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Author SHA1 Message Date
Gnanam 57ef38ebcb fix(providerio): surface ErrStreamStalled in callers + widen flaky test margins
Address review:
- All four provider stream handlers (openai, codex, anthropic, gemini) now treat
  ErrStreamStalled in the same branch as ErrStreamIdle, via a new
  providerio.StreamTimeoutMessage helper that gives the stall a distinct, accurate
  message (it reports the content window and does NOT claim the upstream stopped
  sending data — keep-alives were still arriving). Previously a stalled stream fell
  through to the generic provider-error path.
- Widen the content-watchdog test timing margins (idle 100ms, data/keepalive every
  30ms) so CI/GC jitter can't trip the idle watchdog and mask the content path.
- Add a StreamTimeoutMessage unit test.
2026-06-30 22:13:55 +05:30
Gnanam 31e57915c9 fix(providerio): bound heartbeat-but-no-output streams (content-stall watchdog)
A stalled-but-alive upstream hung the agent indefinitely: SSE keep-alives reset the
idle watchdog (intentionally — a heartbeating upstream isn't 'dead', and aborting it
killed healthy long requests), so a stream that heartbeats while producing nothing
never tripped the idle timeout and there was no other ceiling. Observed on both
chatgpt/gpt-5.x (Codex) and ollama minimax-m3 — different provider code, same shared
providerio SSE loop — so the fix belongs here, once, for every provider.

Add a second 'content' watchdog alongside the idle one: keep-alives still reset idle
(no regression for heartbeating connections), but only REAL data lines reset the
content watchdog. If no data arrives for streamContentStallFactor (2) × the idle
timeout, abort with ErrStreamStalled instead of hanging. A slow-but-producing stream
(data between heartbeats) keeps resetting content and is never killed.

Contained to internal/providers/providerio — no provider/caller changes.
2026-06-30 22:03:24 +05:30
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+7 -97
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@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ jobs:
# is published under the pushed git tag. If they disagree, install.sh/install.ps1
# and the npm postinstall all build a download URL that 404s. Fail fast so a
# forgotten version bump can never publish mis-versioned, un-installable assets.
# Matches on the ref (not event_name) because release-please dispatches this
# workflow at the tag ref — its GITHUB_TOKEN-created tag cannot fire `push`.
- name: Check tag matches package.json version
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
shell: bash
run: |
pkg_version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
@@ -80,15 +78,13 @@ jobs:
path: dist/release/*
if-no-files-found: error
# On a `v*` tag ref (pushed manually, or dispatched at the tag by the
# release-please workflow), publish the packaged archive + .sha256 as GitHub
# Release assets so the documented `scripts/install.sh` / `install.ps1` path
# (which reads /releases/latest) works. Uses the preinstalled `gh` (no new
# action dependency); each matrix OS creates the release if absent
# (best-effort — release-please normally creates it first) then uploads its
# own assets with --clobber. Tags come from merging the release-please PR.
# On a `v*` tag push, publish the packaged archive + .sha256 as GitHub Release
# assets so the documented `scripts/install.sh` / `install.ps1` path (which reads
# /releases/latest) works. Uses the preinstalled `gh` (no new action dependency);
# each matrix OS creates the release if absent (best-effort) then uploads its own
# assets with --clobber. NOTE: maintainers must push the tag — this never tags.
- name: Publish to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
@@ -96,89 +92,3 @@ jobs:
tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes the npm wrapper (@gitlawb/zero) once every platform's release
# assets are live — the package's postinstall downloads its binary from the
# GitHub Release, so publishing before the assets exist would ship a package
# that fails to install.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
publish-npm:
name: Publish npm package
needs: package
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Manual approval gate: this environment carries a required-reviewer rule
# (Settings -> Environments -> npm-publish), so the job pauses until a
# maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
environment:
name: npm-publish
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
# No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
# .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
# unset env var. Trusted publishing needs no token at all.
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 24
# OIDC trusted publishing needs npm >= 11.5.1. Use the npm bundled with
# the pinned Node toolchain (Node 24 ships >= 11.5.1) rather than pulling
# npm@latest from the registry inside the publish path — an unpinned
# install there would be avoidable supply-chain exposure. Fail fast if a
# future runner/toolchain change ever regresses the bundled npm.
- name: Check npm supports trusted publishing
run: |
npm --version | node -e '
const version = require("fs").readFileSync(0, "utf8").trim();
const [major, minor, patch] = version.split(".").map(Number);
const ok =
major > 11 ||
(major === 11 && (minor > 5 || (minor === 5 && patch >= 1)));
if (!ok) {
console.error(
`::error::bundled npm ${version} is too old for OIDC trusted ` +
`publishing (needs >= 11.5.1) — bump node-version in this job.`,
);
process.exit(1);
}
console.log(`npm ${version} supports trusted publishing.`);
'
# Probe the exact URLs postinstall will build (internal/release/release.go
# asset-name scheme) as an anonymous client. This also blocks publishing
# while the repo is still private — private release assets 404 without
# auth, exactly as they would for an installing user.
- name: Verify release assets are downloadable
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/v${version}"
for asset in \
"zero-v${version}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-linux-arm64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-macos-x64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-macos-arm64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-windows-x64.zip"; do
for url in "${base}/${asset}" "${base}/${asset}.sha256"; do
if ! curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null "$url"; then
echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — npm postinstall would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
done
echo "all release assets for v${version} are publicly downloadable."
- name: Publish to npm
run: npm publish --access public
-35
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@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
name: Release Please
on:
push:
branches:
- main
permissions:
contents: write # push the release-PR branch, create the tag + GitHub Release
pull-requests: write # open/update the release PR
issues: write # create/apply release-tracking labels on the release PR
actions: write # dispatch release-artifacts.yml once a release is cut
jobs:
release-please:
name: Release PR / tag
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Run release-please
id: release
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@a02a34c4d625f9be7cb89156071d8567266a2445 # v4.2.0
# Tags created with the default GITHUB_TOKEN never fire `on: push: tags`
# workflows (GitHub suppresses workflows triggered by workflow-created
# events), so release-artifacts.yml would not run for a release-please
# tag. workflow_dispatch invoked through the API is exempt from that
# suppression — dispatch the artifacts build at the new tag explicitly.
- name: Build and publish release artifacts
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
gh workflow run release-artifacts.yml \
--repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
--ref "${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}"
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{".":"0.1.0"}
+1 -21
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@@ -6,32 +6,12 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## 0.1.0 (2026-07-02)
### Features
* publish zero to npm via release-please ([#367](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/367)) ([8eccc26](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8eccc2669887bc38d35bc16a315c888e4d9ec43a))
* **tui:** FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in ([#365](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/365)) ([142c548](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/142c548c89a8652ce300e64ddf1228ee36df7606))
### Bug Fixes
* **auth:** propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider ([#366](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/366)) ([6e0a665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6e0a665118fe0e09c4b07d482dd18f86045acd2b))
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- `SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or `ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- `--theme <name>` flag for the TUI, accepting `auto` or any registered theme (previously only the
`ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- `--theme {auto|dark|light}` flag for the TUI (previously only the `ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- "Accessibility / Appearance" section in the README documenting `NO_COLOR`, `ZERO_THEME`, `/theme`,
and `ZERO_NO_FADE`.
+3 -33
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@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
</p>
Zero is an AI coding agent for your local terminal. It can inspect a repository,
@@ -53,27 +51,6 @@ The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
arm64.
### Bun
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
Install with Bun, then fetch the binary in one of two ways:
```bash
# Option A: run the installer manually
bun add @gitlawb/zero
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
# Option B: allow the postinstall to run on install
# add to your package.json: "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
For global installs (`bun add -g @gitlawb/zero`), use Option A against the
global install path, or prefer the install scripts below.
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
@@ -144,13 +121,6 @@ the key in the wizard:
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
@@ -284,9 +254,9 @@ zero update check for newer releases
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<anything>` | disables color output |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <name>` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI (same names) |
| `/theme` | opens the theme picker inside the TUI (live preview; `/theme <name>` switches directly) |
| `ZERO_THEME=auto|dark|light` | selects the startup theme |
| `--theme auto|dark|light` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI |
| `/theme auto|dark|light` | switches theme inside the TUI |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | disables streaming fade animation |
Meaning does not rely on color alone; diffs, permissions, and statuses also use
-297
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@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/assets/zero-logo.png" alt="Zero" width="385">
</p>
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
</p>
Zero 是一个用于本地终端的 AI 编码智能体。它可以检查仓库、编辑文件、运行命令、使用浏览器/终端辅助工具,并在你选择模型和权限级别的同时保持持久的本地会话。
```bash
zero
zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化,支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行,以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
- **保持上下文本地化。** 会话存储在磁盘上,可搜索、可恢复,且 Zero 不会作为遥测数据上传。
- **可扩展。** 使用 MCP 服务器、技能、插件、钩子和来自同一 CLI 的专业子智能体。
## 安装
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
npm 包安装一个小型包装器以及与你平台匹配的 Zero 二进制文件(从 GitHub Releases 获取)。支持 Linux、macOS 和 Windows 的 x64 和 arm64。
### Bun
Bun 默认不运行依赖的生命周期脚本,因此获取 Zero 二进制文件的 `postinstall` 会被跳过,首次运行会失败并显示 `No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`。
使用 Bun 安装后,通过以下两种方式之一获取二进制文件:
```bash
# 选项 A:手动运行安装程序
bun add @gitlawb/zero
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
# 选项 B:允许 postinstall 在安装时运行
# 添加到你的 package.json: "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
对于全局安装(`bun add -g @gitlawb/zero`),请对全局安装路径使用选项 A,或使用下面的安装脚本。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.25+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
发布安装器和 npm 包需要已发布的 GitHub Release 资源。如果你在首次公开发布之前进行测试,请从源码构建:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
在 Linux 上,如果你需要原生沙箱,还需要构建沙箱辅助程序:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
```
将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
更多安装细节:[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
## 首次运行
启动 TUI:
```bash
zero
```
设置向导帮助你选择提供商和模型。你也可以从命令行配置提供商:
```bash
zero setup
zero providers list
zero models list
zero doctor
```
对于 API 提供商,在设置之前设置匹配的环境变量或在向导中输入密钥:
```bash
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio,然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
## 日常使用
### 交互式 TUI
```bash
zero
```
常用控制:
| 控制 | 操作 |
|---|---|
| `Enter` | 发送提示 |
| `/` | 打开斜杠命令建议 |
| `Shift+Tab` | 切换权限模式 |
| `Ctrl+B` | 显示/隐藏侧边栏 |
| `Ctrl+C` | 取消或退出 |
常用斜杠命令:
| 命令 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| `/model`、`/provider` | 切换活动模型/提供商 |
| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
| `/theme`、`/doctor`、`/config` | 调整外观和检查设置 |
### 无头 `exec` 模式
```bash
zero exec "解释 internal/agent/loop.go"
zero exec --model claude-sonnet-4.5 "重构配置加载器"
zero exec --use-spec "为 API 客户端添加速率限制"
zero exec --worktree "在隔离的工作树中尝试迁移"
zero exec --resume
zero exec --fork <session-id> "尝试另一种方法"
```
编程使用:
```bash
zero exec --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
Stream-JSON 协议文档在 [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)。
## 安全模型
Zero 旨在使副作用可见。
- 工作区读取默认允许。
- 文件写入限制在工作区内,除非你授予其他目录。
- Shell 命令、网络访问、破坏性命令和提权操作需要权限授权。
- `--add-dir <path>` 和 `/add-dir <path>` 授予额外的写入根目录,而不会给智能体整个文件系统。
- 不安全/自主模式是显式选择加入。
- 在 Zero 控制的界面上,密钥会从工具输出和日志中被脱敏。
示例:
```bash
zero --add-dir ../docs-site
zero exec --add-dir ../shared "更新两个仓库"
```
沙箱行为可以通过以下方式检查:
```bash
zero sandbox policy
zero sandbox grants list
```
## Web 和本地控制
Zero 包含本地文件/搜索/编辑/Shell 工具、用于公共 URL 的 `web_fetch`,以及用于额外工具的 MCP 支持。
对于本地开发服务器,使用 Shell 命令(如通过 `exec_command` 的 `curl`),这样正常的沙箱和权限策略就会生效。长时间运行的命令保持附加到后台终端会话,可以从 TUI 中列出或停止。
npm 包还包含本地浏览器/终端工具使用的浏览器和终端辅助包。源码构建可以在它们位于 `PATH` 上或在 Zero 的本地控制设置中配置时使用相同的辅助工具。
## 常用命令
```text
zero 交互式 TUI
zero exec 一次性或脚本化智能体运行
zero setup 首次运行提供商设置
zero auth 支持提供商的 OAuth/登录辅助
zero models 模型注册表和能力
zero providers 提供商配置和检测
zero doctor 设置、密钥和连接检查
zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
zero plugins 管理插件
zero hooks 管理生命周期钩子
zero mcp 管理 MCP 服务器和工具
zero serve --mcp 通过 MCP stdio 暴露 Zero 工具
zero sandbox 检查沙箱策略和授权
zero worktrees 准备隔离的 Git 工作树
zero verify 检测和运行本地验证检查
zero changes 检查和提交本地 Git 变更
zero usage Token 使用量和估算成本
zero cron 定时智能体任务
zero update 检查更新版本
```
## 外观和无障碍
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
含义不仅仅依赖于颜色;差异、权限和状态也使用文本或标记符号。
## 开发
```bash
go test ./...
go run ./cmd/zero-release build
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
交叉编译示例:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero.exe
```
## 文档
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
- [基准测试](docs/BENCHMARK.md)
- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## 贡献
欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md),运行相关测试,然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
安全报告应遵循 [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)。
## 许可证
Zero 基于 [MIT 许可证](LICENSE) 发布。
+1 -19
View File
@@ -54,26 +54,8 @@ const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
'\n' +
'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun
? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. To let it run on future installs, add zero to your\n' +
'project\'s trustedDependencies:\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'then reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
: '') +
'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
'(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper. Reinstall the zero package or run `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` from the repository.'
);
process.exit(1);
}
-32
View File
@@ -24,38 +24,6 @@ Requirements:
- Node.js 18+
- network access to npm and GitHub Releases
## Bun
Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
To install with Bun, either run the installer manually after installing:
```bash
bun add @gitlawb/zero
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
```
Or allow the postinstall to run by adding the package to your project's
`trustedDependencies` before installing:
```json
{
"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
}
```
```bash
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
For global installs (`bun add -g @gitlawb/zero`), run the installer manually
against the global install path, or use the install scripts below.
Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
-19
View File
@@ -280,25 +280,6 @@ func isContextLimitError(message string) bool {
return false
}
// isStreamTimeoutError reports whether a streamed error is a provider stream
// idle/stall timeout (providerio surfaces these as "idle timeout after …" /
// "no output for …" / "stream stalled"). Such a turn produced nothing, so when
// no content was forwarded yet it can be safely re-issued on a fresh connection
// (see the stall-retry in the agent loop). Substring + case-insensitive to
// tolerate the prefixed "provider stream error: …" wrapping.
func isStreamTimeoutError(message string) bool {
lowered := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(message))
if lowered == "" {
return false
}
for _, needle := range []string{"idle timeout after", "no output for", "stream stalled"} {
if strings.Contains(lowered, needle) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// compactionState carries the per-run state the agent loop needs to compact a
// conversation safely. It is created once per Run and is a no-op whenever
// options.ContextWindow <= 0.
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
package agent
import "testing"
// decodeToolArguments must (a) decode a normal single-object payload unchanged,
// (b) tolerate a weak model packing multiple concatenated top-level JSON objects
// into one arguments string by decoding the FIRST object and ignoring the rest
// (the minimax-m3 "invalid character '{' after top-level value" failure), and
// (c) still reject a genuinely malformed/truncated first object.
func TestDecodeToolArguments(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("single object decodes normally", func(t *testing.T) {
var a map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":"x"}`, &a); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if a["path"] != "x" {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want path=x", a)
}
})
t.Run("concatenated objects decode the first, ignore trailing", func(t *testing.T) {
var b map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":"first"}{"path":"second"}`, &b); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("multi-object should decode the first, got err = %v", err)
}
if b["path"] != "first" {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want the first object (path=first)", b)
}
})
t.Run("distinct tools' args concatenated (real minimax case): first object used", func(t *testing.T) {
var c map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"plan":[1,2]}{"cmd":"go version"}`, &c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if _, ok := c["plan"]; !ok || c["cmd"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want only the first object's keys", c)
}
})
t.Run("truncated first object still errors", func(t *testing.T) {
var d map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":`, &d); err == nil {
t.Fatal("truncated JSON must still error")
}
})
t.Run("non-JSON trailing garbage still errors (not masked)", func(t *testing.T) {
var g map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"x":1}xyz`, &g); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a valid first object followed by non-JSON garbage must still error")
}
})
t.Run("recoverableToolArguments: only whole-JSON trailing is tolerated", func(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
ok bool
first string
}{
{`{"a":1}`, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1}{"b":2}`, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1} {"b":2} `, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1}xyz`, false, ""},
{`{"a":`, false, ""},
{` `, false, ""},
}
for _, c := range cases {
first, ok := recoverableToolArguments(c.in)
if ok != c.ok || (ok && first != c.first) {
t.Fatalf("recoverableToolArguments(%q) = (%q,%v), want (%q,%v)", c.in, first, ok, c.first, c.ok)
}
}
})
t.Run("historySafeToolCalls recovers the first object, not {}", func(t *testing.T) {
out := historySafeToolCalls([]ToolCall{
{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"README.md"}{"path":"AGENTS.md"}`}, // concatenated -> first
{ID: "c2", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}xyz`}, // garbage -> {}
{ID: "c3", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"ok"}`}, // valid -> unchanged
})
if out[0].Arguments != `{"path":"README.md"}` {
t.Fatalf("concatenated args should record the first object, got %q", out[0].Arguments)
}
if out[1].Arguments != "{}" {
t.Fatalf("garbage-trailing args should record {}, got %q", out[1].Arguments)
}
if out[2].Arguments != `{"path":"ok"}` {
t.Fatalf("valid args should be unchanged, got %q", out[2].Arguments)
}
})
t.Run("whitespace-only errors (caller guards empty)", func(t *testing.T) {
var e map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(" ", &e); err == nil {
t.Fatal("whitespace-only must error")
}
})
}
+36 -178
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -21,12 +20,6 @@ import (
const maxTurnsAnswer = "Agent reached maximum number of turns without a final answer."
const maxTurnsFinalAnswerPrompt = "You have reached the tool-turn limit. Do not call tools. Give a concise final answer now: summarize what you completed, what you found, and any remaining blockers."
// maxStreamStallRetries bounds how many times a turn that timed out (idle/stall)
// WITH NO OUTPUT yet is re-issued on a fresh connection before giving up. Only
// the no-output case is retried (a partial turn would duplicate), so this is a
// safe recovery for a stalled/dead pooled connection.
const maxStreamStallRetries = 2
const (
toolResultMetaControl = "control"
toolResultControlSpecReview = "spec_review_required"
@@ -210,74 +203,55 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
}
// forwardedVisibleText flags forwarded final PROSE (OnText) specifically —
// the only output whose re-stream on a stall retry would visibly DUPLICATE
// answer text the user already read. Transient working indicators
// (reasoning previews, tool-call "writing…" previews) are deliberately NOT
// counted: a turn that streamed only those then stalled — the common
// gpt-5.x / ollama "froze mid-write_file" case — is safe to re-issue, since
// the TUI resets the tool-call preview on the next tool-call-start and a
// stalled turn is never appended to `messages` (it returns on the error
// before the append), so the retry re-sends clean context with no
// conversation-state duplication.
forwardedVisibleText := false
forwardingOpts := zeroruntime.CollectOptions{OnUsage: options.OnUsage}
if options.OnText != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnText = func(s string) { forwardedVisibleText = true; options.OnText(s) }
}
if options.OnReasoning != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnReasoning = func(s string) { options.OnReasoning(s) }
}
if options.OnToolCallStart != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnToolCallStart = func(id, name string) { options.OnToolCallStart(id, name) }
}
if options.OnToolCallDelta != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnToolCallDelta = func(id, fragment string) { options.OnToolCallDelta(id, fragment) }
}
// recoverStreamError applies the same non-stall recovery the initial stream
// gets to ANY collected error — including one from a reissued (stall-retry)
// stream: an image rejection gets the friendly wrapping, and a context limit
// gets one compaction + reactive reissue (omitting visible callbacks, since
// any pre-error output was already forwarded). It returns the possibly-updated
// collected and a non-nil stop error when the run must end now.
recoverStreamError := func(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (zeroruntime.CollectedStream, error) {
if isImageRejectionError(errors.New(collected.Error)) {
return collected, fmt.Errorf("model %s rejected the image: %s. The model may not support image input — try switching to a vision-capable model (claude, gpt-4o, gemini)", options.Model, collected.Error)
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, stream, zeroruntime.CollectOptions{
OnText: options.OnText,
OnReasoning: options.OnReasoning,
OnUsage: options.OnUsage,
OnToolCallStart: options.OnToolCallStart,
OnToolCallDelta: options.OnToolCallDelta,
})
if collected.Error != "" {
collectedErr := errors.New(collected.Error)
if isImageRejectionError(collectedErr) {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, fmt.Errorf("model %s rejected the image: %s. The model may not support image input — try switching to a vision-capable model (claude, gpt-4o, gemini)", options.Model, collected.Error)
}
// REACTIVE compaction: the streamed error may also be a context limit
// (some providers surface it mid-stream). Compact and retry once.
// REACTIVE compaction: the streamed error may also be a context
// limit (some providers surface it mid-stream). Compact and retry
// the same turn once before giving up.
if compacted, retried, retryErr := compactor.recover(ctx, provider, messages, request.Tools, collected.Error); retried {
messages = compacted
if retryErr != nil {
return collected, retryErr
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, retryErr
}
// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this turn rather
// than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on registry+loaded (not
// the messages), so it stays valid after compaction.
// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this
// turn rather than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on
// registry+loaded (not the messages), so they stay valid after compaction.
// Routing through an empty-loaded partition here would re-hide every
// already-loaded deferred tool.
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
}
// Pre-content reconnect of a mid-stream disconnect: route the connect
// through the reconnect helper too (AUDIT-L1).
retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryStreamErr != nil {
return collected, retryStreamErr
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, retryStreamErr
}
// Omit OnText on the reactive retry: when the original error
// surfaced MID-stream, partial text was already forwarded to the
// user. Re-streaming the retried response on top of it would
// duplicate output. OnUsage IS kept so token telemetry/budgeting
// still counts the successful retry. The retried text is captured
// in collected.Text and becomes the turn's assistant message.
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, zeroruntime.CollectOptions{
OnUsage: options.OnUsage,
})
}
return collected, nil
}
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, stream, forwardingOpts)
if collected.Error != "" {
updated, stop := recoverStreamError(collected)
collected = updated
if stop != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, stop
}
}
// Check ctx first: on cancellation helpers.go sets collected.Error to
// ctx.Err().Error(), so returning errors.New(collected.Error) would lose
@@ -286,58 +260,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, ctx.Err()
}
// A stream idle/stall timeout is safely re-issued when the turn committed NO
// answer text — no forwarded visible prose (forwardedVisibleText) and no
// collected final text (collected.Text). This covers two cases:
// 1. Nothing streamed at all before the connection died (the original
// macOS stale-pooled-connection hang past the response-header timeout).
// 2. The model streamed transient reasoning and began a tool call (e.g. a
// large write_file) then froze mid-arguments — the common gpt-5.x /
// ollama heartbeat-pause stall. That partial tool call is NEVER executed
// (a turn with collected.Error returns before dispatch below) and NEVER
// appended to `messages`, so a retry re-issues clean context; the only
// re-render is transient previews, not duplicated answer text. This is
// why the gate no longer excludes collected.ToolCalls: an incomplete
// tool call from a timed-out stream is discard-and-retry, not output.
// A turn that forwarded real prose is NOT retried (it would duplicate visible
// answer text) and falls through to the error return below. Capped +
// exponential backoff, with a user-visible notice per attempt.
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxStreamStallRetries &&
isStreamTimeoutError(collected.Error) && !forwardedVisibleText &&
collected.Text == ""; attempt++ {
if notify := stallRetryNoticeFor(options); notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamStallRetries)
}
if err := sleepWithContext(ctx, backoffFor(attempt)); err != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, err
}
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
}
retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryErr != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, retryErr
}
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, forwardingOpts)
}
if collected.Error != "" {
// Route a reissued stream's non-stall error through the SAME recovery as
// the initial stream (image-rejection wrapping / context-limit compaction)
// rather than returning it raw.
updated, stop := recoverStreamError(collected)
collected = updated
if stop != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, stop
}
if collected.Error != "" {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, errors.New(collected.Error)
}
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, errors.New(collected.Error)
}
// Carry the turn's terminal stop reason so a final answer cut off at the
@@ -690,20 +615,8 @@ func historySafeToolCalls(calls []ToolCall) []ToolCall {
for i, call := range calls {
safe[i] = call
args := strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)
switch {
case args == "":
if args == "" || !json.Valid([]byte(args)) {
safe[i].Arguments = "{}"
case json.Valid([]byte(args)):
// already a single valid JSON value — keep as-is
default:
// Recover the first object for the concatenated case so the replayed
// transcript matches what executeToolCall actually ran; otherwise (real
// corruption) fall back to an empty object.
if first, ok := recoverableToolArguments(args); ok {
safe[i].Arguments = first
} else {
safe[i].Arguments = "{}"
}
}
}
return safe
@@ -728,53 +641,10 @@ func toolSchemaJSON(registry *tools.Registry, name string) string {
// is a non-nil ABORT error only when the call demands the whole run stop (a
// canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt) rather than continuing — every ordinary
// success or tool error returns a nil abort error.
// recoverableToolArguments inspects a tool call's raw JSON arguments. It returns
// the raw text of the FIRST JSON value when the payload is one value optionally
// followed by additional WHOLE JSON values (the weak-model concatenated case, e.g.
// `{A}{B}`). ok is false when the payload is genuinely malformed: a bad/truncated
// first value, OR trailing NON-JSON garbage after a valid first value (e.g.
// `{"x":1}xyz`) — that case must still error, not be silently accepted. Sharing
// this between dispatch and replay-history keeps them consistent: only a cleanly
// recoverable first object is ever used.
func recoverableToolArguments(arguments string) (first string, ok bool) {
dec := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(arguments))
var head json.RawMessage
if err := dec.Decode(&head); err != nil {
return "", false
}
// The remainder must be only whole JSON values (or nothing); any decode error
// other than EOF means trailing garbage — reject so corruption still surfaces.
for {
var rest json.RawMessage
if err := dec.Decode(&rest); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return strings.TrimSpace(string(head)), true
}
return "", false
}
}
}
// decodeToolArguments decodes a tool call's JSON arguments into v. It tolerates a
// weaker model that packs MULTIPLE concatenated top-level JSON objects into one
// arguments string (`{A}{B}`) — the cause of "invalid character '{' after top-level
// value" failures with small models like minimax-m3 — by decoding the FIRST object
// and ignoring the trailing WHOLE JSON values, so the primary intended call runs.
// A genuinely malformed payload (bad/truncated first object, or non-JSON trailing
// garbage) still returns the real parse error; a standard single-object payload
// decodes exactly as before.
func decodeToolArguments(arguments string, v any) error {
if first, ok := recoverableToolArguments(arguments); ok {
return json.Unmarshal([]byte(first), v)
}
// Not cleanly recoverable — surface the genuine parse error.
return json.Unmarshal([]byte(arguments), v)
}
func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(call.Arguments), &args); err != nil {
return ToolResult{
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Name: call.Name,
@@ -2159,18 +2029,6 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
}
}
// A command that explicitly requests additional sandbox permissions
// (sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) is an ELEVATION the user
// must consent to, even when the base command's sandbox decision was Allow.
// shouldRequestPermission blocks on OnPermissionRequest for exactly this case,
// so the event MUST be a prompt — otherwise it carried Action=allow while the
// loop waited on a decision, and a UI that renders only prompts (the TUI)
// dropped it, deadlocking the run. Keep this consistent with
// shouldRequestPermission's own condition.
if action == PermissionActionAllow && !permissionGranted && shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
action = PermissionActionPrompt
}
if safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow && action == PermissionActionAllow && !grantMatched && block == nil {
return PermissionEvent{}, false
}
+2 -127
View File
@@ -37,35 +37,6 @@ func (provider *mockProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zero
return ch, nil
}
type recordingWebSearchTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Name() string { return "web_search" }
func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Description() string { return "test web search tool" }
func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{
Type: "object",
Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
"query": {Type: "string"},
},
Required: []string{"query"},
AdditionalProperties: false,
}
}
func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{
SideEffect: tools.SideEffectNetwork,
Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt,
Reason: "Sends model-provided search query text to the configured web search backend.",
AdvertiseInAuto: true,
}
}
func (tool *recordingWebSearchTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "1. T — https://x.test"}
}
type sandboxDeniedRetryTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
@@ -894,7 +865,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsLocalWebFetchBeforePermissionRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunAdvertisesPromptedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAdvertisesAllowedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BASE_URL", "https://search.example/api")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreNetworkTools() {
@@ -925,52 +896,6 @@ func TestRunAdvertisesPromptedWebSearchInAutoMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
search := &recordingWebSearchTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(search)
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "web_search"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"private workspace detail"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
var requests []PermissionRequest
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "search", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
OnPermissionRequest: func(_ context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
requests = append(requests, request)
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "network not approved"}, nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denied tool call, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one permission request, got %#v", requests)
}
if requests[0].ToolName != "web_search" || requests[0].Permission != string(tools.PermissionPrompt) || requests[0].SideEffect != string(tools.SideEffectNetwork) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected permission request: %#v", requests[0])
}
if len(search.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("web_search backend must not run when permission is denied, got calls %#v", search.calls)
}
}
func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
@@ -1128,10 +1053,7 @@ func TestRunSanitizesMalformedToolCallArgumentsBeforeRetry(t *testing.T) {
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
// Genuinely malformed (truncated) args: still error -> sanitize -> retry.
// (Concatenated multi-object args are now tolerated; see
// TestRunRecoversFirstObjectFromConcatenatedToolArgs.)
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"README.md"`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"README.md"}{"path":"AGENTS.md"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
@@ -1181,53 +1103,6 @@ func TestRunSanitizesMalformedToolCallArgumentsBeforeRetry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A weak model (e.g. minimax-m3) that packs MULTIPLE concatenated JSON objects into
// one tool-call slot must RECOVER the first object and run the call, not fail with
// "invalid character '{' after top-level value". The trailing object(s) are dropped
// (the model re-issues them on a later turn if still needed).
func TestRunRecoversFirstObjectFromConcatenatedToolArgs(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "README.md"), []byte("hello readme"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"README.md"}{"path":"AGENTS.md"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "read", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want done", result.FinalAnswer)
}
var toolResult string
for _, message := range provider.requests[1].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResult = message.Content
}
}
if strings.Contains(toolResult, "Failed to parse arguments") {
t.Fatalf("concatenated args should recover the first object, not fail to parse: %q", toolResult)
}
if !strings.Contains(toolResult, "hello readme") {
t.Fatalf("expected README.md contents (the first object's path), got %q", toolResult)
}
}
func TestRunDefersSelfCorrectFeedbackUntilAfterToolBatch(t *testing.T) {
// A single assistant turn with two tool calls where the first mutates and
// self-correct fails must keep both tool_results contiguous, with the feedback
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// promptShellTool is a minimal shell-style tool whose Safety requires a prompt,
// standing in for bash so buildPermissionEvent can be exercised directly.
type promptShellTool struct{}
func (promptShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (promptShellTool) Description() string { return "run a shell command" }
func (promptShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (promptShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
}
func (promptShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A command whose sandbox decision is Allow but that explicitly requests
// additional sandbox permissions is an ELEVATION: it must be surfaced as a
// prompt, never Action=allow. Previously it carried allow while the loop still
// blocked on OnPermissionRequest, and the TUI (which renders only prompts)
// dropped it → the run deadlocked forever. This is the exact gpt-5.5
// folder-creation shape captured in the reported hang.
func TestBuildPermissionEventPromptsForAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "mkdir foo && cd foo && go mod init foo",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
}
// Base command allowed by the sandbox…
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("buildPermissionEvent returned ok=false; the elevation request must produce an event")
}
if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want prompt — an additional-permissions elevation must ask the user, not auto-allow", event.Action)
}
// Sanity: shouldRequestPermission agrees the loop blocks on this.
if !shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be true for an additional-permissions request")
}
}
// Without the additional-permissions flag, a sandbox-allowed command is NOT a
// prompt (shouldRequestPermission is false; it just runs) — the override must
// not over-reach and prompt for ordinary allowed commands.
func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_2", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "ls"}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, _ := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if event.Action == PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = prompt for an ordinary allowed command; want allow (no spurious prompt)")
}
if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
}
}
-15
View File
@@ -40,21 +40,6 @@ func reconnectNoticeFor(options Options) reconnectNotifier {
}
}
// stallRetryNoticeFor builds a notifier for the loop's content-stall retry (a
// stream that connected and produced only transient output, then went silent).
// Distinct wording from reconnectNoticeFor's "connection lost" because the
// connection was fine — the model stalled. Surfaced through OnReasoning, the
// non-content channel, so it never folds into the answer text. Nil when there
// is no reasoning sink (the retry still happens silently).
func stallRetryNoticeFor(options Options) reconnectNotifier {
if options.OnReasoning == nil {
return nil
}
return func(attempt, max int) {
options.OnReasoning(fmt.Sprintf("\n[no output — model stalled; retrying %d/%d…]\n", attempt, max))
}
}
// streamWithReconnect issues request via provider.StreamCompletion and, on a
// transient disconnect error, retries the connect up to maxStreamReconnects
// times with exponential backoff. It returns the live stream on success, or the
-168
View File
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// stallProvider connects successfully (HTTP 200) but the stream emits a stall/idle
// timeout error for the first stallBefore calls, then succeeds with "done". The
// pre-stall emission simulates different partial-output shapes:
// - partialText: forwarded PROSE (StreamEventText) — must NOT be retried
// (re-issuing would duplicate visible answer text).
// - reasoningText: transient reasoning preview — IS retried.
// - partialToolCall: a tool call started (+ arg delta) but never ended, the
// "froze mid-write_file" case — IS retried (the incomplete call is never
// executed or committed).
type stallProvider struct {
calls int32
stallBefore int32
partialText string
reasoningText string
partialToolCall string
}
func (p *stallProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
n := atomic.AddInt32(&p.calls, 1)
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 5)
if n <= p.stallBefore {
if p.partialText != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: p.partialText}
}
if p.reasoningText != "" {
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventReasoning, Content: p.reasoningText}
}
if p.partialToolCall != "" {
// A tool call that starts and streams a partial argument fragment but
// never gets StreamEventToolCallEnd, then the stream errors — exactly
// the gpt-5.x "began the big write_file then froze" shape.
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ToolName: p.partialToolCall}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "tc_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"x.html","content":"<!doctype`}
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
Error: "provider stream error: no output for 6m (the model produced nothing)",
}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
// A no-output stall is re-issued on a fresh connection and recovers — this is the
// macOS stale-pooled-connection hang turned into an automatic recovery.
func TestRunRetriesStreamStallWithNoOutput(t *testing.T) {
p := &stallProvider{stallBefore: 1}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a no-output stall should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 stall + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
// A stall AFTER partial output must NOT be retried — re-issuing would duplicate
// the already-streamed text. It surfaces the error instead.
func TestRunDoesNotRetryStallAfterPartialOutput(t *testing.T) {
p := &stallProvider{stallBefore: 1, partialText: "partial"}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a stall after partial output must NOT be retried; want an error")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("partial-then-stall must not retry, got %d calls", got)
}
}
// A stall after only transient REASONING was forwarded (no prose text, no
// completed tool call) IS retried: reasoning is a "thinking" preview, not
// committed answer text, so re-streaming it on a clearly-signalled retry is
// acceptable and recovers the common "reasoned then froze" stall. Only
// forwarded final prose (OnText) blocks the retry (collected.Text is empty
// here, so this exercises the transient-vs-prose gate specifically).
func TestRunRetriesStallAfterOnlyReasoning(t *testing.T) {
p := &stallProvider{stallBefore: 1, reasoningText: "thinking hard"}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(string) {},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a stall after only reasoning should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 stall + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
}
// A stall mid-way through an INCOMPLETE tool call (started + partial args, never
// ended) IS retried — the exact gpt-5.x / ollama "began the big write_file then
// froze" case. The incomplete call is never executed (a turn returns on the
// stall error before dispatch) and never committed to history, so re-issuing is
// safe and recovers to success. This is the primary scenario this change fixes.
func TestRunRetriesStallAfterIncompleteToolCall(t *testing.T) {
starts := 0
p := &stallProvider{stallBefore: 1, reasoningText: "planning", partialToolCall: "write_file"}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
OnReasoning: func(string) {},
OnToolCallStart: func(string, string) { starts++ },
OnToolCallDelta: func(string, string) {},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a stall mid-incomplete-tool-call should retry to success, got %v", err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q", result.FinalAnswer, "done")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 calls (1 stall + 1 retry), got %d", got)
}
if starts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the incomplete tool call should have been forwarded once before the stall, got %d starts", starts)
}
}
// A persistent stall surfaces an error after exhausting the capped retries.
func TestRunGivesUpAfterMaxStallRetries(t *testing.T) {
p := &stallProvider{stallBefore: 99}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", p, Options{Registry: tools.NewRegistry()})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a persistent stall must surface an error after exhausting retries")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != int32(1+maxStreamStallRetries) {
t.Fatalf("want %d calls (1 + %d retries), got %d", 1+maxStreamStallRetries, maxStreamStallRetries, got)
}
}
func TestIsStreamTimeoutError(t *testing.T) {
timeouts := []string{
"provider stream error: no output for 10m (the model produced nothing)",
"provider stream error: idle timeout after 5m0s (upstream stopped sending data)",
"stream stalled (upstream kept the connection alive but produced no output)",
}
for _, m := range timeouts {
if !isStreamTimeoutError(m) {
t.Fatalf("want timeout-classified: %q", m)
}
}
notTimeouts := []string{"", "context length exceeded", "rate limit error: slow down", "model not found"}
for _, m := range notTimeouts {
if isStreamTimeoutError(m) {
t.Fatalf("must NOT classify as timeout: %q", m)
}
}
}
+2 -6
View File
@@ -455,15 +455,11 @@ func TestHarnessTimeoutCancelsBlockedAgent(t *testing.T) {
// The timeout is longer than materialization of the small fixture even on
// slower Windows CI runners, so the agent is reached before it blocks until
// the deadline fires. 10s wasn't generous enough in practice — it failed
// on an otherwise-unrelated PR merge (materialization alone consumed the
// full budget on a contended Windows runner, so the agent was never
// reached); widened for headroom, since the assertions below still bound
// worst-case test time via that same deadline, not this constant.
// the deadline fires.
report := harness.Run(context.Background(), suitePath, suite, BenchmarkInput{
TaskID: "document-stream-json-verify-events",
WorkRoot: t.TempDir(),
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
})
if !agentReached {
+2 -5
View File
@@ -43,11 +43,8 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored API key,
// so ACP is authenticated for apiKeyStored profiles like every other
// surface — no ACP-specific credential handling needed.
NewProvider: deps.newProvider,
RunAgent: agent.Run,
NewProvider: deps.newProvider,
RunAgent: agent.Run,
// Build the SCOPED registry + sandbox engine per workspace, exactly like the
// exec surface, so ACP shell/file tools are confined — never run unconfined.
BuildWorkspace: func(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error) {
+56 -136
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/provideronboarding"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
@@ -44,43 +43,37 @@ import (
var version = "dev"
type appDeps struct {
getwd func() (string, error)
stdin io.Reader
userConfigPath func() (string, error)
resolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
resolveMCPConfig func(workspaceRoot string) (config.MCPConfig, error)
newProvider func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
// exportActiveProvider pins spawned children to the run's provider (production:
// config.SetActiveProviderEnv, set in defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled
// by fillAppDeps, so tests never mutate the process environment unless they
// inject it). nil ⇒ no export.
exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
probeProviderHealth func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
detectLocalRuntimes func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
newSessionStore func() *sessions.Store
loadPlugins func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
loadHooks func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
skillsDir func() string
pluginsDir func() string
toolsDir func() string
newMCPStore func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
newMCPTokenStore func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
newSandboxStore func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
selectSandboxBackend func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
runSandboxSetupHelper func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
registerMCPTools func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
prepareWorktree func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
detectVerifyPlan func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
runVerify func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
runSelfVerify func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
runAgentEval func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
inspectChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
commitChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
runTUI func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
runEditor func(string) error
checkUpdate func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
now func() time.Time
getwd func() (string, error)
stdin io.Reader
userConfigPath func() (string, error)
resolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
resolveMCPConfig func(workspaceRoot string) (config.MCPConfig, error)
newProvider func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
probeProviderHealth func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
detectLocalRuntimes func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
newSessionStore func() *sessions.Store
loadPlugins func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
loadHooks func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
skillsDir func() string
pluginsDir func() string
toolsDir func() string
newMCPStore func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
newMCPTokenStore func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
newSandboxStore func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
selectSandboxBackend func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
runSandboxSetupHelper func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
registerMCPTools func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
prepareWorktree func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
detectVerifyPlan func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
runVerify func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
runSelfVerify func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
runAgentEval func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
inspectChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
commitChanges func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
runTUI func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
runEditor func(string) error
checkUpdate func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
now func() time.Time
}
type mcpToolRuntime interface {
@@ -106,10 +99,9 @@ func Run(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
return appDeps{
getwd: os.Getwd,
stdin: os.Stdin,
userConfigPath: config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
getwd: os.Getwd,
stdin: os.Stdin,
userConfigPath: config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
options, err := config.DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot)
if err != nil {
@@ -126,19 +118,13 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
return config.ResolveMCP(options)
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
// Resolve the OAuth login ONCE: the bearer resolver and the login key it
// bound must describe the same login (the key is passed on to the Codex
// account-header resolver so it never re-selects independently).
resolver, loginKey := oauthLoginForProfile(profile)
return providers.New(profile, providers.Options{
UserAgent: userAgent(),
OAuthResolver: resolver,
OAuthLoginKey: loginKey,
OAuthResolver: oauthResolverForProfile(profile),
})
},
probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
discoverProviderModels: defaultDiscoverProviderModels,
detectLocalRuntimes: provideronboarding.DetectLocalRuntimes,
probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
detectLocalRuntimes: provideronboarding.DetectLocalRuntimes,
newSessionStore: func() *sessions.Store {
return sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{})
},
@@ -231,9 +217,9 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
}
// --theme <name> selects the TUI palette non-interactively (auto or any registered
// theme; populates tui.Options.Theme, which resolveThemeMode prefers over
// ZERO_THEME). Re-split --add-dir afterward so it may appear on either side of --theme.
// --theme {auto|dark|light} selects the TUI palette non-interactively (populates
// tui.Options.Theme, which resolveThemeMode prefers over ZERO_THEME). Re-split
// --add-dir afterward so it may appear on either side of --theme.
theme, args, err := splitLeadingThemeFlag(args)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
@@ -405,14 +391,6 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "unknown command %q\n", args[0]); err != nil {
return 1
}
// First-run users reach for `zero login`/`zero logout` (reported in the
// wild); point them at the real command instead of a bare usage pointer.
switch strings.ToLower(args[0]) {
case "login", "logout":
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "did you mean %q?\n", "zero auth "+strings.ToLower(args[0])); err != nil {
return 1
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "Run zero --help for usage."); err != nil {
return 1
}
@@ -443,9 +421,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
if deps.probeProviderHealth == nil {
deps.probeProviderHealth = defaults.probeProviderHealth
}
if deps.discoverProviderModels == nil {
deps.discoverProviderModels = defaults.discoverProviderModels
}
if deps.detectLocalRuntimes == nil {
deps.detectLocalRuntimes = defaults.detectLocalRuntimes
}
@@ -518,17 +493,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
if deps.now == nil {
deps.now = defaults.now
}
// Wrap newProvider ONCE, after all defaults are filled, so every surface that
// builds the runtime provider gets the credential-store key applied. The
// resolver is pure and leaves apiKeyStored profiles keyless; an unwrapped
// build sends unauthenticated requests. config.ApplyStoredAPIKey is a no-op
// when the key is already set or the profile isn't stored-key, so this is
// safe and idempotent for every profile kind and every injected newProvider.
baseNewProvider := deps.newProvider
userConfigPath := deps.userConfigPath
deps.newProvider = func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return baseNewProvider(applyStoredProviderKeyAt(profile, userConfigPath))
}
return deps
}
@@ -544,21 +508,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
resolved, err := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{})
if err != nil {
// A resolve failure the setup wizard can FIX is not fatal for the
// interactive TUI: drop into the wizard with an empty config so the user
// can onboard/repair, instead of exiting with an error they can only fix
// by hand-editing config.json. That covers a missing/unresolvable active
// provider and an active provider without a model (custom endpoints have
// no catalog default) — previously the second shape bricked bare `zero`
// and `zero setup`, the exact commands that could have fixed it. Any
// other error (malformed JSON, directory conflict, etc.) is still fatal,
// and headless commands (zero config / zero exec) still fail with the
// actionable message.
if !errors.Is(err, config.ErrNoActiveProvider) && !errors.Is(err, config.ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
}
resolved = config.ResolvedConfig{}
forceSetup = true
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), 1)
}
userConfigPath, err := deps.userConfigPath()
if err != nil {
@@ -691,7 +641,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
return deps.runTUI(context.Background(), tui.Options{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Theme: theme,
SavedTheme: resolved.Preferences.Theme,
UserConfigPath: userConfigPath,
DoctorUserConfigPath: doctorUserConfigPath,
ProjectConfigPath: projectConfigPath,
@@ -770,50 +719,20 @@ func tuiSandboxSetupCommand(backend sandbox.Backend, deps appDeps) func(context.
}
}
// buildProvider constructs the run's provider at STARTUP — it is called only from
// the two launch paths (interactive TUI and headless exec), never from mid-run
// rebuilds (escalation, wizard, ACP go through deps.newProvider directly).
func buildProvider(resolved config.ResolvedConfig, deps appDeps) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
if !config.HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
return nil, nil
}
// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored key, so this
// (and every other newProvider caller) needs no per-site key handling.
provider, err := deps.newProvider(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Pin spawned children (sub-agents / swarm members inherit the environment) to
// THIS run's provider from launch, not only after an in-session switch. Without
// the launch-time export a child re-resolves config.json at spawn time, so a
// provider switch persisted by ANOTHER zero process mid-session would silently
// move new children onto a different provider (and different credentials) than
// the parent is running. Runtime switches (/model, /provider, wizard,
// onboarding) re-export on commit, keeping the pin current. Injected via deps
// (nil in tests) because it mutates the process environment.
if deps.exportActiveProvider != nil {
deps.exportActiveProvider(resolved.Provider.Name)
}
return provider, nil
}
// applyStoredProviderKeyAt loads the API key from the encrypted credential store
// when the resolver left it empty (the resolver is pure — no I/O — so an
// apiKeyStored profile reaches this layer keyless). No-op for inline/env-key
// providers and when nothing is stored. This is applied once, centrally, by the
// deps.newProvider wrapper in fillAppDeps so EVERY surface that builds a runtime
// provider (headless exec, the ACP builder, exec's mid-run escalation switcher,
// and any future caller) is covered without a per-site invariant to forget.
func applyStoredProviderKeyAt(profile config.ProviderProfile, userConfigPath func() (string, error)) config.ProviderProfile {
if userConfigPath == nil {
return profile
}
if path, perr := userConfigPath(); perr == nil {
// Load the API key from the encrypted credential store when it isn't already
// resolved from inline config or an env var. This keeps the resolver pure (no
// I/O) and is a no-op for env/inline-key providers and when nothing is stored.
profile := resolved.Provider
if path, perr := deps.userConfigPath(); perr == nil {
if store, err := config.ProviderKeyStoreAt(filepath.Dir(path)); err == nil {
profile = config.ApplyStoredAPIKey(profile, store)
}
}
return profile
return deps.newProvider(profile)
}
func newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot string) *tools.Registry {
@@ -1114,10 +1033,9 @@ func splitLeadingAddDirFlags(args []string) ([]string, []string, error) {
return addDirs, args, nil
}
// splitLeadingThemeFlag strips a leading --theme <auto|theme-name> (space or =form)
// from the root argument list and validates it against the registered themes. The
// last occurrence wins. A value outside the allowed set is a loud error rather than
// a silent fallback.
// splitLeadingThemeFlag strips a leading --theme {auto|dark|light} (space or =form)
// from the root argument list and validates it. The last occurrence wins. A value
// outside the allowed set is a loud error rather than a silent fallback.
func splitLeadingThemeFlag(args []string) (string, []string, error) {
theme := ""
for len(args) > 0 {
@@ -1125,7 +1043,7 @@ func splitLeadingThemeFlag(args []string) (string, []string, error) {
switch {
case args[0] == "--theme":
if len(args) < 2 {
return "", nil, errors.New("--theme requires a value (auto or a theme name; try --theme auto)")
return "", nil, errors.New("--theme requires a value (auto, dark, or light)")
}
value = strings.TrimSpace(args[1])
args = args[2:]
@@ -1135,10 +1053,12 @@ func splitLeadingThemeFlag(args []string) (string, []string, error) {
default:
return theme, args, nil
}
if !tui.ValidThemeArg(value) {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("--theme must be auto or a registered theme name (got %q)", value)
switch strings.ToLower(value) {
case "auto", "dark", "light":
theme = strings.ToLower(value)
default:
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("--theme must be auto, dark, or light (got %q)", value)
}
theme = strings.ToLower(value)
}
return theme, args, nil
}
+1 -148
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -158,80 +157,6 @@ func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesSetupTUIWithNilProviderWhenNoProviderConfigured(t *tes
assertAgentOptions(t, launchedOptions, 12, agent.PermissionModeAsk)
}
func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenResolveReportsNoActiveProvider(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cwd := t.TempDir()
setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
userConfigPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
var launchedOptions tui.Options
launched := false
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
return cwd, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", config.ErrNoActiveProvider, "ghost")
},
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
t.Fatal("newProvider should not be called without a resolved provider")
return nil, nil
},
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) {
return userConfigPath, nil
},
registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
launched = true
launchedOptions = options
return 0
},
})
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !launched {
t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; expected fallback into setup instead of a fatal error")
}
if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
}
if launchedOptions.Provider != nil {
t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want nil for no-provider fallback", launchedOptions.Provider)
}
}
func TestRunNoArgsFailsWhenResolveErrorIsNotProviderRelated(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cwd := t.TempDir()
setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
return cwd, nil
},
resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON")
},
runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
t.Fatal("TUI must not launch on a non-provider resolve error")
return 0
},
})
if exitCode == 0 {
t.Fatal("exit code = 0, want non-zero for fatal config error")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "invalid config JSON") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the underlying config error", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunNoArgsLaunchesTUIWithMCPState(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1472,79 +1397,7 @@ func TestRunThemeFlagRejectsBadValue(t *testing.T) {
if launched {
t.Fatal("the TUI must not launch on a bad --theme value")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "--theme must be auto or a registered theme name") {
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "--theme must be auto, dark, or light") {
t.Fatalf("expected a clear --theme error, got %q", stderr.String())
}
}
// A custom endpoint saved without a model previously bricked bare `zero` and
// `zero setup` — the exact commands that could have fixed it (the resolve
// error escaped before the wizard could open). The interactive TUI now treats
// the requires-model failure as "needs onboarding", same as a missing active
// provider. The error comes from a REAL Resolve over a real config file, so
// this exercises the production sentinel wrapping, not a hand-built error.
func TestRunNoArgsEntersSetupWhenActiveProviderMissesModel(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cwd := t.TempDir()
setCLIUserConfigRoot(t)
brokenConfig := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(brokenConfig, []byte(`{
"activeProvider": "gw",
"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
launched := false
var launchedOptions tui.Options
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.Resolve(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: brokenConfig, Env: map[string]string{}})
},
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
t.Fatal("newProvider must not be called without a resolved provider")
return nil, nil
},
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json"), nil },
registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
return noopMCPRuntime{}, nil
},
runTUI: func(_ context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
launched = true
launchedOptions = options
return 0
},
})
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 0 (setup TUI launched), stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if !launched {
t.Fatal("TUI was not launched; a fixable requires-model config must fall into setup, not exit fatally")
}
if !launchedOptions.Setup.Visible || !launchedOptions.Setup.Required {
t.Fatalf("Setup = %#v, want visible required setup", launchedOptions.Setup)
}
}
// `zero login`/`zero logout` don't exist (it's `zero auth login`); first-run
// users try them (reported in the wild), so the unknown-command error points at
// the real command.
func TestRunUnknownLoginSuggestsAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"login"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
if exitCode != 2 {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want 2 (unknown command)", exitCode)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `"zero auth login"`) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want a zero auth login suggestion", stderr.String())
}
// An unrelated unknown command gets no misleading suggestion.
stderr.Reset()
runWithDeps([]string{"frobnicate"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "did you mean") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, unrelated commands must not get the auth hint", stderr.String())
}
}
-3
View File
@@ -283,9 +283,6 @@ func newAuthManager(deps appDeps, out io.Writer) (*oauth.Manager, error) {
// carries no token material. A real browser launch is intentionally not
// performed (the sandbox/headless contexts make printing the safer default).
OpenBrowser: func(string) error { return nil },
// `zero auth login <preset>` (e.g. xai) should resolve the baked-in preset
// without the operator exporting ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS first.
AllowPresets: true,
})
}
-180
View File
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// seedStoredProviderKey writes key into a credential store rooted beside the
// returned config path, and returns deps fields wired at that path — the same
// layout applyStoredProviderKey resolves through in production.
func seedStoredProviderKey(t *testing.T, providerName, key string) (userConfigPath string) {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv("ZERO_CRED_STORAGE", "encrypted-file") // never touch the real OS keychain in tests
dir := t.TempDir()
store, err := config.ProviderKeyStoreAt(dir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKeyStoreAt: %v", err)
}
if err := store.Set(providerName, key); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed stored key: %v", err)
}
return filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
}
// applyStoredProviderKeyAt must fill APIKey from the credential store for an
// apiKeyStored profile — the single central helper the newProvider wrapper uses.
func TestApplyStoredProviderKeyAtFillsFromCredstore(t *testing.T) {
configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-test")
ucp := func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil }
stored := applyStoredProviderKeyAt(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo", APIKeyStored: true}, ucp)
if stored.APIKey != "sk-stored-test" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want the stored key", stored.APIKey)
}
// A profile that did NOT opt into stored-key auth must be left unchanged —
// a stale store entry must not silently reactivate credentials.
plain := applyStoredProviderKeyAt(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo"}, ucp)
if plain.APIKey != "" {
t.Fatalf("non-stored profile APIKey = %q, want empty", plain.APIKey)
}
}
// fillAppDeps wraps newProvider so EVERY surface that builds a runtime provider
// (buildProvider, the ACP builder — which is just deps.newProvider — and exec's
// escalation switcher) gets the stored key applied. Passing the raw resolved
// profile previously sent unauthenticated requests for apiKeyStored profiles,
// the default onboarding outcome. Testing the wrap covers all those surfaces.
func TestFillAppDepsWrapsNewProviderWithStoredKey(t *testing.T) {
configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-wrap")
var captured config.ProviderProfile
deps := fillAppDeps(appDeps{
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
captured = profile
return nil, nil // only the captured profile matters here
},
})
if _, err := deps.newProvider(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "echo", APIKeyStored: true}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("wrapped newProvider: %v", err)
}
if captured.APIKey != "sk-stored-wrap" {
t.Fatalf("wrapped newProvider built with APIKey = %q, want the stored key (unauthenticated regression)", captured.APIKey)
}
}
// buildProvider (the TUI/exec STARTUP construction site) must export
// ZERO_PROVIDER so children spawned at any point in the run are pinned to the
// parent's provider from launch — not only after an in-session switch. Without
// this, a provider switch persisted by another zero process mid-session moves
// new children onto a different provider (and credentials) than the parent.
func TestBuildProviderExportsActiveProviderEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv, "stale-from-elsewhere")
// The exporter is injected (defaultAppDeps wires config.SetActiveProviderEnv;
// fillAppDeps deliberately leaves it nil so ordinary tests never mutate the
// process env). Inject the real one here to assert the actual env effect.
deps := appDeps{
exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return nil, nil
},
}
resolved := config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Name: "pinned", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindAnthropic, Model: "m"}}
if _, err := buildProvider(resolved, deps); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildProvider: %v", err)
}
if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "pinned" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q after startup build, want %q (children would spawn on the stale provider)", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got, "pinned")
}
// A FAILED build must not move the pin: the process never committed to the
// new provider, so children must keep resolving whatever was in effect.
t.Setenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv, "still-current")
failing := appDeps{
exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return nil, errors.New("boom")
},
}
if _, err := buildProvider(resolved, failing); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected build error")
}
if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "still-current" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q after failed build, want it untouched", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got)
}
// No provider profile at all → no provider, no pin change.
if _, err := buildProvider(config.ResolvedConfig{}, deps); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildProvider(empty): %v", err)
}
if got := os.Getenv(config.ActiveProviderEnv); got != "still-current" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q after profile-less build, want it untouched", config.ActiveProviderEnv, got)
}
}
// A mid-run --allow-escalation model switch previously rebuilt the provider
// from the PURE resolved profile (the stored key lives only in buildProvider's
// local copy), so the escalated provider was keyless and the next completion
// call 401'd mid-run. Every profile handed to newProvider on this path must
// carry the stored key.
func TestRunExecEscalationSwitchKeepsStoredKey(t *testing.T) {
dataHome := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", dataHome)
cwd := t.TempDir()
if _, ok := mustUpgradeTarget(t, "claude-haiku-4.5"); !ok {
t.Skip("registry has no upgrade target for claude-haiku-4.5")
}
configPath := seedStoredProviderKey(t, "echo", "sk-stored-escalation")
var builtProfiles []config.ProviderProfile
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
"exec",
"--allow-escalation",
"--model", "claude-haiku-4.5",
"--init-session-id", "escalation_stored_key_run",
"escalate please",
}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
resolveConfig: func(_ string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "claude-haiku-4.5"
if overrides.Provider.Model != "" {
model = overrides.Provider.Model
}
cfg := execResolvedConfig()
cfg.Provider.ProviderKind = config.ProviderKindAnthropic
cfg.Provider.Model = model
cfg.Provider.APIKeyStored = true // key lives ONLY in the credstore
cfg.MaxTurns = 3
return cfg, nil
},
newProvider: func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
builtProfiles = append(builtProfiles, profile)
return &usageEmittingEscalatingProvider{escalate: len(builtProfiles) == 1}, nil
},
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want success; stderr=%s", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
if len(builtProfiles) < 2 {
t.Fatalf("want at least 2 provider builds (initial + escalated), got %d", len(builtProfiles))
}
for i, profile := range builtProfiles {
if profile.APIKey != "sk-stored-escalation" {
t.Fatalf("provider build %d APIKey = %q, want the stored key (escalated build went out keyless)", i, profile.APIKey)
}
}
}
-5
View File
@@ -81,9 +81,6 @@ func runProviders(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
if command == "detect" {
return runProvidersDetect(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
}
if command == "models" {
return runProvidersModels(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
}
if command != "list" && command != "current" && command != "catalog" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown providers command %q", command))
}
@@ -468,11 +465,9 @@ func writeProvidersHelp(w io.Writer) error {
zero providers use <name> [flags]
zero providers setup <catalog-id> [flags]
zero providers detect [flags]
zero providers models [name] [flags]
Inspects resolved provider profiles and provider catalog descriptors without printing secrets.
Detect probes for running local runtimes (Ollama, LM Studio) and prints adopt commands plus per-provider next steps.
Models probes a provider's live model-listing endpoint (e.g. an OpenAI-compatible /v1/models) and lists the models it serves — including custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoints — so a self-hosted provider needs no per-model config.
Flags:
--json Print JSON summary
-3
View File
@@ -365,9 +365,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
var modelSwitcher func(context.Context, string) (agent.Provider, error)
if options.allowEscalation {
modelSwitcher = func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (agent.Provider, error) {
// deps.newProvider is wrapped (fillAppDeps) to apply the stored key, so
// the escalated provider is authenticated even though resolved.Provider
// is the pure profile — no per-site key handling here.
switchedProfile := resolved.Provider
switchedProfile.Model = modelID
switchedProvider, err := deps.newProvider(switchedProfile)
-86
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ func TestProviderHasOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
func TestSetupRequiredRecognizesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
if err != nil {
@@ -46,88 +45,3 @@ func TestSetupRequiredRecognizesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("a keyless provider with no OAuth login must require onboarding")
}
}
// A profile renamed away from its catalog ID must still get a runtime OAuth
// resolver when the login is stored under the catalog name — and a CASE-VARIANT
// profile name must not drop the catalog-ID candidate (the store is
// case-sensitive; a case-insensitive dedupe would swallow it).
func TestOAuthResolverForProfileFallsBackToCatalogID(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed token: %v", err)
}
// A renamed profile resolves the catalog-ID login, and the returned key MUST be
// that login's key — the same key the Codex account-header resolver reads from,
// so bearer and account can never come from different logins.
if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "codex", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
t.Fatal("renamed profile with a catalog-ID login must get a resolver (unauthenticated-children regression)")
} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt") {
t.Fatalf("bound key = %q, want the chatgpt login key (bearer/account must share it)", key)
}
// Name differs from catalog ID only in CASE: the exact-case store key is
// "provider:chatgpt", so "chatgpt" must survive as a distinct candidate.
if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
t.Fatal("case-variant profile name must still resolve the catalog-ID login (case-insensitive dedupe regression)")
} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt") {
t.Fatalf("case-variant bound key = %q, want the chatgpt login key", key)
}
if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "chatgpt", CatalogID: "chatgpt"}); resolver == nil {
t.Fatal("catalog-named profile must get a resolver")
}
if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(config.ProviderProfile{Name: "openai", CatalogID: "openai"}); resolver != nil || key != "" {
t.Fatalf("a profile with no stored login must get no resolver and an empty key, got key=%q", key)
}
}
// The catalog-ID fallback must NOT reach a sibling profile's OAuth login when
// this profile has its own key — withBearer would erase the key and silently
// bill the model call under the sibling's account (a real cross-profile
// override the fallback introduced). A profile WITH its own resolved key gets no
// resolver even when a catalog-shared login exists.
func TestOAuthResolverForProfileDoesNotOverrideExplicitKey(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file") // an inherited "keyring" would ignore the temp path and hit the OS keychain
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", path)
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
// A personal login stored under the catalog name.
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "personal-tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed token: %v", err)
}
// Work profile: same catalog, its OWN resolved API key, deliberately NOT the
// personal OAuth account. It must keep using its key (no resolver attached).
work := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-work", CatalogID: "anthropic", APIKey: "sk-work-key"}
if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(work); resolver != nil || key != "" {
t.Fatalf("a profile with its own API key must not get a catalog-shared OAuth resolver (cross-profile override), got key=%q", key)
}
// A raw auth-header credential must be protected the same way.
header := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-hdr", CatalogID: "anthropic", AuthHeaderValue: "Bearer byo"}
if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(header); resolver != nil {
t.Fatal("a profile with its own auth header must not get a catalog-shared OAuth resolver")
}
// A same-NAME login must not override an explicit key either (the name
// candidate is gated on the profile being keyless, not just the catalog one).
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic-work"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "name-tok", ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour)}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed name token: %v", err)
}
if resolver, _ := oauthLoginForProfile(work); resolver != nil {
t.Fatal("a profile with its own API key must not get an OAuth resolver even from a same-name login")
}
// Sanity: a keyless sibling on the same catalog DOES resolve the shared login.
keyless := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-oauth", CatalogID: "anthropic"}
if resolver, key := oauthLoginForProfile(keyless); resolver == nil {
t.Fatal("a keyless profile should still resolve the catalog-shared login")
} else if key != oauth.ProviderKey("anthropic") {
t.Fatalf("keyless sibling bound key = %q, want the catalog login key", key)
}
}
+26 -32
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
@@ -11,48 +12,42 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
)
// oauthLoginForProfile resolves the user's OAuth login for a provider ONCE and
// returns both a TokenResolver that authenticates model calls with it and the
// credential-store key it bound to. It returns (nil, "") when no login exists —
// keeping API-key users free of any per-request store lookups, since the resolver
// is only attached when a login is present at construction time.
//
// The returned key is the single source of truth for "which login is this
// provider using": callers pass it to providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey so the
// Codex chatgpt-account-id header reads its account from the exact login that
// issued the bearer token, instead of doing a second, independent lookup that
// could select a different login (a backend-rejected mismatch).
//
// Candidate login names (profile name, then a catalog-ID fallback, both gated on
// the profile having no own configured credential) come from the shared
// ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates so the runtime resolver, the Codex account
// resolver, and the onboarding presence check never diverge.
func oauthLoginForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) (providerio.TokenResolver, string) {
candidates := profile.OAuthLoginCandidates()
if len(candidates) == 0 {
return nil, ""
// providerOAuthName resolves the OAuth login name for a provider profile. It is
// the name a user logs in under (`zero auth login <name>`) whose token then
// authenticates this provider's model calls. For now it is the profile name;
// the provider presets map well-known kinds (openai/anthropic) to canonical
// names on top of this.
func providerOAuthName(profile config.ProviderProfile) string {
return strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name)
}
// oauthResolverForProfile returns a TokenResolver that authenticates a provider's
// model calls with the user's OAuth login, or nil when no login exists for this
// provider. Returning nil for the no-login case keeps API-key users free of any
// per-request store lookups: the resolver is only attached once a login is
// present at construction time.
func oauthResolverForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) providerio.TokenResolver {
name := providerOAuthName(profile)
if name == "" {
return nil
}
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
if err != nil {
return nil, ""
return nil
}
_, key, ok := oauth.FirstStored(store, candidates)
if !ok {
// No login under any candidate (or unreadable/invalid keys) → API-key
// auth, no resolver.
return nil, ""
key := oauth.ProviderKey(name)
if _, ok, loadErr := store.Load(key); loadErr != nil || !ok {
// No login (or an unreadable/invalid key) → API-key auth, no resolver.
return nil
}
manager, err := oauth.NewManager(oauth.ManagerOptions{
Store: store,
HTTPClient: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
// Refreshing a token the user logged into (possibly a preset provider like
// xAI) re-resolves that provider's OAuth config, which needs the preset.
AllowPresets: true,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, ""
return nil
}
resolver := func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
return func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
var token string
var rerr error
if forceRefresh {
@@ -69,5 +64,4 @@ func oauthLoginForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) (providerio.TokenResol
}
return "Authorization", "Bearer " + token, true, nil
}
return resolver, key
}
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
}{
{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
}
@@ -47,21 +46,6 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestProviderCatalogLongCatRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "longcat")
for _, want := range []string{
"requiresAuth=true",
"authEnvVars=LONGCAT_API_KEY",
"setup: zero providers setup longcat --set-active",
} {
if !strings.Contains(block, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected LongCat catalog block to contain %q, got:\n%s", want, block)
}
}
}
func TestProviderCatalogOllamaCloudRequiresAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
output := runProviderCatalogOnboarding(t)
block := providerCatalogOnboardingBlock(t, output, "ollama-cloud")
-148
View File
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
)
type providerModelsOptions struct {
name string
json bool
}
// runProvidersModels lists the models a saved provider actually serves by probing
// its live model-discovery endpoint (e.g. an OpenAI-compatible `/v1/models`). It
// works for custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible providers too: discovery runs off
// the profile's base URL + credentials, so a self-hosted endpoint serving a dozen
// models no longer needs a config object per model — configure the provider once,
// then run any listed model with `zero exec --model <id>` (Zero passes unknown
// model ids through to the provider).
func runProvidersModels(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseProviderModelsArgs(args)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
if help {
if err := writeProvidersHelp(stdout); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
resolved, exitCode := resolveCommandCenterConfig(stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
return exitCode
}
profile, err := selectProviderForCheck(resolved, options.name)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
ctx, stop := signalContext()
defer stop()
models, err := deps.discoverProviderModels(ctx, discoveryCredentialProfile(profile))
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitProvider)
}
if options.json {
items := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(models))
for _, model := range models {
entry := map[string]any{"id": model.ID}
if description := strings.TrimSpace(model.Description); description != "" {
entry["description"] = description
}
items = append(items, entry)
}
payload := map[string]any{
"provider": profile.Name,
"count": len(items),
"models": items,
}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
name := strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name)
if name == "" {
name = "provider"
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Provider models (%s)\n", name); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
for _, model := range models {
line := strings.TrimSpace(model.ID)
if description := strings.TrimSpace(model.Description); description != "" {
line += " — " + description
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, line); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
suffix := "s"
if len(models) == 1 {
suffix = ""
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "%d model%s discovered\n", len(models), suffix); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
if len(models) > 0 {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "next: zero exec %q --model %s\n", "hello", setupCommandArg(models[0].ID)); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
}
return exitSuccess
}
// discoveryCredentialProfile resolves the profile's API key the same way the
// runtime does — inline, then the stored credential, then the configured env var —
// so a `providers models` probe authenticates exactly like a real request. Mirrors
// discoveredModelContextWindow's credential resolution.
func discoveryCredentialProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) config.ProviderProfile {
authed := profile
if strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKey) == "" {
if store, err := config.ProviderKeyStore(); err == nil {
authed = config.ApplyStoredAPIKey(authed, store)
}
}
if strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKey) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(authed.APIKeyEnv) != "" {
authed.APIKey = strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(authed.APIKeyEnv))
}
return authed
}
// defaultDiscoverProviderModels is the production discovery hook: a live probe of
// the provider's model-listing endpoint with no curated-catalog merge or
// coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full model list is returned.
func defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return providermodeldiscovery.Discover(ctx, profile, providermodeldiscovery.Options{})
}
func parseProviderModelsArgs(args []string) (providerModelsOptions, bool, error) {
options := providerModelsOptions{}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
switch {
case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
return options, true, nil
case arg == "--json":
options.json = true
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown flag %q", arg)}
default:
if options.name != "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected argument %q", arg)}
}
options.name = arg
}
}
return options, false, nil
}
-151
View File
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
)
func TestRunProvidersModelsListsDiscoveredModels(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
var probed config.ProviderProfile
deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
probed = profile
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
{ID: "team/model-a", Description: "first"},
{ID: "team/model-b"},
}, nil
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
// No name given → the active provider is probed, with its resolved credential.
if probed.Name != "work" {
t.Fatalf("probed provider = %q, want active provider work", probed.Name)
}
out := stdout.String()
for _, want := range []string{"Provider models (work)", "team/model-a — first", "team/model-b", "2 models discovered", "--model team/model-a"} {
if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
t.Fatalf("output missing %q:\n%s", want, out)
}
}
}
func TestRunProvidersModelsJSON(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "m1", Description: "d1"}, {ID: "m2"}}, nil
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
var payload struct {
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Count int `json:"count"`
Models []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Description string `json:"description"`
} `json:"models"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if payload.Provider != "work" || payload.Count != 2 || len(payload.Models) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("payload = %#v", payload)
}
if payload.Models[0].ID != "m1" || payload.Models[0].Description != "d1" {
t.Fatalf("model[0] = %#v", payload.Models[0])
}
// A model with no description omits the field rather than emitting an empty string.
if payload.Models[1].ID != "m2" || payload.Models[1].Description != "" {
t.Fatalf("model[1] = %#v", payload.Models[1])
}
}
func TestRunProvidersModelsSelectsNamedProvider(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
custom := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "self-hosted",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
BaseURL: "https://models.internal/v1",
APIKey: "sk-internal",
Model: "house-model",
}
deps.resolveConfig = func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
work := config.ProviderProfile{Name: "work", ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAI, BaseURL: config.OpenAIBaseURL, APIKey: "sk", Model: "gpt-4.1"}
return config.ResolvedConfig{ActiveProvider: "work", Provider: work, Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{work, custom}}, nil
}
var probed config.ProviderProfile
deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
probed = profile
return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "house-model"}}, nil
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "self-hosted"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d: %s", exitCode, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
if probed.Name != "self-hosted" || probed.BaseURL != "https://models.internal/v1" {
t.Fatalf("probed = %#v, want the named custom provider", probed)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersModelsUnknownProviderFails(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
called := false
deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
called = true
return nil, nil
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models", "ghost"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode == exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want non-zero for unknown provider", exitCode)
}
if called {
t.Fatal("discovery must not run for an unknown provider")
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `provider "ghost" not found`) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want provider-not-found", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunProvidersModelsSurfacesDiscoveryError(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
deps := commandCenterDeps(t)
deps.discoverProviderModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
return nil, errors.New("models endpoint returned 404")
}
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "models"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps)
if exitCode != exitProvider {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want exitProvider %d", exitCode, exitProvider)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "models endpoint returned 404") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want the discovery error", stderr.String())
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ func validateProviderRuntimeReady(profile config.ProviderProfile) error {
}
func providerProfileHasCredential(profile config.ProviderProfile) bool {
return profile.HasConfiguredCredential()
return strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKey) != "" || profile.APIKeyStored || strings.TrimSpace(profile.AuthHeaderValue) != ""
}
func providerKindForDescriptor(descriptor providercatalog.Descriptor) config.ProviderKind {
+3 -7
View File
@@ -314,14 +314,10 @@ func setupRequired(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) bool {
}
// providerHasOAuthLogin reports whether a stored OAuth login exists for the
// provider. It uses the same ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates the runtime
// resolver does, so the "authenticated in the UI" gate and the "authenticated at
// runtime" resolver can never diverge. This is only consulted for a profile with
// no usable API-key credential (setupRequired returns early otherwise), where
// the candidate set is permissive (profile name + catalog ID).
// provider, keyed by its profile name or catalog id.
func providerHasOAuthLogin(profile config.ProviderProfile, oauthLogins map[string]bool) bool {
for _, name := range profile.OAuthLoginCandidates() {
if oauthLogins[name] {
for _, name := range []string{strings.TrimSpace(profile.Name), strings.TrimSpace(profile.CatalogID)} {
if name != "" && oauthLogins[name] {
return true
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
)
func TestRunSpecialistListShowAndPath(t *testing.T) {
@@ -328,7 +326,7 @@ func setSpecialistConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
default:
t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
}
configRoot, err := config.UserConfigDir()
configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"testing"
)
// SetActiveProviderEnv must export the provider name so a child process (whose
// resolution reads the inherited environment via the nil-map -> os.Getenv path in
// applyEnv) resolves the SAME active provider. A blank name CLEARS it.
func TestSetActiveProviderEnvRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(ActiveProviderEnv, "") // register cleanup; restores the original after
if err := os.Unsetenv(ActiveProviderEnv); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unset: %v", err)
}
SetActiveProviderEnv("") // blank with nothing set stays unset
if got := os.Getenv(ActiveProviderEnv); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("empty name set the env to %q, want unset", got)
}
// Regression: switching from a named provider back to an unnamed/default profile
// must CLEAR a previously exported value, not leave it stale for children.
if err := os.Setenv(ActiveProviderEnv, "stale-provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed stale: %v", err)
}
SetActiveProviderEnv("") // blank must unset the stale value
if got := os.Getenv(ActiveProviderEnv); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("blank name left stale env %q, want cleared", got)
}
cfgStale := &FileConfig{}
applyEnv(cfgStale, nil)
if cfgStale.ActiveProvider != "" {
t.Fatalf("applyEnv still resolved stale provider %q after clear", cfgStale.ActiveProvider)
}
SetActiveProviderEnv("ollama-cloud")
if got := os.Getenv(ActiveProviderEnv); got != "ollama-cloud" {
t.Fatalf("env = %q, want ollama-cloud", got)
}
// applyEnv with a nil map is the exact path a child uses: it falls back to
// os.Getenv, so the inherited value selects the active provider.
cfg := &FileConfig{}
applyEnv(cfg, nil)
if cfg.ActiveProvider != "ollama-cloud" {
t.Fatalf("applyEnv ActiveProvider = %q, want ollama-cloud (inherited env not read)", cfg.ActiveProvider)
}
}
-57
View File
@@ -155,63 +155,6 @@ func MigratePlaintextProviderKeys(path string, store APIKeySetter) (int, error)
return migrated, nil
}
// HasConfiguredCredential reports whether the profile is set up to authenticate
// with its own API key (inline, stored, or a raw auth header). It is the single
// definition of "this profile is key-authed", shared by OAuthLoginCandidates and
// the cli/tui setup surfaces so they never disagree about whether a profile is
// keyed. APIKeyEnv is deliberately NOT included: an env var may be unset at
// runtime while the profile actually relies on an OAuth login, so an
// env-configured-but-empty profile must still be allowed to resolve a token.
func (profile ProviderProfile) HasConfiguredCredential() bool {
return strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKey) != "" ||
profile.APIKeyStored ||
strings.TrimSpace(profile.AuthHeaderValue) != ""
}
// OAuthLoginCandidates returns the login names to try, in order, when resolving
// this profile's OAuth token — used by the runtime bearer resolver, the Codex
// account-header resolver, and the onboarding presence check so all three agree.
//
// It returns NO candidates for a profile that carries its own configured
// credential: attaching an OAuth resolver to such a profile makes withBearer
// erase the key the instant a token resolves, silently routing/billing the call
// through the OAuth account instead of the intended key (the cross-profile
// override the review caught — and, via the profile name, a same-name login
// overriding an explicit key). A stored-key profile that reaches this keyless
// (e.g. a transiently unreadable keyring) is likewise treated as key-auth, so it
// fails with a clear missing-credential error rather than silently borrowing an
// unrelated OAuth login. APIKeyEnv is intentionally not part of that gate (an
// env var may be unset while the profile relies on OAuth).
//
// For a keyless profile the profile name comes first (a login under your own
// profile name is unambiguously yours), then the catalog ID as a FALLBACK (so a
// profile renamed away from its catalog ID — e.g. {name:"codex",
// catalogID:"chatgpt"} — still finds a `zero auth login chatgpt` token).
// Candidates are trimmed, blank-skipped, and de-duplicated CASE-SENSITIVELY — the
// OAuth token store is a case-sensitive map, so "ChatGPT" and "chatgpt" are
// distinct keys and both must survive.
func (profile ProviderProfile) OAuthLoginCandidates() []string {
if profile.HasConfiguredCredential() {
return nil
}
var names []string
add := func(s string) {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
if s == "" {
return
}
for _, existing := range names {
if existing == s { // case-sensitive: the store lookup is case-sensitive
return
}
}
names = append(names, s)
}
add(profile.Name)
add(profile.CatalogID)
return names
}
// ApplyStoredAPIKey fills profile.APIKey from the credential store when it is not
// already resolved — an inline config key or a resolved APIKeyEnv always wins, so
// this only supplies a key for providers whose secret lives in the store. A nil
-66
View File
@@ -172,69 +172,3 @@ func TestProviderProfileAPIKeyStoredRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("no inline key expected, got %q", p.APIKey)
}
}
// OAuthLoginCandidates always offers the profile name, adds the catalog ID as a
// fallback ONLY when the profile has no effective own credential, and dedupes
// case-sensitively (the OAuth store is a case-sensitive map).
func TestOAuthLoginCandidates(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
profile ProviderProfile
want []string
}{
{
name: "renamed keyless profile falls back to catalog id",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "codex", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
want: []string{"codex", "chatgpt"},
},
{
name: "case-variant name keeps distinct catalog-id candidate",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
want: []string{"ChatGPT", "chatgpt"},
},
{
name: "exact-duplicate name and catalog id collapse",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "chatgpt", CatalogID: "chatgpt"},
want: []string{"chatgpt"},
},
{
// A configured key must block ALL candidates (name included): a login
// under the profile's own name would otherwise erase the key too.
name: "own inline key blocks every candidate",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "anthropic-work", CatalogID: "anthropic", APIKey: "sk-work"},
want: nil,
},
{
name: "own auth header blocks every candidate",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "acme", CatalogID: "anthropic", AuthHeaderValue: "Bearer x"},
want: nil,
},
{
// APIKeyStored means key-auth even if the key isn't loaded here (e.g. a
// transiently unreadable keyring): don't silently borrow an OAuth login.
name: "stored-key profile blocks every candidate",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "openai-stored", CatalogID: "openai", APIKeyStored: true},
want: nil,
},
{
// APIKeyEnv is NOT a configured credential for gating: the env var may be
// unset while the profile relies on an OAuth login, so candidates stand.
name: "env-only profile still yields candidates",
profile: ProviderProfile{Name: "xai", CatalogID: "xai", APIKeyEnv: "XAI_API_KEY"},
want: []string{"xai"},
},
{
name: "empty profile yields no candidates",
profile: ProviderProfile{},
want: nil,
},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := c.profile.OAuthLoginCandidates()
if strings.Join(got, ",") != strings.Join(c.want, ",") {
t.Fatalf("OAuthLoginCandidates() = %#v, want %#v", got, c.want)
}
})
}
}
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"testing"
)
// SetMaxTurnsEnv must export the per-run turn budget so a child process (whose
// resolution reads the inherited environment via the nil-map -> os.Getenv path in
// applyEnv) runs with the SAME budget the user set via /turns. n <= 0 is a no-op,
// and a non-numeric/zero env value must not clobber the configured budget.
func TestSetMaxTurnsEnvRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(MaxTurnsEnv, "") // register cleanup; restores the original after
if err := os.Unsetenv(MaxTurnsEnv); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unset: %v", err)
}
SetMaxTurnsEnv(0) // non-positive must not set anything
if got := os.Getenv(MaxTurnsEnv); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("n<=0 set the env to %q, want unset", got)
}
SetMaxTurnsEnv(150)
if got := os.Getenv(MaxTurnsEnv); got != "150" {
t.Fatalf("env = %q, want 150", got)
}
// applyEnv with a nil map is the exact path a child uses: it falls back to
// os.Getenv, so the inherited value sets the budget.
cfg := &FileConfig{MaxTurns: defaultMaxTurns}
applyEnv(cfg, nil)
if cfg.MaxTurns != 150 {
t.Fatalf("applyEnv MaxTurns = %d, want 150 (inherited env not read)", cfg.MaxTurns)
}
// A garbage env value must leave the configured budget untouched.
if err := os.Setenv(MaxTurnsEnv, "not-a-number"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set: %v", err)
}
cfg2 := &FileConfig{MaxTurns: defaultMaxTurns}
applyEnv(cfg2, nil)
if cfg2.MaxTurns != defaultMaxTurns {
t.Fatalf("garbage env clobbered MaxTurns to %d, want default %d", cfg2.MaxTurns, defaultMaxTurns)
}
// An over-ceiling env value (e.g. a raw shell export that bypasses the /turns
// clamp) must be clamped to MaxTurnsCeiling at the read site.
if err := os.Setenv(MaxTurnsEnv, "999999"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set: %v", err)
}
cfg3 := &FileConfig{MaxTurns: defaultMaxTurns}
applyEnv(cfg3, nil)
if cfg3.MaxTurns != MaxTurnsCeiling {
t.Fatalf("applyEnv MaxTurns = %d, want clamped to ceiling %d", cfg3.MaxTurns, MaxTurnsCeiling)
}
}
+1 -21
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
)
@@ -34,32 +33,13 @@ func DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot string) (ResolveOptions, error) {
}
func DefaultUserConfigPath() (string, error) {
userConfigDir, err := UserConfigDir()
userConfigDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve user config directory: %w", err)
}
return filepath.Join(userConfigDir, "zero", "config.json"), nil
}
// UserConfigDir returns the base directory Zero stores per-user config under.
// It mirrors os.UserConfigDir everywhere except macOS: there Go defaults to
// ~/Library/Application Support, but Zero deliberately uses ~/.config (XDG-style,
// matching Linux and Claude Code) so a single config path works cross-platform.
// $XDG_CONFIG_HOME still wins on macOS when set.
func UserConfigDir() (string, error) {
if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
if xdg := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")); xdg != "" {
return xdg, nil
}
home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve home directory: %w", err)
}
return filepath.Join(home, ".config"), nil
}
return os.UserConfigDir()
}
func existingConfigFile(path string) (string, error) {
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
+1 -19
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func setUserConfigRoot(t *testing.T) string {
t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", root)
}
configRoot, err := UserConfigDir()
configRoot, err := os.UserConfigDir()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UserConfigDir() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -130,21 +130,3 @@ func mkdirAll(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Fatalf("create directory %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
func TestDefaultUserConfigPathUsesXDGConfigOnMacOS(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
t.Skip("macOS-specific config path behavior")
}
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", "")
path, err := DefaultUserConfigPath()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() error = %v", err)
}
want := filepath.Join(home, ".config", "zero", "config.json")
if path != want {
t.Fatalf("DefaultUserConfigPath() = %q, want %q", path, want)
}
}
+9 -124
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,9 @@ package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
@@ -15,40 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
// ErrNoActiveProvider marks a resolve failure caused solely by a missing or
// unresolvable active provider. The interactive TUI treats this as "needs
// onboarding" (drop into the setup wizard) rather than a fatal config error.
var ErrNoActiveProvider = errors.New("no active provider configured")
// ErrProviderRequiresModel marks a resolve failure caused solely by the active
// provider missing a model with no catalog default to fall back on (custom
// openai-/anthropic-compatible endpoints — Zero cannot guess a gateway's model).
// Like ErrNoActiveProvider, the interactive TUI treats it as "needs onboarding"
// and drops into the setup wizard so the user can fix it; headless commands
// (zero config, zero exec) still fail with the actionable message.
var ErrProviderRequiresModel = errors.New("provider requires model")
// setupFixableError tags an error with a sentinel for errors.Is WITHOUT
// changing its message: the sentinel's own text must not prefix what the user
// sees (the wrapped message is already complete and actionable).
type setupFixableError struct {
err error
sentinel error
}
func (e *setupFixableError) Error() string { return e.err.Error() }
func (e *setupFixableError) Unwrap() []error { return []error{e.err, e.sentinel} }
// defaultMaxTurns is the per-run tool-turn budget when none is configured. 30 was
// too low for real multi-step agentic work (agents ran out mid-task before reaching
// later steps); 50 matches the old "deep" preset. Raise per-session with /turns.
const defaultMaxTurns = 50
// MaxTurnsCeiling caps the per-run tool-turn budget so a stray env value or typo
// can't set an absurd ceiling. Shared between applyEnv (read site) and the /turns
// command (write site) so the bound holds even if the env is set by a raw shell.
const MaxTurnsCeiling = 500
const defaultMaxTurns = 30
// defaultDeferThreshold is the number of deferred-eligible (MCP) tools at which
// Zero collapses their full JSON schemas into compact `tool_search` reminder
@@ -221,9 +186,6 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
if src.Preferences.Recaps != nil {
dst.Preferences.Recaps = src.Preferences.Recaps
}
if strings.TrimSpace(src.Preferences.Theme) != "" {
dst.Preferences.Theme = strings.TrimSpace(src.Preferences.Theme)
}
mergeLocalControlConfig(&dst.LocalControl, src.LocalControl)
}
@@ -246,17 +208,8 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
// config: a cloned repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to grant
// itself write access outside the workspace. Global config and CLI flags
// are the only config sources for write roots.
//
// Sandbox.Network from project config may only TIGHTEN (→ "deny"), never
// WEAKEN (→ "allow"). A malicious repo must not be able to open network
// access for shell commands. Matches the AdditionalWriteRoots posture.
if network := strings.TrimSpace(src.Sandbox.Network); network != "" {
// Normalize: anything that isn't literally "allow" counts as deny.
if sandbox.NormalizeNetworkMode(sandbox.NetworkMode(network)) != sandbox.NetworkAllow {
dst.Sandbox.Network = network
}
// Silently ignore "allow" from project config — not an error, just
// a privilege the project scope does not have.
dst.Sandbox.Network = network
}
if src.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets {
dst.Sandbox.BlockUnixSockets = true
@@ -405,18 +358,6 @@ func effectiveProviderKind(profile ProviderProfile) ProviderKind {
return ""
}
// catalogDefaultModel returns the default model of a catalog provider ("" when
// the id is unknown), used to fill a missing profile.Model for the official-API
// kinds so a hand-written profile without a model resolves instead of bricking
// every command that resolves config up front (zero config, bare zero setup).
func catalogDefaultModel(catalogID string) string {
descriptor, ok := providercatalog.Get(catalogID)
if !ok {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.DefaultModel)
}
func catalogDescriptorForProfile(profile ProviderProfile) (providercatalog.Descriptor, bool) {
catalogID := providercatalog.NormalizeID(profile.CatalogID)
if catalogID == "" {
@@ -490,53 +431,11 @@ func mergeProfile(base ProviderProfile, next ProviderProfile) ProviderProfile {
return base
}
// ActiveProviderEnv selects the active provider profile by name (read in applyEnv).
const ActiveProviderEnv = "ZERO_PROVIDER"
// SetActiveProviderEnv exports the active provider name to the process environment
// so a spawned child process (which inherits the environment) resolves the SAME
// provider profile — and therefore the same credentials (env key / stored key /
// OAuth) — as its parent. Without this a sub-agent re-resolves config.json's
// default provider and can land on one whose credentials don't match the parent's
// live selection, failing auth the instant it spawns. A blank name CLEARS the
// variable: switching back to an unnamed/default profile must not keep exporting a
// stale provider to children.
func SetActiveProviderEnv(name string) {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
_ = os.Unsetenv(ActiveProviderEnv)
return
}
_ = os.Setenv(ActiveProviderEnv, name)
}
// MaxTurnsEnv overrides the per-run tool-turn budget by name (read in applyEnv).
const MaxTurnsEnv = "ZERO_MAX_TURNS"
// SetMaxTurnsEnv exports the per-run tool-turn budget to the process environment so
// a spawned child (sub-agent / swarm member, which inherits the environment) runs
// with the SAME budget the user set via /turns. Without it a child re-resolves
// config.json's default and a large delegated task can exhaust its turns mid-run
// (exit 4 / max-turns). No-op for n <= 0.
func SetMaxTurnsEnv(n int) {
if n > 0 {
_ = os.Setenv(MaxTurnsEnv, strconv.Itoa(n))
}
}
func applyEnv(cfg *FileConfig, env map[string]string) {
activeProvider := strings.TrimSpace(envValue(env, ActiveProviderEnv))
activeProvider := strings.TrimSpace(envValue(env, "ZERO_PROVIDER"))
if activeProvider != "" {
cfg.ActiveProvider = activeProvider
}
if maxTurns := strings.TrimSpace(envValue(env, MaxTurnsEnv)); maxTurns != "" {
if n, err := strconv.Atoi(maxTurns); err == nil && n > 0 {
if n > MaxTurnsCeiling {
n = MaxTurnsCeiling
}
cfg.MaxTurns = n
}
}
applyProviderEnv(cfg, ProviderKindOpenAI, envProfile{
Name: string(ProviderKindOpenAI),
@@ -778,16 +677,11 @@ func unionStrings(base []string, extra []string) []string {
}
type normalizeOptions struct {
// defaultModels fills a missing profile.Model for the official-API provider
// kinds (openai from the model registry; anthropic/google from their catalog
// descriptors). Off for provider-command configs (command.go), which must
// surface exactly what the external command returned rather than inventing
// a model behind its back.
defaultModels bool
defaultOpenAIModel bool
}
func normalizeProviders(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultModels: true}, envMaps...)
return normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers, activeName, normalizeOptions{defaultOpenAIModel: true}, envMaps...)
}
func normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName string, envMaps ...map[string]string) ([]ProviderProfile, ProviderProfile, error) {
@@ -802,7 +696,7 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
if activeName != "" {
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
}
return []ProviderProfile{}, ProviderProfile{}, nil
}
@@ -834,13 +728,10 @@ func normalizeProvidersWithOptions(providers []ProviderProfile, activeName strin
}
if !activeFound {
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: active provider %q not found", ErrNoActiveProvider, activeName)
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, fmt.Errorf("active provider %q not found", activeName)
}
if active.Model == "" {
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, &setupFixableError{
err: providerError(active, "provider %s requires model — add \"model\" to its entry in config.json, or re-run: zero setup <catalog-id> --model <model>", active.Name),
sentinel: ErrProviderRequiresModel,
}
return nil, ProviderProfile{}, providerError(active, "provider %s requires model", active.Name)
}
return normalized, active, nil
@@ -887,7 +778,7 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
case ProviderKindOpenAI:
if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialOpenAIBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
profile.BaseURL = OpenAIBaseURL
if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
if options.defaultOpenAIModel && profile.Model == "" {
profile.Model = modelregistry.DefaultModelID
}
return profile, nil
@@ -904,9 +795,6 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
case ProviderKindAnthropic:
if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialAnthropicBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
profile.BaseURL = AnthropicBaseURL
if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("anthropic")
}
return profile, nil
}
return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "anthropic provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, AnthropicBaseURL)
@@ -921,9 +809,6 @@ func normalizeProvider(profile ProviderProfile, env map[string]string, options n
case ProviderKindGoogle:
if profile.BaseURL == "" || isOfficialGoogleBaseURL(profile.BaseURL) {
profile.BaseURL = GoogleBaseURL
if options.defaultModels && profile.Model == "" {
profile.Model = catalogDefaultModel("google")
}
return profile, nil
}
return ProviderProfile{}, providerError(profile, "google provider %s requires official baseURL %s", profile.Name, GoogleBaseURL)
+2 -263
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
@@ -884,8 +883,8 @@ func TestResolveAllowsNoConfiguredProviders(t *testing.T) {
if HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
t.Fatalf("Provider = %#v, want zero value", resolved.Provider)
}
if resolved.MaxTurns != defaultMaxTurns {
t.Fatalf("MaxTurns = %d, want default %d", resolved.MaxTurns, defaultMaxTurns)
if resolved.MaxTurns != 30 {
t.Fatalf("MaxTurns = %d, want 30", resolved.MaxTurns)
}
}
@@ -899,9 +898,6 @@ func TestResolveRejectsActiveProviderWithoutConfiguredProfiles(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `active provider "ghost" not found`) {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want active provider missing message", err.Error())
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProvider)", err)
}
if resolved.ActiveProvider != "" {
t.Fatalf("ActiveProvider = %q, want empty", resolved.ActiveProvider)
}
@@ -1059,130 +1055,6 @@ func TestResolveAppliesProviderCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesMiniMaxCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "mini-cn",
"providers": [{
"name": "mini-cn",
"catalog_id": "minimaxi-cn"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"MINIMAXI_API_KEY": "sk-cn-mini",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "minimaxi-cn" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want minimaxi-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindAnthropicCompat {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindAnthropicCompat)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want MiniMax CN default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "MiniMax-M3" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want MiniMax-M3", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "MINIMAXI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want MINIMAXI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-cn-mini" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesZaiCNCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
// The "zai-cn" catalog entry preserves the legacy open.bigmodel.cn endpoint
// for users who still target the China hosting; "zai" itself now points at
// api.z.ai (international). The two env-vars are intentionally distinct
// (ZHIPU_API_KEY for China, ZAI_API_KEY for international) so an account on
// one side cannot be silently used against the other.
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "zai-cn",
"providers": [{
"name": "zai-cn",
"catalog_id": "zai-cn"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"ZHIPU_API_KEY": "sk-zhipu-cn",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai-cn" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai-cn", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai China default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (China default)", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZHIPU_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZHIPU_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zhipu-cn" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults(t *testing.T) {
// "zai" now resolves to the international endpoint; the catalog default
// model stays glm-4.5 (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime).
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "zai-intl",
"providers": [{
"name": "zai-intl",
"catalog_id": "zai"
}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
ProjectConfigPath: path,
Env: map[string]string{
"ZAI_API_KEY": "sk-zai-intl",
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.CatalogID != "zai" {
t.Fatalf("CatalogID = %q, want zai", resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
}
if resolved.Provider.ProviderKind != ProviderKindOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("ProviderKind = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.ProviderKind, ProviderKindOpenAICompatible)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4" {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want Z.ai international default", resolved.Provider.BaseURL)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "glm-4.5" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want glm-4.5 (preserved default; live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2 at runtime)", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "ZAI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("APIKeyEnv = %q, want ZAI_API_KEY", resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv)
}
if resolved.Provider.APIKey != "sk-zai-intl" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want env-resolved secret", resolved.Provider.APIKey)
}
}
func TestResolveProviderCatalogAliasAndLocalNoAuth(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "local",
@@ -1397,45 +1269,6 @@ func TestResolveSandboxBlockUnixSocketsFromFile(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveSandboxNetworkProjectConfigCannotWeaken(t *testing.T) {
// 1. Project config tries to set network to "allow" (should be ignored).
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: userPath,
ProjectConfigPath: projectPath,
Env: map[string]string{},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Sandbox.Network == "allow" {
t.Fatal("resolved.Sandbox.Network = allow, want empty/deny to prevent project config from weakening sandbox")
}
// 2. User config sets network to "allow", project config sets it to "deny" (tightening is allowed).
userPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
"sandbox": {"network": "allow"}
}`)
projectPath2 := writeConfig(t, `{
"sandbox": {"network": "deny"}
}`)
resolved2, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: userPath2,
ProjectConfigPath: projectPath2,
Env: map[string]string{},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved2.Sandbox.Network != "deny" {
t.Fatalf("resolved.Sandbox.Network = %q, want deny (project config allowed to tighten)", resolved2.Sandbox.Network)
}
}
func TestResolveNotifyValid(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{"notify":{"mode":"both","focusMode":"always"}}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
@@ -1718,97 +1551,3 @@ func TestResolveMaxTurnsZeroFallsBackToDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("MaxTurns = %d, want default %d", resolved.MaxTurns, defaultMaxTurns)
}
}
// The reported brick: a hand-written google profile with an apiKey but no
// model made EVERY resolving command fail ("provider google requires model"),
// including zero config and bare zero setup — the only commands that could
// have fixed it. Official-API kinds now fall back to their catalog default
// model, exactly like the openai kind always has.
func TestResolveDefaultsGoogleModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "google",
"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the google catalog", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-pro" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the google catalog default gemini-2.5-pro", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
if resolved.Provider.BaseURL != GoogleBaseURL {
t.Fatalf("BaseURL = %q, want %q", resolved.Provider.BaseURL, GoogleBaseURL)
}
}
func TestResolveDefaultsAnthropicModelFromCatalog(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "anthropic",
"providers": [{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v, want model defaulted from the anthropic catalog", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "claude-sonnet-4.5" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the anthropic catalog default claude-sonnet-4.5", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
}
// An explicitly configured model must always win over the catalog default.
func TestResolveKeepsExplicitGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "google",
"providers": [{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x", "model": "gemini-2.5-flash"}]
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if resolved.Provider.Model != "gemini-2.5-flash" {
t.Fatalf("Model = %q, want the explicitly configured gemini-2.5-flash", resolved.Provider.Model)
}
}
// Provider-command configs must NOT get invented models: the without-defaults
// path surfaces exactly what the external command returned.
func TestNormalizeWithoutModelDefaultsStillRequiresGoogleModel(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults(
[]ProviderProfile{{Name: "google", ProviderKind: ProviderKindGoogle, APIKey: "AIza-x"}},
"google", map[string]string{})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("provider-command path must still require an explicit model")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "requires model") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want requires-model", err.Error())
}
// The residual error must tell the user how to fix it.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config.json") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want an actionable config.json hint", err.Error())
}
}
// The residual requires-model failure (custom endpoint, no catalog default)
// must be tagged setup-fixable WITHOUT changing its message: the interactive
// TUI matches the sentinel to drop into the wizard, while headless commands
// print the exact actionable text.
func TestResolveRequiresModelErrorIsSetupFixable(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "gw",
"providers": [{"name": "gw", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gw.example/v1", "apiKey": "sk-x"}]
}`)
_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected requires-model error for a custom endpoint without model")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is(err, ErrProviderRequiresModel)", err)
}
// The sentinel must NOT prefix the user-facing message.
if !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "provider gw requires model") {
t.Fatalf("message = %q, want it to start with the provider error, not the sentinel text", err.Error())
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sk-x") {
t.Fatalf("error leaked API key: %q", err.Error())
}
}
-4
View File
@@ -97,10 +97,6 @@ type ToolsConfig struct {
type PreferencesConfig struct {
FavoriteModels []string `json:"favoriteModels,omitempty"`
// Theme is the persisted TUI palette preference — "auto" or a registered theme
// name (e.g. "dracula"). Applied at startup below the --theme flag and
// ZERO_THEME, so a /theme choice survives restart. Empty = unset (defaults auto).
Theme string `json:"theme,omitempty"`
// Recaps is a tri-state: nil (unset) defaults to ON; an explicit false means
// the user turned post-turn recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
// custom unmarshal is needed (unlike ToolsConfig.DeferThreshold's int).
+1 -28
View File
@@ -66,13 +66,10 @@ func TestValidateFileRedactsSecretInIssue(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
// An openai-compatible CUSTOM endpoint has no catalog default to fall back
// on, so a missing model is still a real issue — and the message must tell
// the user how to fix it.
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai-compatible", "baseURL": "https://gateway.example/v1"}
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "anthropic"}
]
}`)
@@ -83,30 +80,6 @@ func TestValidateFileMissingModelWarns(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "requires model") {
t.Fatalf("expected requires-model issue, got %#v", issues)
}
if !strings.Contains(issues[0].Message, "config.json") {
t.Fatalf("requires-model issue should carry an actionable hint, got %#v", issues)
}
}
func TestValidateFileDefaultsOfficialKindModels(t *testing.T) {
// Official-API kinds (anthropic/google) fall back to their catalog default
// model, so a hand-written model-less profile validates clean instead of
// bricking zero config / bare zero setup — the only commands that could
// have fixed it (the reported google case).
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "google",
"providers": [
{"name": "google", "provider_kind": "google", "apiKey": "AIza-x"},
{"name": "anthropic", "provider_kind": "anthropic", "apiKey": "sk-ant-x"}
]
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
for _, issue := range issues {
if strings.Contains(issue.Message, "requires model") {
t.Fatalf("official-kind profiles must default their model, got issue %#v", issue)
}
}
}
func TestValidateFileValidConfigHasNoIssues(t *testing.T) {
-22
View File
@@ -154,28 +154,6 @@ func SetRecapsEnabled(path string, enabled bool) (FileConfig, error) {
return cfg, nil
}
// SetTheme persists the TUI theme preference, mirroring SetFavoriteModels
// (read-modify-atomic-write). A blank theme clears the stored preference.
func SetTheme(path string, theme string) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("config path is required")
}
cfg := FileConfig{}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err)
}
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", path, err)
}
cfg.Preferences.Theme = strings.TrimSpace(theme)
if err := writeConfigFile(path, cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, err
}
return cfg, nil
}
func normalizeFavoriteModels(models []string) []string {
seen := map[string]bool{}
favorites := make([]string, 0, len(models))
-33
View File
@@ -272,39 +272,6 @@ func TestSetFavoriteModelsPersistsUserPreferences(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSetThemePersistsUserPreference(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero.json")
writeConfigFixture(t, path, FileConfig{
ActiveProvider: "openai",
Providers: []ProviderProfile{
{Name: "openai", ProviderKind: ProviderKindOpenAI, Model: "gpt-4.1"},
},
}, 0o600)
cfg, err := SetTheme(path, " dracula ")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetTheme() error = %v", err)
}
if cfg.Preferences.Theme != "dracula" {
t.Fatalf("Theme = %q, want dracula (trimmed)", cfg.Preferences.Theme)
}
persisted := readConfigFixture(t, path)
if persisted.Preferences.Theme != "dracula" {
t.Fatalf("persisted Theme = %q, want dracula", persisted.Preferences.Theme)
}
if persisted.ActiveProvider != "openai" || len(persisted.Providers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("provider config was not preserved by SetTheme: %#v", persisted)
}
// A blank value clears the stored preference.
if cfg, err = SetTheme(path, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetTheme(\"\") error = %v", err)
}
if cfg.Preferences.Theme != "" {
t.Fatalf("SetTheme(\"\") should clear the theme, got %q", cfg.Preferences.Theme)
}
}
func TestRecapsPreferenceRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
// Default (unset) is ON.
if !(PreferencesConfig{}).RecapsEnabled() {
+21 -166
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@
package mcp
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -212,85 +211,6 @@ func TestHTTPClientListsAndCallsTools(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestHTTPClientFollowsSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
testServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if request.URL.Path == "/mcp" {
http.Redirect(response, request, "/redirected", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return
}
if request.Method != http.MethodPost || request.URL.Path != "/redirected" {
t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want POST /redirected", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret", got)
http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
message := readHTTPRPCMessage(t, request)
switch message.Method {
case "initialize":
writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05"})
case "notifications/initialized":
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
default:
writeHTTPRPCResponse(t, response, message.ID, map[string]any{})
}
}))
defer testServer.Close()
client, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeHTTP,
URL: testServer.URL + "/mcp",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v", err)
}
if err := client.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Close() error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestHTTPClientRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("redirect target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer target.Close()
redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(response, request, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer redirector.Close()
_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeHTTP,
URL: redirector.URL + "/mcp",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
@@ -420,53 +340,6 @@ func TestSSEClientListsAndCallsToolsFromRemoteStream(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSSEClientRejectsCrossOriginEndpointBeforeSendingHeaders(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("SSE endpoint target received X-Api-Key = %q", got)
}
response.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
}))
defer target.Close()
stream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(response http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
if got := request.Header.Get("X-Api-Key"); got != "secret" {
t.Errorf("X-Api-Key = %q, want secret on configured SSE server", got)
http.Error(response, "missing auth", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if request.Method != http.MethodGet || request.URL.Path != "/sse" {
t.Errorf("request = %s %s, want GET /sse", request.Method, request.URL.Path)
http.Error(response, "bad request", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
response.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(response, "event: endpoint\ndata: %s/messages\n\n", target.URL)
if flusher, ok := response.(http.Flusher); ok {
flusher.Flush()
}
}))
defer stream.Close()
_, err := Connect(ctx, Server{
Name: "docs",
Type: ServerTypeSSE,
URL: stream.URL + "/sse",
Headers: map[string]string{"X-Api-Key": "secret"},
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint origin") {
t.Fatalf("Connect() error = %v, want cross-origin endpoint error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("SSE endpoint target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestHTTPClientReportsNonOKStatus(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
@@ -520,43 +393,28 @@ func TestConnectRejectsUnsupportedTransport(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID(t *testing.T) {
// Pipes, not a pre-filled bytes.Buffer: the fake server responds only AFTER
// reading the outgoing request, matching production ordering. With responses
// pre-loaded, the client's reader goroutine could consume the matching
// response — and hit EOF — before request() registered its pending id,
// flaking as "request() error = EOF" on fast runners.
serverReader, clientWriter := io.Pipe() // client → server
clientReader, serverWriter := io.Pipe() // server → client
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = clientWriter.Close()
_ = serverWriter.Close()
})
serverErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
requests := newMessageReader(serverReader)
request, err := requests.read()
if err != nil {
serverErr <- err
return
}
responses := newMessageWriter(serverWriter)
for _, message := range []rpcMessage{
{Method: "notifications/progress"},
{ID: 99, Error: &rpcError{Code: -32000, Message: "wrong response"}},
{ID: request.ID, Result: mustRaw(map[string]any{"value": "matched"})},
} {
if err := responses.write(message); err != nil {
serverErr <- err
return
}
}
serverErr <- nil
}()
var incoming bytes.Buffer
incomingWriter := newMessageWriter(&incoming)
if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{Method: "notifications/progress"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{
ID: 99,
Error: &rpcError{Code: -32000, Message: "wrong response"},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := incomingWriter.write(rpcMessage{
ID: 1,
Result: mustRaw(map[string]any{"value": "matched"}),
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var outgoing bytes.Buffer
client := &Client{
reader: newMessageReader(clientReader),
writer: newMessageWriter(clientWriter),
reader: newMessageReader(&incoming),
writer: newMessageWriter(&outgoing),
nextID: 1,
}
var result struct {
@@ -568,9 +426,6 @@ func TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID(t *testing.T) {
if result.Value != "matched" {
t.Fatalf("result.Value = %q, want matched response", result.Value)
}
if err := <-serverErr; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fake server error: %v", err)
}
}
type errorCloser struct {
+4 -8
View File
@@ -733,11 +733,7 @@ func resolveSSEEndpointURL(baseValue string, endpointValue string) (string, erro
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse MCP SSE endpoint URL: %w", err)
}
resolvedURL := baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL)
if !sameMCPOrigin(baseURL, resolvedURL) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("MCP SSE endpoint origin %s differs from configured server origin %s", mcpOrigin(resolvedURL), mcpOrigin(baseURL))
}
return resolvedURL.String(), nil
return baseURL.ResolveReference(endpointURL).String(), nil
}
func rpcResponseKey(id any) string {
@@ -877,10 +873,10 @@ func (source *storeTokenSource) Refresh(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
// oauthHTTPClient returns an HTTP client whose transport attaches OAuth bearer
// tokens and refreshes them on 401 for OAuth-configured servers. Servers that do
// not declare OAuth use the default transport with the same MCP redirect guard.
// not declare OAuth get the default client unchanged.
func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(server.Auth), ServerAuthOAuth) {
return mcpHTTPClient(server, nil), nil
return http.DefaultClient, nil
}
store, err := NewTokenStore(TokenStoreOptions{})
if err != nil {
@@ -892,5 +888,5 @@ func oauthHTTPClient(server Server) (*http.Client, error) {
httpClient: http.DefaultClient,
now: time.Now,
}
return mcpHTTPClient(server, newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)), nil
return &http.Client{Transport: newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, server.Name)}, nil
}
-136
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
@@ -150,141 +149,6 @@ func TestOAuthRoundTripperDoesNotRetryAfterSuccessfulNon401(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestOAuthRoundTripperRejectsCrossOriginRedirectBeforeBearerLeak(t *testing.T) {
source := &fakeTokenSource{}
source.access.Store("access-secret")
source.refreshFunc = func() (string, error) { return "access-fresh", nil }
var targetHits int32
target := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
atomic.AddInt32(&targetHits, 1)
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
t.Errorf("redirect target received Authorization = %q", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer target.Close()
redirector := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, target.URL+"/mcp", http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
}))
defer redirector.Close()
client := mcpHTTPClient(
Server{Name: "oauth-docs", Type: ServerTypeHTTP},
newOAuthRoundTripper(http.DefaultTransport, source, "oauth-docs"),
)
resp, err := client.Get(redirector.URL + "/mcp")
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Get() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect error", err)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&targetHits); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("redirect target hits = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSameMCPOriginNormalizesDefaultPorts(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
left string
right string
want bool
}{
{
name: "https default port",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "https://EXAMPLE.test:443/other",
want: true,
},
{
name: "http default port",
left: "http://example.test/mcp",
right: "http://example.test:80/other",
want: true,
},
{
name: "different scheme",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "http://example.test:443/other",
want: false,
},
{
name: "different port",
left: "https://example.test/mcp",
right: "https://example.test:8443/other",
want: false,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
left, err := url.Parse(tc.left)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
right, err := url.Parse(tc.right)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := sameMCPOrigin(left, right); got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("sameMCPOrigin(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tc.left, tc.right, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveSSEEndpointURLRestrictsOrigin(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
base string
endpoint string
want string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "relative endpoint",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "/messages",
want: "https://example.test/messages",
},
{
name: "absolute same origin",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://example.test/messages",
want: "https://example.test/messages",
},
{
name: "default port equivalent",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://example.test:443/messages",
want: "https://example.test:443/messages",
},
{
name: "cross origin",
base: "https://example.test/sse",
endpoint: "https://evil.test/messages",
wantErr: "differs from configured server origin",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := resolveSSEEndpointURL(tc.base, tc.endpoint)
if tc.wantErr != "" {
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v, want %q", err, tc.wantErr)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() error = %v", err)
}
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("resolveSSEEndpointURL() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNonOAuthServerIsUnaffected(t *testing.T) {
// Regression: a server without auth must not get a bearer header or any
// OAuth round tripper, and must connect normally.
-74
View File
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
package mcp
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
const maxMCPRedirects = 10
func mcpHTTPClient(server Server, transport http.RoundTripper) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
CheckRedirect: checkMCPRedirect(server),
}
}
func checkMCPRedirect(server Server) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return func(request *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= maxMCPRedirects {
return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s stopped after %d redirects", server.Type, server.Name, maxMCPRedirects)
}
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
if !sameMCPOrigin(via[0].URL, request.URL) {
return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s refused cross-origin redirect to %s", server.Type, server.Name, mcpOrigin(request.URL))
}
return nil
}
}
func sameMCPOrigin(left *url.URL, right *url.URL) bool {
if left == nil || right == nil {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
effectiveMCPPort(left) == effectiveMCPPort(right)
}
func effectiveMCPPort(value *url.URL) string {
if value == nil {
return ""
}
if port := value.Port(); port != "" {
return port
}
switch strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) {
case "http":
return "80"
case "https":
return "443"
default:
return ""
}
}
func mcpOrigin(value *url.URL) string {
if value == nil {
return "<nil>"
}
host := value.Hostname()
port := effectiveMCPPort(value)
if port != "" {
host = net.JoinHostPort(host, port)
}
if value.Scheme == "" {
return host
}
return strings.ToLower(value.Scheme) + "://" + host
}
+1 -8
View File
@@ -370,14 +370,7 @@ func TestFullFlowStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
redirect := parsed.Query().Get("redirect_uri")
go func() {
cbURL := redirect + "?code=auth-code&state=" + url.QueryEscape(state)
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
resp, err := http.Get(cbURL)
if err == nil {
resp.Body.Close()
return
}
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
_, _ = http.Get(cbURL)
}()
return nil
}
+5 -16
View File
@@ -44,17 +44,10 @@ type Manager struct {
// ManagerOptions configures a Manager.
type ManagerOptions struct {
Store *Store
Registry *Registry
HTTPClient *http.Client
Env map[string]string
// AllowPresets opts this manager into the baked-in OAuth presets without the
// operator exporting ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS — used by the interactive wizard
// and CLI login (and the runtime token refresh) for a provider the user chose
// to sign into, whose preset client identity is public (e.g. xAI). It layers the
// flag onto Env (or the process environment when Env is nil), preserving any
// ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* overrides. Leave false for hermetic tests.
AllowPresets bool
Store *Store
Registry *Registry
HTTPClient *http.Client
Env map[string]string
Now func() time.Time
RefreshBuffer time.Duration
Out io.Writer
@@ -90,13 +83,9 @@ func NewManager(opts ManagerOptions) (*Manager, error) {
if open == nil {
open = func(string) error { return nil }
}
env := opts.Env
if opts.AllowPresets {
env = envWithPresetsAllowed(env)
}
return &Manager{
store: opts.Store, registry: registry, client: client,
env: env, now: now, buffer: buffer, out: out, openBrowser: open,
env: opts.Env, now: now, buffer: buffer, out: out, openBrowser: open,
}, nil
}
-24
View File
@@ -52,30 +52,6 @@ func managerFor(t *testing.T, env map[string]string, openBrowser func(string) er
return m
}
// AllowPresets layers the opt-in onto the manager's env so a login/refresh for a
// preset provider resolves; without it (and no Env) the env stays nil so callers
// and tests remain hermetic.
func TestNewManagerAllowPresetsForcesOptIn(t *testing.T) {
store, err := NewStore(StoreOptions{FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "tok.json")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
m, err := NewManager(ManagerOptions{Store: store, AllowPresets: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager: %v", err)
}
if m.env["ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS"] != "1" {
t.Fatalf("AllowPresets should force the opt-in; got env[%q]=%q", "ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS", m.env["ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS"])
}
m2, err := NewManager(ManagerOptions{Store: store})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewManager: %v", err)
}
if m2.env != nil {
t.Fatalf("env should stay nil without AllowPresets, got %v", m2.env)
}
}
func TestManagerLoginLoopback(t *testing.T) {
fp := newFakeProvider(t, `{"access_token":"at","refresh_token":"rt","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":3600}`)
env := map[string]string{
+1 -28
View File
@@ -1,33 +1,6 @@
package oauth
import (
"os"
"strings"
)
// envWithPresetsAllowed returns an env map that opts into the baked-in presets
// (as if ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1 were exported) so an interactive wizard/CLI
// login for a well-known public client (e.g. xAI) can use the preset without the
// operator setting the flag themselves. It copies base — or snapshots the process
// environment when base is nil — because envValue treats a non-nil map as hermetic
// (a missing key does NOT fall back to os.Getenv), so a partial map would silently
// drop the operator's ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* overrides. The flag is then forced on.
func envWithPresetsAllowed(base map[string]string) map[string]string {
env := make(map[string]string, len(base)+1)
if base == nil {
for _, kv := range os.Environ() {
if eq := strings.IndexByte(kv, '='); eq > 0 {
env[kv[:eq]] = kv[eq+1:]
}
}
} else {
for k, v := range base {
env[k] = v
}
}
env["ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS"] = "1"
return env
}
import "strings"
// providerPreset is a baked-in default OAuth configuration for a well-known
// provider. Every field is overridable per provider via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
-40
View File
@@ -46,46 +46,6 @@ func TestResolveConfigUsesXAIPreset(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// envWithPresetsAllowed lets a caller (the wizard / CLI login / runtime refresh)
// opt into the preset without exporting ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS: an otherwise-inert
// xAI config now resolves from the baked-in preset.
func TestEnvWithPresetsAllowedEnablesPreset(t *testing.T) {
r := NewRegistry()
// Baseline: a hermetic empty map keeps the preset inert.
if _, _, err := r.ResolveConfig("xai", map[string]string{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("xai should not resolve without the opt-in")
}
// The helper forces the opt-in so the preset resolves.
cfg, _, err := r.ResolveConfig("xai", envWithPresetsAllowed(map[string]string{}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("envWithPresetsAllowed should enable the xai preset: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ClientID != "b1a00492-073a-47ea-816f-4c329264a828" {
t.Fatalf("client_id = %q", cfg.ClientID)
}
}
// The helper copies the base map (never mutating it) and keeps ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
// overrides — critical because envValue treats a non-nil map as hermetic, so a
// partial map would silently drop them.
func TestEnvWithPresetsAllowedPreservesOverrides(t *testing.T) {
base := map[string]string{"ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_CLIENT_ID": "custom-id"}
env := envWithPresetsAllowed(base)
if env["ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS"] != "1" {
t.Fatalf("opt-in flag not set: %v", env)
}
if _, mutated := base["ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS"]; mutated {
t.Fatal("envWithPresetsAllowed mutated the caller's base map")
}
cfg, _, err := NewRegistry().ResolveConfig("xai", env)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveConfig with override env: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ClientID != "custom-id" {
t.Fatalf("override dropped through the helper: client_id = %q", cfg.ClientID)
}
}
func TestResolveConfigEnvOverridesPreset(t *testing.T) {
r := NewRegistry()
env := map[string]string{
-20
View File
@@ -41,26 +41,6 @@ func ValidateKey(key string) error {
// ProviderKey builds the store key for a provider login.
func ProviderKey(name string) string { return KeyPrefixProvider + name }
// FirstStored returns the token and its ProviderKey for the FIRST candidate name
// that has a token in the store, with ok=false when none do. Callers pass
// ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates() so that everything derived from a login
// — the bearer token AND any header claim like chatgpt-account-id — comes from
// the SAME login; selecting independently per consumer could otherwise pair a
// bearer from one login with an account header from another. A load error on a
// candidate is treated as a miss (skip to the next), never a hard failure.
func FirstStored(store *Store, candidates []string) (Token, string, bool) {
if store == nil {
return Token{}, "", false
}
for _, name := range candidates {
key := ProviderKey(name)
if token, ok, err := store.Load(key); err == nil && ok {
return token, key, true
}
}
return Token{}, "", false
}
// Status is a redaction-safe summary of a stored token (no secret material).
type Status struct {
Key string `json:"key"`
+1 -7
View File
@@ -123,10 +123,8 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
openAICompat("together", "Together AI", "https://api.together.xyz/v1", "meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct-Turbo", []string{"TOGETHER_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("dashscope", "DashScope", "https://dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1", "qwen-plus", []string{"DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "QWEN_API_KEY"}, "qwen"),
openAICompat("moonshot", "Moonshot AI", "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1", "kimi-k2-0905-preview", []string{"MOONSHOT_API_KEY"}, "kimi"),
openAICompat("longcat", "LongCat", "https://api.longcat.chat/openai", "LongCat-2.0", []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}, "meituan longcat", "meituan", "longcat-2.0"),
openAICompat("nvidia-nim", "NVIDIA NIM", "https://integrate.api.nvidia.com/v1", "nvidia/llama-3.1-nemotron-70b-instruct", []string{"NVIDIA_API_KEY"}, "nvidia nim"),
anthropicCompat("minimax", "MiniMax", "https://api.minimax.io/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAX_API_KEY"}, "mini-max", "mini_max"),
anthropicCompat("minimaxi-cn", "MiniMax CN", "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic", "MiniMax-M3", []string{"MINIMAXI_API_KEY"}, "minimax cn", "minimax-cn"),
openAICompat("mistral", "Mistral", "https://api.mistral.ai/v1", "mistral-large-latest", []string{"MISTRAL_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("github", "GitHub Models", "https://models.inference.ai.azure.com", "openai/gpt-4.1", []string{"GITHUB_TOKEN"}, "github-models"),
transportDescriptor("bedrock", "Amazon Bedrock", TransportBedrock, "https://bedrock-runtime.${AWS_REGION}.amazonaws.com", "anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0", []string{"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_PROFILE"}, []APIFormat{APIFormatBedrockConverse}, true),
@@ -135,11 +133,7 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
openAICompat("venice", "Venice AI", "https://api.venice.ai/api/v1", "qwen-2.5-qwq-32b", []string{"VENICE_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("xiaomi-mimo", "Xiaomi MiMo", "https://api.mimo.xiaomi.com/openai/v1", "mimo-vl", []string{"MIMO_API_KEY", "XIAOMI_API_KEY"}, "xiaomi mimo"),
openAICompat("bankr", "Bankr", "https://api.bankr.bot/v1", "bankr-large", []string{"BANKR_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY"}, "z.ai"),
openAICompat("zai-cn", "Z.ai CN", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZHIPU_API_KEY"}, "z.ai cn"),
openAICompat("kilocode", "KiloCode", "https://api.kilo.ai/api/gateway", "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6", []string{"KILO_API_KEY"}, "kilo", "kilo gateway"),
openAICompat("opencode", "OpenCode Zen", "https://opencode.ai/zen/v1", "deepseek-v4-flash", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode zen"),
openAICompat("opencode-go", "OpenCode Go", "https://opencode.ai/zen/go/v1", "deepseek-v4-pro", []string{"OPENCODE_API_KEY"}, "opencode go"),
openAICompat("zai", "Z.ai", "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4", "glm-4.5", []string{"ZAI_API_KEY", "ZHIPU_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("atomic-chat", "Atomic Chat", "https://api.atomic.chat/v1", "gpt-4.1", []string{"ATOMIC_CHAT_API_KEY"}),
// ChatGPT subscription via a local OAuth proxy. A ChatGPT (Plus/Pro) OAuth
// token only works against ChatGPT's own backend (which is Cloudflare-gated to
+2 -30
View File
@@ -23,10 +23,8 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
"together",
"dashscope",
"moonshot",
"longcat",
"nvidia-nim",
"minimax",
"minimaxi-cn",
"mistral",
"github",
"bedrock",
@@ -36,10 +34,6 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
"xiaomi-mimo",
"bankr",
"zai",
"zai-cn",
"kilocode",
"opencode",
"opencode-go",
"atomic-chat",
"chatgpt-proxy",
"custom-openai-compatible",
@@ -102,28 +96,6 @@ func TestRecommendedProviderEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLongCatDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
descriptor, err := Require("longcat")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Require(longcat) error = %v", err)
}
if descriptor.Name != "LongCat" {
t.Fatalf("Name = %q, want LongCat", descriptor.Name)
}
if descriptor.DefaultBaseURL != "https://api.longcat.chat/openai" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultBaseURL = %q, want LongCat OpenAI-compatible endpoint", descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
}
if descriptor.DefaultModel != "LongCat-2.0" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultModel = %q, want LongCat-2.0", descriptor.DefaultModel)
}
if descriptor.Transport != TransportOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("Transport = %q, want %q", descriptor.Transport, TransportOpenAICompatible)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(descriptor.AuthEnvVars, []string{"LONGCAT_API_KEY"}) {
t.Fatalf("AuthEnvVars = %#v, want LONGCAT_API_KEY", descriptor.AuthEnvVars)
}
}
func TestCatalogDescriptorsExposeRequiredDefaults(t *testing.T) {
for _, descriptor := range All() {
if descriptor.ID == "" {
@@ -291,8 +263,8 @@ func TestListByTransportPreservesCatalogOrder(t *testing.T) {
TransportGoogle: {"google"},
TransportBedrock: {"bedrock"},
TransportVertex: {"vertex"},
TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "minimaxi-cn", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "longcat", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "zai-cn", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
}
for transport, wantIDs := range cases {
+10 -20
View File
@@ -21,22 +21,6 @@ type Model struct {
Source string
}
// Shared by both "minimax" and "minimaxi-cn"; Models() rebuilds a fresh slice
// per call, so the shared backing slice cannot be mutated by callers.
var minimaxCuratedModels = []Model{
{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
}
// Shared by both "zai" (international, api.z.ai) and "zai-cn" (China,
// open.bigmodel.cn); same model lineup on both endpoints.
var zaiCuratedModels = []Model{
{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
}
var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
"ollama-cloud": {
{ID: "qwen3-coder:480b", Description: "catalog default"},
@@ -104,8 +88,10 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
{ID: "meta/llama-3.1-70b-instruct", Description: "general model"},
{ID: "mistralai/mixtral-8x7b-instruct-v0.1", Description: "mixture model"},
},
"minimax": minimaxCuratedModels,
"minimaxi-cn": minimaxCuratedModels,
"minimax": {
{ID: "MiniMax-M3", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "MiniMax-M2.1", Description: "agentic coding model"},
},
"mistral": {
{ID: "mistral-large-latest", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "codestral-latest", Description: "coding model"},
@@ -137,8 +123,12 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
"bankr": {
{ID: "bankr-large", Description: "catalog default"},
},
"zai": zaiCuratedModels,
"zai-cn": zaiCuratedModels,
"zai": {
{ID: "glm-4.5", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "glm-4.5-air", Description: "fast model"},
{ID: "glm-4.6", Description: "latest general model"},
{ID: "glm-z1-air", Description: "reasoning model"},
},
// OpenGateway smart-routes by model id across its upstream providers
// (see /health: xiaomi-mimo, minimax, qwen, google, nvidia, z-ai). These are
// the curated coding defaults; the gateway accepts any model its upstreams
@@ -37,16 +37,6 @@ func TestModelsAreProviderScoped(t *testing.T) {
want: []string{"mistral-large-latest", "codestral-latest"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
{
provider: "minimaxi-cn",
want: []string{"MiniMax-M3", "MiniMax-M2.1"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
{
provider: "zai-cn",
want: []string{"glm-4.5", "glm-4.6", "glm-4.5-air", "glm-z1-air"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -98,66 +88,3 @@ func modelIDs(models []Model) []string {
}
return ids
}
// Pins the contract that MiniMax CN exposes exactly the same model IDs as the
// international provider; a divergence here is almost always a mistake.
func TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimax")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider minimax missing from catalog")
}
cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("minimaxi-cn")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider minimaxi-cn missing from catalog")
}
intlModels := Models(intl)
cnModels := Models(cn)
if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
}
intlIDs := map[string]string{}
for _, m := range intlModels {
intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
}
for _, m := range cnModels {
wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
}
if m.Description != wantDesc {
t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
}
}
}
// Same contract as TestMiniMaxCNModelsMirrorInternational, for Z.ai: the
// international (api.z.ai) and China (open.bigmodel.cn) endpoints expose the
// same model lineup.
func TestZaiCNModelsMirrorInternational(t *testing.T) {
intl, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider zai missing from catalog")
}
cn, ok := providercatalog.Get("zai-cn")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("provider zai-cn missing from catalog")
}
intlModels := Models(intl)
cnModels := Models(cn)
if len(intlModels) != len(cnModels) {
t.Fatalf("model count mismatch: international=%d china=%d", len(intlModels), len(cnModels))
}
intlIDs := map[string]string{}
for _, m := range intlModels {
intlIDs[m.ID] = m.Description
}
for _, m := range cnModels {
wantDesc, ok := intlIDs[m.ID]
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("china provider exposes %q which is not in the international catalog", m.ID)
}
if m.Description != wantDesc {
t.Fatalf("model %q description diverged: international=%q china=%q", m.ID, wantDesc, m.Description)
}
}
}
-4
View File
@@ -128,10 +128,6 @@ func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
return "nvidia"
case "xiaomi-mimo":
return "xiaomi"
case "zai-cn":
return "zai"
case "minimaxi-cn":
return "minimax"
default:
return strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID)
}
@@ -118,8 +118,6 @@ func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
"xiaomi-mimo": "xiaomi",
"dashscope": "alibaba",
"ollama-cloud": "ollama-cloud",
"zai-cn": "zai",
"minimaxi-cn": "minimax",
}
for zeroID, want := range tests {
provider, ok := providercatalog.Get(zeroID)
@@ -85,104 +85,6 @@ func Discover(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, options Optio
}
}
// DiscoverOllamaContextWindow asks a local Ollama daemon for a model's context
// length via its native /api/show endpoint. The generic /v1/models probe
// (parseModelsResponse) only ever returns id/description — OpenAI-compatible
// listings don't carry context-window metadata, and a custom/local model tag
// (e.g. a user's own Ollama pull, including a ":cloud"-tagged model proxied
// through the local daemon) has no curated-catalog entry to borrow one from
// either, so modelContextWindow has nothing to show for it without this. Only
// meaningful for the local Ollama provider (baseURL like
// http://localhost:11434/v1) — Ollama Cloud's hosted API is a different
// service and isn't assumed to expose the same endpoint.
func DiscoverOllamaContextWindow(ctx context.Context, baseURL string, model string, options Options) (int, error) {
model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
if model == "" {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("model name is required")
}
endpoint, err := ollamaShowEndpoint(baseURL)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
payload, err := json.Marshal(struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}{Model: model})
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(string(payload)))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
request.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
client := options.HTTPClient
if client == nil {
client = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
}
response, err := client.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer response.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 1<<20))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ollama show endpoint returned %s: %s", response.Status, strings.TrimSpace(string(body)))
}
return parseOllamaShowContextWindow(body)
}
// ollamaShowEndpoint derives the native Ollama API root from the
// OpenAI-compatible base URL Zero stores for the provider (".../v1") and
// appends /api/show.
func ollamaShowEndpoint(baseURL string) (string, error) {
baseURL = strings.TrimSpace(baseURL)
if baseURL == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("provider base URL is required for ollama model discovery")
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
if err != nil || parsed.Scheme == "" || parsed.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid provider base URL %q", baseURL)
}
path := strings.TrimRight(parsed.Path, "/")
path = strings.TrimSuffix(path, "/v1")
parsed.Path = strings.TrimRight(path, "/") + "/api/show"
parsed.RawQuery = ""
parsed.Fragment = ""
return parsed.String(), nil
}
// parseOllamaShowContextWindow extracts the context length from an
// /api/show response. Ollama reports it under model_info with an
// architecture-prefixed key (e.g. "llama.context_length",
// "qwen2.context_length") — the prefix varies by model family, so this scans
// for any key ending in ".context_length" rather than hardcoding one.
func parseOllamaShowContextWindow(body []byte) (int, error) {
// model_info mixes value types (strings like "general.architecture", numbers
// like "*.context_length"), so decode values generically and only try to
// read a number out of the one key we actually care about.
var payload struct {
ModelInfo map[string]any `json:"model_info"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("decode ollama show response: %w", err)
}
for key, value := range payload.ModelInfo {
if !strings.HasSuffix(key, ".context_length") {
continue
}
if window, ok := value.(float64); ok && window > 0 {
return int(window), nil
}
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ollama show response did not report a context length")
}
func discoverOpenAIModels(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile, options Options) ([]Model, error) {
endpoint, err := modelsEndpoint(profile.BaseURL)
if err != nil {
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package providermodeldiscovery
import (
"context"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
@@ -268,61 +267,3 @@ func modelIDs(models []Model) []string {
}
return ids
}
// TestDiscoverOllamaContextWindowFetchesFromNativeShowEndpoint: the generic
// /v1/models probe never carries context-window metadata (parseModelsResponse
// only extracts id/description), so a custom/local Ollama model tag with no
// curated-catalog match has no other source for it. This exercises the
// Ollama-native /api/show fallback that fills that gap.
func TestDiscoverOllamaContextWindowFetchesFromNativeShowEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
var gotPath, gotMethod, gotBody string
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotPath = r.URL.Path
gotMethod = r.Method
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
gotBody = string(body)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
"model_info": {
"general.architecture": "qwen2",
"qwen2.context_length": 131072
}
}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
window, err := DiscoverOllamaContextWindow(context.Background(), server.URL+"/v1", "kimi-k2.7-code:cloud", Options{HTTPClient: server.Client()})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DiscoverOllamaContextWindow returned error: %v", err)
}
if window != 131072 {
t.Fatalf("context window = %d, want 131072", window)
}
if gotPath != "/api/show" {
t.Fatalf("requested path = %q, want /api/show (not under /v1)", gotPath)
}
if gotMethod != http.MethodPost {
t.Fatalf("method = %q, want POST", gotMethod)
}
if !strings.Contains(gotBody, `"kimi-k2.7-code:cloud"`) {
t.Fatalf("request body = %q, want it to name the model", gotBody)
}
}
func TestDiscoverOllamaContextWindowRequiresModelName(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := DiscoverOllamaContextWindow(context.Background(), "http://localhost:11434/v1", "", Options{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for an empty model name")
}
}
func TestDiscoverOllamaContextWindowErrorsWhenShowOmitsContextLength(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"model_info": {"general.architecture": "qwen2"}}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
if _, err := DiscoverOllamaContextWindow(context.Background(), server.URL+"/v1", "some-model", Options{HTTPClient: server.Client()}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error when no *.context_length key is present")
}
}
+13 -31
View File
@@ -26,13 +26,6 @@ type Options struct {
// OAuth bearer token (preferred over the API key). nil => API-key auth only.
// Applied to the OpenAI and Anthropic providers.
OAuthResolver providerio.TokenResolver
// OAuthLoginKey is the credential-store key OAuthResolver bound to (empty when
// there is no OAuth login). It is the SAME selection the bearer resolver made,
// resolved ONCE by the caller so the Codex chatgpt-account-id header reads its
// account from the exact login that issued the bearer token — never a second,
// independent lookup that could pick a different login (a backend-rejected
// mismatch).
OAuthLoginKey string
}
// New creates a runtime provider for a resolved provider profile.
@@ -258,22 +251,14 @@ func isCodexCatalog(profile config.ProviderProfile, _ resolvedProfile) bool {
// newCodexProvider builds a Codex-flavored openai provider for the chatgpt
// catalog. The Codex headers (`originator`, `chatgpt-account-id`) are
// injected by the CodexProvider wrapper. The `chatgpt-account-id` is read from
// the stored OAuth token's Account field on every request so a refresh that
// rotates the token (and its account claim) takes effect immediately — a static
// AccountID captured at construction would go stale on the first refresh.
//
// The *login* the header reads from is options.OAuthLoginKey — the SAME key the
// bearer resolver bound, resolved ONCE by the caller. The bearer resolver
// refreshes the token in place under that key; reading the account from the same
// key keeps header and token on one login for the provider's life. Resolving the
// key independently here (a second oauth.FirstStored) could, after a transient
// per-candidate load error or a mid-session `zero auth login`, pick a different
// login than the bearer — a mismatch the backend rejects.
// injected by the CodexProvider wrapper. The `chatgpt-account-id` is
// resolved dynamically from the stored OAuth token's Account field on
// every request so a refresh that rotates the token (and its account
// claim) takes effect immediately — a static AccountID captured at
// construction would go stale on the first refresh.
func newCodexProvider(profile config.ProviderProfile, resolved resolvedProfile, options Options) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
accountKey := options.OAuthLoginKey
resolver := openai.CodexAccountResolver(func(ctx context.Context) (string, bool, error) {
account := codexAccountForKey(accountKey)
account := codexAccountFromStore(profile.Name)
if account == "" {
return "", false, nil
}
@@ -303,20 +288,17 @@ func newCodexProvider(profile config.ProviderProfile, resolved resolvedProfile,
})
}
// codexAccountForKey reads the chatgpt_account_id from the token currently
// stored under key. Called per-request (via the resolver) so a refresh that
// rotates the token — saved back in place under the same key — takes effect
// immediately without restarting the agent. Returns "" when key is empty (no
// OAuth login), or the token is absent or carries no account claim.
func codexAccountForKey(key string) string {
if key == "" {
return ""
}
// codexAccountFromStore reads the chatgpt_account_id from the stored OAuth
// token for the given provider name. It is called per-request (via the
// resolver) so a refresh that rotates the token takes effect immediately
// without restarting the agent. Returns "" when no token is stored (the
// Codex provider then omits the header and the user sees a clear 401).
func codexAccountFromStore(providerName string) string {
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
if err != nil {
return ""
}
token, ok, err := store.Load(key)
token, ok, err := store.Load(oauth.ProviderKey(providerName))
if err != nil || !ok {
return ""
}
+12 -64
View File
@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogToCodexProvider(t *testing.T) {
// OAuth token and the "want empty chatgpt-account-id" assertion fails locally
// (it still passes in CI, where no login is stored). Mirrors the isolation in
// TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID.
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", t.TempDir()+"/tokens.json")
transport := &captureTransport{
@@ -323,10 +322,11 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogToCodexProvider(t *testing.T) {
func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID(t *testing.T) {
// The factory reads the stored OAuth token's Account field for the
// chatgpt-account-id header, from the login key the CALLER supplies in
// Options.OAuthLoginKey (the same key the bearer resolver bound). Seed a
// token in an isolated temp store, then pass that key.
store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest(t)
// chatgpt-account-id header. Seed a token in a temp store and point
// ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH at it so the factory picks it up.
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", dir+"/tokens.json")
store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
@@ -344,9 +344,8 @@ func TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID(t *testing.T) {
CatalogID: "chatgpt",
Model: "gpt-5",
}, Options{
HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: transport},
UserAgent: "zero-factory-test",
OAuthLoginKey: oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"),
HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: transport},
UserAgent: "zero-factory-test",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New() error = %v", err)
@@ -408,61 +407,10 @@ func (transport *captureTransport) body() io.Reader {
return strings.NewReader(transport.requestBody)
}
// newOAuthStoreForTest pins the OAuth token store to a plain temp FILE and
// returns a Store on it. Pinning ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE matters as much as the
// path: an inherited "keyring" value would send NewStore to the OS keychain
// and ignore ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH entirely, making the test read/write the
// developer's real logins. Exists so the chatgpt factory tests can seed a
// token without copying the path-handling dance from internal/cli.
func newOAuthStoreForTest(t *testing.T) (*oauth.Store, error) {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", t.TempDir()+"/tokens.json")
// newOAuthStoreForTest builds a Store pointed at the current
// ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH (set by the caller). It exists so the chatgpt
// factory tests can seed a token without copying the path-handling dance
// from internal/cli.
func newOAuthStoreForTest() (*oauth.Store, error) {
return oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
}
// codexAccountForKey reads the chatgpt-account-id from the token stored under a
// FIXED key — the key the caller (cli.oauthLoginForProfile) already bound for the
// bearer token, passed through providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey. The account is
// therefore always read from the same login that issued the bearer (no second,
// independent selection). It re-reads per call, so an in-place token refresh (new
// account claim under the SAME key) is picked up; an empty key (no OAuth login)
// or a missing/account-less token yields "".
func TestCodexAccountForKey(t *testing.T) {
store, err := newOAuthStoreForTest(t)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-1", Account: "acc-catalog-7"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Save chatgpt: %v", err)
}
// A different login WITHOUT an account claim, to prove the read stays on the
// requested key and never crosses to another login's account.
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("codex"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-codex"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Save codex: %v", err)
}
if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt")); got != "acc-catalog-7" {
t.Fatalf("account = %q, want acc-catalog-7", got)
}
// The bound key's token has no account → "", NOT the other login's account.
if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("codex")); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("account = %q, want empty (must not cross to another login's account)", got)
}
// Empty key (no OAuth login) → header omitted.
if got := codexAccountForKey(""); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("account for empty key = %q, want empty", got)
}
// Unknown key → "".
if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("nope")); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("account for unknown key = %q, want empty", got)
}
// An in-place refresh under the bound key IS reflected per request.
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt"), oauth.Token{AccessToken: "tok-refreshed", Account: "acc-rotated"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("refresh chatgpt: %v", err)
}
if got := codexAccountForKey(oauth.ProviderKey("chatgpt")); got != "acc-rotated" {
t.Fatalf("account = %q, want acc-rotated (in-place refresh must be picked up)", got)
}
}
+1 -66
View File
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
declarations = append(declarations, geminiFunctionDeclaration{
Name: tool.Name,
Description: tool.Description,
Parameters: sanitizeGeminiSchema(tool.Parameters),
Parameters: tool.Parameters,
})
}
mapped.Tools = []geminiToolGroup{{FunctionDeclarations: declarations}}
@@ -350,71 +350,6 @@ func (provider *Provider) geminiRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (
return mapped, nil
}
// geminiSchemaFields is the subset of JSON Schema keywords Google's
// functionDeclarations[].parameters accepts (the Generative AI Schema type).
// Anything outside it — most notably OpenAI's `additionalProperties`, which Zero
// emits on every tool's parameters and which Gemini 400s on ("Unknown name
// \"additionalProperties\" … Cannot find field") — must be dropped before the
// request goes out. Kept as an allowlist rather than a denylist so a schema
// keyword Zero (or an MCP server) adds later can't silently leak an unsupported
// field into the Gemini payload.
var geminiSchemaFields = map[string]bool{
"type": true, "format": true, "title": true, "description": true,
"nullable": true, "enum": true, "items": true, "properties": true,
"required": true, "anyOf": true, "propertyOrdering": true, "default": true,
"minimum": true, "maximum": true, "minItems": true, "maxItems": true,
"minLength": true, "maxLength": true, "minProperties": true,
"maxProperties": true, "pattern": true, "example": true,
}
// sanitizeGeminiSchema returns a copy of a JSON-Schema map keeping only the
// keywords Gemini supports (geminiSchemaFields), recursing through the nested
// schemas under `properties`, `items`, and `anyOf`. Returns nil for a nil input
// so a parameterless tool stays parameterless.
func sanitizeGeminiSchema(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
if schema == nil {
return nil
}
out := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
for key, value := range schema {
if !geminiSchemaFields[key] {
continue
}
switch key {
case "properties":
if props, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
cleaned := make(map[string]any, len(props))
for name, sub := range props {
if subMap, ok := sub.(map[string]any); ok {
cleaned[name] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
} else {
cleaned[name] = sub
}
}
value = cleaned
}
case "items":
if subMap, ok := value.(map[string]any); ok {
value = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
}
case "anyOf":
if variants, ok := value.([]any); ok {
cleaned := make([]any, len(variants))
for i, variant := range variants {
if subMap, ok := variant.(map[string]any); ok {
cleaned[i] = sanitizeGeminiSchema(subMap)
} else {
cleaned[i] = variant
}
}
value = cleaned
}
}
out[key] = value
}
return out
}
func mapMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) (*geminiContent, []geminiContent, error) {
systemParts := []geminiPart{}
contents := []geminiContent{}
-127
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package gemini
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
@@ -505,129 +504,3 @@ func eventsOfType(events []zeroruntime.StreamEvent, eventType zeroruntime.Stream
}
return matching
}
// TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields: the sanitizer keeps only
// Gemini-supported keywords and recurses into properties/items/anyOf, so no
// OpenAI-ism (additionalProperties, $schema, patternProperties) survives at any
// depth while legitimate fields (type/description/enum/required/default) stay.
func TestSanitizeGeminiSchemaStripsUnsupportedFields(t *testing.T) {
in := map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"required": []string{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{
"path": map[string]any{
"type": "string",
"description": "a path",
"default": ".",
},
"nested": map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false, // must be stripped at depth too
"properties": map[string]any{
"tags": map[string]any{
"type": "array",
"items": map[string]any{"type": "string", "additionalProperties": true},
},
},
},
},
}
out := sanitizeGeminiSchema(in)
assertNoAdditionalProps(t, out, "root")
if out["additionalProperties"] != nil {
t.Fatal("top-level additionalProperties must be stripped")
}
if out["$schema"] != nil {
t.Fatal("$schema must be stripped")
}
// Legitimate fields survive.
if out["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("type should survive, got %v", out["type"])
}
props := out["properties"].(map[string]any)
pathProp := props["path"].(map[string]any)
if pathProp["description"] != "a path" || pathProp["default"] != "." {
t.Fatalf("legitimate property fields must survive: %#v", pathProp)
}
// nil input stays nil (parameterless tool).
if sanitizeGeminiSchema(nil) != nil {
t.Fatal("nil schema should map to nil")
}
}
// assertNoAdditionalProps fails if additionalProperties appears anywhere in the
// (recursively walked) schema.
func assertNoAdditionalProps(t *testing.T, node any, path string) {
t.Helper()
switch v := node.(type) {
case map[string]any:
if _, ok := v["additionalProperties"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("additionalProperties leaked at %s", path)
}
for k, sub := range v {
assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, path+"."+k)
}
case []any:
for i, sub := range v {
assertNoAdditionalProps(t, sub, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i))
}
}
}
// TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema: end-to-end, the tool
// parameters Zero emits (schemaToRuntimeMap always writes additionalProperties)
// must not reach Gemini — otherwise every functionDeclaration is 400-rejected
// ("Unknown name additionalProperties"), which broke all tool-using exec calls
// against Google (issue #373).
func TestGeminiRequestOmitsAdditionalPropertiesInToolSchema(t *testing.T) {
var gotBody map[string]any
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&gotBody); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
}
writeSSE(w, `{"usageMetadata":{"promptTokenCount":1}}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
provider, err := New(Options{APIKey: "k", BaseURL: server.URL + "/", Model: "models/gemini-2.5-flash"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "grep",
Description: "search",
Parameters: map[string]any{ // exactly what schemaToRuntimeMap produces
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"required": []string{"pattern"},
"properties": map[string]any{
"pattern": map[string]any{"type": "string", "description": "regex"},
},
},
}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
}
drain(stream)
tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
decls := tools[0].(map[string]any)["functionDeclarations"].([]any)
params := decls[0].(map[string]any)["parameters"].(map[string]any)
if _, ok := params["additionalProperties"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("additionalProperties must not be sent to Gemini: %#v", params)
}
// The tool is still usable: its real schema survived.
if params["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("tool parameters type should survive, got %v", params["type"])
}
props := params["properties"].(map[string]any)
if _, ok := props["pattern"]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("tool property must survive sanitization: %#v", props)
}
}
+4 -5
View File
@@ -102,11 +102,10 @@ func New(options Options) (*Provider, error) {
endpoint = baseURL + "/chat/completions"
}
// Route through providerio.HTTPClient so a missing client gets the shared,
// stall-hardened transport (bounded response-header wait + shorter idle-conn
// reuse) rather than the raw http.DefaultClient, which hangs on a reused-dead
// pooled connection (the macOS-only "both providers stall" bug).
httpClient := providerio.HTTPClient(options.HTTPClient)
httpClient := options.HTTPClient
if httpClient == nil {
httpClient = http.DefaultClient
}
maxTokens := options.MaxTokens
if maxTokens < 0 {
+14 -81
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,10 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"regexp"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -27,9 +25,9 @@ var ErrStreamIdle = errors.New("idle timeout (upstream stopped sending data)")
// ErrStreamStalled reports that a streaming upstream kept the connection alive
// (SSE keep-alives reset the idle watchdog, so it never fired) but produced no
// actual output for ContentStallTimeout(idle). Without this an upstream that
// heartbeats-but-stalls — observed on chatgpt/gpt-5.x and ollama reasoning
// models — would hang the agent indefinitely.
// actual output for streamContentStallFactor × the idle timeout. Without this an
// upstream that heartbeats-but-stalls — observed on chatgpt/gpt-5.x and ollama
// reasoning models — would hang the agent indefinitely.
var ErrStreamStalled = errors.New("stream stalled (upstream kept the connection alive but produced no output)")
// StreamTimeoutMessage returns the human-readable detail for a stream-timeout
@@ -40,7 +38,7 @@ var ErrStreamStalled = errors.New("stream stalled (upstream kept the connection
// stuck or very slow.
func StreamTimeoutMessage(err error, idleTimeout time.Duration) string {
if errors.Is(err, ErrStreamStalled) {
return fmt.Sprintf("no output for %s (the model kept the connection alive but produced nothing — it may be stuck; try a faster model or lower reasoning effort)", ContentStallTimeout(idleTimeout))
return fmt.Sprintf("no output for %s (the model kept the connection alive but produced nothing — it may be stuck; try a faster model or lower reasoning effort)", idleTimeout*streamContentStallFactor)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("idle timeout after %s (upstream stopped sending data)", idleTimeout)
}
@@ -55,32 +53,13 @@ func StreamTimeoutMessage(err error, idleTimeout time.Duration) string {
// Override globally with ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT.
const DefaultStreamIdleTimeout = 5 * time.Minute
// ContentStallTimeout bounds a heartbeat-but-no-output stream: keep-alives reset
// the idle watchdog (a heartbeating upstream is not "dead"), but if NO real data
// line arrives for this long the stream is aborted (ErrStreamStalled). Scaled
// above idleTimeout (so a slow-but-producing request that emits data between
// heartbeats is never killed — the watchdog only ever fires when NOTHING real
// arrives), but only 1.2× rather than the old 2×: a genuine heartbeat-pause
// stall on chatgpt/gpt-5.x rarely recovers, so a ~10-minute dead wait (at the 5m
// idle default) was a terrible UX for a doomed turn. At the default idle this is
// 6 minutes; it still scales with ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT. A returned value <= 0
// (idle watchdog disabled) leaves the content watchdog off too.
func ContentStallTimeout(idleTimeout time.Duration) time.Duration {
if idleTimeout <= 0 {
return 0
}
// 1.2× computed as idle + idle/5 (not idle*6/5), plus a clamp: a
// pathologically large ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT could make idle*6 overflow
// int64 and wrap to a NEGATIVE duration, which would arm the content timer
// to fire immediately and abort every stream. Clamping to the max duration
// on overflow just means "effectively no content watchdog" — the sane
// result for an absurd idle timeout.
extra := idleTimeout / 5
if idleTimeout > math.MaxInt64-extra {
return math.MaxInt64
}
return idleTimeout + extra
}
// streamContentStallFactor bounds a heartbeat-but-no-output stream. Keep-alives
// reset the idle watchdog (a heartbeating upstream is not "dead"), but if NO real
// data line arrives for streamContentStallFactor × the idle timeout, the stream is
// treated as stalled and aborted (ErrStreamStalled). It is > 1 so a slow-but-
// producing request — one that emits data between heartbeats — is never killed; the
// content watchdog only catches a stream that heartbeats while producing nothing.
const streamContentStallFactor = 2
// streamIdleTimeoutEnv is the global override for the stream idle timeout. It
// accepts a Go duration ("5m", "300s", "90s") or a bare number of seconds
@@ -126,58 +105,12 @@ func NormalizeBaseURL(baseURL string, defaultBaseURL string, label string) (stri
return baseURL, nil
}
// sharedHTTPClient is the process-wide client used when a provider supplies none.
// It tunes the default transport to defeat the stale-pooled-connection hang: Go
// keeps idle keep-alive connections in a pool, and a later request can reuse one
// the server/NAT has silently dropped. Because the model call is a POST (non-
// idempotent), Go will NOT auto-retry it on a fresh connection — so it blocks
// forever waiting for a response that never arrives. This is provider-agnostic
// (every provider shares the default transport), which is why it reproduced on
// BOTH chatgpt and ollama, and it surfaces on macOS far more than Linux because
// macOS keeps dead pooled connections around longer.
//
// - ResponseHeaderTimeout bounds the gap between finishing the request and the
// first response header, so a reused-dead connection fails fast (then the
// reconnect path re-dials) instead of hanging. It does NOT bound streaming
// after the 200 header arrives, so slow first tokens / long reasoning are
// unaffected (the stream-idle + content watchdogs cover that).
// - IdleConnTimeout is shortened so a connection that went idle across a pause
// is closed (and re-dialed fresh) rather than reused after it has gone stale.
// - DisableKeepAlives on darwin only: ResponseHeaderTimeout/IdleConnTimeout
// above catch a reused connection that's fully dead (never responds) or
// idle past the timeout, but not one that's alive-but-severely-degraded —
// e.g. reused shortly after a prior request on the same host (well within
// 30s, common across quick retries of the same turn), where it still
// delivers real bytes, just at a crippled rate, resetting Zero's stream
// idle/content-stall watchdogs (which only fire on true silence) without
// ever recovering. That degraded-not-dead case is indistinguishable from
// genuine backend slowness from inside the stream, so the only reliable
// fix is removing pooling from the equation entirely on the one platform
// where this class of bug has actually reproduced. A fresh TCP+TLS
// handshake per request costs low tens of milliseconds — negligible next
// to the minutes-long stalls this avoids — and this doesn't touch
// Linux/Windows, where the underlying OS doesn't keep dead/degraded
// pooled connections around as long.
var sharedHTTPClient = func() *http.Client {
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
// 120s, not 60s: a slow cloud proxy (e.g. ollama `*:cloud`) can withhold its
// 200 response header until the upstream model emits a first token, so a 60s cap
// risked aborting a legitimately-slow-but-alive request. 120s still bounds a
// truly dead reused connection (which never responds) while tolerating slow
// header delivery; slow first tokens after the header are covered by the idle +
// content-stall watchdogs.
transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout = 120 * time.Second
transport.IdleConnTimeout = 30 * time.Second
transport.DisableKeepAlives = runtime.GOOS == "darwin"
return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
}()
// HTTPClient returns the configured client or the shared, stall-hardened default.
// HTTPClient returns the configured client or the process default.
func HTTPClient(client *http.Client) *http.Client {
if client != nil {
return client
}
return sharedHTTPClient
return http.DefaultClient
}
// SendEvent writes a provider event without blocking cancellation cleanup.
@@ -322,7 +255,7 @@ func ScanSSEDataWithContext(
// Content watchdog: only real data lines reset it (keep-alives do not), so a
// stream that heartbeats without producing output is bounded instead of
// hanging forever.
contentTimeout := ContentStallTimeout(idleTimeout)
contentTimeout := idleTimeout * streamContentStallFactor
content := time.NewTimer(contentTimeout)
defer content.Stop()
contentC = content.C
@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"math"
"net/http"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -205,36 +202,11 @@ func TestUpstreamUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// ContentStallTimeout is 1.2× the idle timeout, disabled (0) when idle is
// disabled, and must never overflow to a negative duration for an absurdly
// large idle timeout (which would arm the content timer to fire immediately
// and abort every stream).
func TestContentStallTimeout(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
idle time.Duration
want time.Duration
}{
{5 * time.Minute, 6 * time.Minute},
{30 * time.Second, 36 * time.Second},
{100 * time.Millisecond, 120 * time.Millisecond},
{0, 0},
{-1, 0},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := ContentStallTimeout(c.idle); got != c.want {
t.Fatalf("ContentStallTimeout(%v) = %v, want %v", c.idle, got, c.want)
}
}
// Overflow guard: idle*6 would wrap negative; the clamp keeps it positive.
if got := ContentStallTimeout(math.MaxInt64); got <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("ContentStallTimeout(MaxInt64) = %v, must stay positive (no overflow wrap)", got)
}
}
// A heartbeating-but-output-less upstream must not hang forever: SSE keep-alives
// feed the idle watchdog (so it never fires), but the content watchdog
// (ContentStallTimeout(idle)) aborts with ErrStreamStalled when no real data
// line arrives. This is the gpt-5.x / ollama "still generating forever" hang.
// (idleTimeout × streamContentStallFactor) aborts with ErrStreamStalled when no
// real data line arrives. This is the gpt-5.x / ollama "still generating forever"
// hang.
func TestScanSSEDataWithContextAbortsOnContentStall(t *testing.T) {
pr, pw := io.Pipe()
defer func() { _ = pw.Close() }()
@@ -262,8 +234,7 @@ func TestScanSSEDataWithContextAbortsOnContentStall(t *testing.T) {
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
// idle 100ms → content stall at 120ms (ContentStallTimeout = idle*1.2).
// Keep-alives reset idle but not content.
// idle 100ms → content stall at 200ms. Keep-alives reset idle but not content.
done <- ScanSSEDataWithContext(context.Background(), cancel, pr, 100*time.Millisecond, func(string) bool { return true })
}()
@@ -286,7 +257,7 @@ func TestScanSSEDataWithContextContentResetsOnData(t *testing.T) {
pr, pw := io.Pipe()
go func() {
// One data line every 30ms for ~300ms (well past the 120ms content window,
// One data line every 30ms for ~300ms (well past the 200ms content window,
// with comfortable slack under the 100ms idle timeout), so the content
// watchdog keeps resetting, then close cleanly.
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
@@ -318,56 +289,18 @@ func TestScanSSEDataWithContextContentResetsOnData(t *testing.T) {
}
// StreamTimeoutMessage must give a stalled stream a distinct, accurate detail —
// it reports the content window (ContentStallTimeout) and must NOT claim the
// upstream "stopped sending data" (keep-alives were still arriving).
// it reports the content window (idle × factor) and must NOT claim the upstream
// "stopped sending data" (keep-alives were still arriving).
func TestStreamTimeoutMessage(t *testing.T) {
idle := 5 * time.Minute
if msg := StreamTimeoutMessage(ErrStreamIdle, idle); !strings.Contains(msg, "idle timeout after 5m") {
t.Fatalf("idle message = %q, want it to mention the 5m idle timeout", msg)
}
stalled := StreamTimeoutMessage(ErrStreamStalled, idle)
if !strings.Contains(stalled, "no output for 6m") {
t.Fatalf("stalled message = %q, want it to report the 6m content window (idle 5m × 1.2)", stalled)
if !strings.Contains(stalled, "no output for 10m") {
t.Fatalf("stalled message = %q, want it to report the 10m content window", stalled)
}
if strings.Contains(stalled, "stopped sending data") {
t.Fatalf("stalled message must not claim the upstream stopped sending data: %q", stalled)
}
}
// HTTPClient(nil) must return the shared, stall-hardened transport (bounded
// response-header wait + shorter idle-conn reuse) that defeats the macOS stale-
// pooled-connection hang; an explicit client is returned untouched.
func TestHTTPClientReturnsStallHardenedSharedClient(t *testing.T) {
got := HTTPClient(nil)
if got == nil {
t.Fatal("HTTPClient(nil) returned nil")
}
tr, ok := got.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type = %T, want *http.Transport", got.Transport)
}
if tr.ResponseHeaderTimeout != 120*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("ResponseHeaderTimeout = %v, want 120s", tr.ResponseHeaderTimeout)
}
if tr.IdleConnTimeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("IdleConnTimeout = %v, want 30s", tr.IdleConnTimeout)
}
// DisableKeepAlives is the stronger mitigation scoped to darwin only: the
// two timeouts above catch a reused connection that's fully dead or idle
// too long, but not one that's alive-and-degraded (still delivers real
// bytes, just at a crippled rate) — which resets Zero's stream watchdogs
// without ever recovering. Removing pooling from the equation entirely is
// only worth its reconnect cost on the platform this class of bug has
// actually reproduced on.
wantDisableKeepAlives := runtime.GOOS == "darwin"
if tr.DisableKeepAlives != wantDisableKeepAlives {
t.Fatalf("DisableKeepAlives = %v, want %v (GOOS=%s)", tr.DisableKeepAlives, wantDisableKeepAlives, runtime.GOOS)
}
if HTTPClient(nil) != got {
t.Fatal("HTTPClient(nil) must return a shared instance so the conn pool is reused")
}
custom := &http.Client{}
if HTTPClient(custom) != custom {
t.Fatal("an explicit client must be returned unchanged")
}
}
+8 -11
View File
@@ -9,25 +9,22 @@ import (
"time"
)
// TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies
// that first-party in-process network tools are governed by their permission
// metadata, not by the sandboxed shell egress policy.
func TestEvaluatePromptsForNetworkToolsButExemptsThemFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
// TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy verifies that the
// sandbox network policy gates sandboxed shell egress, not first-party
// in-process web tools.
func TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy(t *testing.T) {
base := Policy{Mode: ModeEnforce, Network: NetworkDeny}
engine := NewEngine(EngineOptions{Policy: base})
d := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt,
ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow,
})
if d.Action != ActionPrompt || d.Block != nil {
t.Fatalf("web_search must prompt before permission is granted, got %#v", d)
}
if d.Reason == ReasonNetworkBlocked {
t.Fatalf("web_search prompt should come from tool permission, not shell network policy: %#v", d)
if d.Action != ActionAllow || d.Block != nil {
t.Fatalf("web_search must be allowed by the sandbox gate, got %#v", d)
}
allowed := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionPrompt, PermissionGranted: true,
ToolName: "web_search", SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork, Permission: PermissionAllow, PermissionGranted: true,
})
if allowed.Action != ActionAllow || allowed.Block != nil {
t.Fatalf("granted web_search must be allowed under deny, got %#v", allowed)
+8 -28
View File
@@ -19,13 +19,6 @@ var errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized = errors.New(
const windowsSetupDowngradeReason = "Windows OS sandbox inactive — commands run with workspace path-confinement and " +
"per-command approval only. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for full filesystem and network isolation."
// windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason is surfaced when Windows runs the sandbox in
// the unelevated tier: the restricted-token write-jail is enforced (the command
// runner applies the workspace ACLs itself, which needs no Administrator
// rights), but the WFP network filters are Administrator-only and absent.
const windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason = "Windows sandbox running unelevated — the filesystem write-jail is enforced, but network " +
"isolation still relies on per-command approval. Run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal for OS-level network enforcement."
// windowsSandboxInitialized reports whether the per-host Windows sandbox setup
// marker exists. A missing marker is the common fresh-install state, so the
// caller degrades rather than bricking the command. Indirected through a var so
@@ -181,28 +174,19 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
if request.ValidateExecution && preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire && backend.SupportLevel() != BackendSupportNative {
return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, nativeSandboxUnavailableError(backend)
}
// Windows: the FULL OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup`
// (it applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker).
// Without it, a restricted-filesystem profile can still run in the UNELEVATED
// tier: the command runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (DACL edits
// on user-owned roots need no Administrator rights) and wraps the command in
// the write-restricted token, so the filesystem write-jail holds. Only the
// WFP network filters are Administrator-only, so network stays with the
// in-process approval gate at that tier. A profile that needs the sandbox
// solely for network isolation gains nothing from the unelevated tier and
// DEGRADES to the policy gate as before. A strict caller (--sandbox require)
// still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
// Windows: the OS sandbox needs a one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` (it
// applies WFP network filters + workspace ACLs and writes a marker). Without
// it the command runner hard-fails — so on the default preference, DEGRADE to
// the in-process policy gate + per-command approval (matching Linux/macOS when
// their sandbox is unavailable) instead of bricking every command. A strict
// caller (--sandbox require) still gets a clear error pointing at setup.
windowsNeedsSetup := false
if manager.goos == "windows" && requiresPlatformSandbox && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative && !windowsSandboxInitialized() {
if preference == SandboxPreferenceRequire {
return SandboxExecutionRequest{}, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized
}
enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
windowsNeedsSetup = true
if profile.FileSystem.Kind == FileSystemRestricted {
enforcementLevel = EnforcementUnelevated
} else {
enforcementLevel = EnforcementDegraded
}
}
targetBackend := manager.targetBackend(preference, policy, requiresPlatformSandbox)
downgradeReason := ""
@@ -212,11 +196,7 @@ func (manager SandboxManager) BuildExecutionRequest(request SandboxManagerReques
downgradeReason = windowsSetupDowngradeReason
}
}
if enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated {
downgradeReason = windowsUnelevatedDowngradeReason
}
wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available &&
(enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative || enforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated)
wrapped := backend.CommandWrapping && backend.Available && enforcementLevel == EnforcementNative
markers := backend.SandboxEnvMarkers(policy)
if !wrapped && backend.Name != BackendWSL {
markers = nil
+1 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots(t *testing.T)
if !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir) {
t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want temp root %q", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, tmpdir)
}
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
if pathExists("/tmp") && !writeRootsContain(profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots, "/tmp") {
t.Fatalf("write roots = %#v, want /tmp", profile.FileSystem.WriteRoots)
}
}
@@ -132,64 +132,6 @@ exit 0
}
}
// TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke exercises the unelevated tier end to
// end WITHOUT running the elevated setup helper: the command runner applies
// the workspace ACLs itself, a write inside the workspace succeeds under the
// restricted token, and a write outside every granted root is denied. Unlike
// the elevated smoke above it needs no Administrator terminal.
func TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE") != "1" {
t.Skip("set ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE=1 to run real Windows sandbox smoke tests")
}
runnerExe := realSmokeExecutable(t, "ZERO_WINDOWS_COMMAND_RUNNER_EXE", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName)
root := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
sandboxHome := filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox")
profile := PermissionProfile{
FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
Kind: FileSystemRestricted,
ReadRoots: []string{root},
WriteRoots: []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
IncludePlatformRoots: true,
AllowTemp: true,
},
Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
}
config := WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
SandboxHome: sandboxHome,
CommandCWD: root,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{root},
PermissionProfile: profile,
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
}
// cmd.exe rather than powershell.exe: managed PowerShell cannot initialize
// its crypto provider under a write-restricted token on some hosts
// (0x8009001d, the same restricted-token limitation the runner documents for
// Schannel), and the write-jail assertion only needs a native shell.
insideMarker := filepath.Join(root, "unelevated-write-ok.txt")
runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo ok>" + insideMarker,
}, 0)
if bytes, err := os.ReadFile(insideMarker); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(bytes)) != "ok" {
t.Fatalf("unelevated sandboxed write marker = %q, %v; want ok", bytes, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the unelevated setup marker to be recorded: %v", err)
}
outsideMarker := filepath.Join(outside, "unelevated-write-denied.txt")
runWindowsRealSmokeCommand(t, runnerExe, config, []string{
"cmd.exe", "/d", "/s", "/c", "echo leaked>" + outsideMarker,
}, 1)
if _, err := os.Stat(outsideMarker); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("unelevated sandbox allowed a write outside every granted root")
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("stat outside marker: %v", err)
}
}
func realSmokeExecutable(t *testing.T, envKey string, fallbackName string) string {
t.Helper()
if path := os.Getenv(envKey); path != "" {
+1 -2
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package sandbox
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
)
@@ -129,7 +128,7 @@ func TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots(t *testing.T) {
if !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra)) {
t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want extra root %q", roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort(extra))
}
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" && pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
if pathExists("/tmp") && !stringSliceContains(roots, normalizeWorkspaceRootBestEffort("/tmp")) {
t.Fatalf("Roots()=%v want default /tmp write root", roots)
}
}
+3 -10
View File
@@ -143,16 +143,9 @@ const (
)
const (
EnforcementNative EnforcementLevel = "native"
// EnforcementUnelevated is the Windows-only middle tier used when the
// elevated `zero sandbox setup` has not run: commands still wrap through the
// command runner with a write-restricted token and workspace ACLs (which the
// runner can apply without Administrator rights), but the WFP network
// filters are absent, so network isolation stays with the in-process
// approval gate.
EnforcementUnelevated EnforcementLevel = "unelevated"
EnforcementDegraded EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
EnforcementDisabled EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
EnforcementNative EnforcementLevel = "native"
EnforcementDegraded EnforcementLevel = "degraded"
EnforcementDisabled EnforcementLevel = "disabled"
)
type Policy struct {
@@ -8,21 +8,14 @@ import (
)
func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writer) int {
switch config.SandboxLevel {
case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken:
if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
case WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated:
if err := ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
default:
if config.SandboxLevel != WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "%s: unsupported Windows sandbox level %q\n", WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName, config.SandboxLevel)
return 1
}
if err := ValidateWindowsSandboxSetupMarker(WindowsSandboxSetupConfigFromCommand(config)); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
}
if err := ValidateWindowsNetworkPolicy(config.PermissionProfile.Network); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(stderr, WindowsSandboxCommandRunnerName+": "+err.Error())
return 1
@@ -64,32 +57,3 @@ func runWindowsSandboxCommand(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig, stderr io.Writ
}
return exitCode
}
// ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup applies the workspace ACL plan from the current
// (non-elevated) process so the write-restricted token has somewhere its
// capability SIDs are granted. DACL edits on user-owned workspace and temp
// roots need no Administrator rights; the WFP network filters DO, so this tier
// provisions no network enforcement — the offline-marker SID composed into the
// token stays inert until an elevated `zero sandbox setup` installs the block
// filters. Applied plans are recorded by hash so repeat commands skip the
// re-apply; like the elevated setup, grants are left in place (the rollback is
// deliberately discarded) because they only name synthetic capability SIDs
// that no other token carries.
func ensureWindowsUnelevatedSetup(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig) error {
applied, plan, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
if err != nil {
return err
}
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if marker.contains(applied) {
return nil
}
if _, err := applyWindowsACLPlan(plan); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("apply unelevated workspace ACLs: %w — the workspace may be on a filesystem the current user does not own; "+
"run `zero sandbox setup` from an elevated (Administrator) terminal, or re-run with `--sandbox forbid` to skip OS sandboxing", err)
}
return recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied)
}
+24 -66
View File
@@ -2,16 +2,14 @@ package sandbox
import (
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// On Windows, a not-yet-set-up sandbox must fall back to the UNELEVATED tier
// (wrapped through the runner with the write-restricted token, network left to
// the approval gate) on the default preference — never brick the command —
// while a strict --sandbox require still errors with a setup hint. Once the
// marker exists, enforcement is native and the command wraps.
func TestWindowsFallsBackUnelevatedWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
// On Windows, a not-yet-set-up sandbox must DEGRADE (run unwrapped with a
// downgrade reason) on the default preference — never brick the command — while
// a strict --sandbox require still errors with a setup hint. Once the marker
// exists, enforcement is native and the command wraps.
func TestWindowsDegradesWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
restore := windowsSandboxInitialized
t.Cleanup(func() { windowsSandboxInitialized = restore })
@@ -26,70 +24,13 @@ func TestWindowsFallsBackUnelevatedWhenSandboxNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
ValidateExecution: true,
}
// Marker missing + auto -> unelevated tier: still wrapped, with a reason
// documenting the missing network enforcement, no error.
// Marker missing + auto -> degrade (unwrapped, with a reason), no error.
windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return false }
auto := base
auto.Preference = SandboxPreferenceAuto
req, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("auto must fall back, not error: %v", err)
}
if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementUnelevated {
t.Fatalf("enforcement = %v, want unelevated", req.EnforcementLevel)
}
if !req.CommandWrapped {
t.Fatal("unelevated command must still be wrapped through the sandbox runner")
}
if req.DowngradeReason == "" || !strings.Contains(req.DowngradeReason, "network") {
t.Fatalf("downgrade reason = %q, want an explanation of the missing network enforcement", req.DowngradeReason)
}
// Marker missing + require -> hard error pointing at setup.
require := base
require.Preference = SandboxPreferenceRequire
if _, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(require); !errors.Is(err, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized) {
t.Fatalf("require must error with the setup hint, got %v", err)
}
// Marker present -> native, wrapped, no downgrade reason.
windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return true }
req, err = mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialized auto: %v", err)
}
if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementNative || !req.CommandWrapped {
t.Fatalf("initialized -> native wrapped, got enforcement=%v wrapped=%v", req.EnforcementLevel, req.CommandWrapped)
}
if req.DowngradeReason != "" {
t.Fatalf("native downgrade reason = %q, want empty", req.DowngradeReason)
}
}
// A profile that needs the platform sandbox ONLY for network isolation gains
// nothing from the unelevated tier (which cannot enforce network), so it must
// keep the old degrade-to-policy-gate behavior.
func TestWindowsNetworkOnlyProfileStillDegradesWhenNotInitialized(t *testing.T) {
restore := windowsSandboxInitialized
t.Cleanup(func() { windowsSandboxInitialized = restore })
windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return false }
mgr := NewSandboxManager(SandboxManagerOptions{
GOOS: "windows",
Backend: Backend{Name: BackendWindowsRestrictedToken, Available: true, Executable: "zero.exe", Platform: "windows"},
})
req, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(SandboxManagerRequest{
WorkspaceRoot: `C:\ws`,
Command: CommandSpec{Name: "bash", Args: []string{"-c", "echo hi"}},
Policy: DefaultPolicy(),
Profile: PermissionProfile{
FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{Kind: FileSystemUnrestricted, IncludePlatformRoots: true, AllowTemp: true},
Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
},
Preference: SandboxPreferenceAuto,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("network-only profile must degrade, not error: %v", err)
t.Fatalf("auto must degrade, not error: %v", err)
}
if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementDegraded {
t.Fatalf("enforcement = %v, want degraded", req.EnforcementLevel)
@@ -100,4 +41,21 @@ func TestWindowsNetworkOnlyProfileStillDegradesWhenNotInitialized(t *testing.T)
if req.DowngradeReason == "" {
t.Fatal("expected a downgrade reason explaining the missing setup")
}
// Marker missing + require -> hard error pointing at setup.
require := base
require.Preference = SandboxPreferenceRequire
if _, err := mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(require); !errors.Is(err, errWindowsSandboxNotInitialized) {
t.Fatalf("require must error with the setup hint, got %v", err)
}
// Marker present -> native, wrapped.
windowsSandboxInitialized = func() bool { return true }
req, err = mgr.BuildExecutionRequest(auto)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialized auto: %v", err)
}
if req.EnforcementLevel != EnforcementNative || !req.CommandWrapped {
t.Fatalf("initialized -> native wrapped, got enforcement=%v wrapped=%v", req.EnforcementLevel, req.CommandWrapped)
}
}
+4 -17
View File
@@ -95,14 +95,8 @@ type WindowsSandboxLevel string
const (
WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken WindowsSandboxLevel = "restricted-token"
// WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated is the restricted-token tier without the
// elevated setup: the runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself before
// launching (no Administrator rights needed) and skips the elevated setup
// marker check. Network is NOT enforced at this level — the WFP filters need
// the elevated setup — so callers must keep network behind the approval gate.
WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated WindowsSandboxLevel = "unelevated"
WindowsSandboxLevelElevated WindowsSandboxLevel = "elevated"
WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled WindowsSandboxLevel = "disabled"
WindowsSandboxLevelElevated WindowsSandboxLevel = "elevated"
WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled WindowsSandboxLevel = "disabled"
)
type WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions struct {
@@ -277,20 +271,13 @@ func windowsRestrictedTokenCommandPlan(execRequest SandboxExecutionRequest, poli
return CommandPlan{}, err
}
childEnv := windowsSandboxChildEnv(spec.Env, policy, execRequest.WorkspaceRoot)
// The unelevated enforcement tier maps to the runner's unelevated level: same
// restricted token, but the runner applies the workspace ACLs itself instead
// of requiring the elevated setup marker.
level := WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken
if execRequest.EnforcementLevel == EnforcementUnelevated {
level = WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated
}
args, err := BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
SandboxHome: sandboxHome,
CommandCWD: spec.Dir,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{execRequest.WorkspaceRoot},
PermissionProfile: execRequest.PermissionProfile,
Env: childEnv,
SandboxLevel: level,
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken,
Command: append([]string{spec.Name}, spec.Args...),
})
if err != nil {
@@ -394,7 +381,7 @@ func nextWindowsSandboxFlagValue(args []string, index int) (string, int, error)
func validWindowsSandboxLevel(level WindowsSandboxLevel) bool {
switch level {
case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken, WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated, WindowsSandboxLevelElevated, WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled:
case WindowsSandboxLevelRestrictedToken, WindowsSandboxLevelElevated, WindowsSandboxLevelDisabled:
return true
default:
return false
-144
View File
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
package sandbox
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion = 1
// windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans bounds the applied-plan history so the
// marker cannot grow without limit when a user hops between many workspaces.
// Oldest entries are dropped first; re-applying an already-granted plan is
// harmless, so eviction only costs a redundant ACL apply.
const windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans = 64
// WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan fingerprints one workspace ACL plan the
// unelevated tier has applied. Unlike the elevated setup marker it carries no
// network infrastructure hash: the unelevated tier never provisions WFP
// filters, so there is nothing network-side to fingerprint.
type WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan struct {
ACLPlanHash string `json:"aclPlanHash"`
ACLPlanEntries int `json:"aclPlanEntries"`
}
// WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker records which workspace ACL plans the command
// runner has applied without elevation, keyed by plan hash, so repeat commands
// in a known workspace skip the re-apply. One file serves every workspace under
// a sandbox home (the elevated marker is instead a single-plan snapshot,
// because its WFP half genuinely is machine-global).
type WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker struct {
SchemaVersion int `json:"schemaVersion"`
AppliedPlans []WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan `json:"appliedPlans,omitempty"`
}
func WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome string) string {
return filepath.Join(filepath.Clean(sandboxHome), "windows-unelevated-setup.json")
}
// buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan derives the ACL plan for the command's
// permission profile plus its marker fingerprint. The same BuildWindowsACLPlan
// output later feeds the apply step, so the fingerprint and the applied grants
// can never drift apart.
func buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config WindowsSandboxCommandConfig) (WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan, WindowsACLPlan, error) {
plan, err := BuildWindowsACLPlan(config)
if err != nil {
return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{}, WindowsACLPlan{}, err
}
hash, err := WindowsACLPlanHash(plan)
if err != nil {
return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{}, WindowsACLPlan{}, err
}
return WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{
ACLPlanHash: hash,
ACLPlanEntries: len(plan.Entries),
}, plan, nil
}
// loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker reads the marker; a missing file is the
// common first-run state and returns an empty marker, not an error. A marker
// with an unexpected schema version is treated as empty so the runner re-applies
// (and rewrites) rather than failing.
func loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(sandboxHome string) (WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker, error) {
sandboxHome = strings.TrimSpace(sandboxHome)
if sandboxHome == "" {
return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{}, errors.New("windows sandbox home is required")
}
path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)
bytes, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{SchemaVersion: windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion}, nil
}
return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{}, fmt.Errorf("read windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
}
var marker WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &marker); err != nil {
return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{}, fmt.Errorf("parse windows unelevated setup marker %s: %w", path, err)
}
if marker.SchemaVersion != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion {
return WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker{SchemaVersion: windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion}, nil
}
return marker, nil
}
func (marker WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker) contains(applied WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan) bool {
if strings.TrimSpace(applied.ACLPlanHash) == "" {
return false
}
for _, plan := range marker.AppliedPlans {
if plan.ACLPlanHash == applied.ACLPlanHash && plan.ACLPlanEntries == applied.ACLPlanEntries {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan appends the plan to the marker (dropping
// the oldest entries past the cap) and writes it atomically, following the
// temp-file-then-rename pattern of the sibling marker writers.
func recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(sandboxHome string, applied WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan) error {
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(sandboxHome)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if marker.contains(applied) {
return nil
}
marker.SchemaVersion = windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion
marker.AppliedPlans = append(marker.AppliedPlans, applied)
if overflow := len(marker.AppliedPlans) - windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans; overflow > 0 {
marker.AppliedPlans = append([]WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(nil), marker.AppliedPlans[overflow:]...)
}
path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(sandboxHome)
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create windows unelevated setup marker dir: %w", err)
}
bytes, err := json.MarshalIndent(marker, "", " ")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marshal windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
}
tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), ".windows-unelevated-setup-*.tmp")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
}
tmpPath := tmp.Name()
if _, err := tmp.Write(bytes); err != nil {
_ = tmp.Close()
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("write windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
}
if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("close windows unelevated setup marker temp file: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmpPath, path); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmpPath)
return fmt.Errorf("replace windows unelevated setup marker: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
-157
View File
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
package sandbox
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t *testing.T) WindowsSandboxCommandConfig {
t.Helper()
root := t.TempDir()
return WindowsSandboxCommandConfig{
SandboxHome: filepath.Join(root, ".zero-sandbox"),
CommandCWD: root,
WorkspaceRoots: []string{root},
PermissionProfile: PermissionProfile{
FileSystem: FileSystemPolicy{
Kind: FileSystemRestricted,
ReadRoots: []string{root},
WriteRoots: []WritableRoot{{Root: root, ProtectedMetadataNames: []string{".git", ".zero", ".agents"}}},
AllowTemp: true,
},
Network: NetworkPolicy{Mode: NetworkDeny},
},
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
Command: []string{"cmd.exe", "/c", "echo hi"},
}
}
func TestWindowsSandboxCommandArgsRoundTripUnelevatedLevel(t *testing.T) {
config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
args, err := BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(WindowsSandboxCommandArgsOptions{
SandboxHome: config.SandboxHome,
CommandCWD: config.CommandCWD,
WorkspaceRoots: config.WorkspaceRoots,
PermissionProfile: config.PermissionProfile,
SandboxLevel: WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated,
Command: config.Command,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildWindowsSandboxCommandArgs: %v", err)
}
parsed, err := ParseWindowsSandboxCommandArgs(args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseWindowsSandboxCommandArgs: %v", err)
}
if parsed.SandboxLevel != WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated {
t.Fatalf("round-tripped sandbox level = %q, want %q", parsed.SandboxLevel, WindowsSandboxLevelUnelevated)
}
}
func TestBuildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlanFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
applied, plan, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan: %v", err)
}
if applied.ACLPlanHash == "" || applied.ACLPlanEntries == 0 || applied.ACLPlanEntries != len(plan.Entries) {
t.Fatalf("applied plan = %+v with %d plan entries, want a non-empty consistent fingerprint", applied, len(plan.Entries))
}
// Same config -> same fingerprint (the marker's dedupe key).
again, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rebuild: %v", err)
}
if again != applied {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint not stable: %+v then %+v", applied, again)
}
// An unrestricted profile has no ACL plan to apply and must error.
config.PermissionProfile.FileSystem.Kind = FileSystemUnrestricted
if _, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for an unrestricted filesystem profile")
}
}
func TestWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerRecordAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
config := testWindowsUnelevatedCommandConfig(t)
applied, _, err := buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("buildWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan: %v", err)
}
// Missing marker file is the fresh-install state: empty, no error, no match.
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load missing marker: %v", err)
}
if marker.contains(applied) {
t.Fatal("empty marker must not contain the plan")
}
if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
}
marker, err = loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load recorded marker: %v", err)
}
if !marker.contains(applied) || len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("marker = %+v, want exactly the recorded plan", marker)
}
// Recording the same plan again must not duplicate it.
if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(config.SandboxHome, applied); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("re-record: %v", err)
}
marker, err = loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(config.SandboxHome)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reload marker: %v", err)
}
if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("marker has %d plans after duplicate record, want 1", len(marker.AppliedPlans))
}
}
func TestWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerEvictsOldestPastCap(t *testing.T) {
home := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".zero-sandbox")
first := WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{ACLPlanHash: "hash-0", ACLPlanEntries: 1}
if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(home, first); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("record first: %v", err)
}
for index := 1; index <= windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans; index++ {
plan := WindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan{ACLPlanHash: fmt.Sprintf("hash-%d", index), ACLPlanEntries: index}
if err := recordWindowsUnelevatedAppliedPlan(home, plan); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("record %d: %v", index, err)
}
}
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans {
t.Fatalf("marker has %d plans, want the cap of %d", len(marker.AppliedPlans), windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerMaxPlans)
}
if marker.contains(first) {
t.Fatal("oldest plan should have been evicted past the cap")
}
}
func TestLoadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerResetsUnknownSchema(t *testing.T) {
home := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".zero-sandbox")
if err := os.MkdirAll(home, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir sandbox home: %v", err)
}
path := WindowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerPath(home)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"schemaVersion":99,"appliedPlans":[{"aclPlanHash":"h","aclPlanEntries":1}]}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write marker: %v", err)
}
marker, err := loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker(home)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
if len(marker.AppliedPlans) != 0 || marker.SchemaVersion != windowsUnelevatedSetupMarkerSchemaVersion {
t.Fatalf("unknown schema must reset to empty current-schema marker, got %+v", marker)
}
}
+5 -39
View File
@@ -204,11 +204,7 @@ type ChildRunResult struct {
Events []streamjson.Event
Stderr string
ExitCode int
// Signal is a human-readable description (e.g. "signal: killed") when the child
// was terminated by a signal rather than exiting normally; empty otherwise. It
// turns an opaque exit -1 into an actionable reason (SIGKILL ~ out of memory).
Signal string
Started bool
Started bool
}
func (executor Executor) Run(ctx context.Context, params TaskParameters, options TaskRunOptions) (ExecResult, error) {
@@ -570,35 +566,17 @@ func (executor Executor) runBuiltArgs(ctx context.Context, built BuildArgsResult
exitCode := run.exitCodeOr(-1)
summary := SummarizeStream(run.Events, exitCode)
executor.recordSpecialistStop(accounting, summary, "error", summary.ExitCode, err, false)
// Carry the child session id even on a post-start failure so a caller (the
// swarm launcher -> FailWithSession) can still make the failed member
// drillable; the session exists once the child has started.
return ExecResult{SessionID: built.SessionID}, err
return ExecResult{}, err
}
summary := SummarizeStream(run.Events, run.ExitCode)
rolledUp := executor.rollUpSpecialistUsage(accounting, summary)
executor.recordSpecialistStop(accounting, summary, summary.Status, summary.ExitCode, nil, rolledUp)
return ExecResult{
Result: BuildFinalResult(run.Events, run.Stderr, run.ExitCode, run.Signal),
Result: BuildFinalResult(run.Events, run.Stderr, run.ExitCode),
SessionID: built.SessionID,
}, nil
}
// availableSpecialistList renders the registered specialist names for a corrective
// "not found" error, so a model that guessed a wrong name learns the real options.
func availableSpecialistList(result LoadResult) string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(result.Specialists))
for _, manifest := range result.Specialists {
if n := strings.TrimSpace(manifest.Metadata.Name); n != "" {
names = append(names, n)
}
}
if len(names) == 0 {
return "(none registered)"
}
return strings.Join(names, ", ")
}
func (executor Executor) loadManifest(name string) (Manifest, error) {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
@@ -614,12 +592,7 @@ func (executor Executor) loadManifest(name string) (Manifest, error) {
}
manifest, ok := Find(result, name)
if !ok {
// Corrective error: a model that invents a specialist name (e.g.
// "validator-runner", "file-writer") otherwise gets an opaque "not found"
// and keeps retrying made-up names. List the ACTUALLY-registered ones so it
// self-corrects — no hardcoded names, since a custom registry may not have
// worker/explorer/code-review.
return Manifest{}, fmt.Errorf("specialist %q not found. Available: %s. Pick one of these whose tools fit the task, or omit the name to use the default", name, availableSpecialistList(result))
return Manifest{}, fmt.Errorf("specialist %q not found", name)
}
return manifest, nil
}
@@ -810,22 +783,15 @@ func runChildProcess(ctx context.Context, binaryPath string, args []string, prog
}
exitCode := 0
started := true
signalDesc := ""
if err := command.Wait(); err != nil {
var exitErr *osexec.ExitError
if errors.As(err, &exitErr) {
exitCode = exitErr.ExitCode()
if exitCode < 0 && exitErr.ProcessState != nil {
// ExitCode() is -1 when the child was terminated by a signal rather
// than exiting. ProcessState.String() is the portable description
// (e.g. "signal: killed") — capture it so the failure isn't opaque.
signalDesc = exitErr.ProcessState.String()
}
} else {
return ChildRunResult{Events: events, Stderr: stderr.String(), ExitCode: -1, Started: started}, fmt.Errorf("run specialist child: %w", err)
}
}
return ChildRunResult{Events: events, Stderr: stderr.String(), ExitCode: exitCode, Signal: signalDesc, Started: started}, nil
return ChildRunResult{Events: events, Stderr: stderr.String(), ExitCode: exitCode, Started: started}, nil
}
func (run ChildRunResult) exitCodeOr(defaultExitCode int) int {
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
package specialist
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// A model that invents a specialist name (e.g. "validator-runner", "file-writer")
// must get a corrective error listing the real specialists, so it self-corrects to a
// capable one instead of looping on made-up names that spawn doomed sub-agents.
func TestLoadManifestUnknownNameListsAvailable(t *testing.T) {
executor := Executor{
Load: func(LoadOptions) (LoadResult, error) {
return LoadResult{Specialists: []Manifest{
{Metadata: Metadata{Name: "worker"}},
{Metadata: Metadata{Name: "explorer"}},
{Metadata: Metadata{Name: "code-review"}},
}}, nil
},
}
_, err := executor.loadManifest("validator-runner")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an unknown specialist name must error")
}
msg := err.Error()
for _, want := range []string{"validator-runner", "not found", "worker", "explorer", "code-review"} {
if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
t.Fatalf("error %q missing %q (must steer the model to a real specialist)", msg, want)
}
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
)
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ var knownToolNames = map[string]bool{
}
func DefaultPaths(workspaceRoot string) (Paths, error) {
userConfigDir, err := config.UserConfigDir()
userConfigDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
if err != nil {
return Paths{}, fmt.Errorf("resolve user config directory: %w", err)
}
-6
View File
@@ -260,12 +260,6 @@ func formatTaskOutputSummary(task background.Task, summary StreamResult, rawLine
if !task.CompletedAt.IsZero() {
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "completed_at: %s\n", task.CompletedAt.Format(time.RFC3339))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "exit_code: %d\n", task.ExitCode)
if task.ExitCode < 0 {
// A negative exit code means the background child was terminated by a
// signal rather than exiting (the int-only launcher can't carry the
// signal name). Give the same actionable hint the foreground path does.
builder.WriteString("note: terminated by a signal — killed before it finished. Likely causes: the OS out-of-memory killer (common when many sub-agents run in parallel — try fewer), a timeout, or cancellation.\n")
}
}
if summary.Text != "" {
+1 -7
View File
@@ -124,16 +124,10 @@ func TestOutputToolBlocksUntilTaskCompletes(t *testing.T) {
tool := NewOutputTool(manager)
tool.PollInterval = time.Millisecond
// timeout is a ceiling, not a target: the test still returns as soon as the
// 5ms write lands (PollInterval keeps it responsive), it just tolerates a
// slow/contended CI runner without failing. A 100ms budget against a 5ms
// write only left 20x margin, which Windows CI runners (coarser default
// timer granularity, heavier scheduling contention than Linux/macOS) blew
// through and failed the test on an otherwise-unrelated PR merge.
result := tool.Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{
"task_id": "child_task",
"block": true,
"timeout": 2000,
"timeout": 100,
})
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "output:\nfinished") {
+2 -15
View File
@@ -134,17 +134,12 @@ func SummarizeStream(events []streamjson.Event, processExitCode int) StreamResul
return result
}
func BuildFinalResult(events []streamjson.Event, stderrOutput string, processExitCode int, signalDesc string) tools.Result {
func BuildFinalResult(events []streamjson.Event, stderrOutput string, processExitCode int) tools.Result {
summary := SummarizeStream(events, processExitCode)
hasErrors := len(summary.Errors) > 0 || summary.ExitCode != 0
if summary.Status != "" && summary.Status != "success" && summary.Status != "ok" {
hasErrors = true
}
// A captured kill signal must always surface, even if a late run_end reported a
// clean exit just before the child was killed during teardown.
if strings.TrimSpace(signalDesc) != "" {
hasErrors = true
}
if !hasErrors {
output := summary.Text
if summary.SessionID != "" {
@@ -154,15 +149,7 @@ func BuildFinalResult(events []streamjson.Event, stderrOutput string, processExi
}
var builder strings.Builder
if signal := strings.TrimSpace(signalDesc); signal != "" {
// The child was terminated by a signal (exit code -1) rather than exiting.
// Surface the signal instead of an opaque "exit -1", and list the common
// causes evenhandedly — this branch also covers timeouts and cancellations,
// so don't assert OOM.
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "Subagent terminated by a signal (%s) — it was killed before it finished. Common causes: an out-of-memory kill, a timeout, or cancellation; check the signal to tell which. If you were running many sub-agents in parallel, reduce the concurrency.\n", signal)
} else {
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "Subagent failed (exit %d)\n", summary.ExitCode)
}
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "Subagent failed (exit %d)\n", summary.ExitCode)
if len(summary.Errors) > 0 {
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "errors: %s\n", strings.Join(summary.Errors, "; "))
}
+3 -30
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func TestParseStreamAndBuildFinalResultSuccess(t *testing.T) {
if summary.SessionID != "child" || summary.Text != "done" || summary.ExitCode != 0 || len(summary.Tools) != 1 || summary.Tools[0] != "grep" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected summary: %#v", summary)
}
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "", 0, "")
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "", 0)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK || result.Output != "session_id: child\ndone" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected final result: %#v", result)
}
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestBuildFinalResultUsesTextDeltasWhenFinalMissing(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseStream returned error: %v", err)
}
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "", 0, "")
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "", 0)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK || result.Output != "session_id: child\nhello world" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected final result: %#v", result)
}
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func TestBuildFinalResultErrorIncludesDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseStream returned error: %v", err)
}
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "stderr text", 0, "")
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "stderr text", 0)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("Status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
@@ -93,33 +93,6 @@ func TestBuildFinalResultErrorIncludesDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A child terminated by a signal (exit code -1) must surface the signal + an
// actionable hint, not an opaque "Subagent failed (exit -1)".
func TestBuildFinalResultSurfacesKillSignal(t *testing.T) {
events, err := ParseStream(strings.NewReader(strings.Join([]string{
`{"schemaVersion":2,"type":"run_start","runId":"run_1","sessionId":"child"}`,
`{"schemaVersion":2,"type":"tool_call","runId":"run_1","id":"call_1","name":"read_file"}`,
"",
}, "\n")))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseStream returned error: %v", err)
}
result := BuildFinalResult(events, "", -1, "signal: killed")
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("Status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
// Surfaces the signal + lists causes (OOM/timeout/cancellation) without asserting
// OOM as the sole cause.
for _, want := range []string{"terminated by a signal", "signal: killed", "out-of-memory", "timeout", "cancellation"} {
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, want) {
t.Fatalf("kill output missing %q:\n%s", want, result.Output)
}
}
if strings.Contains(result.Output, "Subagent failed (exit") {
t.Fatalf("signaled child should not show the opaque exit line:\n%s", result.Output)
}
}
func TestParseStreamRejectsInvalidLines(t *testing.T) {
_, err := ParseStream(strings.NewReader(`{"schemaVersion":2,"runId":"run_1"}` + "\n"))
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "type is required") {
-6
View File
@@ -166,12 +166,6 @@ func (c *Coordinator) Fail(id, errMsg string) error {
return c.finish(id, StatusFailed, "", errMsg, "")
}
// FailWithSession marks a task failed but keeps its child session id, so a member
// that ran and failed (e.g. exited non-zero / hit max-turns) is still drillable.
func (c *Coordinator) FailWithSession(id, errMsg, sessionID string) error {
return c.finish(id, StatusFailed, "", errMsg, sessionID)
}
func (c *Coordinator) finish(id string, status TaskStatus, result, errMsg, sessionID string) error {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
+1 -14
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ package swarm
import (
"context"
"errors"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specialist"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// NewSpecialistLauncher adapts internal/specialist.Executor into a
@@ -56,18 +54,7 @@ func NewSpecialistLauncher(executor specialist.Executor) MemberLauncher {
MemberAutonomy: true,
})
if err != nil {
// Preserve the child session id on a post-start failure too (exec.go
// returns it on the error path) so lifecycle's FailWithSession can keep
// the failed member drillable, not just the StatusError case below.
return MemberResult{SessionID: res.SessionID}, err
}
if res.Result.Status == tools.StatusError {
// The child ran but its task FAILED (e.g. non-zero exit / max-turns).
// Surface it as a member failure so the swarm marks it [failed], not
// [done] — otherwise the orchestrator (which can't see the AGENTS panel)
// trusts incomplete work. Keep the session id so the failed member is
// still drillable, and carry its report as the failure message.
return MemberResult{SessionID: res.SessionID}, errors.New(res.Result.Output)
return MemberResult{}, err
}
return MemberResult{Result: res.Result.Output, SessionID: res.SessionID}, nil
}}
@@ -67,50 +67,3 @@ func TestSpecialistLauncherRunsUnregisteredSwarmAgent(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("member args missing agent type: %#v", gotArgs)
}
}
// A member whose child exits non-zero (e.g. exit 4 / max-turns) must be reported as
// a FAILURE — otherwise the swarm marks it [done] and the orchestrator trusts
// incomplete work. The failed member keeps its session id (drill-in) and the child
// report rides along as the failure message.
func TestSpecialistLauncherMarksNonZeroExitAsFailed(t *testing.T) {
four := 4
executor := specialist.Executor{
BinaryPath: "/usr/local/bin/zero",
NewSessionID: func() (string, error) { return "member_task", nil },
Load: func(specialist.LoadOptions) (specialist.LoadResult, error) {
return specialist.LoadResult{}, nil
},
RunChild: func(ctx context.Context, binaryPath string, args []string, progress func(streamjson.Event)) (specialist.ChildRunResult, error) {
return specialist.ChildRunResult{
Events: []streamjson.Event{
{Type: streamjson.EventRunStart, SessionID: "member_task"},
{Type: streamjson.EventFinal, Text: "i could not finish the objective"},
{Type: streamjson.EventRunEnd, Status: "error", ExitCode: &four},
},
ExitCode: 4,
}, nil
},
}
handle, err := NewSpecialistLauncher(executor).Launch(context.Background(), MemberSpec{
ID: "m1",
TaskID: "m1",
AgentType: "subagent",
Team: "probe",
Task: "a task too big for the budget",
SystemPrompt: "You are a subagent spawned to complete a specific task.",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("launch: %v", err)
}
res, err := handle.Wait()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a member that exited non-zero must be reported as FAILED, got nil error")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exit 4") {
t.Fatalf("failure should carry the child report (exit 4), got %q", err.Error())
}
if res.SessionID != "member_task" {
t.Fatalf("a failed member must keep its session id for drill-in, got %q", res.SessionID)
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -71,9 +71,7 @@ func (s *Swarm) watch(t *Team, m *Member, spec MemberSpec) {
}
// fall through to record the original error if relaunch fails
}
// res.SessionID is preserved by the handle even on error, so a member that
// ran then failed stays drillable; a pure launch error carries an empty id.
_ = s.coord.FailWithSession(m.TaskID, memberError(err), res.SessionID)
_ = s.coord.Fail(m.TaskID, memberError(err))
} else {
_ = s.coord.CompleteWithSession(m.TaskID, res.Result, res.SessionID)
}
-19
View File
@@ -79,25 +79,6 @@ func (tool editFileTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, args map[string]any,
content := string(contentBytes)
occurrences := strings.Count(content, oldString)
// CRLF fallback: read_file normalizes \r\n → \n before presenting content to
// the model, so the model's old_string will use \n line endings. When the raw
// file uses \r\n (common on Windows), the \n-based old_string won't match.
// Detect this and transparently normalize: if the direct match fails, translate
// old_string's line endings to \r\n and search again. If found, use the CRLF-translated
// old_string and new_string for the replacement to preserve the file's existing EOL style
// without rewriting EOLs in unrelated parts of the file.
if occurrences == 0 && strings.Contains(content, "\r\n") && !strings.Contains(oldString, "\r\n") {
crlfOldString := strings.ReplaceAll(oldString, "\n", "\r\n")
normalizedOccurrences := strings.Count(content, crlfOldString)
if normalizedOccurrences > 0 {
occurrences = normalizedOccurrences
oldString = crlfOldString
if !strings.Contains(newString, "\r\n") {
newString = strings.ReplaceAll(newString, "\n", "\r\n")
}
}
}
if occurrences == 0 {
return errorResult("Error: Could not find the exact string to replace in " + relativePath + ". The old_string must match the file byte-for-byte.")
}
+54 -144
View File
@@ -28,17 +28,8 @@ const (
completedSessionRetention = 30 * time.Second
maxExecSessions = 64
recentExecOutputBytes = 4096
// maxExecOutputBufferBytes caps the undrained output an unpolled session can
// accumulate. Without a cap, a long-lived background session nobody polls
// again (e.g. a dev server left running after its initiating run was
// cancelled) grows this buffer forever as long as the process keeps writing
// output, with no ceiling — this previously ran a session's memory into the
// tens of gigabytes over several hours and got the whole zero process
// OOM-killed by the OS.
maxExecOutputBufferBytes = 2 * 1024 * 1024
execSessionStopTimeout = 3 * time.Second
execSessionEvictedMessage = "[zero] session evicted: too many background terminals\n"
execOutputBufferTruncatedMessage = "[zero] output buffer truncated: undrained output exceeded 2MiB, oldest output dropped"
execSessionStopTimeout = 3 * time.Second
execSessionEvictedMessage = "[zero] session evicted: too many background terminals\n"
)
type execSessionManager struct {
@@ -242,10 +233,6 @@ type ExecSessionSnapshot struct {
Status string
ExitCode *int
RecentOutput string
// OutputTruncated reflects the buffer's last-known truncation state (see
// execOutputBuffer.peekTruncated), so a session listing (/ps) still shows
// this even if the session is reaped before ever being polled again.
OutputTruncated bool
}
type ExecSessionController interface {
@@ -330,26 +317,24 @@ func (session *execSession) snapshot() ExecSessionSnapshot {
status = "exited"
}
return ExecSessionSnapshot{
ID: session.id,
Command: session.commandText,
Cwd: session.cwd,
RelativeCwd: session.relativeCwd,
StartedAt: startedAt,
LastUsedAt: lastUsedAt,
TTY: session.tty,
Status: status,
ExitCode: copiedExit,
RecentOutput: session.output.recentString(),
OutputTruncated: session.output.peekTruncated(),
ID: session.id,
Command: session.commandText,
Cwd: session.cwd,
RelativeCwd: session.relativeCwd,
StartedAt: startedAt,
LastUsedAt: lastUsedAt,
TTY: session.tty,
Status: status,
ExitCode: copiedExit,
RecentOutput: session.output.recentString(),
}
}
type execOutputBuffer struct {
mu sync.Mutex
data []byte
recent []byte
truncated bool
notify chan struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
data []byte
recent []byte
notify chan struct{}
}
func newExecOutputBuffer() *execOutputBuffer {
@@ -359,10 +344,6 @@ func newExecOutputBuffer() *execOutputBuffer {
func (buffer *execOutputBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
buffer.mu.Lock()
buffer.data = append(buffer.data, p...)
if len(buffer.data) > maxExecOutputBufferBytes {
buffer.data = buffer.data[len(buffer.data)-maxExecOutputBufferBytes:]
buffer.truncated = true
}
buffer.recent = append(buffer.recent, p...)
if len(buffer.recent) > recentExecOutputBytes {
buffer.recent = buffer.recent[len(buffer.recent)-recentExecOutputBytes:]
@@ -392,34 +373,6 @@ func (buffer *execOutputBuffer) drainString() string {
return out
}
// consumeTruncated reports whether the buffer has dropped output to stay
// within maxExecOutputBufferBytes since the last call, resetting the flag.
// Kept as an out-of-band signal rather than text embedded in drainString's
// result: an earlier version prefixed a notice directly into the drained
// string, but that notice always sat ~maxExecOutputBufferBytes (2MiB) before
// the end of the combined output, far outside the byte-budget head/tail
// window truncateExecOutput keeps afterward (at most 400KB even at the
// tool's maximum max_output_tokens) — so the notice was reliably swallowed
// or chopped by that second, unrelated truncation pass. Surfacing it as a
// separate bool lets the caller report it regardless of where in the byte
// stream the overflow happened.
func (buffer *execOutputBuffer) consumeTruncated() bool {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
truncated := buffer.truncated
buffer.truncated = false
return truncated
}
// peekTruncated reports the buffer's last-known truncation state without
// clearing it, for status views (e.g. /ps) that shouldn't consume the signal
// a subsequent poll is still meant to report via consumeTruncated.
func (buffer *execOutputBuffer) peekTruncated() bool {
buffer.mu.Lock()
defer buffer.mu.Unlock()
return buffer.truncated
}
type execCommandTool struct {
baseTool
workspaceRoot string
@@ -532,28 +485,25 @@ func (tool execCommandTool) run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, engine
if err != nil {
return errorResult("Error starting exec_command: " + err.Error())
}
output, outputTruncated := session.collect(ctx, time.Duration(yieldTimeMS)*time.Millisecond)
output := session.collect(ctx, time.Duration(yieldTimeMS)*time.Millisecond)
if ctx != nil && ctx.Err() != nil && !session.doneClosed() {
session.terminate()
more, moreTruncated := session.collect(context.Background(), time.Second)
output += more
outputTruncated = outputTruncated || moreTruncated
output += session.collect(context.Background(), time.Second)
}
exitCode, exited := session.exitStatus()
if exited {
tool.manager.remove(session.id)
}
return execToolResult(execToolResultInput{
commandText: commandText,
output: output,
outputBufferTruncated: outputTruncated,
sessionID: session.id,
exitCode: exitCode,
exited: exited,
relativeCwd: relativeCwd,
tty: session.tty,
plan: session.plan,
maxOutputTokens: maxOutputTokens,
commandText: commandText,
output: output,
sessionID: session.id,
exitCode: exitCode,
exited: exited,
relativeCwd: relativeCwd,
tty: session.tty,
plan: session.plan,
maxOutputTokens: maxOutputTokens,
})
}
@@ -608,49 +558,26 @@ func (tool execCommandTool) startSession(commandText string, absoluteCwd string,
return session, nil
}
// collect drains the session's output buffer, returning the accumulated text
// and whether the buffer ever had to drop output to stay within
// maxExecOutputBufferBytes since the last collect call.
func (session *execSession) collect(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration) (string, bool) {
func (session *execSession) collect(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration) string {
if ctx == nil {
ctx = context.Background()
}
deadline := time.Now().Add(wait)
var builder strings.Builder
truncated := false
finish := func() (string, bool) {
if session.output.consumeTruncated() {
truncated = true
}
return builder.String(), truncated
}
for {
if chunk := session.output.drainString(); chunk != "" {
builder.WriteString(chunk)
if session.output.consumeTruncated() {
truncated = true
}
// A background process that keeps writing output faster than this
// loop can drain it (a chatty dev server, a watch-mode rebuild loop,
// a crash-restart spew) would otherwise never let drainString return
// empty, so the deadline check below — only reached on an empty
// drain — would never fire. That turns `wait` into an unbounded
// block regardless of what the caller asked for. Check it here too,
// so continuous output can never starve the timeout.
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
return finish()
}
continue
}
if session.doneClosed() {
if chunk := session.output.drainString(); chunk != "" {
builder.WriteString(chunk)
}
return finish()
return builder.String()
}
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
return finish()
return builder.String()
}
timer := time.NewTimer(remaining)
select {
@@ -675,9 +602,9 @@ func (session *execSession) collect(ctx context.Context, wait time.Duration) (st
default:
}
}
return finish()
return builder.String()
case <-timer.C:
return finish()
return builder.String()
}
}
}
@@ -774,23 +701,22 @@ func (tool writeStdinTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]a
}
}
}
output, outputTruncated := session.collect(ctx, time.Duration(yieldTimeMS)*time.Millisecond)
output := session.collect(ctx, time.Duration(yieldTimeMS)*time.Millisecond)
exitCode, exited := session.exitStatus()
if exited {
tool.manager.remove(session.id)
}
return execToolResult(execToolResultInput{
commandText: session.commandText,
output: output,
outputBufferTruncated: outputTruncated,
sessionID: session.id,
exitCode: exitCode,
exited: exited,
relativeCwd: session.relativeCwd,
tty: session.tty,
interrupted: interrupted,
plan: session.plan,
maxOutputTokens: maxOutputTokens,
commandText: session.commandText,
output: output,
sessionID: session.id,
exitCode: exitCode,
exited: exited,
relativeCwd: session.relativeCwd,
tty: session.tty,
interrupted: interrupted,
plan: session.plan,
maxOutputTokens: maxOutputTokens,
})
}
@@ -815,22 +741,16 @@ func shouldInterruptExecSession(chars string, tty bool) bool {
}
type execToolResultInput struct {
commandText string
output string
// outputBufferTruncated is true when the session's undrained output buffer
// had to drop bytes to stay within maxExecOutputBufferBytes since it was
// last collected — data that is gone for good, unlike the head/tail
// truncation below (which the caller can recover by polling again or
// raising max_output_tokens).
outputBufferTruncated bool
sessionID int
exitCode int
exited bool
relativeCwd string
tty bool
interrupted bool
plan zeroSandbox.CommandPlan
maxOutputTokens int
commandText string
output string
sessionID int
exitCode int
exited bool
relativeCwd string
tty bool
interrupted bool
plan zeroSandbox.CommandPlan
maxOutputTokens int
}
func execToolResult(input execToolResultInput) Result {
@@ -851,26 +771,16 @@ func execToolResult(input execToolResultInput) Result {
} else {
meta["session_id"] = strconv.Itoa(input.sessionID)
}
if input.outputBufferTruncated {
meta["output_buffer_truncated"] = "true"
}
status := StatusOK
if input.exited && ((input.exitCode != 0 && !input.interrupted) || meta[SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true") {
status = StatusError
}
body := formatExecCommandOutput(output, input.sessionID, input.exited, input.exitCode, input.interrupted)
if input.outputBufferTruncated {
// Appended after truncateExecOutput's own head/tail slicing, not
// embedded in the text that goes through it — a marker inside that
// text can land in the discarded middle or get chopped at a small
// max_output_tokens budget. Appending here guarantees it survives.
body += "\n" + execOutputBufferTruncatedMessage
}
return Result{
Status: status,
Output: body,
Truncated: truncated || input.outputBufferTruncated,
Truncated: truncated,
Meta: meta,
Display: Display{
Summary: execDisplaySummary(input.commandText, input.sessionID, input.exited, input.exitCode),
-146
View File
@@ -363,152 +363,6 @@ func TestStartExecProcessFallsBackAfterPTYStartMutation(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestExecOutputBufferCapsUndrainedData: a session nobody polls must not grow
// its undrained buffer without bound — a long-lived background process that
// keeps writing while unpolled previously ran a session's memory into the
// tens of gigabytes and got the whole zero process OOM-killed by the OS.
func TestExecOutputBufferCapsUndrainedData(t *testing.T) {
buffer := newExecOutputBuffer()
chunk := strings.Repeat("x", 1024)
writes := (maxExecOutputBufferBytes / len(chunk)) + 10 // comfortably over the cap
for i := 0; i < writes; i++ {
if _, err := buffer.Write([]byte(chunk)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
}
}
buffer.mu.Lock()
dataLen := len(buffer.data)
buffer.mu.Unlock()
if dataLen > maxExecOutputBufferBytes {
t.Fatalf("undrained buffer grew to %d bytes, want <= %d", dataLen, maxExecOutputBufferBytes)
}
out := buffer.drainString()
// drainString itself carries no truncation marker: a marker embedded in
// the drained text would always sit ~maxExecOutputBufferBytes before the
// end of the string, past any realistic head/tail truncation window a
// caller applies afterward (see execToolResult), so it's reliably lost.
// The signal lives out of band on consumeTruncated/peekTruncated instead.
if !strings.HasSuffix(out, chunk) {
t.Fatal("drained output should keep the most recent bytes, not the oldest")
}
if len(out) > maxExecOutputBufferBytes {
t.Fatalf("drained output = %d bytes, want <= %d (no marker text mixed in)", len(out), maxExecOutputBufferBytes)
}
if !buffer.peekTruncated() {
t.Fatal("peekTruncated should report the overflow without clearing it")
}
if !buffer.peekTruncated() {
t.Fatal("a second peekTruncated call should still report it — peek must not consume")
}
if !buffer.consumeTruncated() {
t.Fatal("consumeTruncated should report the overflow")
}
if buffer.consumeTruncated() {
t.Fatal("consumeTruncated should reset after being read once")
}
if buffer.peekTruncated() {
t.Fatal("peekTruncated should reflect the reset state after consumeTruncated")
}
// A second drain with no intervening writes must be empty.
if got := buffer.drainString(); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("drainString after a full drain = %q, want empty", got)
}
}
// TestExecToolResultSurfacesBufferTruncationOutsideByteBudget: an earlier
// version embedded the truncation notice directly in the drained text, which
// a review found sits ~maxExecOutputBufferBytes before the end of the
// string — far past the head/tail window truncateExecOutput keeps even at
// the tool's smallest allowed max_output_tokens, so the notice was reliably
// swallowed or chopped. The notice must survive regardless of how small the
// byte budget is, and it must not count against that budget.
func TestExecToolResultSurfacesBufferTruncationOutsideByteBudget(t *testing.T) {
hugeOutput := strings.Repeat("y", maxExecOutputBufferBytes+1024)
result := execToolResult(execToolResultInput{
commandText: "cmd",
output: hugeOutput,
outputBufferTruncated: true,
sessionID: 1,
exited: false,
maxOutputTokens: 1, // the schema's own declared minimum
})
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, execOutputBufferTruncatedMessage) {
t.Fatalf("result output should contain the buffer-truncation notice even at the smallest max_output_tokens, got %q", result.Output[:min(len(result.Output), 200)])
}
if result.Meta["output_buffer_truncated"] != "true" {
t.Fatalf("result meta should flag output_buffer_truncated, got %#v", result.Meta)
}
if !result.Truncated {
t.Fatal("result should report Truncated when the buffer dropped output")
}
}
// TestCollectRespectsDeadlineUnderContinuousOutput asserts collect() returns
// close to its requested deadline even while output keeps arriving. Before
// the corresponding fix, the deadline was only checked in the branch reached
// when drainString returns empty — a background process producing output
// fast/continuously enough to keep the buffer perpetually non-empty could
// theoretically starve that check indefinitely. This synthetic writer
// (8 goroutines, tight loop) did not reliably reproduce that starvation under
// Go's scheduler in practice — the reader still won the race often enough —
// so this test doesn't prove the old code could hang; it just pins down the
// intended behavior (bounded by wait) going forward.
func TestCollectRespectsDeadlineUnderContinuousOutput(t *testing.T) {
session := &execSession{
id: 1000,
output: newExecOutputBuffer(),
done: make(chan struct{}),
}
stop := make(chan struct{})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
// Several concurrent writers, each pushing a decent-sized chunk in a tight
// loop: a single slow writer lets the reader win the race often enough
// (the runtime schedules a gap between writes) to mask the bug. Enough
// parallel writers keep the buffer non-empty essentially continuously,
// closer to a real chatty process whose PTY reads land in bursts.
const writers = 8
chunk := []byte(strings.Repeat("x", 256))
wg.Add(writers)
for i := 0; i < writers; i++ {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for {
select {
case <-stop:
return
default:
session.output.Write(chunk)
}
}
}()
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
close(stop)
wg.Wait()
})
const wait = 200 * time.Millisecond
start := time.Now()
_, _ = session.collect(context.Background(), wait)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
// Generous slack over `wait` for scheduling jitter under a continuously
// writing goroutine — this must stay a small multiple of wait, not
// "however long the writer keeps going" (which is what the bug produced:
// this test would hang past the 30s test timeout without the fix).
if elapsed > 3*wait {
t.Fatalf("collect took %v under continuous output, want close to the %v deadline", elapsed, wait)
}
}
// resilientTempDir is like t.TempDir() but tolerates the Windows handle-release
// lag: a SIGKILL'd child process that had the dir as its cwd may not have
// released it the instant it is reaped, so the immediate RemoveAll t.TempDir()
+2 -2
View File
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ func TestCoreNetworkToolsExposeSafetyMetadata(t *testing.T) {
if property, ok := search.Parameters().Properties["query"]; !ok || property.Type != "string" {
t.Fatalf("web_search must expose a string query property, got %#v", search.Parameters().Properties["query"])
}
if safety := search.Safety(); safety.Permission != PermissionPrompt || !safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
t.Fatalf("web_search safety = %#v, want prompt and advertised in auto", safety)
if safety := search.Safety(); safety.Permission != PermissionAllow || safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
t.Fatalf("web_search safety = %#v, want allow without prompt-advertise override", safety)
}
}
+7 -9
View File
@@ -81,14 +81,13 @@ func newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend searchBackend) Tool {
Required: []string{"query"},
AdditionalProperties: false,
},
// Hosted search sends model-provided query text to a configured network
// backend. Keep it visible in auto mode, but guard execution through the
// normal permission flow like web_fetch.
// Hosted search is a read-only discovery action. It remains marked as
// network for metadata, but sandbox network policy is the shell egress
// boundary; web_search keeps its own result-domain filtering safeguards.
safety: Safety{
SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork,
Permission: PermissionPrompt,
Reason: "Sends model-provided search query text to the configured web search backend.",
AdvertiseInAuto: true,
SideEffect: SideEffectNetwork,
Permission: PermissionAllow,
Reason: "Performs a web search over the network.",
},
},
backend: backend,
@@ -96,8 +95,7 @@ func newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend searchBackend) Tool {
}
// RunWithSandbox follows the normal web_search path. The sandbox network policy
// gates sandboxed shell egress; this in-process hosted search tool is guarded by
// the permission flow plus backend and result-domain safeguards.
// gates sandboxed shell egress, not this in-process hosted search tool.
func (tool webSearchTool) RunWithSandbox(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, engine *zeroSandbox.Engine) Result {
return tool.Run(ctx, args)
}
+5 -40
View File
@@ -116,52 +116,17 @@ func TestWebSearchRegisteredInCoreNetworkTools(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestWebSearchSafetyPromptsForHostedSearchButAdvertisesInAuto(t *testing.T) {
func TestWebSearchSafetyAllowsHostedSearchWithoutPrompt(t *testing.T) {
tool := newWebSearchToolWithBackend(&fakeSearchBackend{})
safety := tool.Safety()
if safety.SideEffect != SideEffectNetwork {
t.Fatalf("side effect = %s, want network", safety.SideEffect)
}
if safety.Permission != PermissionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("permission = %s, want prompt", safety.Permission)
if safety.Permission != PermissionAllow {
t.Fatalf("permission = %s, want allow", safety.Permission)
}
if !safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
t.Fatal("web_search should be advertised in auto mode while still requiring permission")
}
}
func TestWebSearchRegistryRequiresPermissionBeforeBackendCall(t *testing.T) {
backend := &fakeSearchBackend{results: []searchResult{{Title: "T", URL: "https://x.test"}}}
registry := NewRegistry()
registry.Register(newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend))
res := registry.Run(context.Background(), "web_search", map[string]any{"query": "private workspace detail"})
if res.Status != StatusError {
t.Fatalf("expected permission error, got %s: %s", res.Status, res.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(res.Output, "Permission required for web_search") {
t.Fatalf("expected permission-required output, got %q", res.Output)
}
if backend.gotQuery != "" {
t.Fatalf("backend must not be called before permission, got query %q", backend.gotQuery)
}
}
func TestWebSearchRegistryRunsAfterPermissionGranted(t *testing.T) {
backend := &fakeSearchBackend{results: []searchResult{{Title: "T", URL: "https://x.test"}}}
registry := NewRegistry()
registry.Register(newWebSearchToolWithBackend(backend))
res := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "web_search", map[string]any{"query": "go errors"}, RunOptions{
PermissionGranted: true,
})
if res.Status != StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected ok, got %s: %s", res.Status, res.Output)
}
if backend.gotQuery != "go errors" {
t.Fatalf("backend query = %q, want %q", backend.gotQuery, "go errors")
if safety.AdvertiseInAuto {
t.Fatal("web_search should not need the prompt-tool auto advertisement override")
}
}
-23
View File
@@ -250,29 +250,6 @@ func TestEditFileToolReplacesExactStrings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestEditFileToolReplacesCRLF(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(root, "code.go")
writeTestFile(t, path, "const a = 1\r\nconst b = 2\r\n")
result := NewEditFileTool(root).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{
"path": "code.go",
"old_string": "const a = 1\nconst b = 2",
"new_string": "const a = 42\nconst b = 24",
})
if result.Status != StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected edit ok, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(content) != "const a = 42\r\nconst b = 24\r\n" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected edited content: %q", string(content))
}
}
func TestEditFileToolEmitsUnifiedDiff(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "code.go"), "const a = 1\nconst b = 2\n")
-3
View File
@@ -146,9 +146,6 @@ func formatBackgroundTerminalRow(session tools.ExecSessionSnapshot, now time.Tim
}
preview := compactCommandOutputText(session.RecentOutput)
prefix := fmt.Sprintf("%d · %s · %s · %s", session.ID, session.Status, age, cwd)
if session.OutputTruncated {
prefix += " · output truncated"
}
if preview != "" {
return prefix + " · " + command + " · " + preview
}
-7
View File
@@ -56,13 +56,6 @@ func pasteFromClipboardCmd() tea.Cmd {
// spec prompt, the MCP manager, an open picker, the detailed transcript) swallow
// the paste; empty content is a no-op.
func (m model) routePaste(content string) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
// A paste is a deliberate action, same as a keypress or click — it means
// the user moved on to something else, so it disarms a stale Esc
// cancel-confirmation. tea.PasteMsg/clipboardReadMsg aren't
// tea.KeyPressMsg, so they don't go through that generic keypress hook;
// do it once here, before any early return, so both the bracketed-paste
// and right-click-paste paths are covered uniformly.
m = m.disarmCancelConfirmation()
if content == "" {
// Empty text clipboard — the user may have pasted a screenshot.
// Probe the OS clipboard for image content asynchronously.
+7 -23
View File
@@ -441,8 +441,6 @@ func (m model) handleModelCommand(args string) (model, string) {
m.providerProfile = nextProfile
m.provider = nextProvider
m.providerName = displayValue(nextProfile.Name, string(metadata.ProviderKind))
// Keep sub-agent child processes on the same provider we just switched to.
config.SetActiveProviderEnv(nextProfile.Name)
m.modelName = target.modelID
resetEffort := false
if m.reasoningEffort != "" && !reasoningEffortAllowed(target.reasoningEfforts, m.reasoningEffort) {
@@ -490,16 +488,16 @@ func (m model) handleModelCommand(args string) (model, string) {
// picker calls this when a model from a non-active provider is chosen, so the
// picker can list every saved provider and switch across them (like a unified
// provider+model selector). The key is loaded from the encrypted store / env.
func (m model) switchProviderModel(providerName, modelID string) (model, string, tea.Cmd) {
func (m model) switchProviderModel(providerName, modelID string) (model, string) {
if m.pending {
return m, "Model\nCannot switch providers while a run is active.", nil
return m, "Model\nCannot switch providers while a run is active."
}
if m.newProvider == nil {
return m, "Model\nProvider rebuild is not available for this TUI session.", nil
return m, "Model\nProvider rebuild is not available for this TUI session."
}
target, ok := m.savedProviderByName(providerName)
if !ok {
return m, "Model\nunknown provider " + strconv.Quote(providerName), nil
return m, "Model\nunknown provider " + strconv.Quote(providerName)
}
target = m.profileWithCredential(target)
target.Model = strings.TrimSpace(modelID)
@@ -508,35 +506,21 @@ func (m model) switchProviderModel(providerName, modelID string) (model, string,
// was deleted/unreadable the marker can still be set, and building a keyless
// provider would only fail later with a 401. Local/no-auth providers need no key.
if strings.TrimSpace(target.APIKey) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(target.AuthHeaderValue) == "" && !(hasDescriptor && descriptor.Local) {
return m, "Model\nprovider " + strconv.Quote(providerName) + " has no usable credential — run setup or `zero auth login " + providerName + "`.", nil
return m, "Model\nprovider " + strconv.Quote(providerName) + " has no usable credential — run setup or `zero auth login " + providerName + "`."
}
next, err := m.newProvider(target)
if err != nil {
return m, "Model\n" + redaction.RedactString(err.Error(), redaction.Options{ExtraSecretValues: []string{target.APIKey}}), nil
return m, "Model\n" + redaction.RedactString(err.Error(), redaction.Options{ExtraSecretValues: []string{target.APIKey}})
}
m.provider = next
m.providerProfile = target
m.providerName = target.Name
m.modelName = target.Model
// Keep sub-agent child processes on the same provider we just switched to.
config.SetActiveProviderEnv(target.Name)
if strings.TrimSpace(m.userConfigPath) != "" {
_, _ = config.SetActiveProvider(m.userConfigPath, target.Name)
_, _ = config.SetProviderModel(m.userConfigPath, target.Name, target.Model)
}
// Warm discovery for the provider we just switched to, same as Init() does
// for the provider active at launch — otherwise the context-usage gauge has
// no window for this provider until /model happens to be opened separately.
var cmds []tea.Cmd
if hasDescriptor {
if cmd := m.modelPickerProviderDiscoveryCmd(descriptor, target); cmd != nil {
cmds = append(cmds, cmd)
}
if cmd := m.ollamaContextWindowDiscoveryCmd(descriptor, target.BaseURL, target.Model); cmd != nil {
cmds = append(cmds, cmd)
}
}
return m, fmt.Sprintf("Model\nSwitched to %s · %s", target.Name, target.Model), tea.Batch(cmds...)
return m, fmt.Sprintf("Model\nSwitched to %s · %s", target.Name, target.Model)
}
// profileWithCredential fills a profile's APIKey for provider construction the same
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