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KRATOS df2cd633f9 fix(sandbox): require literal words for the whole AST call (#473 review)
astCommandFields guarded only the program word, then ran every argument
through wordText, which keeps literal/quoted parts and silently drops
CmdSubst/ParamExp. A dynamic ARGUMENT was therefore reconstructed lossily:
`git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1` runs as `git foorebase -i` (a
non-existent, non-interactive subcommand) but collapsed to `git rebase -i`
and was blocked -- a false positive on a command the user never wrote, and
new on this branch (the base correctly reports not-interactive).

Extend the literalness guard to every word in the call: if any word carries
an expansion, skip that AST command rather than classify a reconstruction
whose runtime value is unknowable. Skipping is the safe direction -- the
hand-written passes still run first, and a miss falls through to the normal
permission prompt instead of hard-blocking.

Genuine detection is unchanged: `git rebase -i HEAD~1` and the #473 bypass
cases still classify exactly as before.
2026-07-20 11:38:54 +05:30
KRATOS f8c902c087 fix(sandbox): AST pass runs the full pipeline + guards dynamic programs (#473 review)
Address review on #745:
- The AST second opinion now applies the complete detection pipeline via a new
  inspectCommandFields helper (multi-word interactive segments, sh -c payload
  recursion, then the per-program lookup), so parser-hidden bypasses like
  { git rebase -i HEAD~1; } and { sh -c 'vim file.txt'; } are caught, not just
  bare interactive programs.
- astCommandFields now skips a CallExpr whose program word is not a static
  literal (isLiteralWord), so a substitution concatenated with a literal
  ($(printf foo)vim -> foovim) can't fabricate an interactive program name.

Regression tests added for both boundaries. (The un-braced $(printf foo)vim
false positive is a separate, pre-existing hand-parser behavior — present on
main before this PR — and is out of scope here.)
2026-07-19 11:05:18 +05:30
KRATOS 4fa0e5b0ba fix(sandbox): AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses (#473)
The interactive-command guard split shell commands with a hand-written parser
(splitShellSegments), which mis-handles unusual quoting, command substitution,
subshells, and newline separators — an interactive program hidden by one slips
through and the agent hangs until the per-command timeout.

Add astCommandFields(): mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax (already used by analyzer.go) to
re-extract the real simple commands, then apply the SAME per-program checks the
regex path uses (interactivePrograms + hasNonInteractiveFlag). This only ADDS
detections and classifies every program exactly as before — ssh with a trailing
command, python -c, etc. stay allowed — while catching the splitter's bypasses.
Unparseable input (Windows cmd.exe, obfuscation) yields no commands and falls
through to the regex path; the guard never hard-blocks on a parse error.
2026-07-19 10:23:22 +05:30
7 changed files with 215 additions and 68 deletions

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-31
View File
@@ -169,37 +169,6 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The whole point of #702's fix: the unknown-session error's normalized
// signature must not vary with the session id, so a model probing ids 1, 2,
// 3, … produces one repeated signature the failure guard can count. If the id
// leaked into the first 80 normalized chars, each probe would reset the streak
// and the halt would never fire.
func TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant(t *testing.T) {
a := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(1))
b := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(999999))
if a != b {
t.Fatalf("unknown-session signature varies with id:\n %q\n %q", a, b)
}
}
// End to end: with an id-invariant signature, probing a different unknown id
// each turn now trips the repeated-failure halt at toolFailureStopAt, where
// before the fix it never would.
func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
var stoppedAt int
for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i))
if out.Stop {
stoppedAt = i
break
}
}
if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
t.Fatalf("probing distinct unknown ids stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
}
}
func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{
-3
View File
@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ work.
- Use exec_command with `tty: true` for interactive terminal-style commands that
need stdin beyond Ctrl-C. `/ps` and `/stop` are user-facing TUI commands; when
you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
- write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
`\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
+70
View File
@@ -65,6 +65,76 @@ func AnalyzeCommand(script string) AnalysisResult {
return result
}
// astCommandFields parses command with the shell parser and returns each simple
// command as its literal field slice (program + args as text), resolving the
// real command positions across quoting, command substitution, subshells, and
// newline separators — the constructs the hand-written splitter in
// safe_command.go mis-handles (issue #473). It returns nil when the command
// cannot be parsed (e.g. a Windows cmd.exe string), so callers fall through to
// the regex path rather than hard-blocking.
func astCommandFields(command string) [][]string {
file, err := syntax.NewParser().Parse(strings.NewReader(command), "")
if err != nil {
return nil
}
var commands [][]string
syntax.Walk(file, func(node syntax.Node) bool {
call, ok := node.(*syntax.CallExpr)
if !ok || len(call.Args) == 0 {
return true
}
// EVERY word must be a static literal, not just the program name.
// wordText keeps only the literal/quoted parts of a word and silently
// drops expansions, so a dynamic word anywhere in the call reconstructs
// to something the shell will never run: `$(printf foo)vim` (runs as
// `foovim`) collapses to "vim", and `git $(printf foo)rebase -i` (runs
// as `git foorebase -i`, non-interactive) collapses to `git rebase -i`
// and fabricates an interactive match. Since the runtime value of an
// expansion is unknowable here, skip the whole call rather than classify
// a lossy reconstruction. Skipping is the safe direction: the
// hand-written passes above already ran, and a missed detection falls
// through to the normal permission prompt instead of hard-blocking a
// command the user never wrote.
for _, word := range call.Args {
if !isLiteralWord(word) {
return true
}
}
fields := make([]string, 0, len(call.Args))
for _, word := range call.Args {
fields = append(fields, wordText(word))
}
commands = append(commands, fields)
return true
})
return commands
}
// isLiteralWord reports whether every part of word is a static literal (bare or
// quoted). A word containing a command substitution, parameter/arithmetic
// expansion, process substitution, etc. is dynamic — its runtime value is
// unknown, so its wordText (a partial literal) must not be trusted as a program
// name.
func isLiteralWord(word *syntax.Word) bool {
if word == nil {
return false
}
for _, part := range word.Parts {
switch typed := part.(type) {
case *syntax.Lit, *syntax.SglQuoted:
case *syntax.DblQuoted:
for _, inner := range typed.Parts {
if _, ok := inner.(*syntax.Lit); !ok {
return false
}
}
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
// analyzeInto parses script and folds its interactive/destructive/network usage
// into result, sharing seen so program names are de-duplicated across recursion.
func analyzeInto(script string, result *AnalysisResult, seen map[string]bool, depth int) {
+56
View File
@@ -219,9 +219,65 @@ func DetectInteractiveCommand(command string, goos string) InteractiveCommandRes
}
}
// AST second opinion (issue #473): the hand-written segment split above
// mis-handles interactive programs hidden by unusual quoting, command
// substitution, subshells, or newline separators. Re-extract the real simple
// commands from the parsed shell tree and apply the SAME full pipeline
// (interactive segments, sh -c payload recursion, per-program lookup), so a
// bypass is caught while every program stays classified exactly as before
// (ssh with a trailing command, python -c, etc. remain allowed). A command
// the parser cannot handle (Windows cmd.exe, obfuscation) yields no commands
// and falls through unchanged — the guard never hard-blocks on a parse error.
for _, fields := range astCommandFields(command) {
if result, ok := inspectCommandFields(fields, goos); ok {
return result
}
}
return InteractiveCommandResult{}
}
// inspectCommandFields applies the full interactive-detection pipeline to one
// already-split command's fields: the multi-word interactive segments, then the
// `sh -c <payload>` recursion, then the per-program lookup with its
// non-interactive suppressions (hasNonInteractiveFlag covers REPL flags and
// trailing-command clients like ssh). It mirrors the hand-written passes above
// so an AST-extracted command is classified identically to a plainly-split one.
func inspectCommandFields(fields []string, goos string) (InteractiveCommandResult, bool) {
body := strings.ToLower(commandBody(fields))
for _, seg := range interactiveSegments {
if body == seg.match || strings.HasPrefix(body, seg.match+" ") {
suggestion := seg.suggestion
if goos == "windows" && seg.windowsSuggestion != "" {
suggestion = seg.windowsSuggestion
}
return InteractiveCommandResult{Interactive: true, Command: seg.command, Reason: seg.reason, Suggestion: suggestion}, true
}
}
first := firstProgram(fields)
if first == "" {
return InteractiveCommandResult{}, false
}
if payload := shellDashCPayload(first, fields); payload != "" {
if inner := DetectInteractiveCommand(payload, goos); inner.Interactive {
return inner, true
}
return InteractiveCommandResult{}, false
}
program, ok := interactivePrograms[first]
if !ok || (program.windowsOnly && goos != "windows") {
return InteractiveCommandResult{}, false
}
if hasNonInteractiveFlag(first, fields) {
return InteractiveCommandResult{}, false
}
suggestion := program.suggestion
if goos == "windows" && program.windowsSuggestion != "" {
suggestion = program.windowsSuggestion
}
return InteractiveCommandResult{Interactive: true, Command: first, Reason: program.reason, Suggestion: suggestion}, true
}
// wrapperPrograms are launcher prefixes that precede the real program. After
// one of these we keep scanning for the actual executable.
var wrapperPrograms = map[string]bool{
+84
View File
@@ -406,3 +406,87 @@ func TestDetectInteractiveMongoEvalAndFullPaths(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// The hand-written segment splitter misses interactive programs hidden by
// constructs only a real shell parser resolves (a newline separator collapsed
// to a space; a brace group that shifts the real command position). The AST
// second opinion must catch them (issue #473).
func TestDetectInteractiveCommandCatchesParserBypasses(t *testing.T) {
for _, cmd := range []string{
"echo hi\nvim file.txt", // newline separator collapsed to a space by the regex path
"{ vim file.txt; }", // brace group hides the real program position
} {
got := DetectInteractiveCommand(cmd, "linux")
if !got.Interactive {
t.Errorf("DetectInteractiveCommand(%q) = not interactive, want caught (parser bypass)", cmd)
continue
}
if got.Command != "vim" {
t.Errorf("DetectInteractiveCommand(%q).Command = %q, want vim", cmd, got.Command)
}
}
}
// The AST second opinion must not flag an interactive program NAME that appears
// only inside a quoted argument (not a real command position) — the parser
// distinguishes program from argument, so this must stay non-interactive.
func TestDetectInteractiveCommandNoFalsePositiveOnQuotedArgument(t *testing.T) {
got := DetectInteractiveCommand(`echo "please run vim later"`, "linux")
if got.Interactive {
t.Fatalf("interactive name inside a quoted argument must not be flagged, got %#v", got)
}
}
// The AST second opinion must run the FULL pipeline — multi-word interactive
// segments and sh -c payload recursion, not just the per-program lookup — so a
// grouped/nested bypass is caught; and it must not fabricate a program name from
// a command substitution concatenated with a literal (issue #473, review).
func TestDetectInteractiveCommandASTPipelineBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
interactive := []struct{ cmd, wantCmd string }{
{"{ git rebase -i HEAD~1; }", "git rebase -i"}, // multi-word segment in a brace group
{"{ sh -c 'vim file.txt'; }", "vim"}, // sh -c payload in a brace group
}
for _, tc := range interactive {
got := DetectInteractiveCommand(tc.cmd, "linux")
if !got.Interactive || got.Command != tc.wantCmd {
t.Errorf("DetectInteractiveCommand(%q) = %+v, want interactive Command=%q", tc.cmd, got, tc.wantCmd)
}
}
}
// The AST pass must not fabricate a program name from a dynamic (non-literal)
// program word: `$(printf '%s' foo)vim` runs as `foovim`, not vim. Tested at the
// extractor so the hand-written pass (which pre-empts DetectInteractiveCommand
// with its own, separate handling of that construct) does not mask the guard.
func TestAstCommandFieldsSkipsDynamicProgram(t *testing.T) {
for _, fields := range astCommandFields("$(printf '%s' foo)vim file.txt") {
if firstProgram(fields) == "vim" {
t.Fatalf("astCommandFields fabricated a vim command from a substitution: %v", fields)
}
}
}
// The literalness guard covers every word, not just the program name. A dynamic
// ARGUMENT is dropped by wordText the same way a dynamic program word is, so
// `git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1` (which runs as `git foorebase -i`, a
// non-existent and non-interactive subcommand) would otherwise be reconstructed
// as `git rebase -i` and blocked — a false positive on a command the user never
// wrote. Asserted through DetectInteractiveCommand as well as the extractor,
// because the whole point is what the caller ends up blocking.
func TestAstCommandFieldsSkipsDynamicArgument(t *testing.T) {
const dynamic = "{ git $(printf foo)rebase -i HEAD~1 ; }"
for _, fields := range astCommandFields(dynamic) {
if firstProgram(fields) == "git" {
t.Fatalf("astCommandFields reconstructed a git command from a dynamic argument: %v", fields)
}
}
if got := DetectInteractiveCommand(dynamic, "linux"); got.Interactive {
t.Errorf("DetectInteractiveCommand(%q) = %+v, want not interactive", dynamic, got)
}
// The genuine form must still be detected — the guard skips lossy
// reconstructions, it does not weaken real detection.
const genuine = "{ git rebase -i HEAD~1 ; }"
if got := DetectInteractiveCommand(genuine, "linux"); !got.Interactive || got.Command != "git rebase -i" {
t.Errorf("DetectInteractiveCommand(%q) = %+v, want interactive Command=%q", genuine, got, "git rebase -i")
}
}
+2 -14
View File
@@ -707,18 +707,6 @@ type writeStdinTool struct {
manager *execSessionManager
}
// UnknownExecSessionError is the result returned when write_stdin targets a
// session_id with no live exec session. The stable recovery guidance leads and
// the numeric id trails on purpose: the agent's repeated-failure guard keys on
// a normalized, truncated prefix of the error string, so keeping the id out of
// that prefix makes a model probing ids 1, 2, 3, … produce ONE signature that
// finally trips the halt instead of a fresh signature per id — while also
// telling the model how to actually recover. See TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant
// in internal/agent, which pins this invariant against the real guard.
func UnknownExecSessionError(sessionID int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("Error: write_stdin needs a session_id returned by a still-running exec_command; do not guess or probe session ids. Start a process with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes. (no live session %d)", sessionID)
}
func (writeStdinTool) outputCategory(map[string]any) outputCategory {
return outputCategoryProcess
}
@@ -734,7 +722,7 @@ func NewWriteStdinTool(manager *execSessionManager) Tool {
parameters: Schema{
Type: "object",
Properties: map[string]PropertySchema{
"session_id": {Type: "integer", Description: "Identifier of a running unified exec session, as returned by exec_command. Never guess or probe ids.", Minimum: intPtr(1)},
"session_id": {Type: "integer", Description: "Identifier of the running unified exec session."},
"chars": {Type: "string", Description: "Bytes to write to stdin. Defaults to empty, which polls without writing.", Default: ""},
"yield_time_ms": {Type: "integer", Description: "Wait before yielding output. Non-empty writes default to 250 ms and cap at 30000 ms; empty polls wait 5000-300000 ms by default.", Default: defaultPollYieldTimeMS, Minimum: intPtr(1), Maximum: intPtr(maxPollYieldTimeMS)},
"max_output_tokens": {Type: "integer", Description: "Output token budget. Defaults to 10000 tokens; larger requests may be capped by policy.", Default: defaultMaxOutputTokens, Minimum: intPtr(1), Maximum: intPtr(maxExecOutputTokenRequest)},
@@ -796,7 +784,7 @@ func (tool writeStdinTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]a
}
session, ok := tool.manager.get(sessionID)
if !ok {
return errorResult(UnknownExecSessionError(sessionID))
return errorResult(fmt.Sprintf("Error: Unknown exec session_id %d.", sessionID))
}
session.touch()
interrupted := false
+3 -20
View File
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ func TestRegistryHonorsWriteStdinArgumentPermission(t *testing.T) {
registry.Register(NewWriteStdinTool(newExecSessionManager()))
poll := registry.Run(context.Background(), WriteStdinToolName, map[string]any{"session_id": 9999})
if poll.Status != StatusError || !strings.Contains(poll.Output, "still-running exec_command") {
if poll.Status != StatusError || !strings.Contains(poll.Output, "Unknown exec session_id") {
t.Fatalf("empty poll should reach tool without permission prompt, got status=%s output=%q", poll.Status, poll.Output)
}
@@ -901,25 +901,8 @@ func TestWriteStdinReportsUnknownSession(t *testing.T) {
if result.Status != StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %s, want error", result.Status)
}
// The message must lead with recovery guidance and still identify the id.
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "still-running exec_command") {
t.Fatalf("unknown-session error must carry recovery guidance, got: %q", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "1234") {
t.Fatalf("unknown-session error must name the offending id, got: %q", result.Output)
}
}
// The runtime rejects session_id < 1 (intArg min 1); the advertised schema must
// say the same so a model sees the constraint before it probes id 0.
func TestWriteStdinSchemaPinsSessionIDMinimum(t *testing.T) {
schema := NewWriteStdinTool(nil).(writeStdinTool).parameters
prop, ok := schema.Properties["session_id"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("session_id property missing from write_stdin schema")
}
if prop.Minimum == nil || *prop.Minimum != 1 {
t.Fatalf("session_id schema Minimum = %v, want 1 to match the runtime floor", prop.Minimum)
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "Unknown exec session_id 1234") {
t.Fatalf("unexpected output: %q", result.Output)
}
}