fix(sessions): use upstream module path for error diagnostics

A provider error body with invalid UTF-8 was cut to the 8 KiB limit and
then grew on its way into events.jsonl, because JSON turns each invalid
byte into a three-byte U+FFFD: a cause of invalid bytes read back at up
to three times the limit. The cause is now made valid before it is
bounded, and a store round-trip test checks the value that reads back.

Nothing pinned that exec, the spec draft run and the TUI record the
structured payload rather than only the message. Each now has a test
that drives a provider error into the session log and reads back the
status code and the cause, and each fails if its call site records only
the message.

Reported by CodeRabbit on the merge of main.

docs/EXTENDING.md

@@ -307,6 +307,10 @@ attribution headers `X-AIMLAPI-Source: agent/zero` and `X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID`,
 and gets the key under the rules above. Other MCP servers never receive these
 headers or the key.
 
+If the server echoes back the key Zero sent it, Zero replaces the key with
+`[REDACTED]` in that server's error messages and tool results before anything
+reads them, and reports an HTTP error status without the response body.
+
 ### As a server — expose Zero's tools to another agent
 
 ```bash

internal/agent/capture_artifact_refusal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// A CONFIGURATION REFUSAL IS NOT A RETRIABLE FAILURE, EVEN WHEN IT ARRIVES
+// EARLY.
+//
+// capture_artifact rejects in RejectBeforePermission, which the registry returns
+// straight back before any of the gates that attach provenance. Its
+// valid-but-unavailable calls therefore reached the classifier with no denial
+// category, no permission metadata and no refusal marker, and were read as
+// ordinary retriable failures: the model got the schema hint and the call could
+// consume the profile failure-streak escalation, for a tool that never executed
+// and that no argument change can enable.
+func TestDisabledCaptureArtifactIsAPolicyRefusalNotARetriableFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	// No artifacts directory and no enabled driver: valid arguments, unavailable
+	// tool. This is the shape an operator produces by configuration alone.
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	for _, tool := range tools.NewLocalControlArtifactTools(tools.LocalControlArtifactOptions{}) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "capture_artifact", map[string]any{
+		"action": "browser_screenshot",
+		"name":   "shot",
+	}, tools.RunOptions{PermissionGranted: true})
+
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: expected the disabled tool to refuse, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	if !tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("the refusal carries no provenance, so nothing downstream can tell it from a failed command: %#v", result.Meta)
+	}
+
+	// Through the conversion the loop performs, which is where the marker has to
+	// survive to be worth anything.
+	converted := ToolResult{
+		Status: result.Status,
+		Output: result.Output,
+		Meta:   result.Meta,
+	}
+	if !isPolicyRefusal(converted) {
+		t.Error("the marker did not survive into the agent-facing result")
+	}
+	if isRetriableToolError(converted) {
+		t.Error("a tool that never executed, and that no argument change can enable, was marked retriable: the model gets a schema hint telling it to fix arguments that were already valid")
+	}
+}
+
+// The malformed-argument branch must stay retriable. That one IS fixable by
+// trying again differently, which is what the hint exists for, so marking every
+// early rejection would trade one wrong answer for another.
+func TestMalformedCaptureArtifactArgumentsStayRetriable(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	for _, tool := range tools.NewLocalControlArtifactTools(tools.LocalControlArtifactOptions{}) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "capture_artifact", map[string]any{
+		"action": "not_a_real_action",
+	}, tools.RunOptions{PermissionGranted: true})
+
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: expected invalid arguments to fail, got %s", result.Status)
+	}
+	if tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("a malformed-argument error was marked a policy refusal, so the model is denied the hint that would let it fix the call: %q", result.Output)
+	}
+	converted := ToolResult{Status: result.Status, Output: result.Output, Meta: result.Meta}
+	if !isRetriableToolError(converted) {
+		t.Error("invalid arguments should stay retriable")
+	}
+}
+
+// alwaysRefusingCaptureTool stands in for the disabled tool at Run level, so the
+// loop consequence can be observed rather than inferred.
+type alwaysRefusingCaptureTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) Name() string        { return "capture_artifact" }
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) Description() string { return "test capture tool" }
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"action": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"action"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "captures artifacts"}
+}
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{}
+}
+func (tool *alwaysRefusingCaptureTool) RejectBeforePermission(map[string]any) (tools.Result, bool) {
+	return tools.Result{
+		Status: tools.StatusError,
+		Output: "Error: capture_artifact is disabled because no artifact directory is configured.",
+		Meta:   map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled},
+	}, true
+}
+
+// THE LOOP CONSEQUENCE. A refusal must not draw the retry hint, because the hint
+// tells the model to fix arguments that were already valid and the tool will
+// refuse identically next time.
+func TestRunDoesNotHintARefusedCaptureArtifact(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &alwaysRefusingCaptureTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	calls := toolFailureHintAt + 1
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, calls+1)
+	for i := range calls {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "capture_artifact", `{"action":"browser_screenshot"}`))
+	}
+	turns = append(turns, textTurn("gave up on the screenshot"))
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "take a screenshot", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if tool.ran != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the tool executed %d times; it must be refused before Run", tool.ran)
+	}
+	for _, message := range result.Messages {
+		if strings.Contains(message.Content, toolFailureHintMarker) {
+			t.Fatal("a refused, never-executed tool drew the retry hint, which tells the model to fix arguments that were already valid")
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/agent/capture_artifact_streak_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// alternatingRefusalCaptureTool refuses every call with the same CATEGORY and a
+// different MESSAGE, which is what a real disabled driver does: the refusal
+// names the action, and the model is free to alternate valid actions.
+type alternatingRefusalCaptureTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) Name() string        { return "capture_artifact" }
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) Description() string { return "test capture tool" }
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"action": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"action"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "captures artifacts"}
+}
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{}
+}
+func (tool *alternatingRefusalCaptureTool) RejectBeforePermission(args map[string]any) (tools.Result, bool) {
+	action, _ := args["action"].(string)
+	return tools.Result{
+		Status: tools.StatusError,
+		// Action-specific wording, same category. This is the whole point: the
+		// prose differs on every call while the refusal never changes.
+		Output: "Error: Local control driver for " + action + " is disabled.",
+		Meta:   map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled},
+	}, true
+}
+
+// A REFUSAL KEYS ON ITS CATEGORY, INCLUDING WHEN THE CATEGORY IS ONLY A MARKER.
+//
+// The registry marks pre-execution refusals in metadata, and isPolicyRefusal
+// read that marker while observeToolResult keyed on DenialReason, which those
+// paths leave empty. The guard fell back to errorSignature(output), so two
+// refusals of the same category with different wording looked like two
+// different failures and the streak restarted at 1 every call.
+//
+// A model alternating capture_artifact's browser_screenshot and browser_pdf
+// against a disabled driver is refused identically each time and never tripped
+// the six-call halt. Only the generic twelve-error fallback stopped the run,
+// reporting varied errors rather than a repeated refusal.
+func TestAlternatingRefusedActionsStillTripTheRefusalHalt(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &alternatingRefusalCaptureTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	// More calls than the refusal halt but FEWER than the generic any-error
+	// fallback, so only the category-keyed streak can stop this.
+	calls := toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt - 1
+	if calls <= toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: %d calls cannot distinguish the refusal halt from the generic fallback", calls)
+	}
+	actions := []string{"browser_screenshot", "browser_pdf"}
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, calls+1)
+	for i := range calls {
+		action := actions[i%len(actions)]
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "capture_artifact", `{"action":"`+action+`"}`))
+	}
+	turns = append(turns, textTurn("gave up"))
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "capture something", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if tool.ran != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the tool executed %d times; it must be refused before Run", tool.ran)
+	}
+
+	refusals := 0
+	for _, message := range result.Messages {
+		if strings.Contains(message.Content, "is disabled") {
+			refusals++
+		}
+	}
+	if refusals > toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the run made %d refused calls; the six-call refusal halt never tripped because the streak re-keyed on each action's wording", refusals)
+	}
+
+	// And the halt has to read as a repeated refusal, not as varied errors.
+	stop := strings.ToLower(strings.Join(messageContents(result.Messages), "\n"))
+	if strings.Contains(stop, toolFailureHintMarker) {
+		t.Error("a refused, never-executed tool drew the retry hint")
+	}
+}
+
+func messageContents(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
+	for _, message := range messages {
+		out = append(out, message.Content)
+	}
+	return out
+}

internal/agent/capture_disabled_driver_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/localcontrol"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// THE DISABLED-DRIVER BRANCH, REACHED FOR REAL.
+//
+// RejectBeforePermission refuses on two separate conditions, and its neighbour
+// test constructs empty options, so it returns at the FIRST one (no artifact
+// directory configured) and the second is never evaluated. Reverting the
+// disabled-driver branch in local_capture.go to a plain errorResult therefore
+// left the whole agent and tools suites green.
+//
+// This is the shape an operator actually produces: an artifact root IS
+// configured and one driver IS enabled, and the model asks for an action owned
+// by a different, disabled driver. Without provenance that call is read as a
+// retriable failure, so it collects a schema hint and can spend the profile's
+// failure-streak escalation, for a tool no argument change can enable.
+func TestCaptureArtifactDisabledDriverIsAPolicyRefusal(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	options := tools.LocalControlArtifactOptions{
+		ArtifactsDir: t.TempDir(),
+		// Configured and enabled, so the tool as a whole is available and the
+		// missing-directory branch cannot fire.
+		Browser: localcontrol.BrowserOptions{Enabled: true, Driver: "test-browser", HelperPath: "browser-helper"},
+		// Terminal deliberately left disabled.
+	}
+	for _, tool := range tools.NewLocalControlArtifactTools(options) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+
+	// An enabled driver's action must still be accepted, or the test below would
+	// pass for a tool that refuses everything.
+	if result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "capture_artifact", map[string]any{
+		"action": "browser_screenshot", "name": "shot",
+	}, tools.RunOptions{PermissionGranted: true}); tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the enabled browser driver was refused as policy: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "capture_artifact", map[string]any{
+		"action": "terminal_snapshot", "name": "snap", "session": "test-session",
+	}, tools.RunOptions{PermissionGranted: true})
+
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the disabled terminal driver did not refuse: %s / %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	if !tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("a driver disabled by configuration refuses without provenance, so it reads as a retriable failure: %#v", result.Meta)
+	}
+	if got := result.Meta["policy_refusal"]; got != tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled {
+		t.Errorf("policy_refusal = %q, want %q", got, tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled)
+	}
+	if isRetriableToolError(ToolResult{Status: result.Status, Output: result.ModelOutput(), Meta: result.Meta}) {
+		t.Error("the refusal is still classified as retriable, so the model gets a schema hint for a configuration decision")
+	}
+}
+
+// AND THE EARLY REJECTIONS MUST NOT COLLAPSE INTO ONE ANSWER.
+//
+// RejectBeforePermission refuses on configuration; argument validation refuses
+// on a fixable mistake, and it runs FIRST, which is how the disabled-driver
+// branch stayed uncovered. A malformed call must stay an ordinary retriable
+// error, because trying again differently is exactly the right response to it.
+func TestCaptureArtifactMalformedArgumentsStayRetriable(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	for _, tool := range tools.NewLocalControlArtifactTools(tools.LocalControlArtifactOptions{
+		ArtifactsDir: t.TempDir(),
+		Terminal:     localcontrol.TerminalOptions{Enabled: true, Driver: "test-terminal", HelperPath: "terminal-helper"},
+	}) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+
+	// The driver IS enabled, so nothing here is a configuration decision. The
+	// call is simply missing the session the action requires.
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "capture_artifact", map[string]any{
+		"action": "terminal_snapshot", "name": "snap",
+	}, tools.RunOptions{PermissionGranted: true})
+
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("SETUP INVALID: the malformed call did not fail: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	if tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Errorf("a fixable argument mistake was marked a policy refusal, so the model loses the schema hint that would fix it: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	if !isRetriableToolError(ToolResult{Status: result.Status, Output: result.ModelOutput(), Meta: result.Meta}) {
+		t.Errorf("a fixable argument mistake is not retriable: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/guardrails.go

@@ -55,6 +55,22 @@ const (
 	// error, so this only affects true same-error loops.
 	toolFailureStopAt = 6
 
+	// toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt halts a tool that keeps failing with DIFFERENT
+	// errors. The streak above cannot see that case by construction: a changed
+	// signature rebuilds the record at 1, so a tool whose error text varies every
+	// call never reaches toolFailureStopAt however long it loops.
+	//
+	// That is not hypothetical. A headless run made 384 denied calls over 26
+	// minutes without tripping a halt set to 6, because each denial named a
+	// different path. Keying denials on their category (see observeToolResult)
+	// fixes that case; this bound covers every error with no category to key on.
+	//
+	// Deliberately well above toolFailureStopAt. A model iterating on a genuinely
+	// tricky edit legitimately fails several times with different errors while it
+	// converges, and this must not cut those runs short — the same reasoning that
+	// moved toolFailureStopAt from 4 to 6. Both counters reset on success.
+	toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt = 12
+
 	// maxContinueNudges bounds how many times the headless completion gate
 	// (Options.RequireCompletionSignal) re-prompts a model that stopped without a
 	// tool call while work clearly remained. Once spent, the run finalizes as
@@ -324,15 +340,91 @@ func acceptanceVerificationNudge(objective string) string {
 const toolFailureHintMarker = "kept failing with the same error"
 
 type toolFailureRecord struct {
-	count     int
-	errSig    string
-	hintShown bool
+	count    int
+	identity failureIdentity
+	// sawExecuted and sawRefused are the AGGREGATE over the whole streak, not
+	// the current identity. The content-blind bound needs them because it fires
+	// exactly when no identity repeated, so the last one is unrepresentative.
+	sawExecuted bool
+	sawRefused  bool
+	hintShown   bool
+	// anyErrorCount counts consecutive failures of this tool REGARDLESS of the
+	// error, and is cleared only by a success. count above restarts whenever the
+	// signature changes, which is exactly what a varying error message defeats;
+	// this one cannot be reset by changing the text.
+	anyErrorCount int
 }
 
+// failureKind separates a failure the TOOL produced from one POLICY produced.
+//
+// The two used to share one string namespace, with provenance recovered
+// afterwards by testing that string for a "denial:" prefix. Trusted provenance
+// and untrusted content in one namespace is a namespace the untrusted side can
+// write into: a command that printed exactly "denial:permission_denied" and
+// exited non-zero acquired the identity of a real permission refusal, merged
+// its streak with one, and had the run report it as refused although it ran
+// every time. The kind is carried as its own field so no output can spell it.
+type failureKind uint8
+
+const (
+	// The zero value: no failure recorded.
+	_ failureKind = iota
+	// failureKindExecuted: the tool ran and returned an error. The key is the
+	// normalized error signature, which is tool-controlled text.
+	failureKindExecuted
+	// failureKindRefused: policy refused the call before the tool ran. The key is
+	// the denial category, a small closed enum the loop sets.
+	failureKindRefused
+)
+
+// failureIdentity is what the same-identity streak counts. Comparing the pair
+// means an executed error can never equal a refusal however it is spelled.
+type failureIdentity struct {
+	kind failureKind
+	key  string
+}
+
+// toolFailureCause is why the guard stopped, decided where the facts are rather
+// than reconstructed by the caller from overlapping booleans.
+type toolFailureCause uint8
+
+const (
+	// The zero value: the guard did not stop.
+	_ toolFailureCause = iota
+	// toolFailureCauseSameError: the same executed error signature, six times.
+	toolFailureCauseSameError
+	// toolFailureCauseSameRefusal: the same denial category, six times. The prose
+	// differs on every call because it names what was refused, so this is NOT the
+	// same-error case.
+	toolFailureCauseSameRefusal
+	// toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted: the content-blind bound, and every failure
+	// was the tool executing and failing.
+	toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted
+	// toolFailureCauseVariedRefused: the content-blind bound, and every failure
+	// was a policy refusal. Alternating two categories reaches twelve without
+	// either reaching six, and the tool never ran once.
+	toolFailureCauseVariedRefused
+	// toolFailureCauseVariedMixed: the content-blind bound over both kinds.
+	// Named deliberately rather than left to whichever field a switch tested
+	// first.
+	toolFailureCauseVariedMixed
+)
+
 type toolFailureOutcome struct {
 	InjectHint bool
 	Stop       bool
 	Count      int
+	// Cause is set only when Stop is. It carries the aggregate fact about the
+	// sequence that tripped a bound, which the last record alone cannot supply:
+	// the content-blind bound is reached precisely when no single identity
+	// repeated enough, so the identity present at the end says nothing about the
+	// eleven before it.
+	Cause toolFailureCause
+}
+
+// Refused reports whether policy, rather than the tool, produced the failures.
+func (cause toolFailureCause) Refused() bool {
+	return cause == toolFailureCauseSameRefusal || cause == toolFailureCauseVariedRefused
 }
 
 // errorSignature normalizes a tool error to a short, comparable signature so
@@ -358,12 +450,47 @@ func toolFailureHint(toolName, schemaJSON, errOutput string) string {
 
 // toolFailureStopAnswer is the final answer when the repeated-failure guard halts
 // a run.
-func toolFailureStopAnswer(toolName string, count int) string {
-	return "Agent stopped: the `" + toolName + "` tool failed " + strconv.Itoa(count) +
-		" times in a row with the same error, so I halted instead of looping further. " +
+func toolFailureStopAnswer(toolName string, count int, cause toolFailureCause) string {
+	// Each branch claims only what its counter established, and the mixed case is
+	// spelled out rather than decided by whichever field a switch happened to
+	// test first. The wording used to overclaim in both directions: the
+	// content-blind bound said every failure differed, which it does not track,
+	// and it described a run of policy refusals as the tool failing, when the
+	// tool had not run at all.
+	verb, tail := " tool failed ", " times in a row with the same error, "
+	switch cause {
+	case toolFailureCauseSameRefusal:
+		verb, tail = " tool was refused ", " times in a row, "
+	case toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted:
+		tail = " times in a row with varying errors, "
+	case toolFailureCauseVariedRefused:
+		verb, tail = " tool was refused ", " times in a row for different reasons, "
+	case toolFailureCauseVariedMixed:
+		verb, tail = " tool failed or was refused ", " times in a row, "
+	}
+	return "Agent stopped: the `" + toolName + "`" + verb + strconv.Itoa(count) +
+		tail + "so I halted instead of looping further. " +
 		"Please check the request or adjust the tool arguments."
 }
 
+// toolFailureIncompleteReason describes a guard halt for the headless
+// completion gate. A guard halt is BY DEFINITION unfinished work: the run
+// stopped because a tool would not stop failing, not because the task was done.
+//
+// It makes the same claim as toolFailureStopAnswer for the same halt, including
+// the mixed case: a headless caller reads this reason and an interactive one
+// reads the stop answer, and the two must not describe one halt differently.
+// Reported by @jatmn.
+func toolFailureIncompleteReason(toolName string, cause toolFailureCause) string {
+	switch {
+	case cause.Refused():
+		return "halted after `" + toolName + "` was refused repeatedly, without completing the task"
+	case cause == toolFailureCauseVariedMixed:
+		return "halted after `" + toolName + "` failed or was refused repeatedly, without completing the task"
+	}
+	return "halted after `" + toolName + "` failed repeatedly, without completing the task"
+}
+
 // The no-output stop answer is assembled from these fixed parts (only the turn
 // count varies). IsNoProgressStop matches all three so a legitimate message that
 // merely quotes the marker substring is not misclassified as a failed empty run.
@@ -472,28 +599,68 @@ func newGuardState() *guardState {
 // observeToolResult tracks repeated identical failures of a tool. A successful
 // result clears that tool's failure streak. Returns whether to inject a one-shot
 // corrective hint and/or stop the run.
-func (state *guardState) observeToolResult(name string, failed bool, output string) toolFailureOutcome {
+// hintable is separate from failed on purpose. A categorized denial MUST count
+// toward the streaks — that is the whole point of keying on the category — but a
+// schema hint is the wrong response to a policy refusal: the call shape is fine,
+// the answer was no. Collapsing the two is what made the earlier version of this
+// fix a no-op, since the caller could only pass a flag that excluded denials.
+func (state *guardState) observeToolResult(name string, failed bool, hintable bool, output string, denial DenialCategory) toolFailureOutcome {
 	if state.toolFailures == nil {
 		state.toolFailures = map[string]*toolFailureRecord{}
 	}
 	if !failed {
-		delete(state.toolFailures, name) // success resets the streak
+		delete(state.toolFailures, name) // success resets both counters
 		return toolFailureOutcome{}
 	}
-	sig := errorSignature(output)
+	// A denial keys on its CATEGORY, not its prose. The message embeds the path
+	// or command that was refused, so it differs on every call while describing
+	// the same unchanging refusal — which rebuilt the record at 1 each time and
+	// let a denied tool loop indefinitely under a halt set to 6. The category is
+	// a small closed enum the loop already sets on the result.
+	identity := failureIdentity{kind: failureKindExecuted, key: errorSignature(output)}
+	if denial != DenialNone {
+		identity = failureIdentity{kind: failureKindRefused, key: string(denial)}
+	}
 	record := state.toolFailures[name]
-	if record == nil || record.errSig != sig {
-		record = &toolFailureRecord{count: 1, errSig: sig}
+	if record == nil {
+		record = &toolFailureRecord{identity: identity}
 		state.toolFailures[name] = record
+	}
+	if record.identity != identity {
+		// A different failure restarts the same-identity streak but NOT the
+		// content-blind one: changing how a tool fails is not progress.
+		record.count = 1
+		record.identity = identity
+		record.hintShown = false
 	} else {
 		record.count++
 	}
+	record.anyErrorCount++
+	if identity.kind == failureKindRefused {
+		record.sawRefused = true
+	} else {
+		record.sawExecuted = true
+	}
+
 	outcome := toolFailureOutcome{Count: record.count}
-	if record.count >= toolFailureStopAt {
+	switch {
+	case record.count >= toolFailureStopAt:
 		outcome.Stop = true
+		outcome.Cause = toolFailureCauseSameError
+		if identity.kind == failureKindRefused {
+			outcome.Cause = toolFailureCauseSameRefusal
+		}
+		return outcome
+	case record.anyErrorCount >= toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt:
+		// Report the counter that actually tripped. record.count is the
+		// same-identity streak and is often 1 here, which would describe a tool
+		// that failed a dozen different ways as having failed once.
+		outcome.Stop = true
+		outcome.Count = record.anyErrorCount
+		outcome.Cause = record.variedCause()
 		return outcome
 	}
-	if record.count >= toolFailureHintAt && !record.hintShown {
+	if hintable && record.count >= toolFailureHintAt && !record.hintShown {
 		record.hintShown = true
 		outcome.InjectHint = true
 	}
@@ -603,3 +770,15 @@ func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
 
 	return ""
 }
+
+// variedCause classifies a content-blind stop by what the whole streak held.
+func (record *toolFailureRecord) variedCause() toolFailureCause {
+	switch {
+	case record.sawRefused && record.sawExecuted:
+		return toolFailureCauseVariedMixed
+	case record.sawRefused:
+		return toolFailureCauseVariedRefused
+	default:
+		return toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted
+	}
+}

internal/agent/guardrails_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package agent
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
 	var state guardState
 	var stoppedAt int
 	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
-		out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i))
+		out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i), "")
 		if out.Stop {
 			stoppedAt = i
 			break
@@ -203,6 +205,223 @@ func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// A permission denial repeats forever when the streak is keyed on the error
+// TEXT, because the denial message embeds the path or command that varies per
+// call.
+//
+// Observed, not theorised: a headless run made 384 denied calls over 26 minutes
+// without tripping a halt that stops at 6. Every denial carried the same typed
+// category and a different reason string, so errorSignature differed each time
+// and the record was rebuilt at count 1 on every call.
+//
+// TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant fixed one message this way.
+// Keying on the category fixes the class, without needing every future denial
+// message to remember to be invariant.
+func TestPermissionDenialStreakSurvivesVaryingReasonText(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	stoppedAt := 0
+	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
+		// The shape the loop actually produces: same tool, same category, a
+		// different path every time.
+		output := "Error: Permission denied for write_file: cannot write " +
+			filepath.Join("C:", "ws", "pkg", "file"+strconv.Itoa(i)+".go")
+		out := state.observeToolResult("write_file", true, true, output, DenialPermissionDenied)
+		if out.Stop {
+			stoppedAt = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Fatalf("denials with varying reason text stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// The content-blind bound. A tool failing over and over with genuinely
+// DIFFERENT errors and no denial category is still a tool that is not working,
+// and the same-signature streak can never see it.
+//
+// Bounded well above toolFailureStopAt on purpose: a model iterating on a
+// tricky edit legitimately fails a few times with different errors while it
+// converges, and cutting that short is the regression
+// TestSuccessResetsBothFailureCounters guards.
+func TestToolFailingWithDifferentErrorsEveryTimeStillStops(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	stoppedAt := 0
+	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt; i++ {
+		out := state.observeToolResult("bash", true, true, "distinct failure "+strconv.Itoa(i), "")
+		if out.Stop {
+			stoppedAt = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if stoppedAt != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+		t.Fatalf("a tool failing with a new error each call stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// Neither counter may outlive a success, or a long run that fails occasionally
+// and recovers would eventually halt for no reason. This is the property that
+// keeps the content-blind bound safe to add.
+func TestSuccessResetsBothFailureCounters(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	for i := 1; i < toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt; i++ {
+		if out := state.observeToolResult("bash", true, true, "distinct failure "+strconv.Itoa(i), ""); out.Stop {
+			t.Fatalf("stopped at %d before the success that should reset it", i)
+		}
+	}
+	state.observeToolResult("bash", false, false, "ok", "")
+
+	// Same again from zero. Reaching the bound a second time proves the counter
+	// restarted rather than merely paused.
+	stoppedAt := 0
+	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt; i++ {
+		if out := state.observeToolResult("bash", true, true, "later failure "+strconv.Itoa(i), ""); out.Stop {
+			stoppedAt = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if stoppedAt != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+		t.Fatalf("after a success the tool stopped at %d, want a full fresh %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// Records are keyed per tool, so ANOTHER tool succeeding in between must not
+// clear the failing tool's streak.
+//
+// This is the realistic shape of the run that motivated the fix: the model kept
+// making progress elsewhere — reading files, updating its plan — while one tool
+// was refused over and over. A reset keyed on "something succeeded" rather than
+// "this tool succeeded" would make the halt unreachable in exactly the runs that
+// need it.
+func TestAnotherToolSucceedingDoesNotClearAFailingToolsStreak(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	stoppedAt := 0
+	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
+		state.observeToolResult("read_file", false, false, "ok", "")
+		out := state.observeToolResult("write_file", true, false,
+			"Error: Permission denied for write_file: "+strconv.Itoa(i), DenialPermissionDenied)
+		if out.Stop {
+			stoppedAt = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Fatalf("denials interleaved with another tool's successes stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
+	}
+}
+
+// alwaysPromptingTool is never allowed to run: it exists so a Run-level test can
+// drive real permission denials through the loop.
+type alwaysPromptingTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *alwaysPromptingTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (tool *alwaysPromptingTool) Description() string { return "test shell tool" }
+func (tool *alwaysPromptingTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"command": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"command"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *alwaysPromptingTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs shell commands"}
+}
+func (tool *alwaysPromptingTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "should never run"}
+}
+
+// The regression for the gap this whole change existed to close, driven through
+// Run rather than through the guard helper.
+//
+// The first version of this fix was a no-op in production and every one of its
+// unit tests passed, because they called observeToolResult directly with
+// failed=true. The loop passes isRetriableToolError, which returns false for a
+// categorized denial, so the guard took its success branch and deleted the
+// record before it could key on the category. A denied tool still looped to the
+// turn limit.
+//
+// This drives the real path: a tool that always prompts, an approver that always
+// denies, and a different command each turn so the denial REASON — and therefore
+// the error text — varies exactly as it does in a real run.
+func TestRunStopsARepeatedlyDeniedToolAtTheFailureBound(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &alwaysPromptingTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	// Comfortably more turns than the bound, so reaching the bound is what stops
+	// the run rather than exhausting the provider or MaxTurns.
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash",
+			`{"command":"touch /etc/file`+strconv.Itoa(i)+`"}`))
+	}
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+	denials := 0
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "do the thing", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		OnPermissionRequest: func(_ context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+			denials++
+			// The varying half. In production this is the refused path or command;
+			// here it is the command, which lands in the denial message the guard
+			// used to key on.
+			return PermissionDecision{
+				Action: PermissionDecisionDeny,
+				Reason: "refused " + request.ToolName + " call " + strconv.Itoa(denials),
+			}, nil
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if denials != toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the run made %d denied calls, want it halted at %d", denials, toolFailureStopAt)
+	}
+	if tool.ran != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the denied tool executed %d times; the denial must precede execution", tool.ran)
+	}
+	want := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", toolFailureStopAt, toolFailureCauseSameRefusal)
+	if result.FinalAnswer != want {
+		t.Errorf("final answer =\n  %q\nwant\n  %q", result.FinalAnswer, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// The stop message must describe the bound that actually tripped. When the
+// content-blind counter is what halts the run, the same-signature streak is
+// usually 1, and reporting that would tell the user a tool failed once after it
+// failed a dozen different ways.
+func TestVariedFailureStopAnswerReportsTheRightCounter(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	var outcome toolFailureOutcome
+	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt; i++ {
+		outcome = state.observeToolResult("bash", true, true, "distinct failure "+strconv.Itoa(i), "")
+		if outcome.Stop {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !outcome.Stop {
+		t.Fatal("never stopped")
+	}
+	if outcome.Cause != toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted {
+		t.Errorf("Cause = %v for a stop driven by the content-blind counter over executed failures", outcome.Cause)
+	}
+	if outcome.Count != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("Count = %d, want the counter that tripped (%d)", outcome.Count, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+	}
+	answer := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", outcome.Count, outcome.Cause)
+	if !strings.Contains(answer, "varying errors") {
+		t.Errorf("stop answer describes the wrong cause: %q", answer)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(answer, "with the same error") {
+		t.Errorf("stop answer claims a same-error loop after distinct failures: %q", answer)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
 	var state guardState
 	toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{

internal/agent/loop.go

@@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		// collected and a non-nil stop error when the run must end now.
 		recoverStreamError := func(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (zeroruntime.CollectedStream, error) {
 			if isImageRejectionError(errors.New(collected.Error)) {
-				return collected, fmt.Errorf("model %s rejected the image: %s. The model may not support image input — try switching to a vision-capable model (claude, gpt-4o, gemini)", options.Model, collected.Error)
+				cause := &zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: collected.Error, StatusCode: collected.ErrorStatusCode, Cause: collected.ErrorCause}
+				return collected, fmt.Errorf("model %s rejected the image: %w. The model may not support image input — try switching to a vision-capable model (claude, gpt-4o, gemini)", options.Model, cause)
 			}
 			// REACTIVE compaction: the streamed error may also be a context limit
 			// (some providers surface it mid-stream). Compact and retry once.
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			}
 			if collected.Error != "" {
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
-				return result, errors.New(collected.Error)
+				return result, &zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: collected.Error, StatusCode: collected.ErrorStatusCode, Cause: collected.ErrorCause}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -719,6 +720,60 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
 		var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
 		precomputedStart, precomputedEnd := 0, 0
+		// closeOutRemaining terminates every advertised call from `from` onward
+		// TRUTHFULLY, and every early return in this loop goes through it.
+		//
+		// Read-ahead broke the assumption the abort placeholders were written
+		// under. executeParallelReadBatch runs an entire eligible run before the
+		// loop consumes any of it, so "not consumed yet" stopped meaning "not
+		// executed": a sibling can already have run, committed its side effects
+		// and any authorization credit they carry, and still sit past the index
+		// where a terminal branch fires. Recording it as aborted threw that result
+		// away, so the transcript disagreed with what had actually happened, and
+		// its callbacks, trace counter, task observation and images went with it.
+		//
+		// So each remaining call is put in the one state that is true of it:
+		// completed, and finalized exactly once with the same bookkeeping the main
+		// path performs, or unstarted, and aborted. The guard is deliberately NOT
+		// consulted for a drained sibling: these results cannot reverse a stop
+		// decision that has already been made, they are only owed an honest record.
+		closeOutRemaining := func(from int) {
+			for next := from; next < len(collected.ToolCalls); next++ {
+				sibling, ran := precomputedResultFor(precomputed, precomputedStart, precomputedEnd, next)
+				if !ran {
+					messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[next:next+1])
+					continue
+				}
+				nextCall := collected.ToolCalls[next]
+				if options.OnToolCall != nil {
+					options.OnToolCall(nextCall)
+				}
+				options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
+				recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, sibling)
+				task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: nextCall.Arguments, toolResult: sibling})
+				if options.OnToolResult != nil {
+					options.OnToolResult(sibling)
+				}
+				for _, name := range sibling.LoadedTools {
+					loaded[name] = true
+				}
+				// The same fields the consumption path below records, provider call
+				// ID included: a strict replay pairs the result to its tool_use by
+				// that ID, and a finalized sibling without it was the one result in
+				// the turn that could not be paired. Reported by @jatmn.
+				messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
+					Role:               zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
+					Content:            sibling.ModelOutput(),
+					ToolCallID:         sibling.ToolCallID,
+					ToolCallProviderID: nextCall.ProviderCallID,
+					IsError:            sibling.Status == tools.StatusError,
+					ChangedFiles:       append([]string(nil), sibling.ChangedFiles...),
+				})
+				if len(sibling.Images) > 0 {
+					toolResultsWithImages = append(toolResultsWithImages, sibling)
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		for index, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
 			// When this call starts a consecutive run of >= 2 auto-allowed read-only
 			// calls, execute the whole run concurrently now (see parallel_tools.go).
@@ -783,13 +838,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				abortErr = ctx.Err()
 			}
 			if abortErr != nil {
-				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
+				closeOutRemaining(index + 1)
 				messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, abortErr
 			}
 			if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
-				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
+				closeOutRemaining(index + 1)
 				messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
 				result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.ModelOutput()
 				result.StopReason = stopReason
@@ -804,8 +859,29 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			// aren't fixed by reformatting the call, so a "match this schema" hint
 			// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
 			retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
-			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.ModelOutput())
-			posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
+			// A categorized denial is NOT retriable — retrying it verbatim is
+			// pointless — but it is still a failure the streaks must count, or a
+			// refused tool loops until the turn limit. Passing retriableFailure for
+			// both is what let that happen: observeToolResult took its success
+			// branch and deleted the record before it could key on the category.
+			// isPolicyRefusal rather than DenialReason alone: the categories are
+			// only attached where a typed denial is built, so a headless prompt
+			// refusal and an uncategorized sandbox block were counted as SUCCESS
+			// and cleared the record they were supposed to accumulate.
+			policyRefusal := isPolicyRefusal(toolResult)
+			countedFailure := retriableFailure || policyRefusal
+			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, countedFailure, retriableFailure, toolResult.ModelOutput(), toolResult.DenialReason)
+			// The profile's failure-streak trigger is for RETRIABLE failures: it
+			// restores the displaced turn budget and reasoning effort on the theory
+			// that the tool is struggling and needs room. A policy refusal is not a
+			// struggling tool, it is an answer, and spending the one-shot
+			// escalation on one contradicts that trigger's own contract. Denials
+			// still count for the halt above; they just do not buy more budget.
+			if policyRefusal {
+				posture.observeToolOutcome(toolFailureOutcome{}, toolResult)
+			} else {
+				posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
+			}
 			if outcome.Stop {
 				// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
 				// the guard halts mid-turn so the calls after this one never run.
@@ -813,17 +889,22 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// every tool_use has a matching tool_result and the recorded
 				// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
 				// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
-				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
+				closeOutRemaining(index + 1)
 				messages = append(messages, buildToolImageMessages()...)
-				result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
-				// Same headless contract as the empty-turn guard: halting on a
-				// repeated failure is an unfinished run, not success. Gate-off
-				// (interactive / --no-completion-gate) keeps the old behavior.
+				result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count, outcome.Cause)
+				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
+				// THE HALT HAS TO CROSS THE TERMINAL-STATUS BOUNDARY TOO.
+				//
+				// This branch returns straight out, so it never reached the
+				// completion gate that the max-turns paths below go through. Under
+				// RequireCompletionSignal `zero exec` treats only Incomplete as exit
+				// 4 and otherwise emits run_end("success", 0), so a task that was
+				// denied six times, or failed through the twelve-call bound, became
+				// a successful automation result having done none of the work.
 				if options.RequireCompletionSignal {
 					result.Incomplete = true
-					result.IncompleteReason = "the " + call.Name + " tool failed " + strconv.Itoa(outcome.Count) + " times in a row with the same error"
+					result.IncompleteReason = toolFailureIncompleteReason(call.Name, outcome.Cause)
 				}
-				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, nil
 			}
 			if outcome.InjectHint && failureHint == "" {
@@ -1605,9 +1686,41 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		// the Run turn loop performs the actual provider switch. Empty for every
 		// ordinary tool result.
 		RequestedModel: result.Meta["escalate_to_model"],
+		// ONE REFUSAL IDENTITY, derived here so classification and streak
+		// accounting cannot disagree.
+		//
+		// The registry marks its pre-execution refusals in metadata, and
+		// isPolicyRefusal read that marker while observeToolResult keyed on
+		// DenialReason, which those paths leave empty. The guard therefore fell
+		// back to errorSignature(output), and two refusals of the same category
+		// with different wording looked like two different failures. A model
+		// alternating capture_artifact's browser_screenshot and browser_pdf against
+		// a disabled driver is refused identically each time, and never tripped the
+		// six-call refusal halt: only the generic twelve-error fallback stopped it,
+		// reporting varied errors rather than a repeated refusal.
+		DenialReason: denialCategoryForResult(result),
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// denialCategoryForResult gives every pre-execution refusal a stable category,
+// whether it was built as a typed denial or only marked in metadata.
+//
+// The mapping lives here, at the one boundary tools.Result becomes ToolResult,
+// rather than at each producer. A marker without a category is the shape that
+// caused this: it classified as a refusal and keyed as an error signature.
+func denialCategoryForResult(result tools.Result) DenialCategory {
+	switch result.Meta[tools.PolicyRefusalMeta] {
+	case tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled:
+		return DenialFiltered
+	case tools.PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied, tools.PolicyRefusalPermissionRequired:
+		return DenialPermissionDenied
+	case tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied, tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxApproval:
+		return DenialSandboxBlock
+	default:
+		return DenialNone
+	}
+}
+
 const sandboxNamespaceLimitedReason = "sandbox output is limited to the sandbox PID namespace; host/global state requires approval"
 
 func maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) (tools.Result, *ToolResult, bool, PermissionDecisionAction, string, []string, error) {
@@ -1938,6 +2051,10 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
 		Display:         display,
 		LoadedTools:     loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
 		RequestedModel:  meta["escalate_to_model"],
+		// The SAME identity the executed path derives. This is the route a
+		// RejectBeforePermission refusal takes, so leaving it empty here is what
+		// made the marker classify as a refusal and key as an error signature.
+		DenialReason: denialCategoryForResult(tools.Result{Meta: meta}),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -2109,21 +2226,64 @@ func isRetriableToolError(result ToolResult) bool {
 	// A categorized denial (filtered / permission / sandbox) is a policy decision,
 	// not a transient failure — never retry it. This is robust to message wording
 	// (the text checks below remain as a fallback for results lacking the field).
+	return !isPolicyRefusal(result)
+}
+
+// isPolicyRefusal reports a result the run refused on policy grounds: a
+// permission gate, a filter, a sandbox preflight, or a hook.
+//
+// Split out of isRetriableToolError so the two questions cannot drift apart,
+// which is exactly what they had done. The halt guard asked
+// `DenialReason != DenialNone`, and a category is only attached on the paths
+// that build a TYPED denial. A headless run leaves OnPermissionRequest nil, so
+// the loop never reaches its typed-denial branch and the registry returns a bare
+// `Error: Permission required ...` carrying no category. A sandbox preflight
+// denial on a non-shell tool loses its SandboxDecision converting to ToolResult
+// and arrives as an uncategorized `Sandbox block`.
+//
+// Both are refusals, and both were counted as SUCCESS, so observeToolResult
+// cleared the record and the same refused call could repeat to MaxTurns. That is
+// the loop this guard exists to stop. The text checks below already enumerated
+// these outcomes for the retriable question; they simply were not reachable from
+// the counting one.
+func isPolicyRefusal(result ToolResult) bool {
+	// A REFUSAL IS A FAILURE. Everything below inspects metadata and then output
+	// text, and neither is meaningful on a result the tool completed.
+	//
+	// isRetriableToolError gates on this before it calls here, so the boundary
+	// held while that was the only caller. Extracting this helper and calling it
+	// straight from the counting path dropped the gate: an allowed `bash`
+	// printing "Sandbox block", or a read_file returning a document that quotes
+	// one of these phrases, was counted as a denial. Six such successes tripped
+	// the same-signature stop and ended a healthy run with a refusal answer.
+	//
+	// The gate belongs here rather than at each caller, because the next caller
+	// will forget it too.
+	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
+		return false
+	}
 	if result.DenialReason != DenialNone {
-		return false
+		return true
 	}
-	if result.Meta["permission_action"] == string(PermissionActionDeny) {
-		return false
+	if result.Meta[tools.PermissionActionMeta] == string(PermissionActionDeny) {
+		return true
 	}
-	switch {
-	case strings.Contains(result.Output, "is not enabled for this run"),
-		strings.Contains(result.Output, "Permission denied for "),
-		strings.Contains(result.Output, "Permission required for "),
-		strings.Contains(result.Output, "Sandbox block"),
-		strings.Contains(result.Output, "Sandbox approval required for "):
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
+	// STRUCTURED ONLY. This used to fall back to matching phrases in Output
+	// ("Sandbox block", "Permission denied for ", and so on), which cannot work:
+	// Output is tool-controlled. `bash` preserves arbitrary stdout and stderr on
+	// a StatusError for any nonzero exit, so an ALLOWED command running
+	// `printf 'Sandbox block\n' >&2; exit 1` has actually executed, carries no
+	// DenialReason, and was still classified as refused. The loop then withheld
+	// the schema hint and the profile failure-streak recovery, counted the
+	// executed failure toward the refusal halt, and a later stop told the user a
+	// tool had been refused when it had run.
+	//
+	// read_file returning a document that quotes one of those phrases did the
+	// same thing, which is the more likely way a real session hits it.
+	//
+	// The registry now marks every path that returns BEFORE the tool runs, so
+	// the question is answerable from provenance. Nothing below reads Output.
+	return tools.IsPolicyRefusalResult(tools.Result{Meta: result.Meta})
 }
 
 // scrubInterceptedOutput mirrors the registry's scrubResultSecrets boundary for
@@ -2689,7 +2849,7 @@ func deniedPermissionResult(call ToolCall, reason string, requestEvent Permissio
 		Output:       "Error: Permission denied for " + call.Name + ": " + reason,
 		DenialReason: denial,
 		Meta: map[string]string{
-			"permission_action": string(event.Action),
+			tools.PermissionActionMeta: string(event.Action),
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -2715,7 +2875,7 @@ func canceledPermissionResult(call ToolCall, reason string, requestEvent Permiss
 		Output:       "Error: Permission approval cancelled for " + call.Name + ": " + reason,
 		DenialReason: DenialApprovalCanceled,
 		Meta: map[string]string{
-			"permission_action": string(event.Action),
+			tools.PermissionActionMeta: string(event.Action),
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -3569,6 +3729,33 @@ func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult, options Options) (zeroruntime.Mes
 	}, true
 }
 
+// precomputedResultFor reports the read-ahead result for call index, and whether
+// that call actually produced one. A batch entry that never started is still
+// unstarted as far as the transcript is concerned.
+//
+// PRODUCING A RESULT AND ASKING THE RUN TO STOP ARE DIFFERENT FACTS. Treating a
+// non-nil abortErr as "unstarted" conflated them, and a cancelled permission
+// request is exactly the case where they disagree: executeToolCall builds the
+// cancellation result and returns it WITH ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, so an
+// earlier sibling reaching a terminal branch discarded a real result and wrote
+// an aborted placeholder in its place. The transcript then denied that the call
+// had completed permission handling, and the cancellation was missing from
+// OnToolResult, the trace counters and the task observation even though the
+// permission event had already happened.
+//
+// The terminal decision is not affected: draining such a sibling only records
+// what occurred, it cannot reverse a stop already selected.
+func precomputedResultFor(precomputed []precomputedToolResult, start, end, index int) (ToolResult, bool) {
+	if index < start || index >= end {
+		return ToolResult{}, false
+	}
+	entry := precomputed[index-start]
+	if !entry.completed {
+		return ToolResult{}, false
+	}
+	return entry.result, true
+}
+
 func modelAcceptsToolImages(options Options) bool {
 	if options.SupportsVision != nil {
 		return options.SupportsVision(options.Model)

internal/agent/loop_test.go

@@ -685,11 +685,23 @@ func TestIsRetriableToolError(t *testing.T) {
 		{"success", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK}, false},
 		{"bad arguments", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Failed to parse arguments for x: bad json"}, true},
 		{"execution failure", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: read foo.txt: no such file"}, true},
-		{"disabled tool", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: `Error: Tool "x" is not enabled for this run.`}, false},
+		// Each refusal carries the provenance its production path attaches: the
+		// disabled-tool path sets a denial category, the registry gates set the
+		// pre-execution marker. Text is never what decides.
+		{"disabled tool", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: `Error: Tool "x" is not enabled for this run.`, DenialReason: DenialFiltered}, false},
 		{"permission denied (meta)", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Permission denied for x: needs approval", Meta: map[string]string{"permission_action": "deny"}}, false},
-		{"permission required", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Permission required for x: approve first"}, false},
-		{"sandbox block", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Sandbox block: outside_workspace"}, false},
-		{"sandbox approval", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Sandbox approval required for x: network"}, false},
+		{"permission required", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Permission required for x: approve first", Meta: map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalPermissionRequired}}, false},
+		{"sandbox block", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Sandbox block: outside_workspace", Meta: map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied}}, false},
+		{"sandbox approval", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: Sandbox approval required for x: network", Meta: map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxApproval}}, false},
+		// THE INVERSE, which is the failure this classifier had. An allowed tool
+		// that RAN, failed, and happened to print one of those phrases must stay
+		// retriable: `bash` preserves arbitrary stdout and stderr on any nonzero
+		// exit, and read_file returns whatever the file says.
+		{"executed failure printing the sandbox phrase", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Sandbox block\n"}, true},
+		{"executed failure printing a permission denial", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "cp: Permission denied for /etc/hosts"}, true},
+		{"executed failure printing a permission requirement", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Permission required for sudo"}, true},
+		{"executed failure printing the approval phrase", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Sandbox approval required for curl"}, true},
+		{"executed failure quoting the disabled-tool phrase", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "grep: web_fetch is not enabled for this run"}, true},
 		// Structured denial categories are authoritative regardless of message text.
 		{"denial: filtered", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "anything", DenialReason: DenialFiltered}, false},
 		{"denial: permission", ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "anything", DenialReason: DenialPermissionDenied}, false},
@@ -4193,6 +4205,86 @@ func TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestRunReturnsStreamErrorWithStatusCodeAndCause covers the collector-to-agent
+// propagation boundary: a provider stream that terminates with a StreamEventError
+// carrying StatusCode/Cause must have Run return an error that errors.As can
+// still recover those fields from — the detail a session's "error" event needs
+// to actually diagnose why a provider call failed (#674).
+func TestRunReturnsStreamErrorWithStatusCodeAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
+		{
+			Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+			Error:      "provider error: provider returned error",
+			StatusCode: 500,
+			Cause:      "upstream returned an empty completion",
+		},
+	}}}
+
+	_, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
+		SessionID:    "stream-error-session",
+		Cwd:          t.TempDir(),
+		ProviderName: "test-provider",
+		Model:        "test-model",
+	})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Run: expected an error, got nil")
+	}
+
+	var streamErr *zeroruntime.StreamError
+	if !errors.As(err, &streamErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("Run error %v (%T) does not unwrap to *zeroruntime.StreamError", err, err)
+	}
+	if streamErr.StatusCode != 500 {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want 500", streamErr.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if streamErr.Cause != "upstream returned an empty completion" {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want %q", streamErr.Cause, "upstream returned an empty completion")
+	}
+	if err.Error() != "provider error: provider returned error" {
+		t.Fatalf("Error() = %q, want the flattened message unchanged", err.Error())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRunImageRejectionKeepsStreamErrorStatusCodeAndCause covers the 400
+// image-rejection recovery path: the friendly message is kept, but the returned
+// error must still unwrap to the *StreamError so StatusCode and Cause reach the
+// session's "error" event (#674).
+func TestRunImageRejectionKeepsStreamErrorStatusCodeAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
+		{
+			Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+			Error:      "provider error 400: image input is not supported",
+			StatusCode: 400,
+			Cause:      "this model does not support image input",
+		},
+	}}}
+
+	_, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
+		SessionID:    "image-rejection-session",
+		Cwd:          t.TempDir(),
+		ProviderName: "test-provider",
+		Model:        "test-model",
+	})
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("Run: expected an error, got nil")
+	}
+
+	want := "model test-model rejected the image: provider error 400: image input is not supported. The model may not support image input — try switching to a vision-capable model (claude, gpt-4o, gemini)"
+	if err.Error() != want {
+		t.Fatalf("Error() = %q, want the friendly message unchanged: %q", err.Error(), want)
+	}
+	var streamErr *zeroruntime.StreamError
+	if !errors.As(err, &streamErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("Run error %v (%T) does not unwrap to *zeroruntime.StreamError", err, err)
+	}
+	if streamErr.StatusCode != 400 {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want 400", streamErr.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if streamErr.Cause != "this model does not support image input" {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want the upstream cause", streamErr.Cause)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestRunSuppressesAdvisoryHooksInPlanMode: plan mode promises a read-only
 // turn for advisory hooks (sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool), which execute
 // configured host commands outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates.

internal/agent/mixed_halt_reason_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// mixedOutcomeTool needs permission on every call. The test denies every other
+// request, and a call that is allowed executes and fails with an error naming
+// its own item, so no single identity repeats and only the content-blind bound
+// can stop the run.
+type mixedOutcomeTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *mixedOutcomeTool) Name() string             { return "bash" }
+func (tool *mixedOutcomeTool) Description() string      { return "probe" }
+func (tool *mixedOutcomeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
+func (tool *mixedOutcomeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a command"}
+}
+
+func (tool *mixedOutcomeTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: item " + strconv.Itoa(tool.ran) + " failed"}
+}
+
+// A MIXED HALT READS THE SAME HEADLESS AS INTERACTIVE.
+//
+// The stop answer for the content-blind bound over executed failures and
+// refusals says the tool "failed or was refused". The headless reason for the
+// same halt said only that it "failed repeatedly", so zero exec and the
+// interactive answer disagreed about one stop. Reported by @jatmn.
+func TestAMixedGuardHaltIsReportedAsMixedUnderTheCompletionGate(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &mixedOutcomeTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("c"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash", `{"item":`+strconv.Itoa(i)+`}`))
+	}
+	asked := 0
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "run them", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:                registry,
+		PermissionMode:          PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:                len(turns) + 5,
+		RequireCompletionSignal: true,
+		OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+			asked++
+			if asked%2 == 0 {
+				return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
+			}
+			return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if tool.ran == 0 || asked <= tool.ran {
+		t.Fatalf("the run did not mix executed failures with refusals (ran %d of %d asked), so this proves nothing", tool.ran, asked)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "failed or was refused") {
+		t.Fatalf("the halt was not the mixed content-blind bound: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	if !result.Incomplete {
+		t.Fatal("a guard halt under the completion gate must be Incomplete")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.IncompleteReason, "failed or was refused") || !strings.Contains(result.IncompleteReason, "bash") {
+		t.Errorf("IncompleteReason = %q, want it to say the tool failed or was refused, as the stop answer does", result.IncompleteReason)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/parallel_readahead_halt_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// readAheadTool is read-only and thread-safe, so a consecutive run of its calls
+// is executed as one parallel batch before the loop consumes any of it.
+type readAheadTool struct {
+	mu  sync.Mutex
+	ran int
+}
+
+func (t *readAheadTool) Name() string        { return "read_probe" }
+func (t *readAheadTool) Description() string { return "read-only probe" }
+func (t *readAheadTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"id": {Type: "string"}}}
+}
+
+func (t *readAheadTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
+}
+
+func (t *readAheadTool) Capabilities() tools.ToolCapabilities {
+	return tools.ToolCapabilities{Effect: tools.EffectReadOnly, ThreadSafe: true}
+}
+
+func (t *readAheadTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	t.mu.Lock()
+	t.ran++
+	t.mu.Unlock()
+	id, _ := args["id"].(string)
+	// Varying output, so no identity repeats and only the content-blind counter
+	// can halt the run.
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "failure for " + id}
+}
+
+func readCall(id string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
+	return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: id, ToolCallProviderID: "provider-" + id, ToolName: "read_probe"},
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: id, ArgumentsFragment: `{"id":"` + id + `"}`},
+		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: id},
+	}
+}
+
+// READ-AHEAD MEANS "NOT CONSUMED YET" NO LONGER MEANS "NOT EXECUTED".
+//
+// executeParallelReadBatch runs an entire eligible run of read calls before the
+// loop consumes any of them. Every terminal branch in the consumption loop used
+// to close out the calls after the current index with aborted placeholders, on
+// the assumption that they had not run. A sibling that had already executed was
+// therefore recorded as aborted: its real result was discarded, the transcript
+// disagreed with what had happened, and its callbacks, trace counter, task
+// observation and images were lost with it. Where such a sibling is a
+// successful read, execution may already have committed file-observation credit
+// for content the model never receives.
+func TestParallelSiblingsAreFinalizedWhenTheGuardHalts(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &readAheadTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	// Eleven single-call turns bring the content-blind counter to one below its
+	// bound, so the first call of the pair below trips it.
+	var turns [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent
+	for i := 0; i < toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt-1; i++ {
+		id := "s" + strconv.Itoa(i)
+		turns = append(turns, append(readCall(id), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+	}
+	// Then one turn advertising two parallel-eligible calls. Both execute in the
+	// batch; the halt fires while consuming the first.
+	pair := append(readCall("pA"), readCall("pB")...)
+	turns = append(turns, append(pair, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+	turns = append(turns, append(readCall("unreached"), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+
+	var reported []ToolResult
+	var announced int
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "read things", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		OnToolCall:     func(ToolCall) { announced++ },
+		OnToolResult:   func(r ToolResult) { reported = append(reported, r) },
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(result.FinalAnswer, "Agent stopped:") {
+		t.Fatalf("the guard did not halt this run: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+
+	// Every execution is reported exactly once, and the announcements match.
+	if tool.ran != len(reported) {
+		t.Errorf("the tool executed %d times but %d results were reported; a completed call was recorded as aborted",
+			tool.ran, len(reported))
+	}
+	if announced != len(reported) {
+		t.Errorf("OnToolCall fired %d times against %d results; the two callbacks disagree", announced, len(reported))
+	}
+
+	// Strict pairing: one tool result per advertised tool call, and the drained
+	// sibling carries its REAL output rather than the aborted placeholder.
+	byID := map[string]int{}
+	var siblingContent string
+	for _, message := range result.Messages {
+		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
+			continue
+		}
+		byID[message.ToolCallID]++
+		if message.ToolCallID == "pB" {
+			siblingContent = message.Content
+		}
+		// A strict replay pairs each result to its tool_use by the provider
+		// call ID, so the drained sibling needs it as much as the consumed call.
+		if (message.ToolCallID == "pA" || message.ToolCallID == "pB") && message.ToolCallProviderID != "provider-"+message.ToolCallID {
+			t.Errorf("tool result %s carries provider call ID %q, want %q", message.ToolCallID, message.ToolCallProviderID, "provider-"+message.ToolCallID)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{"pA", "pB"} {
+		if byID[id] != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("tool call %s has %d results, want exactly 1", id, byID[id])
+		}
+	}
+	if siblingContent == abortedToolResultNotice {
+		t.Error("the sibling that already ran was recorded as aborted")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(siblingContent, "failure for pB") {
+		t.Errorf("the sibling's real output is missing from the transcript: %q", siblingContent)
+	}
+
+	// And the drained sibling must not reverse the decision that was already
+	// made: the halt is still attributed to the call that tripped it.
+	if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, strconv.Itoa(toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)) {
+		t.Errorf("the stop answer changed after draining siblings: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+}
+
+// imageReadTool is readAheadTool with an image on one named call, so a drained
+// sibling's image can be followed from execution to the transcript.
+type imageReadTool struct {
+	readAheadTool
+	imageFor string
+}
+
+func (t *imageReadTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	result := t.readAheadTool.Run(ctx, args)
+	if id, _ := args["id"].(string); id == t.imageFor {
+		result.Images = []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("\x89PNG")}}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+// The drained sibling's image is part of what ran, so it follows the tool
+// results like any other call's image. Images reach the transcript through the
+// turn's deferred builder, which the halt path calls after closing out the
+// siblings; a drain that skipped the sibling's image would lose it silently.
+func TestParallelSiblingImageSurvivesTheGuardHalt(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &imageReadTool{imageFor: "pB"}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	var turns [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent
+	for i := 0; i < toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt-1; i++ {
+		id := "s" + strconv.Itoa(i)
+		turns = append(turns, append(readCall(id), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+	}
+	pair := append(readCall("pA"), readCall("pB")...)
+	turns = append(turns, append(pair, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "read things", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		SupportsVision: func(string) bool { return true },
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(result.FinalAnswer, "Agent stopped:") {
+		t.Fatalf("the guard did not halt this run: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	images := 0
+	for _, message := range result.Messages {
+		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
+			images += len(message.Images)
+		}
+	}
+	if images != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("the drained sibling's image reached the transcript %d times, want once", images)
+	}
+}
+
+// A call that genuinely never ran still gets an aborted placeholder, so the fix
+// did not simply stop aborting anything.
+func TestUnstartedCallsStillGetAbortedPlaceholders(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &readAheadTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	var turns [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent
+	for i := 0; i < toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt-1; i++ {
+		id := "s" + strconv.Itoa(i)
+		turns = append(turns, append(readCall(id), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+	}
+	// One eligible pair, then a THIRD call outside the batch window is not what
+	// happens here: the whole run is eligible, so instead advertise a single call
+	// and let the halt fire on it, leaving nothing precomputed beyond it.
+	turns = append(turns, append(readCall("solo"), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+	turns = append(turns, append(readCall("unreached"), zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}))
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "read things", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(result.FinalAnswer, "Agent stopped:") {
+		t.Fatalf("the guard did not halt: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	if tool.ran != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the tool ran %d times, want %d; nothing should execute past the halt",
+			tool.ran, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/parallel_tools.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package agent
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
 	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -12,8 +13,17 @@ import (
 // them one after another serializes pure I/O waits. A consecutive run of
 // capability-safe read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
 // then consumed in the original call order, so guard counters, message
-// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing are
-// byte-identical to sequential execution. Runs never span a mutating call: a
+// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing match
+// sequential execution.
+//
+// What can differ is how many calls RAN. A run executes before the guard
+// consumes its first result, so a halt on an earlier call can leave up to
+// maxParallelReadTools-1 siblings already executed. The guard bounds count
+// consumed results, not executions, and the extra executions are reads by the
+// eligibility rule below; closeOutRemaining records them without feeding the
+// guard. Reported by @jatmn.
+//
+// Runs never span a mutating call: a
 // read that follows a write must observe the write, so eligibility is decided
 // per consecutive run, not per batch.
 //
@@ -36,6 +46,15 @@ const maxParallelReadTools = 8
 type precomputedToolResult struct {
 	result   ToolResult
 	abortErr error
+	// completed records whether this call PRODUCED a result, which is a
+	// different question from whether it asks the enclosing run to stop.
+	//
+	// A cancelled permission request is both: executeToolCall builds the
+	// cancellation result, with its call ID, its message and its denial category,
+	// and returns it together with ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled. Reading the
+	// error as "never started" throws that result away, and the transcript then
+	// denies that permission handling happened at all.
+	completed bool
 }
 
 // parallelSafeToolCall reports whether call may run concurrently with its
@@ -189,7 +208,15 @@ func executeParallelReadBatch(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, cal
 			semaphore <- struct{}{}
 			defer func() { <-semaphore }()
 			result, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, calls[index], permissionMode, batchOptions)
-			results[index-start] = precomputedToolResult{result: result, abortErr: abortErr}
+			// Recorded HERE, where both halves are in hand, rather than inferred later
+			// from the error. A populated call ID is what every path that produced a
+			// result sets and what a context cancellation before execution leaves
+			// empty.
+			results[index-start] = precomputedToolResult{
+				result:    result,
+				abortErr:  abortErr,
+				completed: strings.TrimSpace(result.ToolCallID) != "",
+			}
 		}(index)
 	}
 	waitGroup.Wait()

internal/agent/policy_refusal_provenance_run_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// forgedMarkerTool executes, fails, and claims in its metadata that the registry
+// refused it before it ran.
+type forgedMarkerTool struct {
+	ran   int
+	key   string
+	value string
+}
+
+func (tool *forgedMarkerTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (tool *forgedMarkerTool) Description() string { return "test shell tool" }
+func (tool *forgedMarkerTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"command": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"command"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *forgedMarkerTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "reads files"}
+}
+func (tool *forgedMarkerTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{
+		Status: tools.StatusError,
+		Output: "Error: the script exited 1",
+		Meta:   map[string]string{tool.key: tool.value},
+	}
+}
+
+// THE FORGED MARKER MUST NOT CHANGE THE RUN.
+//
+// Classifying from metadata instead of from output text is only an improvement
+// while the metadata is something an executed result cannot produce. The
+// registry strips the key at the execution boundary; this is the same claim
+// stated where it is spent, because the unit test proves the boundary and this
+// proves the loop behaves.
+//
+// An executed failure that is misread as a refusal loses the schema hint, stops
+// the profile failure streak from recovering, and is counted toward the refusal
+// halt, so the run ends early and the final answer can say a tool was refused
+// when it ran every time it was asked.
+func TestRunTreatsAForgedRefusalMarkerAsAnExecutedFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, forged := range []struct{ key, value string }{
+		{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta, tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied},
+		{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta, tools.PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied},
+		{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta, tools.PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled},
+		{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta, "something-the-registry-never-emits"},
+		// The loop reads a denied permission action as a refusal too, so an
+		// executed failure carrying one is the same forgery. Reported by @jatmn.
+		{tools.PermissionActionMeta, string(PermissionActionDeny)},
+	} {
+		value := forged.value
+		t.Run(forged.key+"="+value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			tool := &forgedMarkerTool{key: forged.key, value: value}
+			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+			registry.Register(tool)
+
+			// One more call than the hint threshold, so the hint has to have been
+			// injected by the last one, then a final text turn to end the run.
+			calls := toolFailureHintAt + 1
+			turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, calls+1)
+			for i := range calls {
+				turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash", `{"command":"./flaky.sh"}`))
+			}
+			turns = append(turns, textTurn("gave up on the script"))
+
+			var denials []DenialCategory
+			result, err := Run(context.Background(), "run the script", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+				Registry:       registry,
+				PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+				MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+				OnToolResult: func(toolResult ToolResult) {
+					denials = append(denials, toolResult.DenialReason)
+				},
+				OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+					t.Error("permission was requested for an allow-safety tool; this test must exercise the executed-failure path")
+					return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
+				},
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if tool.ran != calls {
+				t.Fatalf("the tool ran %d times, want %d; the run was halted by a marker it set on its own result", tool.ran, calls)
+			}
+			for index, denial := range denials {
+				if denial != DenialNone {
+					t.Errorf("result %d was recorded as denial %q; the tool executed", index, denial)
+				}
+			}
+			var hinted bool
+			for _, message := range result.Messages {
+				if strings.Contains(message.Content, toolFailureHintMarker) {
+					hinted = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !hinted {
+				t.Errorf("no retry hint was injected for an executed failure carrying %q, so the model got no correction", value)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/agent/policy_refusal_run_path_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/trace"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// THE UNCATEGORIZED REFUSALS ARE THE ONES THIS CHANGE EXISTS FOR, SO THEY ARE THE
+// ONES THAT MUST BE DRIVEN THROUGH Run.
+//
+// A categorized denial is easy to test and was never the gap. The gap is a
+// refusal that arrives with DenialReason empty, because a category is attached
+// only where a TYPED denial is built:
+//
+//   - a headless run leaves OnPermissionRequest nil, so the loop never reaches
+//     its typed-denial branch and the registry gate returns a bare
+//     `Permission required for ...`
+//   - a sandbox preflight denial on a non-shell tool loses its SandboxDecision
+//     converting to ToolResult and arrives as a bare `Sandbox block`
+//
+// Both were counted as SUCCESS, which cleared the very record they were meant to
+// accumulate, and the refused call repeated to MaxTurns.
+//
+// Asserting that through the helper alone would prove nothing: the first version
+// of this fix passed every helper test while being a no-op in production,
+// because the loop asked a different question than the tests did. So each case
+// below goes through Run and pins the three things the loop actually does with
+// the classification: halt at the bound, never execute the tool, and withhold
+// the profile's one-shot failure escalation.
+
+// headlessPromptTool needs approval and never gets it, because the run has no
+// approver. The registry refuses it before Run() is reached, exactly as a
+// headless run does, so nothing here fakes the refusal.
+type headlessPromptTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *headlessPromptTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (tool *headlessPromptTool) Description() string { return "test shell tool" }
+func (tool *headlessPromptTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"command": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"command"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *headlessPromptTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs shell commands"}
+}
+func (tool *headlessPromptTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "should never run"}
+}
+
+// A headless prompt refusal must halt at the same-signature bound rather than
+// repeat to MaxTurns.
+//
+// It used to key on the refusal TEXT, which the registry happens to hold
+// constant here, and the stop then described a repeated failure. The registry
+// marks this path, so the category is now derived at the ToolResult boundary and
+// the streak keys on that instead. The bound is unchanged; the wording is more
+// honest, because a headless prompt refusal is a refusal and not a tool that
+// keeps failing.
+func TestRunStopsAnUncategorizedHeadlessRefusalAtTheFailureBound(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &headlessPromptTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	// Comfortably more turns than the bound, so reaching the bound is what stops
+	// the run rather than exhausting the provider or MaxTurns.
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash",
+			`{"command":"touch /etc/file`+strconv.Itoa(i)+`"}`))
+	}
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("policy-refusal-session", "run-1", "fast")
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "do the thing", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		Trace:          recorder,
+		// Armed well below the halt bound, so a refusal counted as a retriable
+		// failure would visibly spend it.
+		Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
+			Name:     "fast",
+			Escalate: &PostureEscalation{MaxTurns: 999, OnToolFailureStreak: 2},
+		},
+		// OnPermissionRequest deliberately nil: this IS the headless path.
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if len(provider.requests) != toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the run made %d turns, want it halted at %d; an uncategorized refusal is not being counted", len(provider.requests), toolFailureStopAt)
+	}
+	if tool.ran != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the refused tool executed %d times; the registry gate must precede execution", tool.ran)
+	}
+	// Categorized now, so the stop answer says refused. Previously the loop could
+	// not tell and reported a repeated failure.
+	want := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", toolFailureStopAt, toolFailureCauseSameRefusal)
+	if result.FinalAnswer != want {
+		t.Errorf("final answer =\n  %q\nwant\n  %q", result.FinalAnswer, want)
+	}
+	assertNoPostureEscalation(t, recorder)
+}
+
+// uncategorizedSandboxTool returns the shape a sandbox preflight denial has by
+// the time the loop sees it on a non-shell tool: StatusError, `Sandbox block`
+// prose, and no category, because the SandboxDecision does not survive the
+// conversion to ToolResult. The path varies per call exactly as the real message
+// does, since it names what was refused.
+type uncategorizedSandboxTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *uncategorizedSandboxTool) Name() string        { return "write_file" }
+func (tool *uncategorizedSandboxTool) Description() string { return "test write tool" }
+func (tool *uncategorizedSandboxTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"path": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"path"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *uncategorizedSandboxTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "writes files"}
+}
+func (tool *uncategorizedSandboxTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{
+		Status: tools.StatusError,
+		Output: "Sandbox block: write to /out-" + strconv.Itoa(tool.ran) + ".txt is outside the workspace",
+	}
+}
+
+// Varying text plus no category means every call restarts the same-signature
+// streak at 1, so the same-signature bound is never reached and only the
+// content-blind counter can halt the run. Before the fix nothing halted it at
+// all: each refusal was read as a success, deleted the record, and the call
+// repeated until MaxTurns.
+func TestRunStopsAnUncategorizedVaryingSandboxRefusalAtTheVariedBound(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &uncategorizedSandboxTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "write_file",
+			`{"path":"/out-`+strconv.Itoa(i)+`.txt"}`))
+	}
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("policy-refusal-session", "run-2", "fast")
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write the files", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		Trace:          recorder,
+		Profile: &ProfilePolicy{
+			Name:     "fast",
+			Escalate: &PostureEscalation{MaxTurns: 999, OnToolFailureStreak: 2},
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if tool.ran != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the tool was called %d times, want the run halted at %d", tool.ran, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+	}
+	want := toolFailureStopAnswer("write_file", toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt, toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted)
+	if result.FinalAnswer != want {
+		t.Errorf("final answer =\n  %q\nwant\n  %q", result.FinalAnswer, want)
+	}
+	assertNoPostureEscalation(t, recorder)
+}
+
+// The profile's failure-streak trigger restores turn budget and reasoning effort
+// on the theory that a struggling tool needs room. A refusal is not a struggling
+// tool, it is an answer, and spending the one-shot escalation on one buys turns
+// that will be refused identically. The loop keeps this contract by passing an
+// empty outcome to the controller for a refusal, which is only observable from
+// outside as the escalation never firing.
+func assertNoPostureEscalation(t *testing.T, recorder *trace.Recorder) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if got := recorder.Finish().Counter(trace.CounterPostureEscalations); got != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("posture_escalations = %d, want 0; a policy refusal spent the one-shot failure escalation", got)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/policy_refusal_status_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// A REFUSAL IS A FAILURE, AND THE CLASSIFIER MUST SAY SO BEFORE IT READS ANYTHING
+// ELSE.
+//
+// isPolicyRefusal decides on denial category, then permission metadata, then
+// output text. None of those questions is meaningful about a call the tool
+// completed, and the last one is answered by content the model does not control:
+// a `bash` that greps the sandbox docs, a read_file returning this very source
+// file, any successful command whose output happens to carry one of the phrases.
+//
+// isRetriableToolError gated on StatusError before calling in, so the boundary
+// held while that was the only caller. Extracting the helper and calling it from
+// the counting path dropped the gate, and every successful result was put to a
+// question that only failures can answer.
+//
+// Each case below is a SUCCESS. None may be read as a refusal.
+func TestPolicyRefusalNeverClassifiesASuccessfulResult(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name   string
+		result ToolResult
+		// structured marks a result carrying real provenance: a denial category,
+		// permission metadata, or the registry's pre-execution marker. Only those
+		// may be read as a refusal when they fail. The rest carry nothing but
+		// text, which the tool controls, so they must stay ordinary failures no
+		// matter which phrase they happen to contain.
+		structured bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:   "output quotes the sandbox block phrase",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "grep: docs/sandbox.md: Sandbox block"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "output quotes the disabled-tool phrase",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "web_fetch is not enabled for this run"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "output quotes a permission denial",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "log line: Permission denied for bash"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "output quotes a permission requirement",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "log line: Permission required for bash"},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "output quotes a sandbox approval prompt",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Sandbox approval required for curl"},
+		},
+		{
+			// Metadata is no more trustworthy than text on a completed call. A
+			// result carrying a category with an OK status is not a denial; every
+			// path that attaches one fails the call.
+			name:       "stale denial category on a completed call",
+			result:     ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusOK, DenialReason: DenialSandboxBlock, Output: "ok"},
+			structured: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "stale permission metadata on a completed call",
+			result: ToolResult{
+				Status: tools.StatusOK,
+				Meta:   map[string]string{"permission_action": string(PermissionActionDeny)},
+				Output: "ok",
+			},
+			structured: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name: "registry refusal marker on a completed call",
+			result: ToolResult{
+				Status: tools.StatusOK,
+				Meta:   map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied},
+				Output: "ok",
+			},
+			structured: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, testCase := range cases {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if isPolicyRefusal(testCase.result) {
+				t.Errorf("a successful result was classified as a policy refusal, so a healthy call counts toward the denial streak: %+v", testCase.result)
+			}
+			failed := testCase.result
+			failed.Status = tools.StatusError
+			switch {
+			case testCase.structured && !isPolicyRefusal(failed):
+				t.Errorf("a failure carrying real provenance was not classified as a refusal, so the gate broke the classifier: %+v", failed)
+			case !testCase.structured && isPolicyRefusal(failed):
+				t.Errorf("a failure carrying only text was classified as a refusal; output is tool-controlled and cannot decide this: %+v", failed)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// blockTextShellTool runs freely and prints text the classifier keys on. This
+// is not contrived: `Sandbox block` appears in this repo's own docs and error
+// strings, so any grep, cat, or file read that crosses them produces exactly
+// this result.
+type blockTextShellTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (tool *blockTextShellTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (tool *blockTextShellTool) Description() string { return "test shell tool" }
+func (tool *blockTextShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"command": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"command"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *blockTextShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "reads files"}
+}
+func (tool *blockTextShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{
+		Status: tools.StatusOK,
+		Output: "docs/windows-sandbox.md:41: Sandbox block (write jail) is reported as ...",
+	}
+}
+
+// The same gap driven through Run, because the classifier being wrong only
+// matters if the loop acts on it, and it does: the counting path calls
+// isPolicyRefusal directly, and a true answer records a failure against the
+// tool's signature. Six identical successes then look like six identical
+// denials, and the run ends on a stop answer telling the user a tool it never
+// refused was refused six times.
+//
+// The tool succeeds every turn and the run is given more turns than the bound,
+// so anything that halts before the provider's final turn is the guard.
+func TestRunDoesNotHaltOnSuccessfulOutputThatQuotesARefusal(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &blockTextShellTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	calls := toolFailureStopAt + 4
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, calls+1)
+	for i := range calls {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash",
+			`{"command":"grep -n 'Sandbox block' docs/windows-sandbox.md"}`))
+	}
+	turns = append(turns, textTurn("found the docs"))
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "search the docs", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+			t.Error("the loop asked permission for an allow-safety tool; this test must exercise the success path")
+			return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if tool.ran != calls {
+		t.Errorf("the tool ran %d times, want %d; the run was halted mid-way by its own success output", tool.ran, calls)
+	}
+	if result.FinalAnswer != "found the docs" {
+		t.Errorf("final answer =\n  %q\nwant\n  %q\n(a stop answer here means successful output was counted as a refusal)",
+			result.FinalAnswer, "found the docs")
+	}
+}
+
+// failingPhraseTool RAN and failed. Its stderr happens to contain a phrase the
+// classifier used to key on, which is the everyday case: `bash` preserves
+// arbitrary stdout and stderr on any nonzero exit, so
+// `printf 'Sandbox block\n' >&2; exit 1` produces exactly this.
+type failingPhraseTool struct {
+	ran    int
+	output string
+}
+
+func (tool *failingPhraseTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
+func (tool *failingPhraseTool) Description() string { return "test shell tool" }
+func (tool *failingPhraseTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:                 "object",
+		Properties:           map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"command": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:             []string{"command"},
+		AdditionalProperties: false,
+	}
+}
+func (tool *failingPhraseTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "reads files"}
+}
+func (tool *failingPhraseTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	tool.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: tool.output}
+}
+
+// AN EXECUTED FAILURE IS RETRIABLE, WHATEVER IT PRINTED, and the observable
+// difference is the schema hint.
+//
+// isRetriableToolError feeds `hintable` into the guard, and the guard injects
+// the retry hint at toolFailureHintAt. Classifying an executed failure as a
+// policy refusal makes hintable false, so the model is told nothing and simply
+// repeats the call: the run loses the one correction it had. That is on top of
+// the failure being accumulated as a denial.
+//
+// Each phrase below is one the classifier used to match on. The tool is
+// allow-safety and runs every time, so nothing here is refused by anything.
+func TestRunHintsAnExecutedFailureThatPrintsARefusalPhrase(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, output := range []string{
+		"Sandbox block\n",
+		"cp: Permission denied for /etc/hosts",
+		"Permission required for sudo",
+		"Sandbox approval required for curl",
+		"grep: web_fetch is not enabled for this run",
+	} {
+		t.Run(output, func(t *testing.T) {
+			tool := &failingPhraseTool{output: output}
+			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+			registry.Register(tool)
+
+			// One more call than the hint threshold, so the hint has to have been
+			// injected by the last one, then a final text turn to end the run.
+			calls := toolFailureHintAt + 1
+			turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, calls+1)
+			for i := range calls {
+				turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash", `{"command":"./flaky.sh"}`))
+			}
+			turns = append(turns, textTurn("gave up on the script"))
+			provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+			result, err := Run(context.Background(), "run the script", provider, Options{
+				Registry:       registry,
+				PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+				MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+				OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+					t.Error("permission was requested for an allow-safety tool; this test must exercise the executed-failure path")
+					return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
+				},
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if tool.ran != calls {
+				t.Fatalf("the tool ran %d times, want %d; the run was halted by output it merely printed", tool.ran, calls)
+			}
+
+			var hinted bool
+			for _, message := range result.Messages {
+				if strings.Contains(message.Content, toolFailureHintMarker) {
+					hinted = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !hinted {
+				t.Errorf("no retry hint was injected for an executed failure printing %q; it was classified as a policy refusal, so the model got no correction", output)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/agent/policy_refusal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// UNCATEGORIZED REFUSALS MUST STILL COUNT.
+//
+// The halt guard asked DenialReason != DenialNone, but a category is only
+// attached where a TYPED denial is built. A headless run leaves
+// OnPermissionRequest nil, so the loop never reaches that branch and the
+// registry returns a bare "Error: Permission required ..." with no category. A
+// sandbox preflight denial on a non-shell tool loses its SandboxDecision in the
+// conversion and arrives as an uncategorized "Sandbox block".
+//
+// Both were counted as SUCCESS, which cleared the very record the guard
+// accumulates, so the same refused call could repeat to MaxTurns. That is the
+// loop this PR exists to stop.
+func TestUncategorizedPolicyRefusalsAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, testCase := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		result ToolResult
+	}{
+		{
+			// Still uncategorized in the DenialReason sense: a headless run never
+			// reaches the branch that builds a typed denial. It carries the
+			// registry's pre-execution marker instead, which is what makes it
+			// classifiable without reading the message.
+			name: "headless prompt refusal carries no denial category",
+			result: ToolResult{
+				Status: tools.StatusError,
+				Output: `Error: Permission required for bash: The tool is marked "prompt" and was not executed.`,
+				Meta:   map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalPermissionRequired},
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			// The SandboxDecision is still dropped in the conversion for a
+			// non-shell tool; the marker is what survives it.
+			name: "sandbox preflight denial loses its decision in conversion",
+			result: ToolResult{
+				Status: tools.StatusError,
+				Output: "Sandbox block: write outside the workspace",
+				Meta:   map[string]string{tools.PolicyRefusalMeta: tools.PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied},
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "an explicitly denied permission action",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "refused", Meta: map[string]string{"permission_action": string(PermissionActionDeny)}},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "a categorized denial still counts",
+			result: ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "denied", DenialReason: DenialFiltered},
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if !isPolicyRefusal(testCase.result) {
+				t.Fatal("refusal was treated as a success, so the guard's record is cleared and the call can repeat to MaxTurns")
+			}
+			if isRetriableToolError(testCase.result) {
+				t.Error("a policy refusal is not retriable: repeating it verbatim cannot help")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// An ordinary failure is still retriable and still not a refusal, or the guard
+// would halt on things the model can legitimately fix by trying again.
+func TestOrdinaryFailuresAreNotPolicyRefusals(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, output := range []string{
+		"Error: file not found",
+		"Error: invalid JSON in arguments",
+		"Error: connection reset",
+	} {
+		result := ToolResult{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: output}
+		if isPolicyRefusal(result) {
+			t.Errorf("%q was classified as a policy refusal", output)
+		}
+		if !isRetriableToolError(result) {
+			t.Errorf("%q should stay retriable", output)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/agent/precomputed_completion_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+)
+
+// PRODUCING A RESULT AND ASKING THE RUN TO STOP ARE DIFFERENT FACTS.
+//
+// closeOutRemaining decides between finalizing a completed sibling and writing
+// an aborted placeholder, and it used to make that decision from abortErr. A
+// cancelled permission request is exactly where the two facts disagree:
+// executeToolCall builds the cancellation result, with its call ID, its message
+// and its denial category, and returns it TOGETHER with
+// ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled. Reading the error as "never started" discards a
+// real result and records the opposite of what happened, and the cancellation
+// then goes missing from OnToolResult, the trace counters and the task
+// observation even though the permission event already fired.
+func TestABatchEntryWithAResultAndAnAbortErrorIsDrained(t *testing.T) {
+	canceled := canceledPermissionResult(
+		ToolCall{ID: "call-b", Name: "read_probe"},
+		"cancelled in TUI",
+		PermissionEvent{ToolName: "read_probe"},
+	)
+	precomputed := []precomputedToolResult{
+		{result: ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call-a", Name: "read_probe", Status: tools.StatusOK}, completed: true},
+		{
+			result:    canceled,
+			abortErr:  fmt.Errorf("%w for read_probe", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled),
+			completed: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	sibling, ran := precomputedResultFor(precomputed, 0, 2, 1)
+	if !ran {
+		t.Fatal("a cancelled permission result was treated as a call that never started")
+	}
+	if sibling.ToolCallID != "call-b" {
+		t.Errorf("ToolCallID = %q, want the cancellation result rather than an empty placeholder", sibling.ToolCallID)
+	}
+	if sibling.DenialReason != DenialApprovalCanceled {
+		t.Errorf("DenialReason = %q, want the cancellation preserved", sibling.DenialReason)
+	}
+}
+
+// An entry that never produced a result is still unstarted, or the fix would
+// have stopped aborting anything.
+func TestABatchEntryWithNoResultIsStillUnstarted(t *testing.T) {
+	precomputed := []precomputedToolResult{
+		{abortErr: errors.New("cancelled before the tool ran")},
+	}
+	if _, ran := precomputedResultFor(precomputed, 0, 1, 0); ran {
+		t.Error("an entry that produced nothing was finalized as if it had run")
+	}
+}
+
+// A call outside the batch window never started either.
+func TestACallOutsideTheBatchWindowIsUnstarted(t *testing.T) {
+	precomputed := []precomputedToolResult{{result: ToolResult{ToolCallID: "call-a"}, completed: true}}
+	if _, ran := precomputedResultFor(precomputed, 0, 1, 1); ran {
+		t.Error("a call past the batch window was reported as executed")
+	}
+}
+
+// And the flag is recorded where the truth is known rather than inferred later,
+// so a real batch marks what it ran.
+func TestTheBatchRecordsWhatItRan(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(&readAheadTool{})
+	calls := []ToolCall{
+		{ID: "call-a", Name: "read_probe", Arguments: `{"id":"a"}`},
+		{ID: "call-b", Name: "read_probe", Arguments: `{"id":"b"}`},
+	}
+	results := executeParallelReadBatch(context.Background(), registry, calls, 0, 2, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Registry: registry})
+	for index, entry := range results {
+		if !entry.completed {
+			t.Errorf("entry %d executed but was not recorded as completed: %#v", index, entry)
+		}
+		if entry.result.ToolCallID != calls[index].ID {
+			t.Errorf("entry %d is keyed to %q, want %q", index, entry.result.ToolCallID, calls[index].ID)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/agent/refusal_provenance_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// legacyDenialSignaturePrefix is the string provenance used to be encoded in.
+// The identity was one namespace holding both a normalized error signature and
+// a synthetic "denial:<category>" key, and provenance was recovered afterwards
+// with strings.HasPrefix. It survives here, and only here, so the regression
+// names the exact spelling that used to collide.
+const legacyDenialSignaturePrefix = "denial:"
+
+func runUntilGuardHalt(t *testing.T, gate bool) Result {
+	t.Helper()
+	tool := &uncategorizedSandboxTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("c"+strconv.Itoa(i), "write_file", `{"path":"/o-`+strconv.Itoa(i)+`.txt"}`))
+	}
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry:                registry,
+		PermissionMode:          PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:                len(turns) + 5,
+		RequireCompletionSignal: gate,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(result.FinalAnswer, "Agent stopped:") {
+		t.Fatalf("the guard did not halt this run: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+// A GUARD HALT IS UNFINISHED WORK, AND HEADLESS HAS TO HEAR ABOUT IT.
+//
+// The halt returns straight out of the tool loop, so it never reached the
+// completion gate the max-turns paths go through. zero exec treats only
+// Result.Incomplete as exit 4 and otherwise reports run_end success with exit
+// 0, so a task denied six times, or failed through the twelve-call bound, came
+// back as a successful automation result having done none of the work asked.
+func TestGuardHaltIsIncompleteUnderTheCompletionGate(t *testing.T) {
+	headless := runUntilGuardHalt(t, true)
+	if !headless.Incomplete {
+		t.Error("a guard halt reports the run as complete; zero exec would call a run that did nothing a success")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(headless.IncompleteReason, "write_file") {
+		t.Errorf("the incomplete reason does not name the tool that halted the run: %q", headless.IncompleteReason)
+	}
+	// And the interactive default is untouched: Incomplete exists for the
+	// headless gate, so setting it without one would be inventing a status.
+	if interactive := runUntilGuardHalt(t, false); interactive.Incomplete {
+		t.Error("Incomplete was set without RequireCompletionSignal, changing interactive behaviour")
+	}
+}
+
+// executedDenialLookalikeTool runs, fails, and prints exactly the string the
+// guard used to store for a real permission refusal.
+type executedDenialLookalikeTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (t *executedDenialLookalikeTool) Name() string             { return "bash" }
+func (t *executedDenialLookalikeTool) Description() string      { return "probe" }
+func (t *executedDenialLookalikeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
+func (t *executedDenialLookalikeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
+}
+
+func (t *executedDenialLookalikeTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	t.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusError, Output: legacyDenialSignaturePrefix + string(DenialPermissionDenied)}
+}
+
+// TRUSTED PROVENANCE AND UNTRUSTED CONTENT MUST NOT SHARE A NAMESPACE.
+//
+// While the identity was a single string, a command that printed exactly
+// "denial:permission_denied" and exited non-zero took on the identity of a real
+// permission refusal: it merged streaks with one, and the run told the user the
+// tool had been refused when it had executed every time.
+func TestAnExecutedErrorCannotImpersonateARefusal(t *testing.T) {
+	tool := &executedDenialLookalikeTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureStopAt + 4 {
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("c"+strconv.Itoa(i), "bash", `{}`))
+	}
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "run it", &mockProvider{turns: turns}, Options{
+		Registry: registry, PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk, MaxTurns: len(turns) + 5,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if tool.ran == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("the tool never ran, so this no longer covers an executed failure")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "was refused") {
+		t.Errorf("the tool executed %d times and nothing refused it, but the run says it was refused: %q", tool.ran, result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "with the same error") {
+		t.Errorf("an executed failure repeating identically should read as the same error: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+}
+
+// AND THE AGGREGATE IS ITS OWN FACT.
+//
+// The content-blind bound fires precisely when no single identity repeated
+// enough, so the identity present at the end says nothing about the eleven
+// before it. Alternating two refusal categories reaches twelve without either
+// reaching six; the tool never ran once, and the answer used to describe that
+// as the tool failing with varying errors.
+func TestTheContentBlindBoundKeepsRefusalProvenance(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, testCase := range []struct {
+		name       string
+		kinds      []DenialCategory
+		wantCause  toolFailureCause
+		wantAnswer string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "alternating refusal categories",
+			kinds:      []DenialCategory{DenialPermissionDenied, DenialSandboxBlock},
+			wantCause:  toolFailureCauseVariedRefused,
+			wantAnswer: "was refused",
+		},
+		{
+			// Mixed is DECIDED, not inherited from whichever field a switch
+			// tested first. Neither "failed" alone nor "refused" alone is true of
+			// this sequence, so the wording says both.
+			name:       "executed failures mixed with refusals",
+			kinds:      []DenialCategory{DenialNone, DenialPermissionDenied},
+			wantCause:  toolFailureCauseVariedMixed,
+			wantAnswer: "failed or was refused",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "executed failures only",
+			kinds:      []DenialCategory{DenialNone, DenialNone},
+			wantCause:  toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted,
+			wantAnswer: "with varying errors",
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			state := newGuardState()
+			var outcome toolFailureOutcome
+			for index := 0; index < toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt; index++ {
+				// Distinct prose every call, exactly as a real refusal or error
+				// naming what it touched would produce.
+				outcome = state.observeToolResult("bash", true, false,
+					"failure on item "+strconv.Itoa(index), testCase.kinds[index%len(testCase.kinds)])
+				if outcome.Stop {
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !outcome.Stop {
+				t.Fatal("twelve consecutive failures did not trip the content-blind bound")
+			}
+			if outcome.Count != toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt {
+				t.Errorf("Count = %d, want the counter that tripped (%d)", outcome.Count, toolFailureAnyErrorStopAt)
+			}
+			if outcome.Cause != testCase.wantCause {
+				t.Errorf("Cause = %v, want %v", outcome.Cause, testCase.wantCause)
+			}
+			answer := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", outcome.Count, outcome.Cause)
+			if !strings.Contains(answer, testCase.wantAnswer) {
+				t.Errorf("stop answer = %q, want it to contain %q", answer, testCase.wantAnswer)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/agent/sandbox_refusal_boundary_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// deniedWriteTool records every execution. Its body must never run: the sandbox
+// refuses the call at the registry boundary, before the tool is reached.
+type deniedWriteTool struct{ ran int }
+
+func (t *deniedWriteTool) Name() string        { return "write_file" }
+func (t *deniedWriteTool) Description() string { return "test write tool" }
+func (t *deniedWriteTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
+	return tools.Schema{
+		Type:       "object",
+		Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"path": {Type: "string"}},
+		Required:   []string{"path"},
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *deniedWriteTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
+	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "writes files"}
+}
+
+func (t *deniedWriteTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
+	t.ran++
+	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "wrote"}
+}
+
+// THROUGH THE REAL SANDBOX, NOT A FAKE STANDING WHERE IT WOULD BE.
+//
+// The neighbouring uncategorized test deliberately hand-builds the shape a
+// refusal has when no category survives, which is a fact about the LOOP. This
+// one covers the producer: a real sandbox.Engine evaluation denies the call,
+// the registry turns that into a categorized refusal, and the guard keys on the
+// category. Without it, reverting refusalResult(..., PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied)
+// in registry.go to a plain errorResult left both the agent and tools suites
+// green, so nothing depended on the marker at all.
+//
+// Every assertion here fails if a different link breaks: ran proves the body was
+// skipped, the request count proves the CATEGORY bound halted it rather than the
+// content-blind one, and the wording proves the provenance survived conversion.
+func TestRunHaltsARealSandboxDenialOnTheCategoryBound(t *testing.T) {
+	workspace := t.TempDir()
+	forbidden := t.TempDir()
+	policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
+	// Applies whenever the sandbox is enforcing, so this does not depend on the
+	// workspace boundary being reachable from a synthetic request.
+	policy.DenyWrite = []string{forbidden}
+
+	tool := &deniedWriteTool{}
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(tool)
+
+	// A different path every call. Note that errorSignature truncates at 80
+	// characters and the message opens with a fixed 40-character prefix followed
+	// by a long temp root, so the signatures collide here anyway: the request
+	// count below pins WHICH bound halted the run, but it does not by itself
+	// prove the streak was held by the category. The wording assertion is the one
+	// that discriminates, and it is the one that fails when the marker is gone.
+	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolFailureStopAt+4)
+	for i := range toolFailureStopAt + 4 {
+		target := filepath.Join(forbidden, "escape-"+strconv.Itoa(i)+".txt")
+		turns = append(turns, toolTurn("c"+strconv.Itoa(i), "write_file", `{"path":`+strconv.Quote(target)+`}`))
+	}
+	provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
+
+	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write the files", provider, Options{
+		Registry:       registry,
+		PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+		MaxTurns:       len(turns) + 5,
+		Cwd:            workspace,
+		Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
+			WorkspaceRoot: workspace,
+			Policy:        policy,
+		}),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if tool.ran != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the tool body ran %d times; the sandbox must refuse before execution", tool.ran)
+	}
+	if len(provider.requests) != toolFailureStopAt {
+		t.Errorf("the run made %d turns, want the category bound at %d; a categorized refusal whose prose varies must still halt on its category",
+			len(provider.requests), toolFailureStopAt)
+	}
+	if want := toolFailureStopAnswer("write_file", toolFailureStopAt, toolFailureCauseSameRefusal); result.FinalAnswer != want {
+		t.Errorf("final answer =\n  %q\nwant\n  %q", result.FinalAnswer, want)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(result.FinalAnswer, "was refused") {
+		t.Errorf("the refusal provenance did not survive to the answer: %q", result.FinalAnswer)
+	}
+}

internal/agent/stop_answer_wording_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package agent
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// THE ANSWER MUST CLAIM ONLY WHAT THE COUNTER ESTABLISHED.
+//
+// anyErrorCount establishes that the tool failed consecutively without a
+// success. It does NOT establish that every failure differed: five A, five B and
+// two C reach the content-blind bound of 12 without any signature repeating six
+// times, and three of those errors were shared. The old wording called that
+// "each with a different error".
+//
+// The signature bound has the inverse problem. A denial streak keys on the
+// CATEGORY, and the prose behind it embeds the path or command refused, so it
+// differs on every call. Calling that "the same error" is false in the other
+// direction.
+func TestStopAnswerDoesNotOverclaimTheFailurePattern(t *testing.T) {
+	varied := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", 12, toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted)
+	if strings.Contains(varied, "each with a different error") {
+		t.Errorf("the content-blind bound does not track that every failure differed: %q", varied)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(varied, "varying errors") {
+		t.Errorf("the varied stop should still say the errors varied: %q", varied)
+	}
+
+	refused := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", 6, toolFailureCauseSameRefusal)
+	if strings.Contains(refused, "same error") {
+		t.Errorf("a denial streak covers refusals of different paths, so it is not the same error: %q", refused)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(refused, "refused") {
+		t.Errorf("a denial streak should say it was refused: %q", refused)
+	}
+
+	// The one claim that IS justified: a signature streak really did repeat the
+	// same error signature, so that wording stays.
+	same := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", 6, toolFailureCauseSameError)
+	if !strings.Contains(same, "same error") {
+		t.Errorf("a signature streak may still be described as the same error: %q", same)
+	}
+}
+
+// The mixed-signature case jatmn asked for, driven through the real counter
+// rather than asserted about the wording in isolation: a run whose errors vary
+// must trip the content-blind bound and must not be described as all-different.
+func TestMixedSignatureStreakTripsTheContentBlindBound(t *testing.T) {
+	var state guardState
+	var outcome toolFailureOutcome
+	// Five of one error, five of another, two of a third: twelve failures, no
+	// signature repeating six times in a row.
+	for index, output := range []string{
+		"Error: A", "Error: A", "Error: A", "Error: A", "Error: A",
+		"Error: B", "Error: B", "Error: B", "Error: B", "Error: B",
+		"Error: C", "Error: C",
+	} {
+		outcome = state.observeToolResult("bash", true, true, output, DenialNone)
+		if outcome.Stop && index < 11 {
+			t.Fatalf("halted early at failure %d", index+1)
+		}
+	}
+	if !outcome.Stop {
+		t.Fatal("twelve consecutive failures did not trip the content-blind bound")
+	}
+	if outcome.Cause != toolFailureCauseVariedExecuted {
+		t.Errorf("a mixed-signature streak of executed failures should report varied-executed, got %v", outcome.Cause)
+	}
+	answer := toolFailureStopAnswer("bash", outcome.Count, outcome.Cause)
+	if strings.Contains(answer, "each with a different error") {
+		t.Errorf("three of these errors were shared, so they were not each different: %q", answer)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/exec.go

@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 			}
 			return exitInterrupted
 		}
-		sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventError, map[string]any{"message": err.Error()})
+		sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventError, sessions.ErrorEventPayload(err))
 		if options.outputFormat == execOutputStreamJSON {
 			writer.errorEvent("provider_error", err.Error(), false)
 			writer.runEnd("error", exitProvider)

internal/cli/exec_error_payload_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// streamErrorExecProvider fails every request with one provider error event.
+type streamErrorExecProvider struct {
+	event zeroruntime.StreamEvent
+}
+
+func (provider streamErrorExecProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
+	ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 1)
+	ch <- provider.event
+	close(ch)
+	return ch, nil
+}
+
+func providerErrorExecDeps(t *testing.T, store *sessions.Store, workspaceRoot string) appDeps {
+	t.Helper()
+	return appDeps{
+		getwd: func() (string, error) { return workspaceRoot, nil },
+		resolveConfig: func(_ string, _ config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
+			return config.ResolvedConfig{
+				ActiveProvider: "test",
+				Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
+					Name:         "test",
+					ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
+					BaseURL:      "http://127.0.0.1/v1",
+					Model:        "test-model",
+				},
+				MaxTurns: 3,
+			}, nil
+		},
+		resolveMCPConfig: func(string, bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) { return config.MCPConfig{}, nil },
+		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
+			return streamErrorExecProvider{event: zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+				Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+				Error:      "provider request error: model not found",
+				StatusCode: 404,
+				Cause:      "upstream said: no such model",
+			}}, nil
+		},
+		newSessionStore: func() *sessions.Store { return store },
+		newSandboxStore: func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error) {
+			return sandbox.NewGrantStore(sandbox.StoreOptions{FilePath: t.TempDir() + "/grants.json"})
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// recordedProviderError returns the payload of the one error event the run
+// recorded, failing unless there is exactly one session with exactly one.
+func recordedProviderError(t *testing.T, store *sessions.Store) map[string]any {
+	t.Helper()
+	items, err := store.List()
+	if err != nil || len(items) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sessions = %d, %v; want one", len(items), err)
+	}
+	events, err := store.ReadEvents(items[0].SessionID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadEvents returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	var found []map[string]any
+	for _, event := range events {
+		if event.Type != sessions.EventError {
+			continue
+		}
+		var payload map[string]any
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(event.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("unmarshal error payload: %v", err)
+		}
+		found = append(found, payload)
+	}
+	if len(found) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("recorded %d error events, want 1: %#v", len(found), found)
+	}
+	return found[0]
+}
+
+func assertProviderErrorDetail(t *testing.T, payload map[string]any) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if got, want := payload["message"], "provider request error: model not found"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("message = %#v, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["statusCode"], float64(404); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("statusCode = %#v, want %v: the run recorded only the flattened message", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["cause"], "upstream said: no such model"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("cause = %#v, want %q: the run recorded only the flattened message", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// A provider error reaches the exec session log with its HTTP status and the
+// upstream cause, not only the flattened message (#674).
+func TestRunExecRecordsTheProviderErrorStatusAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateCLIUserState(t)
+	workspaceRoot := t.TempDir()
+	// exec records through the default store, which isolateCLIUserState has
+	// moved under the test's temp root; this opens the same one.
+	store := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{})
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--cwd", workspaceRoot, "--init-session-id", "provider_error_run", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr,
+		providerErrorExecDeps(t, store, workspaceRoot))
+
+	if exitCode != exitProvider {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d; stderr=%s", exitCode, exitProvider, stderr.String())
+	}
+	assertProviderErrorDetail(t, recordedProviderError(t, store))
+}
+
+// The spec draft run records its provider error through its own call site, so
+// it is checked on its own.
+func TestRunExecUseSpecRecordsTheProviderErrorStatusAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateCLIUserState(t)
+	workspaceRoot := t.TempDir()
+	store := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{RootDir: t.TempDir()})
+	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
+
+	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--cwd", workspaceRoot, "--use-spec", "-o", "json", "plan the review flow"}, &stdout, &stderr,
+		providerErrorExecDeps(t, store, workspaceRoot))
+
+	if exitCode != exitProvider {
+		t.Fatalf("exit = %d, want %d; stderr=%s stdout=%s", exitCode, exitProvider, stderr.String(), stdout.String())
+	}
+	assertProviderErrorDetail(t, recordedProviderError(t, store))
+}

internal/cli/exec_spec.go

@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ func runExecSpecDraft(run execSpecDraftRun) int {
 			}
 			return exitInterrupted
 		}
-		sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventError, map[string]any{"message": err.Error()})
+		sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventError, sessions.ErrorEventPayload(err))
 		return writeExecSpecDraftProviderError(&writer, run.options.outputFormat, err.Error())
 	}
 	if result.StopReason != agent.StopReasonSpecReviewRequired || draftInfo.SpecID == "" || draftInfo.SpecFilePath == "" {

internal/mcp/aimlapi.go

@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
 package mcp
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 
 	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/aimlapi"
 	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/config"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/redaction"
 )
 
 // The AI/ML API MCP server authenticates with the user's AI/ML API key.
@@ -20,11 +26,17 @@ import (
 // config.LoadAIMLAPIServiceKey, which in the same call decides whether it may
 // be sent (no proxy profile, a single token), so a provider change applies to
 // the next request and a withheld or invalid key means no Authorization
-// header. It lives only in that request's headers: never in Server, its
-// Identity (OAuth token binding), config.json, list output or errors (an
-// error response to such a request is reported without its body). A
-// user-configured Authorization header, OAuth, or a project-touched server
-// always goes without it.
+// header. It lives only in that request's headers, and for the length of the
+// call in the collector its context carries (aimlapiSentKeys), so the reply can
+// be scrubbed: never in Server, its Identity (OAuth token binding), config.json,
+// list output, errors or tool output. Every key the call sent, redirect hops
+// included, and on the SSE transport the keys the stream request sent, is
+// scrubbed from the response's error text, method and result before anything
+// reads them (scrubAIMLAPIKeys) and from any error the call returns, a
+// transport error quoting a URL the server chose among them
+// (scrubAIMLAPIKeyError). An error status to such a request is also reported
+// without its body. A user-configured Authorization header, OAuth, or a
+// project-touched server always goes without it.
 var loadAIMLAPIServiceKey = config.LoadAIMLAPIServiceKey
 
 var aimlapiMCPHost = func() string {
@@ -56,6 +68,9 @@ func applyAIMLAPIRequestHeaders(server Server, request *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	if sent, ok := request.Context().Value(aimlapiSentKeysContextKey{}).(*aimlapiSentKeys); ok {
+		sent.add(key)
+	}
 }
 
 // reapplyAIMLAPIRedirectHeaders gives a redirect hop the automatic headers its
@@ -101,6 +116,159 @@ func hasUserAuthorizationHeader(server Server) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// aimlapiSentKeys collects every key applyAIMLAPIRequestHeaders puts on the
+// requests of one call. The first request's context carries it, and net/http
+// gives each redirect hop that same context, so a key resolved again for a later
+// hop is collected too. The final hop's key alone is not enough: a same-origin
+// server answering the last hop has seen every earlier one.
+type aimlapiSentKeys struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	keys []string
+}
+
+type aimlapiSentKeysContextKey struct{}
+
+// withAIMLAPISentKeys returns ctx carrying a fresh collector for one call.
+func withAIMLAPISentKeys(ctx context.Context) (context.Context, *aimlapiSentKeys) {
+	sent := &aimlapiSentKeys{}
+	return context.WithValue(ctx, aimlapiSentKeysContextKey{}, sent), sent
+}
+
+func (sent *aimlapiSentKeys) add(key string) {
+	sent.mu.Lock()
+	defer sent.mu.Unlock()
+	for _, existing := range sent.keys {
+		if existing == key {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	sent.keys = append(sent.keys, key)
+}
+
+// list returns a copy of the keys collected so far.
+func (sent *aimlapiSentKeys) list() []string {
+	sent.mu.Lock()
+	defer sent.mu.Unlock()
+	return append([]string(nil), sent.keys...)
+}
+
+// scrubAIMLAPIKeys removes the injected keys from a response before any of it
+// is read: the error text, the method name and every string in the result,
+// object member names included. A server can echo the credential it was sent,
+// and MCP reports a failed tool call as a result rather than an error, so the
+// result needs it as much as the error text. Only the known values go, split
+// forms included (redaction.RedactSecretValues); a result that holds none of
+// them keeps its original bytes.
+func scrubAIMLAPIKeys(message rpcMessage, keys ...string) rpcMessage {
+	var sent []string
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(key) != "" {
+			sent = append(sent, key)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(sent) == 0 {
+		return message
+	}
+	if message.Error != nil {
+		scrubbed := *message.Error
+		scrubbed.Message = redaction.RedactSecretValues(scrubbed.Message, sent...)
+		message.Error = &scrubbed
+	}
+	message.Method = redaction.RedactSecretValues(message.Method, sent...)
+	message.Result = scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromJSON(message.Result, sent)
+	return message
+}
+
+func scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromJSON(raw json.RawMessage, keys []string) json.RawMessage {
+	if len(raw) == 0 {
+		return raw
+	}
+	decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
+	decoder.UseNumber()
+	var value any
+	if err := decoder.Decode(&value); err != nil {
+		// Decoding it into the caller's type fails the same way, and that
+		// error does not quote the text.
+		return raw
+	}
+	scrubbed, changed := scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromValue(value, keys)
+	if !changed {
+		return raw
+	}
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(scrubbed)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Never hand back the unscrubbed bytes: an empty result reads as
+		// nothing rather than as the key.
+		return nil
+	}
+	return encoded
+}
+
+func scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromValue(value any, keys []string) (any, bool) {
+	switch typed := value.(type) {
+	case string:
+		scrubbed := redaction.RedactSecretValues(typed, keys...)
+		return scrubbed, scrubbed != typed
+	case []any:
+		changed := false
+		for index, item := range typed {
+			if scrubbed, itemChanged := scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromValue(item, keys); itemChanged {
+				typed[index] = scrubbed
+				changed = true
+			}
+		}
+		return typed, changed
+	case map[string]any:
+		changed := false
+		scrubbed := make(map[string]any, len(typed))
+		for name, item := range typed {
+			scrubbedName := redaction.RedactSecretValues(name, keys...)
+			scrubbedItem, itemChanged := scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromValue(item, keys)
+			if itemChanged || scrubbedName != name {
+				changed = true
+			}
+			scrubbed[scrubbedName] = scrubbedItem
+		}
+		return scrubbed, changed
+	}
+	return value, false
+}
+
+// scrubAIMLAPIKeyError returns err with the injected keys removed from its text.
+// An error the keys do not appear in keeps its chain. One they do appear in is
+// replaced by its scrubbed text, because its chain still holds the key (a
+// *url.Error keeps the URL the server chose); the replacement unwraps only to
+// the context sentinel the original matched, so a cancellation still reads as
+// one.
+func scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(err error, keys ...string) error {
+	if err == nil || len(keys) == 0 {
+		return err
+	}
+	text := err.Error()
+	scrubbed := redaction.RedactSecretValues(text, keys...)
+	if scrubbed == text {
+		return err
+	}
+	replacement := &aimlapiScrubbedError{text: scrubbed}
+	for _, sentinel := range []error{context.Canceled, context.DeadlineExceeded} {
+		if errors.Is(err, sentinel) {
+			replacement.cause = sentinel
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return replacement
+}
+
+// aimlapiScrubbedError is an error whose text had an injected key removed.
+type aimlapiScrubbedError struct {
+	text  string
+	cause error
+}
+
+func (scrubbed *aimlapiScrubbedError) Error() string { return scrubbed.text }
+
+func (scrubbed *aimlapiScrubbedError) Unwrap() error { return scrubbed.cause }
+
 // aimlapiUnauthorizedHint explains how to authenticate when the AI/ML API MCP
 // server rejects a request without OAuth. It names no key material.
 func aimlapiUnauthorizedHint(server Server, status int) string {

internal/mcp/aimlapi_scrub_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
+package mcp
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/aimlapi"
+)
+
+// scrubTestKey has no credential shape, so only the known-value scrub can find
+// it; a shape pattern would leave it alone.
+const scrubTestKey = "aiml0123456789abcdef0123456789abcd"
+
+// aimlapiEcho stands in for mcp.aimlapi.com over streamable HTTP. It answers
+// each JSON-RPC request with reply(method, id), as a JSON body or as one SSE
+// event, and records the Authorization header every request carried.
+type aimlapiEcho struct {
+	sse   bool
+	reply func(method string, id json.RawMessage) string
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	auth  []string
+}
+
+func (echo *aimlapiEcho) RoundTrip(request *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	var body []byte
+	if request.Body != nil {
+		body, _ = io.ReadAll(request.Body)
+		_ = request.Body.Close()
+	}
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	echo.auth = append(echo.auth, request.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	var message struct {
+		ID     json.RawMessage `json:"id"`
+		Method string          `json:"method"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &message)
+	if len(message.ID) == 0 {
+		return fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusAccepted, ""), nil
+	}
+	reply := echo.reply(message.Method, message.ID)
+	response := fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusOK, reply)
+	if echo.sse {
+		response.Header.Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
+		response.Body = io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("event: message\ndata: " + reply + "\n\n"))
+	}
+	return response, nil
+}
+
+// assertSent fails unless every request carried want as its Authorization, so a
+// test cannot pass by never reaching the injected-key path.
+func (echo *aimlapiEcho) assertSent(t *testing.T, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	defer echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(echo.auth) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("the fake server was never called")
+	}
+	for _, got := range echo.auth {
+		if got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want %q", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func rpcReply(id json.RawMessage, field string, value any) string {
+	encoded, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": id, field: value})
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	return string(encoded)
+}
+
+// echoedKeys are the spellings of the key a server echoes back: whole, and
+// split by a NUL and by a zero-width space, which a plain replace would miss.
+func echoedKeys() []string {
+	return []string{
+		scrubTestKey,
+		scrubTestKey[:10] + string(rune(0)) + scrubTestKey[10:],
+		scrubTestKey[:20] + string(rune(0x200b)) + scrubTestKey[20:],
+	}
+}
+
+// assertNoPartOf fails if any eight-byte run of key survives in text.
+func assertNoPartOf(t *testing.T, text string, key string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for start := 0; start+8 <= len(key); start++ {
+		if strings.Contains(text, key[start:start+8]) {
+			t.Fatalf("text still holds part of the key (%q): %q", key[start:start+8], text)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// assertKeyScrubbed fails if any part of scrubTestKey survives in text, or if
+// text does not show the replacement.
+func assertKeyScrubbed(t *testing.T, text string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	assertNoPartOf(t, text, scrubTestKey)
+	if !strings.Contains(text, "[REDACTED]") {
+		t.Fatalf("text = %q, want the key replaced by [REDACTED]", text)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScrubAIMLAPIKeysKeepsAResultWithoutTheKeyByteForByte(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := json.RawMessage(`{"tools": [ {"name": "b", "description": "password=hunter2"} ], "a": 1.50}`)
+	if got := scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromJSON(raw, []string{scrubTestKey}); string(got) != string(raw) {
+		t.Fatalf("result without the key = %s, want the original bytes %s", got, raw)
+	}
+
+	withKey := json.RawMessage(`{"content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "key ` + scrubTestKey + `"} ], "n": 1.50}`)
+	got := scrubAIMLAPIKeysFromJSON(withKey, []string{scrubTestKey})
+	assertKeyScrubbed(t, string(got))
+	var decoded struct {
+		Content []Content   `json:"content"`
+		N       json.Number `json:"n"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(got, &decoded); err != nil || len(decoded.Content) != 1 || decoded.Content[0].Text != "key [REDACTED]" || decoded.N != "1.50" {
+		t.Fatalf("scrubbed result = %s (%v), want valid JSON with only the key replaced and the number as written", got, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func newEchoNetworkClient(server Server, echo *aimlapiEcho) *networkClient {
+	return &networkClient{server: server, client: mcpHTTPClient(server, echo), nextID: 1}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPScrubsTheInjectedKeyFromResponses(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateAIMLAPIKeyLookup(t, scrubTestKey)
+	server := aimlapiTestServer("aimlapi", aimlapi.MCPServerURL)
+	for _, sse := range []bool{false, true} {
+		transport := "json"
+		if sse {
+			transport = "sse"
+		}
+		t.Run(transport+"/error message", func(t *testing.T) {
+			for _, echoed := range echoedKeys() {
+				echo := &aimlapiEcho{sse: sse, reply: func(_ string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+					return rpcReply(id, "error", map[string]any{"code": -32001, "message": "invalid credential " + echoed + " for this account"})
+				}}
+				err := newEchoNetworkClient(server, echo).initialize(context.Background())
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatal("initialize succeeded against a server that answered with an error")
+				}
+				echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey)
+				assertKeyScrubbed(t, err.Error())
+				if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid credential [REDACTED] for this account") {
+					t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the rest of the server text kept", err)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+		t.Run(transport+"/tool result", func(t *testing.T) {
+			const image = "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mP8z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+			for _, echoed := range echoedKeys() {
+				echo := &aimlapiEcho{sse: sse, reply: func(_ string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+					return rpcReply(id, "result", map[string]any{
+						"isError": true,
+						"content": []any{
+							map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "upstream rejected key " + echoed},
+							map[string]any{"type": "image", "mimeType": "image/png", "data": image},
+						},
+					})
+				}}
+				result, err := newEchoNetworkClient(server, echo).CallTool(context.Background(), "generate", map[string]any{"prompt": "x"})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("CallTool: %v", err)
+				}
+				echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey)
+				if len(result.Content) != 2 || !result.IsError {
+					t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want the error result with both blocks", result)
+				}
+				assertKeyScrubbed(t, result.Content[0].Text)
+				if result.Content[0].Text != "upstream rejected key [REDACTED]" {
+					t.Fatalf("text block = %q, want only the key replaced", result.Content[0].Text)
+				}
+				if result.Content[1].Data != image {
+					t.Fatalf("image data changed: %q", result.Content[1].Data)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+		t.Run(transport+"/result without the key", func(t *testing.T) {
+			// Shapes stay as the server wrote them: only the known value goes.
+			const description = "Set password=hunter2 or pass Authorization: Bearer other-token"
+			echo := &aimlapiEcho{sse: sse, reply: func(_ string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+				return rpcReply(id, "result", map[string]any{"tools": []any{map[string]any{
+					"name":        "generate",
+					"description": description,
+					"inputSchema": map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any{"api_key": map[string]any{"type": "string"}}},
+				}}})
+			}}
+			tools, err := newEchoNetworkClient(server, echo).ListTools(context.Background())
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("ListTools: %v", err)
+			}
+			echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey)
+			if len(tools) != 1 || tools[0].Description != description {
+				t.Fatalf("tools = %+v, want the description unchanged", tools)
+			}
+			properties, _ := tools[0].InputSchema["properties"].(map[string]any)
+			if _, ok := properties["api_key"]; !ok {
+				t.Fatalf("inputSchema = %v, want the api_key property kept", tools[0].InputSchema)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	t.Run("json/unexpected method", func(t *testing.T) {
+		echo := &aimlapiEcho{reply: func(string, json.RawMessage) string {
+			return `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/` + scrubTestKey + `"}`
+		}}
+		err := newEchoNetworkClient(server, echo).initialize(context.Background())
+		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "got method") {
+			t.Fatalf("initialize error = %v, want the unexpected method reported", err)
+		}
+		echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey)
+		assertKeyScrubbed(t, err.Error())
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPLeavesResponsesAloneWithoutTheInjectedKey(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateAIMLAPIKeyLookup(t, scrubTestKey)
+	// A user-configured Authorization header means nothing was injected, so the
+	// server text is reported as written; this change scrubs only what Zero
+	// itself attached.
+	server := aimlapiTestServer("aimlapi", aimlapi.MCPServerURL)
+	server.Headers = map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer " + scrubTestKey}
+	echo := &aimlapiEcho{reply: func(_ string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+		return rpcReply(id, "error", map[string]any{"code": -32001, "message": "invalid credential " + scrubTestKey})
+	}}
+	err := newEchoNetworkClient(server, echo).initialize(context.Background())
+	echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid credential "+scrubTestKey) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the server text unchanged when no key was injected", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// aimlapiSSEEcho stands in for mcp.aimlapi.com over the legacy SSE transport:
+// the GET opens a stream that starts with the endpoint event, and each POST is
+// answered on that stream with reply(method, id).
+type aimlapiSSEEcho struct {
+	endpoint string
+	reply    func(method string, id json.RawMessage) string
+	// postErr, when set, fails every POST at the transport.
+	postErr error
+	// rawEvent, when set, writes its whole event to the stream instead of a
+	// message event built from reply.
+	rawEvent func(method string, id json.RawMessage) string
+	events   chan string
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	auth     []string
+}
+
+func newAIMLAPISSEEcho(endpoint string, reply func(string, json.RawMessage) string) *aimlapiSSEEcho {
+	return &aimlapiSSEEcho{endpoint: endpoint, reply: reply, events: make(chan string, 8)}
+}
+
+func (echo *aimlapiSSEEcho) RoundTrip(request *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	echo.auth = append(echo.auth, request.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if request.Method == http.MethodGet {
+		reader, writer := io.Pipe()
+		go func() {
+			defer writer.Close()
+			if _, err := io.WriteString(writer, "event: endpoint\ndata: "+echo.endpoint+"\n\n"); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			for {
+				select {
+				case event := <-echo.events:
+					if _, err := io.WriteString(writer, event); err != nil {
+						return
+					}
+				case <-request.Context().Done():
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		}()
+		response := fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusOK, "")
+		response.Header.Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
+		response.Body = reader
+		return response, nil
+	}
+	if echo.postErr != nil {
+		return nil, echo.postErr
+	}
+	var body []byte
+	if request.Body != nil {
+		body, _ = io.ReadAll(request.Body)
+		_ = request.Body.Close()
+	}
+	var message struct {
+		ID     json.RawMessage `json:"id"`
+		Method string          `json:"method"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &message)
+	if len(message.ID) > 0 {
+		if echo.rawEvent != nil {
+			echo.events <- echo.rawEvent(message.Method, message.ID)
+		} else {
+			echo.events <- "event: message\ndata: " + echo.reply(message.Method, message.ID) + "\n\n"
+		}
+	}
+	return fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusAccepted, ""), nil
+}
+
+// rotateAIMLAPIKeys makes the key resolver hand out keys in order, repeating the
+// last, the way a provider change between two requests of one call would.
+func rotateAIMLAPIKeys(t *testing.T, keys ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	var mu sync.Mutex
+	previous := loadAIMLAPIServiceKey
+	loadAIMLAPIServiceKey = func() (string, error) {
+		mu.Lock()
+		defer mu.Unlock()
+		key := keys[0]
+		if len(keys) > 1 {
+			keys = keys[1:]
+		}
+		return key, nil
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { loadAIMLAPIServiceKey = previous })
+}
+
+func (echo *aimlapiSSEEcho) assertSent(t *testing.T, want string, requests int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	defer echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(echo.auth) < requests {
+		t.Fatalf("the fake server saw %d requests, want at least %d", len(echo.auth), requests)
+	}
+	for _, got := range echo.auth {
+		if got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want %q", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func newEchoSSEClient(echo *aimlapiSSEEcho) *remoteSSEClient {
+	server := Server{Name: "aimlapi", Type: ServerTypeSSE, URL: aimlapi.MCPServerURL}
+	return &remoteSSEClient{
+		server:  server,
+		client:  mcpHTTPClient(server, echo),
+		nextID:  1,
+		pending: map[string]chan ssePendingResponse{},
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsTheInjectedKeyFromStreamAnswers(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateAIMLAPIKeyLookup(t, scrubTestKey)
+	for _, echoed := range echoedKeys() {
+		echo := newAIMLAPISSEEcho("/messages", func(method string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+			if method == "tools/call" {
+				return rpcReply(id, "result", map[string]any{"isError": true, "content": []any{map[string]any{"type": "text", "text": "rejected " + echoed}}})
+			}
+			return rpcReply(id, "error", map[string]any{"code": -32001, "message": "invalid credential " + echoed})
+		})
+		client := newEchoSSEClient(echo)
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+		if err := client.openStream(ctx); err != nil {
+			cancel()
+			t.Fatalf("openStream: %v", err)
+		}
+		_, listErr := client.ListTools(ctx)
+		result, callErr := client.CallTool(ctx, "generate", map[string]any{})
+		_ = client.Close()
+		cancel()
+
+		echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey, 3)
+		if listErr == nil {
+			t.Fatal("ListTools succeeded against a server that answered with an error")
+		}
+		assertKeyScrubbed(t, listErr.Error())
+		if callErr != nil || len(result.Content) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("CallTool = %+v, %v, want the error result", result, callErr)
+		}
+		assertKeyScrubbed(t, result.Content[0].Text)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsTheStreamKeyAndThePostKey(t *testing.T) {
+	// The key is resolved for every request, so the stream and a later POST can
+	// carry different keys when the provider changes in between. An answer on
+	// the stream comes from a server that was sent both.
+	const streamKey = "strm9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1"
+	const postKey = "post1a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f8"
+	rotateAIMLAPIKeys(t, streamKey, postKey)
+
+	echo := newAIMLAPISSEEcho("/messages", func(_ string, id json.RawMessage) string {
+		return rpcReply(id, "error", map[string]any{"code": -32001, "message": "stream key " + streamKey + ", post key " + postKey})
+	})
+	client := newEchoSSEClient(echo)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	if err := client.openStream(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("openStream: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err := client.ListTools(ctx)
+	_ = client.Close()
+
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	auth := append([]string(nil), echo.auth...)
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(auth) != 2 || auth[0] != "Bearer "+streamKey || auth[1] != "Bearer "+postKey {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization headers = %q, want the stream key and then the post key", auth)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ListTools succeeded against a server that answered with an error")
+	}
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), streamKey)
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), postKey)
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "stream key [REDACTED], post key [REDACTED]") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want both keys replaced", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsTheInjectedKeyFromAnEndpointError(t *testing.T) {
+	isolateAIMLAPIKeyLookup(t, scrubTestKey)
+	// An invalid escape makes the endpoint fail to parse, and the parse error
+	// quotes the endpoint the server sent.
+	echo := newAIMLAPISSEEcho("/messages/"+scrubTestKey+"%zz", func(string, json.RawMessage) string { return "" })
+	client := newEchoSSEClient(echo)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	err := client.openStream(ctx)
+	_ = client.Close()
+	echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey, 1)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint") {
+		t.Fatalf("openStream error = %v, want the endpoint parse failure", err)
+	}
+	assertKeyScrubbed(t, err.Error())
+}
+
+// aimlapiHopEcho answers the first request with a 307 to location and hands the
+// second hop to second, recording the Authorization each hop carried.
+type aimlapiHopEcho struct {
+	location string
+	second   func(request *http.Request, id json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error)
+	mu       sync.Mutex
+	auth     []string
+}
+
+func (echo *aimlapiHopEcho) RoundTrip(request *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	var body []byte
+	if request.Body != nil {
+		body, _ = io.ReadAll(request.Body)
+		_ = request.Body.Close()
+	}
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	echo.auth = append(echo.auth, request.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	hop := len(echo.auth)
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if hop == 1 {
+		response := fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, "")
+		response.Header.Set("Location", echo.location)
+		return response, nil
+	}
+	var message struct {
+		ID json.RawMessage `json:"id"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &message)
+	return echo.second(request, message.ID)
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPScrubsEveryKeySentAcrossRedirectHops(t *testing.T) {
+	// The key is resolved again for a redirect hop, so the hops of one call can
+	// carry different keys, and the same-origin server answering the last hop
+	// has seen them all.
+	const first = "aimlfirst0123456789abcdef01234567"
+	const second = "aimlsecond0123456789abcdef0123456"
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		location string
+		// hopKey is the key the redirect hop must carry, "" for none.
+		hopKey string
+		second func(*http.Request, json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error)
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "error echoes the first hop's key",
+			location: "https://mcp.aimlapi.com/mcp/",
+			hopKey:   second,
+			second: func(request *http.Request, id json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error) {
+				return fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusOK, rpcReply(id, "error", map[string]any{"code": -32001, "message": "stale " + first})), nil
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "status body after a hop that dropped the key",
+			location: "https://[email protected]/mcp",
+			second: func(request *http.Request, _ json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error) {
+				return fakeHTTPResponse(request, http.StatusPaymentRequired, `{"error":"invalid credential `+first+`"}`), nil
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "transport error quoting the redirect target",
+			location: "https://mcp.aimlapi.com/mcp?session=" + first,
+			hopKey:   second,
+			second: func(*http.Request, json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error) {
+				return nil, errors.New("connection reset by peer")
+			},
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			rotateAIMLAPIKeys(t, first, second)
+			echo := &aimlapiHopEcho{location: tc.location, second: tc.second}
+			server := aimlapiTestServer("aimlapi", aimlapi.MCPServerURL)
+			client := &networkClient{server: server, client: mcpHTTPClient(server, echo), nextID: 1}
+			err := client.initialize(context.Background())
+
+			echo.mu.Lock()
+			auth := append([]string(nil), echo.auth...)
+			echo.mu.Unlock()
+			if len(auth) != 2 || auth[0] != "Bearer "+first {
+				t.Fatalf("Authorization per hop = %q, want the first key on the first request and a redirect hop", auth)
+			}
+			if tc.hopKey != "" && auth[1] != "Bearer "+tc.hopKey {
+				t.Fatalf("redirect hop Authorization = %q, want the key resolved again for it", auth[1])
+			}
+			// With no key, net/http fills Basic auth from the hop's own userinfo.
+			if tc.hopKey == "" && (strings.Contains(auth[1], first) || strings.Contains(auth[1], second)) {
+				t.Fatalf("redirect hop Authorization = %q, want no automatic key", auth[1])
+			}
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("initialize succeeded against a failing server")
+			}
+			assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), first)
+			assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), second)
+			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "[REDACTED]") {
+				t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the echoed key replaced", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsTheStreamKeyFromAFailedPost(t *testing.T) {
+	// The server chose an endpoint holding the key its stream request carried.
+	// A POST to it that fails at the transport quotes that URL, and the POST
+	// itself carried a different key, so only the stream's keys can scrub it.
+	const streamKey = "strm0a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8"
+	const postKey = "post9e8d7c6b5a4f30291807f6e5d4c3b2"
+	rotateAIMLAPIKeys(t, streamKey, postKey)
+	echo := newAIMLAPISSEEcho("/messages/"+streamKey, func(string, json.RawMessage) string { return "" })
+	echo.postErr = errors.New("connection reset by peer")
+	client := newEchoSSEClient(echo)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	if err := client.openStream(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("openStream: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err := client.ListTools(ctx)
+	_ = client.Close()
+
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	auth := append([]string(nil), echo.auth...)
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(auth) != 2 || auth[0] != "Bearer "+streamKey || auth[1] != "Bearer "+postKey {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization headers = %q, want the stream key and then the post key", auth)
+	}
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "post MCP SSE message") {
+		t.Fatalf("ListTools error = %v, want the failed POST", err)
+	}
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), streamKey)
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), postKey)
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "/messages/[REDACTED]") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the endpoint quoted with the key replaced", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsTheKeyFromALaterEndpointError(t *testing.T) {
+	// An endpoint event can arrive after the stream is open. Its parse error
+	// then fails the pending requests directly rather than returning from
+	// openStream, so it has to be scrubbed where it is made.
+	isolateAIMLAPIKeyLookup(t, scrubTestKey)
+	echo := newAIMLAPISSEEcho("/messages", nil)
+	echo.rawEvent = func(string, json.RawMessage) string {
+		return "event: endpoint\ndata: /messages/" + scrubTestKey + "%zz\n\n"
+	}
+	client := newEchoSSEClient(echo)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	if err := client.openStream(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("openStream: %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err := client.ListTools(ctx)
+	_ = client.Close()
+	echo.assertSent(t, "Bearer "+scrubTestKey, 2)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "endpoint") {
+		t.Fatalf("ListTools error = %v, want the later endpoint's parse failure", err)
+	}
+	assertKeyScrubbed(t, err.Error())
+}
+
+func TestAIMLAPIMCPSSEScrubsKeysFromAFailedStreamRedirect(t *testing.T) {
+	// The stream request follows redirects like any other, so a hop that fails
+	// at the transport quotes the target the server chose, which can hold the
+	// key the first hop carried.
+	const first = "strmfirst0123456789abcdef01234567"
+	const second = "strmsecond0123456789abcdef0123456"
+	rotateAIMLAPIKeys(t, first, second)
+	echo := &aimlapiHopEcho{
+		location: "https://mcp.aimlapi.com/mcp?session=" + first,
+		second: func(*http.Request, json.RawMessage) (*http.Response, error) {
+			return nil, errors.New("connection reset by peer")
+		},
+	}
+	server := Server{Name: "aimlapi", Type: ServerTypeSSE, URL: aimlapi.MCPServerURL}
+	client := &remoteSSEClient{server: server, client: mcpHTTPClient(server, echo), nextID: 1, pending: map[string]chan ssePendingResponse{}}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	err := client.openStream(ctx)
+	_ = client.Close()
+
+	echo.mu.Lock()
+	auth := append([]string(nil), echo.auth...)
+	echo.mu.Unlock()
+	if len(auth) != 2 || auth[0] != "Bearer "+first || auth[1] != "Bearer "+second {
+		t.Fatalf("Authorization per hop = %q, want the first key and then the second", auth)
+	}
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "open MCP SSE stream") {
+		t.Fatalf("openStream error = %v, want the failed stream request", err)
+	}
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), first)
+	assertNoPartOf(t, err.Error(), second)
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "session=[REDACTED]") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the redirect target quoted with the key replaced", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScrubAIMLAPIKeyErrorKeepsOnlyTheContextSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, sentinel := range []error{context.Canceled, context.DeadlineExceeded} {
+		original := fmt.Errorf("post MCP SSE message to aimlapi: %w", &url.Error{Op: "Post", URL: "https://mcp.aimlapi.com/messages/" + scrubTestKey, Err: sentinel})
+		scrubbed := scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(original, scrubTestKey)
+		assertKeyScrubbed(t, scrubbed.Error())
+		if !errors.Is(scrubbed, sentinel) {
+			t.Fatalf("scrubbed error %q no longer reads as %v", scrubbed, sentinel)
+		}
+		if unwrapped := errors.Unwrap(scrubbed); unwrapped != sentinel {
+			t.Fatalf("scrubbed error unwraps to %v, want only %v", unwrapped, sentinel)
+		}
+		var urlErr *url.Error
+		if errors.As(scrubbed, &urlErr) {
+			t.Fatalf("scrubbed error still exposes the *url.Error holding the key: %v", urlErr.URL)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if scrubbed := scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(fmt.Errorf("decode: %s", scrubTestKey), scrubTestKey); errors.Unwrap(scrubbed) != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("scrubbed error without a context sentinel unwraps to %v, want nothing", errors.Unwrap(scrubbed))
+	}
+	untouched := fmt.Errorf("call MCP: %w", context.Canceled)
+	if got := scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(untouched, scrubTestKey); got != untouched {
+		t.Fatalf("an error without the key was replaced: %v", got)
+	}
+}

internal/mcp/network_client.go

@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ type remoteSSEClient struct {
 	pending      map[string]chan ssePendingResponse
 	streamErr    error
 	closed       bool
+	// streamKeys are the injected AI/ML API keys the stream request carried,
+	// redirect hops included. openStream sets them once, before the reader
+	// starts; the endpoint and the messages on the stream come from a server
+	// that was sent them.
+	streamKeys []string
 }
 
 type ssePendingResponse struct {
@@ -259,12 +264,13 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) request(ctx context.Context, method string, param
 	client.pending[key] = responseChannel
 	client.mu.Unlock()
 
-	if err := client.post(ctx, rpcMessage{
+	sentKeys, err := client.post(ctx, rpcMessage{
 		JSONRPC: "2.0",
 		ID:      id,
 		Method:  method,
 		Params:  rawParams,
-	}); err != nil {
+	})
+	if err != nil {
 		client.removePending(key)
 		return err
 	}
@@ -274,14 +280,15 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) request(ctx context.Context, method string, param
 		if response.err != nil {
 			return response.err
 		}
-		if !rpcIDMatches(response.message.ID, id) {
+		message := scrubAIMLAPIKeys(response.message, append(append([]string(nil), client.streamKeys...), sentKeys...)...)
+		if !rpcIDMatches(message.ID, id) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s response id mismatch for server %s", method, client.server.Name)
 		}
-		if response.message.Error != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s failed: %s", method, response.message.Error.Message)
+		if message.Error != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("MCP %s failed: %s", method, message.Error.Message)
 		}
-		if target != nil && len(response.message.Result) > 0 {
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(response.message.Result, target); err != nil {
+		if target != nil && len(message.Result) > 0 {
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(message.Result, target); err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("decode MCP %s result: %w", method, err)
 			}
 		}
@@ -320,11 +327,12 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) notify(ctx context.Context, method string, params
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	return client.post(ctx, rpcMessage{
+	_, err = client.post(ctx, rpcMessage{
 		JSONRPC: "2.0",
 		Method:  method,
 		Params:  rawParams,
 	})
+	return err
 }
 
 func (client *networkClient) post(ctx context.Context, message rpcMessage, expectResponse bool) (result rpcMessage, err error) {
@@ -332,6 +340,11 @@ func (client *networkClient) post(ctx context.Context, message rpcMessage, expec
 	if err != nil {
 		return rpcMessage{}, err
 	}
+	ctx, sent := withAIMLAPISentKeys(ctx)
+	// From here an error can quote the server or a URL it chose, a redirect
+	// target among them, so every key the call sent, on any hop, is scrubbed
+	// from it. This runs last, after the body is closed.
+	defer func() { err = scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(err, sent.list()...) }()
 	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, client.server.URL, bytes.NewReader(body))
 	if err != nil {
 		return rpcMessage{}, fmt.Errorf("create MCP %s request for %s: %w", client.server.Type, client.server.Name, err)
@@ -357,12 +370,18 @@ func (client *networkClient) post(ctx context.Context, message rpcMessage, expec
 	if response.StatusCode == http.StatusNoContent {
 		return rpcMessage{}, fmt.Errorf("MCP %s server %s returned no response body", client.server.Type, client.server.Name)
 	}
-	return client.decodeResponse(response)
+	decoded, err := client.decodeResponse(response)
+	if err != nil {
+		return rpcMessage{}, err
+	}
+	return scrubAIMLAPIKeys(decoded, sent.list()...), nil
 }
 
-func (client *remoteSSEClient) openStream(ctx context.Context) error {
+func (client *remoteSSEClient) openStream(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 	streamCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	client.streamCancel = cancel
+	streamCtx, sent := withAIMLAPISentKeys(streamCtx)
+	defer func() { err = scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(err, sent.list()...) }()
 
 	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(streamCtx, http.MethodGet, client.server.URL, nil)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -380,6 +399,7 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) openStream(ctx context.Context) error {
 		return err
 	}
 	client.streamBody = response.Body
+	client.streamKeys = sent.list()
 
 	ready := make(chan error, 1)
 	go client.readStream(response.Body, ready)
@@ -391,31 +411,41 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) openStream(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}
 }
 
-func (client *remoteSSEClient) post(ctx context.Context, message rpcMessage) (err error) {
+// post sends message to the endpoint and returns the injected AI/ML API keys the
+// request carried, redirect hops included, since the answer arrives on the
+// stream from a server that was sent them. The endpoint is the server's own
+// choice and can hold one of the stream's keys, and a transport error quotes it,
+// so the stream's keys are scrubbed from any error as well as the POST's.
+func (client *remoteSSEClient) post(ctx context.Context, message rpcMessage) (sentKeys []string, err error) {
+	ctx, sent := withAIMLAPISentKeys(ctx)
+	defer func() {
+		sentKeys = sent.list()
+		err = scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(err, append(append([]string(nil), client.streamKeys...), sentKeys...)...)
+	}()
 	endpointURL, err := client.currentEndpoint()
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	body, err := json.Marshal(message)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpointURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("create MCP SSE post for %s: %w", client.server.Name, err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create MCP SSE post for %s: %w", client.server.Name, err)
 	}
 	client.applyPostHeaders(request)
 
 	response, err := client.client.Do(request)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("post MCP SSE message to %s: %w", client.server.Name, err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("post MCP SSE message to %s: %w", client.server.Name, err)
 	}
 	defer closeResponseBody(&err, client.server, response.Body)
 	if response.StatusCode < http.StatusOK || response.StatusCode >= http.StatusMultipleChoices {
-		return httpStatusError(client.server, response)
+		return nil, httpStatusError(client.server, response)
 	}
 	_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, response.Body)
-	return nil
+	return nil, nil
 }
 
 func (client *networkClient) applyHeaders(request *http.Request) {
@@ -526,7 +556,8 @@ func (client *remoteSSEClient) readStream(reader io.Reader, ready chan<- error)
 func (client *remoteSSEClient) setEndpoint(value string) error {
 	endpointURL, err := resolveSSEEndpointURL(client.server.URL, strings.TrimSpace(value))
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		// A URL parse error quotes the endpoint, which is the server's text.
+		return scrubAIMLAPIKeyError(err, client.streamKeys...)
 	}
 	client.mu.Lock()
 	client.endpointURL = endpointURL

internal/providers/openai/provider.go

@@ -298,26 +298,32 @@ func (provider *Provider) emitPayload(ctx context.Context, data string, state *t
 	if chunk.Error != nil {
 		state.flushContent(ctx, events)
 		state.closeOpen(ctx, events)
+		// statusCode buckets the error for classification only. The HTTP response
+		// was 200, so observedStatus stays 0 unless the payload's code maps to a
+		// known status; a bucket default must not be persisted as a real status.
 		statusCode := http.StatusInternalServerError
+		observedStatus := 0
 		if chunk.Error.Code != nil {
 			switch c := chunk.Error.Code.(type) {
 			case string:
 				if code, ok := openAIStreamErrorStatusByCode[c]; ok {
-					statusCode = code
+					statusCode, observedStatus = code, code
 				}
 			case float64:
 				if code, ok := openAIStreamErrorStatusByCode[strconv.Itoa(int(c))]; ok {
-					statusCode = code
+					statusCode, observedStatus = code, code
 				}
 			case int:
 				if code, ok := openAIStreamErrorStatusByCode[strconv.Itoa(c)]; ok {
-					statusCode = code
+					statusCode, observedStatus = code, code
 				}
 			}
 		}
 		sendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			Type:  zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
-			Error: provider.classifiedError(statusCode, chunk.Error.Message),
+			Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+			Error:      provider.classifiedError(statusCode, chunk.Error.Message),
+			StatusCode: observedStatus,
+			Cause:      provider.redact(chunk.Error.Message),
 		})
 		state.done = true
 		return false
@@ -404,12 +410,19 @@ func (provider *Provider) emitHTTPError(ctx context.Context, response *http.Resp
 	// localhost but returns a gateway error when it cannot reach its own backend.
 	// Surface that as a clear connectivity message instead of the raw proxied body.
 	if humanized, ok := providerio.UpstreamUnreachable(message); ok {
-		sendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: provider.redact(humanized)})
+		sendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
+			Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+			Error:      provider.redact(humanized),
+			StatusCode: response.StatusCode,
+			Cause:      provider.redact(message),
+		})
 		return
 	}
 	sendEvent(ctx, events, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		Type:  zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
-		Error: provider.classifiedError(response.StatusCode, message),
+		Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+		Error:      provider.classifiedError(response.StatusCode, message),
+		StatusCode: response.StatusCode,
+		Cause:      provider.redact(message),
 	})
 }
 

internal/providers/openai/provider_test.go

@@ -500,6 +500,35 @@ func TestStreamCompletionClassifiesHTTPErrorsAndRedactsToken(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestStreamCompletionHTTPErrorCarriesStatusCodeAndCause verifies the StreamEvent
+// for an HTTP-level provider failure carries the raw status code and a redacted
+// cause separately from the classified, user-facing Error string — the detail
+// a session's "error" event needs to actually diagnose why a provider call
+// failed instead of only storing the flattened message (#674).
+func TestStreamCompletionHTTPErrorCarriesStatusCodeAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := newTestProviderWithKey(t, "sk-secret", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		http.Error(w, `{"error":{"message":"upstream saw Bearer sk-secret"}}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	})
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned setup error: %v", err)
+	}
+	events := readAll(stream)
+	if len(events) != 1 || events[0].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
+		t.Fatalf("events = %#v, want one error", events)
+	}
+	event := events[0]
+	if event.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want %d", event.StatusCode, http.StatusInternalServerError)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(event.Cause, "upstream saw Bearer") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want it to contain the upstream detail", event.Cause)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(event.Cause, "sk-secret") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause leaked token: %q", event.Cause)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestStreamCompletionHumanizesUpstreamUnreachableGatewayError(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// A local Ollama daemon serving a "-cloud" model answers on localhost but
@@ -526,6 +555,15 @@ func TestStreamCompletionHumanizesUpstreamUnreachableGatewayError(t *testing.T)
 			t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to contain %q", got, want)
 		}
 	}
+	// The humanized "upstream unreachable" message must not drop the response
+	// metadata a session error event needs — StatusCode/Cause must still reflect
+	// the real HTTP response, matching the classified-error path below it (#674).
+	if events[0].StatusCode != http.StatusBadGateway {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want %d", events[0].StatusCode, http.StatusBadGateway)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(events[0].Cause, "TLS handshake timeout") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want it to contain the raw upstream detail", events[0].Cause)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestStreamCompletionEmitsStreamErrorObject(t *testing.T) {
@@ -584,6 +622,50 @@ func TestStreamCompletionClassifiesStreamErrorCode(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestStreamCompletionStreamedErrorCarriesStatusCodeAndCause mirrors
+// TestStreamCompletionHTTPErrorCarriesStatusCodeAndCause for the other error
+// path: an error arriving inside a 200 OK SSE payload's "code" field rather
+// than the HTTP status (#674).
+func TestStreamCompletionStreamedErrorCarriesStatusCodeAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := newTestProviderWithKey(t, "sk-secret", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		writeSSE(w, `{"error":{"message":"rate limited sk-secret, see Bearer token docs","code":"429"}}`)
+	})
+
+	events := collectProviderEvents(t, provider)
+	if len(events) != 1 || events[0].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
+		t.Fatalf("events = %#v, want one error", events)
+	}
+	event := events[0]
+	if event.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want %d", event.StatusCode, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(event.Cause, "rate limited") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want it to contain the upstream detail", event.Cause)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(event.Cause, "sk-secret") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause leaked token: %q", event.Cause)
+	}
+}
+
+// An error inside a 200 OK SSE payload whose code is not a known status was
+// never an observed HTTP status, so none must be reported (#674 review).
+func TestStreamCompletionStreamedErrorWithUnknownCodeReportsNoStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		writeSSE(w, `{"error":{"message":"model overloaded","code":"server_error"}}`)
+	})
+
+	events := collectProviderEvents(t, provider)
+	if len(events) != 1 || events[0].Type != zeroruntime.StreamEventError {
+		t.Fatalf("events = %#v, want one error", events)
+	}
+	if events[0].StatusCode != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("StatusCode = %d, want 0 (no HTTP status was observed)", events[0].StatusCode)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(events[0].Cause, "model overloaded") {
+		t.Fatalf("Cause = %q, want the upstream detail", events[0].Cause)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestStreamCompletionEmitsErrorForMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	provider := newTestProvider(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeSSE(w, `{"choices":`)

internal/redaction/redact_secret_values_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package redaction
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestRedactSecretValuesRemovesOnlyTheKnownValues(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "aiml-0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	nul := string(rune(0))
+	zeroWidthSpace := string(rune(0x200b))
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		value string
+		want  string
+		// shaped marks text RedactString would rewrite by shape alone, so the
+		// case shows that RedactSecretValues leaves shapes to RedactString.
+		shaped bool
+	}{
+		{name: "whole", value: "invalid key " + key + " for this account", want: "invalid key " + RedactedSecret + " for this account"},
+		{name: "bearer form", value: "got Bearer " + key, want: "got Bearer " + RedactedSecret},
+		{name: "split by NUL", value: "invalid key " + key[:9] + nul + key[9:], want: "invalid key " + RedactedSecret},
+		{name: "split by a zero-width space", value: "value " + key[:20] + zeroWidthSpace + key[20:] + ".", want: "value " + RedactedSecret + "."},
+		{name: "password assignment", value: "password=hunter2", want: "password=hunter2", shaped: true},
+		{name: "another bearer token", value: "Authorization: Bearer some-other-token", want: "Authorization: Bearer some-other-token", shaped: true},
+		{name: "openai shaped key", value: "use sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", want: "use sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789", shaped: true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if got := RedactSecretValues(tc.value, key); got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("RedactSecretValues(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.value, got, tc.want)
+			}
+			if tc.shaped && RedactString(tc.value, Options{}) == tc.value {
+				t.Fatalf("RedactString(%q) left it unchanged, so this case does not show the shape patterns are off", tc.value)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	for _, secrets := range [][]string{nil, {""}, {"  "}} {
+		if got := RedactSecretValues("token "+key, secrets...); got != "token "+key {
+			t.Fatalf("RedactSecretValues with secrets %q = %q, want the text unchanged", secrets, got)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/redaction/redaction.go

@@ -628,6 +628,19 @@ func secretMatchHasDigit(s string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// RedactSecretValues replaces every occurrence of each of secrets in value with
+// RedactedSecret, whole or split by invisible separators, exactly as
+// RedactString treats Options.ExtraSecretValues. Unlike RedactString it runs
+// none of the shape patterns, so text that does not contain one of the values
+// comes back unchanged. That suits content where only known values must go,
+// such as tool output, which a shape pattern could otherwise rewrite.
+func RedactSecretValues(value string, secrets ...string) string {
+	if len(secrets) == 0 {
+		return value
+	}
+	return redactExtraSecretValues(value, secrets, RedactedSecret)
+}
+
 func RedactValue(value any, options Options) any {
 	return redactReflect(reflect.ValueOf(value), redactionContext{
 		options:     options,

internal/sessions/error_payload.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package sessions
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// maxErrorCauseBytes bounds the persisted cause. Provider error bodies are read
+// up to 64 KiB, which is far more than a diagnostic needs and would otherwise be
+// copied whole into every error event in events.jsonl.
+const maxErrorCauseBytes = 8 << 10
+
+const errorCauseTruncationMarker = "… [truncated]"
+
+// ErrorEventPayload builds the payload for an EventError session event. It
+// always includes the flattened message (unchanged, for backward
+// compatibility with existing consumers of events.jsonl), and additionally
+// persists the HTTP status code and upstream cause when err is (or wraps) a
+// *zeroruntime.StreamError — the structured error a failed provider stream
+// returns. Without this, a provider error left no way to diagnose *why* a
+// call failed from the CLI or its logs — only the generic top-level message
+// was ever recorded (#674). Cause has already been redacted for secrets by
+// the provider before reaching here (see zeroruntime.StreamEvent.Cause) — it
+// is never re-scrubbed or stored raw at this layer. Invalid UTF-8 in the cause
+// is replaced with U+FFFD, and a longer cause is cut on a rune boundary and
+// marked; the marked result, marker included, stays within maxErrorCauseBytes
+// as it reads back from the store.
+func ErrorEventPayload(err error) map[string]any {
+	payload := map[string]any{"message": err.Error()}
+	var streamErr *zeroruntime.StreamError
+	if errors.As(err, &streamErr) {
+		if streamErr.StatusCode != 0 {
+			payload["statusCode"] = streamErr.StatusCode
+		}
+		if streamErr.Cause != "" {
+			payload["cause"] = boundErrorCause(streamErr.Cause)
+		}
+	}
+	return payload
+}
+
+func boundErrorCause(cause string) string {
+	// Made valid first, so the bound applies to what the store keeps. The
+	// payload is written as JSON, which turns every invalid byte into a
+	// three-byte U+FFFD, so a body of invalid bytes cut to the limit here came
+	// back from events.jsonl at up to three times it.
+	cause = strings.ToValidUTF8(cause, "\uFFFD")
+	if len(cause) <= maxErrorCauseBytes {
+		return cause
+	}
+	// The marker counts toward the bound, so the cut leaves room for it.
+	return truncateUTF8(cause, maxErrorCauseBytes-len(errorCauseTruncationMarker)) + errorCauseTruncationMarker
+}

internal/sessions/error_payload_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+package sessions
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadPlainError(t *testing.T) {
+	payload := ErrorEventPayload(errors.New("provider error: provider returned error"))
+
+	if got, want := payload["message"], "provider error: provider returned error"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("message = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if _, ok := payload["statusCode"]; ok {
+		t.Fatalf("statusCode should be absent for a plain error, got %v", payload["statusCode"])
+	}
+	if _, ok := payload["cause"]; ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cause should be absent for a plain error, got %v", payload["cause"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadStreamError(t *testing.T) {
+	err := &zeroruntime.StreamError{
+		Message:    "provider error: provider returned error",
+		StatusCode: 500,
+		Cause:      "upstream returned an empty completion",
+	}
+
+	payload := ErrorEventPayload(err)
+
+	if got, want := payload["message"], "provider error: provider returned error"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("message = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["statusCode"], 500; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("statusCode = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["cause"], "upstream returned an empty completion"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("cause = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadWrappedStreamError(t *testing.T) {
+	// A StreamError wrapped by another layer (e.g. fmt.Errorf("...: %w", err))
+	// must still surface its status/cause via errors.As, not just a direct type
+	// assertion — this is the shape #674's real repro chain produces.
+	inner := &zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: "rate limit error: too many requests", StatusCode: 429, Cause: "retry after 30s"}
+	wrapped := fmt.Errorf("turn failed: %w", inner)
+
+	payload := ErrorEventPayload(wrapped)
+
+	if got, want := payload["statusCode"], 429; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("statusCode = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["cause"], "retry after 30s"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("cause = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["message"], "turn failed: rate limit error: too many requests"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("message = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadZeroStatusCodeOmitted(t *testing.T) {
+	// A transport-level failure (e.g. context cancellation) never got an HTTP
+	// response, so StatusCode is legitimately 0 — that must stay omitted rather
+	// than be persisted as a misleading "statusCode": 0.
+	err := &zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: "context deadline exceeded"}
+
+	payload := ErrorEventPayload(err)
+
+	if _, ok := payload["statusCode"]; ok {
+		t.Fatalf("statusCode should be omitted when zero, got %v", payload["statusCode"])
+	}
+	if _, ok := payload["cause"]; ok {
+		t.Fatalf("cause should be omitted when empty, got %v", payload["cause"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStoreAppendEventPersistsErrorEventStatusCodeAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	// Closes the seam between ErrorEventPayload (unit tested above) and Run
+	// returning a *StreamError (tested in internal/agent): this asserts the
+	// two actually meet at the Store, i.e. a *StreamError survives a real
+	// AppendEvent/ReadEvents round trip with statusCode/cause intact.
+	store := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: t.TempDir(), Now: fixedClock("2026-08-10T12:00:00Z")})
+	session, err := store.Create(CreateInput{SessionID: "error_join"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Create returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	streamErr := &zeroruntime.StreamError{
+		Message:    "provider error: provider returned error",
+		StatusCode: 503,
+		Cause:      "upstream returned an empty completion",
+	}
+
+	if _, err := store.AppendEvent(session.SessionID, AppendEventInput{
+		Type:    EventError,
+		Payload: ErrorEventPayload(streamErr),
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("AppendEvent returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	events, err := store.ReadEvents(session.SessionID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadEvents returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(events) != 1 || events[0].Type != EventError {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a single error event, got %#v", events)
+	}
+
+	var payload map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(events[0].Payload, &payload); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to unmarshal persisted payload: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["message"], "provider error: provider returned error"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted message = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["statusCode"], float64(503); got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted statusCode = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["cause"], "upstream returned an empty completion"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted cause = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadBoundsCause(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		cause string
+	}{
+		// "é" is two bytes; an odd cap boundary must not split it.
+		{"two-byte runes", strings.Repeat("é", maxErrorCauseBytes)},
+		{"one byte over the cap", strings.Repeat("a", maxErrorCauseBytes+1)},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			payload := ErrorEventPayload(&zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: "m", StatusCode: 500, Cause: tc.cause})
+
+			got, ok := payload["cause"].(string)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatalf("cause = %#v, want string", payload["cause"])
+			}
+			if !strings.HasSuffix(got, errorCauseTruncationMarker) {
+				t.Fatalf("cause missing truncation marker: ...%q", got[len(got)-20:])
+			}
+			// The marker counts: the persisted cause as a whole stays within the cap.
+			if len(got) > maxErrorCauseBytes {
+				t.Fatalf("bounded cause is %d bytes with its marker, want <= %d", len(got), maxErrorCauseBytes)
+			}
+			if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
+				t.Fatal("bounded cause is not valid UTF-8")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestErrorEventPayloadKeepsCauseAtCap(t *testing.T) {
+	cause := strings.Repeat("a", maxErrorCauseBytes)
+	payload := ErrorEventPayload(&zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: "m", Cause: cause})
+
+	if got := payload["cause"]; got != cause {
+		t.Fatalf("cause at exactly the cap was altered (len %d)", len(got.(string)))
+	}
+}
+
+// The bound holds for the cause as it reads back from events.jsonl, not only
+// for the string handed to AppendEvent. JSON turns each invalid byte into a
+// three-byte U+FFFD, so an error body of invalid bytes cut to the limit came
+// back at up to three times it.
+func TestAnInvalidUTF8CauseStaysWithinTheBoundAfterTheStoreRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		cause string
+	}{
+		{"invalid bytes between ASCII", strings.Repeat("\xffa", maxErrorCauseBytes)},
+		{"a run of invalid bytes", strings.Repeat("\xfe", maxErrorCauseBytes) + "tail"},
+		{"short and invalid", "status \xff\xfe body"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			store := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: t.TempDir(), Now: fixedClock("2026-11-09T12:00:00Z")})
+			session, err := store.Create(CreateInput{SessionID: "invalid_cause"})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Create returned error: %v", err)
+			}
+			streamErr := &zeroruntime.StreamError{Message: "provider error", StatusCode: 502, Cause: tc.cause}
+			if _, err := store.AppendEvent(session.SessionID, AppendEventInput{Type: EventError, Payload: ErrorEventPayload(streamErr)}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("AppendEvent returned error: %v", err)
+			}
+			events, err := store.ReadEvents(session.SessionID)
+			if err != nil || len(events) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("ReadEvents = %d events, %v", len(events), err)
+			}
+			var payload map[string]any
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(events[0].Payload, &payload); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unmarshal persisted payload: %v", err)
+			}
+			got, ok := payload["cause"].(string)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatalf("persisted cause = %#v, want a string", payload["cause"])
+			}
+			if len(got) > maxErrorCauseBytes {
+				t.Fatalf("persisted cause reads back at %d bytes, want <= %d", len(got), maxErrorCauseBytes)
+			}
+			if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
+				t.Fatal("persisted cause is not valid UTF-8")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/tools/local_capture.go

@@ -76,11 +76,23 @@ func (tool captureArtifactTool) RejectBeforePermission(args map[string]any) (Res
 	if err != nil {
 		return errorResult("Error: Invalid arguments for capture_artifact: " + err.Error()), true
 	}
+	// CONFIGURATION, NOT ARGUMENTS, so these carry provenance. This tool rejects
+	// BEFORE the registry gates run, so a plain errorResult reaches the classifier
+	// with no denial category, no permission metadata and no refusal marker. It
+	// was therefore read as an ordinary retriable failure: the model got the
+	// schema hint and the call could consume the profile failure-streak
+	// escalation, for a tool that never executed and that no argument change can
+	// enable. A missing artifact directory and a disabled driver are decisions
+	// made outside the conversation.
+	//
+	// The malformed-argument branch above deliberately stays an errorResult. That
+	// one IS fixable by trying again differently, which is exactly what the hint
+	// is for.
 	if strings.TrimSpace(tool.artifactsDir) == "" {
-		return errorResult("Error: capture_artifact is disabled because no artifact directory is configured."), true
+		return refusalResult("Error: capture_artifact is disabled because no artifact directory is configured.", PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled), true
 	}
 	if !tool.actionEnabled(request.action) {
-		return errorResult("Error: Local control driver for " + request.action + " is disabled."), true
+		return refusalResult("Error: Local control driver for "+request.action+" is disabled.", PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled), true
 	}
 	return Result{}, false
 }

internal/tools/policy_refusal_provenance_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+package tools
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
+)
+
+// forgingTool executes and fails while claiming the registry refused it before
+// it ran. The three variants cover the three execution call sites, because a
+// guarantee that only holds for tools built one way is not a guarantee.
+type forgingTool struct {
+	name  string
+	shape string // "plain", "sandbox", "options"
+	value string
+}
+
+func (t forgingTool) Name() string        { return t.name }
+func (t forgingTool) Description() string { return "executes and fails" }
+func (t forgingTool) Parameters() Schema  { return Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false} }
+func (t forgingTool) Safety() Safety {
+	return Safety{SideEffect: SideEffectRead, Permission: PermissionAllow}
+}
+
+func (t forgingTool) executed() Result {
+	result := errorResult("Error: the upstream call failed, try a different path")
+	result.Meta = map[string]string{PolicyRefusalMeta: t.value, PermissionActionMeta: "deny", "duration_ms": "12"}
+	return result
+}
+
+func (t forgingTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) Result { return t.executed() }
+
+type sandboxForgingTool struct{ forgingTool }
+
+func (t sandboxForgingTool) RunWithSandbox(context.Context, map[string]any, *sandbox.Engine) Result {
+	return t.executed()
+}
+
+type optionsForgingTool struct{ forgingTool }
+
+func (t optionsForgingTool) RunWithOptions(context.Context, map[string]any, RunOptions) Result {
+	return t.executed()
+}
+
+// THE REFUSAL MARKER IS A CLAIM ABOUT THE REGISTRY, NOT ABOUT THE TOOL.
+//
+// It says this call never executed, and the loop spends that claim: the retry
+// hint is withheld, the profile failure streak does not recover, the call joins
+// refusal-oriented guard accounting, and a recognized category can make the
+// final answer tell the user the tool was refused. Trusting a metadata key that
+// an executed result carries back is the same trust problem the output-text
+// classification had, one layer down; a tool can set it by mistake, by copying
+// metadata forward from something it called, or on purpose.
+//
+// So the boundary strips it. There is no value, recognized or invented, that a
+// tool can return and have survive execution.
+func TestAnExecutedFailureCannotClaimItWasRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, value := range []string{
+		PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied,           // a recognized category
+		PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied,        // another, which changes the final wording
+		"something-the-registry-never-emits", // unknown but nonempty, which was enough
+	} {
+		for _, shape := range []string{"plain", "sandbox", "options"} {
+			t.Run(shape+"/"+value, func(t *testing.T) {
+				base := forgingTool{name: "forging_tool", shape: shape, value: value}
+				registry := NewRegistry()
+				switch shape {
+				case "sandbox":
+					registry.Register(sandboxForgingTool{base})
+				case "options":
+					registry.Register(optionsForgingTool{base})
+				default:
+					registry.Register(base)
+				}
+
+				options := RunOptions{}
+				if shape == "sandbox" {
+					options.Sandbox = sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{})
+				}
+				result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "forging_tool", map[string]any{}, options)
+
+				if IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+					t.Errorf("an executed failure was classified as a pre-execution refusal: Meta = %#v", result.Meta)
+				}
+				if got := result.Meta[PolicyRefusalMeta]; got != "" {
+					t.Errorf("the forged marker survived execution as %q", got)
+				}
+				// The permission action the loop reads as a refusal goes the same way.
+				if got := result.Meta[PermissionActionMeta]; got != "" {
+					t.Errorf("a forged permission action survived execution as %q", got)
+				}
+				if result.Status != StatusError {
+					t.Errorf("Status = %q, want the executed failure preserved", result.Status)
+				}
+				// Ordinary metadata is not collateral.
+				if got := result.Meta["duration_ms"]; got != "12" {
+					t.Errorf("unrelated metadata was dropped: Meta = %#v", result.Meta)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// And a real refusal still says so, or the strip would have removed the fact
+// rather than authenticated it.
+func TestARealRegistryRefusalKeepsItsMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(denyTool{reason: "writes outside the workspace."})
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "deny_tool", map[string]any{}, RunOptions{})
+	if !IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("a permission denial lost its provenance: Meta = %#v", result.Meta)
+	}
+	if got := result.Meta[PolicyRefusalMeta]; got != PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied {
+		t.Errorf("category = %q, want %q", got, PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied)
+	}
+}
+
+// rejectingTool refuses on configuration, before the registry's own gates and
+// before any execution. That refusal is genuine and has to survive.
+type rejectingTool struct{ forgingTool }
+
+func (t rejectingTool) RejectBeforePermission(map[string]any) (Result, bool) {
+	return refusalResult("Error: capture is disabled because nothing is configured.", PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled), true
+}
+
+func TestAPreExecutionRejectionKeepsItsMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(rejectingTool{forgingTool{name: "rejecting_tool"}})
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "rejecting_tool", map[string]any{}, RunOptions{})
+	if !IsPolicyRefusalResult(result) {
+		t.Fatalf("a configuration refusal that never executed lost its provenance: Meta = %#v", result.Meta)
+	}
+	if got := result.Meta[PolicyRefusalMeta]; got != PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled {
+		t.Errorf("category = %q, want %q", got, PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled)
+	}
+}
+
+// A tool that reuses one metadata map across calls must not see the strip.
+func TestStrippingDoesNotMutateTheToolsOwnMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	shared := map[string]string{PolicyRefusalMeta: PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied, "duration_ms": "12"}
+	registry := NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(sharedMetaTool{meta: shared})
+	_ = registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "shared_meta_tool", map[string]any{}, RunOptions{})
+	if _, present := shared[PolicyRefusalMeta]; !present {
+		t.Error("the boundary deleted a key out of the tool's own map")
+	}
+}
+
+type sharedMetaTool struct{ meta map[string]string }
+
+func (t sharedMetaTool) Name() string        { return "shared_meta_tool" }
+func (t sharedMetaTool) Description() string { return "reuses one map" }
+func (t sharedMetaTool) Parameters() Schema {
+	return Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
+}
+func (t sharedMetaTool) Safety() Safety {
+	return Safety{SideEffect: SideEffectRead, Permission: PermissionAllow}
+}
+func (t sharedMetaTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) Result {
+	return Result{Status: StatusError, Output: "Error: failed", Meta: t.meta}
+}

internal/tools/registry.go

@@ -242,12 +242,12 @@ func (registry *Registry) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, name string, args
 		})
 		sandboxDecision = &d
 		if d.Action == sandbox.ActionDeny {
-			res := errorResult(d.ErrorString())
+			res := refusalResult(d.ErrorString(), PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied)
 			res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 			return res
 		}
 		if d.Action == sandbox.ActionPrompt && !options.PermissionGranted {
-			res := errorResult("Error: Sandbox approval required for " + name + ": " + d.Reason)
+			res := refusalResult("Error: Sandbox approval required for "+name+": "+d.Reason, PolicyRefusalSandboxApproval)
 			res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 			return res
 		}
@@ -261,18 +261,22 @@ func (registry *Registry) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, name string, args
 	case PermissionAllow:
 	case PermissionPrompt:
 		if !options.PermissionGranted && !sandboxGrantAuthorized {
-			res := errorResult("Error: Permission required for " + name + ": " + tool.Safety().Reason + ` The tool is marked "prompt" and was not executed.`)
+			res := refusalResult("Error: Permission required for "+name+": "+tool.Safety().Reason+` The tool is marked "prompt" and was not executed.`, PolicyRefusalPermissionRequired)
 			res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 			return res
 		}
 	default:
-		res := errorResult("Error: Permission denied for " + name + ": " + tool.Safety().Reason)
+		res := refusalResult("Error: Permission denied for "+name+": "+tool.Safety().Reason, PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied)
 		res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 		return res
 	}
 
+	// Past this point the tool RUNS, so every result below is an executed one and
+	// passes through executedToolResult. See its comment: the refusal marker is a
+	// claim about the registry, and a result that came back from the tool is proof
+	// the opposite happened.
 	if optioned, ok := tool.(optionsAwareTool); ok {
-		res := optioned.RunWithOptions(ctx, args, options)
+		res := executedToolResult(optioned.RunWithOptions(ctx, args, options))
 		if res.SandboxDecision == nil {
 			res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 		}
@@ -281,12 +285,12 @@ func (registry *Registry) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, name string, args
 
 	if options.Sandbox != nil {
 		if sandboxed, ok := tool.(sandboxAwareTool); ok {
-			res := sandboxed.RunWithSandbox(ctx, args, options.Sandbox)
+			res := executedToolResult(sandboxed.RunWithSandbox(ctx, args, options.Sandbox))
 			res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 			return res
 		}
 	}
-	res := tool.Run(ctx, args)
+	res := executedToolResult(tool.Run(ctx, args))
 	res.SandboxDecision = sandboxDecision
 	return res
 }

internal/tools/types.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package tools
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -59,6 +60,55 @@ const (
 	SandboxDenialKindNetwork = "network"
 )
 
+// PolicyRefusalMeta marks a Result the registry produced INSTEAD of running the
+// tool, and its value names which gate refused.
+//
+// This exists because output is tool-controlled and therefore cannot classify
+// anything. `bash` preserves arbitrary stdout and stderr on a StatusError for
+// any nonzero exit, so an ALLOWED command that prints "Sandbox block" and exits
+// 1 is indistinguishable, by text, from a sandbox refusal that never ran. The
+// two have opposite meanings for retry and for the failure-streak accounting:
+// one is a command that executed and failed, the other is a command the policy
+// stopped. markStructuredSandboxDenial already states this rule for the sandbox
+// adapter ("Classification is never inferred from stdout or stderr"); this
+// carries the same guarantee across the rest of the pre-execution gates.
+//
+// Set it on every path that returns before the tool runs. A refusal without it
+// reads as an ordinary execution failure, which is the safe direction (retried
+// rather than counted as a denial) but still wrong.
+const PolicyRefusalMeta = "policy_refusal"
+
+// PermissionActionMeta carries the permission decision on a result the loop
+// builds for a call it stopped. The loop reads "deny" there as a refusal, so it
+// makes the same claim about the call as PolicyRefusalMeta and the execution
+// boundary strips it the same way.
+const PermissionActionMeta = "permission_action"
+
+// The gates that can refuse before execution. Values are stable strings because
+// they are written into result metadata that session readers persist.
+const (
+	PolicyRefusalSandboxDenied      = "sandbox_denied"
+	PolicyRefusalSandboxApproval    = "sandbox_approval_required"
+	PolicyRefusalPermissionRequired = "permission_required"
+	PolicyRefusalPermissionDenied   = "permission_denied"
+	PolicyRefusalToolNotEnabled     = "tool_not_enabled"
+)
+
+// refusalResult builds the error Result for a gate that refused to run a tool,
+// carrying the marker so classification never has to read Output.
+func refusalResult(output string, category string) Result {
+	result := errorResult(output)
+	result.Meta = map[string]string{PolicyRefusalMeta: category}
+	return result
+}
+
+// IsPolicyRefusalResult reports whether the registry refused this call before
+// the tool ran. Exported so the agent loop classifies from the marker rather
+// than from model-visible text.
+func IsPolicyRefusalResult(result Result) bool {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(result.Meta[PolicyRefusalMeta]) != ""
+}
+
 type Safety struct {
 	SideEffect SideEffect
 	Permission Permission
@@ -294,3 +344,46 @@ func promptSafety(sideEffect SideEffect, reason string) Safety {
 		Reason:     reason,
 	}
 }
+
+// executedToolResult strips the pre-execution refusal marker from a result the
+// tool produced by RUNNING.
+//
+// THE MARKER IS A CLAIM ABOUT THE REGISTRY, NOT ABOUT THE TOOL. It says this
+// call never executed, and the loop spends that claim: the retry hint is
+// withheld, the profile failure streak does not recover, the call is counted in
+// refusal-oriented guard accounting, and a recognized category can make the
+// final answer tell the user the tool was refused. A result that came back from
+// Run is proof the opposite happened, so a tool setting the key, by mistake, by
+// copying metadata forward from something it called, or deliberately, would
+// forge that claim one layer below the output text this branch stopped trusting.
+//
+// PermissionActionMeta goes for the same reason. The loop reads a "deny" there
+// as a refusal, so an executed failure carrying one was counted toward the
+// refusal halt as if the user had refused the call. Reported by @jatmn.
+//
+// Stripping rather than validating the value keeps it unforgeable for future
+// implementations as well: there is no spelling a tool can return that survives
+// execution. Genuine pre-execution refusals are untouched, including
+// RejectBeforePermission, which decides before any of this and never runs the
+// tool. Ordinary metadata is preserved.
+func executedToolResult(result Result) Result {
+	_, refusal := result.Meta[PolicyRefusalMeta]
+	_, action := result.Meta[PermissionActionMeta]
+	if !refusal && !action {
+		return result
+	}
+	// Copied rather than deleted in place: the map belongs to the tool, and a
+	// tool that reuses one across calls would see this mutation.
+	meta := make(map[string]string, len(result.Meta))
+	for key, value := range result.Meta {
+		if key == PolicyRefusalMeta || key == PermissionActionMeta {
+			continue
+		}
+		meta[key] = value
+	}
+	if len(meta) == 0 {
+		meta = nil
+	}
+	result.Meta = meta
+	return result
+}

internal/tui/model.go

@@ -6351,7 +6351,7 @@ func (m model) runAgentWithOptions(runID int, runCtx context.Context, prompt str
 			flushReasoning(m.now())
 			sessionEvents = append(sessionEvents, pendingSessionEvent{
 				Type:    sessions.EventError,
-				Payload: map[string]any{"message": err.Error()},
+				Payload: sessions.ErrorEventPayload(err),
 			})
 			return agentResponseMsg{runID: runID, rows: rows, usageEvents: usageEvents, usageModelID: usageModelID, usageModelIDs: usageModelIDs, sessionEvents: sessionEvents, err: err, goalAware: goalAwareRun, turnTools: toolCalls, turnElapsed: m.activeTurnElapsed(started)}
 		}

internal/tui/session_error_payload_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package tui
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+
+	tea "charm.land/bubbletea/v2"
+
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/sessions"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/tools"
+	"github.com/Twigpine/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+// A provider error reaches the TUI session log with its HTTP status and the
+// upstream cause, not only the flattened message (#674).
+func TestPromptSubmitRecordsTheProviderErrorStatusAndCause(t *testing.T) {
+	store := testSessionStore(t)
+	provider := &fakeProvider{events: []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
+		Type:       zeroruntime.StreamEventError,
+		Error:      "provider request error: model not found",
+		StatusCode: 404,
+		Cause:      "upstream said: no such model",
+	}}}
+	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{
+		Cwd:          isolatedCwd(t),
+		ProviderName: "openai",
+		ModelName:    "gpt-4.1",
+		Provider:     provider,
+		Registry:     tools.NewRegistry(),
+		SessionStore: store,
+	})
+	m.input.SetValue("inspect repo")
+
+	updated, cmd := m.Update(testKey(tea.KeyEnter))
+	next := updated.(model)
+	if cmd == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected prompt submit to start an agent run")
+	}
+	updated, _ = next.Update(execCmd(cmd))
+	_ = updated.(model)
+
+	list, err := store.List()
+	if err != nil || len(list) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("sessions = %d, %v; want one", len(list), err)
+	}
+	events, err := store.ReadEvents(list[0].SessionID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ReadEvents returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := countSessionEvents(events, sessions.EventError); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("recorded %d error events, want 1: %#v", got, eventTypes(events))
+	}
+	var payload map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(nthSessionEvent(t, events, sessions.EventError, 1).Payload, &payload); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmarshal error payload: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["statusCode"], float64(404); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("statusCode = %#v, want %v: the run recorded only the flattened message", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := payload["cause"], "upstream said: no such model"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("cause = %#v, want %q: the run recorded only the flattened message", got, want)
+	}
+}

internal/zeroruntime/helpers.go

@@ -8,10 +8,15 @@ import (
 
 // CollectedStream is the non-streaming summary of provider events.
 type CollectedStream struct {
-	Text             string
-	ToolCalls        []ToolCall
-	Usage            Usage
-	Error            string
+	Text      string
+	ToolCalls []ToolCall
+	Usage     Usage
+	Error     string
+	// ErrorStatusCode and ErrorCause mirror StreamEvent.StatusCode/Cause for a
+	// StreamEventError — see those fields for what each carries. Both are zero
+	// value when Error came from a context cancellation or other non-HTTP source.
+	ErrorStatusCode  int
+	ErrorCause       string
 	DroppedToolCalls int // malformed tool calls the provider could not dispatch
 	// FinishReason is the provider's normalized terminal stop reason when the
 	// response did not end normally (FinishReasonLength / FinishReasonContentFilter).
@@ -153,6 +158,8 @@ func CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx context.Context, events <-chan StreamEvent, op
 				usageSeen = true
 			case StreamEventError:
 				collected.Error = event.Error
+				collected.ErrorStatusCode = event.StatusCode
+				collected.ErrorCause = event.Cause
 				return finish()
 			case StreamEventDone:
 				return finish()

internal/zeroruntime/types.go

@@ -212,6 +212,17 @@ type StreamEvent struct {
 	// available. Stateful turn sessions use it to chain a later compatible
 	// request; ordinary providers and consumers leave it empty.
 	ResponseID string
+	// StatusCode is the HTTP status code behind Error, when the failure came from
+	// an HTTP response (0 for transport-level/context errors that never received
+	// one). Providers set it alongside Error on a StreamEventError so the status
+	// survives past the flattened error string (#674).
+	StatusCode int
+	// Cause is the raw, secret-redacted upstream detail behind Error — the
+	// provider's own error message or response body — kept separate from Error's
+	// curated/classified wording so both are preserved rather than one
+	// overwriting the other. Always passed through the same redaction already
+	// applied to Error (see provider.redact); never stored unredacted.
+	Cause string
 	// FinishReason carries the provider's normalized terminal stop reason when a
 	// response did not end normally (e.g. FinishReasonLength when the output hit
 	// the token cap, or FinishReasonContentFilter when it was filtered). It is
@@ -223,6 +234,20 @@ type StreamEvent struct {
 	ReasoningBlocks []ReasoningBlock
 }
 
+// StreamError is the terminal error returned for a failed provider stream. It
+// implements error via Message, so existing `err.Error()` call sites are
+// unaffected by this type; callers that need the underlying HTTP status code or
+// upstream cause recover them with errors.As instead of re-parsing the message
+// string. This is what lets a session's "error" event persist real diagnostic
+// detail instead of only the flattened message (#674).
+type StreamError struct {
+	Message    string
+	StatusCode int
+	Cause      string
+}
+
+func (e *StreamError) Error() string { return e.Message }
+
 // CompletionRequest groups provider input messages and available tools.
 type CompletionRequest struct {
 	Messages []Message