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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vasanthdev2004 a4578dacc0 test(tools): stop the tty session before removing its root
TestExecCommandTTYSkipsInteractiveBlock runs ssh to a bogus host under
tty with a 250ms yield. When ssh is still resolving the host after the
yield, the session keeps running in the test's directory and nothing
stops it, so on Windows t.TempDir's cleanup fails with a sharing
violation. It failed Smoke (windows-latest) on a README-only PR.

Stop the session in a cleanup, and build the tool on execTestRoot,
which retries the removal while Windows still holds the directory right
after the stop, as the other exec tests that leave a session do.
2026-10-27 12:31:03 +05:30
Vasanth T 164150633a feat(skills): install a skill's bundled files and point the skill tool at them (#1167)
* feat(skills): install a skill's bundled files and point the skill tool at them

A skill was only its SKILL.md: install copied that one file, and the skill
tool returned only the markdown body, so a skill whose instructions run its
own scripts was broken by installing it, and a hand-placed skill directory
gave the model no way to find the files beside it.

Install now copies the whole skill directory, leaving out hidden entries
(.git, .env) and symlinks, which it neither follows nor copies but reports.
A script stays executable; everything else is installed 0644. A tree over
1,000 files or 32 MiB is refused. skills.lock records a treeHash beside the
SKILL.md hash; skill info reports drift in bundled files, and an entry from
before this is still checked on SKILL.md alone. A reinstall that changed
only a bundled file is reported as an update.

Both skill tools end their output with the skill's directory and a list of
up to 50 bundled files when there are any; a SKILL.md-only skill is
returned unchanged.

Closes #584

* fix(skills): compare a reinstall over an old lock entry with SKILL.md alone

A lock entry written before tree hashes has no treeHash, so the reinstall
compared the new tree hash with an empty string and always counted as an
update. Re-adding an unchanged skill that is only a SKILL.md printed
"Updated" and "the files bundled with it changed" when there were none.

That entry comes from an install that copied SKILL.md alone, so compare
with that: it is an update when SKILL.md changed or the reinstall now
brings bundled files. InstallResult gains previousTreeHash, and the CLI
uses it to say the bundled files are now installed rather than changed
on the first reinstall over such an entry.

* fix(skills): match the tree hash when recovering an interrupted install

lockReconciler matched both trees of an interrupted workspace on the
SKILL.md hash alone. A reinstall that changes only a bundled file keeps
SKILL.md, so a kill between the tree swap and the lockfile publish left
two trees carrying the recorded hash, and recovery kept the new one and
retired the backup the lockfile still described.

A tree now matches an entry with a tree hash only when both hashes
match. An entry from before tree hashes is still matched on SKILL.md
alone. A tree hash that cannot be computed is returned as an error, the
way an unreadable SKILL.md already is, so recovery decides nothing about
a tree it could not read.

Also bring the package comment up to date: install copies the skill
directory, not SKILL.md alone.
2026-10-25 07:24:59 -07:00
Vasanth T 5d080ef46b test(tui): pin the cwd in tests that assert text is absent from the view (#1170)
* test(tui): pin the cwd in tests that assert text is absent from the view

Nine tests built their model with an empty Options.Cwd, so newModel took
the package directory and the title bar showed the developer's real
branch and checkout path. Each then asserted that some text was absent
from the whole view, and failed wherever that branch or path happened to
contain it: TestSuggestionOverlayRenders on a branch with /model in its
name, TestSuggestionOverlayCapsRowsWithoutMoreText on a branch or path
containing "more" or "compact", the provider wizard tests on "offline",
"chatgpt" or "gpt-4.1", and so on.

They now pin Options.Cwd to isolatedCwd, a path that does not exist, so
no branch is read and the path is the same on every machine. A guard
test checks that isolatedCwd stays outside any git checkout.

* test(tui): make isolatedCwd fully qualified and absent by construction

The fixed /workspace/zero path could exist on some machine, a dev
container for one, and newModel would then read whatever is there. On
Windows it was also only drive-relative: \workspace\zero is not a fully
qualified path.

isolatedCwd is now a child of the home TestMain isolates that nothing
creates, so it is fully qualified, absent and outside any checkout on
every platform, and the title bar shows ~/not-a-checkout everywhere. A
t.TempDir path would have put the user name and the test name into the
view. The guard test checks all three properties.

* test(tui): clear the branch in view-test models instead of trusting the cwd

isolatedCwd is a child of the isolated home, which lives under the
temporary directory. With TMPDIR inside a checkout, gitBranch walks up
from that absent path to the checkout and puts its branch in the title
bar, so the guard failed on an ordinary branch and a colliding branch
broke the nine view tests again.

newViewTestModel now builds those models: it sets the isolated cwd and
clears the branch after construction, since no path can promise there
is no checkout above it. The guard keeps only what a path can promise
(fully qualified and absent), and a new test puts the home inside a
checkout on feat/model-picker and checks that neither that branch nor
the real checkout path reaches the view.

* test(tui): assert no checkout path reaches the view in the enclosing-checkout test

The test checked the branch strings and that the isolated cwd shows,
but a view could show both the isolated cwd and a real checkout path
without failing it. It now also asserts that neither the enclosing
checkout nor the directory the tests run from appears in the view.
2026-10-22 06:52:51 -07:00
Vasanth T 1d233c0a9b test(modelregistry): clear ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH in the models.dev tests (#1169)
The variable turns off both the models.dev fetch and the cached overlay,
and four tests in modelsdev_test.go inherited it from the shell. With it
set, TestRefreshModelsDevCacheRejectsBadBodyWithoutClobbering and
TestDefaultModelEntriesAppliesFreshCache fail, and
TestCachedModelsDevProvidersIgnoresStaleCache and
TestCachedModelsDevProvidersRequiresOptIn pass without reaching the
check they are named for: the nil they expect comes from the variable.

Clear it in each of them, as the two sibling refresh tests already do.
2026-10-21 07:33:36 -07:00
Vasanth T de1443b2ed fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to hono 4.13.13 (#1171)
GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 (moderate): hono's serveStatic decodes the request
path a second time, so middleware on static paths can be bypassed.
Versions 4.12.4 to 4.13.10 are affected and main pins 4.13.9 through
tuistory, which release packaging installs as a local-control helper.

npm update takes hono to 4.13.13, inside every range that asks for it.
package.json is unchanged and nothing else in the lock moves.
2026-10-21 07:12:22 -07:00
Felix-Ayush 84c1b15540 fix(oauth): reuse the crash-safe secret store and sync encrypted publications (#1165)
* fix(oauth): use the crash-safe secret store and sync token publications

The encrypted-file OAuth backend carried its own AES-GCM secret implementation that had drifted from internal/securefile: a crash during first login left <secret>.lock behind and every later Save timed out instead of reclaiming it, and the secret and token blobs were published without fsync.\n\nUse securefile.Crypter with an opt-in publication directory so the secret still publishes through the sandbox-denied .secret.publish directory, add file and directory barriers to the encrypted token blob, and extend securefile with the publication directory plus destination-directory sync.\n\nMove the concurrent-creation and wrong-sized-secret coverage to securefile, add a stale-lock regression through the OAuth store, and test publication-dir use, sync ordering, sync-failure preservation, and retry after a failed secret sync. The stale-lock test fails on the previous code.

* test(oauth): cover post-rename directory-sync failures

The existing failure tests inject a file sync error before the rename. Add coverage for a destination-directory barrier failure after the token or secret has been atomically replaced: the write must report the error and the newly published bytes must remain readable. Also cover the corresponding securefile secret path, including its expected size.

* fix(securefile): never clobber a newer lock when restoring a reclaimed one

reclaimStaleLock could rename a lock that had just been replaced, then restore the quarantined copy with os.Rename, replacing a third holder's new lock. Both holders could then publish different secrets for the same file. Restore with O_CREATE|O_EXCL and discard the quarantined copy when the destination is already held.

Extend the directory-sync failure test to prove a later caller actually loads the published secret, not just its size. Add restore tests for the free and already-held cases.
2026-10-21 18:41:38 +08:00
Vasanth T 6393a90ed6 fix: bump Go to 1.26.10 for GO-2026-6809 (#1168)
govulncheck now reports GO-2026-6809 (crypto/x509 distrusts compromised
intermediate certificates) against Go 1.26.9, reachable through
daemon.WriteFrame, so Security & Code Health fails on main and on every
open PR. It is fixed in 1.26.10.

CI and release builds read the toolchain from go.mod. The stated
source-build minimum in README.md, README_ZH.md and docs/INSTALL.md
moves with it.
2026-10-21 16:37:49 +08:00
Vasanth T cd3e0b0a9f test(cli): isolate the exec image tests from the models.dev refresh (#1161)
runExec starts a background models.dev download unless
ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH is set. TestRunExecImageAttachmentHistory moved
the user directories into a TempDir by hand but left the fetch on, so a
5.7 MB download landed in the TempDir while its cleanup ran, and the
macOS runner failed with "unlinkat ... directory not empty". The two
older image tests had no isolation and fetched into the real user cache.

Use isolateCLIUserState in all three, which also points the cache path
into the fixture and turns the fetch off.
2026-10-18 10:08:09 +08:00
Felix-Ayush aa9ba8412e fix(tools): grep stops where a file's line breaks stop (#1160)
* fix(tools): grep stops where a file's line breaks stop

scanGrepFile treated EOF after a trailing line break - and an empty file -
as the START of another line, and handed the matcher an empty line one
number past the real content. Every pattern that matches an empty string
then reported a match on a line no reader sees:

  a.txt holds "x\n"; grep pattern "^$"
    -> a.txt:2:           (grep -c '' GNU-style reports no such line)
  same file, pattern ".*", count mode
    -> "2 matches found"  (one real line, one phantom)
  an empty file, pattern "^$"
    -> a.txt:1:           (the file has no lines at all)

read_file and the file tracker's countLines already state the rule the
scan violated: "the trailing newline does not open a line", and an empty
file has no lines. The scan now stops there too, so anchored and
empty-matching patterns can only match the lines the content carries.

Real matches, numbering, count-per-hit accounting for non-empty patterns,
file mode, glob and symlink handling are unchanged.

* test(tools): make the grep line-number parity test catch the phantom

The parity test matched only "needle", a pattern that cannot match the
empty line the old EOF branch invented, so its absence-of-line-4
assertion passed on the code being fixed. The pattern now also matches an
empty line, and the expected output is asserted exactly: on the pre-fix
scanner the same run reported

    grep = "a.txt:2: needle two\na.txt:4: ",
        want exactly the line read_file numbers 2

so the phantom is visible right beside the real line, and the test is
about the numbering claim it states. Also gofmt-aligns the case table
that made the CI formatting check fail.
2026-10-18 10:07:34 +08:00
Felix-Ayush a97db8832f fix(redaction): redact credentials whose trigger a greedy span swallowed (#1158)
Two credentials glued end to end share one recovering property: the second
one's trigger prefix is where redaction can re-anchor. For fixed-length
bodies that anchor is exact (AKIA{16} stops at the next key), which is the
case the anchored end-chaining always covered. For unbounded bodies it
isn't: github's [A-Za-z0-9]{36,} body eats the literal "ghp" of the token
glued behind it, so the first match ends PAST the second trigger, the scan
that re-anchors at the span end finds nothing there, and the second
credential leaves the output as +_bbbb... / .eyJzdWIi... plaintext:

  RedactString("ghp_aaa..36a..ghp_bbb..36b..")
    -> "[REDACTED]_bbbb......"   (second token's body printed in full)
  RedactString(jwtA+jwtB)
    -> "[REDACTED].eyJzdWIiOiI5ODc2...SA" (second token's payload+sig)

The same holds across shapes (a github key directly feeding "sk-ant-..."
through its body) and for three tokens in one run.

redactAdjacent now follows the run a match starts: at each boundary it
re-binds the match at the EARLIEST trigger occurrence inside the span that
stills validates as its shape (the head before the trigger must match the
anchored pattern exactly, and the run chained from the trigger must reach
past the span, so a mid-body lookalike and a mid-span cut that recovers
nothing leave the span alone), and continues under whichever shape matched
the swallowed trigger. Candidate examination is capped at
maxTriggerOccurrences per span so body spam of trigger lookalikes costs
what the span costs, and the first validating cut wins.

End-chaining for fixed-length bodies, single-credential shapes, custom
replacement templates, and the split path's announced no-op-for-contiguous
text guarantee are all unchanged; the regression tests pin the glued pairs
that previously leaked plus the AWS chaining and lone-token cases.
2026-10-18 10:07:04 +08:00
Vasanth T ef4da1323f fix(workspaceindex): import gitsafe under the Twigpine module path (#1153)
#1149 was opened before #1105 moved the module to github.com/Twigpine/zero
and merged right after it, so its two imports of internal/gitsafe still
used the old path. Nothing provides github.com/Gitlawb/zero any more, so
main stopped building at 2ffe1831.
2026-10-17 16:59:52 +08:00
zzucs 1e848492e5 fix(sessions): preserve image attachment summaries on resume (#1152)
* fix(sessions): preserve image attachment summaries on resume

Persist TUI-compatible attachment counts for ACP and exec user events.
Restore readable markers in live history, session replay and resumed
prompts without storing or resending historical image data.

Cover image-only and mixed prompts, restart recovery, malformed metadata
and the aborted-turn boundary with regression tests.

Fixes #1135

* fix(workspaceindex): follow the current module path

Use github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/gitsafe in the ignore scanner and its
tests. The upstream module rename preceded the scanner's gitsafe change,
leaving these two imports on the old path and preventing the rebased tree
from compiling.

* fix(sessions): count only images accepted by the model

Take ACP and exec attachment counts after the vision capability gate,
matching the TUI's persisted attachment semantics. Update the ignored-image
regressions to require zero saved images and no historical image marker.

Refs #1135
2026-10-17 16:59:21 +08:00
Vasanth T 2ffe1831b0 fix(workspaceindex): run Scan's git calls through gitsafe (#1149)
* fix(workspaceindex): run Scan's git calls through gitsafe

Scan asks git for ignored paths on every turn with its own gitCommand, which
turned off core.fsmonitor and dropped the repository-location variables but
still let a clean filter or diff driver from the repository's own config run
during status. It now goes through gitsafe, like the TUI and the scratch-file
warning: hooks are off as well, and a repository whose config defines a filter
or diff command takes the non-git path. The status call also passes
--ignore-submodules=dirty.

Scan makes two git calls, so gitsafe gains Check, which reads the repository
config once and builds several commands from it. Command is now Check plus one
command, and each command gets its own copy of the environment.

* test(workspaceindex): pin Scan's fallback when gitsafe refuses the repository

A repository whose own config defines a filter or diff command is refused by
gitsafe, and Scan then takes the non-git path. Scan reaches gitsafe.Check
through a package variable now, so a test can stand in for such a repository
without configuring one that names a command, and
TestScanFallsBackWhenGitsafeRefusesTheRepository checks both sides: with git
consulted, .gitignore decides and the fixed list does not apply; refused, the
fixed list applies and .gitignore is not read.
2026-10-17 07:14:03 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5.5 13e2596b2e chore: move repository references to Twigpine/zero (#1105)
Update the Go module path, imports, install scripts, docs, workflows,
packaging and action defaults from Gitlawb/zero to Twigpine/zero. The npm
scope (already @twigpine/zero on main, with its @gitlawb/zero migration
notes), LICENSE, action author, the OpenGateway provider and historical
CHANGELOG links are unchanged.

The X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo header keeps Gitlawb/zero: it is what
AIMLAPI sees for attribution, so changing it needs a maintainer's yes.
docs/INSTALL.md keeps `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/...`, because
every tagged release so far declares that module path. The Homebrew
formula comment names the Twigpine/homebrew-tap tap.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-17 07:13:21 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment 8c4e759798 feat(sandbox): support self-exec pattern to eliminate separate helper binary (#946)
* feat(sandbox): support self-exec pattern to eliminate separate helper binary

Linux sandboxing previously required distributing a separate 'zero-linux-sandbox'
binary and looking it up on PATH.

This wires an internal '__sandbox-helper' entrypoint directly in cmd/zero/main.go
and configures findLinuxSandboxHelperCommand to fallback to os.Executable(),
enabling single-binary zero distributions with fully functional sandboxing.

* fix(sandbox): prefer PATH helper before self-exec fallback

Colocated zero-linux-sandbox stays first. A standalone helper on PATH
is used next. Self-exec of the main zero binary is only the last
fallback, so an installed helper is not ignored.

* feat(sandbox): clean formatting in main.go and add self-exec unit tests

* feat(sandbox): insert __sandbox-helper verb in bwrap plan for self-exec binary

* fix(sandbox): drive Linux selection from the self-exec helper resolver

Availability and command-plan construction now share the same helper
resolution and keep the __sandbox-helper prefix on the backend, so a
main-only install with bwrap reaches native sandboxing.

* fix(sandbox): self-exec only the zero main binary, not test binaries

* fix(sandbox): carry standalone vs self-exec identity into the inner bwrap plan

A versioned physical helper (zero-linux-sandbox-v1) must not receive
__sandbox-helper. The inner plan uses an explicit SelfExec flag, threaded
from argv, instead of guessing from filepath.Base.

* docs(install): describe self-exec as the last helper fallback

Self-execution runs only when neither a colocated nor a PATH
zero-linux-sandbox is available.

* docs(install): state colocated, PATH, then self-exec helper order

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-10-16 14:09:28 +08:00
github-actions[bot] d597f0e095 chore(main): release 0.11.0 (#1146)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-16 11:28:23 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment ce2fcffaf1 perf(redaction): add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings (#945)
* perf(redaction): add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings

Evaluating cascading regular expressions across every log line, tool output,
and session event incurred ~23 µs and 51 heap allocations even on strings with
zero secrets.

This introduces fast-path substring checks before invoking expensive regex
substitutions, yielding a 70x speedup and 0 B/op heap allocation on clean
strings.

* test(redaction): lengthen ghp_ fixtures and cover conditional gates

GitHub classic tokens need 36 characters after ghp_. Benchmarks and
shape tests now use a matching fixture. A table-driven test checks each
fast-path gate, including near-misses and case-insensitive Authorization.

* perf(redaction): structure triggered patterns and avoid allocation in header case checks

* test(redaction): cover secret-header and URL-password gates

Keep the redaction marker literal after url.URL rewrites userinfo, so
callers still see [REDACTED] instead of a percent-encoded form.

* fix(redaction): unescape only the generated URL password

A path or query that already contains the encoded redaction marker
must stay encoded. Only the userinfo password is rewritten in the
clear [REDACTED] form.

* fix(redaction): re-escape URL username after parse

Username() is decoded. Re-encoding with url.User keeps control bytes
out of the redacted URL so a %0AAuthorization userinfo cannot inject
a header after the header pass.

* fix(redaction): fail closed on password URLs without a host

* test(redaction): isolate query-gate coverage from assign and text secrets

* fix(redaction): fold Unicode U+017F and U+212A in containsCaseInsensitive

Go (?i) regular expressions apply Unicode simple case folding, where U+017F (ſ) folds to 's' and U+212A (K) folds to 'k'. Teach containsCaseInsensitive to fold these runes to ASCII lowercase with zero allocations so case-insensitive header gates cannot be bypassed by Unicode-folded equivalents.

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-10-15 21:15:42 +08:00
Kevin Codex 61b09364f0 feat(providers): add Concentrate provider preset (#1147)
* feat(providers): add Concentrate provider preset

Register Concentrate (https://api.concentrate.ai/v1) as an
OpenAI-compatible catalog provider. Concentrate is already listed in the
README Partners section; this adds the provider itself.

- models.dev has no Concentrate provider, so the id `concentrate` and the
  key name CONCENTRATE_API_KEY match OpenClaude's Concentrate
  integration. `Concentrate AI`, `concentrate.ai` and `concentrate-ai`
  resolve to it.
- Default model deepseek-v4-flash-0731: the dated id behind the
  deepseek-v4-flash alias that OpenClaude uses. Concentrate's /v1/models
  keeps the rolling name only in `aliases`, and onboarding keeps the
  default selected only when it matches a live id, so an alias default
  made setup land on the first model in the list (claude-fable-5).
- Curated models: deepseek-v4-flash-0731 (default), deepseek-v4-pro,
  kimi-k3 and glm-5.3. Context windows (1,048,576 each), tool calling and
  thinking support come from Concentrate's public /v1/models.
- Regression test: a Concentrate-shaped live list must contain the
  preset's default model.
- README and README_ZH: key line and setup command.

* test(providers): prove the Concentrate default check runs on the live list

The regression test passed whenever the default model was in the result,
and the curated fallback also contains it. Assert that the mock served
/v1/models and that the result includes claude-fable-5, a model only the
live response lists, so a silent fall back to the curated catalog fails.
2026-10-15 21:14:16 +08:00
fchengyan d1a0d048ee fix(cli): let providers subcommands run with no active provider (#1143)
* fix(cli): let providers subcommands run with no active provider

`zero providers list`, `use`, `remove` and `rename` exited 3 with
`no active provider configured: active provider "" not found` as soon as the
environment supplied more than one provider and config.json had no active
provider: normalizeProvidersWithOptions only elects an active provider by
itself when there is exactly one, and resolveCommandCenterConfig treated the
resulting error as fatal, so the command stopped before doing anything. A
base URL without a key counts as a second provider too (applyProviderEnv
builds a profile from a base URL alone).

The resolver already returns the successfully normalized list alongside
ErrNoActiveProvider, and the interactive TUI already falls back to a usable
entry from it in runInteractiveTUIWithSetup. Do the same here instead of
failing, so these subcommands can answer for providers that only come from
the environment.

Also pin the four env-derived provider tests to a fixed environment and a
temporary user config. They set OPENAI_API_KEY but resolved through the real
resolver against the developer's own config.json and ambient provider
variables, so they failed on any machine that also exported another provider
variable and whose user config had no active provider.

Adds regression coverage for the two-env-provider case: `providers list`
must report every detected provider and `use`/`remove`/`rename` must give
their usual env-derived answer. Verified against the fix (pass) and with the
fix reverted (exit 3, `active provider "" not found`).

Fixes #1130

* refactor(cli): report the configured active provider, not an elected one

Provider-management subcommands answer for the SAVED configuration, while
the TUI's recovery path answers "what can I run with". Adopting
firstUsableProvider in resolveCommandCenterConfig conflated the two: with
two env-derived providers it made `providers current`/`list` present a
provider that `zero exec` would still refuse to run with, and a
base-URL-only profile failed `providers list` because the election demands
a credential. Return the resolver's partial config untouched instead, so
nothing is reported as active when nothing is selected.

Also removes the OAuth store read this path picked up with firstUsableProvider.

Adds assertions that `current` shows nothing selected, `list` marks nothing
active, `use --json` leaves activeProvider empty, plus a base-URL-only case.

* fix(cli): scope the no-active-provider exception to provider management

Returning the resolver's partial config made `zero config` exit 0 with a
partial summary, contradicting the resolver's documented headless contract:
`zero config` / `zero exec` still fail with the actionable message and only
the interactive TUI recovers from a missing active provider. Split the
helper so only issue #1130's commands — `providers list`/`current` and the
unpersisted `use`/`remove`/`rename` reporters — tolerate the state; `zero
config`, `detect`, `models` and `check` keep failing as before.

Also pin the OAuth store in providerEnvSetupDeps: summarizeConfig reads
OAuth login state through the default store, so a developer's stored login
could flip these assertions. Point ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH at a temp file
and force ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file so an ambient keyring setting cannot pull
the OS keychain in either.
2026-10-15 15:40:43 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão c88c77bf70 fix(workspaceindex): skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only (#1117)
* fix(workspaceindex): skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only

Scan has a fixed file budget, and build output (Cargo target/, Python
virtualenvs, caches) could exhaust it before real source was reached:
repo-map reported truncation and ranked fingerprint files above code.

Inside a git work tree, Scan now asks git for the ignored set
(`git status --porcelain=v1 -z --ignored=matching .`), so the repo's own
.gitignore, nested ignore files, info/exclude and core.excludesFile all
apply, including names no fixed list anticipates (.locust_env/). Outside
a work tree, or when git is missing, older than 2.16, fails, or exceeds
5s, a fixed list of common build/cache directory names stands in.

ShouldSkipDir is unchanged: glob, grep, list_directory and path
autocomplete share it and must keep seeing target/, .venv/ and friends.
The lookup runs with GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0 so a per-turn scan never takes
.git/index.lock next to a concurrent git command.

Fixes #1108

* fix(workspaceindex): skip a rename's original-path field when parsing status

In `git status --porcelain=v1 -z`, a rename or copy record is followed by one
more NUL field holding the original path, with no XY prefix. The parser
inspected every field, so an original name beginning with "!! " read as an
ignored entry: after `git mv "!! a" b`, a tracked file "a" disappeared from
Scan.

Move the parsing into parseIgnoredStatus, which consumes that field for R or C
in either status column, and test it directly and end to end.

* fix(workspaceindex): disable repo fsmonitor and force untracked-files=normal for status

Scan's git status lookup must not run a repository's core.fsmonitor hook or fail
when status.showUntrackedFiles=no would reject --ignored=matching.

* fix(workspaceindex): ignore inherited git repository location

Git exports GIT_DIR and GIT_WORK_TREE to hooks. With those pointing at
another repository, Scan kept .locust_env/lib/x.py, which root's own
.gitignore excludes.

* fix(workspaceindex): quote the fsmonitor hook path in the regression

On Windows, sh treats an unquoted backslash path as escapes, so the hook
ran and the marker the test stats was never created. Require a status
without the override to create that marker first.

* fix(workspaceindex): pass the fsmonitor hook path to git with forward slashes

Smoke (windows-latest) failed TestGitIgnoredPathsDisablesRepoFsmonitor
because core.fsmonitor was set to a backslash script path. Git for Windows
hands that value to sh, which consumes the separators, so the hook never
runs and the marker is never created. The test now stores a quoted forward-slash
path. The product code is unchanged.
2026-10-15 15:34:28 +08:00
Vasanth T 640d936bfb fix(tui,cli): stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls (#1133)
* fix(tui,cli): stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls

Zero runs git status and git diff on its own: the TUI's files sweep at
startup and after each command, its pull request diffstat, and the
scratch-file warning after a run. A repository's own config can name
programs those commands run (core.fsmonitor on every status, hooks when
the index is rewritten, clean filters and diff drivers assigned through
.gitattributes), so a workspace unpacked from an archive ran its own code
on the first turn, although Zero refuses the same workspace's project
hooks and plugins until the user trusts it.

internal/gitsafe builds those commands with core.fsmonitor and
core.hooksPath turned off and GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0, and drops the
repository-location variables git exports to hooks, using the same
environment for its config check and for the command. A repository whose
own config, or per-worktree config when extensions.worktreeConfig is on,
defines a filter or diff driver command is refused, and the callers
already treat that like a directory that is not a repository. The status
and diff calls also pass --ignore-submodules=dirty, because a submodule's
own config is not checked.

* test(gitsafe): keep the real-git setup off an inherited GIT_DIR

The setup helper in TestCommandAgainstRealGit ran git with the inherited
environment, so from a hook, or a shell that exports GIT_DIR or
GIT_WORK_TREE, git init and git config would act on the repository those
name instead of the temporary one. It now uses the same environment as
Command, and the test sets both variables to a decoy repository and checks
after each setup step that the decoy was not touched.
2026-10-15 15:33:32 +08:00
Kevin Codex 8e363fcaa5 fix(npm): wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps (#1145)
* fix(npm): wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps

npm applies a publish asynchronously: `npm publish` returns once the upload
is accepted, and the version appears later. In the 0.10.0 release the
@twigpine/zero wrapper appeared 9 seconds after publish-packages.sh stopped
checking for it, and the last platform payload about ten minutes after its
upload. Two things went wrong:

- The wrapper became visible before four of its five platform payloads, so
  installs in that window resolved aliases that 404 and fell back to the
  GitHub-release download. Ordering the uploads does not order what npm
  shows.
- The final `latest` check gave up after 25 seconds and failed the job even
  though every publish landed, which also skipped the @gitlawb/zero steps
  until a re-run.

publish-packages.sh now waits until npm shows every platform version before
it publishes the wrapper, then waits until `latest` is the wrapper version.
One deadline bounds the waits (ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_WAIT_TIMEOUT, default 30
minutes). On timeout it fails before the wrapper goes out and says what npm
never showed. These lookups treat an error as "not yet", unlike the skip
decision, which still stops on anything but E404.

The test fake can now apply a publish only after a number of later lookups,
and records which aliased versions were missing when the wrapper was
published. Against the script as released in v0.10.0, the two new tests fail
the way the release did: the job exits 1 although everything landed, and the
wrapper goes out while its platform payload is not visible.

The two release steps that published 0.10.0 once more as @gitlawb/zero have
done their job and are removed; docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md and the comments that
pointed at them now describe what happened. The Go and wrapper handling of
the old name stays, since only a build installed under it can trigger it.

* fix(npm): validate the publish wait settings, and correct the legacy publishing claim

ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_WAIT_TIMEOUT went into Bash arithmetic as typed. A leading
zero reads as octal (0600 waited 384 seconds), and 08 is an arithmetic error
that, in a script, does not stop it: Bash prints the error, leaves the
deadline unset and carries on, so the run only died at its first wait, after
the platform payloads were published. A negative timeout ended the wait
before it started, and a bad ZERO_NPM_PUBLISH_RETRY_DELAY only failed at the
first sleep, also after publishing began.

Both settings are now checked before anything is published: whole seconds
only, converted with 10# so a leading zero is decimal, bounded before the
conversion, and capped (timeout 86400, delay 600). A bad value fails with
the variable's name.

TestPublishPackagesReadsTheWaitTimeoutAsDecimal makes the script wait, which
is where the old code broke: against the reviewed script it publishes the
platform payload and then exits 1 on "08: value too great for base".
TestPublishPackagesRejectsAnInvalidWaitSetting covers -5, abc, 1e3, an
over-range and an overflowing timeout, and a non-numeric delay; the old
script published with five of them and crashed on the sixth with
"abc: unbound variable".

docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md said nothing could publish @gitlawb/zero again.
Removing the trusted publisher stops this workflow; a maintainer could
still publish by hand, and the doc now says that.
2026-10-15 13:30:11 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 856919bcaa chore(main): release 0.10.0 (#1061)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-15 12:14:04 +08:00
Vasanth T 883e5bec24 fix(sessions): keep a session lease for the life of the process, not of the Store (#1144)
A session's lease file lived in the Store that took it, so once that Store
was unreachable the garbage collector closed the file, and closing it drops
the lock. That made TestForkAndChildHoldTheParentTheyAreCreatedFrom fail on
main whenever a collection ran before its dry-run prune. It can also happen
in an exec run: PrepareExec takes the calling or forked session's lease on a
Store the run never touches again, so the parent's lease can disappear part
way through and a prune in another terminal could remove it.

Leases now belong to the process, as Hold documents. Every Store holding a
session shares one lease file in a process-wide table, and the file is
unlocked and closed only when the last Store holding it releases it.
2026-10-15 12:05:04 +08:00
Kevin Codex 530563a0bb feat(npm): publish as @twigpine/zero (#1142)
* feat(npm): publish as @twigpine/zero

The npm package moves from @gitlawb/zero to @twigpine/zero, and everything
that finds Zero's GitHub repository by name now names Twigpine/zero.

Package name
- package.json, the lockfile and release-please use @twigpine/zero.
  `repository` names Twigpine/zero: npm checks provenance against it, so a
  publish from this repo with the old URL fails with E422. The homepage is
  zero.twigpine.com.
- The name lives in package.json only. build-platform-packages.mjs names the
  wrapper, platform versions, alias names and alias targets from it, and
  bin/zero.js reads its own package.json for the alias it resolves and for
  every reinstall hint. The Go constant npmPackageName is held equal to
  package.json by a test.

Repository defaults
- The update check (DefaultRepository), install.sh, install.ps1, the npm
  wrapper's fallback downloader, and the GitHub Action's zero-repo default
  all used Gitlawb/zero. That name now belongs to an unrelated GitHub org, and
  these paths download and run what they find there, so they point at
  Twigpine/zero. Docs, README and issue-template links follow. The Go module
  path (and so `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/...`) is unchanged here.

Publishing
- The two inline publish steps become scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh, which
  reads the name from the assembled payloads, refuses to start when the
  wrapper's aliases do not match the platform payloads, skips versions
  already on the registry (so re-running a half-finished job is safe), and
  publishes with --ignore-scripts. The dist-tag rules are unchanged.
  internal/npmwrapper/publish_test.go runs it against a fake registry.

Docs explain the switch for existing installs: uninstall @gitlawb/zero first,
because both packages own the `zero` bin and npm refuses the second (EEXIST).

* feat(npm): publish 0.10.0 once more as @gitlawb/zero to point users at the new name

Deprecating @gitlawb/zero alone would strand every existing npm install.
0.9.0's `zero upgrade` runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`; with
nothing newer under that name npm installs nothing, prints no deprecation
warning (it only warns when it installs something), and Zero then reports
"updated via npm to 0.10.0" while staying on 0.9.0.

So this release goes out once more under the old name, as a bridge:

- The publish job assembles the same verified artifacts a second time with
  the new `build-platform-packages.mjs --package-name @gitlawb/zero` and
  publishes them with publish-packages.sh, after the @twigpine/zero publish.
  A gate runs it only while @gitlawb/zero's latest is still 0.9.0 (or is
  this version, on a re-run), so it happens once.
- The build knows its name from the package.json beside it. The Go side
  reports InstallMethodNpmLegacy: `zero upgrade` refuses with the switch
  steps before any release check (so it works offline too), and
  `zero update --check` adds them whether or not an update is out.
- bin/zero.js prints the same steps after zero exits (the TUI would hide a
  notice printed first), only when stderr is a terminal, and not for
  `update`/`upgrade`, which print it themselves.
- Updating from 0.9.0 now installs a real version, so npm also shows the
  deprecation message.

The steps say to uninstall @gitlawb/zero before installing @twigpine/zero:
both own the `zero` bin, npm refuses the second install with EEXIST, and a
forced install loses the bin when the old package is later removed (checked
against npm 11.16).

docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md has the maintainer runbook: bootstrap and trust the new
package, retarget the old one's trusted publisher for the bridge, then
deprecate @gitlawb/zero, revoke its publisher, and delete the bridge steps.

* fix(npm): only skip a publish when npm says the version is not there

publish-packages.sh treated any failed `npm view <name>@<version>` as "not
published". A transient network, auth or registry error on the re-run that the
skip exists for therefore published a version that was already out, and npm
rejected it with EPUBLISHCONFLICT; with the registry unreachable it published
blind. npm 11 reports every kind of missing (no such package, no such version,
including platform versions) as E404, so only E404 now means "not published".
Any other failure is retried three times and then stops the job before it
publishes anything, with npm's own error shown.

The test fake now answers a missing version with E404 the way npm does (it
returned an empty success before), and can fail lookups with a network error.
The two new tests fail on the old lookup: one with EPUBLISHCONFLICT after
transient failures, the other by publishing while the registry is unreachable.

Also renames the unused retry variable in the legacy-name gate step to `_`
(shellcheck SC2034), matching the script.
2026-10-15 11:05:51 +08:00
Vasanth T c56a4c4e6e fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to patched shell-quote (#1131)
shell-quote 1.9.0 is inside the range GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv covers
(>= 1.8.4, < 1.11.0). It reaches the lock through tuistory,
@opentui/react and react-devtools-core, which asks for ^1.6.1, so
refreshing the lock moves it to 1.12.0 without touching package.json.
Release packaging installs the local-control helpers from this lock,
so the old version shipped in the helper tree.
2026-10-15 10:13:27 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão 300cf6275f fix(acp): persist token usage events for ACP sessions (#1137)
* fix(acp): persist token usage events for ACP sessions

ACP turns never set agent.Options.OnUsage, so provider token counts were
dropped on the floor. zero exec and the TUI persist the same counts as
session usage events, and `zero usage report` totals those events, which
left every editor-driven ACP session at zero requests and zero tokens.

runTurn now queues each report through usage.EventUsagePayload, the same
writer exec uses for a non-escalating run, and commits it in the turn's
existing buffered batch under the session id. A hard run failure still
returns before persistTurn, so that turn's usage is dropped with its
history. StopCancelled stays a successful outcome and keeps the usage
already reported. session/load and session/resume still skip event types
other than messages, compaction, and tools, so the restored prompt and
the wire replay do not gain a usage channel. ACP has no model escalation,
so the payload has no "model" key and no prompt, tool argument, or other
raw input.

This sits beside the permission-mode field persisted on the session
(#1134). It does not change the ACP wire protocol, exec, the TUI, or the
report reader.

Refs #1118

* test(acp): pin cancel, resume, and payload shape for usage events

The persistence test showed that a successful turn records token counts,
and the hard-failure test showed that an aborted turn records nothing.
Neither one locked the two edges that are easy to get backwards.

A client cancel is a StopCancelled outcome, not a hard failure, so the
tokens the provider already reported stay in the session log. session/load
and session/resume read that same log; the replay and the next prompt
must still be the conversation, with no usage payload on the wire and no
token counts folded into the resumed prompt. The persisted JSON is also
checked to be token-count keys only, so a prompt or tool argument cannot
ride along in the usage record.

Refs #1118
2026-10-15 09:44:28 +08:00
Fabio Tavares Leitão 106c0b77f9 test(cli): pin sandbox policy golden temp roots (#1139)
* test(cli): pin sandbox policy golden temp roots

TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields compared the
policy snapshot to a fixed golden after stripping only the temp roots
NewScope keeps. NewScope drops a candidate that sits inside an earlier one,
while the JSON (built with a nil scope) still lists it, so a TMPDIR inside
/tmp — or TMP inside TEMP on Windows — survived normalization and failed
the golden. Pin the variables that path reads (TMPDIR on Unix, TEMP and TMP
on Windows) and cover a nested temp dir that is not inside the earlier
candidate, so the normalizer removes it instead of leaving it in the JSON.

Refs #1121

* test(cli): run the golden against an ambient nested temp dir

The nested golden created its temp dir in the package working directory and
failed when that path sat inside /tmp, so a checkout under /tmp could not
run it and the test wrote into the source tree. Stage the issue's shape
first — TMPDIR inside /tmp, or TMP inside TEMP — then let the pin override
those variables. Directories come from t.TempDir. If the nested shape cannot
be built, skip.

Refs #1121
2026-10-15 09:21:16 +08:00
zzucs 846d30f57f test(cli): give the local adoption probe a test-sized timeout (#1136)
* test(cli): give the local adoption probe a test-sized timeout

TestLocalAdoptionSavesAndReloadsEligibleModel relied on the 400ms
defaultLocalProbeTimeout, which treats a slow probe as "runtime not running"
and silently drops the candidate; under -race on a busy runner one slow
loopback round trip can exceed it and empty the detection result. Pass a
5-second test deadline instead. The production default is unchanged and stays
covered by TestDetectLocalRuntimesAppliesDefaultTimeout.

Refs #1132

* test(cli): correct the timeout-coverage note on the adoption probe

TestDetectLocalRuntimesAppliesDefaultTimeout pins the probe timeout with an
explicit 20ms deadline, so it covers timeout enforcement rather than the
400ms production default. Reword the comment accordingly; no assertion or
production behavior changes.

Addresses the CodeRabbit finding on #1136.
2026-10-14 22:31:06 +08:00
zzucs bb96206c27 fix(acp): persist the session permission mode across restarts (#1134)
ACP kept the permission mode in memory only: both mode doors called setMode,
registerSession always started at PermissionModeAuto, and nothing wrote the
mode to the session store, so session/load and session/resume returned a
plan/ask session as auto after a restart.

Save the mode next to the model on both doors, store first so a failed write
fails the request instead of leaving disk behind memory, and restore it through
registerSession. A session with no saved mode (written before this change)
keeps auto; a saved value outside auto/ask/plan never comes back weaker than
ask, and unsafe stays unreachable over ACP.

Refs #1125
2026-10-14 22:30:25 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 e0fb65f003 test(sessions): run the session lock test on Windows and add a cross-process one (#1115)
* test(sessions): run the session lock test on Windows and add a cross-process one

TestSessionFileLockSerializesAcrossStores was skipped on Windows with
"flock semantics differ on windows", so the LockFileEx path in
filelock_windows.go was never exercised by a test on the platform that
uses it. LockFileEx locks are per handle, which is what the test relies
on, so the skip was unnecessary: remove it.

Also add a helper-process test (same pattern as lockutil's) proving the
session lock blocks a different process and is released by the OS when
the holder exits without unlocking.

Both fail on Windows when the lock is replaced by a no-op.

Fixes #1104

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(sessions): keep the session lock alive in the helper process

The helper discarded the unlock closure returned by lockSession, which is the only reference to the open lock file/handle. GC finalization could close it while the helper waits on stdin, releasing the OS lock early and making the cross-process test pass for the wrong reason. Retain the closure and runtime.KeepAlive it after io.Copy, as the lockutil helper does.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:29:36 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5.5 a3d4edef8f test(tui): isolate user home, config and cache dirs for the TUI tests (#1114)
* test(tui): isolate user home, config and cache dirs for the TUI tests

newModel reads <user config>/zero/commands/*.md, and the package has 500+
newModel calls with no isolation, so a developer's own slash commands and
state leaked into the TUI tests (and tests could write to real user
directories), against the AGENTS.md "Hermetic tests" rule.

Add testutil.IsolateUserDirs, which points HOME, USERPROFILE, APPDATA,
LOCALAPPDATA and the XDG_* roots at a temp dir (covering Linux, macOS and
Windows), and call it from a TestMain in internal/tui. Per-test t.Setenv
overrides still win.

Refs #1103

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(testutil): fail closed when user dir isolation cannot be applied

IsolateUserDirs now returns an error when any Setenv fails, rolling back
the variables it had already redirected, and its restore func reports
restoration failures. The TUI TestMain exits non-zero when isolation,
restoration or removal of the temp root fails, and the helper test
restores the inherited XDG_DATA_HOME via t.Setenv before clearing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

* test(testutil): cover partial-redirect rollback and compare physical paths

Make Setenv injectable so a test can let HOME be redirected and fail the
next variable, proving IsolateUserDirs rolls back a variable it really
changed (the NUL-root case fails on the first call and cannot).

Add testutil.PathWithin, which resolves the existing part of each path
with EvalSymlinks before the containment check, and use it in both the
helper test and the TUI hermetic test so symlinked temp dirs and Windows
short names cannot cause false results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:28:58 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a195e8848c fix(tui): stop held peer message Allow/Deny from deadlocking Update (#1111)
The peer approval prompt's decide closure called runtimeMessageSink from
inside Update. The sink ends in program.Send, which blocks on bubbletea's
unbuffered message channel; the only reader is the event loop that is
running Update, so answering a held cross-session message hung the TUI.

Give pendingPermissionPrompt a decideCmd that returns a tea.Cmd yielding
the peerDecisionMsg, and have resolvePermissionWithReason return it
instead of calling the sink. Tests now drive the decision through the
returned command and a blocking sink, which hangs on the old code.

Fixes #1099

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:28:03 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a0979fb756 test(tools): poll for listening address in foreground server test (#1110)
TestExecCommandForegroundServerReturnsSessionAndServesHTTP parsed the
helper's listening address from the first exec_command result only, with
a 500 ms yield. On a loaded Windows runner the helper had not printed its
address yet, so the test failed even though the session was running.

Poll the session with write_stdin until the address appears (20 s
deadline), and register the cleanup before the address check so the
server is stopped on early failure too.

Fixes #1097

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 22:21:12 +08:00
Kevin Codex 4dc603f622 refactor(config): drop the unreachable SetNotify wrapper (#1128)
SetNotify was kept in #1001 as a thin replace-form wrapper over
UpdateNotify for existing tests, but every product surface (the CLI
`zero config notify` and the TUI /notify picker) calls UpdateNotify's
merge form directly, so the advisory deadcode job reports it as
unreachable. Move the replace helper into writer_test.go as the
unexported setNotify, keep every test it served unchanged in behaviour,
and point the two CLI doc comments at UpdateNotify.

`make deadcode` no longer lists internal/config; the other advisory
findings in that job are pre-existing and untouched.
2026-10-14 16:45:00 +08:00
4d2e9f0d08 fix(config): sync atomic config replacements (#1093)
* fix(config): sync atomic config replacements

Persist temporary config contents before rename, then sync the parent directory on platforms that support it. Return persistence failures and cover ordering, cleanup, and pre/post-replacement failure states.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#1087

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd7-47fc-76eb-82d3-3f6c25384912
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(config): sync new config directories and relax unopenable dir sync

Sync each directory entry created by MkdirAll into its parent so a crash
cannot lose the config directory after a successful first write.

Treat a config directory that cannot be opened as best-effort durable,
matching the sessions store's syncDir; only a failed Sync or Close is
reported, since the rename has already replaced the file.

Check the temp file is closed with Seek instead of Stat: on Windows,
File.Stat on a closed file returns "The handle is invalid" rather than
os.ErrClosed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(config): report directory-open failures except for write-only directories

syncConfigDir treated every os.Open failure as success, so a caller could
acknowledge a save whose directory barrier was never reached (Copilot
review, PR #1093). Keep the maintainer-requested best effort for a
directory the user can write but not read, as in the sessions store, and
return every other open failure.

TestSyncConfigDir now expects os.ErrNotExist for a missing directory on
non-Windows hosts; it fails on the previous code with
"missing directory: error = <nil>, want file does not exist".

* fix(config): create the config directory durably on the lock path and roll back failed barriers

Every exported mutator acquires the config lock before it writes, and the
lock file is a sibling of the config, so lockConfigFile's MkdirAll was what
created the config directory on a first write. writeConfigData then found
nothing missing and never synced the new entries into their parents, so a
locking mutator could report success without the directory creation being
durable (CodeRabbit review, PR #1093).

A failed parent sync also left the newly created directories in place: a
retry found nothing missing, skipped the barrier, and reported success.

Route both creation sites through one helper, ensureConfigDir. It creates
each missing component with os.Mkdir so it knows exactly what it created,
syncs each new entry into its parent deepest first, and on any barrier
failure removes only the directories this call created, deepest first,
with os.Remove so a directory another process has populated survives. A
failed rollback is joined into the error, never swallowed. A component
that appeared between the lookup and the Mkdir is not rolled back but its
parent is still synced.

Regression coverage:
- TestLockingMutatorSyncsCreatedDirectories drives UpdateNotify on a
  missing nested directory, asserts the parent syncs happen before the
  lock file exists, that a failed barrier rolls the directories back, and
  that the retry re-runs the barrier. On the previous code it fails with
  "error = <nil>, want injected sync failure" because the lock path
  bypassed the barrier entirely.
- TestWriteConfigDataRollsBackOnlyCreatedDirectories asserts a failed
  barrier removes the created directories but keeps a pre-existing
  directory and its file, and that a directory populated by another
  process is kept and the failed rollback reported. On the previous code
  it fails with "must be removed after a failed parent sync: <nil>".

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <[email protected]>
2026-10-14 16:39:10 +08:00
Kevin Codex 1335ca6671 feat(providers): add GMI Cloud provider preset and partner listing (#1127)
Register GMI Cloud (https://api.gmi-serving.com/v1) as an
OpenAI-compatible catalog provider and add it to the README Partners
section.

- The catalog id `gmicloud` matches the models.dev provider id, so the
  remote model catalog resolves without a mapping. `gmi-cloud`,
  `GMI Cloud` and `gmi` resolve to it.
- Reads GMI_API_KEY (the name in GMI's docs) and GMICLOUD_API_KEY (the
  name models.dev uses).
- Defaults to Qwen/Qwen3.8-Max. The curated list is Qwen 3.8 Max and
  Flash (GMI's partner models), then DeepSeek V4 Pro and Flash. All four
  are served by GMI's /v1/models.
- README and README_ZH: key line, setup command, and the partner logo in
  light and dark variants under docs/assets/.

Verified live with a GMI key: `zero providers check gmicloud
--connectivity` passes, and `zero exec` completes a read-then-write task
on both Qwen 3.8 models.
2026-10-14 12:55:29 +08:00
Fabio Tavares LeitãoandClaude Sonnet 5.5 ddc45f2c81 feat(providers): opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments (#1106)
* feat(providers): opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments

The shared HTTP transport waits at most 120s for a response header. A local
model server that has to load a large model can take longer than that to
produce the first byte (measured 1-5 minutes on a throttled local Ollama), so
an otherwise-alive request is aborted.

Add ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT, mirroring ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT: a Go
duration or a bare number of seconds; "0", "off", "none" or "disabled" remove
the limit; an unparseable or non-positive value falls back to the default
instead of removing the limit. The default stays 120s, so nothing changes for
anyone who does not set the variable. The constant and the resolver sit next to
the idle-timeout equivalents in providerio.

Checked against a throttled local Ollama: ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT=5s
fails at ~6.4s, =300s succeeds at ~223s (a request that would have hit the
120s ceiling).

Refs #1038

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142QEjA7eEFcdXTpcTmcAZk

* fix(providers): keep the 120s header timeout when bare seconds overflow

A value such as 36028797018963968 passes strconv.Atoi and wraps to zero
when multiplied by time.Second, which would disable the default. Values
that do not fit in time.Duration stay on the default.

* fix(providers): keep timeout defaults when bare seconds overflow

ResolveStreamIdleTimeout multiplied bare seconds by time.Second the same way the header timeout did, so a large count wrapped to zero and disabled the watchdog. Both resolvers now share a bounds-checked conversion.

* fix(providers): apply the header timeout when the shared client is taken

The stall-hardened transport baked ResponseHeaderTimeout in at package init, so a later ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT never reached the real client and the 120s check depended on the env at init. Each resolved value now keeps its own transport, and a slow header proves that transport enforces it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-13 12:49:55 +08:00
Lortu | AEGIS Core eebb384676 feat(runtime): add process-local per-model RPM admission limits (#1116)
* feat(runtime): add process-local per-model RPM admission limits

* fix(config): preserve model RPM through provider fallback

* test(config): pin provider-command RPM cap precedence

* style(config): gofmt provider-command RPM test
2026-10-13 10:15:11 +08:00
Kevin Codex 39d6560137 docs(readme): add Trendshift badges and Partners section (#1126)
Add three Trendshift badges under the tagline (#1 Go repository of the
day, #3 Go repository of the week, #3 on GitHub Trending) and a Partners
section listing Twigpine, Xiaomi MiMo, Novita AI, Concentrate, and Exa,
following the layout used in the OpenClaude README. README_ZH.md gets
the same badge row and a matching section.

The Novita, Concentrate, and Exa logos are vendored under docs/assets
with light and dark variants. The Twigpine and Xiaomi MiMo logos are
loaded from their own sites, as OpenClaude does; Twigpine switches to
its dark variant under a dark color scheme.
2026-10-13 09:40:10 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp bb3346a828 fix(execution): reserve process capacity before launching (#1092)
Reject starts when all slots are live or reserved, prune only completed history, and release reservations on launch failure. Keep live processes tracked even after failed termination. Add concurrent admission and real-process regressions for #1085.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd5-eb93-74c9-a1ac-5b140edaf973

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:03:04 +08:00
HazyLabandhazyhaar ac5fe0d218 fix(security): harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters (#1066)
* fix(security): harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters

- sandbox: recognize POSIX short-option clusters in shellCommandFlag (ZERO-ESC-02)
  Extract payload commands behind combined short flags (-ec, -lc, -xc) and long
  --command in dashCPayload and shellDashCPayload, preventing destructive
  subcommands from bypassing recursive AST inspection and auto-allowing execution.
- tools: anchor write_file and edit_file to *os.Root descriptor (ZERO-TRAV-01)
  Use openScopedWriteRoot and commitRootedFileContents to traverse parents relative
  to the root descriptor handle, eliminating residual TOCTOU directory swaps.
- tools: harden format_on_write against untrusted execution and secret leakage
  Pass --no-config to prettier to disable dynamic JS config execution, reject
  formatter binaries resolved inside the workspace (formatterBinaryInWriteRoots),
  and scrub credential-bearing environment variables before running formatters.

* fix(security): stop shell flag parsing at dash-dash and verify root descriptor identity

Stop recursing into shell `-c` payloads for tokens that follow the `--`
separator, which marks positional operands rather than options, in both
shellDashCPayload (text detector) and dashCPayload (AST analyzer). This
prevents `bash -- -ec '...'` from being classified on a command the shell
never runs as a command string.

Verify the identity of the *os.Root descriptor returned by openScopedWriteRoot
against a pre-open os.Stat of the resolved root, closing the check-to-use
window opened by os.OpenRoot re-resolving the path. A root substituted for a
symlink or a different directory is refused and the descriptor closed.

Regression tests fail on the unfixed code:
- TestShellDashCPayloadStopsAtDashDash, TestDetectInteractiveCommandAllowsNonInteractive
- TestAnalyzeCommand (`bash -- -ec ...` must stay non-interactive/non-destructive)
- TestOpenScopedWriteRootRejectsSubstitutedRoot

Bureau: desk-pr-1066

* fix(tools): relax symlink resolution error handling on host formatters and clean up test directory

* fix(security): anchor write preimage on root descriptor and report skipped formatters

---------

Co-authored-by: hazyhaar <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:02:17 +08:00
zzucs 0c6f179a84 fix(tools): hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under root (#1063)
* fix(tools): hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under the workspace root

On Windows a leading-slash POSIX path is not absolute, so read tools joined
it under the workspace root and surfaced a raw GetFileAttributesEx error.
Append a Windows-only hint naming the host OS and the workspace root when such
a path is missing, so the model switches to a workspace-relative path instead
of retrying the same shape.

Guidance only: which path is opened, confinement errors, and write-path
resolution are unchanged. All read tools share the annotated resolver.

Refs #972

* test(tools): keep the Windows path hint wiring test hermetic

The cross-platform wiring test used a fixed "/home/..." request, but
resolveScopedReadPathForGOOS injects only the annotation GOOS: on Unix the
request is host-absolute, so root was ignored and the test read state it did
not own. Build the request from t.TempDir() instead - joined under root on
Windows, anchored in root on Unix - and resolve an existing file under that
tree to prove the resolution stayed in test-owned storage. The native Windows
end-to-end test is unchanged.

Addresses the P2 finding on #1063.

* fix(tools): reject mixed-separator UNC paths in the Windows hint

Windows treats both separators as valid, so a second leading separator in
either position (/\server\share, /\?\C:...) is the same UNC or device-style
prefix as //. looksLikePosixAbsolutePath excluded only the literal "//", so a
missing mixed-separator target was misreported as a POSIX path resolved under
the workspace root. Exclude either separator byte and cover both mixed forms
in the shape and annotation tables.

Addresses the P3 finding on #1063.
2026-10-12 15:01:44 +08:00
feb992757c fix(tui): bound live dictation regions (#985)
* fix(tui): bound live dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve user edits across dictation partials

* fix(tui): reanchor stale dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): bound live dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve user edits across dictation partials

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): reanchor stale dictation regions

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve dictation separators after reanchoring

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a07cfc-4f4e-773c-b42e-6229ef568a01
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): reject Unicode whitespace in browser title origins

Cover encoded whitespace before permission translation and through wire payloads. Pin parent reasoning-effort forwarding at the specialist resume call site.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a097c8-242d-732f-bf6e-7321d8cf732c
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Anandan <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 15:01:09 +08:00
Vasanth T 23c27e0778 feat(sessions): add zero sessions prune, which never removes a session another process has open (#1089)
* feat(sessions): prune old sessions, never one another process has open

Store.Prune removes sessions last updated before a cutoff of at least a
day, and reports what it removed, what it kept and why, and what failed.
A dry run makes the same decisions and removes nothing.

A session holds no lock between writes, so nothing told a prune in one
terminal that another terminal still had the session open. Each session
now has a lease file: a process that writes a session, or loads it
through the rehydrated reads the TUI, exec --resume and ACP use to
continue one, holds a shared lock on it for its lifetime, and prune
takes it exclusively and leaves alone any session it cannot get. On
Windows the lease file is opened with FILE_SHARE_DELETE so a held lease
never blocks removing the directory.

Prune also keeps every ancestor of a session that stays, since Lineage
and Tree fail on a missing ancestor, removes descendants before their
ancestors, re-checks each session under its lease and write lock, and
removes the metadata first so a removal that fails part way leaves
nothing that looks like a session.

Part of #971.

* feat(cli): add zero sessions prune, with a retention setting read from user config only

`zero sessions prune --older-than 30d` removes sessions last updated
before the cutoff, `--dry-run` lists what it would remove and why it
keeps the rest, and `--json` prints the report. The cutoff is days or a
Go duration and never under a day. Without --older-than, prune uses
sessions.retentionDays; with neither it refuses and says how to set one,
so nothing is removed unless asked for.

sessions.retentionDays is read straight from the user config file.
Sessions belong to the user rather than to a repository, so a project's
.zero/config.json cannot choose what prune deletes, and no resolver
merge copies the setting from anywhere.

Closes #971.

* test(sessions): a dry run reports a session another process has open as kept

* test(sessions): pin the dry run for undated sessions and the lease a new session takes

* test(sessions): report every failure when a session is written while pruning

* docs(readme): list sessions prune in the Chinese README as well

* fix(sessions): a fork or child holds its parent, and is refused while prune holds it

A lease is taken best effort, so a fork whose parent prune held at that
moment went ahead: the rehydrated read in exec --fork could not hold the
parent, Fork read it anyway, and the fork was created under a parent
prune was removing. Fork and CreateChild now take the parent's lease
themselves before reading it, and refuse when prune holds it, so the
parent of a session being created is never removed under it.

* docs(sessions): say that nothing calls Release yet, and what it is for

* fix(sessions): let go of the lease before removing a pruned session's directory

lease.lock is deleted with the rest of the session while prune still
holds it. Where a delete only takes effect once the last handle closes
(Windows without POSIX delete semantics: older builds, or FAT and exFAT
volumes), prune's own handle kept the directory from being empty, so
the removal failed and left an empty directory behind. Prune now closes
the lease after session.lock is gone and before the directory goes.

* test(cli): an empty --older-than is a usage error, not the retention setting

* fix(sessions): refuse to continue a session prune holds, rather than read it without the lease

A resume that started while prune held the session could not take the
lease, read the session anyway, and went on to use one prune was free to
remove: a read changes nothing prune checks again. The rehydrated read
behind the TUI resume, exec --resume and --fork, and ACP session/load
and session/resume now fails with ErrPruning at that moment, and none of
the three falls back to a raw read on it. ACP load stays best effort
about a history it cannot read, but not about this one. Writes are
unchanged: a write lands under session.lock, where prune checks the
session again.

Prune takes the lease through the new Store.HoldExclusive, which the
TUI and ACP tests use to hold a session the way prune does.

* test(sessions): a lease that cannot be taken keeps the session, and does not stop a resume

Prune fails closed when it cannot take a session's lease at all, so a
process whose own hold fails the same way can carry on: prune cannot
remove the session either. Refusing there instead would stop resume
and fork wherever locking does not work, for people who never prune.

* fix(sessions): keep a parent forked after the plan, and refuse sessions removed under a caller

Three gaps jatmn found in the prune lease rules.

A fork made after prune's plan, by a process that has since exited,
was not in the plan, so its old parent was removed and the fork was
left under a missing ancestor. Once prune holds a parent exclusively it
now looks for sessions the plan did not see that name it as parent,
and keeps it if there is one.

Store.Create with a ParentSessionID, which exec --calling-session-id
and spec implementations use, did not hold the parent at all. It now
holds it the way Fork and CreateChild do, and all three refuse a
parent whose directory is still there without its metadata: prune
removes the metadata first and unlinks lease.lock after it, so a lease
taken at that moment lands on a fresh lease file and proves nothing.

A resume, exec --resume or --fork, or ACP load that picked a session a
moment before prune removed it could take a fresh lease and read the
session as empty. HoldToContinue now holds the picked session and
requires its metadata, and those callers go through it. The
rehydrated read on its own still reads a missing session as empty.

* fix(sessions): make a dry run decide at removal time like a real prune

A dry run appended every planned session to Removed without calling
pruneSession, so none of the checks made once a session is held for removal
ran: the second lease check, the re-read of the last update, and the scan for
a child created after the plan. On the same disk, a dry run could list a
session that a real run keeps.

pruneSession now takes a dry-run flag, makes every one of those checks under
the same locks, and stops before removing anything. The prune command reports
a session a dry run could not check as such, not as one it could not remove.
2026-10-12 14:26:29 +08:00
Kevin Codex 2c418fc8ff fix: unbreak main CI (cron claim tests, Go 1.26.9) (#1124)
* test(cron): pass the history limit in the claim tests

#1094 added a limit argument to cron.Store.Runs. #1090 merged shortly
after from a branch that predated it, so its two new tests in
cron_claim_test.go still called Runs with only the job id and the
internal/cli test package stopped compiling on main:

    internal/cli/cron_claim_test.go:111:38: not enough arguments in call to stores[0].Runs
        have (string)
        want (string, int)

That failed vet and every job that runs go test. Pass 0, which selects
the default MaxRunHistory cap, as the other callers in this package do.

* fix: bump Go to 1.26.9 for stdlib vulnerability fixes

govulncheck reports ten reachable standard-library vulnerabilities on
Go 1.26.6, all fixed in 1.26.9: GO-2026-6603, 6605, 6610, 6611, 6612,
6613 and 6617 in net/http, GO-2026-6608 in net/textproto, GO-2026-6607
in crypto/tls, and GO-2026-6604 in os (Windows only).

CI and release workflows read the toolchain from go.mod, so the go
directive is the only version to change. Update the stated source-build
minimum in the READMEs and install guide to match.
2026-10-12 10:46:27 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 571af701bd fix(mcp): refresh OAuth tokens for discovered endpoints and registered clients (#1113)
Login discovers the token endpoint (RFC 9728 / 8414) and may obtain a
client_id/client_secret through dynamic registration, but persisted none
of it. Refresh read only the config-file OAuthConfig, which is empty for
the standard `auth: oauth` setup, so every expired access token failed
with "no token endpoint configured for refresh" and required a new
`zero mcp oauth login`.

Store the discovered token endpoint (and whether it was server-advertised)
and the dynamically registered client on the token, and fall back to them
in Refresh. Explicit config still wins, and values already in config are
not copied into the store. A stored endpoint is re-validated before use:
the shared https/loopback rule always, and for a server-advertised
endpoint the same public-network policy and pinned client Login used. The
refreshed token keeps the stored fields so later refreshes keep working.

Fixes #1101

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:58:49 +08:00
2eb9d94fac fix(cron): preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete (#1090)
* fix(cron): preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete

Let claimFire own schedule state and increment the current fire count under the store lock. Abort completion writes on read errors rather than restoring a stale snapshot.

Cover adjacent slots in both completion orders using independent stores, including failed executions, duplicate claim rejection, and unreadable completion state.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#962

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dc9c-8bc2-72cc-ad0b-6c64e3578df8
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): avoid stale next-run summary on persist failure

Report the next run as unknown when completion state cannot be persisted, as requested in review. Extend the existing corrupt-state regression to verify the summary.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-0c9c-753c-9afc-45f9c1082c17
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:56:39 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5.5 eefa978f61 fix(daemon): do not retry workers that finished with a final exit code (#1112)
The pool stopped retrying only on exit 0 or ExitPermanent (76), so the
other codes `zero exec` uses to say a run is over (2 usage, 3 provider,
4 incomplete, 130 interrupted) were treated as crashes and retried up to
MaxAttempts with backoff. Exit 4 means the agent already ran, so each
retry repeated its side effects, re-billed the provider and appended a
second run to the same session stream.

Treat those four codes as final: return the worker's exit code with
ErrPermanent. Crash-type exits (1, signals) and launch/read errors still
retry.

Fixes #1100

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:55:55 +08:00
Shubham bea2230633 chore: remove unused test exports and dead shell-highlight/theme/upstream helpers (#1096) 2026-10-12 09:55:24 +08:00
Marlowe df67edec13 fix(redaction): redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end (#1095)
* fix(redaction): redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end

Two AWS keys with no separator between them (AKIA...AKIA...) only had the
first redacted: the leading \b in the secret patterns sees a word character
on the left of the second key and misses it.

Apply each textSecretPattern via a helper that also retries at every redacted
span end with a \b-stripped, start-anchored variant of the pattern, so a
credential starting exactly where the previous one ended is still caught.
Chained runs (three or more glued credentials) are followed to the end. A
mid-word occurrence that does not abut a redacted span still does not match.

Extracted from #1075 per Vasanthdev2004's suggestion on #969; #1067 remains
the fix for the RedactString leak.

* Address CodeRabbit critical: bound redactAdjacent span-chaining loop

The outer loop re-read len(spans) while the inner loop appended chained
spans to the same slice, so appended spans were re-chained and the span
count grew exponentially on long glued-key runs (RedactString handles
untrusted content). Bound the loop to the original match count and add a
regression test with 64 glued AWS keys asserting 64 markers promptly.
2026-10-12 09:54:52 +08:00
42eb6ab5fb fix(cron): bound run history and read recent records from the tail (#1094)
* fix(cron): bound run history and read recent records from the tail

Retain the newest 1,000 outcomes under the job lock and publish complete history snapshots. Add bounded reverse reads and regression coverage for legacy logs, failures, and concurrent stores.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#1086

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcd6-ad63-74d8-8396-45573c57dcec
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): skip oversized legacy history records

Discard entire oversized lines during bounded tail reads so compaction can record new outcomes without weakening atomic publication. Cover exact size boundaries and oversized first, middle, and unterminated final records.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e861-ebee-7764-be1d-e67517cd914c
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): append the outcome when the history log cannot be replaced

On Windows the atomic replace of runs.jsonl fails while another process
holds the log open, which dropped every outcome for as long as it stayed
open. Keep the replace, and only when it fails append the record on a
fresh line. The leading newline terminates any unterminated tail; the
blank line it may leave is already skipped by readRuns. Zero's own
readers take the job lock, so they never observe a partial append.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

* fix(cron): preserve the history DACL and append only on sharing violations

Compacting runs.jsonl renamed a temporary file over it, which on Windows
replaced a DACL applied to the log with the job directory's inherited
one. Publish through ReplaceWithRetry so the log keeps its descriptor.

Fall back to appending only when the replace fails with a Windows
sharing or lock violation, the error a reader holding the log open
produces. Any other failure, such as a persistent access denial, is
returned so a log that can never be replaced cannot grow past the
retention limit. fsutil.IsSharingOrLockViolation exposes the existing
classifier, gated to Windows because errno 32 and 33 mean EPIPE and EDOM
elsewhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:45:29 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp 8a68660161 fix(daemon): bound pending sessions and prune on completion (#1091)
Reject excess unfinished sessions before registration and dispatch, independently of retained history. Release admission and prune on every terminal path.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0dcbe-87ec-74e6-bdd0-6341b0c26d9a

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:40:41 +08:00
Vasanth T ab018b3098 fix(daemon): stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity (#1088)
* test(daemon): stop what a worker left running after it was reaped

A daemon worker is launched into its own process group, but Kill and the
Cancel hook pass its PID to background.TerminateProcess, which looks the
group up again with Getpgid when it signals. Once the worker has exited
and been waited, that lookup fails, only the dead PID is signalled, and a
child the worker left running survives. This pins the case with a shell
worker that backgrounds a sleep and exits: after the wait, Kill and the
Cancel hook must still stop the sleep.

Committed ahead of the fix so CI shows it failing on the current
behaviour on Linux and macOS.

* fix(daemon): stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity

Kill and the Cancel hook now go through background.TerminateCommandGroup,
which signals the group the worker was launched into (ConfigureChild-
ProcessGroup's Setpgid) instead of rediscovering it from the PID, so a
worker that has exited, or on Darwin one that is still a zombie, no longer
leaves its children running. It is TerminateCommand without the reap:
the pool waits on its workers itself and exec.Cmd calls Cancel from
inside Wait, so reaping there would be a second Wait.

On Windows it is the same tree kill, with the process handle pinned while
it runs. A command that has already been waited cannot be pinned; that
now reports os.ErrProcessDone, which exec.Cmd's Cancel contract treats
as nothing to cancel, instead of the unexported "already released" error.

Fixes #861
2026-10-12 09:38:26 +08:00
1697b7a5ce fix(tui): show provider ownership in Recent and Favorites (#1083)
* fix(tui): show provider ownership in recent and favorite models

Display saved provider names in mixed-provider picker groups and include them in row sizing. Preserve provider-grouped rows and selection values.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#840

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0d8e9-d346-71f9-bdac-4ac762d810a5
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): label mixed-group rows with the provider Enter uses

Recent and Favorites rows labeled their owner from recent history, but
selection falls back to the active provider when that owner was renamed
or removed, so the label could name a provider that would not be used.
Derive the label from the same decision selection makes
(modelPickerSwitchOwner) and store it on the row as OwnerLabel.

Cap the owner prefix at 20 cells so an unbounded profile name cannot
consume the model name once the overlay reaches its 76-column maximum.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): distinguish abbreviated model picker owners

Budget owner cues against the rendered row width, preserve model names, and distinguish abbreviated saved profiles with numbered suffix cues. Show the highlighted full owner as a wrapped key before selection. Cover shared-prefix and shared-suffix owners, narrow terminals, Favorites, and Enter routing.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): preserve model labels when owner cues cannot fit

Split owner cues onto a second line when the model needs the row width. Check the actually rendered row before suppressing the full owner key, so owner text hidden inside a clipped model label cannot hide that key.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): fit multiline model rows and mouse targets

Fit the model picker item window to its rendered viewport height and share that window with mouse hit-testing. Account for group headers and two-line rows so clicking either line selects the correct model and the keyboard-selected item remains visible.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0e862-13e1-756e-9608-58d5fed96f05
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-10-12 09:37:30 +08:00
Vasanth T 6b5852dc18 fix(sandbox): say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded (#1082)
* fix(sandbox): say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded

Only `zero doctor` and `zero sandbox policy` reported a degraded sandbox, so
a TUI session or a `zero exec` run went ahead with the native sandbox
effectively off and nobody saw it. Both now say so once, before the first
prompt or tool call, naming the downgrade reason: exec on stderr next to
the grant migration notice, the TUI as a system notice when it opens.

The line comes from the session's own engine through Backend.BuildPlan,
the plan `zero sandbox policy` prints, so the notice and the command that
explains it cannot describe two different sandboxes. Only the degraded
level speaks: a disabled sandbox is the user's choice, and the unelevated
Windows tier still enforces the write jail.

Exec tests that expect a quiet stderr now compare against the notice this
host prints under the default policy, since they run on the host's own
backend and a Linux runner without the helper is degraded while macOS and
Windows are not.

Fixes #1041

* fix(sandbox): say so when the nesting markers skip wrapping

With ZERO_SANDBOXED and ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND set, BuildCommandPlan passes
every command through unwrapped on the word of an outer sandbox nothing
verifies (#727). The notice came from Backend.BuildPlan, which does not
model that path, so a native backend reported full enforcement and a
session started with the markers ran every command unwrapped in silence.
The engine's notice now mirrors the runner and names the markers and the
unverified outer sandbox. A disabled sandbox still says nothing.

hostSandboxNotice builds its expectation through the engine too, and the
tests that pin the notice clear the markers so a suite run inside a Zero
sandbox does not change their answer.

* fix(tui): say the startup notices again when a session is resumed

/resume rebuilds the transcript from an empty one, so the startup notices
went with the old transcript and the session it switched to ran under a
degraded sandbox without a word. The model keeps the notices and puts
them back first, before the resume summary. Rewind and compaction stay in
the same session and keep the notice in the scrollback above their
divider.

Also pins why the notice can be decided once, at startup: grants made
during a session only open the network or add allow and deny paths,
never the mode, and every mode but disabled already needs the platform
sandbox, so no grant reaches a degraded command plan the startup notice
missed, and a deny path the backend cannot enforce is refused instead.

* fix(tui): say the startup notices again when /new opens a session

/new cleared the transcript and added only its own note, so the new
session started under a degraded sandbox without a word, the same gap
/resume had. It now puts the notices back first, the way /resume does.
/clear stays in the same session and, like rewind and compaction, keeps
the notice in the scrollback above its divider.

* fix(modelregistry): start no background refresh when the fetch is turned off

The TUI and exec each started a goroutine that called
RefreshModelsDevCache, which reads ZERO_DISABLE_MODELS_FETCH and the
cache path when it runs. A test that turned the fetch off through
t.Setenv could finish and have the setting restored before that
goroutine ran, and the refresh would then fetch into the developer's
real cache. StartModelsDevRefresh reads the setting before starting
anything, so with the fetch off no refresh exists to outlive the test.

* test(cli): keep the degraded-notice tests out of the developer's user state

runExecWithSandbox and the TUI launch test left the sandbox grant store
and the models.dev cache at their defaults, so they read the
developer's sandbox-grants.json and could migrate it, and could refresh
the real models cache. Both now run under isolateCLIUserState, and both
join TestCLILaunchHelpersLeaveUserStateAlone so the isolation is pinned
for each of them.

* fix(cli): stop exec when the degraded-sandbox notice cannot be written

The notice goes out before any tool runs, and before MCP servers and
plugins start through the same sandbox, but a failed write to stderr
was ignored, so the run went ahead with reduced isolation and no
warning delivered. It now stops with exitCrash, the way the image and
reasoning-effort notices in the same function already do.
2026-10-12 09:36:52 +08:00
Vasanth T aa52040498 fix(deps): refresh the lockfile to patched hono and @hono/node-server (#1080)
The lock pinned hono 4.12.27 and @hono/node-server 1.19.14 through
tuistory 0.10.0, and npm audit reports advisories against both. tuistory
already declares ^4.11.7 and ^1.19.9, so the patched releases fit the
existing ranges: hono 4.13.9 and @hono/node-server 1.19.17. package.json
is unchanged.

npm also re-syncs the lock's root entry with package.json, which main had
already changed without regenerating the lock: license MIT, android in
os, and no install script.
2026-10-12 09:33:58 +08:00
Vasanth T 547330197b fix(oauth): give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown (#1079)
* fix(oauth): give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown

The loopback OAuth callback server was written out three times: the shared
oauth.LoopbackListener, MCP's Login and OpenRouter's login. Each ended with
Shutdown under a one-second deadline, and Shutdown only closes idle
connections. A client that has sent part of a request header is not idle, so it
survived the deadline, and its goroutine and the Serve goroutine stayed alive
after the flow returned (#1028).

#1051 fixed that for LoopbackListener (a header read bound, force-close when
Shutdown runs out of time, and a join on Serve) and left the other two exactly
as they were, because each was its own copy.

The lifecycle now lives once, in oauth.CallbackServer, with #1051's behavior
unchanged: ReadHeaderTimeout of 5s, Shutdown within 1s, Close() on a missed
deadline, and Close returning only after Serve has. LoopbackListener uses it
through an unexported constructor that keeps its ConnState test hook, and MCP's
Login and OpenRouterLogin use StartCallbackServer, which both packages could
already import.

Each call site gets a regression test that stalls a raw client mid-header ahead
of the real callback and then requires the stalled connection to be closed once
the login returns. The ordering does the synchronising: the stalled client is
dialled before the real callback, Serve accepts in order, and the login cannot
finish until the real callback has been served, so no sleep is involved.

Fixes #1028

* test(oauth): pin the callback server's header bound and its join on Serve

Two of the three things CallbackServer does had no test that noticed their
removal, the same as when #1051 introduced them on LoopbackListener: the
five-second header read bound, and Close waiting for the Serve goroutine.

The header test stalls a client mid-header and never calls Close, so it can
only pass on ReadHeaderTimeout; the bound is a package var so the test can
shorten it. It synchronises on StateNew. Go reports StateActive only after a
request read returns, and a stalled header read returns only when the header
timeout fires, so a helper waiting for StateActive depended on the bound under
test and turned its removal into a SETUP INVALID instead of a failure.

The join test uses the case where the join matters: with no connections open,
Shutdown closes the listener and returns at once, so without the join Close can
return before Serve does. Without it the test failed 10 runs out of 10.
2026-10-12 09:33:10 +08:00
Vasanth T 7f11491078 fix(acp): publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only (#1078)
* fix(acp): publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only

session/load registered a fully promptable session for any session kind,
including the child, side and spec sub-runs that every other resume path
refuses through sessions.IsResumableKind: the TUI, exec sessions, the exec CLI,
and ACP's own session/resume. So a sub-run could be opened and continued as a
standalone conversation through ACP and nowhere else, with whatever its parent
run relied on about that sub-run's lifecycle no longer true.

Load has a real render-only use, a client rebuilding a transcript it can scroll,
so it still loads those sessions and still replays their history. What changes
is that the session it publishes for a non-resumable kind is marked read-only,
and session/prompt refuses it with an invalid-params error that says why.
runTurn is reached only from session/prompt, so that one gate covers every way a
turn can run; set_mode and the config options only change settings.

The flag is decided at first registration and never changes. Resume refuses a
non-resumable kind before it registers anything, and session/new always creates
a standalone session, so the only path that can publish one of these ids is
load, which now publishes it read-only.

TestACPResumeAppliesStandaloneSessionKindPolicy claimed "session/load should
retain render-only access", but its prompt check ran before the load, so it only
proved the refused resume never registered the session. It now prompts after the
load as well. TestACPLoadPublishesSubRunsReadOnly checks every kind in both
directions, so a gate that refused everything would fail on the resumable kinds,
with a setup guard that the table agrees with IsResumableKind.

Fixes #1045

* test(acp): require resumable sessions to be promptable after load, not merely unrefused

TestACPLoadPublishesSubRunsReadOnly decided the outcome from the error text:
"refused as view-only" was false for any error other than the view-only one, so
a regular or fork session whose prompt failed for some other reason still
passed. With every writable prompt made to fail with an internal error, the old
test stayed green. Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR.

Resumable sessions now have to prompt successfully. For the sub-run kinds the
decision is the RPC code, and the message is checked only to tell the view-only
refusal apart from other invalid-params errors such as an unknown session id.
2026-10-12 09:32:40 +08:00
Marlowe 0324c1d410 fix(mcp): forward image tool results on the existing image channel (#1077)
* fix(mcp): forward image tool results on the existing image channel

Recreated from Gitlawb/zero#1012 (approved but unmerged).
Original: euxaristia/zero:feat/823-forward-mcp-images

* test(mcp): pin the pre-decode encoded cap and MIME sniffing guards

Adds the two reviewer-requested tests for the untrusted-input boundary:
- TestOverCapEncodedPayloadIsRejectedBeforeDecoding: a payload one byte
  over EncodedLen(MaxImageBytes) is rejected and the decoder is never
  called, so a hostile server cannot force arbitrary decode work.
- TestDeclaredMimeTypeDisagreeingWithSniffedBytesIsDropped: an HTML
  payload declared as image/png is sniffed from its bytes and dropped
  rather than forwarded to the provider as an image.

Both mutations (removing the cap, trusting the declared mimeType) were
verified to turn their test red locally.
2026-10-12 09:31:17 +08:00
Marlowe b9ef1d271a fix(agent): retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch (#1076)
* fix(agent): retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch

Recreated from Gitlawb/zero#1014 (approved but unmerged).
Original: euxaristia/zero:fix/973-mid-stream-transport-retry

* Address CodeRabbit nit: add Unix ECONNABORTED needle to shouldReconnect

midStreamAbortNeedles claims to be a subset of shouldReconnect but listed
'software caused connection abort' (the Unix/macOS ECONNABORTED text),
which shouldReconnect did not match. Add the needle alongside the other
abort phrases, and cover it in TestShouldReconnectClassification.
2026-10-12 09:30:19 +08:00
Vasanth T 9520f2bad7 fix(search): redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty (#1073)
* fix(search): redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty

`zero search --json` prints Hit.Session straight to stdout and redactMetadata
covered ten of its string fields. Filling every string-kinded field of
sessions.Metadata with a credential and walking the result names twenty that
came back carrying it: SessionKind, Tag, RootSessionID, AgentName, TaskID,
SpawnedFromEventID, SpecID, SpecFilePath, SpecStatus, SpecDraftModelID,
SpecDraftReasoning, SpecUserComment, SpecRejectReason, SpecSourceSessionID,
SpecImplSessionID, and the five on the Goal (Objective, Status, StatusReason,
CreatedAt, UpdatedAt).

The ones carrying the most free text are the ones a hand-kept list is least
likely to reach: SpecUserComment and SpecRejectReason are review text the user
typed, SpecDraftReasoning is the model's own prose, and Goal.Objective and
Goal.StatusReason are however the goal was phrased.

Goal is redacted through a copy. Metadata is passed by value but Goal is a
pointer inside it, so redacting in place would edit the session the caller still
holds, and a search would quietly rewrite the live record it was only asked to
report on.

TestRedactMetadataCoversEveryTextField walks the struct rather than repeating
the list, so a string field added to Metadata or Goal later fails on the day it
lands. It carries a SETUP INVALID guard that the chosen secret is a shape
RedactString actually recognizes, since otherwise every leg would pass
vacuously, and a second guard that the walk visited any fields at all.

* test(search): make the metadata coverage guard recurse, so nesting cannot slip past it

The first version of the guard walked only the direct string fields of
sessions.Metadata and hand-allocated the Goal beside it. That left it with the
blind spot it exists to close: a nested struct or pointer field added later
would arrive empty, the walk would find nothing in it, and the test would pass
while the new field went out unredacted. Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR.

Filling is now recursive through structs, pointers and slices, allocating what
it finds nil, and the walk is its mirror. The test compares the two counts, so a
shape one traversal understands and the other does not fails as SETUP INVALID
rather than passing quietly.

Both helpers fail rather than skip on a kind they do not understand. A field the
guard cannot populate is a field it is not guarding, and saying so at the point
it is added is the whole value of having it.
2026-10-12 09:29:36 +08:00
Vasanth T e2d18c50f0 test(config,tui): stop two tests reading the developer's environment and checkout path (#1072)
`go test ./...` is red on a developer machine and green in CI, for two tests
that take an input from the machine rather than from the test.

TestResolveReportsExplicitMaxTurns left ResolveOptions.Env nil on four of its
five cases, and a nil Env means "read the real process environment" (envValue).
Any one of the ten variables the resolver reads is enough to break it. With
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL exported, applyProviderEnv synthesizes a second, keyless
"anthropic" profile from a base URL on its own, the single-provider shortcut in
normalizeProviders no longer applies because there are now two, and Resolve
returns `no active provider configured: active provider "" not found` before the
test reaches its assertion. Measured one variable at a time against a clean
environment, all ten fail the same test: ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,
ANTHROPIC_MODEL, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_MODEL, GEMINI_API_KEY,
GOOGLE_API_KEY, ZERO_PROVIDER and ZERO_MAX_TURNS.

The cases now state an empty environment instead of no environment, which is
what they meant, and the test exports three hostile values itself so it proves
that rather than relying on the machine it runs on being clean. Reverting either
changed case fails the test on a clean environment too, so this cannot regress
silently on CI.

TestAltScreenTranscriptScrollKeepsFooterFixed asserted the branch survives in
the title bar at width 90 while leaving Options.Cwd empty, so newModel took the
real working directory. The outcome is not a monotonic function of that path's
length, which is why this took a measurement rather than a guess. The title bar
picks the widest candidate that fits: workspace carries branch and path, cwdOnly
carries the path alone, compactLeft carries the branch alone. At width 90 with
this branch, a cwd of up to 52 bytes keeps both, 53 to 74 falls to path-only and
drops the branch, and 75 or more falls again to branch-only and restores it. The
test failed from a checkout whose package path is 74 bytes and passed from one
at 80; CI sits at 40. Cwd is now pinned, which also stops newModel reading the
real repository for a branch the test overwrites anyway.

No production code changes. The resolver's nil-Env contract and the header's
candidate ladder are both deliberate; only the tests were leaning on them.
2026-10-12 09:28:11 +08:00
Vasanth T e20b762426 fix(redaction): redact credentials split by an invisible character (#1067)
* fix(redaction): redact credentials split by an invisible character

Every shape matcher in RedactString describes a contiguous run of body
characters, and none of their classes admits a control or format character.
One NUL or ESC dropped into the body of a key therefore ended the match and
both fragments were emitted untouched. Whoever read that output next saw the
original key back, because nothing about those characters was ever displayed:
a terminal eats the escape, a log viewer or JSON consumer strips the control
byte, and a copy-paste drops both.

The matchers now also run over a copy with those characters removed, and the
spans they find are mapped back so the replacement covers the original bytes,
separators included. Emitting the compacted copy would hand the caller a
different string than the one they passed in, and leaving a separator behind
would read as two secrets where there was one.

Written against the character classes rather than the two bytes in the report,
because every other Cc and Cf character behaves the same way: BEL, backspace,
DEL, the C1 controls, zero-width space and joiner, word joiner, BOM and soft
hyphen all split a key on main. Tab, newline and carriage return are
deliberately excluded and a test says so: they are real text structure, a
credential broken across a line is visible to whoever reads it rather than
hidden from them, and stripping them would let one match span a line break and
replace unrelated lines.

Text with no such character takes exactly the path it took before, decided by
a byte scan that allocates nothing, so the common case is unchanged at 51
allocations. Text that carries control characters and no credential pays for
one compacted copy and a second pattern pass.

Fixes #969

* test(redaction): assert the exact output around a malformed byte

The malformed-UTF8 legs only asked whether the key was gone, so a decoder that measured an invalid byte as the three bytes of U+FFFD still passed: the replacement covered the secret and moved its edges onto the bytes beside it. They now assert the whole string. One leg also records that an invalid byte is not one of the invisible separators, on the same ground as tab and newline: it decodes to U+FFFD and is drawn.

* fix(redaction): keep credential boundaries while matching across invisible characters

The split-credential pass compacted every Cc and Cf character out of the whole
string before matching, which removed delimiters as well as filler. Two things
followed. A whole credential written after a NUL lost the word boundary the
shape matchers open with, so "prefix<NUL>AKIA...<ESC>..." stopped redacting even
though the unsplit "prefix<NUL>AKIA..." has always redacted. And with the
delimiter between two credentials gone, the unbounded JWT shapes ran out of the
first key and through the header of the next, replacing both with one marker and
exposing the second token's payload and signature. The same reach consumed
ordinary prose written after a key.

Three changes, one rule: a separator is filler inside a credential and a
delimiter outside one, and the difference comes from the source rather than from
the compacted copy.

The pass now runs after the contiguous matchers instead of before them, over
what they left, and never across a replacement. A whole credential is claimed by
its own strict match, so neighbours stay separate and the delimiter between them
survives. The shape matchers used here drop their leading word boundary, and the
byte before the match's original start is what has to be a non-word byte, so a
key after a NUL redacts and a key glued to the end of a word still does not.

The offset table is gone with them. It carried a start and an end for every
source byte, which is sixteen bytes per byte of input on a 64-bit build, and
RedactString is handed whole command output and notification bodies with no
bound in front of it. Only the endpoints of actual matches are resolved now, in
one walk. On a 4 MiB input with a split key, the split path allocated 223.6 MB
before this change and 154.9 MB after, against 146.3 MB for the same text with
no separator in it.

Tests cover a delimiter in front of a split key against its unsplit verdict at
every kind of leading byte, each supported shape placed in front of a JWT with
each class of separator, text immediately behind a key, a caller-supplied
replacement made of word characters, and the allocation ceiling.

* fix(redaction): match split credentials with gap-tolerant shapes on the original text

CodeRabbit found a bypass in the compaction approach:
"xAKIA<NUL>AKIAIOSF<SOH>ODNN7EXAMPLE" leaked while its unsplit counterpart
redacts. With the separators removed first, the leftmost AWS match began at the
decoy AKIA, was then rejected for the "x" in front of it, and had already
consumed the start of the real key, so the real key was never considered. The
ordinary-prose version is any word ending in "sk" followed by a hyphen, "ask-"
or "task-", ahead of a split OpenAI key.

Resuming the scan one byte after each rejection would close that but is
quadratic for the greedy shapes on text like "ask-ask-ask-..." with one NUL in
it. So the boundary goes back inside the pattern instead. Each shape is rewritten
through regexp/syntax so a run of separators may sit between any two characters
it consumes, but never before the first, and matched against the ORIGINAL text
with its leading \b intact. RE2 then judges the word boundary against the real
neighbour in one linear pass, and there is no compaction and no offset mapping.
The separator class is generated from the same Unicode tables as
splitSecretSeparator.

Two further cases came out of rerunning the seeded differential against main:

- The shapes are matched independently and the union of their spans replaced.
  Applied one after another, a split key's unbounded body ran on across a
  separator into a following JWT, stopped at its first dot, and left the JWT
  shape nothing to match, exposing its payload and signature.
- A second pass, ungated, catches a credential glued onto a split one, which
  gains its word boundary only once the first is replaced. It is often whole
  itself, so its region can hold no separator by then.

On 6,000 control-free inputs the output is byte-for-byte main's. On 6,000 with
invisible characters, 147 outputs still hold a known credential once those are
removed, against 2112 on main; 140 of the 147 leak on main too when the input is
unsplit, and the remaining 7 are the one limit now written into the header
comment: a split key whose first fragment is a complete credential on its own,
with another credential glued onto its tail.

* fix(redaction): keep two split credentials of one shape apart

Matches of one pattern never overlap, so when a split credential's body ran
on through the separator after it, a following credential of the same shape
could not start a match of its own. A JWT body stops at the next token's
first dot and a classic GitHub body at its underscore, so two split JWTs
side by side left the second one's payload and signature in the clear.
A match the OpenAI filter rejects spans what it ran into as well, so a
split key after kebab-case prose was rejected with the prose and printed.

When a match runs through a separator run into a position where the same
shape matches again and reaches at least as far, that credential is taken
on its own, and the first is cut at the separators when it is a complete
match by itself. Each piece is filtered on its own. Candidates are tried
latest first and only where the shape's literal prefix follows the
separators, at most eight per match, so the pass stays linear.

The header comment now says plainly that the rest of a key whose front
part is complete alone stays visible, and drops a stale sentence from
before the shapes were matched independently.

* fix(redaction): recognise the next credential when its prefix is split too

The run-on search looked for a shape's literal prefix contiguously after
the separators, so a token split inside its first few characters was never
seen as a new start and its payload leaked again. The prefix is now matched
with gaps allowed between its characters, the way the shapes are. The new
test splits the second token's header at every character, which also
pins that the bounded search is spent only where a credential can begin.

* fix(redaction): take one run-on step per match, not the whole chain

Following a run-on from the second credential into a third, and on to the
end of the chain, did that walk again from every match inside the chain,
which is quadratic: a megabyte of split JWTs back to back allocated about
seventeen gigabytes and ran for ten minutes. Each match now separates only
the credential it ran into. The scan's own next match starts inside that
credential and takes the following step, so a chain is still covered, and
in chains of three or more the markers after the first pair can join.

A test bounds the allocation on a chain of split JWTs; the linear pass uses
about forty times the input and the walk used far more.
2026-10-12 09:24:15 +08:00
Gaurav Bhatia 7f8e5f08bb feat(notify): make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable (#1001)
* feat(notify): make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable

The notify system existed but was silent unless the user hand-edited
config.json, with no UI surface to discover or change it.

- resolver: fall back to mode=both, focusMode=unfocused when the notify
  block is missing or empty (Fixes #579)
- tui: add /notify slash command with popup picker, mirroring /theme;
  explicit choices persist via config.SetNotify
- cli: add `zero config notify` to read/update/reset the preference
  (--mode, --focus, --reset, --json)
- config: add SetNotify writer using the existing atomic-write helper,
  validating against the same vocab the resolver accepts

The TUI effectiveTUINotifyMode default (empty -> both) now matches the
resolver. exec_test.go seeds notify.mode=off where a test asserted
silent stderr, which the old empty-default implicitly provided.

* fix(notify): apply review feedback from CodeRabbit

- cli: omitted --mode/--focus flags now preserve the current resolved
  value instead of wiping it (--reset remains the only clearing path);
  aligns the CLI with the TUI's mode-only preservation behavior
- tui: reject /notify inputs with more than two tokens instead of
  silently accepting them
- tui: apply /notify choices to the live notifier via the new
  notify.Notifier.Configure, so the change takes effect on the next
  permission prompt in the same session (the previous message claimed
  this but only the persisted value was updated)
- notify: add Notifier.Configure (mutex-guarded policy swap that
  preserves sinks, focus state, and the writer)
- tests: mode-only/focus-only CLI preservation, live-notifier apply,
  trailing-argument rejection, Configure immediate-effect + sink
  retention

* fix(notify): read cfg under the lock in Notify

Configure (334c688) made cfg mutable at runtime, but Notify still read
n.cfg.Mode before acquiring n.mu — a data race with a concurrent
Configure. Move the mode check inside the critical section and copy cfg
to a local for all reads.

Regression test TestConfigureConcurrentWithNotify runs Configure
concurrently with Notify; verified it reports DATA RACE on the unfixed
code and passes after the fix (go test -race -count=5).

* fix(notify): keep defaults out of the resolver; preserve the user's own values

Addresses the maintainer review (Vasanthdev2004) on PR #1001. All three
findings share one root cause: the resolved config was treated as if it
were the user's choice.

- resolver: no longer defaults notify.mode/focusMode. The TUI's
  effectiveTUINotifyMode already maps empty -> both on its own, so the
  permission-prompt alert still works out of the box, while headless
  `zero exec` stays byte-identical to base (no BEL/OSC-9 on stderr under
  -o json), the exec empty-stderr fixture is restored, and the
  ZERO_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL sink is not armed by an implicit default.
- cli: `zero config notify` seeds omitted fields from the user's own
  file (new config.UserNotify), never from the resolved view — a
  project config's mode:off can no longer be copied into the user's
  global config, and blank stays blank instead of pinning today's
  default as an explicit choice. --reset remains the only clearing path.
- tui: /notify mode-only changes preserve the focus stored in the
  user's own file (blank stays blank); the /notify picker enumerates the
  full 4x3 mode x focus space so every valid pair is a row, the current
  pair is always preselected, and Enter can never commit a setting the
  user did not choose. State view reads the stored pair.
- tests: the three regressions from the review — exec writes nothing to
  stderr on a clean run (fixture restored + resolver empty-default
  test), a ProjectConfigPath test proving project notify cannot leak
  into the user file, and Enter on an open picker from a pair outside
  the old curated list (off, always) keeps the setting unchanged.

* fix(cli): zero config notify no longer requires a configured provider

The command resolved the full config (providers included) before
touching notification settings, so a fresh user with no provider hit
ErrNoActiveProvider and could not read, set, or reset their notify
preference — the exact first-run user this feature targets (CodeRabbit
review, PR #1001).

The command manages a user preference, so it now talks only to the
user's own config file (config.UserNotify / config.SetNotify) and never
runs config resolution. Display reports the user's stored values — a
project config that overrides notify for one repo is not shown here,
matching the write path's source-of-truth from the maintainer review.

* fix(notify): separate live session policy from persisted user preference

Addresses the review from jatmn (PR #1001). The three notification
states — stored user file, resolved startup pair, live session — are
distinct contracts and must not be conflated:

- handleNotifyCommand now keeps two focus values per update: the LIVE
  focus (in-session, initialized from the resolved pair, so a project's
  focus rule keeps applying) feeds the notifier's Configure and the
  status line; the PERSISTED focus seeds from the user's own file
  (config.UserNotify), so a mode-only /notify writes the mode while the
  user's focus value — blank included — is preserved and project values
  never leak into the global file.
- /notify list reports the live pair (model fields), not the stored
  file, which can legitimately disagree under a project override.
- the /notify picker preselects the live pair; committing a row is an
  explicit choice, so Enter on the preselected row keeps the setting.
- /notify list requires exactly one token, matching /theme, /effort,
  and /style (rejects "/notify list junk").
- shell completions: config gained a notify child with its flags
  (--mode/--focus/--reset/--json), plus a completion-tree assertion for
  both contexts so new CLI surfaces cannot go stale.
- help/copy pass: the CLI help now describes the stored global
  notification preference controlling BOTH the completion and
  needs-input alerts, --reset as returning the TUI to its effective
  default (headless unconfigured stays silent), lists all three focus
  values in /notify usage, and drops the stale "resolver default"
  wording from effectiveTUINotifyMode and the command doc.
- tests: contract-matrix coverage with the three states deliberately
  disagreeing (blank user file + project-resolved off/focused) asserting
  list/picker/preselection/Enter, mode-only and explicit-pair updates on
  both live and persisted sides, and restart precedence; the SA4006
  lint hits are resolved by asserting the returned live model.

lint-static: 0 issues. Affected suites green under -race; the only
remaining local failures are the known environment flakes
(TestRunAuthOpenRouterSavesMintedKey on macOS keychain under a
sanitized env, and TestLoadProviderCommand* 5s subprocess timeouts
under full-suite load — both pass in isolation and fail identically on
clean origin/main here).

* fix(notify): close the remaining review findings (isolation, races, fidelity)

Addresses the third review round (PR #1001) as one boundary pass:

- BTW isolation: /notify mutations and the picker are now behind the
  existing btwCommandUnavailable guard (like /theme), because the side
  conversation shares the parent's notifier pointer — an unblocked
  /notify off inside BTW reconfigured the parent and wrote the global
  file while only the side's display changed. /notify list stays
  available. Regression: side-conversation attempt then return, checking
  the parent's actual notification output and the stored preference.
- Serialization: new UpdateNotify runs read-merge-write as ONE
  transaction under a cross-process advisory lock (flock/LockFileEx on a
  .lock file beside the config, credstore's pattern), so two concurrent
  partial updates (--mode off vs --focus always) cannot interleave and
  silently undo each other's explicit change. The CLI and the TUI's
  mode-only persistence both go through it; the TUI's stale pre-read of
  the stored focus is gone (the merge reads under the lock). Verified
  0/30 lost updates driving the real binary with two concurrent
  processes per round; a goroutine-level regression test asserts both
  explicit fields survive.
- Fidelity: notification writes now edit ONLY the notify member's bytes
  (setNotifyJSONObject, on the existing byte-preserving JSON editor),
  so unrelated values survive with their explicit presence intact —
  including tools.deferThreshold: 0 and MCP disabled: false, which the
  typed serializer's omitempty cannot round-trip, and keys FileConfig
  does not model at all. A reset removes the notify member instead of
  leaving a {} husk.
- Startup recovery: Resolve's ErrNoActiveProvider partial result now
  carries the parsed non-provider fields (notify, sandbox, tools, ...),
  and the setup-recovery branch that clears the resolved config keeps
  the notify block — a stored explicit mode:off no longer resurrects
  alerts through the provider-recovery path. Regression: stale
  activeProvider + stored off/always through recovery asserts the
  launched TUI receives the opt-out, not the both/unfocused default.
- docs nits: zero config --help now describes both alert classes; the
  two remaining "resolver default" wordings updated.

lint-static: 0 issues. Affected packages green under -race (the only
local failure is the known TestRunAuthOpenRouterSavesMintedKey macOS
keychain flake, which fails identically on clean origin/main here).

* fix(config): notify reset removes every duplicate notify member

A hand-edited config may contain duplicate notify members (JSON decoders
tolerate them; the last occurrence wins). The reset path removed only
the final member, so an earlier block survived and became the effective
preference on the next decode — `zero config notify --reset` reported
success while the old value still applied (CodeRabbit review, PR #1001).

Loop the removal until no notify member remains, mirroring
setPetPreferenceJSON's duplicate handling. The replace path still edits
the LAST member, which is the one a decoder treats as effective, so an
earlier duplicate stays inert there.

Regression TestSetNotifyResetRemovesEveryDuplicateNotifyMember verifies
the reset-orphaned failure output on the pre-fix code and passes after;
it also pins the no-op reset and the last-member-replace behavior.

* fix(config): join UpdateNotify release error; restore main's test surface

CodeRabbit pass on the rebased head, three findings:

- UpdateNotify discarded the advisory-lock release error while every
  other writer joins it into the result (errors.Join). A failed unlock
  would leave later config updates blocked while the caller is told
  success. Now named-result + deferred Join, matching SetPet et al.
- The rebase had resolved model_test.go by taking the pre-rebase file,
  which silently dropped every test upstream added or changed since the
  fork point (composer blink/cursor suite, beginRun run-details,
  scrim-preserves-semantic-colors, session payload, Termux burst, ...).
  Rebuilt the file from origin/main plus only this branch's own additions
  (TestEffectiveTUINotifyMode), so main's newer assertions are back:
  the stale scrim assertion now expects semantic ANSI preservation, and
  the removed TestBeginRunResetsSidebarHidden stays removed exactly as
  upstream had already replaced it with TestBeginRunKeepsRunDetailsClosed.

* fix(tui): restore pickerTheme's transcript append; pin the picker failure path

Rebase regression (Vasanthdev2004, PR #1001): resolving the choosePicker
conflict attached the shared transcript-append line to the new
pickerNotify case, so the pickerTheme case lost it — a theme choice
whose preference could not be saved fell out with the session theme
changed and nothing reported, while the /theme text path kept its line,
so no test went red. Restore main's line in the pickerTheme case.

New regression TestThemePickerAppendNoteOnFailedSave drives the exact
reported shape: UserConfigPath under a regular file (the write must
fail), a pickerTheme item, choosePicker, and the could-not-save note
asserted in the transcript. Verified it fails on the pre-fix code with
the reviewer's own repro output and passes after.

Also restores the TestEffectiveTUINotifyMode comment to the post-review
wording (the default lives in the TUI, not config.Resolve, so headless
runs stay silent); the model_test.go rebuild had pulled the older
pre-notify phrasing back in.

* test(tui): restore the default palette after the picker regression test

Vasanthdev2004 follow-up (PR #1001): handleThemeCommand applies its
theme to the package-level zeroTheme, so TestThemePickerAppendNoteOnFailedSave
left dracula installed and the next palette-sensitive test
(TestFocusedPermissionSelectedRowUsesSelectionTintNotBrandChip) read
dracula's selection tint instead of the default. One line, the package's
existing convention: defer applyTheme(themeDark, true), as every other
theme-committing test already does. Verified the tint test fails in
sequence before the defer and the full internal/tui suite passes under
-race after.

* fix(tui): label the effective-default notify mode as "(default)"

jatmn round (PR #1001): the TUI printed the effective default mode as a
bare "both" while the new CLI labeled the same configuration "mode:
(default)" — the two first-party surfaces contradicted each other, and a
user could not tell whether "both" was stored or effective. Focus
already labeled its built-in default ("unfocused (default)"); mode now
mirrors it.

The model keeps the RAW configured mode (notifyConfiguredMode) alongside
the effective one, so state output can distinguish "both because the user
chose both" from "both because nothing is configured" — clearing to the
raw value when an explicit choice is made. effectiveModeLabel renders the
(default) tag on the /notify list card and the /notify change line, the
same wording the CLI read path uses. No defaults are persisted; resolver
and headless behavior untouched.

Regression TestNotifyStateLabelsEffectiveDefaultMode pins the contract:
unconfigured shows "both (default)", explicit stored "both" renders bare,
an explicit /notify bell choice renders bare in both the change line and
later state. Verified it fails on the pre-fix code and passes after.

* fix(config): one lock authority; full-replace across duplicate notify keys

jatmn round (PR #1001), two findings plus one documented precedence:

- UpdateNotify took a SECOND lock primitive over the same config.json.lock.
  On Windows its LockFileEx range did not overlap lockutil's, so notify
  writes could race provider/theme/credential/MCP writes and silently
  discard them; on every platform it also bypassed the established
  no-follow path checks and the bounded wait. Delete filelock_unix.go /
  filelock_windows.go entirely and use the existing lockConfigFileFn
  authority every other mutator already shares. New regression
  TestUpdateNotifyRacesExistingConfigMutatorWithoutLoss holds notify vs
  SetTheme and requires both acknowledged edits to survive; the real
  binary also races 30/30 clean cross-process on the shared lock.

- setNotifyJSONObject replaced only the last duplicate notify member, but
  Go's decoder MERGES the fields of duplicate members into one struct, so
  a replacement omitting a field inherited it from an earlier duplicate
  ({"notify":{"mode":"off"},"notify":{"focusMode":"focused"}} +
  SetNotify({FocusMode:"always"}) left mode "off" effective). The
  nonempty path now removes every duplicate and inserts the replacement
  fresh — full replace semantics, nothing inherited. UpdateNotify's
  partial merge is unaffected (it seeds omitted fields before the edit).
  Regression TestSetNotifyReplacementInheritsNoFieldFromEarlierDuplicate,
  verified failing on the pre-fix editor and passing after.

- zero config notify --reset combined with --mode/--focus now documents
  its precedence: --reset wins, explicit values are ignored (the help
  previously did not define the combination).

* fix(config): replace single notify member in place; reserve wipe for duplicates

Vasanthdev2004 review note (PR #1001, non-blocking): the duplicate-key fix
ran remove-and-reinsert for EVERY notify write, including the ordinary
single-member file — insertJSONMember appends after the last member, so
every /notify toggle moved the notify key to the end of the config object
and collapsed its formatting while everything around kept theirs.
Nothing was lost (member order carries no meaning), but a byte-preserving
write should not reformat what it need not touch.

setNotifyJSONObject now counts notify members first: exactly one is a
positional value replace (key stays where the user put it, surrounding
bytes untouched); two or more keeps the remove-every-duplicate-and-insert
path, where Go's field-merging decode would otherwise let an earlier
block leak fields into the replacement. Regression
TestSetNotifySingleMemberReplacedInPlace asserts exact bytes through an
in-place replace, verified failing on the over-eager version and passing
after; the duplicate regression and the whole config suite stay green.
2026-10-12 09:23:37 +08:00
Anandan 99721c762f fix(providers): send stable session headers to OpenCode (#1060) 2026-09-16 07:58:40 +08:00
Fayupable dcf229fecd refactor(tests): replace duplicated wait-for helpers with testutil.WaitFor (#1039)
Fixes #1023
2026-09-15 13:16:54 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 3fae0de2ea chore(main): release 0.9.0 (#1059)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 13:05:02 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 4ba112a0eb chore(main): release 0.9.0 (#958)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-15 12:59:18 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia b76c764b77 fix(providerio): close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR (#1058)
* fix(providerio): close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR

OpenRouter and other HTTP/2 backends can silently reset or drop connections
that sit idle in Go's client connection pool across user turns. When a
subsequent turn reuses the stale connection, it fails on stream connect with
PROTOCOL_ERROR.

Launch a background idle connection closer on non-darwin platforms to evict
idle pooled connections on a 30-second interval, forcing fresh handshakes
after idle pauses while preserving connection reuse across fast agent turns.

Refs #1057

* test(providerio): poll for idle connection eviction with bounded deadline

Replace the fixed 60ms sleep in TestStartIdleConnCloserClosesIdleConnections
with a 2-second bounded polling loop to avoid test flakes under heavy CI
load or under the race detector.

Refs #1057

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 12:58:58 +08:00
Anandan d73ec81e2d feat(tui): interactive terminal attach for tty exec sessions (#1055)
* feat(execution): add a stdin-only write for interactive processes

* feat(tui): attach overlay for interactive terminal sessions

* feat(tui): add /attach for interactive terminal sessions

* feat(tools): point the model at tty sessions for interactive prompts

* feat(tui): open the terminal automatically for tty exec sessions

* feat(tools): tell the model to keep polling while the user types

* feat(tui): give attached terminal sessions the full viewport

* feat(tools): route sudo through an escalated tty session

* fix(tui): route the auto-attach tick to its run

* fix(tui): defer auto-attach while another view owns the screen

* fix(tui): keep bracketed-paste framing for attached sessions

* fix(tools): let tty sessions run interactive commands

* fix(tui): capture the auto-attach baseline before the exec starts
2026-09-15 08:40:47 +08:00
Vladimir Babin 2479d946c1 fix(mcp): reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response (#1054)
* fix(mcp): reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response

networkClient.request matched the decoded POST body to the in-flight call on
id alone, so a server that answered tools/call with a method-bearing frame
produced an empty, error-free result. Apply the same isRequestOrNotification
guard the SSE paths already use and return a protocol error naming the method.

Fixes #1050

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>

* fix(mcp): describe the unexpected frame by method, not as a request

A method-bearing frame without an id is a notification, so the error
should not call it a request.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Babin <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:40:10 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu d76f7f6931 ci: run the action-summary test suite in zero-action-smoke (#1053)
Motivation: scripts/action-summary.mjs is invoked by the composite
action in action.yml on every action run, and ships with a 12-test
suite in scripts/action-summary.test.mjs. Neither the action-smoke
workflow nor the main Go-focused ci.yml executed that suite, and the
action-smoke workflow's paths filters did not even include those two
script files, so a change to the helper or its tests triggered no CI
job at all.

Approach: add scripts/action-summary.mjs and
scripts/action-summary.test.mjs to both the pull_request and push
paths filters in .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml, and add a
Setup Node (actions/setup-node, node-version 24, matching the pin
already used in release-artifacts.yml) step followed by a
`node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` step in the validate
job, ahead of the existing action.yml validation steps.

Validation:
- `node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs` passes locally: 12/12
  tests pass (Node v22.23.1; repo engines field requires >=18, CI pins
  24).
- Broke an assertion in a scratch copy of the test file outside the
  repo and reran `node --test`: 1 test failed and the process exited
  non-zero, confirming the new CI step actually gates on failures as
  the issue requires.
- `python3 -c "import yaml; yaml.safe_load(...)"` confirms the edited
  workflow YAML still parses.
- Confirmed .github/workflows/ci.yml has no Node step (Go-only
  pipeline), so zero-action-smoke.yml is the correct integration
  point.
- Base branch CI (upstream/main) is currently green.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1030

Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:39:40 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu 37d69c96ce ci: disable persisted checkout credentials on release workflows (#1052)
Motivation:
release-artifacts.yml's three actions/checkout steps (ordinary checkout,
workflow-dispatch requested-ref checkout, and the npm-publish job
checkout) and pr-auto-review.yml's single checkout step all leave
persist-credentials at its default, so the workflow token stays in the
job's local git config for every later step, including build/test/package
steps that never need it. ci.yml and zero-action-smoke.yml already
disable this. Neither modified file runs git push/commit/tag: the GitHub
Release publish step supplies its own explicit GH_TOKEN, and npm
publishing uses OIDC trusted publishing, so removing the persisted
credential changes no behavior.

Approach:
Add `persist-credentials: false` to each of the four checkout steps,
matching the exact convention already used in ci.yml/zero-action-smoke.yml.

Validation:
- go build ./... and go vet ./... pass.
- gofmt -l . reports nothing.
- go test ./internal/installtest/... passes.
- actionlint on both changed files reports only two pre-existing shellcheck
  warnings in release-artifacts.yml (SC2016, SC2034) that are unrelated to
  this diff and were confirmed present before the change as well (verified
  by stashing and re-running actionlint against the original files).
- A live GitHub Actions run of the release/publish workflows was not
  reproducible locally; this change only disables a default the workflows
  never rely on, so no functional change is expected.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1029

Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:39:05 +08:00
Pujitha PaladuguandPujitha Paladugu 176f5a242b fix(oauth): force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline (#1051)
* fix(oauth): force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline

Motivation:
LoopbackListener.Close shuts the callback server down with a 1-second
context and discards the result. http.Server.Shutdown only closes idle
connections, so a client that sends a partial request header and never
finishes it counts as active; Shutdown blocks out the full deadline,
times out, and Close returns while that connection and its Serve
goroutine remain open indefinitely. This is a loopback-only (127.0.0.1),
short-lived, single-use server, so the impact is a resource leak past
the end of the flow, not a remote vulnerability or crash.

Approach:
- add a ReadHeaderTimeout to the server so a stalled request header is
  bounded on its own;
- follow a timed-out or otherwise failed Shutdown with server.Close()
  to forcibly tear down any connection still open past the deadline;
- join the Serve goroutine (via a done channel) before Close returns,
  so its completion is observable instead of left dangling.

internal/mcp/oauth.go and internal/provideroauth/openrouter.go build
their own loopback servers with the same pattern; they are left
untouched here to keep this change scoped to the file the issue's
reproduction demonstrates.

Validation:
- go build ./internal/oauth/... and go vet ./internal/oauth/...: clean.
- gofmt -l internal/oauth/: clean (make fmt-check clean repo-wide).
- go test ./internal/oauth/... -race -v -count=1: all pass, including
  three new tests (TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection,
  TestLoopbackCloseIsIdempotent,
  TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback).
- Confirmed TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection fails
  against the pre-fix loopback.go (with the new test kept) and passes
  with the fix applied.
- Full repo go build ./..., go vet ./..., and go test ./... pass.
- Could not run make lint-static (golangci-lint) locally: it needs a
  very large dependency download and the local environment ran out of
  disk space fetching it. That check is continue-on-error (advisory)
  in .github/workflows/ci.yml, not a required gate.

Report: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1028
Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5 (via Claude Code)

* test(oauth): synchronize loopback regression tests instead of sleeping

TestLoopbackCloseForceClosesSlowHeaderConnection relied on a fixed
100ms sleep to let Serve accept a connection before sending a stalled
header; under load this could fail or silently skip the force-close
path it's meant to exercise. Use an http.Server.ConnState hook (via a
new unexported newLoopbackListener, set before Serve starts to avoid
a race) to wait for the real StateNew signal instead.

TestLoopbackCloseReturnsPromptlyAfterSuccessfulCallback measured
Close's elapsed time without joining its http.Get goroutine or
draining/closing the response body; join it first so the timing
starts from a connection that's actually back to idle.

Also register t.Cleanup(l.Close) in both tests so a Fatalf between
construction and the existing explicit Close doesn't leak the
listener's Serve goroutine.

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>

---------

Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <[email protected]>
2026-09-15 08:37:58 +08:00
Anandan 9e609c5242 feat(exec): default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling (#1049)
* feat(config): report whether the tool-turn budget was explicitly set

ResolvedConfig.MaxTurns is ambiguous today: a configured 80 and the
built-in default 80 are indistinguishable, so a caller that wants a
different default cannot tell "user chose this" from "nobody set it".
FileConfig now records at each merge gate (config files, provider
command, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, CLI overrides) when a source supplies a
positive maxTurns, and Resolve surfaces it as MaxTurnsSet.

* feat(exec): default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling

The shared 80-turn default is sized for the TUI, where the user can
say "continue" and the run resumes. Headless exec has nobody to do
that, so benchmark evals truncated at 80 turns mid-implementation.
An unset budget now resolves to MaxTurnsCeiling for exec only; any
explicit source (flag, mode preset, ZERO_MAX_TURNS, config file) and
exec-profile budgets keep their precedence. The TUI default is
unchanged.

* test(cli,config): cover the headless turn-budget default

* refactor(cli): extract the headless turn-budget decision
2026-09-15 08:37:09 +08:00
Anandan 2f531178f6 feat(tui): richer /resume session browser (#1047)
* feat(tui): support an optional detail line on picker rows

Add a faint second line under picker items so richer surfaces can show
secondary metadata (project, model, size) without crowding the label.
The line renders on the selection band, joins the search haystack, and
only appears at medium width and above; detail rows halve the visible
window so the overlay keeps its height, and mouse hit-testing maps a
click on either line to the same item.

* feat(tui): show project, model, and size under /resume rows

Each session row now carries a detail line with the project directory
(~-contracted), the model that ran it, and its event count, plus a
status chip for forks and tagged sessions. The line also joins the
filter haystack, so searching by project path or model name works.
Narrow terminals keep the existing single-line list.

* feat(tui): show relative last-activity age in /resume rows

Replace the absolute timestamp column with relative age ("2h ago",
"12d ago") so recency reads at a glance; distant history still shows
the calendar date. Also adds coverage for the detail line: rendering
at wide vs narrow tiers, status chips, and filtering by model.

* refactor(tui): drop the event count from /resume detail rows

Event count is an internal metric — the detail line now carries just
project, model, and the status chip, which are the fields that
actually discriminate sessions.

* fix(tui): sanitize session metadata before it reaches picker rows

Persisted titles (--session-title, /rename) and other metadata can
legally contain newlines; a stray line would break the picker's fixed
row geometry and misalign mouse hit-testing. Reuse sanitizeCardField
for the label and detail line, and cover the detail-line click path.

* fix(tui): strip carriage returns from rendered session metadata

A \r in a persisted title or model id rewinds the cursor to column 0
and overwrites the row. Fold it into sanitizeCardField alongside the
existing newline handling, and cover it in the picker test.

* fix(tui): pad picker detail lines on the selection band

The detail line only painted its text, so the selection highlight
stopped at the end of the text instead of spanning the row like the
label line above it. Pad the remainder with the row surface.

* test(tui): cover carriage returns in sanitizeCardField

* fix(tui): drop all control runes from rendered session metadata

The picker detail line newly renders cwd, model id, and tag, and any
of them can legally carry ESC/CSI/OSC/BEL/BS/VT/NEL bytes — a project
directory name containing \x1b[2J would repaint the terminal when the
picker opens. sanitizeCardField now maps line separators and tabs to
spaces and drops every remaining control rune, matching the package's
other sanitizers; this also closes the same hole for titles, which
predates the detail line.

* fix(tui): include exactly-30-day sessions in the relative-age branch
2026-09-15 08:36:37 +08:00
Vasanth T 3b43c43eca fix(sandbox): keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from (#1040)
* fix(sandbox): keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from

FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT refuses a reparse point at the final path
component and resolves every component above it, which is right for a path
the operator named and not enough for one this package derived. The
write-root carveouts are derived: <root>/.git/hooks and <root>/.git/config
are constructed from a root, and <root>/.git is a name an unprivileged
workspace writer can create before setup runs. mklink /J needs no
privilege, so a junction there had the apply open <junction-target>/hooks,
an ordinary directory with nothing wrong about its final component, and
zero sandbox setup wrote a deny ACE on it as Administrator, outside the
workspace.

A derived entry now carries the root it came from, and the apply requires
the object it finally holds to still live under it. The check is on the
handle rather than the name: GetFinalPathNameByHandle answers where the
open object actually is, and both sides go through it so the spelling
normalizes the same way. Materialization is checked before it creates,
since os.MkdirAll follows the same reparse points.

Deliberately not a refusal of every reparse point on the path. Above the
write root the path is the operator's, who may keep a workspace under a
junction or a mapped directory; only the tail the sandbox appended is held
strict.

Closes #1024

* fix(sandbox): reject the reparse ancestor itself before materializing

The pre-create check asked where the deepest existing ancestor lives, and
a junction answers with its own path: the open does not follow a
final-component reparse point, so <root>/.git came back as <root>/.git and
matched. os.MkdirAll does follow it. What disqualifies that ancestor is
that it IS a reparse point, not where it reports living.

Found by reverting the check and watching the test still pass, which said
the guard was doing nothing rather than that the test was weak. Pinned
against the function now, because through the whole apply the create is
made and then removed on the failure path, so the filesystem afterwards
looks identical either way. The plan wiring gets its own test for the same
reason: every apply-level case here hands the group an anchor directly, so
none of them would notice the builder never setting one.

* fix(sandbox): anchor only the carveouts that are under the root, and put the DACL back

Two from review, both right.

ReadOnlySubpaths is a profile field an operator can set to any path, and one
placed outside the write root is a configuration that works today; anchoring
it unconditionally turned that into a containment refusal. Only paths
lexically under the root are anchored now, which is where the derived
carveouts are anyway, and anything else keeps the final-component guard it
always had.

The successful-apply tests left their deny ACE in place, so t.TempDir could
fail to remove the tree. Restoring the snapshot exposed the sharper half:
the ACE denied the group the test runs as, which revoked its own WRITE_DAC
and left the rollback unable to reopen the target. The tests deny a group
this process is not a member of instead, which is what a capability SID is
in production, and roll back afterwards.

* test(sandbox): check the plan anchoring on every platform, out-of-root case included

The plan builder is cross-platform and its anchor tests were in a Windows-only
file, so nothing checked the wiring on Linux or macOS. Moved beside the other
BuildWindowsACLPlan tests, with the case review raised: an out-of-root
ReadOnlySubpath stays unanchored, and an in-root one is still held to its
write root.

* test(sandbox): give the cross-platform anchor tests native paths

Moving these beside the other BuildWindowsACLPlan tests made them run on
Linux and macOS, where their Windows path literals stop meaning what they
say: pathWithinRoot is filepath.Rel underneath, a backslash is an ordinary
character off Windows, and C:\workspace\.git\hooks is then one component
that is not under C:\workspace, so every anchor came back empty. The
neighbouring tests get away with such literals because they only compare
strings they built the same way and never ask whether one contains another.

Paths are built with filepath.Join from temp roots now, so the containment
question is asked in the separator the running platform actually uses.
2026-09-15 08:35:54 +08:00
KRATOS faec8ee201 feat(acp): emit structured file changes in tool updates (#999)
* feat(tools): retain bounded structured file diffs

* feat(acp): emit structured file changes in tool updates

* fix(acp): harden structured file diff transport

* fix(tools): reject unsafe rich diff previews

* fix(acp): preserve safe rich diff semantics

* fix(tools): bind structured diffs to committed changes

* fix(acp): preserve structured diff identity

* fix(tools): close rich diff race gaps

* fix(tools): report partial patch paths from workspace

* fix(tools): finalize structured diff evidence

* fix(tools): separate unverified patch writes

* test(tools): cover failed formatter recovery

* fix(acp): serialize file deletions as nullable diffs

* fix(tools): recreate files after formatter failure

* test(acp): require nullable diff fields on wire
2026-09-15 08:31:39 +08:00
KRATOS c1937dfac7 feat(acp): add standard session list and resume (#914)
* feat(acp): add standard session list and resume

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* fix(acp): preserve notification wire order

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* fix(acp): bind sessions to persisted workspaces

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* fix(acp): compare workspaces by filesystem identity, not by spelling

@Vasanthdev2004's three findings, all reproduced before changing anything.

TWO SPELLINGS OF ONE DIRECTORY WERE TWO WORKSPACES. Both comparisons were string
equality on ResolveWorkspaceRoot output, and that resolver is abs plus
filepath.Clean plus a stat — it does not fold case and does not resolve
junctions. A session persisted from the TUI was unresumable from an editor
holding a different spelling of the same project folder, and session/list
filtered by the other spelling returned nothing, which makes it an invisible
failure rather than a reported one. It lands on exactly the case this feature
exists for, and on the two processes most likely to disagree about spelling.

os.SameFile asks the filesystem which directories these are, which is the
question. filepath.EvalSymlinks is NOT the fix on Windows — it normalises a
drive letter and returns a junction path unchanged, so the alias survives it,
and junctions need no privilege. String equality stays as the fast path, and a
stat failure falls back to it rather than widening the match: this gate refuses
access to another workspace's files and configuration, so an unanswerable
comparison denies.

THE TEST COULD NOT SEE ANY OF IT. testDeps resolves with the identity function,
so the guard degenerated to "are these two strings different" fed two unrelated
temp directories — it could only ever answer yes. The rejection direction was
pinned and the acceptance direction was asserted nowhere. The new test uses a
resolver reproducing the production normalisation and drives the ACCEPTANCE
direction through an alias, skipping if the filesystem folds the alias away so
it never passes vacuously. Reverting to string equality fails it three ways:
load, resume, and a list that returns zero.

THE WIRE KEYS ARE AN EXTERNAL CONTRACT. Nothing pinned sessionId, cwd, title,
updatedAt, _meta, modelId, createdAt, sessions, nextCursor, cursor, loadSession,
promptCapabilities, sessionCapabilities, list or resume, so renaming a Go field
would break every client and leave the suite green. Renaming modelId to model_id
now fails.

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* fix(acp): test the alias guard where the bug lives, and stop listing unusable sessions

THE TEST COULD NOT RUN ON THE PLATFORM THE BUG IS FROM. @Vasanthdev2004's point,
and he is right that it is not a nit. The alias test built its second name with
os.Symlink, which needs a privilege an ordinary Windows session does not hold, so
it SKIPPED there — and Windows is where junctions exist and where this defect came
from. The identity guard was verified by CI on the two platforms that never had
the problem. It now builds the alias with mklink /J on Windows, which needs no
privilege and is how he found the defect in the first place, and keeps the symlink
arm elsewhere.

This is the second time in this series a correct fix shipped with a test that
could not exercise it: the same helper shape was added to internal/memory for the
same reason a day earlier.

A SESSION WITH NO PERSISTED WORKSPACE IS NOT RESUMABLE, SO IT IS NOT LISTED.
CodeRabbit's finding. activatePersistedSession refuses an empty Cwd, but the
listing advertised it anyway — a menu entry that only fails when taken. The test
asserts both halves, because the listing is only correct relative to what resume
will accept: the omitted session is checked to really fail on resume, and a usable
session is checked to survive the filter.

Mutation-checked: removing the filter advertises the unusable session again.
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* fix(acp): resolve every listed workspace, not only when a filter was supplied

@anandh8x's P1, both halves reproduced before changing anything.

The loop resolved item.Cwd only when a cwd filter was present, and skipped only a
blank one. Two shapes stayed on the menu that session/resume then refuses:

  - a session whose persisted workspace has since been deleted, advertised as
    resumable
  - a legacy entry holding a relative path, reported as cwd "." although ACP
    requires SessionInfo.cwd to be absolute

Every entry is now resolved unconditionally, anything that cannot resolve is
omitted, and the RESOLVED root is what SessionInfo carries — absolute as the
contract requires, and the same value the client hands back on resume. The
optional identity filter then applies to the resolved roots, which is also where
it belonged.

Listing is a menu: activatePersistedSession resolves and refuses what it cannot
reach, so anything this loop cannot resolve is something a client would be
offered and then denied.

Mutation-checked: restoring the resolve-only-when-filtered shape re-advertises
the deleted workspace and re-emits the relative cwd.

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* test(acp): assert the relative entry is retained, not merely absolute

CodeRabbit's catch, and the test was genuinely weaker than it looked. It checked
that the deleted workspace was gone, the live one kept, and every listed cwd
absolute — all of which a "fix" that simply DISCARDED any non-absolute entry
would satisfy, while losing a resumable session.

Presence is now asserted separately from spelling: the relative entry must still
be listed, and listed with an absolute path.

Mutation-checked: skipping non-absolute entries instead of resolving them now
fails with "a session with a resolvable relative workspace was dropped rather
than normalised". The first attempt at that mutation did not compile, so it
proved nothing until it was rewritten — worth saying, because a mutation that
fails to build looks exactly like a test that passes.

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* fix(acp): a relative persisted workspace is omitted, not rebased

Reported by @anandh8x. Resolving a stored relative cwd does not recover the
session's workspace, it invents one: ResolveWorkspaceRoot joins it against
whatever directory the ACP server happens to be running in, and that invented
absolute path was then advertised as the session's workspace and accepted as
its home on resume.

Reproduced on f2c6fc9a, a session persisted with cwd ".":

  LISTED legacy-rel as cwd="/Users/kratos/dev/f914/internal/acp"
  resume with an UNRELATED workspace -> err=... cwd does not match its persisted workspace
  resume with NO cwd (falls back to ".") -> err=<nil>

The mismatch check does its job when the client names a workspace, so the only
opening was the fallback path, where the rebased value was compared against
itself and always agreed. A conversation created for one project could be
resumed against another project's files, configuration and tools.

Both doors now take the same guard: handleSessionList omits an entry whose
persisted cwd is not absolute, and activatePersistedSession refuses one rather
than resolving it. The original base is not knowable from the metadata, so
guessing at it is not an option a fix can take.

This reverses an earlier assertion in TestSessionListResolvesEveryWorkspace,
which expected the relative entry to be normalised and retained. That was
requested in review on the grounds that dropping it loses a resumable session.
It does, but the entry was never resumable into its own workspace, only into
this process's. The test now asserts it is dropped, and a new
TestResumeRefusesARelativePersistedWorkspace covers the fallback path that the
listing filter alone leaves open.

Both guards mutation-checked: removing either one fails its test.
Pre-existing on this branch and on its merge-base, unrelated to this change:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider both exit 3 in this environment.

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* test(acp): the resume guard is asserted through both activating methods

Raised by CodeRabbit: the test is named for resume and called session/load.

session/load and session/resume are separate entry points that today share
activatePersistedSession, so an assertion through either one passes while the
guard holds — but the name promised a surface it was not touching. Both are now
named explicitly, which keeps that true: if resume is ever given its own path,
this fails rather than quietly covering half of what it claims to.

With the guard removed, both methods accept a relative persisted workspace on
the no-cwd fallback. The named-workspace case was already refused by the
existing mismatch check; the fallback was the only door open, and it is open on
both.

Not taken in this PR, from the same review: threading a rooted directory handle
through ResolveWorkspaceRoot and workspace construction so a root rename or link
swap cannot redirect later file operations. That is a real question and a
pre-existing one — this change adds a refusal and no path handling — but it is a
capability refactor across workspace and tool access with its own race test, not
something to fold into a session-list fix. Worth its own issue.

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* fix(acp): activation requires an absolute cwd in the REQUEST, not just the record

Reported by @jatmn.

ResumeSessionParams is a type alias for LoadSessionParams, so JSON decoding turns
an OMITTED resume cwd into an empty string. That blank reached the shared
activation path, whose blank-cwd fallback substitutes meta.Cwd — so
{"sessionId":"known"} activated a persisted session, even though ACP v1 requires
session/resume to carry an absolute working directory.

This is a different hole from the persisted-cwd one fixed earlier on this branch.
That guard asks whether the STORED workspace is identifiable; this asks whether
the CALLER named one at all. The earlier fix does not cover it, because a stored
absolute cwd passes that check and the blank request then silently inherits it.

requestedWorkspace validates the request's own cwd before anything reaches the
fallback: absent, empty and whitespace-only are all invalid params, and so is a
relative path. Applied to both activating methods rather than to resume alone —
load's omitted-cwd fallback was inheriting the same way, and leaving one door
open is how this class survived the last fix.

Mutation-checked at the wire, which is where the defect lives: making the blank
case return no error compiles and fails the regression on four separate requests
— session/load and session/resume, each with cwd omitted and with cwd blank. A
Go-level test would not have caught it, since the defect is in decoding an absent
field.

Two notes from a verification pass, neither a defect:

Error precedence changed: a blank cwd with an UNKNOWN session id now reports the
cwd problem instead of "session not found". Kept deliberately and pinned — it
stops the server confirming whether a session exists to a request that named no
workspace.

AdditionalDirectories is declared on two params structs and consumed nowhere in
the repo. Not a hole today, but it is the same shape — client-supplied paths with
no absoluteness rule — so the field now carries a note saying it must go through
requestedWorkspace when wired up.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d. go test -race ./internal/acp/ -count=5: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
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* fix(acp): resume the conversation a session became, and fail closed when it cannot

Three defects in ACP session restoration, all reported by @jatmn.

loadHistory read the raw event log and kept only EventMessage. A compacted
session stores its original prefix alongside an EventCompaction naming the
events it replaced and carrying their summary, so restoring from the raw log
replayed superseded turns AND dropped the summary that replaced them. It now
reads the same rehydrated view the TUI and exec paths use, and explicitly
projects the compaction summary -- switching readers alone would still drop it,
because rehydration substitutes the compaction event in place of what it
replaced.

historyErr only suppressed replay and raised a warning: the session was
registered and reported ready regardless, so an unreadable events file left the
caller holding a live, promptable session ID whose next prompt ran as a fresh
conversation under the old identity. Resume now fails. Load keeps the
best-effort policy deliberately rather than by inheriting the shared helper.

Tool calls and their results were dropped from session/load, so a restored
transcript showed prose asserting edits with no record that any tool ran. They
now replay through the same toolCallStart/toolCallResult mapping a live turn
uses, keyed on the stored toolCallId so results pair with their calls. They do
not enter turnRecord, so load and resume still consume the same effective
history. Resume stays replay-free.

Also asserts that an unset sessionCapabilities is omitted rather than
serialized as null, raised by CodeRabbit.

* fix(acp): persist tool activity for session replay

* test(acp): bound replay notification waits

* fix(acp): preserve session restore invariants

* fix(acp): restore session lifecycle boundaries

* fix(acp): preserve replay and restore identity

* fix(acp): commit a completed turn as one store batch

A completed turn was buffered until its outcome was known and then persisted
one event per call. Each call took and released the store's session lock, so a
second ACP instance holding the same session -- its turnMu is its own, only the
store is shared -- could append its whole turn between two of them: user A,
user B, answer B, answer A. Every write was individually locked and the log
was valid, but a fresh load pairs prose by order and reconstructed three wrong
turns from two right ones. Before this branch the user and assistant events
went to AppendEvents together; buffering until the outcome is known was the
right change and splitting the commit into singleton writes was not.

The whole buffer now goes through one Store.AppendEvents call, which writes the
batch under one lock and one file write. That is the contiguity being restored:
not a disk transaction, and not a promise about a crash mid-fsync. The outcome
gate still runs first; a hard failure still commits nothing; cancellation still
commits through the same boundary. A persistence failure is now the failure of
the whole batch, so there is no dependent suffix to protect and the rewritten
regression asserts that nothing of the turn is durable, the warning is raised,
and a fresh load replays none of it.

The two-instance regression holds both writers at the commit boundary until
each has arrived and then delegates to the real batch API under the real lock;
it observes what production hands it rather than batching anything itself, so
reverting to singleton writes fails it before any interleaving has to be
provoked. The restored prompt keeps both prose pairs and no historical tool
output.

Also normalizes the expected workspace in the listing test through
filepath.Clean, matching the resolver's output contract, so a TMPDIR spelled
with a ".." component no longer fails a correct result.

Rebased onto main to pick up the ACP browser metadata, specialist model
restoration and worktree pointer protection changes. Both reported by @jatmn.
2026-09-12 18:18:39 +05:30
KRATOS 90014210d2 fix(daemon): publish status files atomically (#949)
* fix(daemon): publish status files atomically

* fix(daemon): bind status publication to directory handle

* fix(daemon): validate status directory access

* fix(daemon): accept current token directory owner

* fix(daemon): migrate owned runtime directories safely

* fix(daemon): open Windows security handle relatively

* fix(daemon): use current NT directory object

* fix(observability): harden existing crash directories

* fix(security): bind crash report creation to private root

* fix(observability): atomically publish crash reports

* fix(observability): preserve committed crash reports

* fix(observability): revalidate committed crash path

* fix(daemon): secure runtime lifecycle boundaries

* fix(daemon): bind status ownership through cleanup

* fix(daemon): preserve Windows status security

* fix(daemon): retain trusted runtime root for lifecycle

* fix(daemon): roll back redirected socket binds

* fix(daemon): address status publication review
2026-09-12 18:18:12 +05:30
Vasanth T 6937a309cf fix(tools): say when format-on-write ran out of time (#1044)
* fix(tools): say when format-on-write ran out of time

The 10s bound exists so a wedged formatter cannot hang a tool call, which
is right, and on expiry the unformatted write stood with nothing said. Every
other fallback here is a standing fact about the environment (toggle off, no
formatter for the extension, binary not installed) and is silent because
nothing is wrong. A deadline firing is not that: formatting was configured,
available and expected, and the file was written unformatted because the
machine was slow. Left silent, the caller believes it wrote canonical style
and finds out from a CI format check it cannot see, which is the failure
this feature exists to prevent.

The timeout is now reported on the write and edit summaries, naming the file
and the formatter. The caller cancelling and the formatter exiting non-zero
are deliberately not reported: the first is already surfaced as a cancelled
run, and the second usually means content the formatter could not parse,
which a write does not promise to fix.

The bound stays 10s rather than being raised. Raising it makes a wedged
formatter block longer, which is the thing the bound is for; what was
missing was knowing when it fired.

Closes #1022

* fix(tools): put the written bytes back when the formatter fails

These formatters edit in place, so one killed by the deadline, killed by
the caller, or exiting partway through its own rewrite can leave the target
truncated: neither the input nor the output. Returning the written bytes on
top of that left the tracker baseline and the diff preview describing a
file that is not on disk, so the next edit would compare against content the
file does not have. That is a worse failure than the missing formatting the
previous commit set out to disclose.

The failure paths write the bytes back, and when even that fails the user
hears about it, since it is their file. Written back unconditionally on that
path rather than only when the bytes differ: comparing first means reading
the file to find out, and a read that fails leaves the same ambiguity this
exists to remove.

The fixture is proven to damage the file on a throwaway copy, because a
successful restore erases the evidence from the real one. My first attempt
asserted that on the target itself, where it could only pass vacuously or
report the opposite of what it saw.
2026-09-12 08:54:58 +08:00
Vasanth T da244bcbfc fix(sessions): render resume context fields in key order (#1043)
* fix(sessions): render resume context fields in key order

extractText walked a map[string]any directly and Go randomizes map
iteration, so the same session put the same fields in a different order in
every process: one run rendered a tool call as c1 read_file {"path":...},
the next as {"path":...} c1 read_file. That block is part of the user
prompt, so the prompt itself changed run to run, which leaves a provider
nothing stable to prefix-cache for it and makes two resumes of one session
impossible to diff while debugging.

Only the ordering is decided here. The summary short-circuit is untouched,
a list keeps the order it was written in, and which fields survive at all
stays the caller's projection.

Pinned as exact rendered strings rather than as two renders agreeing: a
same-process repeat passes whenever the random order happens to repeat,
which for a small map is often. The raw-JSON case proved it while being
written, matching on the first five attempts before diverging on the sixth.

Closes #1020

* test(sessions): name the expected context block instead of the first render

Comparing later renders against the first only asks whether the renderer is
stable, and a renderer that is stably wrong passes it: any fixed field order
satisfies it, including the unsorted one this change replaces.

It also hid something. The events were tool calls, which
promptContextEvents filters out of the resume context on this branch, so
the block being compared was a single message line and nothing said so. The
test now names the block it expects, on events that survive the filter, and
both failures are visible.
2026-09-12 08:54:33 +08:00
Vasanth T e34c8d2252 test(cli): skip the serve-scope symlink test when the platform refuses the link (#1042)
Creating a symlink on Windows needs SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, which an
ordinary developer account does not hold, so this reported a failure with
nothing wrong in the code: "A required privilege is not held by the client".
CI runners are elevated, so it only ever appeared locally, where it cost a
round of triage on #1003 before being ruled environmental and would do the
same to any contributor on a stock Windows machine.

The two other symlink tests in this package, and most of the rest of the
repo, already answer this way. Swept the remaining os.Symlink-then-Fatal
sites rather than assuming: internal/release passes, the one in
internal/agent is never reached, and the unix-only files cannot hit it. This
was the outlier.

Closes #1021
2026-09-12 08:53:51 +08:00
Vasanth T 91d921f4c5 feat(tui): offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation (#1019)
* feat(tui): offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation

Mid-run escalation existed but only exec offered it. The TUI already handled
every consequence of a switch, re-deriving the compaction threshold "after a
mid-run escalate_model switch" and resolving the summarizer against the active
profile, while nothing on that surface could cause one: escalate_model was
registered by exec alone. This closes that, opt-in, the same conservative way
exec answers the question.

Opt-in rather than default because escalation moves a run onto a different model,
which changes what it costs and which provider sees the conversation. That is the
operator's call, and the exec flag already answers it.

The switchers are built per turn from m.providerProfile rather than once at
launch. A TUI session can change models with /model, so a closure capturing the
startup profile would escalate from whatever the session began with instead of
what is in force now, and would carry that stale profile's base URL and
credential with it. exec has no such problem because its profile cannot change
mid-run, which is why the wiring lives in different places on the two surfaces.

The nil-contract logic is now shared rather than copied. providers.
EscalationSwitchers is the single implementation both surfaces call: the loop
swaps only on a non-nil provider, so a (nil, nil) return has to leave everything
untouched including the caller's usage attribution, and the session switcher is
installed only when the run STARTED optimized so escalation cannot change the
transport underneath a session. A second copy of that would only ever have been
exercised on one surface. exec's behaviour is unchanged: its six existing
escalation tests pass against the shared builder.

The tool and the switchers ride on one flag and a test asserts they cannot be
separated. Registering escalate_model without wiring a switcher ships a tool the
loop silently ignores, so the model reports an escalation that never happened;
that is the specific failure worth a guard rather than a comment.

Note this does not answer all of #554. Assigning models per phase, plan with one
and execute with another, is still not built. This makes the mechanism reachable
from the interactive surface, which is the part that was one flag away.

Refs #554

* fix(tui): attribute usage after an escalation to the model in force

exec reassigns currentModel when the escalation switcher fires; the TUI
captured usageModelID once per run and handed the switcher no callback,
so every usage event after a mid-run escalation was billed to the model
the run started on. The switcher now updates usageModelID, and the final
response carries the model per usage event so the batch fallback does
not swing the other way and bill the events before the switch to the
escalated model. Covered by a run through a scripted escalation that
checks both the live and the batch attribution.

* fix(cli): accept the root flags in any order

Each leading-flag splitter stops at the first token it does not own, so
running them once in a fixed sequence made the order load-bearing:
`zero --allow-escalation --theme auto` stranded the theme as an unknown
command and exited with an argument error instead of launching, and the
same happened after --skip-permissions-unsafe. The three splitters now
run until they make no progress, at the root and after the unsafe flag,
so every ordering reaches the TUI with every flag applied. A --theme
written before --skip-permissions-unsafe was dropped on that path; it is
kept now, with a later one winning as the last occurrence does.

* fix(cli): forward a root --allow-escalation into exec, reject it elsewhere

The root flag was stripped before dispatch, so `zero --allow-escalation
exec ...` and `zero --allow-escalation -p ...` ran without the opt-in the
help text promises, and `zero --allow-escalation version` accepted a flag
it could only discard. It now follows --add-dir: re-synthesised into the
exec argument list for the exec and -p shapes, so exec parses it as its
own flag, and rejected loudly for every other command. The ordering test
now generates every permutation of the three root flags, with
--skip-permissions-unsafe absent or at any position.

* fix(tui): record the model on an escalated run persisted usage events

The live usage record carried the model in force; the persisted session
payload did not. The usage report rebuilds cost from that payload and
falls back to the session-wide model when an event does not name one, so
an escalated interactive run was priced end to end at the model it started
on. Written only under escalation, matching what exec records under the
same flag, so an ordinary run persists the same compact payload as before.

* test(cli): isolate the new launch helpers from real user state

A temporary working directory isolates project files and nothing else.
runWithDeps fills the dependencies a test leaves out with production ones,
and the interactive launch path reads user config, opens stores, refreshes
the models.dev cache and migrates any inline plaintext API key into the
credential store before it reaches an injected runTUI callback. Running
these tests on a developer machine therefore rewrote that developer's
config.json and wrote a credential file beside it, and the results depended
on whatever providers, MCP servers and plugins the machine had.

Both new helpers now point every per-user base directory at a throwaway
root, pin the models.dev cache path, disable its background fetch, and
force the file credential backend so nothing reaches the host keyring. A
new test seeds a config with an inline key outside those fixture roots and
fails if either helper rewrites it or leaves a file beside it; without the
isolation it reports the rewritten config and the credentials.enc files.

* test(cli): check each launch helper isolation on its own

t.Setenv restores at the end of the test, not when the helper returns, so
one test exercising both helpers let the first isolation cover for the
second. Each helper now seeds its own emulated user config in a subtest,
and removing the isolation from either one fails that subtest.

* test(cli): pin the isolation itself, not only what this platform writes

The exec helper writes its models.dev cache from a background goroutine,
so a footprint check could not prove its isolation deterministically. Each
subtest now also asserts the helper moved the per-user paths off the
seeded root and disabled the fetch and the keyring backend, which fails
for either helper when the isolation call is removed.
2026-09-12 08:51:42 +08:00
Vasanth T 6ae8396f02 fix(sessions): carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt (#1016)
* fix(sessions): carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt

A turn that read six files and then died on a provider error left this behind
for the next turn:

  - #1 message: add retries to the http client
  - #6 error: provider error: upstream timeout

Nothing named the files, so the next turn re-read them from scratch (#913).

The work was never lost from the session: tool calls and results are recorded as
they happen, and the error path carries them out with everything else.
promptContextEvents then dropped both types on the way into the prompt, so the
record existed and nothing read it.

Filtering them was deliberate (#460) and is right for work an answer already
describes: forty read_file results add length and no information next to the
assistant message explaining them. It is wrong only for work with no answer
after it, and that is exactly what an interruption leaves. A turn that ends
normally was survivable for that reason, which is why this went unnoticed: the
answer was doing the remembering.

So the events after the last assistant message come along and the rest stays
filtered. The tail gets its own allowance rather than sharing the conversation
budget, so a tool-heavy interrupted turn still cannot push an earlier message
out of the context. That is the property #460 added the filter for and it is
asserted directly.

This changes a tested contract. TestFormatExecPromptKeepsConversationMessagesWhenNoisyEventsFollow
asserted that tool results are omitted, and its fixture is an interrupted turn:
43 results after an assistant answer with nothing speaking for them. That is the
#913 shape, so no rule satisfies both and the contract had to move. The test
keeps the guarantee it was written for, that conversation survives a noisy turn,
and a counterpart now pins the other half: work an answer already covers is
still filtered.

Not fixed here, and worth saying plainly: this carries what was DONE, not what
was READ. Zero has no conversation-history parameter at all, agent.Run seeds
from the system prompt and the user prompt every time, so file contents cannot
survive a turn boundary today. The next turn learns it already read a path and
can decide, rather than starting blind.

* fix(sessions): carry the tool outcome, not the tool output

The tail was carrying whole tool-result events, so up to 500 bytes of raw tool
output rode into a later turn prompt. Nothing redacts on the way in, and the
prompt renderer truncates rather than filters, so the only thing standing between
a file read and a later prompt was a length limit.

It bought almost nothing. The tail exists so a resumed turn knows what the
interrupted one did, and the CALL already says that: the tool name and its
arguments, which is the path for a read. The result body is the one part of the
pair that can carry file contents.

The status is kept rather than dropping the result entirely. A bare call reads as
work that succeeded, so a failed read would come back as a file the next turn
believes it already has.

Raised by CodeRabbit on the PR, and right.

* test(sessions): scope the outcome assertion to the tool_result lines

The status check searched the whole prompt for "error", which the provider error
message in the same fixture also contains. Blanking the status out left the test
passing, so it was asserting the presence of an unrelated line.

Scoped to the tool_result lines, it fails on that mutation naming the outcome it
lost.

* test(sessions): pin the whole of every tool line, not a search for one string

Two assertions here were weaker than what they claimed.

Searching the prompt for the fixture's whole secret only rejects that exact
string, so a change that carried a truncated or partly redacted prefix of the
output into the prompt would have passed. And asking whether "ok" and "error"
each appear somewhere among the result lines passes just as well with the two
statuses swapped, or both hung off the wrong call.

Both tool calls and both results are now pinned outright, which says what the
trim actually promises: nothing but the tool name and the outcome survives a
result, and the line order pairs each outcome with its own call. Compared as a
set of fields per line rather than as a string, because the renderer walks the
payload map and Go randomizes that order, so the same events come out in a
different field order on every run.

Reported by CodeRabbit on this PR.

* fix(sessions): keep a tool call's identity and drop its payload in resume context

toolResultOutcome strips a result down to name and status, and calls were left
verbatim, so an interrupted write_file put its content into the next turn's
prompt while the matching result body did not. Same secret, one door left open.
Admitting calls is the #913 fix and has to stay: a resumed turn knowing which
file was read is the whole point. What had to change is the symmetry.

toolCallIdentity is the call-side half of toolResultOutcome. It decodes the
arguments, keeps the fields that say what a call was about, and drops the ones
that carry what it was about to write, run or search for. Paths, directories,
urls, names, patterns and a read window survive; write_file's content, edit_file's
old and new strings, apply_patch's hunks and a shell command line do not.

An allow-list rather than a deny-list, so an argument this file has never seen is
dropped rather than replayed. A new tool with a new body field then shows up as a
missing path in a resume prompt, which is visible, instead of a new leak, which
is not. Keyed by argument name rather than tool name, so an MCP tool whose
argument is a url keeps it without being enumerated. Arguments that do not decode
as an object are removed outright: text that could not be read is text that
cannot be checked.

The tail budget gets a comment rather than a change. Tail slots exist only when
the conversation uses fewer than the 80-event cap, so a session already at the
cap carries no interrupted tool work, which is what every session did before
tool events were admitted and what the #460 cap is there to hold. Reserving a
minimum tail by trimming conversation further is a product decision, and it is
not this one.

Reported by jatmn.

* fix(sessions): scrub credentials out of retained tool-call values

An allow-listed key is not a safe value. web_fetch accepts a credential in
the query string and redacts the URL it reports back, so an interrupted
fetch had its token dropped from the result and kept verbatim in the call,
and this projection then carried it into the next resume or fork prompt.
Retained string values now go through the same redaction web_fetch uses on
its own returned URL: host, path and ordinary query survive, the token does
not, and non-string values are untouched.

* fix(sessions): project a tool call's top-level fields instead of patching one

toolResultOutcome builds its output from the fields it keeps, so a field it
has never heard of cannot reach a prompt through it. The call side edited
arguments in place and returned every sibling key, and returned the payload
untouched when there were no arguments at all, so a producer recording one
more top-level field would put it into the next turn. Both halves now name
what survives and drop the rest.

* fix(sessions): name the value shapes a projected argument may keep, and scope the ambiguous aliases

Two halves of the same gap: the projection decided which KEYS survive and
said nothing about the values under them or about which tool gave them
meaning.

Values. Strings were scrubbed and everything else passed through, which
reads as "a number is nothing to scrub" and is true of a number and not of
an object. MCP schemas allow object and array properties, so
{"query":{"api_key":"...","content":"private body"}} arrived under a
permitted key and carried a whole payload into the next prompt. Redacting a
serialized object would not have helped, since ordinary private text has no
credential shape to match. The retained shapes are named now: a scrubbed
string, and the scalars a read window is made of. A container is dropped and
the call keeps its name and id, so a resumed turn still knows which tool ran.

Meaning. grep accepts "search" for its pattern and edit_file accepts the
same word for the text being replaced, so admitting it globally would have
replayed file contents. It is scoped to grep, and the rule is kept as a
test: an argument name any mutating tool accepts for body content belongs in
the per-tool table or nowhere. The unambiguous supported forms are added to
the shared table: glob's match, and read_file's start_line, end_line,
max_lines, byte_offset and byte_limit.

Driven through the store on both resume and fork, including a call the tool
would have rejected, since the agent records OnToolCall before execution. The
persisted events are asserted unchanged: this is a view for the prompt, not
an edit to the record.

* test(sessions): assert the window key with its value, not the number alone

strings.Contains(out, "40") finds it inside "4096", so the start_line
assertion passed whether or not start_line survived the projection, which
is the opposite of what it claimed. The rendered arguments carry the pairs,
so the assertions name them.
2026-09-12 08:51:10 +08:00
beardthelion 2837f5efb3 fix(installtxn): put back an install a killed commit left behind (#997)
* fix(installtxn): put back an install a killed commit left behind

CommitDir publishes by two renames: the live target moves into a workspace
backup, then the staged copy is renamed into place. Neither is journaled, so a
process killed between them left the target absent with the install's only copy
retained in a workspace nothing ever read. plugins.Load and skills.Load
enumerate directories, so the extension simply disappeared, while the lockfile
went on listing it. Recovering needed one fact the transaction never wrote
down: which install a backup belonged to. CommitDir now records that before it
moves anything, and Recover puts the backup back when the target is absent.

Recovery is a second data-loss surface, so it is bounded on every side. It
refuses a name that is not a single element inside the install root, never
replaces a live target, identifies a workspace by the name StageDir gives one
rather than by contents alone, and leaves intact anything it cannot attribute.

Every path that takes the install lock recovers, not just the two that install.
Recovering on the install path alone is worse than not recovering: a removal
takes the not-present branch, drops the lockfile entry and reports success
while the backup it never looked at stays on disk, and the next install
republishes it, reinstating an extension the user deleted. Removal and the
terminalpet install hold the same lock and now do the same thing first.

Recovery stays an explicit call rather than a side effect of Lock, matching how
the other staged-swap transactions here invoke their repair pass and keeping a
filesystem mutation visible at the sites that cause it.

* fix(installtxn): retire a backup the publish rename already superseded

Recover skipped any workspace whose target was occupied, which left the backup
of a commit that was killed after its publish rename but before its cleanup.
Removing that install then deleted the live target and its lockfile entry but
not the skipped backup, and the next recovery read the absent target as an
interrupted swap and published the stale tree again. plugins.Load and
skills.Load enumerate directories, so the removed extension was loadable again
with nothing in the lockfile naming it.

The target already records how far the commit got, so recovery reads it as the
phase rather than carrying a phase file. Absent means the swap never finished
and the backup is put back as before. Present means the publish rename
committed, so the backup beside it is superseded and its workspace is retired.
The live install is never replaced or removed either way, and the guards that
skip a workspace with no backup, an unreadable or missing marker, or a recorded
name that is not a single element inside the install root are unchanged. The
retire path removes the workspace directly rather than through
cleanupWorkspace, which refuses one holding a previous precisely because it
cannot tell a superseded backup from one still owed a restore.

Reading the target that way is only safe once nothing can leave a partial tree
there. rollback deleted the failed install in place before restoring, so a
process killed partway through that delete left a husk at the target while the
backup was still the only complete copy, and recovery would have taken the husk
for a committed publish and deleted the last good tree. The renames are now
ordered so the target is never partial: the failed install moves aside into the
workspace, the backup moves back to the target, and only then is the set aside
tree removed. A first install has no backup to protect and recorded no target,
so it still deletes in place.

The move aside can fail too, and then the failed install stays live at the
target with the backup still the only copy of what it replaced. Rollback drops
the workspace marker on that path, which leaves a workspace nothing can
attribute, and recovery already leaves those alone.

* fix(installtxn): reconcile both halves of an interrupted commit

Recovery inferred three facts from incidental filesystem shape: target
presence stood in for the transaction phase, a public dot prefix plus two
ordinary filenames stood in for ownership, and a void best effort call stood
in for both "nothing to recover" and "recovery failed".

CommitDir swaps the trees and only then publishes the lockfile, so a kill
between the two leaves exactly what a kill after both leaves. A phase bit
written after the publish only inverts which side of the write the ambiguity
falls on, so Recover now asks the caller which of the two trees its published
metadata records. plugins and skills answer from the recorded hash; the
terminalpet install publishes no metadata and passes nil, where a live target
is the committed one. A backup the metadata still records goes back over the
target through the same move aside ordering rollback uses.

Recover returns an error, and every caller that takes the install lock aborts
on it before reading the lockfile, inspecting the target, installing over it,
or reporting a successful removal. Malformed, legacy, and unattributable
workspaces are still skipped without error; a workspace we own and could not
resolve is reported, and every workspace is processed before returning.

Ownership is now proven rather than inferred. The workspace marker carries a
magic and version first line, so a user authored skill directory that happens
to be named with the workspace prefix and to hold a previous directory is left
alone. A recorded name carrying the workspace prefix is refused too, since it
names another transaction rather than an install. Retirement clears the backup
before the workspace around it: os.RemoveAll unlinks the marker first, so a
failure inside the backup used to cost the workspace the attribution that gets
it reported at all.

* fix(installtxn): do not read a target we could not probe as absent

recoverWorkspace read any os.Lstat failure on the target as nothing being
there, which enters the restore branch: the one branch that moves a tree,
taken on the strength of a question that never got an answer. Only a
not-exist error means the swap did not finish; every other probe failure
leaves the phase unknown, so it is reported and the workspace is left as it
was.

The same distinction the reconcilers already draw between a missing file and
a file that could not be read, applied to the probe that decides which branch
recovery takes at all.

* fix(installtxn): ask the reconciler about the name that resolved the path

recoverableTarget trims the recorded name before resolving the path, but the
raw line went to the reconciler, so the two halves of one decision ran on two
different values. A marker recording "demo " resolves dir/demo and then asks
the lockfile about "demo ". The lookup misses, a miss proves the publish never
ran, and the committed target is replaced with the tree it superseded. Found
by CodeRabbit on the round-2 push; the test observes that replacement before
the fix.

Also fixes the two CI failures on the new tests, neither of which was a
product defect:

macOS and Windows: the skills recovery matrix compared the lock source against
the path the test handed the installer, while Install records
canonicalSource(source). t.TempDir returns /var on macOS where the recorded
value is /private/var, and an 8.3 short name on Windows where it is the long
one. The expectation now comes from the same resolver the installer uses.

Windows: the two plugins failure-injection tests make a directory unwritable to
force a rename or removal to fail. Windows does not block either that way and
root ignores the bits, so the injected failure never fired and the tests
asserted against a success they never meant to produce. They now skip there, as
the installtxn and skills equivalents already did.

* fix(installtxn): stop recovery acting on trees the lockfile never described

An adversarial pass over the recovery protocol, driven end to end through the
built binary rather than package tests, found that the protocol still acted on
evidence it did not have.

The one that loses data: a missing lock entry was read as proof the publish
never ran, so recovery replaced whatever was at the target with the retained
backup. A missing entry proves no such thing. The entry can be lost after a
publish that did run, since a truncated or deleted lockfile reads as an empty
one, and a directory with no entry is a state these packages already support
(Load returns it, Remove handles it). Worse, the tree at the target may have
nothing to do with the transaction: `zero tools make foo` scaffolds into the
plugins root, and a hand-written skill directory is an ordinary thing to find
in the skills root. Both were destroyed and replaced by a stale backup, and the
install reported success. Reproduced through the CLI both ways before the fix.
A missing entry is now PhaseUnknown, which stops every caller and touches
nothing.

The rest are the same class as the target probe fixed in 005fff72, a probe
whose failure was read as a fact:

- A marker that could not be read was skipped as somebody else's content, so
  the only copy of an install stayed stranded while the caller was told there
  was nothing to do. Present but unreadable is now reported.
- The retained backup was probed with Stat, which follows symlinks and never
  checked the type, so a symlink there published content from outside the
  install root and a regular file published a file where a directory belongs.
  Only a directory is a tree this package set aside.
- An entry at the target was read as an install at the target. A dangling
  symlink satisfies Lstat, and treating it as live retired the only real copy.
- Two workspaces claiming one install were acted on in turn, which published
  one over the other and deleted the rest. Nothing ranks two claims, so both
  are reported.
- A stale `failed` tree from an earlier rollback made the restore rename fail
  for good, and since every caller aborts on a recovery error that wedged every
  install and removal in the root. The workspace is proven ours, so the stale
  tree is cleared first.
- A recorded name carrying a NUL or longer than a path element can be reached
  Lstat and came back with an error that is not not-exist, reported on every
  pass forever with no way for a caller to clear it. Such a name is not an
  install to recover and is skipped.

Unresolved-transaction errors now name the workspace directory, because the
only remedy is to delete it by hand and nothing in the CLI can reach it.

Left alone deliberately: an interrupted RemoveDir still writes no marker, which
the PR body already discloses as a pre-existing residual.
2026-09-12 08:46:32 +08:00
HazyLab 08fbea7a32 fix(redaction): split camelCase keys in normalizeKey (#994)
* fix(redaction): split camelCase keys in normalizeKey

A lower-to-upper boundary now inserts an underscore, so accessToken
and refreshToken match the registry instead of leaking into logs.
Token-count fields such as promptTokens stay unredacted.

Fixes #922

* fix(config): replace deprecated reflect.Ptr with reflect.Pointer

* fix(doctor): report auth presence under a non-sensitive key

camelCase normalization treats credentialConfigured as a credential
segment, so check() redacted the set/not-set indicator. authConfigured
does not match the registry.
2026-09-12 08:45:58 +08:00
cairn-internandcairn-intern 82ae3a8809 docs: name the five supported targets and drop Plan 9 as a review gate (#986)
* docs: name the five supported targets and drop Plan 9 as a review gate

Plan 9 has never compiled and is not a release or CI target. Reviews still
asked for plan9 shims. Document the five release platforms as the supported
set so unsupported GOOS is not a review criterion.

Fixes Gitlawb/zero#817

* docs: exclude unsupported GOOS/GOARCH from review criteria

CONTRIBUTING.md names five exact release combinations. Align AGENTS.md and
.coderabbit.yaml so other GOOS/GOARCH pairs are not a review criterion.
Unsupported targets such as plan9 remain allowed as fixtures.

* docs: retain Android support in target policy

---------

Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:45:36 +08:00
488def68dc fix(config): preserve unknown top-level fields (#984)
* fix(config): preserve unknown top-level fields

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(config): match JSON Unicode case folding

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a044e2-92ad-774b-9a86-094e2e5293bf
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:45:10 +08:00
b04fe96e9e fix(config): lock config read-modify-write across processes (#960)
* fix(config): lock config read-modify-write across processes

Every config mutator loads the whole document, edits independent fields, and
publishes a complete replacement by rename. The rename is atomic, so a reader
never sees partial JSON — but two processes that loaded the same revision each
write a full document, and the second rename silently discards the first one's
acknowledged update. The result is valid JSON with one update missing and no
error anywhere.

lockConfigFile takes a cross-process advisory lock through lockutil, using the
retry-with-deadline idiom cron, hooks and oauth already share (10s timeout, 20ms
retry). Callers acquire BEFORE their first read, so the lock spans load,
mutation, validation and publication and the read inside it is authoritative —
holding it only around the write would still let both processes start from the
same stale revision.

The lock file is a sibling (config.json.lock), never the config itself: an
advisory lock is held against an inode, and publishing by rename installs a new
one, so locking the config directly would leave each process holding a
different inode.

Covered: all 14 mutators in writer.go, plus ClearProviderKeyStored and
MigratePlaintextProviderKeys in credentials.go. The migration matters most — it
rewrites the config on every startup, so it is the likeliest writer to collide
with an interactive mutation in another Zero. The SetProviderDescription test
seam locks too, so it cannot stand in as the one unsynchronized writer.

Two shapes needed care:

- The lock is not reentrant. EnsureCatalogProvider scans for an existing
  profile and then upserts, so UpsertProvider is split into a locking wrapper
  and upsertProviderLocked; one lock now spans the scan and the upsert, which
  also closes the window where two processes could both create the same
  catalog profile.
- SetPet edits raw bytes to preserve unknown members and formatting rather than
  round-tripping the struct. It takes the same lock, so it neither clobbers nor
  is clobbered by the struct writers.

Regression tests, each verified to FAIL with the lock disabled:

- TestConcurrentMutationsDoNotLoseUpdates — theme, pet, recaps, favorites and a
  provider mutated at once; all five are independent fields, so a lost update
  shows up as a zero value in exactly one of them.
- TestConcurrentProviderUpsertsAllSurvive — 16 distinct providers added
  concurrently, all must be present.
- TestConcurrentSameFieldMutationsSerialize — 24 writers contending on one
  field; every call succeeds and the document stays readable.
- TestCrossProcessMutationExcludesAndPreserves — the coordinated two-process
  case. Goroutines share this process's descriptors, so only a second OS
  process shows the lock is kernel-held. The child announces itself, then the
  parent asserts its write cannot land while the lock is held elsewhere, does
  its own mutation, releases, and requires both updates to survive.

Fixes #832

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

* fix(cli): take the config lock for MCP config edits

The previous commit locked internal/config's mutators, but that is not every
writer of the user config document. internal/cli's MCP editor reads the SAME
file, edits it, and republishes it with the identical temp-file+rename shape,
at three sites (add/update, remove, disable/enable). Locking only one package
left `zero mcp add` free to clobber a concurrent provider or preference write —
and to be clobbered by one — with the file still valid JSON afterwards, which
is the same silent lost update issue #832 reports.

config.LockFile exports the existing helper so the lock is one authority across
packages rather than a private detail of internal/config. A second, adjacent
implementation would drift from the first exactly the way this writer already
drifted from the mutators.

TestRunMCPAddParticipatesInConfigLock is the regression. Racing the two writers
and waiting to observe a lost update is NOT reliable — the losing interleaving
is narrow, and a straightforward concurrent version of this test passed five
consecutive runs against the unlocked code, so it would have shipped as
reassurance that proved nothing. It instead asserts the deterministic property:
while the config lock is held elsewhere, the MCP writer's update cannot land,
and it completes once the lock is released. That fails immediately against the
unlocked code and passes with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

* fix(config): report config unlock failures instead of discarding them

AGENTS.md requires that a mutator never report success when unlock failed, and
the release error was being dropped on the floor. A failed Release can leave the
lock held for the rest of the process, so returning (cfg, nil) after one claims
a state the next mutation cannot reproduce — it will block for the full lock
timeout and then fail.

lockConfigFile now returns lock.Release directly, and every caller joins it into
its own result with the idiom credstore already uses:

	defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, unlock()) }()

Joined, not chosen between: a release failure annotates the result rather than
masking the mutation error that explains what actually went wrong. That covers
all 16 mutators in writer.go, both in credentials.go, and the test seam. The
three MCP sites return an exit code rather than an error, so they convert a
release failure into a crash exit and a stderr message, without overwriting a
failure the command had already reported.

A release failure cannot be provoked through the public API — lockutil.Release
is idempotent and reports nil once released — so the mutators call through a
lockConfigFileFn seam that a test can substitute. My first attempt at this test
could only ever t.Skip, which asserts nothing; the seam is what turns it into a
real assertion.

- TestMutationReportsUnlockFailure: SetTheme surfaces the release error AND the
  mutation is still published, since a release failure annotates the result
  rather than undoing the write.
- TestMutationErrorSurvivesUnlockFailure: an unknown-provider error and the
  release failure are both present in the joined error.

Both verified to fail when the defer discards the release error.

Note for review: cron, hooks, oauth and swarm all still discard their
lockutil.Release error, so this makes internal/config stricter than its
siblings. Worth deciding whether the guideline should be applied to them too —
out of scope here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

* fix(cli): complete MCP config lock handling

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a043da-1703-70c5-9d8d-904cd8fd964b
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(cli): synchronize MCP config lock assertion

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): persist provider model selection atomically

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a04c92-2d1d-7508-91bc-416341b7e8b0
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): surface unsaved model selections on every switch path

choosePicker replaces handleModelCommand's status text with its own
applied-notice, so the "· not saved (…)" qualifier that text carried was
dropped and the selection reported an unqualified success. The user only
found out at the next launch, when the old persisted model came back.
dispatchCommand drops the same text on a committed switch, so typed
/model had the identical hole — the cross-provider path already returned
the outcome as a value precisely because display copy is not a contract.

handleModelCommand now returns that outcome too, and one
modelAppliedNoticeFor decides how a committed switch is announced for
both entry points, so neither can regain the gap independently.

Recent-model history is written under the same lock, so a selection that
already lost the lock would pay a SECOND full timeout for one keystroke
and add a redundant save error. It now falls back to the in-session
updateRecentModels for exactly that case, keyed on a new
config.ErrLockUnavailable rather than on any persistence failure: a
missing config file also fails the lookup, and that write still has its
own reason to be attempted.

Regressions cover both entry points. The picker test holds the config
lock — the case the review asked for — and bounds elapsed time, which is
what proves one keystroke costs one wait; it fails at 20s against the
previous code. The typed test uses an unwritable config path so it
proves the same plumbing without a second ten-second timeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01REzorhNj3F1DGPXyn5Uq7j

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:44:43 +08:00
79fa1422ef fix(providers): register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime (#550)
* fix(providers): register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime

Point atomic-chat at the default local API (http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1),
mark it Local with no API key, and auto-detect it alongside Ollama and
LM Studio. Keep opencode-go-anthropic-compatible in the provider catalog
and curated model list after rebasing onto latest main.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* docs(zh): sync Atomic Chat local runtime into README_ZH

The English README lists Atomic Chat in the provider list and tells
local-model users to run its desktop app on http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1,
but the Chinese README still mentioned only Ollama and LM Studio.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(providers): give the local Atomic Chat runtime its own catalog ID

Repurposing the existing atomic-chat ID from the hosted, key-gated preset
to a keyless local one silently downgraded credential checks for profiles
already saved against the remote endpoint: MissingCredentialEnv resolves
RequiresAuth from the catalog descriptor, so those profiles were reported
as ready and only failed later with an unauthenticated call to
api.atomic.chat.

Keep the hosted atomic-chat descriptor as it was and register the local
runtime under a separate atomic-chat-local ID, mirroring the existing
ollama-cloud/ollama split. Stored profiles keep their identity and no
migration is needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* test(onboarding): assert the full Atomic Chat local endpoint and default model

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(models): drop the placeholder curated list for atomic-chat-local

Atomic Chat's model catalog is a Hugging Face scrape refreshed every 12h
plus arbitrary owner/repo lookups, so the served model ID is whichever
model the user loaded and no hardcoded list stays accurate.

The single local-model entry short-circuited Models() without adding
anything: the descriptor is openai-compatible, so modelMatchesProvider
never matches a registry entry and the fallback already yields the
descriptor's DefaultModel. Output is unchanged; the difference is that
local-model is no longer presented as a curated contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(onboarding): pin the probed model in the local-runtime adopt command

probeLocalRuntime already reads the runtime's /v1/models, but SetupAction
dropped the result and emitted 'zero providers add <id> --set-active'
with no --model. The add path then persisted the catalog DefaultModel,
which for a local runtime is the placeholder 'local-model', and the first
completion failed with an unknown-model response.

SetupAction now pins the probed id via SetupCommandWithModel. The catalog
default wins when the server actually serves it, so an existing Ollama
setup does not switch models; otherwise the first advertised id is used.
An empty probe result leaves the command on the catalog default rather
than inventing an id.

Covers a server whose returned id is not 'local-model'.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(onboarding): shell-safe adopt command + reject atomic-chat-local placeholder model

commandArg now POSIX single-quotes rendered args instead of strconv.Quote, so a model id from an untrusted /v1/models response cannot expand when the adopt command is pasted into a shell.

providerProfileForAdd now errors when atomic-chat-local is added without --model instead of persisting the local-model placeholder that fails the first completion.

Adds regression tests for command substitution, backticks, and the require-model guard.

* fix(onboarding): finish Atomic Chat setup across supported shells

Rebase on current main and keep the hosted Atomic Chat preset intact.
Only emit setup arguments that are portable across POSIX, cmd.exe and
PowerShell; show interactive guidance for other model IDs. Reject the
Atomic Chat placeholder before both CLI and TUI persistence, and stop
advertising adoption when discovery finds no usable model.

Validation: full Go test suite, focused race suite, vet, release build,
smoke, formatting, advisory lint and vulncheck pass with isolated config
and inherited Anthropic overrides removed. Onboarding, CLI and TUI test
packages cross-compile for Windows and Linux. Regression tests fail on
the rebased pre-fix code and pass with these changes.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#550 and Gitlawb/zero#592.

* fix(onboarding): preserve option-looking model IDs in adopt commands

Use the existing --model=value grammar when a discovered model begins
with a hyphen. Validate the model separately from the fixed separator so
shell safety remains unchanged and '=' is not added to the allowlist.

Exercise generated detection actions through shell tokenization, the actual
add parser, and profile construction for Atomic Chat, LM Studio and Ollama.
Cover leading hyphens, flag-looking IDs, ordinary IDs, spaces, and unsafe
inline values. Before the fix, the new regression failed with:
  generated adoption command rejected by add parser: --model requires a value

Validation: full Go suite, focused race tests, formatting, vet, release
build, smoke, lint-static and vulncheck passed. Affected test packages
cross-compiled for Windows and Linux.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#550.

* fix(onboarding): select eligible chat models and preserve Ollama defaults

P2: apply the existing known-noncoding exclusion before default preference
or first-model fallback. When a nonempty list has no eligible model, offer
commandless guidance instead of persisting the rejected/default model.

P3: recognize an Ollama untagged default's :latest spelling, preserving the
advertised ID. Prefer exact matches and leave other tags/providers alone.

Add selector tests plus a mock-server integration test through discovery,
the generated action, the real add parser, profile persistence, a fresh
process, and the chat completion request. Before this fix, that test failed:
  fresh process sent model "text-embedding-local", want eligible model "-loaded chat model"
The Ollama alias case also failed before the fix:
  AdoptModel() = "qwen3:8b", want "llama3.1:latest"

Explicit model choices, shell checks, hosted/local provider identities and
Atomic placeholder guards retain their existing behavior.

Validation: full Go suite, focused race tests, formatting, vet, release
build, smoke, lint-static and vulncheck passed. Affected test packages
cross-compiled for Windows and Linux. Integration evidence uses a mock
server; native Windows shell and actual runtime behavior are not claimed.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#550 and Gitlawb/zero#592.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: alex <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:43:46 +08:00
cairn-internandcairn-intern 1aacf38b72 fix(background): treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited (#981)
* fix(background): treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited

terminateOwnedProcess always returned leaderAlreadyExited=false, so
TerminateCommand surfaced "did not exit after SIGKILL" when ps was
unavailable and the leader was already a waitable zombie. Probe the
leader the way Windows uses GetExitCodeProcess, then still signal the
group so live descendants are not skipped.

* fix(background): preserve live-group termination failures

---------

Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:41:52 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment 3063593129 ci: harden GitHub Actions permissions, add job timeouts, concurrency and coverage reporting (#951)
* ci: harden workflow permissions, add timeouts, concurrency and coverage report

* ci: reuse make fmt-check and refine coverage table formatting

* ci: scan Windows build graph via vulncheck-windows and collapse coverage summary to single-pass awk

* ci: invoke the pinned Windows govulncheck via a local GOBIN

go install writes the binary to GOBIN, which is not necessarily on PATH.
Install into .cache/gobin and run that executable. GOOS=windows applies
only to the scan so the scanner stays a host binary.

* ci: declare contents:read on the action smoke workflow

Pull-request workflows inherit the default GITHUB_TOKEN unless they
set an explicit permission block. The smoke workflow is now covered
by the same least-privilege policy as ci.yml.

* ci: parse workflow permissions structurally and quote the Windows scanner path

The pull-request token check now ignores commented lookalikes and accepts
an inline on: [pull_request] trigger. vulncheck-windows keeps the cache
path as one shell word.

* ci: drop -race from this PR so issue 939 stays with PR 940

Coverage profile remains. The dedicated race-detector job is owned by
the open race PR.

* ci: parse workflow permissions as YAML and scope GOWORK=off

* ci: label the non-race smoke test explicitly

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:41:14 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment d6b25fc303 perf(providers): parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs (#955)
* perf(providers): parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs

Enable t.Parallel() on independent provider test cases and shrink default
retry backoffs from seconds to 1ms during test runs, reducing provider test
suite duration from ~300s to ~2.4s without flakiness.

* test(providerio): add unit coverage for ShrinkBackoffForTest and restoration

* test(openai): keep Codex idle-timeout acceptance test serial

StreamIdleTimeout arms a wall-clock watchdog. Parallel scheduling can
lose the 50ms race against response.completed even though the test
only checks that the option is accepted.

* fix(config): replace deprecated reflect.Ptr with reflect.Pointer

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:40:36 +08:00
7c50a9fb98 security(mcp): prevent server requests from matching client pending responses (#942)
* security(mcp): prevent server requests from matching client pending responses

* fix(mcp): send courtesy -32601 reply asynchronously off read loop

* fix(mcp): restore jsonRPCIDEchoable and validate request IDs before responding

* fix(mcp): queue and drop courtesy replies without blocking client callers

* fix(mcp): drop canceled queued requests

* fix(mcp): preserve valid numeric request IDs

* fix(mcp): treat JSON method member presence as the request discriminator

An explicit empty method string is a request, not a response.
Courtesy -32601 is still dropped when the write queue is full: failAll
on that path stopped the reader and blocked inbound pipe writes
(TestStdioClientUndrainedServerDoesNotBlockCallerWithDeadline).

* fix(mcp): count dropped courtesy replies when the write queue is full

The inbound reader must not stop. An empty select default is now an
atomic counter rather than a silent discard.

* fix(mcp): retain method presence, writer lifecycle, and original JSON-RPC IDs

* fix(mcp): bound courtesy overflow, pin writer queue, match exponent IDs

* fix(mcp): skip SSE frames that carry a method member

Treat method presence the same on stdio and SSE so empty or null method
never completes a pending client request.

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:34:42 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia 275e248669 fix(oauth): Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries (#1007)
* fix(oauth): split an oversized keyring token blob across entries

Store every provider and MCP token in one keyring entry and the store stops
working once the logins outgrow it. On macOS the secret rides inside a
`security -i` command line capped at 4095 bytes, which leaves 3027 bytes of
JSON for all logins combined, so a second OIDC login fails to save and every
write after it fails too.

Split a blob that does not fit across numbered entries and put a manifest in
the anchor account. Chunks live in two alternating generations: a write fills
the one that is not live, then replaces the manifest, so that single write is
the commit point and a crash partway through still reads the previous
generation. `zc1:` cannot prefix base64, so an entry written by an existing
build is still recognised and read without a migration step.

Reserve the range a write will occupy before occupying it. Without that, a
write interrupted while filling a longer generation leaves chunks above the
count the manifest records, and no later cleanup knows to delete them: a
fragment of a token blob would stay in the keychain for good.

Expose the per-entry budget from internal/keyring rather than hardcoding the
macOS figure in the oauth store, sharing one line builder with Set so the
budget and the boundary it describes cannot drift. Backends with no limit
report so and keep the single-entry layout, so Linux is untouched.

Refs #937

* fix(oauth): lock keyring reads, validate manifest digest, and harden chunk tests

* test(oauth): assert Status blocks during keyring lock regression test

* fix(oauth): sweep both chunk generations when a store regrows

A shrink writes the blob back under the anchor, which replaces the manifest
and takes the per-generation chunk counts with it. From then on nothing can
name the chunks a failed cleanup left behind, so the growth branch's sweep of
the target generation is the only one that will ever reach them — and it only
ever targets family A. A keychain that refused one delete during the shrink
therefore kept a superseded generation of access, ID and refresh tokens
indefinitely, with no way for the user to know.

Sweep the other generation alongside the target, and document that the
reclaim waits for the next growth: a store that shrinks once and never grows
again keeps the residue, which sweeping on every whole write would close at a
cost of 128 `security` invocations per save on macOS.

Also record why Load and Status take the cross-process lock, and give the
missing-chunk error the same "log in again" advice the digest failure carries.

Refs #937

* fix(oauth): serialize keyring operations under user-level lock

Derive the keyring backend lock file path from the user's home directory rather than file store configuration, ensuring processes with distinct store paths share the same lock domain for the OS keychain.

Refs #938

* Address review feedback on chunked keyring token store and recovery

Refs #938

* Refine auth reset message and chunk format notation

Refs #938

* Harden OAuth store reset lifecycle, keyring migration recovery, and completions.

Refs #938

* Validate keyring cleanup markers, propagate lock resolution errors, and test reader concurrency.

Refs #938

* Preserve live OAuth credentials when stale cleanup markers survive migration.

Refs #937

* Verify JSON output from OAuth reset to cover its recovery response.

Refs #937

* Verify that JSON OAuth reset actually removes stored logins.

Refs #937

* Require confirmation before resetting shared OAuth credentials.

Refs #937

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:33:44 +08:00
0207f2b269 fix(sandbox): keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead (#1006)
* fix(sandbox): keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead

* fix(sandbox): address CodeRabbit review feedback on PR 640

* refactor(sandbox): Address CodeRabbit nitpicks on PR 640.

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): skip inherited ACEs and reject DenyRead upfront during setup

Skip inherited ACEs when preserving read deny entries, correct syntax in the command runner error message, and evaluate unsupported DenyRead profiles before the elevation check in Windows sandbox setup.

Refs #640

* Reject unsupported DenyRead profiles upfront during sandbox setup

Refs #640

* Migrate legacy Windows DenyWrite ACEs, randomize smoke probes, and clean dead descendant machinery.

Refs #640

* Use /d /c for denied-write probe command and verify ownership on cleanup.

Refs #640

* Honor NoInherit in legacy ACL migration and verify probe ownership.

Refs #639

* Preserve DenyRead bits when migrating combined legacy deny ACEs.

Refs #639

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:33:06 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp 8b3d1b1597 fix(tools): reject fuzzy edits with drifted content (#983)
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a0448f-5860-721c-8a47-5119fc57f685

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:32:36 +08:00
cairn-internandcairn-intern a3852bac59 fix(update): keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records (#979)
* fix(update): keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records

A failed restore currently records the last verified binary only as a
.deletable .keep marker in the install directory. Write an unresolved
identity-bound record to the existing per-user update-recovery store on
that failure path too, and consult it during preflight so deleting the
marker cannot silence the tamper refusal.

Fixes #868

* fix(update): keep a fail-closed signal if unresolved recovery records cannot be written

Ignoring a failed appendUnresolvedRecoveryRecord left only the sibling
.keep marker. An install-directory writer can delete that marker, after
which preflight finds no unresolved state and a retry can overwrite the
last verified recovery copy. Relocate that copy to a .recovery name when
the per-user record cannot be persisted so promotion still refuses.

Fixes #868

* fix(update): do not relocate the live binary when failed-restore compensation cannot record

persistFailedRestoreSignal relocated through the handle when the per-user
unresolved record could not be written, without checking that the object
was still the aside copy. A restore that had already put the verified
bytes back at targetPath then had that binary moved out of the executable
path. Verify identity with verifyPromotedTarget before relocating.

Unreadable recovery-state JSON now fails closed instead of looking like
an empty queue. The per-user vs per-machine split is documented: a second
account still relies on the install-directory .keep marker.

Fixes #868

* fix(update): durably commit recovery state on Windows

---------

Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:29:11 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia a3e7446681 chore(tui): remove unused test exports GetLocalDiffStats and WatchPRState (#975)
Refs #904

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:28:31 +08:00
KRATOS 0021475d4c fix(swarm): stop original member before handoff (#957)
* fix(swarm): stop source before handoff

* fix(swarm): make handoff recovery fail closed

* test(swarm): remove handoff timing assumptions
2026-09-12 08:28:01 +08:00
HazyLabandcl-ment deba3adfca security(update): prevent tar extraction from traversing escaping symlinks (#943)
* security(update): prevent tar extraction from traversing escaping symlinks (fixes #920)

When extracting tar archives, lexical path cleaning alone does not prevent
subsequent file entries from being written through a previously extracted
directory symlink that resolves outside destDir (Zip/Tar Slip).

This introduces verifyNoSymlinkEscape in safeExtractPath, which recursively
inspects existing path components between destDir and target using os.Lstat
and filepath.EvalSymlinks to reject entries attempting to write through escaping
symlinks.

* test(update): exercise chained symlink escape during file extract

The previous case was a single escaping symlink already rejected by the
existing Linkname check. Seed a mid -> outside chain under destDir and
extract a regular file through it so verifyNoSymlinkEscape is what fails,
with no write outside destDir.

* fix(update): resolve destDir symlinks and permit valid dangling symlinks in archive

* docs(update): document POSIX-only scope for verifyNoSymlinkEscape

* internal/update: test extracting files through directory symlinks

* fix(update): reject dangling symlinks instead of lexical fallback

EvalSymlinks failure used filepath.Clean on the link text, which does
not preserve already-traversed links. A dangling member is now an
error.

* fix(update): resolve dangling symlink chains from the physical parent

* fix(update): authorize tar paths through OpenRoot and reject outbound symlink entries

* fix(update): resolve intermediate symlink parents and cap Root link depth

Walk each path component from the physical parent, reject a ninth link,
and look up release binaries through OpenRoot as regular files only.

---------

Co-authored-by: cl-ment <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:27:31 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia 501f32160f ci: Run the race detector on pull requests (#940)
* ci: run the race detector on pull requests

The Makefile declares `go test ./... -race -count=1` as the project's test
command, but no workflow invokes that target. ci.yml and pr-auto-review.yml both
run plain `go test ./...`, and `-race` appears nowhere under .github/workflows,
so the detector has never run on a pull request. The concurrent paths where a
race is easiest to introduce and hardest to see in review, the turn loop,
streaming provider I/O, the session store, cron, swarm mailboxes, and the
cross-process lock paths in the credential and OAuth stores, are all unchecked.

Add a dedicated job rather than putting -race on the existing matrix step. A
race run is typically several times a plain one, and the matrix Test step is
followed by build and smoke, so folding it in would serialize behind those and
make that job the new long pole. On its own it runs alongside the Windows job,
which is the current long pole at 9m29s, and a failure reads as a race rather
than as a smoke failure.

Run `make test` instead of repeating its flags, so the project's declared test
command and what CI executes cannot drift apart again.

Refs #939

* ci: add permissions to race detector job

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-09-12 08:24:18 +08:00
Vasanth Tandbaoyu0 1e4db7c664 fix: let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard (#1025)
* fix(providerhealth,tools): let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard

With HTTPS_PROXY pointing at a local forward proxy, the transport dials the
proxy first and tunnels the request through it. The SSRF-guarded dialer in
providerhealth refused that dial as a loopback address, so
`zero doctor --connectivity` failed with "proxyconnect tcp: provider
connectivity URL is unsafe: loopback hosts are blocked" for a public
provider that had already been validated, and web_fetch had no proxy
support at all (#569).

Each dialer is now handed its transport's own Proxy function and lets a dial
through unpinned only when the address is exactly the proxy endpoint that
function names for the request scheme: same host, same port, with a missing
proxy port taken as the scheme default. A sibling loopback port is still
refused. The shared check lives in internal/proxydial since providerhealth
and tools otherwise share nothing.

web_fetch honours http.ProxyFromEnvironment again. The guarded fetch had set
Proxy to nil as part of its SSRF hardening; the target is still validated
before the request, and what a forward proxy removes is only the dial-time
rebind pin, which is inherent to using any forward proxy. The pre-permission
URL validation stays in place.

Started from #594 by baoyu0. This version keeps the pre-permission check,
matches the proxy port exactly instead of any port when the proxy URL has
none, and injects the transport's Proxy function instead of reading the
environment a second time.

Closes #569

Co-authored-by: baoyu0 <[email protected]>

* fix(proxydial): have the dialer ask its transport for the proxy at dial time

Copying transport.Proxy into the dialer at construction left the wiring
between the two unpinned: a dialer handed nil would pass every unit test
while a proxied request still died as loopback. The dialer now consults
the transport it is installed on, and each package drives a real request
through a loopback listener acting as the proxy and checks that the
CONNECT arrives. The proxy is substituted on the transport rather than
through HTTPS_PROXY, since http.ProxyFromEnvironment reads the
environment once per process and an env-based test would depend on
test order.

* fix(proxydial): bind the proxy exemption to the route the transport chose

Asking the Proxy function a question of our own invention answered for a
request the transport never made. With NO_PROXY excluding a host, the real
request to that host goes direct while a synthetic probe still comes back
proxied, so a direct dial whose address happened to equal the configured
proxy endpoint skipped the guard and reached whatever the name resolved to
at connect time. A probe on the previous head dials rebind.example:80 with
zero safety lookups; the guard now runs and refuses its private answer.
Host-dependent proxy callbacks make the mismatch general, and no spelling
of the probe host closes it, because the two calls are about different
requests.

The decision is now recorded where it is made. proxydial.Transport wraps
the transport, asks its Proxy function about the actual request, and puts
the answer in that request's context; the transport derives the dial
context from the request context, so the dialer reads back the route this
very connection is being opened for. Per-request, so concurrent requests
cannot overwrite each other, and the context key is unexported so nothing
outside the package can plant one.

Address matching is gone with it. A transport opens one connection dial,
and when a proxy is selected that dial goes to the proxy, so the recorded
route already identifies the dial. Comparing the address on top could only
disagree with the transport, which is what a Unicode proxy hostname did:
Go dials xn--bro-hoa.example while the URL still spells it as configured,
and the proxy was refused as an ordinary private address. Both spellings
are now one endpoint with no comparison to get wrong.

Documents where destination enforcement ends: with a proxy configured, the
target hostname is sent to the proxy and the proxy resolves it, so the
local pre-request checks no longer bind the address that is reached. A
forward proxy already sees and can rewrite every request through it, so
that trust comes with configuring one; the alternative is refusing to use
proxies at all, which is the outage in #569.

---------

Co-authored-by: baoyu0 <[email protected]>
2026-09-10 21:50:26 +05:30
Vasanth T f9092668a8 fix(agent): stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host (#1017)
* fix(agent): stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host

TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget counted exec_command shell guidance along with
the schemas, and that guidance is host-specific. The same tree measured 3498 on
Linux, about 3600 on a Windows host with pwsh 7, and 3653 on Windows PowerShell
5.1, because shellGuidanceForRuntime appends a longer block for 5.1 (it has to
explain that && and || do not work there).

5.1 is stock Windows, and that case has been over the 3650 ceiling since
view_image landed. So `go test ./...` failed for anyone on a stock Windows box
while CI stayed green: the runners have pwsh 7 and take the cheaper branch. The
workflow does run the tests on windows-latest, so this was never a coverage gap,
just a ceiling sized against whichever shell the runner happened to have.

The two halves are now charged separately. The schema ceiling measures the
schemas alone and reads 3498 on Linux and on Windows PowerShell 5.1, so it
ratchets the same thing everywhere. The host guidance gets its own ceiling at
200, above the worst case rather than above this machine: 5.1 is 155 tokens,
pwsh 7 is 110, cmd.exe is 87, POSIX is 0.

No guidance text was trimmed. It is what stops the model writing bash on Windows,
and the 5.1 note is the reason a chained command does not silently do half its
work. Paying 155 tokens for it is the right trade; measuring it as if it were a
schema was not.

HostExecCommandShellGuidance is exported for the budget, which is production
surface added for a test. It is one accessor over existing logic, and the
alternative is a ratchet that cannot tell the two costs apart. A guard in
internal/tools pins that the guidance really is the tail of the description, so
the subtraction cannot silently start measuring the wrong thing.

* test(tools,agent): make the guidance contract checkable off Windows

The ratchet separates the fixed tool schemas from this host's exec_command
shell guidance, and both halves of that separation were only being checked on
Windows.

The description test returned early off Windows once the accessor reported no
guidance, so it never looked at the description. Dropping the GOOS condition in
the constructor would have a POSIX host append its own guidance (about 150
characters on darwin) with the accessor still reporting none and the ratchet
charging every byte of it to the schemas, and nothing would fail. Both the
description and the accessor now take goos, so the contract is checked for all
three platforms from any one of them.

The budget also went from subtracting a separately rounded guidance estimate to
removing the guidance from the description before estimating. ApproxTextTokens
is an integer division, so floor((schema+guidance)/4) - floor(guidance/4) is one
token high whenever the two remainders add past four, and which side of that a
host lands on depends on the length of its guidance. That is the same
host-dependence the ratchet was being fixed for, one token smaller.

No behaviour change: exec_command's description is byte for byte what it was on
every platform.
2026-09-10 21:43:58 +05:30
KRATOS 7f5e5af7bb fix(acp): make configured MCP tools callable (#1003)
* fix(acp): register configured MCP tools per turn

* fix(acp): address MCP review findings
2026-09-10 20:17:26 +05:30
f30f550e60 fix(sandbox): protect worktree git pointers (#805)
* fix(sandbox): resolve git metadata carveouts for worktrees

.git is a file (gitdir: ...) in worktrees/submodules, not a dir. The
hooks/config write-deny carveout assumed a directory and pointed at
<root>/.git/hooks, which has no mkdir-able parent under the .git file.
bwrap then failed 'Can't mkdir parents ... Not a directory', blocking
every sandboxed tool in worktree checkouts.

Resolve the real (common) git dir via the gitdir pointer + commondir so
worktrees deny the shared hooks/config like a plain clone. Plain
checkouts (.git dir) and .git-absent roots keep the literal paths.

* fix(sandbox): bound worktree git metadata carveouts to the write root

Refuse gitdir/commondir pointers that escape the workspace instead of
carving outside confinement. Invalid, stale, or non-directory pointers
return no carveouts so bwrap does not mkdir under a .git file.

* fix(sandbox): evaluate gitdir/commondir through symlinks

Containment must use the real path so an in-root symlink cannot punch
hooks/config carveouts outside the write root.

* fix(sandbox): fail closed on gitdir eval and protect the pointer file

Refuse carveouts when EvalSymlinks cannot produce a real in-root path,
compare evaluated roots and targets, and write-deny the .git pointer so
it cannot redirect hooks/config between commands.

* fix(sandbox): deny worktree-local gitdir metadata and parse first gitdir line

Keep hooks/config write-denied on both the common dir and the in-root
worktree gitdir, emit those paths under the lexical write root, and
accept a gitdir: pointer that has trailing comment lines.

* fix(sandbox): skip special git metadata files and re-check carveouts at apply

Read .git and commondir only when they are regular files so a FIFO cannot
block profile construction. At sandbox apply, drop ReadOnlySubpaths that
no longer sit inside the write root after a symlink swap.

* fix(sandbox): follow directory .git symlinks and unix-tag FIFO tests

A .git symlink to a directory is a normal checkout, so keep lexical
hooks/config carveouts. FIFO coverage stays on unix so Windows still
compiles.

* fix(sandbox): protect worktree git pointer directly

* test(sandbox): skip unavailable symlink fixture

* fix(sandbox): preserve git symlink semantics

* fix(sandbox): limit git pointer carveout to regular files

---------

Co-authored-by: jatmn <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: jatmn <[email protected]>
2026-09-08 07:54:22 +08:00
Vasanth T aadb4a27e9 fix(specialist): keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed (#1009)
* fix(specialist): keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed

Metadata.Model exists so a bounded, delegated task can run on a cheaper model
than its parent, and BuildArgs appends it to the child argv through
appendModelArgs. BuildResumeArgs never did.

So a specialist pinned to a cheap model ran on that model exactly once. The
moment the orchestrator resumed it, the child fell back to whatever the
parent's configured model resolved to. Nothing surfaced it: the resumed child
starts normally and does the work, so the only symptom is the bill.
Cost-motivated delegation quietly stopped saving anything.

Resuming does not restore the recorded model on its own. sessions.PrepareExec
records the model a run used but never feeds it back into provider
construction, so the flag has to be passed again rather than relied upon.

BuildResumeArgsInput now carries ParentModel and ParentReasoningEffort, the
same fallbacks the fresh path takes, and runResume passes what TaskRunOptions
already held. The reasoning-effort rule travels with the model unchanged: the
parent's effort is inherited only when the manifest pins no model of its own,
because a manifest that chose a different model has not agreed to the parent's
effort for it.

Regressions drive both builders and compare them, so the two paths cannot
drift again: a pinned model survives resume, an unpinned one still inherits the
parent's, both halves of the effort rule hold, and the flag keeps its position
relative to --auto in both.

Refs #554

* test(specialist): cover the resume call site, not just its builder

The builder tests all call BuildResumeArgs directly, so dropping the
ParentModel field from the runResume call site still compiled and still passed
every one of them. The defect this fixes lived at the call site, so it needs a
test that goes through Run.

Driven through the real dispatch with the RunChild seam capturing argv.

* test(specialist): guard the fresh call site as well

runFresh and runResume each construct their builder input by hand and carry a
byte-identical ParentModel line. Deleting either compiles and, until now,
deleting the fresh one was silent.

The resume half is what this branch repairs. This covers the other half so the
pair cannot drift again in the direction nobody was looking.
2026-09-07 16:02:39 +05:30
KRATOS a6ec0435e3 feat(acp): surface safe browser tool metadata (#1000)
* feat(acp): surface safe browser tool metadata

* fix(acp): align browser permission titles

* fix(acp): namespace browser metadata

* fix(acp): reject unsafe browser title text
2026-09-07 15:50:49 +05:30
Anandan 1b5db17656 fix(mcp): discover OAuth through protected resource metadata (#991)
* fix(mcp): discover OAuth through protected resource metadata

* fix(mcp): refuse OAuth discovery redirects

* fix(mcp): harden OAuth metadata discovery

* fix(mcp): protect discovered OAuth endpoints
2026-08-28 21:17:08 +05:30
Anandan eeea3308fe fix(tui): move voice capture to Ctrl+Space (#968)
* fix(tui): keep voice mode from swallowing spaces

* fix(tui): clarify voice capture controls

* fix(tui): align active voice status with capture key
2026-08-28 10:27:33 +05:30
PierrunoYTandClaude Opus 5 27b319ca88 test(execution): fail loudly when ps cannot answer instead of skipping (#961)
* test(execution): fail loudly when ps cannot answer instead of skipping

Every test in process_unix_test.go proves something about zombie detection, and
every one of those proofs is read out of ps. When ps could not answer, the
tests skipped — which is indistinguishable from success in CI output — and one
assertion passed vacuously for the same reason. A regression in ps parsing or
availability would have shown up as green.

requireProcessState probes BOTH ps pipelines against this test process, which
is by definition alive and not a zombie, so a working ps must report a live
state for it. When it cannot:

- Under CI (or ZERO_REQUIRE_PS=1) this is a hard failure. ps is present on every
  image used today, so its absence means the pipeline regressed and that has to
  surface immediately.
- Otherwise it stays a skip, so a contributor on an unsupported box is not
  blocked.

Both pipelines are probed because they are deliberately separate: the tests
assert what the production process-table parser concludes, so this file keeps
its own per-PID ps oracle rather than borrowing that parser to establish its own
preconditions. One regression must not be able to silence both sides at once.

Once the probe passes, failing to observe an EXPECTED state is a defect rather
than an environment problem, so the remaining escapes become failures:

- The zombie waits (awaitZombie) fail instead of skipping. The caller never
  waits on the child, so its zombie row persists until reaped — reaching the
  deadline means the child never exited or ps stopped answering, and the two
  are reported distinctly.
- A zombie group that is not signalable fails instead of skipping: a zombie
  still occupies the process table, so if kill(-pid, 0) fails the case under
  test is not present and the assertions after it would prove nothing.
- processSignalTarget returning anything but the individual PID fails instead
  of skipping: the child inherited this process's group, so its PGID is this
  process's PID and can never equal its own PID.

The vacuous assertion in TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup now requires
ok. That is sound rather than merely stricter: the test never waits on the
child, so the group's zombie row must still be present after termination, and
an unknown state means ps stopped answering rather than that the group is
clean.

Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6) rather than by cross-compilation alone:

- all three tests pass unmodified
- with a stub ps that exits 1: CI unset skips with the reason named; CI=true
  fails, naming which pipeline could not answer
- the same broken-ps run against the ORIGINAL file produced two silent skips
  plus one unrelated failure after 12s, versus an immediate, explicit failure now

Windows is unaffected (the file is !windows); go vet passes for linux, darwin
and windows.

Fixes #863

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

* test(execution): treat an unsignalable zombie group as a kernel difference

The macOS Smoke job failed:

    the zombie group 5931 is not signalable (operation not permitted)

That was my error. I converted this skip along with the ps-availability ones,
but it never had anything to do with ps: whether kill(2) may signal a group
whose only member is a zombie is a KERNEL difference. Linux permits it, so
signalTargetRunning goes on to consult ps — the branch this test was written
for. Darwin returns EPERM, so signalTargetRunning short-circuits on the kill and
never reaches ps.

Rather than restore the blanket skip, the test now records which branch answers:

- Signal permitted: assert processGroupHasRunningMember directly, so a ps-side
  regression cannot hide behind the kill result. This is new coverage; the old
  test only checked signalTargetRunning, which conflates the two paths.
- Signal refused: log it and continue.

The outcome assertion — a zombie-only group must not count as running — now runs
on EVERY platform. Previously Darwin skipped before reaching it, so this is
strictly more coverage there, not less.

Any errno other than EPERM still fails: it means the group is not in the state
the test needs, and nothing after it would be meaningful.

TerminateProcessTree is asserted only where the signal is permitted, because
terminateTarget's own kill(2) would hit the same EPERM and return it as a
cleanup error. Worth a maintainer's eye: that may be a real gap in
TerminateProcessTree on such a platform — a zombie-only tree is already exited
and arguably should terminate cleanly rather than report failure, which is the
same spurious-cleanup-failure class #774 set out to remove. Confirming that
needs a Darwin host and is a production change, so it is flagged rather than
guessed at here.

Verified on Linux (WSL, go1.26.6): all three tests pass, including the new
direct ps assertion. The Darwin branch was exercised by forcing the EPERM path
on Linux — it logs both explanations and passes with the outcome assertion
still enforced. go vet passes for linux, darwin and windows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U389qmQUhoZB3YtXkFmiTq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-26 13:22:43 +08:00
Anandan 1fde941803 perf: reduce startup and turn overhead (#932)
* perf(tui): disable duplicate composer cursor blink

* perf(tui): stop composer wakeups after idle

* refactor(tools): publish immutable registry snapshots

* perf(startup): defer optional tool discovery

* perf(provider): reuse compatible response sessions

* feat(provider): add native patch tool input

* fix(provider): recognize saved chat sessions

* perf(tui): render only on screen changes

* fix(runtime): address performance review findings

* fix(usage): expose cache efficiency details

* perf(agent): reduce redundant bounded-task turns

* fix: harden runtime review edge cases

* fix: address runtime review findings

* build: restore official Bubble Tea dependency

* fix(cli): redact MCP registration errors

* fix: harden turn session regressions

* fix: keep run tools and patch roots consistent

* fix: bind freeform patch writes to scoped roots

* test: keep patch fixtures out of worktree

* fix(tools): reject mixed-root freeform patches
2026-08-26 13:22:05 +08:00
KRATOS 7acac7acee fix(sandbox): refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's (#911)
* fix(sandbox): a temporary root is refcounted, so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's

Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the self-contained pieces to arrive separately.

A temporary grant was add-then-remove with no notion of who still needed the
root. The second caller to ask for a root already present got a NO-OP undo, and
the first caller's cleanup then removed the root out from under it — so a live
grant lost its access while its holder still believed it had it.

Two read-only tools in the same parallel batch, both blocked on the same
directory, is exactly that shape, and read-only tools are precisely the ones the
batch runs concurrently.

tempReads/tempWrites now count live holders, and the root is only stripped when
the last one releases.

The release also performs both mutations under ONE hold of the lock. Dropping it
between them left a window where the root was still in readRoots but no longer in
tempReads: a concurrent AddTemporaryRead landing there reads it as a PERMANENT
root, hands its caller a no-op undo, and this call then strips the root — so that
caller believes it holds access it has already silently lost.

Independent of the remaining #829 work; builds and tests against current main on
its own.

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* fix(sandbox): a read covered by a TEMPORARY write root takes a reference too

Found by a self-review of this branch: the refcount closed the defect within
reads and within writes, but not across them.

AddTemporaryRead returned a no-op undo whenever writeRootCoversLocked said a
write root already covered the path, and the comment there claimed that cover was
permanent. It is not: writeRootCoversLocked scans extraRoots, and
AddTemporaryWrite appends TEMPORARY write roots into that same slice. So a read
covered by another holder's temporary write took no reference, and that holder's
cleanup silently revoked the reader's access — the very defect the refcount
exists to close, reached across the read/write boundary instead of within one
side of it.

Demonstrated before fixing, and the regression fails without it:

  ReadRoots before release = [ws, …/outer]
  ReadRoots after  release = [ws]
  the write holder's cleanup revoked a live read grant on …/outer/inner

The read now takes a reference on the covering temporary write root, and the
genuinely permanent case — the workspace root, or a session-scoped grant — still
returns a no-op undo.

The regression also asserts the other direction: once the reader releases too,
the root is gone, so the reference does not leak the grant past its last holder.

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* test(sandbox): make the concurrency test concurrent, and portable off macOS

Both raised by CodeRabbit. The third finding on this PR — a read covered by a
TEMPORARY write root taking no reference — was already fixed in 87a722cb with the
regression it asked for; this covers the two that were still live, and both are
cases of a test reporting more than it checked.

THE CONCURRENCY TEST WAS NOT CONCURRENT. The gate spun until hasReadRoot saw
somebody holding the root, which is satisfied by the FIRST holder, then opened
the release. The spin wins that race against goroutines still being scheduled:
instrumented over 200 runs, 194 peaked at a single simultaneous holder and not
one ever reached eight. A test named for concurrent holders was exercising one
holder at a time. Against a deliberately broken refcount, where the first release
strips the root, it passed 33 times in 40 — it was a flaky test that mostly
agreed with broken code. Counting all eight acquisitions makes the overlap real:
200 of 200 runs now peak at eight, and the same broken refcount is caught 40
times in 40. Holders signal the barrier on every path including failure, so a
holder that returns early fails the test rather than hanging it.

THE HELPER SKIPPED ON WINDOWS. scopeOutsideRoots reached for /Users/Shared and
fell back to /var/empty, neither of which exists there, so every test built on it
skipped and reported green having asserted nothing. It now uses the home
directory, which no platform lists as a default write root, matching what
scope_extra_read_test.go already does — and then PROVES the choice against
defaultTempWriteRoots rather than assuming it, so a future default root turns
these tests into an honest skip instead of a silent no-op.

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* fix(sandbox): a permanent grant outlives the temporary one, and an undo is per holder

Both P1s from @anandh8x, both reproduced before changing anything, and both are
the same mistake in different places: treating "something covers this path" as
though it answered "and will it still be there afterwards".

A PERMANENT GRANT WAS REVOKED BY A TEMPORARY HOLDER. extraRoots holds temporary
write roots alongside permanent ones, so Add asked only whether the path was
already covered. A session-scoped grant made while a temporary holder happened to
cover it recorded nothing at all, and disappeared the moment that holder
released. Outliving the request that prompted it is the entire difference between
Add and AddTemporaryWrite, and it was not happening. AddRead had it too,
including across the boundary: a permanent read covered only by a temporary WRITE
root died with that root.

Permanent coverage is now looked for first and across every root, so a temporary
cover cannot decide the answer when a permanent one is also present. The same
root held temporarily is promoted in place — its holders' releases become no-ops,
which is what permanence means here. A BROADER temporary root over a narrower
permanent grant cannot be fixed by promotion, so the narrower root is recorded in
its own right; that is the case he specifically called out, and it is the one a
promotion-only fix would have missed.

ONE HOLDER'S UNDO IS ONE HOLDER'S REFERENCE. The comment on releaseTemporaryRead
claimed each undo is called exactly once and that flooring the count at zero
covered the rest. Flooring stops the count going negative; it does nothing about
a holder's second call consuming a DIFFERENT holder's reference. With two
readers, calling the first's undo twice took the count 2 -> 1 -> 0 and removed a
root the second was still using — the exact revocation this refcount exists to
prevent, reached through a duplicate call rather than a sibling's cleanup, and a
deferred cleanup in a retry path is how a caller does that by accident. Every
undo handed out is now wrapped so it drops its own reference at most once, and
the comment says what is actually true.

Both mutation-checked: unwrapping the undo, and ignoring permanence in Add, each
fail the test that covers them. Race detector clean.

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* chore(sandbox): re-request an automated review of this head

No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to ff85dbcc, a commit
that no longer exists on the branch, and a stale changes-requested keeps the PR
at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on push
rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.

The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
4a7063aa. The tree they approved is byte-identical to this one.

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* test(sandbox): a fixture failure fails, a report cannot deadlock, and AddRead's
own branches are covered

All raised by CodeRabbit on the full review. Every one verified before changing
anything.

## The concurrent test could hang instead of failing

failures was buffered at one slot per holder, but each goroutine can report at
BOTH hasReadRoot checks — its own grant going missing while held, and again
after the release gate. Nothing drains the channel until after wg.Wait(), so the
ninth report blocks forever, wg.Done() is never reached and the wait hangs. The
test would deadlock in exactly the case it exists to catch: a refcount bug
severe enough to fail more than eight of eight holders. Buffered at 2*holders.

## A broken fixture reported itself as a pass

TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant called t.Skip when os.MkdirAll failed.
The directory is the fixture, not a precondition the environment may reasonably
withhold, and the sibling test above it already uses t.Fatal for the same call.

## Two tests assumed something they never checked

Both tests in scope_extra_read_test.go place their grant under $HOME precisely
because NewScope seeds /tmp and $TMPDIR as write roots — a grant that collapsed
into one of those would be writable for a reason unrelated to the property under
test. $HOME is normally clear of them, but a sandboxed or CI environment that
points HOME at a temp directory turns both tests into something that proves
nothing while still reporting PASS.

homeGrantOutsideTempRoots now builds the fixture for both and skips with the
reason when the assumption does not hold. Verified by running with HOME set to a
temp directory: both tests SKIP naming the covering root, where before they
passed. The path is resolved before comparing, because the temp roots are
resolved and /var is a symlink to /private/var on macOS.

## AddRead's branches were only covered from the write side

Two subtests added: a permanent read under a temporary WRITE root, and a narrow
permanent read under a BROAD temporary read root. Both mutation-checked by
removing the corresponding temporary-coverage guard in AddRead — each fails.

The first mutation I ran did not fail its test, and the finding looked wrong: the
pattern being edited occurs in Add, AddRead and AddTemporaryWrite alike, and a
first-match edit had changed Add. Re-run against the line inside AddRead, it
fails as claimed. Recorded because a mutation that misses its target is
indistinguishable from a test that holds.

## Also asserted: the refcount table is empty, not merely invisible

hasReadRoot answers what a caller can see. An entry left at zero in tempReads is
not visible that way and would still leak one map entry per acquire/release
cycle, so the contention test now checks the terminal state directly.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean.
Unrelated and pre-existing here: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): a reader outliving its writer keeps read authority, not write

Reported by @jatmn, and it is a privilege escalation rather than a lifetime bug.

AddTemporaryRead, given a path already covered by a temporary WRITE root, took a
reference on that write root and returned an undo that released it. The lifetime
was then correct — the reader no longer lost its access when the writer cleaned
up — but the capability was wrong. extraRoots feeds validate(), which authorises
WRITES, so once the write holder released first the path stayed in extraRoots for
as long as the read holder lived. A caller that asked only to READ could write
anywhere below the former write root after the write grant had ended.

His diagnosis names the root cause exactly: one write-capability reference was
doing two jobs, tracking a lifetime and standing in for a read-only dependent.

The lifetime is now kept as what the caller actually asked for — a temporary READ
root on its own path. AddTemporaryRead consults permanentWriteRootCoversLocked
rather than writeRootCoversLocked, so a merely temporary write cover no longer
short-circuits it into borrowing write authority.

Mutation-checked: restoring writeRootCoversLocked in that branch compiles and
fails the regression on three separate assertions — the reader keeps no read root
of its own, ReadRoots() loses the path, and the writer's cleanup revokes a live
read grant.

Two things a verification pass turned up that are worth recording:

The comment justifying this design said readRoots "feeds ReadRoots() and nothing
else". That was false — it also feeds ExtraReadRoots(). The security argument
survives, because neither confers write authority and validate() reads
workspaceRoot plus extraRoots, which this path never enters. But that sentence IS
the written justification for the whole choice, so it now lists both and says why
neither grants write.

The "the reader releases first" subtest passes on the unfixed tree: the
escalation needs the WRITER to go first. It is a real no-regression control for
the opposite ordering, not evidence the finding is closed, and it is renamed to
say so rather than padding the count.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d as requested. go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
clean. Pre-existing here and on main, unrelated:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): a nested write holder keeps only the subtree it asked for

Reported by CodeRabbit, and it is the write-side twin of the read-side
escalation @jatmn found — I had disclosed it on this PR as still open, so this
closes it rather than deferring it again.

AddTemporaryWrite, given a path already covered by a broader TEMPORARY write
root, took a reference on that covering root. The lifetime was right and the
capability was wrong, exactly as on the read side: extraRoots is what validate()
authorises writes from, so keeping the covering root alive handed the nested
holder everything its neighbour had asked for.

Reproduced:

  both held           tempWrites={outer:2}                extraRoots=[... outer]
  after outer release tempWrites={outer:1}                extraRoots=[... outer]
  -> the inner-only holder can WRITE outer/sibling/not-mine.txt

A narrower request now records its own root. Each holder gets exactly the
authority it asked for and a lifetime of its own:

  both held           tempWrites={outer:1, inner:1}       extraRoots=[... outer inner]
  after outer release tempWrites={inner:1}                extraRoots=[... inner]
  -> sibling denied, inner retained

Only an EXACT match shares a refcount entry; a narrower one never does, which is
the distinction the escalation turned on. The nesting costs a redundant
extraRoots entry while both holders are live, which is not wrong — the broader
root already permits everything the narrower one does.

Three regressions: the escalation itself (broad holder releases first), the
opposite order as a control, and two holders of the same root sharing one entry.

Mutation: restoring the covering-root borrow compiles and fails the escalation
test on both the sibling and the covering root itself.

Honest note on a second mutation. Removing the permanent-cover early return
compiles and fails NOTHING. That is correct rather than a coverage gap: a
permanently covered request would then record its own temporary root, which is
redundant but harmless, since the permanent root outlives it and already permits
the writes. The early return is a cleanliness guard, not a correctness one, and
I would rather say so than write a test that pretends otherwise.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* test(sandbox): the outside-roots fixture fails loudly instead of skipping

Raised by CodeRabbit, and the helper had already written the argument against
itself: its own comment says "A skip is not a pass" while three of its four exits
were skips.

Every caller of scopeOutsideRoots asserts an AUTHORIZATION boundary — who may
write where, and whose release revokes it. A skipped fixture means that assertion
never ran and the build reported green anyway, which is precisely the failure the
helper was written to close. It closed it for one case (a home directory that
resolves nowhere on Windows) and left the others open.

Three exits become fatal:

  os.UserHomeDir failing        — resolves on every platform Zero supports
  os.MkdirTemp(home) failing    — a home that will not take a temp directory is a
                                  broken machine, not a limited one
  os.MkdirAll under base        — base was just created successfully, so a
                                  subdirectory failing under it is the same

If any fires, the right outcome is a red build somebody fixes, not silent
non-coverage of the sandbox's write rules.

ONE SKIP STAYS, and it is a different kind. When the grant path is already inside
a default write root, the fixture built correctly and the machine is fine — the
grant simply cannot demonstrate anything, because that path is writable before
any temporary grant exists. Running on would assert a permission that was never
in question. The comment now says which kind it is, so the distinction survives
the next reader.

Verified the fatal path fires: forcing the MkdirTemp error compiles and fails
TestANestedWriteHolderKeepsOnlyItsOwnSubtree at the fixture with the reason,
where it previously reported a pass.

go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

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* fix(sandbox): least authority for nested readers, and a hermetic grant fixture

@jatmn's three findings, taken as one pass over the grant construct rather than
as three local patches — his point that the same invariant kept not being
reapplied to the symmetric branch was fair, and this is the symmetric branch.

## The nested reader kept its neighbour's tree

AddTemporaryRead had exactly the shape AddTemporaryWrite was fixed for one
commit earlier: reader B asking for outer/inner took a reference on reader A's
covering root. Lifetime correct, capability wrong. readRoots feeds validateRead
and the native sandbox profile, so once A released, B could read outer/sibling.

Reproduced: tempReads={outer:2}; after A releases, the inner-only reader reads a
sibling it never asked for.

The rule is now the same on both sides: permanent coverage decides first, an
EXACT temporary root shares one refcount, and a narrower request records its own
root. Mutation: restoring the borrow fires both escalation assertions.

## Slice order no longer decides permanent coverage

permanentReadRootCoversLocked asks the whole question over both lists before any
insertion order can answer it, and AddRead now uses the same predicate instead of
its own scan, so the two cannot drift.

Honest note: with the borrow gone, this mutation is no longer catchable. Making
the scan return at the first covering entry compiles and fails nothing, because
AddTemporaryRead no longer borrows anything — it either no-ops or records its own
root, and neither escalates. The guard now prevents a redundant refcount entry
rather than an escalation. Verified by measurement, not assumed.

## A test that asserted the defect

TestANarrowerRequestHoldsTheCoveringGrant proved a lifetime property by
asserting the BROAD root was still present after the broad holder released —
which is the escalation written down as a requirement. It is replaced by tests
that assert lifetime and authority separately: the requested path stays readable,
the sibling and the covering root do not, plus the reverse release order,
exact-root sharing, and a permanent narrow root not borrowing a broad temporary
one.

## The obsolete predicate that broke CI

writeRootCoversLocked lost its last caller when the three coverage decisions
moved to permanentWriteRootCoversLocked and exact-root logic. make lint-static
reproduced the Windows `unused` failure locally. Removed rather than suppressed.
This is on me: I did not run lint-static before the previous push, which is a
required step, and CI caught what I should have.

## Fixtures out of the real home

scopeOutsideRoots and homeGrantOutsideTempRoots both built fixtures under
os.UserHomeDir(). Fixed at the cause jatmn identified rather than by relaxing the
setup checks: NewScope seeds the system temp directory as a permanent write root,
which is what made a t.TempDir() grant vacuous and sent the fixture to HOME in the
first place. Both helpers now build the Scope DIRECTLY — the pattern
scopeOutsideDefaults and temporaryWriteFixture already used — so no defaults are
seeded, t.TempDir() is outside by construction, and nothing touches HOME.

Each helper now asserts the NEGATIVE against its own scope before returning: the
target must be unwritable, and unreadable where relevant, before any grant
exists. That is stronger than the old check against defaultTempWriteRoots(),
which asked about a scope these tests no longer build.

Verified with HOME readable but not writable (caches redirected): the sandbox
suite passes. The one remaining failure there is
TestSeatbeltEnforcesExtraWriteRoots in seatbelt_integration_darwin_test.go, which
is NOT in this PR's diff — pre-existing, same shape, and worth its own issue
rather than riding along here.

gofmt, go vet, lint-static (0 issues), go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=5:
all clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 14 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0

* refactor(sandbox): drop the child-grant accessors this PR does not consume

Reported by @jatmn.

ExtraRoots and ExtraReadRoots have no production caller anywhere in the tree —
only their own definitions and this PR's tests. They arrived with the initial
split because the extraction was made at the file level: the temporary-root
implementation came across while the CLI and runner wiring that consumes them
stayed behind in #829's child read-grant propagation area. That leaves unrelated
production surface in a branch scoped to refcounting.

Both accessors are removed, along with the getter-only propagation assertion that
existed to exercise them. The refcount regressions that used ExtraRoots only to
inspect beyond-workspace write state now use a test-only helper over Roots(),
because that inspection is a test concern rather than an API this branch needs.

Nothing about the refcount, permanence, least-authority, atomic-release or
hermetic-fixture work changes, and no child propagation is wired here — that
would widen the scope rather than fix the extraction boundary.

One comment needed correcting rather than deleting. The justification for keeping
a reader's lifetime as a READ root named the lists readRoots feeds, and that
sentence has now been wrong in both directions: an earlier draft said "ReadRoots
and nothing else" while ExtraReadRoots also read it, and the accessor it was
corrected to mention is the one being removed here. It now describes what ships
and says why the list has to stay exhaustive as accessors change.

Rebased onto 6fe0d1ed, 0 behind. lint-static: 0 issues.
go test -race ./internal/sandbox/ -count=3: clean. Pre-existing here and on main:
TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics and
TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.
2026-08-26 13:21:25 +08:00
KRATOS 1649008506 fix(tools): an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb (#908)
* fix(tools): an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb

Split out of #829 as an independent fix, per @Vasanthdev2004's review asking for
the small self-contained pieces to arrive separately.

A successful edit re-baselined the file through RecordHash, which drops EVERY
recorded read range. A file read in three pieces therefore lost all three to a
single two-line edit, and the next six edits into regions that had already been
read were refused as unseen — the model had to re-read what it had just read in
order to keep working.

RecordEdit replaces that on the edit path. Because the edit is ours, the changed
span is known exactly, so ranges the edit did not touch are carried across,
ranges after it are shifted by the line delta, and a range the edit spans is
split around it.

An EXTERNAL change still drops everything, deliberately: once a formatter has
rewritten the file we no longer know which line holds what was read, and the
conservative drop is the only honest answer there.

"Seen whole" is now decided in ONE place. SeenWhole derives the answer from the
ranges because the raw flag is only ever set by a single covering read, but
RecordEdit branched on the flag — so a file read whole in two chunks reported
seen-whole true, then false after one edit, putting back the write_file refusal
the derived answer exists to prevent.

countLines now reports the count a READER would give. strings.Split leaves an
empty final element for content ending in a newline, so it counted 4 lines for a
3-line file; since SeenWhole asks whether the ranges cover 1..total, that
inflated total made full coverage unreachable for a file just read in full.
Nearly every text file ends in a newline, so this was the common case.

Origin-Session: local-de382f | Claude Code | 9 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 92ae33c95cd1
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15

* chore(tools): re-request an automated review of this head

No code change. CodeRabbit's verdict on this PR is pinned to 6f0cd6c4, a commit
that was force-pushed away five days ago, and a stale changes-requested keeps the
PR at mergeStateStatus=BLOCKED exactly as a human one would. It re-reviews on
push rather than on request, and repeated @coderabbitai triggers over five days
produced nothing, so this is the only lever available without maintainer rights.

The cost is that this dismisses @Vasanthdev2004's and @anandh8x's approvals of
0b6fcf54, which is an unhappy trade for an empty commit — the tree they approved
is byte-identical to this one.

Origin-Session: local-8cd239 | Claude Code | 6 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 149ab98453ad
Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 3 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: ae653221fa15

* perf(tools): derive the changed-line span from bytes, not from per-line slices

Reported by @jatmn.

changedLineSpan split both file versions into []string, so it allocated one
string header per line for EACH version — work that scales with the size of the
file rather than the size of the edit. countLines then split a third time just to
take a length. All of it ran before RecordEdit had checked whether there was a
tracked observation to update at all.

He measured 32,036,640 bytes for two 2 MB versions of a million short lines, and
extrapolated roughly 1.6 GB of headers for a 100 MB file before counting the
content, the updated bytes and the hashes already live beside them.

The memory was not the sharp end. edit_file writes the updated bytes BEFORE
calling RecordEdit, so an out-of-memory kill lands after the user's file has
changed and before the tracker baseline catches up: the file and the record of it
disagree, and nothing says so. His instruction was to fix the allocation source
rather than add a size guard, and that a guard — if used at all — would have to
reject before os.WriteFile rather than during post-write re-baselining. Taken as
written: there is no new limit, and the same edits are accepted as before.

Two identical byte prefixes share every line that ends inside them, so counting
newlines in the common prefix counts the unchanged leading lines directly. Same
for the suffix, with one rule that the line-array version got for free: the line
a shared tail STARTS in is only shared when the tail begins on a line boundary in
both versions, or its opening bytes differ and it is a changed line that merely
ends the same way.

Measured on his own scenario, two 2 MB versions:

  changedLineSpan   32,036,640 bytes  ->  0 allocations
  countLines        per-line slice    ->  0 allocations

## The equivalence is tested, not asserted

A rewrite of a diff primitive is only safe if it is behaviour-preserving, so the
replaced implementation is kept in the test file as an oracle and both are asked
the same questions. That caught 206 mismatches in my first attempt at the byte
scan — empty versions, and trailing lines that are only partially shared. Neither
appears in the hand-written cases, and I would have shipped it.

Two regressions: the oracle comparison, and an absolute allocation ceiling rather
than a ratio, so a future rewrite that reintroduces per-line slices fails rather
than merely getting slower. Mutation: restoring strings.Split in either function
allocates 3.2 MB and 3.6 MB against a 4 KB bound.

splitLinesForTracking lost its last caller and is removed — the same obsolete-
helper lint failure that broke Windows CI on #911, caught here by running
make lint-static before pushing rather than after. 0 issues.

Rebased onto ad34dc8d, 0 behind. go test -race ./internal/tools/: clean.
Pre-existing here and on main: TestRunDoctorFormatsRedactedProviderDiagnostics
and TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider exit 3 in this environment.

Origin-Session: local-c962d7 | Claude Code | 17 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: a599377c09e0
2026-08-26 13:20:48 +08:00
KRATOS 6fe0d1edcd fix(lockutil): use kernel-held advisory locks (#950)
* fix(lockutil): use kernel-held advisory locks

* fix(lockutil): harden cross-platform lock files

* test(lockutil): require one concurrent holder
2026-08-25 21:20:18 +08:00
e59bf78cab fix(sandbox): Make WSL backend tests deterministic. (#948)
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 21:19:31 +08:00
Kevin CodexandClaude Fable 5 6645f9744b perf(agent): cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input cap… (#532)
* perf(agent): cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input caps, free reactive prune, window re-derive

Compaction summarization was the single most expensive recurring event
in a long run: the full elided middle — verbatim tool bodies included —
went to the session's main model at full price (a ~100k-token call near
a 200k window, recursively multiplied on overflow).

Four changes, each independently safe:

- Dedicated summarizer model. Compaction summaries route to a cheap
  model resolved as ZERO_COMPACTION_MODEL > preferences.compactionModel
  > a curated default on official endpoints (Haiku 4.5 / Gemini
  Flash-Lite / gpt-4.1-mini; custom-endpoint catalogs are unknowable so
  they get none). Built lazily on the first paid compaction; ANY
  failure permanently falls back to the main provider for the run, so a
  misconfigured summarizer can never break compaction. "main" at any
  level forces the old behavior.

- Summarizer input caps. renderTranscript clamps tool-result bodies to
  2,000 chars and tool-call arguments to 500 (head+tail, rune-safe) —
  the summary needs what was done and decided, not raw payloads. Cuts
  summarizer input 5-10x on tool-heavy sessions.

- Free reactive prune. recover() now runs the same prune-first stage as
  the proactive path: a context-limit error is first answered by
  pruning stale tool bodies at zero cost, without consuming the
  one-shot reactive budget; the paid summarizer only runs when a later
  error finds nothing left to prune.

- Window re-derivation on model switch. Options.ContextWindowFor
  (wired to the model registry in exec and the TUI) lets the loop
  re-derive the compaction threshold after escalate_model, closing the
  documented KNOWN LIMITATION where a switch to a smaller-window model
  could overflow and a larger one over-compacted.

## Rebase notes (2026-08-25, onto 2749447c)

Rebased across 214 commits. main now summarizes through the context planner
(#879) and switches models via turn sessions, so the agent side was reworked
rather than merged textually:

- Summarizer selection lives on compactionState and is resolved lazily per
  main model through summarizeWithPlanner (planner + trace preserved); a
  failing dedicated summarizer is marked broken and the same slice is
  retried once on the main provider.
- Options.Summarizer now receives the main model in force:
  `func(ctx, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)`, and may return
  (nil, nil) when no dedicated model applies. After a successful
  escalate_model switch the loop calls compactor.switchModel, which
  re-derives the window and re-resolves the summarizer — a run that started
  on the cheap model and escalated regains cheap summaries (review P2).
- recover()'s free prune stage runs before the one-shot reactive guard
  (pruning is free and cannot loop) and mirrors maybeCompact's two prune
  passes; the free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
  window the provider enforces (with a 5% estimate margin), otherwise the
  same call falls through to the paid summarizer. Gating on the 70%
  proactive threshold would have sent histories in the 70-95% band to the
  summarizer unnecessarily (review P1 and the follow-up question).
- ContextWindowFor is wired through the turn-session switch path; the
  planner's window is updated alongside the compactor's.

Tests: the PR's suite is ported to the new seams, plus insufficient-prune
fall-through, free prune after the budget is spent, window-vs-threshold
gating, and summarizer re-resolution across a model switch.

* fix(agent): branch on a dedicated-summarizer flag instead of comparing providers

Review follow-ups for #532:

- summarizeProvider now reports whether the dedicated summarizer was
  selected and summarizeClosure branches on that flag; the previous
  `chosen == provider` compared Provider interface values, which panics
  when the dynamic type is not comparable. Regression test uses a provider
  with a slice field for both the summarizer and the main provider.
- CompactionModelID's curated-default test covers the official OpenAI
  profile alongside Anthropic and Google.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 21:18:04 +08:00
Kevin CodexandClaude Fable 5 2749447cdc fix(tools): make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file (#956)
* fix(tools): make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file

Head-to-head benchmarking against Grok Build on grok-4.6 (3 tasks × 3 runs)
showed Zero solving every task but spending 2.7× the tokens and 2.3× the
time on the multi-file feature task. Every one of the 20 apply_patch calls
in those runs failed, after which the model degraded to whole-file
write_file rewrites and read→write verification loops.

Root causes and fixes:

- The sandbox and the tool both rejected an absolute path that lies inside
  the workspace ("must stay inside the workspace"). Models routinely echo
  the absolute path read_file showed them. Absolute paths now flow through
  the normal workspace-scope validation (inside → allowed, outside → still
  denied); unified-diff headers are rewritten to a/ b/ relative form before
  git apply, and platform symlink prefixes (/var → /private/var) are
  normalised the same way the other file tools do.
- The structured parser demanded a byte-exact "*** Begin Patch" /
  "*** End Patch"; grok-4.6 writes "*** Begin Patch ***". Decorated marker
  spellings are accepted, and a unified range after "@@" ("-12,4 +12,6",
  optionally with a heading) no longer becomes a literal context search.
- Parse errors now carry a one-line format reminder so a failed call is
  recoverable in one retry instead of a format-guessing loop.
- edit_file (exact search/replace with uniqueness guard, CRLF and fuzzy
  fallbacks) is advertised to the model again alongside apply_patch, and
  the apply_patch description shows the structured format.
- Writers (edit_file, write_file, apply_patch) recorded a file's line total
  with lineCount, which is one higher than read_file's count for a file
  ending in a newline. RecordSeenRange resets every observation when the
  total changes, so a partial read_file after a successful edit silently
  discarded whole-file knowledge and the next edit was refused with
  "content that has not been read exactly in this session". All writers
  now record the same total read_file reports (trackedLineTotal).
- read_file's padded "  N | " line prefix was ~19% of every read (about
  1.5k tokens per 800-line file) and was re-sent on every later call. It is
  now the compact "N→" prefix models already know; nothing parsed the old
  form.
- The editing-discipline prompt steers: edit_file for a targeted change,
  apply_patch for multi-hunk/multi-file changes, write_file only for new
  files or full rewrites; a successful edit result is confirmation, so the
  file is not re-read to verify it.

Tests: regression tests for decorated markers, writer/reader line-total
agreement (edit → partial read → edit far away still succeeds), range hunk headers,
absolute in-workspace paths (structured + unified), outside-workspace
rejection, header-line-only relativisation, and tool visibility; the
prompt and tool-budget tests updated to the new contract.

Benchmark (grok-4.6, 3 tasks x 3 runs, harness in demo/bench-zero-vs-grok):
Zero 0.8.0 617 s / 1,527k tokens -> with this change 346 s / 493k tokens;
Grok Build 407 s / 713k. Every run of every configuration solved its task.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): keep CRLF line endings when relativizing patch headers

relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths split on a normalized "\n" and rejoined with
"\n", so any CRLF patch that needed a header rewrite lost its line endings
everywhere; git apply could then fail to match a CRLF file. Split on "\n"
only and carry each line's trailing "\r" through, including on rewritten
headers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(sandbox): share the structured-patch classifier with apply_patch

Review follow-ups for #956:

- The tool accepted decorated structured markers ("***Begin Patch") that
  the sandbox's applyPatchPaths did not recognise, so for that spelling the
  boundary scanned the patch as a unified diff, extracted no targets and
  validated nothing. The marker classifier now lives in the sandbox package
  (StructuredPatchMarker / IsStructuredPatch) and the tool delegates to it,
  so both sides accept exactly the same set; tests cover inside, traversal
  and outside targets for the no-space spelling at the boundary.
- Document the containment model at the apply site: structured patches are
  applied through an opened os.Root (descriptor-relative, no-follow);
  unified diffs keep the pre-existing git-apply pathname flow, which the
  absolute-path rewrite does not widen (they become the same root-relative
  form relative paths always used).
- OpenAI addendum: the one-file-per-call rule names read_file, edit_file and
  write_file explicitly and allows a single multi-file apply_patch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(sandbox): compare slash-normalised patch paths so the check passes on Windows

structuredPatchHeaderPaths normalises separators to "/", so the absolute
outside-workspace path in the boundary test must be compared in its slash
form; on Windows the backslash original never matched and the Smoke job
failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(sandbox): validate the parsed patch path at the scope boundary

For each accepted marker spelling, pass the exact path applyPatchRequestPaths
produced to scope.validate: an outside path must be denied and an inside
path accepted, so a separator-handling regression between the parser and the
scope cannot slip past the test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): apply unified diffs in-process through the workspace root

Review follow-up for #956. Unified diffs were validated by pathname and then
handed to git apply, which reopened the targets by name — a check-to-use
window a symlink swap could exploit — and the absolute-path rewrite added in
this PR normalised `diff --git` headers with strings.Fields, which splits a
git C-quoted path containing whitespace.

Both go away by not shelling out at all: parseUnifiedPatch translates a
unified diff into the same operations a structured patch produces, and both
formats are applied by applyPatchOperations through os.OpenRoot — every
stat, read, create and write is descriptor-relative and refuses to follow a
link out of the root. git is no longer required by apply_patch.

Unified-diff support: modifications, creations (--- /dev/null), deletions
(+++ /dev/null), multiple hunks per file, git "rename from/to" (a move,
hunks optional) and "copy from/to" (a new copy operation whose destination
inherits only the tracker credit the source had), "\ No newline at end of
file" on either side, a/ b/ prefixes, C-quoted paths, CRLF patches, and
git's diff/index/mode lines. Hunks are placed at their "@@ -a,b" range when
the expected lines match there and located by context otherwise (so a
stale range still applies and duplicate blocks are disambiguated by the
range). Binary patches are rejected.

Removed: the git apply flow, relativizeUnifiedPatchPaths,
recheckPatchWriteTargets, missingPatchTargets, completeCreatedPatchTargets
and recordCreatedPatchTargets. validatePatchPaths/changedFilesFromPatch stay
for mutation-target listing.

Tests: the existing unified-diff suite now runs through the in-process
applier unchanged; new coverage for quoted whitespace paths (inside applies,
outside is refused untouched), a workspace path swapped for a symlink that
escapes the root (both formats refused, outside file unmodified), create +
delete + no-newline markers, range hint vs context fallback, rename with a
hunk, and binary/empty rejection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): harden unified-diff parsing and cover the copy operation

Review follow-ups for #956 (in-process unified applier):

- A hunk that ends before its declared line counts is reported as
  malformed instead of silently absorbing the next file's ---/+++ header
  pair (which then failed later against the wrong file). Both shapes are
  caught: leftover counts at a header or at end of input, and a --- line
  directly followed by +++ inside a hunk. The element after a patch's final
  newline is no longer counted as an empty context line, so a truncated
  hunk cannot look complete.
- "\ No newline at end of file" may only follow a file's final hunk; a
  marker before another hunk is rejected rather than leaking into that
  hunk's result.
- Zero-context insertions (git diff -U0) are documented as
  position-trusting by design, matching git apply without fuzz; hunks with
  context are verified at the range before it is used.

Tests: copy from/to (source kept, destination created with the hunk
applied and tracked with the source's whole-file state; existing
destination refused untouched; copy onto itself refused), over-declared and
truncated hunk counts, and the no-newline marker before vs after the final
hunk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): require an @@ line before treating ---/+++ inside a hunk as a file boundary

A removed "-- x" line directly followed by an added "++ y" line is valid
hunk content that also matches the ---/+++ header shape; the boundary check
now additionally requires the following line to be a hunk header, and a
regression test keeps such a pair intact. End-of-input strictness for a hunk
cut short is documented as deliberate: applying a truncated hunk would make
a partial change (removals without their replacements).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* refactor(tools): share one line-count implementation between reader and writer

sourceLineCount and trackedLineTotal computed the same count; keeping two
copies invites exactly the reader/writer drift this PR fixed. The reader now
delegates to trackedLineTotal, which carries the tracker contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): verify a unified deletion's expected content before removing the file

A unified diff's "+++ /dev/null" hunks state the content being removed, but
the in-process applier dropped them and deleted unconditionally, so a stale
deletion removed a file whose current content the patch never described.
Unified deletions now keep their hunks, require at least one, and run them
through the same verifier as updates: the hunks must match the current file
and leave nothing behind, otherwise the deletion is refused and the file is
untouched. A structured "*** Delete File" keeps its unconditional meaning.

Hardening from the same review: every non-create change re-reads its source
through the opened root immediately before commit and refuses to proceed if
the bytes differ from what was planned.

Tests: matching deletion, stale deletion (file byte-for-byte unchanged),
partial deletion, header-only deletion, multi-hunk deletion with one stale
hunk (nothing removed) and all-good hunks, structured delete unchanged, and
a source changed between planning and commit for update and delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tools): a move with a missing source is refused before publishing

The pre-commit recheck now refuses a move whose source vanished after
planning instead of publishing the destination and then failing; update the
test to the safer contract (error names the recheck, nothing is created).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): byte-exact unified deletions and git's header-only empty-file forms

Review follow-ups for #956:

- A unified deletion is verified byte for byte: the removed lines (with the
  removed side's "\ No newline at end of file" honoured) must equal the
  current file exactly, with only the file's own line-ending style
  normalised. None of the whitespace tolerance used to locate update hunks
  applies, and a whitespace-only remainder no longer passes; a deletion is
  not recoverable, so it fails closed.
- git describes an empty file's deletion or creation with header lines only
  ("diff --git", "deleted file mode"/"new file mode", "index") and no
  hunks. Both forms are recognised: the deletion is applied only when the
  current file is empty, the creation writes an empty file, and they compose
  with hunk-carrying files in the same patch.
- The pre-commit recheck test also covers the copy operation and asserts no
  destination is created on refusal.

Tests: whitespace/indentation/blank-line/space-only/missing-newline
mismatches all refused with the file unchanged, matching no-newline marker
and CRLF file accepted, header-only deletion of a non-empty file refused,
multi-file patch with header-only delete + create + a normal hunk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tools): remove the move source after planning via a deterministic hook

The refused-move test now creates source.txt, plans the move, and removes
the file through a test-only pre-commit hook (structuredPatchBeforeCommit)
so it exercises the post-planning disappearance path rather than a source
that was never there. Assertions unchanged: refused before publishing, no
destination created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* test(tui): read_file fixtures use the compact N→ prefix

Three TUI fixtures still built fake read_file output in the legacy
"  N | text" shape; they pass either way but pinned an outdated contract.
They now mirror what appendReadFileRange emits, and the shape comment and
the expanded-card assertion are updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

* fix(tools): name the committed files when a patch is partially applied

Review follow-up for #956. When a later change in a multi-file patch fails
(for example the pre-commit recheck refuses a file that changed after
planning), the error now lists exactly which files were already committed
and states that the rest are unchanged, instead of a generic "partially
applied" warning. The model can then re-read only what actually changed.

Test: a three-file structured patch whose second file is altered after
planning fails with "already committed: first.txt", first.txt holds the
patched content, and the other two files are untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012JqvAf7zsP1qYFVZayKXHq

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-25 20:23:48 +08:00
github-actions[bot] ad34dc8d81 chore(main): release 0.8.0 (#896)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-22 00:08:57 +08:00
beardthelion 6edf9a8b78 fix(sandbox): normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist (#934)
* fix(sandbox): retire recorded approvals through a policy bump

Ahead of tightening which command prefixes may be approved, make the
upgrade path safe. A grant already on disk that the narrower rules
reject fails validation on read, and that path rejects the entire grants
file rather than the one entry. Every caller treats a read error as "no
grant" (engine.go LookupCommandPrefix, ApprovedCommandPrefixes, and the
Lookup in Evaluate), so one stale prefix would silently disable the
user's persisted deny grants too, with the error text never reaching
them.

Bump the approval policy version instead and let the store's existing
migration handle it: it backs the file up, keeps deny grants,
invalidates prior approvals, and reports the counts once through the
startup notice that both frontends already print. That is what the
mechanism was built for.

The v1-migration test pinned the policy version as a literal, so it now
derives the expected value from the constant and will not need editing
on the next bump.

* fix(sandbox): normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist

unsafeCommandPrefixLauncher matched the program name as written, so
python3.11, python2.7, python.exe, node.exe and git.exe all validated as
ordinary commands and could be persisted as command-prefix grants.
Lookup is a string-prefix match, so a single approval then auto-allowed
every later invocation: granting [python3.11 -c] covers
`python3.11 -c "import os; os.system(...)"` with no further prompt.

internal/agent's commandName already normalizes case and Windows
executable extensions for the allow side of the same decision; the deny
side did not, and the two disagreeing is the bug. Reduce the program to
the launcher it actually runs and match on that: executable extension,
Windows' trailing dots and spaces (python. starts python.exe), CPython
ABI flags, then a trailing version, testing the digit-stripped form as
well so python3.11 and python3 both arrive as python. A name is only
ever narrowed toward an existing entry, so the failure direction is an
extra permission prompt, never a silent grant. Digits without a
separator stay part of the name, which keeps base64, 7z and sha256sum
grantable.

Two Windows spellings cannot be resolved by name at all, so the shape is
refused alongside a path: 8.3 short names truncate the stem, which makes
POWERS~1.EXE unrecognizable, and python.exe::$DATA reaches the same
executable through its default stream. Normalizing the first token
before the banned-suggestion comparison keeps git.exe at parity with
git.

The list also gains launchers of the same class it already covers and
that normalization cannot reach: cmd, wsl, the remaining POSIX shells,
busybox, uv and uvx. Entries normalization now covers (/bin/bash,
/bin/zsh, powershell.exe, python3, pypy3) are gone; the first two were
already unreachable behind the path check above them.

Covers the persisted store, the session-scoped grants the agent takes
during a turn, the legacy-schema migration that prunes such a grant
per entry, and the Windows spellings hermetically.

* fix(sandbox): treat free-threaded CPython as a launcher too

The ABI flags came from the pre-3.13 set, so "python3.13t" and
"python3.13t.exe" normalized to themselves and stayed grantable as
command prefixes while the GIL build "python3.13" was refused. A
free-threaded interpreter runs arbitrary code just the same.

Add "t" to the flags trimmed under the existing digit guard, which is
what keeps ordinary names intact: "zstd" and "cat" have no digit beneath
the trimmed letters, so they keep their own names and stay grantable.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.

* fix(sandbox): refuse the remaining spellings of listed launchers

Same defect as the free-threaded build, found by sweeping the families
already on the list for names it cannot reach:

- nodejs is node on Debian and Ubuntu, and was grantable.
- python3-dbg, python3.11-dbg and python3.13t-dbg are interpreters that
  run arbitrary code; so are bash-static, pwsh-preview and
  node-nightly. A closed set of build-channel suffixes now normalizes
  them. The set stays closed deliberately: a general "-word" strip would
  also swallow node-gyp, python3-config and ruby-lsp, which are ordinary
  tools a user should still be able to approve, and those are pinned as
  must-stay-grantable.
- pnpm, yarn and bunx run package scripts exactly as npm and npx do, and
  npm and npx are already refused.
- sudoedit escalates like sudo.

The launcher-wrapper family (winpty, chroot, unshare, nsenter, parallel,
script, unbuffer, taskset, flock) has the same inconsistency against the
env/nohup/timeout/setsid entries already on the list, and is left for a
separate decision rather than widened here.

* test(sandbox): cover the -debug and -beta launcher suffixes

Four of the six build-channel suffixes had regression cases; -debug and
-beta did not, so removing either from the set left every test green.
Both now fail RED when their entry is dropped.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #934.
2026-08-21 12:50:11 +08:00
Indra Gunawan 90dcfd127e fix(modelregistry): expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models (#931)
deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-pro expose thinking-mode effort control
through the OpenAI-compatible reasoning_effort parameter (low/high/max;
medium/xhigh map onto high). reasoningEffortsForModelName did not recognize
the deepseek family, so /effort only offered 'auto' for these models.

Advertise {low, high, max} so the /effort picker and Ctrl+T ring work, and
add fallback coverage for deepseek-v4-flash/pro/reasoner/chat.
2026-08-21 12:48:12 +08:00
Vasanth T 01c3498205 feat(update): recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs (#910)
* feat(update): recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs

* fix(update): match the keg shape, correct the docs, cover Apply and cross-target

* test(update): build the release fixture from the running platform

* fix(update): require a Homebrew receipt before refusing self-update

Review found the keg check was shape-only, and it was right: a directory
tree a user built themselves can have exactly a keg's shape. Classifying
one as Homebrew refuses a `zero upgrade` that would have worked
perfectly, on a machine Homebrew has never touched.

Two changes, cheap one first. The shape rule now requires the full
<prefix>/Cellar/<formula>/<version>/bin/<binary> depth rather than one
segment fewer, which already excludes the exact path the review raised.
Then, only for a path that still looks like a keg, one Stat for
INSTALL_RECEIPT.json — the file Homebrew writes into every keg and
nothing else does.

The receipt is what the old comment argued against, on the grounds that
it would put filesystem I/O on a path that runs at every version check.
That is no longer true of it: the Stat happens only after the shape test
has already matched, so an ordinary install still reaches no filesystem
here at all.

A directory named INSTALL_RECEIPT.json is not a receipt, which a bare
Stat would have accepted silently.

NOT taken: the same review asked for the Homebrew branch to be moved
ahead of the cross-target one in upgradeGuidance. That ordering is
deliberate and already pinned by
TestUpgradeGuidanceKeepsCrossTargetAnswerForHomebrew, whose comment
predicted exactly this reading — "it reads like an ordering bug until you
see which question is being answered". Homebrew is a property of the
binary on THIS machine; when the check was asked about a different
target the answer belongs to that other machine, and `brew upgrade zero`
would change this one instead. The reasoning is now recorded at the
branch as well as in the test, so the next reader finds it in both
places.

The install docs claimed detection was the Cellar path alone, which
undersold it, and stated the self-update rule absolutely in one paragraph
before excepting mise in the next. Both say the same thing now.

* test(update): give the Homebrew fixtures a receipt, and stop gating the receipt rule on the host

The previous commit made a receipt the thing that distinguishes a keg from any
directory sitting under a path containing "Cellar". Two fixtures still built a
keg without one, so detection correctly answered standalone and both failed:

  TestDetectInstallMethodRecognisesAHomebrewKeg  keg path: got "standalone", want "homebrew"
  TestApplyRefusesToUpdateAHomebrewKeg           refusal does not name the command that works:
                                                 download release archive: dial tcp: lookup example.test

The second is worth reading twice: with detection returning standalone, Apply
stopped refusing and went to the network, so the failure surfaced as a DNS error
rather than as a missing refusal. Both fixtures write a receipt now.

The reason this reached CI at all is the second half. Every test of the receipt
rule passed runtime.GOOS to isHomebrewPath, which already takes the target as a
parameter, so all of them skipped on Windows and the rule could only ever break
somewhere else. They pass an explicit target now and run everywhere. The two
that exercise DetectInstallMethod stay host-gated, because those are about the
wired entry point rather than the rule, but the rule underneath them is no
longer invisible here.

Verified the receipt path arithmetic on both non-Windows targets rather than
trusting the host-gated tests: isHomebrewPath is false before the receipt is
written and true after, with the receipt at the keg directory hasHomebrewReceipt
actually reads.
2026-08-21 12:33:21 +08:00
1ec7219aee feat: use Exa as default search provider (#926)
* feat: use Exa as default search provider

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a01522-a5f1-7139-8a55-5e417cba2751
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(config): carry a legacy default's disable across the Exa migration

A user who ran `zero mcp disable firecrawl` chose not to open that outbound
connection. Renaming the built-in default to exa re-opened it under the new
name on upgrade, and because the replacement looked like an untouched default
the startup warning stayed quiet too.

Carry an explicit user-level disable of a retired default onto its successor,
but only when the user never declared the successor themselves — an explicit
exa entry wins either way. The carried-over disable is recorded as a user-level
decision, so the lower-trust project layer cannot lift it while
`zero mcp enable exa` still can.

Regression coverage: the legacy-disabled upgrade path, the explicit-exa
override, a configured-but-enabled legacy entry, the CLI re-enable, the
project-layer re-enable attempt, and the resulting startup behavior
(NormalizeConfig must not hand back an exa server to connect to).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(config): keep a retired default's transport for partial user entries

A user who added an API key to the firecrawl default wrote only the header —
the seeded default supplied the http type and URL. Once the default stops being
seeded that entry resolves with no type, url, or command, and NormalizeConfig
rejects it, taking down startup for every other server too rather than just
that one.

Record what Zero used to ship for a retired default and re-seed it under the
user's own fields. Only for an entry that named no transport of its own: an
entry with a self-hosted url or a stdio command is a complete definition the
user owns, and grafting the retired http default onto a command produces a
server that is rejected outright.

Regression coverage at both ResolveMCP and NormalizeConfig for the header-only
entry and its failure path, the self-hosted stdio entry that must be left
alone, and a disabled retired entry keeping a usable transport so a later
re-enable resolves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-08-20 20:26:24 +08:00
Eli Lap 1a81292d3f Fix LM studio (local) model discovery. (#918)
* Fix LM studio (local) model discovery.

* fix(openai): handle typed-nil properties in normalizeToolParameters

The `properties == nil` interface comparison misses typed-nil
`map[string]any` values, which JSON-serialize as `null` instead of
`{}`. Strict OpenAI-compatible servers (LM Studio) reject the request.

Type-assert first, then compare the underlying map, so a typed-nil
properties field is rewritten to an empty object. Adds a regression
test that exercises the typed-nil path.

* test(openai): cover non-map properties in normalizeToolParameters

CodeRabbit follow-up on the typed-nil fix: lock in the behavior
when `properties` is a non-map value (e.g., empty slice) so the
type-assert branch normalizes it to an empty object on the wire.
2026-08-20 20:26:03 +08:00
Vasanth T a78c6c357e fix(acp): three defects a desktop ACP client hits (#915)
* fix(acp): four defects a desktop ACP client hits

Found by driving `zero acp` from ZeroApp and comparing both sides of the
wire. None of them fail loudly — they produce a blank transcript, a
silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons nobody can tell apart.

session/load restored the conversation into the agent's own memory and
sent nothing. The turns were read from the store and used to build every
later prompt, but not one notification went out, so a client that resumed
opened an empty transcript against a model that remembered everything.
Ask a follow-up and ZERO answers correctly, about a question no longer on
screen. It now replays the loaded turns as user/agent message chunks
before returning, so a client rendering on the reply already has them.
Whole messages rather than per-token deltas: this is a transcript, not a
stream.

A permission option we offered could not be accepted. The fallback list
for a request with no AvailableDecisions lived inside
buildPermissionOptions, while requestPermission validated the client's
answer against the raw field — so whenever ZERO did not enumerate, the
client was sent Allow and Reject and its reply was checked against an
empty slice. Every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny
with "permission option was not offered". The user clicked Allow and ZERO
recorded a denial, and nothing surfaced it, because a denial is a
legitimate answer. One resolver now feeds both, so they agree by
construction. The narrowing this validation exists for is unchanged: an
unoffered broader grant is still refused.

Cancelling a permission prompt came back as an internal error. Only
context.Canceled was recognised, so errPermissionApprovalCanceled fell
through to -32603 carrying the sentinel text, and clients render that as
a failed turn — declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. For
apply_patch, dismissing the dialog is the only refusal a client is
offered. It maps to StopCancelled now. The sentinel is exported so the
surfaces can recognise it; a genuine failure is still an error.

request_permissions labelled two different decisions "Allow". The label
is the only thing an ACP client shows, and plain allow and strict-review
allow are offered together, so the panel had two identical buttons where
one silently enabled strict auto-review of what was granted. The
distinction cannot live in the option id, which is opaque to the client,
so it is in the name.

Eleven tests, each confirmed to fail without its fix.

* refactor(acp): drop the session/load replay, superseded by #914

gnanam's #914 lands the same fix and does more with it: the replayed
messages carry stable ids derived from the store's event ids, session/load
replays while session/resume deliberately does not, and both are
capability-gated. Keeping a second, weaker replay here would have meant a
conflict in handleSessionLoad and translate.go for no gain.

translate.go is back to its state on main. What remains are the three
defects #914 does not touch: the permission option that could not be
accepted, the cancel that arrived as an internal error, and the two
options labelled the same.

* fix(acp): validate a permission reply against the options that were sent

CodeRabbit caught a hole on the same seam this PR already fixes, in the
other direction.

buildPermissionOptions drops PermissionDecisionCancel, because ACP
expresses cancellation through the outcome rather than an option. But
ZERO enumerates cancel in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and
apply_patch — the two commonest prompts — so validating against the
decisions accepted {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an
identifier no client was ever shown, aborting the whole turn.

Rather than reject cancel by name, decisionFromOutcome now takes the
[]PermissionOption that were actually sent, and requestPermission builds
that list once and uses it for both halves. "What we offered" and "what we
accept" become the same slice instead of two things kept in step, so
anything optionKindFor declines to render is excluded structurally — the
next such action is covered the day it is added.

The regression test is written over every option-less decision rather
than over cancel specifically, for the same reason. Cancelling through
the outcome still works, which is asserted separately: closing the
selected-id route must not close the real one.

Also adds the cancellation coverage CodeRabbit asked for on the two
sandbox-retry paths. Both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
reached by a different denial, and the ACP mapping in this PR depends on
them producing something recognisable. They also assert the escalated
retry does not run: a cancelled prompt that still ran it would run the
command the user had just declined.
2026-08-20 20:24:02 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia 8dd33ec39e docs(agents): Record four recurring review blockers (#899)
* docs(agents): Record four recurring review blockers

These classes come up across unrelated pull requests, are not caught by CI,
and nothing in AGENTS.md currently prevents them, so each is rediscovered by a
reviewer at the cost of a round trip.

Host tool version floors is the clearest case. Zero shells out to git and the
project declares no minimum version anywhere, so adding a modern flag raises
that floor silently and an older host fails with a usage error instead of a
clear message. Prove-the-test-fails addresses a recurring shape where the
problem is not a missing test but one that passes either way, because an
earlier guard rejects the input before the behavior under test runs. Hermetic
tests covers isolation helpers applied to some tests but not others reaching
the same storage. Platform error codes extends the existing platform-truth
rule, which covers path canonicalization but not errno and NTSTATUS values.

Advisory lint findings are deliberately not included: deadcode and lint-static
both run with continue-on-error in ci.yml, and section 3 already requires
fixing findings the change introduces.

Refs #898

* docs(agents): Tighten version-floor, isolation, and errno guidance

Three corrections from review, two of them to claims that were too strong.

Git version floors are per subcommand, not per flag. --end-of-options reached
the shared parser in 2.24 but git rev-parse only accepted it from 2.30, so
recording the flag's general debut would still let a caller ship something
that fails on 2.24 through 2.29.

The hermetic-tests bullet named config, cache, and state but gave a procedure
covering only config. It now covers each root, including %LocalAppData% for
the cache root, which os.UserCacheDir resolves without consulting XDG.

The errno bullet asserted ENOTDIR on Linux and Darwin. Only Linux was actually
measured; Darwin was assumed, in a bullet whose whole point is not to assume.
It now says the call may report either code and both should be accepted, which
is what the guidance was trying to teach.

Refs #898

* docs(agents): Clarify macOS and Windows roots for hermetic test isolation.

os.UserConfigDir and os.UserCacheDir derive from HOME on macOS and AppData/LocalAppData on Windows rather than reading XDG variables.

Refs #899

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-20 20:23:31 +08:00
Anandan d7ac85cbf9 Polish Zero's TUI and harden patch, model, and background workflows (#916)
* Checkpoint UI polish

* Fix structured apply patch handling

* Restore tool previews when resuming sessions

* Improve theme-aware code rendering

* Replace persistent sidebar with run details

* Remove inert transcript interactions

* Cover resumed edit previews

* Smooth active run status feedback

* Preserve semantic colors behind overlays

* Normalize ChatGPT model aliases

* Render staged image attachments in terminal

* Polish transcript and tool feedback

* Resolve rebased diff renderer conflict

* Address UI polish review findings

* Fix smoke test regressions

* Harden patch and transcript edge cases

* Bind structured patches to workspace root

* Use unique structured patch temp files

* Retry structured patch temp allocation

* Reuse rooted patch temp allocator

* Fix Windows CI process checks

* Fix structured patch safety boundaries

Preserve read-before-write credit only when the model already knew the full source, reject ambiguous hunk matches, and retain CRLF line endings. Add regression coverage for unsafe overwrites, positive tracking cases, duplicate matches, and Windows-style files.

* Resolve plan test seam after rebase

Drop the obsolete sticky-plan height helper while retaining the PR status test seams brought forward by the UI changes.

* Address final review correctness gaps

Bound narrow waiting labels, reject malformed plan records, preserve missing final newlines, reject out-of-order EOF hunks, clear stale tracking after failed rollback, and keep deferred tool loading aligned with model visibility.

* Harden patch transactions and review edges

Publish new patch targets without overwriting raced destinations, journal only completed mutations, and create replacement temps beside their targets. Reject pre-plan diagnostics, cover tool-search transcript suppression, and leave sufficient cleanup time in the Windows process fixture.

* Bind patch rollback to committed versions

Capture file identity and content before publication, quarantine rollback targets atomically, and refuse destructive undo when a path was replaced or modified in place. Add deterministic coverage for publication and rollback races.

* Align structured patch failure semantics

Use prevalidated sequential application with explicit partial-success errors instead of unsafe multi-file rollback. Retain atomic per-file publication, no-overwrite creates, unsupported-hardlink fallback, and conservative tracker invalidation.

* Preserve patch context bytes

Track source offsets for structured-patch context lines and reuse the exact matched source text during replacement. This keeps tolerant matching from changing indentation or mixed line endings outside the requested edit.
2026-08-19 22:18:47 +05:30
d66ad71532 chore: remove dead wrapper functions and unused test seams (#905)
* chore: remove dead wrapper functions and unused test seams

These five functions are unreachable from any cmd/* main even when tests are included (deadcode -test ./...), so they are genuinely dead on every platform:

- TraceEventKeys: one-line alias of ParseTraceEventKeys, no callers
- ValidateToolCapabilities: one-line alias of ValidateCapabilities, no callers
- GetLocalDiffStats and WatchPRState: test seams in internal/tui/export_test.go that no test calls
- ScanSSEData: non-context SSE scanner in internal/providers/providerio, fully superseded by ScanSSEDataWithContext

The five remaining -test findings are //go:build !linux stubs (landlock/seccomp/linux_helper) that are live on Linux, so they are left in place.

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* Bump Go to 1.26.6 so govulncheck and Windows smoke pass.

The 1.26.5 standard library still reports GO-2026-6218 and the Punycode
label check that fail required CI; 1.26.6 matches main and clears them.

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-08-18 21:44:13 +08:00
d065467cd3 feat(zerogit): auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch (#671)
* feat(zerogit): auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch

zero changes push/pr refused to push straight to the default branch but
never offered an alternative, unlike other agent tooling that names and
checks out a feature branch automatically. Add CreateBranch, IsDefaultBranch,
CurrentGitUser, and branch-name slugify/build helpers to zerogit, and wire
push/pr to auto-create a "<user>/<slug>" branch (slug from an LLM when a
provider is configured, otherwise a deterministic fallback from the diff)
whenever the current branch is the default one and --yes/--dry-run weren't
passed.

* fix(zerogit): normalize LLM branch slugs, bound remote lookup, handle existing branches

Address CodeRabbit's review on the auto-branch-naming PR:

- generateAutoBranchSlug now takes the first non-empty, quote-trimmed
  line of the model's response before slugifying, instead of folding
  any preamble or wrapping quotes into the branch name.
- isDefaultBranch's ls-remote lookup is now bounded by a 5s timeout so
  a slow or unreachable remote can't stall push/pr; falls back to the
  local main/master heuristic as before.
- CreateBranch checks whether the target branch already exists locally
  and checks it out instead of failing checkout -b on the collision.

Also add regression coverage: CurrentGitUser's OS-username fallback
tier, CreateBranch's existing-branch and generic checkout-failure
paths, a CLI-level test for changes pr (previously untested) mirroring
the existing changes push coverage, and a messy-LLM-response case for
the slug normalization fix.

* fix(zerogit,cli): make auto-branching collision-safe, remote-aware, fail-closed, and opt-in for LLM naming

- CreateBranch never checks out an existing branch on a name collision: it
  picks a unique suffixed name off the current HEAD (name-2 .. name-9) and
  fails visibly when the namespace is exhausted, so a stale branch with
  unrelated history can no longer be published while the new commit stays
  behind on the default branch.
- ensureFeatureBranch resolves the remote once (explicit --remote, then the
  original branch's configured upstream, then origin) via IsDefaultBranch,
  which now reports the resolved remote, and push/pr thread that remote into
  Push, so a freshly created branch without tracking configuration no longer
  falls back to origin in fork setups.
- The default-branch check fails closed: main and master count as default
  with no network, an unreachable remote falls back to the local
  refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD record, and when neither answers the push is
  refused with guidance instead of silently dropping the confirmation guard
  for repositories whose default is trunk or develop.
- LLM branch naming is now opt-in via --auto on push/pr, matching commit
  --auto: a configured provider alone no longer causes the change diff to be
  uploaded during ordinary git-only pushes.
- After the ordinary commit-then-push sequence the tree is clean, so the
  fallback name comes from the HEAD commit subject instead of the constant
  user/changes.

* style(zerogit): align fake-runner result comments to gofmt output

* test(zerogit): cover Push's fail-closed path when the default branch is unknown

* fix(zerogit): keep a stale cached remote HEAD from clearing the push guard

When the live ls-remote default-branch lookup fails, isDefaultBranch fell
back to the local refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD cache and returned
branch == cachedName. That cache is only a hint: if the server renamed its
default (main -> trunk) the record still names main, so checking whether
pushing trunk is safe returned false and the newly protected branch was
pushed without --yes.

Trust the cache only to block a push (a positive match proves the branch is
the recorded default); on a mismatch fall through to the existing
fail-closed unknown-default error instead of treating the branch as
unprotected.

* fix(cli): honor --diff-bytes when inspecting the diff for auto-branch naming

changes push/pr accept and document --diff-bytes, but ensureFeatureBranch
inspected the working tree with only Cwd set. With --auto the resulting
unbounded diff was embedded in the branch-name request to the provider, so a
user who capped the diff to limit how much proprietary source is uploaded
for naming still sent the complete diff.

Thread options.maxDiffBytes through ensureFeatureBranch into InspectOptions,
matching how the commit path already bounds the diff.

* fix(cli): refuse an auto-branch push when HEAD has nothing to publish

The auto-branch path decided to branch solely from working-tree status and
never checked that HEAD was ahead of the default branch. On a clean,
up-to-date default branch it would create and push user/<subject> at the
exact default tip; with only uncommitted edits it named a branch from those
edits but pushed the unchanged HEAD, leaving the edits local, and changes pr
then abandoned the empty branch before the host rejected the comparison.

Add zerogit.CommitsAhead and consult it before branching: when HEAD is
provably not ahead of <remote>/<default>, report "no changes to publish"
instead of creating the branch. An indeterminate count (for example a
remote-tracking ref that was never fetched) is treated as "cannot tell" so a
legitimate first push is not blocked.

* fix(cli): recover the branch slug from preamble or fenced LLM replies

The slug helper returned the first non-empty line verbatim, so a reply like
"Here is a suggested branch name:\nadd-login-page" produced
user/here-is-a-suggested-branch-name, and a reply wrapped in a code fence
slugified the ``` line to nothing and silently fell back to the local name.

Drop Markdown code-fence lines and prefer a line that already reads as a
kebab-case slug, falling back to the first quoted/plain line only when no
slug-shaped line exists. Cover preamble and fenced responses with tests.

* fix(zerogit): harden auto-branch remote handling

Three review findings:

- isDefaultBranch passed the remote to ls-remote before the HEAD
  positional with no --, so a remote value shaped like an option
  (--upload-pack=/bin/echo) was parsed as one. Terminate options with --
  and cover a dash-prefixed remote.

- An unborn remote (freshly created, zero refs) answered ls-remote with
  empty output, fell through to the fail-closed unknown-default error,
  and made the very first feature-branch push a --yes dead end that
  git remote set-head --auto cannot repair. ls-remote succeeding with no
  refs now counts as proof there is no protected default; main/master
  stay guarded by the name heuristic and every failure path stays
  fail-closed.

- CreateBranch probed only local refs/heads for collisions, so a branch
  existing only on the target remote (an old merged-PR branch) was
  silently fast-forwarded by the later push -u. The target remote's
  heads are now probed once (bounded, with --) and count as taken;
  an unreachable remote fails visibly before anything is created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(zerogit): close branch-naming and push safety gaps from review

Require a confirmed unborn HEAD, not just an empty ls-remote --symref,
before granting the first-push exception, since a dangling remote
HEAD looked the same. Resolve branch naming and ahead-count checks
against the remote branch instead of a working-tree snapshot, which
could describe uncommitted edits a commit-only push would never
publish. Guard concurrent branch creation with a force-with-lease
push. Scope the ls-remote timeout to the default-branch preflight
only, so it no longer caps Push's own unrelated check.

* fix(cli): require a clean tree before auto-branch push/pr

Refuse ensureFeatureBranch when the working tree is dirty or the
ahead count against the remote default cannot be determined, so a
default-branch push cannot leave uncommitted edits behind or publish
an empty comparison under a guessed name.

* fix(zerogit): drop fixed five-second remote lookup timeout

IsDefaultBranch and CreateBranch applied a hard 5s bound on ls-remote,
so ordinary feature-branch pushes and the collision probe failed on slow
but reachable remotes (SSH/VPN) before Push could run. Honor the
caller's context instead; callers that need a bound pass a deadline.

* fix(cli): bypass the ahead-count and diff-base checks on a confirmed-unborn remote

jatmn flagged that the confirmed-unborn-remote exception this PR added to
IsDefaultBranch never actually helps the main/master case it was written
for: when the local branch is named main, isDefaultBranch returns true from
the name heuristic before it ever consults the remote, so
ensureFeatureBranch still unconditionally calls commitsAhead against
<remote>/<branch>. On a genuinely empty remote that ref cannot exist, so
`zero changes push`/`pr` from a local default branch against a brand-new
empty remote still dead-ended with "cannot determine whether HEAD is
ahead of origin/main" - the exact bug this PR set out to fix.

Tracing the flow further, the same problem also hit the diff-base Inspect
call right after: it uses the same nonexistent <remote>/<branch> ref, so
bypassing only commitsAhead would have left the dead end one line later.

ensureFeatureBranch now probes the new zerogit.IsUnbornRemote (ls-remote
--heads on the remote) whenever commitsAhead fails, and only bypasses both
checks when that probe positively confirms the remote has no refs at all.
An unreachable remote, or one that answers with refs, still fails closed
exactly as before - the fail-closed "unknown default branch" behavior is
unchanged and covered by TestEnsureFeatureBranchFailsWhenAheadCountUnknown
and the new TestEnsureFeatureBranchFailsWhenUnbornCheckErrors.

TestEnsureFeatureBranchCreatesBranchOnConfirmedUnbornRemote is the
regression test: confirmed failing (with the exact dead-end error) against
the pre-fix logic, passing after.

* fix(zerogit): resolve main/master against the live remote default first

isDefaultBranch short-circuited on the literal branch names main/master
before ever consulting the remote. A repository whose remote default is
genuinely something else (e.g. trunk) could still have a local main branch
tracking that remote, and the shortcut wrongly treated it as protected
instead of trusting the live symref result. The conventional-name check
now only applies as a last-resort fallback, after both the live ls-remote
symref lookup and the local remotes/<remote>/HEAD cache fail to answer.

* fix(cli): preserve push lease on retry and check the live default ref

Two related gaps in ensureFeatureBranch's auto-branch preflight:

- When an auto-branch push loses a force-with-lease race against a
  concurrent creator, the generated branch is left checked out locally
  with no successful push behind it. A retry took the "already off the
  default branch" early return and dropped RequireNewRemoteBranch,
  letting the next push silently fast-forward whatever the concurrent
  creator published. The lease now stays required unless the branch
  already has a configured upstream (proof a push already landed).

- The ahead-of-default check compared HEAD against the local
  remote-tracking ref, which is only refreshed at clone or the last
  fetch. A stale ref can under-report how far ahead HEAD is, or say
  zero when the remote has actually moved past it, so ensureFeatureBranch
  now refreshes that tracking ref before trusting it, and fails closed
  if the refresh itself cannot be confirmed.

Adds regression coverage for both: a retry after a lease collision keeps
requiring the lease (and an already-published branch does not), and a
stale tracking ref is refreshed before the ahead check runs (with a
fail-closed case when that refresh cannot be confirmed).

* fix(cli): track generated branches, reject PR on unborn remote, classify main on unborn

* fix(zerogit,cli): preserve explicit nonexistence lease on force, propagate marker write errors, check unborn remote before branch switch

* fix(zerogit): preserve non-existence lease on target remote and roll back failed branch marking

Compare target remote against configured upstream remote to retain non-existence lease on target, roll back created branch if marking fails, and allow --yes to bypass PR default-branch preflight.

Refs #671

* fix(cli): address review findings for auto feature branch creation

* fix(cli): refine LLM preamble candidate slug extraction and enforce unborn-remote guard

* fix(cli): restore default branch after auto-branch and resolve --yes upstream

Do not leave auto-branch commits on the protected local default branch,
and resolve the real upstream for the unborn-remote guard under --yes
instead of always probing origin.

* test(cli): assert auto-branch passes capped diff into the provider

Thread --auto and a mock provider through DiffBytes coverage so the
cap is checked on the real LLM request path, not only Inspect.

* fix(cli): block auto-branch on unborn remotes and fix lease/restore

Refuse auto-creating a feature branch when the target remote has no refs yet.
Publishing only user/slug leaves remote HEAD dangling, so the next changes pr
fails closed and a later main push has no PR diff. Require push --yes first.

Keep the nonexistence lease unless branch@{upstream} is exactly the target
remote/generated-branch ref from a successful push -u. Inherited origin/main
from branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit must not drop the lease.

Restore the original default branch against its own upstream tip, not the
push destination, so --remote upstream does not rewrite a fork main that
tracks origin/main.

* fix(cli): recover push -u upstream and filter LLM slug preambles

Push -u can publish a remote branch then fail to write local upstream
config. Treat that as incomplete, recover with set-upstream-to, and probe
the remote before reasserting the nonexistence lease on retry. Also skip
one-word LLM acknowledgements before accepting a slug-shaped line.

Refs #671

* fix(cli): decide the branch-collision lease with one live remote check

Replace the local-state inference chain (upstream config, a
zeroAutoBranch marker, per-remote provenance tracking) that kept
producing new collision-safety edge cases across many review rounds
with a single live remoteHasBranch check against the destination
remote: missing there gets the nonexistence lease, already there gets
a plain push, and git's own fast-forward check is the safety net if
that existing branch isn't actually ours.

Removes MarkGeneratedBranch/IsGeneratedBranch, now dead, along with
the tests that pinned the specific local-state heuristics rather than
the collision-safety property itself.

* fix(cli,zerogit): address CodeRabbit findings on auto-branch naming

Recover trailing-punctuation LLM slugs, notice deterministic fallback,
report dual restore/rollback failures, and skip Push upstream repair on
dry-run. Align comments with fail-closed and DryRun behavior.

Refs #671

* fix(tools): set explicit stdin reader and use resolved binary for format-on-write

Use the binary path resolved by exec.LookPath and set formatter.Stdin
to an empty reader so format-on-write does not hang on inherited stdin
handles on Windows.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit,tools): address CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671

Remove redundant command validation, eliminate duplicate remote lookup in PR
workflow, harden ref options and branch switching, isolate test Git
environment, and add formatter lookup test.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit): address new CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671

Harden CreateBranch name validation, remove unreachable workflow error check,
complete doc comment, isolate test Git environment, and clean up unused
appDeps field.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit,tools): address third round of CodeRabbit review findings on PR 671

Use featureBranchOptions struct for ensureFeatureBranch, bound preflight
contexts, add upstream repair mismatch subtest, and centralize test Git
config isolation.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit): finish ensureFeatureBranch doc contract and close review gaps

The ensureFeatureBranch doc comment ended mid-sentence and sat on the featureBranchOptions type, so go doc attached function prose to the struct. Move it above the function and state which deps are required non-nil (inspectChanges, commitsAhead, headCommitSubject, currentGitUser, createBranch) versus optional and nil-guarded (refreshTrackingRef, isUnbornRemote, branchUpstreamRef, resetBranchRef, deleteBranch). Also extract the branch slug filename with path.Base because git paths are always slash-separated, gate two tests on the git version their fixtures need (autoSetupMerge=inherit requires 2.35, init --bare -b requires 2.28), and cover the literal "user" CurrentGitUser fallback via a test seam.

Refs #671

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* Protect auto-branch publication and default ref restoration

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(cli): wire expected-old restore through the dependency seam

The P1 fix added expectedOld to resetBranchRef but left the appDeps field and the workflows.go import behind, so the CLI package did not compile. Update the field type to the 5-argument signature and restore the filepath import used by worktree release resolution.

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(cli,zerogit): wire CAS tip and close review test gaps

Addresses the CodeRabbit round on 93e3448e: fillAppDeps now defaults currentBranchTip so the compare-and-swap old value actually reaches ResetBranchRef in production; TestEnsureFeatureBranchRestoresDefaultBranchAfterCreate asserts the CAS value; the real-git auto-branch test asserts local main is restored to its upstream tip; docs explain the deliberate context.Background push, CurrentBranchTip semantics, the RemoteHasBranch tip-equality ownership check, and the Git 2.24 requirement for CommitsAhead; CreateBranch gains name-validation subtests.

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(zerogit): make RemoteHasBranch report existence only, not tip equality

RemoteHasBranch's tip-equality check made ensureFeatureBranch reassert the
nonexistence lease (--force-with-lease=<branch>:) on every push after the
first: a second local commit puts HEAD ahead of the just-published remote
tip, so the check reported false for a branch that plainly exists, and Git
rejected the follow-up push with a stale-info error instead of a normal
fast-forward.

The concurrent-creator race the tip check was meant to guard was already
handled one layer up: ensureFeatureBranch drops to a plain push when the
branch exists and relies on Git's own fast-forward check as the safety net
(see TestRunChangesPushDropsLeaseWhenBranchExistsOnRemote), so a race
survivor with unrelated history is rejected there regardless of tip
equality here.

Add TestRemoteHasBranchReportsTrueForDivergedTip, which fails under the old
tip-equality check and passes now.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit): preserve the generated branch on a compare-and-swap conflict

After auto-branching, ensureFeatureBranch restores the default branch to its
own upstream tip using the compare-and-swap form of update-ref. When that
refused because the default branch had moved concurrently, the failure was
indistinguishable from an ordinary update-ref write error, so the rollback
path ran and deleted the freshly created feature branch. That branch
exclusively owns the user's commits at that point, so a lost race destroyed
work in order to "recover" from it.

Add ErrCompareAndSwapConflict, returned by ResetBranchRef only when an
expected-old value was supplied (the sole way git refuses is a tip mismatch).
ensureFeatureBranch now recognizes it and returns without rolling back,
reporting that the branch was preserved so the user can reconcile the default
branch by hand.

Extend TestResetBranchRefRefusesConcurrentDefaultAdvance, which already drove
a real concurrent advance, to require the sentinel. Add
TestEnsureFeatureBranchPreservesBranchOnCompareAndSwapConflict, which fails
with "must not delete the generated branch" when the new branch is removed.

Refs #671

* Address review feedback for auto-branch workflow.

Refresh the exact configured upstream ref before branching and restoring, guard direct URL and path remote destinations from tracking-ref assertion, and remove undeclared --end-of-options from CommitsAhead.

Refs #671

* fix(zerogit,cli): resolve reviewer feedback on branch restoration and remote handling

Update CommitsAhead and ResetBranchRef to safely terminate option parsing with --, inspect all linked worktrees before ref updates, resolve advertised branches on direct path and URL remotes, and query git configuration directly for tracking remote and merge branch without splitting on slashes.

Refs #671

* fix(zerogit): invoke rev-list without positional delimiter to treat revs correctly

Remove premature option terminator from rev-list command invocation while validating base ref against option-like prefixes.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit): resolve restore tip commit and enforce push remote unborn policy

Resolve restore tip commits via ResolveRemoteBranchTip for named and direct URL/path upstreams to eliminate bare branch fallback, enforce unborn destination policy on push remotes before branch creation, and extract resolveBranchPushPlan to isolate decision logic from repository mutation.

Refs #671

* fix(cli,zerogit): address review feedback on destination remote and upstream matching

Forward resolved pushRemote to branchPushPlan, update HasUpstream to support multi-segment remote upstream references, clarify IsNamedRemote comment, and extend CLI argument parsing tests.

Refs #671

* docs(cli): complete ensureFeatureBranch documentation and wire branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge

Refs #671

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-08-16 16:01:40 +08:00
Vasanth T 0eab63c908 docs(agents): record the normalize-before-match blocker (#900)
Three separate changes hit this in a fortnight, each written by someone
being careful about exactly the thing that got them.

A transform that removes bytes without leaving a gap is also a
reassembler. Redaction that matches by shape, run before a sanitizer that
strips control bytes, lets a credential split by a NUL or an ESC pass the
patterns as two fragments and be rejoined on the way out: the MCP failure
reason in #835, and the imported-transcript chokepoint in #878. The path
form of the same mistake is comparing where a handle landed against a
value produced by the same resolver the kernel just used, so a redirect
agrees with itself: the ACL guard in #808, where junctions were caught
only by an accident of Go's mode bits and directory symlinks were not
caught at all.

The unsplit value passing is what makes it survive review, so the note
says the test needs a split case.
2026-08-15 20:32:33 +08:00
64a783b08c fix(dictation): redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors (#852)
* fix(dictation): redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors

Streaming dictation (Deepgram, OpenAI Realtime) injected API keys into
websocket URLs/headers and echoed unredacted transport errors and
server-side error payloads. Wrap those error endpoints with
providerio.Redact and switch the connect-error format specifier from %w
to %s so the raw error cannot leak via errors.Unwrap().

Adds regression tests asserting the API key is not present in the
returned stream error for both transcribers.

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>

* fixup(dictation): address review: redact session/write errors, move redaction tests

- Redact API key in OpenAI Realtime session configuration error.
- Return redacted OpenAI Realtime write error from writeErrCh instead of discarding.
- Move TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction and
  TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction next to their source files.

Refs #710

* fixup(dictation): sync Deepgram redaction test on CloseStream before close

Address CodeRabbit nitpick: the server now drains the client's audio frames and
waits for CloseStream before rejecting the connection with an API-key-bearing
policy-violation close reason. This ensures StreamTranscribe observes the close
reason (and redacts it) instead of failing earlier on a write error.

Refs #710

* fix(dictation): preserve context.Canceled through streaming error redaction

Formatting the read error with %s dropped the unwrap chain, so an Esc
abort of a Deepgram or OpenAI Realtime dictation no longer matched
errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) in the TUI and produced a spurious
error toast on top of the cancellation notice. Return the cancellation
sentinel itself before redacting — it carries no key — and keep the
redacted flat string for genuine failures. Adds regression tests that
cancel a live stream and assert the sentinel survives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(dictation): close remaining cancellation and redaction gaps

Key cancellation detection on ctx.Err() instead of
errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), which was racing against
writer-goroutine transport errors that could overwrite the error
value right before the check. Applied consistently across both
transcriber implementations. Fix goroutine leaks and a possible hang
in the cancellation regression tests.

* test(dictation): cover dial and startup cancel identity

Add regression tests for Esc-abort during WebSocket dial and right after
accept (session update / first write) so those redaction sites keep
returning context.Canceled for the TUI errors.Is check.

* fix(dictation): prefer cancel over a racing OpenAI realtime error

Esc can cancel after conn.Read already has an error frame. Check ctx.Err()
after partial callbacks and on the realtimeError path so the stream still
returns context.Canceled instead of a redacted failure notice.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#710

* fix(dictation): prevent auto-submit on cancelled realtime race

handleDictationTranscribed suppressed context.Canceled but then fell
through to the msg.submit branch. A delta -> Esc -> already-buffered
realtime error race returns a nonempty transcript alongside
context.Canceled, so with stt.autoSubmit on, Esc could submit the
composer's restored pre-existing text instead of doing nothing.

Treat a canceled result as terminal before the auto-submit path is
reached, and add a TUI-level test covering the race.

* test(dictation): exercise writeErrCh cancellation branch in realtime transcriber

* fix(dictation): add custom key header redaction and single-pass redaction tests

* fix(dictation): track dictation sessionID to drop stale completions after Esc and synchronize write cancellation test

* fix(dictation): initialize non-zero session ID and filter stale session 0 messages

Ensure the first dictation session in a process gets stale-message protection by initializing sessionID to 1 in newDictationController and removing msg.sessionID != 0 exemptions in handleDictationTranscribed and handleDictationPartial. Clean up unreachable redaction guards in providerio.

Refs #710

* fix(dictation): redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors

Streaming dictation (Deepgram, OpenAI Realtime) injected API keys into
websocket URLs/headers and echoed unredacted transport errors and
server-side error payloads. Wrap those error endpoints with
providerio.Redact and switch the connect-error format specifier from %w
to %s so the raw error cannot leak via errors.Unwrap().

Adds regression tests asserting the API key is not present in the
returned stream error for both transcribers.

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>

* fixup(dictation): address review: redact session/write errors, move redaction tests

- Redact API key in OpenAI Realtime session configuration error.
- Return redacted OpenAI Realtime write error from writeErrCh instead of discarding.
- Move TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction and
  TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction next to their source files.

Refs #710

* fixup(dictation): sync Deepgram redaction test on CloseStream before close

Address CodeRabbit nitpick: the server now drains the client's audio frames and
waits for CloseStream before rejecting the connection with an API-key-bearing
policy-violation close reason. This ensures StreamTranscribe observes the close
reason (and redacts it) instead of failing earlier on a write error.

Refs #710

* fix(dictation): preserve context.Canceled through streaming error redaction

Formatting the read error with %s dropped the unwrap chain, so an Esc
abort of a Deepgram or OpenAI Realtime dictation no longer matched
errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) in the TUI and produced a spurious
error toast on top of the cancellation notice. Return the cancellation
sentinel itself before redacting — it carries no key — and keep the
redacted flat string for genuine failures. Adds regression tests that
cancel a live stream and assert the sentinel survives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(dictation): close remaining cancellation and redaction gaps

Key cancellation detection on ctx.Err() instead of
errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), which was racing against
writer-goroutine transport errors that could overwrite the error
value right before the check. Applied consistently across both
transcriber implementations. Fix goroutine leaks and a possible hang
in the cancellation regression tests.

* test(dictation): cover dial and startup cancel identity

Add regression tests for Esc-abort during WebSocket dial and right after
accept (session update / first write) so those redaction sites keep
returning context.Canceled for the TUI errors.Is check.

* fix(dictation): prefer cancel over a racing OpenAI realtime error

Esc can cancel after conn.Read already has an error frame. Check ctx.Err()
after partial callbacks and on the realtimeError path so the stream still
returns context.Canceled instead of a redacted failure notice.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#710

* fix(dictation): prevent auto-submit on cancelled realtime race

handleDictationTranscribed suppressed context.Canceled but then fell
through to the msg.submit branch. A delta -> Esc -> already-buffered
realtime error race returns a nonempty transcript alongside
context.Canceled, so with stt.autoSubmit on, Esc could submit the
composer's restored pre-existing text instead of doing nothing.

Treat a canceled result as terminal before the auto-submit path is
reached, and add a TUI-level test covering the race.

* test(dictation): exercise writeErrCh cancellation branch in realtime transcriber

* fix(dictation): add custom key header redaction and single-pass redaction tests

* fix(dictation): track dictation sessionID to drop stale completions after Esc and synchronize write cancellation test

* fix(dictation): initialize non-zero session ID and filter stale session 0 messages

Ensure the first dictation session in a process gets stale-message protection by initializing sessionID to 1 in newDictationController and removing msg.sessionID != 0 exemptions in handleDictationTranscribed and handleDictationPartial. Clean up unreachable redaction guards in providerio.

Refs #710

* fix(dictation): drop providerio widen; pin session and redaction tests

Revert the Token/X-Api-Key providerio.Redact expansion (belongs in its own PR with coverage). Make Deepgram single-pass, cancel-race, and live-session partial tests pin the branches they name, and restore the ST1005 nolint on the user-facing Deepgram error string.

* fix(dictation): ignore stale batch startup by session ID

Gate dictationStartedMsg on session ID so a late Start result after cancel cannot reset a newer recording. Rename and comment cleanups from review; race suite recorded on the PR body.

* fix(dictation): exit writers on cancel and pin dial/write redaction paths

Select on ctx.Done while waiting for audio chunks so cancelled streaming
sessions do not leave writer goroutines blocked on an open idle channel.
Add non-cancellation redaction tests for Deepgram dial failure and OpenAI
Realtime dial, session-configuration, and async writer failures.

Refs #852

* fix(dictation): close the realtime socket on writer failure so a silent server cannot strand the read loop

CodeRabbit review 4885680006 flagged that the OpenAI Realtime writer goroutine pushed write errors to writeErrCh and returned without closing the connection, so conn.Read stays parked forever when the peer goes silent after session setup and the error is never drained. Close the socket on both the append and commit write failure paths (CloseNow, since the close handshake itself would block on a silent peer), and add a silent-server regression test.

Refs #852

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* test(dictation): cancel the silent-server writer failure test during teardown

CodeRabbit review 4909044011 identified that the silent-server regression test used context.Background(), allowing its goroutine to remain blocked in conn.Read after a timeout. Give the test a cancellable context and defer cancellation so teardown always releases the blocked read.

Refs #852

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 20:31:52 +08:00
9c292092a2 fix(daemon): clean up child after startup timeout (#774)
* fix(daemon): clean up child after startup timeout

* fix(daemon): terminate startup process tree

* test(background): accept reaped-later zombie children

* fix(background): retain configured process group target

* fix(background): address termination review feedback

* fix(daemon): use launch-time group identity, fix zombie/reap classification

Addresses jatmn's three #774 review findings:

- TerminateCommand rediscovered the process group via
  execution.TerminateProcessTree's Getpgid(pid) lookup. On Darwin,
  that lookup can return ESRCH once an unreaped group leader has
  already exited, even though live descendants remain in the group
  it configured at launch — silently falling back to signalling only
  the (already dead) leader PID and leaving descendants running (the
  required macOS smoke job's failure). Add
  execution.TerminateProcessGroup, which signals the negative PID
  directly using the launch-time Setpgid invariant instead of
  rediscovering it, and route TerminateCommand through it.

- signalTargetRunning's zombie check matched the individual-PID
  fallback target (a process that is not its own group leader)
  against the process table by PGID. That target's actual PGID
  differs from its own PID by definition, so no row ever matched,
  unknown resulted every time, and a zombie individual-PID target
  was always conservatively reported as still running. Branch on the
  sign of the target: group members by PGID, individual PIDs by PID.

- TerminateCommand returned the termination error even when the
  subsequent reap succeeded — a successful cmd.Wait is authoritative
  proof the leader is gone and collected, regardless of how the kill
  attempt itself went (e.g. taskkill /T racing an already-exited PID
  on Windows). Classify a successful reap as success.

All three regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix
code (confirmed by temporarily reverting each fix and rerunning).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): harden command termination inputs

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-abb8-73de-9489-51e9e6514c6b

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(background): preserve process tree failures

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* docs(daemon): clarify boundary-probe and Setsid-guard comments per PR #774 review

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 20:31:10 +08:00
KRATOSandClaude Opus 4.8 060d38ce71 feat(security): path-jail primitive, credential-store locking, worktree git hardening (#891)
Split 1/3 of #829, carved out as the independently-reversible hardening layer
with no dependency on the orchestration work that stacks on top of it.

- internal/pathjail: os.Root handle-relative path confinement — ancestor
  traversal is confined, the final component is checked for reparse points
  (including a name written with a trailing separator), unprivileged Windows
  junctions are covered, temp-name fragments are rejected before they can
  escape the directory, whitespace-bearing paths are confined as spelled, and
  temp files stay unpredictable and exclusive.
- internal/credstore: file locking around the credential read-modify-write —
  exclusive for writers, shared for readers, so a reader cannot race a publish.
- internal/worktrees: git invocation hardening.

pathjail has no importers in this PR by design; internal/memory and
internal/specialist adopt it in the stacked PRs (2/3 and 3/3).


Origin-Session: local-de382f | Claude Code | 4 prompts
Origin-Snapshot: 52db9b74dad5

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 20:24:08 +08:00
Anandan 04fd3c01a7 Improve diff viewer rendering (#902)
* Improve diff viewer rendering

* Address diff viewer review findings

* Fix diff viewer interaction regressions

* Preserve header-like diff content

* Fix diff hunk parsing and image vulnerability

* Strengthen diff blank-context coverage

* Fix diff rendering edge cases
2026-08-15 17:54:38 +08:00
Vasanth T dc15e82298 fix: bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes (#903) 2026-08-14 18:58:16 +05:30
Anandan 2d2450e9a7 fix(providers): discover ChatGPT capabilities (#890)
* fix(providers): discover ChatGPT capabilities

* fix(providers): preserve discovered capabilities

* test(agent): cover service tier switching

* fix(tui): restrict fast mode to ChatGPT
2026-08-12 22:41:05 +05:30
cabfeefc4e security(update): stage binary replacement at an unpredictable, exclusive path (#751)
* security(update): stage binary replacement at an unpredictable, exclusive path

Fixes #742. installBinary staged downloaded release bytes at the fixed
<target>.new path and opened it with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC. In an
installation directory writable by a lower-privileged process, that
process could pre-create <target>.new as a hard link or reparse point
to another file the (possibly elevated) updater can write; the
truncating open then overwrote that unintended file with verified Zero
executable bytes.

stagingFilePath now generates a cryptographically random suffix so the
path can't be targeted in advance, and platform-specific
createStagingFile opens it exclusively without following a pre-existing
link: O_CREATE|O_EXCL on POSIX (which POSIX guarantees fails on a
pre-existing path, symlink or not, without resolving it), and
CreateFile with CREATE_NEW|FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT plus a
post-open GetFileInformationByHandle check on Windows (not a reparse
point, not a directory, single hard link).

replace_windows.go's rename-swap sequence is unchanged: the dangerous
operation was always the truncating open of the staged path, not the
.old rename/removal that follows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* security(update): bind the binary swap to the staged object, not its pathname

Addresses the two open findings on #751.

[P1] The staged file is no longer promoted by pathname. Randomizing the name
and creating it exclusively stops PRE-creation, but under #742's model — a
lower-privileged principal that can write in the installation directory — the
name can be observed after the fact and the entry replaced between the write and
the swap, so the updater would install the substituted file. installBinary now
keeps the creating handle open and promotes through it:

- Windows renames through the handle itself
  (SetFileInformationByHandle/FileRenameInfo, hence the added DELETE access), so
  there is no second pathname lookup to win. replaceBinary is gone; promote owns
  the aside-rename of the running binary and its restore-on-failure retry.
- POSIX has no rename-by-descriptor, so staging moves into a private directory
  created next to the target by os.MkdirTemp (mode 0700, random name, created
  exclusively). An attacker who can write in the installation directory cannot
  create, replace, or list entries inside it. promote additionally sets the
  executable bit through the handle (os.Chmod would re-resolve the path) and
  fails closed if the entry ever stops naming the object it wrote.

[P2] Staging cleanup now covers every failure path: the removal defer is
registered before the copy, and stageBinary discards the object if the copy
fails, so a mid-write error (ENOSPC, unreadable source) no longer leaks a
release-sized file that the next attempt will not reuse. CleanupStaleBinary also
sweeps leftovers from a hard crash — staging files on Windows, staging
directories on POSIX, where it used to be a no-op — skipping anything younger
than an hour so a concurrent update is never disturbed.

Tests: substitution-race regression per platform (Windows asserts the verified
bytes are installed despite a replaced staging entry; POSIX asserts the private
0700 directory and that promote refuses a substituted entry), success controls,
cleanup-on-failure, and the crash-leftover sweep. The forced-staging-failure test
for helper refresh now uses a stageBinary seam, because the staging location can
no longer be occupied from outside — which is the point of the fix.

* security(update): close remaining updater staging races

Address jatmn's review findings on PR #751:

- Windows promote() now verifies targetPath is actually reachable after a
  reported-successful handle rename before trusting it. Some Windows versions
  have been observed accepting SetFileInformationByHandle against a handle
  whose directory entry was substituted out from under it without the object
  actually moving, which let promote report success while targetPath was
  left missing entirely. renameFileByHandle is now a package var so this is
  covered by a deterministic regression test rather than relying on
  reproducing the exact trigger condition.

- When a promotion failure's restore-to-.old also fails (a writable-parent
  attacker occupying targetPath with a lock MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING can't
  get past), that combination is now wrapped in ErrTargetPossiblyTampered
  instead of reading like an ordinary failed update, with a best-effort
  MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT fallback so an admin-context updater can still
  recover the original at next boot.

- POSIX promote() now binds its final rename to a directory descriptor
  opened when the staging directory is created (unix.Renameat), not a
  pathname. The 0700 staging directory protects its contents from a
  writable-parent principal, but not its own directory entry — that
  principal could rename the staging directory aside and recreate a
  look-alike with an attacker file at the same basename in the gap between
  the identity check and the rename, which a plain os.Rename would silently
  follow.

- Stale-cleanup on both platforms now matches the exact generated artifact
  shape (POSIX: prefix + os.MkdirTemp's all-digit suffix; Windows: prefix +
  32 lowercase hex chars + ".new") instead of a loose prefix/suffix, so a
  user's own similarly-named file or directory is never swept up. Both also
  re-check identity immediately before deleting to shrink the window a
  writable-parent principal could swap the checked path in.

- copyFrom now copies in chunks and refreshes the POSIX staging directory's
  mtime between them, since writing into an already-created file never
  touches the parent directory's own mtime — a large or slow copy could
  previously look abandoned to a concurrent update's cleanup sweep while
  still in progress.

Verified on real Windows and Linux (via WSL), plus cross-compiled build/vet
checks for darwin/linux-arm64.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(update): address staging review findings

* fix(update): verify promoted object identity safely

Bind POSIX staging creation and both rename endpoints to directory descriptors, clean only identity-matched empty directories, and verify Windows promotion by file identity rather than path spelling.

Preserve unverifiable crash leftovers and add adversarial cleanup, hard-link, and reparse-ancestor coverage.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-27da-72ec-8e6d-5d43f127b6a1

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): preserve promotion recovery signals

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): keep the recovery copy a failed restore promised

Two error-path follow-ups from the #742 staging review.

When a promotion fails and restoring the original also fails, the error tells
the operator their original is preserved at <binary>.old — and then the next
Apply deleted it, because a present target read as proof the copy was stale.
What occupies the target in exactly that case is the bytes the updater could
not verify, so cleanup was erasing the one it could. A failed restore now marks
the copy, cleanup honors the mark, and a successful promotion clears it.

The POSIX staging flow could also leave an empty .zero-stage-* directory behind
when the stat immediately after mkdirat failed. Nothing knows that name yet, so
it would have stayed for good; it is now removed best-effort with rmdir
semantics, which cannot touch anything but the empty directory just created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): stop the recovery copy from being destroyed by the next attempt

The marker added in d9523ba kept cleanup from deleting <target>.old, but four
paths still undermined the promise it was meant to make.

Promotion destroyed the copy it was preserving. Skipping the pre-rename cleanup
was not enough: os.Rename uses MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING on Windows, so renaming
the running binary aside overwrote the last verified copy with the unverified
bytes the earlier failure left at the target — and a promotion that then failed
could only move those unverified bytes back. Promotion now refuses while the
tamper state is unresolved. Only the operator can say whether the file at the
target is theirs, so the error names both moves that end it: restore the copy,
or delete the marker to accept what is installed.

The marker itself was a predictable link-following truncate write. Its path is
fixed, so a writer in the install directory could pre-create it as a hard link
or reparse point and have the elevated updater write through it. It is now
created with the same CREATE_NEW + FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT + fresh-regular-
file check as a staging file, and never truncates; an existing name is treated
as already-marked rather than an object to open.

A marker that could not be written left the promise unqualified while the next
run's cleanup deleted exactly the file it named. That failure now rides in the
error, telling the operator to copy it somewhere safe now.

Helper refreshes downgraded tampering to a warning. An ordinary helper failure
still warns — a stale helper is better than a failed update — but a helper whose
path may hold unverified content fails the apply, because helpers are resolved
from the install directory and executed by the sandbox runner, and reporting
Applied: true would hand the operator a success while a sibling executable is
suspect. ErrTargetPossiblyTampered moved to apply.go so callers on every
platform can test for it without build tags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): keep the recovery copy when its marker cannot be established

Surfacing a failed marker write told the operator to hurry; it did not stop the
next run from deleting the file they were being told to save. When no marker can
be established, the copy is now moved to an unpredictable sibling name that
routine cleanup never touches — CleanupStaleBinary only ever removes the exact
"<target>.old" — and the error names where it went. Telling the operator to act
now remains the fallback for when even that move fails.

The marker check is conservative in the same direction: only a definite
"not there" allows the copy to be deleted. An Lstat that fails for any other
reason leaves the question open, and deleting is irreversible while keeping
costs one stale file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): preserve Windows recovery state across retries

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* fix(update): watch every recovery path and never orphan a partial marker

A failed second-or-later update marks the randomized aside it used, but
promotion only consulted the canonical <target>.old marker, so a retry
proceeded over an unverified target while the verified copy sat marked on a
path the refusal logic did not watch. Promotion now enumerates every recovery
candidate — canonical and randomized asides — and refuses while any of them
is marked, naming each recovery path and its marker.

The missing-target refusal had the same single-path blind spot: with a stale
canonical .old from an earlier successful update plus the aside from an
interrupted attempt, it named only the canonical path, which can be the wrong
binary. It now names the single actual candidate or refuses the ambiguous
layout outright until the operator resolves it.

A failed marker write could also leave a partial .keep behind while the
recovery copy was relocated elsewhere; later refusals then named a location
that no longer held the verified bytes. markOldBinaryPreserved now removes
the entry it created before reporting a write/close failure, and
conservatively reports success when that removal (or the state check) fails
so oldPath stays authoritative. keepUnmarkedRecoveryCopy is handle-bound end
to end: it pins the recovery copy with a no-delete-sharing, no-reparse open,
verifies it is a single-link regular file, renames through the handle with
ReplaceIfExists false, and confirms identity at the destination, failing
closed with ErrTargetPossiblyTampered on any race.

Finally, the error for an unestablishable marker still promised that a later
update would otherwise remove the copy, but CleanupStaleBinary is now a
no-op; the operator is told that a manual copy is required.

* fix(update): tolerate the fail-closed outcome of a fully-unlinked substitution

TestPromoteInstallsTheStagedObjectNotTheStagedPath deletes the staging
file's only directory entry and recreates it as an "attacker" file, then
required promote to succeed with the verified bytes installed. CI's
windows-latest runner permits that delete (this workstation's exclusive
share mode blocks it, so the path went unexercised here); on that runner,
renaming the now fully-unlinked staging handle back into existence is not
something every Windows build honors, so verifyPromotedTarget's post-
rename identity check finds nothing at targetPath, promote fails, and
restoreOriginalBinary moves the pre-update binary back — a safe, fail-
closed outcome, not a security regression.

The test now accepts either outcome after a real substitution: promote
succeeding with the verified bytes, or promote failing as long as the
attacker's substituted bytes were never installed. Any promote failure
that occurs without substitution having actually happened still fails
the test outright.

* fix(update): surface unverified recovery path, match .old case-insensitively

keepUnmarkedRecoveryCopy discarded the destination path when the rename
to it succeeded but the post-rename identity verification failed,
leaving restoreOriginalBinary's error telling the operator to save
oldPath after it had already been vacated. Return the attempted kept
path alongside the verification error so the caller can still name it.

existingRecoveryPaths compared "<target>.old" filenames case-sensitively,
but NTFS is case-insensitive/case-preserving, so a recovery or marker
file spelled e.g. "zero.exe.OLD" could be silently skipped by every
caller's fail-closed check. Fold both sides before matching.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(update): bound Windows recovery cleanup

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbdec-f8dc-71f9-abdd-ea044a902b9a
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): secure Windows recovery cleanup

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): terminate Windows rename paths

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(update): allow namespaced recovery copies

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-a912-7462-8938-1b4a8d95f1f3
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): bind Windows cleanup to handles, drop dead cleanup API

Failure-path staging cleanup on Windows re-resolved the staging pathname
after the exclusive handle was closed, so a principal who can write in the
installation directory could substitute that entry in the gap and have the
updater delete a file of their choosing. Removal is now requested through the
handle (FileDispositionInfo) before it is released, and nothing is removed by
name afterwards; the same change covers the staging-file verification failure
path and the partial recovery marker.

CleanupStaleBinary has had no production caller since bounded, identity-bound
cleanup moved into promote, so the exported no-op and the tests that could only
pass vacuously against it are removed. The POSIX link-regression tests now
drive createStagingFileAt, the primitive createStagedBinary actually uses,
instead of a path-taking helper kept alive only for them.

Also documents the fail-closed Windows recovery states in docs/UPDATE.md,
including the refusal a planted .old/.keep pair can cause.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): bind Windows recovery to handles and bound its state

Addresses the 2026-08-02 review round on #751.

Keep the recovery restore bound to the object promote moved aside instead
of its pathname: promote now opens the target with delete access and no
delete sharing before renaming it aside, and restoreOriginalBinary renames
that same handle back (retrying through the handle, never re-resolving the
source name), so a directory writer cannot swap the aside entry during the
promotion gap and have the substitute installed.

Run the recovery-state checks as a standalone-install precondition, under
the same lock promotion uses, so "already up to date" can no longer report
success while a .keep/.recovery state is unresolved. The in-promotion check
stays to close the race.

Make the cleanup record a queue: entries are only retired once their object
is actually gone, so a copy held open by a scanner is retried by a later
update rather than leaking, while records for paths that vanished or that
this updater could never have created are retired instead of accumulating.

Also from review of the above:
- delete the pathname restore chain that lost its production callers
  (restoreOriginalBinary's pathname form, openIdentityFile,
  recordRecoveryCleanup) and point their tests at the live handle path
- name the relocation path in the error when the post-move verification
  fails, since oldPath is already vacated by then
- scope the recovery docs to Windows and describe POSIX replace semantics

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 20:03:18 +08:00
AnandanandVasanthdev2004 0c1de25a04 Add interactive terminal companions (#887)
* Add terminal companions

* Polish interactive terminal companions

* Fix terminal companion edge cases

* Strengthen terminal companion regression tests

* Preserve config layout when selecting pets

* Handle sparse pet preference layouts

* fix(terminalpet): reset SGR before erasing a sixel companion

On Windows Terminal the companion draws a filled black rectangle over the
interface, and dragging it mangles text under and around it. It looks like a
platform quirk. It is an untested code path that only Windows reaches.

Sixel is the only protocol here that erases by PAINTING CHARACTERS. Kitty hands
the terminal an image id and the placement goes away. A sixel is already in the
cell grid, so clearRenderedImage writes literal spaces over the cells it
occupied. Those spaces are ordinary characters and carry whatever SGR the TUI
last set, and nothing normalised it, so every erase stamped a filled block in
the ambient background. A drag erases and repaints on every pixel, so the block
was continuously refreshed over the UI.

It stayed invisible everywhere else because ghostty, kitty, WezTerm and iTerm
all resolve to the Kitty protocol and delete by id, never reaching this code.
Windows Terminal is the only mainstream terminal that lands on the sixel branch,
which is why testing on Linux and macOS could not have caught it.

The erase now resets SGR before painting, and uses DECSC/DECRC rather than
CSI s/u because only DECSC saves the attributes this clobbers. Restoring them
matters: the erase is emitted mid-frame, between styled writes the TUI has
already begun.

Measured before and after rather than reasoned about. Before:

  \x1b[s\x1b[3;41H      \x1b[4;41H      \x1b[5;41H      \x1b[u

no reset anywhere. After, the reset leads and DECRC closes.

Tests assert the bytes, since bytes are what the terminal sees: SGR is reset
BEFORE the first row is painted rather than merely present somewhere, the erase
still covers every claimed cell so the fix cannot be satisfied by erasing
nothing, and the Kitty path still deletes by id rather than acquiring the
character-painting erase. Verified by mutation: restoring the old sequence fails
the first of those with the exact reported symptom.

Deliberately not fixed here, since both are design calls rather than defects:
the erase rectangle is computed from the app's own cell maths rather than the
terminal's real footprint, and the sixel path has no in-place move, so every
drag pixel is a full erase and repaint where Kitty gets a cheap reposition.

* fix(tui): ask sixel terminals for their cell size and erase what was painted

The companion blanks a row and a column of live interface on Windows Terminal.
The cause is one predicate.

petPixelProtocolSupported gates two unrelated questions that only looked like
one: whether pixel-precise dragging is available, and whether to ask the
terminal for its cell size with CSI 16 t. It answers true for Kitty only, so on
a sixel terminal the request was never sent, the reply never arrived, and
petCellPixelWidth/Height stayed zero for the whole session.

Everything downstream then took its fallback. petImageHeightPixels returned its
blind preferredHeight of 75 pixels instead of the cell-aware branch below it,
and the erase in clearRenderedImage used petImageColumns and petImageRows. Those
constants describe the RESERVED area, not what was painted. Windows Terminal
reports a 20x10 cell, so a 75-pixel sprite covers 4 rows and about 8 columns
while the erase blanked 5 by 9, taking a row and a column of interface with it
on every move. A drag repaints per pixel, so it did that continuously.

Windows Terminal answers CSI 16 t, confirmed by hand: it replies
ESC [6;20;10t. This was never a question of terminal support. Nothing asked.

So the request now goes out for every image protocol, via a predicate separate
from the dragging one, and the sixel footprint is computed from the rendered
pixel height and the reported cell size rather than from the constants. It is
still clamped to the reserved area, because the layout keeps that many cells
clear and the drag clamps to it, so a larger computed footprint would mean
erasing into live interface.

Deliberately NOT widening petPixelProtocolSupported itself: that would enable
pixel-precise dragging on sixel as a side effect, which is a separate feature
decision rather than part of this defect.

Kitty is untouched and a test pins that. There Columns and Rows are the
placement REQUEST handed to the terminal, which owns the region and scales into
it, so recomputing them would resize the image rather than fix an erase.

Tests use the real 20x10 measurement: the sixel footprint is 4 rows not 5, Kitty
keeps its requested placement, the fallback without metrics stays the reserved
area rather than collapsing to zero and erasing nothing, and every image
protocol asks for the measurement.

* Keep Sixel companions in the reserved dock

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 09:24:06 +08:00
github-actions[bot] 2458e0c67b chore(main): release 0.7.0 (#837)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-10 11:13:32 +08:00
Vasanth T 027a67080b fix(mcp): name the non-text blocks a tool result drops (#874)
* fix(mcp): name the non-text blocks a tool result drops

TextContent keeps only blocks whose type is "text", so a server that
returns an image, audio, or an embedded resource produced "(empty MCP
tool result)". A screenshot or browser server would complete a call
successfully, hand back a perfectly good image, and the model would be
told nothing came back. It then usually retries, which spends another
call to reach the same empty answer, and the user never learns an image
existed at all.

Carrying the payload is the larger half of #823 and is not this change.
Dropping silently is the part that causes the retry loop, and it can be
fixed on its own.

Decode mimeType on Content, and add DroppedContentSummary, which
describes what TextContent discarded ("1 image/png block", "2 resource
blocks, 1 audio/wav block"), grouping by mime type and ordering by first
appearance so the same result always reads the same way. Servers that
omit mimeType fall back to the block type rather than printing an empty
label.

registryTool.Run appends that as a note, and only when something was
actually dropped, so a text-only result is byte-for-byte unchanged. The
note also says retrying will return the same thing, since telling the
model what happened without telling it not to retry only fixes half the
loop.

Refs #823.

* fix(mcp): do not promise a retry returns the same content

The dropped-block note said "Retrying will return the same thing".
registryTool.Run makes a fresh remote call on every retry, so the server
may well answer differently; that is a promise this code is in no
position to make.

What cannot change is that Zero still has nowhere to put a non-text
block, so the note now says retrying cannot RECOVER the payload. Same
guidance, a claim that is actually true.

The test pins both directions: the new wording must be present, and the
absolute claim must not come back.

Raised by CodeRabbit on #874.
2026-08-10 10:59:03 +08:00
euxaristiaandeuxaristia fb4f293c20 feat(providers): live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway (#860)
* feat(providers): fetch live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway

Prefer each aggregator public /v1/models catalog over the dead OpenGateway
models.json path and models.dev-only OpenRouter mapping so the picker shows
current routes with context windows and free labels.

Refs #859

* fix(providers): parse OpenRouter string pricing and simplify sort assertions

Parse OpenRouter prompt and completion string pricing fields into InputCost and OutputCost, and directly assert alphabetical model sort order in discovery tests.

Refs #859

* fix(providers): scale live pricing and restore OpenRouter fallback

Convert OpenRouter/OpenGateway per-token pricing to per-million for Model costs, and fall back to models.dev when the live OpenRouter fetch fails so the picker still degrades.

* fix(providers): fall back on OpenRouter parse errors; cover live-only merge

Route malformed OpenRouter HTTP 200 bodies through the models.dev fallback,
and exercise catalog vs live payload split so live-only models stay merged.

* fix(providers): address remaining CodeRabbit findings on live catalogs

Reject non-finite OpenRouter pricing, keep capability-marked live-only
models, and harden related regression tests.

---------

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 10:58:38 +08:00
Vasanth T ccc42b94e7 test(agent): raise the eager tool schema ceiling to 3650 (#877)
main is red. TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget fails at 3578 tokens against
a 3550 ceiling, and every open PR inherits it.

Bisected: edf660ab and 4ca4fa75 pass, cd0eb194 (#843, which added
view_image to the core set) fails at 3588. #867 later trimmed it to 3578.
#843's own CI was green, because the ceiling is only crossed once the
tool set is combined, so no per-PR check could have caught it.

Raised rather than paid down. The overrun is 28 tokens, and view_image
costs 82, the second cheapest tool in the set against exec_command's 909
and request_permissions' 397. It is simply the one that crossed the line.
The alternative was trimming a description to reclaim 28 tokens,
degrading a tool's usability to satisfy a line drawn against a 2026-07
measurement that predates two tools. The ratchet worked exactly as
intended: it caught the creep and forced a decision instead of a drift.

Also corrects the failure message. It advised "defer a tool", but this
test pins DeferThreshold at 0 so deferral is inactive and marking a tool
deferred leaves it exposed here, changing nothing. Deferring is still
worth doing for real sessions; it just cannot move this number. The
levers that can are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
deliberate raise, and the message now says so.
2026-08-10 10:57:42 +08:00
Vasanth T 2ec5c3ae6b fix(agent): tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox (#885)
Approving a command prefix does not only stop the prompt from reappearing.
shellExecutionArgsForApproval rewrites the call to require_escalated, which
resolves to a nil sandbox engine, so the command runs unsandboxed on the host.
The engine's escalation gate is then satisfied by the PermissionGranted flag
from the approval the user just gave for the sandboxed form.

The escalation itself is deliberate and guarded: proposedCommandPrefix refuses
to offer a prefix when any other segment of the command is not known-safe,
precisely because approval covers the whole command. The defect is that the
prompt never said so. The user chose "allow command prefix for session" and got
"and also run it outside the sandbox".

So this discloses rather than removes. PermissionRequest gains
PrefixApprovalEscalates, computed by shellPrefixApprovalEscalates from the same
guards the rewrite consults, and the two prefix options append "(runs outside
the sandbox)" when it is set. Both the TUI and the ACP path carry it, since an
editor user decides on the same terms as a terminal user.

The main test asserts the disclosure and the rewrite agree on every input
rather than checking each against a fixed expectation, so the two cannot drift
apart later. Verified by mutation: reverting the helper to always-false fails
it, as does making the label unconditional.
2026-08-10 10:56:49 +08:00
ff62f73b7f fix(secrets,worktrees): fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees (#855)
* fix(secrets,worktrees): fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees

1. Prevent trailing redaction leaks in github_token, aws_access_key_id, and google_api_key by adding trailing word boundaries and allowing variable lengths. Refine the openai_key pattern to cleanly distinguish legacy keys and modern prefixed keys (sk-proj-, sk-svcacct-) from ordinary kebab-case phrases.
2. Implement auto-pruning of zero-owned git worktrees older than 24 hours at the start of worktrees.Prepare to prevent indefinite disk space leaks.

* fix(secrets,worktrees): close tail-leak edge case and worktree data-loss risk

Drop the trailing \b anchor on the four secret patterns whose body
class allows "-" (slack_token, google_api_key, the modern openai_key
branch, jwt). \b requires a word/non-word transition, so a secret
ending in "-" right before a delimiter has none, and the engine
backtracked the greedy quantifier to drop that last character instead
of failing the match, leaking it. The body character class already
provides the real stopping boundary, so the anchor was unnecessary.

Fix two issues in worktree Clean flagged in review:

- Staleness was decided by the worktree directory's own mtime, which
  only changes when an entry is added/removed/renamed directly inside
  it, not when a long-running task edits existing files deeper in the
  tree. Clean now walks the tree and treats any recently modified entry
  as live, and also skips any worktree a caller has explicitly locked
  via git worktree lock.
- baseDir ownership used a raw strings.HasPrefix, so a sibling like
  "<baseDir>-other" would false-match. Replaced with a filepath.Rel
  path-boundary check.

* fix(worktrees): check exit codes on removal, fail closed on inspection errors

defaultRunGit deliberately returns a nil error alongside a nonzero
CommandResult.ExitCode for a failed git invocation, so the worktree
remove call must check ExitCode itself instead of trusting a nil error
to mean success. Route it through gitOutput, which already does that.

worktreeIsStale treated an inspection failure (an unreadable file, a
WalkDir error) the same as "keep walking," which can let an
incompletely-inspected worktree be judged stale. Any inspection error
now makes it ineligible for removal instead.

* fix(secrets,worktrees): catch appended-suffix keys and scope pruning to owned worktrees

The scanner's trailing \b anchors made a credential vanish entirely when
followed by a word character outside its body class (an appended suffix
like AKIA...EXTRA, or ghp_..._suffix): the fixed or unbounded-greedy
quantifier had no valid word boundary to land on and the whole match
failed, so the real secret reached the redaction output unredacted.
Dropping the trailing anchors lets the body class itself stop the match,
so the credential prefix still gets redacted even when noise follows it.
Also recognize sk-admin- alongside sk-proj-/sk-svcacct- so OpenAI admin
keys aren't skipped by the narrowed modern-key branch.

Clean pruned any worktree under the caller-supplied BaseDir, but Prepare
only ever creates worktrees under a per-repository
zero-worktree-<repoKey> subtree of it. Scope pruning to that subtree so a
worktree a user manages by hand elsewhere under a shared BaseDir is never
force-removed. Also refuse to force-remove a worktree whose mtime looks
stale but that still has uncommitted or untracked changes: a task can
hold live work while waiting on a model, network, or user for longer
than the staleness window without writing to the tree again.

* fix(worktrees): make nested-activity test exercise the deep walk it claims to

activePath/internal was created by the same MkdirAll as the nested pkg
dir but never backdated, so it kept a fresh mtime and worktreeIsStale's
walk reported "not stale" as soon as it hit that directory, before ever
reaching the freshly-written file two levels deeper. The test passed
without actually exercising recursion past the first directory.

* fix(worktrees): lock zero-created worktrees and treat ignored files as dirty

Prepare never called git worktree lock, so the entry.locked skip in Clean
only ever protected worktrees a human locked by hand, never zero's own; a
worktree that finished committing and sat idle (e.g. waiting on a slow
model or network retry) for more than 24h looked clean-and-stale and got
force-removed by the mtime+dirty heuristic alone. Lock every worktree
Prepare creates so it gets the same protection.

worktreeIsDirty also used git status --porcelain with no --ignored, so a
worktree holding only .gitignore-matched task data (credentials, generated
drafts, artifacts) reported as clean and got force-removed with --force,
silently discarding it. Add --ignored so those files count as dirty too.

* fix(worktrees): release Zero's Prepare lock so Clean can reclaim finished worktrees

Prepare locks every worktree it creates so Clean's mtime+dirty staleness
heuristic never force-removes one Zero is still using, but nothing ever
unlocked it, making the automatic disk-space cleanup permanently inert.

Add Release (git worktree unlock) and wire it in two ways: zero exec
--worktree defers a release once its own run finishes, since that flow's
use of the worktree is bound to its own process. zero worktrees prepare
hands the path to a longer-lived external caller with no defined
end-of-life, so a new zero worktrees release <path> subcommand lets that
caller release it explicitly when done.

* fix(worktrees): normalize release path, aggregate Clean errors, unlock deleted worktrees

Address CodeRabbit's review on the lock-release fix:

- zero worktrees release now resolves its path argument to absolute
  before calling Release, since git worktree unlock matches against
  the path git recorded at creation, not whatever directory the
  caller happens to be running from.
- Clean now aggregates removal failures with errors.Join instead of
  overwriting lastErr, so multiple stale worktrees failing removal in
  the same pass are all reported, not just the last one.
- Release falls back to options.Cwd as the git working directory when
  the worktree path itself no longer exists (e.g. a caller deleted a
  locked worktree by hand instead of releasing it first), so the
  orphaned lock can still be cleared.

Added regression coverage for all three.

* style(worktrees): align aggregation test comments to gofmt output

* fix(worktrees,cli): restore reuse lease and scope unlock to owned locks

- Prepare re-locks a reused worktree so Clean's staleness heuristic cannot
  force-remove it while the new caller is still using it; a lock already
  held by a live external caller is kept in place and reported through the
  new Result.LockAcquired field.
- exec --worktree only releases the lock its own Prepare call acquired and
  surfaces a failed release on stderr with the affected path instead of
  discarding the error.
- worktrees release wires the resolved workspace root into Options.Cwd so
  the deleted-path recovery works outside the worktree directory.
- The relative-path release test derives its expected value via
  filepath.Abs, matching the resolution the CLI uses, so macOS /var vs
  /private/var spellings no longer break it.

* fix(worktrees,cli): reject in-use leases, validate before cleanup, add release -C

- Prepare rejects a worktree whose lock another run still holds, on both
  the reuse and the create-race paths, instead of handing a second live
  caller an unprotected shared checkout whose sole Git lock the first
  caller's exit would release.
- The automatic stale-worktree pruning runs only after the request itself
  validates, so a rejected command (an invalid --name) has no destructive
  cleanup side effect; covered end to end with real git in both directions.
- worktrees release accepts -C/--cwd naming the source repository, which
  the deleted-path recovery needs when launched outside the repo (the
  deleted worktree path is a one-way hash with no way back to its source).

* test(worktrees): canonicalize test roots to physical spelling

git records worktree paths in physical form, so the CI runners' symlinked
(/var -> /private/var) and 8.3-short (RUNNER~1) temp spellings made Clean's
containment check skip the test's stale entry and the pruning assertion
fail on macOS and Windows.

* fix(worktrees): preserve orphaned commits, verify release ownership, canonicalize base dir

Four fixes from the latest review round:

- Clean now creates a durable ref (refs/zero/orphaned-worktree/<sha>)
  for a detached worktree's HEAD before force-removing it, when that
  commit isn't already reachable from any other ref. Prepare always
  creates worktrees with `worktree add --detach`, so a commit made
  there had no ref pointing at it once the worktree was deleted,
  making it immediately eligible for git gc despite never having been
  merged/pushed elsewhere.

- Clean resolves its configured base directory through EvalSymlinks
  before comparing it against git's reported worktree paths: `git
  worktree list --porcelain` reports each worktree's PHYSICAL location
  (resolving symlink components), so a symlinked --worktree-dir made
  every worktree created under it permanently unprunable.

- Release now verifies path has a zero-worktree-<repoKey> ancestor
  directory component before running `git worktree unlock`, so it
  can't be used to clear the lock on a worktree a user or another tool
  manages by hand. The check doesn't need to know which --dir a given
  Prepare call used (nothing records that against a specific worktree,
  and the CLI never threads BaseDir through to Release) — the repoKey
  component is Prepare's actual ownership signature regardless of
  which directory it was created under.

- Route the release command's printed path and exec's release-failure
  diagnostic through the existing CLI redaction helper, and split the
  worktrees help text into prepare-specific and release-specific flag
  sections (release only ever supported -C/--cwd, not the --name/--dir/
  --json the shared block advertised).

All four have regression tests confirmed to fail without their fix
(two using real git worktrees, not just fakeRunner sequences). Build,
vet, and gofmt clean on linux/windows/darwin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(worktrees): recoverable PID leases and reclaimable released worktrees

Two review findings on the cleanup lifecycle:

- A lock left by an abnormal exit (SIGKILL, crash, power loss) was
  skipped by Clean forever, recreating the permanent disk leak this PR
  set out to fix. exec --worktree now records its PID in the lease
  reason; Clean expires a lease whose recorded owner is provably dead,
  unlocking only after the staleness, dirty, and HEAD-preservation
  guards all pass. Human locks and PID-less leases (external
  `worktrees prepare` owners) remain permanent until explicit release,
  and any ambiguity in the liveness probe counts as alive.

- An explicitly released worktree holding only gitignored residue
  (node_modules, build output) was skipped at every age. Release is the
  owner's completion signal, so unlocked entries now block removal only
  on tracked/untracked changes; expired crashed leases keep the
  conservative --ignored probe since they never signaled completion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(worktrees): address review feedback on lease detection and release safety

Split dead-lease PID checking into posix/windows implementations so
Windows can reliably tell a dead process from a live one. Fix a path
canonicalization mismatch in two release tests. Derive release
ownership from git worktree list instead of the git-dir parent, which
was wrong for repos with a separate git-dir. Refuse to clear a lock
that was not taken by Zero in the first place.

* fix(worktrees): canonicalize paths for clean/release ownership checks

Compare Clean containment and Release ownership against physical path
spellings so macOS /var vs /private/var and symlink TMPDIR layouts match
git worktree list. Require a registered porcelain entry and a Zero lease
reason before unlock; treat an already-unlocked Zero worktree as a no-op.

* fix(worktrees,secrets): address jatmn review findings on #632

- Prepare and Release now agree on repoKey regardless of which worktree
  (main or linked) Prepare runs from, by keying off git worktree list's
  first entry (always the main worktree) instead of --show-toplevel.
  A worktree prepared from a linked checkout previously failed its own
  ownership check on release and its lease could never be cleared.
- osProcessAlive on Windows no longer treats every OpenProcess failure
  as "process is dead": only ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (a live process this
  caller lacks rights to query) is now distinguished from a genuinely
  missing PID, so Clean can no longer force-remove an active worktree
  whose owning process it simply couldn't query.
- The openai_key redaction pattern now recognizes sk-or-v1- (OpenRouter)
  alongside the existing sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- prefixes, so
  hyphenated OpenAI-compatible provider keys are redacted again without
  reopening the sk-<kebab-case-phrase> false-positive this pattern was
  narrowed to avoid.
- Release/exec --worktree error text is redacted before reaching
  stderr, matching the already-redacted success path; ownership errors
  interpolate the caller-supplied path, which could carry a key-shaped
  segment.
- canonicalizePath resolves symlinks through the nearest existing
  ancestor when the target itself no longer exists, so the documented
  `release -C` recovery path works again for a worktree deleted by hand
  under a symlinked --worktree-dir.
- Prepare rolls back the worktree `git worktree add` just created if the
  subsequent lock call fails for a reason other than a concurrent
  racer, instead of leaking an unleased checkout until Clean's 24h
  staleness window reclaims it.

Not addressed here: the P2 finding that worktree ownership is provable
only by a directory-name convention plus a lock-reason prefix, both of
which a user can reproduce by hand. A durable per-worktree ownership
marker would close that gap, but internal/worktrees has been on main
since #70, so a marker requirement could reject worktrees an
already-installed zero created before this change existed. Needs a
decision on migration before implementing.

* fix(worktrees): prove Prepare ownership with a git-admin marker

Address review findings that path convention plus lease-reason prefix are
forgeable by hand. Prepare now writes a zero-owner marker into the worktree
admin dir; Release and Clean require it before force-touching a path. Clean
also keys its owned subtree off the main worktree root so linked-checkout
calls still prune the same bucket Prepare uses. Tests plant the marker and
list the main worktree first so fixtures match production.

* fix(cli): complete worktrees release in shell completions

* test(worktrees,cli): add coverage for linked-worktree Clean, forged lease rejection, and completions

- TestCleanFromLinkedWorktreePrunesStaleWorktree: pins Clean deriving its
  owned-subtree key from the main worktree root (not the invoking linked
  checkout's --show-toplevel) so Prepare/Clean run from a linked worktree
  actually reclaim the worktrees Prepare created there.
- TestReleaseRejectsForgedZeroLeaseWithoutOwnershipMarker: pins the
  ownership-marker requirement against the exact forgery jatmn described - a
  worktree under the predictable zero-worktree-<repoKey> path, manually
  locked with a reason that merely starts with the zero lease prefix.
- Fix TestPrepareCreatesDetachedGitWorktree: its fake git runner ran out of
  canned results at Prepare's post-lock ownership-marker write, so
  writeOwnershipMarker resolved gitDir to "" and os.WriteFile wrote
  "zero-owner" as a relative path into the test process's real working
  directory instead of failing loudly. Give it autoAbsoluteGitDir like the
  other Prepare-exercising tests use and assert on the marker-write call.
- completions_test.go: assert `worktrees`/`worktree` completions include
  `release` alongside `prepare`.

* fix(redaction,worktrees): sort extra secret values by length descending and canonicalize worktree paths

* fix(secrets,worktrees): restore Anthropic key redaction and handle legacy worktree cleanup

* fix(secrets): add bash output redaction regression test for Anthropic API keys

* fix(worktrees): touch worktree mtime on reuse to prevent stale pruning

When Prepare reuses an existing worktree, it now touches the directory
to refresh its mtime. This prevents Clean from force-removing a
long-running but idle worktree (e.g. waiting on a model) that has no
recent file changes but is still actively in use.

Addresses the data-loss risk flagged in the PR review where mtime-only
staleness + --force removal could discard live worktrees.

Co-authored-by: cairn-code
Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(worktrees): properly handle os.Chtimes error on reused worktree path

Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <[email protected]>

* fix(worktrees,secrets): unlock using porcelain entry path, set RepoRoot to primaryRoot, and add anthropic_key pattern

Unlock using matched porcelain entry path, set Result.RepoRoot to primaryRoot in Prepare, add dedicated anthropic_key secret pattern, and canonicalize fake-runner test paths.

Refs #632

* fix(tools): correct redaction placeholder assertion in Anthropic key test

TestFormatBashOutputRedactsAnthropicKey checked for the openai_key
placeholder instead of anthropic_key, a copy-paste leftover. The
redaction itself was already correct; only the assertion was wrong.

* test(worktrees): physicalize test paths for macOS tempdir symlink resolution

* fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit review findings

Align RedactString token boundaries with secrets.Scan, strengthen the
Anthropic bash redaction assertion, fix Clean fixtures so they reach
the guards under test, and fail closed on ambiguous processAlive probes.

* fix(secrets,worktrees): restore broad key redaction and legacy Clean safety

Address human review on #855: keep sk- bodies with a digit filter instead
of enumerated vendor prefixes, add a looser JWT form, restore the
sk-test fixture, probe legacy ownership before dirty, treat non-INVALID
Windows OpenProcess errors as alive, redact Abs/cwd release errors, and
reclaim dead-owner leases on Prepare reuse.

* fix(secrets,redaction): always redact known OpenAI key prefixes

Alphabet-only sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- tokens are still credentials;
keep the digit filter only for unknown sk- vendor forms so kebab phrases
like sk-learn-… stay un-redacted.

* Preserve digit-free legacy keys during redaction.

Refs #855

* fix(secrets,worktrees): address CodeRabbit findings on PR #855

Redact full compact JWE tokens, pin git locale for lock parsing, write the
ownership marker atomically, surface missing-dir unlock failures, and
fail closed when HEAD probes are indeterminate. Align Clean fixtures and
digit-free known-prefix redaction tests with the shipped behavior.

Refs #855

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: cairn-code <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 10:51:11 +08:00
0176ee49ff feat(agent): add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning (#853)
* feat(agent): add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning

* fix(agent): drop redundant modeName branch, add plan mode regression tests

string(permissionMode) already yields "plan" / "spec-draft", so the
if/else recomputing modeName in the denial message was dead branching
on the same values. Also add plan-mode coverage mirroring three of the
four existing spec-draft regression tests: advertised tool set, and
denied write_file/bash calls. The fourth (submit-and-stop review
control) has no plan-mode analog, since plan mode has no submit tool.

* fix(agent): deny request_permissions in plan/spec-draft even when the registry omits it

request_permissions is dispatched by name in executeToolCall before the
registry-based ToolAdvertised gate runs, so that gate only helps when
the tool happens to be present in the caller's registry. A plan- or
spec-draft-mode registry that simply omits the tool (rather than
registering it as denied) let the call fall through to a real
turn/session-scoped permission grant, defeating the read-only
boundary. Deny it unconditionally at the top of
executeRequestPermissions for both read-only modes instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): suppress executable hooks while plan/spec-draft mode is active

Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but sessionStart/sessionEnd fire on
every run and beforeTool/afterTool fire around allowed read calls, and
all four execute configured host commands outside the advertised-tool
and sandbox gates — so a project hook could mutate the workspace or
spawn a process from a session that advertises it cannot. Gate all four
dispatch points on the run's permission mode, with a regression test
asserting no hook command launches during a plan-mode run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): close plan-mode tool advertisement bypass

toolAdvertisedInPlan whitelisted ask_user and update_plan by name
alone, so a caller could register a mutating tool under either name
and have it advertised and executed in plan mode. Validate every tool
against its Safety() instead. Also exclude lsp_navigate, which is
marked SideEffectRead but lazily spawns a real language-server
process, contradicting plan mode's read-only guarantee. Add
regression tests for both.

* fix(agent): keep trust-gated hooks in spec-draft mode

Plan mode still suppresses executable hooks so a read-only planning turn
cannot spawn host processes via session or tool hooks. Spec-draft keeps
the existing trust model: project hooks fire when the workspace (or its
worktree trust root) is trusted. Unconditionally suppressing hooks in
spec-draft broke TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd for trusted
worktrees under --use-spec --worktree.

* fix(agent): cover plan-mode spoof and lsp_navigate denials

Expand the name-only spoof regression to both update_plan and ask_user,
and add an execution-path denial for lsp_navigate so plan mode cannot
spawn language servers even when a call still arrives.

* fix(agent): filter tool_search deferred candidates by plan/spec-draft visibility

tool_search resolved and ranked deferred tools by EnabledTools/DisabledTools
only, never by the run's permission-mode visibility. tool_search itself is
already denied at dispatch in plan/spec-draft (its Safety carries no side
effect, so it fails the same SideEffect==Read advertisement gate direct calls
use), so this was not reachable through the normal Run() path today. But it
is a real landmine: if that outer gate is ever loosened independently (e.g.
tool_search's no-side-effect Safety is judged advertisable), the loader had
no gate of its own and would hand a deferred write/mutator tool's name,
description, and full schema straight to a plan/spec-draft model.

Mirror agent.ToolAdvertised's plan/spec-draft branches inside the tools
package (toolAdvertisedForPermissionMode, next to the existing
toolAllowedByFilters mirror that avoids the same import cycle) and apply it
alongside the operator filters in visibleDeferredTools and
visibleEagerToolNames.

Added unit tests in tool_search_test.go for both modes, and an end-to-end
agent test that force-calls tool_search in plan mode and asserts no schema
leaks. Verified by reverting tool_search.go and confirming the new tests fail
(one shows load_tools resolving to the mutator's name); restored and
confirmed they pass. Also confirmed via a temporary probe that if plan mode's
outer advertisement gate is loosened, this filter is what actually stops the
leak.

* fix(agent): require Safety for spec-draft ask_user/submit_spec

Do not advertise or load re-registered control tools by name alone in
spec-draft mode. ask_user must be SideEffectRead+Allow and submit_spec
must be SideEffectWrite+Allow, matching the real tools. Apply the same
filter in tool_search and add spoof regression tests.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#642

* fix(agent): wire plan mode into TUI, CLI, and ACP entry points

Address the P1 finding that PermissionModePlan was documented but never
selected by /plan, zero exec, or ACP mode selectors. /plan on|off now
toggles the session permission mode (restoring the prior mode on off),
zero exec --plan selects plan for a run, and ACP advertises plan as a
client-selectable mode. Integration coverage for each entry path.

* fix(cli): reject --plan combined with --worktree

Worktree preparation runs in runExec before the plan permission mode is
assigned, so `zero exec --plan --worktree` could still trigger workspace
mutation ahead of the read-only gate. Reject the combination during
option validation, alongside the existing --use-spec/--skip-permissions-
unsafe conflict checks, so no worktree prep can occur.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* test(tools): assert spoofed tool schema doesn't leak via tool_search

The spoofed-control-tool regression only asserted on the description
string; Parameters() exposed no distinctive schema marker, so a
regression that leaked the schema without the description would still
have passed. Add a spoofed_secret property to the test tool's schema
and assert it's absent from result.Output alongside the description.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* fix(tui): gate local mutating commands behind plan mode

/plan on only flips the agent permission mode, which gates agent tool
calls. Local TUI commands that run entirely inside the TUI process
bypass that gate: /rewind restores workspace files from a checkpoint,
/export writes a transcript to disk, and /sandbox-setup spawns a
native host process. Add a shared plan-mode guard at the start of
dispatchCommand (mirroring the existing BTW-unavailable guard) that
rejects these three commands while permissionMode is
agent.PermissionModePlan, with regression coverage proving each is
blocked with no mutation/process spawn in plan mode and unaffected
outside it.

Addresses a coderabbitai finding on PR #642.

* fix(agent,specialist): layer plan mode system prompt and enforce read-only subagent mode

* Fix jatmn review findings for PR 642

* fix(agent,cli,tui): resolve CodeRabbit review comments on active turn model field and --plan permission mode conflict

* fix(agent): propagate permission mode to exec options and serialize ACP mode changes

Parse permissionMode in resolveExecPermissionMode, acquire turnMu.Lock in ACP handleSetMode to serialize mode changes with active turns, and block MCP subcommands in TUI plan mode.

Refs #642

* fix(agent,tui): update tests off removed tools.CoreTools/NewWriteFileTool/NewLSPNavigateTool wrappers

Those were thin unscoped wrappers around the Scoped variants, deleted
upstream in #706 since nothing else called them directly. Only these
tests still did; switch to the Scoped calls main's own tests already
use.

* fix(agent): fail-closed beforeTool vetoes and permission-mode plan guards

Keep beforeTool deny gates active under plan mode so hooksSuppressed no longer
fails open, and stop propagating --permission-mode for auto/ask/member children
so swarm members keep write tools. Apply --plan combination rejects to
--permission-mode plan as well.

Refs #853

* fix(agent): address CodeRabbit findings for plan-mode advertisement and entry paths

Unify plan/spec-draft tool advertisement in tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode
(with PermissionDeny short-circuit), cover ACP config and --permission-mode plan
list-tools paths, and allow bare /mcp while blocking mutating MCP subcommands.

Refs #853

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 10:15:29 +08:00
Anandan 160e3bed1a Unify tool output views (#880)
* Unify tool output views

* Preserve finalized tool outcomes

* Make outcome tests portable
2026-08-10 09:58:05 +08:00
Vasanth T 7fbd864e91 fix(tui): fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable (#872)
* fix(tui): fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable

AllMotion (1003) buys exactly one thing over CellMotion (1002): hover
highlighting. Wheel, click and drag all arrive under either. But a
terminal that does not implement 1003 does not degrade to 1002, it sends
nothing at all, and because the TUI holds the alternate screen the
terminal's own scrollback and wheel are gone too. The user is left
unable to scroll by any means, and a long answer then reads as a hang
rather than as a missing highlight. That is how #870 arrived: a
completed turn with "59 more" lines below the fold, reported as a
freeze.

The existing code already conceded 1003 is fragile by carving out PRoot.
The legacy Windows console is the same case and was not covered, so a
bare zero.exe outside Windows Terminal asked for a mode its terminal
does not answer.

Move the decision into mouseModeFor, which trusts terminals that
identify themselves (WT_SESSION for Windows Terminal, TERM_PROGRAM for
hosts like VS Code and mintty) and assumes an unidentified Windows
terminal is the legacy console. Guessing wrong that way costs a hover
highlight; guessing wrong the other way costs every mouse event.

ZERO_MOUSE_MODE=all|cell|off overrides it, so a user on a terminal we
guessed wrong about can fix it without waiting for a release. An
unrecognised value is ignored rather than treated as "off", so a typo
cannot silently kill the mouse.

Refs #870.

* test(tui): pin the inherited-environment limit of the mouse-mode guess

WT_SESSION and TERM_PROGRAM are inherited, so they answer for whichever
process set them rather than for the console host attached now. A shell
started from Windows Terminal or Git Bash that later runs zero.exe
against the legacy console still carries them, and mouseModeFor then
asks for AllMotion on a host that may drop every mouse event: the #870
failure class through a narrower door.

Not fixed, and deliberately so. Telling an inherited variable from a live
one needs the console host rather than the environment, and erring the
other way costs every Windows Terminal user their hover highlighting for
a case that takes an unusual launch path to reach.

So the limit is written down in the code and pinned by a test that also
asserts ZERO_MOUSE_MODE=cell still overrides it, since that override is
the only recourse an affected user has. If real host detection lands
later the test fails by design, and its message says to delete it.

Raised by @jatmn on #872.
2026-08-10 09:57:44 +08:00
euxaristia 020c28eaf9 fix(tui): fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background (#850)
* fix(tui): fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background

Blank and cleared cells fell back to the terminal's own default
background instead of the theme's panel color, flashing white on
light themes during resize or when ClearScreen erases the frame.
Wrap the rendered content in zeroTheme.panel sized to the full frame
so every cell is explicitly painted.

* fix(tui): apply theme panel content to tea.View after render

tea.NewView stores the original string; reassigning the local content
variable left the view unchanged. Call SetContent after the panel
render so the alt-screen frame uses the themed output.
2026-08-10 09:57:25 +08:00
euxaristiaandgoogle-labs-jules[bot] 21e1e8d072 style(cli): flatten trust workspace resolve errors with %s (#849)
* fix: prevent leaking sensitive info in wrapped error responses

Modified `fmt.Errorf` calls in `internal/cli/trust.go` to use `%s` instead of `%w` when wrapping errors that are subsequently redacted via `redaction.ErrorMessage()`. This ensures the underlying error is flattened to a plain string, preventing sensitive information from being exposed later via `errors.Unwrap()`.

Co-authored-by: euxaristia <[email protected]>

* chore(cli): drop agent sentinel from trust error-format tidy

Remove .jules/sentinel.md (local agent artifact, not in main). Keep the
trust.go %s flatten as a readability tidy only; redaction.ErrorMessage
already stringifies inline, so this is not a security fix.

* style(cli): note intentional %s flatten on trust resolve errors

Keep a short comment at both sites so the %s form is not "fixed" back to %w; ErrorMessage stringifies inline.

---------

Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-10 09:50:44 +08:00
936aa4e77c fix(lsp): dispatch notifications off read loop (#759)
* fix(lsp): dispatch notifications off read loop

* fix(lsp): keep notification reads non-blocking

* fix(lsp): make the notification queue lossless

Addresses the P1 on #759.

The previous commit traded the read-loop deadlock for silent protocol-event
loss: at 64 queued items enqueueNotification discarded the OLDEST message. A
textDocument/publishDiagnostics is the server's only report for its URI, so a
dropped one makes session.waitForDiagnostics time out and Manager.Check return
no diagnostics even though the server published them — and the overflow test
codified that loss as intended behavior.

The queue is now unbounded: the read loop still never blocks (so a handler may
make a re-entrant Client.Call), and nothing is discarded. Both alternatives are
worse — blocking on a full buffer is the original deadlock, and dropping loses
state the protocol never repeats. Growth is bounded in practice by what the
server emits while a handler runs; the backing array is released as soon as the
queue drains, so a burst does not retain capacity afterwards.

Tests: TestClientNotificationQueueIsLossless replaces the drop-oldest test, and
the end-to-end burst test now also asserts that all 512 notifications sent while
a handler was blocked in a re-entrant call arrive, in order. Both were checked
against the old drop-oldest policy and fail there (64 of 512 delivered, FIFO
broken), so they have teeth.

* fix(lsp): stop retaining notifications after Close

Addresses the shutdown defect CodeRabbit found in the lossless queue.

Client.Close signals the worker loop to exit, but readLoop keeps consuming
frames until the transport ends — and Server.Shutdown closes the client BEFORE
closing stdin, so a language server emitting notifications while it handles
shutdown/exit fed an unbounded queue that nothing would ever drain.

failPending's closeOnce now marks the queue closed and releases whatever is in
it, and enqueueNotification drops instead of appending once that flag is set.
Both run under notifyMu, so an enqueue racing with shutdown either sees the flag
and drops its item or appends just before it and has the item cleared. Queued
work is dropped rather than drained: the worker is gone by definition of close,
and callers that need diagnostics collect them before shutting the client down.

TestClientDropsNotificationsAfterClose keeps the transport writable after Close,
as Server.Shutdown does, and requires 64 subsequent notifications to neither
reach the handler nor accumulate. Verified against the unguarded enqueue, where
it reports 64 retained notifications.

* fix(lsp): baseline diagnostics against receipt, bound the notification backlog

Addresses jatmn's two #759 review findings:

- Manager.Check captured its diagnostics baseline from publishCount,
  which only advances once session.handleNotification actually runs
  for a URI. Dispatch happens off a queue now, so a publish for a
  version Check is about to supersede could already be sitting
  received-but-undispatched at baseline-capture time, then run
  afterward and look newer than the baseline purely because handling
  lagged receipt. Since many servers omit the version field, the
  existing staleness check in handleNotification (positive-version
  only) couldn't catch it either. Stamp every notification with a
  receipt sequence at enqueue time (Client.NotificationSeq), carry it
  through the queue to the handler, and baseline against receipt
  instead of against how many publishes have been processed.

- The lossless notification queue had no failure policy: a language
  server sustaining a higher notification rate than the single
  handler can drain (no stuck handler required) would retain every
  full json.RawMessage payload without bound. Add notifyQueueLimit;
  exceeding it fails and closes the client observably, letting the
  manager's existing dead-session eviction take over on next use,
  instead of growing the queue until the heap gives out.

Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code:
the receipt-vs-baseline race was reproduced directly against the
pre-fix API (confirmed real, not hypothetical) before porting the
test to the fixed API, and the overload test was confirmed to fail
with the limit check removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(lsp): bound notification backlog bytes

Track retained notification payload bytes in addition to queue length and fail the client before the backlog exceeds 16 MiB. Wake diagnostic waiters when that failure closes the client, preserving already-received fresh diagnostics during debounce. Add race-enabled regression coverage for byte overload cleanup and client-failure wakeup.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-b80c-717b-b041-5d5135a61d96

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(lsp): preserve diagnostics across client closure

When a fresh publish and client closure wake a diagnostic waiter together, reconcile against the recorded receipt sequence instead of allowing select order to discard the publish.

Add a regression that repeatedly makes both wakeups ready together and verifies diagnostics handled before closure are preserved.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-5dd3-7118-a7a6-fba8f9d5af29

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(lsp): drain accepted notifications on close

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(lsp): pin the receipt boundary at read time and finish the drain

Stamping a notification's receipt seq at enqueue left a window async dispatch
had opened: readMessage consumes the frame, then json.Unmarshal and the enqueue
run later on the same goroutine while another can capture a publishBaseline. A
publishDiagnostics for superseded text could land above a baseline taken after
it was already off the wire and — most servers omit the version field the
staleness check needs — reach the caller as the answer for the new text. The
read loop now stamps every frame the moment it leaves the wire and hands that
seq to the enqueue, so decoding cost sits outside the boundary. ReceiptSeq
replaces NotificationSeq: the clock counts frames, and gaps in it are fine.

Notification drain handling is now uniform. Every exit from waitForDiagnostics
catches the worker up on notifications it already accepted before reading what
was recorded, instead of only the seq<=baseline closure arm doing so. That
covers cancellation racing an accepted-but-queued publish (which used to make
Check return (nil, nil) for text the server had answered), and the debounce
closure arm returning while a newer publish was still queued (which handed the
caller the older one). After closure the drain is bounded — admission is shut
and a handler's re-entrant Call fails immediately — so it is no longer cut short
by ctx; on a live client the catch-up is bounded by a short grace instead.

Also cap Content-Length before allocating the body, so the notification byte
budget is authoritative rather than measured after a huge frame is materialized.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(lsp): follow publishes accepted while catch-up is waiting

Catch-up snapshotted the accepted sequence once, but the reader keeps running
while it waits. The worker finishing the item that was last at the start
satisfied the check, so catch-up returned with a newer publish for the same URI
still queued — and the caller read diagnosticsFor and got the older one. That is
the failure the closed-client drain exists to prevent, reproduced on the live
path by the async dispatch this PR introduces.

The target is now re-read every pass. This cannot spin forever: the live-client
grace already caps the wait no matter how fast the server publishes, and a
closed client still drains unconditionally because its backlog cannot grow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* test(lsp): wait for follow-up notification enqueue

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

* test(lsp): pin receipt stamping to read time, not enqueue

Regression test for the gap flagged in review pullrequestreview-4834747507
on #759: TestPublishBaselineRejectsFrameReadBeforeBaseline calls
stampReceipt directly and never drives readLoop, so it doesn't pin where
the stamp is taken. A response frame (read but never enqueued as a
notification) distinguishes the two call sites directly.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 09:50:03 +08:00
30f6d8f591 fix(specialist): make overwrites atomic (#757)
* fix(specialist): make overwrites atomic

* fix(specialist): harden atomic replacement

* fix(specialist): replace through a Windows-atomic, DACL-preserving primitive

Addresses both P1 findings on #757.

os.Rename — which fsutil.RenameWithRetry wraps — is documented non-atomic
outside Unix, and the retry loop only handles sharing violations. Worse, the
replacement is a freshly created temporary file, so renaming it over the
destination also publishes the directory's inherited DACL in place of the
destination's own: overwriting a specialist that had been explicitly restricted
inside a group-readable directory would expose its system prompt to that group.
temp.Chmod(0o600) cannot prevent that on Windows, where Go maps only the
owner-write bit.

New fsutil.ReplaceWithRetry publishes through a platform primitive:

- Windows uses ReplaceFileW with REPLACEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH, one operation that
  carries the replaced file's security descriptor, attributes, and streams over
  to the replacement. REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_ACL_ERRORS is deliberately not passed —
  silently losing the descriptor is the failure being fixed — so a merge failure
  surfaces and leaves the destination untouched. A missing destination falls back
  to a rename (nothing to replace or preserve), as do volumes that cannot perform
  a replace at all (FAT/exFAT, some network redirectors), which carry no ACL
  either. The transient-lock retry is unchanged.
- Unix keeps rename(2), which is already atomic within one filesystem.

Tests: Windows coverage asserts the destination's creation time survives (a
rename would not, proving the call goes through ReplaceFileW) and that a
protected owner-only DACL survives both at the fsutil layer and through the real
`Create --force` path; a plain rename was verified to replace that DACL with the
directory's inherited ACEs, so the assertion has teeth. POSIX covers both
destination shapes.

* fix(fsutil): stop ignoring ACL merge errors, recover partial ReplaceFileW

Addresses jatmn's two #757 review findings:

- The call passed REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_MERGE_ERRORS (0x2) while the
  comment claimed ACL failures were fail-closed. Microsoft documents
  0x2 and REPLACEFILE_IGNORE_ACL_ERRORS (0x4) identically: with
  either set, a call lacking WRITE_DAC "succeeds but the ACLs are not
  preserved". Passing 0x2 therefore let a --force overwrite silently
  publish the temp file's inherited directory DACL over a restricted
  specialist and expose its system prompt. Pass no flags at all.

- With no backup file, ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT (1176) and
  ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2 (1177) leave the destination
  deleted (1176) or renamed to an unreachable name (1177) while the
  replacement survives only under its temporary name. Returning those
  unrepaired let the caller's deferred temp-file cleanup remove the
  sole surviving copy, so one failed 'specialist create --force'
  destroyed both the old manifest and the new one. recoverPartialReplace
  now moves the replacement into place and still reports the error,
  since the destination's descriptor died with the destination.

Also drops the doc claim that REPLACEFILE_WRITE_THROUGH (0x1) flushes
before returning: Microsoft documents that value as "not supported".

The two fsutil regression tests are verified to fail against the
pre-fix code. The specialist-side test guards the caller half of the
recovery contract and does not fail pre-fix; its comment says so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(fsutil): preserve Windows replacement backups

Use a managed ReplaceFileW backup so partial failures can restore the original file and DACL. Fail closed when atomic replacement is unsupported, retry rollback and backup cleanup, and retain a known backup if rollback cannot complete.\n\nCover unsupported volumes, 1176/1177 semantics, cleanup, rollback retries, and symlink rejection.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-be8e-75eb-b274-b7e22af373a0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(specialist): report committed cleanup warnings

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* docs(specialist): describe what a failed overwrite actually leaves behind

The Windows partial-replace recovery errors told an operator the replacement
"remains at" the caller's temporary path, but the only caller removes that file
in a deferred cleanup before the error ever surfaces — it named a file that was
already gone. Recovery from a failed overwrite is always about the original, so
the errors now describe only what the replace itself left on disk: the state of
the destination and of the managed backup. The replacement path is no longer a
parameter, since nothing reports it.

The one terminal state that needs a human — 1177 whose rollback exhausted its
retries — now says so outright. The original then exists only under an opaque
.zero-replace-*.backup name, and the loader reads *.md, so the specialist stays
invisible until somebody moves it back. The error names both paths and the
action; docs/SPECIALISTS.md walks through it; and loadDirectory records why the
non-.md siblings an interrupted overwrite can leave are skipped rather than
guessed at.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(specialist): serialize managed loads during replacement

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019faf74-99d4-75cf-ac7a-661c308240ef
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 09:49:32 +08:00
euxaristiaandgoogle-labs-jules[bot] c52db055b0 fix: suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands (#848)
Addresses a Gosec G204 (Command Injection) warning where provider command strings were passed directly into `sh -c` and `cmd /C`. Since these commands originate from the user's trusted local config and explicitly require shell features (like pipes and variable expansions) to function, removing the shell invocation introduces a breaking change. This adds a documented `#nosec` annotation to suppress the false positive instead of degrading functionality.

Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-10 09:12:58 +08:00
55fa05f0ab fix(sandbox): deny reads of Zero credential stores (#681)
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of zero credential stores

* fix(sandbox): address PR review comments

- Deny reads of mcp-oauth-tokens.json.secret in the default Zero
  config candidates: file-backed oauth stores keep their encryption
  secret in a sibling .secret file, so the default MCP token store
  needs the same protection as the override paths (CodeRabbit).
- Clarify that explicit credential-file overrides are still filtered
  by on-disk existence like every other candidate (Copilot).
- Align the zeroUserConfigDir doc comment with config.UserConfigDir:
  macOS honors XDG_CONFIG_HOME before falling back to ~/.config
  (Copilot).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): deny the whole Zero config dir, not itemized filenames

Address code review on PR #681:

- Deny credentialDenyReadPaths' Zero-config candidate as the containing
  directory instead of an itemized filename list. The token/credential/
  config stores each publish through a randomly-named .tmp-<pid>-<nanos>
  sibling before their atomic rename, and the legacy MCP token store
  leaves a mcp-oauth-tokens.json.migrated backup after importing it —
  none of those names were covered by the old itemized list, so a
  sandboxed command could read them under the read-all posture.

- Stop dropping default candidates that don't exist yet at profile-build
  time. A store created later in a long-lived sandboxed session (e.g. a
  concurrent ) previously got no deny rule at all; every
  backend already treats a deny rule over a not-yet-existing path as a
  harmless no-op that still takes effect once the path appears.

- Resolve ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH / ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH overrides
  the same way the token stores resolve them (relative-to-cwd, no ~
  expansion) instead of through normalizeProfilePath, which tilde-expands
  and so could derive a deny path different from where the store actually
  writes.

Adds regression coverage for the directory-wide deny (including the
migrated backup and synthetic temp-file siblings), for building the
profile before the store directory exists, and for the tilde-override
resolution mismatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): address macOS deny-path test and config parity

Recompute the expected Zero config deny path after MkdirAll and resolve
the temp base with EvalSymlinks so macOS /var -> /private/var does not
flake TestPermissionProfileDeniesZeroCredentialFiles. Add a parity test
that sandbox.zeroUserConfigDir stays aligned with config.UserConfigDir.

Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): harden credential deny paths

* test(cli): normalize credential deny baseline

* fix(sandbox): close credential path gaps

* test(sandbox): normalize command credential path

* fix(sandbox): handle absent credential paths safely

* fix(sandbox): protect MCP OAuth siblings

* fix(sandbox): protect OAuth lock siblings

* docs(sandbox): clarify Linux future-path limits

* test(sandbox): probe credential store reads in the Linux smoke test

The smoke test wired HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME at credential directories but never
attempted a read through the sandbox, so it could not catch a real-bwrap
regression for the paths this change protects. Write a secret into ~/.aws and
$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero and add both to the deny-read table.

* fix(sandbox): keep the credential deny usable, current, and unguessable

Four problems with the credential deny baseline, all in the same mechanism.

The whole-directory deny over $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/zero also hid the supported
user plugin, specialist, and command roots, whose commands and scripts are
executed through this sandbox, so an installed user plugin could no longer
start. Narrowing the deny to itemized files was not an option: the stores
publish through temporary names and a concurrent login can add a store that
did not exist when the profile was built, and only a directory rule covers
both. The directory deny therefore stays, and the non-secret subtrees are
carved back out through a new DenyReadCarveouts field: seatbelt re-allows
them after the deny (SBPL is last-match-wins) plus ancestor metadata so path
resolution can reach them, and bubblewrap masks the directory with --perms
111 instead of 000 -- unlistable but traversable -- and re-binds the carveout
read-only before the tmpfs is remounted read-only.

A relative ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH, or
XDG_CONFIG_HOME was resolved against the command directory only, while
oauth.ResolveStorePath and mcp.ResolveTokenStorePath call filepath.Abs, i.e.
resolve against the Zero process working directory. A command run from a
subdirectory therefore had the wrong path denied and the real store stayed
readable under the read-all posture. Relative candidates now resolve against
both directories, since the process that resolves the value is not
necessarily the one that writes the store. The regression test runs the
command from a different directory than the process, which the previous
tests did not.

bubblewrap cannot mount over a path that is absent when the namespace is
assembled, so a store created mid-session stayed readable through the live
read-only host-root bind for the rest of a long-lived sandbox session. The
directories Zero owns -- its config directory and the per-store publication
directories -- are now reported as EnsureDenyReadDirs and created (0700)
before the namespace is assembled, so their mask always exists. Third-party
stores such as ~/.aws are still skipped when absent: Zero must not create
them, and that limitation stays documented on the field.

The fixed <store>.tmp publication sibling made the plaintext token, and via
the same path its encryption key, observable to a same-user sandboxed process
with write access to an override parent: it could wait for the known name and
rename the opened inode into an allowed path. Both stores now publish through
a per-store <store>.publish directory with a randomly-named file inside. The
directory name is derived from the store path, so the profile can deny it up
front, while the random name inside is what cannot be waited for or renamed
away. A test keeps the duplicated suffix in step with oauth.PublicationDirSuffix.

Also adds the seatbelt render coverage that was missing: dropping
DenyReadIfExists from denyReadRules made every credential store readable
again on macOS without failing a single test.

* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps

Preserve process credential roots alongside command overrides while limiting host precreation and read carveouts to trusted process-derived paths.

Canonicalize future credential roots through existing path aliases, reject symlink carveouts, and collapse automatic masks already covered by user or automatic directory denies. Normalize the policy golden and add regression coverage across profile, Seatbelt, and bubblewrap rendering.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): normalize credential carveout paths

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): canonicalize backend credential masks

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(sandbox): normalize backend mask expectations

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa019-2f41-7398-8692-75327064c6f0

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): fail closed for replaceable token stores

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): allow keyring token path overrides

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbdfa-8469-731e-87c0-b26b7641cf59
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): harden command credential roots

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbec7-c723-74d9-a323-026040b94436
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): close credential deny review gaps

Reapply credential denies after Seatbelt extension carveouts and model the legacy MCP token path as a migration input rather than an atomic writer.

Retain Bubblewrap fail-closed markers for OAuth outputs exposed through readable carveouts, and add regressions for both platform policies.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fbf55-f6b0-71fc-b384-652ba32b9645
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: PierrunoYT <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:33:29 +08:00
1057d74512 docs(readme,cli): document /new & zero upgrade, add Discord link, and sync help text (#489)
* docs(readme): document /new, zero upgrade, and add Discord link

Add the /new slash command and zero upgrade command to the README's
command references, expand docs/UPDATE.md to cover the --apply install
flow, and link the project Discord server.

* docs(update): escape pipe in --endpoint table cell

CodeRabbit flagged the unescaped | in the --endpoint placeholder
breaking the Markdown table layout.

* docs(readme-zh): bring /new and zero upgrade in line with README.md

README_ZH.md had picked up the Discord link but was still missing the
/new slash command and zero upgrade entries added to README.md,
letting the translation drift out of sync.

* cli: add upgrade to root help output

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>

* docs: make required update flag explicit in common commands

zero update errors without --check or --apply, so the bare form in
the common-commands examples was misleading. Addresses the Copilot
finding from the PR #489 review.

* docs: use a permanent (non-expiring) Discord invite in the READMEs

* docs(cli): match upgrade help summary to download/verify/install wording

Copilot flagged the root zero --help summary for upgrade as less
specific than the download/verify/install phrasing already used in
README.md and docs/UPDATE.md for the same command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* docs: use discord.gg short link for the community invite

discord.com/invite/<code> and discord.gg/<code> resolve to the same
invite; discord.gg is the canonical short form to publish.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(update,readme-zh): keep npm --json stdout clean, add ZH Discussions route

`zero upgrade --json` (and `zero update --apply --json`) on an npm-managed
install wired npm's own stdout directly to the process stdout, so its
progress output landed ahead of the JSON result and made it unparseable.
Route npm's stdout into a buffer when JSON output is requested, only
surfacing it in the error message if the install fails.

README_ZH.md's Community section only pointed to Discord, unlike the
English README, which reserves Discord for real-time chat and routes
Q&A/ideas/sharing to GitHub Discussions per SUPPORT.md/CONTRIBUTING.md
policy. Bring the Chinese section in line with the same split.

Addresses the outstanding findings from jatmn's review on PR #489.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* docs(update): qualify npm-managed JSON output

Document the npm subprocess output caveat instead of promising a single parseable JSON document for apply operations. Drop the JSON-specific updater plumbing and tests so the PR remains focused on documentation and help discovery.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-8bcd-71bc-9bde-9b4c28b78b38

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* docs(update): align upgrade guidance

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(update): keep the upgrade recommendation about this machine

`zero update --check --target windows-x64` answers a question about a different
machine, but the new call to action told the user to run `zero upgrade`, which
only ever installs onto this one — replacing the target-specific download
guidance the flag used to print. The recommendation is now conditional: a
current-platform check keeps it, and a cross-target check gets the manual
instruction plus a note naming the machine `zero upgrade` would have touched
instead.

Also align two flag contracts with what the code does: `zero update --help`
described --repo/--endpoint as check-only although apply honors them, and
UPDATE.md did not mention that both are ignored on an npm-managed apply, which
takes its release from the npm registry rather than GitHub.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): do not send a custom-source check to the default source

`zero upgrade` is a fresh invocation: it does not inherit the --repo/--endpoint
of the check that suggested it, so recommending it bare after a custom-source
check told the user to install from a repository they never asked about. The
check now records the flag it was given and the guidance repeats it, naming
where a bare upgrade would install from instead.

ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL is deliberately not recorded: every Check reads it from
the environment, including the one inside Apply, so a bare upgrade already
follows it and telling the user to repeat it would be wrong.

Two smaller edges from the same review: a cross-target check on a host with no
published release target no longer ends by describing what `zero upgrade` does
there, since it does not work there at all; and the flag table and help text now
carry the npm caveat the prose bullet already had, so docs and help agree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(update): keep source guidance accurate

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fafa2-7d9d-75bc-8801-6d0efc8db1df
Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:32:53 +08:00
Anandan f922cb378e Add cross-session messaging (#884)
* Add cross-session messaging

* Harden cross-session messaging

Authenticate sender metadata against live registry records, bound peer lifecycle state, preserve records across transient discovery failures, and make receipt delivery direct and bounded.

Also serialize TUI peer approvals, harden platform runtime paths and transport deadlines, widen session references, and add regression coverage for identity spoofing, queue limits, path boundaries, and tool failures.

* Support canonical macOS socket paths

Resolve Unix transport directories to their physical path before applying strict no-symlink traversal, allowing the standard /var to /private/var macOS alias without weakening runtime-directory validation.

* Fix macOS socket path regression test

Create the canonicalization fixture beneath a guaranteed short Unix path so it exercises the primary endpoint on macOS, and report temporary-directory cleanup failures.

* Harden peer messaging lifecycle

* Fix Windows peer directory traversal

* Handle Windows token-owned peer directories

* Accept equivalent Windows ACL masks

* Build Windows peer ACL explicitly

* Pin Windows ACL trustee SIDs

* Validate Windows peer ACL semantics

* Propagate Windows peer handle cleanup errors

* Use null handle for Windows close failure test

* Test held-message eviction callback
2026-08-09 18:12:09 +05:30
Anandan 7f39a63067 Centralize agent context planning (#879)
* Centralize agent context planning

* Fix context plan request accounting

* Freeze planned tool schemas
2026-08-08 16:40:17 +05:30
Anandan ff608c7834 Reduce compaction context while preserving task state (#873)
* Reduce compaction context while preserving task state

* Fix durable compaction evidence identity

* Preserve structured tool errors during compaction

* Unify manual and automatic compaction

* Report compaction truncation structurally

* Preserve automatic compaction metadata
2026-08-08 11:26:27 +05:30
Anandan 57858a31d1 Improve source read efficiency and model compatibility (#867)
* Improve source read efficiency and compatibility

* Preserve lexical context in ranged reads

* Fix bounded source read edge cases

* Prevent overflow in ranged minified reads

* Trim eager read tool schemas
2026-08-07 21:29:45 +05:30
euxaristia 1e73ecae8a docs(agents): Codify recurring review blockers in AGENTS.md (#857)
* docs(agents): codify recurring review blockers in AGENTS.md

Capture the high-frequency classes that drive multi-round maintainer reviews
(stale bases, path canonicalization, secret handling, partial setup, missing
regression tests, scope honesty) so coding agents fix them before first review.

Refs #856

* docs(agents): tighten security and atomic-write review guidance

Require open-time containment binding instead of pre-open EvalSymlinks, and
require temp-file then atomic replace rather than exclusive create alone.

Refs #856

* docs(agents): require traversal-wide containment for no-follow APIs

Final-component-only O_NOFOLLOW is insufficient on Linux and reparse
points need platform protections. Align the Security edges guidance
with the full-path containment requirement from review.
2026-08-07 20:18:11 +08:00
KRATOS cae0269e77 fix(tui): a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows (#876)
syscall.StringToUTF16 PANICS rather than returning an error when the
string contains a NUL — documented standard-library behaviour — and
github.com/atotto/clipboard's Windows path calls it directly. So one NUL
anywhere in a copied transcript selection killed the whole program:
"zero: tui error: program was killed: program experienced a panic",
reported from a real Windows machine.

The NUL reaches the clipboard because ansi.Strip removes escape
SEQUENCES and leaves C0 bytes untouched, and the transcript carries them
from two independent directions: tool output (a binary read, git's -z
NUL-separated listings — which this repo itself parses in
files_git_sweep.go) and Zero's own card protocol, whose row prefixes are
literally "\x00command-card\x00" and "\x00plan-card\x00".

Sanitised at the WRITE rather than at each source, because the sources
are unbounded: any tool result a user can select from is one, and a fix
per source is a fix the next tool re-breaks. The same pass protects the
OSC52 fallback, where a stray control byte terminates the escape
sequence early and silently corrupts the copy instead of crashing —
which is likely why this went unnoticed off Windows, where the identical
NUL produces a bad copy rather than a dead process.

\n and \t survive: a multi-line selection is the normal case and both
are legal clipboard content.

Fixes #875
2026-08-07 20:17:19 +08:00
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 5 cd0eb194e4 feat(tools): give tool results an image channel and add view_image (#843)
* feat(tools): give tool results an image channel and add view_image

Closes #824.

tools.Result carried only text, so no tool could hand the model a picture.
The sharpest edge was our own capture tooling: browser_screenshot,
desktop_screenshot and browser_pdf wrote a PNG, set Meta["artifact_path"]
and returned "Artifact captured: <path>". Nothing read that path
afterwards, so the model asked for a screenshot, was told one existed, and
could not look at it.

Zero was never image-blind on the way in — zeroruntime.ImageBlock,
Message.Images and internal/imageinput are mature. What was missing is the
model-initiated leg.

Result.Images is delivered as a following USER message, not on the tool
result itself. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message:
Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block whose content is a
string, Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image
content-parts to the user role with an explicit comment saying so. Attaching
them to the tool result would have plumbed the whole path and delivered
nothing. A separate message also keeps one tool result per tool call, which
the providers validate.

Blocks with no data, or a media type outside the provider allow-list, are
dropped rather than sent — a rejected image would fail the whole turn, and
the tool's text still stands on its own. The message names the tool, since
the images arrive detached from their result and nothing else says which
call produced them when several ran in one turn.

view_image resolves through resolveScopedReadPath before imageinput.LoadFile.
That scoping is load-bearing: LoadFile joins a relative path to the
workspace root and otherwise takes the path as given, so without it the tool
would read anywhere on disk. It is registered with the other scoped readers
and declared read-only and thread-safe, matching read_file.

The capture tools now attach what they wrote. A PDF or an unreadable file
yields no image and the text stands alone, so a capture is never failed over
its attachment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): keep tool results contiguous when a tool returns an image

The image messages are user-role, and the first version appended each one
immediately after its own tool result. With two tool calls in a turn that
produces tool_result, user, tool_result — and a user message between two
tool results breaks strict provider replay.

Anthropic makes it concrete. appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user
content into one block list, and tool_result blocks must come first in that
message, so the interleaved shape maps to:

    [tool_result, text, image, tool_result]

which the API rejects. loop.go already documents this exact rule three lines
below the change, for the self-correction feedback it defers for the same
reason.

Images are now collected during the tool loop and appended once every
tool_result is recorded — including the aborted placeholders on the abort,
stop-reason and repeated-failure paths, so an early exit cannot strand them
mid-sequence either.

The original test used a single tool call, which cannot exhibit the bug. The
new one runs two calls where the first returns an image and asserts the image
message does not fall between the first and last tool result.

Also from review: view_image joins the "execute" tool category, which grants
read_file but not view_image, so a specialist declared with tools: [execute]
could not look at a screenshot it had just captured. Covered by a test that
holds for every category granting read_file rather than naming one. And the
core read-only set is now asserted by tool name, not only by count — a count
still passes when one reader is swapped for another.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(agent): pin the tool-result/image ordering contract

The assertions only tracked the first and last tool-result index, so four
distinct broken orderings passed: a message wedged between the two tool results,
a duplicated image flush, a duplicated tool result, and both results answering
the same tool_call_id. Mutation-testing each of those against the real loop
confirmed the old assertions were green on all four.

Now it collects every tool-result index and id and requires exactly two, in
c1-then-c2 order, at adjacent indexes, with the image following the last one and
delivered exactly once. Adjacency is the assertion that carries the contract:
Anthropic needs every tool_result block ahead of any other block in the user
message they coalesce into, so anything between the two results is the 400 this
change exists to avoid.

The image is deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1. appendUserBlocks merges
consecutive user-role content, so [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] maps to
tool_result blocks first and replays fine; pinning would fail that valid shape
while killing nothing the adjacency and count assertions do not already catch.

messageShape reports the actual role ordering on failure, and the loop uses two
ifs rather than a switch so an image left on a tool-role message is reported as
the misplacement it is instead of "the image never reached the model".

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 21:35:41 +05:30
Vasanth T 4ca4fa75d3 fix(agent): end the additional_permissions retry loop (#864)
* fix(agent): end the additional_permissions retry loop

Asking the agent to run an ordinary read-only command on Windows could leave it
oscillating between two rejections instead of executing:

    additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to "with_additional_permissions"
    additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, ...

Both come from inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, and each names only the fix
that ADDS something. The first pushes the model toward setting the flag; the
second pushes it back toward requesting a permission the command does not need.
Neither ever says to omit the field, which is the correct action for a read-only
command, so the two messages form a two-state oscillator. Every rejection now
carries that remedy.

The schema half is why the object is attached at all. Neither field description
said to omit them for ordinary commands, so a model that legitimately used
with_additional_permissions once in a session had nothing telling it to stop
attaching a permission object to the next command. Both descriptions now lead
with "omit", and they are shared constants rather than duplicated verbatim in
bash.go and exec_command.go, where they were free to drift.

Rejection is still rejection. Nothing that was refused is now accepted on the
strength of an empty or mismatched payload, and sandbox_permissions is never
upgraded on the model's behalf; only the guidance changed.

The one behavioural change is that an explicit additional_permissions: null is
now treated as the omitted field, since a null grants nothing and carries no
flag. That flips three shapes from reject to execute: null with use_default,
with require_escalated, and with no mode at all. The escalated one still routes
through the normal escalation prompt and is not a new capability — the identical
request without the null key already behaved that way. A FLAGGED null still
errors, so with_additional_permissions plus null is not silently downgraded.

Fixes #845. Fixes #847.

* fix(tools): condition the omit guidance on needed access, not read-only

The description said to omit sandbox_permissions "for ordinary commands,
including every read-only one". That overstates it: curl and gh are read-only
and still need sandboxed network, so a model following it literally would omit
the override on a command that genuinely needs one and hit the opposite failure.

It now says to omit unless the command needs access the sandbox does not already
give it. That is the claim that is actually true, and it is one a model can act
on without first deciding what counts as read-only.

The schema test asserted the wrong half too — a bare substring check for
"read-only" pinned the overstatement rather than the contract. It now pins the
conditional, with the reasoning recorded so the weaker assertion does not come
back.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #864.
2026-08-06 21:34:54 +05:30
Anandan edf660ab85 perf: compact common test output (#846)
* perf: compact common test output

* test: strengthen command reducer guarantees

* fix: tighten command output summary detection
2026-08-06 20:35:13 +05:30
Vasanth T 91b413c514 fix(sandbox): stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths (#865)
* fix(sandbox): stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths

The restricted token put the World SID (S-1-1-0, Everyone) in its
restricted-SID list unconditionally, from the original sandbox baseline
and with no comment saying why.

A WRITE_RESTRICTED token runs two checks for a write and needs both: the
normal one against its enabled SIDs, and a second against the restricted
list. The write jail rests entirely on that second check only succeeding
where Zero has explicitly ACL'd a capability SID. Everyone is a SID every
principal carries, so on any path whose DACL grants Everyone write, the
restricted half passed for free and confinement fell back to the ordinary
user's own permissions -- the exact boundary this token exists to be
stricter than.

Reachable with no privilege, no symlink and no race: an Everyone-writable
directory is enough, and share roots opened with Everyone:F and loose
third-party installer ACLs supply them. Ruled out as the common case:
C:\Users\Public\Documents grants BATCH, not Everyone.

The runner already stated the rule this broke -- it declines to add the
user SID, Administrators or SYSTEM because "each has write access nearly
everywhere" -- while listing Everyone among the restricted SIDs.

Removed only from the WRITE_RESTRICTED token, because without that flag it
is load-bearing rather than gratuitous. The restricted-SID check then
applies to reads too, and default Windows DACLs grant BUILTIN\Users rather
than anything in this list, so a token with no Everyone cannot open cmd.exe
and dies at launch with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022). Dropping it
there was tried first and takes TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke with
it. That path is taken only when a profile configures DenyRead, which is
already the posture trading capability for read-deny enforcement (#612), so
the bypass survives there deliberately and narrowly; closing it needs a
read-side grant that is not a universal group.

Verified against real tokens rather than reasoned about. The new smoke test
drives the real runner and asserts three outcomes that only agree when the
jail is intact: a granted root is writable, an ordinary outside path is
denied, and an Everyone-writable outside path is denied too. Before the
change its third case wrote the file with exit 0; the first two were
already correct, which is what made the gap invisible. Restoring the SID
unconditionally turns it red again.

* test(sandbox): make a denied write distinguishable from a runner failure

The denial assertions expected exit 1, which the runner also returns for
its own errors -- a failed marker validation, a bad argument, a token it
could not build. Written that way the test passes both when the sandbox
denies the write and when nothing ever ran, and the second case proves
nothing while being indistinguishable from success.

That is a poor property for any test and a bad one for this test, whose
entire job is to notice a confinement regression. The leading
"granted root is writable" assertion covered part of it, but said nothing
about whether the two later commands launched.

The denial commands now report a distinctive exit code the runner cannot
produce for itself, so the code proves cmd.exe actually ran and its
redirect was refused.

Re-checked in both directions rather than assumed: the test passes against
the fix, and restoring the World SID unconditionally fails it with
"exit code = 0, want 77" -- still catching the bug it was written for.

Raised by CodeRabbit on #865.
2026-08-04 18:51:35 +05:30
Vasanth T 021281ebba fix(cli): report MCP servers that failed to start (#822) (#827)
* fix(cli): report MCP servers that failed to start (#822)

`zero mcp check` inspected only the error returned by registration and then
printed "is reachable". RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a server
that fails to connect is recorded on the runtime and registration returns
nil. That is right for startup, where one bad server must not stop Zero
launching, and wrong here: this is the command a user runs when a server is
misbehaving, and it told them the broken server was fine.

The failure data already existed as SkippedServer{Name, Err}; nothing
consumed it in this path. The check now fails with the recorded error, in
both text and JSON output.

Covered by a test that spawns a genuinely missing command rather than
stubbing the runtime, because the defect was precisely a mismatch between
what registration returns and what it records. Reverting the fix makes it
print "MCP server broken is reachable. 0 tool(s) available."

* test(cli): cover the unreachable --json contract

The text path was covered and the JSON path was not, though the change
adds its own return with a different payload: status "unreachable" plus a
redacted error, rather than status "ok" with a tool count. A caller
parsing that shape was relying on something nothing pinned.

Reverting the fix now fails both cases. The JSON one is the more useful
of the two, because the wrong output is still valid JSON and would decode
cleanly into a caller expecting success.
2026-08-03 22:50:15 +05:30
8e266797a8 perf: improve harness context efficiency (#838)
* Improve harness context efficiency

* Address harness efficiency review findings

* Make recaps idle and cancellable

Delay recap generation until the session has been inactive, orient it around the active goal and next task, cancel stale work on activity, and render the result ephemerally above the composer.

Also strengthen the formatter safety regression to exercise formatter-modified edit output.

* Track every replace-all edit span

Translate each replacement into its post-edit line range, including cumulative shifts from earlier replacements, so follow-up edits remain authorized for every model-supplied change.

* Make review regressions cross-platform

Verify replace-all tracking through the canonical edit tool path instead of a platform-sensitive temp path, and cover cancellation when recaps are disabled during generation.

* fix(tools): derive SeenWhole from the recorded ranges

SeenWhole was a flag set only by a SINGLE read covering the file, while
SeenRange judged coverage from the accumulated ranges. The two then
disagreed about identical reads: after reading lines 1-50 and 51-100 of a
100-line file, SeenRange(1,100) was true and SeenWhole was false.

That matters because write_file gates overwrites on SeenWhole. A file past
the read byte budget cannot be read whole in one call — the read is
truncated and RecordSeenRange is correctly skipped, since the model did not
see those lines — so no sequence of reads could ever set the flag, and the
overwrite was refused permanently with:

    the intended change depends on content that has not been read exactly
    in this session. Read the affected lines with read_file, then retry.

Advice that could not change the answer. edit_file was unaffected because it
gates on SeenRange, so the escape was to edit rather than rewrite, but a
model following the error text would loop.

SeenWhole is now computed from the ranges against the file's recorded line
count, so scoped reads that together cover a file make it writable and the
error text becomes actionable. The observation carries that line count, and
a read reporting a different one clears the accumulated ranges: they
describe a shape the file no longer has.

Coverage is judged by merging sorted ranges rather than walking every line
against every range, which the previous SeenRange did — same answer, and it
no longer scans line-by-line over a large file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(tools): key the large-file test on the resolved path

read_file resolves the workspace root through EvalSymlinks before recording
anything, so the tracker is keyed on the resolved path. The test asserted
against the raw t.TempDir() path, which is the same string on Windows and a
different one on macOS, where the temp dir sits under /var — a symlink to
/private/var. The SeenWhole assertions would have looked up a key that never
existed: passing here, failing on macOS CI.

Also switches the line generator to fmt.Fprintf (staticcheck QF1012).

Both from CodeRabbit on #842.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(tools): actually switch the line generator to fmt.Fprintf

The previous commit's message claimed this was done. It was not: the edit
silently did not apply and I reported it fixed without re-reading the file,
so builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...)) survived at the head — caught by
@anandh8x, not by me.

Verified this time by running the linter rather than by reading the diff:
golangci-lint --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./internal/tools/
reports 0 issues.

* fix: keep exact-read workflows recoverable

* test: cover permission normalization wiring

* fix: commit file observations after output budgeting

* fix: defer file observations across retries

* test: normalize patch line endings

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:30:03 +05:30
Anandan d37de9214b fix: use OAuth credentials in provider health checks (#828)
* fix: use OAuth credentials in provider health checks

* fix(providerhealth): verify OAuth login for all probes

* fix(providerhealth): retain API key redaction

* fix(providerhealth): redact bare OAuth tokens

* test(cli): isolate OAuth doctor config

* test(cli): isolate doctor config path
2026-07-30 22:32:58 +05:30
Anandan 588635487f feat(tui): replace /retitle with local /rename (#826)
* Improve session naming and resume picker

* Address session rename review feedback
2026-07-30 19:58:02 +05:30
Anandan 845df6c7d2 fix(tui): hide unavailable sidebar shortcut (#821)
* fix(tui): hide unavailable sidebar shortcut

* test(tui): cover medium sidebar footer hint
2026-07-30 17:33:08 +05:30
Anandan 15eb16f736 fix(tui): exclude permission waits from turn time (#820)
* fix(tui): exclude permission waits from turn time

* fix(tui): exclude permission waits from TTFT
2026-07-30 17:03:27 +05:30
github-actions[bot] 097c2652cb chore(main): release 0.6.0 (#786)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-29 09:56:37 +08:00
15b7a5475c fix(acp): interrupt idle reads on cancellation (#782)
* fix(acp): interrupt idle reads on cancellation

* fix(acp): make idle-read interruption per-Read, not per-Serve-call

Addresses the P2 on #782.

The previous design raced a single, whole-connection Once (endRead) between the
read loop's own "I have a terminal result" claim and a watcher goroutine's
"ctx is done, treat this as interrupted" claim. This has a real, deterministic
failure mode that has nothing to do with goroutine-scheduling luck: bufio.Reader
can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call (io.Reader
explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a line delimiter is found
within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for that call, but
bufio caches the error internally and returns it — without ever touching the
underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. If cancellation
happens in the gap between that first, successful read and the next one (e.g.
while a synchronously-dispatched handler is still writing its response), the
watcher's ctx.Done() case fires and claims the Once BEFORE the read loop ever
gets back to a ReadBytes call — so when the cached error then surfaces (with
zero contact with the underlying reader, let alone anything closing it), it is
misattributed as a cancellation-driven interruption and silently swallowed as a
clean shutdown, hiding a genuine broken transport.

The fix moves interruption-detection down to the Read call itself instead of
bracketing the whole Serve loop. interruptibleReader wraps the connection's
reader: each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it
against ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is
returned untouched — cancellation a moment later has no bearing on a call that
already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, the reader is closed (when
closable) to nudge a genuinely blocked read, a generation counter is bumped, and
the call still waits for and returns the underlying call's own result rather
than a synthesized one.

Serve then brackets each ReadBytes call (which may invoke the wrapped Read zero
or more times — zero when bufio answers from its own buffer, including a
previously-cached error) with a snapshot of that counter before and after. A
read whose bracket shows no change was never raced against cancellation — either
answered from the buffer or genuinely completed before ctx.Done() could matter —
so its outcome is reported truthfully regardless of the ctx state by the time it
surfaces. Only a bracket that changed proves this specific call actually took
the cancellation branch.

Verified the fix has teeth: reverted to the original implementation and
confirmed the new regression test (which forces the exact bufio-caching
sequence deterministically, with a panic guard proving the underlying reader is
never called a second time) fails 100% of the time against it, then restored
the fix and confirmed it passes.

Also applied the two open review threads on the existing tests: readStarted and
writeStarted are now buffered channels with non-blocking sends rather than
close(), so a future change causing an extra read or write can't panic on a
double-close.

Validated with go build/vet/test on Windows, plus go vet/build and
`go test -race ./internal/acp/... -count=50` (and count=100 focused on the
cancellation/error tests) under WSL/Linux — this session's Windows host has no
C toolchain for -race directly.

* fix(acp): preserve decided read results and require explicit reader ownership

Addresses jatmn's two #782 review findings:

- interruptibleReader.Read's select between resultCh and ctx.Done()
  chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready, so a real terminal read
  error decided just before cancellation could be misattributed to
  shutdown and silently swallowed. Re-check resultCh non-blockingly
  before claiming a call for cancellation.

- NewConn inferred reader ownership from an io.Closer assertion and
  closed any reader that happened to implement it, including one a
  caller merely borrowed. Split into NewConn (never closes r) and
  NewOwnedConn (explicit ownership, closes r on cancellation), and
  switch the sole production call site (process stdin) to the latter.

Also applies CodeRabbit's atomic.Int64 and leading-ctx-parameter nits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): synchronize read completion with cancellation

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-9e4e-7506-85ab-e151888bfd71

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): preserve read completion across cancellation

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(acp): bound buffered error synchronization

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): report shutdown transport errors

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(acp): inject cancellation context

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 09:46:55 +08:00
bdbda89f3e fix(swarm): close lifecycle admission on shutdown (#776)
* fix(swarm): close lifecycle admission on shutdown

* fix(swarm): admit lifecycle work without holding the lock across Launch

Addresses the P1 on #776 plus the two documentation P3s.

[P1] beginLifecycleAdmission returned with lifecycleMu.RLock() held for the
caller's entire duration — including the call into the injected
MemberLauncher.Launch. Close needs the write lock before it can call s.cancel(),
so a launcher that blocks in Launch waiting on its context (the ordinary shape of
a launcher that waits for a slot, a daemon connection, or a sandbox handshake)
deadlocked every Close caller: the launch held the read lock while Close waited
for the write lock to reach the very cancellation the launch needed to unblock.

beginLifecycleAdmission is now a counted ticket: it holds lifecycleMu only across
the closed check and a lifecycleWork.Add(1), then returns a release func
(lifecycleWork.Done) the caller defers. Close flips closed and releases the lock
BEFORE calling cancel, then waits out lifecycleWork (admitted-but-unfinished
work) followed by watchers (goroutines admitted work may still be starting) — so
it remains a true completion barrier without holding any lock across external
launcher code. Every call site (Spawn, Handoff, AdoptOrphans, the retry path in
watch, and afterExit) moved to the ticket pattern.

[P3] beginLifecycleAdmission's contract and the Scheduler/Close handoff are now
both documented at the point that matters: the func-returning signature makes
the release contract explicit in the type itself, and Scheduler's comment spells
out why the read/write lock ordering guarantees exactly one of Scheduler or
Close closes whatever scheduler ends up installed.

Tests: TestCloseCancelsLauncherBlockedInLaunch reproduces the exact deadlock
(spawn parked in Launch, Close in a second goroutine, both must complete once
cancellation reaches the launcher) — verified it hangs under the old held-lock
pattern by temporarily restoring it. TestCloseWaitsForAdmittedSpawn is the
converse: Close must not return while an admitted spawn is still running.

Validated with `go test -race ./internal/swarm/... -count=1` under WSL/Linux
(this session's Windows host has no C toolchain for -race directly), plus
`go vet ./...` under WSL and go build/vet/test on Windows.

* fix(swarm): fail late queue admissions and dequeues after shutdown

Addresses jatmn's two #776 review findings:

- Close swept (clearQueue) every team's queue before waiting for
  admitted-but-in-flight lifecycle operations to finish. A Spawn,
  Handoff, or AdoptOrphans call that got its ticket right before
  closed flipped could still append to a team's queue after the
  sweep ran, stranding that spec forever (never launched, since
  shutdown began; never failed, since the sweep won't run again).
  Reorder Close to wait for lifecycleWork before sweeping queues, so
  every queue append from already-admitted work is visible to the
  sweep.

- afterExitAdmitted dequeued a queued spec (t.onExit) and launched it
  unconditionally once its own ticket was granted, even though Close
  can flip closed in the gap between that dequeue (which makes the
  spec invisible to the clearQueue sweep) and the launch. Re-check
  closed after dequeuing so a spec pulled off the queue after
  shutdown began fails with ErrSwarmClosed instead of starting a new
  worker.

Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code
(confirmed by temporarily reverting each fix and rerunning).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): snapshot teams after lifecycle work stops

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-a4d5-7078-a80b-802bab23607e

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): reject late admitted launches during shutdown

Re-check the closed state at the final launcher boundary so lifecycle work admitted before Close cannot start or retry a member after shutdown has already won the race.

Add deterministic late-dispatch and scheduler-handoff coverage, stress concurrent Spawn and Close under the race detector, and keep the late-team snapshot regression isolated from launcher behavior.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-4f7f-766e-a312-a7db232b9987

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): reject post-close launch commits

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): gate retry relaunch on the post-close commit

The post-Launch shutdown gate added for spawns and queue drains was missing
from the bounded-retry path, which called the launcher and swapped in the new
handle unguarded. Since FuncLauncher returns a live handle immediately without
consulting its context, a Close landing between the pre-check and Launch's
return left the watcher supervising a member relaunched after shutdown began —
and recording that member's outcome on the task.

Extract the commit gate as commitLaunch and route the relaunch through it via
relaunchAdmitted, so an initial launch and a retry pass the same three gates:
admission, the pre-Launch re-check, and the post-Launch commit. When shutdown
wins, the handle is reaped and the watcher records the terminal failure instead
of adopting it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 09:46:25 +08:00
Vasanth T 8acd42a3bd fix(providers): retry provably pre-send transport failures (#447) (#750)
* fix(providers): retry provably pre-send transport failures (#447)

A flaky link that failed the streaming completion POST at connect time
stopped the turn and forced a manual continue, because the shared retry
layer never retries transport errors: a completion POST is
non-idempotent, so a replay could duplicate billable work.

That rationale does not apply to a PROVABLY pre-send failure, where no
request bytes ever left this host: a replay cannot duplicate anything,
exactly like a 429/503 where the server told us it did not accept the
request. SendWithRetry now retries, with the existing backoff, only that
narrow class: DNS resolution failure, a refused or unreachable dial, and
a TLS handshake timeout. Every ambiguous or post-send failure stays
unretried and is checked first so a mixed message can never be misread:
connection reset, broken pipe, EOF, a bare i/o timeout, context
deadline. All three providers route their completion POST through this
layer, so one change covers them uniformly.

This deliberately narrows the issue's ask (which listed connection
reset) to the provably-safe subset, and keeps the reset-stays-unretried
test green. Tests cover the retry-on-pre-send, no-retry-on-ambiguous,
and predicate-classification paths.

NOTE FOR REVIEW: this refines a deliberately conservative, documented
no-retry stance. Opening it for the owner's sign-off on the stance, not
as a settled call.

* fix(providers): classify pre-send dials by errno so Windows retries too

CodeRabbit flagged that the pre-send predicate matched only POSIX dial
wording, so a refused or unreachable dial on Windows (whose text differs
entirely: 'No connection could be made because the target machine
actively refused it') would not be retried.

Match the syscall errno via errors.Is instead: Go maps ECONNREFUSED /
ENETUNREACH / EHOSTUNREACH / ECONNRESET to the host's real values,
including the WSA codes on Windows, so classification is identical on
every platform. Errno matching is also authoritative where the string
markers were only heuristic, closing the theoretical substring gap. The
string markers stay as a fallback for errors already flattened to text.
ECONNRESET is added to the post-send exclusions by identity so a Windows
reset is excluded too.

Tests build the production error shape (net.OpError -> os.SyscallError ->
errno) so the Windows path is exercised portably on every platform, plus
an end-to-end SendWithRetry case for an errno-wrapped refused dial. Cross
-compiled and vetted for linux and darwin.

* fix(providers): scope pre-send retry to the dial phase and fail fast on permanent errors

Addresses gnanam's two [Major] review findings on this PR.

[Major] Pre-send errno classification was not scoped to the dial, so a post-send
read/write carrying ECONNREFUSED/ENETUNREACH/EHOSTUNREACH (a route dropping
mid-generation) was misclassified "provably pre-send" and could replay a
non-idempotent completion POST up to 6 times. errors.Is matches an errno
anywhere in the chain regardless of which operation raised it, so
isPreSendTransportError now requires an Op=="dial" *net.OpError before admitting
those errnos or their POSIX wording. That makes "no request bytes were sent"
structural: a post-send failure can no longer replay a POST. The dial errno
match still covers Windows (Go maps the WSA* codes), so the platform coverage
this PR added is preserved.

[Major] Permanent failures hung the agent ~60s on the 429-tuned schedule.
NXDOMAIN (net.DNSError with IsNotFound) is now treated as permanent and not
retried, and the pre-send path gets its own short bound and sub-second schedule
(preSendMaxAttempts=3, 500ms/1s) instead of reusing the 2/4/8/16/30s rate-limit
backoff, so a mistyped host or a dead local daemon fails in about 1.5s.

[Minor] Fixed the stale SendWithRetry doc that still claimed transport errors are
never replayed.

Tests: post-send read/write errnos and NXDOMAIN now assert exactly 1 call (no
replay); dial errnos plus the string fallback assert the pre-send cap; added the
pre-send backoff schedule. Race detector and all provider packages green.

* fix(providers): match Windows WSA dial errnos so refused dials retry on Windows too

CodeRabbit caught a real Windows bug, which I verified with a real dial on
Windows: errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED) returns FALSE for a refused dial
there, because a real Windows dial carries the raw WSAECONNREFUSED (10061) while
Go's syscall.ECONNREFUSED is a distinct value the net package never produces. The
POSIX string fallback ("connection refused") does not match the Windows wording
("No connection could be made because the target machine actively refused it")
either. So the pre-send dial classification silently never fired on Windows, the
exact platform this PR set out to fix.

Move the dial errnos into a platform-specific list (dialPreSendErrnos): POSIX
everywhere, plus the WSA* codes on Windows. The existing wrapDialErrno fixtures
wrap the Go syscall constants, which is why they passed on both platforms and
missed this. Adds TestIsPreSendTransportErrorRealRefusedDial, which does a REAL
refused dial and asserts pre-send classification, so the platform's true error
shape is exercised on every OS.

* fix(providers): exclude Plan 9 from the POSIX dial-errno build tag

* fix(providers): keep the pre-send errno classification off Plan 9

retry.go referenced syscall.ECONNRESET and dialPreSendErrnos directly, but the
errno definitions live in build-tagged files that exclude Plan 9 (which has no
BSD-style errno constants), so the package stopped compiling for GOOS=plan9 on
this branch even though it builds on the merge base.

Move the two syscall touch-points behind per-platform helpers: retry.go now
calls isConnResetErrno and ranges dialPreSendErrnos, both provided by
retry_dialerrno.go, retry_dialerrno_windows.go, and a new
retry_dialerrno_plan9.go. The Plan 9 variant supplies an empty errno list and a
false isConnResetErrno, so retry.go falls back to its existing string-marker
heuristics there. Behavior on linux/darwin/windows is unchanged (isConnResetErrno
matches the same syscall.ECONNRESET as before). retry_test.go is tagged !plan9
because it constructs real syscall.Errno dial shapes.

Verified: GOOS=plan9 build and vet now pass; windows and linux build, vet, gofmt,
and the full providerio test suite stay green.

* fix(providers): stop pre-send retry from replaying a redirected POST

Addresses jatmn's review on #750.

[P1] client.Do could follow a 307/308 after already transmitting the original
POST, and a dial failure to the redirect target then satisfied
isPreSendTransportError and replayed the request, re-billing a completion the
first host already received. SendWithRetry now disables redirect following
(CheckRedirect returns http.ErrUseLastResponse on a cloned client), so any
dial/DNS/TLS error from Do can only come from the single initial request and
the pre-send classification is sound. A 3xx surfaces as the response for the
caller's existing non-2xx handling. Regression test asserts the POST is sent
once and the 307 is not followed.

[P2] The pre-send retry used the loop-wide attempt counter shared with 429/503
retries, so a couple of status retries exhausted the pre-send budget and the
first dial/DNS/TLS blip after them got no retry. Track pre-send failures and
their backoff ordinal in a separate counter. Regression test covers a
status-then-transport-failure sequence.

[P3] Correct the Plan 9 and wrapDialErrno comments: the Plan 9 string-marker
fallback keeps the pre-send inclusions and the separate reset exclusion, and
the errno fixtures do not reproduce a real Windows dial (that carries distinct
WSA errnos), which the real-dial test covers.

* fix(providers): decouple the status retry budget from pre-send retries

Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.

The previous change gave pre-send failures their own counter, but every retry
still advanced the loop-wide attempt counter that the 429/503 branch used. So
the coupling survived in the opposite direction: two safely replayed refused
dials shortened the later status retry window and started its backoff at a
later rung.

Give the status path its own statusAttempts counter and backoff ordinal. With
both budgets tracked separately the shared loop counter has no remaining
reader, so the loop no longer carries one. Behaviour is unchanged when only one
kind of failure occurs: the first retryable status still waits on rung 1 and
still gets maxAttempts requests.

Adds TestSendWithRetryStatusBudgetSurvivesPreSendRetries, the inverse of the
existing mixed-sequence test: two refused dials followed by rate limiting must
still leave the status path its full window.

* fix(providers): keep following redirects, but never replay a redirected POST

Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.

Blocking redirects outright was too blunt. SendWithRetry is the shared
completion path, so replacing every caller's CheckRedirect with
ErrUseLastResponse turned a legitimate 307/308 from a redirecting
OpenAI-compatible gateway into a terminal non-2xx that providers report as an
upstream error, and it discarded an injected client's redirect policy.

Observe the redirect instead of preventing it: a per-attempt flag is set from
CheckRedirect, which then delegates to the caller's policy when one is set and
otherwise mirrors net/http's default ten-hop cap. The pre-send retry is gated on
that flag, so an attempt that entered a redirect is never replayed while
redirecting endpoints keep working. The safety property is unchanged, since a
dial failure on a redirect hop follows a POST the origin already received.

Adds three regressions: a redirect is followed through to the final response, a
dial failure after a redirect is not replayed, and a caller-supplied
CheckRedirect still runs and still decides.

* test(providerio): pin the redirect asymmetry for retryable statuses

A reviewer read the redirect guard as incomplete, because it stops a redirected
POST being replayed after a transport error but not after a 429/503/529. The
asymmetry is intentional, and nothing recorded that, so the next reader would
reasonably reach the same conclusion.

The two cases differ in what is known about the request. A transport failure
after a redirect leaves it unknown whether the redirect target received and
began processing the POST, so replaying could duplicate billable work. A
retryable status means every hop answered: the 307/308 is the origin declining
and delegating, and the 429 is the target declining as well, so nothing accepted
the request and a replay duplicates nothing.

The exposure is also the same as a retryable status with no redirect involved,
which this package has always retried, so guarding here would not close a gap.
It would make a rate-limited completion behind a redirecting gateway fail
outright rather than back off, which is the regression class already raised
against disabling redirects wholesale.

Adds the case as a test asserting the intended behaviour, plus a comment at the
branch explaining why it is not guarded.

* fix(providers): retry connect timeouts and proxy CONNECT failures

Three classification gaps against #447, all raised in review.

A connect-phase timeout was never retried. It is provably pre-send for the same
structural reason a refused dial is, since the connection was never established
and no request bytes left this host, but it arrives carrying "i/o timeout" and
the blanket wording exclusion rejected it before the connect gate could admit
it. Intermittent connect timeouts are exactly the transient failure the issue
is about, so the most common case was the one not covered. It is now admitted
ahead of the wording exclusions, gated on the connect phase so a post-send read
timeout, which is also Timeout(), still cannot replay a POST.

A failed CONNECT through an HTTP proxy was never retried either. net tags it Op
"proxyconnect" rather than "dial", so it missed the gate entirely. Same
guarantee applies: the tunnel to the model host was never built. The gate now
accepts both, which matters most in the environment where transient connect
failures are most common.

ETIMEDOUT and WSAETIMEDOUT join the errno lists so a connect timeout still
classifies if it reaches us with the errno but without the timeout flag.

The pre-send budget also now resets after a hop that reaches the server. It is
meant to bound consecutive connect failures, not the lifetime of the call, and
without the reset an early run of blips permanently spent it, so a later blip
surfaced as a transport error while the status budget still had room. That is
the coupling the two counters were split apart to remove, in the one ordering
the earlier tests missed. Total work stays bounded, since every reset costs a
status attempt and those are capped.

Also corrects the SendWithAuthRetry comment, which still claimed the inner path
retried only 429/503/529.

Tests cover dial and proxyconnect timeouts as retryable and read/write timeouts
as not, a refused proxy CONNECT, and the interleaved pre-send/status/pre-send
sequence. Each fix fails its test when reverted.
2026-07-28 22:42:01 +08:00
Vasanth T 1c38e8cba5 fix(config): make the provider-command timeout an upper bound (#811) (#813)
providerCommandTimeout bounded only the wait, so the call could take arbitrarily
longer than the 5s its error text promised. Two phases sat outside it.

Starting the process ran before the clock began. On Windows that is
CREATE_SUSPENDED, job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread
snapshot, none of it fast on a cold or contended machine. The deadline is now
armed first and the start races it, so process creation is inside the budget.

Draining after termination was unbounded too: the timer path called Terminate
and then received on the wait with no limit. Terminate normally makes that
immediate, which is exactly why it survived unnoticed, but a tree that resists
termination held the call open long past the deadline that had just expired.
That receive is now bounded, and a call that gives up leaves cmd.Wait running,
so the output buffers are synchronised: the I/O pump keeps writing into buffers
the caller already holds, which a plain bytes.Buffer cannot survive.

The timeout error also carried nothing actionable. It was a bare string with the
underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped, so a user whose provider
command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or what the command had said.
It now names the phase, wraps the cause, and includes the redacted output the
failure path already had.

Both bounds are asserted on extracted helpers rather than end to end, because
end to end they are untestable: a terminated command stops writing and its wait
returns at once, so an unbounded drain and an unsynchronised buffer both pass a
whole-call test. The first version of these tests did exactly that and proved
nothing. Removing either bound now fails, as does arming the deadline after the
start, which reports the wrong phase.
2026-07-28 22:41:09 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 58daea7a48 feat(providers): add Fireworks AI provider preset (#772)
* feat(providers): add Fireworks AI provider preset

Add an OpenAI-compatible Fireworks catalog entry with curated coding
models, models.dev alias mapping, onboarding tests, and README setup.

* fix(provider): use correct Fireworks DeepSeek V3 model ID

Update default and catalog model IDs to deepseek-v3-0324 per Fireworks API.
2026-07-28 22:40:41 +08:00
Vasanth T 3e7692d8f0 fix(sandbox): scrub the daemon token file pointer (#677) (#818)
scrubSensitiveEnv removed ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN but not its file
counterpart. TokenFromEnv accepts either form, so a sandboxed command
still inherited the path to the bridge token, and the default posture is
read-all, so it could then read the token itself.

Scrubbing the pointer is the whole fix rather than half of one: the path
comes from this variable alone and TokenFromEnv has no default location
to fall back on, so a command that never sees the variable has nothing to
guess at. This mirrors GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, which is already
scrubbed for the same reason.

Extends the existing scrub table, which compares the surviving
environment exactly, so the case fails if the entry is dropped. Verified:
without the fix the assertion reports ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN_FILE
surviving into the scrubbed environment.
2026-07-28 21:56:28 +08:00
Vasanth T 33c94ec7a3 fix(sandbox): deny reads of git's credential stores (#815) (#816)
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of git's credential stores (#815)

git's credential-store backend keeps host passwords and personal access tokens
in cleartext, at ~/.git-credentials or ~/.config/git/credentials depending on
whether the user is on the XDG layout. Neither was on the deny list, so any
command the agent runs could read them.

Scoped to those two files deliberately. #815 also covers SSH private keys and
the GPG keyring, and those are a harder trade: denying ~/.ssh stops a sandboxed
git push over SSH from working, and excluding that directory is not even
sufficient, since an IdentityFile directive can point key material anywhere.
These two cost nothing by comparison, because git reads them to authenticate
rather than to know who the user is, so a sandboxed git keeps working and
simply cannot act as the user.

The XDG one denies the file rather than the directory around it, which is the
opposite of the choice made for ~/.config/zero and is deliberate: ~/.config/git
also holds the global git config, which userGitConfigReadPaths grants on
purpose so a sandboxed git can read user.name and aliases instead of failing
outright. Denying the directory would take that away.

Tests assert both stores are denied, that the git config beside the XDG one
stays readable, and that an explicit read grant still re-includes them like
every other entry. Dropping either entry fails the first; widening the XDG
entry to the directory fails the config assertion.

* test(sandbox): assert the credential deny exists before the grant lifts it

The allow-read case only checked that the credential store was absent from
the deny list once an explicit grant covered it. A deny rule that was never
added satisfies that just as well, so the test passed with the production
change reverted and proved nothing about the interaction it was named for.

Check both runs: denied with no grant, absent with one. The first leg is
what establishes there is something for the grant to override.
2026-07-28 18:31:33 +08:00
Vasanth T c9f9dc02ef test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows (#814)
* test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows

This package fails on every run on a Windows box without PowerShell 7, which
is what a stock install is: PowerShell 7 is a separate download. CI never sees
any of it, because the runners have 7. Three distinct causes, all surfaced by
the move to PowerShell in #804.

The stop-intent test waited a fixed second for a session to die and asserted on
whatever was true by then. Under cmd.exe that was enough; under PowerShell the
tree is slower to stand up and tear down, and the FIRST stop in a fresh process
pays the interpreter's cold start, so it routinely returned with termination
under way but unfinished. The assertion read that as a failed stop. It now
re-sends the stop until the session reports it has exited. Repeating is safe,
since Terminate is a no-op against an already-dead tree, and it keeps the
interrupt flag that a poll with empty chars would drop.

Separately, and pre-existing, every test that starts a session hit a teardown
race: a terminated process does not release its handles the instant the session
reports exited, and Windows refuses to remove a directory with an open handle
where POSIX does not. t.TempDir removes once and fails the test on the sharing
violation, so ordinary teardown timing was reported as a broken test. Those
roots now clean up with a bounded retry, and give up quietly rather than
failing: the process is already terminated, so the worst case is a stale
directory under the OS temp root.

Last, the MSYS guard test asserted a windows_shell_syntax block using a command
containing `&&`. On PowerShell 5.1 the windows_powershell_version preflight
added by #804 fires first and shadows it. The `&&` was incidental to what that
case is about, so it is gone. This one is worth noting as a shape rather than a
typo: a new preflight silently changed which block an older assertion got, and
only on the shell CI does not run.

Verified by running the package repeatedly rather than once: previously failing
on every run, now passing 3 of 3, and the stop-intent test passing 8 of 8 alone
and 6 of 6 under CPU contention. Disabling the terminate path still fails it,
so the assertion continues to bind.

* test(tools): assert the stop intent killed the session

The retry loop added to survive a slow PowerShell teardown also made the
test unfalsifiable. The helper sleeps 5s, well inside the 30s deadline, so
a terminate that did nothing at all would let the sleep end on its own and
every existing assertion would still hold: the session reports exited, it
reports an exit code, and the interrupted flag echoes the request rather
than the outcome. Neutering KillProcessTree confirmed it, the test passed.

Assert instead that the helper's completion line never appears, which
distinguishes a killed session from a finished one without depending on
how long the loop took. Output is accumulated across every poll rather
than read off the last result, because each continuation returns only what
the session produced since the previous collection.
2026-07-28 18:00:41 +08:00
Vasanth T ec3b822505 fix(tui): paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V (#534) (#807)
* fix(tui): paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V

Ctrl+V did nothing when the clipboard held a screenshot, while right-click
paste attached it. The image plumbing was already there: routePaste probes the
OS clipboard for an image whenever a paste arrives with empty text.

The gap is that a clipboard holding only an image produces no bracketed paste
at all, since the terminal has no text to send, so routePaste never runs and its
probe never fires. Right-click reached the probe only because that path always
delivers a clipboardReadMsg, empty or not. Bubble's own Ctrl+V binding stays
disabled, so nothing else was listening for the key.

Handle Ctrl+V by issuing the image probe directly. It reads image content only,
never text, so bracketed paste remains the single text path and a Ctrl+V with
text on the clipboard is unaffected. The probe yields no message when there is
no image, keeping it a silent no-op, and it is gated on noBlockingModal so a
permission prompt or picker still swallows the key.

readClipboardImage becomes a var so the tests stub it instead of depending on
the machine's real clipboard.

Fixes #534

* fix(tui): also probe the clipboard on Cmd+V, and test the real key route

Two things raised in review, both fair.

The handler matched keyCtrl only, which is ModCtrl. macOS reports Command as
ModSuper, as the rest of the TUI already models it, so Cmd+V never reached the
image probe even though the change claimed to cover it. It now matches both, via
a keySuper helper alongside the existing modifier helpers.

Worth being precise about the limit: this only helps where the terminal delivers
the key to the application. A terminal that handles Cmd+V itself pastes the
clipboard TEXT and sends no key event at all, so an image-only clipboard still
produces nothing for this to react to. That is a separate problem from the one
being fixed here.

The tests also did not exercise the route they were named for. One asserted that
Update returned some non-nil command and then ran a freshly built probe; the
other never called Update at all. Both now stub the reader BEFORE Update and run
the command Update actually returned.

That matters more than it sounds. Making the branch return a different non-nil
command leaves the old assertion passing and fails the new one, which is exactly
the hole: the old test proved a command was issued, not that it was the image
probe. Removing the route entirely, or reverting to ModCtrl only, also fails now.

* fix(imageinput): report an unreadable clipboard image instead of silence

On macOS the clipboard reader shells to pngpaste or a PyObjC one-liner, and
neither ships with the OS: pngpaste is Homebrew-only and Apple dropped the
bundled PyObjC. A stock Mac therefore fails every time, and the failure was
returned as (nil, nil), which the caller reads as "no image on the clipboard"
and treats as a silent no-op. Pressing Ctrl+V produced nothing at all: no
image, no error, no hint that anything was missing.

The darwin path already knows the difference. It probes with `clipboard info`
first and only reaches the extraction step once the clipboard is confirmed to
hold an image, so a failure there is not absence, it is "there is an image and
nothing here can read it". That now returns ErrClipboardImageUnreadable, which
the existing error path turns into a transcript notice naming what to install.

The defect predates this branch, but this branch is what makes the path
reachable from Ctrl+V, so shipping without it would close #534 with a feature
that is inert on one of the three platforms. Raised by gnanam, who measured it
on a real Mac rather than inferring it.

Deliberately narrow. The Linux arm cannot tell "no tool" from "no image"
without probing separately, and Windows uses PowerShell, which is always
present, so neither is touched.

The test drives the whole path: stubbed reader returns the error, Ctrl+V
issues the probe, and the assertion is that the failure reaches the transcript
as an error row rather than stopping earlier. Swallowing the error again makes
it fail.

* test(imageinput): cover the darwin unreadable-clipboard decision itself

The test added with the fix asserted around the change rather than on it. It
substituted ReadClipboardImage with a stub returning the error, which proves
the TUI surfaces an error handed to it, but never reaches
readClipboardImageDarwin, where the decision lives. Reverting both production
return sites to nil,nil left every package green, which is the definition of a
test that is not testing the change. Caught by gnanam.

readClipboardImageDarwin shells out twice and had no seam, so the two steps are
now package-level vars, the same shape as the readClipboardImage var this
change already relied on. That makes the case that matters reachable: the info
probe succeeds and reports an image, and the extractor then fails. It cannot be
arranged from outside the function, because from there both steps are one
opaque call.

Five cases, and the negative ones carry as much weight as the positive. An
image with no working extractor, and an extractor that exits 0 with no bytes,
must both be actionable. A clipboard offering no image, and a failing info
probe, must both stay silent, because turning those into a notice would make
every stray Ctrl+V nag the user. The extractor must not run at all in either
silent case.

Repeating gnanam's experiment now fails: reverting both return sites to nil,nil
fails the two actionable cases and leaves the silent ones passing, which is
exactly the discrimination the fix is supposed to add.
2026-07-28 17:51:28 +08:00
Anandan 81a5e6cb71 fix(sandbox): preserve user config and retry denied writes (#801)
* fix(sandbox): preserve user config and retry denied writes

Keep user identity and configuration paths discoverable while retaining managed cache and temporary storage. Classify native sandbox failures as typed recoverable denials so approved commands can retry outside the sandbox.

Add regression coverage for global Git ignores, typed denial handling, and permission retry behavior.

* fix(sandbox): tighten denial retry safeguards

* test(sandbox): assert denial contract

* fix(sandbox): trust typed denials and restore Cargo state

Stop promoting command output keywords into recoverable unrestricted denials, so only structured adapter facts can enter the approved unsandboxed retry path.

Restore the managed CARGO_HOME directory and environment override so Cargo remains writable while the caller's real home stays read-only.

* fix(sandbox): mask preserved credential configs

Preserving caller configuration made credential-bearing tool files discoverable under Linux's read-all sandbox profile. Add default and environment-overridden npm, GitHub CLI, netrc, Docker, Kubernetes, and Zero config paths to the credential deny set, with regression coverage.

Clarify the typed-denial retry and platform read-model comments without changing the approval behavior.

* fix(sandbox): protect custom gcloud config

CLOUDSDK_CONFIG can relocate gcloud credentials outside the XDG-derived default. Include the configured directory in the credential deny profile and cover the override with a regression test.

* fix(sandbox): deny zero credential directory

* test(sandbox): keep zero credential directory deny path expectations
2026-07-27 15:35:04 +05:30
Anandan 5d1869e7bc feat: add persistent session goals (#803)
* feat: add persistent session goals

* Fix goal run isolation and guards

* Strengthen loop goal isolation test

* Cover goal edit state transitions

* fix(goal): bound automatic continuations

Persist a provider-independent continuation limit, require approval for model-created goals, and keep resume, BTW, and loop runs from starting or charging unrelated goal work.

Also reject trailing lifecycle arguments and bound persisted objective length.

* fix(goal): resume continuations after btw
2026-07-27 13:22:09 +05:30
Anandan 518d2e53ba fix(windows): use PowerShell for command execution (#804)
* fix(windows): prefer PowerShell for command execution

Detect PowerShell 7 or Windows PowerShell before falling back to cmd.exe, and share the selected host shell across agent tools and the interactive shell escape.

Configure UTF-8 output, preserve restricted-sandbox MSYS safeguards, and add Windows coverage for pipelines, workspace writes, and interactive stdin sessions.

* test(windows): align shell coverage with PowerShell

Make Windows command fixtures and guidance assertions follow the selected host shell, preserve cmd fallback coverage, and use a genuine MSYS executable when PowerShell aliases are available.

Remove the unsupported non-TTY PowerShell stdin assertion; Windows interactive stdin requires a separate PTY transport.

* fix(sandbox): classify Windows executable suffixes

Normalize .exe, .cmd, .bat, and .com command names before safety and network lookup so PowerShell invocations such as curl.cmd receive the same network permission handling as curl.

Add analyzer and engine-level regressions for the Windows PowerShell command shape observed in CI.

* fix(sandbox): normalize absolute Windows command paths

Extract drive-letter and UNC basenames before removing shell escape characters so fully qualified Windows executables continue matching canonical safety and network classifications.

Cover both drive and UNC curl paths with analyzer regressions.

* fix(sandbox): normalize relative Windows paths

Recognize drive-relative, explicit relative, and suffixed backslash executable paths before generic shell escape removal so Windows commands continue to match canonical sandbox risk entries.

* fix(windows): harden PowerShell execution

* fix(sandbox): classify PowerShell removal aliases
2026-07-27 13:21:47 +05:30
Vasanth T d82b94defe test(cli): order the prewarm probe against the turn (#809)
* test(cli): order the prewarm probe against the turn

TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate intermittently sees zero prewarm HEAD
probes on the Windows runner. It polled for up to 5s after the run returned,
reasoning that the deadline exceeded the 3s prewarm timeout so a slow probe
could not flake it. That reasoning does not hold. The probe is issued on the
run's context and runExec cancels that context as it returns, because the stop
function signalContext hands back is a CancelFunc. Once the run is over the
probe is cancelled rather than slow, so polling cannot observe one that has not
already landed, at any deadline.

Against a mock server the turn finishes in microseconds, which leaves the probe
racing teardown. The turn now blocks until the probe arrives, giving it a
window while the run is still alive. The wait is bounded, so a probe that never
fires still fails the assertion with a useful message.

This widens the window rather than closing it: prewarmTimeout is armed inside
the probe goroutine, so holding the turn cannot extend it. The comment says so,
and names prewarmTimeout as the thing to look at if this ever recurs.

* test(cli): fail when the prewarm hold gives up

The bounded wait let the turn proceed after its guard expired, so a probe that
arrived late still left the count at 1 and the test passed. That proves the
probe was eventually received, not that it preceded the turn, which is the only
thing this test claims. Raised by CodeRabbit.

The expiry is now recorded and checked before the count, since the count cannot
tell the two apart.

Verified by suppressing the probe, which makes the guard expire: the assertion
fires with its own message rather than the count assertion, and the run takes
the full guard duration.
2026-07-27 12:12:34 +08:00
88fb7b6192 fix(sandbox): add platform-specific write lock around grant state file (#752) (#755)
* fix(sandbox): add platform-specific write lock around grant state file (#752)

Add grants_lock_unix.go and grants_lock_windows.go with a lockStateFile
method that serializes access to the persisted grant state across
processes. Wire the lock into Grant, GrantCommandPrefix, Revoke,
RevokePath, and Clear.

Also add .gitattributes to force LF line endings for Go files so
gofmt checks pass on Windows.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sandbox): do not lock the grants file when there is no notice to consume

Addresses jatmn's #755 finding.

ConsumeMigrationNotice took the interprocess lock unconditionally, and
lockStateFile MkdirAlls the grants directory and creates
<grants>.lockfile. Every startup and every 'zero exec' calls this, so it
turned reading the grant state into requiring a WRITABLE grants
directory: a user with no grants file whose ZERO_SANDBOX_GRANTS_PATH (or
its parent config directory) sits on a read-only mount failed outright
with 'failed to migrate sandbox grants', where the pre-lock code read an
empty state and wrote nothing.

Peek at the state without the lock first and return early when no
migration write is required. Only when one is — a schema/policy
migration, or clearing NoticePending — take the lock and re-read under
it, since the unlocked peek is a snapshot another process may have
already consumed or migrated, and is meaningless by contract when
needsMigration is set.

Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code.
The read-only-directory test skips on Windows (mode bits do not deny
writes) and as root (permissions are bypassed), so a portable companion
asserts the same requirement by requiring that nothing is created at
all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 12:11:35 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 0125e70d0f Fix pinned Go quality tools on Go 1.26 (#689)
* fix pinned Go quality toolchain

* fix(make): use a POSIX GOTOOLCHAIN prefix for pinned tool targets

The Windows_NT branch used cmd.exe syntax (set "..." &&), but GNU Make
runs recipes through sh even on Windows (MSYS/Git Bash), where that
form fails and breaks make lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck. A plain
GOTOOLCHAIN=... prefix works everywhere, so the OS check is gone.

Also switch GO_VERSION/GO_TOOLCHAIN to recursive expansion so
'go list -m' only runs when a tool target actually needs it, instead
of at parse time for every target. Addresses PR review from CodeRabbit
and Copilot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(build): make pinned-tool targets shell-neutral, fix README drift

Address code review on PR #689:

- lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck previously set GOTOOLCHAIN via a
  POSIX `VAR=value cmd` recipe prefix. GNU Make on Windows runs
  recipes through whatever SHELL is configured, and under a native
  cmd.exe setup that syntax is invalid — cmd.exe treats the whole
  "GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.26.5" token as the program to run and fails before
  go ever executes (reproduced locally: cmd.exe errors with
  "'MYVAR' is not recognized..." for the equivalent pattern). Switched
  to a target-specific `export`, which sets the variable in the child
  process environment via Make itself, before  is invoked —
  works under sh, cmd.exe, and PowerShell alike (verified against all
  three targets with SHELL := cmd.exe).

- README.md's Code Quality and Security Checks section still told
  contributors to run the raw `go run ...@version` commands this PR
  identifies as selecting the wrong (older) toolchain and failing to
  load this Go 1.26.5 module — only CI and AGENTS.md had been updated
  to the new make targets. Points steps 3-4 at `make lint-static` /
  `make vulncheck` instead, matching AGENTS.md.

Verified end-to-end: `make vulncheck`, `make deadcode`, and `make
lint-static` all run successfully and reach their tools (deadcode's
advisory report and lint-static's 35 pre-existing findings match the
PR's documented baseline).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(build): support stock macOS make

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 12:09:37 +08:00
Vasanth T f5fa4ffc64 fix(config): stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout (#810)
Both background-child tests fail intermittently on the Windows runner, and
have since #690. #800 and #802 each relaxed an assertion, which is why neither
held: the deadline itself was the problem.

The tests drove LoadProviderCommand, so the fixture's own startup was billed to
the production 5s budget. On a loaded runner the outer timer won the select in
runProviderCommand, and both symptoms follow from that. The nonzero-exit test
saw a timeout instead of the exit status it asserts, because the timer
preempted the shell's exit. The other test lost its PID file, because the
timer's Terminate killed the background child before it could record a PID,
putting the file permanently out of reach however long the assertion polled.

Neither test is a claim about the 5s budget. They assert which error each
cmd.Wait path yields and that the leftover descendant is killed, so they now
call runProviderCommand directly with a budget of their own and the production
deadline stops competing with process startup. Making the child outlive that
budget lets both drop their elapsed-versus-lifetime bounds as well, so no
wall-clock assertion is left in either test.

That is only worth doing if the two timeout paths can be told apart, and they
could not: the WaitDelay path and the outer-timer path both returned the same
bare sentinel, so asserting on it would have been satisfied by the very timeout
the tests exist to rule out. The WaitDelay path now wraps rather than replaces.
Callers asking errors.Is for the sentinel are unaffected, so no user-visible
message changes.

The Windows fixture also waited for its ready marker by launching a second
PowerShell. That cold start is pure overhead added after the PID is already
written, so the wait now runs in cmd itself and is bounded.

Verified by looping both tests under CPU contention: 7 failures in 16
iterations before, none in 32 after, with per-iteration time going from a
spread of 2.3s to 66s down to a steady 2.1s. Removing the wrap makes the
WaitDelay assertion fail, so it is load-bearing rather than decorative.
2026-07-27 10:00:32 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 9fbdc34155 feat(skills): report hash drift in skill info (#795)
Mirror plugin info: compare on-disk SKILL.md to the skills.lock hash so
edited installs are visible. Also drop the nonexistent skills lock
command from EXTENDING.md.
2026-07-27 10:00:07 +08:00
583e6530bd fix(lint): resolve static analysis baseline (#769)
* fix(lint): resolve static analysis baseline

* fix(lint): clear linux staticcheck findings

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-b2ee-7442-8a31-80b2cf9dd270

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 09:59:33 +08:00
Anandan ac50a5a840 test(config): wait for background PID file (#802)
* test(config): wait for background PID file

* test(config): make delayed PID check deterministic
2026-07-25 23:02:07 +05:30
Anandan a4a805a6c8 fix(tui): reset quiet clock for new runs (#799)
New turns inherited lastStreamActivity from the prior turn, so a fresh request could immediately look stalled. Initialize stream activity from the same timestamp as turnStartedAt and cover the stale-clock case with a deterministic regression test.
2026-07-24 17:38:10 +05:30
Anandan 9fe02ae52e fix(sandbox): clarify scoped permission prompts (#798) 2026-07-24 17:37:32 +05:30
Anandan 9d5c82d441 test(config): remove Windows startup timing assumptions (#800)
Cold PowerShell startup under concurrent Windows CI can consume most of the provider timeout, so an unsynchronized PID file may never be written and a fixed four-second bound can fail despite correct process-tree cleanup. Treat an absent PID as a helper that never reached startup, retain strict liveness checks for synchronized children, and bound completion by the child's natural lifetime instead.
2026-07-24 15:43:51 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 97ef90d27a chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform (#706)
* chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform

The Security and code health job's advisory deadcode step reports 152
unreachable functions on main. Running the same check under GOOS=linux,
windows, and darwin shows 13 of those are false positives whose callers
live in windows build-tagged files, so only functions unreachable on all
three platforms are touched.

Functions with no references anywhere are deleted, including the
internal/reasoning package, which nothing imports. Functions that only
tests reference move into per-package export_test.go files so tests keep
their seams while the production binary sheds the code. Test call sites
of deleted convenience wrappers are ported to the live APIs (scoped tool
constructors, tools.DeferredSource, FinishReason checks).

Kept despite the report: cron.Store.Runs (only reader of runs.jsonl,
which production writes), and agenteval.TraceEventKeys and
MissingTraceEvents (used across packages by the trace contract test).

* docs(config): correct ValidateFile's errors.As claim

Message is a flattened string (.Error() already called on the parse
error), not a wrapped error, so callers can't recover the concrete
json error type via errors.As. Fix the comment to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* chore(trace,skills): drop obsolete Sink adapters and fix stale doc references

The dead-code pass removed the Emit methods but left Sink, NDJSONSink, and
TextSink exported with a contract nothing implements; remove the types with
their contract. Also remove the stray blank line at EOF of trace.go flagged
by gofmt, and update skills package docs and HOW_ZERO_WORKS.md to stop
directing callers to DiscoveryRoots/Duplicates, which are now test seams.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: clean up remaining review nits on dead code removal

Replace a pointless fmt.Errorf(...%w...).Error() with fmt.Sprintf
using %v, since the wrapped error was discarded immediately anyway.
Remove a comment block that was duplicated verbatim.

* docs(skills): drop remaining references to test-only List/Get

Load and MergedSkills comments still named List/Get as production
entry points after they moved to export_test.go. Point callers at
Load and ListFromRoots instead.

* chore: remove now-unreferenced export_test.go seams

execSessionManager.len() and likelySandboxDenied/sandboxDenialKind had
no remaining callers after the sandbox unify-command-execution rebase;
the production code they wrapped for tests no longer exists.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:04:41 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 5c58256abc fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows (#690)
* fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows

taskkill /T walks the process tree by parent PID in user space and can
miss descendants, leaving the sleeping child holding the inherited
stdout/stderr pipes so cmd.Wait() blocked until natural completion
(~10s instead of the 5s timeout).

Assign the started command to a job object with
JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE and terminate the job on timeout so
the kernel kills the whole tree atomically; taskkill remains as a
fallback. Also set cmd.WaitDelay so Wait can never hang on pipes held
by an escaped orphan, and add a regression assertion that the sleeping
child is actually gone after the timeout returns.

Fixes #683

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): harden provider-command tree termination

Address code review on PR #690: terminate the process tree when
cmd.Wait() returns exec.ErrWaitDelay (a background descendant kept
inherited pipes open, previously left running); start the Windows
process suspended and assign it to the job object before resuming its
main thread, closing the window where a fast child could escape the
job; drop JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE so a successful command's
detached helpers survive Close() instead of being reaped; escape
single quotes in generated PID-file paths; and correct a misnamed
Windows exit-code constant in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): avoid gofmt smart-quote rewrite in doc comment

gofmt's doc-comment formatter rewrites a trailing '' into a curly
closing quote, which CI's gofmt -l check flags as unformatted. Reword
to avoid the pattern instead of embedding a raw quote pair.

* fix(config): terminate leaked descendants on nonzero exit, avoid PID reuse

Terminate the process tree on any error returned from cmd.Wait, not only

exec.ErrWaitDelay. Go only returns ErrWaitDelay when the shell itself

exited successfully; a nonzero exit (e.g. sleep 600 & exit 7) yields the

bare *ExitError instead, so a detached background child that held the

inherited pipes open was never terminated on that path.

Also stop falling through to the taskkill/PID fallback once a job handle

successfully contained the tree: by the time Terminate runs on the

ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already reaped the root process, so its

PID may have been reused by an unrelated process, and taskkill /T /PID

against a reused PID would force-kill the wrong tree.

Addresses PR #690 review feedback.

* fix(config): surface suspended-thread resume failures instead of hanging

resumeMainThread now reports whether it actually resumed at least one

thread. If Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread all fail, the launched

process would otherwise sit suspended forever, never exit on its own,

and get misreported as a plain 5s provider-command timeout instead of

the real resume failure. attachCommandProcess now terminates the

process immediately in that case.

Also documents the known, non-regressive limitation that the taskkill

fallback (used only when job creation/assignment itself fails) can

still miss a descendant that has reparented away from the tree it

walks by PID.

Addresses remaining PR #690 review feedback; PR description corrected

separately to drop the outdated JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE claim.

* fix(config): guard taskkill with retained process identity

* fix(config): retain POSIX process group identity

* test(tui): match provider wizard shortcut

* test(tui): pin credential-step env for deterministic footer assertion

The credential step's footer only shows the /→ shortcut once a key
is present, whether typed or inherited from the provider's
AuthEnvVars. The previous commit changed the assertion to
"Enter/→ continue" without accounting for that, so the test only
passed by coincidence when ANTHROPIC_API_KEY happened to be set in the
environment — failing deterministically on a clean CI runner (as
smoke reported on all three OSes). Pin the env var empty and assert
the no-key footer text so the test is correct regardless of ambient
environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): preserve provider process attributes

* test(config): keep SysProcAttr coverage portable

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:03:59 +08:00
Felix-Ayush fa8734f179 fix(cli): include plugins info in shell completions (#794)
zero plugins info landed in #773 but the completions tree still only
offered list/add/remove, so generated bash/zsh/fish scripts omitted it.
2026-07-24 08:49:01 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 5bb1bc11c3 fix(tui): fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal (#709)
* fix(tui): disable bubbletea hard scroll optimization unconditionally

Vendors a patched charm.land/bubbletea/v2 (via a local go.mod replace)
with hard scroll optimization (using terminal scroll-region sequences
to shift existing lines instead of repainting) disabled unconditionally,
instead of only on GOOS=="windows".

That GOOS check only catches a Windows terminal driving the program
directly. It misses a Linux process running inside a multipass VM
whose output is ultimately displayed by Windows Terminal over a
remote shell, which corrupts rendering badly (garbled/overlapping
text, worse on resize) the same way the check exists to prevent.
There's no reliable way to detect that remote hop from inside the VM,
so scroll optimization is now off in all cases.

* fix(tui): force redraw on streamed newlines to clear stale caret

The streaming caret (appendStreamingCursor) is appended to whichever
visual line is currently last. Over a remote terminal chain
(multipass VM output displayed by Windows Terminal), the renderer's
incremental cell diff sometimes fails to clear the caret's old cell
when a newline moves it to a new line, leaving ghost carets behind.

Fire tea.ClearScreen when a streamed delta contains a newline: that's
exactly the moment the caret moves and the risk exists, so it forces
a full redraw right then instead of leaving it to the incremental
diff, without doing so on every animation tick.

* chore(tui): trim upstream repo metadata from vendored bubbletea fork

The vendored bubbletea-v2-patched module is ~99% byte-identical to
upstream charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8; only cursed_renderer.go
differs (one line disabling hard scroll optimization). The .github
workflows, README.md, UPGRADE_GUIDE_V2.md, Taskfile.yaml and CI config
files are upstream repo metadata that serve no purpose inside this
repo, so remove them to slim the PR. The Go source and testdata golden
files are kept because Go's replace directive requires the full module
to be present and buildable.

Refs #709

* fix(tui): address review round on the rendering workaround and vendored fork

Fork correctness fixes (all flagged by review):

- key.go: KeyMediaRecord repeated the previous const expression and
  decoded record presses as previous-track; map it to uv.KeyMediaRecord.
- mouse.go: MouseButton11 likewise collapsed onto MouseButton10.
- termios_unix.go: BSDLY/BS0 are output-delay bits; read them from Oflag
  instead of Lflag so useBackspace is set correctly.
- cursed_renderer.go: count wrapped rows with (lineWidth-1)/w so an
  exact terminal-width multiple no longer inserts a blank line; compare
  colors by normalized RGBA via a nil-safe helper instead of interface
  equality (which panics on non-comparable implementations); and make
  clearScreen invalidate lastView so the queued erase flushes with the
  next frame instead of deferring until an unrelated view change — the
  reordering that could leave the ghost caret in place.
- exec_test.go: implement reset() on the spy renderer and inject it
  before Run; assert exec preserves renderer state (releaseTerminal
  with reset=false).
- logging_test.go: restore the default logger's output/prefix/flags and
  fail fast on setup errors.
- tea_test.go: tie the Quit-pumping goroutine to a channel closed when
  Run returns instead of leaking it until process exit.

TUI scoping (review P2): the forced redraw on streamed newlines is now
rate-limited to ~10/s so heavy streaming output no longer turns every
newline into a full-screen repaint, and ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR=1 opts a
correctly-rendering terminal back into the fast incremental path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): guarantee deferred stream-clear redraw and other review fixes

A throttled stream-clear could drop the redraw entirely when a
newline arrived in the last delta of a turn, leaving a ghost caret on
screen. Add a one-shot deferred flush timer plus a flush on stream
end. Fix a stale comment and a test that leaked global logger state
in the vendored bubbletea fork.

* fix(tui): use m.now for stream-clear throttle and harden tests

Drive stream-clear rate limiting through the mockable clock and a
shared streamClearThrottle constant so both the agentTextMsg and
flush paths stay in sync. Add an explicit two-newline-within-window
regression and detect ClearScreen by function pointer so tests do not
evaluate Tick side effects.

* fix(tui): relocate bubbletea fork out of third_party

Move the maintained bubbletea/v2 hard-scroll patch from
third_party/bubbletea-v2-patched to patches/bubbletea-v2 and update the
root go.mod replace. third_party/ is immutable vendored content per
AGENTS.md; a maintained fork belongs outside that tree.

* fix(ci,docs): run vendored bubbletea fork tests and document unsupported go install path

patches/bubbletea-v2 is its own Go module so `go test ./...` from the repo
root never touched its 7 test files. Add a CI step (and a make test-patches
target for local use) that runs the fork's own suite across the smoke
matrix.

The root go.mod's local `replace charm.land/bubbletea/v2 =>
./patches/bubbletea-v2` also breaks `go install
github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@<version>`, since a versioned install can't
resolve a replace pointing at a filesystem path. Document that path as
unsupported in README.md and docs/INSTALL.md and point at git clone + go
build instead, per jatmn's review findings on PR #709.

* ci: run vendored bubbletea fork tests with -race

CodeRabbit review on this PR. The fork exists specifically to patch a
concurrency bug (charmbracelet/bubbletea#1690), so its regression test
needs the race detector to actually catch a reintroduced race instead
of just passing on a benign-looking run.

* fix(tui): drop vendored bubbletea fork; keep stream-clear workaround

Maintainers asked not to ship an in-tree bubbletea replace: it breaks
versioned go install and is a large maintenance surface for a narrow
multipass/Windows Terminal scroll bug. Remove patches/bubbletea-v2 and
the replace directive; keep the model.go full-redraw-on-streamed-newline
workaround (ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR to opt out). Restore normal install docs.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#709

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 08:48:16 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 d9b882eb0a fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically (#686)
* fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically

* fix(cron): hold the per-ID lock from reservation through persistence

Address code review on PR #686: reserveID made the timestamp directory
visible via os.Mkdir before metadata.json existed, but Remove (which
takes the per-ID lock before deleting) never coordinated with that
window. A concurrent `zero cron rm <id>` could delete the bare
reservation and report success right after Add reserved it; writeJob's
MkdirAll would then silently resurrect the directory and persist the
job anyway. A second Add could also re-reserve the same id while the
first writer was still running, putting two writers on the same
metadata path.

reserveID now acquires the same per-ID lock (used by Get/Update/
Mutate/Remove/AppendRun) for each candidate id before attempting
os.Mkdir, and returns it still held; Add releases it only after
writeReservedJob commits (or tears down) the reservation. A concurrent
Remove for that id now blocks until the reservation is resolved one
way or the other, and a concurrent Add attempting the same candidate
id serializes through the lock rather than only racing the Mkdir.

Adds two regression tests: one proving Remove waits for and removes
the committed job rather than the bare reservation, and one proving a
second reserveID call for the same candidate id blocks on the shared
lock and moves on to the next candidate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 19:28:04 +08:00
github-actions[bot] a50574f673 chore(main): release 0.5.0 (#714)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 09:37:36 +08:00
nb213andbinyangzhu000-sudo c00a4734b5 Add Atlas Cloud provider preset (#784)
Co-authored-by: binyangzhu000-sudo <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:20:21 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 2479884dea feat(plugins): add zero plugins info command (#773)
* feat(plugins): add zero plugins info command

Add plugins info to inspect manifest state, extension counts, and
lockfile source/hash with optional hash drift detection.

* fix(plugins): derive lock dir from plugin install path for info

Remove LockDir from InfoOptions and read the lockfile from
filepath.Dir(plugin.PluginDir) so lock metadata matches the resolved
plugin location. Consolidate duplicate lock hash output lines.
2026-07-22 08:14:00 +08:00
Anandan ab2f9fbd3e Add shell completion generation (#764)
* Add shell completion generation

Add zero completions for bash, zsh, fish, PowerShell, and Elvish using one shared command tree that covers aliases, nested commands, root flags, and common exec flags.

Validate missing and unsupported shell arguments as usage errors and document safe installation examples in command help.

Refs #499

* Complete shell target suggestions

Expose every supported shell as a completions subcommand candidate and document Elvish activation.

Refs #499

* Fix Elvish completion syntax

Close generated Elvish conditional branches, use value equality, and validate generated script structure plus native Bash and Zsh syntax.

Refs #499
2026-07-22 08:13:14 +08:00
PierrunoYTandAmp baa4be13ac fix: make extension installs transactional (#762)
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:12:49 +08:00
ddfdf2878e Fix ChatGPT OAuth model discovery and ACP model selection (#724)
* fix: expose authenticated ChatGPT models to ACP

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): persist discovered model selections

* fix(acp): normalize model selections

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 08:11:55 +08:00
Anandan 96859c9bd1 feat(sandbox): unify command execution and enforcement (#781)
* feat(sandbox): unify command execution and enforcement

* test(sandbox): make platform contracts portable

* fix(sandbox): close execution lifecycle races

Bound retained interactive output, preserve interruption state, and start workspace observation before process launch.

Protect active runtime roots with cross-platform leases, capture transient protected-path creation events, and restore process attributes after PTY fallback.

* fix(sandbox): restore strict macOS isolation

Remove Seatbelt host-local network allowances after native validation showed localhost filters can reach host interfaces.

Track process reap completion so retained sessions cannot signal a stale numeric PID.
2026-07-21 18:55:13 +05:30
Vasanth T 3524f795e5 fix(cli): warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection (#767)
Closes #721.

`zero providers use <name>` wrote activeProvider to config.json and reported
"Active provider set to <name>" even when ZERO_PROVIDER was set, which applyEnv
makes win over config.json unconditionally. So the switch was reported as a
success while `providers current` still showed the env-pinned provider, a silent
no-op.

Detect the override and say so: the text path prints a note to stderr naming the
env var and the provider that stays active, and the --json path adds
effectiveProvider / overriddenByEnv fields so a machine consumer is not misled
either. The config write still lands unchanged; only the reporting is honest.

The env read is injected via a new appDeps.getenv (os.Getenv in production, left
nil by fillAppDeps like exportActiveProvider) so tests stay hermetic against an
ambient ZERO_PROVIDER. The related env-derived-profile "not found" case the issue
also mentions is already handled by the unpersisted-provider path (#707) and #716.
2026-07-21 13:00:50 +05:30
Vasanth T b1f41735a7 fix(lsp): make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite (#684) (#766)
* fix(lsp): make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite

Closes #684.

TestManagerCheckRealGopls skipped only when gopls was absent from PATH, so an
installed-but-unhealthy gopls (e.g. an unusable persistent-index cache that makes
the server exit during initialization with EOF) failed `go test ./...` for every
developer who merely had gopls on PATH.

Gate it behind ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION, matching the repo's other real-server
opt-ins (internal/dictation smoke tests). The default hermetic suite keeps its
coverage on the fake server and never touches the developer's global gopls; the
real check still runs on demand with ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1.

* test(lsp): require ZERO_GOPLS_INTEGRATION=1 exactly, so =0 keeps the check off
2026-07-21 13:00:41 +05:30
Vasanth T 4945684fa2 fix(sandbox): bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle (#765)
Closes #728.

The Windows ACL setup resolved each target's pathname independently across
os.Stat, GetNamedSecurityInfo, and SetNamedSecurityInfo (and again on rollback),
so during elevated setup a lower-privileged local user could swap a target for a
symlink/junction between operations and redirect the ACL change onto a system
object the process never validated. That is a TOCTOU across a privilege boundary.

Open each target once with a no-follow handle (FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT plus
FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS, READ_CONTROL|WRITE_DAC) and drive both the read
(GetSecurityInfo) and the write (SetSecurityInfo) through that one handle, so they
hit the same kernel object. isDir is read from the same handle rather than a
separate Stat. A target that resolves to a reparse point is refused outright,
since a setup target that is a symlink/junction during elevated setup is the
swap-attack signature. Rollback re-opens no-follow rather than restoring by
pathname; the residual window is small because the target is ACL-restricted by
then, and one caller discards the rollback closure so handles are not retained for
the whole sandbox lifetime.

Tests (windows-tagged, no elevation needed): the handle-based apply plus rollback
round-trip on a user-owned temp dir, the materialize-and-remove path, reparse
rejection via a junction (needs no admin, so it runs in CI), and the not-exist
mapping. The full privilege-boundary race can't be reproduced in CI, so the guard
is verified structurally (one handle for read and write) and by junction rejection.
2026-07-21 13:00:29 +05:30
Vasanth T 5140d4bf7b docs(contributing): add contribution volume and batching guidance (#783)
Documents expectations for keeping contribution flow sustainable during the
stabilization phase: one issue per bug (no bundled multi-finding audits), keep
only a few items open at a time, and hold AI-assisted contributions to the same
per-item verification bar. Complements the existing issue-approved gate, which
already covers PR-to-issue linkage and scope; the gap was submission volume.
2026-07-21 15:16:22 +08:00
KRATOSandKRATOS 3967d49d64 feat(tui): permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline (#780)
* feat(tui): let the permission prompt take free-text feedback inline

"No, and tell Zero what to do differently" now opens an inline input on the
permission card instead of silently cancelling: type an instruction, Enter sends
it, Esc returns to the option list. The text is delivered as a Deny decision whose
Reason is the typed instruction, so the agent surfaces it via deniedPermissionResult
as the tool result and the model adjusts in the SAME turn — where the old cancel
returned an error and aborted the run. Empty input + Enter falls back to a plain
cancel (the prior meaning).

No agent-side change: PermissionDecision.Reason already carries free text to the
model. The UI mirrors the ask_user "type your own answer" pattern — the feedback
field reuses the shared composer input and the card renders it in the transcript
body.

Also: a focused permission prompt now suppresses the composer (and idle
hints/plan panel), keeping only the status line, exactly like the ask_user modal.
Its keys are inert anyway, so a "describe a task for zero…" box below the card was
misleading — and in feedback mode the shared input would otherwise echo in two
places.

Tests cover open / submit-as-Deny-with-text / empty-cancels / Esc-returns, the
composer suppression in both modes, and that the feedback text renders exactly
once.

* fix(tui): preserve the composer draft across permission feedback (#780 review)

anand + CodeRabbit (Major): entering feedback mode cleared the shared composer
input via SetValue(""), and neither submit nor cancel restored it — so a user
with a half-typed or queued next-turn message who chose "tell Zero what to do
differently" lost that draft.

Snapshot the composer value into pendingPermissionPrompt.savedDraft when feedback
mode opens, and restore it on BOTH exits (submit and Esc-cancel). Only the
feedback text is consumed, delivered via the decision Reason. Adds regression
tests for both paths; mutation-verified against the SetValue("") regression.

* fix(tui): guard permission-feedback backspace and clicks (#780 review)

Vasanthdev2004 review, all on the permission path:

1. Real bug: Backspace on an empty feedback field dropped a staged attachment.
   The keyBackspace case runs before the typing branch and, on an empty composer
   (feedback mode clears it), fell to removeLastAttachment — silently dropping a
   staged image/doc that savedDraft does not restore. Route Backspace to the
   shared input while typing so it is a plain edit of the feedback text.

2. Defence-in-depth: the mouse click resolver in handleTranscriptSelectionMouse
   resolved a clicked permission option (Allow included) with no typing check. It
   is safe today only because renderFocusedPermissionPrompt returns nil clickable
   offsets in feedback mode — a single early-return in a function other PRs also
   edit. Add an explicit !typing guard on the click path so the safety is stated,
   not emergent.

3. Test hardening (also raised by CodeRabbit): assert len(got) == 1 before
   indexing got[0] in the draft-preservation test, so a regression fails cleanly
   instead of panicking.

Tests: TestPermissionFeedbackBackspaceKeepsStagedAttachment (mutation-verified
against the missing guard) and TestPermissionFeedbackRendersNoClickableOptionsWhileTyping.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 23:29:10 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 89bdc6719a fix(tools): read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring (#779)
* fix(tools): read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring

renderReadFileRange hard-failed when end_line < start_line, costing the caller a
whole retry for an arithmetic slip. It was also inconsistent: start_line past EOF
returns a friendly note and end_line past EOF is auto-clamped to the last line —
only a backwards range hard-errored.

Recover it the same way: clamp end_line UP to start_line (read just that line) and
surface the adjustment in the output so it is never silent. Valid ranges
(end_line >= start_line) are byte-for-byte unchanged.

The change is in the argument-validation phase, before any file I/O, so there is
no runtime cost; if anything it saves the agent a wasted retry turn.

Tests: TestReadFileToolRecoversBackwardsRange (recovery + note + reads only
start_line, mutation-verified against the old hard error) and
TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery (valid ranges carry no note and read
the identical window).

* test(tools): assert full valid-range output in read_file recovery test (#779 review)

anand + CodeRabbit: TestReadFileToolValidRangeUnchangedByRecovery claimed
byte-for-byte preservation but only checked substrings, so an altered
header/separator or a stray out-of-range line would still pass. Compare the
whole result.Output against the exact expected rendering.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 22:57:25 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 722bb31216 fix(tui): stop the permission card clashing on cool themes (#778)
The focused permission prompt was the only prompt card in the TUI that used
brand/warning colours for its interior, and both read badly on cool themes such
as dracula:

1. The selected option ("Yes, proceed") was filled with zeroTheme.badge — the
   brand chip meant for short labels (" 0 ", " ASK ", " SPEC REVIEW "), a
   full-brightness accent fill. Every other selectable list in the TUI (model
   picker, provider list, / palette) highlights its selected row with onSel/selBg
   instead. The permission card was the outlier, painting a saturated accent slab
   across the row and skipping the card tint every other line composed onto.

2. The card BODY was tinted with permBg, an amber-family wash intended to signal
   a warning surface. It works on the warm default palette but renders as a
   brown-yellow slab over cool themes, and it made the permission card the only
   prompt whose body carries a fill — ask_user, spec review and plan all use a
   transparent body (lipgloss.NewStyle()).

Fix both to match the rest of the TUI: the selected row uses onSel(ink) like
every other picker, and the body drops its permBg fill for a transparent one.
Warning identity is unchanged — the amber PERMISSION badge and the amber-mixed
border still mark it as a permission gate; only the clashing interior fills go.

TestFocusedPermissionSelectedRowUsesSelectionTintNotBrandChip asserts against
palette entries (not hardcoded hex, so it survives a theme retune): the selected
row carries selBg and not the brand accent, the body carries no permBg wash, and
the PERMISSION badge keeps its amber fill so the card still reads as a warning.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 22:39:50 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS a21a052a4a feat(sandbox): disable the sandbox via config (#687) (#746)
* feat(sandbox): disable the sandbox via config (#687)

Add a sandbox.enabled field (`"sandbox": {"enabled": false}`). ModeDisabled
already short-circuits the engine but had no config surface.

- SandboxConfig.Enabled *bool (pointer distinguishes an explicit false from an
  omitted key).
- mergeConfig honors it (global config / CLI); applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy maps
  enabled:false to ModeDisabled.
- mergeProjectConfig intentionally does NOT merge it: a cloned repo must not be
  able to disable the sandbox that constrains it — same posture as
  AdditionalWriteRoots and the Network tighten-only rule.

* fix(config): honor sandbox.enabled from the CLI override path (#687 review)

applyOverrides copied BlockUnixSockets/MonitorDenials but not the new Enabled
tri-state pointer, so a CLI/programmatic Overrides{Sandbox:{Enabled:&false}} was
dropped — contradicting the 'global config / CLI can disable' contract. Preserve
the pointer in applyOverrides (runs after all config sources, so an explicit
override wins) and add a resolver regression test: an explicit false override
disables, and an explicit true override wins over a lower-precedence config false.

* fix(config): keep sandbox.enabled out of the provider-command path (#687 review)

mergeConfig now copies Sandbox.Enabled, and it is shared by two callers: the
global-config merge (trusted) and the provider-command merge (not). A provider
command is an arbitrary executable named in config, and LoadProviderCommand
parses its stdout into a full FileConfig -- so one returning a valid provider
plus {"sandbox":{"enabled":false}} could disable the sandbox meant to constrain
it, despite the setting being documented as global-config/CLI only. Confirmed
reproducible in both directions before the fix.

Clear Sandbox.Enabled from the provider-command config before merging, mirroring
the carve-out mergeProjectConfig already applies for the same reason. Done at the
call site rather than inside mergeConfig because that helper must keep honouring
the setting for the trusted global-config merge.

Adds TestResolveSandboxEnabledIgnoredFromProviderCommand covering both
directions (cannot disable, cannot enable) and asserting the provider itself is
still applied, so the guard cannot be satisfied by dropping the command wholesale.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 21:07:04 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS f079b90f82 fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473) (#745)
* fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473)

The interactive-command guard split shell commands with a hand-written parser
(splitShellSegments), which mis-handles unusual quoting, command substitution,
subshells, and newline separators — an interactive program hidden by one slips
through and the agent hangs until the per-command timeout.

Add astCommandFields(): mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax (already used by analyzer.go) to
re-extract the real simple commands, then apply the SAME per-program checks the
regex path uses (interactivePrograms + hasNonInteractiveFlag). This only ADDS
detections and classifies every program exactly as before — ssh with a trailing
command, python -c, etc. stay allowed — while catching the splitter's bypasses.
Unparseable input (Windows cmd.exe, obfuscation) yields no commands and falls
through to the regex path; the guard never hard-blocks on a parse error.

* fix(sandbox): AST pass runs the full pipeline + guards dynamic programs (#473 review)

Address review on #745:
- The AST second opinion now applies the complete detection pipeline via a new
  inspectCommandFields helper (multi-word interactive segments, sh -c payload
  recursion, then the per-program lookup), so parser-hidden bypasses like
  { git rebase -i HEAD~1; } and { sh -c 'vim file.txt'; } are caught, not just
  bare interactive programs.
- astCommandFields now skips a CallExpr whose program word is not a static
  literal (isLiteralWord), so a substitution concatenated with a literal
  ($(printf foo)vim -> foovim) can't fabricate an interactive program name.

Regression tests added for both boundaries. (The un-braced $(printf foo)vim
false positive is a separate, pre-existing hand-parser behavior — present on
main before this PR — and is out of scope here.)

* fix(sandbox): require literal words for the whole AST call (#473 review)

astCommandFields guarded only the program word, then ran every argument
through wordText, which keeps literal/quoted parts and silently drops
CmdSubst/ParamExp. A dynamic ARGUMENT was therefore reconstructed lossily:
`git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1` runs as `git foorebase -i` (a
non-existent, non-interactive subcommand) but collapsed to `git rebase -i`
and was blocked -- a false positive on a command the user never wrote, and
new on this branch (the base correctly reports not-interactive).

Extend the literalness guard to every word in the call: if any word carries
an expansion, skip that AST command rather than classify a reconstruction
whose runtime value is unknowable. Skipping is the safe direction -- the
hand-written passes still run first, and a miss falls through to the normal
permission prompt instead of hard-blocking.

Genuine detection is unchanged: `git rebase -i HEAD~1` and the #473 bypass
cases still classify exactly as before.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 21:01:55 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS b30c3971b4 fix(tui): model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette (#775)
* fix(tui): label model rows by id when the description is prose

The model picker (provider wizard AND onboarding, which share displayLabel)
labelled each row with the provider's Description, falling back to the ID only
when the description was "generic". That is right when Description holds a short
display name -- "Grok 4.3" for x-ai/grok-4.3, which is what the field is for and
why the row prefers it over an ugly raw ID.

Providers do not all honour that. Aggregators commonly return a prose blurb
instead ("Fast DeepSeek model for efficient chat, coding help, and agent
loops"), which fails as a label twice: it overflows the row, and because such
blurbs are written per model FAMILY rather than per model, several DIFFERENT
models collapse to byte-identical rows. Observed in a live picker with two
identical "Open-weight GPT model for self-hosted reasoning..." rows and two
identical "Kimi multimodal agent model..." rows -- the distinguishing ID was
visible only in the detail line of whichever row happened to be highlighted, so
the list could not be used to pick between them.

providerWizardGenericModelDescription cannot catch these: it rejects vague
descriptions ("live model", "catalog default"), whereas these are specific, just
shared and sentence-shaped. So gate on shape instead -- a display name is short
and few-worded; anything longer is prose and the ID (unique by construction)
makes the better label. Friendly names are still preferred where providers
supply them, so the existing behaviour is unchanged for well-behaved catalogs.

* fix(tui): keep the sidebar open under the / command palette

sidebarAvailable grouped suggestionsActive() with the full-screen overlays
(setup, wizards, pickers), whose stated rationale is that they "take over the
chat column and render at full width". That is not true of the `/` palette:
suggestionOverlay draws it through centerRenderedBlock at
minInt(width, suggestionPaletteMaxWidth), a centred box capped at 76 cells
floating over the chat column.

Treating it as full-screen collapsed the whole layout on every `/`: the sidebar
disappeared, the plan panel dropped out of it and re-rendered inline above the
composer, and the transcript re-wrapped to full width -- a jarring reflow for a
popup, and worst mid-run with a live plan on screen.

It cannot overlap the sidebar either: twoColumnTranscriptView renders the
overlay with width = chatColumnWidth, so the palette is capped at
min(chatColumn, 76) and centred inside the chat column. Mouse hit-testing is
unaffected because sidebarLineAtMouse carries its own suggestionsActive() guard,
so clicks still reach the palette rather than the sidebar rows beneath it.

The genuinely full-width overlays keep suppressing the sidebar, pinned by the
new test alongside the palette case.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 20:58:11 +05:30
Vasanth T da9fb50f54 fix(tools): give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance (#749 follow-up) (#768)
* fix(tools): give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance

Follow-up to #749 (write_stdin session-id probing) / #702.

write_stdin had three "no valid live session" error paths with three different
messages and signatures: a missing session_id returned "session_id is required",
a zero/negative/non-integer one returned "session_id must be at least 1", and
only a valid-but-unknown id got the rich UnknownExecSessionError recovery guidance
("do not guess or probe; start a session with exec_command, or use edit_file/
write_file"). So a model that called write_stdin with session_id 0 (the common
"I have no id" placeholder) got a terse error with no way forward, and naming the
minimum nudged it toward trying 1, 2, 3... the exact id-probing #749 suppresses.
The three signatures also meant a model moving 0 to 1 to 2 reset the
repeated-failure streak on each class of mistake.

Route the missing / non-integer / <1 cases through the same UnknownExecSessionError
message. Now every "no live session" mistake gives the same recovery guidance and,
because that message is id-invariant, shares one repeated-failure signature, so any
mix of missing/zero/probing accumulates toward the halt.

Updates TestWriteStdinRequiresPositiveSessionID to cover missing/zero/negative/
non-integer and assert the recovery message. Guardrail signature/halt tests
unchanged.

* test(tools): cover the explicit session_id: nil case for write_stdin
2026-07-20 13:59:11 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 684901165d fix(sandbox): don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping (#727) (#744)
The ambient ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 + ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND markers are user-controlled
at an unsandboxed process boundary. Policy could auto-allow an ordinary shell
command (backend reports a native wrapping sandbox) while the runner, seeing the
same markers, returned an unwrapped pass-through plan — the command then ran
directly on the host with no isolation and no prompt.

shellSandboxActive now mirrors the runner: when IsAlreadySandboxed() (the markers
are present, so wrapping is skipped) the sandbox is not the boundary for this
command, so it reports inactive and the shell command takes the normal approval
path instead of auto-allowing. Immediate mitigation per the issue; authenticated
launch provenance is the longer-term fix.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 11:56:36 +05:30
Vasanth T e1975c1b39 fix(perfbench): grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits (#763)
* fix(perfbench): grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits

The turn benchmark invoked `zero exec` in its default read-only posture,
which exposes no write or shell tools (no edit_file/apply_patch/
write_file/exec_command/bash). So the mutating classes (edit/fix/
refactor) could never apply a change: a run either ground to the turn
ceiling hunting for an edit tool or reported a no-tool blocker, and the
only tasks that 'passed' were ones whose oracle grep matched the stamped
.zero-answer.txt narration rather than a real edit.

This invalidated every mutating-class number in both baselines. A live
trace of fix-07 (a one-line admin->user prefix change) showed the model
calling only read_file/grep/lsp_navigate/update_plan and then stating it
had no file-writing tool. Adding --skip-permissions-unsafe exposes the
full tool set; each task already runs in an isolated throwaway fixture
copy, so there is nothing to protect. With the flag, edit-01/fix-01/
fix-07/refactor-01 go from failing (or false-passing) to 4/4 real
passes, and tool_execution rises from ~0.4% to ~29% of wall as the write
tools are actually exercised.

Adds TestBuildTurnExecArgsGrantsWriteTools pinning the flag as a
correctness contract.

* fix(perfbench): use --auto member and let the oracle judge incomplete exits

Reviewer feedback on the write-tools grant: --skip-permissions-unsafe is
broader than the benchmark needs. It also drops the workspace, network,
and destructive-command guards and auto-retries sandbox-blocked commands
unsandboxed. Switch to --auto member, which grants exactly the write +
sandboxed-shell tools the mutating classes need while keeping those
safeguards.

member-auto's shell is sandboxed, though, so on a host without sandbox
setup the agent's own self-verification (go test/build) can't run and the
turn exits INCOMPLETE even after a correct edit. The runner used to treat
any nonzero exit as failure before consulting the oracle, which would
false-fail those correct edits. Make the oracle authoritative for
oracle-bearing tasks: the stamped test/grep against the actual fixture
files is ground truth, so a correct edit passes regardless of the exit
code. Latency-only tasks have no oracle, so a nonzero exit still fails
them.

Verified with a 4-task glm-5.2 smoke (edit-01/fix-01/fix-07/refactor-01):
4/4 real passes under --auto member. Updates the exec-args test to assert
--auto member is present and --skip-permissions-unsafe is absent, and adds
TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit and
TestNonzeroExitStillFailsLatencyOnly.

* fix(perfbench): reject fixtureless tasks so the write-tools grant can't escape isolation

CodeRabbit and gnanam both flagged the same structural gap: buildTurnExecArgs
grants the write + sandboxed-shell tools to every invocation, but the fixture
isolation was conditional (a task with no workspaceFixture ran in the caller's
cwd). So the grant and the guard could drift apart, and a fixtureless task would
run an agent with write/shell tools in the caller's real repo dir.

Make the isolation a checked precondition: NewTurnExecRunner now rejects a task
with no workspaceFixture before launching zero exec, failing loudly rather than
silently running in cwd. Every shipped task already declares a fixture, so this
only fires on a malformed or newly added one.

Adds TestTurnRunnerRejectsFixturelessTask (rejection is pre-launch: it returns
the fixture error even with a nonexistent binary).

* fix(perfbench): defer to the oracle only for INCOMPLETE (exit 4), not every nonzero exit

anand's follow-up: the previous commit cleared VerifyErr for any nonzero
run_end whenever a VerificationCommand was present, which would also convert
a crash (1), usage error (2), provider failure (3), or interruption (130)
into a passing result whenever a partial edit happened to satisfy the oracle.

Gate the oracle override on exitCode == exitIncomplete (4): the completion
gate's "work maybe done but not signaled" case, the only one where a correct
edit can legitimately exit nonzero (its sandboxed self-verify couldn't run
under --auto member). Every other nonzero exit stays authoritative, so a
partial edit can't launder a crashed or interrupted run into a pass.

The 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4 (those tasks exit INCOMPLETE, not some
other code). Adds TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative (a correct edit that
reports exit 1 must still fail) and mirrors internal/cli.exitIncomplete as a
local execExitIncomplete constant.

* test(perfbench): pin the exit-4 oracle deferral from both sides; drop dead fixture branch

Follow-ups from a self-review of the exit-4 gating:

- Add TestIncompleteExitStillFailsWhenOracleFails: an INCOMPLETE (exit 4) run
  that did NO work must still FAIL, because deferring to the oracle still means
  the oracle is consulted. The sibling TestOracleAuthoritativeOnIncompleteExit
  applies a correct edit and would pass either way, so without this a regression
  that turned exit 4 into a blanket pass would go unnoticed.
- Broaden TestNonIncompleteExitStaysAuthoritative to a table over exit 1/3/130
  (crash/provider/interrupt), not just 1, so every named launder-risk code is
  covered.
- Tighten the NewTurnExecRunner doc: the verdict gate is the VerificationCommand
  (which runs the stamped OracleTest via go test), not OracleTest on its own.
- Drop the now-dead "if WorkspaceFixture != empty" branch: the fixtureless guard
  added earlier already guarantees it is set.

No behavior change; the 4-task glm-5.2 smoke stays 4/4.
2026-07-20 11:34:20 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 8c6d3022bd feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698) (#747)
* feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698)

/undo was unregistered and fell through to commandUnknown. Add it to the
/rewind command's aliases (the same mechanism /quit, /find, /mcp-status use), so
it dispatches to the existing rewind handler with args intact.

* test(tui): cover the /undo numeric-sequence form (#698 review)

Add a parseCommand("/undo 123") assertion so both the latest and numeric
<sequence> forms of the /rewind contract are exercised through the alias.

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 11:32:44 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 974fc036c2 fix(oauth): refuse redirects on credential POSTs (#729) (#741)
Token exchange/refresh and the device authorization/poll POSTs validated only
the initial endpoint, then let the http.Client follow a 307/308 that replays the
form body (code, PKCE verifier, refresh_token, client_secret) to an unvalidated
origin.

Add withoutRedirects(): a shallow client copy whose CheckRedirect refuses every
redirect (ErrUnsafeRedirect). Applied at PostToken (covers ExchangeCode, Refresh,
and MCP which delegate to it), RequestDeviceCode, and pollDeviceOnce. The caller's
client is never mutated; legitimate token endpoints that return 200 are unaffected.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 08:19:37 +05:30
PierrunoYT 4cbd144d11 fix(providers): stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles (#716)
* fix(providers): stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles

* fix(providers): address env profile review feedback

* fix(providers): keep env JSON response schemas stable
2026-07-20 10:23:44 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 c0b6b9e5c9 docs(readme): note govulncheck/golangci-lint install to GOPATH/bin (#711)
* docs(readme): note govulncheck/golangci-lint install to GOPATH/bin

The installed binaries land in $GOPATH/bin (default ~/go/bin), which must
be on PATH to run govulncheck directly. Document the export snippet so the
lint/security tooling from the contributor setup actually resolves.

* docs(readme): say "them" instead of singling out govulncheck

golangci-lint installs to the same $GOPATH/bin as govulncheck, so the
PATH note applies to both, not just the one named.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* docs(readme): honor GOBIN and make the PATH snippet idempotent

go install writes to GOBIN when set, with GOPATH/bin as the fallback, and
rerunning the old snippet appended the same directory repeatedly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-20 10:21:54 +08:00
PierrunoYT d74ceb1127 fix(tui): cache settled alt-screen transcript (#647)
* fix(tui): cache settled alt-screen transcript

* fix(tui): invalidate settled alt-screen cache on in-place status row updates

setDoctorStatusRow, setSandboxSetupStatusRow, and setCompactStatusRow all
mutate an already-flushed transcript row in place (m.transcript[i] = row)
without invalidating the alt-screen settled cache. Since none of frontier,
width, or row count change on such an update, settleTranscript's rebuild
guard never fires and the View fast path serves the stale cached snapshot -
e.g. the doctor connectivity spinner freezes on its first frame.

Zero altScreenSettledWidth on the in-place path, mirroring the existing
pattern in toggleTranscriptRow, so the next settle rebuilds the cache.

Addresses PR #647 review feedback from Vasanthdev2004.

* fix(tui): invalidate settled transcript cache

* fix(tui): invalidate settled file selection cards
2026-07-20 10:20:46 +08:00
Vasanth T fbf85984f6 fix(agent): stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash (#702) (#749)
A model that calls write_stdin with no live session probed sequential
session_ids (1, 2, 3, …), each failing, and the run ground on for a long
time before halting. The repeated-failure guard keys on a normalized,
80-char-truncated signature of the tool error, and the old message
"Unknown exec session_id %d" put the varying id inside that prefix, so
every probe produced a fresh signature and the 6x-same-error halt never
fired.

- Rewrite the unknown-session error so stable recovery guidance leads and
  the id trails past the signature window: probing now collapses to one
  signature and trips the halt, and the model is told how to recover
  (start an exec_command, or use the file-edit tools).
- Pin session_id's schema Minimum to 1 so the advertised schema matches
  the runtime floor (intArg min 1).
- system_prompt: state that session_id is only ever an id returned by a
  still-running exec_command and must never be guessed or probed.

Tests pin the id-invariance of the signature and that distinct-id probing
now halts at the guard's stop threshold, plus the schema floor and the
recovery text. The TUI "Sent input" label on a failed write_stdin
(issue criterion 4) is a separate cosmetic concern in a shared hot path
and is left as a follow-up.
2026-07-19 22:13:35 +05:30
Anandan 9242b9e037 Add transcript-grounded structured task state (#761)
* Add transcript-grounded structured task state

Project existing plan, tool-result, changed-file, verification, and completion events into a deterministic per-run snapshot.

Emit content-free aggregate snapshots to traces. Carry bounded objective context through compaction and ground completion checks only when the projection matches the transcript; mismatches retain transcript-derived behavior and drop stale carried state.

Tested: make fmt-check

Tested: go vet ./...

Tested: go test ./...

Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke

Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)

Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings

Tested: git diff HEAD --check

* Preserve task objective across repeated compaction

Keep the immutable run objective when plan calls have been elided, while admitting mutable task fields only when plan parity still matches the transcript.

Make plan parsing match update_plan rejection semantics, coalesce and cap task-state trace events, rename parity to its plan-only scope, use explicit nilable dependencies, and remove confirmable objective fingerprints from traces.

Tested: make fmt-check

Tested: go vet ./...

Tested: go test ./...

Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build

Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke

Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found)

Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings

Tested: git diff HEAD --check
2026-07-19 21:38:58 +05:30
Anandan 2e267bdbee feat(tui): add isolated /btw conversations (#748)
* feat(tui): add isolated btw conversations

Add /btw with inline-question support, isolated non-resumable session forks, background main-run routing, and safe return behavior.

Refs #637

* test(tui): cover btw return controls

Preserve drafts when Ctrl+C is pressed during an active BTW run and cover returning to the parent through the documented /btw toggle.

* Address BTW isolation review feedback

* Reject explicit resumes of side sessions

* Harden BTW isolation lifecycle
2026-07-19 20:37:38 +05:30
Anandan 739a47e3ea perf(agent): preserve prompt cache prefixes (#760)
* perf(agent): preserve prompt cache prefixes

Build the system prompt once per run, fingerprint the exact emitted prompt and ordered tool definitions, and expose the full system-prompt hash in traces.

Add normalized and serialized two-turn regressions covering append-only messages, stable tools, and a stable session cache key.

* fix(tools): stabilize registry iteration order

Return registered tools in name order so provider-visible tool lists and prompt-prefix fingerprints cannot drift with Go map iteration. Add a regression covering the registry ordering contract.
2026-07-19 20:29:58 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS ce4a996ffa fix(oauth): validate discovered endpoints before merge/use (#511) (#739)
Discovery metadata was merged without the https/loopback endpoint rule that
configured endpoints already pass, letting a malicious issuer downgrade the
authorization/token/device/registration endpoint after config validation.

- Add exported ValidateEndpointURL as the single endpoint-safety rule;
  validateTokenEndpoint now delegates to it.
- Backstop in BuildAuthorizationURL (the choke point both the provider and MCP
  flows build their browser URL through).
- Validate each discovered endpoint before merge in the provider resolveEndpoints
  and validate resolved MCP metadata in both branches; fail closed on insecure.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-19 09:56:32 +05:30
Vasanth T 378d538e24 perf(agent): execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) (#740)
* perf(agent): execution profiles, --exec-profile, bench passthrough, TUI /profile (PR10b+10c)

* fix(execprofile): harden profiles against review findings

- fast escalates on critical-risk mutations, not high: the sandbox marks
  every shell command high before command analysis, so a high trigger
  spent the one-shot on the first go test of any task
- escalation can now restore the provider-default effort a profile
  displaced (PostureEscalation.RestoreDefaultEffort; a plain empty
  target means leave untouched)
- TUI /turns while a profile is active pins the budget: disarms the
  escalation turn target (mirroring exec's explicit --max-turns rule)
  and profile reverts use touched bits instead of value equality, so
  explicit choices survive even when they coincide with profile values
- spec-draft runs get the same escalation policy as the main run
  instead of the displaced budget with no safety net
- bench validates and canonicalizes --exec-profile before spawning:
  an unknown name previously produced an exit-0 report full of
  millisecond usage-error walls
- turn summary prints exec-profile alongside mode; zero exec rejects
  an inline-empty --exec-profile=; balanced trace label documented and
  pinned as deliberate attribution

* fix(execprofile): explicit effort choices disarm the escalation effort restore

An explicit effort set AFTER profile selection could be cleared by a
mid-run escalation (the effort analog of the /turns pin, introduced by
RestoreDefaultEffort): TUI /effort and Ctrl+T now disarm the restore on
a policy clone, and the spec-draft path only arms it when no explicit
--spec-reasoning-effort governs the draft.

* fix(execprofile): address review findings on the profile surfaces

- --use-spec projects away a profile's self-correct knob instead of
  silently arming an option the draft runner ignores (the explicit
  --self-correct --use-spec combination is already a parse-time error)
- RunTurnBench canonicalizes and validates ExecProfile at the library
  boundary, so a direct caller's casing/whitespace cannot fork report
  labels and an unknown name fails before anything runs
- reverting a profile whose displaced budget was zero clears
  ZERO_MAX_TURNS (SetMaxTurnsEnv ignores zero, so sub-agents would have
  kept the removed profile's budget)
- the TUI effort-disarm test fails instead of skipping when the catalog
  stops filling low effort

* fix(tui): reconcile an active profile's effort fill on model switch

The fill is per-model, not a session preference: fast selected on a
model without low fills nothing, and switching to a model that supports
it should behave like selecting the profile there; the reverse switch
must not keep sending a level the destination does not support. Both
switch paths (the /model command and the cross-provider picker) now
re-derive the fill, leaving explicitly touched efforts alone and
keeping the escalation's effort restore in step. Also: the revert-env
test asserts key removal via LookupEnv, and applyProfileTurnBudget's
pinned-budget parameter is named and documented as covering mode
presets, not just the flag.

* fix(tui): void profile effort bookkeeping when the model-switch drop erases it

The /model path's pre-existing unsupported-effort drop ran before the
profile reconciliation and left contradictory state behind: a dropped
touched override kept blocking the profile from governing, and a
dropped profile fill left a stale applied value with the effort restore
still armed. The drop itself is load-bearing (the TUI run path forwards
the effort to the provider unfiltered), so instead of preserving a
known-unsupported level, the voided choice now resets the profile's
effort bookkeeping and the reconcile re-derives from scratch. The whole
sequence lives in one ring-parameterized helper driven by the switch
target's authoritative ring, unit-tested against synthetic rings for
both the void-then-refill arc and the supported-override survival.

* fix(tui): only drop an explicit effort when the target ring is authoritative

A nil ring meant both a catalog model with no effort controls and a
live-discovered custom model the catalog cannot vouch for. The drop now
requires an authoritative ring (a resolved catalog entry, whose ring may
legitimately be empty); an unknown ring preserves an explicit preference,
matching the cross-provider picker's behavior, while the profile's own
fill still applies only where support is known.
2026-07-19 00:53:17 +05:30
Vasanth T 015452c1c9 fix(perfbench): keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps (#737)
* fix(perfbench): keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps

* fix(perfbench): exclude stamped answer from positive oracle greps too
2026-07-18 22:54:02 +05:30
Vasanth T af875df587 perf(agent): posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) (#736)
* trace(perf): add posture escalation counter

* feat(agent): typed posture-escalation policy and tool-result risk field

* feat(agent): posture controller wiring and executed-risk stamping

* test(agent): cover posture controller, escalation act path, and risk stamping

* test(agent): pin zero risk on not-executed results

* fix(agent): wire uncertain-path escalation and validate risk thresholds
2026-07-18 22:32:02 +05:30
Vasanth T dbd9443014 fix(perfbench): absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class (#730)
* fix(perfbench): absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class

* fix(perfbench): state that errored tasks count as pass-rate failures

* fix(perfbench): align errored-task wording with the actual tier accounting

* chore(perfbench): never commit generated baseline reports
2026-07-18 21:39:52 +05:30
Anandan 0fae754460 docs: refresh repository agent guidelines (#734)
* docs: refresh repository agent guidelines

* docs: make validation guidance non-mutating
2026-07-18 21:37:36 +05:30
Vasanth T 2cc6f43bf7 docs(community): wire Discussions as the front door for questions and ideas (#732)
* docs(community): wire Discussions as the front door for questions and ideas

* docs(community): restore LF endings and make feature routing coherent
2026-07-18 21:34:58 +05:30
uma-prasadandCursor 77960229b8 fix(doctor): detect missing native binary during runtime checks (#450)
* fix(doctor): report missing npm native binary in wrapper

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(doctor): preserve JSON output for missing native binary

* fix(doctor): preserve doctor CLI behavior in wrapper fallback

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* style: gofmt npmwrapper doctor fallback tests

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(doctor): reuse shared Bun recovery helpers in wrapper fallback

Extract bunRecoveryParagraph and related helpers so the doctor missing-binary text path and the generic wrapper bail share the same copy. Add regression tests with ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN to guard against future drift.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
2026-07-18 22:49:19 +08:00
Vasanth T 60dc84e7a3 perf(openai): optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) (#723)
* trace(perf): add provider prewarm span and prefix-stability counters

* feat(openai): optimized turn session with prewarm and prefix telemetry

* feat(providers): gate optimized OpenAI turn sessions behind env flag

* feat(cli): wire optimized turn sessions into headless exec

* docs(readme): document the optimized OpenAI turn-session toggle

* fix(openai): include tool descriptions in prefix digest, harden gate and test bounds

* fix(openai): isolate prewarm tracing, skip non-reusable transports, fingerprint wire order and cache key

* test(openai): pin keep-alive transports in probe-expecting tests

* feat(providers): preserve resolved capabilities on switched-model fallback sessions
2026-07-18 14:24:50 +05:30
Vasanth T 30e2c3f7ff perf(providers): provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7) (#720)
* perf(providers): add provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7)

* fix(providers): project effective reasoning efforts into capabilities

* feat(agent): carry optimized turn sessions across mid-run model switches

* test(agent): cover swap-time session open failure
2026-07-18 09:33:07 +05:30
Anandan 18cce358a2 Add deterministic completion policy (#719)
Extract completion decisions from the agent loop into a feature-gated typed policy with complete, incomplete, and uncertain outcomes. Preserve bounded plan-stall nudges and allow at most one semantic acceptance check for self-correcting runs.

Tested: make build

Tested: make test

Tested: go fmt ./...

Tested: go vet ./...

Tested: make lint

Tested: govulncheck ./...

Note: repository-wide pinned golangci-lint reports 36 pre-existing unrelated findings; internal/agent/... reports 0 issues.
2026-07-18 00:29:58 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS e5670c427f perf(output): add token-aware semantic output budgeting (PR11) (#717)
* perf(output): add token-aware budget contract

* perf(output): add semantic retention policies

* perf(output): budget results after redaction

* perf(output): propagate tool truncation metadata

* perf(output): trace semantic budget decisions

* perf(output): classify core tool output

* docs(output): describe semantic output budgeting

* test(output): make spill fallback portable on windows

* fix(output): address semantic budgeting review findings

* test(output): make hook budgeting tests portable

* fix(output): retain oversized single-line file content

* fix(output): apply semantic budgets to captured output

* fix(output): preserve hook budgets and search paths

* fix(output): preserve alias and truncation metadata

* test(trace): validate output budget metadata

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-18 00:02:43 +05:30
KRATOSandKRATOS 31d45d5f14 perf(agent): concurrent read-only tool batches via capability gate (#715)
Upgrade the parallel tool planner from SideEffectRead probes to the PR5
CapabilitiesOf contract: EffectReadOnly + ThreadSafe + auto-allowed, with
resource-key conflict boundaries so same-path reads stay sequential.

Mark audited pure reads ThreadSafe (read_file, read_minified_file,
list_directory, glob, grep, skill, web_fetch). Glob/grep use scopedScan
directory keys (nil for workspace-wide "." so scans do not false-conflict).

Tests cover the capability gate, key conflicts, extendParallelRun windows,
and catalog ThreadSafe audit for concurrent-safe reads.

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 17:52:11 +05:30
Vasanth T 727ad4d321 perf(turn-bench): Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness (#712)
* perf(turn-bench): Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness

The baseline manifest's pass/fail contract had three holes that let a weak
or no-op agent read as a pass:

  - edit grep oracles were substring checks: a reworded line (e.g.
    fmt.Println("debug: starting") -> fmt.Println("starting up")) passed
    `! grep 'debug: starting'`.
  - refactor lived in the build tier with a non-positive `go build ./...`,
    so a no-op refactor passed.
  - the 24 read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) had no oracle;
    a zero-exit only proved the turn ran.

This makes the tiers honest:

  - edit/refactor now carry a stamped oracle_test.go compiled by
    `go test ./...` — the Go compiler is the structural verifier, so a
    no-op refactor, a missing field, or a reworded-but-not-removed line
    fails to compile/run. The test is stamped into the fixture copy AFTER
    the agent run, so it can't interfere with the agent's own build or be
    pre-seen.
  - nav gains an answer-oracle: the harness captures the agent's final
    answer (.zero-answer.txt) and greps it for determinable facts. Count
    tasks (nav-04/05/08) use a structured `count: N` token so the oracle is
    tight rather than a loose prose-contains on "0".
  - refactor graduates from build to correctness (its oracle is now
    positive); nav graduates from latency-only to correctness. The build
    tier is empty (buildOnlyClasses: []).
  - longproc/longctx/parallel stay permanently latency-only — there is no
    deterministic oracle for "report whether the build succeeds" or
    "summarize a large file"; documented in MANIFEST.md.

Tier counts: correctness 34 (edit 10 + fix 8 + nav 10 + refactor 6),
build 0, latency 14. Total 48 unchanged.

TurnSchemaVersion 2 -> 3: the result shape is unchanged (only class-list
membership shifts) but correctnessPassRate now means something strictly
stronger, so the bump prevents a v2->v2 cross-version comparison from
misreading the jump as a model improvement.

Prerequisite fix: the mutating fixtures had no go.mod, so `go test ./...`
in the temp copy failed with "cannot find main module". Added go.mod per
fixture (edit/fix/refactor/nav) and moved copyFixture's temp dir one level
below the system temp root — Go ignores go.mod in direct children of the
temp dir (a hijack guard), which would have broken every compiler-backed
oracle. This also fixes the pre-existing fix/refactor oracles, which were
silently broken because the test suite used fake runners that never ran
go test.

Tests: stub-binary gating tests prove each oracle fails the wrong thing
(no-op refactor, missing field, wrong nav answer, reworded debug print) and
passes the right thing (real refactor, added field, correct answer); an
edit-01 test proves the scoped negative grep doesn't false-fail a correct
rename that leaves the doc comment. Aggregation, schema, and unit tests
cover the v3 tier model and the answer-capture helper.

* Address CodeRabbit review on PR #712: tighten oracles + isolation

- nav count oracles (nav-01/04/05/08): anchored line-exact
  `^count: N$` with the fixture's exact expected count, so a substring
  like "the count: 0" or a wrong count like "count: 3" fails instead
  of rubber-stamping. nav-01 added to the structured-count contract.
- stampOracleAndAnswer now errors when a task has an oracle or
  verification but no workspace fixture, so verification can't run in
  the caller's cwd with the oracle never compiled (false-pass closed).
- copyFixture uses a unique 0700 os.MkdirTemp parent under the temp
  root and nests the copy beneath it (grandchild of temp root), so the
  Go go.mod hijack guard is satisfied and cleanup removes the whole
  parent. Avoids a predictable shared world-readable dir.
- Rejection tests require a non-empty VerifyErr via a shared
  assertVerifyFailed helper, proving the failure came from
  verification rather than a harness error or a silent non-pass.
- Unify streamJSONExitCode + streamJSONFinalText behind one
  parseStreamJSON parser (behavior-preserving; scanner limits and
  malformed-event handling now live in one place).

* Address gnanam1990 review on PR #712: close count=0 gameability + stronger oracles

- nav count tasks (nav-04/05/08) had a count=0 ground truth, so an agent
  that never opened the workspace and always emitted "count: 0" passed
  three correctness tasks -- the exact pass-rate-misread-as-correctness
  failure this PR closes. nav-04 now has a real TestGreet (count 1) and
  nav-05 a real TODO (count 1); nav-01's file count moves to 5. nav-08
  stays at 0 (a real third-party import would need a network fetch and
  break the offline suite) but its oracle now requires the answer to name
  both stdlib imports (fmt from main.go, testing from main_test.go), so a
  blind count:0 or a main.go-only read fails. nav-08's prompt now asks the
  agent to enumerate and classify every import, so naming the stdlib
  imports is part of a correct answer, not a false-fail.
- refactor-05: stamp a behavioral oracle (TestGreetWrapped) so deleting
  both Wrapper and greetWrapped, or stubbing the caller to return "",
  fails to compile/run. The negative grep alone passed that wrong edit.
- refactor-04: replace the brittle exact-text shell grep with a stamped
  file-reading oracle using a spacing-tolerant regex, so a bare
  map[string]int decl under any spacing/:= variant can't dodge it, and
  the Stats type must be referenced in main.go.
- edit-05: also assert the "debug: starting" message text is absent, so
  a respell onto fmt.Printf / backticks / log.Println / println that
  still prints the message fails (the fmt.Println(" check missed those).
- v3 doc comments on ClassSummary / TurnBenchResult /
  FormatTurnBenchSummary now describe the v3 tiers (correctness =
  edit/fix/nav/refactor, build empty, latency = longproc/longctx/
  parallel) instead of the stale v2 model.
- stampOracleAndAnswer failure now mutates the existing outcome instead
  of returning a fresh one, so the already-parsed trace and trace issue
  survive a stamp error (attribution is preserved, pass/fail unchanged).
- Schema comment provenance: "PR #701" -> neutral "Phase 0 oracle
  hardening" (this PR is #712).
- New gating + satisfiable stub tests for refactor-04/05 and edit-05, and
  count-oracle zero-guess / inspection-proof tests for nav-04/05/08.

* Fix macOS CI: copyFixture isolation test was slash-sensitive

TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation compared filepath.Dir(parent)
against os.TempDir() verbatim. On macOS $TMPDIR ends in a trailing slash
("/var/folders/.../T/") while filepath.Dir strips it, so the equality
false-failed even though the parent is genuinely a direct child of the
temp root. Linux (/tmp, no slash) and Windows (no slash in this Go
build) matched by accident.

The production copyFixture nesting is correct on all platforms (the
grandchild copy sits one level below the temp root, satisfying Go's
go.mod hijack guard); only the assertion was slash-sensitive. Normalize
both sides with filepath.Clean.

* Close nav-04/05 blind-count-one gameability (anandh8x review)

nav-04 and nav-05 had a count-only oracle (anchored '^count:1$'). Once the
ground truth became 1, an agent that never inspects the fixture and always
emits 'count: 1' passed both — the blind-count-one surface the prior
non-zero-ground-truth fix opened. Pair the count with a workspace-derived
named fact that proves inspection, mirroring nav-08's fmt+testing:

- nav-04 now also requires 'TestGreet' (the one test function in
  main_test.go) — a specific, non-generic name a blind agent can't produce
  without reading main.go to learn a greet function exists. Fully closes
  the blind-count-one surface.
- nav-05 now also requires 'main.go' (the file holding the one TODO).
  main.go is the conventional entrypoint and the most guessable filename, so
  this reduces rather than fully closes the surface — a blind 'count: 1, in
  main.go' can still pass. Accepted for Phase 0: the blind floor drops below
  100% (a bare 'count: 1' fails), so a model still moves the pass rate by
  inspecting. MANIFEST.md documents this residual honestly.

Two gating tests per task: RejectsBlindCountOne (bare 'count: 1' now fails)
and, for nav-05, RejectsSubstring (main.go present but unanchored count
still fails — parity with nav-04). Existing accept tests still pass (their
answers already name TestGreet / main.go).

Doc nits also fixed: MANIFEST.md #701 -> #712; refactor-05 removed from the
'no oracleTest' inventory (it now has TestGreetWrapped); the nav-01 named-
fact prose corrected to the three files the oracle actually anchors on;
test comment #701 -> #712.
2026-07-17 17:32:45 +05:30
github-actions[bot] e666395d47 chore(main): release 0.4.0 (#625)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-17 13:25:31 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 9043baedcf fix(sandbox): scrub dynamic credential env vars (#682)
* fix(sandbox): scrub dynamic credential env vars

* fix(sandbox): tolerate env assignments in configured sensitive keys

A config value mistakenly given as a full assignment (e.g.
"COMPANY_LLM_SECRET=...") would never match the real env key during
scrubbing, silently re-exposing the credential to sandboxed commands.
normalizeSensitiveEnvKeys now keeps only the name part before '=' and
re-trims it, per PR review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): scrub credentials on direct/degraded command plans

directCommandPlan (used when the native sandbox backend is unavailable,
disabled, or not required, including the EnforcementDegraded fallback)
left Env nil whenever spec.Env was nil, so exec.Cmd inherited the full
caller environment unscrubbed. Configured apiKeyEnv credentials and
dynamically named ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_SECRET variables leaked
through that path even though the wrapped sandbox plans already
scrubbed them.

Route direct plans through scrubSensitiveEnv the same way wrapped
plans do, snapshotting os.Environ() when spec.Env is nil so scrubbing
still applies. Adds a regression test covering the degraded-fallback
path with both a configured and a dynamically named secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 13:04:12 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19 4d8c31cf16 fix(config): enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable (#609)
A user-level MCP server disable is now sticky. The project config
(a cloned repo's ./.zero/config.json) cannot re-enable a server the
user disabled, and cannot disable a server the user explicitly enabled.

The previous merge just assigned base.Disabled = next.Disabled, so a repo
that set disabled:true could silently defeat a user's explicit mcp enable
<server>. The guard is now symmetric via a mergeMCPServer canReenable
flag: once a higher-trust scope has explicitly set the disabled flag, a
lower-trust layer may not override that decision in either direction. Only
the CLI override scope (canReenable=true) may lift a sticky user decision.

The prior disabledSet-before-check ordering bug is also fixed: the
higher-trust scope's prior disabledSet/Disabled is captured before folding
in next's flag, so a project layer can still disable a default-enabled
server (e.g. firecrawl) rather than being silently ignored.

Ports the fix onto main's refactored MCP merge (internal/config/mcp_merge.go
and mergeProjectMCPConfig), which splits project-scope merging from the
general mergeMCPConfig path.

Fixes #512
2026-07-17 13:03:32 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 824ecdbcf9 fix(hooks): run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts (#606)
* fix(hooks): run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts

On interrupt, Run returns with ctx already canceled. The deferred
dispatchSessionEnd call passed that same ctx into Hooks.Dispatch, whose
context.WithTimeout derives an already-canceled child context, so the
hook process never actually launches (recorded as timed-out/error in
the audit log). Since most sessions end via interrupt, sessionEnd
hooks were effectively unreliable.

Detach the sessionEnd dispatch from the run context's cancellation
with context.WithoutCancel so the dispatcher's own timeout still
applies without being short-circuited by the run's cancellation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* test(agent): fall back to GOROOT for hook regression

* test(agent): justify GOROOT fallback

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 13:03:14 +08:00
6b9c2f0c08 feat(aimlapi): AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) (#655)
* feat(aimlapi): AI/ML API guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance)

Add the AI/ML API provider integration to the zero CLI: a guided TUI
onboarding sub-flow that takes an existing key or an email top-up and
writes the issued key into the provider profile, attributed to the
Gitlawb rebate partner.

- internal/aimlapi: OpenAI-compatible client, partner-checkout top-up,
  key validation, streaming, and endpoint config (Paths A/B/C).
- providercatalog / providermodelcatalog: register the aimlapi provider
  with default headers and models.
- tui: aimlapi onboarding screen wired into the provider wizard and
  onboarding flow.

Default endpoints point at production (auth/app/api/pay/aimlapi.com);
each is overridable via AIMLAPI_*_URL env vars.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): address review findings in onboarding flow

- topup: use errors.As for the 5xx retry check so a wrapped APIError
  still retries instead of aborting a paid checkout.
- onboarding: a Path-A top-up on an email with no account now lands on a
  single coherent "key saved, balance not topped up" screen instead of a
  green "ready" plus a red error.
- onboarding: an empty amount field is rejected instead of silently
  falling through to the $25 default.
- collapse the two identical top-up prompt constants into MsgTopUpPrompt
  and drop the dead amountPrompt() branch.
- reuse stdlib maps.Clone instead of a third bespoke header-copy helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and sharpen amount validation

* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and surface real amount errors

* docs(aimlapi): document exported client API; drop out-of-scope gitignore entry

Addresses the two CodeRabbit PR checks on #655:

- Add doc comments to the exported aimlapi client API (Client, APIError,
  the session/checkout/onboarding types and their methods) and
  ParseAmountUSD, to satisfy the docstring-coverage check.
- Remove the unrelated /zero.exe~ .gitignore entry that an earlier
  review-fix commit added; it is out of scope for the provider work, so
  the PR no longer touches .gitignore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): render aimlapi row like other recommended providers

* fix(aimlapi): resolve onboarding review findings (Path A funding, base URL, request cancellation)

* fix(aimlapi): validate pasted API keys

* test(aimlapi): clarify pasted key validation

* test(aimlapi): cover key-balance low-balance transition

* fix(aimlapi): reject non-finite top-up amounts

* fix(cli): scope and canonicalize provider headers

* fix(tui): distinguish invalid verification codes

* feat(aimlapi): resume account-bound top-ups safely

* feat(tui): offer top-up for existing AIMLAPI keys

* feat(tui): reuse AIMLAPI env key on first run

* feat(tui): reuse configured AIMLAPI profiles

* test(aimlapi): trim redundant flow coverage

* fix(tui): preserve existing AIMLAPI profile metadata

* fix(tui): clone AIMLAPI headers in env fallback

* fix(aimlapi): address remaining review findings

* fix(aimlapi): harden onboarding lifecycle

* fix(aimlapi): preserve validated checkout context

* fix(aimlapi): harden checkout retry state

* fix(tui): clarify AIMLAPI configured choices

* fix(aimlapi): make checkout retries idempotent

* fix(aimlapi): validate checkout responses

* fix(providers): reconcile aimlapi catalog after rebase

---------

Co-authored-by: Lookoff123 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:49:38 +08:00
KRATOSandKRATOS 8ef8576df7 perf(tools): add explicit effect metadata for safe concurrency (#705)
* perf(tools): add explicit tool effect metadata

Introduce fail-closed EffectClass and ToolCapabilities on every built-in
tool so a later concurrent read-only batch PR can decide safety from
explicit metadata rather than tool names. Plugin and MCP tools stay
EffectUnknown. No concurrent execution is enabled.

* fix(tools): address review feedback on effect metadata

Harden capability normalization and resource keys before PR6 consumes them:

- Force ThreadSafe=false for every non-ReadOnly effect at read time
- Reject duplicate builtin names in ValidateBuiltinCatalog
- Coerce numeric session ids and accept "session" for process keys
- Strip path/query before userinfo in endpoint host parsing
- Wire apply_patch keys from unified-diff paths + cwd
- Reclassify bash as WorkspaceWrite (one-shot shell mutator)
- Expand regression tests for keys, normalization, and gates

* fix(tools): keep multiFileResourceKeys used by apply_patch keys

Satisfies unused lint after switching apply_patch to applyPatchResourceKeys.

* fix(tools): resolve CodeRabbit residual capability/key issues

- Join apply_patch diff paths under cwd for conflict keys
- Validate constructor-declared capabilities before normalization
- Unify session/process ID key extraction helper

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:48:36 +08:00
Anandanandanandh8x 1c5c6e78a8 feat(perf): emit prompt-prefix hash fingerprint per turn (#704)
Compute a seven-field SHA-256 fingerprint of the cacheable prompt
prefix (base instructions, confirmation policy, project context, skills,
tools, tool schemas, complete) and emit one prefix_hash event per turn
through the trace recorder. The complete hash is the SHA-256 of the
canonical join of the other six, so any sub-component drift is
observable both individually and in aggregate.

The decomposition exists so a downstream observer can detect which
sub-component of the prefix broke cache stability across turns: a
stable complete_prefix hash means the cacheable prefix is byte-
identical, and the sub-hash that changed names the culprit.

No behavior change for untraced runs. For OpenAI, the existing
prompt_cache_key (session ID) is unchanged; the fingerprint is purely
additive observability. The Anthropic cache_control breakpoint work
already in main is not touched.

Co-authored-by: anandh8x <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:47:53 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 7f669f4550 feat(tui): Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation (#699)
* feat(tui): Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation

Add Ctrl+X leader shortcuts for common slash commands (with Ctrl+X ?
chord map), and Ctrl+P/N previous/next selection in modals and pickers.

* fix(tui): drop Ctrl+X e /edit leader chord

/edit replaces the composer and would discard an in-progress draft; leave
it unbound so leader shortcuts stay draft-preserving.

* fix(tui): consume idle Ctrl+N as a no-op

Reserve Ctrl+N for emacs menu navigation so it never falls through to
remapped global bindings when no selection surface is open.

* docs: drop manual CHANGELOG entries for TUI shortcuts
2026-07-17 12:44:00 +08:00
euxaristia 2b42cd567b fix(tui): stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused (#672)
* fix(tui): stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused

The composer's cursor blinked on a fixed timer unconditionally, including
mid-keystroke, which made typing feel janky since the cursor's job is to mark
the current position. Gate the existing blink tick on two states instead:
force solid while a keystroke landed within the last 500ms (reusing the
existing lastCharTime tracker), and hide it entirely while the terminal
window is unfocused (new terminalFocused field, driven by tea.FocusMsg/
BlurMsg). Idle and focused keeps the prior blink behavior unchanged.

Also decouples view.ReportFocus from the notifier (it was previously gated on
m.notifier != nil, which is effectively always true in production but left
cursor-focus behavior fragile if that ever changes) so focus reporting is
requested unconditionally.

* fix(tui): apply caret visibility synchronously and in the argument-hint line

- A keypress, focus, or blur now updates composerCursorVisible in its own
  message handler instead of waiting for the next 530ms composerBlinkMsg
  tick, which could render a typed character caret-less, leave a visible
  caret in an unfocused terminal, or keep it hidden after a refocus.
- commandArgumentHintComposerLine takes the caret visibility state instead
  of painting its cursor cell unconditionally, so the required-argument
  hint path follows the same focus and blink contract as the main
  composer renderer.
- New tests assert the state immediately after each message, with no blink
  tick in between, and cover the argument-hint render in both states.

* fix(tui): apply the caret state on composer paste

A paste is the same immediate-input transition as a keypress: routePaste now
refreshes lastCharTime and sets the caret visible for both the bracketed
tea.PasteMsg and right-click clipboardReadMsg paths, so a paste right after
the blink phase hid the caret renders solid immediately instead of waiting
for a tick that would toggle off a stale idle state.
2026-07-17 12:43:30 +08:00
euxaristia 665bd4b3d0 WIP: feat(tui): TUI theme presets (Dune and Neon) (#634)
* draft(tui): add theme interface and Claude/Codex presets proposal

Introduces the Theme interface alongside the initial specifications and styling models for the Claude (card-based, warm) and Codex (high-density, split-screen cyberpunk) layout presets. Detailed design plans are documented in docs/THEMES.md.

* fix(tui): implement Claude/Codex themes on the existing palette system

theme.go had replaced the tuiTheme/buildTheme/palette architecture every
renderer depends on with a standalone Theme interface using the wrong
lipgloss import, breaking the build and orphaning the existing theme
registry, /theme command, and picker.

Revert theme.go to the working implementation and add claude and codex
as real palette entries in theme_palettes.go, following the file's own
extension pattern. Both pass the WCAG AA contrast and gray-ramp
invariants asserted across the whole registry, and are picked up
automatically by --theme, ZERO_THEME, /theme, and the picker.

Rewrite docs/THEMES.md to describe the actual palette-registry
architecture instead of the removed interface.

* fix(tui): rename Claude/Codex to neutral Dune/Neon, ensure WCAG AA contrast compliance, and add tests

* style(tui): gofmt theme_select_test.go (drop trailing whitespace)

The ubuntu smoke run fails on gofmt -l; this clears the only unformatted
file in the draft so CI goes green.

* test(tui): cover the CLI/env resolution path for the dune and neon presets

TestNewThemePresetsWired only checked lookupTheme and the IsDark
grouping. Add coverage for the actual --theme/ZERO_THEME precedence
path (resolveThemeMode) and confirm applyTheme swaps zeroTheme to each
preset's own palette rather than a built-in fallback.

* fix(tui): raise Dune/Neon palette contrast and fix theme docs

Darken dune's accent, blue, and red tokens so the selected-row caret,
local-model dot, and diff deletion text clear WCAG AA against selBg and
delBg, including after ANSI-256 downsampling. Also correct THEMES.md's
description of bare /theme (it opens a live-preview picker, not a
list), and add the dune/neon names to the ZERO_THEME/--theme tables in
README.md and README_ZH.md.

* fix(tui): keep Dune and Neon readable after ANSI-256 downsampling

- Dune's accent becomes #724028: still AA on selBg and panel in truecolor
  (5.46:1 and 7.03:1), and its xterm-256 quantization (#444444) now clears
  AA on quantized selBg at 6.47:1 where the previous #7c4712 quantized to
  #875f00 at 3.81:1. Blue already survived quantization at 4.67:1.
- Neon's diff bands move to hexes that quantize to distinct green and red
  xterm entries (addBg #083c10 -> #005f00, delBg #3c0810 -> #5f0000,
  addBgWord #147828 -> #008700, delBgWord #74202e -> #870000) instead of
  collapsing to the same grays, while keeping every truecolor invariant.
- New TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast quantizes the palette tokens the way
  a 256-color terminal does and asserts the Dune selected-row pairs stay AA
  and the Neon bands keep their green/red identity and mutual separation.
- docs/THEMES.md is now linked from the Documentation sections of both
  READMEs, and the Unreleased changelog inventory says twelve themes and
  names dune and neon.

* fix(tui): keep Neon diff content AA after quantization, fix error border

- faintest becomes #74c468: line numbers now quantize to #87d75f, which
  clears AA on the xterm-green addBg (#005f00) where the old #58af69
  quantized to 2.95:1, while staying dimmer than faint so the gray ramp
  stays monotonic.
- addInk becomes #ecffdc, quantizing to #ffffd7 for 4.60:1 on the word
  band's #008700 (was 4.29:1). Both rendered diff-content pairs are now
  asserted in the ANSI-256 test instead of documented as omissions.
- cardErr becomes #9a4042: 3.01:1 against the panel (2.43:1 before) and
  3.65:1 quantized, meeting the 3:1 non-text component threshold, with the
  border surface asserted in both renderings.
- docs/THEMES.md no longer claims the extended invariants run against the
  whole registry: it now says new palettes must be added to the
  per-palette contrast tests or given equivalent coverage.
2026-07-17 12:38:51 +08:00
euxaristia 9acb4113cc feat(cli): show ZERO wordmark on --version (#673)
* feat(cli): show ZERO wordmark on --version

The TUI's empty-state ZERO ascii art gets exposed via a new tui.Wordmark
helper and printed above the version line for `zero -v`/`--version`.
Coloring only applies when stdout is a real TTY and NO_COLOR isn't set,
so redirected or piped output (scripts parsing the version) stays plain.

* fix(release): match --version output by suffix, not exact string

The release smoke check compared zero --version output to an exact
"zero <version>" string, which broke once --version started printing
the wordmark above the version line. Check for a "version: <version>"
suffix instead so the smoke check doesn't couple to the wordmark art.

* fix(cli,tui): keep --version machine-readable off-TTY, drop wordmark color

- When stdout is not a terminal, --version prints exactly "zero <version>"
  again: pipes, redirects, command substitutions, and the release smoke
  contract all parse that single record, so the banner is a TTY-only
  affordance now.
- The TTY path keeps the banner but restores "zero <version>" as the
  version record instead of "version: <version>".
- Wordmark renders uncolored: only newModel resolves --theme/ZERO_THEME,
  so painting the global dark palette here was unreadable on light
  terminals. The terminal's default foreground works on any background.
- smokeVersion goes back to requiring the exact "zero <version>" output
  instead of the suffix match that papered over the banner.
2026-07-16 23:02:22 +08:00
d66a9dda69 feat(providers): add AI/ML API preset (rebased onto main) (#621)
* feat(providers): add AI/ML API preset

* fix(providers): relocate aimlapi preset and drop referral header

Addresses the two review asks on #402:

- Move the AI/ML API descriptor out of catalog slot #2 (it sat above the
  first-party OpenAI/Anthropic/Google entries) down next to openrouter in
  the aggregator cluster. Re-sync expectedCatalogIDs and the
  TransportOpenAICompat order-list to match.
- Drop the always-on X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID / Integration-Repo /
  Integration-Version attribution headers. There's no partner arrangement
  behind the preset, so a non-overridable referral tag on every user's
  request isn't something to ship on a community preset. aimlapi now rides
  through plain CopyHeaders like every other provider. Removes
  HeadersForCatalog (it existed only for this special-case), reverts the
  factory and discovery call sites to CopyHeaders, and drops the header
  test. The factory/discovery tests now assert the endpoint, auth, and the
  user's own custom headers survive while no attribution header is sent.

* fix(providers): address CodeRabbit review on #621

- Document AIMLAPIID for docstring coverage.
- Apply providerio.CopyHeaders for Anthropic and Google provider paths,
  matching the OpenAI path introduced for aimlapi header isolation.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(providers): gofmt factory.go to unblock CI smoke

Remove mixed tab/space indentation in the openai.New options block so
ubuntu-latest fmt-check passes.

---------

Co-authored-by: Dmitry Tumanov <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-16 22:57:35 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 7d579996b4 feat(skills): discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading (#696)
* feat(skills): discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading

Add ~/.agents/skills as a read-only global discovery root after the
primary
Zero skills dir and before plugin roots. Unify runtime and CLI discovery
on
one multi-root path (DiscoveryRoots / LoadFromRoots / GlobalRoots) and
always
register the multi-root skill tool so bare runs and plugin runs share
the
same load surface.
Install/remove/lock still target only the primary Zero skills directory.
Fixes #610

* docs(skills): note lock stays on the primary write root

Document that install/remove/lock target only the primary Zero skills
directory, matching multi-root discovery write-root isolation.

* fix(skills): bubble primary root load errors from LoadFromRoots

Return non-missing failures from the first non-empty skills root so a
broken primary dir is not reported as an empty skill list. Keep fail-open
behavior for optional roots (~/.agents/skills, plugins).

* fix(skills): treat non-directory skills root as error on Windows

Windows maps ENOTDIR to ErrNotExist, so ReadDir on a regular file looked
like a missing skills dir. Reclassify existing non-directories and assert
the portable load behavior in tests.
2026-07-16 21:59:20 +08:00
Vasanth T abe24bcb10 Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline) (#700)
* Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline)

Introduce an opt-in `internal/trace` package that attributes a run's wall
time to named spans — prompt build, provider connect/queue, generation,
tool queue/execution, permission wait, verification, compaction,
persistence — plus counters for model requests, tool calls, retries,
reconnects, compactions, completion nudges, acceptance checks, model
switches, and input/cached/output tokens. The recorder is nil-safe (a nil
*Recorder is a no-op), so every stamp site can call it unguarded; an
untraced run is byte-identical to today.

The recorder threads into agent.Run via a new `Options.Trace` field and a
single `trace.WithContext` assignment, so the shared providerio seam
(connect around client.Do, queue around OAuth resolve, first token at the
first non-keepalive SSE payload) reaches it through `trace.FromContext`
without any provider-interface change. All instrumentation is opt-in: when
`Options.Trace` is nil the hot path is untouched.

Headless `zero exec` gains `--trace <path>` (and `ZERO_TRACE=<path>`),
writing an agenteval-contract-compatible NDJSON trace (`-` for stderr).
The trace is pure observation; enabling it does not change behavior.

A new per-turn benchmark harness extends `internal/perfbench` (reusing the
existing TaskSet/NumericStats/subprocess runner shapes): `RunTurnBench`
aggregates per-span median/P95 across iterations, ranks the top three
controllable latency sources by share of attributed time, rolls up per
task class, and totals tokens/counts. A checked-in 42-task manifest across
seven classes (nav, edit, fix, refactor, longproc, longctx, parallel) and
local offline fixtures back it, and `make baseline` runs it against the
built `zero`, writing `internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json`. The
report is machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.

The manifest is JSON rather than YAML to avoid adding a dependency;
per-task verification targets the specific test (`go test -run <name>`)
so fix tasks are independent. Each task is a fresh `zero exec` process, so
iterations are cold-start samples; a warm in-process path is left for
follow-up.

Verified: `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean on touched
files; `go test -race` green for internal/trace, internal/agent,
internal/perfbench, and cmd/zero-perf-bench.

* test(trace): make TestAttributionRatio clock-independent

The test recorded two synthetic 10ms spans with no real delay and asserted
the attribution ratio stayed <= 1.0. On a precise clock (Linux/macOS CI) the
wall is microseconds while attributed is 20ms, so attributed/wall blows past
1.0 and the test failed — even though the ratio legitimately exceeds 1.0
when spans overlap (parallel tool execution). On Windows the coarse timer
masked it, so the failure only surfaced in CI.

Assert the contract instead: attributed is the deterministic sum of span
durations, and the ratio equals attributed/wall (0 when wall is zero). Add a
zero-wall case for the divide-by-zero guard.

* Address review feedback on the per-turn tracer + benchmark harness

Benchmark runner (internal/perfbench):
- A nonzero agent exit code no longer counts as Passed. The runner set
  VerifyErr but then fell through to outcome.Passed = true, so a crashed
  run could be recorded as a pass. Return before the verification block
  when VerifyErr is already set.
- A task now passes only when every iteration passes. The previous
  "any iteration passes" rule let a flaky fail hide behind one good run.
- Each invocation copies its workspace fixture to a fresh temp dir and
  runs the agent + verifier there, so mutating tasks (edit/fix/refactor)
  can't dirty the checked-in fixtures or bleed into the next iteration.
- Trace load failures (missing/malformed trace file) are surfaced as
  result warnings via a new TraceIssue field instead of being swallowed.

Tracer (internal/trace):
- Finish freezes the recorder: Counter, addSpan, and the first-event
  stamps are dropped after Finish returns, so a snapshot captures exactly
  one turn and late stamps can't mutate it.
- WriteText propagates the first write error instead of silently
  swallowing sink failures.

Provider seam (internal/providers/providerio):
- FirstTokenAt is stamped only after a payload is accepted as real model
  output, not before handle() decides to drop it as an error payload.

Agent loop (internal/agent):
- The compaction counter increments only when the history actually
  shrinks, in both the proactive and reactive paths — paid no-ops no
  longer inflate the compaction total.
- Document on Options.Trace that a fresh Recorder is required per Run.

CLI (internal/cli/exec):
- Finish the trace at the agent.Run boundary and defer only the
  serialization, so the snapshot covers exactly the turn.
- Reject --trace / ZERO_TRACE for spec-draft runs with a clear error
  instead of silently accepting and writing nothing.

Manifest + fixtures:
- Strengthen the edit verifiers: rename and value-bump tasks now assert
  the old symbol is gone, and the getter task greps the method signature.
- Add the missing testdata/edit fixture (10 edit tasks referenced a
  directory that was never committed, so the whole edit class errored
  out at run time).
- The manifest test now stats each fixture so a missing dir fails at
  load time instead of at every run.
- longproc benchmark keeps Process live across the loop; README code
  fence gets a language tag and documents the per-invocation fixture copy.
- Add tests for the tracing wrapper (nil vs wired recorder, OnUsage
  forwarding, token aggregation) and the frozen-recorder contract.

* Address review feedback: exclusive-time attribution + wired spans + fix-suite compile

Rewrite the trace attribution model so concurrent/nested spans no longer
double-count. Spans record wall intervals; the recorder derives a parent for
each by interval containment and computes exclusive time (duration minus the
union of its children). AttributedDuration sums only top-level spans; Coverage
is the union of intervals over wall, capped at 1, the honest ">=95%" metric.
Top-latency ranking uses exclusive time so shares sum to ~1 instead of being
inflated by overlapping provider_connect/generation and nested
permission_wait/tool_execution.

Wire the spans that were named but never stamped: verification around the
self-correct verify pass, and StampFirstVisibleEvent on the first forwarded
text event. Drop the tool_queue/process_wait/persistence constants that had no
stamps, and rename the misnamed near-noise prompt_build span to tool_partition.
Trim RequiredEventKeys to events a healthy short run actually emits; move
conditional phases (tools, permission, compaction, verification) to
OptionalEventKeys so a short trace does not false-fail.

Make ReadNDJSON fail loudly on a corrupt file: require a type:trace header,
error on span/counter lines that appear before it, and error when a header
yields no spans or counters.

Fix the blocking fix-suite compile error: Label's %d format verb on a string
tripped go test's vet before any fix task could verify. Make it a runtime
wrong-prefix bug ("admin-" vs "user-") that still type-checks, so each fix
task is independent again.

Manifest: correct refactor-04's stats.go to main.go, reword fix-07 to the
wrong-prefix bug, add a latency-only description (read-only tasks carry no
verification oracle by design), and frame the report README on exclusive time
and coverage.

Tests updated for the occurrence/exclusive/coverage model; trace, perfbench,
and agent green under -race.

* Fix exclusive-time round-trip, identical-interval nesting, and empty-trace parse

Three correctness bugs in the attribution model found by an adversarial review
of the prior commit, all undermining the no-double-count guarantee:

1. exclusive_ms:0 was overwritten with the inclusive Duration on re-parse. A
   parent whose children tile its interval legitimately has exclusive time 0;
   WriteNDJSON emits exclusive_ms:0, but ReadNDJSON's "<= 0 means missing"
   fallback turned that back into the full duration, so every re-parsed trace
   re-introduced the double-counting the model exists to prevent (the benchmark
   harness, which ranks re-parsed traces, inherits it). Gate the fallback on
   key ABSENCE, so a written 0 is preserved.

2. deriveNesting formed a 2-cycle for two spans with identical [start, end]
   intervals: the symmetric containment check made each parent the other,
   dropping both from top-level and zeroing AttributedDuration. Break the tie
   deterministically — strict containment is an unambiguous parent; for
   identical intervals, only the lower-indexed span may parent the other, so
   one stays top-level.

3. ReadNDJSON returned a valid empty TurnTrace for empty/blank-only input, so a
   run that crashed before emitting a trace (or where --trace was not honored)
   masqueraded as a clean zero-attribution sample. Empty input now errors, so
   the harness records a TraceIssue.

Also: decode counters via json.Number so int64 values above 2^53 round-trip
exactly instead of losing precision through float64; and drop the harness's
own "exclusive <= 0 -> Duration" ranking fallback, which was the same
double-count on the re-parsed path. Added regression tests covering the
zero-exclusive round-trip, the identical-interval nesting, empty-input
rejection, and counter precision.

* perf(turn-bench): split pass/fail into oracle tiers so the pass rate can't be misread as correctness

The turn benchmark counted any exit-0 task as passed, including the 24
read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) that carry no verification
oracle — so the JSON tasksPassed / "N/M passed" headline could read as a
correctness verdict it never was. Split pass/fail into three oracle tiers:

- correctness (edit grep + fix go test): the only pass rate that can move
  with model quality (tasksVerified / tasksPassed / correctnessPassRate)
- build-only (refactor go build): a non-positive oracle, reported as
  buildPassRate and excluded from correctnessPassRate; the manifest declares
  buildOnlyClasses: ["refactor"]
- latency-only (no oracle): counted in latencyOnlyTasks, never in any pass
  rate

NewTurnExecRunner no longer sets Passed=true for tasks with no
verificationCommand, and the summary headline names each tier explicitly so
an exit-0 read-only run cannot inflate a correctness number. Bumps
TurnSchemaVersion to 2. Class breakdown and tier contract documented in
internal/perfbench/MANIFEST.md and reports/README.md.

Also install the trace first-token/visible-event forwarding handlers in
agent.Run whenever options.Trace is set, not only when a UI OnText /
OnReasoning callback is set, so a headless traced run (zero exec --trace)
still captures FirstTokenAt. forwardedVisibleText stays tied to the user
callback so stall-retry semantics are unchanged. Adds a regression
assertion to the existing traced-run test.

* Address CodeRabbit review on 2bfb3406: omitempty + crash visibility

Three findings from CodeRabbit's review of the 3-tier pass-rate fix:

- BuildPassRate dropped its omitempty so an explicit 0.0 (all refactor
  tasks fail to compile) is no longer indistinguishable from 'no build
  tasks ran' in the JSON. Matches CorrectnessPassRate's always-serialize
  behavior, which is the whole point of the tier split: the report
  cannot be misread.
- A crashed sample (outcome.Err) now emits a Warning mirroring the
  TraceIssue path, so a run that died every iteration can't look like a
  normal benchmark with fewer measurements instead of a failure.
- cmd.Run()'s returned error is preserved on the no-run_end path: when
  stderr is empty and Run failed (binary missing, exec permission
  denied), the actual OS error is reported instead of collapsing to the
  generic 'missing terminal run_end event'.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench/agent/trace.

* Address CodeRabbit re-review: anti-averaging README + fixture-isolation test

Re-review at d0615249 asked for the pass-rate contract to be loud to
downstream consumers and for the fixture-isolation property to be asserted,
not just read from code.

- reports/README.md gains a prominent 'do not average the tier pass rates /
  do not report a single pass rate' warning. The schema offers no headline
  pass rate on purpose; a consumer must name the tier it is reporting. This
  is the durability fix for the misread the tier split exists to prevent.
- turn_bench_test.go gains TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation: copies
  a fixture, mutates the copy, and asserts the source is byte-identical
  (and that a file added to the copy never appears in the source). Proves the
  'fixtures stay clean across runs' property without needing the binary.

Items the re-review also raised that were already satisfied: the
oracle-presence-over-declared-list precedence is documented on the
BuildOnlyClasses field (taskbench.go), and the PR body already says
'48-task manifest'. The Share->exclusiveShare rename is tracked in #701.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench.
2026-07-16 21:58:20 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 75a78e715b feat(cli): wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope (#694)
* feat(cli): wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope

Pass the resolved workspace into mcp.ServeOptions and honor --add-dir so
resources/list and scoped tools can expose extra roots beyond cwd.

* fix(cli): keep lexical serve --add-dir roots for path matching

Use symlink-resolved paths only for deduplication so Scope roots stay
aligned with the un-evaluated WorkspaceRoot MCP serve already passes.
2026-07-15 21:16:51 +08:00
PierrunoYT 8502449430 test(tui): isolate provider wizard credentials (#688) 2026-07-15 21:06:48 +08:00
euxaristia c0bcfdda41 chore(deps): bump go module dependencies (#669)
Updates charm.land bubbles/bubbletea/lipgloss v2, golang.org/x/sys,
golang.org/x/sync, and dlclark/regexp2/v2 to their latest patch releases.
2026-07-15 21:06:17 +08:00
euxaristia 1bb6b5745a fix(swarm): wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test (#667)
The launcher recording a spawn and the job's Runs counter incrementing
are sequential but distinct steps in the scheduler goroutine
(fireIfIdle's Spawn call, then run's job.incRuns()). The test polled
only the launcher's recorded count, then asserted Runs immediately
with no wait, so a scheduler goroutine preempted between those two
steps could be observed with a stale Runs value under CI load. Wait
for Runs itself instead of assuming the launcher signal implies it.
2026-07-15 21:05:46 +08:00
1283 changed files with 162824 additions and 14372 deletions

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+3
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ reviews:
- path: "tests/**/*.ts"
instructions: |
Review tests for Bun test idioms, deterministic behavior, and meaningful coverage of safety decisions, provider/runtime flows, session events, and TUI command behavior.
- path: "**/*.go"
instructions: |
Do not request Plan 9 or other unsupported GOOS/GOARCH shims. The five native prebuilt release targets are linux-x64, linux-arm64, macos-arm64, macos-x64, and windows-x64. Android/Termux is also a supported runtime through the documented android-arm64 source build and Linux artifact fallback. Other GOOS/GOARCH combinations are not a review criterion.
tools:
github-checks:
timeout_ms: 300000
+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
*.go text eol=lf
*.mod text eol=lf
*.sum text eol=lf
+7 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Questions and setup help
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a
about: Ask in Discussions Q&A. Include zero --version, your OS, provider/model, and zero doctor output for setup problems.
- name: Feature ideas
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas
about: Propose and discuss ideas in Discussions before opening a PR (Zero is in controlled development, see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
url: https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
+13 -3
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,22 @@
name: Feature request
description: Propose a new capability or change
name: Feature request (previously discussed)
description: File only after your idea gained traction in Discussions Ideas or a maintainer asked for a tracking issue
labels: ["enhancement"]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
Please do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
New feature ideas start in [Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not here. This form is for the step after that: an idea that gained traction in Discussions,
or one a maintainer asked to have tracked as an issue. Please link the discussion below.
Do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
`issue-approved` label (see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- type: input
id: discussion
attributes:
label: Ideas discussion
description: Link to the Discussions Ideas thread (or note which maintainer asked for this issue).
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
+154 -55
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,109 @@ on:
branches:
- main
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
quality:
name: Code Quality & Lint
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Check formatting
run: make fmt-check
- name: Vet
run: go vet ./...
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make deadcode
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: make lint-static
test:
name: Unit Tests & Coverage
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Test with coverage
run: |
go test -count=1 -coverprofile=coverage.out -covermode=atomic ./...
- name: Publish coverage summary
if: always()
shell: bash
run: |
if [ -f coverage.out ]; then
go tool cover -func=coverage.out | awk '
BEGIN {
total = "unknown"
rows = ""
}
$1 == "total:" {
total = $3
next
}
{
rows = rows sprintf("| `%s` | `%s` | **%s** |\n", $1, $2, $3)
}
END {
print "### 📊 Test Coverage Summary: **" total "**"
print "<details><summary>Coverage per function</summary>\n"
print "| File | Function | Coverage |"
print "| :--- | :--- | :--- |"
printf "%s", rows
print "</details>"
}' >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
fi
- name: Upload coverage artifact
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: zero-coverage-report
path: coverage.out
if-no-files-found: warn
smoke:
name: Smoke (${{ matrix.os }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
@@ -18,34 +117,22 @@ jobs:
- macos-latest
- windows-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Check formatting
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
shell: bash
run: |
unformatted="$(gofmt -l .)"
if [ -n "$unformatted" ]; then
echo "gofmt needed on:" >&2
echo "$unformatted" >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Vet
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
run: go vet ./...
- name: Test
- name: Test (Fast Non-Race)
run: go test ./...
- name: Build binary
@@ -54,9 +141,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Smoke binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
performance:
name: Performance Smoke
race:
name: Race Detector
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
# A race the detector newly reports can present as a deadlock rather than a
# failure, and the default job timeout is six hours. This job is expected to
# be the longest in the workflow, so the ceiling is generous but finite.
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- name: Checkout
@@ -70,64 +163,70 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# Invoke the Makefile target rather than repeating its flags. `make test`
# is already `go test ./... -race -count=1`, so running it here is what
# stops the project's declared test command and what CI actually runs
# from drifting apart again. The race detector needs cgo, which the
# hosted ubuntu runner supplies without an extra setup step.
- name: Test with the race detector
run: make test
performance:
name: Performance Smoke
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Build binary
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release build
- name: Performance smoke
run: go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench --output dist/perf/perf-bench.json --ci
run: |
mkdir -p dist/perf
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench --output dist/perf/perf-bench.json --ci
- name: Upload performance report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: zero-performance-smoke
path: dist/perf/perf-bench.json
if-no-files-found: warn
security:
name: Security & code health
name: Security & Code Health
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.3.0
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
# their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
# then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
# so all three run under it.
- name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
run: |
toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: govulncheck (linux)
run: make vulncheck
# Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
# CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
# published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
- name: govulncheck
run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...
# Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
# code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
# still being wired or removed.
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...
# Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
# doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
# package but never actually called, plus staticcheck-style correctness
# and readability issues. Scoped to a few linters rather than the full
# default battery, and non-blocking, while the existing findings across
# the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
- name: govulncheck (windows)
run: make vulncheck-windows
+1
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
+28 -55
View File
@@ -34,12 +34,15 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || inputs.ref == '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Checkout requested ref
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.ref != '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
@@ -97,19 +100,21 @@ jobs:
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes @gitlawb/zero to npm: first the five platform payloads (versions
# of the SAME package at suffixed versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the
# native binary + vendored helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose
# optionalDependencies alias those platform versions. Platform versions MUST
# publish first — the wrapper pins them exactly, so the reverse order would
# open a window where installs resolve aliases that 404. See
# docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
# Publishes the npm package named in package.json (@twigpine/zero): first
# the five platform payloads (versions of the SAME package at suffixed
# versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the native binary + vendored
# helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose optionalDependencies alias those
# platform versions. Platform versions MUST publish first — the wrapper pins
# them exactly, so the reverse order would open a window where installs
# resolve aliases that 404. See docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file + the npm-publish
# environment as a trusted publisher, and provenance is then generated
# automatically. npm checks provenance against package.json `repository`,
# so that must name this repository. Note npm only allows configuring a
# trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so a new package name starts
# with a one-time manual `npm publish` of an empty 0.0.0 placeholder.
# Because the platform payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse
# that single trusted-publisher configuration.
publish-npm:
@@ -122,13 +127,15 @@ jobs:
# maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
environment:
name: npm-publish
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@twigpine/zero
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
# No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
# .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
@@ -196,47 +203,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Assemble npm packages
run: node scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs --artifacts-dir dist/artifacts --out-dir dist/npm
# Platform versions are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version
# (X.Y.Z-linux-x64), so they must never publish under the default
# `latest` dist-tag — that would make `npm install @gitlawb/zero`
# deliver a platform payload as the CLI. Publish them under a dedicated
# tag and assert `latest` survived before the wrapper goes out.
- name: Publish platform packages to npm
# Platform payloads first under the `platform` dist-tag, then the wrapper,
# with the `latest` dist-tag checked before and after (platform versions
# are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version and must never become
# `latest`). npm applies publishes asynchronously, so the script waits
# until npm shows every platform version before the wrapper goes out,
# and until `latest` moves after it. Versions already on the registry
# are skipped, so "Re-run failed jobs" is safe after a partial publish.
- name: Publish npm packages
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
for dir in dist/npm/platforms/*/; do
echo "publishing ${dir}"
(cd "$dir" && npm publish --access public --tag platform)
done
# Tolerate a failed lookup (registry lag, or no latest tag yet on a
# bootstrap publish): under set -e a bare failure here would abort
# AFTER the platform payloads went out, leaving no wrapper and a
# re-run that fails on republishing existing versions. An empty
# value falls through the guard below.
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
case "$latest" in
"${version}-"*)
echo "::error::dist-tag latest points at platform version ${latest} — a platform publish clobbered it. Fix the dist-tag before the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "dist-tag latest is ${latest} (unchanged by platform publishes)."
- name: Publish wrapper to npm
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
(cd dist/npm/wrapper && npm publish --access public)
# Confirm the wrapper owns `latest` (retry: registry metadata can lag
# a publish by a few seconds).
for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
if [ "$latest" = "$version" ]; then
echo "dist-tag latest is ${version}."
exit 0
fi
sleep 5
done
echo "::error::dist-tag latest is ${latest}, expected ${version} after the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
run: scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh dist/npm
+15
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
push:
branches:
@@ -12,8 +14,13 @@ on:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- scripts/action-summary.mjs
- scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
validate:
name: Validate action.yml
@@ -24,6 +31,14 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 24
- name: Run action-summary test suite
run: node --test scripts/action-summary.test.mjs
- name: Parse action.yml and assert documented inputs
shell: bash
run: |
+3
View File
@@ -55,3 +55,6 @@ docs/superpowers/
zero-termux-arm64
zero-linux-sandbox
zero-seccomp
# Generated benchmark reports are evidence for one configuration, never tree state
internal/perfbench/reports/*.json
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.3.0"}
{".":"0.11.0"}
+151 -19
View File
@@ -1,27 +1,159 @@
---
description: Project guidelines for the open-source CLI coding agent (zero) repository.
globs: "*.go, *.js, *.md, *.json, *.toml, *.yaml, *.yml"
alwaysApply: false
---
# Repository Guidelines for Zero
# Repository Conventions for Zero
These instructions apply to all work in this repository. For the user-facing
guide to extending Zero with specialists, hooks, plugins, MCP, and skills, see
[docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
This file outlines the project conventions and repository guidelines for coding agents when working on the `zero` repository. For the general guide on how to extend Zero (write specialist sub-agents, hooks, plugins, MCP, skills), see [docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
## 1. Contribution and Pull Request Rules
## 1. Project Conventions
- Before opening any pull request, **all contributors**—including maintainers,
community contributors, and coding agents—must read and follow
[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md).
- Community pull requests require an existing parent issue with the
`issue-approved` label. Team members may open pull requests through the
internal development process described in `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
- Keep each change focused on the approved or assigned scope. Do not include
unrelated fixes, refactors, formatting churn, generated output, or existing
local changes in the same commit or pull request.
- Discuss new implementation languages, runtimes, major dependency changes,
and broad architectural rewrites with maintainers before implementation.
- Pull request descriptions must explain what changed and why, link the parent
issue when required, and list the tests or verification performed. Include
screenshots or a short recording for user-visible UI changes when practical.
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
- Unify functions/methods where possible to prevent codebase inflation. Prefer a single cross-platform function with conditional checks over duplicating helpers per platform.
## 2. Repository and Implementation Conventions
## 2. Guidelines for Coding Agents
- Use the Go version declared in `go.mod`. Do not hardcode a different local
toolchain version in scripts or documentation.
- Use the repository build and release commands (`make` and
`go run ./cmd/zero-release ...`) instead of inventing parallel build flows.
- Keep tests beside their source files (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`). Add a
regression test for behavior changes and run affected concurrent code under
the race detector.
- Never edit files under `third_party/`; they are vendored.
- Prefer one cross-platform function with small conditional checks over
duplicated platform-specific helpers when the behavior can remain unified.
- Do not commit generated benchmark reports from
`internal/perfbench/reports/*.json`; reports are configuration-specific
evidence, not repository state.
- Preserve the user's working tree. Do not overwrite, delete, stage, or commit
unrelated tracked or untracked files.
If you are an AI coding agent executing tasks in this repository, you **MUST** run all Go code quality and security checks before committing code or completing your task:
## 3. Required Validation
1. **Format & Vet**: Run `go fmt ./...` and `go vet ./...`.
2. **Lint**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
3. **Security**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
Run validation from the repository root before committing, opening a pull
request, or completing an implementation task:
If any check fails or cannot be run, do not ignore it. Prompt the user for instructions or setup assistance before proceeding.
1. **Formatting check**: `make fmt-check`. If it fails, format with
`go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`) and run the check again.
2. **Vet**: `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Tests**: `go test ./...`. Use `make test` for the full race-enabled suite,
or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
6. **Advisory lint**: `make lint-static`.
7. **Security**: `make vulncheck`.
8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
tracked changes).
`make lint` currently runs the formatting check and `go vet`; it does **not**
run golangci-lint. The pinned golangci-lint job is advisory in CI while the
existing repository-wide backlog is cleaned up. Fix findings introduced by or
related to the current change. Unrelated pre-existing advisory findings do not
justify expanding a focused pull request; report them separately.
Formatting, vet, tests, build, smoke, diff hygiene, and govulncheck are hard
requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
it.
## 4. Common Review Blockers
These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Supported targets only:** CONTRIBUTING.md names the five native prebuilt
release artifacts (`linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-arm64`, `macos-x64`,
`windows-x64`) and the additional supported Android/Termux source-build and
artifact-fallback path. Other `GOOS`/`GOARCH` combinations, including
`plan9`, are unsupported and are not a review criterion. Do not block a PR
for failing to compile on an unsupported `GOOS`/`GOARCH`. Tests may use
`plan9` as a fixture for "unsupported".
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
(`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Normalize before matching:** Any transform that REMOVES bytes without
leaving a gap is also a reassembler, so it has to run before whatever matches
on the result. Redacting by shape and then stripping control bytes lets a
credential split by a NUL, an ESC or a C1 byte pass the patterns as two
fragments and be rejoined on the way out; comparing a path against a form
produced by the same resolver the kernel just used makes a redirect agree with
itself. Strip, decode, or canonicalize first, then match. The unsplit value
passing is not evidence, so the test needs a split case.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
classification and side effects too.
- **Host tool version floors:** Zero shells out to `git` and other host tools,
and the project does not declare a minimum version for any of them. A flag,
subcommand, or config key that is not long-established therefore raises that
floor silently, and the failure on an older host is an unhelpful usage error
rather than a clear message. Before adding one, check when it landed and say
so where a caller would look. Record the floor for the exact subcommand you
call, not for the flag in general: `--end-of-options` reached Git's shared
parser in 2.24, but `git rev-parse` only accepted it from 2.30, and
`git checkout` and `git reset` later still. Likewise `--show-current` is
`git branch` 2.22, and `branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit` is 2.35. Then either
keep a fallback for older versions or gate the call. A test that depends on a
newer feature must skip below its floor instead of failing, and say which
version it needs.
- **Prove the test fails without the change:** A regression test earns its
place only if it fails on the unfixed code, for the reason it claims. Run it
both ways and quote the failure in the PR. The recurring miss is not a
missing test but a test that never reaches the behavior it names, because an
earlier guard rejects the input first, so it passes with and without the fix.
When a test targets a specific layer, call that layer directly rather than
relying on a public entry point that may refuse earlier.
- **Hermetic tests:** Tests must not read or write the developer's real config,
cache, or state directories. Redirect every root the code under test
resolves, not just config. `os.UserConfigDir` and `os.UserCacheDir` read
`XDG_CONFIG_HOME` and `XDG_CACHE_HOME` only on Linux and the BSDs. On macOS
they derive from `HOME`, and on Windows from `%AppData%` and `%LocalAppData%`.
Setting the XDG variables alone still leaves a macOS run writing to the real
home, so set `HOME` as well, or take the directory as a parameter. Apply it to
every test that reaches the same storage, not only the one where it was first
needed; a test that passes on a clean machine and pollutes a real one is a
blocker.
- **Error codes vary by platform and by flag combination:** A check written
against the code one target returns can be silently inert on another while
still looking correct. `openat(O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW)` on a symlink may
report `ENOTDIR` or `ELOOP` depending on the platform, because the kernel can
reject the directory mismatch before it ever resolves the link; accept both
rather than assuming the one POSIX names. On Windows, `\\?\` and `\\.\`
prefixes are not UNC paths, and an `NtCreateFile` information class must match
the struct actually passed. Confirm the code each supported target returns
instead of reasoning from the man page.
+317 -4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,314 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.11.0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/compare/v0.10.0...v0.11.0) (2026-10-15)
### Features
* **providers:** add Concentrate provider preset ([#1147](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1147)) ([61b0936](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/61b09364f0f45b0fa8aebaf0a6c3d1c55dbe01c3))
### Bug Fixes
* **cli:** let providers subcommands run with no active provider ([#1143](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1143)) ([d1a0d04](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/d1a0d048ee2c1e7cbfb75160ec4c9f099f3c4472))
* **npm:** wait for npm to apply each publish, and drop the one-time @gitlawb/zero steps ([#1145](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1145)) ([8e363fc](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/8e363fcaa5d51bf5b5b244692dc61bf8d4ae8799))
* **tui,cli:** stop a repository's git config from running programs in Zero's own git calls ([#1133](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1133)) ([640d936](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/640d936bfbe00c4cd3017ca35fb7b5c15d91a1c5))
* **workspaceindex:** skip git-ignored and build-cache dirs in Scan only ([#1117](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1117)) ([c88c77b](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/c88c77bf701039dca01d9786bf5648d779c949b3))
### Performance Improvements
* **redaction:** add fast-path byte checks to eliminate regex allocations on clean strings ([#945](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/945)) ([ce2fcff](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ce2fcffaf10d8e8c8c5a13e06fd7809f09fc9867))
## [0.10.0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/compare/v0.9.0...v0.10.0) (2026-10-15)
### Features
* **notify:** make permission-prompt alerts on by default and discoverable ([#1001](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1001)) ([7f8e5f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f8e5f08bb83371ce16cc54c97ab032a010026cf))
* **npm:** publish as @twigpine/zero ([#1142](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1142)) ([530563a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/530563a0bb58d3cbadceb97b3ee234ef763124df))
* **providers:** add GMI Cloud provider preset and partner listing ([#1127](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1127)) ([1335ca6](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1335ca6671023ecda81a3cfaae7e9f2ff5d6e0de))
* **providers:** opt-in ZERO_RESPONSE_HEADER_TIMEOUT override for slow first-byte deployments ([#1106](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1106)) ([ddc45f2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ddc45f2c8152fdd04b45dc11ed20d246fe7740a5))
* **runtime:** add process-local per-model RPM admission limits ([#1116](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1116)) ([eebb384](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eebb384676fb567acc1f5a20dcbb17df8a03dc42))
* **sessions:** add zero sessions prune, which never removes a session another process has open ([#1089](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1089)) ([23c27e0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/23c27e0778e3af54c04b8749d1eda846d3253f4e))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** persist the session permission mode across restarts ([#1134](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1134)) ([bb96206](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb96206c2781e846fd13437113eec5790afe9c81)), closes [#1125](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1125)
* **acp:** persist token usage events for ACP sessions ([#1137](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1137)) ([300cf62](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/300cf6275f8c94f06da3f00197d21cb8771842d9)), closes [#1118](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1118)
* **acp:** publish sub-run sessions loaded over ACP as view-only ([#1078](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1078)) ([7f11491](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/7f11491078662b2d389c278f3ce5d41d956670c4))
* **agent:** retry mid-stream transport aborts before tool dispatch ([#1076](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1076)) ([b9ef1d2](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/b9ef1d271aa6ebc6d9adad2ef4ff0d695bb40da5))
* **config:** sync atomic config replacements ([#1093](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1093)) ([4d2e9f0](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/4d2e9f0d08472f7304652ef7896df587e1cc6c21))
* **cron:** bound run history and read recent records from the tail ([#1094](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1094)) ([42eb6ab](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/42eb6ab5fbe4ae9037f1f4cd42a00243c456a22e))
* **cron:** preserve newer claims when overlapping runs complete ([#1090](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1090)) ([2eb9d94](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2eb9d94fac56d91d749ea4f96edcf1c87f79b48c))
* **daemon:** bound pending sessions and prune on completion ([#1091](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1091)) ([8a68660](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/8a68660161b04ce9668363faa14ff72c9fbad223))
* **daemon:** do not retry workers that finished with a final exit code ([#1112](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1112)) ([eefa978](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/eefa978f6183332b7416c70c25242bcdfba1a75c)), closes [#1100](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1100)
* **daemon:** stop worker process groups by their launch-time identity ([#1088](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1088)) ([ab018b3](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ab018b3098b5cb103cf8f90b8698d32a6687bdf7)), closes [#861](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/861)
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched hono and @hono/node-server ([#1080](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1080)) ([aa52040](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/aa52040498e012c41d5e8f6027a91c18eff861d4))
* **deps:** refresh the lockfile to patched shell-quote ([#1131](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1131)) ([c56a4c4](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/c56a4c4e6e598504ab417e8cc4f5ab8d69f1b42f))
* **execution:** reserve process capacity before launching ([#1092](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1092)) ([bb3346a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/bb3346a82883c19ed8815fe1e874f54950711d69))
* **mcp:** forward image tool results on the existing image channel ([#1077](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1077)) ([0324c1d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0324c1d4103328eb90cb24a0b582dba335255b5c))
* **mcp:** refresh OAuth tokens for discovered endpoints and registered clients ([#1113](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1113)) ([571af70](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/571af701bd3d8dfaf40f87b5b112b25e7def5b29)), closes [#1101](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1101)
* **oauth:** give every loopback callback server the bounded shutdown ([#1079](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1079)) ([5473301](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/547330197b20ece591e077e876a4b8ffd015cb6e))
* **providers:** send stable session headers to OpenCode ([#1060](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1060)) ([99721c7](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/99721c762f37cd43ac511007a5f51d1846df959e))
* **redaction:** redact adjacent AWS keys glued end to end ([#1095](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1095)) ([df67ede](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/df67edec13345b73a85327adc003cacc7bdd8009))
* **redaction:** redact credentials split by an invisible character ([#1067](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1067)) ([e20b762](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/e20b7624261cef8336a8eb0fbdd44d536ad77fc2))
* **sandbox:** say when a session's sandbox enforcement is degraded ([#1082](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1082)) ([6b5852d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/6b5852dc18bb256af1f25745697c2f2e3ea6f112))
* **search:** redact every text field of session metadata, not ten of thirty ([#1073](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1073)) ([9520f2b](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/9520f2bad7e09ce4a8d0d42be7ce77d2ae928ddd))
* **security:** harden shell flag parsing, write roots, and formatters ([#1066](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1066)) ([ac5fe0d](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/ac5fe0d21849b0f74af428dd3ca12e3b80a8b7aa))
* **sessions:** keep a session lease for the life of the process, not of the Store ([#1144](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1144)) ([883e5be](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/883e5bec24dac791d1d60618c7f4927f4659b687))
* **tools:** hint when Windows resolves POSIX paths under root ([#1063](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1063)) ([0c6f179](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/0c6f179a8443d4dfdfbbefe5cc6caf11c2a525f0))
* **tui:** bound live dictation regions ([#985](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/985)) ([feb9927](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/feb992757c582c68f0397e070e206d4bf07071e1))
* **tui:** show provider ownership in Recent and Favorites ([#1083](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1083)) ([1697b7a](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/1697b7a5ce948e781877cdbe9223adac62c3fde6))
* **tui:** stop held peer message Allow/Deny from deadlocking Update ([#1111](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1111)) ([a195e88](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/a195e8848cec1a27b4fe1789ecc572b943c32186)), closes [#1099](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1099)
* unbreak main CI (cron claim tests, Go 1.26.9) ([#1124](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/1124)) ([2c418fc](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/commit/2c418fc8ff6763de16703128f372fe526fddd331))
## [0.9.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.8.0...v0.9.0) (2026-09-15)
### Features
* **acp:** add standard session list and resume ([#914](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/914)) ([c1937df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c1937dfac72e6ad0e5ade6e48e2d9c17d9c3e5d6))
* **acp:** emit structured file changes in tool updates ([#999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/999)) ([faec8ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/faec8ee2017fdd6d0c2c347add892cb73eb413d7))
* **acp:** surface safe browser tool metadata ([#1000](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1000)) ([a6ec043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a6ec0435e36b9bea9793b2fd97f2ecd30e3a0f9b))
* **exec:** default headless runs to the turn-budget ceiling ([#1049](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1049)) ([9e609c5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9e609c52420fd322f047fc238c04ac81dd623fdd))
* **tui:** interactive terminal attach for tty exec sessions ([#1055](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1055)) ([d73ec81](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d73ec81e2d3facb5377bc9ad0fe2aa314628a0c0))
* **tui:** offer mid-run model escalation behind --allow-escalation ([#1019](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1019)) ([91d921f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91d921f4c5b8289a9e437f786218f1b48f2add5a))
* **tui:** richer /resume session browser ([#1047](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1047)) ([2f53117](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2f531178f614e587b629e4f81e0470adda647fbd))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make configured MCP tools callable ([#1003](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1003)) ([7f5e5af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f5e5af7bbdbe5bb4d91706146072d461c0234a4))
* **agent:** stop the tool-schema ratchet meaning a different thing per host ([#1017](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1017)) ([f909266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f9092668a832ea73a69551f0ea2df4f6eaf356df))
* **background:** treat POSIX zombie leader as already-exited ([#981](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/981)) ([1aacf38](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1aacf38b727d31b5ca09949316d6afa8292aec46))
* **config:** lock config read-modify-write across processes ([#960](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/960)) ([b04fe96](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b04fe96e9ef3f2deda4fb2a972270300629079d2))
* **config:** preserve unknown top-level fields ([#984](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/984)) ([488def6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/488def68dcc6d36701fdf171e94a74a436b090fc))
* **daemon:** publish status files atomically ([#949](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/949)) ([9001421](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90014210d2ada2e3d61f4eca5087d3f35a3c4b8b))
* **installtxn:** put back an install a killed commit left behind ([#997](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/997)) ([2837f5e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2837f5efb38dcd3c69771b0ba31565f98a206120))
* let the configured forward proxy through the loopback guard ([#1025](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1025)) ([1e4db7c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1e4db7c6643ca7e2c3d8e4b8b30371cfbe43561e))
* **lockutil:** use kernel-held advisory locks ([#950](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/950)) ([6fe0d1e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fe0d1edcdbadea6d566800fbcca739c1cd54ea1))
* **mcp:** discover OAuth through protected resource metadata ([#991](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/991)) ([1b5db17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1b5db1765672820caac1684b168c9898b5ba3593))
* **mcp:** reject a server-initiated request as a streamable-HTTP response ([#1054](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1054)) ([2479d94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479d946c15dbf74ee3c04a637e97181d1786f08))
* **oauth:** force-close loopback callback connections past the shutdown deadline ([#1051](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1051)) ([176f5a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/176f5a242b754a86ea4c7121a8dcc1c0d72cf2e4))
* **oauth:** Split an oversized keyring token blob across entries ([#1007](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1007)) ([275e248](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/275e2486695338ce38193a6e3319f8b6a9a5c33c))
* **providerio:** close idle connections periodically to prevent HTTP/2 PROTOCOL_ERROR ([#1058](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1058)) ([b76c764](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b76c764b77926891aa67163e6605a2d8540aacaa))
* **providers:** register Atomic Chat as local OpenAI-compatible runtime ([#550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/550)) ([79fa142](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/79fa1422ef1a3691b93342788453ebc284d57f9c))
* **redaction:** split camelCase keys in normalizeKey ([#994](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/994)) ([08fbea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/08fbea7a3221d2061d88038924f90a4cba9af1ac))
* **sandbox:** keep a derived ACL target inside the write root it came from ([#1040](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1040)) ([3b43c43](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3b43c43eca968c8619adadc81fcc1a17e220216a))
* **sandbox:** keep Windows restricted-token SIDs narrow and fail closed on DenyRead ([#1006](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1006)) ([0207f2b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0207f2b2697149a73ecc89a5ab5db0bd665f1911))
* **sandbox:** Make WSL backend tests deterministic. ([#948](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/948)) ([e59bf78](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e59bf78cabc2703678778b904c27c8bc8ef82bc8))
* **sandbox:** protect worktree git pointers ([#805](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/805)) ([f30f550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f30f550e6037c53f8521ba2d59c984ae6c574917))
* **sandbox:** refcount temporary roots so one holder's cleanup cannot revoke another's ([#911](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/911)) ([7acac7a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7acac7acee65565e25089f2a7b5813c086ce65eb))
* **sessions:** carry an interrupted turn's work into the resume prompt ([#1016](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1016)) ([6ae8396](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6ae8396f0282a5f18a431f0c0ef1a272ecc2ca2b))
* **sessions:** render resume context fields in key order ([#1043](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1043)) ([da244bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da244bcbfcfa05e414567ac0acc3cf8ba745ad7d))
* **specialist:** keep the pinned model when a specialist is resumed ([#1009](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1009)) ([aadb4a2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aadb4a27e9cdb41e774e8e1a8f23cf9c2fb50db2))
* **swarm:** stop original member before handoff ([#957](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/957)) ([0021475](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0021475d4c58c91911098f414795512cf60a0b56))
* **tools:** an edit keeps the reads it did not disturb ([#908](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/908)) ([1649008](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1649008506da0e675431dc056251a01891b15cc8))
* **tools:** make apply_patch tolerant and re-expose edit_file ([#956](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/956)) ([2749447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2749447cdce4ae5dd333538b36fa919b80ecc66d))
* **tools:** reject fuzzy edits with drifted content ([#983](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/983)) ([8b3d1b1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8b3d1b1597b04bfa6d4bc7f912abc13ca80a6298))
* **tools:** say when format-on-write ran out of time ([#1044](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/1044)) ([6937a30](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6937a309cf00825572210a7610a1f3ea8b74c2f9))
* **tui:** move voice capture to Ctrl+Space ([#968](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/968)) ([eeea330](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/eeea3308fed38b37b203522624babaf2f30df91f))
* **update:** keep Windows failed-restore state in trusted recovery records ([#979](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/979)) ([a3852ba](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a3852bac595e06c5d3ca9da22212b281b8796802))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** cheap compaction — dedicated summarizer model, input cap… ([#532](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/532)) ([6645f97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6645f9744b37dda4d52ecc4631578d62cefc89de))
* **providers:** parallelize isolated provider unit tests and shrink retry backoffs ([#955](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/955)) ([d6b25fc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d6b25fc3039a6b7d72a5703a87a097449792b102))
* reduce startup and turn overhead ([#932](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/932)) ([1fde941](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1fde941803c4295c11a4a14559f3c5217d1a9e69))
## [0.8.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0) (2026-08-21)
### Features
* **security:** path-jail primitive, credential-store locking, worktree git hardening ([#891](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/891)) ([060d38c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/060d38ce716feb7c5b6657b082cd35cb8dda3d75))
* **update:** recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs ([#910](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/910)) ([01c3498](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/01c3498205e69d26e5f929225f9455b276444f39))
* use Exa as default search provider ([#926](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/926)) ([1ec7219](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1ec7219aee7b2840481ab0905f131644e27d2a4e))
* **zerogit:** auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch ([#671](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/671)) ([d065467](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d065467cd3ec3ed91c5dc60554c36fc4b4d6de4c))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** three defects a desktop ACP client hits ([#915](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/915)) ([a78c6c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a78c6c357e1d21146d7cd2e8030a754e06f7f1f5))
* bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes ([#903](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/903)) ([dc15e82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc15e822987d8d7de467c62c375518f435b74d8c))
* **daemon:** clean up child after startup timeout ([#774](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/774)) ([9c29209](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9c292092a26c9092fd873d072b0af1b0d9d39ef0))
* **dictation:** redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors ([#852](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/852)) ([64a783b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/64a783b08caa2c7b21f188033b9ed84a14e00e84))
* **modelregistry:** expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models ([#931](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/931)) ([90dcfd1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90dcfd127e8a6d9902ec9f4e72f6d03fef1a0fc6))
* **providers:** discover ChatGPT capabilities ([#890](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/890)) ([2d2450e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2d2450e9a744349f0d01b1d4e9ba29c24ba5650d))
* **sandbox:** normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist ([#934](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/934)) ([6edf9a8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6edf9a8b78dc030dc44598919db1c7fa9d4f809a))
## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
### Features
* **agent:** add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning ([#853](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/853)) ([0176ee4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0176ee49ffddcff6f7edf6ae2ade4967e5b22cc3))
* **providers:** live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway ([#860](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/860)) ([fb4f293](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fb4f293c20eb860ca388a10d22fd566ce282ba1f))
* **tools:** give tool results an image channel and add view_image ([#843](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/843)) ([cd0eb19](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cd0eb194e4df4b844785796c0701216740a56344))
* **tui:** replace /retitle with local /rename ([#826](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/826)) ([5886354](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/588635487f22ef4d62d350140a219b7b8bb24119))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** end the additional_permissions retry loop ([#864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/864)) ([4ca4fa7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4ca4fa75d31b139dbe55a3badf17da86892ab001))
* **agent:** tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox ([#885](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/885)) ([2ec5c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2ec5c3ae6b8fb543887bdeafdb34c4da057b8d36))
* **cli:** report MCP servers that failed to start ([#822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/822)) ([#827](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/827)) ([021281e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/021281ebbab3f2bbe6a77b2dab4bf121bcfe6b52))
* **lsp:** dispatch notifications off read loop ([#759](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/759)) ([936aa4e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/936aa4e77cf49738560a89395b8ba4d22263a396))
* **mcp:** name the non-text blocks a tool result drops ([#874](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/874)) ([027a670](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a67080bea511b876c284bc911ef011eceb308))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of Zero credential stores ([#681](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/681)) ([55fa05f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/55fa05f0ab5a01b495345d43464606cd19a31b4f))
* **sandbox:** stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths ([#865](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/865)) ([91b413c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91b413c514cc1607d5b4e7936780d40569239814))
* **secrets,worktrees:** fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees ([#855](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/855)) ([ff62f73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ff62f73b7f4dc5e2472db21acba43cf6140c06d1))
* **specialist:** make overwrites atomic ([#757](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/757)) ([30f6d8f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30f6d8f591a0b81638b4182ff56c86c8a50a5c70))
* suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands ([#848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/848)) ([c52db05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c52db055b0b213758a33c5c5627a411e052f8de4))
* **tui:** a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows ([#876](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/876)) ([cae0269](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cae0269e77e7a0a493cf799b41c653c9ff9a19de)), closes [#875](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/875)
* **tui:** exclude permission waits from turn time ([#820](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/820)) ([15eb16f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15eb16f736f903c94203207032f98aacbcf06318))
* **tui:** fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable ([#872](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/872)) ([7fbd864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7fbd864e91433441489902571ea394ebc5b7bd0d))
* **tui:** fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background ([#850](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/850)) ([020c28e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/020c28eaf95e2f38853f99fc06a13cd1568bf3c9))
* **tui:** hide unavailable sidebar shortcut ([#821](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/821)) ([845df6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/845df6c7d28e02f475e90acfe838733eb37e6aa2))
* use OAuth credentials in provider health checks ([#828](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/828)) ([d37de92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d37de9214b1ba86542f4f5ef3b060bb96849763b))
### Performance Improvements
* compact common test output ([#846](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/846)) ([edf660a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/edf660ab85131f90a452cee51dc2c3a5cf62d632))
* improve harness context efficiency ([#838](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/838)) ([8e26679](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8e266797a8305e689806eadcf9698da2796481ab))
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
### Features
* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
### Features
* **plugins:** add zero plugins info command ([#773](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/773)) ([2479884](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479884dea49580c853a53536c3bbab22ce8a2bf))
* **sandbox:** disable the sandbox via config ([#687](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/687)) ([#746](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/746)) ([a21a052](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a21a052a4a32ce9cb3c93c94350cd24e138532cd))
* **sandbox:** unify command execution and enforcement ([#781](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/781)) ([96859c9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/96859c9bd16f6dad4e332efc7e68178b9116118a))
* **tui:** add /undo as an alias for /rewind ([#698](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/698)) ([#747](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/747)) ([8c6d302](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8c6d3022bd7801eaad6a0440bb21a27221887297))
* **tui:** add isolated /btw conversations ([#748](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/748)) ([2e267bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2e267bdbee4a77813e93a7ab51f0c575b66cee8c))
* **tui:** permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline ([#780](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/780)) ([3967d49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3967d49d64998341af8ef6d7523fc63aeb2a5a7a))
### Bug Fixes
* **agent:** stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash ([#702](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/702)) ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749)) ([fbf8598](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fbf85984f679058125951fe2d5e4f200e09a3e2f))
* **cli:** warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection ([#767](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/767)) ([3524f79](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3524f795e5fdbb827166a84f03351cedfc9eba30))
* **doctor:** detect missing native binary during runtime checks ([#450](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/450)) ([7796022](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/77960229b839dca856616f846839aa773f2923f7))
* **lsp:** make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite ([#684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/684)) ([#766](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/766)) ([b1f4173](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1f41735a7f6b7928a1875e986a4dca39d106cb9))
* make extension installs transactional ([#762](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/762)) ([baa4be1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/baa4be13ac5321da4e9f53e864dd1cd395481200))
* **oauth:** refuse redirects on credential POSTs ([#729](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/729)) ([#741](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/741)) ([974fc03](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/974fc036c2f9a194722f2e8fddbb4fdbf797effe))
* **oauth:** validate discovered endpoints before merge/use ([#511](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/511)) ([#739](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/739)) ([ce4a996](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce4a996ffac4482e704f0fd61b3e442398fb2401))
* **perfbench:** absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class ([#730](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/730)) ([dbd9443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dbd94430143df6754d68551d1028ad8f15b82f1b))
* **perfbench:** grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits ([#763](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/763)) ([e1975c1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e1975c1b396b3236ed648870230b4f85863b1d03))
* **perfbench:** keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps ([#737](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/737)) ([015452c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/015452c1c98a39eabb021324182094e188a8bd47))
* **providers:** stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles ([#716](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/716)) ([4cbd144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4cbd144d11e5cb67bc5fea46f5b294562dac7a1a))
* **sandbox:** AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses ([#473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/473)) ([#745](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/745)) ([f079b90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f079b90f82dac7b7ae0864b279dc9094e31a6627))
* **sandbox:** bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle ([#765](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/765)) ([4945684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4945684fa26aa5994eda59dcabedc817423c535d))
* **sandbox:** don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping ([#727](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/727)) ([#744](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/744)) ([6849011](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/684901165d1b7f50a8bb4af31b1c1951e6926a79))
* **tools:** give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749) follow-up) ([#768](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/768)) ([da9fb50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da9fb50f549f6701eb136fc99f6178d0772d9334))
* **tools:** read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring ([#779](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/779)) ([89bdc67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/89bdc6719a1e1b3a3ef0e36b91a7839b3efdfba9))
* **tui:** cache settled alt-screen transcript ([#647](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/647)) ([d74ceb1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d74ceb11271ed68a21c19248210e098f411805fb))
* **tui:** model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette ([#775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/775)) ([b30c397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b30c3971b40b06ba52ad649ba9dc0ad560d4be4c))
* **tui:** stop the permission card clashing on cool themes ([#778](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/778)) ([722bb31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/722bb3121682d9cd9cd4bc6c127e9014d719262a))
### Performance Improvements
* **agent:** concurrent read-only tool batches via capability gate ([#715](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/715)) ([31d45d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/31d45d5f14e915acb9946e8b8eb81632c48f126a))
* **agent:** execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) ([#740](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/740)) ([378d538](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/378d538e240c289e57821e9f9628f76034419d01))
* **agent:** posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) ([#736](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/736)) ([af875df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/af875df58775484304fc65586bd6c74552ad01a2))
* **agent:** preserve prompt cache prefixes ([#760](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/760)) ([739a47e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/739a47e3eac92c3decc8734f52a4d99c7480c3ca))
* **openai:** optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) ([#723](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/723)) ([60dc84e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/60dc84e7a38c5544ebc047f3cfaf4625dd1e83b5))
* **output:** add token-aware semantic output budgeting (PR11) ([#717](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/717)) ([e5670c4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e5670c427ff39c628fb0822fd5c9317ee2174583))
* **providers:** provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7) ([#720](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/720)) ([30e2c3f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30e2c3f7ffa1d5e487bd10b59d4e823cda191d48))
* **turn-bench:** Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness ([#712](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/712)) ([727ad4d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/727ad4d321fab45d0cf40f8535522e3d94e55c4a))
## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0) (2026-07-17)
### Features
* **aimlapi:** AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) ([#655](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/655)) ([6b9c2f0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6b9c2f0c083e02bcd3aad68fb7af0501a9e7cd61))
* **cli:** show ZERO wordmark on --version ([#673](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/673)) ([9acb411](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9acb4113cc3337b3f361a16278e9cf11ca105e34))
* **cli:** wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope ([#694](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/694)) ([75a78e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/75a78e715bf23154f69c8c79cb58eb4b535b2a2a))
* **npm:** ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies ([#626](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/626)) ([5e1405d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5e1405d0b7abff5b3ccb3cfdb66d64d6d3322922))
* **perf:** emit prompt-prefix hash fingerprint per turn ([#704](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/704)) ([1c5c6e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c5c6e78a8a0e228bdf53d7be90934fbce9d98c3))
* **providers:** add AI/ML API preset (rebased onto main) ([#621](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/621)) ([d66a9dd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d66a9dda69c32aa59f4bea903cfefe00d4b7adef))
* **providers:** refresh MiniMax model coverage ([#665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/665)) ([fa3052a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa3052a1422a4ad30a3a6295829564f42dee31a8))
* **skills:** discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading ([#696](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/696)) ([7d57999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7d579996b43741a2e57e3e38fcdd8484fcfc34e9))
* **tui:** Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation ([#699](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/699)) ([7f669f4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f669f455021be51319ee3b8298cd48a17f745c7))
* **tui:** press up to edit queued messages ([#656](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/656)) ([4c986d3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4c986d327b5ed26338d295c23bea5839681db8d0))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make truncateHint rune-safe ([#614](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/614)) ([ddc4927](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ddc4927aac5544bf4dd2c46615aeda5a81c96576))
* **agent,tui:** resolve git branch detection when starting Zero in subdirectories ([#613](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/613)) ([0184581](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0184581ec234ea414e0a47bc33e8b0f4ddfb497b))
* **agent:** raise default and deep-mode turn budgets ([#650](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/650)) ([635c93a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/635c93af51ebc20f3e0917917e55a79edfe27c35))
* **cli:** prevent consuming positional arguments as flag values ([#619](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/619)) ([5b4f48d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5b4f48d2dcb66402c13bde0c3cfe9c9371da19fb))
* **config:** enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable ([#609](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/609)) ([4d8c31c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4d8c31cf16a3080344e3be7039408fcae71c075d)), closes [#512](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/512)
* **config:** surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them ([#645](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/645)) ([893b7b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/893b7b424cc203a2fcf92327a4e25c84286a90e0))
* **cron:** prevent cron job Mutate from clobbering concurrent updates ([#630](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/630)) ([e4bd703](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e4bd703cfb28dab2dfa3c2ddba46237e1bb2e164))
* **daemon:** handle os.ErrPermission as collision during O_EXCL lock creation ([#616](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/616)) ([8ea5384](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ea53841a5d54c37a153779ae86bea010659433c))
* **exec:** stop false INCOMPLETE downgrades on conversational final messages ([#608](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/608)) ([b6117af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b6117af86d6bc87a4ee66910e99d76cb16b03fed))
* harden MCP credential boundaries ([#597](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/597)) ([fdddb05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fdddb05ba84b1600ae6c3a20028bf83afe474c44))
* **hooks:** fail closed on launch failures for beforeTool hooks ([#629](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/629)) ([dc06fe7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc06fe72caf45f72d2cba1e8a835c0f5b405c1e8))
* **hooks:** run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts ([#606](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/606)) ([824ecdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/824ecdbcf9c467c35ef4e2666770fdadcb5bf402))
* **keyring:** pass generic password via stdin on macOS ([#574](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/574)) ([91ea6de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91ea6ded7503538834a84d090f78670a363c62d3))
* **lock:** prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix ([#628](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/628)) ([da41c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da41c3a75b782d6e0836fe13346321e40a90fbb4))
* **openai:** omit prompt_cache_key for openai-compatible providers ([#636](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/636)) ([1af5882](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1af58828eb3c22567599c000736c913a290959d2)), closes [#624](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/624)
* **plugins:** resolve relative executable paths against plugin root ([#627](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/627)) ([2efe6d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2efe6d539e29374b3ef39c2290bdea81f33a228b))
* **sandbox:** remove windowsWriteRestricted flag to fix DenyRead bypass ([#612](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/612)) ([3d96ac7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3d96ac7e55c760a97f28c0e6ceaf1ec3b4ab717a))
* **sandbox:** scrub dynamic credential env vars ([#682](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/682)) ([9043bae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9043baedcff7776c7373645b57563cac06b31847))
* **sandbox:** scrub sensitive credentials from sandbox environment ([#660](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/660)) ([6fc1220](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fc1220f6ac66fb3ae67b637cbbed7068d2213c0))
* **sandbox:** unblock git fetch/commit/add under the write-restricted sandbox ([#654](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/654)) ([5c4815a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c4815a66ed07d9cf90b825adfd936d3ac07639d))
* **sandbox:** use WRITE_RESTRICTED token when no DenyRead paths are configured ([#658](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/658)) ([a5d2e32](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a5d2e327c8681671aa8a9e5378801215b747edcf))
* **securefile,credstore:** call Sync on temp file before close and rename ([#631](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/631)) ([212734a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/212734adf3b5f982e22385161205aa1afe4634fe))
* **securefile:** reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS ([#615](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/615)) ([8536cc8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8536cc87f7a885f9e436d6ef28f5f325201623dc))
* **swarm:** wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test ([#667](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/667)) ([1bb6b57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1bb6b5745af90321d1e657a12a1976cded5dd1bd))
* **tools:** classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials ([#659](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/659)) ([8bd9742](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8bd9742fa95c41b93ea4e718628aed0ff3ae9dd0))
* **tools:** preserve SysProcAttr during PTY fallback ([#618](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/618)) ([f78b36c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f78b36c770daa4577a9f99265b18a354454e36eb))
* **tui:** resolve pending askUser callbacks to prevent runner hangs ([#620](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/620)) ([aa73a76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aa73a76f1bd1b6fe97bac2fbff2d61b7474139f2))
* **tui:** stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused ([#672](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/672)) ([2b42cd5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2b42cd567b96d6f7e0818594e53ff31cce1e42e9))
* **windows:** resolve absolute path for taskkill to prevent hijacking ([#617](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/617)) ([2db00ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2db00ee3d57db97e0fbe23cb8628e8bcb47f6f09))
### Performance Improvements
* **tools:** add explicit effect metadata for safe concurrency ([#705](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/705)) ([8ef8576](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ef8576df7d0775a5b815bc0776a794cadb75c34))
## [0.3.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0) (2026-07-09)
@@ -127,14 +435,19 @@ tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Shared multi-agent skills discovery: when present, `~/.agents/skills` is searched after the primary
Zero skills dir (and before plugin skill roots). `zero skills list` / `info` and the runtime `skill`
tool share one multi-root discovery path; install/remove/lock still target only the Zero skills directory.
- `SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or `ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- Twelve built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`,
`solarized-light`, `dune`, and `neon` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or
`ZERO_THEME`. Every palette is contrast-audited to WCAG AA, and the new presets are additionally
audited after xterm-256 downsampling; see [docs/THEMES.md](docs/THEMES.md). The built-in light
theme was reworked for legibility.
- `--theme <name>` flag for the TUI, accepting `auto` or any registered theme (previously only the
`ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- "Accessibility / Appearance" section in the README documenting `NO_COLOR`, `ZERO_THEME`, `/theme`,
+73 -5
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ stabilizes. Community participation is still welcome, especially through bug
reports, feature requests, reproduction details, logs, and discussion on existing
issues.
Questions and setup help belong in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions) (see
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md)), not in the issue tracker. Feature ideas start in the
[Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) category;
an idea that gains traction there is the path to an approved issue and,
eventually, an accepted PR.
Please read this policy before opening a pull request. Pull requests that do not
follow it may be closed without review.
@@ -33,7 +40,11 @@ unless the issue has been explicitly approved for outside contribution.
There are three primary ways to contribute:
1. Open a bug report with clear reproduction steps.
2. Open a feature request describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior.
2. Propose a feature in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
describing the problem, use case, and expected behavior. A feature-request
issue is filed only after the idea gains traction there or a maintainer asks
for one.
3. Add useful context to an existing issue, such as logs, screenshots, examples,
affected versions, or reproduction cases.
@@ -46,7 +57,8 @@ All community pull requests require an approved parent issue.
Before starting implementation work:
1. Open an issue using the appropriate issue template.
1. For a bug, open an issue using the bug-report template. For a feature, start
in Discussions Ideas; the feature-request issue comes after the discussion.
2. Describe the bug, feature request, or functional change clearly.
3. Wait for the core team to review the issue.
4. Do not open a pull request unless the issue has the `issue-approved` label.
@@ -55,6 +67,28 @@ An approved issue means only that the specific issue has been accepted for work.
It does not approve unrelated future work, future pull requests, or future issues
from the same author. Each issue is reviewed case by case.
## Contribution Volume and Batching
To keep triage and review sustainable while the project stabilizes, please keep
your contribution flow to a size the core team can realistically work through:
- One issue per bug. File each defect as its own issue with its own
reproduction. Please do not bundle several unrelated findings into a single
"audit" issue; separate issues are far easier to triage, approve, and close
individually.
- Keep only a few items open at a time. If you already have several issues or
pull requests awaiting review, let those move through the queue before opening
more. A large simultaneous burst from one contributor slows review for
everyone, even when each item is valid.
- AI-assisted contributions are welcome, held to the same bar. Automated audits
and generated patches are fine, but each issue and pull request must be
individually verified, scoped, and reproducible before you open it. Please do
not post bulk machine-generated findings unfiltered.
These apply to all contributors and are about review bandwidth, not the value of
any single report. Maintainers may ask you to consolidate, split, or hold
submissions to keep the queue manageable.
## Pull Request Requirements
Before opening a community pull request, make sure all of the following are true:
@@ -92,6 +126,31 @@ not enough. Dependency changes need a clear project benefit, such as fixing a
specific bug, addressing a security issue, improving compatibility, or supporting
an approved feature.
## Supported platforms
Zero publishes five native prebuilt artifacts from
`.github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml`:
- `linux-x64` (`linux/amd64`)
- `linux-arm64` (`linux/arm64`)
- `macos-arm64` (`darwin/arm64`)
- `macos-x64` (`darwin/amd64`)
- `windows-x64` (`windows/amd64`)
The shell installer and npm wrapper resolve the applicable artifacts from that
list. The PowerShell installer supports the published `windows-x64` artifact;
there is no native Windows ARM64 artifact. Windows on ARM users can run the x64
build under emulation or build from source.
Android/Termux is also supported even though it has no distinct release
artifact. The npm wrapper maps Android to the Linux artifact, and
`docs/INSTALL.md` documents the native `android/arm64` source build needed on
devices whose seccomp policy blocks the Linux build's syscall path.
Other `GOOS`/`GOARCH` values, including Plan 9, are unsupported. They are not a
review criterion. Do not block a pull request for failing to compile on an
unsupported target. Tests may use `plan9` as a fixture for an unsupported OS.
## What We Prioritize
The core team will prioritize:
@@ -133,7 +192,12 @@ Clear bug reports are the most useful way to help the project during this phase.
## Submitting a Feature Request
When filing a feature request, please include:
Feature requests start as a thread in
[Discussions Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas),
not as an issue. The feature-request issue form exists for the step AFTER that:
when an idea has gained traction in Discussions or a maintainer has asked for an
issue to track it. Whether in the discussion or the eventual issue, please
include:
- The problem you are trying to solve.
- The behavior or functionality you are requesting.
@@ -156,5 +220,9 @@ contribution phase.
## Getting Help
If you are unsure whether a change is appropriate, open an issue first and ask.
Please keep discussion focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
General questions, setup help, and "is this a bug or my config" uncertainty all
go to
[Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a).
If you are unsure whether a proposed code change is appropriate, raise it in
Discussions Ideas or on the relevant issue first and ask. Please keep discussion
focused, specific, and respectful of maintainer time.
+46 -4
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@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says to build and run quality checks
# with `make` — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean help
GO_VERSION = $(word 2,$(shell git grep -G -h "^go[[:space:]]" -- go.mod))
GO_TOOLCHAIN = go$(GO_VERSION)
DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows tidy clean baseline help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
@@ -33,6 +39,28 @@ fmt-check:
# Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
lint: fmt-check vet
# Versioned tools select the toolchain from their own modules when invoked with
# package@version. Read this module's go directive directly, without invoking
# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
lint-static deadcode vulncheck vulncheck-windows: export GOWORK = off
lint-static:
go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
deadcode:
go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode@$(DEADCODE_VERSION) -test=false ./...
vulncheck:
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
vulncheck-windows:
mkdir -p "$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin"
GOBIN="$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin" go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION)
GOOS=windows "$(CURDIR)/.cache/gobin/govulncheck" ./...
tidy:
go mod tidy
@@ -40,5 +68,19 @@ clean:
rm -f zero
go clean ./...
# Run the per-turn benchmark harness over the checked-in baseline manifest and
# write the JSON result to internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json. Requires a
# built `zero` binary and a model; set ZERO_BENCH_MODEL (required) and
# ZERO_BENCH_BINARY (defaults to ./zero) to configure the run. The report is
# machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.
baseline: build
@if [ -z "$(ZERO_BENCH_MODEL)" ]; then echo "Set ZERO_BENCH_MODEL (and optionally ZERO_BENCH_BINARY) before running 'make baseline'"; exit 2; fi
@ZERO_BIN="$${ZERO_BENCH_BINARY:-./zero}"; \
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench turn \
--suite internal/perfbench/manifests/baseline.json \
--model $(ZERO_BENCH_MODEL) \
--binary "$$ZERO_BIN" \
--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean"
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, vulncheck-windows, tidy, clean, baseline"
+206 -31
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,17 @@
<p align="center"><strong>A terminal coding agent you own.</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.10+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.10+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
</p>
@@ -22,10 +29,74 @@ zero exec "fix the failing test in ./pkg"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## Partners
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## Why Zero
- **Use the model you want.** Bring OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, OpenRouter,
DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI, Qwen, Kimi, GitHub Models, Ollama, LM Studio, or any
DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI, Qwen, Kimi, GitHub Models, Ollama, LM Studio, Atomic Chat, or any
OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint.
- **Stay in control.** File writes, shell commands, network access, and
out-of-workspace writes go through Zero's permission and sandbox policy.
@@ -45,7 +116,7 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
@@ -59,26 +130,38 @@ matching GitHub Release whenever it is missing. Windows on ARM runs the x64
build under emulation. See [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md) for
how the package is put together.
Installed Zero as `@gitlawb/zero`? The package moved to `@twigpine/zero` in
0.10.0 and the old name gets no further releases. Both packages provide the
`zero` command, so quit any running `zero`, then remove the old package first:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
Your config, sessions, and logins are kept; they live outside the package. For
Bun, pnpm, and yarn, see [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero).
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.10+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -90,17 +173,18 @@ If you are testing before the first public release, build from source:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
On Linux, build the sandbox helper too if you want native sandboxing:
On Linux, native sandboxing needs Bubblewrap. The main `zero` binary re-executes
itself as the helper when `zero-linux-sandbox` is absent. A separate helper next
to `zero` or on `PATH` still takes precedence:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # optional
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`
(`~/.local/bin` is a good default). macOS does not need an extra helper binary.
Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as their sandbox helper; release
archives still ship standalone Windows helper executables.
Put `zero` on `PATH` (`~/.local/bin` is a good default). macOS does not need an
extra helper binary. Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as their
sandbox helper; release archives still ship standalone Windows helper executables.
More install details: [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md).
@@ -129,17 +213,45 @@ the key in the wizard:
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
To configure AI/ML API directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup aimlapi --set-active
```
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
To configure GMI Cloud directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
To configure Concentrate directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
@@ -167,8 +279,12 @@ zero providers add custom-openai-compatible \
--set-active
```
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
`zero providers detect`.
For local models, run Ollama, LM Studio, or the [Atomic Chat](https://atomic.chat)
desktop app, then use `zero setup` or `zero providers detect`. For Atomic Chat,
load a model and enable its local OpenAI-compatible API (default
`http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1`). Choose `atomic-chat-local`; detection includes the
loaded model ID in the add command. If no usable ID is discovered, load a model
and retry. Model IDs requiring shell-specific quoting use interactive setup.
## Daily Use
@@ -184,9 +300,11 @@ Useful controls:
|---|---|
| `Enter` | send the prompt |
| `/` | open slash-command suggestions |
| `Ctrl+X` then letter | common slash commands (e.g. `m` → `/model`; `Ctrl+X` `?` for full list) |
| `Ctrl+P` / `Ctrl+N` | previous / next item in menus (arrows still work) |
| `Shift+Tab` | cycle permission mode |
| `Ctrl+B` | show/hide the sidebar |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel or exit |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel, exit, or return from a `/btw` conversation |
Common slash commands:
@@ -196,6 +314,8 @@ Common slash commands:
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/new` | start a fresh session in place (previous session stays on disk) |
| `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
| `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
| `/permissions`, `/tools` | inspect available tools and policy |
@@ -254,6 +374,19 @@ zero sandbox grants list
Zero includes local file/search/edit/shell tools, `web_fetch` for public URLs,
and MCP support for additional tools.
`web_fetch` refuses loopback, private and other special-use addresses: it checks
the URL before asking permission, resolves the host, and dials the address it
validated so a name cannot resolve to something else in between.
If `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` is set, `web_fetch` and the provider connectivity
probe use it, and that last step changes: the proxy is dialed and the target
hostname is sent to it, so the proxy decides which address the request actually
reaches. The URL is still checked and resolved locally first, but a proxy that
answers differently can reach a private service. A forward proxy already sees
and can rewrite every request through it, so this is the trust you accept by
configuring one. Leave the variables unset for the checks to be enforced end to
end.
For local dev servers, use shell commands such as `curl` through `exec_command`
so the normal sandbox and permission policy applies. Long-running commands stay
attached to a background terminal session and can be listed or stopped from the
@@ -277,7 +410,7 @@ zero context context-budget report
zero repo-map deterministic repository map
zero repo-info local repository summary
zero search | find search local session history
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, and rewind sessions
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, rewind, and prune sessions
zero spec manage spec-mode drafts
zero specialist manage specialist subagents
zero skills manage markdown instruction skills
@@ -291,9 +424,17 @@ zero verify detect and run local verification checks
zero changes inspect and commit local git changes
zero usage token usage and estimated cost
zero cron scheduled agent jobs
zero update check for newer releases
zero update --check check for newer releases
zero upgrade download, verify, and install the latest release
```
Cron keeps the newest 1,000 run outcomes per job in `runs.jsonl`. Each new run
atomically replaces the history with the retained tail; existing larger histories
are trimmed on their next run. Archive the file before that run if you need older
outcomes. This retention does not delete session directories or reset fire counts.
Malformed records and legacy lines of 1 MiB or more are skipped when reading or
compacting history; new records of that size are rejected.
## Extending Zero
### Project and personal instructions
@@ -332,7 +473,7 @@ manifest.
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<anything>` | disables color output |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `solarized-light`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `neon`, `solarized-light`, `dune`) |
| `--theme <name>` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI (same names) |
| `/theme` | opens the theme picker inside the TUI (live preview; `/theme <name>` switches directly) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | disables streaming fade animation |
@@ -349,23 +490,36 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Experimental: `ZERO_OPENAI_TURN_SESSION=1` enables the optimized OpenAI turn
session (background connection prewarm + request-prefix telemetry) for headless
`zero exec` runs against official OpenAI profiles. Off by default; `0`, `false`,
or `off` disable it. A/B-benchmark it by running the same `zero-perf-bench` suite
with the variable unset and set.
Native ChatGPT Responses sessions are enabled by default. Set
`ZERO_CHATGPT_TURN_SESSION=0`, `false`, or `off` to restore stateless HTTP/SSE
transport.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
1. **Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
3. **Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:
Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
pinned tool versions.
The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
run them directly. If it isn't, add it:
```bash
# Install golangci-lint
go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
# Install govulncheck
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
gobin="$(go env GOBIN)"; [ -z "$gobin" ] && gobin="$(go env GOPATH)/bin"
case ":$PATH:" in *":$gobin:"*) ;; *) export PATH="$PATH:$gobin" ;; esac
```
### Cross-Compile Examples
@@ -379,6 +533,7 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Install](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [Update flow](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Themes](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON protocol](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [Specialists](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
@@ -386,6 +541,26 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Performance](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [Agent evals](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## Community
Real-time chat happens on the [Discord server](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn).
Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
| Category | Use it for |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | Setup help, provider/model configuration, "how do I" questions |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | Feature proposals and design discussion before any PR |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | Your skills, plugins, MCP setups, themes, and workflows |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | Releases and project news from the maintainers |
For a good Q&A answer fast, include `zero --version`, your OS and install
method, the provider/model in use, and `zero doctor` output. See
[SUPPORT.md](SUPPORT.md). Bugs belong in
[issues](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/new/choose); security reports
follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never a public thread.
## Contributing
Contributions are welcome. Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md), run the
+130 -15
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,17 @@
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/daily?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=trendshift-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-trendshift-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/trendshift/repositories/70679/weekly?language=Go" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
<a href="https://trendshift.io/repositories/70679?utm_source=repository-badge&amp;utm_medium=badge&amp;utm_campaign=badge-repository-70679" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"><img src="https://trendshift.io/api/badge/repositories/70679" alt="Twigpine/zero | Trendshift" width="250" height="55"/></a>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.10+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.10+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
</p>
@@ -20,9 +27,73 @@ zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 合作伙伴
<table align="center">
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://twigpine.com">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://twigpine.com/logo-dark.png">
<img src="https://twigpine.com/logo.png" alt="Twigpine logo" width="72">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://mimo.mi.com">
<img src="https://mimo.xiaomi.com/mimo-v2-pro/assets/logo.svg" alt="Xiaomi MiMo logo" width="136">
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://novita.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/novita-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/novita-logo.svg" alt="Novita AI logo" width="136">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://concentrate.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/concentrate-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/concentrate-logo.svg" alt="Concentrate logo" width="64">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://exa.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/exa-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/exa-logo.svg" alt="Exa logo" width="110">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://twigpine.com"><strong>Twigpine</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://mimo.mi.com"><strong>Xiaomi MiMo</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://novita.ai/"><strong>Novita AI</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://concentrate.ai/"><strong>Concentrate</strong></a></td>
<td align="center"><a href="https://exa.ai/"><strong>Exa</strong></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150" height="80">
<a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo-dark.svg">
<img src="docs/assets/gmi-cloud-logo.svg" alt="GMI Cloud logo" width="120">
</picture>
</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center"><a href="https://www.gmicloud.ai/"><strong>GMI Cloud</strong></a></td>
</tr>
</table>
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio、Atomic Chat,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化,支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行,以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
@@ -34,32 +105,41 @@ zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
npm 包是一个小型包装器,其平台构建(Linux 和 macOS 的 x64/arm64、Windows 的 x64,包含浏览器/终端控制辅助工具)作为可选依赖直接从 npm registry 安装——没有安装脚本,也不会从 npm 之外下载任何内容。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的行为完全一致,无需任何信任或批准步骤。跳过可选依赖的安装(`--omit=optional`)也能工作:只要二进制文件缺失,包装器就会从对应的 GitHub Release 下载。Windows on ARM 通过模拟运行 x64 构建。详见 [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md)。
之前通过 `@gitlawb/zero` 安装过 Zero?从 0.10.0 起,npm 包已迁移到 `@twigpine/zero`,旧包名不再发布新版本。两个包都提供 `zero` 命令,所以请先退出正在运行的 `zero`,再卸载旧包:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
配置、会话和登录信息都会保留,它们存放在包之外。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的命令见 [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.5+。
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.10+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -70,14 +150,14 @@ go run ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
在 Linux 上,如果你需要原生沙箱,还需要构建沙箱辅助程序:
在 Linux 上,原生沙箱需要 Bubblewrap。主程序 `zero` 在找不到 `zero-linux-sandbox` 时会以自身作为辅助进程重新执行。同目录或 PATH 上的独立 helper 仍优先:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # 可选
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
```
将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
将 `zero` 放在 `PATH` 上(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
更多安装细节:[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
@@ -105,6 +185,8 @@ export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export GMI_API_KEY=...
export CONCENTRATE_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
@@ -113,7 +195,23 @@ export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio,然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
要直接配置 GMI Cloud,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup gmicloud --set-active
```
要直接配置 Concentrate,运行:
```bash
zero providers setup concentrate --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama、LM Studio 或 [Atomic Chat](https://atomic.chat) 桌面应用,
然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。使用 Atomic Chat 时,请先加载模型并启用
本地 OpenAI 兼容 API(默认地址为 `http://127.0.0.1:1337/v1`),再选择 `atomic-chat-local`。
检测生成的添加命令会包含已加载的模型 ID;如果未发现可用的 ID,请加载模型后重试。
对于需要特定 Shell 转义的模型 ID,请使用交互式设置。
## 日常使用
@@ -141,6 +239,7 @@ zero
| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
| `/new` | 原地开始一个新会话(之前的会话仍保留在磁盘上) |
| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
@@ -212,7 +311,7 @@ zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉、回滚和清理会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
@@ -226,7 +325,8 @@ zero verify 检测和运行本地验证检查
zero changes 检查和提交本地 Git 变更
zero usage Token 使用量和估算成本
zero cron 定时智能体任务
zero update 检查更新版本
zero update --check 检查更新版本
zero upgrade 下载、验证并安装最新版本
```
## 外观和无障碍
@@ -234,7 +334,7 @@ zero update 检查更新版本
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`neon`、`solarized-light`、`dune`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
@@ -261,6 +361,7 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [主题](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
@@ -268,6 +369,20 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## 社区
实时交流在 [Discord 服务器](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn) 进行。
提问、安装帮助、想法和分享都在
[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions):
| 分类 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| [Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
| [Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
| [Announcements](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
## 贡献
欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md),运行相关测试,然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ Please include, where possible:
depend on a user explicitly disabling the sandbox (`--skip-permissions-unsafe`), are generally
out of scope — but please report anything you are unsure about.
- Zero sends no telemetry. Network calls go to the model/tool providers you configure (and, for
keyless web search, to the documented Firecrawl endpoint — see the README).
keyless web search, to Exa's hosted MCP endpoint at `https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp`).
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Getting help with Zero
## Questions, setup help, configuration
Ask in [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions). Use
[Q&A](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) so answers can
be marked and found by the next person.
The fastest way to a useful answer is to include:
- `zero --version` output
- your OS (Windows, macOS, Linux) and how you installed Zero (npm, install
script, source)
- the provider and model you are using (`zero providers list`)
- `zero doctor` output for setup problems
- the exact command you ran and the exact error text
## Bugs
If Zero does something wrong (crashes, wrong output, broken behavior), file a
[bug report](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/issues/new/choose). If you are not
sure whether it is a bug or a setup problem, start in Discussions and we will
promote it to an issue if it is one.
## Feature ideas
Start a thread in
[Ideas](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/discussions/categories/ideas). Zero is
in controlled development (see CONTRIBUTING.md), so discussing an idea first is
also the path to getting a PR accepted.
## Security issues
Never file a public issue or discussion. Report privately via
[GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/security/advisories/new)
(see SECURITY.md).
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: ZERO
description: >-
Run the ZERO coding agent headlessly in a GitHub workflow. ZERO is
model- and provider-agnostic: you supply the provider and API key as inputs.
author: Gitlawb
author: Twigpine
branding:
icon: terminal
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ inputs:
zero-repo:
description: Repository to install the ZERO release from (owner/repo).
required: false
default: Gitlawb/zero
default: Twigpine/zero
outputs:
exit-code:
+215 -21
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,63 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeSync } from 'node:fs';
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
const CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME = '@twigpine/zero';
// The npm package moved from @gitlawb/zero to @twigpine/zero in 0.10.0. That
// release was also published once under the old name, so 0.9.0's `zero
// upgrade` and anyone still installing the old name land on a working build
// that says where the package went (docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). Nothing is
// published under the old name after that.
const LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME = '@gitlawb/zero';
// The npm name this wrapper was published under, read from its own
// package.json so the name lives in one place. The platform payload alias and
// every reinstall hint below derive from it.
function readPackageName(root) {
try {
const { name } = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(root, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
if (typeof name === 'string' && name !== '') return name;
} catch {
// An unreadable manifest must not stop the CLI from launching.
}
return CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME;
}
const packageName = readPackageName(packageRoot);
// Same note as legacyPackageSwitchMessage in internal/update/installmethod.go.
// Uninstalling first is the only safe order: both packages own the `zero` bin,
// so npm refuses to install the new one over the old (EEXIST), and forcing it
// lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin.
function legacyPackageNotice() {
return (
`[zero] Zero has moved to ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME} on npm, and ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME} gets no further releases.\n` +
'To keep getting updates, quit zero and run:\n' +
` npm uninstall -g ${LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
` npm install -g ${CURRENT_PACKAGE_NAME}\n` +
'Uninstall first: both packages provide the `zero` command. With bun, pnpm or yarn, use its global remove and add commands instead.\n'
);
}
// Printed when the wrapper exits rather than before zero starts, because the
// TUI takes over the screen and would hide anything printed first. Only on a
// terminal, so scripts that capture stderr see nothing new. `zero update` and
// `zero upgrade` print the same note themselves.
if (packageName === LEGACY_PACKAGE_NAME && !['update', 'upgrade'].includes(process.argv[2])) {
process.on('exit', () => {
if (process.stderr.isTTY || process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_TTY === '1') {
// Synchronous: an exit handler cannot wait for an asynchronous write.
writeSync(2, legacyPackageNotice());
}
});
}
function zeroBinaryName(platform = process.platform) {
return platform === 'win32' ? 'zero.exe' : 'zero';
}
@@ -55,12 +107,139 @@ function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, helpers });
}
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// Mirrors internal/cli/observability.go parseDoctorArgs + writeDoctorHelp so the
// wrapper's missing-binary doctor fallback matches the Go doctor CLI surface.
const DOCTOR_HELP = `Usage:
zero doctor [flags]
Runs Go backend health checks for config and provider setup.
Flags:
--json Print JSON report
--connectivity Include provider endpoint connectivity probe when available
-h, --help Show this help
`;
const EXIT_USAGE = 2;
function installedByBun() {
if (process.env.ZERO_WRAPPER_SIMULATE_BUN === '1') {
return true;
}
return process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
}
function bunRecoveryParagraph() {
return (
'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
` bun pm trust ${packageName} (project install)\n` +
` bun pm -g trust ${packageName} (global install)\n` +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
` "trustedDependencies": ["${packageName}"]\n` +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
);
}
function buildFromSourceParagraph() {
return (
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Twigpine/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).'
);
}
function missingBinaryContextParagraph() {
return (
`Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of ${packageName}\n` +
`(${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.'
);
}
function missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript) {
const ranByBun = installedByBun();
return (
missingBinaryContextParagraph() +
'\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
` npm install -g ${packageName}\n` +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun ? bunRecoveryParagraph() : '') +
buildFromSourceParagraph()
);
}
function formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript) {
return (
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
function parseDoctorArgs(args) {
let json = false;
for (const arg of args) {
switch (arg) {
case '-h':
case '--help':
case 'help':
return { kind: 'help' };
case '--json':
json = true;
break;
case '--connectivity':
break;
default:
return { kind: 'error', message: `unknown doctor flag ${JSON.stringify(arg)}` };
}
}
return { kind: 'run', json };
}
function missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript) {
return {
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, 'Z'),
ok: false,
checks: [
{
id: 'runtime.go',
label: 'Go runtime',
status: 'fail',
message: 'Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.',
details: {
remedy: `node "${postinstallScript}"`,
},
},
],
};
}
function missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) {
return (
'Zero doctor report (' +
new Date().toISOString() +
')\n' +
'Overall: fail\n' +
'[fail] runtime.go - Native zero binary is missing next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
' remedy: node "' +
postinstallScript +
'"\n' +
'\n' +
missingNativeRecoveryParagraphs(postinstallScript)
);
}
// The platform payload is a version of this same package, installed under an
// npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
// resolve and we fall through to the downloader.
function platformPackageBinary() {
const aliasedName = `@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
const aliasedName = `${packageName}-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
let manifestPath;
try {
manifestPath = createRequire(import.meta.url).resolve(`${aliasedName}/package.json`);
@@ -100,8 +279,6 @@ function downloadMissingBinary(packageRoot) {
});
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
function resolveNativeBinary() {
const fromPlatformPackage = platformPackageBinary();
if (fromPlatformPackage) return fromPlatformPackage;
@@ -114,21 +291,38 @@ function resolveNativeBinary() {
const nativePath = resolveNativeBinary();
if (!nativePath) {
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.\n' +
'\n' +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs')}"\n` +
'\n' +
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).',
);
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
// `zero doctor` is the diagnostic command: when the native binary is missing
// it's the one invocation that must NOT bail with the generic wrapper error,
// because that's exactly the blind alley issue #405 reports. Instead, surface
// a doctor-shaped FAIL line for the runtime so the user's diagnostic finds the
// real cause. We branch on a literal 'doctor' subcommand only (matching `zero
// doctor` and `zero doctor --connectivity`), preserving the existing bail for
// every other invocation (exec, providers list, TUI, --version, etc.).
const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
const isDoctor = argv.length > 0 && argv[0] === 'doctor';
if (isDoctor) {
const parsed = parseDoctorArgs(argv.slice(1));
if (parsed.kind === 'help') {
process.stdout.write(DOCTOR_HELP);
process.exit(0);
}
if (parsed.kind === 'error') {
process.stderr.write(`[zero] ${parsed.message}\n`);
process.exit(EXIT_USAGE);
}
if (parsed.json) {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(missingNativeDoctorJSONReport(postinstallScript), null, 2) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
process.stdout.write(missingNativeDoctorTextReport(postinstallScript) + '\n');
process.exit(1);
}
console.error(formatGenericMissingNativeBinaryMessage(postinstallScript));
process.exit(1);
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+5 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
const (
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ func run(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.
if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "tasks" {
return runTasksCommand(args[1:], getenv, stdout, stderr)
}
if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "turn" {
return runTurnCommand(args[1:], getenv, stdout, stderr)
}
options, err := parseArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
@@ -206,6 +209,7 @@ func helpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench [options]",
" zero-perf-bench tasks [options] (Terminal-Bench-style task harness; see `tasks --help`)",
" zero-perf-bench turn [options] (per-turn tracing benchmark; see `turn --help`)",
"",
"Options:",
" --iterations <n> Measured samples to collect (default: 5)",
+17
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
func TestParseArgsUsesCliAndEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
@@ -92,3 +94,18 @@ func TestHelpText(t *testing.T) {
func emptyEnv(string) string {
return ""
}
func TestTurnExitCodeFailsWhenEveryTaskErrored(t *testing.T) {
var stderr bytes.Buffer
allErrored := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 3}
if code := turnExitCode(allErrored, &stderr); code != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 1 when every task errored", code)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "no accepted benchmark sample") {
t.Fatalf("stderr missing explanation: %q", stderr.String())
}
partial := perfbench.TurnBenchResult{TasksAttempted: 3, TasksErrored: 2}
if code := turnExitCode(partial, &stderr); code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d, want 0 for partial errors (summary surfaces them)", code)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// taskOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench tasks` subcommand: the reproducible
+279
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execprofile"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// turnOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench turn` subcommand: the per-turn
// benchmark harness that runs ZERO headlessly with --trace, parses each turn's
// NDJSON trace, and records per-span latency plus the top controllable latency
// sources — the Phase 0 baseline's "do not proceed until" criterion.
type turnOptions struct {
SuitePath string
Model string
Mode string
ExecProfile string
SelfCorrect bool
Binary string
Iterations int
Version string
Commit string
Output string
JSON bool
DryRun bool
Help bool
}
func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
options, err := parseTurnArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
return 2
}
if options.Help {
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(stdout, turnHelpText())
return 0
}
set, err := perfbench.LoadTaskSet(options.SuitePath)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
// The dry-run path records a zero-iteration run without a binary, so the
// manifest loads and the report path is exercised in CI without a model.
if options.DryRun {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "[zero] turn benchmark: dry run (no agent invoked)")
return 0
}
binary, err := perfbench.ResolveBinary(options.Binary)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 2
}
result, err := perfbench.RunTurnBench(context.Background(), set, perfbench.TurnBenchConfig{
Model: options.Model,
Mode: options.Mode,
ExecProfile: options.ExecProfile,
SelfCorrect: options.SelfCorrect,
Version: options.Version,
Commit: options.Commit,
Iterations: options.Iterations,
Runner: perfbench.NewTurnExecRunner(binary),
})
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
if options.Output != "" {
if err := writeTurnReport(options.Output, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
}
if options.JSON {
if err := perfbench.WriteTurnBenchJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, perfbench.FormatTurnBenchSummary(result))
return turnExitCode(result, stderr)
}
// turnExitCode fails the command when every attempted task errored (no
// iteration produced an accepted benchmark sample): such a report measures
// nothing, and exiting 0 would let a broken configuration (missing binary, bad
// path, failing harness step) pass as a clean baseline. Partial errors keep
// exit 0 — the summary surfaces them loudly and the surviving samples are
// still valid measurements.
func turnExitCode(result perfbench.TurnBenchResult, stderr io.Writer) int {
if result.TasksAttempted > 0 && result.TasksErrored == result.TasksAttempted {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: every task errored with no accepted benchmark sample (see warnings); the report contains no valid measurements")
return 1
}
return 0
}
func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, error) {
options := turnOptions{
Iterations: 1,
Version: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_VERSION")),
Commit: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT")),
}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
flag, inlineValue := splitFlagValue(arg)
switch flag {
case "--suite":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.SuitePath = value
index = next
case "--model":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Model = value
index = next
case "--mode":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Mode = value
index = next
case "--exec-profile":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.ExecProfile = value
index = next
case "--binary":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Binary = value
index = next
case "--iterations":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
parsed, err := parsePositiveInteger(flag, value)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Iterations = parsed
index = next
case "--version":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Version = value
index = next
case "--commit":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Commit = value
index = next
case "--output":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Output = value
index = next
case "--self-correct":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.SelfCorrect = true
case "--json":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.JSON = true
case "--dry-run":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.DryRun = true
case "-h", "--help":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.Help = true
default:
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown option: %s", arg)
}
}
if options.Help {
return options, nil
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.SuitePath) == "" {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--suite is required")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.Model) == "" && !options.DryRun {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--model is required (or pass --dry-run)")
}
// Validate the profile here, before anything spawns: an unknown name would
// otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds, and
// those near-zero walls would be recorded as valid latency samples in an
// exit-0 report — exactly the misread-as-improvement trap the harness
// closed for spawn failures. Normalizing to the catalog name also keeps
// the stamped execProfile canonical (Lookup is case-insensitive), so two
// captures of the same posture always compare equal.
if raw := strings.TrimSpace(options.ExecProfile); raw != "" {
profile, ok := execprofile.Lookup(raw)
if !ok {
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown execution profile %q for --exec-profile. Valid profiles: %s", raw, strings.Join(execprofile.Names(), ", "))
}
options.ExecProfile = profile.Name
}
return options, nil
}
func writeTurnReport(path string, result perfbench.TurnBenchResult) error {
if dir := filepath.Dir(path); dir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var buffer bytes.Buffer
if err := perfbench.WriteTurnBenchJSON(&buffer, result); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, buffer.Bytes(), 0o644)
}
func turnHelpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench turn [options]",
"",
"Runs ZERO headlessly with --trace against a per-turn benchmark task set and",
"records per-span latency plus the top controllable latency sources (the",
"Phase 0 baseline's \"do not proceed until\" criterion). Each task is a fresh",
"`zero exec` process, so iterations are cold-start samples; a warm path needs",
"an in-process runner (future work).",
"",
"Options:",
" --suite <path> Task set JSON file (required)",
" --model <model> Model to run (required unless --dry-run)",
" --mode <name> Exec mode preset to apply",
" --exec-profile <name>",
" Execution profile for every task (fast|balanced|thorough);",
" forwarded to zero exec and stamped into the result",
" --self-correct Enable the post-edit verify-and-correct loop",
" --binary <path> Path to the `zero` binary (default: zero on PATH / repo root)",
" --iterations <n> Times to run each task (default: 1)",
" --version <v> Record the ZERO version (default: $ZERO_BENCH_VERSION)",
" --commit <sha> Record the ZERO commit (default: $ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT)",
" --output <path> Write the JSON result to path",
" --json Print only the JSON result",
" --dry-run Load the manifest and exit without invoking the agent",
" -h, --help Show this help",
}, "\n") + "\n"
}
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package main
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfile(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json",
"--model", "m",
"--exec-profile", "fast",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
// Inline form.
options, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite=suite.json",
"--model=m",
"--exec-profile=thorough",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs inline: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "thorough" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want thorough", options.ExecProfile)
}
}
// The bench validates the profile BEFORE spawning anything: an unknown name
// would otherwise make every child exit with a usage error in milliseconds
// and record those near-zero walls as valid latency samples in an exit-0
// report. Lookup normalization also keeps the stamped name canonical so two
// captures of the same posture compare equal.
func TestParseTurnArgsExecProfileValidatesAndNormalizes(t *testing.T) {
getenv := func(string) string { return "" }
options, err := parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "FAST",
}, getenv)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTurnArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.ExecProfile != "fast" {
t.Fatalf("ExecProfile = %q, want the canonical fast", options.ExecProfile)
}
_, err = parseTurnArgs([]string{
"--suite", "suite.json", "--model", "m", "--exec-profile", "blanced",
}, getenv)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an unknown profile must fail parse, before anything spawns")
}
for _, name := range []string{"balanced", "fast", "thorough"} {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), name) {
t.Fatalf("error must list %q, got %q", name, err.Error())
}
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/review"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/review"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/release"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/release"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
+5 -1
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,13 @@ package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/cli"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/cli"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == sandbox.LinuxSandboxHelperSubcommand {
os.Exit(sandbox.RunLinuxSandboxHelper(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr))
}
os.Exit(cli.Run(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout, os.Stderr))
}
+29 -4
View File
@@ -102,14 +102,26 @@ The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Standalone project skill directories are not supported in this version (shared project-wide skills must go in `AGENTS.md` or as a hook). However, project plugins (section 6) may bundle skills, which are merged into the active run.
Discovery root: `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` → `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills` → `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`. A missing directory is fine — Zero just reports "no skills".
Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
1. **Primary Zero dir** — `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` if set, else `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills`, else `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`
2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
For a skill installed since Zero started installing bundled files, `skill info` also reports drift in any file installed with it.
```text
~/.local/share/zero/skills/
~/.local/share/zero/skills/ # primary (install/remove target)
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
SKILL.md
~/.agents/skills/ # optional shared multi-agent root
shared-review/
SKILL.md
```
`SKILL.md` format:
@@ -126,9 +138,18 @@ description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. During an agent run, Zero loads the default skills directory before plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions silently. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. Across roots, Zero loads the primary directory first, then `~/.agents/skills`, then plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
The `skill` core tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name.
The `skill` tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name (primary, agents, or plugin).
A skill can ship files beside its `SKILL.md`, in the [agentskills.io](https://agentskills.io/specification) layout: `scripts/`, `references/`, `assets/` or anything else the instructions refer to. `zero skill add` installs the whole skill directory, leaving out hidden entries such as `.git` and not following or copying symlinks (it lists any it skipped). A skill larger than 1,000 files or 32 MiB is refused. When the `skill` tool loads a skill that has such files, its output ends with the skill's directory and a list of the files, so instructions like "run `scripts/fill.py`" can be followed. Running a bundled script goes through the normal tool permissions; installing or loading a skill never runs anything.
```text
pdf/
SKILL.md
scripts/fill.py
references/form-fields.md
```
## 4. Hooks
@@ -240,10 +261,13 @@ OAuth server names ending in `.<32 hex chars>` are reserved for token storage.
```bash
zero serve --mcp
zero serve --mcp -C /path/to/workspace
zero serve --mcp --add-dir /path/to/extra
```
The server speaks MCP over stdio. Configure it from the receiving side as a `stdio` server whose command is `zero serve --mcp`.
`-C/--cwd` sets the workspace root exposed as MCP resources and used by core tools. `--add-dir` (repeatable) widens that resource/tool scope beyond the workspace without granting the sandbox temp roots used by interactive runs.
## 6. Plugins
A plugin is a self-contained directory that bundles tools, hooks, and skills for one capability. Plugins live at:
@@ -276,6 +300,7 @@ Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins info github-pr-review # show manifest path, enabled state, lock metadata
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
+5 -5
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.task }}
provider: openai
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ jobs:
| `github-token` | no | `${{ github.token }}` | Token used to post a PR comment. Requires `pull-requests: write`. |
| `working-directory` | no | `${{ github.workspace }}` | Directory to run ZERO in. |
| `zero-version` | no | (action ref → `latest`) | ZERO release version/tag to install, e.g. `v1.2.3` or `latest`. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Gitlawb/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Twigpine/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
## Outputs
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
with:
prompt: |
Investigate this issue and propose a fix.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
- uses: Twigpine/zero@v1
id: zero
with:
prompt-file: .github/zero/upgrade-deps.md
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ jobs:
- **Least-privilege tokens.** Grant only the permissions the workflow needs
(`contents: write` to edit files, `pull-requests: write` to comment). The
default `GITHUB_TOKEN` is scoped to the repository.
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Gitlawb/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Twigpine/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
workflow run uses a known ZERO version. `zero-version` lets you pin the
installed binary independently of the action ref.
- **Linux and macOS runners** are supported; Windows runners are rejected with a
+29 -9
View File
@@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ sequenceDiagram
Agent->>Tool: execute(ctx, args)
Tool-->>Agent: output, error, metadata
Agent->>Hooks: afterTool hooks
Agent->>Agent: redact, truncate, classify success/failure
Agent->>Agent: redact secrets, apply semantic output budget, enforce byte ceiling
Agent->>Agent: classify success/failure
Agent-->>Surface: OnToolResult callback
Agent->>Transcript: append tool result message
end
@@ -301,8 +302,9 @@ Conceptually, one requested tool goes through these phases:
the model can inspect it and decide what to do next.
6. **Render and persist** — the result is surfaced to the TUI, stream-JSON
writer, or ACP client. TUI and exec record rich tool/session events for
resume/history; ACP currently persists conversational messages and streams
tool/permission updates to the client.
resume/history; ACP persists conversational messages and completed tool-call
starts/results for load replay. Live streaming details and permission
exchanges remain client notifications rather than durable history.
Tool success and failure are both informative context. A successful `read_file`
result gives the model file contents; a failed `edit_file` result gives the model
@@ -604,17 +606,34 @@ flowchart TD
Prompt -- Yes --> Decision[Permission callback]
Prompt -- No --> Run[Registry.RunWithOptions]
Decision --> Run
Run --> Redact[Redact secrets + enforce output ceiling]
Redact --> Message[Return tool result to model]
Run --> Redact[Redact secrets]
Redact --> Budget[Token-aware semantic output budget]
Budget --> Ceiling[Existing hard byte ceiling]
Ceiling --> Message[Return one tool result to model]
```
Oversized results use deterministic, provider-neutral estimated-token budgets.
Policies retain useful structure for files, search matches, tests, process logs,
diffs, and worker conclusions; tools without a declared category use a UTF-8-safe
head/tail fallback. The estimate is intentionally conservative for non-ASCII
text and is not exact provider tokenization. Existing byte ceilings remain the
authoritative safety limit. When the existing spill mechanism can persist the
complete redacted text received by the budgeting layer, the result includes its
safe spill reference. This does not imply capture of subprocess bytes already
discarded by a tool's established internal buffer.
Core tool groups include:
- **Read-only tools**: file reads, directory listing, glob, grep, LSP navigation,
skills, `ask_user`, permission requests.
- **Write tools**: `write_file`, `edit_file`, `apply_patch`, `update_plan`.
- **Shell tools**: `exec_command`, `write_stdin`, legacy `bash`.
- **Network tools**: `web_fetch` and optional web search backend.
- **Network tools**: `web_fetch` and optional web search backend. `web_fetch`
validates the URL before the permission prompt, refuses loopback/private/
special-use addresses, and dials the address it resolved. With
`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` set, the proxy is dialed instead and resolves the
target itself, so destination enforcement ends at the proxy; see the note in
the README.
- **Local-control tools**: config-gated wrappers for browser, terminal, desktop,
and artifact helpers backed by packages such as `internal/localcontrol` and
`internal/browser`.
@@ -733,9 +752,10 @@ flowchart TD
- **Skills** are instruction packs the model can load on demand.
- **Specialists** are sub-agents callable through the `Task` tool.
- **MCP servers** contribute external tools.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap merges plugin skill
roots into the runtime skill tool and prompt-visible skill list; the base
`internal/skills` scanner still scans one root at a time.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
`LoadFromRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
- **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.
## End-to-End Data Flow
+151 -27
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,35 @@
# Installing Zero
Zero is distributed as:
Pick whichever fits how you already install things. None of these is the
blessed one.
- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
- release archives on GitHub Releases
- source builds with Go 1.26.5+
| Method | Command | Self-update |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
| npm | `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Twigpine/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
| `go install` | `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest` | rerun the command |
| Source | `go build -o zero ./cmd/zero` | rebuild |
The install scripts download a platform-specific release archive and require a
published GitHub Release for the requested version. The npm package is
self-contained: the platform binary installs from the npm registry.
`zero upgrade` follows whatever owns the binary, with one exception it cannot
detect. It delegates to npm for an npm install, refuses outright for a Homebrew
keg and names `brew upgrade zero`, and replaces the binary in place for
everything else — including a mise-managed one, which is the exception.
mise is the one case it cannot detect: a mise-managed binary is an ordinary
standalone install on disk, so `zero upgrade` will replace it and leave mise
describing a version that is no longer there. Use `mise upgrade` instead.
Release archives are the substrate for most of the above: the install scripts
and the npm fallback both download a platform archive from a published GitHub
Release and verify its checksum.
## npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
zero
```
@@ -40,15 +56,47 @@ cannot write to keeps failing — rerun the install or the command below with
sufficient permissions). To trigger the fetch manually:
```bash
node "$(npm root -g)/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
node "$(npm root -g)/@twigpine/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
```
### Moving from @gitlawb/zero
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0. From 0.10.0 it is
`@twigpine/zero`, and the old name gets no further releases.
Both packages provide the `zero` command, so npm refuses to install the new
one while the old one is installed (`EEXIST`). Forcing it is worse: a later
uninstall of the old package removes the shared `zero` command. Quit any
running `zero` (on Windows a running `zero.exe` cannot be removed), then
uninstall the old package before installing the new one:
```bash
npm uninstall -g @gitlawb/zero
npm install -g @twigpine/zero
```
With another package manager, the same two steps:
```bash
bun remove -g @gitlawb/zero && bun add -g @twigpine/zero
pnpm remove -g @gitlawb/zero && pnpm add -g @twigpine/zero
yarn global remove @gitlawb/zero && yarn global add @twigpine/zero
```
Config, sessions, logins, and plugins live in your user config and home
directories, not in the package, so they carry over unchanged.
0.10.0 was also published once as `@gitlawb/zero`, so an old install that
updates lands on a working build. That build prints these steps when `zero`
exits in a terminal, and `zero upgrade` and `zero update --check` print them
too.
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
From a checkout:
@@ -73,7 +121,7 @@ scripts/install.sh --install-dir "$HOME/bin"
Defaults:
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `~/.local/bin/zero`
@@ -84,7 +132,7 @@ Requirements: Bash, `curl` or `wget`, `tar`, and `shasum` or `sha256sum`.
Install the latest release:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Twigpine/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
From a checkout:
@@ -107,14 +155,59 @@ powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -InstallDir "$env:U
Defaults:
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Repository: `Twigpine/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
## mise
[mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/) installs Zero straight from the GitHub Release
archives through its `ubi` backend, so there is nothing extra to publish and no
registry in the middle:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/zero
```
Pin a version the same way you would any other tool:
```bash
mise use -g ubi:Twigpine/[email protected]
```
Updates come from `mise upgrade`. `zero upgrade` also works, because a
mise-managed binary is an ordinary standalone install, but then mise's records
describe a version that is no longer on disk. Prefer `mise upgrade`.
## go install
```bash
go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest
```
Every release so far declares the module path `github.com/Gitlawb/zero`, so
`go install` has to use that path; `github.com/Twigpine/zero/cmd/zero@latest`
fails with "module declares its path as" until a release is tagged with the new
module path.
This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.10+ and it does not go through the
release archives. Two consequences worth knowing before you pick it:
- On Linux, Bubblewrap is still required for native sandboxing. Zero resolves
the helper in this order: an executable `zero-linux-sandbox` next to `zero`,
then `PATH`, then self-exec of the main binary. Standalone helpers remain
optional and preferred. See
[Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds](#sandbox-helpers-for-source-builds).
- `zero upgrade` treats the result as a standalone install and will replace the
binary with a release build rather than rebuilding from source. If you chose
`go install` deliberately, rerun it instead.
macOS and Windows need no extra helper.
## From Source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
@@ -125,25 +218,32 @@ Build a local binary:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.10+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
Release archives include the platform sandbox helpers. If you build directly
from source, build the helpers you need:
Release archives include the platform sandbox helpers. A source build of the
main `zero` binary is enough for Linux native sandboxing. Zero resolves the
helper in this order:
Linux:
1. an executable `zero-linux-sandbox` next to `zero`
2. then `PATH`
3. then self-exec of the main binary
Bubblewrap must still be installed. Standalone helpers remain optional and
preferred.
A separate helper remains supported if it sits next to `zero` or on `PATH`:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox # optional
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`, for example
`~/.local/bin`. `zero-seccomp` is kept as a compatibility wrapper; the sandbox
helper applies the Unix-socket filter itself when that sandbox option is enabled.
Linux native sandboxing also requires Bubblewrap to be installed.
Put `zero` on `PATH`, for example `~/.local/bin`. `zero-seccomp` is kept as a
compatibility wrapper; the sandbox helper applies the Unix-socket filter itself
when that sandbox option is enabled.
macOS uses the system sandbox and does not need an extra helper binary.
@@ -158,7 +258,7 @@ seccomp filter on Android:
pkg install golang
# Build Zero for Android
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
git clone https://github.com/Twigpine/zero.git
cd zero
CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=android GOARCH=arm64 go build -ldflags="-s -w" -o zero ./cmd/zero
@@ -234,10 +334,34 @@ directory.
## Updating
Check for a newer release:
Check for a newer release, then download, verify, and install it in place:
```bash
zero update --check
zero upgrade
```
Then reinstall with npm or rerun the install script for the version you want.
See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
`zero upgrade` behaves differently depending on how Zero was installed, because
overwriting a binary a package manager owns leaves that manager describing a
version that is no longer there:
- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` for you. An install of
the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses instead and prints the steps in
[Moving from @gitlawb/zero](#moving-from-gitlawbzero): that name gets no
further releases, so npm would only reinstall the same version.
- **Homebrew**: refuses, and tells you to run `brew upgrade zero`. Replacing the
keg binary directly would be reverted by the next `brew upgrade` or
`brew reinstall`.
- **everything else**: downloads the verified release archive and replaces the
binary in place.
Homebrew is detected by the binary living inside a Cellar keg that carries
Homebrew's own `INSTALL_RECEIPT.json`. The keg shape alone is not enough: a
directory tree you built yourself can have exactly that shape, and refusing to
update an install Homebrew never touched would be a real cost for a made-up
reason. The receipt is the thing only Homebrew writes.
An ordinary install under `/usr/local/bin` is left alone even on an Intel Mac
where that is also the Homebrew prefix.
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# Local per-model completion limits
Add `modelRPM` to the existing Zero config file:
```json
{"modelRPM": {"gpt-4.1": 30, "claude-sonnet-4.5": 15}}
```
Keys resolve through the model registry; custom IDs match exactly after trimming
whitespace. Missing keys and zero mean unlimited. Negative limits and conflicting
aliases are configuration errors. Project config may add or tighten a user cap,
but cannot relax it. Changes take effect on the next Zero process start.
For `zero exec` and interactive agent turns, admission happens immediately before
the wrapped turn session's `Stream`. N admissions fit in any sliding 60-second
window; N+1 returns a local rate-limit error before entering that method. The
error reports when a slot expires. Exec uses its existing provider-error exit
code plus a local-limit hint. There is no sleep or hidden retry. Failed admitted
requests still consume a slot.
Sessions and model switches share a limiter in one process. Separate processes
have independent windows; restarting clears them. This is not an account-wide
cap. It counts Stream admissions, not all HTTP requests: setup/prewarm,
compaction, provider-internal retries, discovery and direct calls outside that
boundary are not counted. No TPM, cost budgets, persistence, cross-process
coordination or new runtime/Python dependency is introduced.
+77 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# npm packaging
How `@gitlawb/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
How `@twigpine/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/postinstall.mjs`,
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`, or the npm-publish steps of
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
## Goals
A `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
A `npm install -g @twigpine/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
- No `EBADENGINE` warnings — ours or from any package in the dependency tree.
- No install scripts anywhere in the tree, so npm's `allow-scripts` gating,
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ The model is the one used by Codex, esbuild, and Biome: a tiny wrapper package
plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
```
@gitlawb/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @gitlawb/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-win32-x64
@twigpine/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @twigpine/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @twigpine/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@twigpine/zero@{version}-win32-x64
```
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@gitlawb/zero` package**,
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@twigpine/zero` package**,
published at suffixed versions (`0.4.0-linux-x64`) and referenced through
`npm:` aliases in `optionalDependencies`. One package name means one npm
trusted-publisher configuration — no new publish credentials per platform.
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
### Binary resolution in `bin/zero.js`
1. Resolve `@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
1. Resolve `@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
it. This wins over any previously downloaded copy — the platform version is
pinned to the wrapper release.
2. Fall back to a binary previously downloaded next to the wrapper.
@@ -103,10 +103,22 @@ dependencies of the wrapper:
platform binary (plus the musl variant on linux, which its launcher detects
at runtime) — about 65 MB saved per platform package.
### One package name
The npm name lives in `package.json` and nothing else repeats it:
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` names the wrapper, the platform
versions, the alias names, and the alias targets from it, and `bin/zero.js`
reads its own `package.json` to derive the alias it resolves. The Go side
needs the name as a constant (`npmPackageName` in
`internal/update/installmethod.go`), and a test holds it equal to
`package.json`.
## Publishing rules (release pipeline)
These are the invariants `release-artifacts.yml` must hold. Breaking the first
one is user-visible immediately.
one is user-visible immediately. `scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh` implements
them, and `internal/npmwrapper/publish_test.go` runs it against a fake
registry.
1. **Platform versions must never become `latest`.** `0.4.0-linux-x64` is a
semver *prerelease* of `0.4.0`; publishing it without an explicit
@@ -118,20 +130,67 @@ one is user-visible immediately.
bootstrap publish) — a missing value must not abort the job between the
platform and wrapper publishes, which would strand a half-published
release.
2. **Platform versions publish before the wrapper.** The wrapper's
`optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing the wrapper
first would create a window where installs resolve aliases that 404.
2. **Platform versions are on the registry before the wrapper.** The
wrapper's `optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing
the wrapper first would create a window where installs resolve aliases
that 404. Ordering the uploads is not enough: npm applies a publish
asynchronously, and in 0.10.0 a platform version appeared ten minutes
after its upload returned, after the wrapper. The publish script waits
until npm shows every platform version before it publishes the wrapper,
and waits the same way for `latest` afterwards (up to 30 minutes in all).
3. **Exact-version pinning.** The wrapper at `X.Y.Z` references platform
versions `X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>` exactly — never ranges — so a wrapper
and its binaries can never skew.
and its binaries can never skew. The publish script refuses to start when
the wrapper's aliases do not match the platform payloads beside it.
4. All publishes go through the existing npm OIDC trusted-publishing flow and
the `npm-publish` environment gate; no tokens. Because the platform
payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse the single
trusted-publisher configuration.
trusted-publisher configuration. npm checks provenance against
`package.json` `repository`, so it must name the repository the workflow
runs in.
5. **Re-runs are safe.** A version already on the registry is skipped rather
than republished, so re-running a job that failed between the platform and
wrapper publishes finishes the release. Only npm's E404 counts as "not
published"; a lookup that fails any other way is retried and then stops the
job before anything is published.
`zero update` keeps working unchanged: it detects an npm install by finding a
`package.json` named `@gitlawb/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
`package.json` named `@twigpine/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`.
## The move from `@gitlawb/zero`
Zero was published as `@gitlawb/zero` up to 0.9.0 and as `@twigpine/zero`
from 0.10.0. There is no in-place migration: both packages own the `zero`
bin, so npm refuses to install one over the other (`EEXIST`), and forcing it
lets a later uninstall of the old package delete the shared bin. The user
has to uninstall the old package and install the new one, in that order.
Deprecating the old package alone would not have reached existing users.
0.9.0's `zero upgrade` runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`; with
nothing newer under that name, npm reinstalls nothing, prints no deprecation
warning (it only warns when it installs something), and Zero reports the
update as done. So 0.10.0 was published once more under the old name, as a
bridge:
- The release job assembled the same verified artifacts a second time with
`build-platform-packages.mjs --package-name @gitlawb/zero` and published
them with the same script, after the `@twigpine/zero` publish. The steps
that did this ran once and have been removed from `release-artifacts.yml`.
- The bridge build knows its name from the `package.json` beside it. The Go
binary reports it as `InstallMethodNpmLegacy`: `zero upgrade` refuses
with the switch steps instead of reinstalling it, and `zero update --check`
adds them. `bin/zero.js` prints the same steps after `zero` exits, on a
terminal only. This handling stays in the code, since only a build
installed under the old name ever triggers it.
- Updating from 0.9.0 installs that bridge build, so npm also shows the
deprecation message.
`@gitlawb/zero` is deprecated on every version and no longer has a trusted
publisher, so this release workflow cannot publish it again; another version
would take a maintainer publishing by hand. Its versions stay on the
registry: existing installs resolve their platform payload through them, so
they must never be unpublished.
## Runbook: bumping the vendored helpers
+10 -9
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
Run this checklist when a PR changes npm distribution files such as
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`,
Go build or release tooling, or the npm `bin` wrapper.
`scripts/npm/publish-packages.sh`, Go build or release tooling, or the npm
`bin` wrapper.
## Required Checks
@@ -37,24 +38,24 @@ path:
```bash
# platform-package path
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero
cp -R dist/npm/platforms/zero-<platform>-<arch> \
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
# first-run download fallback (delete the platform package first)
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@twigpine/zero/bin/zero.js --version
```
## Checklist
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@gitlawb/zero`), version,
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@twigpine/zero`), version,
`bin.zero` entry, and NO `scripts` entries — the published package must be
free of lifecycle scripts (see NPM_PACKAGING.md).
- `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` emits platform payloads whose
`package.json` is `@gitlawb/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`package.json` is `@twigpine/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`os`/`cpu`, contains the executable binary and the vendored `helpers/` tree
with regular-file (non-symlink) `.bin` shims, and a wrapper payload with no
scripts, no dependencies, and the full five-alias `optionalDependencies`
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Zero.
## User Docs
- [Install](INSTALL.md)
- [Local per-model completion limits](MODEL_RPM.md)
- [Update flow](UPDATE.md)
- [OAuth logins and subscription-backed providers](oauth-subscriptions.md)
+42
View File
@@ -138,3 +138,45 @@ output or stop a still-running task by id.
If Zero is restarted while a background task is still marked `running`, the new
manager marks that task `error` and clears its PID. This avoids sending
`TaskStop` to a stale PID that may now belong to an unrelated process.
## Recovering an Interrupted Overwrite
Zero writes and flushes a complete temporary file before publishing an overwrite,
so a write failure before publication leaves the existing manifest unchanged
instead of truncating it. On Unix, publication uses a same-directory rename and
preserves the existing file's permission bits.
On Windows, Zero uses `ReplaceFileW` to preserve the destination DACL instead of
silently replacing it with the temporary file's inherited DACL. `ReplaceFileW`
is not observer-atomic: another process can briefly observe the destination path
as absent during replacement. Zero serializes specialist loads and managed
mutations within one process, but cannot synchronize external processes or
editors.
Windows errors 1176 (`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT`) and 1177
(`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2`) are partial replacement failures. With
Zero's managed backup, 1176 leaves the original names intact and needs no manual
recovery. For 1177, Zero has moved the original aside and tries to move it back.
That rollback almost always succeeds, and the failed write changes nothing.
If the rollback itself fails — typically because another process is holding a
lock on the file — the original is not lost, but it is left under a name Zero
does not read:
```text
<specialist dir>/.zero-replace-<random>.backup
```
Only `*.md` files are loaded as specialists, so until that file is renamed the
specialist will not appear in `zero specialist list` or resolve by name. Zero's
error message includes both the backup path and destination path. Recover by
closing whatever holds the lock and renaming the backup back:
```powershell
Move-Item .zero-replace-<random>.backup <name>.md
```
A `.zero-replace-*.backup` can also linger after a *successful* overwrite if the
backup could not be deleted afterward. That case is reported as a warning rather
than an error — the new manifest is already in place, and the leftover file is
safe to delete.
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
# TUI Themes
Zero's TUI ships a set of built-in color themes. Pick one with `--theme <name>`,
the `ZERO_THEME` environment variable, or the `/theme <name>` command while
running. `auto` (the default) follows the terminal's detected background.
Run `/theme` with no argument to open a picker: move through the list to
live-preview each theme, press Enter to apply the highlighted one, or Esc to
cancel and restore the previously active theme. Run `/theme list` to print
the active theme and the registered names without opening the picker.
## Dune (`dune`)
A warm sand-and-cream palette: sand/cream surface, charcoal ink, and a soft
amber accent.
## Neon (`neon`)
A neon-on-black palette: pitch-black surface, bright green ink, and a cyan accent.
## Adding a theme
Every theme is a `palette` (a table of color hex tokens) plus one entry in
`themeRegistry`, both in `internal/tui/theme_palettes.go`. `buildTheme` in
`internal/tui/theme.go` turns a `palette` into the resolved `lipgloss.Style`
set every renderer reads from the active `zeroTheme`. Adding a theme means
adding a new `palette{...}` literal, a `themeRegistry` entry, and test
coverage for the new palette (see below).
Registry-wide tests in `internal/tui/theme_select_test.go` assert the basic
WCAG AA text tokens, the gray-ramp order, the diff word-span pairs, and the
selected-row band for every entry. The rendered-surface invariants beyond
those (permission surfaces, selected-row secondary text, diff gutters, and
the xterm-256 downsampling checks) are asserted per palette, not against the
whole registry: `TestExtendedThemeContrastInvariants` and
`TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast` enumerate the palettes they cover. A new
theme must be added to those tests (or given equivalent palette-specific
assertions), or CI can stay green while its permission, selected-row, and
diff surfaces ship unreadable.
+91 -9
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
# Update Flow
`zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
local CLI version.
local CLI version. `zero update --apply` (or its shorthand, `zero upgrade`)
downloads, verifies, and installs it.
```bash
zero update --check
zero update --check --json
zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
zero update --check --repo Twigpine/zero
zero update --check --target windows-x64
zero upgrade
zero update --apply
```
The command is intentionally check-only:
`--check` and `--apply` are mutually exclusive. `zero update` requires one of
them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
`--check` is check-only:
- It does not replace the running binary.
- It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
@@ -19,14 +26,39 @@ The command is intentionally check-only:
- `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
CI.
`--apply` installs the update in place:
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest`. An install
of the old `@gitlawb/zero` package refuses, without a release check, and
prints the steps to switch to `@twigpine/zero` (see
[INSTALL.md](INSTALL.md#moving-from-gitlawbzero)); `--check` prints them
too.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
optional sandbox helpers.
- On Windows, the running executable is renamed aside and cleaned up on the
next `zero update --apply` or `zero upgrade`, since it can't be overwritten
while running.
- `--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
since applying always installs onto the current machine.
- `--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @twigpine/zero@latest` and
takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
`--check` there.
- `--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
also write progress output to stdout, so neither
`zero update --apply --json` nor `zero upgrade --json` is guaranteed to
produce a single parseable JSON document. Use `--check --json` for
machine-readable automation.
Useful flags:
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Use another GitHub repository for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
| `--endpoint <url\|owner/repo>` | Use a specific release API URL or repository slug for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
| `--timeout <duration>` | Override the default release check timeout. |
| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target. |
| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target (`--check` only). |
Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`,
`windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current
@@ -37,8 +69,58 @@ Endpoint resolution order:
1. `--endpoint`
2. `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL`
3. `--repo`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Twigpine/zero/releases/latest`
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
before reinstalling.
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
instead of reinstalling.
## Windows recovery state (standalone installs)
This section describes Windows only. On Linux and macOS a standalone update
renames the staged file directly over the executable path through the
installation directory's file descriptor, so the replacement is atomic and no
aside copy, marker, or recovery record is ever created — a failed update leaves
the previous binary in place and nothing to resolve.
On Windows, a running executable cannot be replaced in place, so the previous
binary is moved aside to `<binary>.zero-update-<random>.old` first. The updater
records that exact file — bound to its filesystem identity, in per-user state
outside the installation directory — and deletes only that recorded copy after
the next update is verified in place. Backups it did not create are never
removed, so a file such as `zero.exe.before-manual-patch.old` is left alone. A
recorded copy that something else holds open (an on-access scanner, an editor)
stays recorded and is removed by a later update instead.
An update **refuses to run** while unresolved recovery state exists beside the
binary:
| State on disk | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `<binary>.old` (or `<binary>.<suffix>.old`) plus a `.keep` marker, or a per-user update-recovery record naming that copy | A previous update could not restore the original binary. The `.old` file may be the last binary the updater verified; the installed one may be unverified. The `.keep` marker is in the installation directory and can be deleted; the identity-bound record is not, so deleting the marker alone does not end the refusal. |
| `<binary>.…old.<suffix>.recovery` | A previous update could not even write the marker, so it moved the last verified binary to that name. |
| The binary is missing and one or more `*.old` files exist | The previous attempt was interrupted between moves. |
The refusal names the paths involved and the two moves that end the state:
either move the recovery binary back over the executable path, or — if the
installed binary is the one you want — delete the recovery copy itself (not
only the `.keep` marker) after verifying the installed binary, then update
again. Deleting the marker alone is not enough: a failed restore also records
that copy in per-user state outside the installation directory, and the next
update consults that record even if the marker is gone.
That trusted record lives under `%AppData%\zero\update-recovery` (per-user).
The recovery copy and its `.keep` marker sit in the installation directory
(per-machine). A second Windows account on the same machine does not see the
first account's unresolved record; the sibling marker is the machine-visible
signal for every account. There is no separate machine-wide store: writing one
would need a shared writable location and ACL rules the updater does not own.
This is deliberately fail-closed and differs from older releases, which deleted
`<binary>.old` and proceeded. The trade-off is that anyone who can write in the
installation directory can plant `<binary>.old` and `<binary>.old.keep` there
and make every subsequent update refuse until an operator clears them. That is
the safe direction: the alternative is an update that overwrites the only
verified copy of the previous binary. If updates start refusing, inspect those
files before removing them — an installation directory that a lower-privileged
account can write to is itself worth fixing.
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+12 -9
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@@ -1,31 +1,34 @@
module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
module github.com/Twigpine/zero
go 1.26.5
go 1.26.10
require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
)
require (
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.11.0 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 // indirect
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.24 // indirect
@@ -34,5 +37,5 @@ require (
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.15.0 // indirect
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 // indirect
)
+22 -14
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0 h1:YSnNh5cPYlYjPxRrzs5VEn3vwhtEn3jVGRBT3M7/I0g=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:l97h4hym2hvWBVfmJDtrEHHCtkIKeTEb3TTJ4ZOB3wY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7 h1:7qw2tTAVar7m7klOPBYfTB0mniv/RuexsYwMRNxSeL0=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:DGW2q8gvzHnOpMpZTORs0aySVHCox5C+2Svk0fci1qs=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4 h1:lcPeVtcp23SNra7lHy8iYE4UC2aIipVQ47sbGyyxR5Q=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4/go.mod h1:0653x8epbZSzdDfO/XPS1a/uYPOBeSsCssOpJOqDzik=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1 h1:7r55WzBxpo/R3z98hGmY7KKPd3ET6vsf0Fb9sDHOV60=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:GE6M31gaWZVXzGw73OeuTTgy4lX+OtkH0E5ymnNsHxo=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9 h1:DpJCMWKgzQK8SJv4zbKKFHAI10ymWy/evClPFk0k0f8=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.9/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
@@ -16,8 +18,8 @@ github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1 h1:OEIrQ8maEeDBXQDoGCbbTTXYJMYRCRO1fnodZ
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1/go.mod h1:0L9PGwj20lrtmEMeyw4WKJ/TMyDtvAoK9bf2u/mNo3w=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3 h1:QPa1IWkYI+AOB+fE+mg/5/4HRMZcaXex9t5KX76i20Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3/go.mod h1:/zT4BhpD5aGFpqQQqw7a+VtHCzu+zrQtt1zhMt9mR4Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 h1:4+r3uOJ69ueRBt4okgEfWZeXs3BD36HcDBmOIAUlETk=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1/go.mod h1:f/jRa757WUmaOZrbPspXymbg/GnbF+rwe4OLsG7aXYo=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7 h1:3FmWoGNWK4STvqg0O0Aeav2T7rodWJAPeF0QpH+8gFw=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7/go.mod h1:f/jRa757WUmaOZrbPspXymbg/GnbF+rwe4OLsG7aXYo=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7 h1:kzv1kJvjg2S3r9KHo8hDdHFQLEqn4RBCb39dAYC84jI=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7/go.mod h1:9qGpnAVYz+8ACONkZBUWPtL7lulP9No6p1epAihUZwQ=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb h1:m1Uub9uM7meZ8ofVyeRfK7M/knCi3sF2gKn9kldVW0I=
@@ -34,8 +36,8 @@ github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 h1:+gs4oBZ2gPfVrKPthwbMzWZDaAFPGYK72F0NJ
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:EFJ2TJMRUaplDxHKj1qAEhCtQPW2tJSwu5BF98AuoVM=
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15 h1:6B2JPeOGlpff2Uz6vOEH1Vzpi0iUz20A+lPVhPHtNUA=
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15/go.mod h1:NX3SzP+inril6yawo5CQXx8+fk145lPDC6pumgx0mVg=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 h1:mf4KkFUj0gJuarK8P+LgiS+Lit7m9N1yAwEfPbee7R0=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:avUrQvPaLz2DrFNHJF0taWAFFX2C1GMSSoeiqFjcBmU=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0 h1:liNiWIPCvCh5HBcYfsjd+P16AG79fwd6T1Toy2gOtEA=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0/go.mod h1:avUrQvPaLz2DrFNHJF0taWAFFX2C1GMSSoeiqFjcBmU=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 h1:HSQxCeh5YZH3EL3W39ixjtyaEhcWSXQHtHnMBzSs474=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0/go.mod h1:p4lGIVX+8Wa6ZPNDvqcxq36XpUDLh42FLetFU7odllI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
@@ -62,9 +64,15 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0 h1:FMb1nTbH5H9vF55SriQHgFw5GnNL9Jg6L25BwXKzhB0=
golang.org/x/image v0.45.0/go.mod h1:n62x/7RqlwXDvGsSU4u6IUTUf6KghUZ9Bt7cG/T9Fx4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405 h1:yhCVgyC4o1eVCa2tZl7eS0r+SDo693bJlVdllGtEeKM=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1 h1:DP3TfgZhDkT7lerUdnp6PTGKyxxzz6T+cOlY/xEvfWk=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1/go.mod h1:lXJ8SexMvEVcHCoDvAGLZgFJ9Wsm2sulmoNEXGhYZD0=
+956 -100
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File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+2496 -19
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File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+217
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
package acp
// desktopinterop_test.go covers three defects found by driving the real `zero
// acp` binary from a desktop ACP client. Each is a case where ZERO and a
// conforming client disagreed about the wire, and none of them failed loudly —
// they produced a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons the user
// could not tell apart.
//
// A fourth, session/load restoring history without replaying it, is fixed by
// #914 rather than here: that one also gives the replayed messages stable ids
// and keeps session/resume replay-free, which this did not.
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
// ---- an offered option is an acceptable answer ----
// The list the options were BUILT from and the list the answer was CHECKED
// against were different whenever ZERO did not enumerate: the client was sent
// Allow and Reject, and its reply was validated against an empty slice, so
// every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny. The user clicked
// Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, with nothing on screen to say so.
func TestAnOfferedOptionIsAccepted(t *testing.T) {
// No AvailableDecisions: the fallback path, which is every permission event
// that is not a prompt.
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
if len(options) == 0 {
t.Fatal("no options were offered")
}
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Fatalf("option %q was answered with %q (%s) — an offered option must be accepted",
option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
}
}
}
// The narrowing this validation exists for still holds: a client must not be
// able to return a broader grant than it was shown.
func TestAnOptionThatWasNotOfferedIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("an unoffered broader grant was accepted as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// The resolver is the single source of truth for both sides, which is what
// makes the two agree by construction rather than by being kept in step.
func TestOfferedDecisionsMatchWhatWasSent(t *testing.T) {
for _, req := range []agent.PermissionRequest{
{ToolName: "bash"},
{ToolName: "bash", AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}},
} {
offered := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if !actionOffered(option.OptionID, offered) {
t.Fatalf("option %q was sent but is not in the offered set %v", option.OptionID, offered)
}
}
}
}
// ---- two options the user can tell apart ----
// request_permissions offers plain allow and strict-review allow together, and
// both were labelled "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows,
// so the panel presented two identical buttons where one silently enabled
// strict auto-review of what was granted.
func TestEveryOfferedOptionHasADistinctLabel(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
}
seen := map[string]string{}
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
if previous, clash := seen[option.Name]; clash {
t.Fatalf("options %q and %q share the label %q — a user cannot tell them apart",
previous, option.OptionID, option.Name)
}
seen[option.Name] = option.OptionID
}
}
// The two remain distinct decisions: the label changed, the round trip did not.
func TestStrictAllowStillRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "request_permissions",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
},
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict)},
buildPermissionOptions(req),
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict {
t.Fatalf("strict allow round-tripped as %q", decision.Action)
}
}
// ---- cancelling a permission is a cancellation, not a crash ----
// Only context.Canceled was recognised, so dismissing a permission dialog came
// back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel text. Clients render
// that as a failed turn, so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over —
// and for apply_patch, dismissing is the ONLY refusal a client is offered.
func TestCancellingAPermissionEndsTheTurnAsCancelled(t *testing.T) {
canceled := fmt.Errorf("%w for apply_patch", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled)
reason, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, canceled)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor returned an error for a cancellation: %v", err)
}
if reason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", reason, StopCancelled)
}
}
// A genuine failure must still be an error. Mapping too much to cancelled would
// hide real faults behind a clean ending, which is the opposite mistake.
func TestARealFailureIsStillAnError(t *testing.T) {
failure := errors.New("provider exploded")
if _, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, failure); !errors.Is(err, failure) {
t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor(%v) = %v, want the failure preserved", failure, err)
}
}
// The sentinel is matched through errors.Is, so it survives the wrapping every
// return site applies — each one adds the tool name.
func TestPermissionCancellationSurvivesWrapping(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.Is(fmt.Errorf("%w for bash", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("a wrapped permission cancellation was not recognised")
}
if errors.Is(errors.New("something else"), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
t.Fatal("an unrelated error was reported as a permission cancellation")
}
}
// A decision that never became an option cannot be selected.
//
// PermissionDecisionCancel is the case that exists today: optionKindFor drops
// it because ACP expresses cancellation through the outcome, yet ZERO
// enumerates it in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch. While
// the reply was validated against the DECISIONS rather than the sent options, a
// client could return {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"} — an id it was
// never shown — and abort the whole turn.
//
// Written over every option-less decision rather than over "cancel", so a
// future action that optionKindFor declines to render is covered the day it is
// added rather than the day someone remembers this test.
func TestADecisionThatIsNotAnOptionCannotBeSelected(t *testing.T) {
for _, toolName := range []string{"bash", "apply_patch"} {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: toolName,
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
agent.PermissionDecisionCancel,
},
}
options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
for _, action := range req.AvailableDecisions {
if actionOffered(string(action), options) {
continue // it was sent; selecting it is legitimate
}
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(action)},
options,
)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Fatalf("%s: %q was never sent as an option but was accepted as %q",
toolName, action, decision.Action)
}
}
}
}
// Cancelling is still reachable — through the outcome, which is where ACP puts
// it. Closing the selected-id route must not close the real one.
func TestCancellingThroughTheOutcomeStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
options := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "apply_patch"})
decision := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, options)
if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Fatalf("outcome=cancelled gave %q, want cancel", decision.Action)
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package acp
import "context"
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
+181
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
package acp
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestACPImageAttachmentHistory(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
text string
images int
withoutVision bool
want string
}{
{name: "image only", images: 1, want: "[1 image]"},
{name: "text and images", text: "compare these", images: 2, want: "compare these [2 images]"},
{name: "ignored by model", images: 1, withoutVision: true, want: ""},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.DiscoverModels = func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
modalities := []string{"text", "image"}
if tc.withoutVision {
modalities = []string{"text"}
}
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "fake-model", InputModalities: modalities}}, nil
}
type observedTurn struct {
prompt string
images int
}
turns := make(chan observedTurn, 8)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, prompt string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
turns <- observedTurn{prompt: prompt, images: len(opts.Images)}
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "received"}, nil
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const imageData = "image-history-bytes-not-for-storage"
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(imageData))
var blocks []ContentBlock
if tc.text != "" {
blocks = append(blocks, TextBlock(tc.text))
}
for range tc.images {
blocks = append(blocks, ImageBlock(encoded, "image/png"))
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: blocks}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
live := <-turns
wantLiveImages := tc.images
if tc.withoutVision {
wantLiveImages = 0
}
if live.images != wantLiveImages {
t.Fatalf("live images = %d, want %d", live.images, wantLiveImages)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || len(events) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("read completed turn: events=%+v err=%v", events, err)
}
var user struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Attachments struct {
Images int `json:"images"`
} `json:"attachments"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(events[0].Payload, &user); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if user.Role != "user" || user.Content != tc.text || user.Attachments.Images != wantLiveImages {
t.Errorf("stored user event = %s, want original text and attachments.images=%d", events[0].Payload, wantLiveImages)
}
for _, event := range events {
if bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte(encoded)) || bytes.Contains(event.Payload, []byte(imageData)) {
t.Errorf("image data leaked into session event: %s", event.Payload)
}
}
followUp := func(t *testing.T, client *clientHarness) {
t.Helper()
if err := client.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("what did I send?")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got := <-turns
if want := "User: " + tc.want + "\n"; !strings.Contains(got.prompt, want) {
t.Errorf("seeded prompt missing user history %q: %q", want, got.prompt)
}
if got.images != 0 {
t.Errorf("historical images reattached: %d", got.images)
}
}
followUp(t, h)
h.stop()
// Fresh agents and stores reproduce a process restart, with no shared
// in-memory history to hide a missing attachment in the event log.
for _, method := range []string{MethodSessionLoad, MethodSessionResume} {
t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
restoredDeps := deps
restoredDeps.Store = sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{RootDir: deps.Store.RootDir})
loader := newHarness(t, restoredDeps)
defer loader.stop()
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, method, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if method == MethodSessionLoad {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
if update.SessionUpdate != UpdateUserMessageChunk || update.Content.Text != tc.want {
t.Errorf("replayed user = %+v, want %q", update, tc.want)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal("user turn was not replayed")
}
} else {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
t.Errorf("resume replayed transcript: %+v", update)
default:
}
}
followUp(t, loader)
})
}
})
}
}
func TestACPAttachmentHistoryReadsExistingSessionMessages(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
meta, err := deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{SessionID: "attachment-compatibility", Cwd: t.TempDir()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for i, payload := range []string{
`{"role":"user","content":"old text"}`,
`{"role":"user","content":"","attachments":{"images":1,"documents":2}}`,
`{"role":"user","content":"still text","attachments":{"images":-1,"documents":1.5}}`,
`{"role":"assistant","content":"answer","attachments":{"images":1}}`,
} {
if _, err := deps.Store.AppendEvent(meta.SessionID, sessions.AppendEventInput{Type: sessions.EventMessage, Payload: json.RawMessage(payload)}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("append message %d: %v", i, err)
}
}
a := &Agent{deps: deps}
_, messages, _, err := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := []string{"old text", "[1 image] [2 documents]", "still text", "answer"}
if len(messages) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("messages = %+v", messages)
}
for i, text := range want {
if messages[i].content != text {
t.Errorf("message %d = %q, want %q", i, messages[i].content, text)
}
}
}
+180 -15
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -80,13 +81,21 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
reader *bufio.Reader
w io.Writer
rawReader io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
readerCloser io.Closer
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
handlers map[string]HandlerFunc
notifiers map[string]NotifyFunc
// Notifications for one method are an ordered stream: session/update in
// particular is stateful, so dispatching every frame in an unrelated
// goroutine can make a later chunk overtake an earlier one. Different
// methods retain independent tails, keeping session/cancel responsive while
// an update handler is busy.
notifyMu sync.Mutex
notifyTails map[string]chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
nextID int64
@@ -96,17 +105,35 @@ type Conn struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
// lifetime.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
reader: bufio.NewReader(r),
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
rawReader: r,
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
notifyTails: make(map[string]chan struct{}),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
}
}
// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
c := NewConn(r, w)
c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
return c
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
@@ -128,17 +155,36 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
c.wg.Wait()
}()
interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
//
// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
before := interruptible.generation()
line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
return nil
}
return err
@@ -146,6 +192,100 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
}
}
// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
//
// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
//
// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
type interruptibleReader struct {
inner io.Reader
closer io.Closer
ctx context.Context
closeOnce sync.Once
gen atomic.Int64
}
func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
type interruptibleReadResult struct {
n int
err error
}
// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
once sync.Once
}
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
return claimed
}
// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
// publishes a result for Read to join.
func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
}
decision.complete()
}()
res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
return res
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
go func() {
resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
}()
select {
case res := <-resultCh:
return res.n, res.err
case <-r.ctx.Done():
// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
if decision.interrupt() {
r.gen.Add(1)
if r.closer != nil {
r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
}
}
// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
// report) is what the caller should see.
res := <-resultCh
return res.n, res.err
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
@@ -171,11 +311,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
}(msg)
case msg.isNotify():
if fn := c.notifiers[msg.Method]; fn != nil {
c.wg.Add(1)
go func(m rpcMessage) {
defer c.wg.Done()
fn(ctx, m.Params)
}(msg)
c.dispatchNotification(ctx, msg, fn)
}
default:
// Malformed frame; reply only if we can identify a request id.
@@ -185,6 +321,35 @@ func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
}
}
// dispatchNotification preserves wire order within one method without making
// unrelated notification methods wait for each other. The read loop installs
// each tail before starting its goroutine, so goroutine scheduling cannot
// reorder the chain it observes.
func (c *Conn) dispatchNotification(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage, fn NotifyFunc) {
c.notifyMu.Lock()
previous := c.notifyTails[msg.Method]
done := make(chan struct{})
c.notifyTails[msg.Method] = done
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
c.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer c.wg.Done()
defer func() {
close(done)
c.notifyMu.Lock()
if c.notifyTails[msg.Method] == done {
delete(c.notifyTails, msg.Method)
}
c.notifyMu.Unlock()
}()
if previous != nil {
<-previous
}
fn(ctx, msg.Params)
}()
}
func (c *Conn) dispatchRequest(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage) {
fn := c.handlers[msg.Method]
if fn == nil {
+368
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,30 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
type testReadCloser struct {
read func([]byte) (int, error)
close func() error
}
func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
func (r testReadCloser) Close() error { return r.close() }
type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
// connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
t.Helper()
@@ -25,6 +44,275 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
}
}
func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
reader := testReadCloser{
read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return pipeReader.Read(p)
},
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return pipeReader.Close()
},
}
conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-readStarted
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "non-closable"
if closable {
name = "closable"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
})
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
var reader io.Reader = read
if closable {
reader = testReadCloser{
read: read,
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return nil
},
}
}
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
newConn := NewConn
if closable {
// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
newConn = NewOwnedConn
}
conn := newConn(reader, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-writeStarted
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
}
})
}
}
// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
//
// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
var readCalls atomic.Int32
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
readCalls.Add(1)
// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
// loop's next ReadBytes call.
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
t.Cleanup(release)
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
conn := NewConn(read, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
}
cancel()
release()
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
}
if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
resultReady := make(chan struct{})
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
defer close(resultReady)
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
go func() {
n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
}()
<-resultReady
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
cancel()
res := <-readDone
if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
}
if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
}
cancel()
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
readComplete := make(chan struct{})
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
go func() {
res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
close(readComplete)
resultCh <- res
}()
<-readComplete
if decision.interrupt() {
t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
}
res := <-resultCh
if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
panic("boom")
})
conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
}
}
func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
@@ -72,6 +360,86 @@ func TestConnNotification(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConnNotificationsForOneMethodStayInWireOrder(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
firstStarted := make(chan struct{})
releaseFirst := make(chan struct{})
delivered := make(chan int, 2)
b.HandleNotify("update", func(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var in struct{ Sequence int }
_ = json.Unmarshal(params, &in)
if in.Sequence == 1 {
close(firstStarted)
<-releaseFirst
}
delivered <- in.Sequence
})
if err := a.Notify("update", map[string]int{"Sequence": 1}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-firstStarted:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("first notification did not start")
}
if err := a.Notify("update", map[string]int{"Sequence": 2}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case sequence := <-delivered:
t.Fatalf("notification %d overtook the blocked first notification", sequence)
case <-time.After(25 * time.Millisecond):
}
close(releaseFirst)
for want := 1; want <= 2; want++ {
select {
case got := <-delivered:
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("notification order = ...,%d; want %d", got, want)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("notification %d was not delivered", want)
}
}
}
func TestConnDifferentNotificationMethodsStayConcurrent(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
updateStarted := make(chan struct{})
releaseUpdate := make(chan struct{})
cancelDelivered := make(chan struct{})
b.HandleNotify("update", func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) {
close(updateStarted)
<-releaseUpdate
})
b.HandleNotify("cancel", func(context.Context, json.RawMessage) {
close(cancelDelivered)
})
if err := a.Notify("update", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("update notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-updateStarted:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("update notification did not start")
}
if err := a.Notify("cancel", nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancel notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-cancelDelivered:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("different notification method was blocked behind update")
}
close(releaseUpdate)
}
func TestConnMethodNotFound(t *testing.T) {
a, _, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
+213
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// captureAgentOptions makes every turn record the agent.Options it was built
// with, so a test can assert the permission mode the next prompt actually runs
// with rather than only what the wire reports.
func captureAgentOptions(deps *Deps) *agent.Options {
var captured agent.Options
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
captured = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
}
return &captured
}
func newHarnessT(t *testing.T, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
t.Cleanup(h.stop)
return h
}
func mustCall(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, h *clientHarness, method string, params any, result any) {
t.Helper()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, method, params, result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", method, err)
}
}
// restartHarness replaces the live agent with a fresh one over the same store,
// which is the process restart the persisted mode has to survive.
func restartHarness(t *testing.T, h *clientHarness, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
h.stop()
return newHarnessT(t, deps)
}
func modeOptionValue(t *testing.T, options []SessionConfigOption) string {
t.Helper()
for _, option := range options {
if option.ID == configIDMode {
return option.CurrentValue
}
}
t.Fatalf("no mode config option in %+v", options)
return ""
}
func assertModeReported(t *testing.T, result LoadSessionResult, want agent.PermissionMode) {
t.Helper()
if result.Modes == nil || result.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("modes = %+v, want currentModeId %q", result.Modes, want)
}
if got := modeOptionValue(t, result.ConfigOptions); got != string(want) {
t.Fatalf("mode config option = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestACPModePersistsAcrossRestartLoadAndResume(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want plan", meta.PermissionMode)
}
// LOAD after a restart: the response must report the stored mode, and the
// next prompt must actually run with it.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModePlan)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("continue")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
t.Fatalf("after load, agent.Options.PermissionMode = %q, want plan", captured.PermissionMode)
}
// RESUME after another restart reports the same.
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var resumed ResumeSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &resumed)
assertModeReported(t, resumed, agent.PermissionModePlan)
}
func TestACPModePersistsViaSetConfigOption(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk),
}, &configured)
if got := modeOptionValue(t, configured.ConfigOptions); got != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q, want ask", got)
}
meta, err := deps.Store.Get(created.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
t.Fatalf("store.Get: %v", err)
}
if meta.PermissionMode != string(agent.PermissionModeAsk) {
t.Fatalf("stored mode = %q, want ask", meta.PermissionMode)
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
}
// TestACPModeRestoreFallback pins the restore boundary: no stored value keeps
// the historical auto default, and a stored value outside the three offered
// modes must never come back weaker than ask (and never unsafe).
func TestACPModeRestoreFallback(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
seed string // "" means metadata written before modes were persisted
want agent.PermissionMode
}{
{name: "unset keeps auto", want: agent.PermissionModeAuto},
{name: "ask preserved", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unknown falls back to ask", seed: "bogus", want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
{name: "unsafe never restored", seed: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe), want: agent.PermissionModeAsk},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
workspace := t.TempDir()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
if tc.seed != "" {
if _, err := deps.Store.UpdateMode(created.SessionID, tc.seed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed mode: %v", err)
}
}
h = restartHarness(t, h, deps)
var loaded LoadSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &loaded)
assertModeReported(t, loaded, tc.want)
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("go")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("next prompt PermissionMode = %q, want %q", captured.PermissionMode, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode pins the store-first order: when the
// mode cannot be saved the request fails and the live session is untouched.
func TestACPSetModeWriteFailureKeepsLiveMode(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
captured := captureAgentOptions(&deps)
h := newHarnessT(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &created)
// Remove the metadata file so UpdateMode fails but the live session stays
// promptable (turn persistence only warns when the file is gone).
metadataPath := filepath.Join(deps.Store.RootDir, created.SessionID, sessions.MetadataFile)
if err := os.Remove(metadataPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove metadata: %v", err)
}
err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{})
var rpcErr *rpcError
if !errors.As(err, &rpcErr) || rpcErr.Code != codeInternalError {
t.Fatalf("set_mode with an unsavable mode = %v, want internal error", err)
}
mustCall(t, ctx, h, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("still auto")}}, &PromptResult{})
if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModeAuto {
t.Fatalf("failed set_mode changed the live mode: PermissionMode = %q, want auto", captured.PermissionMode)
}
}
+81 -24
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
// permission.go maps ZERO's permission prompt model onto ACP's
@@ -15,17 +15,10 @@ import (
// PermissionOptions. Only the actions ZERO actually presented (AvailableDecisions)
// are surfaced; the optionId is the ZERO action string for a clean round-trip.
func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
actions := req.AvailableDecisions
if len(actions) == 0 {
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
actions = []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
actions := offeredDecisions(req)
options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
for _, action := range actions {
kind, name := optionKindFor(action)
kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
if kind == "" {
continue // skip actions that have no clean ACP option (e.g. cancel)
}
@@ -38,21 +31,61 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
return options
}
// offeredDecisions resolves what this request actually offers the client.
//
// ONE RESOLVER, USED BY BOTH SIDES, and that is the entire point of it existing.
// The fallback below used to live inside buildPermissionOptions while
// requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw
// req.AvailableDecisions. When ZERO did not enumerate — which is every
// permission event that is not a prompt, and includes a shell call whose sandbox
// decision came back deny — the two disagreed completely: the client was sent
// "Allow" and "Reject", and validation was performed against an EMPTY list, so
// every option the client could possibly click failed closed to deny with
// "permission option was not offered".
//
// The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial. Nothing surfaced it,
// because a denial is a legitimate answer — the tool was simply refused and the
// turn carried on as though the user had rejected it.
func offeredDecisions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []agent.PermissionDecisionAction {
if len(req.AvailableDecisions) > 0 {
return req.AvailableDecisions
}
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
return []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
// optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
// human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
// outcome rather than an option (cancel).
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
//
// escalates reports that approving a command prefix will also run the command
// outside the sandbox. The two prefix options say so in their label, since the
// label is all an ACP client shows and the option id carries no room for it. An
// editor user is deciding on exactly the same terms as a terminal user, so the
// disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
switch action {
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow:
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
// SPLIT FROM PLAIN ALLOW because the label is the only thing an ACP
// client shows. Both were labelled "Allow", and request_permissions
// offers them together — so the panel presented two identical buttons,
// and whichever the user picked looked the same while one of them
// silently turned on strict auto-review of what was granted. The option
// id carries no room for the distinction, so it has to be in the name.
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow with strict review"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow this command for the session"
return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Allow this command for the session", escalates)
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow:
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow this command"
return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Always allow this command", escalates)
case agent.PermissionDecisionDeny:
return PermRejectOnce, "Reject"
case agent.PermissionDecisionCancel:
@@ -64,19 +97,31 @@ func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
// decisionFromOutcome maps the client's permission outcome back to a ZERO
// decision. A cancelled outcome cancels the run; a selected option id is the ZERO
// action verbatim (validated against what was offered); anything unrecognized
// fails closed to deny.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
// action verbatim (validated against what was actually sent); anything
// unrecognized fails closed to deny.
//
// IT TAKES THE OPTIONS THAT WERE SENT, not the decisions the request offered,
// and the two are not the same list. Some actions never become options —
// PermissionDecisionCancel is dropped by optionKindFor because ACP expresses
// cancellation through the outcome instead — yet it IS enumerated in
// AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch, the two commonest
// prompts. Validating against the decisions therefore accepted
// {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an identifier no client was ever
// shown, aborting the whole turn.
//
// Passing the sent options makes "what we offered" and "what we accept" the
// same slice rather than two things kept in step, so anything optionKindFor
// declines to render is excluded structurally instead of by name.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []PermissionOption) agent.PermissionDecision {
switch outcome.Outcome {
case OutcomeCancelled:
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}
case OutcomeSelected:
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)
// Bind to what was actually offered for THIS call: a client must not be able
// to return a broader grant (always_allow / allow_for_session) that wasn't
// presented. Anything not offered fails closed to deny.
if actionOffered(action, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: action}
if actionOffered(outcome.OptionID, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)}
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission option was not offered"}
default:
@@ -84,9 +129,9 @@ func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.Permi
}
}
func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, a := range offered {
if a == action {
func actionOffered(optionID string, offered []PermissionOption) bool {
for _, option := range offered {
if option.OptionID == optionID {
return true
}
}
@@ -97,13 +142,15 @@ func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.Permis
// session/request_permission request from a ZERO permission request.
func permissionToolCall(req agent.PermissionRequest) ToolCallUpdate {
args := marshalArgs(req.Args)
return ToolCallUpdate{
upd := ToolCallUpdate{
ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID,
Title: toolTitle(req.ToolName, string(args)),
Kind: toolKindFor(req.ToolName),
Status: ToolStatusPending,
RawInput: rawInputBytes(args),
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, req.ToolName)
return upd
}
func marshalArgs(args map[string]any) []byte {
@@ -123,3 +170,13 @@ func rawInputBytes(data []byte) json.RawMessage {
}
return json.RawMessage(data)
}
// withSandboxEscalationNote appends the escalation disclosure to a prefix
// option's label. Kept parallel to the TUI's wording so the same consequence is
// not described two different ways depending on which client the user runs.
func withSandboxEscalationNote(name string, escalates bool) string {
if !escalates {
return name
}
return name + " (runs outside the sandbox)"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package acp
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
func escalationRequest(escalates bool) agent.PermissionRequest {
return agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
PrefixApprovalEscalates: escalates,
}
}
// An ACP client renders only Name, so if the escalation is not in the label the
// editor user approves it blind. They face exactly the outcome a terminal user
// faces, so the disclosure has to reach both clients or it is not a fix.
func TestACPPrefixOptionsDiscloseLeavingTheSandbox(t *testing.T) {
found := 0
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(true)) {
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(option.OptionID)
if action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix && action != agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix {
if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
t.Errorf("option %q carries the disclosure but does not escalate", option.Name)
}
continue
}
found++
if !strings.Contains(option.Name, "outside the sandbox") {
t.Errorf("prefix option %q does not say the command leaves the sandbox", option.Name)
}
}
if found != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected both prefix options, saw %d", found)
}
}
func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(false)) {
if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
t.Errorf("option %q warns about the sandbox when approving would not leave it", option.Name)
}
}
}
// The disclosure must live in the label only. The option id is the decision
// action round-tripped verbatim, and decisionFromOutcome matches it against
// what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
request := escalationRequest(true)
options := buildPermissionOptions(request)
for _, option := range options {
decision := decisionFromOutcome(
RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
options,
)
if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
}
}
}
+23 -6
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
)
func TestBuildPermissionOptions(t *testing.T) {
@@ -39,11 +39,14 @@ func TestBuildPermissionOptionsDefault(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestDecisionFromOutcome(t *testing.T) {
offered := []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
offered := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
},
})
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Errorf("cancelled -> %q, want cancel", d.Action)
}
@@ -79,3 +82,17 @@ func TestPermissionToolCall(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("expected rawInput from args")
}
}
func TestPermissionToolCallKeepsTheBrowserDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
call := permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "browser-1",
ToolName: "browser_connect",
Args: map[string]any{"target": "127.0.0.1:9222"},
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, call); got != (BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: "connect"}) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor = %#v", got)
}
if call.Title != "browser connect" {
t.Fatalf("title = %q", call.Title)
}
}
+172 -8
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,14 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// translate.go maps ZERO's agent events onto ACP session/update payloads. The
@@ -17,6 +20,14 @@ func agentMessageChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
func replayMessageChunk(role, messageID, text string) ContentChunk {
update := UpdateAgentMessageChunk
if role == "user" {
update = UpdateUserMessageChunk
}
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: update, MessageID: messageID, Content: TextBlock(text)}
}
func agentThoughtChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentThoughtChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
@@ -44,12 +55,125 @@ func toolKindFor(name string) string {
// toolTitle builds a concise human title, e.g. "read_file src/main.go".
func toolTitle(name, rawArgs string) string {
if browser, ok := browserToolDetails(name); ok {
return browserToolTitle(browser.Command, rawArgs)
}
if hint := primaryArgHint(rawArgs); hint != "" {
return name + " " + hint
}
return name
}
// browserToolDetails identifies ZERO's local browser helpers without treating
// similarly named MCP tools as browser automation. The descriptor intentionally
// contains no request data: ACP tool input is already protocol-visible, but a
// durable UI must not need to retain text, local CDP targets, or full URLs just
// to recognise the browser operation.
func browserToolDetails(name string) (*BrowserToolDetails, bool) {
const prefix = "browser_"
command, ok := strings.CutPrefix(name, prefix)
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
switch command {
case "install", "launch", "connect", "open", "snapshot", "click", "type", "press", "action":
return &BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: command}, true
default:
return nil, false
}
}
const zeroBrowserMetaKey = "github.com/Twigpine/zero/browser"
// attachBrowserToolDetails stores ZERO's browser descriptor in ACP's reserved
// extension channel. Keeping this in one helper prevents start, result, and
// permission payloads from drifting onto different wire shapes.
func attachBrowserToolDetails(update *ToolCallUpdate, name string) {
browser, ok := browserToolDetails(name)
if !ok {
return
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(browser)
if err != nil {
return
}
update.Meta = map[string]json.RawMessage{zeroBrowserMetaKey: raw}
}
// browserToolTitle avoids putting browser_type text, an attached DevTools
// endpoint, or a URL query/fragment in a tool-card title. Those values can
// carry credentials or session data; the UI only needs the operation and, for
// navigation, a human-recognisable origin.
func browserToolTitle(command, rawArgs string) string {
switch command {
case "action":
action, ok := exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, "command")
if !ok {
return "browser action"
}
if action, ok := tools.NormalizedBrowserActionCommand(action); ok {
return "browser action " + action
}
return "browser action"
case "open":
rawURL, ok := exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, "url")
if !ok {
return "browser open"
}
normalized, err := tools.NormalizeBrowserOpenURL(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return "browser open"
}
u, err := url.Parse(normalized)
if err != nil || u.Scheme == "" || u.Host == "" {
return "browser open"
}
origin := u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
if !browserTitleTextSafe(origin) {
return "browser open"
}
return "browser open " + truncateHint(origin)
default:
return "browser " + command
}
}
// browserTitleTextSafe validates text after URL parsing has decoded escaped
// UTF-8 in the host. Valid UTF-8 alone is not presentation-safe: whitespace, control,
// format/bidi, and line/paragraph separator runes can reorder or split the
// permission label shown to a user. The execution URL remains unchanged.
func browserTitleTextSafe(text string) bool {
if !utf8.ValidString(text) {
return false
}
for _, r := range text {
if unicode.IsSpace(r) || unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// exactJSONStringArg mirrors ZERO's map-based tool argument decoding: only the
// exact JSON key is considered, and a non-string value is invalid. In
// particular, an incidental "URL" key must not change a permission title when
// browser_open will only read "url".
func exactJSONStringArg(rawArgs, key string) (string, bool) {
var args map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(rawArgs), &args) != nil {
return "", false
}
raw, ok := args[key]
if !ok {
return "", false
}
var value string
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &value) != nil {
return "", false
}
return value, true
}
// primaryArgHint extracts the most relevant argument (path/pattern/command) from
// raw JSON arguments. Best-effort; returns "" when it can't parse.
func primaryArgHint(rawArgs string) string {
@@ -89,7 +213,7 @@ func rawInput(args string) json.RawMessage {
// toolCallStart maps an advertised ZERO tool call to the initial ACP "tool_call"
// update (status in_progress — ZERO executes immediately after advertising).
func toolCallStart(call agent.ToolCall) ToolCallUpdate {
return ToolCallUpdate{
upd := ToolCallUpdate{
SessionUpdate: UpdateToolCall,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Title: toolTitle(call.Name, call.Arguments),
@@ -97,6 +221,8 @@ func toolCallStart(call agent.ToolCall) ToolCallUpdate {
Status: ToolStatusInProgress,
RawInput: rawInput(call.Arguments),
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, call.Name)
return upd
}
// toolCallResult maps a finished ZERO tool result to a "tool_call_update".
@@ -116,26 +242,64 @@ func toolCallResult(result agent.ToolResult) ToolCallUpdate {
if locs := toolResultLocations(result); len(locs) > 0 {
upd.Locations = locs
}
attachBrowserToolDetails(&upd, result.Name)
return upd
}
func toolResultContent(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallContent {
content := make([]ToolCallContent, 0, 1+len(result.FileDiffs))
text := strings.TrimRight(result.Output, "\n")
if text == "" {
text = result.Display.Summary
}
if text == "" {
return nil
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
}
return []ToolCallContent{ToolContent(TextBlock(text))}
content = append(content, ToolContent(TextBlock(text)))
return appendToolResultDiffs(content, result.FileDiffs)
}
func appendToolResultDiffs(content []ToolCallContent, diffs []tools.FileDiff) []ToolCallContent {
for _, diff := range diffs {
if !filepath.IsAbs(diff.Path) || (!diff.OldExists && !diff.NewExists) {
continue
}
var oldText *string
if diff.OldExists {
old := diff.OldText
oldText = &old
}
var newText *string
if diff.NewExists {
updated := diff.NewText
newText = &updated
}
content = append(content, ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: diff.Path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText})
}
return content
}
func toolResultLocations(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallLocation {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if strings.TrimSpace(f) == "" {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
seen := make(map[string]bool, len(result.FileDiffs)+len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, diff := range result.FileDiffs {
path := diff.Path
if path == "" || seen[path] {
continue
}
seen[path] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: path})
}
// FileDiff.Path is canonical absolute path data while ChangedFiles is
// normally workspace-relative. Without the trusted workspace root these
// coordinate systems cannot be correlated safely: a suffix match would let
// /workspace/sub/a.go consume the fallback for a distinct root a.go. The
// shared seen set deduplicates only identities already exactly comparable.
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if f == "" || seen[f] {
continue
}
seen[f] = true
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: f})
}
return locs
+427 -5
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,30 @@
package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func browserDescriptor(t *testing.T, update ToolCallUpdate) BrowserToolDetails {
t.Helper()
raw, ok := update.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("browser metadata = %#v, want %q", update.Meta, zeroBrowserMetaKey)
}
var details BrowserToolDetails
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &details); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode browser metadata: %v", err)
}
return details
}
func TestAgentMessageAndThoughtChunks(t *testing.T) {
m := agentMessageChunk("hello")
if m.SessionUpdate != UpdateAgentMessageChunk || m.Content.Type != "text" || m.Content.Text != "hello" {
@@ -56,6 +72,223 @@ func TestToolTitleAndHint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBrowserToolUpdatesAreStructuredAndPresentationSafe(t *testing.T) {
start := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-1",
Name: "browser_open",
Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/settings?token=not-for-a-title#account"}`,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, start); got != (BrowserToolDetails{Version: 1, Command: "open"}) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor = %#v, want open", got)
}
if start.Title != "browser open https://example.com" {
t.Fatalf("browser title = %q", start.Title)
}
if strings.Contains(start.Title, "token=") || strings.Contains(start.Title, "#account") {
t.Fatalf("browser title leaked URL-sensitive data: %q", start.Title)
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire struct {
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := wire.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("browser wire metadata = %#v", wire.Meta)
}
typed := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-2",
Name: "browser_type",
Arguments: `{"ref":"email","text":"[email protected]"}`,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, typed); got.Command != "type" {
t.Fatalf("browser type descriptor = %#v", got)
}
if typed.Title != "browser type" || strings.Contains(typed.Title, "[email protected]") {
t.Fatalf("browser type title = %q", typed.Title)
}
action := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "browser-3",
Name: "browser_action",
Arguments: `{"command":"keyboard_insert_text","args":["[email protected]"]}`,
})
if action.Title != "browser action keyboard_insert_text" {
t.Fatalf("browser action title = %q", action.Title)
}
result := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "browser-2",
Name: "browser_type",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
})
if got := browserDescriptor(t, result); got.Command != "type" {
t.Fatalf("browser result descriptor = %#v", got)
}
}
func TestBrowserDescriptorSurvivesProtocolShapedRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
updates := []ToolCallUpdate{
toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{
ID: "start",
Name: "browser_open",
Arguments: `{"url":"https://user:[email protected]/private?token=secret#fragment"}`,
}),
toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "result",
Name: "browser_type",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
}),
permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "permission",
ToolName: "browser_connect",
Args: map[string]any{"target": "127.0.0.1:9222"},
}),
}
type protocolToolCallUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate,omitempty"`
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
RawInput json.RawMessage `json:"rawInput,omitempty"`
Content []ToolCallContent `json:"content,omitempty"`
Locations []ToolCallLocation `json:"locations,omitempty"`
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
for _, update := range updates {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(update)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var root map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &root); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, ok := root["browser"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor escaped ACP _meta: %s", encoded)
}
var protocol protocolToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &protocol); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
forwarded, err := json.Marshal(protocol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var roundTripped ToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(forwarded, &roundTripped); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
details := browserDescriptor(t, roundTripped)
if details.Version != 1 || details.Command == "" {
t.Fatalf("round-tripped browser descriptor = %#v", details)
}
descriptorJSON := string(roundTripped.Meta[zeroBrowserMetaKey])
for _, secret := range []string{"password", "private", "token", "fragment", "127.0.0.1", "9222"} {
if strings.Contains(descriptorJSON, secret) {
t.Fatalf("browser descriptor leaked %q: %s", secret, descriptorJSON)
}
}
}
}
func TestBrowserPermissionTitlesMirrorSafeToolArguments(t *testing.T) {
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"url":"evil.example.test/pay?token=hidden#fragment"}`); got != "browser open https://evil.example.test" {
t.Fatalf("bare-host title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"URL":"https://different.example.test"}`); got != "browser open" {
t.Fatalf("case-variant URL title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("open", `{"URL":"https://different.example.test","url":"https://actual.example.test/path"}`); got != "browser open https://actual.example.test" {
t.Fatalf("exact URL key title = %q", got)
}
if got := browserToolTitle("action", `{"command":"not an action"}`); got != "browser action" {
t.Fatalf("unknown browser action title = %q", got)
}
longHost := "https://" + strings.Repeat("a", 200) + ".example.test/path?token=hidden"
title := browserToolTitle("open", `{"url":"`+longHost+`"}`)
if !utf8.ValidString(title) || utf8.RuneCountInString(title) > len("browser open ")+61 || strings.Contains(title, "token=") {
t.Fatalf("bounded browser origin title = %q", title)
}
}
func TestBrowserOpenTitlesRejectDecodedUnicodePresentationControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"https://safe.example%C2%A0evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%83evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E3%80%80evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%AEevil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%81%A6evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%C2%85evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%A8evil.test/path",
"https://safe.example%E2%80%A9evil.test/path",
} {
t.Run(rawURL, func(t *testing.T) {
normalized, err := tools.NormalizeBrowserOpenURL(rawURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("execution URL rejected: %v", err)
}
if normalized != rawURL {
t.Fatalf("execution URL = %q, want unchanged %q", normalized, rawURL)
}
args, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"url": rawURL})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if title := browserToolTitle("open", string(args)); title != "browser open" {
t.Errorf("unsafe origin accepted before permission translation: %q", title)
}
updates := []ToolCallUpdate{
toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "start", Name: "browser_open", Arguments: string(args)}),
permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolCallID: "permission", ToolName: "browser_open", Args: map[string]any{"url": rawURL}}),
}
for _, update := range updates {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(update)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var decoded ToolCallUpdate
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &decoded); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if decoded.Title != "browser open" {
t.Fatalf("unsafe browser title survived wire round trip: %q", decoded.Title)
}
for _, r := range decoded.Title {
if unicode.IsControl(r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Cf, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zl, r) || unicode.Is(unicode.Zp, r) {
t.Fatalf("browser title contains unsafe presentation rune %U: %q", r, decoded.Title)
}
}
}
})
}
}
func TestBrowserDescriptorDoesNotClaimSimilarlyNamedMCPTools(t *testing.T) {
start := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "mcp-1", Name: "browser_plugin_open", Arguments: `{}`})
if len(start.Meta) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("MCP-like tool received built-in browser metadata: %#v", start.Meta)
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(start)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(string(encoded), `"browser"`) {
t.Fatalf("non-browser tool encoded browser field: %s", encoded)
}
}
func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
upd := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "tc1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`})
if upd.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCall {
@@ -74,21 +307,26 @@ func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
ok := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "tc1",
Name: "edit_file",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "applied\n",
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", ""},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before\n", NewText: "after\n"}},
})
if ok.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCallUpdate || ok.Status != ToolStatusCompleted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected ok result: %+v", ok)
}
if len(ok.Content) != 1 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
if len(ok.Content) != 2 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected content: %+v", ok.Content)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 1 || ok.Locations[0].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("blank changed files should be dropped, got %+v", ok.Locations)
if diff := ok.Content[1]; diff.Type != "diff" || diff.Path != path || diff.OldText == nil || *diff.OldText != "before\n" || diff.NewText == nil || *diff.NewText != "after\n" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected diff content: %+v", diff)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 2 || ok.Locations[0].Path != path || ok.Locations[1].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("unproven absolute/relative aliases must both remain visible, got %+v", ok.Locations)
}
failed := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "tc2", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "boom"})
@@ -97,6 +335,190 @@ func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestToolCallDiffJSONDistinguishesEmptyFilesAndDeletion(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "empty.txt")
content := appendToolResultDiffs(nil, []tools.FileDiff{
{Path: path, OldExists: false, NewExists: true, NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: ""},
{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before"},
})
if len(content) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("diff content = %#v", content)
}
for index, diff := range content {
encoded, err := json.Marshal(diff)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var wire map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &wire); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if wire["path"] != path {
t.Fatalf("wire diff %d = %s", index, encoded)
}
switch index {
case 0:
oldText, present := wire["oldText"]
if !present || oldText != nil || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("create diff = %s, want null oldText and empty newText", encoded)
}
case 1:
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || wire["newText"] != "" {
t.Fatalf("empty replacement diff = %s", encoded)
}
case 2:
newText, present := wire["newText"]
if wire["oldText"] != "before" || !present || newText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deletion diff = %s, want oldText and null newText", encoded)
}
}
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsPreserveDistinctPathIdentities(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
rootPath := filepath.Join(root, "a.go")
nestedPath := filepath.Join(root, "sub", "a.go")
diff := func(path string) tools.FileDiff {
return tools.FileDiff{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
diffs []tools.FileDiff
want []string
}{
{name: "both rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath), diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "root rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(rootPath)}, want: []string{rootPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
{name: "nested rich", diffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff(nestedPath)}, want: []string{nestedPath, "a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", filepath.Join("sub", "a.go")},
FileDiffs: tc.diffs,
})
if len(locations) != len(tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
for index := range tc.want {
if locations[index].Path != tc.want[index] {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want %#v", locations, tc.want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestToolCallResultPreservesWhitespaceInFilePaths(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := " report.txt "
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].Path != absolutePath {
t.Fatalf("diff content path = %#v, want %q", update.Content, absolutePath)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("locations = %#v, want exact paths %q and %q", update.Locations, absolutePath, relativePath)
}
}
func TestToolResultLocationsDeduplicateOnlyExactPaths(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
locations := toolResultLocations(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{path, path},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "before", NewText: "after"}},
})
if len(locations) != 1 || locations[0].Path != path {
t.Fatalf("exact duplicate locations = %#v", locations)
}
}
func TestDeletedFileEmitsDiffAndKeepsLocations(t *testing.T) {
relativePath := "deleted.go"
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), relativePath)
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ChangedFiles: []string{relativePath},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: absolutePath, OldExists: true, NewExists: false, OldText: "before",
}},
})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || *update.Content[0].OldText != "before" || update.Content[0].NewText != nil {
t.Fatalf("deleted file diff = %#v, want oldText with null newText", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 2 || update.Locations[0].Path != absolutePath || update.Locations[1].Path != relativePath {
t.Fatalf("deleted file locations = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultEmitsOnlyRedactedFileDiffs(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt")
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: path, OldExists: true, NewExists: true, OldText: "token=" + secret, NewText: "safe",
}}})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusError, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 1 || update.Content[0].OldText == nil || strings.Contains(*update.Content[0].OldText, secret) {
t.Fatalf("ACP content leaked unredacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsSemanticallyUnchangedRedactedDiff(t *testing.T) {
oldSecret := "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
newSecret := "ghp_9876543210ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{
ChangedFiles: []string{"credentials.txt"},
FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credentials.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "token=" + oldSecret, NewText: "token=" + newSecret,
}},
})
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK,
ChangedFiles: scrubbed.ChangedFiles, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs,
})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP emitted semantically unchanged redacted diff: %#v", update.Content)
}
if len(update.Locations) != 1 || update.Locations[0].Path != "credentials.txt" {
t.Fatalf("ACP path fallback = %#v", update.Locations)
}
}
func TestToolCallResultOmitsDefaultIgnorableSplitSecretsOnEitherSide(t *testing.T) {
secret := "sk-ant-api03-AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGG"
for name, separator := range map[string]string{
"combining grapheme joiner": "\u034f",
"variation selector": "\ufe0f",
} {
for _, side := range []string{"old", "new"} {
t.Run(name+" "+side, func(t *testing.T) {
obfuscated := secret[:20] + separator + secret[20:]
diff := tools.FileDiff{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt"), OldExists: true, NewExists: true,
OldText: "safe old", NewText: "safe new",
}
if side == "old" {
diff.OldText = obfuscated
} else {
diff.NewText = obfuscated
}
scrubbed := tools.ScrubResultSecrets(tools.Result{FileDiffs: []tools.FileDiff{diff}})
if !scrubbed.Redacted || len(scrubbed.FileDiffs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registry boundary retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", scrubbed)
}
update := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call", Status: tools.StatusOK, FileDiffs: scrubbed.FileDiffs})
if len(update.Content) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ACP content retained an obfuscated secret: %#v", update.Content)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestPlanUpdateAndStatus(t *testing.T) {
upd := planUpdate([]tools.PlanItem{
{Content: "step a", Status: "completed"},
+112 -27
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ const (
MethodAuthenticate = "authenticate"
MethodSessionNew = "session/new"
MethodSessionLoad = "session/load"
MethodSessionList = "session/list"
MethodSessionResume = "session/resume"
MethodSessionPrompt = "session/prompt"
MethodSessionCancel = "session/cancel" // notification
MethodSessionUpdate = "session/update" // notification (agent -> client)
@@ -62,8 +64,16 @@ type PromptCapabilities struct {
}
type AgentCapabilities struct {
LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"`
PromptCapabilities PromptCapabilities `json:"promptCapabilities"`
LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"`
PromptCapabilities PromptCapabilities `json:"promptCapabilities"`
SessionCapabilities *SessionCapabilities `json:"sessionCapabilities,omitempty"`
}
// Empty capability objects are presence flags in ACP v1. Pointers preserve
// the wire distinction between an advertised `{}` and an omitted capability.
type SessionCapabilities struct {
List *struct{} `json:"list,omitempty"`
Resume *struct{} `json:"resume,omitempty"`
}
type AuthMethod struct {
@@ -103,10 +113,6 @@ type ContentBlock struct {
func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
// ---- sessions ----
// McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
@@ -121,9 +127,14 @@ type McpServer struct {
}
type NewSessionParams struct {
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
// AdditionalDirectories is declared by the protocol and consumed nowhere in
// this repo yet. When it is wired up it must go through requestedWorkspace
// like Cwd does: these are client-supplied paths with no absoluteness rule of
// their own, which is the same shape as the resume-cwd hole that made
// {"sessionId":"known"} activate a session against this process's directory.
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
}
type NewSessionResult struct {
@@ -144,6 +155,39 @@ type LoadSessionResult struct {
Modes *SessionModeState `json:"modes,omitempty"`
}
// ListSessionsParams and the following types implement ACP v1 session/list.
// Transcript contents stay behind session/load; this method returns metadata
// only and leaves the optional pagination cursor opaque.
type ListSessionsParams struct {
Cwd string `json:"cwd,omitempty"`
Cursor string `json:"cursor,omitempty"`
}
type SessionInfoMeta struct {
ModelID string `json:"modelId,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt,omitempty"`
}
type SessionInfo struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updatedAt,omitempty"`
Meta *SessionInfoMeta `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
type ListSessionsResult struct {
Sessions []SessionInfo `json:"sessions"`
NextCursor string `json:"nextCursor,omitempty"`
}
// session/resume takes session/load's wire shape, so its cwd is a plain string
// too and an omitted one decodes exactly like an empty one. Sharing the type is
// safe only because activatePersistedSession requires an absolute cwd from the
// request itself — nothing downstream may supply a default for either method.
type ResumeSessionParams = LoadSessionParams
type ResumeSessionResult = LoadSessionResult
// ---- prompt turn ----
type PromptParams struct {
@@ -178,6 +222,7 @@ type SessionNotification struct {
// ContentBlock under "content"; the variant is set via SessionUpdate.
type ContentChunk struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
MessageID string `json:"messageId,omitempty"`
Content ContentBlock `json:"content"`
}
@@ -214,6 +259,21 @@ type ToolCallUpdate struct {
RawInput json.RawMessage `json:"rawInput,omitempty"`
Content []ToolCallContent `json:"content,omitempty"`
Locations []ToolCallLocation `json:"locations,omitempty"`
// Meta is ACP's extension channel. ZERO-owned values must remain beneath a
// namespaced key so protocol-shaped clients can preserve them while decoding
// and re-encoding a tool call.
Meta map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"_meta,omitempty"`
}
// BrowserToolDetails identifies the browser helper operation behind a tool
// call. Version is the schema version for this optional ZERO extension;
// Command is one of install, launch, connect, open, snapshot, click, type,
// press, or action. Future fields must remain display-safe and must not
// include browser profile data, cookies, typed text, URL paths/queries, or
// DevTools endpoints.
type BrowserToolDetails struct {
Version int `json:"version"`
Command string `json:"command"`
}
// ToolCallContent is a tool call's rendered output. ZERO emits "content" (a
@@ -224,19 +284,36 @@ type ToolCallContent struct {
// type == "content"
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
// type == "diff"
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText *string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
}
// MarshalJSON preserves ACP's discriminated content union. A diff always has
// path, while nullable oldText/newText distinguish creation, deletion, and an
// existing file replaced with empty content. Other content variants omit all
// diff fields rather than serializing irrelevant nulls.
func (content ToolCallContent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
if content.Type == "diff" {
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Path string `json:"path"`
OldText *string `json:"oldText"`
NewText *string `json:"newText"`
}{
Type: content.Type, Path: content.Path, OldText: content.OldText, NewText: content.NewText,
})
}
return json.Marshal(struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
}{Type: content.Type, Content: content.Content})
}
func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
}
func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
}
type ToolCallLocation struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Line *int `json:"line,omitempty"`
@@ -337,19 +414,22 @@ type SetSessionModeParams struct {
type SetSessionModeResult struct{}
// ---- session config options (model selection) ----
// ---- session config options ----
type SessionConfigOptionValue struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
}
type SessionConfigOption struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Values []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"values,omitempty"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type"`
CurrentValue string `json:"currentValue"`
Options []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"options"`
}
type SetSessionConfigOptionParams struct {
@@ -373,6 +453,11 @@ type ZeroSetModelResult struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}
// configIDModel is the SessionConfigOption id ZERO uses to expose model choice
// through the standard session/set_config_option method.
const configIDModel = "model"
const (
configIDModel = "model"
configIDMode = "mode"
configOptionTypeSelect = "select"
configCategoryModel = "model"
configCategoryMode = "mode"
)
+309
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// `zero exec` persists every provider usage report as a session usage event, so
// `zero usage report --session <id>` can total a run. The ACP agent did not set
// OnUsage, which dropped the token counts of every ACP session. A turn with two
// provider requests (a tool round trip) must leave two usage events, in the shape
// the usage report reads, next to the turn's messages.
func TestACPPromptPersistsProviderUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1300, OutputTokens: 21, CachedInputTokens: 900})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "done"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("count my tokens")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
type usagePayload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
CachedInputTokens int `json:"cachedInputTokens"`
}
var got []usagePayload
messages := 0
for _, event := range events {
switch event.Type {
case sessions.EventUsage:
var payload usagePayload
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", event.Payload, err)
}
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
got = append(got, payload)
case sessions.EventMessage:
messages++
}
}
want := []usagePayload{
{PromptTokens: 1200, CompletionTokens: 34, TotalTokens: 1234},
{PromptTokens: 1300, CompletionTokens: 21, TotalTokens: 1321, CachedInputTokens: 900},
}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
for i := range want {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("usage event %d = %+v, want %+v", i, got[i], want[i])
}
}
if messages != 2 {
t.Fatalf("message events = %d, want the user and assistant messages of the turn", messages)
}
}
// Usage joins the turn's buffered batch, so a hard run failure that aborts the
// turn leaves nothing durable, exactly as it does for the turn's messages.
func TestACPHardTurnFailureDropsItsUsageWithTheTurn(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 500, OutputTokens: 5})
return agent.Result{}, errors.New("injected hard run failure")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("failing turn")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("hard RunAgent failure was reported as a successful turn")
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(events) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("aborted turn left durable events: %+v", events)
}
}
// StopCancelled is a successful ACP outcome: the turn commits. Tokens the
// provider already reported were spent, so they stay in the session log even
// though the client cancelled. A hard error (the test above) is the path that
// drops them.
func TestACPCancelledTurnKeepsReportedUsage(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{}, context.Canceled
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 80, OutputTokens: 3})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "partial"}, context.Canceled
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var result PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("cancelled turn")},
}, &result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("cancelled turn returned an RPC error: %v", err)
}
if result.StopReason != StopCancelled {
t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", result.StopReason, StopCancelled)
}
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
usageEvents := 0
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type != sessions.EventUsage {
continue
}
usageEvents++
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
var payload struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if payload.PromptTokens != 80 || payload.CompletionTokens != 3 || payload.TotalTokens != 83 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled-turn usage = %+v, want 80/3/83", payload)
}
}
if usageEvents != 1 {
t.Fatalf("usage events = %d, want the one report from the cancelled turn", usageEvents)
}
}
// Usage events sit in the same log session/load and session/resume read, but
// history reconstruction skips them. The wire replay stays the conversation,
// and the next turn's prompt stays the conversation: token counts never become
// context and never cross the ACP wire.
func TestACPLoadAndResumeIgnoreUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
const userLine = "unique-acp-user-line"
const answer = "unique-acp-answer"
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
if opts.OnUsage == nil {
t.Errorf("agent.Options.OnUsage is not wired: the ACP agent drops provider token usage")
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
opts.OnUsage(agent.Usage{InputTokens: 1200, OutputTokens: 34})
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: answer}, nil
}
workspace := t.TempDir()
h := newHarness(t, deps)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var created NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: workspace}, &created); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock(userLine)},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
h.stop()
events, err := deps.Store.ReadEvents(created.SessionID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sawUsage := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == sessions.EventUsage {
sawUsage = true
assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t, event.Payload)
}
}
if !sawUsage {
t.Fatal("session log has no usage event to ignore")
}
loader := newHarness(t, deps)
if err := loader.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &LoadSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
}
var replayed []string
for {
select {
case update := <-loader.notifications:
replayed = append(replayed, update.Content.Text)
case <-time.After(150 * time.Millisecond):
goto drained
}
}
drained:
loader.stop()
if len(replayed) != 2 || replayed[0] != userLine || replayed[1] != answer {
t.Fatalf("session/load replay = %#v, want the user line and the answer only", replayed)
}
for _, text := range replayed {
if strings.Contains(text, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(text, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("session/load replayed usage onto the wire: %q", text)
}
}
var gotPrompt string
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, prompt string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, _ agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
gotPrompt = prompt
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "continued"}, nil
}
resumer := newHarness(t, deps)
defer resumer.stop()
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionResume, ResumeSessionParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Cwd: workspace, McpServers: []McpServer{},
}, &ResumeSessionResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/resume: %v", err)
}
if err := resumer.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: created.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("carry on")},
}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resumed session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, userLine) || !strings.Contains(gotPrompt, answer) {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt = %q, want the prior conversation", gotPrompt)
}
if strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "promptTokens") || strings.Contains(gotPrompt, "1200") {
t.Fatalf("resumed prompt contains persisted usage: %q", gotPrompt)
}
}
// usagePayloadAllowedKeys is the non-escalating EventUsagePayload shape. ACP
// has no model escalation, and the writer must not grow a prompt, tool
// argument, or other raw field.
var usagePayloadAllowedKeys = map[string]bool{
"promptTokens": true,
"completionTokens": true,
"totalTokens": true,
"cachedInputTokens": true,
"cacheWriteTokens": true,
"reasoningTokens": true,
}
func assertUsagePayloadIsTokenCountsOnly(t *testing.T, payload json.RawMessage) {
t.Helper()
var raw map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("usage payload %s: %v", payload, err)
}
if len(raw) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("usage payload is empty: %s", payload)
}
for key := range raw {
if !usagePayloadAllowedKeys[key] {
t.Fatalf("usage payload key %q is not a token count: %s", key, payload)
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func enabledSelfCorrector(t *testing.T) *SelfCorrector {
@@ -5,9 +5,29 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Description() string {
return "record normalized shell arguments"
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: true}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
@@ -16,7 +36,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -51,7 +71,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testi
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -88,7 +108,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *t
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
@@ -107,9 +127,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -117,7 +135,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -144,3 +162,237 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
}
}
// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
t.Helper()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
PermissionModeUnsafe,
Options{Cwd: root},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
return result
}
// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
// `git branch --show-current`.
//
// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
// The call both errors point at must actually work.
converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
}
}
// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
t.Helper()
if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
}
if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
}
}
// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"cmd": "git --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
},
}
_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
if !requested {
t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
}
// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
// error the model could not act on.
func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
}
func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
} {
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": mode,
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"deny_read": []any{},
"entries": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("mode %q retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", mode, args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("mode %q normalized to %q, want use_default", mode, got)
}
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallNormalizesProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
tool := &normalizationRecordingShellTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tool)
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"./zero --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
`"additional_permissions":{"file_system":{"deny_read":[],"entries":[],"read":[],"write":[]},"network":{"enabled":false}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("provider-expanded empty permissions were rejected: %s", result.Output)
}
if len(tool.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("shell tool calls = %d, want 1", len(tool.calls))
}
args := tool.calls[0]
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode = %q, want use_default", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsPreservesRealRequest(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; !exists {
t.Fatal("non-empty additional_permissions was removed")
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsRemovesWorkspaceReadAlreadyCoveredBySandbox(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: root,
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
})
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"entries": []any{
map[string]any{
"access": "read",
"path": map[string]any{
"type": "path",
"path": ".",
},
},
},
"deny_read": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, root, engine)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("already-covered additional_permissions was retained: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
+8 -3
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// providerCallingAskUserThenAnswer returns a mock provider whose first turn calls
@@ -141,9 +141,11 @@ func TestRunAskUserCancellationAbortsRun(t *testing.T) {
registry := registryWithAskUser()
args := `{"questions":[{"question":"Which framework?"}]}`
provider := providerCallingAskUserThenAnswer(args, "done")
var toolResults []ToolResult
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "clarify", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Registry: registry,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { toolResults = append(toolResults, result) },
OnAskUser: func(_ context.Context, _ AskUserRequest) (AskUserResponse, error) {
return AskUserResponse{}, context.Canceled
},
@@ -158,6 +160,9 @@ func TestRunAskUserCancellationAbortsRun(t *testing.T) {
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to stop after the canceled ask_user (1 turn), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if len(toolResults) != 1 || toolResults[0].ToolCallID == "" {
t.Fatalf("cancellation must emit exactly one result for the call, got %#v", toolResults)
}
// The recorded tool result must reflect cancellation, not a synthetic answer.
var toolMsg string
for _, m := range result.Messages {
+8 -20
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/testutil"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestAsyncDiagnosticsNilCollectorNoOps(t *testing.T) {
@@ -111,7 +112,11 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
diagnostics := newAsyncDiagnostics(check, "/ws")
diagnostics.enqueue(context.Background(), []string{"a.go"})
waitForIdle(t, diagnostics)
testutil.WaitFor(t, "worker idle", func() bool {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
defer diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
return diagnostics.working == nil
})
mu.Lock()
response = "ERR new"
mu.Unlock()
@@ -123,23 +128,6 @@ func TestAsyncDiagnosticsReEditReplacesResult(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func waitForIdle(t *testing.T, diagnostics *asyncDiagnostics) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
diagnostics.mu.Lock()
busy := diagnostics.working
diagnostics.mu.Unlock()
if busy == nil {
return
}
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatal("worker never went idle")
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
}
// changedFilesTool is a fake mutating tool reporting a changed file without
// touching the filesystem.
type changedFilesTool struct{}
+2 -14
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax"
)
@@ -501,15 +501,3 @@ func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
}
return true
}
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+39 -2
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import (
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestProposedCommandPrefixUsesSafeSimpleCommands(t *testing.T) {
@@ -99,6 +99,43 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The launcher denylist is only worth anything if it holds on the path a user
// actually sees. A model naming its own prefix_rule is that path: before
// launcher names were normalized, "python3.11" was offered as a one-token
// grant, and hasStringPrefix then matched every later python3.11 invocation.
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsLauncherSpellingsInRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
for _, testCase := range []struct {
command string
rule []any
}{
{"python3.11 script.py", []any{"python3.11"}},
{"python.exe script.py", []any{"python.exe"}},
{"node.exe app.js", []any{"node.exe"}},
{"cmd /c whoami", []any{"cmd"}},
{"busybox sh -c id", []any{"busybox"}},
{"uv run main.py", []any{"uv", "run"}},
{"python3.11 -c import_os", []any{"python3.11", "-c"}},
} {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": testCase.command,
"prefix_rule": testCase.rule,
})
if got != nil {
t.Errorf("prefix_rule %v for %q was offered as %#v, want rejected", testCase.rule, testCase.command, got)
}
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixStillOffersOrdinaryCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "cargo build --release",
"prefix_rule": []any{"cargo", "build"},
})
if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "cargo" || got[1] != "build" {
t.Fatalf("ordinary prefix rule = %#v, want [cargo build]", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeShellForms(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"cat < in > out",
+289 -33
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Session compaction.
@@ -37,8 +40,9 @@ const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
// transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
const summaryLabel = "[Summary of earlier conversation]"
// summaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to the summarizer model.
const summaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
// CompactionSummaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to both automatic
// and manually requested compaction summarizers.
const CompactionSummaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
"Write a dense, factual summary of the conversation so far. Preserve: the user's goals and explicit constraints; " +
"decisions made and why; files created or modified (with paths) and key code changes; commands run and their important " +
"results; and anything still in progress or unresolved. Omit pleasantries. Use terse bullet points. Do not invent details. " +
@@ -55,6 +59,10 @@ type CompactionOptions struct {
// injected so Compact stays pure and testable; the agent loop wires it to a
// real provider call.
Summarize func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)
// taskState is a snapshot supplied by the running agent. Its immutable
// objective is always preserved; mutable fields are admitted only when its
// plan projection still matches the transcript.
taskState *taskStateSnapshot
}
// CompactionResult is the metadata-bearing result returned by CompactMessages.
@@ -70,6 +78,12 @@ type CompactionResult struct {
// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
// state needed by later compactions.
SummaryText string
// ProjectedChars is the text content sent to the summarizer after semantic
// projection, excluding provider protocol framing.
ProjectedChars int
// Truncated reports whether projection dropped content to satisfy its
// bounded brief or previous-summary limits.
Truncated bool
// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
Compacted bool
}
@@ -132,11 +146,17 @@ func estimateToolDefTokens(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) int {
for _, tool := range tools {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Description)
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(tool.Type))
if len(tool.Parameters) > 0 {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters); err == nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
}
if tool.Format != nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Type)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Syntax)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Format.Definition)
}
total += 4 // per-tool overhead
}
return total
@@ -211,15 +231,15 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
}, nil
}
summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
summaryResult, err := SummarizeCompactionMessages(middle, opts.Summarize)
if err != nil {
return CompactionResult{}, err
}
summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)
summary := summaryResult.SummaryText
// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle)
content := appendPreservedState(summaryLabel+"\n"+summary, middle, opts.taskState)
compacted := make([]zeroruntime.Message, 0, systemEnd+1+(len(messages)-boundary))
compacted = append(compacted, messages[:systemEnd]...)
@@ -233,10 +253,53 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
RemovedCount: len(middle),
PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
SummaryText: summary,
ProjectedChars: summaryResult.ProjectedChars,
Truncated: summaryResult.Truncated,
Compacted: true,
}, nil
}
// CompactionSummaryResult describes the shared summarization input and output.
type CompactionSummaryResult struct {
SummaryText string
ProjectedChars int
Truncated bool
}
// SummarizeCompactionMessages applies the shared semantic projection before
// invoking a caller-supplied summarizer. Automatic context-pressure compaction
// and manual session compaction both use this path.
func SummarizeCompactionMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, summarize func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)) (CompactionSummaryResult, error) {
if summarize == nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
summaryInput := projection.messages
if len(summaryInput) == 0 {
summaryInput = messages
}
summary, err := summarize(summaryInput)
if err != nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, err
}
return CompactionSummaryResult{
SummaryText: strings.TrimSpace(summary),
ProjectedChars: compactionMessageChars(summaryInput),
Truncated: projection.truncated,
}, nil
}
func compactionMessageChars(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
total := 0
for _, message := range messages {
total += len(message.Content)
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
total += len(call.Name) + len(call.Arguments)
}
}
return total
}
// safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
// the preserved suffix begins on a user or assistant message rather than a
// tool/tool_result message. A tool result with no preceding assistant tool call
@@ -325,6 +388,9 @@ type compactionState struct {
// OnText is deliberately NOT forwarded (compaction stays invisible to the user),
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
task *taskState
planner *contextPlanner
trace *trace.Recorder
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -332,6 +398,27 @@ type compactionState struct {
// starts at 1.0 and converges via an EMA as each turn reports actual usage, so
// later turns compact nearer to real capacity. Zero is treated as 1.0.
calibrationRatio float64
// summarizerFactory lazily builds the dedicated (cheap) summarizer provider
// (Options.Summarizer) for the current main model. summarizerProvider
// memoizes the built provider and summarizerResolved records that the
// factory ran (it may legitimately return no provider: the main model is
// already the cheap one). summarizerBroken is the sticky fallback: once a
// build or call fails, the run stays on the main provider until the next
// model switch — a misconfigured cheap model must never break (or
// repeatedly delay) compaction.
summarizerFactory func(ctx context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error)
summarizerProvider Provider
summarizerResolved bool
summarizerBroken bool
// window is the context window the threshold was derived from. The
// reactive free-prune stage compares against it (the limit the provider
// enforces), not against the 70% proactive threshold — a pruned history
// between the two would still succeed on retry.
window int
// mainModel is the model the run currently streams on; the summarizer
// choice is made against it and remade after a mid-run switch.
mainModel string
}
// calibrate folds one turn's (rawEstimate, actualPromptTokens) sample into the
@@ -364,13 +451,88 @@ func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
return int(float64(raw) * state.calibrationRatio)
}
func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
return &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
state := &compactionState{
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
window: options.ContextWindow,
mainModel: options.Model,
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
planner: newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow, serviceTier: options.ServiceTier}),
trace: options.Trace,
summarizerFactory: options.Summarizer,
}
return state
}
// updateWindow re-derives the compaction threshold after a mid-run model
// switch. The low-water mark is reset: it was measured against the old
// threshold, and keeping it could suppress a compaction the smaller window
// now requires. <= 0 (unknown model) leaves everything unchanged.
func (state *compactionState) updateWindow(window int) {
if window <= 0 {
return
}
state.enabled = true
state.window = window
state.threshold = compactionThreshold(window)
state.lowWaterMark = 0
if state.planner != nil {
state.planner.config.contextWindow = window
}
}
// switchModel records a mid-run model switch: the window is re-derived
// (window <= 0 keeps the old one) and the summarizer choice is forgotten so
// the next compaction re-resolves it against the new main model. A run that
// started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer) and escalated to an
// expensive one therefore regains cheap summaries — the exact workflow a
// dedicated summarizer exists for.
func (state *compactionState) switchModel(modelID string, window int) {
state.mainModel = modelID
state.updateWindow(window)
state.summarizerProvider = nil
state.summarizerResolved = false
state.summarizerBroken = false
}
// summarizeProvider returns the provider summarization calls should use and
// whether it is the dedicated summarizer: that one when it applies to the
// current main model and is healthy, else the main provider. The factory runs
// at most once per main model; a build error marks the summarizer broken for
// that model. Callers branch on the boolean rather than comparing Provider
// values — interface comparison panics on a non-comparable dynamic type.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeProvider(ctx context.Context, main Provider) (Provider, bool) {
if state.summarizerFactory == nil || state.summarizerBroken {
return main, false
}
if !state.summarizerResolved {
state.summarizerResolved = true
built, err := state.summarizerFactory(ctx, state.mainModel)
if err != nil {
state.summarizerBroken = true
return main, false
}
state.summarizerProvider = built
}
if state.summarizerProvider == nil {
return main, false
}
return state.summarizerProvider, true
}
// fitsWindow reports whether a calibrated size is safely under the limit the
// provider enforces. The proactive threshold (70% of the window) is a trigger
// for the paid summarizer, not the hard limit; the reactive path compares
// against the window itself, with a small margin for estimate error, so a
// history pruned to, say, 85% of the window takes the free retry.
func (state *compactionState) fitsWindow(size int) bool {
if state.window <= 0 {
return size <= state.threshold
}
return size <= state.window-state.window/20
}
// maybeCompact runs proactive compaction at the top of a turn. It returns the
@@ -405,6 +567,14 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
@@ -416,7 +586,8 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
// Summarizer failed: keep the original history. The reactive path (or a
@@ -430,6 +601,12 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
// Only count a compaction when it actually shrank the history, so the
// compaction counter reflects real context reductions rather than paid
// no-ops that left the token budget untouched.
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterCompactionCount, 1)
}
state.lowWaterMark = newSize
return compacted
}
@@ -451,16 +628,41 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// context-limit error never triggers an unexpected summarization call.
return messages, false, nil
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
return messages, false, nil
}
if !isContextLimitError(errorMessage) {
// CHEAP FIRST STAGE (mirrors maybeCompact): a context-limit failure can
// often be fixed for free by dropping superseded reads and pruning old
// tool-result bodies. It runs regardless of the one-shot reactive budget
// (it costs nothing and cannot loop: a second pass finds nothing left to
// prune). The free retry is taken only when the pruned history fits the
// window the provider enforces — otherwise a retry would fail the same
// way, so fall through to the paid summarizer in this same call.
toolTokens := estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
prunedAny := false
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages, prunedAny = pruned, true
}
if prunedAny {
size := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if state.fitsWindow(size) {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages, true, nil
}
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
return messages, false, nil
}
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if compactErr != nil {
// A genuine compaction attempt was made (and failed): the budget is spent
@@ -479,7 +681,11 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// one-shot budget now so a provider that keeps returning context-limit errors
// after a successful compaction can't loop forever. Store the low-water mark in
// the SAME combined (messages + tool-defs) domain maybeCompact uses, so the
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like.
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like. Count it now that the shrink
// is confirmed, so the counter mirrors maybeCompact's real-reduction policy.
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterCompactionCount, 1)
}
state.reactiveAttempted = true
state.lowWaterMark = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(result) + estimateToolDefTokens(tools))
return result, true, nil
@@ -489,9 +695,22 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
// compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
// OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
// The call goes to the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one applies; if that
// call fails the summarizer is marked broken for the current model and the
// same slice is retried once on the main provider, so the caller sees at most
// one (main-provider-quality) error.
func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
if state.planner == nil {
state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
}
return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
chosen, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(ctx, provider)
summary, err := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, chosen, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
if err == nil || !dedicated {
return summary, err
}
state.summarizerBroken = true
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
}
}
@@ -503,7 +722,11 @@ func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage
// Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
// to the caller unchanged.
func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{}), nil)
}
func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, planner, recorder)
if err == nil {
return summary, nil
}
@@ -512,11 +735,11 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
}
mid := len(messages) / 2
left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
left, leftErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage, planner, recorder)
if leftErr != nil {
return "", leftErr
}
right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
right, rightErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage, planner, recorder)
if rightErr != nil {
return "", rightErr
}
@@ -529,7 +752,7 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
}, onUsage)
}, onUsage, planner, recorder)
if reduceErr != nil {
if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
@@ -545,15 +768,15 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
}
// summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
},
// No tools: this is a plain text summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
requestMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: CompactionSummaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
parts := systemPromptParts{prompt: CompactionSummaryInstructions, baseInstructions: CompactionSummaryInstructions}
plan := planner.planWithPromptParts(requestMessages, nil, "", parts)
recordContextPlanTrace(recorder, plan)
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, plan.Request)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
@@ -570,8 +793,41 @@ func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
return summary, nil
}
// summaryToolResultClamp bounds each tool-result body in the summarizer input.
// Tool outputs dominate the elided middle's bulk (build logs, file reads,
// search results), yet the summary instructions only need their gist — the
// model that ACTED on the full output already turned it into decisions the
// surrounding messages record. 2,000 chars (~500 tokens) keeps the useful
// head+tail of a result while cutting the summarizer input by 5-10x on
// tool-heavy sessions; the summarizer's own cost is the price being cut.
const summaryToolResultClamp = 2000
// summaryToolArgsClamp bounds each tool-call argument blob in the transcript:
// a write_file call carries the whole file body in its arguments.
const summaryToolArgsClamp = 500
// clampForSummary head+tail-truncates text for the summarizer transcript,
// snapping to rune boundaries so the clamp never splits a UTF-8 sequence.
func clampForSummary(text string, max int) string {
if max <= 0 || len(text) <= max {
return text
}
head := max * 3 / 4
tail := max - head
for head > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(text[head]) {
head--
}
start := len(text) - tail
for start < len(text) && !utf8.RuneStart(text[start]) {
start++
}
return text[:head] + "\n…[" + strconv.Itoa(len(text)-head-(len(text)-start)) + " chars omitted for summarization]…\n" + text[start:]
}
// renderTranscript flattens messages into a plain-text transcript for the
// summarizer. Secret scrubbing already happened upstream at the tool boundary.
// Tool-result bodies and tool-call arguments are clamped (see the constants
// above): the summary needs what was done and decided, not the raw payloads.
func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for _, message := range messages {
@@ -581,13 +837,13 @@ func renderTranscript(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
if len(message.ToolCalls) > 0 {
calls := make([]string, 0, len(message.ToolCalls))
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+call.Arguments+")")
calls = append(calls, call.Name+"("+clampForSummary(call.Arguments, summaryToolArgsClamp)+")")
}
line += "\n[tool calls: " + strings.Join(calls, "; ") + "]"
}
lines = append(lines, line)
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+message.Content)
lines = append(lines, "tool result: "+clampForSummary(message.Content, summaryToolResultClamp))
default:
lines = append(lines, string(message.Role)+": "+message.Content)
}
+469
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// compactableHistory returns a history whose middle is large enough to trip
// the proactive threshold for a 1000-token window.
func compactableHistory() []zeroruntime.Message {
return []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.Repeat("u", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("a", 4000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "a2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u3"},
}
}
// Summarization must run on the dedicated (cheap) summarizer when one is
// configured — the main provider sees no summarize traffic at all.
func TestMaybeCompactUsesDedicatedSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "CHEAP SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
compacted := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), main, compactableHistory(), nil)
if len(cheap.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("dedicated summarizer never received the summarize call")
}
if len(main.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("main provider must see no summarize traffic, got %d requests", len(main.requests))
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("summarizer factory calls = %d, want 1 (lazy, memoized)", factoryCalls)
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(compactableHistory()) {
t.Fatal("compaction did not shrink the history")
}
found := false
for _, message := range compacted {
if strings.Contains(message.Content, "CHEAP SUMMARY") {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("cheap summarizer's summary missing from the compacted history")
}
}
// A failing summarizer falls back to the main provider for the SAME slice and
// stays broken for the rest of the run — no repeated failed cheap calls.
func TestSummarizerFailureFallsBackToMainAndSticks(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY 2"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return broken, nil },
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
input := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}
summary, err := summarize(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fallback must succeed via the main provider: %v", err)
}
if summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, want the main provider's", summary)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer requests = %d, want exactly 1", len(broken.requests))
}
if !state.summarizerBroken {
t.Fatal("a failed summarizer must be marked broken for the run")
}
// Second summarization: straight to main, no cheap retry.
if _, err := summarize(input); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(broken.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("broken summarizer was retried (%d requests)", len(broken.requests))
}
if len(main.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("main provider requests = %d, want 2", len(main.requests))
}
}
// A factory that errors (misconfigured model) is equivalent to no summarizer:
// main provider used, factory not retried.
func TestSummarizerFactoryErrorFallsBack(t *testing.T) {
main := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "MAIN SUMMARY"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
factoryCalls := 0
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) {
factoryCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unknown model")
},
}, nil)
summarize := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)
summary, err := summarize([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("summary = %q, err = %v; want main provider fallback", summary, err)
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory calls = %d, want 1 (sticky failure)", factoryCalls)
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("after a factory failure the run must stay on the main provider")
}
if factoryCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory retried after failure (%d calls)", factoryCalls)
}
}
// Tool payloads are clamped in the summarizer transcript: results to
// summaryToolResultClamp, call arguments to summaryToolArgsClamp.
func TestRenderTranscriptClampsToolPayloads(t *testing.T) {
bigResult := strings.Repeat("r", 50_000)
bigArgs := strings.Repeat("w", 20_000)
transcript := renderTranscript([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "editing", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "c1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: bigArgs},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "c1", Content: bigResult},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "keep going"},
})
if len(transcript) > summaryToolResultClamp+summaryToolArgsClamp+1024 {
t.Fatalf("transcript is %d bytes; clamps did not apply", len(transcript))
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "chars omitted for summarization") {
t.Fatal("clamped transcript must carry the omission marker")
}
if !strings.Contains(transcript, "keep going") {
t.Fatal("non-tool content must survive unclamped")
}
// Head AND tail of the clamped payloads survive.
if !strings.HasPrefix(transcript[strings.Index(transcript, "tool result: ")+len("tool result: "):], "r") ||
!strings.Contains(transcript, "rrr\n\nuser: keep going") {
t.Fatalf("head/tail of the tool result lost:\n%s", transcript[:200])
}
}
// bigToolHistory returns a history with n large tool results (~40k estimated
// tokens each): the trailing protection window keeps the newest verbatim,
// the older ones are prunable.
func bigToolHistory(n int) []zeroruntime.Message {
bigBody := strings.Repeat("x", 160_000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"}}
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
id := string(rune('a' + i))
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: "read_file", Arguments: "{\"path\":\"" + id + "\"}"}}},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: id, Content: bigBody},
)
}
return append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "go"})
}
func summaryProvider(text string) *mockProvider {
return &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: text}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
}
// A context-limit error is first answered with the free prune stage; when the
// pruned history fits the window the retry is free (no summarizer call) and
// the one-shot reactive budget is untouched. The paid summarizer only runs
// when a later error finds nothing left to prune.
func TestRecoverPrunesBeforeSummarizing(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// The protected trailing tool output (~40k tokens) must fit the window.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("prunable history that fits must produce a free retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune stage must not call the summarizer (%d requests)", len(provider.requests))
}
if state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a free prune retry must not consume the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// Second context-limit error on the pruned history: nothing meaningfully
// prunable remains, so the paid summarizer fires and consumes the budget.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("second recover must compact and retry")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("second recover must reach the summarizer")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("a paid recover must consume the reactive budget")
}
}
// When pruning reclaims something but the pruned history still exceeds the
// window, recover falls through to the paid summarizer in the SAME call
// instead of spending a retry that would fail the same way.
func TestRecoverFallsThroughToSummarizerWhenPruneIsInsufficient(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
// A 1,000-token window: even the protected trailing output overflows it.
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
compacted, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must still end in a retry via summarization")
}
if len(provider.requests) == 0 {
t.Fatal("insufficient prune must reach the summarizer in the same recover call")
}
if !state.reactiveAttempted {
t.Fatal("the paid summarizer consumes the reactive budget")
}
if estimateTokens(compacted) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("recover did not shrink the history")
}
}
// The free prune stage is not gated behind the one-shot budget: after a paid
// reactive compaction, a later context-limit error still gets a free retry
// when pruning makes the history fit.
func TestRecoverFreePruneRunsAfterBudgetIsSpent(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 200_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.reactiveAttempted = true
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("free prune must retry without the summarizer even when the budget is spent (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
if estimateTokens(pruned) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatal("prune did not shrink the history")
}
// With nothing left to prune and the budget spent, the caller keeps its
// original error — recover neither loops nor summarizes.
_, retried, err = state.recover(context.Background(), provider, pruned, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil || retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("spent budget must not summarize again (retried=%v, requests=%d, err=%v)", retried, len(provider.requests), err)
}
}
// The free-retry gate compares against the window the provider enforces, not
// the 70% proactive threshold: a history pruned to ~80% of the window still
// takes the free retry.
func TestRecoverFreeRetryGateUsesWindowNotThreshold(t *testing.T) {
provider := summaryProvider("SUMMARY")
messages := bigToolHistory(5)
pruned, _ := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, 2)
prunedTokens := estimateTokens(pruned)
// Choose a window so the pruned size sits between 70% and 95% of it.
window := prunedTokens * 100 / 80
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: window, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if prunedTokens <= state.threshold {
t.Fatalf("test setup: pruned size %d must exceed the proactive threshold %d", prunedTokens, state.threshold)
}
_, retried, err := state.recover(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil, "maximum context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !retried || len(provider.requests) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a history that fits the window must take the free retry (retried=%v, requests=%d)", retried, len(provider.requests))
}
}
// After a mid-run model switch the summarizer is re-resolved against the new
// main model: a run that started on the cheap model (no dedicated summarizer)
// and escalated gets a cheap summarizer, and a previously broken one is
// retried for the new model.
func TestSwitchModelReresolvesSummarizer(t *testing.T) {
cheap := summaryProvider("CHEAP SUMMARY")
main := summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY")
var factoryModels []string
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Model: "cheap-model",
Summarizer: func(_ context.Context, mainModelID string) (Provider, error) {
factoryModels = append(factoryModels, mainModelID)
if mainModelID == "cheap-model" {
return nil, nil // main already is the cheap model
}
return cheap, nil
},
}, nil)
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("on the cheap model the main provider must summarize")
}
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated || len(factoryModels) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("factory must run once per main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
state.switchModel("big-model", 400_000)
if state.threshold != compactionThreshold(400_000) || state.window != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("switchModel must re-derive the window, got threshold=%d window=%d", state.threshold, state.window)
}
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("after escalating to an expensive model the dedicated cheap summarizer must be used")
}
if len(factoryModels) != 2 || factoryModels[1] != "big-model" {
t.Fatalf("factory must be re-invoked with the new main model, calls=%v", factoryModels)
}
// A broken summarizer is retried after the next switch.
state.summarizerBroken = true
if _, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); dedicated {
t.Fatal("a broken summarizer must fall back to main")
}
state.switchModel("other-model", 0)
if got, dedicated := state.summarizeProvider(context.Background(), main); !dedicated || got != Provider(cheap) {
t.Fatal("a model switch must clear the broken flag and rebuild the summarizer")
}
}
func TestCompactionUpdateWindow(t *testing.T) {
state := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 100_000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
state.lowWaterMark = 50_000
before := state.threshold
state.updateWindow(0) // unknown model: unchanged
if state.threshold != before || state.lowWaterMark != 50_000 {
t.Fatal("updateWindow(0) must be a no-op")
}
state.updateWindow(10_000)
if state.threshold >= before {
t.Fatalf("threshold = %d, want re-derived below %d", state.threshold, before)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != 0 {
t.Fatal("low-water mark must reset on a window change")
}
if !state.enabled {
t.Fatal("a positive window must keep compaction enabled")
}
}
// End-to-end: after escalate_model switches providers, the loop re-derives the
// context window via ContextWindowFor, visible in the OnContext report.
func TestRunEscalationRederivesContextWindow(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(escalatingTool{target: "big-model"})
switched := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "escalate"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
var windows []int
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
ContextWindow: 100_000,
Model: "small-model",
ModelSwitcher: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return switched, nil },
ContextWindowFor: func(modelID string) int {
if modelID == "big-model" {
return 400_000
}
return 0
},
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) { windows = append(windows, breakdown.ContextWindow) },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(windows) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected at least 2 OnContext reports, got %d", len(windows))
}
if windows[0] != 100_000 {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 window = %d, want the original 100000", windows[0])
}
if windows[len(windows)-1] != 400_000 {
t.Fatalf("post-escalation window = %d, want 400000", windows[len(windows)-1])
}
}
// nonComparableProvider has a slice field, so comparing two Provider interface
// values holding it would panic; the summarizer path must never compare them.
type nonComparableProvider struct {
inner *mockProvider
tags []string
}
func (p nonComparableProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
return p.inner.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
}
func TestSummarizeClosureNeverComparesProviderValues(t *testing.T) {
broken := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "boom: model not found"},
}}}
main := nonComparableProvider{inner: summaryProvider("MAIN SUMMARY"), tags: []string{"x"}}
state := newCompactionState(Options{
ContextWindow: 1000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Summarizer: func(context.Context, string) (Provider, error) { return nonComparableProvider{inner: broken}, nil },
}, nil)
summary, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}})
if err != nil || summary != "MAIN SUMMARY" {
t.Fatalf("fallback with non-comparable providers must not panic and must use main, got %q err=%v", summary, err)
}
// And with no dedicated summarizer at all the closure still works.
state = newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
if _, err := state.summarizeClosure(context.Background(), main)([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "history"}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
+44 -3
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
@@ -43,8 +43,14 @@ func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
}
if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
if result.Truncated {
t.Fatal("Truncated = true for a projection within its limits")
}
if len(captured) != 1 || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "first question") || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "second question") {
t.Fatalf("summarized projection = %#v, want intent from the non-preserved middle", captured)
}
if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
@@ -96,11 +102,46 @@ func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != 0 || result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("no-op projection metadata = (%d, %t), want zero values", result.ProjectedChars, result.Truncated)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsTruncatedProjectionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}}
for index := range 20 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: strings.Repeat("contextword ", 256) + string(rune('a'+index)),
})
}
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
)
var captured []zeroruntime.Message
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
return "bounded summary", nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Compacted || !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("compaction metadata = compacted %t, truncated %t; want both true", result.Compacted, result.Truncated)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
+182 -41
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Compaction preservation.
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ const (
const (
maxRecentEdits = 20
maxEditNoteBytes = 160
// maxTaskObjectiveBytes keeps the original objective recognizable after
// compaction without allowing an unusually large prompt to recreate the
// context pressure the compaction just removed.
maxTaskObjectiveBytes = 512
)
const (
@@ -76,32 +80,14 @@ func extractLatestPlan(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
// ({"plan":[{content,status,...}]}) as terse status-tagged bullet lines. Returns
// "" on malformed arguments or an empty plan.
func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Step string `json:"step"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
return ""
}
lines := make([]string, 0, len(parsed.Plan))
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
content := strings.TrimSpace(item.Content)
if content == "" {
content = strings.TrimSpace(item.Step)
}
if content == "" {
continue
}
status := strings.TrimSpace(item.Status)
if status == "" {
status = "pending"
}
line := "- [" + status + "] " + content
if notes := strings.TrimSpace(item.Notes); notes != "" {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(plan))
for _, item := range plan {
line := "- [" + item.Status + "] " + item.Content
if notes := item.Notes; notes != "" {
line += "\n Notes: " + notes
}
lines = append(lines, line)
@@ -116,7 +102,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
body string
}
// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
// recentEdits returns files mutated by editing calls in messages
// — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
// note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
// changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
@@ -127,6 +113,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
// rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
pathByID := map[string]string{}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
sequence := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
@@ -143,12 +130,24 @@ func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
sequence = append(sequence, path)
}
}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || len(message.ChangedFiles) == 0 {
continue
}
for _, path := range message.ChangedFiles {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
continue
}
sequence = append(sequence, path)
noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
}
}
order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
if len(order) == 0 {
return nil
}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
continue
@@ -431,12 +430,30 @@ func capBody(body string) string {
// preservedState is the JSON shape of the carried-across-compaction block.
type preservedState struct {
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
Task *preservedTaskState `json:"task,omitempty"`
RecentEdits []preservedEdit `json:"recent_edits,omitempty"`
Tools []preservedTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
ProjectInstructions []preservedInstruction `json:"project_instructions,omitempty"`
}
type preservedTaskState struct {
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
Constraints []string `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
UnresolvedFailures []taskFailureState `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
Approvals []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
Artifacts []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
@@ -464,8 +481,39 @@ type preservedInstruction struct {
// may live only inside the injected summary message, which on a later compaction
// lands in middle with no real tool calls left to extract. Fresh tool calls and
// instruction blocks override the carried-forward copy by name/source.
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnapshot *taskStateSnapshot) string {
priorState := parsePreservedStateBlock(latestSummaryContent(middle))
task := priorState.Task
if taskSnapshot != nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
Constraints: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskConstraints(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Constraints, maxTaskConstraints),
ChangedFiles: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskChangedFiles(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.ChangedFiles, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
UnresolvedFailures: mergeTaskFailures(priorTaskFailures(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.UnresolvedFailures, taskSnapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys),
Approvals: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskApprovals(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Approvals, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
Artifacts: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskArtifacts(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Artifacts, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
}
// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
// even after compaction removes the plan tool call needed for comparison.
if taskSnapshot.PlanParity == taskPlanParityMatch {
task.Status = taskSnapshot.Status
task.Pending = taskSnapshot.Plan.Pending
task.InProgress = taskSnapshot.Plan.InProgress
task.Completed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Completed
task.Failed = taskSnapshot.Plan.Failed
task.VerificationPassed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Passed
task.VerificationFailed = taskSnapshot.Verification.Failed
task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
}
}
freshConstraints := explicitConstraintsFromMessages(middle)
if len(freshConstraints) > 0 {
if task == nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{}
}
task.Constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(task.Constraints, freshConstraints, maxTaskConstraints)
}
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -493,12 +541,114 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
projectInstructionEntries(middle),
)
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, task, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
summary += "\n\n" + block
}
return summary
}
func explicitConstraintsFromMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
var constraints []string
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || strings.Contains(message.Content, preservedStateLabel) {
continue
}
if _, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content); body != "" {
continue
}
constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(constraints, extractExplicitConstraints(message.Content), maxTaskConstraints)
}
return constraints
}
func priorTaskConstraints(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Constraints
}
func priorTaskChangedFiles(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.ChangedFiles
}
func priorTaskFailures(task *preservedTaskState) []taskFailureState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.UnresolvedFailures
}
func priorTaskApprovals(task *preservedTaskState) []taskApprovalState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Approvals
}
func priorTaskArtifacts(task *preservedTaskState) []taskArtifactState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Artifacts
}
func mergeTaskFailures(older, newer []taskFailureState, resolved []string) []taskFailureState {
resolvedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(resolved))
for _, key := range resolved {
resolvedSet[key] = struct{}{}
}
merged := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, failure := range append(append([]taskFailureState(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := resolvedSet[failure.Key]; ok {
continue
}
withoutSameKey := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(merged))
for _, existing := range merged {
if existing.Key != failure.Key {
withoutSameKey = append(withoutSameKey, existing)
}
}
merged = append(withoutSameKey, failure)
}
if len(merged) > maxTaskEvidenceEntries {
merged = merged[len(merged)-maxTaskEvidenceEntries:]
}
return merged
}
func mergeBoundedComparable[T comparable](older, newer []T, limit int) []T {
merged := make([]T, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
seen := make(map[T]struct{}, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, value := range append(append([]T(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
continue
}
seen[value] = struct{}{}
merged = append(merged, value)
}
if len(merged) > limit {
merged = merged[len(merged)-limit:]
}
return merged
}
func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
return objective
}
const suffix = "…"
limit := maxTaskObjectiveBytes - len(suffix)
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(objective[limit]) {
limit--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(objective[:limit]) + suffix
}
// mergeRecentEdits overlays fresh edits onto edits preserved by an earlier
// compaction. Unlike mergeSkillEntries (which keeps refreshed entries in their
// original slot), a path touched again by a fresh edit MOVES to the newest
@@ -555,11 +705,11 @@ func preservedEditsToEntries(edits []preservedEdit) []skillEntry {
// formatPreservedState renders state as the labelled, single-line
// JSON block. Returns "" when there is nothing to preserve.
func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && task == nil && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
return ""
}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan, Task: task}
for _, e := range edits {
state.RecentEdits = append(state.RecentEdits, preservedEdit{Path: e.name, Note: e.body})
}
@@ -579,15 +729,6 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skil
return preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
if idx < 0 {
+169 -6
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// stateConversation is a long enough conversation that Compact elides a middle
@@ -59,6 +61,169 @@ func TestCompactPreservesActivePlan(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/db.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"},
}})
messages := stateConversation()
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Status != taskStatusActive || state.Task.InProgress != 1 || state.Task.Pending != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected compact task state: %#v", state.Task)
}
if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
}
if len(state.Task.ChangedFiles) != 1 || state.Task.ChangedFiles[0] != "internal/db.go" {
t.Fatalf("changed files were not preserved: %#v", state.Task.ChangedFiles)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesRuntimeEvidenceAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests failed",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession, Scope: "/tmp",
}})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Never add background memory models."},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "understood"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
)
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || len(state.Task.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || len(state.Task.Approvals) != 1 || len(state.Task.Artifacts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("runtime evidence did not survive repeated compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if got := state.Task.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary; got != "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence" {
t.Fatalf("newer failure evidence did not replace the older summary: %#v", state.Task.UnresolvedFailures)
}
for _, want := range []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never add background memory models."} {
if !containsString(state.Task.Constraints, want) {
t.Fatalf("constraint %q missing after repeated compaction: %#v", want, state.Task.Constraints)
}
}
}
func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if value == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
prior := preservedState{Task: &preservedTaskState{Objective: "stale objective", Status: taskStatusActive, Pending: 1}}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(prior)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\nold\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
}
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SUMMARY", nil },
taskState: &taskStateSnapshot{
Objective: "current objective",
PlanParity: taskPlanParityMismatch,
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(compacted[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "current objective" {
t.Fatalf("immutable objective was lost on plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.Pending != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable task fields survived plan mismatch: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestTaskObjectiveSurvivesRepeatedCompactionWithoutPlanRefresh(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("keep this objective", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Compact: %v", err)
}
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
)
snapshot := task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput)
if snapshot.PlanParity != taskPlanParityMismatch {
t.Fatalf("plan call should be absent after first compaction, parity=%q", snapshot.PlanParity)
}
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: snapshot,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || state.Task.Objective != "keep this objective" {
t.Fatalf("objective lost after second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if state.Task.Status != "" || state.Task.InProgress != 0 {
t.Fatalf("uncorroborated mutable fields survived second compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesLoadedSkills(t *testing.T) {
summary := compactStateConversation(t, stateConversation())
if !strings.Contains(summary, preservedStateLabel) {
@@ -283,12 +448,10 @@ func TestExtractLatestPlanReturnsMostRecent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsAcceptsStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsRejectsUnsupportedStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
got := formatPlanArguments(`{"plan":[{"step":"write failing test","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"keep existing shape","status":"pending"}]}`)
for _, want := range []string{"- [in_progress] write failing test", "- [pending] keep existing shape"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q in formatted plan, got %q", want, got)
}
if got != "" {
t.Fatalf("unsupported alias should reject the whole plan like update_plan, got %q", got)
}
}
+318
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const (
compactionUserWordBudget = 256
compactionAssistantWordBudget = 200
compactionToolCallsPerTurn = 8
compactionToolArgumentBytes = 120
compactionErrorBytes = 150
compactionResultBytes = 1200
compactionPreviousSummaryBytes = 16 * 1024
compactionBriefMaxBytes = 24 * 1024
)
var compactionWordPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[\p{L}\p{N}]+`)
type compactionProjection struct {
messages []zeroruntime.Message
truncated bool
}
// projectCompactionInput removes reconstructible tool output before the model
// summary call. It retains a bounded transcript of user intent, assistant
// decisions, tool actions, and concise errors. Exact durable state is appended
// separately from the original messages after the summary returns.
func projectCompactionInput(messages []zeroruntime.Message) compactionProjection {
sections := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
previousSummary := ""
truncated := false
for index, message := range messages {
switch message.Role {
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser:
content := message.Content
if marker := strings.Index(content, preservedStateLabel); marker >= 0 {
content = content[:marker]
}
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel) {
fullSummary := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel))
previousSummary = clipHeadTailBytes(fullSummary, compactionPreviousSummaryBytes)
truncated = truncated || len(fullSummary) > compactionPreviousSummaryBytes
continue
}
if content = clipInformativeWords(content, compactionUserWordBudget); content != "" {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user #%d]\n%s", index, content))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant:
lines := make([]string, 0, 1+len(message.ToolCalls))
if content := clipInformativeWords(message.Content, compactionAssistantWordBudget); content != "" {
lines = append(lines, content)
}
calls := message.ToolCalls
omitted := 0
if len(calls) > compactionToolCallsPerTurn {
omitted = len(calls) - compactionToolCallsPerTurn
calls = calls[omitted:]
}
if omitted > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("* (%d earlier tool calls omitted)", omitted))
}
for _, call := range calls {
lines = append(lines, compactionToolCallLine(call))
}
if len(lines) > 0 {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[assistant #%d]\n%s", index, strings.Join(lines, "\n")))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
// New tool-result messages carry the execution status directly, as the
// source ToolResult does. Keep the text check for older session history
// created before Message exposed IsError.
name := toolNameForResult(messages, index)
mustPreserve := name == "ask_user" || len(message.ChangedFiles) > 0
if !mustPreserve && !message.IsError && !isLikelyToolError(message.Content) {
continue
}
if name == "" {
name = "tool"
}
switch {
case message.IsError || isLikelyToolError(message.Content):
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_error #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
case name == "ask_user":
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user_answer #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(message.Content, compactionResultBytes)))
default:
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_result #%d] %s changed %s\n%s", index, name,
clipBytes(strings.Join(message.ChangedFiles, ", "), compactionToolArgumentBytes), clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
}
}
}
if len(sections) == 0 && previousSummary == "" {
return compactionProjection{}
}
brief, briefTruncated := capCompactionBrief(strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"))
truncated = truncated || briefTruncated
if previousSummary != "" {
brief = "[previous summary]\n" + previousSummary + "\n\n" + brief
}
return compactionProjection{
messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.TrimSpace(brief)}},
truncated: truncated,
}
}
func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
if len(brief) <= compactionBriefMaxBytes {
return brief, false
}
marker := "\n\n...[middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget]...\n\n"
available := compactionBriefMaxBytes - len(marker)
// Keep both chronological edges: the oldest material has not necessarily
// been summarized before, while the newest material is most actionable.
headBytes := available * 2 / 5
tailBytes := available - headBytes
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(brief, headBytes)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(brief, tailBytes)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail), true
}
func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
detail := ""
if call.Freeform && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(call.Arguments), ", ")
}
var arguments map[string]any
if detail == "" && json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
detail = value
break
}
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "ask_user" {
detail = askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments)
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
if patch, ok := arguments["patch"].(string); ok {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(patch), ", ")
}
}
}
if detail == "" {
detail = commandFromArguments(call.Arguments)
}
if detail == "" {
return "* " + call.Name
}
return fmt.Sprintf("* %s %q", call.Name, clipBytes(detail, compactionToolArgumentBytes))
}
func isLikelyToolError(content string) bool {
prefix := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if len(prefix) > compactionErrorBytes {
prefix = prefix[:compactionErrorBytes]
}
lower := strings.ToLower(prefix)
for _, prefix := range []string{"error:", "tool error:", "failed:", "permission denied", "command failed"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func clipInformativeWords(text string, limit int) string {
flat := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
if flat == "" || limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
count := 0
for _, location := range compactionWordPattern.FindAllStringIndex(flat, -1) {
word := strings.ToLower(flat[location[0]:location[1]])
if compactionStopWords[word] {
continue
}
count++
if count > limit {
end := location[0]
return strings.TrimSpace(flat[:end]) + "...(truncated)"
}
}
return flat
}
func clipBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 3 {
end := limit
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return text[:end]
}
end := limit - 3
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(text[:end]) + "..."
}
func clipHeadTailBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
marker := "\n...[middle omitted]...\n"
if limit <= len(marker) {
return clipBytes(text, limit)
}
available := limit - len(marker)
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(text, available/2)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(text, available-available/2)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail)
}
func clipPrefixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
end := limit
for end > 0 && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
if boundary := strings.LastIndex(text[:end], "\n\n["); boundary > 0 {
end = boundary
}
return text[:end]
}
func clipSuffixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
start := len(text) - limit
for start < len(text) && text[start]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
start++
}
if boundary := strings.Index(text[start:], "\n\n["); boundary >= 0 {
start += boundary + 2
}
return text[start:]
}
func askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments map[string]any) string {
raw, ok := arguments["questions"].([]any)
if !ok {
return ""
}
questions := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
for _, item := range raw {
object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
continue
}
if question, ok := object["question"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(question) != "" {
questions = append(questions, strings.TrimSpace(question))
}
}
return strings.Join(questions, " | ")
}
func patchPaths(patch string) []string {
var paths []string
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, line := range strings.Split(patch, "\n") {
for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, prefix) {
continue
}
path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, prefix))
if path != "" && !seen[path] {
seen[path] = true
paths = append(paths, path)
}
}
}
return paths
}
var compactionStopWords = map[string]bool{
"a": true, "an": true, "the": true, "is": true, "are": true, "was": true, "were": true,
"be": true, "been": true, "being": true, "have": true, "has": true, "had": true,
"do": true, "does": true, "did": true, "will": true, "would": true, "could": true,
"should": true, "may": true, "might": true, "shall": true, "can": true, "need": true, "must": true,
"to": true, "of": true, "in": true, "for": true, "on": true, "with": true, "at": true,
"by": true, "from": true, "as": true, "into": true, "through": true, "during": true,
"before": true, "after": true, "above": true, "below": true, "between": true, "under": true, "over": true,
"and": true, "but": true, "or": true, "nor": true, "not": true, "so": true, "yet": true,
"both": true, "either": true, "neither": true, "each": true, "every": true, "all": true,
"any": true, "few": true, "more": true, "most": true, "other": true, "some": true, "such": true, "no": true,
"that": true, "this": true, "these": true, "those": true, "it": true, "its": true,
"i": true, "me": true, "my": true, "we": true, "our": true, "you": true, "your": true,
"he": true, "him": true, "his": true, "she": true, "her": true, "they": true, "them": true, "their": true,
"who": true, "which": true, "what": true, "if": true, "then": true, "than": true,
"when": true, "where": true, "how": true, "just": true, "also": true,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
if clipped := clipBytes("世界", limit); len(clipped) > limit || !utf8.ValidString(clipped) {
t.Fatalf("clipBytes limit %d returned invalid result %q", limit, clipped)
}
}
}
func TestBoundaryClippersHandleNonPositiveLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, clip := range []func(string, int) string{clipPrefixAtBoundary, clipSuffixAtBoundary} {
for _, limit := range []int{-1, 0} {
if got := clip("世界", limit); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("clipper limit %d = %q, want empty", limit, got)
}
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDropsRecoverableToolBodies(t *testing.T) {
largeBody := strings.Repeat("recoverable source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "I will inspect before editing.", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "read", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "read", Content: largeBody},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "test", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "test", Content: "Error: parser regression\nlong diagnostic details"},
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
projected := projection.messages
if len(projected) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("projection = %#v, want one compact message", projected)
}
content := projected[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Inspect the parser", `read_file "internal/parser.go"`, `exec_command "go test ./internal/parser"`, "Error: parser regression"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
if strings.Contains(content, "recoverable source line") || strings.Contains(content, "long diagnostic details") {
t.Fatalf("projection retained reconstructible or overlong tool output: %q", content)
}
if estimateTokens(projected)*20 >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatalf("projection did not materially reduce tokens: before=%d after=%d", estimateTokens(messages), estimateTokens(projected))
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsStructurallyMarkedToolErrors(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "git", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"git status"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "git", Content: "fatal: not a git repository", IsError: true},
}
projected := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages
if len(projected) != 1 || !strings.Contains(projected[0].Content, "fatal: not a git repository") {
t.Fatalf("structured tool error was dropped from projection: %#v", projected)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "ask", Name: "ask_user", Arguments: `{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
{ID: "raw-patch", Name: "apply_patch", Freeform: true, Arguments: "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/api.go\n*** Add File: internal/config.go\n*** End Patch\n"},
{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "patch", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"}},
}
content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "internal/api.go", "internal/config.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCapsToolCallsPerTurn(t *testing.T) {
calls := make([]zeroruntime.ToolCall, 12)
for index := range calls {
calls[index] = zeroruntime.ToolCall{Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"file.go"}`}
}
projected := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: calls}}).messages
content := projected[0].Content
if strings.Count(content, "* read_file") != compactionToolCallsPerTurn || !strings.Contains(content, "4 earlier tool calls omitted") {
t.Fatalf("tool-call tail was not bounded: %q", content)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCarriesPreviousSummaryOutsideBriefCap(t *testing.T) {
previous := "keep the earlier architecture decision\n" + strings.Repeat("prior detail ", 2000) + "\nkeep the newest prior decision"
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\n" + previous + "\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n{}"}}
for index := range 500 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("later transcript detail ", 20)})
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "later request " + strings.Repeat("context ", 20) + string(rune('a'+index%26))})
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
content := projection.messages[0].Content
if !strings.Contains(content, "[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision") || !strings.Contains(content, "keep the newest prior decision") {
t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q", content)
}
if !strings.Contains(content, "middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget") {
t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q", content)
}
if !projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDoesNotInferTruncationFromUserText(t *testing.T) {
projection := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Keep this literal marker: [middle omitted]",
}})
if projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("literal user text produced a false truncation signal")
}
}
+10 -3
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// recentEdits extracts each mutated file's path and a one-line note from the
@@ -20,11 +20,15 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e3", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/baz.go"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e3", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/baz.go"}},
}
edits := recentEdits(messages)
if len(edits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
if len(edits) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
}
if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
@@ -32,6 +36,9 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
}
if edits[2].name != "internal/baz.go" || edits[2].body != "Done!" {
t.Fatalf("third edit = %#v, want apply_patch changed file with its note", edits[2])
}
}
// After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
var markerPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`msg-\d+`)
+137 -13
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// --- Pure Compact() tests -------------------------------------------------
@@ -58,12 +59,15 @@ func TestCompactKeepsSystemAndPreservedSuffix(t *testing.T) {
if last.Content != "most recent question" {
t.Fatalf("expected most recent message preserved, got %q", last.Content)
}
// The summarized middle excludes system and preserved suffix.
if len(captured) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 summarized messages, got %d: %#v", len(captured), captured)
// The summarizer receives a compact semantic projection of the middle rather
// than reconstructible raw tool output.
if len(captured) != 1 || captured[0].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Fatalf("expected one projected summary input, got %#v", captured)
}
if captured[0].Content != "first question" {
t.Fatalf("expected oldest non-system message first, got %#v", captured[0])
for _, want := range []string{"[user #0]", "first question", "[assistant #1]", "first answer", "second question"} {
if !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projected summary input missing %q: %q", want, captured[0].Content)
}
}
// Compaction must shrink the conversation.
if estimateTokens(result) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
@@ -271,6 +275,27 @@ func TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
if estimateToolDefTokens(one) <= 0 {
t.Fatal("a tool definition (name + description + schema) should estimate > 0 tokens")
}
typed := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
typed[0].Type = zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFreeform
if estimateToolDefTokens(typed) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatal("a non-empty tool type must increase the estimated request cost")
}
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
format zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat
}{
{name: "type", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar"}},
{name: "syntax", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Syntax: "lark"}},
{name: "definition", format: zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Definition: "start: WORD"}},
} {
t.Run("format "+test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
formatted := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition(nil), one...)
formatted[0].Format = &test.format
if estimateToolDefTokens(formatted) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatalf("a non-empty format %s must increase the estimated request cost", test.name)
}
})
}
two := append(append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, one...), zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: "write_file",
Description: "Write contents to a file in the workspace.",
@@ -336,7 +361,7 @@ func TestRunProactiveCompactionTriggers(t *testing.T) {
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -364,7 +389,7 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
},
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
_, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -379,6 +404,43 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMaybeCompactStopsAfterSupersededReadsReachThreshold(t *testing.T) {
body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
}
pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 {
t.Fatal("test setup did not reclaim superseded read output")
}
prunedSize := estimateTokens(pruned)
if estimateTokens(messages) <= prunedSize {
t.Fatal("test setup does not cross the compaction threshold")
}
provider := &summarizeRecordingProvider{}
state := &compactionState{
enabled: true,
threshold: prunedSize,
preserveLast: 2,
}
got := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
if provider.summarizeCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cheap pruning should avoid the summarizer, got %d calls", provider.summarizeCalls)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != prunedSize {
t.Fatalf("lowWaterMark = %d, want %d", state.lowWaterMark, prunedSize)
}
if !strings.Contains(got[2].Content, "superseded identical") || got[4].Content != body {
t.Fatalf("unexpected pruned messages: %#v", got)
}
}
// reactiveProvider builds up history with a tool call on turn 1, then errors
// with a context-limit message on turn 2 (once the history is large enough that
// compaction can shrink it), then succeeds on the same-turn retry. Summary
@@ -388,6 +450,7 @@ type reactiveProvider struct {
summarizeCalls int
turnRequests int
failedOnce bool
connectError bool
bigText string
finalText string
}
@@ -409,6 +472,9 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
return streamEvents(toolTurnWithText(provider.bigText, "1", "read_file", `{"path":"x"}`)), nil
case provider.turnRequests == 2 && !provider.failedOnce:
provider.failedOnce = true
if provider.connectError {
return nil, errors.New("context_length_exceeded")
}
return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."},
}), nil
@@ -417,6 +483,39 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
}
}
func TestRunConnectErrorCompactionRecordsReplacementPlan(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
connectError: true,
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("connect-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil || result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("connect-error compaction failed: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 || contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("replacement request context not reported: %#v", contextPlans)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 || gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("replacement request trace not recorded: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
@@ -427,7 +526,9 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
// the compaction closure. read_file also returns a sizeable result that
// bloats the history.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("reactive-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -436,6 +537,10 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected reactive compaction to recover the run, got error: %v", err)
@@ -446,6 +551,25 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
if provider.summarizeCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected reactive compaction to invoke the summarizer")
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("main request context callbacks = %d, want initial turns plus compacted retry", len(contextPlans))
}
if contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("retry context was not updated after compaction: before=%d after=%d", contextPlans[1].MessageTokens, contextPlans[2].MessageTokens)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence count = %d, want two turns, compaction, and retry: %#v", len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes), gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected request-specific invalidation evidence: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].CompletePrefixHash == gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("compaction fingerprint reused the main request prefix: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
// midStreamReactiveProvider forwards some text BEFORE surfacing a context-limit
@@ -491,7 +615,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryDoesNotDoubleEmitText(t *testing.T) {
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
var deltas []string
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
@@ -581,7 +705,7 @@ func TestCompactNeverProducesConsecutiveUserMessages(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2})
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 1000, CompactionPreserveLast: 2}, nil)
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "SUMMARY"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
@@ -628,7 +752,7 @@ func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRecoverDisabledIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0})
st := newCompactionState(Options{ContextWindow: 0}, nil)
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "x"}}
called := false
// recover must not invoke the provider/summarize when disabled, even on a
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// someRequestContains reports whether any message sent to the provider across all
+86
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
package agent
// CompletionDecision is the deterministic outcome of evaluating a text-only
// assistant turn. Uncertain means the loop needs one bounded follow-up action
// before it can finalize the run.
type CompletionDecision string
const (
CompletionUncertain CompletionDecision = "uncertain"
CompletionComplete CompletionDecision = "complete"
CompletionIncomplete CompletionDecision = "incomplete"
)
type completionAction string
const (
completionActionNone completionAction = ""
completionActionContinue completionAction = "continue"
completionActionSemanticCheck completionAction = "semantic_check"
)
type completionEvaluation struct {
Decision CompletionDecision
Action completionAction
Reason string
}
// completionPolicy owns the small amount of state needed to keep uncertain
// decisions bounded. requireSemanticCheck is set only for run profiles that
// already opted into self-correction; ordinary completion remains entirely
// local and adds no model call.
type completionPolicy struct {
continueNudges int
requireSemanticCheck bool
semanticCheckRequested bool
}
func newCompletionPolicy(requireSemanticCheck bool) *completionPolicy {
return &completionPolicy{requireSemanticCheck: requireSemanticCheck}
}
func (policy *completionPolicy) evaluate(text string, context completionContext) completionEvaluation {
// A direct admission is strong local evidence and takes precedence over all
// weaker signals, avoiding both continuation nudges and semantic checks.
if reason := selfReportedIncompletion(text); reason != "" {
return completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionIncomplete, Reason: reason}
}
// A continuation cue is strong unfinished evidence; a pending plan is only
// weak evidence because bookkeeping can be stale. Both get a bounded chance
// to continue, but only a persisted cue is ultimately incomplete.
cue := endsWithContinuationCue(text)
if cue || context.PlanPending {
if policy.continueNudges < maxContinueNudges {
policy.continueNudges++
reason := "your message ended mid-step"
if !cue {
reason = "pending plan items remain — finish them, or mark them complete with update_plan if you are done"
}
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionUncertain,
Action: completionActionContinue,
Reason: reason,
}
}
if cue {
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionIncomplete,
Reason: "your message ended mid-step",
}
}
}
// Profiles with self-correction enabled require one task-grounded semantic
// check. It is requested at most once per run; the next locally complete turn
// is accepted without another model call.
if policy.requireSemanticCheck && !policy.semanticCheckRequested {
policy.semanticCheckRequested = true
return completionEvaluation{
Decision: CompletionUncertain,
Action: completionActionSemanticCheck,
}
}
return completionEvaluation{Decision: CompletionComplete, Action: completionActionNone}
}
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCompletionPolicyLocalEvidenceDecidesWithoutSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
complete := policy.evaluate("Done. All required checks pass.", completionContext{})
if complete.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("confident completion decision = %q, want %q", complete.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
incomplete := policy.evaluate("I couldn't verify the result, so this is my best guess.", completionContext{})
if incomplete.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("admitted failure decision = %q, want %q", incomplete.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyPreservesBoundedPlanStallProtection(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("Let me inspect the remaining configuration:", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionIncomplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyTreatsPendingPlanAsWeakEvidence(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(false)
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxContinueNudges; attempt++ {
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionUncertain || got.Action != completionActionContinue {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d = (%q, %q), want uncertain continue", attempt+1, got.Decision, got.Action)
}
}
got := policy.evaluate("All set.", completionContext{PlanPending: true})
if got.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("stale plan decision after nudge budget = %q, want %q", got.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
}
func TestCompletionPolicyAllowsExactlyOneRequiredSemanticCheck(t *testing.T) {
policy := newCompletionPolicy(true)
first := policy.evaluate("Implemented and tested.", completionContext{})
if first.Decision != CompletionUncertain || first.Action != completionActionSemanticCheck {
t.Fatalf("first decision = (%q, %q), want uncertain semantic check", first.Decision, first.Action)
}
second := policy.evaluate("PASS. The result meets the task criterion.", completionContext{})
if second.Decision != CompletionComplete {
t.Fatalf("post-check decision = %q, want %q", second.Decision, CompletionComplete)
}
if second.Action == completionActionSemanticCheck {
t.Fatal("semantic check was requested more than once")
}
}
func TestAcceptanceVerificationNudgeIncludesBoundedObjective(t *testing.T) {
objective := "make the requested behavior observable"
nudge := acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective)
if !strings.Contains(nudge, "Task objective: "+objective) {
t.Fatalf("semantic check was not grounded in the objective: %q", nudge)
}
}
+37 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Context budget.
@@ -23,6 +23,24 @@ type ContextBreakdown struct {
TotalTokens int // SystemTokens + ToolTokens + MessageTokens
ContextWindow int // model context window; 0 when unknown
UsedFraction float64 // TotalTokens / ContextWindow; 0 when window unknown
// Blocks explain why each model-visible category is present without exposing
// its content. The planner currently preserves all three categories.
Blocks []ContextBlock
// CompletePrefixHash identifies the provider-visible system+tool prefix.
CompletePrefixHash string
// PrefixInvalidationReason is "initial", "unchanged", or a stable comma-
// separated list of changed prefix categories.
PrefixInvalidationReason string
}
// ContextBlock is content-free evidence for one model-visible context category.
type ContextBlock struct {
Kind string
Tokens int
CacheClass string
Authority string
Recoverable bool
Reason string
}
// MeasureContext estimates the per-category token footprint of a request: the
@@ -41,6 +59,24 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
ContextWindow: contextWindow,
}
breakdown.TotalTokens = breakdown.SystemTokens + breakdown.ToolTokens + breakdown.MessageTokens
if breakdown.SystemTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "system", Tokens: breakdown.SystemTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "required", Reason: "instructions, workspace policy, and safety policy",
})
}
if breakdown.ToolTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "tools", Tokens: breakdown.ToolTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "capability", Reason: "currently permitted and selected tool definitions",
})
}
if breakdown.MessageTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "conversation", Tokens: breakdown.MessageTokens, CacheClass: "dynamic_tail",
Authority: "transcript", Reason: "valid provider replay history and current task context",
})
}
if contextWindow > 0 {
breakdown.UsedFraction = float64(breakdown.TotalTokens) / float64(contextWindow)
}
+4 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
if breakdown.UsedFraction != wantFraction {
t.Fatalf("UsedFraction = %v, want %v", breakdown.UsedFraction, wantFraction)
}
if len(breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("Blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", breakdown.Blocks)
}
}
func TestMeasureContextUnknownWindowHasZeroFraction(t *testing.T) {
+189
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type contextPlannerConfig struct {
contextWindow int
promptCacheKey string
serviceTier string
promptParts systemPromptParts
}
// contextPlanner is the single seam for constructing model-visible requests.
// Planning is deterministic and does not retrieve content, execute tools, or
// change permissions. The initial implementation deliberately preserves every
// message and tool definition while making composition and cache drift
// inspectable; later selection policies must continue to cross this seam.
type contextPlanner struct {
config contextPlannerConfig
previousPrefix prefixFingerprint
hasPrevious bool
toolSnapshotKey string
toolSnapshot []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
}
type contextPlan struct {
Request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
Breakdown ContextBreakdown
PrefixFingerprint prefixFingerprint
}
func newContextPlanner(config contextPlannerConfig) *contextPlanner {
return &contextPlanner{config: config}
}
// Plan returns a provider request snapshot plus content-free accounting.
// It intentionally performs no relevance filtering: preserving current model
// capability is the baseline contract for future planner policies.
func (planner *contextPlanner) Plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, planner.config.promptParts)
}
// planWithPromptParts plans a request whose stable system sections differ from
// the planner's configured main-run prompt, such as a compaction summary call.
func (planner *contextPlanner) planWithPromptParts(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, parts)
}
func (planner *contextPlanner) plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
requestMessages := copyMessages(messages)
requestSystemPrompt := leadingSystemContent(requestMessages)
if parts.prompt != requestSystemPrompt {
// Component boundaries from a different request would make the detailed
// invalidation reason misleading. Retain the exact request prefix and
// classify it conservatively as an unstructured system prompt instead.
parts = systemPromptParts{prompt: requestSystemPrompt}
}
fingerprint := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts, toolDefs))
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: requestMessages,
Tools: planner.snapshotTools(toolDefs, fingerprint),
ReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort,
ServiceTier: planner.config.serviceTier,
PromptCacheKey: planner.config.promptCacheKey,
}
breakdown := MeasureContext(request.Messages, request.Tools, planner.config.contextWindow)
breakdown.CompletePrefixHash = fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash
var previous *prefixFingerprint
if planner.hasPrevious {
previous = &planner.previousPrefix
}
breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason = explainPrefixChange(previous, fingerprint)
planner.previousPrefix = fingerprint
planner.hasPrevious = true
return contextPlan{
Request: request,
Breakdown: breakdown,
PrefixFingerprint: fingerprint,
}
}
// snapshotTools freezes provider-visible tool definitions when their semantic
// fingerprint changes. Stable turns reuse the frozen schemas instead of
// recursively cloning every map and slice for every request.
func (planner *contextPlanner) snapshotTools(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, fingerprint prefixFingerprint) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
key := fingerprint.ToolsHash + "\x00" + fingerprint.SchemaHash
if planner.toolSnapshotKey != key {
planner.toolSnapshot = copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs)
planner.toolSnapshotKey = key
}
return planner.toolSnapshot
}
func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
if toolDefs == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(toolDefs))
for index, definition := range toolDefs {
copied[index] = definition
copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
if definition.Format != nil {
format := *definition.Format
copied[index].Format = &format
}
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaMap(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
if schema == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
for key, value := range schema {
copied[key] = copySchemaValue(value)
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaValue(value any) any {
switch typed := value.(type) {
case map[string]any:
return copySchemaMap(typed)
case []any:
copied := make([]any, len(typed))
for index, item := range typed {
copied[index] = copySchemaValue(item)
}
return copied
case []string:
return append([]string(nil), typed...)
default:
return value
}
}
func leadingSystemContent(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
contents := make([]string, 0, 1)
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem {
break
}
contents = append(contents, message.Content)
}
return strings.Join(contents, "\n\n")
}
func explainPrefixChange(previous *prefixFingerprint, current prefixFingerprint) string {
if previous == nil {
return "initial"
}
if previous.CompletePrefixHash == current.CompletePrefixHash {
return "unchanged"
}
reasons := make([]string, 0, 3)
if previous.SystemPromptHash != current.SystemPromptHash {
parts := make([]string, 0, 4)
if previous.BaseInstructionsHash != current.BaseInstructionsHash {
parts = append(parts, "base_instructions")
}
if previous.ConfirmationPolicyHash != current.ConfirmationPolicyHash {
parts = append(parts, "confirmation_policy")
}
if previous.ProjectContextHash != current.ProjectContextHash {
parts = append(parts, "project_context")
}
if previous.SkillsHash != current.SkillsHash {
parts = append(parts, "skills")
}
if len(parts) == 0 {
parts = append(parts, "system_prompt")
}
reasons = append(reasons, parts...)
}
if previous.ToolsHash != current.ToolsHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "tools")
}
if previous.SchemaHash != current.SchemaHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "schema")
}
if len(reasons) == 0 {
return "prefix_changed"
}
return strings.Join(reasons, ",")
}
+190
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
package agent
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "inspect this", Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte{1, 2, 3}}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"main.go"}`}}, Reasoning: []zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{{Provider: "test", Type: "thinking", Signature: "sig"}}},
}
toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
Format: &zeroruntime.ToolDefinitionFormat{Type: "grammar", Syntax: "lark", Definition: "start: PATH"},
Parameters: map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []string{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
"anyOf": []any{map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
},
}}
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
contextWindow: 128_000,
promptCacheKey: "session-1",
serviceTier: "priority",
promptParts: systemPromptParts{prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "system"},
})
plan := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
want := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: toolDefs,
ReasoningEffort: "medium",
ServiceTier: "priority",
PromptCacheKey: "session-1",
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(plan.Request, want) {
t.Fatalf("planned request changed provider input:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.Request, want)
}
stable := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if &stable.Request.Tools[0] != &plan.Request.Tools[0] {
t.Fatal("stable tool fingerprint rebuilt the immutable schema snapshot")
}
// A plan owns its request snapshot; later caller mutation cannot change its
// messages or its recursively nested tool schema.
messages[1].Content = "changed"
messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] = 9
toolDefs[0].Name = "changed_tool"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
toolDefs[0].Format.Definition = "changed"
if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Format == nil || plan.Request.Tools[0].Format.Definition != "start: PATH" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("planned tools alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
next := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if next.PrefixFingerprint == plan.PrefixFingerprint || next.Request.Tools[0].Name != "changed_tool" {
t.Fatalf("changed tool schema did not refresh snapshot: %#v", next)
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" {
t.Fatalf("refresh mutated earlier request: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
}
func TestContextPlannerReportsInspectableBlocks(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: 100_000})
plan := planner.Plan([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: filler(400)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: filler(200)},
}, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file"}}, "")
if plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" || plan.Breakdown.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence = %#v", plan.Breakdown)
}
if len(plan.Breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", plan.Breakdown.Blocks)
}
wantKinds := []string{"system", "tools", "conversation"}
total := 0
for index, block := range plan.Breakdown.Blocks {
if block.Kind != wantKinds[index] || block.Tokens <= 0 || block.Reason == "" || block.Authority == "" || block.CacheClass == "" {
t.Fatalf("block %d = %#v", index, block)
}
total += block.Tokens
}
if total != plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens {
t.Fatalf("block tokens = %d, want total %d", total, plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerFingerprintsActualRequestSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "configured system", baseInstructions: "configured system",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "request-specific system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"},
}
plan := planner.Plan(messages, nil, "")
want := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(
systemPromptParts{prompt: "request-specific system"}, nil,
))
if plan.PrefixFingerprint != want {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint describes configured prompt instead of request:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.PrefixFingerprint, want)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerExplainsPrefixInvalidation(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "base", projectContext: "project",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}, {Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"}}
tools := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "initial" {
t.Fatalf("first reason = %q, want initial", got)
}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("stable reason = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
tools[0].Description = "Read an exact file"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "tools" {
t.Fatalf("tool reason = %q, want tools", got)
}
tools[0].Parameters["required"] = []any{"path"}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "schema" {
t.Fatalf("schema reason = %q, want schema", got)
}
planner.config.promptParts.prompt = "system with changed project"
planner.config.promptParts.projectContext = "changed project"
messages[0].Content = "system with changed project"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "project_context" {
t.Fatalf("project reason = %q, want project_context", got)
}
}
func TestExplainPrefixChangeNamesEveryChangedComponent(t *testing.T) {
baseline := prefixFingerprint{
SystemPromptHash: "system",
BaseInstructionsHash: "base",
ConfirmationPolicyHash: "policy",
ProjectContextHash: "project",
SkillsHash: "skills",
ToolsHash: "tools",
SchemaHash: "schema",
CompletePrefixHash: "complete",
}
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*prefixFingerprint)
want string
}{
{name: "base instructions", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.BaseInstructionsHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "base_instructions"},
{name: "confirmation policy", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ConfirmationPolicyHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "confirmation_policy"},
{name: "project context", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ProjectContextHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "project_context"},
{name: "skills", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash, value.SkillsHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "skills"},
{name: "unclassified system prompt", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash = "changed" }, want: "system_prompt"},
{name: "tools and schema", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.ToolsHash, value.SchemaHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "tools,schema"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
current := baseline
test.mutate(&current)
current.CompletePrefixHash = "changed"
if got := explainPrefixChange(&baseline, current); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %q", got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// richMCPTool mimics a real MCP tool's schema (Exa/Firecrawl-style search): an
+105 -11
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestOptionsDeferThresholdFieldExists(t *testing.T) {
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.Completi
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *
func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
}
if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -368,9 +368,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
}
}
@@ -798,3 +797,98 @@ func TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("deferred tool must be callable under eager fallback, got status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// fakeDeferredMutatorTool is a deferred-eligible tool with mutating Safety
// (SideEffectWrite), standing in for a real write/mutator MCP tool that would
// be hidden behind tool_search once deferral activates.
type fakeDeferredMutatorTool struct{ name string }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Description() string { return "mutates the workspace, deferred" }
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "mutates"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "mutated"}
}
func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
// TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema guards the concern
// raised in PR #642 review (jatmn, P2): that tool_search filters deferred
// candidates only by EnabledTools/DisabledTools, not by plan-mode visibility,
// so a plan-mode model could call `tool_search select:<deferred write tool>`
// and receive that tool's full schema even though a direct call to it is
// correctly denied the following turn.
//
// tool_search's own Safety is SideEffectNone, and ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode (the
// same gate executeToolCall uses to deny a direct call) requires
// SideEffect==Read to advertise a tool in plan mode. That means tool_search
// itself is never advertised, never activates deferral (loaderUsable in
// partitionToolsCached requires ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)), and
// is denied at dispatch like any other hidden tool if a stale/adversarial
// call reaches it anyway — so a deferred mutator's schema can never reach the
// model through tool_search while in plan mode. This test pins that
// end-to-end: tool_search is absent from the advertised tool list, and a
// forced call to it is denied before rendering any tool schema.
func TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate2"})
registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{ // turn 1: force a call to tool_search even though it should not be advertised.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: tools.ToolSearchToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__mutate"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{ // turn 2: final answer.
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred mutators registered => eligible for deferral.
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// tool_search (and the deferred mutators) must not be advertised in plan
// mode's turn 1 tool list at all.
for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
if def.Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate" || def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate2" {
t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise a deferred mutator, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
}
// The forced call must be denied outright, never a loaded-schema result:
// the tool result must not mention the mutator's name or carry a
// load_tools signal.
var toolMessage string
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolMessage = message.Content
break
}
}
if !strings.Contains(toolMessage, "not available in plan mode") {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search call denied in plan mode, got %q", toolMessage)
}
if strings.Contains(toolMessage, "mcp__srv__mutate") {
t.Fatalf("denial must not leak the deferred mutator's name/schema, got %q", toolMessage)
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
result, _ := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}`}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DisabledTools: []string{"read_file"},
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
)
// argsPermTool implements tools.ArgsPermissioner; plainTool does not.
+19 -8
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// TestOptionsModelSwitcherFieldExists asserts the escalation hook is an
@@ -144,9 +144,10 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
var switchedTo string
switchCount := 0
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", firstProvider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
ServiceTier: "priority",
MaxTurns: 4,
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error) {
switchCount++
switchedTo = modelID
@@ -167,9 +168,15 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
if len(firstProvider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected first provider to handle exactly the escalation turn, got %d requests", len(firstProvider.requests))
}
if got := firstProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
t.Fatalf("initial request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
}
if len(secondProvider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected second provider to handle the post-switch turn, got %d requests", len(secondProvider.requests))
}
if got := secondProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "" {
t.Fatalf("post-switch request retained service tier %q", got)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "answered on the upgraded model" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer from the swapped provider, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
@@ -211,9 +218,10 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("recovered")}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
MaxTurns: 4,
Registry: registry,
Model: "claude-sonnet-4.5",
ServiceTier: "priority",
MaxTurns: 4,
ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (Provider, error) {
return nil, errors.New("provider build blew up")
},
@@ -225,6 +233,9 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected the run to continue on the original provider, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
}
if got := provider.requests[1].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
t.Fatalf("failed-switch request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after non-fatal switch error, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agent
import (
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/lsp"
)
// fileDiagnosticsTimeout bounds one inline post-edit diagnostics check so a
+378
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type customApplyPatchTool struct {
calls int
}
type fixedPathScope struct {
roots []string
}
func (scope fixedPathScope) Roots() []string {
return append([]string(nil), scope.roots...)
}
func newFixedPathScope(t *testing.T, roots ...string) fixedPathScope {
t.Helper()
resolved := make([]string, 0, len(roots))
for _, root := range roots {
absolute, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Abs(%q): %v", root, err)
}
if physical, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absolute); err == nil {
absolute = physical
}
resolved = append(resolved, absolute)
}
return fixedPathScope{roots: resolved}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Name() string { return "apply_patch" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Description() string { return "custom JSON tool" }
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"value": {Type: "string"}}}
}
func (*customApplyPatchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead}
}
func (tool *customApplyPatchTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls++
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchUsesExistingToolExecutionPath(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: hello.txt\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchSupportsGrantedExtraRoot(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(root, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewScope: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(extra, "hello.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+hello\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("freeform extra-root apply_patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read extra-root patched file: %v", err)
}
if string(content) != "hello\n" {
t.Fatalf("patched content = %q, want hello newline", content)
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsMixedWorkspaceAndExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
for _, extraHasMatchingPath := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "extra target missing"
if extraHasMatchingPath {
name = "extra target exists"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(workspace, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
workspaceTarget := filepath.Join(workspace, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(workspaceTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
extraTarget := filepath.Join(extra, "src", "a.go")
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(extraTarget), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(extraTarget, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
extraCreated := filepath.Join(extra, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: src/a.go",
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + extraCreated,
"+extra",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "mixes workspace-relative paths with an extra write root") {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch result = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(workspaceTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("workspace target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if extraHasMatchingPath {
if content, err := os.ReadFile(extraTarget); err != nil || string(content) != "old\n" {
t.Fatalf("extra-root target changed: content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
}
if _, err := os.Stat(extraCreated); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("mixed-root patch created extra file: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchAcceptsOneSemanticRoot(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
useExtraRoot bool
}{
{name: "workspace"},
{name: "extra root", useExtraRoot: true},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, []string{extra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
root := workspace
if test.useExtraRoot {
root = extra
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(root, "src"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target := filepath.Join(root, "src", "a.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte("old\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
updatePath := target
if !test.useExtraRoot {
updatePath = filepath.Join("src", "a.go")
}
created := filepath.Join(root, "b.go")
patch := strings.Join([]string{
"*** Begin Patch",
"*** Update File: " + updatePath,
"@@",
"-old",
"+new",
"*** Add File: " + created,
"+created",
"*** End Patch",
}, "\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspace, scope))
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: workspace, FileTracker: tools.NewFileTracker()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("single-root patch status = %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(target); err != nil || string(content) != "new\n" {
t.Fatalf("updated content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
if content, err := os.ReadFile(created); err != nil || string(content) != "created\n" {
t.Fatalf("created content=%q err=%v", content, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestFreeformApplyPatchRejectsAbsolutePathOutsideGrantedRoots(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
granted := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, granted)
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope))
target := filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: patch, Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(target); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("ungranted absolute patch created target: %v", err)
}
}
func TestPreparedFreeformPatchRejectsIntermediateSymlinkSwap(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("creating directory symlinks requires privileges on Windows")
}
root := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
intermediate := filepath.Join(extra, "nested")
if err := os.Mkdir(intermediate, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Mkdir: %v", err)
}
scope := newFixedPathScope(t, root, extra)
tool := tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, scope)
target := filepath.Join(intermediate, "blocked.txt")
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: " + target + "\n+blocked\n*** End Patch\n"
args, err := tools.PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments(tool, patch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PrepareFreeformApplyPatchArguments: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Remove(intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Remove intermediate: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Symlink(outside, intermediate); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Symlink: %v", err)
}
result := tool.Run(context.Background(), args)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch status = %s, want error: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outside, "blocked.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("symlink-swapped patch wrote outside root: %v", err)
}
}
func TestUnknownFreeformToolFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), tools.NewRegistry(), zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "unknown", Arguments: "raw", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unknown freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
}
func TestCustomApplyPatchCannotUseFreeformContract(t *testing.T) {
custom := &customApplyPatchTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(custom)
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: "raw patch", Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeUnsafe, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "Unsupported freeform tool call") {
t.Fatalf("custom freeform apply_patch result = %#v, want unsupported error", result)
}
if custom.calls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("custom apply_patch executed %d times", custom.calls)
}
}
func TestDeniedFreeformApplyPatchDoesNotWrite(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil))
patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: denied.txt\n+must not exist\n*** End Patch\n"
result, err := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, zeroruntime.ToolCall{
ID: "call-1",
Name: "apply_patch",
Arguments: patch,
Freeform: true,
}, PermissionModeAsk, Options{
Cwd: root,
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "test denial"}, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "denied.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("denied freeform patch changed the workspace: %v", err)
}
}
func TestHistorySafeToolCallsPreservesRawFreeformArguments(t *testing.T) {
raw := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/main.go\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\n"
safe := historySafeToolCalls([]ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: raw, Freeform: true,
}})
if len(safe) != 1 || safe[0].Arguments != raw || safe[0].ProviderCallID != "provider-1" || !safe[0].Freeform {
t.Fatalf("freeform history changed raw call: %#v", safe)
}
}
func TestAbortedToolResultPreservesProviderCallID(t *testing.T) {
messages := appendAbortedToolResults(nil, []ToolCall{{
ID: "call-1", ProviderCallID: "provider-1", Name: "read_file",
}})
if len(messages) != 1 || messages[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || messages[0].ToolCallProviderID != "provider-1" || !messages[0].IsError {
t.Fatalf("aborted tool result lost provider identity: %#v", messages)
}
}
+20 -23
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Guardrail thresholds for the agent loop. These keep a runaway model from
@@ -34,11 +33,11 @@ const (
// knows before spending more tool turns.
toolOnlyProgressReminderAt = 6
// planReminderTurn is the turn (1-based) by the end of which a multi-step
// task should have called update_plan; if it hasn't, a one-time reminder is
// injected. Set to 3 (not 2) so short, legitimate two-step tasks finish
// without a spurious planning nag.
planReminderTurn = 3
// planReminderTurn and planReminderToolThreshold keep bounded implementation
// work plan-free while still nudging a genuinely sustained run that has not
// established any structured progress. Both thresholds must be met.
planReminderTurn = 7
planReminderToolThreshold = 7
// planToolName is the planning tool the loop watches for by name.
planToolName = "update_plan"
@@ -127,9 +126,8 @@ func endsWithContinuationCue(text string) bool {
// which the update_plan tool coerces to "pending") counts as remaining, matching
// that tool's own status normalization.
func planStatusRemaining(status string) bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]",
"failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
switch normalizeTaskPlanStatus(status) {
case "completed", "failed":
return false
default:
return true
@@ -307,8 +305,8 @@ func hasAnyPrefix(s string, prefixes []string) bool {
// the bug-hunt surfaced: well-formed output treated as correct; pre-existing tests
// passing treated as the objective being met; and a result that merely matches a
// baseline the task asked to beat or improve. General — no task-specific content.
func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
return "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
func acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective string) string {
nudge := "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
"NOT the shape or format of your output, NOT that pre-existing tests pass, and NOT that your " +
"result merely matches a baseline you were asked to beat or improve. " +
"Re-read the original task, then run a concrete check that exercises the actual requirement: " +
@@ -316,6 +314,10 @@ func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
"thing the task asked you to produce, recover, fix, or optimize. " +
"If that check passes, reply PASS and cite the evidence. " +
"If it does not pass — or you cannot run such a check — say so plainly and keep working; do not claim success."
if objective = capTaskObjective(objective); objective != "" {
nudge += "\n\nTask objective: " + objective
}
return nudge
}
// toolFailureHintMarker is a stable substring for tests.
@@ -553,16 +555,12 @@ func (state *guardState) pendingPlanItems() bool {
// many items are still remaining. Malformed arguments leave the prior count
// unchanged (best-effort — the plan panel itself tolerates the same).
func (state *guardState) observePlanUpdate(arguments string) {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(arguments), &parsed) != nil {
plan, ok := parseTaskPlan(arguments)
if !ok {
return
}
pending := 0
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
for _, item := range plan {
if planStatusRemaining(item.Status) {
pending++
}
@@ -593,13 +591,12 @@ func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
return planStaleReminder(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
// NOT-CALLED reminder: by the end of planReminderTurn the model should have
// called update_plan if it's doing a multi-step task (>=1 other tool call).
// One-shot for the whole run.
// NOT-CALLED reminder: once both the turn and tool-call thresholds are met,
// sustained work should have called update_plan. One-shot for the whole run.
if !state.notCalledReminderSent &&
!state.planEverCalled &&
turn >= planReminderTurn &&
state.totalToolCalls >= 1 {
state.totalToolCalls >= planReminderToolThreshold {
state.notCalledReminderSent = true
return planNotCalledReminder()
}
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