeHookPreparer{}),
})
}
// ONE DISCLOSURE, ONE DELIVERY, FROM EITHER HOOK PHASE.
//
// beforeTool was moved onto the typed EnforcementNotices slice and afterTool was
// left folding its notices into the prose feedback. Both halves then wrote the
// same fact: the typed slice, which every surface composes through ModelOutput
// and HumanDisplay, and the "Hook output:" block appended to the body. Since the
// two carry the identical fixed string, the model saw the disclosure twice and a
// bash or exec card showed it in the amber furniture and again in the body.
//
// Half a symmetry is its own defect, and this is the composition that catches it:
// a tool that reports a notice, followed by an afterTool hook that reports the
// same one.
func TestAnAfterToolNoticeIsDeliveredOnce(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(noticeProjectionTool{})
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "notice_projection", Arguments: `{}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), Hooks: afterToolNoticeDispatcher(t)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
// SETUP: the hook really ran, or the silence below is the silence of a hook
// that never executed.
if !strings.Contains(result.ModelOutput(), afterToolChatter) {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the afterTool hook's own output never arrived, so nothing here is under test:\n%s", result.ModelOutput())
}
if got := strings.Count(result.ModelOutput(), sharedEnforcementNotice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the disclosure reached the model %d times, want once:\n%s", got, result.ModelOutput())
}
if got := strings.Count(strings.Join(result.EnforcementNotices, "\n"), sharedEnforcementNotice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the typed slice carries the disclosure %d times, want once: %v", got, result.EnforcementNotices)
}
// The body must not carry it at all: the surfaces draw it from the slice, so a
// copy in the body is what renders it twice.
if strings.Contains(result.BaseModelOutput(), sharedEnforcementNotice) {
t.Errorf("the disclosure is in the result body as well as the typed slice:\n%s", result.BaseModelOutput())
}
if strings.Count(result.HumanDisplay().Summary, sharedEnforcementNotice) != 1 {
t.Errorf("the card summary shows the disclosure %d times, want once:\n%s",
strings.Count(result.HumanDisplay().Summary, sharedEnforcementNotice), result.HumanDisplay().Summary)
}
}
// And an afterTool hook that discloses something the tool did not still gets
// through, on the typed channel rather than as prose.
func TestAnAfterToolNoticeReachesTheTypedSlice(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(quietTool{})
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "quiet_tool", Arguments: `{}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), Hooks: quietToolAfterHookDispatcher(t)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.ModelOutput(), afterToolChatter) {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the afterTool hook never ran:\n%s", result.ModelOutput())
}
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 1 || result.EnforcementNotices[0] != sharedEnforcementNotice {
t.Errorf("an afterTool hook's disclosure did not reach the typed slice, so no card renders it: %v", result.EnforcementNotices)
}
if strings.Contains(result.BaseModelOutput(), sharedEnforcementNotice) {
t.Errorf("the disclosure travelled as prose in the body instead:\n%s", result.BaseModelOutput())
}
}
// quietTool carries no enforcement notice of its own.
type quietTool struct{}
func (quietTool) Name() string { return "quiet_tool" }
func (quietTool) Description() string { return "test tool with no enforcement notice" }
func (quietTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
func (quietTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (quietTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "the command output"}
}
func quietToolAfterHookDispatcher(t *testing.T) *hooks.Dispatcher {
t.Helper()
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.after-tool", Event: hooks.EventAfterTool, Matcher: "quiet_tool", Command: "vet", Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
Execution: execution.NewRunner(sharedNoticeHookPreparer{}),
})
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// providerCallingAskUserThenAnswer returns a mock provider whose first turn calls
+8 -20
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/testutil"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsNilCollectorNoOps(t *testing.T) {
@@ -111,7 +112,11 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, "/ws")
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
waitForIdle(t, diagnostics)
testutil.WaitFor(t, "worker idle", func() bool {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
defer diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
return diagnostics.working == nil
})
mu.Lock()
response = "ERR new"
mu.Unlock()
@@ -123,23 +128,6 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func waitForIdle(t *testing.T, diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
busy := diagnostics.working
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if busy == nil {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("worker never went idle")
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// changedFilesTool is a fake mutating tool reporting a changed file without
// touching the filesystem.
type changedFilesTool struct{}
+210
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
zeroruntime "github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const beforeToolNotice = "denyRead is configured, so the write jail is not confining writes"
// beforeToolChatter is what a hook prints for its own reasons. It must never
// reach the model: main is silent for a successful hook, and a hook that logs is
// not asking to be heard by anything but the operator's terminal.
const beforeToolChatter = "hook-ran-and-logged-this"
// noticeHookPreparer plans the hook command with an enforcement notice attached,
// the way the sandbox does for a command it weakened. The prepared child prints
// ordinary output as well, so one run carries both kinds of text and the
// delivery decision has to tell them apart.
type noticeHookPreparer struct{}
func (noticeHookPreparer) PrepareExecution(_ context.Context, _ execution.Request) (execution.PreparedCommand, error) {
var command *exec.Cmd
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = exec.Command("cmd.exe", "/c", "echo "+beforeToolChatter)
} else {
command = exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", "echo "+beforeToolChatter)
}
return execution.PreparedCommand{
Command: command,
Enforcement: execution.Enforcement{Notices: []string{beforeToolNotice}},
}, nil
}
func beforeToolDispatcher(t *testing.T, event hooks.Event, exitCode int) *hooks.Dispatcher {
t.Helper()
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.before-tool", Event: event, Matcher: "read_file", Command: "hook", Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
Execution: execution.NewRunner(noticeHookPreparer{}),
})
}
func readFileRunOptions(t *testing.T, dispatcher *hooks.Dispatcher) (Options, *mockProvider, string) {
t.Helper()
root := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), []byte("hello"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write notes.txt: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"notes.txt"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "read it"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
return Options{
SessionID: "session-hook",
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
MaxTurns: 2,
}, provider, root
}
// countRequestsContaining reports how many provider requests carry needle, so a
// notice delivered twice is distinguishable from one delivered once.
func countRequestsContaining(requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest, needle string) int {
total := 0
for _, request := range requests {
for _, message := range request.Messages {
if strings.Contains(message.Content, needle) {
total++
}
}
}
return total
}
// THE NOTICE CROSSES TO THE MODEL. THE HOOK'S OWN OUTPUT DOES NOT.
//
// executeToolCall used to read the beforeTool outcome only when Blocked was
// true, so a hook that ran under the weakened DenyRead token said so to nobody.
// Delivering DispatchOutcome.Messages fixed that and overshot: hookMessage folds
// the notice together with the hook's ordinary stdout, so every successful
// hook's routine logging became a standing input channel into the next model
// request, which is not what main does.
//
// One hook run produces both kinds of text here, because the bug is exactly a
// failure to tell them apart. Asserted on what the PROVIDER received, since that
// is the boundary that matters; a unit test on the joining helper cannot see
// which slice the loop passes it.
func TestSuccessfulBeforeToolHookDeliversItsNoticeAndNotItsOutput(t *testing.T) {
options, provider, _ := readFileRunOptions(t, beforeToolDispatcher(t, hooks.EventBeforeTool, 0))
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read the notes", provider, options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
// The tool ran, so this is the successful-hook path rather than a blocked
// call that never reached the tool.
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, "hello") {
t.Fatal("SETUP INVALID: the tool result never reached the model, so nothing was delivered to check")
}
// And the hook really did run and really did print, or the silence asserted
// below would be the silence of a hook that never executed.
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, beforeToolNotice) {
t.Fatal("the enforcement notice never reached the model, so a hook could run under the weakened token and say so to nobody")
}
if got := countRequestsContaining(provider.requests, beforeToolNotice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the notice reached the model %d times, want exactly once", got)
}
if someRequestContains(provider.requests, beforeToolChatter) {
t.Error("the hook's ordinary output reached the model; main is silent for a successful hook and routine logging must not become model input")
}
}
// A VETO MUST NOT SWALLOW A NOTICE FROM A HOOK THAT ALREADY RAN.
//
// Dispatch runs hooks in order and returns at the first veto. The successful
// hook ahead of it may already have run under the weakened token, and that is a
// fact about something that happened. The veto result used to be built from the
// blocking hook's Reason alone, so the earlier disclosure existed only in the
// audit record.
func TestABlockedCallStillCarriesTheEarlierHooksNotice(t *testing.T) {
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.first", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: "hook", Enabled: true},
{ID: "zero.veto", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: "veto", Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
Execution: execution.NewRunner(vetoSecondPreparer{}),
})
options, provider, _ := readFileRunOptions(t, dispatcher)
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read the notes", provider, options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
// SETUP: the second hook really did veto, or this is the ordinary path.
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, "was blocked by hook") {
t.Fatal("SETUP INVALID: the call was not blocked, so the veto path is not under test")
}
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, beforeToolNotice) {
t.Error("the veto result dropped the notice from the hook that had already run under the weakened token")
}
if got := countRequestsContaining(provider.requests, beforeToolNotice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the notice reached the model %d times, want exactly once", got)
}
if someRequestContains(provider.requests, beforeToolChatter) {
t.Error("the vetoed result carried the earlier hook's ordinary output")
}
}
// vetoSecondPreparer runs the first hook successfully with a notice and makes
// the second one exit non-zero, which is a veto for a blocking event.
type vetoSecondPreparer struct{}
func (vetoSecondPreparer) PrepareExecution(_ context.Context, request execution.Request) (execution.PreparedCommand, error) {
script := "echo " + beforeToolChatter
notices := []string{beforeToolNotice}
if request.Command.Name == "veto" {
script = "exit 2"
notices = nil
}
var command *exec.Cmd
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = exec.Command("cmd.exe", "/c", script)
} else {
command = exec.Command("/bin/sh", "-c", script)
}
return execution.PreparedCommand{
Command: command,
Enforcement: execution.Enforcement{Notices: notices},
}, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
zeroruntime "github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// editMatchingDispatcher is beforeToolDispatcher for the edit tool, so the same
// notice-and-chatter hook runs ahead of a call whose result carries a diff.
func editMatchingDispatcher(t *testing.T) *hooks.Dispatcher {
t.Helper()
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.before-tool", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "edit_file", Command: "hook", Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
Execution: execution.NewRunner(noticeHookPreparer{}),
})
}
// editFileRunOptions is readFileRunOptions for a tool whose result carries a
// rich preview, which is the case the disclosure went missing on.
func editFileRunOptions(t *testing.T, dispatcher *hooks.Dispatcher, onResult func(ToolResult)) (Options, *mockProvider) {
t.Helper()
root := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "x.go"), []byte("package main\n\nconst answer = 41\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write x.go: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedEditFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "edit_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"x.go","old_string":"41","new_string":"42"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "edited it"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
return Options{
SessionID: "session-hook-edit",
Cwd: root,
Registry: registry,
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
OnToolResult: onResult,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
MaxTurns: 2,
}, provider
}
// THE NOTICE HAS TO SURVIVE A RESULT WHOSE BODY IS A DIFF.
//
// This is the boundary the component suites left between them. The delivery test
// above proves a beforeTool notice reaches the provider with read_file, whose
// body is its output. The card tests prove a card renders a notice when the
// result already carries one typed. Neither composed the two, and in between them
// the notice was being folded into result.Output as hook prose.
//
// For an edit or a write that is exactly where it disappears: the card builds its
// body from Display.Preview rather than Output, and draws enforcement furniture
// only from the typed slice, so the operator saw the diff and no disclosure at
// all, live and restored, while the model saw the disclosure. A notice about a
// weakened token was hidden on precisely the results where something was written.
func TestABeforeToolNoticeSurvivesARichPreviewResult(t *testing.T) {
dispatcher := editMatchingDispatcher(t)
var results []ToolResult
options, provider := editFileRunOptions(t, dispatcher, func(result ToolResult) {
results = append(results, result)
})
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "bump the answer", provider, options); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if len(results) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: %d tool results, want the one edit", len(results))
}
result := results[0]
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the edit failed, so this is not the successful rich-preview path: %s", result.Output)
}
preview := result.BaseDisplay().Preview
if !strings.Contains(preview, "42") {
t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the result carries no diff preview, which is the whole case under test: %q", preview)
}
// TYPED, which is what every interactive surface reads.
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 1 || result.EnforcementNotices[0] != beforeToolNotice {
t.Errorf("the hook's disclosure did not reach the typed field, so the card and the restored card show the diff and no disclosure: %v", result.EnforcementNotices)
}
// AND NOT IN THE BODY AS WELL. Decoration has one owner per surface; carrying
// it in both places renders it twice wherever the surface draws the slice.
if strings.Contains(result.BaseModelOutput(), beforeToolNotice) {
t.Errorf("the disclosure is in the result body as well as the typed field:\n%s", result.BaseModelOutput())
}
// The diff itself stays a parseable diff.
if strings.Contains(preview, beforeToolNotice) {
t.Errorf("the disclosure was glued onto the diff:\n%s", preview)
}
// And the model still sees it, exactly once, with none of the hook's chatter.
if got := countRequestsContaining(provider.requests, beforeToolNotice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the notice reached the model %d times, want exactly once", got)
}
if someRequestContains(provider.requests, beforeToolChatter) {
t.Error("the hook's ordinary output reached the model")
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax"
)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import (
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestProposedCommandPrefixUsesSafeSimpleCommands(t *testing.T) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Session compaction.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// compactableHistory returns a history whose middle is large enough to trip
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Compaction preservation.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// stateConversation is a long enough conversation that Compact elides a middle
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const (
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// recentEdits extracts each mutated file's path and a one-line note from the
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
var markerPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`msg-\d+`)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// --- Pure Compact() tests -------------------------------------------------
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// someRequestContains reports whether any message sent to the provider across all
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Context budget.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type contextPlannerConfig struct {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// richMCPTool mimics a real MCP tool's schema (Exa/Firecrawl-style search): an
+2 -2
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestOptionsDeferThresholdFieldExists(t *testing.T) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// argsPermTool implements tools.ArgsPermissioner; plainTool does not.
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// noticeProjectionTool stands in for any sandboxed command tool: it reports the
// enforcement disclosure the way the real ones do, through the sandbox metadata
// key that finalizeToolOutcome promotes into the typed notice slice.
type noticeProjectionTool struct{}
func (noticeProjectionTool) Name() string { return "notice_projection" }
func (noticeProjectionTool) Description() string { return "test tool carrying an enforcement notice" }
func (noticeProjectionTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
func (noticeProjectionTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (noticeProjectionTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "the command output",
Display: tools.Display{Summary: "the human summary"},
Meta: map[string]string{"sandbox_notices": "least-privilege notice"},
}
}
// THE PROJECTION MUST CARRY ONE REPRESENTATION, NOT TWO.
//
// executeToolCall copies the typed notice slice into agent.ToolResult, so the
// text fields it copies alongside must be the UNDECORATED base. Storing the
// already-rendered text there instead leaves the same fact in two places with no
// contract between them: it happens to render once today only because the
// outcome arrives finalized and the agent accessor then reads Outcome.ModelView
// rather than the stored field. Any result that reaches the accessor without a
// finalized outcome renders the disclosure twice, and every raw reader of
// .Output sees text that disagrees with Outcome.ModelView.
func TestEnforcementNoticeIsStoredOnceAndRenderedOnce(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "least-privilege notice"
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(noticeProjectionTool{})
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "notice_projection", Arguments: `{}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("the notice never reached the agent result: %#v", result)
}
// The stored fields are the canonical undecorated base, and they agree with
// the finalized outcome they were projected from.
if strings.Contains(result.Output, notice) {
t.Errorf("ToolResult.Output stores the rendered notice as well as the slice: %q", result.Output)
}
if strings.Contains(result.Display.Summary, notice) {
t.Errorf("ToolResult.Display.Summary stores the rendered notice as well as the slice: %q", result.Display.Summary)
}
if result.Output != result.Outcome.ModelView {
t.Errorf("stored output %q disagrees with the finalized model view %q", result.Output, result.Outcome.ModelView)
}
if result.Display.Summary != result.Outcome.HumanView.Summary {
t.Errorf("stored summary %q disagrees with the finalized human view %q", result.Display.Summary, result.Outcome.HumanView.Summary)
}
// And every consumer that renders goes through the accessors, which show the
// disclosure exactly once without hiding the output it is attached to.
// loop.go builds the provider transcript from ModelOutput; the CLI writer and
// the TUI cards use both accessors.
transcript := result.ModelOutput()
if got := strings.Count(transcript, notice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the transcript shows the notice %d times, want 1: %q", got, transcript)
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "the command output") {
t.Errorf("the transcript lost the command output: %q", transcript)
}
summary := result.HumanDisplay().Summary
if got := strings.Count(summary, notice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the human summary shows the notice %d times, want 1: %q", got, summary)
}
if !strings.Contains(summary, "the human summary") {
t.Errorf("the human summary lost the tool summary: %q", summary)
}
}
// A result that never crossed the registry has no finalized outcome, so the
// accessor falls back to the stored field. That is the path on which a stored
// rendering would double, and it is the reason the contract above is stated on
// the stored fields rather than only on the accessors.
func TestUnfinalizedResultStillRendersTheNoticeOnce(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "least-privilege notice"
result := ToolResult{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "the command output",
Display: tools.Display{Summary: "the human summary"},
EnforcementNotices: []string{notice},
}
if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
t.Fatal("fixture is finalized; it no longer covers the fallback path")
}
if got := strings.Count(result.ModelOutput(), notice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("ModelOutput shows the notice %d times, want 1: %q", got, result.ModelOutput())
}
if got := strings.Count(result.HumanDisplay().Summary, notice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("HumanDisplay shows the notice %d times, want 1: %q", got, result.HumanDisplay().Summary)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// TestOptionsModelSwitcherFieldExists asserts the escalation hook is an
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/lsp"
)
// fileDiagnosticsTimeout bounds one inline post-edit diagnostics check so a
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type customApplyPatchTool struct {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Guardrail thresholds for the agent loop. These keep a runaway model from
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// emptyTurn is a stream that produces no visible text and no tool calls.
+94 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestAppendHookFeedbackFormatsOutput(t *testing.T) {
@@ -84,12 +84,102 @@ func TestBlockedByHookResultFallsBackWhenReasonEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// THE BLOCKING HOOK'S OWN NOTICE IS A NOTICE, NOT PART OF THE VETO TEXT.
//
// It used to arrive folded into Reason, so it reached the model inside the error
// message and never reached EnforcementNotices, which is what every surface
// renders as the disclosure and what the session record keeps apart from the
// body.
func TestBlockedByHookResultCarriesTheBlockersNoticeOnTheTypedSlice(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "denyRead is configured, so the write jail is not confining writes"
out := blockedByHookResult(
ToolCall{ID: "c4", Name: "bash"},
hooks.DispatchOutcome{Blocked: true, BlockedBy: "policy", Reason: "policy violation", Notices: []string{notice}},
)
if len(out.EnforcementNotices) != 1 || out.EnforcementNotices[0] != notice {
t.Fatalf("EnforcementNotices = %#v, want the blocking hook's notice", out.EnforcementNotices)
}
if strings.Contains(out.Output, notice) {
t.Errorf("the notice is also inside the veto message, so it is said twice:\n%s", out.Output)
}
if got := strings.Count(out.ModelOutput(), notice); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("the model sees the notice %d times, want once:\n%s", got, out.ModelOutput())
}
}
// AN EARLIER HOOK'S NOTICE SURVIVES A REASON THAT QUOTES IT.
//
// The veto path used to drop every notice whose text appeared anywhere in the
// blocking hook's reason, on the theory that the reason already carried it. A
// blocking hook that printed the same sentence, for example by relaying another
// tool's stderr, therefore removed an earlier hook's disclosure from the typed
// slice.
func TestBlockedByHookResultKeepsAnEarlierNoticeTheReasonQuotes(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "denyRead is configured, so the write jail is not confining writes"
out := blockedByHookResult(
ToolCall{ID: "c5", Name: "bash"},
hooks.DispatchOutcome{
Blocked: true,
BlockedBy: "veto",
Reason: "refusing: the last run reported \"" + notice + "\"",
Notices: []string{notice},
},
)
if len(out.EnforcementNotices) != 1 || out.EnforcementNotices[0] != notice {
t.Fatalf("the earlier hook's notice was dropped because the veto quoted it: %#v", out.EnforcementNotices)
}
}
func TestDispatchHelpersAreNoopWithoutDispatcher(t *testing.T) {
options := Options{} // Hooks is nil
if _, blocked := dispatchBeforeTool(context.Background(), options, ToolCall{Name: "bash"}, nil); blocked {
t.Fatal("a nil dispatcher must never block a tool")
}
if feedback := dispatchAfterTool(context.Background(), options, ToolCall{Name: "bash"}, nil, tools.Result{}); feedback != "" {
t.Fatalf("a nil dispatcher must yield no feedback, got %q", feedback)
if feedback, notices := dispatchAfterTool(context.Background(), options, ToolCall{Name: "bash"}, nil, tools.Result{}); feedback != "" || notices != nil {
t.Fatalf("a nil dispatcher must yield no feedback and no notices, got %q and %v", feedback, notices)
}
}
// A SUCCESSFUL beforeTool HOOK'S NOTICE MUST STAY TYPED.
//
// executeToolCall used to read the beforeTool outcome only when Blocked was true,
// so a hook that ran fine and produced an enforcement notice — for instance that
// it ran under the weakened DenyRead token — put that notice in the audit record
// and nowhere anybody could see it. The first fix delivered it as prose appended
// to the result output, which reached the model and no interactive surface,
// because those build their enforcement furniture from the typed slice.
//
// So the delivery is the typed field, and this pins the merge: the hook's notice
// first, the tool's own after it, each exactly once, blanks contributing nothing.
func TestBeforeToolNoticesMergeIntoTheTypedField(t *testing.T) {
const notice = "hook ran without WRITE_RESTRICTED because denyRead is configured"
const toolOwned = "the sandbox dropped the network capability for this call"
result := withAppliedHookNotices(ToolResult{Output: "ok"}, []string{notice}, nil)
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 1 || result.EnforcementNotices[0] != notice {
t.Fatalf("a successful beforeTool notice did not reach the typed field: %v", result.EnforcementNotices)
}
// AND NOT THE OUTPUT AS WELL, or every surface that renders the slice shows
// the disclosure twice.
if strings.Contains(result.Output, notice) {
t.Errorf("the notice was written into the output as well as the typed field: %q", result.Output)
}
// Both arrive, hook first, when the tool carries its own.
result = withAppliedHookNotices(ToolResult{EnforcementNotices: []string{toolOwned}}, []string{notice}, nil)
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 2 || result.EnforcementNotices[0] != notice || result.EnforcementNotices[1] != toolOwned {
t.Fatalf("the hook and tool notices did not merge in order: %v", result.EnforcementNotices)
}
// The same disclosure from both sides is carried once.
result = withAppliedHookNotices(ToolResult{EnforcementNotices: []string{notice}}, []string{notice}, nil)
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 1 {
t.Errorf("one disclosure reported by both the hook and the tool was carried %d times: %v", len(result.EnforcementNotices), result.EnforcementNotices)
}
// Blank notices contribute nothing, so a run with no hook output stays silent.
result = withAppliedHookNotices(ToolResult{}, []string{"", " "}, nil)
if len(result.EnforcementNotices) != 0 {
t.Errorf("blank hook notices produced %v, want nothing", result.EnforcementNotices)
}
}
+307 -73
View File
@@ -11,28 +11,33 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/streamjson"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const maxTurnsAnswer = "Agent reached maximum number of turns without a final answer."
const maxTurnsFinalAnswerPrompt = "You have reached the tool-turn limit. Do not call tools. Give a concise final answer now: summarize what you completed, what you found, and any remaining blockers."
// maxStreamStallRetries bounds how many times a turn that timed out (idle/stall)
// WITH NO OUTPUT yet is re-issued on a fresh connection before giving up. Only
// the no-output case is retried (a partial turn would duplicate), so this is a
// safe recovery for a stalled/dead pooled connection.
// OR hit a mid-stream transport abort (#973) with no answer text yet is re-issued
// on a fresh connection before giving up. Incomplete tool-call previews are
// allowed through the gate (they are never dispatched before the error return).
// The safety claim is only that visible answer prose is not duplicated on retry —
// not that every partial stream shape is excluded. Covers a stalled/dead pooled
// connection or a socket abort before tool dispatch.
//
// Set to 1 (not 2): each attempt can itself idle for the full stream timeout
// (~5min) before the stall is even detected, so 2 retries left an interactive
// session frozen for ~15min. One retry keeps the common single-hiccup recovery
// while bounding the worst case to ~2× the idle timeout.
// while bounding the worst case to ~2× the idle timeout. Mid-stream transport
// aborts share this bound (do not raise it for #973).
const maxStreamStallRetries = 1
const (
@@ -374,7 +379,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
rec.StampFirstToken()
}
if onText != nil {
forwardedVisibleText = true
// Zero-length chunks are not committed answer prose; counting
// them would block an eligible mid-stream abort retry.
if s != "" {
forwardedVisibleText = true
}
onText(s)
}
}
@@ -450,9 +459,14 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
// A stream idle/stall timeout is safely re-issued when the turn committed NO
// answer text — no forwarded visible prose (forwardedVisibleText) and no
// collected final text (collected.Text). This covers two cases:
// A stream idle/stall timeout OR mid-stream transport abort (#973 — wsarecv /
// connection reset / unexpected EOF / connection closed / broken pipe) is
// safely re-issued when the turn committed NO answer text — no forwarded
// visible prose (forwardedVisibleText) and no collected final text
// (collected.Text). The abort gate matches midStreamAbortNeedles only, not
// the full shouldReconnect list: connect-phase timeouts and connection
// refused are NOT retried here (a slow healthy server must not cost a
// second prefill). This covers three cases:
// 1. Nothing streamed at all before the connection died (the original
// macOS stale-pooled-connection hang past the response-header timeout).
// 2. The model streamed transient reasoning and began a tool call (e.g. a
@@ -463,13 +477,27 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// re-render is transient previews, not duplicated answer text. This is
// why the gate no longer excludes collected.ToolCalls: an incomplete
// tool call from a timed-out stream is discard-and-retry, not output.
// 3. Mid-stream socket abort after connect succeeded (Windows WSAECONNABORTED /
// wsarecv, connection reset by peer). Same no-tool-executed safety: the
// error returns before tool dispatch, so a bounded retry is safe.
// A turn that forwarded real prose is NOT retried (it would duplicate visible
// answer text) and falls through to the error return below. Capped +
// exponential backoff, with a user-visible notice per attempt.
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxStreamStallRetries &&
isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) && !forwardedVisibleText &&
(isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) || isMidStreamTransportAbort(collected.Error)) &&
!forwardedVisibleText &&
collected.Text == ""; attempt++ {
if notify := stallRetryNoticeFor(options); notify != nil {
var notify reconnectNotifier
if isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) {
notify = stallRetryNoticeFor(options)
} else {
notify = reconnectNoticeFor(options)
// Count this post-connect reissue even when the replacement
// connect succeeds immediately. streamWithReconnect only
// increments reconnect_count after a failed connect attempt.
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterReconnectCount, 1)
}
if notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamStallRetries)
}
if err := sleepWithContext(ctx, backoffFor(attempt)); err != nil {
@@ -482,12 +510,22 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryErr != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return result, ctx.Err()
}
return result, retryErr
}
stallGenSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, forwardingOpts)
stallGenSpan.End()
}
// Recheck ctx after a retried CollectStream: helpers.go stores
// ctx.Err().Error() in collected.Error, and errors.New of that string
// drops the context.Canceled sentinel ACP branches on.
if ctx.Err() != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
if collected.Error != "" {
// Route a reissued stream's non-stall error through the SAME recovery as
// the initial stream (image-rejection wrapping / context-limit compaction)
@@ -498,6 +536,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, stop
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
if collected.Error != "" {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, errors.New(collected.Error)
@@ -646,9 +688,25 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
// interleaving yields [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and a 400.
// Same reason the self-correction feedback below is deferred.
var toolImageMessages []zeroruntime.Message
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
// which the providers validate. Vision-gate evaluation is deferred until
// after any model switch this turn resolves, so images can reach an
// escalated vision-capable model.
var toolResultsWithImages []ToolResult
buildToolImageMessages := func() []zeroruntime.Message {
var out []zeroruntime.Message
for _, tr := range toolResultsWithImages {
if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(tr, options); ok {
out = append(out, imageMessage)
}
}
return out
}
// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -705,15 +763,8 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
IsError: toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
})
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
// which the providers validate.
if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(toolResult); ok {
toolImageMessages = append(toolImageMessages, imageMessage)
if len(toolResult.Images) > 0 {
toolResultsWithImages = append(toolResultsWithImages, toolResult)
}
// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
@@ -725,13 +776,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
if abortErr != nil {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, abortErr
}
if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.ModelOutput()
result.StopReason = stopReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -755,7 +806,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
@@ -774,10 +825,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
}
}
// Every tool_result for this turn is now recorded, including aborted
// placeholders, so the images can follow without splitting them.
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
toolImageMessages = nil
// Run post-edit self-correction once over the union of files this turn
// changed, then append any feedback after every tool_result is recorded so
@@ -865,6 +912,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
}
// Every tool_result, self-correct notice, and model-switch update for this
// turn is now in place; evaluate and append image messages against the
// effective (potentially escalated) model.
messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
toolResultsWithImages = nil
// A turn can mix valid tool calls with a dropped (nameless) one. The valid
// calls executed above; surface the dropped call too so it is never
// silently ignored just because the turn also did real work. This is
@@ -1414,10 +1467,31 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}
// beforeTool hooks may veto the call before it runs (a non-zero exit blocks).
//
// A SUCCESSFUL beforeTool HOOK STILL HAS SOMETHING TO SAY, BUT ONLY ITS NOTICE.
//
// Reading the outcome only when Blocked left the enforcement disclosure in the
// audit record and nowhere the model or the operator could see it: a hook could
// run under the weakened DenyRead token and say so to nobody.
//
// Notices, NOT Messages. Messages is presentation text that hookMessage builds
// by folding the notice together with the hook's ordinary stdout, so delivering
// it would put every successful hook's routine logging, large diagnostics, and
// whatever text a hook happened to process into the next model request. That is
// a behaviour change nobody asked for and a standing input channel. main is
// silent for successful hooks and stays silent here for everything except the
// disclosure. Carried to the tool result below, the same surface afterTool
// feedback already uses.
var beforeToolNotices []string
// Filled after the tool runs, and merged with beforeTool's at the one
// finalization below so both phases land on the same contract.
var afterToolNotices []string
if toolFound {
if outcome, blocked := dispatchBeforeTool(ctx, options, call, args); blocked {
outcome, blocked := dispatchBeforeTool(ctx, options, call, args)
if blocked {
return blockedByHookResult(call, outcome), nil
}
beforeToolNotices = outcome.Notices
}
args = shellExecutionArgsForApproval(call.Name, args, decisionAction, options)
@@ -1463,7 +1537,10 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
})
if retryResult, directResult, retried, action, reason, prefix, abortErr := maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, permissionMode, options, progressCallback); retried || directResult != nil || abortErr != nil {
if directResult != nil {
return *directResult, abortErr
// A denied, cancelled, or ungrantable retry still returns a result for a
// call whose beforeTool hook already ran. Without this the disclosure is
// produced and then dropped on the floor.
return withAppliedHookNotices(*directResult, beforeToolNotices, nil), abortErr
}
result = retryResult
permissionGranted = true
@@ -1489,7 +1566,15 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
// afterTool hooks run once the tool has executed; their output (e.g. a
// formatter or vet result) is surfaced back to the model on the result.
if toolFound {
if feedback := dispatchAfterTool(ctx, options, call, args, result); feedback != "" {
// NEITHER PHASE'S NOTICES ARE FOLDED IN HERE. They are typed enforcement
// data on both sides now, and appending them as hook prose was what kept
// beforeTool's out of every surface that renders the typed slice, and what
// made afterTool's arrive twice once that slice was composed. Only the
// hook's own output, which is what an afterTool validator asked to say,
// still travels this way.
feedback, notices := dispatchAfterTool(ctx, options, call, args, result)
afterToolNotices = notices
if strings.TrimSpace(feedback) != "" {
var didRedact bool
result.Output, didRedact = appendHookFeedback(result.Output, feedback)
if didRedact {
@@ -1516,27 +1601,32 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
// Secret scrubbing happens at the registry boundary (the single point both
// the agent loop and the MCP server pass through), so result.Output is
// already redacted here and result.Redacted reflects whether it changed.
return ToolResult{
Risk: executedRisk,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.ModelOutput(),
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Images: result.Images,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.HumanDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
//
// Wrapped in the same finalization every other return from a hooked call
// uses, so the normal path cannot drift away from the veto and retry paths.
return withAppliedHookNotices(ToolResult{
Risk: executedRisk,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.BaseModelOutput(),
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
EnforcementNotices: append([]string(nil), result.EnforcementNotices...),
Images: result.Images,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.BaseDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
// the Run turn loop performs the actual provider switch. Empty for every
// ordinary tool result.
RequestedModel: result.Meta["escalate_to_model"],
}, nil
}, beforeToolNotices, afterToolNotices), nil
}
const sandboxNamespaceLimitedReason = "sandbox output is limited to the sandbox PID namespace; host/global state requires approval"
@@ -1833,6 +1923,10 @@ func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, n
}
func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolResult {
// PrePermissionRejecter runs before Registry.RunWithOptions, so it must
// explicitly cross the same transcript/redaction boundary before its result
// can be forwarded through ACP.
result = tools.ScrubResultSecrets(result)
output, outputRedacted := scrubInterceptedOutput(result.Output)
display := result.Display
summary, summaryRedacted := scrubInterceptedOutput(display.Summary)
@@ -1860,6 +1954,7 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
Meta: meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: display,
LoadedTools: loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
@@ -1915,9 +2010,9 @@ func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, arg
// dispatchAfterTool runs configured afterTool hooks once a tool has executed and
// returns any advisory output (e.g. a formatter or vet result) to surface back
// to the model. afterTool hooks never block. A nil dispatcher is a no-op.
func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, result tools.Result) string {
func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, result tools.Result) (string, []string) {
if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
return ""
return "", nil
}
outcome := options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
Event: hooks.EventAfterTool,
@@ -1933,7 +2028,13 @@ func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args
"changedFiles": result.ChangedFiles,
},
})
return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Join(outcome.Messages, "\n"))
// Both halves, because they have different destinations. The hook's own output
// is prose that belongs in the result body where an afterTool validator's
// findings have always gone; its enforcement notices are typed data that the
// caller merges into the result the same way beforeTool's are. Returning only
// the joined messages was what left afterTool on the old channel while
// beforeTool moved, and a notice reported by both then appeared twice.
return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Join(outcome.Messages, "\n")), outcome.Notices
}
// dispatchSessionStart runs configured sessionStart hooks once before the first
@@ -1997,7 +2098,7 @@ func blockedByHookResult(call ToolCall, outcome hooks.DispatchOutcome) ToolResul
reason = "blocked by a beforeTool hook"
}
message := fmt.Sprintf("Error: %q was blocked by hook %q: %s", call.Name, outcome.BlockedBy, reason)
return ToolResult{
result := ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: tools.StatusError,
@@ -2005,12 +2106,124 @@ func blockedByHookResult(call ToolCall, outcome hooks.DispatchOutcome) ToolResul
Redacted: redacted,
DenialReason: DenialHookBlocked,
}
// Dispatch runs hooks in order and stops at the first veto, so an earlier hook
// may already have run under a weakened token before this one said no. Its
// notice describes something that happened and has to survive the veto, and so
// does the blocking hook's own.
//
// ALL OF THEM, FROM THE TYPED SLICE. Reason carries the hook's words only, so
// nothing here is said twice and nothing has to be filtered out. The filter
// this replaced matched notices against the reason text, and dropped an
// earlier hook's disclosure whenever the blocking hook's output quoted it.
return withAppliedHookNotices(result, outcome.Notices, nil)
}
// withAppliedHookNotices is the single place a hook enforcement notice
// reaches a tool result on a path that does NOT run afterTool.
//
// The normal tail joins the notices with the afterTool feedback and delivers
// both at once. Two other exits return a result for a call whose hook already
// ran: a later hook's veto, and a denied, cancelled, or ungrantable unsandboxed
// retry. Routing all three through one function is what keeps "the hook ran
// under this token" from depending on which exit the call happened to take.
//
// NO REBUDGET HERE, AND THAT IS LOAD-BEARING ON WHAT MAY PASS THROUGH. The
// normal tail appends and then calls Registry.RebudgetAfterHook, because what it
// appends is afterTool feedback: hook stdout, which a hook can make arbitrarily
// large. These notices cannot be: they are CommandPlan.Notes, which only this
// package's own fixed sentences may fill (none does today; #1006 refuses the
// denyRead trade the last one described), and nothing hook-authored reaches
// this slice: DispatchOutcome.Messages is where
// hook output lives, and the capture site deliberately does not read it.
//
// So if anything ever widens what is delivered here to include text a hook or a
// tool can size, this needs the rebudget step as well, which means converting
// through tools.Result the way the tail does rather than editing Output in
// place. Do not widen it without that.
// withAppliedHookNotices carries a hook's disclosures onto the result as TYPED
// enforcement notices, and is the single finalization point every return path
// from a hooked call goes through.
//
// BOTH PHASES, because half a symmetry is its own defect. beforeTool was moved
// onto the typed slice while afterTool was left folding its notices into the
// prose feedback, and since the two carry the identical fixed string, a
// disclosure reported by both then reached the model twice: once from the typed
// prepend every surface composes, once inside the hook feedback in the body. A
// bash or exec card showed it in the furniture and again in the body.
//
// It used to fold them into result.Output as prose. That reached the provider,
// which reads the output, and reached nothing else. Every interactive surface
// builds its enforcement furniture from the typed slice, and for an edit or a
// write the card shows Display.Preview instead of Output, so the disclosure was
// absent from the live card in both its collapsed and expanded states and from
// the session payload that restores them. A notice about a weakened token was
// therefore shown to the model and hidden from the operator, on exactly the
// results where something was written.
//
// Typed here, the canonical accessors compose it per surface, the same way a
// tool's own notices already work. Nothing is written into Output as well:
// decoration has one owner per surface or the disclosure appears twice.
// Hook notices lead, in run order, with the tool's own after them: dedupe makes
// the ordering moot for the duplicate case that motivated this, and for distinct
// disclosures it keeps the shape the tool-owned notices already had.
func withAppliedHookNotices(result ToolResult, before []string, after []string) ToolResult {
hookNotices := before
if len(after) > 0 {
hookNotices = append(append([]string(nil), before...), after...)
}
merged, didRedact := mergeEnforcementNotices(hookNotices, result.EnforcementNotices)
result.EnforcementNotices = merged
if didRedact {
result.Redacted = true
}
return result
}
// mergeEnforcementNotices puts the hook disclosures ahead of the
// tool's own and drops exact repeats, so a surface rendering the slice shows
// each disclosure exactly once.
//
// Hook notices are third-party text arriving on an intercepted path that bypasses
// the registry's redaction boundary, so they are scrubbed here the way
// appendHookFeedback scrubbed them while they travelled as prose. The bool
// reports whether scrubbing changed anything, so Redacted keeps matching the
// registry's contract.
func mergeEnforcementNotices(before []string, own []string) ([]string, bool) {
if len(before) == 0 && len(own) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
merged := make([]string, 0, len(before)+len(own))
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(before)+len(own))
redacted := false
for index, notice := range append(append([]string(nil), before...), own...) {
if index < len(before) {
scrubbed := redaction.RedactString(notice, redaction.Options{})
redacted = redacted || scrubbed != notice
notice = scrubbed
}
if strings.TrimSpace(notice) == "" {
continue
}
if _, already := seen[notice]; already {
continue
}
seen[notice] = struct{}{}
merged = append(merged, notice)
}
if len(merged) == 0 {
return nil, redacted
}
return merged, redacted
}
// appendHookFeedback appends afterTool hook output to a tool result's output,
// scrubbed for secrets like every other string crossing the tool boundary. The
// returned bool reports whether scrubbing changed the feedback, so the caller can
// set ToolResult.Redacted to match the registry's redaction contract.
// The joiner that folded beforeTool notices in with the afterTool feedback is
// gone. Sending a typed enforcement notice out as hook prose was the defect, not
// the delivery: see withAppliedHookNotices. afterTool feedback still arrives here
// on its own, which is all this path was ever meant to carry.
func appendHookFeedback(output string, feedback string) (string, bool) {
scrubbed := redaction.RedactString(feedback, redaction.Options{})
redacted := scrubbed != feedback
@@ -2145,17 +2358,19 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
Cwd: options.Cwd,
})
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.ModelOutput(),
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.HumanDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
Status: result.Status,
Output: result.BaseModelOutput(),
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
EnforcementNotices: append([]string(nil), result.EnforcementNotices...),
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
FileDiffs: result.FileDiffs,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
Display: result.BaseDisplay(),
Outcome: result.Outcome,
}
}
return ToolResult{
@@ -3457,8 +3672,10 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
//
// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
// result, so nothing else associates them.
func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
// result, so nothing else associates them. If the effective model cannot
// accept images, the tool's text result is left unchanged and this follow-up
// is a notice with no image parts, matching the CLI/TUI vision gate.
func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult, options Options) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
for _, image := range result.Images {
if len(image.Data) == 0 {
@@ -3479,9 +3696,26 @@ func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
if label == "" {
label = "tool"
}
if !modelAcceptsToolImages(options) {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + " was not sent because the current model does not support image input. Switch to a vision-capable model before retrying image delivery, including any images skipped by the tool's image budget.",
}, true
}
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
Images: images,
}, true
}
func modelAcceptsToolImages(options Options) bool {
if options.SupportsVision != nil {
return options.SupportsVision(options.Model)
}
registry, err := modelregistry.DefaultRegistry()
if err != nil {
return modelregistry.VisionCapableByName(options.Model)
}
return modelregistry.SupportsVision(registry, options.Model)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// imageEchoProvider records the messages of the first request it receives, then
+24 -7
View File
@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specmode"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/specmode"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type mockProvider struct {
@@ -27,6 +27,23 @@ type mockProvider struct {
requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
}
func TestPrePermissionRejectScrubsFileDiffs(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
result := toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(ToolCall{ID: "call", Name: "test"}, tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt"),
OldExists: true,
NewExists: true,
OldText: "token=" + secret,
NewText: "safe",
}},
})
if len(result.FileDiffs) != 1 || strings.Contains(result.FileDiffs[0].OldText, secret) || !result.Redacted {
t.Fatalf("pre-permission FileDiff = %#v, redacted = %t", result.FileDiffs, result.Redacted)
}
}
func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()})
call := ToolCall{Name: tools.ExecCommandToolName}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
type safetyTool struct {
+487
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// midStreamAbortProvider connects successfully but emits a transport-abort
// StreamEventError on the first abortBefore calls, then succeeds with "done".
// hangOnCall, if > 0, makes that 1-based call block until ctx is done so a
// cancel during the retried CollectStream can be reproduced.
// connectFailFrom, if > 0, makes that 1-based call and later return a
// reconnectable connect error so streamWithReconnect enters its backoff.
type midStreamAbortProvider struct {
calls int32
abortBefore int32
abortError string
partialText string
emptyTextEvent bool
partialToolCall string
hangOnCall int32
connectFailFrom int32
connectErr string
started chan struct{}
}
func (p *midStreamAbortProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
n := atomic.AddInt32(&p.calls, 1)
if p.connectFailFrom > 0 && n >= p.connectFailFrom {
if p.started != nil {
select {
case <-p.started:
default:
close(p.started)
}
}
errMsg := p.connectErr
if errMsg == "" {
errMsg = "connection reset by peer"
}
return nil, errors.New(errMsg)
}
if p.hangOnCall > 0 && n == p.hangOnCall {
if p.started != nil {
close(p.started)
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent)
go func() {
<-ctx.Done()
close(ch)
}()
return ch, nil
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 5)
if n <= p.abortBefore {
if p.emptyTextEvent {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: ""}
}
if p.partialText != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: p.partialText}
}
if p.partialToolCall != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ToolName: p.partialToolCall}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"x.html","content":"<!doctype`}
}
errMsg := p.abortError
if errMsg == "" {
errMsg = "provider stream error: read: connection reset by peer"
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
Error: errMsg,
}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamConnectionReset(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a mid-stream connection reset should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamWindowsAbort(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: read: wsarecv: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine",
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a Windows mid-stream abort should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
// wsarecv alone (no "connection was aborted" substring) must still retry, so
// deleting the wsarecv needle cannot go green.
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamWsarecvNeedle(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: read: wsarecv: 10053",
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wsarecv without 'connection was aborted' should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryMidStreamAbortAfterPartialOutput(t *testing.T) {
sawText := 0
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, partialText: "partial"}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnText: func(string) { sawText++ },
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a mid-stream abort after partial output must NOT be retried; want an error")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("partial-then-abort must not retry, got %d calls", got)
}
if sawText == 0 {
t.Fatal("OnText must have fired so forwardedVisibleText is the named guard")
}
}
// A zero-length OnText chunk is not committed answer prose, so an eligible
// transport abort still retries.
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamAbortAfterEmptyTextEvent(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, emptyTextEvent: true}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnText: func(string) {},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty OnText must not block mid-stream abort retry, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamAbortAfterIncompleteToolCall(t *testing.T) {
starts := 0
dispatched := 0
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, partialToolCall: "write_file"}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnToolCallStart: func(string, string) { starts++ },
OnToolCallDelta: func(string, string) {},
OnToolCall: func(ToolCall) { dispatched++ },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a mid-stream abort mid-incomplete-tool-call should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
if starts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the incomplete tool call should have been forwarded once before the abort, got %d starts", starts)
}
if dispatched != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnToolCall must never fire for an incomplete aborted tool call (no dispatch), got %d", dispatched)
}
}
func TestRunGivesUpAfterMaxMidStreamAbortRetries(t *testing.T) {
if maxStreamStallRetries != 1 {
t.Fatalf("maxStreamStallRetries = %d, want 1 (#973 must not raise this bound)", maxStreamStallRetries)
}
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 99}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a persistent mid-stream abort must surface an error after exhausting retries")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry); pin the bound at 1, got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRunMidStreamAbortUsesReconnectNotice(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
var notices string
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("retry should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
lower := strings.ToLower(notices)
if !strings.Contains(lower, "connection lost") || !strings.Contains(lower, "reconnecting") {
t.Fatalf("transport abort must use reconnect wording, notices = %q", notices)
}
if strings.Contains(lower, "model stalled") {
t.Fatalf("transport abort must not use stall wording, notices = %q", notices)
}
}
func TestRunCancelDuringMidStreamRetryPreservesContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
started := make(chan struct{})
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, hangOnCall: 2, started: started}
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := Run(ctx, "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
errCh <- err
}()
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for retried stream")
}
cancel()
err := <-errCh
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("want context.Canceled after cancel during retried stream")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("cancel during retried stream must keep the sentinel, got %q (errors.Is Canceled = false)", err)
}
}
func TestRunCancelDuringReplacementConnectBackoffPreservesContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = 200 * time.Millisecond
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
started := make(chan struct{})
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1, connectFailFrom: 2, started: started}
errCh := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := Run(ctx, "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
errCh <- err
}()
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for replacement connect failure")
}
cancel()
err := <-errCh
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("want context.Canceled after cancel during replacement connect backoff")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("cancel during replacement connect backoff must keep the sentinel, got %q (errors.Is Canceled = false)", err)
}
}
func TestRunMidStreamAbortRecordsReconnectCountOnImmediateReplacement(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
rec := trace.NewRecorder("midstream-abort", "run-1", "test")
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{abortBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
Trace: rec,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("retry should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 immediate replacement), got %d", got)
}
gotTrace := rec.Finish()
if got := gotTrace.Counter(trace.CounterReconnectCount); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reconnect_count = %d, want 1 for a successful replacement connection", got)
}
if got := gotTrace.Counter(trace.CounterModelRequests); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("model_requests = %d, want 2 (initial + replacement)", got)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryResponseHeaderTimeout(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 99,
abortError: "net/http: timeout awaiting response headers",
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a response-header timeout must not be retried as a mid-stream abort")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("header timeout must not retry, got %d calls", got)
}
}
func TestIsMidStreamTransportAbort(t *testing.T) {
aborts := []string{
"provider stream error: read: connection reset by peer",
"provider stream error: unexpected EOF",
"provider stream error: read: wsarecv: 10053",
"provider stream error: read: wsarecv: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine",
"An existing connection was forcibly closed by the remote host",
"provider stream error: read: connection closed",
"write: broken pipe",
"provider stream error: server closed the connection",
"provider stream error: software caused connection abort",
}
for _, m := range aborts {
if !isMidStreamTransportAbort(m) {
t.Fatalf("want mid-stream transport abort: %q", m)
}
}
notAborts := []string{
"",
"context length exceeded",
"rate limit error: slow down",
"model not found",
"net/http: timeout awaiting response headers",
"dial tcp 10.0.0.1:443: connect: connection refused",
"i/o timeout",
"500 Internal Server Error",
"502 Bad Gateway",
"503 Service Unavailable",
"504 Gateway Timeout",
"provider request error: request does not satisfy oneOf schema",
"provider request error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
"provider error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
"provider error: upstream connection reset by peer",
"provider error: unexpected EOF while reading upstream response",
"provider error: 502 Bad Gateway",
"auth error: connection reset by peer",
"rate limit error: server closed",
"schema error: property oneOf is invalid",
}
for _, m := range notAborts {
if isMidStreamTransportAbort(m) {
t.Fatalf("must NOT classify as mid-stream transport abort: %q", m)
}
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryClassifiedProviderErrorWithSocketPhrase(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider request error: connection closed is not a supported finish reason",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("classified provider error with 'connection closed' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "connection closed") {
t.Fatalf("expected original error preserved, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryProviderErrorWithSocketPhrase(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider error: unexpected EOF while reading upstream response",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("provider error with 'unexpected EOF' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if got := err.Error(); got != p.abortError {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want original provider error %q", got, p.abortError)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotRetryApplicationErrorContainingEOFSubstring(t *testing.T) {
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider request error: request does not satisfy oneOf schema",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected application error, got nil")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("application error with 'oneOf' must not retry (got %d calls, want 1)", got)
}
if notices != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no reconnect notices, got %q", notices)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oneOf") {
t.Fatalf("expected original error preserved, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRunRetriesMidStreamUnexpectedEOF(t *testing.T) {
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
p := &midStreamAbortProvider{
abortBefore: 1,
abortError: "provider stream error: unexpected EOF",
}
var notices string
opts := Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(s string) { notices += s },
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, opts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected EOF should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 abort + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
lower := strings.ToLower(notices)
if !strings.Contains(lower, "connection lost") || !strings.Contains(lower, "reconnecting") {
t.Fatalf("expected reconnect notice, got %q", notices)
}
}
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type propagationOutputTool struct {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// Parallel read-ahead for tool batches. When a turn requests several
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// probeTool records execution overlap and ordering so tests can assert what
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// countingSchemaTool records how many times its Parameters() schema is read, so a
Loaded 100 of 875 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff. Show more