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Author SHA1 Message Date
KRATOS ecce5d9374 test(tui): cover the /undo numeric-sequence form (#698 review)
Add a parseCommand("/undo 123") assertion so both the latest and numeric
<sequence> forms of the /rewind contract are exercised through the alias.
2026-07-19 11:06:45 +05:30
KRATOS a053a6a8f0 feat(tui): add /undo as an alias for /rewind (#698)
/undo was unregistered and fell through to commandUnknown. Add it to the
/rewind command's aliases (the same mechanism /quit, /find, /mcp-status use), so
it dispatches to the existing rewind handler with args intact.
2026-07-19 10:51:09 +05:30
7 changed files with 35 additions and 116 deletions

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+6 -6
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@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ func RequestDeviceCode(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, cfg Config, now
if err := validateTokenEndpoint(endpoint); err != nil {
return DeviceAuth{}, err
}
// Refuse redirects so a device-authorization redirect can't replay the
// client_id/client_secret POST body to an unvalidated origin.
client = withoutRedirects(client)
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
}
@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ func pollDeviceOnce(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, cfg Config, device
if err := validateTokenEndpoint(cfg.TokenEndpoint); err != nil {
return Token{}, err
}
// Refuse redirects so a poll redirect can't replay the device_code/secret
// POST body to an unvalidated origin.
client = withoutRedirects(client)
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("grant_type", deviceGrantType)
form.Set("device_code", deviceCode)
-25
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@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package oauth
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
@@ -29,30 +28,6 @@ func TestRequestDeviceCodeSendsClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRequestDeviceCodeRefusesRedirect(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, hits := redirectTrap(t, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect) // 307
_, err := RequestDeviceCode(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient,
Config{ClientID: "c", ClientSecret: "shh", DeviceAuthorizationEndpoint: endpoint}, nil)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsafeRedirect) {
t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceCode err = %v, want ErrUnsafeRedirect", err)
}
if n := hits(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker received %d request(s) — client_secret replayed", n)
}
}
func TestPollDeviceOnceRefusesRedirect(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, hits := redirectTrap(t, http.StatusPermanentRedirect) // 308
_, err := pollDeviceOnce(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient,
Config{ClientID: "c", ClientSecret: "shh", TokenEndpoint: endpoint}, "device-code", nil)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsafeRedirect) {
t.Fatalf("pollDeviceOnce err = %v, want ErrUnsafeRedirect", err)
}
if n := hits(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker received %d request(s) — device_code/secret replayed", n)
}
}
func TestRequestDeviceCode(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"WXYZ-1234","verification_uri":"https://x/dev","verification_uri_complete":"https://x/dev?c=WXYZ","expires_in":600,"interval":3}`))
+3 -20
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@@ -116,23 +116,6 @@ func validateTokenEndpoint(endpoint string) error {
return ValidateEndpointURL(endpoint)
}
// withoutRedirects returns a shallow copy of client whose redirect policy
// refuses to follow ANY redirect. A credential-bearing OAuth POST (token
// exchange/refresh, device authorization, device-token poll) must never let a
// 307/308 replay its form body — codes, PKCE verifiers, refresh tokens, client
// secrets — to a target that was never endpoint-validated. The caller's client
// is left unmodified.
func withoutRedirects(client *http.Client) *http.Client {
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
copied := *client
copied.CheckRedirect = func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return ErrUnsafeRedirect
}
return &copied
}
func isLoopbackHost(host string) bool {
if host == "localhost" {
return true
@@ -193,9 +176,9 @@ func PostToken(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, tokenEndpoint string, f
if err := validateTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint); err != nil {
return Token{}, err
}
// Refuse redirects so a 307/308 from the token endpoint can't replay this
// credential-bearing POST body to another (unvalidated) origin.
client = withoutRedirects(client)
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
}
-60
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@@ -5,12 +5,10 @@ import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -128,64 +126,6 @@ func TestBuildAuthorizationURLRejectsInsecureEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// redirectTrap starts an "attacker" server that counts any hit, and a credential
// endpoint that redirects to it with the given status. It returns the endpoint
// URL and a func reporting how many times the attacker was contacted — a
// non-zero count means the credential-bearing POST body was replayed (#729).
func redirectTrap(t *testing.T, status int) (endpoint string, attackerHits func() int32) {
t.Helper()
var hits int32
attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"access_token":"leaked","refresh_token":"leaked"}`)
}))
t.Cleanup(attacker.Close)
endp := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, attacker.URL, status)
}))
t.Cleanup(endp.Close)
return endp.URL, func() int32 { return atomic.LoadInt32(&hits) }
}
func TestPostTokenRefusesRedirect(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, hits := redirectTrap(t, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect) // 307
form := url.Values{}
form.Set("grant_type", "authorization_code")
form.Set("code", "the-code")
form.Set("client_secret", "shh")
_, err := PostToken(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient, endpoint, form, Token{}, nil)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsafeRedirect) {
t.Fatalf("PostToken err = %v, want ErrUnsafeRedirect", err)
}
if n := hits(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker received %d request(s) — credential body was replayed", n)
}
}
func TestExchangeCodeRefusesRedirect(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, hits := redirectTrap(t, http.StatusPermanentRedirect) // 308
_, err := ExchangeCode(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient,
Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: endpoint}, "the-code", "verifier", "http://127.0.0.1/cb", nil)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsafeRedirect) {
t.Fatalf("ExchangeCode err = %v, want ErrUnsafeRedirect", err)
}
if n := hits(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker received %d request(s) — code/verifier replayed", n)
}
}
func TestRefreshRefusesRedirect(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, hits := redirectTrap(t, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect) // 307
_, err := Refresh(context.Background(), http.DefaultClient,
Config{ClientID: "c", TokenEndpoint: endpoint}, Token{RefreshToken: "rt"}, nil)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsafeRedirect) {
t.Fatalf("Refresh err = %v, want ErrUnsafeRedirect", err)
}
if n := hits(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker received %d request(s) — refresh_token replayed", n)
}
}
func TestValidateTokenEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]bool{
"https://auth.example.com/token": true,
-5
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@@ -90,11 +90,6 @@ var (
// ErrInsecureTokenEndpoint is returned when a credential would be sent over a
// non-https, non-loopback endpoint.
ErrInsecureTokenEndpoint = errors.New("oauth: refusing to send credential to a non-https token endpoint")
// ErrUnsafeRedirect is returned when a credential-bearing OAuth POST (token
// exchange/refresh, device authorization, or device-token poll) is redirected.
// Following it would replay the form body — codes, PKCE verifiers, refresh
// tokens, client secrets — to a target that never passed endpoint validation.
ErrUnsafeRedirect = errors.New("oauth: refusing to follow a redirect from a credential endpoint")
// ErrNoRefreshToken is returned when a refresh is attempted without one.
ErrNoRefreshToken = errors.New("oauth: no refresh token available")
// ErrAuthorizationPending is the RFC 8628 "keep polling" signal.
+1
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@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ var commandDefinitions = []commandDefinition{
},
{
name: "/rewind",
aliases: []string{"/undo"},
usage: "/rewind [latest|<sequence>]",
group: commandGroupSession,
description: "Restore workspace files to a checkpoint and truncate the session.",
+25
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@@ -985,6 +985,31 @@ func TestParseBackgroundTerminalCommands(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// /undo is an alias for /rewind (issue #698): previously it fell through to
// commandUnknown.
func TestUndoAliasesRewind(t *testing.T) {
rewind, ok := resolveCommand("/rewind")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected /rewind to resolve")
}
alias, ok := resolveCommand("/undo")
if !ok || alias.kind != rewind.kind {
t.Fatalf("expected /undo to alias /rewind, got ok=%v command=%#v", ok, alias)
}
// End-to-end: a typed /undo dispatches to the rewind handler with args intact,
// for both the "latest" and numeric-<sequence> forms of the /rewind contract.
if parsed := parseCommand("/undo latest"); parsed.kind != commandRewind || parsed.text != "latest" {
t.Fatalf("parseCommand(%q) = %#v, want commandRewind with text=latest", "/undo latest", parsed)
}
if parsed := parseCommand("/undo 123"); parsed.kind != commandRewind || parsed.text != "123" {
t.Fatalf("parseCommand(%q) = %#v, want commandRewind with text=123", "/undo 123", parsed)
}
// Guard: without the alias it would be commandUnknown.
if parsed := parseCommand("/undo"); parsed.kind == commandUnknown {
t.Fatal("/undo resolved to commandUnknown — the alias is not wired")
}
}
func TestCommandSelectionRequiresInputFromUsage(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string