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github-actions[bot] e666395d47 chore(main): release 0.4.0 (#625)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-17 13:25:31 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 9043baedcf fix(sandbox): scrub dynamic credential env vars (#682)
* fix(sandbox): scrub dynamic credential env vars

* fix(sandbox): tolerate env assignments in configured sensitive keys

A config value mistakenly given as a full assignment (e.g.
"COMPANY_LLM_SECRET=...") would never match the real env key during
scrubbing, silently re-exposing the credential to sandboxed commands.
normalizeSensitiveEnvKeys now keeps only the name part before '=' and
re-trims it, per PR review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(sandbox): scrub credentials on direct/degraded command plans

directCommandPlan (used when the native sandbox backend is unavailable,
disabled, or not required, including the EnforcementDegraded fallback)
left Env nil whenever spec.Env was nil, so exec.Cmd inherited the full
caller environment unscrubbed. Configured apiKeyEnv credentials and
dynamically named ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_CLIENT_SECRET variables leaked
through that path even though the wrapped sandbox plans already
scrubbed them.

Route direct plans through scrubSensitiveEnv the same way wrapped
plans do, snapshotting os.Environ() when spec.Env is nil so scrubbing
still applies. Adds a regression test covering the degraded-fallback
path with both a configured and a dynamically named secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 13:04:12 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19 4d8c31cf16 fix(config): enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable (#609)
A user-level MCP server disable is now sticky. The project config
(a cloned repo's ./.zero/config.json) cannot re-enable a server the
user disabled, and cannot disable a server the user explicitly enabled.

The previous merge just assigned base.Disabled = next.Disabled, so a repo
that set disabled:true could silently defeat a user's explicit mcp enable
<server>. The guard is now symmetric via a mergeMCPServer canReenable
flag: once a higher-trust scope has explicitly set the disabled flag, a
lower-trust layer may not override that decision in either direction. Only
the CLI override scope (canReenable=true) may lift a sticky user decision.

The prior disabledSet-before-check ordering bug is also fixed: the
higher-trust scope's prior disabledSet/Disabled is captured before folding
in next's flag, so a project layer can still disable a default-enabled
server (e.g. firecrawl) rather than being silently ignored.

Ports the fix onto main's refactored MCP merge (internal/config/mcp_merge.go
and mergeProjectMCPConfig), which splits project-scope merging from the
general mergeMCPConfig path.

Fixes #512
2026-07-17 13:03:32 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 824ecdbcf9 fix(hooks): run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts (#606)
* fix(hooks): run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts

On interrupt, Run returns with ctx already canceled. The deferred
dispatchSessionEnd call passed that same ctx into Hooks.Dispatch, whose
context.WithTimeout derives an already-canceled child context, so the
hook process never actually launches (recorded as timed-out/error in
the audit log). Since most sessions end via interrupt, sessionEnd
hooks were effectively unreliable.

Detach the sessionEnd dispatch from the run context's cancellation
with context.WithoutCancel so the dispatcher's own timeout still
applies without being short-circuited by the run's cancellation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* test(agent): fall back to GOROOT for hook regression

* test(agent): justify GOROOT fallback

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 13:03:14 +08:00
6b9c2f0c08 feat(aimlapi): AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) (#655)
* feat(aimlapi): AI/ML API guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance)

Add the AI/ML API provider integration to the zero CLI: a guided TUI
onboarding sub-flow that takes an existing key or an email top-up and
writes the issued key into the provider profile, attributed to the
Gitlawb rebate partner.

- internal/aimlapi: OpenAI-compatible client, partner-checkout top-up,
  key validation, streaming, and endpoint config (Paths A/B/C).
- providercatalog / providermodelcatalog: register the aimlapi provider
  with default headers and models.
- tui: aimlapi onboarding screen wired into the provider wizard and
  onboarding flow.

Default endpoints point at production (auth/app/api/pay/aimlapi.com);
each is overridable via AIMLAPI_*_URL env vars.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): address review findings in onboarding flow

- topup: use errors.As for the 5xx retry check so a wrapped APIError
  still retries instead of aborting a paid checkout.
- onboarding: a Path-A top-up on an email with no account now lands on a
  single coherent "key saved, balance not topped up" screen instead of a
  green "ready" plus a red error.
- onboarding: an empty amount field is rejected instead of silently
  falling through to the $25 default.
- collapse the two identical top-up prompt constants into MsgTopUpPrompt
  and drop the dead amountPrompt() branch.
- reuse stdlib maps.Clone instead of a third bespoke header-copy helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and sharpen amount validation

* fix(aimlapi): retry transient poll errors and surface real amount errors

* docs(aimlapi): document exported client API; drop out-of-scope gitignore entry

Addresses the two CodeRabbit PR checks on #655:

- Add doc comments to the exported aimlapi client API (Client, APIError,
  the session/checkout/onboarding types and their methods) and
  ParseAmountUSD, to satisfy the docstring-coverage check.
- Remove the unrelated /zero.exe~ .gitignore entry that an earlier
  review-fix commit added; it is out of scope for the provider work, so
  the PR no longer touches .gitignore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* fix(aimlapi): render aimlapi row like other recommended providers

* fix(aimlapi): resolve onboarding review findings (Path A funding, base URL, request cancellation)

* fix(aimlapi): validate pasted API keys

* test(aimlapi): clarify pasted key validation

* test(aimlapi): cover key-balance low-balance transition

* fix(aimlapi): reject non-finite top-up amounts

* fix(cli): scope and canonicalize provider headers

* fix(tui): distinguish invalid verification codes

* feat(aimlapi): resume account-bound top-ups safely

* feat(tui): offer top-up for existing AIMLAPI keys

* feat(tui): reuse AIMLAPI env key on first run

* feat(tui): reuse configured AIMLAPI profiles

* test(aimlapi): trim redundant flow coverage

* fix(tui): preserve existing AIMLAPI profile metadata

* fix(tui): clone AIMLAPI headers in env fallback

* fix(aimlapi): address remaining review findings

* fix(aimlapi): harden onboarding lifecycle

* fix(aimlapi): preserve validated checkout context

* fix(aimlapi): harden checkout retry state

* fix(tui): clarify AIMLAPI configured choices

* fix(aimlapi): make checkout retries idempotent

* fix(aimlapi): validate checkout responses

* fix(providers): reconcile aimlapi catalog after rebase

---------

Co-authored-by: Lookoff123 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:49:38 +08:00
KRATOSandKRATOS 8ef8576df7 perf(tools): add explicit effect metadata for safe concurrency (#705)
* perf(tools): add explicit tool effect metadata

Introduce fail-closed EffectClass and ToolCapabilities on every built-in
tool so a later concurrent read-only batch PR can decide safety from
explicit metadata rather than tool names. Plugin and MCP tools stay
EffectUnknown. No concurrent execution is enabled.

* fix(tools): address review feedback on effect metadata

Harden capability normalization and resource keys before PR6 consumes them:

- Force ThreadSafe=false for every non-ReadOnly effect at read time
- Reject duplicate builtin names in ValidateBuiltinCatalog
- Coerce numeric session ids and accept "session" for process keys
- Strip path/query before userinfo in endpoint host parsing
- Wire apply_patch keys from unified-diff paths + cwd
- Reclassify bash as WorkspaceWrite (one-shot shell mutator)
- Expand regression tests for keys, normalization, and gates

* fix(tools): keep multiFileResourceKeys used by apply_patch keys

Satisfies unused lint after switching apply_patch to applyPatchResourceKeys.

* fix(tools): resolve CodeRabbit residual capability/key issues

- Join apply_patch diff paths under cwd for conflict keys
- Validate constructor-declared capabilities before normalization
- Unify session/process ID key extraction helper

---------

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:48:36 +08:00
Anandanandanandh8x 1c5c6e78a8 feat(perf): emit prompt-prefix hash fingerprint per turn (#704)
Compute a seven-field SHA-256 fingerprint of the cacheable prompt
prefix (base instructions, confirmation policy, project context, skills,
tools, tool schemas, complete) and emit one prefix_hash event per turn
through the trace recorder. The complete hash is the SHA-256 of the
canonical join of the other six, so any sub-component drift is
observable both individually and in aggregate.

The decomposition exists so a downstream observer can detect which
sub-component of the prefix broke cache stability across turns: a
stable complete_prefix hash means the cacheable prefix is byte-
identical, and the sub-hash that changed names the culprit.

No behavior change for untraced runs. For OpenAI, the existing
prompt_cache_key (session ID) is unchanged; the fingerprint is purely
additive observability. The Anthropic cache_control breakpoint work
already in main is not touched.

Co-authored-by: anandh8x <[email protected]>
2026-07-17 12:47:53 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 7f669f4550 feat(tui): Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation (#699)
* feat(tui): Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation

Add Ctrl+X leader shortcuts for common slash commands (with Ctrl+X ?
chord map), and Ctrl+P/N previous/next selection in modals and pickers.

* fix(tui): drop Ctrl+X e /edit leader chord

/edit replaces the composer and would discard an in-progress draft; leave
it unbound so leader shortcuts stay draft-preserving.

* fix(tui): consume idle Ctrl+N as a no-op

Reserve Ctrl+N for emacs menu navigation so it never falls through to
remapped global bindings when no selection surface is open.

* docs: drop manual CHANGELOG entries for TUI shortcuts
2026-07-17 12:44:00 +08:00
euxaristia 2b42cd567b fix(tui): stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused (#672)
* fix(tui): stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused

The composer's cursor blinked on a fixed timer unconditionally, including
mid-keystroke, which made typing feel janky since the cursor's job is to mark
the current position. Gate the existing blink tick on two states instead:
force solid while a keystroke landed within the last 500ms (reusing the
existing lastCharTime tracker), and hide it entirely while the terminal
window is unfocused (new terminalFocused field, driven by tea.FocusMsg/
BlurMsg). Idle and focused keeps the prior blink behavior unchanged.

Also decouples view.ReportFocus from the notifier (it was previously gated on
m.notifier != nil, which is effectively always true in production but left
cursor-focus behavior fragile if that ever changes) so focus reporting is
requested unconditionally.

* fix(tui): apply caret visibility synchronously and in the argument-hint line

- A keypress, focus, or blur now updates composerCursorVisible in its own
  message handler instead of waiting for the next 530ms composerBlinkMsg
  tick, which could render a typed character caret-less, leave a visible
  caret in an unfocused terminal, or keep it hidden after a refocus.
- commandArgumentHintComposerLine takes the caret visibility state instead
  of painting its cursor cell unconditionally, so the required-argument
  hint path follows the same focus and blink contract as the main
  composer renderer.
- New tests assert the state immediately after each message, with no blink
  tick in between, and cover the argument-hint render in both states.

* fix(tui): apply the caret state on composer paste

A paste is the same immediate-input transition as a keypress: routePaste now
refreshes lastCharTime and sets the caret visible for both the bracketed
tea.PasteMsg and right-click clipboardReadMsg paths, so a paste right after
the blink phase hid the caret renders solid immediately instead of waiting
for a tick that would toggle off a stale idle state.
2026-07-17 12:43:30 +08:00
euxaristia 665bd4b3d0 WIP: feat(tui): TUI theme presets (Dune and Neon) (#634)
* draft(tui): add theme interface and Claude/Codex presets proposal

Introduces the Theme interface alongside the initial specifications and styling models for the Claude (card-based, warm) and Codex (high-density, split-screen cyberpunk) layout presets. Detailed design plans are documented in docs/THEMES.md.

* fix(tui): implement Claude/Codex themes on the existing palette system

theme.go had replaced the tuiTheme/buildTheme/palette architecture every
renderer depends on with a standalone Theme interface using the wrong
lipgloss import, breaking the build and orphaning the existing theme
registry, /theme command, and picker.

Revert theme.go to the working implementation and add claude and codex
as real palette entries in theme_palettes.go, following the file's own
extension pattern. Both pass the WCAG AA contrast and gray-ramp
invariants asserted across the whole registry, and are picked up
automatically by --theme, ZERO_THEME, /theme, and the picker.

Rewrite docs/THEMES.md to describe the actual palette-registry
architecture instead of the removed interface.

* fix(tui): rename Claude/Codex to neutral Dune/Neon, ensure WCAG AA contrast compliance, and add tests

* style(tui): gofmt theme_select_test.go (drop trailing whitespace)

The ubuntu smoke run fails on gofmt -l; this clears the only unformatted
file in the draft so CI goes green.

* test(tui): cover the CLI/env resolution path for the dune and neon presets

TestNewThemePresetsWired only checked lookupTheme and the IsDark
grouping. Add coverage for the actual --theme/ZERO_THEME precedence
path (resolveThemeMode) and confirm applyTheme swaps zeroTheme to each
preset's own palette rather than a built-in fallback.

* fix(tui): raise Dune/Neon palette contrast and fix theme docs

Darken dune's accent, blue, and red tokens so the selected-row caret,
local-model dot, and diff deletion text clear WCAG AA against selBg and
delBg, including after ANSI-256 downsampling. Also correct THEMES.md's
description of bare /theme (it opens a live-preview picker, not a
list), and add the dune/neon names to the ZERO_THEME/--theme tables in
README.md and README_ZH.md.

* fix(tui): keep Dune and Neon readable after ANSI-256 downsampling

- Dune's accent becomes #724028: still AA on selBg and panel in truecolor
  (5.46:1 and 7.03:1), and its xterm-256 quantization (#444444) now clears
  AA on quantized selBg at 6.47:1 where the previous #7c4712 quantized to
  #875f00 at 3.81:1. Blue already survived quantization at 4.67:1.
- Neon's diff bands move to hexes that quantize to distinct green and red
  xterm entries (addBg #083c10 -> #005f00, delBg #3c0810 -> #5f0000,
  addBgWord #147828 -> #008700, delBgWord #74202e -> #870000) instead of
  collapsing to the same grays, while keeping every truecolor invariant.
- New TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast quantizes the palette tokens the way
  a 256-color terminal does and asserts the Dune selected-row pairs stay AA
  and the Neon bands keep their green/red identity and mutual separation.
- docs/THEMES.md is now linked from the Documentation sections of both
  READMEs, and the Unreleased changelog inventory says twelve themes and
  names dune and neon.

* fix(tui): keep Neon diff content AA after quantization, fix error border

- faintest becomes #74c468: line numbers now quantize to #87d75f, which
  clears AA on the xterm-green addBg (#005f00) where the old #58af69
  quantized to 2.95:1, while staying dimmer than faint so the gray ramp
  stays monotonic.
- addInk becomes #ecffdc, quantizing to #ffffd7 for 4.60:1 on the word
  band's #008700 (was 4.29:1). Both rendered diff-content pairs are now
  asserted in the ANSI-256 test instead of documented as omissions.
- cardErr becomes #9a4042: 3.01:1 against the panel (2.43:1 before) and
  3.65:1 quantized, meeting the 3:1 non-text component threshold, with the
  border surface asserted in both renderings.
- docs/THEMES.md no longer claims the extended invariants run against the
  whole registry: it now says new palettes must be added to the
  per-palette contrast tests or given equivalent coverage.
2026-07-17 12:38:51 +08:00
euxaristia 9acb4113cc feat(cli): show ZERO wordmark on --version (#673)
* feat(cli): show ZERO wordmark on --version

The TUI's empty-state ZERO ascii art gets exposed via a new tui.Wordmark
helper and printed above the version line for `zero -v`/`--version`.
Coloring only applies when stdout is a real TTY and NO_COLOR isn't set,
so redirected or piped output (scripts parsing the version) stays plain.

* fix(release): match --version output by suffix, not exact string

The release smoke check compared zero --version output to an exact
"zero <version>" string, which broke once --version started printing
the wordmark above the version line. Check for a "version: <version>"
suffix instead so the smoke check doesn't couple to the wordmark art.

* fix(cli,tui): keep --version machine-readable off-TTY, drop wordmark color

- When stdout is not a terminal, --version prints exactly "zero <version>"
  again: pipes, redirects, command substitutions, and the release smoke
  contract all parse that single record, so the banner is a TTY-only
  affordance now.
- The TTY path keeps the banner but restores "zero <version>" as the
  version record instead of "version: <version>".
- Wordmark renders uncolored: only newModel resolves --theme/ZERO_THEME,
  so painting the global dark palette here was unreadable on light
  terminals. The terminal's default foreground works on any background.
- smokeVersion goes back to requiring the exact "zero <version>" output
  instead of the suffix match that papered over the banner.
2026-07-16 23:02:22 +08:00
d66a9dda69 feat(providers): add AI/ML API preset (rebased onto main) (#621)
* feat(providers): add AI/ML API preset

* fix(providers): relocate aimlapi preset and drop referral header

Addresses the two review asks on #402:

- Move the AI/ML API descriptor out of catalog slot #2 (it sat above the
  first-party OpenAI/Anthropic/Google entries) down next to openrouter in
  the aggregator cluster. Re-sync expectedCatalogIDs and the
  TransportOpenAICompat order-list to match.
- Drop the always-on X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID / Integration-Repo /
  Integration-Version attribution headers. There's no partner arrangement
  behind the preset, so a non-overridable referral tag on every user's
  request isn't something to ship on a community preset. aimlapi now rides
  through plain CopyHeaders like every other provider. Removes
  HeadersForCatalog (it existed only for this special-case), reverts the
  factory and discovery call sites to CopyHeaders, and drops the header
  test. The factory/discovery tests now assert the endpoint, auth, and the
  user's own custom headers survive while no attribution header is sent.

* fix(providers): address CodeRabbit review on #621

- Document AIMLAPIID for docstring coverage.
- Apply providerio.CopyHeaders for Anthropic and Google provider paths,
  matching the OpenAI path introduced for aimlapi header isolation.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>

* fix(providers): gofmt factory.go to unblock CI smoke

Remove mixed tab/space indentation in the openai.New options block so
ubuntu-latest fmt-check passes.

---------

Co-authored-by: Dmitry Tumanov <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-16 22:57:35 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 7d579996b4 feat(skills): discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading (#696)
* feat(skills): discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading

Add ~/.agents/skills as a read-only global discovery root after the
primary
Zero skills dir and before plugin roots. Unify runtime and CLI discovery
on
one multi-root path (DiscoveryRoots / LoadFromRoots / GlobalRoots) and
always
register the multi-root skill tool so bare runs and plugin runs share
the
same load surface.
Install/remove/lock still target only the primary Zero skills directory.
Fixes #610

* docs(skills): note lock stays on the primary write root

Document that install/remove/lock target only the primary Zero skills
directory, matching multi-root discovery write-root isolation.

* fix(skills): bubble primary root load errors from LoadFromRoots

Return non-missing failures from the first non-empty skills root so a
broken primary dir is not reported as an empty skill list. Keep fail-open
behavior for optional roots (~/.agents/skills, plugins).

* fix(skills): treat non-directory skills root as error on Windows

Windows maps ENOTDIR to ErrNotExist, so ReadDir on a regular file looked
like a missing skills dir. Reclassify existing non-directories and assert
the portable load behavior in tests.
2026-07-16 21:59:20 +08:00
Vasanth T abe24bcb10 Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline) (#700)
* Add per-turn tracing and a turn-benchmark harness (Phase 0 baseline)

Introduce an opt-in `internal/trace` package that attributes a run's wall
time to named spans — prompt build, provider connect/queue, generation,
tool queue/execution, permission wait, verification, compaction,
persistence — plus counters for model requests, tool calls, retries,
reconnects, compactions, completion nudges, acceptance checks, model
switches, and input/cached/output tokens. The recorder is nil-safe (a nil
*Recorder is a no-op), so every stamp site can call it unguarded; an
untraced run is byte-identical to today.

The recorder threads into agent.Run via a new `Options.Trace` field and a
single `trace.WithContext` assignment, so the shared providerio seam
(connect around client.Do, queue around OAuth resolve, first token at the
first non-keepalive SSE payload) reaches it through `trace.FromContext`
without any provider-interface change. All instrumentation is opt-in: when
`Options.Trace` is nil the hot path is untouched.

Headless `zero exec` gains `--trace <path>` (and `ZERO_TRACE=<path>`),
writing an agenteval-contract-compatible NDJSON trace (`-` for stderr).
The trace is pure observation; enabling it does not change behavior.

A new per-turn benchmark harness extends `internal/perfbench` (reusing the
existing TaskSet/NumericStats/subprocess runner shapes): `RunTurnBench`
aggregates per-span median/P95 across iterations, ranks the top three
controllable latency sources by share of attributed time, rolls up per
task class, and totals tokens/counts. A checked-in 42-task manifest across
seven classes (nav, edit, fix, refactor, longproc, longctx, parallel) and
local offline fixtures back it, and `make baseline` runs it against the
built `zero`, writing `internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json`. The
report is machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.

The manifest is JSON rather than YAML to avoid adding a dependency;
per-task verification targets the specific test (`go test -run <name>`)
so fix tasks are independent. Each task is a fresh `zero exec` process, so
iterations are cold-start samples; a warm in-process path is left for
follow-up.

Verified: `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean on touched
files; `go test -race` green for internal/trace, internal/agent,
internal/perfbench, and cmd/zero-perf-bench.

* test(trace): make TestAttributionRatio clock-independent

The test recorded two synthetic 10ms spans with no real delay and asserted
the attribution ratio stayed <= 1.0. On a precise clock (Linux/macOS CI) the
wall is microseconds while attributed is 20ms, so attributed/wall blows past
1.0 and the test failed — even though the ratio legitimately exceeds 1.0
when spans overlap (parallel tool execution). On Windows the coarse timer
masked it, so the failure only surfaced in CI.

Assert the contract instead: attributed is the deterministic sum of span
durations, and the ratio equals attributed/wall (0 when wall is zero). Add a
zero-wall case for the divide-by-zero guard.

* Address review feedback on the per-turn tracer + benchmark harness

Benchmark runner (internal/perfbench):
- A nonzero agent exit code no longer counts as Passed. The runner set
  VerifyErr but then fell through to outcome.Passed = true, so a crashed
  run could be recorded as a pass. Return before the verification block
  when VerifyErr is already set.
- A task now passes only when every iteration passes. The previous
  "any iteration passes" rule let a flaky fail hide behind one good run.
- Each invocation copies its workspace fixture to a fresh temp dir and
  runs the agent + verifier there, so mutating tasks (edit/fix/refactor)
  can't dirty the checked-in fixtures or bleed into the next iteration.
- Trace load failures (missing/malformed trace file) are surfaced as
  result warnings via a new TraceIssue field instead of being swallowed.

Tracer (internal/trace):
- Finish freezes the recorder: Counter, addSpan, and the first-event
  stamps are dropped after Finish returns, so a snapshot captures exactly
  one turn and late stamps can't mutate it.
- WriteText propagates the first write error instead of silently
  swallowing sink failures.

Provider seam (internal/providers/providerio):
- FirstTokenAt is stamped only after a payload is accepted as real model
  output, not before handle() decides to drop it as an error payload.

Agent loop (internal/agent):
- The compaction counter increments only when the history actually
  shrinks, in both the proactive and reactive paths — paid no-ops no
  longer inflate the compaction total.
- Document on Options.Trace that a fresh Recorder is required per Run.

CLI (internal/cli/exec):
- Finish the trace at the agent.Run boundary and defer only the
  serialization, so the snapshot covers exactly the turn.
- Reject --trace / ZERO_TRACE for spec-draft runs with a clear error
  instead of silently accepting and writing nothing.

Manifest + fixtures:
- Strengthen the edit verifiers: rename and value-bump tasks now assert
  the old symbol is gone, and the getter task greps the method signature.
- Add the missing testdata/edit fixture (10 edit tasks referenced a
  directory that was never committed, so the whole edit class errored
  out at run time).
- The manifest test now stats each fixture so a missing dir fails at
  load time instead of at every run.
- longproc benchmark keeps Process live across the loop; README code
  fence gets a language tag and documents the per-invocation fixture copy.
- Add tests for the tracing wrapper (nil vs wired recorder, OnUsage
  forwarding, token aggregation) and the frozen-recorder contract.

* Address review feedback: exclusive-time attribution + wired spans + fix-suite compile

Rewrite the trace attribution model so concurrent/nested spans no longer
double-count. Spans record wall intervals; the recorder derives a parent for
each by interval containment and computes exclusive time (duration minus the
union of its children). AttributedDuration sums only top-level spans; Coverage
is the union of intervals over wall, capped at 1, the honest ">=95%" metric.
Top-latency ranking uses exclusive time so shares sum to ~1 instead of being
inflated by overlapping provider_connect/generation and nested
permission_wait/tool_execution.

Wire the spans that were named but never stamped: verification around the
self-correct verify pass, and StampFirstVisibleEvent on the first forwarded
text event. Drop the tool_queue/process_wait/persistence constants that had no
stamps, and rename the misnamed near-noise prompt_build span to tool_partition.
Trim RequiredEventKeys to events a healthy short run actually emits; move
conditional phases (tools, permission, compaction, verification) to
OptionalEventKeys so a short trace does not false-fail.

Make ReadNDJSON fail loudly on a corrupt file: require a type:trace header,
error on span/counter lines that appear before it, and error when a header
yields no spans or counters.

Fix the blocking fix-suite compile error: Label's %d format verb on a string
tripped go test's vet before any fix task could verify. Make it a runtime
wrong-prefix bug ("admin-" vs "user-") that still type-checks, so each fix
task is independent again.

Manifest: correct refactor-04's stats.go to main.go, reword fix-07 to the
wrong-prefix bug, add a latency-only description (read-only tasks carry no
verification oracle by design), and frame the report README on exclusive time
and coverage.

Tests updated for the occurrence/exclusive/coverage model; trace, perfbench,
and agent green under -race.

* Fix exclusive-time round-trip, identical-interval nesting, and empty-trace parse

Three correctness bugs in the attribution model found by an adversarial review
of the prior commit, all undermining the no-double-count guarantee:

1. exclusive_ms:0 was overwritten with the inclusive Duration on re-parse. A
   parent whose children tile its interval legitimately has exclusive time 0;
   WriteNDJSON emits exclusive_ms:0, but ReadNDJSON's "<= 0 means missing"
   fallback turned that back into the full duration, so every re-parsed trace
   re-introduced the double-counting the model exists to prevent (the benchmark
   harness, which ranks re-parsed traces, inherits it). Gate the fallback on
   key ABSENCE, so a written 0 is preserved.

2. deriveNesting formed a 2-cycle for two spans with identical [start, end]
   intervals: the symmetric containment check made each parent the other,
   dropping both from top-level and zeroing AttributedDuration. Break the tie
   deterministically — strict containment is an unambiguous parent; for
   identical intervals, only the lower-indexed span may parent the other, so
   one stays top-level.

3. ReadNDJSON returned a valid empty TurnTrace for empty/blank-only input, so a
   run that crashed before emitting a trace (or where --trace was not honored)
   masqueraded as a clean zero-attribution sample. Empty input now errors, so
   the harness records a TraceIssue.

Also: decode counters via json.Number so int64 values above 2^53 round-trip
exactly instead of losing precision through float64; and drop the harness's
own "exclusive <= 0 -> Duration" ranking fallback, which was the same
double-count on the re-parsed path. Added regression tests covering the
zero-exclusive round-trip, the identical-interval nesting, empty-input
rejection, and counter precision.

* perf(turn-bench): split pass/fail into oracle tiers so the pass rate can't be misread as correctness

The turn benchmark counted any exit-0 task as passed, including the 24
read-only tasks (nav/longproc/longctx/parallel) that carry no verification
oracle — so the JSON tasksPassed / "N/M passed" headline could read as a
correctness verdict it never was. Split pass/fail into three oracle tiers:

- correctness (edit grep + fix go test): the only pass rate that can move
  with model quality (tasksVerified / tasksPassed / correctnessPassRate)
- build-only (refactor go build): a non-positive oracle, reported as
  buildPassRate and excluded from correctnessPassRate; the manifest declares
  buildOnlyClasses: ["refactor"]
- latency-only (no oracle): counted in latencyOnlyTasks, never in any pass
  rate

NewTurnExecRunner no longer sets Passed=true for tasks with no
verificationCommand, and the summary headline names each tier explicitly so
an exit-0 read-only run cannot inflate a correctness number. Bumps
TurnSchemaVersion to 2. Class breakdown and tier contract documented in
internal/perfbench/MANIFEST.md and reports/README.md.

Also install the trace first-token/visible-event forwarding handlers in
agent.Run whenever options.Trace is set, not only when a UI OnText /
OnReasoning callback is set, so a headless traced run (zero exec --trace)
still captures FirstTokenAt. forwardedVisibleText stays tied to the user
callback so stall-retry semantics are unchanged. Adds a regression
assertion to the existing traced-run test.

* Address CodeRabbit review on 2bfb3406: omitempty + crash visibility

Three findings from CodeRabbit's review of the 3-tier pass-rate fix:

- BuildPassRate dropped its omitempty so an explicit 0.0 (all refactor
  tasks fail to compile) is no longer indistinguishable from 'no build
  tasks ran' in the JSON. Matches CorrectnessPassRate's always-serialize
  behavior, which is the whole point of the tier split: the report
  cannot be misread.
- A crashed sample (outcome.Err) now emits a Warning mirroring the
  TraceIssue path, so a run that died every iteration can't look like a
  normal benchmark with fewer measurements instead of a failure.
- cmd.Run()'s returned error is preserved on the no-run_end path: when
  stderr is empty and Run failed (binary missing, exec permission
  denied), the actual OS error is reported instead of collapsing to the
  generic 'missing terminal run_end event'.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench/agent/trace.

* Address CodeRabbit re-review: anti-averaging README + fixture-isolation test

Re-review at d0615249 asked for the pass-rate contract to be loud to
downstream consumers and for the fixture-isolation property to be asserted,
not just read from code.

- reports/README.md gains a prominent 'do not average the tier pass rates /
  do not report a single pass rate' warning. The schema offers no headline
  pass rate on purpose; a consumer must name the tier it is reporting. This
  is the durability fix for the misread the tier split exists to prevent.
- turn_bench_test.go gains TestCopyFixtureIsolatesSourceFromMutation: copies
  a fixture, mutates the copy, and asserts the source is byte-identical
  (and that a file added to the copy never appears in the source). Proves the
  'fixtures stay clean across runs' property without needing the binary.

Items the re-review also raised that were already satisfied: the
oracle-presence-over-declared-list precedence is documented on the
BuildOnlyClasses field (taskbench.go), and the PR body already says
'48-task manifest'. The Share->exclusiveShare rename is tracked in #701.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; go test -race green for perfbench.
2026-07-16 21:58:20 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 75a78e715b feat(cli): wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope (#694)
* feat(cli): wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope

Pass the resolved workspace into mcp.ServeOptions and honor --add-dir so
resources/list and scoped tools can expose extra roots beyond cwd.

* fix(cli): keep lexical serve --add-dir roots for path matching

Use symlink-resolved paths only for deduplication so Scope roots stay
aligned with the un-evaluated WorkspaceRoot MCP serve already passes.
2026-07-15 21:16:51 +08:00
PierrunoYT 8502449430 test(tui): isolate provider wizard credentials (#688) 2026-07-15 21:06:48 +08:00
euxaristia c0bcfdda41 chore(deps): bump go module dependencies (#669)
Updates charm.land bubbles/bubbletea/lipgloss v2, golang.org/x/sys,
golang.org/x/sync, and dlclark/regexp2/v2 to their latest patch releases.
2026-07-15 21:06:17 +08:00
euxaristia 1bb6b5745a fix(swarm): wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test (#667)
The launcher recording a spawn and the job's Runs counter incrementing
are sequential but distinct steps in the scheduler goroutine
(fireIfIdle's Spawn call, then run's job.incRuns()). The test polled
only the launcher's recorded count, then asserted Runs immediately
with no wait, so a scheduler goroutine preempted between those two
steps could be observed with a stale Runs value under CI load. Wait
for Runs itself instead of assuming the launcher signal implies it.
2026-07-15 21:05:46 +08:00
euxaristia 6fc1220f6a fix(sandbox): scrub sensitive credentials from sandbox environment (#660)
* fix(windows): retry atomic file renames on Access is denied / Sharing violation

* test(swarm): add unit tests for rename retry and non-retryable errors

* test(swarm): skip TestMailboxRenameRetry on non-Windows platforms

* fix(sandbox): scrub sensitive provider credentials from sandbox env

* refactor(sandbox): unify environment creation and reduce lines of code

* fix(sandbox): forward workspaceRoot through sandboxEnvironment, gate Windows env on backend

* style(sandbox,swarm): remove stray blank lines flagged by gofmt

* refactor(fsutil): extract shared rename retry helper, derive scrub list from provider catalog

Address CodeRabbit review feedback:

- Add internal/fsutil.RenameWithRetry with an injectable rename override and
  move the four duplicated renameWithRetry/isWindowsSharingViolation copies
  (cron, sessions, sandbox, swarm) onto it. Mailbox keeps its rename test
  seam by passing its field through. Add fsutil tests for the Windows retry
  and non-retryable paths.
- Remove the orphaned metadata.json.tmp in cron writeJob when the rename
  permanently fails, matching the sibling writers.
- Derive scrubSensitiveEnv keys from providercatalog AuthEnvVars plus a
  static list of non-catalog secrets, so new providers are scrubbed
  automatically. AWS_PROFILE and GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS stay
  because they are pointers, not secrets.

* fix(sandbox): deny sandboxed reads of cloud credential stores by default

Address CodeRabbit finding that scrubbed env pointers still left the
underlying credential files readable under the read-all workspace posture:

- Add credentialDenyReadPaths: default profile-level deny-read entries for
  ~/.aws, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, and the GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS
  target file, wired into both permission profile builders so the seatbelt
  and Linux helper backends enforce them. Entries are stat-filtered and a
  store nested under a user AllowRead entry is dropped, keeping an explicit
  opt-out.
- Keep the defaults out of Policy.DenyRead, whose emptiness gates escalated
  execution, and skip Windows so the profile deny list does not flip the
  runner off the WRITE_RESTRICTED token path.
- Scrub GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS from the sandbox env; keep AWS_PROFILE
  since the deny-read rule on ~/.aws is the real protection and the SDKs
  fall back to the default profile regardless.
- Add credential deny path tests, extend the scrub test, relax the profile
  test's exact deny count to containment.

* test(cli): pin HOME in sandbox policy golden test

The default credential-store deny-read entries depend on what exists in the
real home directory (the macOS CI image ships ~/.aws), which leaked host
paths into the policy JSON golden comparison. Point HOME at an empty temp
directory so the golden stays hermetic.

* fix(sandbox): protect GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS without a home, retry lock violations

Address CodeRabbit review feedback:

- credentialDenyReadPaths no longer returns early when the home lookup
  fails; home-based candidates become conditional and the
  GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS target is always considered.
- fsutil.RenameWithRetry also retries ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION (errno 33),
  matching the mcp lock handling; helper renamed to
  isWindowsSharingOrLockViolation.
- Extend tests: homeless GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS case and a lock
  violation step in the retry sequence.

* fix(sandbox): tighten env-scrub test assertion and add missing secret keys

TestScrubSensitiveEnv only checked an allowlist plus a length count, so a
duplicate allowed key silently replacing a required one would still pass.
Compare the exact expected key/value map instead.

Also add ZERO_WEBSEARCH_API_KEY and ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN to
scrubSensitiveEnv's sensitiveKeys list: both are real bearer secrets read
from the environment but were missing from the scrub list, leaving them
readable by sandboxed commands when set in the parent shell.
2026-07-14 21:46:10 +08:00
euxaristia 80c39aa599 docs: add codebase minimization guideline to AGENTS.md (#661) 2026-07-14 15:15:45 +08:00
euxaristia 8bd9742fa9 fix(tools): classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials (#659)
* fix(tools): classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials

A Windows restricted-token sandbox failure is often completely silent:
when the token cannot open the target executable or its DLLs (or an
MSYS runtime dies during init), the command exits nonzero having
written zero bytes to stdout and stderr. The existing detection is
keyword-based, so these failures were never marked as sandbox denials,
the agent loop never offered the unsandboxed-retry prompt, and the
model was left staring at 'Command completed with no output' until it
gave up.

Treat a wrapped command on the Windows restricted-token or elevated
backend that exits nonzero with completely empty output as a likely
sandbox denial. A command that legitimately fails silently (findstr
with no match, for example) now costs one extra approval prompt; the
inverse misclassification silently strands the session, so the trade
goes to prompting.

* test(tools): cover the elevated Windows backend in the silent-denial test

The heuristic treats windows-elevated identically to
windows-restricted-token, but only the latter was exercised.
Parameterize the silent-failure test over both backends.
2026-07-14 15:13:05 +08:00
euxaristia 91ea6ded75 fix(keyring): pass generic password via stdin on macOS (#574)
* fix(keyring): pass generic password via stdin on macOS

Pass the generic password secret to security add-generic-password via stdin instead of passing it as a command-line argument. This prevents the secret from leaking to the local process list (visible via ps) and aligns the macOS keyring implementation with the Linux secret-tool implementation.

* fix(keyring): pipe secret twice for macOS security password+retype prompt

The macOS security add-generic-password command prompts for both a password and a retype confirmation when -w has no trailing value. The previous stdin approach only piped the secret once, causing a passwords don't match failure. Write the secret twice separated by newlines to satisfy both prompts.

* fix(keyring): reject multiline secrets on macOS instead of corrupting them

Addresses jatmn's review:
- security's -w password+retype prompt reads stdin line by line, so a
  secret containing its own newline can't be distinguished from the
  password/retype separator: the first line read back would silently
  truncate the stored value. Set now rejects a secret containing \r or
  \n on darwin before invoking security, rather than storing a
  corrupted value. Linux's secret-tool has no such restriction (reads
  the whole stdin payload), so it is unaffected.
- Updated the package doc comment, which still described the old
  argv-based (process-list-exposed) macOS path this PR replaced.

Added TestKeyringSetRejectsMultilineSecretOnDarwin and
TestKeyringSetAllowsMultilineSecretOnLinux.

* fix(keyring): drive security -i for macOS Set instead of the -w prompt

The trailing -w prompt uses getpass(3), which reads from /dev/tty whenever
the process has a controlling terminal, so the piped secret was ignored in
any interactive session, and getpass's small fixed buffer would truncate
long secrets (like the base64 OAuth blob) when the fallback did engage.

Interactive mode reads whole commands from stdin, keeping argv at just -i.
Arguments are quoted for SecurityTool's split_line parser (backslash and
double quote escaped inside double quotes). The parser is line-based with a
4096-byte buffer, so Set rejects newlines and oversized payloads up front
rather than corrupting the stored value.
2026-07-14 14:46:09 +08:00
Octopusandocto-patch fa3052a142 feat(providers): refresh MiniMax model coverage (#665)
Co-authored-by: octo-patch <[email protected]>
2026-07-13 22:33:55 +08:00
euxaristia 4c986d327b feat(tui): press up to edit queued messages (#656)
* feat(tui): press up to edit queued messages

Pressing up with a message queued pops it back into the composer for
editing, taking priority over history recall. While a message is queued
the empty composer shows a hint placeholder. A second prompt queued
during the same run now stacks under the first instead of replacing it.

* refactor(tui): remove openclaude references from queued_message comments
2026-07-13 22:18:55 +08:00
euxaristia a5d2e327c8 fix(sandbox): use WRITE_RESTRICTED token when no DenyRead paths are configured (#658)
Removing the WRITE_RESTRICTED flag in #612 made the restricted-SID check
apply to reads as well as writes. Default Windows DACLs grant
BUILTIN\Users rather than any SID in the token's restricted list
(random capability SIDs, logon SID, Everyone), so the sandboxed process
could no longer open any executable or non-KnownDlls DLL: every spawned
command failed with exit 1 and no output, including cmd builtins'
children (gh, git, where.exe). The existing
TestWindowsRestrictedTokenNestedPipeCapture smoke test reproduces the
regression.

Restore WRITE_RESTRICTED, but only when the permission profile has no
DenyRead paths. The flag makes the kernel skip restricted-SID deny ACEs
for reads, which is exactly the DenyRead bypass #612 fixed, so profiles
that configure DenyRead keep the fully restricted token and trade spawn
capability for read-deny enforcement. DenyRead is empty by default, so
the common case regains a working sandbox while #612's guarantee holds
for the profiles that rely on it.
2026-07-13 22:17:31 +08:00
euxaristia 5c4815a66e fix(sandbox): unblock git fetch/commit/add under the write-restricted sandbox (#654)
* fix(sandbox): stop blocking git fetch/commit/add by unblocking .git writes

The sandbox denied every write under .git for shell-executed commands,
so any git operation that touches its own metadata (fetch, commit, add,
pull, merge, stash) failed under the default sandbox. Narrow the block
to .git/hooks (auto-executing scripts) and .git/config (remote URLs,
credential.helper, core.hooksPath), the two subpaths that are actually
dangerous to write; the rest of .git stays writable to git subprocesses
since those writes go through git's own invariants.

The app-level auto-allow gate for direct file-tool writes (write_file,
edit_file, apply_patch) is unaffected and still treats all of .git as
protected, since hand-editing git's internals bypasses those invariants.

* test(cli): normalize Windows path separators in sandbox policy golden

The sandbox policy golden is shared across platforms, but readOnlySubpaths
carve-outs are built with filepath.Join and render as backslash paths on
Windows. normalizePortableJSONRootString only converted a bare backslash, so
the Windows smoke run diverged from the forward-slash golden. Replace all
backslashes with slashes during normalization so the shared golden passes on
every runner.
2026-07-13 21:56:10 +08:00
euxaristia 635c93af51 fix(agent): raise default and deep-mode turn budgets (#650)
* fix(agent): raise default and deep-mode turn budgets

The default per-run tool-turn budget of 50 was still too low for larger
multi-step tasks that span several files: agents hit the ceiling and
stopped with a "remaining work" summary instead of finishing. Raise the
default from 50 to 80.

The "deep" preset also carried MaxTurns: 50, identical to the default, so
its "larger turn budget" promise no longer held on the turn-budget axis.
Raise it to 160 so deep runs get a genuinely larger budget again.

Users can still override per-session with /turns or --max-turns (bounded
by MaxTurnsCeiling).

* test(cli): expect deep-mode MaxTurns=160 after budget raise
2026-07-13 21:54:48 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19 893b7b424c fix(config): surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them (#645)
* fix(config): surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them

json.Unmarshal ignores unknown JSON keys by default, so typos such as
"maxTurn" or "sandbox.network" were silently discarded: the user
believed a setting (e.g. a sandbox hardening option) was active while
Zero used its default. Worse, "zero doctor" reported
"config files parsed and validated successfully" even when fields were dropped.

Add a reflection-based unknown-field scanner
(internal/config/unknownfields.go) that walks the FileConfig JSON schema
and recurses into nested objects, arrays, and maps, reporting each
unknown key with its full JSON path and a near-match suggestion
("did you mean 'maxTurns'?"). The two legacy top-level aliases
(mcpServers, mcp_servers) are allowlisted so they are not flagged,
and detection only inspects json tags, so a config written by a newer
Zero with new fields still loads and merges normally — validate/doctor
just surface the unknown keys as issues rather than rejecting the file.

Wire the scanner into ValidateBytes/ValidateFile, which zero doctor
already uses, so doctor now reports the unknown fields instead of
"validation passed".

Add tests for unknown top-level keys, unknown nested keys, unknown
keys inside a provider entry, and that the legacy aliases are not
flagged.

Fixes #644

* fix(config): address review comments on unknown-field scanner

- Treat JSON keys case-insensitively (matching encoding/json), so a
  valid case variant such as "MaxTurns" is not falsely flagged as
  unknown. Canonical (correct-case) names are kept only for the
  "did you mean" hint.
- Allowlist ProviderProfile's legacy snake_case keys (providerKind,
  catalog_id, base_url, api_key, ...) that ProviderProfile.UnmarshalJSON
  accepts but which are not fields on the Go type, so existing
  configs using them are not false-positive'd in zero doctor.
- Make the near-match suggestion deterministic: sort candidates before
  picking so an edit-distance tie always resolves to the same lexical
  winner (map-range order was nondeterministic and could flake).
- Make the unknown-field test assertions order-independent (search by
  FieldPath instead of assuming issues[0]).

Add regression coverage for legacy provider keys and valid case
variants not being flagged.
2026-07-13 21:52:44 +08:00
euxaristia da41c3a75b fix(lock): prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix (#628)
* fix(lock): prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix

During lock reclamation, reclaiming a suspected stale lock renames the file aside and renames it back if not stale. On POSIX systems, the rename back silently overwrites any new lock file created in the gap. On Windows, it fails to rename back and leaks the stale file.

Introduce a cross-platform restoreLockFile helper:
- On POSIX: Use os.Link to link the file back (which atomic-fails if the target already exists), then remove the temporary link.
- On Windows: Use os.Rename (which safely fails if the target exists).
If restoring fails, delete the temporary file immediately to prevent leaks.

* fix(lockutil): fix Windows build by using golang.org/x/sys/windows

Addresses jatmn's follow-up review: the required Windows smoke check was
failing because syscall.MoveFileEx is not exported by the standard
library's syscall package on this platform, so internal/lockutil (and
everything importing it: cron, daemon, hooks, oauth) failed to compile
on Windows.

Switched to golang.org/x/sys/windows, which does export MoveFileEx with
the same signature, already a direct module dependency. Verified on a
real Windows machine that the no-flags call still fails with
ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when the destination exists, and that this
satisfies errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), which cron/daemon/hooks/oauth's
reclaim paths all depend on to decide whether the sidelined lock was
genuinely superseded (safe to discard) versus some other, unrelated
failure (must be preserved).

TestRestoreLockFile already covered both the successful-restore and
fail-when-target-exists cases; it now passes on Windows.

* fix(lockutil): route lock file deletes through RemoveLockFile with Windows retry loop

* fix(lockutil): close restore split-brain and unify RemoveLockFile

RestoreLockFile could fail with errors other than os.ErrExist (hardlink-
incapable filesystems such as FAT or some FUSE/network mounts, ENOSPC,
Windows sharing violations). Callers only clean up on os.ErrExist, so any
other failure left the lock path missing with the live holder's lock
stranded in the sidelined file; the next O_EXCL create then succeeded and
two processes held the lock. RestoreLockFile now falls back to an O_EXCL
copy in that case, which preserves the no-overwrite guarantee, and a
successful restore with a failed sidelined-file cleanup reports nil
instead of a failed restore.

RemoveLockFile now has one cross-platform contract: removing an already
missing file reports nil on POSIX too, matching Windows, and daemon
release() drops its caller-side ErrNotExist filter.

Tests: TestRestoreByCopy and TestRemoveLockFile run on all platforms;
Windows-tagged tests pin the ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS mapping to os.ErrExist
and exercise the RemoveLockFile retry loop to success and to bounded
exhaustion. The package doc comment documents the shared contract.

* refactor(swarm): extract reclaimStaleLock to mirror other lock callers

The stale-lock reclaim in acquireLock was inline, so its restore path
(a holder rotated a fresh lock in the gap between the stale check and
the rename) could not be regression-tested the way cron, daemon, hooks,
and oauth test theirs. Extract it into reclaimStaleLock with the same
shape as the other callers, behavior unchanged, and add the mirrored
regression test.

* test(hooks,oauth): add stale lock reclaim regression tests

Mirror the cron reclaim test in the two packages that lacked coverage
for reclaimStaleLock: a genuinely stale lock is reclaimed, a fresh lock
(reacquired in the gap) is restored intact rather than stolen, and a
missing lock reports no reclaim. daemon already had equivalent tests in
lock_test.go.

* fix(lock): fail closed and drop sidelined file when restore fails

A non-os.ErrExist error from RestoreLockFile means both the no-replace
restore and its O_EXCL copy fallback failed, so the lock path may be
missing while the sidelined holder is live. Callers previously swallowed
that error and their next O_EXCL create would succeed, breaking mutual
exclusion. reclaimStaleLock in cron, daemon, hooks, oauth, and swarm now
returns an error for that case and the acquire loops fail closed instead
of re-acquiring.

The sidelined .stale.* file is now removed on every restore failure, not
only os.ErrExist: once the restore has failed it has no protocol
function (release only consults the lock path), so keeping it only
leaked files.

Also replace the numeric errno literals in the Windows RemoveLockFile
retry loop with windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION and
windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.

* refactor(lockutil): extract shared ReclaimStaleLock helper

Consolidate the duplicated reclaimStaleLock functions from cron, hooks,
oauth, and swarm into lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock. Each caller now passes
an mtime-based isLive predicate to the shared helper, which owns the
rename-aside, restore-if-live, cleanup, ErrExist handling, and
fail-closed error propagation.

Daemon keeps its own reclaimStaleLock because it uses PID-based liveness
(different predicate shape and no staleAfter duration).

The per-package reclaim regression tests are removed since the shared
helper is thoroughly tested in lockutil/reclaim_test.go (dead lock
reclaimed, live lock restored, missing lock, fail-closed on restore
error, sidelined file dropped when new holder wins).

* fix(lockutil): propagate non-contention rename failures from ReclaimStaleLock

A rename-aside failure that is not a lost race previously mapped to the
benign lost-race result, so acquirers spun until their deadline and
reported a timeout instead of the real failure. Keep only a missing
source and the Windows sharing-violation/access-denied contention
errnos benign (neither Windows errno maps to os.ErrExist, and
ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION does not map to os.ErrPermission either, so the
classification compares raw errnos) and return everything else so
callers fail closed.

Also convert daemon's private reclaimStaleLock to the shared helper so
it picks up the same contract, and reword the caller error messages
from "restore reclaimed" to "reclaim stale" since the error can now
come from the rename aside as well.

* fix(lockutil): publish restore-by-copy atomically and honor lost mailbox reclaims

restoreByCopy created the destination lock file empty before copying into
it, so a crash mid-copy could leave a live holder's lock permanently
unrepresented at the lock path. Stage the copy under a private name and
publish it with the platform's no-replace primitive instead.

swarm's mailbox lock discarded the reclaimed boolean and always retried
immediately, so a lost reclaim race (or Windows sharing-violation
contention) could hot-spin past the lock timeout instead of falling
through to the bounded wait like the other lock callers.

* fix(lockutil): shrink the reclaim/restore window with a fast replacing rename

Restoring a lock that turned out live went through the no-replace path
(plus its copy fallback on some failures) first, which is slow enough
that a fourth process's unrelated O_EXCL create could win lockPath while
it was absent for the whole call. RestoreLockFile's no-replace contract
would then report os.ErrExist and the caller silently dropped the
sidelined lock, orphaning the still-running original holder.

restoreLiveLock now tries a single replacing rename straight back first,
falling back to the no-replace path only if that fails. It shrinks the
window from a whole restore call down to roughly one syscall; it does
not close it, since the fast path can silently overwrite a competing
lock rather than detect it. A fully race-free reclaim would need an
OS-level advisory lock checked non-destructively instead of by moving
the file, which is a larger change than this.
2026-07-13 21:45:08 +08:00
euxaristia 5a5b7fd5b8 docs: add Go code quality & security checks and bump Go version to 1.26+ (#635)
* docs: add Go code quality & security checks and bump Go version to 1.26+

* docs: address CodeRabbit review comments and use pinned versions and Go 1.26.5+

* docs: remove trailing blank lines at end of AGENTS.md

* docs: add missing /v2/ segment to golangci-lint install path

The go install command pointed at the v1 module path
(golangci-lint/cmd/golangci-lint), which does not resolve for
v2.12.2. The go run invocation earlier in the same section already
had the correct v2 path.

* docs: trim AGENTS.md below 8 KiB guideline and clean up README cross-compile header

* docs: address CodeRabbit review feedback on extending guide
2026-07-12 22:37:30 +08:00
euxaristia 212734adf3 fix(securefile,credstore): call Sync on temp file before close and rename (#631)
When writing credentials or generating user secrets, files are written using a write-to-temp-then-rename pattern. However, neither package called Sync (fsync) on the temporary file before closing and renaming. If a crash or power failure occurred shortly after write, this could result in truncated or 0-byte key/credential files on disk.

Add tmp.Sync() calls to writeNewSecretFile and Store.write to guarantee durability.
2026-07-12 22:35:55 +08:00
euxaristia 2efe6d539e fix(plugins): resolve relative executable paths against plugin root (#627)
* fix(plugins): resolve relative executable paths against plugin root

When a plugin registers a tool or a hook command as a relative path (e.g. ./tools/helper.sh), running it in the caller's workspace CWD allows local execution hijacking by placing a malicious script at that path in the untrusted workspace. Update expandPluginRootPath to resolve relative executable paths containing path separators to absolute paths inside the plugin's install directory.

* fix(plugins): remove ineffectual permission initializer in toolSafety

The initial assignment to permission was always overwritten by one of
the switch arms below it, including a case that just reassigned the
same PermissionPrompt value the initializer already held. Flagged by
ineffassign in CI.
2026-07-12 22:34:34 +08:00
Kevin Codex 5e1405d0b7 feat(npm): ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies (#626)
* feat(npm): ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies

Replace the postinstall downloader with Codex-style platform packages:
suffixed versions of @gitlawb/zero (X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>) carrying the
binary, sandbox helpers, and the vendored agent-browser/tuistory tree,
referenced from the wrapper via npm: aliases in optionalDependencies.

The published wrapper has no lifecycle scripts and no dependencies, so
npm/Bun/pnpm installs are silent: no EBADENGINE from agent-browser's
node>=24 engines pin, no allow-scripts warnings, no network outside the
npm registry. The old downloader remains as a checksum-verified first-run
fallback for --omit=optional installs and unsupported platforms.

scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs assembles the payloads from the
release archives at publish time: it materializes npm's symlink .bin
shims into regular sh shims (npm pack silently drops symlinks) and prunes
agent-browser's other-platform binaries (~65 MB per package). The publish
job uploads platform versions first under --tag platform, asserts the
latest dist-tag survived (platform versions are semver prereleases of the
wrapper version), then publishes the wrapper.

See docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the architecture and publishing rules.

* fix(npm): address PR review — LICENSE in payloads, dist-tag lookup guard, accurate fallback and platform docs

- Ship the repo LICENSE in both the wrapper and platform payloads (npm only
  includes a license file physically present in the packed directory).
- Guard the platform-publish dist-tag lookup with || true so a transient
  npm view failure (or a bootstrap publish with no latest tag) cannot abort
  the job between the platform and wrapper publishes.
- Gate the wrapper's fallback downloader on the release matrix so platforms
  with no asset (windows-arm64 and unknown combos) skip the spawn instead of
  attempting it every run; keep deliberate retry-on-failure for supported
  platforms and say so honestly in the notice and docs.
- Correct Windows support wording everywhere: x64 only, ARM runs under
  emulation (README, README_ZH, INSTALL.md incl. the release-target list).
2026-07-11 23:25:41 +08:00
KRATOSandKRATOS 1af58828eb fix(openai): omit prompt_cache_key for openai-compatible providers (#636)
Interactive TUI always has a session ID, so every completion request
forwarded OpenAI's prompt_cache_key. Strict openai-compatible gateways
(e.g. NVIDIA NIM) reject unknown fields with a 400, while plain zero
exec usually has no session and omits the field.

Disable prompt_cache_key for ProviderKindOpenAICompatible; keep it for
official OpenAI. ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY remains a global kill
switch.

Fixes #624

Co-authored-by: KRATOS <[email protected]>
2026-07-10 21:43:49 +08:00
euxaristia dc06fe72ca fix(hooks): fail closed on launch failures for beforeTool hooks (#629)
When executing a security-critical beforeTool hook, if the hook command fails to launch (e.g. binary not found, missing execute permission), it previously failed open and let tool execution proceed.

Update classifyResult to return AuditBlocked, true when a launch error occurs on a beforeTool hook, enforcing a fail-closed policy. Observational afterTool hooks still fail open.
2026-07-10 16:42:32 +08:00
euxaristia e4bd703cfb fix(cron): prevent cron job Mutate from clobbering concurrent updates (#630)
Inside fireJob, the Mutate transaction callback previously returned the stale in-memory job copy (read at tick start). This clobbered any concurrent updates made to the job (such asExpr, Prompt, or Cwd edits) while the job was running.

Update the callback to apply schedule and status changes directly onto the fresh current job loaded from disk, and return current.
2026-07-10 16:41:27 +08:00
euxaristia aa73a76f1b fix(tui): resolve pending askUser callbacks to prevent runner hangs (#620)
When a run is completed or canceled (agentResponseMsg) while an askUser prompt is pending, or when a stale/superseded askUserRequestMsg is received, the answer callback is now invoked with nil. This unblocks the waiting agent loop goroutine, preventing goroutine leaks and runner hangs.
2026-07-10 10:12:16 +08:00
euxaristia 5b4f48d2dc fix(cli): prevent consuming positional arguments as flag values (#619)
When parsing CLI flags, positional prompt text placed immediately after flags requiring values (e.g. --auto, --notify, --max-turns) would be greedily consumed as their value by nextFlagValue. Refine nextFlagValue to validate choices/types (autonomy levels, notify modes, integers) to detect invalid values early and fail validation rather than eating positional arguments.
2026-07-10 10:11:12 +08:00
euxaristia f78b36c770 fix(tools): preserve SysProcAttr during PTY fallback (#618)
When falling back from a failed PTY start to a pipe execution, the command attributes are reset. Previously, resetExecCommandForPipeFallback set command.SysProcAttr = nil, which stripped custom settings like Windows CmdLine quoting. Update the fallback logic to restore the original SysProcAttr instance, and add TestStartExecProcessPTYFallbackPreservesSysProcAttr to cover.
2026-07-10 10:08:32 +08:00
euxaristia 2db00ee3d5 fix(windows): resolve absolute path for taskkill to prevent hijacking (#617)
Using unqualified taskkill / taskkill.exe commands on Windows can allow binary hijacking under certain conditions. Update all process termination callers on Windows to resolve the absolute path to taskkill.exe under System32 (referencing SystemRoot/windir environment variables, falling back to C:\Windows).
2026-07-10 10:08:11 +08:00
euxaristia 8ea53841a5 fix(daemon): handle os.ErrPermission as collision during O_EXCL lock creation (#616)
On Windows, a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the lock file in a 'delete pending' state, causing a racing O_EXCL create to fail with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (mapped to os.ErrPermission). Treat os.ErrPermission as lock contention / already-existing lock, matching the collision checks in cron, hooks, oauth, and securefile.
2026-07-10 10:07:50 +08:00
euxaristia 8536cc87f7 fix(securefile): reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS (#615)
* fix(securefile): reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS

When createSecretFile fails to acquire the O_EXCL lock because it already exists, check if the file is stale (older than 10 seconds). If so, atomically reclaim it via a rename-aside check, preventing a permanent DOS after abrupt process crashes. Update the lock file to write and verify process-specific tokens, and add TestCreateSecretFileReclaimsStaleLock to cover the stale reclaim flow.

* style(securefile): gofmt const block alignment
2026-07-10 10:07:22 +08:00
euxaristia ddc4927aac fix(acp): make truncateHint rune-safe (#614)
truncateHint slices string hints using a raw byte offset (s[:max]), which can split multi-byte UTF-8 characters (like CJK characters, emojis, or accents) in half and produce invalid UTF-8 sequences. Update it to count and slice by runes to guarantee valid UTF-8, and add a unit test TestToolTitleTruncateHintRuneSafe to verify.
2026-07-10 10:05:56 +08:00
euxaristia 0184581ec2 fix(agent,tui): resolve git branch detection when starting Zero in subdirectories (#613)
Currently, both gitBranchForPrompt (agent) and gitBranch (tui) check for a .git entry directly inside the current working directory. When starting Zero in nested folders/subdirectories of a repository, the check fails and the branch segment is omitted.

Export findProjectGitRoot as FindProjectGitRoot in agent package, and use it in both functions to resolve the correct repository root before checking HEAD and resolving the branch name. Also resolve relative worktree gitdirs relative to the repository root.
2026-07-10 10:05:36 +08:00
euxaristia 3d96ac7e55 fix(sandbox): remove windowsWriteRestricted flag to fix DenyRead bypass (#612)
On Windows, creating restricted tokens with windowsWriteRestricted (0x08) instructs the kernel to skip checking the restricted SIDs list for read operations. This bypasses DenyRead path policies on NTFS. Remove the flag to enforce restricted SID constraints on both read and write operations, and add integration test assertions to verify that DenyRead paths are correctly blocked.
2026-07-10 10:05:04 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani fdddb05ba8 fix: harden MCP credential boundaries (#597)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-10 09:00:17 +08:00
euxaristia b6117af86d fix(exec): stop false INCOMPLETE downgrades on conversational final messages (#608)
* fix(agent): scope self-reported incompletion to sentences about the current objective

The detector matched inability stems anywhere in the final message, so a
conversational recap of a past exchange ("You asked if I could work
autonomously ... so I couldn't actually do it at the time") downgraded a
completed run to INCOMPLETE. Match per sentence instead, drop quoted spans,
and skip sentences that retell a past exchange. The real transcript is now a
regression test, and genuine admissions still fire, both present tense and
past tense about the current task.

* feat(exec): add --no-completion-gate for conversational callers

A chat frontend driving zero exec has an operator present, so a final
message that hands the turn back ("the sandbox blocks network egress,
approve it and I'll continue") is a complete conversational answer, not an
unfinished task. The headless completion gate still stamped such runs
INCOMPLETE (exit 4) on the honest inability phrasing, and no phrase
heuristic can fix that case because the admission is true. The new flag
maps to RequireCompletionSignal=false so conversational callers can opt
out. Default behavior is unchanged.

* fix(exec): address review findings on quote stripping and --use-spec combination

stripQuoted now removes only balanced quoted spans: an opening delimiter
that never closes is restored verbatim, so a stray quote cannot swallow
the rest of the message and hide a genuine admission from the detector.
Regression tests cover dangling straight, curly, and backtick delimiters.

--no-completion-gate combined with --use-spec is now rejected at parse
time, mirroring the --self-correct check: the spec-draft path never
consults the completion gate, so the flag would be silently ignored.
2026-07-10 08:59:33 +08:00
251 changed files with 20290 additions and 1341 deletions

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+69 -11
View File
@@ -97,16 +97,21 @@ jobs:
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes the npm wrapper (@gitlawb/zero) once every platform's release
# assets are live — the package's postinstall downloads its binary from the
# GitHub Release, so publishing before the assets exist would ship a package
# that fails to install.
# Publishes @gitlawb/zero to npm: first the five platform payloads (versions
# of the SAME package at suffixed versions like X.Y.Z-linux-x64, carrying the
# native binary + vendored helpers), then the wrapper at X.Y.Z whose
# optionalDependencies alias those platform versions. Platform versions MUST
# publish first — the wrapper pins them exactly, so the reverse order would
# open a window where installs resolve aliases that 404. See
# docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md for the full contract.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
# Because the platform payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse
# that single trusted-publisher configuration.
publish-npm:
name: Publish npm package
needs: package
@@ -156,10 +161,11 @@ jobs:
console.log(`npm ${version} supports trusted publishing.`);
'
# Probe the exact URLs postinstall will build (internal/release/release.go
# asset-name scheme) as an anonymous client. This also blocks publishing
# while the repo is still private — private release assets 404 without
# auth, exactly as they would for an installing user.
# Probe the exact URLs the wrapper's first-run downloader builds
# (internal/release/release.go asset-name scheme) as an anonymous client
# — install.sh/install.ps1 and `zero update` read them too. This also
# blocks publishing while the repo is still private: private release
# assets 404 without auth, exactly as they would for an installing user.
- name: Verify release assets are downloadable
shell: bash
run: |
@@ -173,12 +179,64 @@ jobs:
"zero-v${version}-windows-x64.zip"; do
for url in "${base}/${asset}" "${base}/${asset}.sha256"; do
if ! curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null "$url"; then
echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — npm postinstall would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — the wrapper's fallback downloader and install.sh would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
done
echo "all release assets for v${version} are publicly downloadable."
- name: Publish to npm
run: npm publish --access public
- name: Download release artifacts
uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
with:
pattern: zero-*
path: dist/artifacts
merge-multiple: true
- name: Assemble npm packages
run: node scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs --artifacts-dir dist/artifacts --out-dir dist/npm
# Platform versions are semver PRERELEASES of the wrapper version
# (X.Y.Z-linux-x64), so they must never publish under the default
# `latest` dist-tag — that would make `npm install @gitlawb/zero`
# deliver a platform payload as the CLI. Publish them under a dedicated
# tag and assert `latest` survived before the wrapper goes out.
- name: Publish platform packages to npm
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
for dir in dist/npm/platforms/*/; do
echo "publishing ${dir}"
(cd "$dir" && npm publish --access public --tag platform)
done
# Tolerate a failed lookup (registry lag, or no latest tag yet on a
# bootstrap publish): under set -e a bare failure here would abort
# AFTER the platform payloads went out, leaving no wrapper and a
# re-run that fails on republishing existing versions. An empty
# value falls through the guard below.
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
case "$latest" in
"${version}-"*)
echo "::error::dist-tag latest points at platform version ${latest} — a platform publish clobbered it. Fix the dist-tag before the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "dist-tag latest is ${latest} (unchanged by platform publishes)."
- name: Publish wrapper to npm
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
(cd dist/npm/wrapper && npm publish --access public)
# Confirm the wrapper owns `latest` (retry: registry metadata can lag
# a publish by a few seconds).
for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
latest="$(npm view @gitlawb/zero dist-tags.latest || true)"
if [ "$latest" = "$version" ]; then
echo "dist-tag latest is ${version}."
exit 0
fi
sleep 5
done
echo "::error::dist-tag latest is ${latest}, expected ${version} after the wrapper publish." >&2
exit 1
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.3.0"}
{".":"0.4.0"}
+11 -310
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@@ -1,326 +1,27 @@
---
description: Extending Zero — how to write AGENTS.md files, custom specialists, skills, hooks, MCP servers, and plugins for the open-source CLI coding agent.
description: Project guidelines for the open-source CLI coding agent (zero) repository.
globs: "*.go, *.js, *.md, *.json, *.toml, *.yaml, *.yml"
alwaysApply: false
---
# Extending Zero
# Repository Conventions for Zero
Zero is an open-source terminal coding agent. Out of the box it does the obvious things — read, edit, run, search — but the design point of the project is that **every surface is configurable**. This document is the user-facing guide for that configuration.
This file outlines the project conventions and repository guidelines for coding agents when working on the `zero` repository. For the general guide on how to extend Zero (write specialist sub-agents, hooks, plugins, MCP, skills), see [docs/EXTENDING.md](docs/EXTENDING.md).
If you only want to *use* Zero, the [README](README.md) is enough. This page is for the other three jobs:
1. Tell the agent about *your* project (drop an `AGENTS.md` in your repo).
2. Add new specialist sub-agents.
3. Wire Zero into the rest of your toolchain (MCP, skills, hooks, plugins).
## 1. Drop a project `AGENTS.md`
When Zero starts in a directory, it looks for project-level instructions and injects them into the system prompt. The lookup walks from your current working directory **up to the nearest git root** and reads the first matching file at each level — general rules at the repo root, more specific rules in sub-trees. Files are labeled with their directory in the prompt (e.g. `## Project guidelines (services/api/AGENTS.md)`).
Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
| Path | Notes |
| --- | --- |
| `./AGENTS.md` | The classic spot — committed to your repo, shared with the team. |
| `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
| `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
```markdown
# Project conventions for <your project>
## 1. Project Conventions
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
```
- Unify functions/methods where possible to prevent codebase inflation. Prefer a single cross-platform function with conditional checks over duplicating helpers per platform.
Tips:
## 2. Guidelines for Coding Agents
- Keep each file under ~8 KiB. Zero caps the **total** across all matched files at 32 KiB; everything past the cap is dropped.
- Re-state rules in the imperative voice: "Run `make lint`", not "you should consider running the linter".
- Don't put secrets, model IDs, or environment-specific paths in `AGENTS.md`. Use `config.json` for those.
- In a monorepo, drop a narrower `AGENTS.md` in each sub-tree (e.g. `services/api/AGENTS.md`). Zero picks those up automatically when you launch from inside the sub-tree.
- A YAML frontmatter block (`---\n...\n---`) at the top is preserved verbatim in the injected prompt but is not parsed for `globs:` or `alwaysApply:` scoping today — keep the body self-contained.
If you are an AI coding agent executing tasks in this repository, you **MUST** run all Go code quality and security checks before committing code or completing your task:
### Personal guidelines, across every project
1. **Format & Vet**: Run `go fmt ./...` and `go vet ./...`.
2. **Lint**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
3. **Security**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
For preferences that follow *you*, not a specific repo (tone, tooling habits, workflow), drop a `ZERO.md` in your user config directory: `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` on Linux/macOS, `%AppData%\Roaming\zero\ZERO.md` on Windows — the same directory as `config.json` and your personal specialists. Same format and 8 KiB cap as the project files above, and the same case-insensitive basename match.
This file is injected as its own `## User guidelines` section, before the project's `AGENTS.md`/`ZERO.md`, and is labeled as personal preference in the prompt: project guidelines are the later, more specific instruction and take precedence over it when the two conflict.
## 2. Custom specialists
Specialists are Zero's sub-agents. Three scopes, in priority order:
| Scope | Path | Shared? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in | compiled into Zero | yes — `worker`, `explorer`, `code-review` |
| User | `~/.config/zero/specialists/*.md` | no — your machine only |
| Project | `./.zero/specialists/*.md` | yes — the repo team |
Project overrides user overrides built-in when names collide.
A specialist is a markdown manifest with frontmatter and a system prompt:
```markdown
---
description: Reviews API changes for breaking-change risk and missing tests.
tools: read-only,plan
---
You review API changes. For every changed hunk in `internal/api/` or any file
that ends in `_api.go`:
1. Confirm the public signature is backward-compatible, or note the breaking
change explicitly with the migration path.
2. Confirm a corresponding test exists in `internal/api/*_test.go` and that
the new behaviour is exercised.
3. Flag any new exported symbol without a doc comment.
Reply with one JSON object per finding: `{"file", "line", "severity", "message", "fix"}`.
```
CLI management (the prompt is passed inline via `--prompt`):
```bash
zero specialist list
zero specialist show api-reviewer
zero specialist create api-reviewer \
--project \
--description "Reviews API changes" \
--tools read-only,plan \
--prompt "$(cat api-reviewer.md)"
zero specialist edit api-reviewer --project
zero specialist delete api-reviewer --project
zero specialist path # prints the resolved specialists directory
```
The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in [`docs/SPECIALISTS.md`](docs/SPECIALISTS.md).
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI specialist manager (create / edit / delete / preview) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero specialist` CLI subcommands above.
## 3. Skills
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Skills are **user-level only** in this version — there's no project-scoped skill directory yet, so anything you want shared with the team goes in `AGENTS.md` (section 1) or as a hook (section 4).
Discovery root: `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` → `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills` → `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`. A missing directory is fine — Zero just reports "no skills".
```
~/.local/share/zero/skills/
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
SKILL.md
```
`SKILL.md` format:
```markdown
---
description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
---
# Run benchmarks
1. `make bench` — captures the wall-clock and RSS before and after.
2. `benchstat before.txt after.txt` — diffs the two.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. During an agent run, Zero loads the default skills directory before plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions silently. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
The `skill` core tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name.
## 4. Hooks
Hooks fire shell commands on lifecycle events. Configure them in JSON:
- User: `~/.config/zero/hooks.json`
- Project: `./.zero/hooks.json`
```json
{
"enabled": true,
"hooks": [
{
"id": "block-rm-rf",
"event": "beforeTool",
"matcher": "bash",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh",
"enabled": true
},
{
"id": "log-session",
"event": "sessionStart",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-log.sh",
"enabled": true
}
]
}
```
The `args` array (when present) is passed verbatim to `exec.CommandContext`. The actual hook payload — event name, matcher, tool call id, tool name, tool input, tool output, status — is delivered to the command as **JSON on stdin**, not via `${...}` substitution. A typical handler reads stdin and decides what to do:
```bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# /usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh
set -euo pipefail
payload="$(cat)"
if printf '%s' "$payload" | grep -q '"input":"[^"]*rm[[:space:]]+-rf'; then
echo "refusing rm -rf" >&2
exit 1
fi
```
Events the agent emits (in dispatch order):
| Event | Fires when | Matcher allowed? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `beforeTool` | A tool is about to run | yes (tool name) |
| `afterTool` | A tool just returned | yes (tool name) |
| `sessionStart` | A session begins | no |
| `sessionEnd` | A session ends | no |
| `specialistStart` | A sub-agent is spawned | yes (specialist name) |
| `specialistStop` | A sub-agent ends | yes (specialist name) |
A hook's exit code decides what happens next: `0` continues, non-zero blocks the tool call (`beforeTool`) or surfaces an error (`afterTool`). Hook execution is recorded in the audit log; the audit is reachable from the agent's view of past actions, not from a dedicated `zero doctor` check.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI hooks manager is on the backlog. Today you edit the JSON directly.
## 5. MCP — Model Context Protocol
Zero is both an **MCP client** (it can call external MCP servers) and an **MCP server** (other agents can call its tools).
### As a client — configure MCP servers in `config.json`
```json
{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--port", "7777"]
},
"github": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.example.com/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE" }
}
}
}
}
```
Manage via CLI:
```bash
zero mcp add docs --type stdio -- docs-mcp --port 7777
zero mcp add github --type http --url https://api.example.com/mcp \
--header "Authorization=Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE"
zero mcp list
zero mcp check docs
zero mcp remove github
zero mcp oauth login github
```
Servers are merged from user and project configs (project wins on conflicts). Token-bearing values in `config.json` are sent verbatim — there is no `${env:...}` expansion — so prefer one of:
- A wrapper script that sources the secret and execs the real command.
- A `--header` value produced by command substitution (`"Authorization=Bearer $(print-token)"`) in a private shell config that you keep out of git.
- A secret manager that injects the env var your MCP server reads on its own (the `command` and `args` then run inside that environment).
### As a server — expose Zero's tools to another agent
```bash
zero serve --mcp
```
The server speaks MCP over stdio. Configure it from the receiving side as a `stdio` server whose command is `zero serve --mcp`.
## 6. Plugins
A plugin is a self-contained directory that bundles tools, hooks, and skills for one capability. Plugins live at:
- User: `~/.config/zero/plugins/<id>/`
- Project: `./.zero/plugins/<id>/`
Each plugin has a `plugin.json` manifest:
```json
{
"id": "github-pr-review",
"name": "GitHub PR Review",
"description": "Adds review tools for GitHub PRs.",
"version": "1.0.0",
"tools": [
{ "name": "list_prs", "command": "./tools/list_prs.sh" }
],
"hooks": [
{ "name": "pre-merge-check", "event": "beforeTool", "command": "./hooks/pre-merge.sh" }
],
"skills": [
{ "path": "./skills/review-checklist/SKILL.md" }
]
}
```
Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
A plugin is enabled by being present in the plugins directory and disabled by removing it (or by the user setting `"enabled": false` in its `plugin.json`). Plugins are not enabled or disabled by a CLI subcommand today.
Plugin commands run with the plugin directory as their working directory. Use relative paths; the loader resolves them at activation time.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI plugins manager (browse, install, enable / disable) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero plugins` CLI subcommands above.
## 7. Configuration locations
Three layers, applied in order (later layers override earlier ones):
| Layer | Path | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in defaults | compiled in | Lowest priority. |
| User config | `~/.config/zero/config.json` | Your machine. Never committed. |
| Project config | `./.zero/config.json` | The repo. Committed (or not, your call). |
| CLI flags | `--model`, `--mode`, ... | Highest priority, per-invocation. |
| Environment | `ZERO_*` | Provider commands, secrets, skills dir override. |
The user config holds things that should follow the user across projects (default provider, default model, theme). The project config holds things the team agreed on (provider catalog, sandbox policies, model restrictions).
The sandbox `additionalWriteRoots` key is **ignored in project config** by design — a checked-out repo cannot widen its own sandbox. Set it in the user config or pass `--add-dir` per-invocation.
## 8. End-to-end example
A team that wants every contributor's Zero to behave the same way commits:
- `AGENTS.md` — project conventions, build commands, do-not-edit lists.
- `.zero/config.json` — provider catalog, default model, allowed tools.
- `.zero/specialists/api-reviewer.md` — the team's PR-review specialist.
- `.zero/hooks.json` — block `rm -rf` and `git push --force` on `beforeTool`.
- `.zero/plugins/internal-tooling/` — a plugin that adds the team's internal CLI tools to the agent's toolset.
Each contributor adds only:
- `~/.config/zero/config.json` — their personal API keys, theme, default mode.
- `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` — personal preferences that follow them across every project (see section 1).
- `~/.local/share/zero/skills/` — personal skills they keep across projects.
That's it. Run `zero` from the repo root and the agent has the team's full instruction set, every contributor's personal setup, and nothing else.
## 9. Reference
- [README](README.md) — install, quickstart, command reference.
- [docs/SPECIALISTS.md](docs/SPECIALISTS.md) — full specialist manifest spec.
- [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md) — `zero exec` I/O contract.
- [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md) — install from source or release.
If any check fails or cannot be run, do not ignore it. Prompt the user for instructions or setup assistance before proceeding.
+63 -4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,60 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0) (2026-07-17)
### Features
* **aimlapi:** AI/ML API provider with guided onboarding (top-up + key issuance) ([#655](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/655)) ([6b9c2f0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6b9c2f0c083e02bcd3aad68fb7af0501a9e7cd61))
* **cli:** show ZERO wordmark on --version ([#673](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/673)) ([9acb411](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9acb4113cc3337b3f361a16278e9cf11ca105e34))
* **cli:** wire MCP serve WorkspaceRoot and --add-dir scope ([#694](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/694)) ([75a78e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/75a78e715bf23154f69c8c79cb58eb4b535b2a2a))
* **npm:** ship the native binary as platform optionalDependencies ([#626](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/626)) ([5e1405d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5e1405d0b7abff5b3ccb3cfdb66d64d6d3322922))
* **perf:** emit prompt-prefix hash fingerprint per turn ([#704](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/704)) ([1c5c6e7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c5c6e78a8a0e228bdf53d7be90934fbce9d98c3))
* **providers:** add AI/ML API preset (rebased onto main) ([#621](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/621)) ([d66a9dd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d66a9dda69c32aa59f4bea903cfefe00d4b7adef))
* **providers:** refresh MiniMax model coverage ([#665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/665)) ([fa3052a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa3052a1422a4ad30a3a6295829564f42dee31a8))
* **skills:** discover shared ~/.agents/skills with multi-root skill loading ([#696](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/696)) ([7d57999](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7d579996b43741a2e57e3e38fcdd8484fcfc34e9))
* **tui:** Ctrl+X leader chords and emacs menu navigation ([#699](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/699)) ([7f669f4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7f669f455021be51319ee3b8298cd48a17f745c7))
* **tui:** press up to edit queued messages ([#656](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/656)) ([4c986d3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4c986d327b5ed26338d295c23bea5839681db8d0))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** make truncateHint rune-safe ([#614](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/614)) ([ddc4927](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ddc4927aac5544bf4dd2c46615aeda5a81c96576))
* **agent,tui:** resolve git branch detection when starting Zero in subdirectories ([#613](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/613)) ([0184581](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0184581ec234ea414e0a47bc33e8b0f4ddfb497b))
* **agent:** raise default and deep-mode turn budgets ([#650](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/650)) ([635c93a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/635c93af51ebc20f3e0917917e55a79edfe27c35))
* **cli:** prevent consuming positional arguments as flag values ([#619](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/619)) ([5b4f48d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5b4f48d2dcb66402c13bde0c3cfe9c9371da19fb))
* **config:** enforce MCP trust boundary so project config cannot override user disable ([#609](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/609)) ([4d8c31c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4d8c31cf16a3080344e3be7039408fcae71c075d)), closes [#512](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/512)
* **config:** surface unknown/typo'd config fields instead of silently dropping them ([#645](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/645)) ([893b7b4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/893b7b424cc203a2fcf92327a4e25c84286a90e0))
* **cron:** prevent cron job Mutate from clobbering concurrent updates ([#630](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/630)) ([e4bd703](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e4bd703cfb28dab2dfa3c2ddba46237e1bb2e164))
* **daemon:** handle os.ErrPermission as collision during O_EXCL lock creation ([#616](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/616)) ([8ea5384](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ea53841a5d54c37a153779ae86bea010659433c))
* **exec:** stop false INCOMPLETE downgrades on conversational final messages ([#608](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/608)) ([b6117af](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b6117af86d6bc87a4ee66910e99d76cb16b03fed))
* harden MCP credential boundaries ([#597](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/597)) ([fdddb05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fdddb05ba84b1600ae6c3a20028bf83afe474c44))
* **hooks:** fail closed on launch failures for beforeTool hooks ([#629](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/629)) ([dc06fe7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc06fe72caf45f72d2cba1e8a835c0f5b405c1e8))
* **hooks:** run sessionEnd hooks after Esc/Ctrl+C interrupts ([#606](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/606)) ([824ecdb](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/824ecdbcf9c467c35ef4e2666770fdadcb5bf402))
* **keyring:** pass generic password via stdin on macOS ([#574](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/574)) ([91ea6de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91ea6ded7503538834a84d090f78670a363c62d3))
* **lock:** prevent POSIX lock file overwrite and leak on Windows/Unix ([#628](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/628)) ([da41c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da41c3a75b782d6e0836fe13346321e40a90fbb4))
* **openai:** omit prompt_cache_key for openai-compatible providers ([#636](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/636)) ([1af5882](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1af58828eb3c22567599c000736c913a290959d2)), closes [#624](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/624)
* **plugins:** resolve relative executable paths against plugin root ([#627](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/627)) ([2efe6d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2efe6d539e29374b3ef39c2290bdea81f33a228b))
* **sandbox:** remove windowsWriteRestricted flag to fix DenyRead bypass ([#612](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/612)) ([3d96ac7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3d96ac7e55c760a97f28c0e6ceaf1ec3b4ab717a))
* **sandbox:** scrub dynamic credential env vars ([#682](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/682)) ([9043bae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9043baedcff7776c7373645b57563cac06b31847))
* **sandbox:** scrub sensitive credentials from sandbox environment ([#660](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/660)) ([6fc1220](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6fc1220f6ac66fb3ae67b637cbbed7068d2213c0))
* **sandbox:** unblock git fetch/commit/add under the write-restricted sandbox ([#654](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/654)) ([5c4815a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c4815a66ed07d9cf90b825adfd936d3ac07639d))
* **sandbox:** use WRITE_RESTRICTED token when no DenyRead paths are configured ([#658](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/658)) ([a5d2e32](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a5d2e327c8681671aa8a9e5378801215b747edcf))
* **securefile,credstore:** call Sync on temp file before close and rename ([#631](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/631)) ([212734a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/212734adf3b5f982e22385161205aa1afe4634fe))
* **securefile:** reclaim stale lock files to prevent permanent DOS ([#615](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/615)) ([8536cc8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8536cc87f7a885f9e436d6ef28f5f325201623dc))
* **swarm:** wait for job.Runs directly in scheduler skip test ([#667](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/667)) ([1bb6b57](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1bb6b5745af90321d1e657a12a1976cded5dd1bd))
* **tools:** classify silent wrapped Windows command failures as sandbox denials ([#659](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/659)) ([8bd9742](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8bd9742fa95c41b93ea4e718628aed0ff3ae9dd0))
* **tools:** preserve SysProcAttr during PTY fallback ([#618](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/618)) ([f78b36c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f78b36c770daa4577a9f99265b18a354454e36eb))
* **tui:** resolve pending askUser callbacks to prevent runner hangs ([#620](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/620)) ([aa73a76](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/aa73a76f1bd1b6fe97bac2fbff2d61b7474139f2))
* **tui:** stop the composer cursor blinking while typing or unfocused ([#672](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/672)) ([2b42cd5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2b42cd567b96d6f7e0818594e53ff31cce1e42e9))
* **windows:** resolve absolute path for taskkill to prevent hijacking ([#617](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/617)) ([2db00ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2db00ee3d57db97e0fbe23cb8628e8bcb47f6f09))
### Performance Improvements
* **tools:** add explicit effect metadata for safe concurrency ([#705](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/705)) ([8ef8576](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8ef8576df7d0775a5b815bc0776a794cadb75c34))
## [0.3.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0) (2026-07-09)
@@ -127,14 +181,19 @@ tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- Shared multi-agent skills discovery: when present, `~/.agents/skills` is searched after the primary
Zero skills dir (and before plugin skill roots). `zero skills list` / `info` and the runtime `skill`
tool share one multi-root discovery path; install/remove/lock still target only the Zero skills directory.
- `SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or `ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- Twelve built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`,
`solarized-light`, `dune`, and `neon` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or
`ZERO_THEME`. Every palette is contrast-audited to WCAG AA, and the new presets are additionally
audited after xterm-256 downsampling; see [docs/THEMES.md](docs/THEMES.md). The built-in light
theme was reworked for legibility.
- `--theme <name>` flag for the TUI, accepting `auto` or any registered theme (previously only the
`ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- "Accessibility / Appearance" section in the README documenting `NO_COLOR`, `ZERO_THEME`, `/theme`,
+16 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean help
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean baseline help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
@@ -40,5 +40,19 @@ clean:
rm -f zero
go clean ./...
# Run the per-turn benchmark harness over the checked-in baseline manifest and
# write the JSON result to internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json. Requires a
# built `zero` binary and a model; set ZERO_BENCH_MODEL (required) and
# ZERO_BENCH_BINARY (defaults to ./zero) to configure the run. The report is
# machine-specific and regenerated, not hand-edited.
baseline: build
@if [ -z "$(ZERO_BENCH_MODEL)" ]; then echo "Set ZERO_BENCH_MODEL (and optionally ZERO_BENCH_BINARY) before running 'make baseline'"; exit 2; fi
@ZERO_BIN="$${ZERO_BENCH_BINARY:-./zero}"; \
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench turn \
--suite internal/perfbench/manifests/baseline.json \
--model $(ZERO_BENCH_MODEL) \
--binary "$$ZERO_BIN" \
--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean"
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean, baseline"
+71 -32
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
@@ -49,34 +49,15 @@ npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
arm64.
### Bun
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
Alternatives: allow the postinstall up front by adding
`"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` to your project's package.json
before `bun add`, or run the installer manually
(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`) on Bun versions
that do not have `bun pm trust`.
The npm package is a small wrapper whose platform build (Linux and macOS on
x64/arm64, Windows on x64 — including the browser/terminal control helpers)
installs as an optional dependency straight from the npm registry — no install
scripts, no downloads outside npm. Bun, pnpm, and yarn work the same way with
no trust or approval steps. Installs that skip optional dependencies
(`--omit=optional`) still work: the wrapper fetches the binary from the
matching GitHub Release whenever it is missing. Windows on ARM runs the x64
build under emulation. See [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md) for
how the package is put together.
### Install scripts
@@ -94,7 +75,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.25+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
@@ -148,7 +129,16 @@ the key in the wizard:
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
To configure AI/ML API directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup aimlapi --set-active
```
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
@@ -157,6 +147,33 @@ To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
```bash
zero providers add minimax --set-active
zero providers add minimaxi-cn --set-active
```
To use the OpenAI-compatible endpoints instead, add a custom compatible profile
for the required region:
```bash
zero providers add custom-openai-compatible \
--name minimax-openai \
--model MiniMax-M3 \
--base-url https://api.minimax.io/v1 \
--api-key-env MINIMAX_API_KEY \
--set-active
zero providers add custom-openai-compatible \
--name minimax-cn-openai \
--model MiniMax-M3 \
--base-url https://api.minimaxi.com/v1 \
--api-key-env MINIMAXI_API_KEY \
--set-active
```
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
`zero providers detect`.
@@ -174,6 +191,8 @@ Useful controls:
|---|---|
| `Enter` | send the prompt |
| `/` | open slash-command suggestions |
| `Ctrl+X` then letter | common slash commands (e.g. `m` → `/model`; `Ctrl+X` `?` for full list) |
| `Ctrl+P` / `Ctrl+N` | previous / next item in menus (arrows still work) |
| `Shift+Tab` | cycle permission mode |
| `Ctrl+B` | show/hide the sidebar |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel or exit |
@@ -322,7 +341,7 @@ manifest.
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<anything>` | disables color output |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `solarized-light`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `neon`, `solarized-light`, `dune`) |
| `--theme <name>` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI (same names) |
| `/theme` | opens the theme picker inside the TUI (live preview; `/theme <name>` switches directly) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | disables streaming fade animation |
@@ -339,7 +358,26 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Cross-compile examples:
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:
1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:
```bash
# Install golangci-lint
go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
# Install govulncheck
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
```
### Cross-Compile Examples
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
@@ -350,6 +388,7 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [Install](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [Update flow](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Themes](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON protocol](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [Specialists](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
+5 -22
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
@@ -38,25 +38,7 @@ npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
npm 包安装一个小型包装器以及与你平台匹配的 Zero 二进制文件(从 GitHub Releases 获取)。支持 Linux、macOS 和 Windows 的 x64 和 arm64。
### Bun
Bun 默认不运行依赖的生命周期脚本,因此获取 Zero 二进制文件的 `postinstall` 会被跳过,首次运行会失败并显示 `No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`。
最简单的解决方法是安装后信任该包,这会运行被阻止的 postinstall。项目安装和全局安装均适用:
```bash
# 项目安装
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# 全局安装
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
其他方式:在 `bun add` 之前将 `"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` 添加到项目的 package.json 以提前允许 postinstall;或在不支持 `bun pm trust` 的旧版 Bun 上手动运行安装程序(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`)。
npm 包是一个小型包装器,其平台构建(Linux 和 macOS 的 x64/arm64、Windows 的 x64,包含浏览器/终端控制辅助工具)作为可选依赖直接从 npm registry 安装——没有安装脚本,也不会从 npm 之外下载任何内容。Bun、pnpm 和 yarn 的行为完全一致,无需任何信任或批准步骤。跳过可选依赖的安装(`--omit=optional`)也能工作:只要二进制文件缺失,包装器就会从对应的 GitHub Release 下载。Windows on ARM 通过模拟运行 x64 构建。详见 [docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md](docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md)。
### 安装脚本
@@ -74,7 +56,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.25+。
源码构建需要 Go 1.26.5+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
@@ -252,7 +234,7 @@ zero update 检查更新版本
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`neon`、`solarized-light`、`dune`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
@@ -279,6 +261,7 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [主题](docs/THEMES.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
+76 -23
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
@@ -39,6 +40,11 @@ function resolveHelper(packageRoot, name) {
return null;
}
// Legacy path: helpers installed as npm dependencies of the wrapper. Current
// installs vendor the helpers inside the platform package instead (a helpers/
// directory next to the binary, found by the Go side on its own), so this
// manifest is usually empty — it only matters for a downloaded-binary install
// whose wrapper still carries helper dependencies.
function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
const helpers = {};
for (const name of ['agent-browser', 'tuistory']) {
@@ -49,38 +55,85 @@ function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, helpers });
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
// The platform payload is a version of @gitlawb/zero itself, installed under
// an npm: alias (see docs/NPM_PACKAGING.md). The alias name is derived from
// process.platform/process.arch, so an unsupported platform simply fails to
// resolve and we fall through to the downloader.
function platformPackageBinary() {
const aliasedName = `@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}`;
let manifestPath;
try {
manifestPath = createRequire(import.meta.url).resolve(`${aliasedName}/package.json`);
} catch {
return null;
}
const candidate = join(dirname(manifestPath), zeroBinaryName());
return existsSync(candidate) ? candidate : null;
}
if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
// Mirrors the release matrix (internal/release/release.go): the platforms a
// GitHub Release asset exists for. android maps to the linux asset; there is
// no windows-arm64 asset (Windows on ARM runs the x64 build under emulation).
function releaseAssetAvailable() {
const platform = { linux: 'linux', android: 'linux', darwin: 'macos', win32: 'windows' }[
process.platform
];
const arch = process.arch === 'x64' || process.arch === 'arm64' ? process.arch : null;
if (!platform || !arch) return false;
return !(platform === 'windows' && arch === 'arm64');
}
// Fallback for installs without a platform package (--omit=optional, package
// managers that skip optionalDependencies): fetch the binary next to the
// wrapper with the same checksum-verified downloader that used to run as
// postinstall. Deliberately NOT cached on failure — a transient network error
// self-heals on the next run — so this retries on every invocation until a
// binary is in place. Platforms with no release asset skip the attempt.
function downloadMissingBinary(packageRoot) {
const downloadScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
if (!existsSync(downloadScript) || !releaseAssetAvailable()) return;
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
'[zero] no platform package installed — fetching the native binary from the GitHub Release (retried on each run until it succeeds).',
);
spawnSync(process.execPath, [downloadScript], {
stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'inherit'],
});
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
function resolveNativeBinary() {
const fromPlatformPackage = platformPackageBinary();
if (fromPlatformPackage) return fromPlatformPackage;
const downloaded = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
if (existsSync(downloaded)) return downloaded;
downloadMissingBinary(packageRoot);
return existsSync(downloaded) ? downloaded : null;
}
const nativePath = resolveNativeBinary();
if (!nativePath) {
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary is available for this install.\n' +
'Normally npm installs it as an optional dependency of @gitlawb/zero\n' +
`(@gitlawb/zero-${process.platform}-${process.arch}), and the wrapper can\n` +
'also download it from the GitHub Release when it is missing.\n' +
'\n' +
'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'Things to try:\n' +
' - reinstall without omitting optional dependencies:\n' +
' npm install -g @gitlawb/zero\n' +
' - run the downloader manually (needs write access to the package dir):\n' +
` node "${join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs')}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun
? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
: '') +
'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
'(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
'If this platform has no prebuilt binary, build from source:\n' +
'https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero (go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.26+).',
);
process.exit(1);
}
const env = { ...process.env };
const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
if (localControlHelpers) {
env.ZERO_LOCAL_CONTROL_HELPERS = localControlHelpers;
} else {
+4
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ func run(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.
if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "tasks" {
return runTasksCommand(args[1:], getenv, stdout, stderr)
}
if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "turn" {
return runTurnCommand(args[1:], getenv, stdout, stderr)
}
options, err := parseArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
@@ -206,6 +209,7 @@ func helpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench [options]",
" zero-perf-bench tasks [options] (Terminal-Bench-style task harness; see `tasks --help`)",
" zero-perf-bench turn [options] (per-turn tracing benchmark; see `turn --help`)",
"",
"Options:",
" --iterations <n> Measured samples to collect (default: 5)",
+238
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// turnOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench turn` subcommand: the per-turn
// benchmark harness that runs ZERO headlessly with --trace, parses each turn's
// NDJSON trace, and records per-span latency plus the top controllable latency
// sources — the Phase 0 baseline's "do not proceed until" criterion.
type turnOptions struct {
SuitePath string
Model string
Mode string
SelfCorrect bool
Binary string
Iterations int
Version string
Commit string
Output string
JSON bool
DryRun bool
Help bool
}
func runTurnCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
options, err := parseTurnArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
return 2
}
if options.Help {
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(stdout, turnHelpText())
return 0
}
set, err := perfbench.LoadTaskSet(options.SuitePath)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
// The dry-run path records a zero-iteration run without a binary, so the
// manifest loads and the report path is exercised in CI without a model.
if options.DryRun {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "[zero] turn benchmark: dry run (no agent invoked)")
return 0
}
binary, err := perfbench.ResolveBinary(options.Binary)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 2
}
result, err := perfbench.RunTurnBench(context.Background(), set, perfbench.TurnBenchConfig{
Model: options.Model,
Mode: options.Mode,
SelfCorrect: options.SelfCorrect,
Version: options.Version,
Commit: options.Commit,
Iterations: options.Iterations,
Runner: perfbench.NewTurnExecRunner(binary),
})
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
if options.Output != "" {
if err := writeTurnReport(options.Output, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
}
if options.JSON {
if err := perfbench.WriteTurnBenchJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Turn benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
return 0
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, perfbench.FormatTurnBenchSummary(result))
return 0
}
func parseTurnArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (turnOptions, error) {
options := turnOptions{
Iterations: 1,
Version: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_VERSION")),
Commit: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT")),
}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
flag, inlineValue := splitFlagValue(arg)
switch flag {
case "--suite":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.SuitePath = value
index = next
case "--model":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Model = value
index = next
case "--mode":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Mode = value
index = next
case "--binary":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Binary = value
index = next
case "--iterations":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
parsed, err := parsePositiveInteger(flag, value)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Iterations = parsed
index = next
case "--version":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Version = value
index = next
case "--commit":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Commit = value
index = next
case "--output":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Output = value
index = next
case "--self-correct":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.SelfCorrect = true
case "--json":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.JSON = true
case "--dry-run":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.DryRun = true
case "-h", "--help":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.Help = true
default:
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown option: %s", arg)
}
}
if options.Help {
return options, nil
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.SuitePath) == "" {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--suite is required")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.Model) == "" && !options.DryRun {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--model is required (or pass --dry-run)")
}
return options, nil
}
func writeTurnReport(path string, result perfbench.TurnBenchResult) error {
if dir := filepath.Dir(path); dir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var buffer bytes.Buffer
if err := perfbench.WriteTurnBenchJSON(&buffer, result); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, buffer.Bytes(), 0o644)
}
func turnHelpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench turn [options]",
"",
"Runs ZERO headlessly with --trace against a per-turn benchmark task set and",
"records per-span latency plus the top controllable latency sources (the",
"Phase 0 baseline's \"do not proceed until\" criterion). Each task is a fresh",
"`zero exec` process, so iterations are cold-start samples; a warm path needs",
"an in-process runner (future work).",
"",
"Options:",
" --suite <path> Task set JSON file (required)",
" --model <model> Model to run (required unless --dry-run)",
" --mode <name> Exec mode preset to apply",
" --self-correct Enable the post-edit verify-and-correct loop",
" --binary <path> Path to the `zero` binary (default: zero on PATH / repo root)",
" --iterations <n> Times to run each task (default: 1)",
" --version <v> Record the ZERO version (default: $ZERO_BENCH_VERSION)",
" --commit <sha> Record the ZERO commit (default: $ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT)",
" --output <path> Write the JSON result to path",
" --json Print only the JSON result",
" --dry-run Load the manifest and exit without invoking the agent",
" -h, --help Show this help",
}, "\n") + "\n"
}
+340
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
# Extending Zero
Zero is an open-source terminal coding agent. Out of the box it does the obvious things — read, edit, run, search — but the design point of the project is that **every surface is configurable**. This document is the user-facing guide for that configuration.
If you only want to *use* Zero, the [README](../README.md) is enough. This page is for the other three jobs:
1. Tell the agent about *your* project (drop an `AGENTS.md` in your repo).
2. Add new specialist sub-agents.
3. Wire Zero into the rest of your toolchain (MCP, skills, hooks, plugins).
## 1. Drop a project `AGENTS.md`
When Zero starts in a directory, it looks for project-level instructions and injects them into the system prompt. The lookup walks from your current working directory **up to the nearest git root** and reads the first matching file at each level — general rules at the repo root, more specific rules in sub-trees. Files are labeled with their directory in the prompt (e.g. `## Project guidelines (services/api/AGENTS.md)`).
Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
| Path | Notes |
| --- | --- |
| `./AGENTS.md` | The classic spot — committed to your repo, shared with the team. |
| `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
| `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
```markdown
# Project conventions for <your project>
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
```
Tips:
- Keep each file under ~8 KiB. Zero caps the **total** across all matched files at 32 KiB; everything past the cap is dropped.
- Re-state rules in the imperative voice: "Run `make lint`", not "you should consider running the linter".
- Don't put secrets, model IDs, or environment-specific paths in `AGENTS.md`. Use `config.json` for those.
- In a monorepo, drop a narrower `AGENTS.md` in each sub-tree (e.g. `services/api/AGENTS.md`). Zero picks those up automatically when you launch from inside the sub-tree.
- A YAML frontmatter block (`---\n...\n---`) at the top is preserved verbatim in the injected prompt but is not parsed for `globs:` or `alwaysApply:` scoping today — keep the body self-contained.
### Personal guidelines, across every project
For preferences that follow *you*, not a specific repo (tone, tooling habits, workflow), drop a `ZERO.md` in your user config directory: `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` on Linux/macOS, `%AppData%\zero\ZERO.md` on Windows — the same directory as `config.json` and your personal specialists. Same format and 8 KiB cap as the project files above, and the same case-insensitive basename match.
This file is injected as its own `## User guidelines` section, before the project's `AGENTS.md`/`ZERO.md`, and is labeled as personal preference in the prompt: project guidelines are the later, more specific instruction and take precedence over it when the two conflict.
## 2. Custom specialists
Specialists are Zero's sub-agents. Three scopes, in priority order:
| Scope | Path | Shared? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in | compiled into Zero | yes — `worker`, `explorer`, `code-review` |
| User | `~/.config/zero/specialists/*.md` | no — your machine only |
| Project | `./.zero/specialists/*.md` | yes — the repo team |
Project overrides user overrides built-in when names collide.
A specialist is a markdown manifest with frontmatter and a system prompt:
```markdown
---
description: Reviews API changes for breaking-change risk and missing tests.
tools: read-only,plan
---
You review API changes. For every changed hunk in `internal/api/` or any file
that ends in `_api.go`:
1. Confirm the public signature is backward-compatible, or note the breaking
change explicitly with the migration path.
2. Confirm a corresponding test exists in `internal/api/*_test.go` and that
the new behaviour is exercised.
3. Flag any new exported symbol without a doc comment.
Reply with one JSON object per finding: `{"file", "line", "severity", "message", "fix"}`.
```
CLI management (the prompt is passed inline via `--prompt`):
```bash
zero specialist list
zero specialist show api-reviewer
zero specialist create api-reviewer \
--project \
--description "Reviews API changes" \
--tools read-only,plan \
--prompt "$(cat api-reviewer.md)"
zero specialist edit api-reviewer --project
zero specialist delete api-reviewer --project
zero specialist path # prints the resolved specialists directory
```
The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in [`docs/SPECIALISTS.md`](SPECIALISTS.md).
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI specialist manager (create / edit / delete / preview) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero specialist` CLI subcommands above.
## 3. Skills
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Standalone project skill directories are not supported in this version (shared project-wide skills must go in `AGENTS.md` or as a hook). However, project plugins (section 6) may bundle skills, which are merged into the active run.
Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
1. **Primary Zero dir** — `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` if set, else `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills`, else `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`
2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skills add` / `remove` / `lock`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`.
```text
~/.local/share/zero/skills/ # primary (install/remove/lock target)
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
SKILL.md
~/.agents/skills/ # optional shared multi-agent root
shared-review/
SKILL.md
```
`SKILL.md` format:
```markdown
---
description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
---
# Run benchmarks
1. `make bench` — captures the wall-clock and RSS before and after.
2. `benchstat before.txt after.txt` — diffs the two.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. Within a single skills root, duplicate names are resolved by lexicographic directory order. Across roots, Zero loads the primary directory first, then `~/.agents/skills`, then plugin skill roots; earlier roots win name collisions. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are merged into the active agent run at plugin activation time, so bundled skills appear in the available skills list and can be loaded with the `skill` tool.
The `skill` tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name (primary, agents, or plugin).
## 4. Hooks
Hooks fire shell commands on lifecycle events. Configure them in JSON:
- User: `~/.config/zero/hooks.json`
- Project: `./.zero/hooks.json`
```json
{
"enabled": true,
"hooks": [
{
"id": "block-rm-rf",
"event": "beforeTool",
"matcher": "bash",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh",
"enabled": true
},
{
"id": "log-session",
"event": "sessionStart",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-log.sh",
"enabled": true
}
]
}
```
The `args` array (when present) is passed verbatim to `exec.CommandContext`. The actual hook payload — event name, matcher, tool call id, tool name, tool input, tool output, status — is delivered to the command as **JSON on stdin**, not via `${...}` substitution. A typical handler reads stdin and decides what to do:
```bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# /usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh
set -euo pipefail
payload="$(cat)"
if printf '%s' "$payload" | grep -q '"input":"[^"]*rm[[:space:]]+-rf'; then
echo "refusing rm -rf" >&2
exit 1
fi
```
Events the agent emits (in dispatch order):
| Event | Fires when | Matcher allowed? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `beforeTool` | A tool is about to run | yes (tool name) |
| `afterTool` | A tool just returned | yes (tool name) |
| `sessionStart` | A session begins | no |
| `sessionEnd` | A session ends | no |
| `specialistStart` | A sub-agent is spawned | yes (specialist name) |
| `specialistStop` | A sub-agent ends | yes (specialist name) |
A hook's exit code decides what happens next: `0` continues, non-zero blocks the tool call (`beforeTool`) or surfaces an error (`afterTool`). Hook execution is recorded in the audit log; the audit is reachable from the agent's view of past actions, not from a dedicated `zero doctor` check.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI hooks manager is on the backlog. Today you edit the JSON directly.
## 5. MCP — Model Context Protocol
Zero is both an **MCP client** (it can call external MCP servers) and an **MCP server** (other agents can call its tools).
### As a client — configure MCP servers in `config.json`
```json
{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--port", "7777"]
},
"github": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.example.com/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE" }
}
}
}
}
```
Manage via CLI:
```bash
zero mcp add docs --type stdio -- docs-mcp --port 7777
zero mcp add github --type http --url https://api.example.com/mcp \
--header "Authorization=Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE"
zero mcp list
zero mcp check docs
zero mcp remove github
zero mcp oauth login github
```
Servers are merged from user and project configs (project wins on conflicts). Token-bearing values in `config.json` are sent verbatim — there is no `${env:...}` expansion — so prefer one of:
- A wrapper script that sources the secret and execs the real command.
- A `--header` value produced by command substitution (`"Authorization=Bearer $(print-token)"`) in a private shell config that you keep out of git.
- A secret manager that injects the env var your MCP server reads on its own (the `command` and `args` then run inside that environment).
Project MCP config remains supported for shared team servers, but a project layer
that changes an existing server's target (`url`, `command`, or `args`) does not
inherit user credentials. Clear or replace `headers`, `env`, or `oauth` explicitly,
or use a new server name. OAuth tokens are bound to the resolved server identity,
so changing a server target can require `zero mcp oauth login <server>` again.
OAuth server names ending in `.<32 hex chars>` are reserved for token storage.
### As a server — expose Zero's tools to another agent
```bash
zero serve --mcp
zero serve --mcp -C /path/to/workspace
zero serve --mcp --add-dir /path/to/extra
```
The server speaks MCP over stdio. Configure it from the receiving side as a `stdio` server whose command is `zero serve --mcp`.
`-C/--cwd` sets the workspace root exposed as MCP resources and used by core tools. `--add-dir` (repeatable) widens that resource/tool scope beyond the workspace without granting the sandbox temp roots used by interactive runs.
## 6. Plugins
A plugin is a self-contained directory that bundles tools, hooks, and skills for one capability. Plugins live at:
- User: `~/.config/zero/plugins/<id>/`
- Project: `./.zero/plugins/<id>/`
Each plugin has a `plugin.json` manifest:
```json
{
"id": "github-pr-review",
"name": "GitHub PR Review",
"description": "Adds review tools for GitHub PRs.",
"version": "1.0.0",
"tools": [
{ "name": "list_prs", "command": "./tools/list_prs.sh" }
],
"hooks": [
{ "name": "pre-merge-check", "event": "beforeTool", "command": "./hooks/pre-merge.sh" }
],
"skills": [
{ "path": "./skills/review-checklist/SKILL.md" }
]
}
```
Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
A plugin is enabled by being present in the plugins directory and disabled by removing it (or by the user setting `"enabled": false` in its `plugin.json`). Plugins are not enabled or disabled by a CLI subcommand today.
Plugin commands run with the plugin directory as their working directory. Use relative paths; the loader resolves them at activation time.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI plugins manager (browse, install, enable / disable) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero plugins` CLI subcommands above.
## 7. Configuration locations
Five configuration sources, in precedence order (later sources override earlier ones):
| Source | Path / Key | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in defaults | compiled in | Lowest priority. |
| User config | `~/.config/zero/config.json` | Your machine. Never committed. |
| Project config | `./.zero/config.json` | The repo. Committed (or not, your call). |
| Environment | `ZERO_*` | Provider commands, secrets, skills dir override. |
| CLI flags | `--model`, `--mode`, ... | Highest priority, per-invocation. |
The user config holds things that should follow the user across projects (default provider, default model, theme). The project config holds things the team agreed on (provider catalog, sandbox policies, model restrictions).
The sandbox `additionalWriteRoots` key is **ignored in project config** by design — a checked-out repo cannot widen its own sandbox. Set it in the user config or pass `--add-dir` per-invocation.
## 8. End-to-end example
A team that wants every contributor's Zero to behave the same way commits:
- `AGENTS.md` — project conventions, build commands, do-not-edit lists.
- `.zero/config.json` — provider catalog, default model, allowed tools.
- `.zero/specialists/api-reviewer.md` — the team's PR-review specialist.
- `.zero/hooks.json` — block `rm -rf` on `beforeTool`.
- `.zero/plugins/internal-tooling/` — a plugin that adds the team's internal CLI tools to the agent's toolset.
Each contributor adds only:
- `~/.config/zero/config.json` — their personal API keys, theme, default mode.
- `~/.config/zero/ZERO.md` — personal preferences that follow them across every project (see section 1).
- `~/.local/share/zero/skills/` — personal skills they keep across projects.
That's it. Run `zero` from the repo root and the agent has the team's full instruction set, every contributor's personal setup, and nothing else.
## 9. Reference
- [README](../README.md) — install, quickstart, command reference.
- [docs/SPECIALISTS.md](SPECIALISTS.md) — full specialist manifest spec.
- [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md) — `zero exec` I/O contract.
- [docs/INSTALL.md](INSTALL.md) — install from source or release.
+4 -3
View File
@@ -733,9 +733,10 @@ flowchart TD
- **Skills** are instruction packs the model can load on demand.
- **Specialists** are sub-agents callable through the `Task` tool.
- **MCP servers** contribute external tools.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap merges plugin skill
roots into the runtime skill tool and prompt-visible skill list; the base
`internal/skills` scanner still scans one root at a time.
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
`LoadFromRoots` / `DiscoveryRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
- **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.
## End-to-End Data Flow
+23 -50
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ Zero is distributed as:
- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
- release archives on GitHub Releases
- source builds with Go 1.25+
- source builds with Go 1.26.5+
The npm package and install scripts download a platform-specific release archive.
They require a published GitHub Release for the requested version.
The install scripts download a platform-specific release archive and require a
published GitHub Release for the requested version. The npm package is
self-contained: the platform binary installs from the npm registry.
## npm
@@ -16,59 +17,32 @@ npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
The package supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and arm64. It installs the
`zero` command and downloads the matching release binary during `postinstall`.
The package supports Linux and macOS on x64 and arm64, and Windows on x64
(Windows on ARM runs the x64 build under emulation). It installs a small
`zero` wrapper plus, as an optional dependency, a platform payload with the
native binary and the bundled browser/terminal control helpers. There are no
install scripts and nothing is downloaded from outside the npm registry, so
the install is silent and works identically under npm, Bun, pnpm, and yarn —
no trust or approval steps. See [NPM_PACKAGING.md](NPM_PACKAGING.md) for the
package architecture.
Requirements:
- Node.js 18+
- network access to npm and GitHub Releases
- network access to npm
## Bun
Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
If the install skipped optional dependencies (`npm install --omit=optional`,
or a package manager configured to do so), the wrapper falls back to
downloading the binary from the matching GitHub Release, with checksum
verification. The fetch is retried on each run until a binary is in place (a
transient network failure heals itself; an install directory the current user
cannot write to keeps failing — rerun the install or the command below with
sufficient permissions). To trigger the fetch manually:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
node "$(npm root -g)/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs"
```
`bun pm untrusted` (or `bun pm -g untrusted`) lists the blocked postinstalls if
you want to inspect before trusting.
Alternatively, allow the postinstall to run at install time by adding the
package to your project's `trustedDependencies` before installing:
```json
{
"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
}
```
```bash
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
On Bun versions that do not have `bun pm trust`, run the installer manually
after installing:
```bash
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
```
Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
@@ -151,7 +125,7 @@ Build a local binary:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.25+.
Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
@@ -252,8 +226,7 @@ Supported targets:
- `linux-arm64`
- `macos-x64`
- `macos-arm64`
- `windows-x64`
- `windows-arm64`
- `windows-x64` (Windows on ARM runs this build under emulation)
Each archive must have a matching `.sha256` file. The install scripts download
both files, verify the checksum, and then copy the binary into the install
+162
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
# npm packaging
How `@gitlawb/zero` is put together on npm, why it is shaped this way, and the
rules the release pipeline must follow. Read this before touching
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/postinstall.mjs`,
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`, or the npm-publish steps of
`release-artifacts.yml`.
## Goals
A `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` must be **silent and self-contained**:
- No `EBADENGINE` warnings — ours or from any package in the dependency tree.
- No install scripts anywhere in the tree, so npm's `allow-scripts` gating,
Bun's blocked-by-default lifecycle scripts, and pnpm's strict mode all
install zero without prompts, trust ceremonies, or broken binaries.
- No network fetches outside the npm registry at install time. GitHub being
down or rate-limited must not break `npm install`.
- Browser control (`agent-browser`) and terminal control (`tuistory`) work out
of the box.
## Architecture
The model is the one used by Codex, esbuild, and Biome: a tiny wrapper package
plus per-platform payloads carrying the native binaries.
```
@gitlawb/zero <- wrapper: bin/zero.js + optionalDependencies
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-darwin-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-darwin-x64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-arm64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-arm64
├─ @gitlawb/zero-linux-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-linux-x64
└─ @gitlawb/zero-win32-x64 -> npm:@gitlawb/zero@{version}-win32-x64
```
- The platform "packages" are **versions of the same `@gitlawb/zero` package**,
published at suffixed versions (`0.4.0-linux-x64`) and referenced through
`npm:` aliases in `optionalDependencies`. One package name means one npm
trusted-publisher configuration — no new publish credentials per platform.
The alias suffixes use Node's `process.platform`/`process.arch` names so
`bin/zero.js` can derive its platform package directly.
- Each platform version sets `os` and `cpu`, so npm installs exactly one of
them and skips the rest.
- A platform payload is assembled from the platform's release archive by
`scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` and contains the `zero` binary,
the platform's sandbox helpers, and the vendored `helpers/` tree (see
below). It has no `bin`, no scripts, and no dependencies — it is inert on
its own; the wrapper execs the binary out of it.
- The published wrapper has **no scripts and no dependencies** — the
assembly script strips both from the repo `package.json` and injects the
exact-version `optionalDependencies`. (The repo `package.json` keeps
`agent-browser`/`tuistory` in `dependencies` purely as the version pins for
the vendored helpers tree; they are never installed by consumers.)
- There is **no windows-arm64 build** (matches the release matrix); Windows on
ARM runs the x64 build under emulation via the first-run fallback.
### Binary resolution in `bin/zero.js`
1. Resolve `@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>` and exec the `zero` binary from
it. This wins over any previously downloaded copy — the platform version is
pinned to the wrapper release.
2. Fall back to a binary previously downloaded next to the wrapper.
3. If neither exists (`--omit=optional`, package managers that skip optional
dependencies), run the **fallback downloader**: `scripts/postinstall.mjs`,
the exact logic that used to run as a postinstall hook (HTTPS-only, SHA-256
verified against the release's own checksum file, no zip-slip), invoked by
the wrapper itself. Failures are deliberately not cached — the fetch
retries on every run until a binary is in place, so a transient network
error self-heals. Platforms with no release asset (anything outside the
matrix above, including windows-arm64) skip the attempt entirely rather
than probing the network each run.
4. If the download is impossible too, print build-from-source guidance.
There is deliberately **no `scripts.postinstall`** in any published
`package.json`. The downloader exists only as a first-run fallback.
### Vendored helpers (`helpers/`)
`agent-browser` (Apache-2.0, vercel-labs/agent-browser) and `tuistory` are
**vendored binaries/packages inside the platform payload**, not npm
dependencies of the wrapper:
- As a dependency, agent-browser's `engines: { node: ">=24", pnpm: ">=11" }`
and postinstall script produce `EBADENGINE` and `allow-scripts` warnings for
every installer. As a vendored tree it produces none, because npm never
resolves it.
- `zero-release package` already stages the helpers tree into every release
archive (`stageLocalControlHelpers` runs `npm ci` from the repo's
`package.json` pins + lockfile on the native builder). The assembly script
reuses that staged tree, so npm installs and `install.sh` installs get
identical helpers.
- The Go binary resolves helpers from `<binary dir>/helpers/node_modules/.bin`
on its own (`internal/localcontrol/browser.go`, `adjacentHelper`) — no
wrapper involvement, no configuration.
- **Symlink materialization:** `npm pack` silently drops symlinks, and npm's
own `.bin` shims are symlinks on POSIX. The assembly script rewrites every
`.bin` symlink into a relocatable `#!/bin/sh` exec shim and dereferences any
other symlink, so the vendored tree survives publishing. (Verified
empirically; nested `node_modules` under `helpers/` IS packed — only the
package-root `node_modules` is always ignored.)
- **Binary pruning:** agent-browser ships one ~11 MB native binary per
platform (7 total). The assembly script keeps only the payload's own
platform binary (plus the musl variant on linux, which its launcher detects
at runtime) — about 65 MB saved per platform package.
## Publishing rules (release pipeline)
These are the invariants `release-artifacts.yml` must hold. Breaking the first
one is user-visible immediately.
1. **Platform versions must never become `latest`.** `0.4.0-linux-x64` is a
semver *prerelease* of `0.4.0`; publishing it without an explicit
non-`latest` dist-tag would clobber `latest` and users would install a
platform payload as the CLI. The workflow publishes platform versions with
`--tag platform` and asserts `latest` survived before the wrapper publish,
then asserts `latest` equals the wrapper version after it. Both lookups
tolerate a failed `npm view` (registry lag, or no `latest` tag yet on a
bootstrap publish) — a missing value must not abort the job between the
platform and wrapper publishes, which would strand a half-published
release.
2. **Platform versions publish before the wrapper.** The wrapper's
`optionalDependencies` pin exact suffixed versions; publishing the wrapper
first would create a window where installs resolve aliases that 404.
3. **Exact-version pinning.** The wrapper at `X.Y.Z` references platform
versions `X.Y.Z-<platform>-<arch>` exactly — never ranges — so a wrapper
and its binaries can never skew.
4. All publishes go through the existing npm OIDC trusted-publishing flow and
the `npm-publish` environment gate; no tokens. Because the platform
payloads are versions of the same package, they reuse the single
trusted-publisher configuration.
`zero update` keeps working unchanged: it detects an npm install by finding a
`package.json` named `@gitlawb/zero` next to the running binary — true inside
a platform payload too — and updates via `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
## Runbook: bumping the vendored helpers
The vendored helper versions are pinned by the repo `package.json`
`dependencies` + `package-lock.json`; the release build vendors exactly what
the lockfile resolves. No `^range` surprises ship: a release carries what its
lockfile pinned at build time.
- Routine bump: `npm install agent-browser@<version>` (or `tuistory@…`) in the
repo to update pin + lockfile, verify the browser/terminal tools end-to-end,
ship with the next release.
- Security response: if a vendored helper publishes a security fix, the bump
is release-worthy on its own — cut a patch release of zero carrying only the
pin change.
- Attribution: agent-browser is Apache-2.0; its LICENSE ships inside the
vendored package directory (`helpers/node_modules/agent-browser/`), which
satisfies redistribution attribution.
## History / rationale
Until v0.3.x the npm package was a wrapper with a `postinstall` downloader and
`agent-browser`/`tuistory` as regular dependencies. That produced three
warnings on every install (`EBADENGINE` from agent-browser's `node >=24`
engines pin, and `allow-scripts` warnings for both postinstall scripts), broke
silently under Bun's default script blocking, and coupled `npm install` to
GitHub Releases availability. The platform-package model removes the warnings
structurally — there is nothing left in the tree for a package manager to warn
about — rather than asking users to approve or suppress them.
+45 -10
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# npm Wrapper Smoke Checklist
Run this checklist when a PR changes npm distribution files such as
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, Go build or release tooling, or the npm `bin`
wrapper.
`package.json`, `bin/zero.js`, `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs`,
Go build or release tooling, or the npm `bin` wrapper.
## Required Checks
@@ -21,17 +21,52 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
```
## End-To-End Assembly Smoke
Build a real archive for the host platform and assemble the npm payloads from
it (this is exactly what the publish job does):
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release package
node scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs \
--artifacts-dir dist/release --out-dir dist/npm --only <platform>-<arch>
```
Then simulate an installed layout and run the wrapper through each resolution
path:
```bash
# platform-package path
mkdir -p /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb
cp -R dist/npm/wrapper /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero
cp -R dist/npm/platforms/zero-<platform>-<arch> \
"/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
# first-run download fallback (delete the platform package first)
rm -rf "/tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero-<platform>-<arch>"
node /tmp/zero-sim/node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/bin/zero.js --version
```
## Checklist
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@gitlawb/zero`), version,
`bin.zero` entry, and exactly one `scripts` entry — the `postinstall` hook.
- `scripts/postinstall.mjs` resolves the correct release asset name/URL per
platform (`ZERO_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=1` prints the plan), verifies the downloaded
archive's SHA-256, and extracts only the known binary basenames into place.
`ZERO_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1` opts out cleanly (exit 0) and an unsupported
platform/arch is a non-fatal skip.
- The wrapper binary resolves through the package `bin` entry and
`node_modules/.bin` in a package-install smoke test.
`bin.zero` entry, and NO `scripts` entries — the published package must be
free of lifecycle scripts (see NPM_PACKAGING.md).
- `scripts/npm/build-platform-packages.mjs` emits platform payloads whose
`package.json` is `@gitlawb/zero@<version>-<platform>-<arch>` with matching
`os`/`cpu`, contains the executable binary and the vendored `helpers/` tree
with regular-file (non-symlink) `.bin` shims, and a wrapper payload with no
scripts, no dependencies, and the full five-alias `optionalDependencies`
matrix.
- `scripts/postinstall.mjs` (the first-run fallback) resolves the correct
release asset name/URL per platform (`ZERO_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=1` prints the
plan), verifies the downloaded archive's SHA-256, and extracts only the
known binary basenames into place. `ZERO_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1` opts out cleanly
(exit 0) and an unsupported platform/arch is a non-fatal skip.
- The wrapper prefers the platform package binary over a previously downloaded
one, and `agent-browser`/`tuistory` run from the platform package's
`helpers/node_modules/.bin` shims.
- The built binary exits 0 for `zero --version` or `zero --help`.
- `zero --version` reports `zero <package.json version>`.
- Release packaging still emits the expected archive and checksum names when
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
# TUI Themes
Zero's TUI ships a set of built-in color themes. Pick one with `--theme <name>`,
the `ZERO_THEME` environment variable, or the `/theme <name>` command while
running. `auto` (the default) follows the terminal's detected background.
Run `/theme` with no argument to open a picker: move through the list to
live-preview each theme, press Enter to apply the highlighted one, or Esc to
cancel and restore the previously active theme. Run `/theme list` to print
the active theme and the registered names without opening the picker.
## Dune (`dune`)
A warm sand-and-cream palette: sand/cream surface, charcoal ink, and a soft
amber accent.
## Neon (`neon`)
A neon-on-black palette: pitch-black surface, bright green ink, and a cyan accent.
## Adding a theme
Every theme is a `palette` (a table of color hex tokens) plus one entry in
`themeRegistry`, both in `internal/tui/theme_palettes.go`. `buildTheme` in
`internal/tui/theme.go` turns a `palette` into the resolved `lipgloss.Style`
set every renderer reads from the active `zeroTheme`. Adding a theme means
adding a new `palette{...}` literal, a `themeRegistry` entry, and test
coverage for the new palette (see below).
Registry-wide tests in `internal/tui/theme_select_test.go` assert the basic
WCAG AA text tokens, the gray-ramp order, the diff word-span pairs, and the
selected-row band for every entry. The rendered-surface invariants beyond
those (permission surfaces, selected-row secondary text, diff gutters, and
the xterm-256 downsampling checks) are asserted per palette, not against the
whole registry: `TestExtendedThemeContrastInvariants` and
`TestExtendedThemeANSI256Contrast` enumerate the palettes they cover. A new
theme must be added to those tests (or given equivalent palette-specific
assertions), or CI can stay green while its permission, selected-row, and
diff surfaces ship unreadable.
+7 -7
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
go 1.26.5
require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
@@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ require (
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
)
require (
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.11.0 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 // indirect
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.24 // indirect
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ require (
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.15.0 // indirect
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 // indirect
)
+14 -14
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0 h1:YSnNh5cPYlYjPxRrzs5VEn3vwhtEn3jVGRBT3M7/I0g=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:l97h4hym2hvWBVfmJDtrEHHCtkIKeTEb3TTJ4ZOB3wY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7 h1:7qw2tTAVar7m7klOPBYfTB0mniv/RuexsYwMRNxSeL0=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:DGW2q8gvzHnOpMpZTORs0aySVHCox5C+2Svk0fci1qs=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4 h1:lcPeVtcp23SNra7lHy8iYE4UC2aIipVQ47sbGyyxR5Q=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4/go.mod h1:0653x8epbZSzdDfO/XPS1a/uYPOBeSsCssOpJOqDzik=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1 h1:7r55WzBxpo/R3z98hGmY7KKPd3ET6vsf0Fb9sDHOV60=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1/go.mod h1:GE6M31gaWZVXzGw73OeuTTgy4lX+OtkH0E5ymnNsHxo=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1 h1:OEIrQ8maEeDBXQDoGCbbTTXYJMYRCRO1fnodZ
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1/go.mod h1:0L9PGwj20lrtmEMeyw4WKJ/TMyDtvAoK9bf2u/mNo3w=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3 h1:QPa1IWkYI+AOB+fE+mg/5/4HRMZcaXex9t5KX76i20Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3/go.mod h1:/zT4BhpD5aGFpqQQqw7a+VtHCzu+zrQtt1zhMt9mR4Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 h1:4+r3uOJ69ueRBt4okgEfWZeXs3BD36HcDBmOIAUlETk=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1/go.mod h1:f/jRa757WUmaOZrbPspXymbg/GnbF+rwe4OLsG7aXYo=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7 h1:3FmWoGNWK4STvqg0O0Aeav2T7rodWJAPeF0QpH+8gFw=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7/go.mod h1:f/jRa757WUmaOZrbPspXymbg/GnbF+rwe4OLsG7aXYo=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7 h1:kzv1kJvjg2S3r9KHo8hDdHFQLEqn4RBCb39dAYC84jI=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7/go.mod h1:9qGpnAVYz+8ACONkZBUWPtL7lulP9No6p1epAihUZwQ=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb h1:m1Uub9uM7meZ8ofVyeRfK7M/knCi3sF2gKn9kldVW0I=
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 h1:+gs4oBZ2gPfVrKPthwbMzWZDaAFPGYK72F0NJ
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:EFJ2TJMRUaplDxHKj1qAEhCtQPW2tJSwu5BF98AuoVM=
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15 h1:6B2JPeOGlpff2Uz6vOEH1Vzpi0iUz20A+lPVhPHtNUA=
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15/go.mod h1:NX3SzP+inril6yawo5CQXx8+fk145lPDC6pumgx0mVg=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 h1:mf4KkFUj0gJuarK8P+LgiS+Lit7m9N1yAwEfPbee7R0=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:avUrQvPaLz2DrFNHJF0taWAFFX2C1GMSSoeiqFjcBmU=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0 h1:liNiWIPCvCh5HBcYfsjd+P16AG79fwd6T1Toy2gOtEA=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.5.0/go.mod h1:avUrQvPaLz2DrFNHJF0taWAFFX2C1GMSSoeiqFjcBmU=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 h1:HSQxCeh5YZH3EL3W39ixjtyaEhcWSXQHtHnMBzSs474=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0/go.mod h1:p4lGIVX+8Wa6ZPNDvqcxq36XpUDLh42FLetFU7odllI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1 h1:DP3TfgZhDkT7lerUdnp6PTGKyxxzz6T+cOlY/xEvfWk=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1/go.mod h1:lXJ8SexMvEVcHCoDvAGLZgFJ9Wsm2sulmoNEXGhYZD0=
+3 -2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -70,8 +71,8 @@ func primaryArgHint(rawArgs string) string {
func truncateHint(s string) string {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
const max = 60
if len(s) > max {
return s[:max] + "…"
if utf8.RuneCountInString(s) > max {
return string([]rune(s)[:max]) + "…"
}
return s
}
+34
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
package acp
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -126,3 +128,35 @@ func TestPromptText(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("promptText = %q", got)
}
}
func TestToolTitleTruncateHintRuneSafe(t *testing.T) {
// A 61-character string containing multi-byte UTF-8 runes (emojis / CJK characters).
// We want to verify that it is truncated without cutting any runes or producing invalid UTF-8.
longPath := "📁/项目/非常长的路径名称/测试/🚀/emoji-and-cjk-characters-which-are-very-long-and-exceed-sixty-characters"
// Create JSON args for read_file
rawArgs := `{"path":"` + longPath + `"}`
got := toolTitle("read_file", rawArgs)
expectedPrefix := "read_file "
if !strings.HasPrefix(got, expectedPrefix) {
t.Fatalf("expected title to start with %q, got %q", expectedPrefix, got)
}
hint := strings.TrimPrefix(got, expectedPrefix)
// Hint should end with the ellipsis character
if !strings.HasSuffix(hint, "…") {
t.Fatalf("expected truncated hint to end with ellipsis, got %q", hint)
}
// Check that we don't have invalid UTF-8 runes
if !utf8.ValidString(hint) {
t.Fatalf("truncated hint is not a valid UTF-8 string: %q", hint)
}
// The rune count of the hint (excluding ellipsis) should be exactly 60
runes := []rune(strings.TrimSuffix(hint, "…"))
if len(runes) != 60 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 60 runes before ellipsis, got %d (hint: %q)", len(runes), hint)
}
}
+20
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,26 @@ func TestSelfReportedIncompletionMatching(t *testing.T) {
{"I replaced the placeholder value with the computed key.", false},
{"The retry uses exponential backoff as a fallback.", false},
{"Without proper error handling the function would crash, so I added it.", false},
// real false positive (conversational recap): retelling a PAST exchange is
// not an admission about the current objective — the sentence carries its
// own narrative context ("You asked …", "at the time"):
{"You asked if I could work autonomously on zero if you gave me a GitHub account — I was honest that my sandbox had no repo, no build system, and no network/integration wired up yet, so I couldn't actually do it at the time.", false},
{"When we last spoke, I couldn't reach the GitHub API from the sandbox.", false},
{"Last session I was unable to build the project; that is what we should retry now.", false},
// quoted admissions (the model citing its own earlier message or a log
// line) must NOT be flagged:
{`My earlier reply said "I couldn't do it" but the tooling is now installed.`, false},
{"The run log contains `I cannot access the network`, which is expected inside the sandbox.", false},
// current-objective admissions must STILL be flagged, including past tense
// and multi-sentence finals whose other sentences are narrative:
{"I couldn't complete the refactor.", true},
{"I hit an error I could not resolve, so the migration is unfinished.", true},
{"You asked me to port the parser. I couldn't finish the second half.", true},
// unbalanced delimiters must not swallow the tail (only BALANCED quoted
// spans are stripped), so an admission after a stray quote still fires:
{"The log ends with a stray \" and I couldn't finish the migration.", true},
{"There is an unterminated `code span and I cannot proceed with the fix.", true},
{"The doc opens with “a curly quote and I was unable to complete the task.", true},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got := selfReportedIncompletion(c.text) != ""
+12 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -430,6 +431,12 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
// Only count a compaction when it actually shrank the history, so the
// compaction counter reflects real context reductions rather than paid
// no-ops that left the token budget untouched.
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterCompactionCount, 1)
}
state.lowWaterMark = newSize
return compacted
}
@@ -479,7 +486,11 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// one-shot budget now so a provider that keeps returning context-limit errors
// after a successful compaction can't loop forever. Store the low-water mark in
// the SAME combined (messages + tool-defs) domain maybeCompact uses, so the
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like.
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like. Count it now that the shrink
// is confirmed, so the counter mirrors maybeCompact's real-reduction policy.
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterCompactionCount, 1)
}
state.reactiveAttempted = true
state.lowWaterMark = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(result) + estimateToolDefTokens(tools))
return result, true, nil
+97 -20
View File
@@ -183,35 +183,112 @@ var successNegationTails = []string{
"reproduce", "spot any", "locate any",
}
// selfReportedIncompletion returns a short reason when the model's final text
// admits it guessed or could not meet the objective, else "". Case-insensitive.
func selfReportedIncompletion(text string) string {
lower := strings.ToLower(text)
for _, phrase := range selfReportPhrases {
if strings.Contains(lower, phrase) {
return selfReportReason(phrase)
// narrativeMarkers flag a sentence as RETELLING a past exchange rather than
// reporting the outcome of the current objective, so an inability admission in
// that sentence is about THEN, not NOW. Grounded in a real false positive: a
// conversational recap ("You asked if I could work autonomously … I was honest
// that my sandbox had no repo … so I couldn't actually do it at the time") was
// downgraded to INCOMPLETE on the quoted "i couldn't " stem even though the
// current turn's objective (summarize where we left off) was fully met. Every
// marker is second-person or explicitly past-referential, so a first-person
// admission about the current task ("I couldn't complete the refactor") is
// never masked.
var narrativeMarkers = []string{
"you asked", "you said", "you wanted", "you mentioned",
"we discussed", "we talked", "we covered",
"when we last", "last time", "last session", "previous session",
"previous conversation", "earlier session", "earlier conversation",
"at the time", "back then",
}
// stripQuoted removes spans enclosed in double quotes (straight or curly) or
// backticks, so an admission the model merely QUOTES — its own earlier message,
// a log line, an error string — cannot fire the detector. Only BALANCED spans
// are removed: an opening delimiter that never closes is kept as literal text,
// so a stray quote cannot swallow the rest of the message (and with it a
// genuine admission the detector must see). Single quotes are left alone: they
// are overwhelmingly apostrophes ("couldn't"), and treating them as quote
// delimiters would swallow the text between two contractions.
func stripQuoted(s string) string {
var b strings.Builder
var span strings.Builder // pending text since the open delimiter, kept if it never closes
open := rune(0)
for _, r := range s {
switch {
case open != 0:
if (open == '"' && r == '"') || (open == '“' && r == '”') || (open == '`' && r == '`') {
open = 0
span.Reset()
continue
}
span.WriteRune(r)
case r == '"' || r == '“' || r == '`':
open = r
span.WriteRune(r)
default:
b.WriteRune(r)
}
}
for _, stem := range inabilityStems {
// Scan EVERY occurrence of the stem, not just the first: an earlier
// success-negation use ("I could not find any examples, so I could not
// implement it") must not mask a later genuine admission with the same stem.
for start := 0; ; {
rel := strings.Index(lower[start:], stem)
if rel < 0 {
break
b.WriteString(span.String()) // dangling delimiter: restore the span verbatim
return b.String()
}
// admissionSentences splits lowered text into sentence-ish fragments so the
// detector judges each claim in its own context. Newlines split too (markdown
// bullets are separate claims); the exact boundaries only need to keep an
// admission next to its own narrative/negation context, not be grammatical.
func admissionSentences(lower string) []string {
return strings.FieldsFunc(lower, func(r rune) bool {
return r == '.' || r == '!' || r == '?' || r == '\n'
})
}
// selfReportedIncompletion returns a short reason when the model's final text
// admits it guessed or could not meet the objective, else "". Case-insensitive.
// Matching is per sentence, after dropping quoted spans, and a sentence that
// retells a past exchange (narrativeMarkers) is skipped entirely — an admission
// must be the model's own report about the CURRENT objective, not general
// language that merely resembles one.
func selfReportedIncompletion(text string) string {
for _, sentence := range admissionSentences(strings.ToLower(stripQuoted(text))) {
if containsAny(sentence, narrativeMarkers) {
continue
}
for _, phrase := range selfReportPhrases {
if strings.Contains(sentence, phrase) {
return selfReportReason(phrase)
}
abs := start + rel
tail := strings.TrimSpace(lower[abs+len(stem):])
if !hasAnyPrefix(tail, successNegationTails) {
return selfReportReason(strings.TrimSpace(stem) + " …")
}
for _, stem := range inabilityStems {
// Scan EVERY occurrence of the stem, not just the first: an earlier
// success-negation use ("I could not find any examples, so I could not
// implement it") must not mask a later genuine admission with the same stem.
for start := 0; ; {
rel := strings.Index(sentence[start:], stem)
if rel < 0 {
break
}
abs := start + rel
tail := strings.TrimSpace(sentence[abs+len(stem):])
if !hasAnyPrefix(tail, successNegationTails) {
return selfReportReason(strings.TrimSpace(stem) + " …")
}
start = abs + len(stem)
}
start = abs + len(stem)
}
}
return ""
}
func containsAny(s string, subs []string) bool {
for _, sub := range subs {
if strings.Contains(s, sub) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func selfReportReason(marker string) string {
return `the final message admits the objective was not met ("` + marker + `")`
}
+107 -6
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -114,6 +115,26 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
return Result{}, errors.New("agent provider is required")
}
// Tracing is opt-in. When a recorder is wired, thread it into ctx so the
// providerio seam and reconnect helper can reach it via trace.FromContext,
// mark the run's start, and wrap OnUsage so token counters accumulate for
// free alongside the existing per-request plumbing. nil recorder leaves the
// loop byte-identical: FromContext returns nil, the no-op stamps cost
// nothing, and the OnUsage wrapper is not installed.
if options.Trace != nil {
ctx = trace.WithContext(ctx, options.Trace)
options.Trace.Start()
originalOnUsage := options.OnUsage
options.OnUsage = func(usage Usage) {
if originalOnUsage != nil {
originalOnUsage(usage)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterInputTokens, int64(usage.InputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens, int64(usage.CachedInputTokens))
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens, int64(usage.OutputTokens))
}
}
maxTurns := options.MaxTurns
if maxTurns <= 0 {
maxTurns = 12
@@ -164,7 +185,11 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result = Result{Messages: copyMessages(messages)}
dispatchSessionStart(ctx, options)
defer func() {
dispatchSessionEnd(ctx, options, result, err)
// Use a context detached from ctx's cancellation: on Esc/Ctrl+C the run
// context is already canceled by the time this defer runs, and a canceled
// parent would make Hooks.Dispatch's context.WithTimeout derive an
// already-expired context, so the sessionEnd hook would never actually run.
dispatchSessionEnd(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), options, result, err)
}()
for turn := 0; turn < maxTurns; turn++ {
result.Turns = turn + 1
@@ -184,12 +209,40 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
toolPartitionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanToolPartition)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
toolPartitionSpan.End()
// Prompt-prefix fingerprint: hash the seven cacheable sub-components
// of this turn's request (system prompt sections, project context,
// skills, partitioned tool list, tool schemas) and emit one trace
// event. Stable across turns => cacheable. Drift in any sub-hash
// names the sub-component that broke the cache for this turn. The
// computation is pure and cheap (seven SHA-256s of small strings)
// and is a no-op when tracing is off.
if options.Trace != nil {
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(options, exposed)
options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
BaseInstructionsHash: fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fp.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fp.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fp.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fp.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fp.CompletePrefixHash,
})
}
// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
compactionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanCompaction)
messages = compactor.maybeCompact(ctx, provider, messages, exposed)
compactionSpan.End()
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
@@ -255,11 +308,39 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// conversation-state duplication.
forwardedVisibleText := false
forwardingOpts := zeroruntime.CollectOptions{OnUsage: options.OnUsage}
if options.OnText != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnText = func(s string) { forwardedVisibleText = true; options.OnText(s) }
// Install text/reasoning forwarding handlers whenever EITHER a user
// callback OR a trace recorder is set. A headless traced run (e.g. `zero
// exec --trace`) sets Trace but no OnText/OnReasoning; without these
// handlers the stream is still collected, but FirstTokenAt would never
// stamp and the trace would lose its TTFT signal. The trace recorder's
// stamp methods are nil-safe, but we guard on `trace != nil` so a run with
// a user callback but no recorder still works. forwardedVisibleText stays
// tied to the USER callback only, preserving the stall-retry semantics
// (a trace-only handler forwards nothing the user would see duplicated).
rec := options.Trace
onText := options.OnText
if onText != nil || rec != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnText = func(s string) {
if rec != nil {
rec.StampFirstVisibleEvent()
rec.StampFirstToken()
}
if onText != nil {
forwardedVisibleText = true
onText(s)
}
}
}
if options.OnReasoning != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnReasoning = func(s string) { options.OnReasoning(s) }
onReasoning := options.OnReasoning
if onReasoning != nil || rec != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnReasoning = func(s string) {
if rec != nil {
rec.StampFirstToken()
}
if onReasoning != nil {
onReasoning(s)
}
}
}
if options.OnToolCallStart != nil {
forwardingOpts.OnToolCallStart = func(id, name string) { options.OnToolCallStart(id, name) }
@@ -297,14 +378,18 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
if retryStreamErr != nil {
return collected, retryStreamErr
}
genSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, zeroruntime.CollectOptions{
OnUsage: options.OnUsage,
})
genSpan.End()
}
return collected, nil
}
generationSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, stream, forwardingOpts)
generationSpan.End()
if collected.Error != "" {
updated, stop := recoverStreamError(collected)
collected = updated
@@ -357,7 +442,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, retryErr
}
stallGenSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected = zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, retryStream, forwardingOpts)
stallGenSpan.End()
}
if collected.Error != "" {
// Route a reissued stream's non-stall error through the SAME recovery as
@@ -459,6 +546,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
if cue || planPending {
if continueNudges < maxContinueNudges {
continueNudges++
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterCompletionNudges, 1)
reason := "your message ended mid-step"
if !cue {
reason = "pending plan items remain — finish them, or mark them complete with update_plan if you are done"
@@ -488,6 +576,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// (no admission, no cue) then finalizes as success on the next turn.
if options.SelfCorrect != nil && !acceptanceRequested {
acceptanceRequested = true
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterAcceptanceChecks, 1)
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: acceptanceVerificationNudge(),
@@ -548,20 +637,26 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
runEnd++
}
if runEnd-index >= 2 {
batchSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanToolExecution)
precomputed = executeParallelReadBatch(ctx, registry, collected.ToolCalls, index, runEnd, permissionMode, options)
batchSpan.End()
precomputedStart, precomputedEnd = index, runEnd
}
}
if options.OnToolCall != nil {
options.OnToolCall(call)
}
options.Trace.StampFirstUsefulAction()
var toolResult ToolResult
var abortErr error
if index >= precomputedStart && index < precomputedEnd {
toolResult, abortErr = precomputed[index-precomputedStart].result, precomputed[index-precomputedStart].abortErr
} else {
toolSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanToolExecution)
toolResult, abortErr = executeToolCall(ctx, registry, call, permissionMode, options)
toolSpan.End()
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -666,6 +761,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// context-window sizing, and usage attribution follow the new model.
provider = newProvider
options.Model = turnRequestedModel
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
// here, so a switch to a model with a different window keeps compacting
@@ -764,6 +860,7 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages [
if err != nil {
return "", messages, ""
}
finalGenSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanGeneration)
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, stream, zeroruntime.CollectOptions{
OnText: options.OnText,
OnReasoning: options.OnReasoning,
@@ -771,6 +868,7 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages [
OnToolCallStart: options.OnToolCallStart,
OnToolCallDelta: options.OnToolCallDelta,
})
finalGenSpan.End()
if ctx.Err() != nil || collected.Error != "" || strings.TrimSpace(collected.Text) == "" {
return "", messages, ""
}
@@ -1874,7 +1972,10 @@ func requestPermission(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest, options O
if options.OnPermissionRequest == nil {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: request.Reason}, nil
}
return options.OnPermissionRequest(ctx, request)
permSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanPermissionWait)
decision, err := options.OnPermissionRequest(ctx, request)
permSpan.End()
return decision, err
}
func normalizePermissionDecisionAction(action PermissionDecisionAction) PermissionDecisionAction {
+171
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specmode"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -92,6 +94,87 @@ func TestRunDispatchesSessionLifecycleHooks(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// cancelingProvider simulates an Esc/Ctrl+C abort: it cancels the run's own
// context mid-stream (as the TUI's interrupt handler would) and returns no
// events, so Run observes ctx.Err() and returns early with an already-canceled
// context in scope for the deferred sessionEnd dispatch.
type cancelingProvider struct {
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func (provider *cancelingProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
provider.cancel()
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent)
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
// TestRunDispatchesSessionEndHookAfterContextCancellation is a regression test
// for a bug where an interrupted run (Esc/Ctrl+C) canceled ctx before the
// deferred sessionEnd dispatch ran, so Hooks.Dispatch's context.WithTimeout(ctx, ...)
// derived an already-canceled context and the hook command never actually launched.
func TestRunDispatchesSessionEndHookAfterContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
if err != nil {
// The test binary runs on the build machine, so its build-time GOROOT
// still identifies the toolchain that produced it.
goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
goBinary += ".exe"
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
}
}
audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
}
dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
{ID: "zero.session-end", Event: hooks.EventSessionEnd, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
},
},
Audit: audit,
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
provider := &cancelingProvider{cancel: cancel}
_, err = Run(ctx, "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "session-cancel",
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Hooks: dispatcher,
})
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("Run err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
events, err := audit.ReadEvents()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ReadEvents: %v", err)
}
var completedStatus hooks.AuditStatus
found := false
for _, event := range events {
if event.Type == "hook_execution_completed" && event.Event == hooks.EventSessionEnd {
completedStatus = event.Status
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("no sessionEnd hook_execution_completed audit event, events=%#v", events)
}
if completedStatus != hooks.AuditCompleted {
t.Fatalf("sessionEnd hook status = %q, want %q (hook must actually run despite ctx cancellation)", completedStatus, hooks.AuditCompleted)
}
}
type recordingWebSearchTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
@@ -2947,6 +3030,24 @@ func TestGitBranchForPromptResolvesRelativeWorktreeGitdir(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGitBranchForPromptInSubdirectory(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
gitdir := filepath.Join(root, ".git")
if err := os.MkdirAll(gitdir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(gitdir, "HEAD"), []byte("ref: refs/heads/main\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
subdir := filepath.Join(root, "sub", "dir")
if err := os.MkdirAll(subdir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := gitBranchForPrompt(subdir); got != "main" {
t.Fatalf("gitBranchForPrompt in subdirectory = %q, want main", got)
}
}
func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsWorkspaceContext(t *testing.T) {
cwd := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(cwd, "AGENTS.md"), []byte("Always run `make lint` before committing."), 0o644); err != nil {
@@ -3443,3 +3544,73 @@ func TestRunDoesNotFlagCleanToolOutput(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("clean output should not get a reminder, got %q", captured.Output)
}
}
// TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage verifies the per-turn tracing setup in Run:
// a wired recorder is Started, OnUsage is wrapped so it still forwards to the
// caller's callback AND stamps token counters, and the run completes.
func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{InputTokens: 100, CachedInputTokens: 20, OutputTokens: 40}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
onUsageCalls := 0
rec := trace.NewRecorder("tracing-session", "run-1", "test")
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "tracing-session",
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
Trace: rec,
OnUsage: func(Usage) { onUsageCalls++ },
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
tr := rec.Finish()
if tr.StartedAt.IsZero() {
t.Fatal("tracing wrapper did not Start the recorder")
}
// FirstTokenAt must stamp even though no OnText/OnReasoning user callback is
// set: a headless traced run (e.g. `zero exec --trace`) sets Trace but no UI
// callbacks, so the loop installs trace-only forwarding handlers to capture
// TTFT. Without them FirstTokenAt stays zero and the trace loses its signal.
if tr.FirstTokenAt.IsZero() {
t.Fatal("FirstTokenAt not stamped for a traced run with no OnText/OnReasoning callbacks")
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterInputTokens); got != 100 {
t.Fatalf("input token counter = %d, want 100", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterCachedInputTokens); got != 20 {
t.Fatalf("cached input token counter = %d, want 20", got)
}
if got := tr.Counter(trace.CounterOutputTokens); got != 40 {
t.Fatalf("output token counter = %d, want 40", got)
}
if onUsageCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("wrapped OnUsage did not forward to the caller's callback")
}
}
// TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage verifies a nil recorder leaves the loop
// byte-identical: OnUsage is not wrapped, so the caller's callback still fires
// and nothing panics.
func TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{InputTokens: 7}},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
onUsageCalls := 0
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "nil-trace-session",
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
ProviderName: "test-provider",
Model: "test-model",
OnUsage: func(Usage) { onUsageCalls++ },
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
if onUsageCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("OnUsage not forwarded when Trace is nil")
}
}
+300
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
package agent
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// promptSubstrings are the seven cacheable sub-components of the prompt a run
// sends to a model. Each is the literal content the sub-component would emit
// into the system prompt or tool list, hashed so a downstream observer can
// detect drift turn-over-turn. The substrings are produced by
// buildPromptSubstrings and consumed by ComputePrefixFingerprint.
type promptSubstrings struct {
baseInstructions string
confirmationPolicy string
projectContext string
skills string
tools string
schema string
}
// buildPromptSubstrings assembles the seven cacheable sub-components of the
// prompt without joining them. The system prompt sections are produced by the
// same private builders that buildSystemPrompt uses, so the substrings are
// byte-identical to what would have appeared in the joined prompt. The tools
// and schema substrings are derived from the partitioned tool list (caller-
// provided) so this helper does not need to re-run the partition.
//
// This is the seam ComputePrefixFingerprint reads from. It exists as a
// separate function (rather than returning both prompt and substrings from
// buildSystemPrompt) so existing callers of buildSystemPrompt are unaffected
// and the substrings helper is independently testable.
func buildPromptSubstrings(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) promptSubstrings {
core := strings.TrimSpace(options.SystemPrompt)
if core == "" {
core = strings.TrimSpace(coreSystemPrompt)
}
if core == "" {
core = fallbackSystemPrompt
}
// The confirmation policy is appended unconditionally in buildSystemPrompt;
// the substring here is the same constant.
policy := strings.TrimSpace(confirmationPolicy)
// projectContext is the joined output of workspaceContext, which itself
// walks the AGENTS.md / ZERO.md / .zero/AGENTS.md chain. Hashing the
// joined string captures every guideline file's contribution and the
// ordering between them.
project := workspaceContext(options.Cwd)
// skills is the joined output of skillsContext, with each skill on its own
// line. The substring is the literal text the model would see.
skills := skillsContext(options)
// tools and schema are derived from the partitioned tool list. The list
// passed in is already in stable order (partitionToolsCached is the
// canonical stable partitioner) so concatenating in slice order is
// sufficient — we sort names again defensively in case a future caller
// hands us a list from a different partitioner.
toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr := toolSubstrings(exposed)
return promptSubstrings{
baseInstructions: core,
confirmationPolicy: policy,
projectContext: project,
skills: skills,
tools: toolsSubstr,
schema: schemaSubstr,
}
}
// toolSubstrings extracts a stable, name-sorted digest of the partitioned tool
// list. The tools substring is "name1\nname2\n..." (sorted) so a reordering of
// the partition produces a different hash. The schema substring is the
// concatenation of each tool's JSON schema in name order, so a schema change
// is detected independently of the tool ordering.
func toolSubstrings(exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) (toolsSubstr, schemaSubstr string) {
if len(exposed) == 0 {
return "", ""
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(exposed))
byName := make(map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(exposed))
for _, def := range exposed {
names = append(names, def.Name)
byName[def.Name] = def
}
sort.Strings(names)
var toolsSB, schemaSB strings.Builder
for i, name := range names {
if i > 0 {
toolsSB.WriteByte('\n')
}
toolsSB.WriteString(name)
def := byName[name]
// Parameters is rendered to a canonical JSON string per tool. The
// schema-render cache in internal/agent (used by partitionToolsCached)
// guarantees the same render is byte-identical across turns for the
// same tool, so this substring is a stable hash input.
schemaSB.WriteString(name)
schemaSB.WriteByte('\n')
schemaSB.WriteString(canonicalSchemaString(def.Parameters))
schemaSB.WriteByte('\n')
}
return toolsSB.String(), schemaSB.String()
}
// canonicalSchemaString renders a tool's parameter schema to a stable string.
// tools.ToolDef.Parameters is a map[string]any in the common case; Go's
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", m) iterates a map in random order, which would produce
// a different hash for the same Parameters value across calls and defeat
// the fingerprint. encoding/json marshals maps with keys sorted
// alphabetically, so json.Marshal is the primary stable render. The
// fallback for the rare non-JSON-compatible value (functions, channels,
// NaN/Inf floats, cyclic references) is a stable key-sorted stringifier
// that walks the value with sorted keys for maps and a leading
// "__non_json:" prefix so a future schema change is visible in the trace
// (a SchemaHash collision from the same value) rather than a silent hash
// drift.
//
// Note: SchemaHash is a stability signal, not a wire-identity signal. The
// bytes json.Marshal produces for a Go map[string]any may differ from
// the bytes the provider actually sends on the wire (provider encoders
// use their own JSON conventions; an Anthropic schema may serialize with
// different whitespace, key order, or number formatting). A consumer
// must NOT assume SchemaHash matches the provider's wire schema — only
// that two turns with the same Go-side Parameters produce the same
// SchemaHash. This is sufficient for the trace's purpose (drift
// detection) but not for a content-based equality check.
func canonicalSchemaString(params map[string]any) string {
if len(params) == 0 {
return ""
}
data, err := json.Marshal(params)
if err != nil {
return "__non_json:" + stableStringify(params)
}
return string(data)
}
// stableStringify renders v to a deterministic string. Maps have their keys
// sorted alphabetically; slices are walked in order; primitives use their
// natural Go format. The function is recursive but bounded by the size of
// the input, so a cyclic reference is not reachable here (the json.Marshal
// fallback is hit when json.Marshal itself returns an error, which for the
// common case is a non-JSON-compatible value, not a cycle — cycles are
// rare in tool schemas and acceptable to mis-render in the fallback path
// since the trace's contract is "the hash is stable for the same input,"
// not "the fallback is lossless"). Used only when json.Marshal fails.
func stableStringify(v any) string {
var sb strings.Builder
writeStable(&sb, v)
return sb.String()
}
func writeStable(sb *strings.Builder, v any) {
switch x := v.(type) {
case nil:
sb.WriteString("null")
case bool:
if x {
sb.WriteString("true")
} else {
sb.WriteString("false")
}
case string:
sb.WriteByte('"')
sb.WriteString(x)
sb.WriteByte('"')
case float64:
// Use %g for compact, deterministic float rendering. NaN and Inf are
// not JSON-encodable (which is why we are in the fallback path) and
// render as "NaN" / "+Inf" / "-Inf" — distinct, stable strings.
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%g", x)
case float32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%g", float64(x))
case int:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case int64:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case int32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint64:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case uint32:
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%d", x)
case map[string]any:
sb.WriteByte('{')
keys := make([]string, 0, len(x))
for k := range x {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
for i, k := range keys {
if i > 0 {
sb.WriteByte(',')
}
sb.WriteByte('"')
sb.WriteString(k)
sb.WriteString(`":`)
writeStable(sb, x[k])
}
sb.WriteByte('}')
case []any:
sb.WriteByte('[')
for i, item := range x {
if i > 0 {
sb.WriteByte(',')
}
writeStable(sb, item)
}
sb.WriteByte(']')
default:
// Last-resort: include the type so distinct values produce distinct
// strings even if their default format collides. Without the type
// tag, fmt.Sprintf("%v", x) for two different types could produce
// the same bytes (rare, but the type prefix makes it impossible).
fmt.Fprintf(sb, "<%T:%v>", x, x)
}
}
// ComputePrefixFingerprint returns a trace.PrefixHash (a 7-field fingerprint
// of the prompt prefix) for one turn of a run. The seven sub-hashes are
// independent SHA-256s of the corresponding sub-component; the complete-prefix
// hash is a SHA-256 of the canonical concatenation of the other six, so any
// sub-component drift is observable both individually and in aggregate.
//
// I/O side effects: buildPromptSubstrings calls workspaceContext, which runs
// git (gitBranchForPrompt, FindProjectGitRoot) and reads the AGENTS.md /
// ZERO.md / .zero/AGENTS.md chain plus the repo map. The same workspace-
// context work is performed separately by buildSystemPrompt a few lines
// later in the request-build path, so on every traced turn the file and
// git reads happen twice. The duplication is intentional for this PR (a
// follow-up will pass substrings through) and is a known perf cost only on
// the opt-in trace path.
//
// A stable CompletePrefixHash across turns means the four captured
// sub-components (baseInstructions, confirmationPolicy, projectContext,
// skills) are byte-identical. It does NOT rule out drift in the seven
// uncaptured sections of buildSystemPrompt (modelPromptAddendum,
// sessionRuntimeContext, approvedCommandPrefixContext, workspaceSeedContext,
// userGuidelines, specialistDelegationContext, responseStyleContext). For
// default Options the four captured substrings are the full prompt; for
// non-default Options the seven uncaptured sections may contribute, and a
// consumer correlating CompletePrefix stability with cached_input_tokens
// must cross-check the model_switches counter (modelPromptAddendum changes
// on a model switch) to disambiguate "no drift" from "drift in an
// uncaptured section."
func ComputePrefixFingerprint(options Options, exposed []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) prefixFingerprint {
subs := buildPromptSubstrings(options, exposed)
base := sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions)
policy := sha256hex(subs.confirmationPolicy)
project := sha256hex(subs.projectContext)
skills := sha256hex(subs.skills)
toolsH := sha256hex(subs.tools)
schema := sha256hex(subs.schema)
complete := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
base, policy, project, skills, toolsH, schema,
}, "|"))
return prefixFingerprint{
BaseInstructionsHash: base,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: policy,
ProjectContextHash: project,
SkillsHash: skills,
ToolsHash: toolsH,
SchemaHash: schema,
CompletePrefixHash: complete,
}
}
// prefixFingerprint is the agent-side shape of a prompt-prefix fingerprint. It
// is converted to a trace.PrefixHash at the loop boundary (see EmitPrefixHash
// in loop.go) so the trace package does not need to import this one. The field
// names match the trace.PrefixHash JSON tags 1:1.
type prefixFingerprint struct {
BaseInstructionsHash string
ConfirmationPolicyHash string
ProjectContextHash string
SkillsHash string
ToolsHash string
SchemaHash string
CompletePrefixHash string
}
// sha256hex returns the hex-encoded SHA-256 of s. Empty input produces the
// hash of the empty string, which is a constant; callers that want to
// distinguish "absent" from "empty" should check s before calling.
func sha256hex(s string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
+243
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintStableAcrossCalls asserts the headline property
// the trace is meant to expose: two ComputePrefixFingerprint calls over the
// same Options and the same exposed tool list produce byte-identical hashes.
// This is the regression catch for "did anyone introduce non-determinism into
// the prompt prefix."
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintStableAcrossCalls(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
}
first := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
second := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint must be stable across calls with the same input:\n first=%+v\n second=%+v", first, second)
}
if first.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must be non-empty for a non-trivial prompt")
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashIsNameSetSensitive asserts the
// name-set sensitivity of the ToolsHash. The test name used to read as
// "reorder changes hash" but the assertion is the opposite: the hash is
// name-set sensitive, not name-order sensitive (toolSubstrings sorts
// names before hashing). The partitioner is expected to produce a stable
// order, so a name-order change is not a hash signal — a name-set change
// is. The test asserts both: permutation of the same tools produces the
// same hash, and adding a tool produces a different hash.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintToolsHashIsNameSetSensitive(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
a := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
}
b := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "grep", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-grep"}},
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-read"}},
}
// toolSubstrings sorts names internally, so the ToolsHash is identical
// for a permutation of the same tools. We assert that here to document
// the contract: name-order independence, name-set sensitivity.
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, a)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, b)
if fpA.ToolsHash != fpB.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must be name-set sensitive, not name-order sensitive: a=%s b=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpB.ToolsHash)
}
// A different tool set must produce a different ToolsHash.
c := append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, a...)
c = append(c, zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{Name: "bash", Parameters: map[string]any{"schema": "schema-bash"}})
fpC := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, c)
if fpA.ToolsHash == fpC.ToolsHash {
t.Fatalf("ToolsHash must change when the tool set changes: a=%s c=%s", fpA.ToolsHash, fpC.ToolsHash)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash asserts that a
// change to a tool's Parameters schema is visible in the SchemaHash. A schema
// edit that should be cache-stable (e.g. field reorder, doc tweak) will move
// the hash and surface in the trace; a schema edit that legitimately
// invalidates the cache also moves the hash, which is the right behavior.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSchemaChangeChangesSchemaHash(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
a := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"version": "v1"}},
}
b := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"version": "v2"}},
}
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, a)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, b)
if fpA.SchemaHash == fpB.SchemaHash {
t.Fatalf("SchemaHash must change when tool Parameters change: a=%s b=%s", fpA.SchemaHash, fpB.SchemaHash)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash asserts the
// most common drift path: a system-prompt edit (e.g. an agent.md update, a
// model addendum change) must move the base-instructions hash, which moves
// the complete-prefix hash, which is what the trace is for.
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintSystemPromptChangeChangesBaseHash(t *testing.T) {
optsA := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core v1"}
optsB := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core v2"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "noop", Parameters: map[string]any{}}}
fpA := ComputePrefixFingerprint(optsA, exposed)
fpB := ComputePrefixFingerprint(optsB, exposed)
if fpA.BaseInstructionsHash == fpB.BaseInstructionsHash {
t.Fatalf("BaseInstructionsHash must change when SystemPrompt changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.BaseInstructionsHash, fpB.BaseInstructionsHash)
}
if fpA.CompletePrefixHash == fpB.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must change when any sub-hash changes: a=%s b=%s", fpA.CompletePrefixHash, fpB.CompletePrefixHash)
}
}
// TestComputePrefixFingerprintCompleteIsAggregateOfSubHashes asserts the
// canonical-join property: CompletePrefixHash must depend on every sub-hash.
// This is the regression catch for "did anyone reorder or drop a sub-hash
// from the canonical join without updating CompletePrefixHash."
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCompleteIsAggregateOfSubHashes(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
exposed := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Parameters: map[string]any{"k": "v"}}}
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, exposed)
// Manually compute what the canonical join should be.
expected := sha256hex(strings.Join([]string{
fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
fp.ProjectContextHash,
fp.SkillsHash,
fp.ToolsHash,
fp.SchemaHash,
}, "|"))
if fp.CompletePrefixHash != expected {
t.Fatalf("CompletePrefixHash must equal sha256hex of the canonical join of the other six:\n got: %s\n expected: %s", fp.CompletePrefixHash, expected)
}
}
// TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
// substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
// which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
func TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions(t *testing.T) {
opts := Options{
Cwd: t.TempDir(),
SystemPrompt: "test core",
}
subs := buildPromptSubstrings(opts, nil)
// Invariants the trace depends on (default Options):
// 1. baseInstructions substring equals the core system prompt bytes.
// 2. confirmationPolicy substring is non-empty (the embedded policy
// is always present, post TrimSpace).
// 3. skills, tools, and schema substrings are empty (no skills or
// tools configured for default Options).
if subs.baseInstructions != "test core" {
t.Fatalf("baseInstructions substring must equal the core system prompt: got %q want %q", subs.baseInstructions, "test core")
}
if subs.confirmationPolicy == "" {
t.Fatalf("confirmationPolicy substring must be non-empty (the embedded policy is always present)")
}
if subs.skills != "" {
t.Fatalf("skills substring must be empty for default Options: got %q", subs.skills)
}
// Round-trip: the corresponding fingerprint hashes must equal
// sha256hex of the substrings, with no truncation or reformatting
// between the two layers.
fp := ComputePrefixFingerprint(opts, nil)
if fp.BaseInstructionsHash != sha256hex(subs.baseInstructions) {
t.Fatalf("BaseInstructionsHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the substring")
}
if fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash != sha256hex(subs.confirmationPolicy) {
t.Fatalf("ConfirmationPolicyHash in fingerprint must equal sha256hex of the substring")
}
}
// TestCanonicalSchemaStringStableForMapParameters asserts the headline
// property the trace needs: the same map[string]any produces the same
// canonical string across calls, even though Go's fmt.Sprintf("%v", m)
// iterates a map in random order. json.Marshal sorts map keys
// alphabetically, which is the fix.
func TestCanonicalSchemaStringStableForMapParameters(t *testing.T) {
params := map[string]any{
"description": "read a file",
"properties": map[string]any{
"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
},
"required": []any{"path"},
"type": "object",
}
first := canonicalSchemaString(params)
second := canonicalSchemaString(params)
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString must be stable across calls for the same Parameters:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, second)
}
if first == "" {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce a non-empty string for a non-empty map")
}
// Two maps with the same key/value pairs (different declaration
// order in source) must produce identical canonical strings. This
// is the property that defeats Go's map iteration randomization.
reordered := map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []any{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{
"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"},
},
"description": "read a file",
}
if canonicalSchemaString(params) != canonicalSchemaString(reordered) {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce identical output for maps with the same key/value pairs in different declaration orders")
}
}
// TestCanonicalSchemaStringFallbackStableForNonJSONValue exercises the
// non-JSON fallback in canonicalSchemaString: when Parameters contains a
// value json.Marshal cannot encode (here, a channel), the function must
// fall back to a key-sorted stringification that is stable across calls
// and across map-iteration order. The previous fallback used
// fmt.Sprintf("%v", params), which iterates the map in random order and
// produced a different hash for the same value across calls — defeating
// the fingerprint. The current fallback is stable by construction.
func TestCanonicalSchemaStringFallbackStableForNonJSONValue(t *testing.T) {
ch := make(chan int) // channels are not JSON-encodable
params := map[string]any{
"description": "a tool with a non-JSON value",
"channel": ch,
"z_first": 1,
"a_second": 2,
}
first := canonicalSchemaString(params)
second := canonicalSchemaString(params)
if first == "" {
t.Fatal("canonicalSchemaString must produce a non-empty string for the fallback path")
}
if first != second {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must be stable across calls:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, second)
}
// A re-ordered map (same key/value pairs, different declaration order)
// must produce the same fallback string. This is the property the
// key-sorted stringifier provides that fmt.Sprintf("%v", m) does not.
reordered := map[string]any{
"a_second": 2,
"z_first": 1,
"channel": ch,
"description": "a tool with a non-JSON value",
}
if canonicalSchemaString(params) != canonicalSchemaString(reordered) {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must produce identical output for maps with the same key/value pairs in different declaration orders:\n first=%s\n second=%s", first, canonicalSchemaString(reordered))
}
// The fallback must include the "__non_json:" prefix so a consumer
// can tell the bytes are not a JSON-marshaled schema (a hash collision
// between a json.Marshal result and a stableStringify result is
// possible in theory; the prefix makes the source observable).
if !strings.HasPrefix(first, "__non_json:") {
t.Fatalf("canonicalSchemaString fallback must start with the __non_json: prefix, got: %s", first)
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -74,14 +75,21 @@ func stallRetryNoticeFor(options Options) reconnectNotifier {
// already past its deadline is returned immediately (no retry) — those have
// their own handling (compaction for context-limit, image-rejection, etc.).
func streamWithReconnect(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest, notify reconnectNotifier) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
recorder := trace.FromContext(ctx)
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err == nil {
if recorder != nil {
recorder.Counter(trace.CounterModelRequests, 1)
}
return stream, nil
}
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxStreamReconnects; attempt++ {
if !shouldReconnect(ctx, err) {
return nil, err
}
if recorder != nil {
recorder.Counter(trace.CounterReconnectCount, 1)
}
if notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamReconnects)
}
@@ -90,6 +98,9 @@ func streamWithReconnect(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, request zerorun
}
stream, err = provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err == nil {
if recorder != nil {
recorder.Counter(trace.CounterModelRequests, 1)
}
return stream, nil
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/verify"
)
@@ -133,7 +134,9 @@ func (sc *SelfCorrector) inspect(ctx context.Context, changedFiles []string) Cor
}
if sc.cfg.IncludeTests && sc.verifier != nil {
verifySpan := trace.FromContext(ctx).Span(trace.SpanVerification)
vr, err := sc.verifier.Verify(ctx)
verifySpan.End()
if err != nil {
// "No plan / no tests" is not an error (DetectPlan returns an empty
// plan), so a non-nil error means verification could not run at all —
+12 -8
View File
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
}
b.WriteString("</environment>")
b.WriteString(projectGuidelines(cwd, findProjectGitRoot(cwd)))
b.WriteString(projectGuidelines(cwd, FindProjectGitRoot(cwd)))
if repoMap := repoMapContext(cwd); repoMap != "" {
b.WriteString("\n\n## Repo map\n\n" + repoMap)
}
@@ -542,17 +542,17 @@ func resolveDirCaseInsensitive(target, anchor string) (string, bool) {
return cur, true
}
// findProjectGitRoot returns the nearest ancestor of cwd that contains a
// FindProjectGitRoot returns the nearest ancestor of cwd that contains a
// .git entry (file or directory). Returns "" when no git root is found, so
// the caller can fall back to cwd-only lookup.
func findProjectGitRoot(cwd string) string {
func FindProjectGitRoot(cwd string) string {
cwd = strings.TrimSpace(cwd)
if cwd == "" {
return ""
}
cur := cwd
for {
if hasGitMetadata(cur) {
if HasGitMetadata(cur) {
return cur
}
parent := filepath.Dir(cur)
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ func findProjectGitRoot(cwd string) string {
}
}
func hasGitMetadata(dir string) bool {
func HasGitMetadata(dir string) bool {
gitPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".git")
info, err := os.Stat(gitPath)
if err != nil {
@@ -619,7 +619,11 @@ func repoMapContext(cwd string) string {
// cwd, handling both a regular checkout (.git dir) and a worktree (.git file).
// Returns "" on any problem — the prompt simply omits the branch segment.
func gitBranchForPrompt(cwd string) string {
gitPath := filepath.Join(cwd, ".git")
gitRoot := FindProjectGitRoot(cwd)
if gitRoot == "" {
return ""
}
gitPath := filepath.Join(gitRoot, ".git")
info, err := os.Stat(gitPath)
if err != nil {
return ""
@@ -635,10 +639,10 @@ func gitBranchForPrompt(cwd string) string {
return ""
}
// In worktree mode the gitdir is often RELATIVE (e.g.
// "gitdir: ../.git/worktrees/<name>") — resolve it against cwd, not the
// "gitdir: ../.git/worktrees/<name>") — resolve it against the worktree root (gitRoot), not the
// process working directory, or HEAD lookup fails and we drop the branch.
if !filepath.IsAbs(dir) {
dir = filepath.Join(cwd, dir)
dir = filepath.Join(gitRoot, dir)
}
headPath = filepath.Join(dir, "HEAD")
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ func TestFindProjectGitRootIgnoresEmptyGitDirectory(t *testing.T) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(leaf, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := findProjectGitRoot(leaf); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("findProjectGitRoot = %q, want empty for invalid .git directory", got)
if got := FindProjectGitRoot(leaf); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("FindProjectGitRoot = %q, want empty for invalid .git directory", got)
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -279,6 +280,16 @@ type Options struct {
// request), so every existing caller is unaffected. A returned error is
// non-fatal: the run continues on the current model.
ModelSwitcher func(ctx context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error)
// Trace, when set, records per-turn timing for the run: the loop stamps
// spans (prompt build, generation, tool execution, permission wait,
// compaction, provider connect) and counters (model requests, tool calls,
// retries, tokens) into it. nil DISABLES tracing entirely — every stamp is
// nil-safe and the loop is byte-identical to an untraced run. The caller
// owns the recorder: Run stamps into it but does not Finish or emit it.
// A fresh Recorder is required per Run — reusing one across runs merges
// their spans, counters, and first-event timestamps, and Finish freezes a
// recorder so no further stamps take.
Trace *trace.Recorder
// SelfCorrect, when set, runs a post-edit verify-and-correct cycle after a
// mutating tool call: it verifies the changed files (LSP diagnostics + project
// tests) and feeds failures back to the model to fix, bounded by an attempt
+259
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
)
// PaymentMethod selects how a partner-checkout top-up is paid for.
type PaymentMethod string
const (
PaymentMethodCard PaymentMethod = "card"
PaymentMethodCrypto PaymentMethod = "crypto"
)
// SessionStatus is the lifecycle state of a partner-checkout session, as reported
// by the aimlapi.com backend while polling for payment.
type SessionStatus string
const (
SessionStatusPendingAuth SessionStatus = "pending_auth"
SessionStatusPendingPayment SessionStatus = "pending_payment"
SessionStatusPaid SessionStatus = "paid"
SessionStatusExchanging SessionStatus = "exchanging"
SessionStatusExchanged SessionStatus = "exchanged"
SessionStatusCancelled SessionStatus = "cancelled"
SessionStatusExpired SessionStatus = "expired"
SessionStatusFailed SessionStatus = "failed"
)
// AuthResult is the bearer token minted by a passwordless sign-in / sign-up.
type AuthResult struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
}
// PartnerCheckoutSession is a partner-attributed top-up session; its SessionToken
// addresses it on later pay/exchange/poll calls.
type PartnerCheckoutSession struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
SessionToken string `json:"sessionToken"`
PartnerID string `json:"partnerId"`
PartnerName *string `json:"partnerName"`
UserID *int64 `json:"userId"`
AmountUSDMinor *int64 `json:"amountUsdMinor"`
Status SessionStatus `json:"status"`
IssuedKeyID *string `json:"issuedKeyId"`
ReturnURL *string `json:"returnUrl"`
}
// PaymentSession is the hosted payment-provider checkout; PayURL is the page the
// user opens to pay.
type PaymentSession struct {
ProviderSessionID string `json:"providerSessionId"`
PayURL string `json:"payUrl"`
}
// PayResult pairs the hosted checkout with the updated partner-checkout session
// returned when a top-up payment is initiated.
type PayResult struct {
Checkout PaymentSession `json:"checkout"`
PartnerCheckout PartnerCheckoutSession `json:"partnerCheckout"`
}
// ExchangeResult holds the API key minted when a paid session is exchanged.
type ExchangeResult struct {
APIKey string `json:"apiKey"`
APIKeyID string `json:"apiKeyId"`
}
// TopUpByKeyRequest funds a partner-checkout session with the API key that owns
// the account (Path A / env key), instead of an email session.
type TopUpByKeyRequest struct {
SessionToken string
AmountUSDMinor int
PaymentSessionID string // idempotency: same id → same checkout, never a second charge
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout (card, saved off-session)
SuccessURL string
CancelURL string
}
// TopUpByKeyResult is the hosted checkout returned by TopUpByKey.
type TopUpByKeyResult struct {
Checkout PaymentSession `json:"checkout"`
}
// APIError is a non-2xx HTTP response from the aimlapi.com API. Status carries the
// code so callers can branch (e.g. 401 = bad key, 5xx = retryable).
type APIError struct {
Message string
Status int
Body string
}
// Error renders the method, endpoint, status, and (when present) the response body.
func (e APIError) Error() string {
if strings.TrimSpace(e.Body) != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: HTTP %d: %s", e.Message, e.Status, strings.TrimSpace(e.Body))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s: HTTP %d", e.Message, e.Status)
}
// Client talks to the aimlapi.com auth, app, and inference APIs for the onboarding
// and partner-checkout top-up flows.
type Client struct {
endpoints Endpoints
httpClient *http.Client
}
func NewClient(endpoints Endpoints, httpClient *http.Client) *Client {
if httpClient == nil {
httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 60 * time.Second}
}
return &Client{endpoints: endpoints, httpClient: httpClient}
}
// CreateSession opens a partner-checkout session attributed to partnerID; the
// returned SessionToken addresses it on the pay/exchange/poll calls.
func (c *Client) CreateSession(ctx context.Context, partnerID string, partnerName string, returnURL string) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
body := map[string]any{"partnerId": partnerID}
if strings.TrimSpace(partnerName) != "" {
body["partnerName"] = strings.TrimSpace(partnerName)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(returnURL) != "" {
body["returnUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(returnURL)
}
var result PartnerCheckoutSession
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions", "", body, &result)
return result, err
}
// GetSession fetches the current state of a partner-checkout session; used to poll
// for payment completion.
func (c *Client) GetSession(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
var result PartnerCheckoutSession
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken), "", nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// Pay initiates payment for a session and returns the hosted checkout URL.
// autoTopUp enrolls the account in automatic top-up at checkout time.
func (c *Client) Pay(ctx context.Context, bearer string, sessionToken string, amountUSDMinor int, paymentSessionID string, method PaymentMethod, successURL string, cancelURL string, autoTopUp bool) (PayResult, error) {
body := map[string]any{
"amountUsdMinor": amountUSDMinor,
"paymentSessionId": paymentSessionID,
"method": method,
}
if strings.TrimSpace(successURL) != "" {
body["successUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(successURL)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(cancelURL) != "" {
body["cancelUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(cancelURL)
}
// Only sent when enabled: enrolls the account in automatic top-up. The backend
// honours this field at checkout time.
if autoTopUp {
body["autoTopUp"] = true
}
var result PayResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken)+"/pay", bearer, body, &result)
return result, err
}
// Exchange converts a paid session into a freshly minted API key (new-account flow).
func (c *Client) Exchange(ctx context.Context, bearer string, sessionToken string) (ExchangeResult, error) {
var result ExchangeResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/")+"/v3/partner-checkout/sessions/"+urlPathEscape(sessionToken)+"/exchange", bearer, nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// TopUpByKey funds a partner-checkout session using the raw API key that owns the
// account (Path A / env key), returning the hosted checkout. It binds the session
// to the key's account server-side, so no email session is needed and no key is
// exchanged. req.PaymentSessionID makes a retry idempotent (same id → same
// checkout, never a second charge).
func (c *Client) TopUpByKey(ctx context.Context, apiKey string, req TopUpByKeyRequest) (TopUpByKeyResult, error) {
body := map[string]any{
"sessionToken": req.SessionToken,
"amountUsdMinor": req.AmountUSDMinor,
"paymentSessionId": req.PaymentSessionID,
}
if req.AutoTopUp {
body["autoTopUp"] = true
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.SuccessURL) != "" {
body["successUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.SuccessURL)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.CancelURL) != "" {
body["cancelUrl"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.CancelURL)
}
var result TopUpByKeyResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.billingV2URL("/billing/topup"), apiKey, body, &result)
return result, err
}
// billingV2URL builds a v2 billing API URL from the inference base. The top-up
// endpoint lives next to the balance endpoint on the API gateway, one version up
// (".../v1" → ".../v2/billing/..."), so it re-anchors the version while keeping any
// host/prefix an override supplied.
func (c *Client) billingV2URL(path string) string {
base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(c.endpoints.InferenceBaseURL), "/")
base = strings.TrimSuffix(base, "/v1")
return strings.TrimRight(base, "/") + "/v2" + path
}
func (c *Client) request(ctx context.Context, method string, endpoint string, bearer string, body any, out any) error {
var reader io.Reader
if body != nil {
data, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reader = bytes.NewReader(data)
}
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, endpoint, reader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
request.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if body != nil {
request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(bearer) != "" {
request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+strings.TrimSpace(bearer))
}
response, err := c.httpClient.Do(request)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("network request to %s failed: %w", endpoint, err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
text, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, 1<<20))
if readErr != nil {
return readErr
}
if response.StatusCode < 200 || response.StatusCode >= 300 {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint, Status: response.StatusCode, Body: string(text)}
}
if out == nil {
return nil
}
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(text)) == 0 {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint + " returned empty body", Status: response.StatusCode}
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(text, out); err != nil {
return APIError{Message: method + " " + endpoint + " returned non-JSON body", Status: response.StatusCode, Body: string(text)}
}
return nil
}
func urlPathEscape(value string) string {
return url.PathEscape(value)
}
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// Additional client methods backing the interactive TUI onboarding flow. They
// target the endpoints shipped in the aimlapi backend:
// - GET {inference}/billing/balance (Path A: validate key + balance)
// - PATCH{auth}/v1/auth/account (Path B: does the account exist?)
// - POST {auth}/v1/auth/sign-in/code(/verify) (Path B existing: passwordless login)
// - POST {auth}/v1/auth/account/passwordless (Path B new: email-only signup)
// - POST {app}/v1/keys (mint a key once we hold a session)
// BalanceResult is the wallet balance returned by GetBalance, with the backend's
// low-balance flag and threshold.
type BalanceResult struct {
Balance float64 `json:"balance"`
LowBalance bool `json:"lowBalance"`
LowBalanceThreshold float64 `json:"lowBalanceThreshold"`
}
// CheckResult reports whether an email already has an account, driving the
// sign-in vs sign-up branch of the onboarding flow.
type CheckResult struct {
// "sign-in" (account exists) or "sign-up" (no account yet).
Action string `json:"action"`
Provider *string `json:"provider"`
}
// CreatedKey is an API key minted by CreateKey.
type CreatedKey struct {
Key string `json:"key"`
ID string `json:"id"`
}
func (c *Client) authURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AuthBaseURL, "/") + path
}
func (c *Client) appURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.AppBaseURL, "/") + path
}
func (c *Client) inferenceURL(path string) string {
return strings.TrimRight(c.endpoints.InferenceBaseURL, "/") + path
}
// GetBalance doubles as key validation: a 401 means the key is invalid, a 2xx
// returns the wallet balance. Auth is the raw API key itself.
func (c *Client) GetBalance(ctx context.Context, apiKey string) (BalanceResult, error) {
var result BalanceResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.inferenceURL("/billing/balance"), apiKey, nil, &result)
return result, err
}
// CheckAccount reports whether an email already has an aimlapi.com account
// (Action "sign-in") or not ("sign-up").
func (c *Client) CheckAccount(ctx context.Context, email string) (CheckResult, error) {
var result CheckResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPatch, c.authURL("/v1/auth/account"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, &result)
return result, err
}
// SendSignInCode emails a 6-digit sign-in code to an existing account.
func (c *Client) SendSignInCode(ctx context.Context, email string) error {
return c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/sign-in/code"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, nil)
}
// VerifySignInCode exchanges an emailed code for a session bearer token.
func (c *Client) VerifySignInCode(ctx context.Context, email string, code string) (AuthResult, error) {
var result AuthResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/sign-in/code/verify"), "", map[string]any{"email": email, "code": code}, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Token) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an auth token")
}
return result, err
}
// CreatePasswordlessAccount registers a new email-only account and returns its
// session bearer token.
func (c *Client) CreatePasswordlessAccount(ctx context.Context, email string) (AuthResult, error) {
var result AuthResult
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.authURL("/v1/auth/account/passwordless"), "", map[string]any{"email": email}, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Token) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an auth token")
}
return result, err
}
// CreateKey mints a fresh API key for a session-holding user.
func (c *Client) CreateKey(ctx context.Context, bearer string, name string) (CreatedKey, error) {
body := map[string]any{}
if strings.TrimSpace(name) != "" {
body["name"] = strings.TrimSpace(name)
}
var result CreatedKey
err := c.request(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.appURL("/v1/keys"), bearer, body, &result)
if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(result.Key) == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an API key")
}
return result, err
}
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package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
func TestCreateKeySendsAuthenticatedRequestAndDecodesKey(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost || r.URL.Path != "/v1/keys" {
t.Fatalf("request = %s %s, want POST /v1/keys", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer session-token" {
t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q", got)
}
var body map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if body["name"] != "Zero CLI" {
t.Fatalf("name = %q", body["name"])
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"key":"sk-issued","id":"key-id"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
key, err := client.CreateKey(context.Background(), " session-token ", " Zero CLI ")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if key.Key != "sk-issued" || key.ID != "key-id" {
t.Fatalf("key = %#v", key)
}
}
func TestCreateKeyRejectsEmptyKeyResponse(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"id":"key-id"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if _, err := client.CreateKey(context.Background(), "session-token", "Zero"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("CreateKey accepted a response without an API key")
}
}
func TestAuthMethodsRejectEmptyTokenResponses(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"token":""}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AuthBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
tests := []struct {
name string
call func() error
}{
{
name: "verify sign-in code",
call: func() error {
_, err := client.VerifySignInCode(context.Background(), "[email protected]", "123456")
return err
},
},
{
name: "create passwordless account",
call: func() error {
_, err := client.CreatePasswordlessAccount(context.Background(), "[email protected]")
return err
},
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if err := test.call(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("accepted a response without an auth token")
}
})
}
}
func TestClientReturnsTypedAPIError(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "invalid key", http.StatusUnauthorized)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{InferenceBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
_, err := client.GetBalance(context.Background(), "bad-key")
var apiErr APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want APIError", err, err)
}
if apiErr.Status != http.StatusUnauthorized || apiErr.Body != "invalid key\n" {
t.Fatalf("APIError = %#v", apiErr)
}
}
func TestTypedResponseRejectsEmptySuccessBody(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{InferenceBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if _, err := client.GetBalance(context.Background(), "key"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("GetBalance accepted an empty successful response")
}
}
func TestBodylessOperationAcceptsEmptySuccessBody(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AuthBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
if err := client.SendSignInCode(context.Background(), "[email protected]"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SendSignInCode() error = %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseAmountUSD(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
want int
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "default", want: DefaultAmountUSDMinor},
{name: "minimum", value: "20", want: 2000},
{name: "cents", value: "25.49", want: 2549},
{name: "below minimum", value: "19.99", wantErr: true},
{name: "above maximum", value: "10001", wantErr: true},
{name: "not a number", value: "twenty", wantErr: true},
{name: "nan", value: "NaN", wantErr: true},
{name: "infinity", value: "Inf", wantErr: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := ParseAmountUSD(test.value)
if (err != nil) != test.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("ParseAmountUSD(%q) error = %v", test.value, err)
}
if got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("ParseAmountUSD(%q) = %d, want %d", test.value, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
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package aimlapi
import (
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
)
type Endpoints struct {
AuthBaseURL string
AppBaseURL string
InferenceBaseURL string
PayBaseURL string
// VerificationBaseURL is the aimlapi web-app frontend base. The browser is sent
// back here after the partner checkout completes (see BuildPartnerReturnURL), so
// it must point at the same environment's front as the one the CLI is talking to
// to land the user there. Empty falls back to DefaultReturnURL.
VerificationBaseURL string
}
const (
DefaultPartnerID = "part_62yQoGYDq4Yqnrj2R1iGrDNJ"
DefaultPartnerName = "Gitlawb"
PartnerHeaderName = "X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"
// DefaultReturnURL is the https fallback the browser is sent to after the
// checkout / OAuth consent finishes when no frontend base is known. It must be
// a real web page the browser can open — NOT a custom scheme like
// zero://aimlapi/complete, which fails with "the scheme does not have a
// registered handler" because the CLI registers no OS protocol handler. The
// CLI learns of success by polling; this URL is purely the browser's landing.
DefaultReturnURL = "https://aimlapi.com/app"
DefaultModel = "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5"
MinAmountUSDMinor = 2000
MaxAmountUSDMinor = 1000000
DefaultAmountUSDMinor = 2500
)
func ResolveEndpoints() Endpoints {
return Endpoints{
AuthBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_AUTH_URL", "https://auth.aimlapi.com"),
AppBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", "https://app.aimlapi.com"),
InferenceBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1"),
PayBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_PAY_URL", "https://pay.aimlapi.com"),
VerificationBaseURL: envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_VERIFICATION_BASE_URL", "https://aimlapi.com/app"),
}
}
// ResolvePartnerID applies the same explicit-option, environment, and default
// precedence everywhere partner attribution is used. Keeping checkout creation
// and saved inference profiles on one resolver prevents them from attributing
// the same user to different partners.
func ResolvePartnerID(explicit string) string {
if value := strings.TrimSpace(explicit); value != "" {
return value
}
return envOrDefault("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", DefaultPartnerID)
}
// WithResolvedPartnerHeader returns a copy with the effective partner ID set.
// Header matching is case-insensitive so an existing spelling is replaced rather
// than duplicated. Callers remain responsible for applying catalog attribution
// only to the canonical AIMLAPI endpoint.
func WithResolvedPartnerHeader(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
resolved := make(map[string]string, len(headers)+1)
for key, value := range headers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(key), PartnerHeaderName) {
continue
}
resolved[key] = value
}
resolved[PartnerHeaderName] = ResolvePartnerID("")
return resolved
}
func BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(appBaseURL string, sessionToken string) (successURL string, cancelURL string) {
base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(appBaseURL), "/")
if base == "" {
// With no base there is nothing to anchor an absolute URL to. Return empty
// so the caller omits the return URLs entirely (client.Pay skips empty ones,
// leaving the backend's generic checkout) instead of emitting a broken
// relative "/checkout?...".
return "", ""
}
token := url.QueryEscape(sessionToken)
return base + "/checkout?checkout=success&partnerCheckout=1&sessionToken=" + token,
base + "/checkout?checkout=cancel&partnerCheckout=1&sessionToken=" + token
}
// BuildPartnerReturnURL returns the https page the browser is sent back to once
// the partner checkout or OAuth consent completes — the aimlapi web app the user
// opened the flow from. frontendBaseURL is normally endpoints.VerificationBaseURL
// (the front that hosts the login/consent page), so the return follows the same
// environment. AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL overrides it outright; an empty base falls back
// to DefaultReturnURL. It is deliberately NOT a custom scheme (zero://…): no
// browser can hand a custom scheme off without an OS-registered handler, which a
// CLI does not install.
func BuildPartnerReturnURL(frontendBaseURL string) string {
if override := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL")); override != "" {
return override
}
if base := strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(frontendBaseURL), "/"); base != "" {
return base
}
return DefaultReturnURL
}
func envOrDefault(name string, fallback string) string {
if value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(name)); value != "" {
return value
}
return fallback
}
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package aimlapi
import "testing"
func TestResolveEndpointsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_AUTH_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", "")
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PAY_URL", "")
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if endpoints.AuthBaseURL != "https://auth.aimlapi.com" ||
endpoints.AppBaseURL != "https://app.aimlapi.com" ||
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL != "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1" ||
endpoints.PayBaseURL != "https://pay.aimlapi.com" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected endpoints: %#v", endpoints)
}
}
func TestResolvedPartnerHeaderUsesEnvironmentOverrideWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", "part_override")
headers := WithResolvedPartnerHeader(map[string]string{
"x-aimlapi-partner-id": "part_catalog",
"X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo": "Gitlawb/zero",
})
if got := headers[PartnerHeaderName]; got != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("partner header = %q, want part_override", got)
}
if _, ok := headers["x-aimlapi-partner-id"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("case-insensitive partner header was duplicated: %#v", headers)
}
if got := headers["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"]; got != "Gitlawb/zero" {
t.Fatalf("unrelated header changed: %#v", headers)
}
}
func TestBuildPartnerReturnURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL", "")
// The frontend base (the web app the flow was opened from) is returned as-is,
// trailing slash trimmed — an https page the browser can actually land on.
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL("https://aimlapi.com/app/"); got != "https://aimlapi.com/app" {
t.Fatalf("return URL = %q, want the frontend base", got)
}
// An empty base falls back to the https default, never a custom scheme.
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL(""); got != DefaultReturnURL {
t.Fatalf("empty base return URL = %q, want %q", got, DefaultReturnURL)
}
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_RETURN_URL", "https://example.test/done")
if got := BuildPartnerReturnURL("https://aimlapi.com/app"); got != "https://example.test/done" {
t.Fatalf("env override return URL = %q", got)
}
}
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package aimlapi
// UI strings shared by the first-run and provider-wizard onboarding surfaces.
const (
// Path A — existing API key. Pick-path prompt + option labels.
MsgAPIKeyInputPrompt = "Enter your aimlapi.com key."
MsgAPIKeyInvalid = "API key is invalid. Please make sure you enter a valid aimlapi.com key."
MsgPickPathPrompt = "Do you have aimlapi.com key?"
MsgPickPathHaveKey = "I already have aimlapi.com key"
MsgPickPathHaveHint = "Proceed to paste the key"
MsgPickPathNewUser = "I am a new user"
MsgPickPathNewHint = "One click set up"
// Path B — email.
MsgEnterEmail = "Enter your email.\nTo access aimlapi.com dashboard."
MsgEmailInvalid = "Email format is incorrect."
MsgAccountActionInvalid = "aimlapi.com returned an unsupported account action. Please try again."
// %s = email
MsgCodeSent = "We sent a 6-digit code to %s.\nEnter it below to continue."
MsgCodeIncorrect = "Code you've entered is incorrect."
// Balance check.
MsgLowBalance = "Your aimlapi.com balance is running low.\nIt is recommended to top up your balance."
MsgEverythingRuns = "Everything is ready."
// Low-balance choices (spec wording).
MsgLowBalanceTopUp = "Sure, let's do that"
MsgLowBalanceSkip = "I'll skip topping up the balance for now"
// Top-up workflow.
MsgTopUpPrompt = "Add credits.\nEnter an amount (min $20)."
MsgAmountRequired = "Please enter a top-up amount."
// %s = checkout URL
MsgTopUpBrowserFallback = "If the browser did not open automatically please use this link to top up your account: %s"
MsgTopUpFailed = "Top up failed. Please try again."
MsgTopUpSuccess = "Top-up successful."
// Success — key delivered.
// %s = amount in dollars (e.g. "25")
MsgTopUpAddedFmt = "$%s has been added to your balance."
// %s = email
MsgSuccessMagicLink = "We've emailed you a magic link to %s. Use it to access your aimlapi.com account and review your usage and balance."
)
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package aimlapi
import "testing"
func TestValidEmailRejectsIncompleteDomains(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
value string
valid bool
}{
{value: "[email protected]", valid: true},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: true},
{value: "123@123.", valid: false},
{value: "123@123", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
{value: "[email protected]", valid: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.value, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := ValidEmail(test.value); got != test.valid {
t.Fatalf("ValidEmail(%q) = %v, want %v", test.value, got, test.valid)
}
})
}
}
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package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// StreamTopUpOptions drives a session-based partner-checkout top-up for the
// interactive (TUI) onboarding. The caller already holds a user session —
// obtained from an email-code sign-in (Path B existing) or a
// passwordless new account (Path B sign-up) — so this skips authentication and
// runs create-session → pay → wait-for-payment, optionally exchanging the paid
// session into a fresh key (new accounts) versus keeping the caller's key.
type StreamTopUpOptions struct {
SessionToken string // user session bearer (required)
AmountUSD string // dollars; parsed via ParseAmountUSD (min $20)
// InferenceBaseURL pins key-bound billing and the returned provider profile to
// the endpoint that validated the credential. Empty uses ResolveEndpoints.
InferenceBaseURL string
Method PaymentMethod
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout time
Exchange bool // exchange the paid session into a new key (new accounts)
Model string
PartnerID string
PartnerName string
NoOpen bool
// ResumeSessionToken, when set, resumes that partner-checkout session instead
// of opening a new one, so a retry after an ambiguous failure (a lost Pay/
// Exchange response) can never double-charge or strand an already-paid session.
ResumeSessionToken string
// PaymentSessionID is generated once per amount/auto-top-up intent and reused
// on retry so an ambiguous Pay response cannot create a second checkout.
PaymentSessionID string
HTTPClient *http.Client
OpenBrowser func(string) error
OnStatus func(Status, string)
// OnSession reports the partner-checkout session token the moment it exists (a
// fresh CreateSession, or the resumed one), so the caller can retain it and
// resume on a later failure. It fires with "" when the session is dead and the
// retained token should be dropped (a fresh run must start over).
OnSession func(sessionToken string)
}
// topupPhase is where StreamTopUp enters its create-checkout → poll → exchange
// pipeline. A fresh run starts at phasePay; a resume skips ahead to whatever the
// existing session's status makes safe.
type topupPhase int
const (
phasePay topupPhase = iota // (re-)open the Stripe checkout, then poll + exchange
phasePoll // checkout already open; poll for payment, never re-pay
phaseExchange // already paid; exchange only (recovers a lost key)
phaseWaitExchange // an exchange claim is in flight; poll, never call Exchange twice
)
// StreamTopUp performs the browser-checkout top-up and reports progress via
// OnStatus.
func StreamTopUp(ctx context.Context, options StreamTopUpOptions) (ProvisionedKey, error) {
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if baseURL := strings.TrimSpace(options.InferenceBaseURL); baseURL != "" {
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL = baseURL
}
client := NewClient(endpoints, options.HTTPClient)
partnerID := ResolvePartnerID(options.PartnerID)
partnerName := firstNonEmpty(options.PartnerName, DefaultPartnerName)
method := options.Method
if method != PaymentMethodCrypto {
method = PaymentMethodCard
}
amount, err := ParseAmountUSD(options.AmountUSD)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.SessionToken) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a session is required to top up")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.PaymentSessionID) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a payment session id is required to top up")
}
status(options.OnStatus, StatusCreatingSession, "")
sessionToken, phase, err := resolveTopupSession(ctx, client, options, partnerID, partnerName, endpoints)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
// Retain the live token so an ambiguous failure below can resume this session
// rather than open a second checkout on the next attempt.
reportSession(options.OnSession, sessionToken)
if phase <= phasePay {
successURL, cancelURL := BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(endpoints.PayBaseURL, sessionToken)
status(options.OnStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "")
pay, err := client.Pay(ctx, options.SessionToken, sessionToken, amount, options.PaymentSessionID, method, successURL, cancelURL, options.AutoTopUp)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
checkoutURL, err := validatedCheckoutURL(pay.Checkout.PayURL)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
announceCheckout(options.OnStatus, options.OpenBrowser, options.NoOpen, checkoutURL)
}
paidToken := sessionToken
if phase <= phasePoll {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusWaitingPayment, "")
paid, err := pollUntilPaid(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
paidToken = paid.SessionToken
if paid.Status == SessionStatusExchanging {
// Another/lost request claimed exchange while we were polling payment.
// Carry that fact into the provisioning branch so it follows the claim
// instead of issuing a second single-flight Exchange request.
phase = phaseWaitExchange
}
}
result := ProvisionedKey{
BaseURL: endpoints.InferenceBaseURL,
Model: firstNonEmpty(options.Model, DefaultModel),
}
if options.Exchange {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusProvisioningKey, "")
if phase == phaseWaitExchange {
return ProvisionedKey{}, pollUntilExchangeSettled(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession)
}
exchange, err := client.Exchange(ctx, options.SessionToken, paidToken)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(exchange.APIKey) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("aimlapi.com did not return an API key")
}
result.APIKey = exchange.APIKey
result.APIKeyID = exchange.APIKeyID
}
return result, nil
}
// resolveTopupSession returns the partner-checkout session token to drive and the
// phase to enter. A fresh run opens a new session at phasePay. A resume inspects
// the existing session and enters the earliest phase that cannot re-charge:
// - pending_auth → phasePay: payment never started, so (re-)Pay is safe.
// - pending_payment → phasePoll: a checkout is already open; poll, never re-Pay.
// - paid → phaseExchange: exchange the paid session once.
// - exchanging → phaseWaitExchange: another/lost request owns the atomic
// exchange claim; poll it, never issue a second Exchange request.
// - exchanged → terminal: the one-shot raw key is gone; point at dashboard
// recovery and keep the token so a re-run repeats that guidance, not a charge.
// - cancelled/expired/failed → terminal: drop the dead token so a re-run is fresh.
func resolveTopupSession(ctx context.Context, client *Client, options StreamTopUpOptions, partnerID, partnerName string, endpoints Endpoints) (string, topupPhase, error) {
resume := strings.TrimSpace(options.ResumeSessionToken)
if resume == "" {
session, err := client.CreateSession(ctx, partnerID, partnerName, BuildPartnerReturnURL(endpoints.VerificationBaseURL))
if err != nil {
return "", phasePay, err
}
return session.SessionToken, phasePay, nil
}
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, resume)
if err != nil {
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(options.OnSession, "")
}
return "", phasePay, err
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPendingAuth:
return resume, phasePay, nil
case SessionStatusPendingPayment:
return resume, phasePoll, nil
case SessionStatusPaid:
return resume, phaseExchange, nil
case SessionStatusExchanging:
return resume, phaseWaitExchange, nil
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
default:
reportSession(options.OnSession, "") // drop the dead token → next run starts fresh
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
}
}
func reportSession(callback func(string), sessionToken string) {
if callback != nil {
callback(sessionToken)
}
}
// announceCheckout opens the hosted checkout in the browser (unless suppressed)
// and reports the URL either way, so the TUI can always show the direct link.
func announceCheckout(onStatus func(Status, string), open func(string) error, noOpen bool, checkoutURL string) {
if noOpen || open == nil {
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, checkoutURL)
return
}
if err := open(checkoutURL); err != nil {
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "Open manually: "+checkoutURL)
return
}
status(onStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, checkoutURL)
}
func validatedCheckoutURL(value string) (string, error) {
checkoutURL := strings.TrimSpace(value)
parsed, err := url.Parse(checkoutURL)
if err != nil || !parsed.IsAbs() || !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "https") || parsed.Hostname() == "" || parsed.User != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("payment provider did not return a valid HTTPS checkout URL")
}
return checkoutURL, nil
}
// StreamTopUpByKeyOptions drives a top-up funded with the API key that already
// owns the account (Path A pasted key, or AIMLAPI_API_KEY). Unlike StreamTopUp it
// needs no email session and never exchanges a key — the caller already holds one,
// so it only funds the wallet: create-session → pay-by-key → wait-for-payment.
type StreamTopUpByKeyOptions struct {
APIKey string // raw key that owns the account (required)
AmountUSD string // dollars; parsed via ParseAmountUSD (min $20)
InferenceBaseURL string // validated key endpoint; empty uses ResolveEndpoints
AutoTopUp bool // enroll the account in automatic top-up at checkout time
PartnerID string
PartnerName string
NoOpen bool
// ResumeSessionToken resumes an existing partner-checkout session instead of
// opening a new one. PaymentSessionID is the idempotency handle carried across
// retries so a re-issued pay returns the same checkout, never a second charge.
ResumeSessionToken string
PaymentSessionID string // required; generate once via NewPaymentSessionID, reuse on retry
HTTPClient *http.Client
OpenBrowser func(string) error
OnStatus func(Status, string)
OnSession func(sessionToken string)
}
// StreamTopUpByKey funds the account behind APIKey via the hosted checkout and
// reports progress through OnStatus. It returns an empty ProvisionedKey: the
// pasted/env key is unchanged, only the balance grows.
func StreamTopUpByKey(ctx context.Context, options StreamTopUpByKeyOptions) (ProvisionedKey, error) {
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints()
if baseURL := strings.TrimSpace(options.InferenceBaseURL); baseURL != "" {
endpoints.InferenceBaseURL = baseURL
}
client := NewClient(endpoints, options.HTTPClient)
partnerID := ResolvePartnerID(options.PartnerID)
partnerName := firstNonEmpty(options.PartnerName, DefaultPartnerName)
amount, err := ParseAmountUSD(options.AmountUSD)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.APIKey) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("an API key is required to top up")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.PaymentSessionID) == "" {
return ProvisionedKey{}, fmt.Errorf("a payment session id is required to top up")
}
status(options.OnStatus, StatusCreatingSession, "")
sessionToken, phase, err := resolveByKeySession(ctx, client, options, partnerID, partnerName, endpoints)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
reportSession(options.OnSession, sessionToken)
if phase <= phasePay {
successURL, cancelURL := BuildPartnerCheckoutReturnURLs(endpoints.PayBaseURL, sessionToken)
status(options.OnStatus, StatusOpeningCheckout, "")
pay, err := client.TopUpByKey(ctx, options.APIKey, TopUpByKeyRequest{
SessionToken: sessionToken,
AmountUSDMinor: amount,
PaymentSessionID: options.PaymentSessionID,
AutoTopUp: options.AutoTopUp,
SuccessURL: successURL,
CancelURL: cancelURL,
})
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
checkoutURL, err := validatedCheckoutURL(pay.Checkout.PayURL)
if err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
announceCheckout(options.OnStatus, options.OpenBrowser, options.NoOpen, checkoutURL)
}
if phase <= phasePoll {
status(options.OnStatus, StatusWaitingPayment, "")
if _, err := pollUntilPaid(ctx, client, sessionToken, options.OnSession); err != nil {
return ProvisionedKey{}, err
}
}
// No exchange: the account is funded and the caller keeps its existing key.
return ProvisionedKey{}, nil
}
// resolveByKeySession mirrors resolveTopupSession for the by-key flow. Because
// by-key never exchanges, a paid/exchanging/exchanged session all mean "already
// funded, done" (phaseExchange skips straight past pay + poll to the empty result).
func resolveByKeySession(ctx context.Context, client *Client, options StreamTopUpByKeyOptions, partnerID, partnerName string, endpoints Endpoints) (string, topupPhase, error) {
resume := strings.TrimSpace(options.ResumeSessionToken)
if resume == "" {
session, err := client.CreateSession(ctx, partnerID, partnerName, BuildPartnerReturnURL(endpoints.VerificationBaseURL))
if err != nil {
return "", phasePay, err
}
return session.SessionToken, phasePay, nil
}
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, resume)
if err != nil {
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(options.OnSession, "")
}
return "", phasePay, err
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPendingAuth:
return resume, phasePay, nil
case SessionStatusPendingPayment:
return resume, phasePoll, nil
case SessionStatusPaid, SessionStatusExchanging, SessionStatusExchanged:
return resume, phaseExchange, nil
default:
reportSession(options.OnSession, "") // drop the dead token → next run starts fresh
return "", phasePay, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
}
}
+457
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@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestStreamTopUpByKeyFundsWithoutExchange(t *testing.T) {
var topupCalls, exchangeCalls int
var topupBody map[string]any
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPendingAuth})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/billing/topup"):
topupCalls++
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&topupBody)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(TopUpByKeyResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPaid})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/exchange"):
exchangeCalls++
t.Errorf("by-key must never exchange a key")
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", server.URL+"/v1")
var opened string
result, err := StreamTopUpByKey(context.Background(), StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
APIKey: "sk-user",
AmountUSD: "20",
AutoTopUp: true,
PaymentSessionID: "pay-1",
OpenBrowser: func(u string) error { opened = u; return nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUpByKey = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "" {
t.Fatalf("by-key must not mint a key, got %q", result.APIKey)
}
if topupCalls != 1 || exchangeCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("topup=%d exchange=%d, want 1/0", topupCalls, exchangeCalls)
}
if opened != "https://pay/checkout" {
t.Fatalf("opened checkout = %q", opened)
}
if topupBody["autoTopUp"] != true || topupBody["paymentSessionId"] != "pay-1" {
t.Fatalf("topup body missing autoTopUp/paymentSessionId: %#v", topupBody)
}
}
func TestValidatedCheckoutURLRequiresAbsoluteHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "https", value: " https://pay.example.test/checkout?id=1 ", want: "https://pay.example.test/checkout?id=1"},
{name: "empty", wantErr: true},
{name: "relative", value: "/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "http", value: "http://pay.example.test/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "file", value: "file:///tmp/checkout", wantErr: true},
{name: "custom protocol", value: "wallet://checkout/123", wantErr: true},
{name: "userinfo", value: "https://[email protected]/checkout", wantErr: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := validatedCheckoutURL(test.value)
if (err != nil) != test.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("validatedCheckoutURL(%q) error = %v", test.value, err)
}
if got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("validatedCheckoutURL(%q) = %q, want %q", test.value, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpByKeyPinsValidatedInferenceEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
validatedCalls := 0
validated := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPendingAuth})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/billing/topup"):
validatedCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(TopUpByKeyResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_tok", Status: SessionStatusPaid})
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected validated-endpoint request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer validated.Close()
override := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Errorf("validated key leaked to process override: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}))
defer override.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", validated.URL)
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_INFERENCE_URL", override.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUpByKey(context.Background(), StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
APIKey: "production-key",
AmountUSD: "20",
InferenceBaseURL: validated.URL,
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
OpenBrowser: func(string) error { return nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUpByKey() error = %v", err)
}
if validatedCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("validated endpoint top-up calls = %d, want 1", validatedCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpEmailRetrySendsStablePaymentSessionID(t *testing.T) {
getCalls := 0
var paymentSessionID string
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions/"):
status := SessionStatusPendingAuth
if getCalls > 0 {
status = SessionStatusPaid
}
getCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_retry", Status: status})
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/pay"):
var body map[string]any
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
paymentSessionID, _ = body["paymentSessionId"].(string)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PayResult{Checkout: PaymentSession{PayURL: "https://pay/checkout"}})
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pcs_retry",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-stable",
AmountUSD: "20",
NoOpen: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp() error = %v", err)
}
if paymentSessionID != "payment-stable" {
t.Fatalf("paymentSessionId = %q, want stable retry id", paymentSessionID)
}
}
// resumeServer is a partner-checkout backend fake that fails the test if the
// re-charging endpoints (create-session / pay) are ever hit, and serves a
// scripted GetSession status sequence so a resume can be driven deterministically.
type resumeServer struct {
t *testing.T
statuses []string // GetSession status per call, last value repeats
getCalls int
payCalls int
createCall int
exchanged int
}
func (rs *resumeServer) handler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/partner-checkout/sessions"):
rs.createCall++
rs.t.Errorf("resume must not create a new session")
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/pay"):
rs.payCalls++
rs.t.Errorf("resume must not re-pay (double charge)")
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/exchange"):
rs.exchanged++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ExchangeResult{APIKey: "sk-resumed", APIKeyID: "key_1"})
case r.Method == http.MethodGet:
status := rs.statuses[len(rs.statuses)-1]
if rs.getCalls < len(rs.statuses) {
status = rs.statuses[rs.getCalls]
}
rs.getCalls++
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pc_tok", Status: SessionStatus(status)})
default:
rs.t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
})
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumePaidExchangesWithoutRecharge(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"paid"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
var seen string
result, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
OnSession: func(token string) { seen = token },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp resume = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "sk-resumed" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want recovered key", result.APIKey)
}
if rs.exchanged != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 1", rs.exchanged)
}
if seen != "pc_tok" {
t.Fatalf("OnSession token = %q, want retained pc_tok", seen)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumePendingPaymentPollsNeverRepays(t *testing.T) {
// First GetSession (resume resolution) sees the still-open checkout; the next
// (poll) sees it settle. Pay must never be called — the fake fails the test if
// it is.
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "paid"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
result, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StreamTopUp resume = %v", err)
}
if result.APIKey != "sk-resumed" {
t.Fatalf("APIKey = %q, want recovered key", result.APIKey)
}
if rs.payCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("pay calls = %d, want 0", rs.payCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpPollingDeadSessionClearsRetainedToken(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "expired"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
seen := []string{}
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
OnSession: func(token string) { seen = append(seen, token) },
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "payment expired") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want expired payment error", err)
}
if len(seen) == 0 || seen[len(seen)-1] != "" {
t.Fatalf("OnSession events = %#v, want terminal clear", seen)
}
}
func TestPollUntilPaidTerminal4xxClearsRetainedToken(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "session rejected", http.StatusNotFound)
}))
defer server.Close()
seen := "retained"
_, err := pollUntilPaid(context.Background(), NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client()), "pc_missing", func(token string) {
seen = token
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("pollUntilPaid() error = nil, want terminal 4xx")
}
if seen != "" {
t.Fatalf("retained session = %q, want cleared", seen)
}
}
func TestPollUntilExchangeSettledClearsDeadSession(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
name string
statusCode int
status SessionStatus
}{
{name: "terminal API rejection", statusCode: http.StatusNotFound},
{name: "expired exchange claim", status: SessionStatusExpired},
} {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
if test.statusCode != 0 {
http.Error(w, "session rejected", test.statusCode)
return
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PartnerCheckoutSession{SessionToken: "pcs_dead", Status: test.status})
}))
defer server.Close()
seen := "retained"
err := pollUntilExchangeSettled(context.Background(), NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client()), "pcs_dead", func(token string) {
seen = token
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("pollUntilExchangeSettled() error = nil")
}
if seen != "" {
t.Fatalf("retained session = %q, want cleared", seen)
}
})
}
}
func TestResumeHelpersClearOnlyRejectedSessions(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
status int
wantClear bool
}{
{name: "terminal 4xx", status: http.StatusNotFound, wantClear: true},
{name: "retryable 5xx", status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable, wantClear: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "session lookup failed", test.status)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(Endpoints{AppBaseURL: server.URL}, server.Client())
for _, flow := range []struct {
name string
resolve func(func(string)) error
}{
{
name: "session bearer",
resolve: func(onSession func(string)) error {
_, _, err := resolveTopupSession(context.Background(), client, StreamTopUpOptions{
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_rejected", OnSession: onSession,
}, DefaultPartnerID, DefaultPartnerName, Endpoints{})
return err
},
},
{
name: "api key",
resolve: func(onSession func(string)) error {
_, _, err := resolveByKeySession(context.Background(), client, StreamTopUpByKeyOptions{
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_rejected", OnSession: onSession,
}, DefaultPartnerID, DefaultPartnerName, Endpoints{})
return err
},
},
} {
t.Run(flow.name, func(t *testing.T) {
seen := "retained"
if err := flow.resolve(func(token string) { seen = token }); err == nil {
t.Fatal("resolve error = nil")
}
if cleared := seen == ""; cleared != test.wantClear {
t.Fatalf("session cleared = %v, want %v", cleared, test.wantClear)
}
})
}
})
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumeExchangedReturnsRecoveryError(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want an already-exchanged recovery error", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 (no second key)", rs.exchanged)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpResumeExchangingPollsWithoutSecondExchange(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"exchanging", "exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want dashboard recovery guidance", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 while an exchange claim is in flight", rs.exchanged)
}
if rs.createCall != 0 || rs.payCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("resume created/paid a new checkout: create=%d pay=%d", rs.createCall, rs.payCalls)
}
}
func TestStreamTopUpPollObservesExchangingWithoutSecondExchange(t *testing.T) {
rs := &resumeServer{t: t, statuses: []string{"pending_payment", "exchanging", "exchanged"}}
server := httptest.NewServer(rs.handler())
defer server.Close()
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_APP_URL", server.URL)
_, err := StreamTopUp(context.Background(), StreamTopUpOptions{
SessionToken: "bearer",
ResumeSessionToken: "pc_tok",
PaymentSessionID: "payment-1",
AmountUSD: "20",
Exchange: true,
NoOpen: true,
})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exchanged") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want dashboard recovery guidance", err)
}
if rs.exchanged != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exchange calls = %d, want 0 after poll observed an existing claim", rs.exchanged)
}
}
+186
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Status is a progress phase reported by StreamTopUp through its OnStatus callback.
type Status string
const (
StatusCreatingSession Status = "creating-session"
StatusOpeningCheckout Status = "opening-checkout"
StatusWaitingPayment Status = "waiting-payment"
StatusProvisioningKey Status = "provisioning-key"
)
// ProvisionedKey is the outcome of a top-up: the (optionally minted) API key plus
// the inference base URL and model to write into the provider profile.
type ProvisionedKey struct {
APIKey string
APIKeyID string
BaseURL string
Model string
}
const (
pollInterval = 3 * time.Second
pollTimeout = 20 * time.Minute
)
// ParseAmountUSD parses a dollar string into USD minor units (cents), enforcing the
// min/max top-up bounds. An empty value yields the default amount.
func ParseAmountUSD(value string) (int, error) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if value == "" {
return DefaultAmountUSDMinor, nil
}
dollars, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
// NaN/±Inf parse without error and slip past the min/max comparisons below
// (every ordered comparison with NaN is false), so reject them explicitly
// before the cents conversion turns them into a garbage minor-unit amount.
if err != nil || math.IsNaN(dollars) || math.IsInf(dollars, 0) || dollars <= 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid amount %q; pass a positive USD amount", value)
}
minor := int(dollars*100 + 0.5)
if minor < MinAmountUSDMinor {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("minimum top-up is $%d", MinAmountUSDMinor/100)
}
if minor > MaxAmountUSDMinor {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("maximum top-up is $%d", MaxAmountUSDMinor/100)
}
return minor, nil
}
// NewPaymentSessionID returns a random UUIDv4-shaped idempotency id for a top-up.
// The caller generates it once per top-up intent and reuses it on retry so the
// backend (and Stripe) coalesce retries onto the same checkout instead of a
// second charge.
func NewPaymentSessionID() (string, error) {
var b [16]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
return "", err
}
b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // version 4
b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // variant 10
return fmt.Sprintf("%x-%x-%x-%x-%x", b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil
}
func pollUntilPaid(ctx context.Context, client *Client, sessionToken string, onSession func(string)) (PartnerCheckoutSession, error) {
deadline := time.Now().Add(pollTimeout)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
// Context cancellation/deadline is terminal (also covers an in-flight
// request cancelled mid-poll, whose transport error wraps ctx.Err()).
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
// A 4xx API response is terminal. Everything else — a 5xx or a transient
// transport error (non-APIError, e.g. a dropped connection during the
// wait) — is retried until the poll deadline.
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(onSession, "")
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
continue
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusPaid, SessionStatusExchanging:
return session, nil
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
case SessionStatusCancelled, SessionStatusExpired, SessionStatusFailed:
// The checkout cannot recover from these states. Drop the retained token
// (and the TUI's paired by-key idempotency ID) now so the very next retry
// creates a fresh payment intent.
reportSession(onSession, "")
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("payment %s; re-run the top-up to try again", session.Status)
default:
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, err
}
}
}
return PartnerCheckoutSession{}, fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for payment; re-run once the payment clears")
}
func isTerminalSessionAPIError(err error) bool {
var apiErr APIError
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.Status >= http.StatusBadRequest && apiErr.Status < http.StatusInternalServerError
}
// pollUntilExchangeSettled follows an exchange claim that was already in flight
// when a retry resumed the session. Exchange is single-flight and the raw key is
// returned only to the winning request, so issuing Exchange again is never safe.
// Once the claim completes, direct the user to the dashboard recovery path.
func pollUntilExchangeSettled(ctx context.Context, client *Client, sessionToken string, onSession func(string)) error {
deadline := time.Now().Add(pollTimeout)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
session, err := client.GetSession(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return err
}
if isTerminalSessionAPIError(err) {
reportSession(onSession, "")
return err
}
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return err
}
continue
}
switch session.Status {
case SessionStatusExchanged:
return fmt.Errorf("session was already exchanged; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard")
case SessionStatusExchanging:
if err := sleepContext(ctx, pollInterval); err != nil {
return err
}
case SessionStatusCancelled, SessionStatusExpired, SessionStatusFailed:
reportSession(onSession, "")
return fmt.Errorf("key provisioning %s; rotate the key from the aimlapi.com dashboard", session.Status)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("key provisioning returned to %s; re-run the top-up", session.Status)
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for key provisioning; retry to check the same session")
}
func sleepContext(ctx context.Context, delay time.Duration) error {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-timer.C:
return nil
}
}
func status(callback func(Status, string), value Status, detail string) {
if callback != nil {
callback(value, detail)
}
}
func firstNonEmpty(values ...string) string {
for _, value := range values {
if value = strings.TrimSpace(value); value != "" {
return value
}
}
return ""
}
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
package aimlapi
import (
"net/mail"
"strings"
)
// ValidEmail performs the lightweight validation used before starting the
// passwordless onboarding request.
func ValidEmail(value string) bool {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
address, err := mail.ParseAddress(value)
if err != nil || address.Address != value {
return false
}
at := strings.LastIndexByte(value, '@')
if at <= 0 || at == len(value)-1 {
return false
}
domain := value[at+1:]
if strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(domain, ".") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") {
return false
}
dot := strings.LastIndexByte(domain, '.')
if dot <= 0 || dot == len(domain)-1 {
return false
}
tld := domain[dot+1:]
if len(tld) < 2 {
return false
}
for _, char := range tld {
if char < 'A' || char > 'Z' && char < 'a' || char > 'z' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+14 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package background
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
)
@@ -14,7 +15,8 @@ import (
func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
if err := exec.Command("taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
taskkill := taskkillPath()
if err := exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
return nil
}
process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
@@ -23,3 +25,14 @@ func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
}
return process.Kill()
}
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = os.Getenv("windir")
}
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = `C:\Windows`
}
return filepath.Join(systemRoot, "System32", "taskkill.exe")
}
+31 -6
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/worktrees"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zerogit"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
"github.com/charmbracelet/x/term"
)
var version = "dev"
@@ -339,7 +340,17 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
return 0
}
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero %s\n", version); err != nil {
// Pipes and redirects keep the machine-readable contract exactly as it
// was: a single "zero <version>" line. Scripts, command substitutions,
// and the NPM wrapper smoke check all parse that record, so the banner
// is strictly a TTY affordance.
if !stdoutIsTerminal(stdout) {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero %s\n", version); err != nil {
return 1
}
return 0
}
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "%s\n\nzero %s\n", tui.Wordmark(), version); err != nil {
return 1
}
return 0
@@ -755,11 +766,12 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
}
sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
Store: sandboxStore,
Backend: sandboxBackend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
})
lastKnownMCPConfig := mcpConfig
fileTracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
@@ -1115,6 +1127,17 @@ func closeSpecialistRuntime(stderr io.Writer, runtime *agentToolRuntime) {
}
}
// stdoutIsTerminal reports whether w is an interactive terminal. Tests pass
// bytes.Buffer writers and pipes/redirects fail term.IsTerminal, so both take
// the machine-readable path.
func stdoutIsTerminal(w io.Writer) bool {
f, ok := w.(*os.File)
if !ok {
return false
}
return term.IsTerminal(f.Fd())
}
func writeAppError(stderr io.Writer, message string, exitCode int) int {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] %s\n", message); err != nil {
return 1
@@ -1347,6 +1370,8 @@ Flags:
--notify <off|bell|notify|both>
Override notification mode for this run
--no-notify Disable notifications for this run
--no-completion-gate Accept a no-tool-call reply as final without the INCOMPLETE
downgrade (for conversational callers with an operator present)
`)
return err
}
+29
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ func TestRunPrintsVersion(t *testing.T) {
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code 0, got %d", exitCode)
}
// Non-terminal stdout keeps the machine-readable contract: exactly one
// "zero <version>" record, no wordmark banner, no ANSI.
if got := stdout.String(); got != "zero dev\n" {
t.Fatalf("expected version output, got %q", got)
}
@@ -49,6 +51,33 @@ func TestRunPrintsVersion(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestRunVersionRedirectedFile covers the `zero --version > file` path: stdout
// is a real *os.File but not a terminal, so the single-line contract must hold.
func TestRunVersionRedirectedFile(t *testing.T) {
stdout, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "version-stdout")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create temp stdout: %v", err)
}
defer stdout.Close()
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := Run([]string{"--version"}, stdout, &stderr)
if exitCode != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code 0, got %d", exitCode)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(stdout.Name())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read temp stdout: %v", err)
}
if got := string(content); got != "zero dev\n" {
t.Fatalf("expected version output, got %q", got)
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected empty stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunPrintsHelp(t *testing.T) {
for _, args := range [][]string{
{"--help"},
+77
View File
@@ -348,6 +348,83 @@ func TestRunProvidersAddWritesCatalogProfile(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiWritesDefaultHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"providers", "add", "aimlapi"}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
cfg := readFileConfig(t, configPath)
if len(cfg.Providers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("providers = %#v, want one provider", cfg.Providers)
}
profile := cfg.Providers[0]
if profile.Name != "aimlapi" ||
profile.CatalogID != "aimlapi" ||
profile.BaseURL != "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1" ||
profile.Model != "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5" ||
profile.APIKeyEnv != "AIMLAPI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected provider profile: %#v", profile)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"] != "part_62yQoGYDq4Yqnrj2R1iGrDNJ" ||
profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"] != "Gitlawb/zero" {
t.Fatalf("missing aimlapi.com default headers: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiMixedCaseHeaderOverride(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
// A differently-cased override must replace the catalog header in place, not
// leave both spellings behind to race when request construction canonicalizes.
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
"providers", "add", "aimlapi",
"--header", "x-aimlapi-partner-id=part_override",
}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
profile := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0]
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["x-aimlapi-partner-id"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("lowercase override left a duplicate key: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"] != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("override did not win on the canonical key: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddAimlapiOverrideDropsCatalogHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{
"providers", "add", "aimlapi",
"--base-url", "https://staging.example/v1",
"--header", "X-Environment=staging",
}, &stdout, &stderr, providerSetupDeps(configPath))
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
}
profile := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0]
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("partner attribution leaked to overridden endpoint: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if _, ok := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("integration attribution leaked to overridden endpoint: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-Environment"] != "staging" {
t.Fatalf("explicit user header was dropped: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestRunProvidersAddWritesCustomHeaders(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
+5 -4
View File
@@ -211,11 +211,12 @@ func fireJob(store *cron.Store, now func() time.Time, job cron.Job, stdout io.Wr
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: could not re-read job %s before persist: %v\n", job.ID, readErr)
return job, nil
}
if current.Status == cron.StatusPaused {
// Honor an external pause that landed while the job ran.
job.Status = cron.StatusPaused
current.FireCount = job.FireCount
current.NextRunAt = job.NextRunAt
if current.Status != cron.StatusPaused {
current.Status = job.Status
}
return job, nil
return current, nil
})
if errors.Is(err, cron.ErrJobNotFound) {
// Genuinely removed mid-run: don't recreate it (no run record, no persist).
+2 -1
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
if name == "" {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero skill info <name> [--json]")
}
info, ok := skills.Info(dir, name)
// Resolve across primary + ~/.agents/skills; lock metadata only from primary.
info, ok := skills.InfoFromRoots(dir, skills.GlobalRoots(dir), name)
if !ok {
return writeAppError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("skill %q not found", name), exitUsage)
}
+104 -7
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specmode"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/usage"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/worktrees"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
@@ -110,10 +111,26 @@ type execOptions struct {
notifyMode string
// noNotify forces ModeOff for this run. Mutually exclusive with notifyMode.
noNotify bool
// noCompletionGate turns off the headless completion gate
// (agent.Options.RequireCompletionSignal) for this run. It exists for
// CONVERSATIONAL exec callers — a chat frontend driving exec with an operator
// present to reply (e.g. zeroclaw chat). There, a final message that hands
// the turn back ("the sandbox blocks network egress, approve it and I'll
// continue") is a COMPLETE answer, not an unfinished task, so the gate's
// self-report admission check and INCOMPLETE downgrade (exit 4) would only
// mislabel honest blocker reports. Default off: plain `zero exec` keeps the
// gate, preserving CI/cron semantics.
noCompletionGate bool
// addDirs holds directories passed via --add-dir that should be allowed as
// additional write roots for this run. Unioned with
// config.SandboxConfig.AdditionalWriteRoots at scope construction time.
addDirs []string
// tracePath, when set, writes a per-turn NDJSON trace (agenteval-compatible)
// to the given file path — or to stderr when the value is "-". Falls back to
// the ZERO_TRACE env var when the flag is absent. Off by default: a run
// without it leaves agent.Options.Trace nil and is byte-identical to before.
// The trace is pure observation — enabling it does not change agent behavior.
tracePath string
}
type execUsageError struct {
@@ -412,6 +429,12 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
notify.MaybeAddWebhookSink(notifier, os.Getenv, func(format string, args ...any) {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[notify] "+format+"\n", args...)
})
// Spec-draft runs synthesize a prompt offline and never drive a model turn, so
// there is no per-turn trace to emit. Reject --trace / ZERO_TRACE up front with
// a clear error rather than silently accepting and writing nothing.
if options.useSpec && resolveTracePath(options) != "" {
return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "--trace / ZERO_TRACE are not supported for spec-draft runs")
}
if options.useSpec {
return runExecSpecDraft(execSpecDraftRun{
options: options,
@@ -464,6 +487,24 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to create run id: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
// Per-turn tracing is opt-in (--trace <path> or ZERO_TRACE=<path>). The
// recorder is stamped throughout agent.Run and the providerio seam; the run
// itself is byte-identical to an untraced run. We finish the recorder at the
// agent.Run boundary (below) so the snapshot captures exactly one turn, then
// serialize the snapshot on every exit path via the defer. "-" writes NDJSON
// to stderr; otherwise the path is created/truncated. A failure to emit is
// logged to stderr, never fatal.
tracePath := resolveTracePath(options)
var traceRecorder *trace.Recorder
var traceSnapshot *trace.TurnTrace
if tracePath != "" {
traceRecorder = trace.NewRecorder(preparedSession.Session.SessionID, runID, "")
defer func() {
if err := writeTraceSnapshot(traceSnapshot, tracePath, stderr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "[zero] failed to write trace: %s\n", err)
}
}()
}
writer := execEventWriter{
stdout: stdout,
stderr: stderr,
@@ -546,6 +587,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
ModelSwitcher: modelSwitcher,
ReasoningEffort: forwardEffort,
Trace: traceRecorder,
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
Images: images,
Registry: registry,
@@ -556,8 +598,10 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
// Headless exec: don't accept a no-tool-call turn as "done" while work
// clearly remains (pending plan items / a mid-step continuation cue) —
// nudge to continue, and finalize as INCOMPLETE rather than false success
// if the model keeps stalling. The interactive TUI leaves this off.
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
// if the model keeps stalling. The interactive TUI leaves this off, and
// --no-completion-gate lets conversational exec callers (a chat frontend
// with an operator present) opt out the same way.
RequireCompletionSignal: !options.noCompletionGate,
Sandbox: sandboxEngine,
FileTracker: fileTracker,
Hooks: hookDispatcher,
@@ -613,6 +657,12 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
sessionRecorder.append(sessions.EventUsage, payload)
},
})
// Finish the trace now that the turn is done, so the snapshot captures exactly
// agent.Run's work and nothing the post-run cleanup stamps. The deferred
// writer serializes the snapshot on every exit path.
if traceRecorder != nil {
traceSnapshot = traceRecorder.Finish()
}
notifier.Notify(notify.Completion, notify.DefaultMessage(notify.Completion))
if writer.err != nil {
return exitCrash
@@ -803,14 +853,28 @@ func buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig
policy := applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox)
backend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: policy,
Store: store,
Backend: backend,
Scope: scope,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Policy: policy,
Store: store,
Backend: backend,
Scope: scope,
SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
}), nil
}
func providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) []string {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(resolved.Providers)+1)
for _, profile := range resolved.Providers {
if key := strings.TrimSpace(profile.APIKeyEnv); key != "" {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
}
if key := strings.TrimSpace(resolved.Provider.APIKeyEnv); key != "" {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
return keys
}
// applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy overlays every config-sourced sandbox knob onto
// the default policy.
func applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(policy sandbox.Policy, cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
@@ -1225,3 +1289,36 @@ func execNotifyMode(options execOptions, resolved config.ResolvedConfig) string
}
return resolved.Notify.Mode
}
// resolveTracePath returns the trace destination for this run: the --trace flag
// value when set, else the ZERO_TRACE env var, else "" (tracing off). A value of
// "-" means "write to stderr".
func resolveTracePath(options execOptions) string {
if v := strings.TrimSpace(options.tracePath); v != "" {
return v
}
if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ZERO_TRACE")); v != "" {
return v
}
return ""
}
// writeTraceSnapshot writes an already-finished trace snapshot to dest ("-" =>
// stderr, otherwise a file path created/truncated). A nil snapshot is a no-op
// (tracing off, or the run exited before agent.Run produced a turn). The trace
// is best-effort: a write error is returned to the caller, which logs it but
// never fails the run.
func writeTraceSnapshot(snapshot *trace.TurnTrace, dest string, stderr io.Writer) error {
if snapshot == nil || dest == "" {
return nil
}
if strings.TrimSpace(dest) == "-" {
return trace.WriteNDJSON(stderr, snapshot)
}
file, err := os.Create(dest)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer file.Close()
return trace.WriteNDJSON(file, snapshot)
}
+59
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
options.selfCorrect = true
case arg == "--no-notify":
options.noNotify = true
case arg == "--no-completion-gate":
options.noCompletionGate = true
case arg == "--trace":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
return options, false, err
}
options.tracePath = value
index = next
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--trace="):
options.tracePath = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--trace="))
case arg == "--notify":
value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
if err != nil {
@@ -402,6 +413,11 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
// rather than pretend it took effect.
return options, false, execUsageError{"--self-correct cannot be combined with --use-spec."}
}
if options.useSpec && options.noCompletionGate {
// Same reasoning as --self-correct above: the spec-draft path never consults
// the completion gate, so the flag would be silently ignored.
return options, false, execUsageError{"--no-completion-gate cannot be combined with --use-spec."}
}
if !options.useSpec && options.specModel != "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--spec-model requires --use-spec."}
}
@@ -461,6 +477,49 @@ func nextFlagValue(args []string, index int, flag string) (string, int, error) {
if next == "" || flagValueLooksLikeOption(next) {
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("%s requires a value", flag)}
}
// Validate specific flag values to prevent consuming positional prompt text
switch flag {
case "--auto":
switch strings.ToLower(next) {
case "low", "medium", "high", "member":
default:
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("Invalid autonomy level %q. Expected low, medium, or high.", next)}
}
case "--notify":
switch strings.ToLower(next) {
case "off", "bell", "notify", "both":
default:
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --notify %q. Expected off, bell, notify, or both.", next)}
}
case "-o", "--output":
switch strings.ToLower(next) {
case "text", "json", "stream-json", "debug":
default:
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid output format %q. Expected text, json, stream-json, or debug.", next)}
}
case "-i", "--input":
switch strings.ToLower(next) {
case "text", "stream-json":
default:
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("Invalid input format %q. Expected text or stream-json.", next)}
}
case "--reasoning-effort", "--spec-reasoning-effort":
switch strings.ToLower(next) {
case "low", "medium", "high":
default:
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q. Expected low, medium, or high.", flag, next)}
}
case "--depth":
if _, err := strconv.Atoi(next); err != nil {
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --depth %q. Expected a non-negative integer.", next)}
}
case "--max-turns":
if _, err := strconv.Atoi(next); err != nil {
return "", index, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("invalid --max-turns %q. Expected a positive integer.", next)}
}
}
return next, index + 1, nil
}
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
package cli
import "testing"
// --no-completion-gate exists for conversational exec callers (a chat frontend
// with an operator present): an honest blocker report that hands the turn back
// must not be downgraded to INCOMPLETE there. The flag maps to
// agent.Options.RequireCompletionSignal = false; default keeps the gate on.
func TestParseExecArgsNoCompletionGate(t *testing.T) {
options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--prompt", "hi", "--no-completion-gate"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseExecArgs: %v", err)
}
if !options.noCompletionGate {
t.Fatal("--no-completion-gate must set noCompletionGate")
}
options, _, err = parseExecArgs([]string{"--prompt", "hi"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseExecArgs: %v", err)
}
if options.noCompletionGate {
t.Fatal("noCompletionGate must default to false (gate on)")
}
}
// The spec-draft path never consults the completion gate, so the combination
// must be rejected up front instead of silently ignoring the flag (mirrors the
// existing --self-correct + --use-spec check).
func TestParseExecArgsNoCompletionGateRejectsUseSpec(t *testing.T) {
if _, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--prompt", "hi", "--use-spec", "--no-completion-gate"}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("--no-completion-gate with --use-spec must error")
}
}
+17
View File
@@ -21,3 +21,20 @@ func TestParseExecArgsInlinePromptKeepsLeadingDash(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("inline prompt = %q, want %q", got, "-foo bar")
}
}
func TestParseExecArgsPreventsPositionalFromBeingConsumedAsFlagValue(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--auto", "do a build"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Invalid autonomy level") {
t.Fatalf("expected error that --auto has invalid autonomy level, got: %v", err)
}
_, _, err = parseExecArgs([]string{"--notify", "do a build"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid --notify") {
t.Fatalf("expected error that --notify is invalid, got: %v", err)
}
_, _, err = parseExecArgs([]string{"--max-turns", "do a build"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid --max-turns") {
t.Fatalf("expected error that --max-turns is invalid, got: %v", err)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -345,8 +345,8 @@ func TestRunExecModeSeedsModelAndTurnOverrides(t *testing.T) {
if gotModel != "claude-opus-4.1" {
t.Fatalf("overrides.Provider.Model = %q, want claude-opus-4.1", gotModel)
}
if gotMaxTurns != 50 {
t.Fatalf("overrides.MaxTurns = %d, want 50", gotMaxTurns)
if gotMaxTurns != 160 {
t.Fatalf("overrides.MaxTurns = %d, want 160 (deep mode)", gotMaxTurns)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ func runMCPOAuthLogin(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps ap
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
if err := store.Save(serverName, token); err != nil {
if err := store.SaveForServer(server, token); err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ func runMCPOAuthLogout(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps a
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
removed, err := store.Delete(serverName)
removed, err := store.DeleteForServerName(serverName)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
+34 -17
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ func TestRunMCPOAuthLogout(t *testing.T) {
if err := store.Save("remote", mcp.StoredToken{AccessToken: "a", RefreshToken: "r"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Save() error = %v", err)
}
if err := store.SaveForServer(mcp.Server{Name: "remote", Identity: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"}, mcp.StoredToken{AccessToken: "identity", RefreshToken: "ir"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveForServer() error = %v", err)
}
deps := appDeps{newMCPTokenStore: func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error) { return store, nil }}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -101,6 +104,9 @@ func TestRunMCPOAuthLogout(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok, _ := store.Load("remote"); ok {
t.Fatal("token still present after logout")
}
if statuses, err := store.Status(); err != nil || len(statuses) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("status after logout = %#v err=%v, want no tokens", statuses, err)
}
}
func TestRunMCPOAuthLoginStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
@@ -122,23 +128,24 @@ func TestRunMCPOAuthLoginStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
}
cwd := t.TempDir()
mcpConfig := config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"remote": {
Type: "http",
URL: "https://remote.invalid/mcp",
Auth: "oauth",
OAuth: &config.MCPOAuthConfig{
ClientID: "client-123",
AuthorizationEndpoint: "https://remote.invalid/authorize",
TokenEndpoint: tokenServer.URL,
Scopes: []string{"read"},
},
},
}}
deps := appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
newMCPTokenStore: func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error) { return store, nil },
resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"remote": {
Type: "http",
URL: "https://remote.invalid/mcp",
Auth: "oauth",
OAuth: &config.MCPOAuthConfig{
ClientID: "client-123",
AuthorizationEndpoint: "https://remote.invalid/authorize",
TokenEndpoint: tokenServer.URL,
Scopes: []string{"read"},
},
},
}}, nil
resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return mcpConfig, nil
},
now: time.Now,
}
@@ -173,9 +180,13 @@ func TestRunMCPOAuthLoginStoresTokens(t *testing.T) {
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stderr=%s stdout=%s", exitCode, stderr.String(), stdout.String())
}
token, ok, err := store.Load("remote")
servers, err := mcp.NormalizeConfig(mcpConfig)
if err != nil || len(servers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig() servers=%#v err=%v", servers, err)
}
token, ok, err := store.LoadForServer(servers[0])
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("Load() ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
t.Fatalf("LoadForServer() ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
if token.AccessToken != "access-final" || token.RefreshToken != "refresh-final" {
t.Fatalf("stored token = %#v", token)
@@ -483,7 +494,13 @@ func TestRunMCPOAuthLoginTrustedProjectServerStoresToken(t *testing.T) {
if gotExclude {
t.Fatal("trusted workspace must resolve MCP config with excludeProject=false")
}
token, ok, err := store.Load("remote")
servers, err := mcp.NormalizeConfig(config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"remote": projectServer,
}})
if err != nil || len(servers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig() servers=%#v err=%v", servers, err)
}
token, ok, err := store.LoadForServer(servers[0])
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("token must be stored on trusted login; ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
+15 -15
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ import (
// pluginActivation holds what plugin activation contributed to a bootstrap so the
// later dispatcher + skill wiring can consume it: the plugin hook definitions and
// the plugin skill search roots. The zero value (no plugins) is inert — the
// dispatcher gets no extra hooks and the skill tool keeps only the default dir.
// The embedded trustSkip reports whether the project plugin layer was dropped for
// an untrusted workspace, so the caller can fold it into the single combined
// trust notice.
// the plugin skill search roots. The zero value (no plugins) still overlays the
// multi-root skill tool (primary + ~/.agents/skills) so discovery is identical
// with or without plugins. The embedded trustSkip reports whether the project
// plugin layer was dropped for an untrusted workspace, so the caller can fold it
// into the single combined trust notice.
type pluginActivation struct {
hooks []hooks.Definition
skillRoots []string
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDep
loaded, err := deps.loadPlugins(plugins.LoadOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot, ExcludeProject: excludeProject})
if err != nil {
writePluginActivationWarning(stderr, "failed to load plugins: "+err.Error())
// Still overlay multi-root discovery (primary + agents) so a plugin load
// failure cannot hide shared skills.
registry.Register(plugins.NewSkillTool(deps.skillsDir(), nil))
return pluginActivation{trustSkip: skip}
}
@@ -67,14 +70,11 @@ func activatePlugins(workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDep
writePluginActivationWarning(stderr, warning)
}
// Re-register the skill tool to also resolve plugin-declared skills. The core
// skill tool only reads the default skills dir; the plugin-aware replacement
// merges the default dir with the plugin skill roots (default dir wins a name
// clash), so plugin skills appear in the agent's skill list. With no plugin
// skill roots this is byte-equivalent to the default skills surface.
if len(result.SkillRoots) > 0 {
registry.Register(plugins.NewSkillTool(deps.skillsDir(), result.SkillRoots))
}
// Always overlay the multi-root skill tool so discovery is identical with or
// without plugins: primary DefaultDir + optional ~/.agents/skills + plugin
// roots (earlier wins). With empty SkillRoots and no agents dir this is
// byte-equivalent to the core single-dir skill surface.
registry.Register(plugins.NewSkillTool(deps.skillsDir(), result.SkillRoots))
return pluginActivation{hooks: result.Hooks, skillRoots: result.SkillRoots, trustSkip: skip}
}
@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ func projectPluginsDirExists(workspaceRoot string) bool {
}
// skillInfos resolves the reusable skills the model can load via the skill tool —
// the default skills dir merged with any plugin skill roots, the same set the
// plugin-aware skill tool resolves against — as plain data for the agent's system
// primary dir + optional ~/.agents/skills + plugin skill roots, the same set the
// multi-root skill tool resolves against — as plain data for the agent's system
// prompt. It returns nil when no skills are installed, so a skill-less run leaves
// the prompt byte-identical.
func (a pluginActivation) skillInfos(defaultDir string) []agent.SkillInfo {
+41
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ func TestActivatePluginsRegistersToolAndCollectsHooks(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestActivatePluginsRegistersPluginSkillTool(t *testing.T) {
// Isolate host ~/.agents/skills so it cannot interfere with this test.
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
pluginDir := t.TempDir()
skillDir := filepath.Join(pluginDir, "skills", "demo-skill")
if err := os.MkdirAll(skillDir, 0o755); err != nil {
@@ -108,6 +113,42 @@ func TestActivatePluginsRegistersPluginSkillTool(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestActivatePluginsAlwaysRegistersMultiRootSkillTool(t *testing.T) {
// Even with zero plugins / zero plugin skill roots, activation must overlay
// the multi-root skill tool so ~/.agents/skills is loadable on bare runs.
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
agents := filepath.Join(home, ".agents", "skills")
if err := os.MkdirAll(agents, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
skillDir := filepath.Join(agents, "agents-skill")
if err := os.MkdirAll(skillDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(skillDir, "SKILL.md"), []byte("---\nname: agents-skill\n---\nagents body"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewSkillTool(t.TempDir())) // core single-dir tool
var stderr bytes.Buffer
workspace := t.TempDir()
activation := activatePlugins(workspace, registry, fakePluginDeps(t, nil), &stderr, workspace)
if len(activation.skillRoots) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no plugin skill roots, got %#v", activation.skillRoots)
}
skillTool, ok := registry.Get("skill")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("skill tool missing after activation")
}
res := skillTool.Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"name": "agents-skill"})
if res.Status != tools.StatusOK || !bytes.Contains([]byte(res.Output), []byte("agents body")) {
t.Fatalf("agents skill must load with zero plugin roots: %q (%s)", res.Status, res.Output)
}
}
func TestActivatePluginsSurfacesLoadDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
// Load succeeds (no top-level error) but reports a per-plugin diagnostic for a
// plugin it had to skip. activatePlugins must forward that diagnostic to stderr
+62 -3
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@ package cli
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/aimlapi"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
@@ -424,22 +426,39 @@ func providerProfileForAdd(options providerAddOptions) (config.ProviderProfile,
if apiKeyEnv == "" && len(descriptor.AuthEnvVars) > 0 {
apiKeyEnv = descriptor.AuthEnvVars[0]
}
baseURL := firstNonEmptyCLI(options.baseURL, descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
var catalogHeaders map[string]string
if sameProviderSetupBaseURL(baseURL, descriptor.DefaultBaseURL) {
catalogHeaders = descriptor.CustomHeaders
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.ID), "aimlapi") {
catalogHeaders = aimlapi.WithResolvedPartnerHeader(catalogHeaders)
}
}
profile := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: name,
ProviderKind: providerKindForDescriptor(descriptor),
CatalogID: descriptor.ID,
BaseURL: firstNonEmptyCLI(options.baseURL, descriptor.DefaultBaseURL),
BaseURL: baseURL,
APIKeyEnv: apiKeyEnv,
APIFormat: firstAPIFormat(descriptor),
AuthHeader: strings.TrimSpace(options.authHeader),
AuthScheme: normalizeAuthScheme(options.authScheme),
AuthHeaderValue: strings.TrimSpace(options.authHeaderValue),
CustomHeaders: copyProviderHeaders(options.customHeaders),
Model: firstNonEmptyCLI(options.model, descriptor.DefaultModel),
// Catalog attribution belongs only to the catalog endpoint. Explicit
// user headers still apply to an override/staging/proxy endpoint.
CustomHeaders: mergeProviderHeaders(catalogHeaders, options.customHeaders),
Model: firstNonEmptyCLI(options.model, descriptor.DefaultModel),
}
return profile, nil
}
func sameProviderSetupBaseURL(left string, right string) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(
strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(left), "/"),
strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(right), "/"),
)
}
func selectProviderForCheck(resolved config.ResolvedConfig, name string) (config.ProviderProfile, error) {
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
@@ -544,3 +563,43 @@ func copyProviderHeaders(headers map[string]string) map[string]string {
}
return copied
}
func mergeProviderHeaders(base map[string]string, overrides map[string]string) map[string]string {
merged := copyProviderHeaders(base)
if len(overrides) == 0 {
return merged
}
if merged == nil {
merged = map[string]string{}
}
for key, value := range overrides {
// HTTP header names are case-insensitive and request construction
// canonicalizes them (http.Header.Set), so an override that differs from a
// base key only in case must replace that key's value in place — otherwise
// both survive as distinct map entries and race non-deterministically at
// build time. Keep the existing spelling (the catalog's, which the resolver
// re-merges verbatim); only a genuinely new header is added as typed.
if existing, ok := headerKeyFold(merged, key); ok {
merged[existing] = value
continue
}
merged[key] = value
}
return merged
}
// headerKeyFold returns the key in headers whose canonical HTTP form matches key,
// so a case-insensitive override lands on the existing entry instead of adding a
// colliding duplicate.
func headerKeyFold(headers map[string]string, key string) (string, bool) {
if _, ok := headers[key]; ok {
return key, true
}
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(key)
for existing := range headers {
if http.CanonicalHeaderKey(existing) == canonical {
return existing, true
}
}
return "", false
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
package cli
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
)
func TestProviderSensitiveEnvKeys(t *testing.T) {
resolved := config.ResolvedConfig{
Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{
{Name: "custom", APIKeyEnv: " COMPANY_LLM_SECRET "},
{Name: "catalog", APIKeyEnv: "OPENAI_API_KEY"},
{Name: "inline"},
},
Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Name: "active", APIKeyEnv: "ACTIVE_PROVIDER_SECRET"},
}
want := []string{"COMPANY_LLM_SECRET", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "ACTIVE_PROVIDER_SECRET"}
if got := providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("providerSensitiveEnvKeys() = %v, want %v", got, want)
}
}
+14 -2
View File
@@ -483,6 +483,14 @@ func TestTUISandboxSetupCommandGatedToWindowsNativeBackend(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields(t *testing.T) {
// Point HOME at an empty directory so the default credential-store
// deny-read entries (which depend on what exists in the real home, e.g.
// ~/.aws on the macOS CI image) cannot leak host paths into the golden
// comparison.
emptyHome := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", emptyHome)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", emptyHome)
t.Setenv("GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS", "")
store := newSandboxTestStore(t)
workspace := t.TempDir()
deps := appDeps{
@@ -616,8 +624,12 @@ func jsonValuesEqual(t *testing.T, wantBytes []byte, gotBytes []byte) bool {
func normalizePortableJSONRootString(value *any) {
switch current := (*value).(type) {
case string:
if current == `\` {
*value = "/"
// Normalize OS-specific path separators so the shared golden file
// matches on both Unix (slash) and Windows (backslash) runners.
// readOnlySubpaths carve-outs are built with filepath.Join, which
// renders as backslash paths on Windows.
if current != "" {
*value = strings.ReplaceAll(current, `\`, "/")
}
case []any:
for index := range current {
+90 -5
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
@@ -14,9 +16,21 @@ import (
type serveOptions struct {
mcp bool
cwd string
addDirs []string
allowUnsafeTools bool
}
// serveRootsScope is a PathScope used only for MCP serve: the workspace root
// plus optional --add-dir roots, without the sandbox temp write roots that
// would otherwise pollute resources/list.
type serveRootsScope []string
func (s serveRootsScope) Roots() []string {
roots := make([]string, len(s))
copy(roots, s)
return roots
}
func runServe(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
options, help, err := parseServeArgs(args)
if err != nil {
@@ -36,7 +50,11 @@ func runServe(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) i
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
registry := newServeRegistry(workspaceRoot, options.allowUnsafeTools)
scope, err := buildServeScope(workspaceRoot, options.addDirs)
if err != nil {
return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
}
registry := newServeRegistry(workspaceRoot, scope, options.allowUnsafeTools)
if options.allowUnsafeTools {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Unsafe MCP server tools enabled because --allow-unsafe-tools was passed."); err != nil {
return exitCrash
@@ -47,6 +65,8 @@ func runServe(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) i
Name: "zero",
Version: version,
PermissionGranted: options.allowUnsafeTools,
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Scope: scope,
})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
@@ -54,11 +74,11 @@ func runServe(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) i
return exitSuccess
}
func newServeRegistry(workspaceRoot string, allowUnsafeTools bool) *tools.Registry {
func newServeRegistry(workspaceRoot string, scope tools.PathScope, allowUnsafeTools bool) *tools.Registry {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
toolset := tools.CoreReadOnlyTools(workspaceRoot)
toolset := tools.CoreReadOnlyToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, scope)
if allowUnsafeTools {
toolset = tools.CoreTools(workspaceRoot)
toolset = tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, scope)
}
for _, tool := range toolset {
registry.Register(tool)
@@ -66,6 +86,58 @@ func newServeRegistry(workspaceRoot string, allowUnsafeTools bool) *tools.Regist
return registry
}
// buildServeScope returns nil when there are no extra roots (workspace-only),
// otherwise a PathScope listing the workspace first followed by each --add-dir.
func buildServeScope(workspaceRoot string, addDirs []string) (tools.PathScope, error) {
if len(addDirs) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
roots := make([]string, 0, 1+len(addDirs))
workspaceRoot = filepath.Clean(workspaceRoot)
if abs, err := filepath.Abs(workspaceRoot); err == nil {
workspaceRoot = abs
}
// Keep lexical absolute paths in roots so path checks stay aligned with the
// un-evaluated WorkspaceRoot used when Scope is nil. Symlink-resolved forms
// are only keys for duplicate detection.
workspaceResolved := workspaceRoot
if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(workspaceRoot); err == nil {
workspaceResolved = resolved
}
roots = append(roots, workspaceRoot)
seen := map[string]struct{}{workspaceResolved: {}}
for _, dir := range addDirs {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(dir)
if trimmed == "" {
return nil, execUsageError{"--add-dir requires a path"}
}
absolute, err := filepath.Abs(trimmed)
if err != nil {
return nil, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("--add-dir %q: %v", trimmed, err)}
}
info, err := os.Stat(absolute)
if err != nil {
return nil, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("--add-dir %q: %v", trimmed, err)}
}
if !info.IsDir() {
return nil, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("--add-dir %q is not a directory", trimmed)}
}
resolved := absolute
if r, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absolute); err == nil {
resolved = r
}
if _, ok := seen[resolved]; ok {
continue
}
seen[resolved] = struct{}{}
roots = append(roots, absolute)
}
return serveRootsScope(roots), nil
}
func parseServeArgs(args []string) (serveOptions, bool, error) {
options := serveOptions{}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
@@ -85,6 +157,18 @@ func parseServeArgs(args []string) (serveOptions, bool, error) {
options.cwd = args[index]
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--cwd="):
options.cwd = strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--cwd=")
case arg == "--add-dir":
index++
if index >= len(args) {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--add-dir requires a path"}
}
options.addDirs = append(options.addDirs, args[index])
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--add-dir="):
value := strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--add-dir=")
if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
return options, false, execUsageError{"--add-dir requires a path"}
}
options.addDirs = append(options.addDirs, value)
default:
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown serve flag %q", arg)}
}
@@ -100,7 +184,8 @@ Starts Zero as an MCP stdio server.
Flags:
--mcp Run the MCP stdio server
-C, --cwd <path> Set the workspace directory
-C, --cwd <path> Set the workspace directory (resources + tools)
--add-dir <path> Extra resource/tool root (repeatable)
--allow-unsafe-tools Expose write and shell tools to the MCP host
-h, --help Show this help
`)
+140
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
@@ -80,6 +82,120 @@ func TestRunServeRequiresMCPMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunServeMCPWiresWorkspaceRootAndAddDirIntoResources(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
extra := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(workspace, "workspace.txt"), []byte("ws\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(extra, "extra.txt"), []byte("ex\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps(
[]string{"serve", "--mcp", "-C", workspace, "--add-dir", extra},
&stdout,
&stderr,
appDeps{stdin: bytes.NewReader(serveMCPResourcesInput(t))},
)
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d stderr=%q", exitCode, stderr.String())
}
output := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(output, "workspace.txt") {
t.Fatalf("expected workspace resource, got %q", output)
}
if !strings.Contains(output, "extra.txt") {
t.Fatalf("expected --add-dir resource, got %q", output)
}
}
func TestRunServeMCPRejectsMissingAddDir(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
missing := filepath.Join(workspace, "does-not-exist")
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps(
[]string{"serve", "--mcp", "-C", workspace, "--add-dir", missing},
&stdout,
&stderr,
appDeps{stdin: bytes.NewReader(nil)},
)
if exitCode != exitUsage {
t.Fatalf("exit=%d want %d stderr=%q", exitCode, exitUsage, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "--add-dir") {
t.Fatalf("expected --add-dir error, got %q", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestParseServeArgsCollectsAddDirs(t *testing.T) {
options, help, err := parseServeArgs([]string{"--mcp", "--add-dir", "/one", "--add-dir=/two", "-C", "/ws"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if help {
t.Fatal("unexpected help")
}
if !options.mcp || options.cwd != "/ws" {
t.Fatalf("options=%#v", options)
}
if len(options.addDirs) != 2 || options.addDirs[0] != "/one" || options.addDirs[1] != "/two" {
t.Fatalf("addDirs=%v", options.addDirs)
}
}
func TestBuildServeScopeNilWithoutExtras(t *testing.T) {
scope, err := buildServeScope(t.TempDir(), nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if scope != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected nil scope, got %#v", scope)
}
}
func TestBuildServeScopeKeepsLexicalPaths(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
realWorkspace := filepath.Join(base, "real-workspace")
realExtra := filepath.Join(base, "real-extra")
for _, dir := range []string{realWorkspace, realExtra} {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
linkWorkspace := filepath.Join(base, "link-workspace")
linkExtra := filepath.Join(base, "link-extra")
if err := os.Symlink(realWorkspace, linkWorkspace); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Symlink(realExtra, linkExtra); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
scope, err := buildServeScope(linkWorkspace, []string{linkExtra})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if scope == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil scope")
}
roots := scope.Roots()
wantWorkspace, err := filepath.Abs(linkWorkspace)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantExtra, err := filepath.Abs(linkExtra)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(roots) != 2 || roots[0] != wantWorkspace || roots[1] != wantExtra {
t.Fatalf("roots=%v want [%q %q]", roots, wantWorkspace, wantExtra)
}
}
func serveMCPInput(t *testing.T) []byte {
t.Helper()
@@ -104,6 +220,30 @@ func serveMCPInput(t *testing.T) []byte {
return input.Bytes()
}
func serveMCPResourcesInput(t *testing.T) []byte {
t.Helper()
var input bytes.Buffer
writeServeMCPMessage(t, &input, map[string]any{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "initialize",
"params": map[string]any{},
})
writeServeMCPMessage(t, &input, map[string]any{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "notifications/initialized",
"params": map[string]any{},
})
writeServeMCPMessage(t, &input, map[string]any{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "resources/list",
"params": map[string]any{},
})
return input.Bytes()
}
func writeServeMCPMessage(t *testing.T, buffer *bytes.Buffer, message map[string]any) {
t.Helper()
body, err := json.Marshal(message)
+48
View File
@@ -200,6 +200,54 @@ func TestSaveSetupProviderStoresPastedAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSaveSetupProviderAimlapiEnvReferenceAndOverrideHeaders(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
result, err := saveSetupProvider(appDeps{
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
}, tui.SetupSelection{
CatalogID: "aimlapi",
BaseURL: "https://staging.example/v1",
Model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
}, setupSaveOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("saveSetupProvider() error = %v", err)
}
if result.Provider.APIKey != "" || result.Provider.APIKeyEnv != "AIMLAPI_API_KEY" {
t.Fatalf("runtime profile did not retain AIMLAPI_API_KEY reference: %+v", result.Provider)
}
if len(result.Provider.CustomHeaders) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("catalog headers leaked to first-run override: %#v", result.Provider.CustomHeaders)
}
persisted := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0]
if persisted.APIKey != "" || persisted.APIKeyEnv != "AIMLAPI_API_KEY" || persisted.APIKeyStored {
t.Fatalf("persisted credential source changed: %+v", persisted)
}
if len(persisted.CustomHeaders) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("persisted override contains catalog headers: %#v", persisted.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestSaveSetupProviderAimlapiUsesResolvedPartnerOverride(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", "part_override")
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
result, err := saveSetupProvider(appDeps{
userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
}, tui.SetupSelection{
CatalogID: "aimlapi",
BaseURL: "https://api.aimlapi.com/v1",
Model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
}, setupSaveOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("saveSetupProvider() error = %v", err)
}
if got := result.Provider.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; got != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("runtime partner header = %q, want part_override", got)
}
if got := readFileConfig(t, configPath).Providers[0].CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; got != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("persisted partner header = %q, want part_override", got)
}
}
func TestSaveSetupProviderStoresCustomEndpointSelection(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
+21 -22
View File
@@ -59,25 +59,21 @@ func runSkills(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
}
func runSkillsList(dir string, options skillListOptions, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
discovered, err := skills.List(dir)
// Management CLI lists global roots only (primary + ~/.agents/skills); plugin
// skills stay out of `zero skills list` and surface via the agent skill tool.
roots := skills.GlobalRoots(dir)
discovered, dups, err := skills.ListFromRoots(roots)
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
}
// Surface name collisions that List silently resolved (first directory wins),
// so a shadowed same-named skill is reported instead of just disappearing.
// Warnings go to stderr, keeping stdout (including --json) clean.
if dups, derr := skills.Duplicates(dir); derr == nil {
for _, dup := range dups {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: duplicate skill %q: using %s, ignoring %s\n",
redaction.RedactString(dup.Name, redaction.Options{}),
redaction.RedactString(dup.Winner, redaction.Options{}),
redaction.RedactString(dup.Loser, redaction.Options{}))
}
} else {
// Don't silently swallow a scan failure: "no warnings" would then be
// ambiguous (no duplicates vs. detection broke). Surface it on stderr.
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: could not check for duplicate skills: %s\n",
redaction.ErrorMessage(derr, redaction.Options{}))
// Surface name collisions that ListFromRoots silently resolved (earlier root
// wins), so a shadowed same-named skill is reported instead of just
// disappearing. Warnings go to stderr, keeping stdout (including --json) clean.
for _, dup := range dups {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: duplicate skill %q: using %s, ignoring %s\n",
redaction.RedactString(dup.Name, redaction.Options{}),
redaction.RedactString(dup.Winner, redaction.Options{}),
redaction.RedactString(dup.Loser, redaction.Options{}))
}
if options.json {
payload := struct {
@@ -88,16 +84,16 @@ func runSkillsList(dir string, options skillListOptions, stdout io.Writer, stder
}
return exitSuccess
}
output := redaction.RedactString(formatSkillList(discovered, dir), redaction.Options{})
output := redaction.RedactString(formatSkillList(discovered), redaction.Options{})
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, output); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitSuccess
}
func formatSkillList(discovered []skills.Skill, dir string) string {
func formatSkillList(discovered []skills.Skill) string {
if len(discovered) == 0 {
return fmt.Sprintf("No Zero skills found in %s.", dir)
return "No skills found."
}
lines := []string{"Zero Skills:"}
for _, skill := range discovered {
@@ -131,10 +127,13 @@ func writeSkillsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
zero skills <command>
Commands:
list List discovered Zero skills
add <git-url|path> Install a skill (checksum-pinned in skills.lock)
list List discovered skills (Zero dir + ~/.agents/skills)
add <git-url|path> Install a skill into the Zero skills dir (checksum-pinned in skills.lock)
info <name> Show a skill's frontmatter, source, and pinned hash
remove <name> Remove an installed skill and its lockfile entry
remove <name> Remove an installed skill and its lockfile entry from the Zero skills dir
list and info also search ~/.agents/skills when present (read-only).
add and remove always target the Zero-specific skills directory.
`)
return err
}
+91 -1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,15 @@ func writeSkillFixture(t *testing.T, dir string, name string, content string) {
}
}
func isolateCLIAgentsHome(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
}
func TestRunSkillsListText(t *testing.T) {
isolateCLIAgentsHome(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
writeSkillFixture(t, dir, "confirmation-policy", "---\nname: confirmation-policy\ndescription: Ask before risky actions.\n---\nbody")
@@ -43,6 +51,7 @@ func TestRunSkillsListText(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames(t *testing.T) {
isolateCLIAgentsHome(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
// Two directories declare the same frontmatter name; List keeps one and the
// other is shadowed. The command must warn instead of silently dropping it.
@@ -62,6 +71,7 @@ func TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunSkillsDefaultsToList(t *testing.T) {
isolateCLIAgentsHome(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
writeSkillFixture(t, dir, "demo", "body")
@@ -78,6 +88,7 @@ func TestRunSkillsDefaultsToList(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunSkillsListJSON(t *testing.T) {
isolateCLIAgentsHome(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
writeSkillFixture(t, dir, "demo", "---\nname: demo\ndescription: a demo\n---\nbody")
@@ -111,6 +122,7 @@ func TestRunSkillsListJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestRunSkillsEmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
isolateCLIAgentsHome(t)
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skills", "list"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
skillsDir: func() string { return filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing") },
@@ -118,11 +130,89 @@ func TestRunSkillsEmptyDir(t *testing.T) {
if exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(stdout.String()), "no") {
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(stdout.String()), "no skills found") {
t.Fatalf("expected a no-skills message, got:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunSkillsListIncludesAgentsOnlySkill(t *testing.T) {
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
agents := filepath.Join(home, ".agents", "skills")
writeSkillFixture(t, agents, "agents-only", "---\nname: agents-only\ndescription: Shared multi-agent skill.\n---\nbody")
primary := t.TempDir()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skills", "list"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
skillsDir: func() string { return primary },
})
if exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "agents-only") {
t.Fatalf("list should include agents-only skill:\n%s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, agents) {
t.Fatalf("list should show agents path:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestRunSkillsListPrimaryShadowsAgents(t *testing.T) {
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
agents := filepath.Join(home, ".agents", "skills")
primary := t.TempDir()
writeSkillFixture(t, primary, "shared", "---\nname: shared\ndescription: From primary.\n---\nbody")
writeSkillFixture(t, agents, "shared", "---\nname: shared\ndescription: From agents.\n---\nbody")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skills", "list"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
skillsDir: func() string { return primary },
})
if exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "From primary") {
t.Fatalf("primary should win list description:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), primary) {
t.Fatalf("primary path should be shown:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), `duplicate skill "shared"`) {
t.Fatalf("expected cross-root duplicate warning, got: %q", stderr.String())
}
}
func TestRunSkillInfoResolvesAgentsOnly(t *testing.T) {
home := t.TempDir()
t.Setenv("HOME", home)
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", home)
agents := filepath.Join(home, ".agents", "skills")
writeSkillFixture(t, agents, "agents-info", "---\nname: agents-info\ndescription: Agents info.\n---\nbody")
primary := t.TempDir()
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "agents-info"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
skillsDir: func() string { return primary },
})
if exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "agents-info") || !strings.Contains(out, "Agents info.") {
t.Fatalf("info missing agents skill:\n%s", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "source:") || strings.Contains(out, "hash:") {
t.Fatalf("agents-only info must not invent lock metadata:\n%s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, agents) {
t.Fatalf("info should show agents path:\n%s", out)
}
}
func TestRunSkillsDoesNotLaunchTUI(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
launchCalled := false
@@ -40,8 +40,11 @@
"writeRoots": [
{
"root": "$WORKSPACE",
"readOnlySubpaths": [
"$WORKSPACE/.git/hooks",
"$WORKSPACE/.git/config"
],
"protectedMetadataNames": [
".git",
".zero",
".agents"
]
+194
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
package config
import (
"fmt"
"slices"
"strings"
)
func mergeMCPConfig(dst *MCPConfig, src MCPConfig, canReenable bool) {
if len(src.Servers) == 0 {
return
}
if dst.Servers == nil {
dst.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
}
for name, server := range src.Servers {
dst.Servers[name] = mergeMCPServer(dst.Servers[name], server, canReenable)
}
}
// mergeProjectMCPConfig merges a project-scoped (lower-trust) MCP config into
// dst. It never re-enables a server the user explicitly disabled or disabled a
// server the user explicitly enabled: it merges with canReenable=false so the
// trust-boundary guard in mergeMCPServer keeps the user's decision authoritative.
func mergeProjectMCPConfig(dst *MCPConfig, src MCPConfig) error {
if len(src.Servers) == 0 {
return nil
}
if dst.Servers == nil {
dst.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
}
for name, server := range src.Servers {
base := dst.Servers[name]
candidate := mergeMCPServer(base, server, false)
if projectMCPServerTargetChanges(base, server) && hasInheritedMCPCredentialMaterial(server, candidate) {
return fmt.Errorf("project MCP server %q cannot override target while inheriting user credentials; set headers/env/oauth explicitly or use a new server name", name)
}
candidate.ProjectConfigured = true
dst.Servers[name] = candidate
}
return nil
}
// mergeMCPServer merges a later config layer's MCP server into the base. The
// canReenable flag marks the CLI-override scope, the only layer that is allowed
// to lift a sticky user-level disable/enable decision (see the disabled-handling
// block).
func mergeMCPServer(base MCPServerConfig, next MCPServerConfig, canReenable bool) MCPServerConfig {
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Type) != "" {
base.Type = next.Type
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Command) != "" {
base.Command = next.Command
}
if next.Args != nil {
base.Args = append([]string{}, next.Args...)
}
if next.Env != nil {
base.Env = copyMCPStringMap(next.Env)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.URL) != "" {
base.URL = next.URL
}
if next.Headers != nil {
base.Headers = copyMCPStringMap(next.Headers)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Auth) != "" {
base.Auth = next.Auth
}
if next.OAuth != nil {
base.OAuth = next.OAuth
}
// Capture the higher-trust scope's prior decision before folding in
// next.disabledSet. The trust boundary must be evaluated against the state
// the higher-trust layer actually left behind, not against next's own flag.
baseDisabledSet := base.disabledSet
baseDisabled := base.Disabled
if next.disabledSet {
base.disabledSet = true
}
if next.disabledSet || next.Disabled {
// Trust boundary: once a higher-trust scope has explicitly set the
// disabled flag, a lower-trust layer (project config) cannot override
// that decision in either direction — the user's choice (whether to
// enable or disable a server) wins over the repo. This blocks a repo
// from re-enabling a server the user disabled, and from disabling a
// server the user explicitly enabled. The only layer allowed to
// override an explicit higher-scope decision is the CLI override scope
// (canReenable=true).
if canReenable || !(baseDisabledSet && baseDisabled != next.Disabled) {
base.Disabled = next.Disabled
}
}
if next.configured {
base.configured = true
}
if next.ProjectConfigured {
base.ProjectConfigured = true
}
return base
}
func projectMCPServerTargetChanges(base MCPServerConfig, next MCPServerConfig) bool {
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Type) != "" && mcpServerTransportKind(base) != mcpServerTransportKind(mergeMCPServer(base, next, true)) {
return true
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.URL) != "" && strings.TrimSpace(next.URL) != strings.TrimSpace(base.URL) {
return true
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Command) != "" && strings.TrimSpace(next.Command) != strings.TrimSpace(base.Command) {
return true
}
if next.Args != nil && !slices.Equal(trimMCPArgs(next.Args), trimMCPArgs(base.Args)) {
return true
}
return false
}
func mcpServerTransportKind(server MCPServerConfig) string {
if typ := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(server.Type)); typ != "" {
return typ
}
if strings.TrimSpace(server.URL) != "" {
return "http"
}
return "stdio"
}
func hasInheritedMCPCredentialMaterial(project MCPServerConfig, candidate MCPServerConfig) bool {
if project.Headers == nil && hasMCPStringMapMaterial(candidate.Headers) {
return true
}
if project.Env == nil && hasMCPStringMapMaterial(candidate.Env) {
return true
}
if project.OAuth == nil && hasMCPOAuthMaterial(candidate.OAuth) {
return true
}
return false
}
func hasMCPStringMapMaterial(values map[string]string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func hasMCPOAuthMaterial(oauth *MCPOAuthConfig) bool {
if oauth == nil {
return false
}
if strings.TrimSpace(oauth.ClientID) != "" ||
strings.TrimSpace(oauth.ClientSecret) != "" ||
strings.TrimSpace(oauth.AuthorizationEndpoint) != "" ||
strings.TrimSpace(oauth.TokenEndpoint) != "" ||
strings.TrimSpace(oauth.RegistrationEndpoint) != "" ||
strings.TrimSpace(oauth.IssuerURL) != "" {
return true
}
for _, scope := range oauth.Scopes {
if strings.TrimSpace(scope) != "" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func trimMCPArgs(values []string) []string {
if values == nil {
return nil
}
trimmed := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if value != "" {
trimmed = append(trimmed, value)
}
}
return trimmed
}
func copyMCPStringMap(values map[string]string) map[string]string {
if values == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make(map[string]string, len(values))
for key, value := range values {
copied[key] = value
}
return copied
}
+201
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
package config
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestResolveRejectsProjectMCPURLOverrideWithInheritedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trusted.example/mcp",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {"url": "https://attacker.example/mcp"}
}
}
}`)
_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Resolve() error = nil, want inherited MCP credential rejection")
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "user-secret") {
t.Fatalf("error leaked header secret: %q", err.Error())
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `project MCP server "docs" cannot override target`) {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want project MCP target rejection", err.Error())
}
}
func TestResolveMCPRejectsProjectURLOverrideWithInheritedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trusted.example/mcp",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcpServers": {
"docs": {"url": "https://attacker.example/mcp"}
}
}`)
_, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveMCP() error = nil, want inherited MCP credential rejection")
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "user-secret") {
t.Fatalf("error leaked header secret: %q", err.Error())
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), `project MCP server "docs" cannot override target`) {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want project MCP target rejection", err.Error())
}
}
func TestResolveRejectsProjectMCPStdioOverrideWithInheritedEnv(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--user"],
"env": {"ZERO_DOCS_TOKEN": "user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {"args": ["--project"]}
}
}
}`)
_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Resolve() error = nil, want inherited MCP env rejection")
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "user-secret") {
t.Fatalf("error leaked env secret: %q", err.Error())
}
}
func TestResolveAllowsProjectMCPTargetOverrideWhenCredentialsCleared(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"web": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trusted.example/mcp",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer user-secret"}
},
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--user"],
"env": {"ZERO_DOCS_TOKEN": "user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"web": {"url": "https://project.example/mcp", "headers": {}},
"docs": {"args": ["--project"], "env": {}}
}
}
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
web := resolved.MCP.Servers["web"]
if web.URL != "https://project.example/mcp" || len(web.Headers) != 0 || !web.ProjectConfigured {
t.Fatalf("web = %#v, want project URL, cleared headers, project marker", web)
}
docs := resolved.MCP.Servers["docs"]
if got := strings.Join(docs.Args, " "); got != "--project" {
t.Fatalf("docs.Args = %q, want --project", got)
}
if len(docs.Env) != 0 || !docs.ProjectConfigured {
t.Fatalf("docs = %#v, want cleared env and project marker", docs)
}
}
func TestResolveAllowsTrustedMCPOverridesToInheritCredentials(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://trusted.example/mcp",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: userPath,
Env: map[string]string{},
Overrides: Overrides{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]MCPServerConfig{
"docs": {URL: "https://cli.example/mcp"},
}}},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
docs := resolved.MCP.Servers["docs"]
if docs.URL != "https://cli.example/mcp" || docs.Headers["Authorization"] != "Bearer user-secret" || docs.ProjectConfigured {
t.Fatalf("docs = %#v, want trusted override to inherit headers without project marker", docs)
}
}
func TestResolveMCPProjectArgsTargetCompareUsesNormalizedArgs(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--port", "7777"],
"env": {"ZERO_DOCS_TOKEN": "user-secret"}
}
}
}
}`)
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {"args": [" --port ", "7777", ""]}
}
}
}`)
resolved, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Resolve() error = %v", err)
}
if !resolved.MCP.Servers["docs"].ProjectConfigured {
t.Fatalf("docs = %#v, want project marker", resolved.MCP.Servers["docs"])
}
}
+15 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
package config
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
)
@@ -13,6 +15,18 @@ func terminateCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
if cmd.Process == nil {
return
}
_ = exec.Command("taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
taskkill := taskkillPath()
_ = exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
}
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = os.Getenv("windir")
}
if systemRoot == "" {
systemRoot = `C:\Windows`
}
return filepath.Join(systemRoot, "System32", "taskkill.exe")
}
+68 -75
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/aimlapi"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/notify"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
@@ -42,8 +43,10 @@ func (e *setupFixableError) Unwrap() []error { return []error{e.err, e.sentinel}
// defaultMaxTurns is the per-run tool-turn budget when none is configured. 30 was
// too low for real multi-step agentic work (agents ran out mid-task before reaching
// later steps); 50 matches the old "deep" preset. Raise per-session with /turns.
const defaultMaxTurns = 50
// later steps); 50 was still too low for larger tasks spanning several files (agents
// hit the ceiling and stopped with a "remaining work" summary instead of finishing).
// Raise per-session with /turns.
const defaultMaxTurns = 80
// MaxTurnsCeiling caps the per-run tool-turn budget so a stray env value or typo
// can't set an absurd ceiling. Shared between applyEnv (read site) and the /turns
@@ -163,23 +166,29 @@ func ResolveMCP(options ResolveOptions) (MCPConfig, error) {
// can override any field or disable a default by writing over it.
cfg := FileConfig{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: DefaultMCPServers()}}
for _, path := range []string{options.UserConfigPath, options.ProjectConfigPath} {
if path == "" {
continue
}
// Drop the project layer when the workspace is untrusted, so a cloned repo's
// ./.zero/config.json cannot register (and spawn) stdio MCP servers. Fail-closed:
// only a trusted workspace clears ExcludeProject. Defaults and user config still load.
if options.ExcludeProject && path == options.ProjectConfigPath {
continue
}
fileConfig, err := loadConfigFile(path)
if options.UserConfigPath != "" {
fileConfig, err := loadConfigFile(options.UserConfigPath)
if err != nil {
return MCPConfig{}, err
}
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, fileConfig.MCP)
// User config is higher-trust than project config: it may re-enable a
// server the user disabled (a user-level disable is sticky, but the user
// scope itself may lift it).
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, fileConfig.MCP, true)
}
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, options.Overrides.MCP)
// Drop the project layer when the workspace is untrusted, so a cloned repo's
// ./.zero/config.json cannot register (and spawn) MCP servers. Fail-closed:
// only a trusted workspace clears ExcludeProject. Defaults and user config still load.
if options.ProjectConfigPath != "" && !options.ExcludeProject {
fileConfig, err := loadConfigFile(options.ProjectConfigPath)
if err != nil {
return MCPConfig{}, err
}
if err := mergeProjectMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, fileConfig.MCP); err != nil {
return MCPConfig{}, err
}
}
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, options.Overrides.MCP, true)
return cfg.MCP, nil
}
@@ -206,7 +215,7 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
for _, provider := range src.Providers {
mergeProvider(dst, provider)
}
mergeMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP)
mergeMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP, true)
if network := strings.TrimSpace(src.Sandbox.Network); network != "" {
dst.Sandbox.Network = network
}
@@ -261,7 +270,9 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
}
mergeProvider(dst, provider)
}
mergeMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP)
if err := mergeProjectMCPConfig(&dst.MCP, src.MCP); err != nil {
return err
}
// Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots is intentionally NOT merged from project
// config: a cloned repo's .zero/config.json must not be able to grant
// itself write access outside the workspace. Global config and CLI flags
@@ -702,7 +713,7 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
if hasProviderFields(overrides.Provider) {
mergeProvider(cfg, overrides.Provider)
}
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, overrides.MCP)
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, overrides.MCP, true)
}
func mergeLocalControlConfig(dst *LocalControlConfig, src LocalControlConfig) {
@@ -834,63 +845,6 @@ func validateSTTConfig(cfg STTConfig) error {
return nil
}
func mergeMCPConfig(dst *MCPConfig, src MCPConfig) {
if len(src.Servers) == 0 {
return
}
if dst.Servers == nil {
dst.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
}
for name, server := range src.Servers {
dst.Servers[name] = mergeMCPServer(dst.Servers[name], server)
}
}
func mergeMCPServer(base MCPServerConfig, next MCPServerConfig) MCPServerConfig {
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Type) != "" {
base.Type = next.Type
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Command) != "" {
base.Command = next.Command
}
if next.Args != nil {
base.Args = append([]string{}, next.Args...)
}
if next.Env != nil {
base.Env = copyMCPStringMap(next.Env)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.URL) != "" {
base.URL = next.URL
}
if next.Headers != nil {
base.Headers = copyMCPStringMap(next.Headers)
}
if strings.TrimSpace(next.Auth) != "" {
base.Auth = next.Auth
}
if next.OAuth != nil {
base.OAuth = next.OAuth
}
if next.disabledSet || next.Disabled {
base.Disabled = next.Disabled
}
if next.configured {
base.configured = true
}
return base
}
func copyMCPStringMap(values map[string]string) map[string]string {
if values == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make(map[string]string, len(values))
for key, value := range values {
copied[key] = value
}
return copied
}
func hasProviderFields(profile ProviderProfile) bool {
return HasProviderProfile(profile)
}
@@ -1089,6 +1043,45 @@ func applyCatalogDescriptor(profile *ProviderProfile, descriptor providercatalog
if profile.APIKeyEnv == "" && len(descriptor.AuthEnvVars) > 0 && (!explicitBaseURL || sameBaseURL(profile.BaseURL, descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)) {
profile.APIKeyEnv = descriptor.AuthEnvVars[0]
}
canonicalCatalogEndpoint := !explicitBaseURL || sameBaseURL(profile.BaseURL, descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
if len(descriptor.CustomHeaders) > 0 && canonicalCatalogEndpoint {
catalogHeaders := descriptor.CustomHeaders
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.ID), "aimlapi") {
catalogHeaders = aimlapi.WithResolvedPartnerHeader(catalogHeaders)
}
merged := copyStringMap(catalogHeaders)
for key, value := range profile.CustomHeaders {
// Header names are case-insensitive. Preserve the catalog spelling while
// replacing its value so request construction cannot see two colliding
// map entries whose eventual winner depends on iteration order.
existingKey := ""
for candidate := range merged {
if strings.EqualFold(candidate, key) {
existingKey = candidate
break
}
}
if existingKey != "" {
merged[existingKey] = value
continue
}
merged[key] = value
}
profile.CustomHeaders = merged
} else if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(descriptor.ID), "aimlapi") && !canonicalCatalogEndpoint {
// AIMLAPI attribution is owned by the catalog endpoint. A profile can retain
// those generated headers after its base URL is edited; strip their names
// before sending requests to an arbitrary staging/proxy host while preserving
// unrelated headers explicitly supplied by the user.
for profileKey := range profile.CustomHeaders {
for catalogKey := range descriptor.CustomHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(profileKey, catalogKey) {
delete(profile.CustomHeaders, profileKey)
break
}
}
}
}
}
func sameBaseURL(left string, right string) bool {
+190 -3
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
)
func TestResolveAppliesLayerPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
@@ -554,7 +555,7 @@ func TestResolveReplacesMCPServerOverlayCollections(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveMCPServerLayersCanClearAndReenable(t *testing.T) {
func TestResolveMCPServerLayersCannotReenableUserDisabled(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
@@ -588,9 +589,11 @@ func TestResolveMCPServerLayersCanClearAndReenable(t *testing.T) {
}
docs := resolved.MCP.Servers["docs"]
if docs.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("docs.Disabled = true, want project layer to re-enable")
// A user-level disable is sticky: project config must not re-enable it.
if !docs.Disabled {
t.Fatal("docs.Disabled = false, want user-level disable to remain sticky")
}
// Non-disable fields from the project layer still merge normally.
if len(docs.Args) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("docs.Args = %#v, want project layer to clear inherited args", docs.Args)
}
@@ -599,6 +602,125 @@ func TestResolveMCPServerLayersCanClearAndReenable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMergeMCPStickyDisableReenable(t *testing.T) {
disabled := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: true, disabledSet: true}
// A lower-trust (project) layer must not lift a sticky user disable.
project := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: false, disabledSet: true}
if got := mergeMCPServer(disabled, project, false); !got.Disabled {
t.Fatal("project layer re-enabled a sticky user disable")
}
// The user scope (explicit mcp enable command / CLI override) may re-enable.
override := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: false, disabledSet: true}
if got := mergeMCPServer(disabled, override, true); got.Disabled {
t.Fatal("user-scope override must be able to re-enable")
}
// A user-scope disable stacked on a project attempt still sticks.
if got := mergeMCPServer(disabled, project, false); !got.Disabled {
t.Fatal("sticky disable must survive a project re-enable attempt")
}
// Baseline: a project layer may disable a default-enabled server when no
// higher-trust scope has explicitly set disabled (the trust boundary must
// not block legitimate project disables). Regression guard for the
// disabledSet-before-check ordering bug.
defaultEnabled := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: false, disabledSet: false}
projectDisable := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: true, disabledSet: true}
if got := mergeMCPServer(defaultEnabled, projectDisable, false); !got.Disabled {
t.Fatal("project layer should be able to disable a default-enabled server")
}
// And an empty project layer must not flip an unconfigured server to disabled.
if got := mergeMCPServer(MCPServerConfig{}, MCPServerConfig{}, false); got.Disabled {
t.Fatal("an empty project layer must not disable an unconfigured server")
}
}
// TestResolveMCPCannotReenableUserDisabled exercises the trust boundary at the
// actual ResolveMCP entry point: a project config (project scope) must not lift
// a disable the user set in their higher-trust user config.
func TestResolveMCPCannotReenableUserDisabled(t *testing.T) {
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"disabled": true
}
}
}
}`)
// Project config tries to re-enable it.
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcpServers": {
"docs": {
"disabled": false
}
}
}`)
resolved, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: userPath,
ProjectConfigPath: projectPath,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP() error = %v", err)
}
docs, ok := resolved.Servers["docs"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("docs server missing from resolved config")
}
if !docs.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("docs.Disabled = false, want user-level disable to remain sticky across project re-enable")
}
}
// TestResolveMCPUserLiftsProjectDisabled asserts the reverse direction is open:
// a user config (higher-trust scope) re-enabling a server the project config
// disabled must be permitted, since user > project in the trust hierarchy.
func TestResolveMCPUserLiftsProjectDisabled(t *testing.T) {
// Project config disables the server.
projectPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcpServers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"disabled": true
}
}
}`)
// User config re-enables it.
userPath := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"disabled": false
}
}
}
}`)
resolved, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{
UserConfigPath: userPath,
ProjectConfigPath: projectPath,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP() error = %v", err)
}
docs, ok := resolved.Servers["docs"]
if !ok {
t.Fatal("docs server missing from resolved config")
}
if docs.Disabled {
t.Fatalf("docs.Disabled = true, want user scope to lift the project-level disable")
}
}
func TestResolveRejectsDuplicateMCPRootAliases(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"mcpServers": {
@@ -1374,6 +1496,71 @@ func TestResolveProviderProfileExtendedJSONAliases(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestApplyCatalogDescriptorFoldsCustomHeadersCaseInsensitively(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", "part_env")
descriptor, err := providercatalog.Require("aimlapi")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
profile := ProviderProfile{
BaseURL: descriptor.DefaultBaseURL,
CustomHeaders: map[string]string{
"x-aimlapi-partner-id": "part_override",
},
}
applyCatalogDescriptor(&profile, descriptor, true)
if got := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; got != "part_override" {
t.Fatalf("canonical header value = %q, want override", got)
}
if _, duplicate := profile.CustomHeaders["x-aimlapi-partner-id"]; duplicate {
t.Fatalf("case-colliding header survived merge: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestApplyCatalogDescriptorUsesAimlapiPartnerEnvironmentOverride(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("AIMLAPI_PARTNER_ID", "part_env")
descriptor, err := providercatalog.Require("aimlapi")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
profile := ProviderProfile{BaseURL: descriptor.DefaultBaseURL}
applyCatalogDescriptor(&profile, descriptor, true)
if got := profile.CustomHeaders["X-AIMLAPI-Partner-ID"]; got != "part_env" {
t.Fatalf("partner header = %q, want part_env", got)
}
}
func TestApplyCatalogDescriptorStripsAimlapiAttributionFromRetargetedProfile(t *testing.T) {
descriptor, err := providercatalog.Require("aimlapi")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
profile := ProviderProfile{
BaseURL: "https://proxy.example.test/v1",
CustomHeaders: map[string]string{
"x-aimlapi-partner-id": "persisted-partner",
"X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Repo": "Gitlawb/zero",
"X-AIMLAPI-Integration-Version": "zero",
"X-Environment": "staging",
},
}
applyCatalogDescriptor(&profile, descriptor, true)
for key := range profile.CustomHeaders {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(key), "x-aimlapi-") {
t.Fatalf("catalog attribution survived retargeting: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
if profile.CustomHeaders["X-Environment"] != "staging" {
t.Fatalf("user header was removed: %#v", profile.CustomHeaders)
}
}
func TestResolveProviderProfileParseThinkTagsFalseAlias(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "custom",
+13 -10
View File
@@ -440,16 +440,19 @@ type MCPConfig struct {
}
type MCPServerConfig struct {
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
Args []string `json:"args,omitempty"`
Env map[string]string `json:"env,omitempty"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"`
OAuth *MCPOAuthConfig `json:"oauth,omitempty"`
Disabled bool `json:"disabled,omitempty"`
disabledSet bool
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
Args []string `json:"args,omitempty"`
Env map[string]string `json:"env,omitempty"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
Headers map[string]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"`
OAuth *MCPOAuthConfig `json:"oauth,omitempty"`
Disabled bool `json:"disabled,omitempty"`
// ProjectConfigured marks servers touched by project config. It is runtime
// metadata, not persisted config.
ProjectConfigured bool `json:"-"`
disabledSet bool
// configured is true when the user's config JSON declared an object for
// this server at all (i.e. UnmarshalJSON ran for it), regardless of which
// fields it set or what values they hold. A built-in default seeded by
+235
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strings"
)
// unknownFieldIssues scans data for JSON object keys that do not correspond to
// any known config field, recursing into nested objects, arrays, and maps so
// that typos such as "maxTurn" or "sandbox.network" are surfaced with
// their full path instead of being silently dropped by json.Unmarshal.
//
// The two legacy top-level aliases (mcpServers, mcp_servers) are explicitly
// allowed because FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON still reads them; nothing else is
// grandfathered, so a typo in a current or future field name is reported.
// Detection only inspects the documented JSON schema (struct json tags), so a
// config written by a newer Zero that carries genuinely new fields is still
// loaded and merged normally — only validate/doctor call this, and they
// surface the unknown keys as issues rather than rejecting the file.
func unknownFieldIssues(data []byte) []Issue {
var issues []Issue
collectUnknownFields(reflect.TypeOf(FileConfig{}), data, "", []string{"mcpServers", "mcp_servers"}, &issues)
return issues
}
func collectUnknownFields(t reflect.Type, raw json.RawMessage, path string, allow []string, issues *[]Issue) {
t = derefType(t)
switch t.Kind() {
case reflect.Struct:
var present map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &present); err != nil {
return
}
known := knownJSONFields(t)
allowSet := toSet(allow)
for key, val := range present {
// JSON key matching is case-insensitive, so compare against a
// lower-cased key. A differently-cased but valid key (e.g.
// "MaxTurns") is still parsed by json and must not be flagged.
low := strings.ToLower(key)
if allowSet[low] {
continue
}
if kf, ok := known[low]; ok {
// Alias keys (legacy snake_case forms accepted by a
// custom UnmarshalJSON) have no Go type to recurse into;
// they are leaves, so skip descent rather than panic.
if kf.typ != nil {
collectUnknownFields(kf.typ, val, joinPath(path, key), nil, issues)
}
} else {
*issues = append(*issues, Issue{
FieldPath: joinPath(path, key),
Message: unknownFieldMessage(joinPath(path, key), key, canonicalKeys(known)),
})
}
}
case reflect.Slice, reflect.Array:
var elems []json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &elems); err != nil {
return
}
for i, el := range elems {
collectUnknownFields(t.Elem(), el, fmt.Sprintf("%s[%d]", path, i), nil, issues)
}
case reflect.Map:
var m map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &m); err != nil {
return
}
for k, v := range m {
collectUnknownFields(t.Elem(), v, joinPath(path, k), nil, issues)
}
}
}
// legacyJSONAliases lists JSON keys a struct's custom UnmarshalJSON
// accepts in addition to its declared (camelCase) json tags. Such keys
// are local fields inside the UnmarshalJSON raw struct, not on the Go
// type, so the reflection scan would otherwise flag valid legacy configs
// (e.g. base_url, api_key) as unknown. Keep this in sync with each
// UnmarshalJSON's raw struct.
var legacyJSONAliases = map[string][]string{
"config.ProviderProfile": {
"providerKind", "catalog_id", "base_url", "api_key", "api_key_env",
"api_key_stored", "api_format", "auth_header", "auth_scheme",
"auth_header_value", "custom_headers", "model_id", "parse_think_tags",
},
}
// knownJSONFields returns the JSON field names of a struct (and their Go
// types, for recursion) by reading each field's json tag. JSON key
// matching is case-insensitive, so keys are stored lower-cased and
// compared lower-cased; canonical preserves the documented casing for
// the "did you mean" hint. Fields without a json tag (unexported
// helpers such as *Set markers) are omitted: they never appear in
// serialized config and must not be treated as valid keys.
func knownJSONFields(t reflect.Type) map[string]knownField {
t = derefType(t)
out := make(map[string]knownField, t.NumField())
for i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {
f := t.Field(i)
tag := f.Tag.Get("json")
if tag == "" || tag == "-" {
continue
}
name := strings.Split(tag, ",")[0]
if name == "" {
continue
}
low := strings.ToLower(name)
out[low] = knownField{canonical: name, typ: f.Type}
}
for _, alias := range legacyJSONAliases[t.String()] {
// No Go type to recurse into: legacy aliases are leaf fields.
// canonical preserves the documented casing for the hint.
out[strings.ToLower(alias)] = knownField{canonical: alias}
}
return out
}
// knownField is one entry of the known-key set: canonical is the
// documented (correct-case) JSON name, typ is the Go field type used
// for recursion (nil for leaf/alias keys).
type knownField struct {
canonical string
typ reflect.Type
}
func derefType(t reflect.Type) reflect.Type {
for t != nil && t.Kind() == reflect.Ptr {
t = t.Elem()
}
return t
}
func joinPath(path, key string) string {
if path == "" {
return key
}
return path + "." + key
}
func toSet(items []string) map[string]bool {
s := make(map[string]bool, len(items))
for _, it := range items {
// JSON key matching is case-insensitive.
s[strings.ToLower(it)] = true
}
return s
}
func canonicalKeys(m map[string]knownField) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for _, kf := range m {
out = append(out, kf.canonical)
}
return out
}
func unknownFieldMessage(fullPath, key string, candidates []string) string {
if near := nearestKey(key, candidates); near != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown config field %q; did you mean %q?", fullPath, suggestPath(fullPath, near))
}
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown config field %q", fullPath)
}
// suggestPath rewrites only the leaf of fullPath with the suggested key so the
// hint reads "sandbox.network" rather than just "network".
func suggestPath(fullPath, suggestedLeaf string) string {
if i := strings.LastIndex(fullPath, "."); i >= 0 {
return fullPath[:i+1] + suggestedLeaf
}
return suggestedLeaf
}
func nearestKey(key string, candidates []string) string {
// Sort so map-range nondeterminism cannot change which candidate
// wins a distance tie: the lexically-first winner is stable.
sort.Strings(candidates)
best := ""
bestDist := -1
for _, c := range candidates {
d := editDistance(key, c)
if bestDist == -1 || d < bestDist {
bestDist = d
best = c
}
}
if bestDist >= 0 && bestDist <= 2 && bestDist < len(key) {
return best
}
return ""
}
func editDistance(a, b string) int {
la, lb := len(a), len(b)
if la == 0 {
return lb
}
if lb == 0 {
return la
}
prev := make([]int, lb+1)
for j := 0; j <= lb; j++ {
prev[j] = j
}
for i := 1; i <= la; i++ {
cur := make([]int, lb+1)
cur[0] = i
for j := 1; j <= lb; j++ {
cost := 1
if a[i-1] == b[j-1] {
cost = 0
}
cur[j] = min3(cur[j-1]+1, prev[j]+1, prev[j-1]+cost)
}
prev = cur
}
return prev[lb]
}
func min3(a, b, c int) int {
m := a
if b < m {
m = b
}
if c < m {
m = c
}
return m
}
+2
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ func ValidateFile(path string) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ func ValidateBytes(data []byte) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON: %w", err).Error()}}
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
+137
View File
@@ -122,3 +122,140 @@ func TestValidateFileValidConfigHasNoIssues(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected no issues for valid config, got %#v", issues)
}
}
func TestValidateFileFlagsUnknownTopLevelKey(t *testing.T) {
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1"}
],
"maxTurn": 1
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
if len(issues) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected unknown-field issue for top-level typo, got none")
}
var got Issue
found := false
for _, issue := range issues {
if issue.FieldPath == "maxTurn" {
got, found = issue, true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("expected unknown-field issue at maxTurn, got %#v", issues)
}
if !strings.Contains(got.Message, `did you mean "maxTurns"`) {
t.Fatalf("expected near-match suggestion, got %q", got.Message)
}
}
func TestValidateFileFlagsUnknownNestedKey(t *testing.T) {
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1"}
],
"sandbox": {
"network": "allow",
"blockUnixSocket": true
}
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
var got Issue
found := false
for _, issue := range issues {
if issue.FieldPath == "sandbox.blockUnixSocket" {
got, found = issue, true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("expected nested unknown-field issue at sandbox.blockUnixSocket, got %#v", issues)
}
if !strings.Contains(got.Message, `did you mean "sandbox.blockUnixSockets"`) {
t.Fatalf("expected near-match suggestion, got %q", got.Message)
}
}
func TestValidateFileFlagsUnknownInProvider(t *testing.T) {
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1", "endpoint": "https://example.test/v1"}
]
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
var found bool
for _, issue := range issues {
if issue.FieldPath == "providers[0].endpoint" {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("expected unknown-field issue for providers[0].endpoint, got %#v", issues)
}
}
func TestValidateFileAllowsLegacyAliases(t *testing.T) {
// The legacy mcpServers / mcp_servers aliases are still read by
// FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON and must not be reported as unknown.
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1"}
],
"mcpServers": {
"docs": {"type": "stdio", "command": "docs-mcp"}
}
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
for _, issue := range issues {
if strings.Contains(issue.FieldPath, "mcpServers") {
t.Fatalf("legacy alias mcpServers reported as unknown: %#v", issues)
}
}
}
func TestValidateFileAllowsCaseVariantKey(t *testing.T) {
// encoding/json matches object keys case-insensitively, so "MaxTurns"
// parses into MaxTurns. The scanner compares lower-cased keys,
// so a valid case variant must not be flagged as unknown.
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "provider_kind": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1"}
],
"MaxTurns": 1
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
for _, issue := range issues {
if strings.Contains(issue.Message, "unknown config field") {
t.Fatalf("valid case-variant key flagged as unknown: %#v", issues)
}
}
}
func TestValidateFileAllowsLegacyProviderKeys(t *testing.T) {
// ProviderProfile.UnmarshalJSON accepts snake_case legacy keys
// (base_url, api_key, providerKind, ...). These are valid and
// must not be flagged as unknown — only the canonical camelCase
// tags are visible to the reflection scan, so they are allowlisted.
path := writeValidateFixture(t, `{
"activeProvider": "main",
"providers": [
{"name": "main", "providerKind": "openai", "base_url": "https://example.test/v1", "api_key": "sk-x", "model": "gpt-4.1"}
]
}`)
_, issues := ValidateFile(path)
for _, issue := range issues {
if strings.Contains(issue.Message, "unknown config field") {
t.Fatalf("legacy provider key reported as unknown: %#v", issues)
}
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func TestBuildCountsProjectGuidelinesAndFreeBudget(t *testing.T) {
Model: "gpt-4.1",
},
Registry: registry,
ContextWindow: 10_000,
ContextWindow: 20_000,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Build returned error: %v", err)
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ func TestBuildCountsProjectGuidelinesAndFreeBudget(t *testing.T) {
if report.ProviderName != "openai" || report.ModelID != "gpt-4.1" || report.APIModel != "gpt-4.1" {
t.Fatalf("provider metadata = %#v", report)
}
if report.ContextWindow != 10_000 {
t.Fatalf("ContextWindow = %d, want 10000", report.ContextWindow)
if report.ContextWindow != 20_000 {
t.Fatalf("ContextWindow = %d, want 20000", report.ContextWindow)
}
if report.ProjectGuidelineFile != "AGENTS.md" {
t.Fatalf("ProjectGuidelineFile = %q, want AGENTS.md", report.ProjectGuidelineFile)
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestBuildCountsProjectGuidelinesAndFreeBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("UsedTokens = %d, want > 0", report.UsedTokens)
}
if report.FreeTokens <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("FreeTokens = %d, want > 0", report.FreeTokens)
t.Fatalf("FreeTokens = %d, UsedTokens = %d, ContextWindow = %d, want > 0", report.FreeTokens, report.UsedTokens, report.ContextWindow)
}
if report.FreeTokens+report.UsedTokens != report.ContextWindow {
t.Fatalf("free + used = %d, want %d", report.FreeTokens+report.UsedTokens, report.ContextWindow)
+4
View File
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ func (s *Store) write(data map[string]string) error {
_ = tmp.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("credstore: write: %w", err)
}
if err := tmp.Sync(); err != nil {
_ = tmp.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("credstore: sync: %w", err)
}
if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("credstore: write: %w", err)
}
+17 -29
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Cross-process lock tuning. The lock is held only for a single metadata
@@ -45,11 +47,11 @@ func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
// releaser could never delete it — stranding the lock. Fail closed.
if _, werr := f.WriteString(token); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: write job lock: %w", werr)
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: close job lock: %w", cerr)
}
var released bool
@@ -58,10 +60,8 @@ func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
return
}
released = true
// Only remove the file if it still carries OUR token, so a lock
// reclaimed as stale by another process is not deleted out from under it.
if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(lockPath); rerr == nil && string(data) == token {
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
}
}, nil
}
@@ -79,7 +79,18 @@ func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
// wins) and restores it if it turns out fresh, so a live lock is never deleted
// out from under its holder.
if info, statErr := os.Stat(lockPath); statErr == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) > cronLockStaleAfter {
if reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, cronLockStaleAfter) {
cleared, rerr := lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= cronLockStaleAfter
})
if rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break mutual exclusion). Fail closed
// instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cron: reclaim stale job lock: %w", rerr)
}
if cleared {
continue // cleared a genuinely stale lock; retry the O_EXCL create now
}
// Lost the reclaim race (or it was actually fresh) — fall through to the
@@ -91,26 +102,3 @@ func (s *Store) lockJob(id string) (func(), error) {
time.Sleep(cronLockRetryDelay)
}
}
// reclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a stale lock file. It renames the lock to a
// per-acquirer unique name (only one racer can rename a given file, so two racers
// can never both reclaim the same lock), then verifies the moved file is still
// stale; if it became fresh (another holder reacquired in the gap between the
// stale check and the rename) it is restored rather than stolen. Returns true only
// when a genuinely stale lock was removed, so the caller knows it is safe to retry
// the exclusive create immediately; on a lost race it returns false and the caller
// falls through to its bounded wait.
func reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token string, staleAfter time.Duration) bool {
reclaimed := fmt.Sprintf("%s.stale.%s", lockPath, token)
if err := os.Rename(lockPath, reclaimed); err != nil {
return false // another racer already moved/removed it, or it vanished
}
if info, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= staleAfter {
// Not actually stale anymore — a holder reacquired it in the gap. Put it
// back instead of stealing a live lock, and let the caller wait.
_ = os.Rename(reclaimed, lockPath)
return false
}
_ = os.Remove(reclaimed)
return true
}
-46
View File
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
package cron
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestReclaimStaleLock(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
lockPath := filepath.Join(dir, "job.lock")
// A genuinely stale lock (old mtime) is reclaimed and removed.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("crashed-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
old := time.Now().Add(-2 * cronLockStaleAfter)
if err := os.Chtimes(lockPath, old, old); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-a", cronLockStaleAfter) {
t.Fatal("a stale lock should be reclaimed")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("reclaimed stale lock should be gone, stat err=%v", err)
}
// A FRESH lock (someone reacquired in the gap) must be RESTORED intact, not
// stolen — this is the H3 mutual-exclusion protection.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-b", cronLockStaleAfter) {
t.Fatal("a fresh lock must not be reclaimed")
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(lockPath); err != nil || string(data) != "live-holder" {
t.Fatalf("fresh lock must be left intact, got %q err %v", data, err)
}
// A missing lock reports no reclaim (nothing to steal).
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
if reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-c", cronLockStaleAfter) {
t.Fatal("a missing lock should not report a reclaim")
}
}
+7 -1
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/fsutil"
)
const (
@@ -144,7 +146,11 @@ func (s *Store) writeJob(job Job) error {
if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, data, 0o600); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.Rename(tmp, filepath.Join(dir, "metadata.json"))
if err := fsutil.RenameWithRetry(tmp, filepath.Join(dir, "metadata.json"), nil); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmp)
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *Store) Get(id string) (Job, error) {
+29 -29
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Single-instance lock. Mirrors reference-daemon-code-agent-js/supervisor.js's
@@ -43,16 +45,16 @@ func acquireLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (*fileLock, error) {
// the single-instance guarantee — so on write failure, remove it and fail.
if _, werr := fmt.Fprintf(f, "%d\n", os.Getpid()); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = os.Remove(path)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(path)
return nil, werr
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = os.Remove(path)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(path)
return nil, cerr
}
return &fileLock{path: path}, nil
}
if !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrExist) {
if !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrExist) && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission) {
return nil, err
}
pid, perr := readPidFile(path)
@@ -65,7 +67,13 @@ func acquireLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (*fileLock, error) {
// freshly-created lock — leaving both "holding" the single-instance lock.
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside so only one racer wins the rename,
// and restores it if a live holder reacquired in the gap (D6).
reclaimStaleLock(path, isAlive)
if _, rerr := reclaimStaleLock(path, isAlive); rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break the single-instance guarantee).
// Fail closed instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon: reclaim stale lock: %w", rerr)
}
}
return nil, ErrAlreadyRunning
}
@@ -73,37 +81,29 @@ func acquireLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (*fileLock, error) {
// daemonLockSeq makes each reclaim attempt's sidelined filename unique per process.
var daemonLockSeq atomic.Uint64
// reclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a single-instance lock whose recorded PID is
// dead. A blind Remove lets two racers both delete-and-recreate the lock and wind up
// BOTH holding it; instead this renames the lock file aside (only one racer can win
// the rename of a given inode), re-reads the moved file's PID, and removes it only if
// that PID is still dead. If a new holder reacquired the lock in the gap between the
// stale check and the rename, the moved file carries that LIVE pid, so it is renamed
// back rather than stolen. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was removed.
func reclaimStaleLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) bool {
reclaimed := fmt.Sprintf("%s.stale.%d-%d", path, os.Getpid(), daemonLockSeq.Add(1))
if err := os.Rename(path, reclaimed); err != nil {
return false // another racer already moved/removed it, or it vanished
}
if pid, err := readPidFile(reclaimed); err == nil && pid > 0 && isAlive(pid) {
// A holder reacquired the lock in the gap — its live PID is now in the moved
// file. Restore it instead of stealing a live lock; let the caller refuse.
_ = os.Rename(reclaimed, path)
return false
}
_ = os.Remove(reclaimed)
return true
// reclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a single-instance lock whose recorded
// PID is dead, via lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock: the lock file is renamed aside
// (only one racer can win the rename) and stolen only if the moved file's PID
// is still dead; a holder that reacquired the lock in the gap between the
// stale check and the rename carries a LIVE pid and is restored rather than
// stolen. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was removed. A
// non-nil error means the caller must fail closed instead of re-acquiring
// (see lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock).
func reclaimStaleLock(path string, isAlive func(pid int) bool) (bool, error) {
suffix := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d", os.Getpid(), daemonLockSeq.Add(1))
return lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(path, suffix, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
pid, err := readPidFile(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && pid > 0 && isAlive(pid)
})
}
// release removes the lock file. Safe to call once.
// release removes the lock file. Safe to call once. An already-missing lock
// file is not an error (lockutil.RemoveLockFile swallows it on every platform).
func (l *fileLock) release() error {
if l == nil || l.path == "" {
return nil
}
if err := os.Remove(l.path); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return err
}
return nil
return lockutil.RemoveLockFile(l.path)
}
// readPidFile reads and parses the PID recorded in a lock file.
+4 -4
View File
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ func TestReclaimStaleLockRemovesDeadHolder(t *testing.T) {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("4242\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write stale lock: %v", err)
}
if !reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return false }) {
t.Fatal("reclaimStaleLock must report a genuinely stale (dead-PID) lock reclaimed")
if ok, err := reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return false }); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("reclaimStaleLock must report a genuinely stale (dead-PID) lock reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("a reclaimed stale lock must be removed, stat = %v", err)
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ func TestReclaimStaleLockRestoresLiveHolder(t *testing.T) {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("4242\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write lock: %v", err)
}
if reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return true }) {
t.Fatal("reclaimStaleLock must NOT report a live-PID lock reclaimed")
if ok, err := reclaimStaleLock(path, func(int) bool { return true }); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("reclaimStaleLock must NOT report a live-PID lock reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
// Package fsutil provides small filesystem helpers shared across packages.
package fsutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"runtime"
"syscall"
"time"
)
// RenameWithRetry renames src to dst, retrying briefly on Windows when the
// destination is transiently locked (antivirus scanners, search indexers, or
// a concurrent reader holding the file open). rename overrides os.Rename so
// tests can exercise the retry path; pass nil to use os.Rename.
func RenameWithRetry(src, dst string, rename func(src, dst string) error) error {
if rename == nil {
rename = os.Rename
}
var err error
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
err = rename(src, dst)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
if os.IsPermission(err) || isWindowsSharingOrLockViolation(err) {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
}
break
}
return err
}
func isWindowsSharingOrLockViolation(err error) bool {
var errno syscall.Errno
if errors.As(err, &errno) {
const ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION syscall.Errno = 32
const ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION syscall.Errno = 33
return errno == ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION || errno == ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION
}
return false
}
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
package fsutil
import (
"errors"
"runtime"
"syscall"
"testing"
)
func TestRenameWithRetryRetriesOnWindows(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
t.Skip("RenameWithRetry only retries on Windows")
}
var attempts int
err := RenameWithRetry("src", "dst", func(src, dst string) error {
attempts++
switch attempts {
case 1:
return syscall.Errno(32) // ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION
case 2:
return syscall.Errno(33) // ERROR_LOCK_VIOLATION
default:
return nil
}
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retries, got: %v", err)
}
if attempts != 3 {
t.Errorf("expected 3 attempts, got %d", attempts)
}
}
func TestRenameWithRetryNonRetryableError(t *testing.T) {
sentinel := errors.New("disk on fire")
var attempts int
err := RenameWithRetry("src", "dst", func(src, dst string) error {
attempts++
return sentinel
})
if !errors.Is(err, sentinel) {
t.Fatalf("expected sentinel error, got: %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected only 1 attempt for non-retryable error, got %d", attempts)
}
}
+4 -2
View File
@@ -176,8 +176,7 @@ func (dispatcher *Dispatcher) runWithTimeout(ctx context.Context, hook Definitio
func classifyResult(event Event, result commandResult) (AuditStatus, bool) {
// A hook that started but was killed by its deadline (or a cancellation) never
// returned a verdict. For a blocking event we must fail CLOSED and veto: a
// hung beforeTool policy hook cannot be treated as approval. (A launch failure
// below still fails OPEN, so a misconfigured hook doesn't wedge every tool.)
// hung beforeTool policy hook cannot be treated as approval.
if result.TimedOut {
if blocksOn(event) {
return AuditBlocked, true
@@ -185,6 +184,9 @@ func classifyResult(event Event, result commandResult) (AuditStatus, bool) {
return AuditError, false
}
if result.Err != nil {
if blocksOn(event) {
return AuditBlocked, true
}
return AuditError, false
}
if result.ExitCode != 0 {
+8 -4
View File
@@ -186,14 +186,18 @@ func TestExecCommandRunnerCapturesExitAndStdin(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestExecCommandRunnerReportsLaunchFailureWithoutBlocking(t *testing.T) {
func TestExecCommandRunnerReportsLaunchFailureFailsClosedForBeforeTool(t *testing.T) {
result := execCommandRunner(context.Background(), "definitely-not-a-real-binary-zzz", nil, nil, t.TempDir(), nil)
if result.Err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected launch error for a missing binary")
}
// A launch failure is an error, never a block, even for beforeTool.
if status, blocked := classifyResult(EventBeforeTool, result); blocked || status != AuditError {
t.Fatalf("classify = (%q, %v), want (error, false) for a launch failure", status, blocked)
// A launch failure for beforeTool fails closed (vetoes/blocks).
if status, blocked := classifyResult(EventBeforeTool, result); !blocked || status != AuditBlocked {
t.Fatalf("beforeTool classify = (%q, %v), want (blocked, true) for a launch failure", status, blocked)
}
// An observational afterTool hook still fails open (does not block).
if status, blocked := classifyResult(EventAfterTool, result); blocked || status != AuditError {
t.Fatalf("afterTool classify = (%q, %v), want (error, false) for a launch failure", status, blocked)
}
}
+18 -26
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lockutil"
)
// Cross-process lock tuning for the audit log. The lock is held only across a
@@ -28,8 +30,7 @@ var auditLockSeq atomic.Uint64
// than auditLockStaleAfter) is reclaimed. Wall-clock time is used deliberately so
// lock timing never depends on the store's injectable clock and the stale check
// compares against real file mtimes. This mirrors internal/cron/lock.go and
// internal/oauth/lock.go (a shared filelock helper would DRY all three — left as a
// follow-up to avoid churning those already-green packages here).
// internal/oauth/lock.go. Uses internal/lockutil for lock restore and reclaim.
func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
lockPath := store.auditPath + ".lock"
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(lockPath), 0o700); err != nil {
@@ -44,11 +45,11 @@ func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
// releaser could never delete it — stranding the lock. Fail closed.
if _, werr := f.WriteString(token); werr != nil {
_ = f.Close()
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: write audit lock: %w", werr)
}
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: close audit lock: %w", cerr)
}
var released bool
@@ -57,10 +58,8 @@ func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
return
}
released = true
// Only remove if the file still carries OUR token, so a lock
// reclaimed as stale by another process is not deleted under it.
if data, rerr := os.ReadFile(lockPath); rerr == nil && string(data) == token {
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
_ = lockutil.RemoveLockFile(lockPath)
}
}, nil
}
@@ -76,7 +75,18 @@ func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
// reclaimStaleLock renames the file aside (only one rename wins) and restores
// it if it turns out fresh, so a live lock is never deleted out from under it.
if info, statErr := os.Stat(lockPath); statErr == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) > auditLockStaleAfter {
if reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, auditLockStaleAfter) {
cleared, rerr := lockutil.ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token, func(reclaimedPath string) bool {
info, err := os.Stat(reclaimedPath)
return err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= auditLockStaleAfter
})
if rerr != nil {
// Reclaim hit a hard failure: the rename aside failed outright, or a
// live holder's lock could not be put back (the lock path may be
// missing, so re-acquiring would break mutual exclusion). Fail closed
// instead of spinning to the deadline.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("hooks: reclaim stale audit lock: %w", rerr)
}
if cleared {
continue
}
// Lost the reclaim race (or it was actually fresh) — fall through to the
@@ -88,21 +98,3 @@ func (store *AuditStore) lockAudit() (func(), error) {
time.Sleep(auditLockRetryDelay)
}
}
// reclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a stale lock file: it renames the lock to a
// per-acquirer unique name (only one racer can rename a given file), then verifies
// the moved file is still stale; if a holder reacquired it in the gap it is
// restored rather than stolen. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was
// removed. Mirrors internal/cron/lock.go and internal/oauth/lock.go.
func reclaimStaleLock(lockPath, token string, staleAfter time.Duration) bool {
reclaimed := fmt.Sprintf("%s.stale.%s", lockPath, token)
if err := os.Rename(lockPath, reclaimed); err != nil {
return false
}
if info, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err == nil && time.Since(info.ModTime()) <= staleAfter {
_ = os.Rename(reclaimed, lockPath)
return false
}
_ = os.Remove(reclaimed)
return true
}
+41 -6
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
// macOS and `secret-tool` (libsecret) on Linux. It stores a single secret string
// per (service, account). Windows and other platforms report unsupported.
//
// It shells out to the OS tools rather than taking a third-party dependency. On
// macOS the secret is passed to `security` as an argument, so it is briefly
// visible to other processes via the process list; on Linux the secret is passed
// over stdin and is not exposed in the argument vector. Callers that need to keep
// a secret out of the process list on macOS should prefer the file backend.
// It shells out to the OS tools rather than taking a third-party dependency.
// On both macOS and Linux the secret is passed over stdin, never the argument
// vector, so it is not exposed via the process list. On macOS the write goes
// through `security -i` (interactive mode), whose command parser is line-based
// with a fixed 4096-byte line buffer, so Set rejects secrets containing
// newlines or exceeding that budget rather than silently corrupting them;
// Linux's secret-tool has no such restriction.
package keyring
import (
@@ -63,8 +65,28 @@ func (k *Keyring) Set(service, account, secret string) error {
}
switch k.goos {
case "darwin":
// The secret must stay out of the argument vector (visible to every
// process via `ps`), but a trailing -w prompt is not a substitute:
// security prompts with getpass(3), which reads from /dev/tty whenever
// the process has a controlling terminal (ignoring a piped stdin) and
// truncates at getpass's small fixed buffer otherwise. Instead drive
// `security -i`: interactive mode reads whole commands from stdin, so
// argv is just ["-i"] and the secret rides inside the command line.
// That parser is line-based with a fixed 4096-byte buffer, so reject
// newlines and oversized payloads up front; an overlong line would be
// split and executed as two garbage commands, silently corrupting the
// stored value.
for _, s := range []string{service, account, secret} {
if strings.ContainsAny(s, "\r\n") {
return wrap("set", errors.New("service, account, and secret must not contain newlines on macOS (security -i is line-based)"))
}
}
// -U updates the item if it already exists rather than failing.
_, err := k.exec(nil, "security", "add-generic-password", "-U", "-s", service, "-a", account, "-w", secret)
line := "add-generic-password -U -s " + securityQuote(service) + " -a " + securityQuote(account) + " -w " + securityQuote(secret) + "\n"
if len(line) > securityMaxLine {
return wrap("set", fmt.Errorf("secret too large for the macOS security tool's %d-byte command line; use the file backend instead", securityMaxLine))
}
_, err := k.exec([]byte(line), "security", "-i")
return wrap("set", err)
case "linux":
// secret-tool reads the secret from stdin, keeping it out of the argv.
@@ -140,6 +162,19 @@ func (k *Keyring) Delete(service, account string) (bool, error) {
}
}
// securityMaxLine is the most `security -i` can read as one command: its line
// buffer is MAX_LINE_LEN (4096) bytes in Apple's SecurityTool, one of which the
// terminating NUL consumes.
const securityMaxLine = 4095
// securityQuote wraps s for one argument of a `security -i` command line. The
// tool's parser (split_line in Apple's SecurityTool) treats a backslash inside
// double quotes as escaping the next character and the matching quote as the
// argument terminator, so those two characters are all that needs escaping.
func securityQuote(s string) string {
return `"` + strings.NewReplacer(`\`, `\\`, `"`, `\"`).Replace(s) + `"`
}
func (k *Keyring) exec(stdin []byte, name string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), commandTimeout)
defer cancel()
+164 -3
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,52 @@ func attrValue(args []string, attr string) string {
func key(service, account string) string { return service + "\x00" + account }
// splitSecurityLine mirrors split_line in Apple's SecurityTool so the fake
// parses `security -i` command lines the way the real tool does: whitespace
// separates arguments, double or single quotes group one, and a backslash
// escapes the next character both inside and outside quotes.
func splitSecurityLine(line string) []string {
var args []string
var cur strings.Builder
inArg, escaped := false, false
quote := byte(0)
for i := 0; i < len(line); i++ {
c := line[i]
switch {
case escaped:
cur.WriteByte(c)
escaped = false
case c == '\\':
escaped = true
inArg = true
case quote != 0:
if c != quote {
cur.WriteByte(c)
continue
}
args = append(args, cur.String())
cur.Reset()
inArg, quote = false, 0
case c == '"' || c == '\'':
quote = c
inArg = true
case c == ' ' || c == '\t':
if inArg {
args = append(args, cur.String())
cur.Reset()
inArg = false
}
default:
cur.WriteByte(c)
inArg = true
}
}
if inArg {
args = append(args, cur.String())
}
return args
}
func (f *fakeKeyring) run(_ context.Context, name string, stdin []byte, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
f.lastStdin = string(stdin)
f.lastArgs = append([]string{name}, args...)
@@ -58,10 +104,19 @@ func (f *fakeKeyring) run(_ context.Context, name string, stdin []byte, args ...
}
switch f.goos {
case "darwin":
svc, acct := flagValue(args, "-s"), flagValue(args, "-a")
switch args[0] {
cmdArgs := args
if args[0] == "-i" {
// Interactive mode: the command arrives as one line on stdin.
line, _, _ := strings.Cut(string(stdin), "\n")
cmdArgs = splitSecurityLine(line)
if len(cmdArgs) == 0 {
return nil, fakeExit{1}
}
}
svc, acct := flagValue(cmdArgs, "-s"), flagValue(cmdArgs, "-a")
switch cmdArgs[0] {
case "add-generic-password":
f.data[key(svc, acct)] = flagValue(args, "-w")
f.data[key(svc, acct)] = flagValue(cmdArgs, "-w")
return nil, nil
case "find-generic-password":
if v, ok := f.data[key(svc, acct)]; ok {
@@ -129,6 +184,112 @@ func TestKeyringRoundTripDarwin(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestKeyringRoundTripDarwinUsesStdin(t *testing.T) {
f := newFake("darwin")
k := f.keyring()
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", "blob-CCC"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Set: %v", err)
}
// The secret must travel via stdin, never the argument vector: the write
// goes through `security -i`, whose whole command line (secret included)
// arrives on stdin while argv carries only the -i flag.
wantStdin := "add-generic-password -U -s \"zero\" -a \"tokens\" -w \"blob-CCC\"\n"
if f.lastStdin != wantStdin {
t.Fatalf("secret not sent via stdin correctly: stdin=%q, want=%q", f.lastStdin, wantStdin)
}
wantArgs := []string{"security", "-i"}
if len(f.lastArgs) != len(wantArgs) || f.lastArgs[0] != wantArgs[0] || f.lastArgs[1] != wantArgs[1] {
t.Fatalf("argv = %v, want %v", f.lastArgs, wantArgs)
}
got, ok, err := k.Get("zero", "tokens")
if err != nil || !ok || got != "blob-CCC" {
t.Fatalf("Get = %q ok=%v err=%v", got, ok, err)
}
existed, err := k.Delete("zero", "tokens")
if err != nil || !existed {
t.Fatalf("Delete: existed=%v err=%v", existed, err)
}
}
// TestKeyringSetRejectsMultilineSecretOnDarwin guards against silently
// truncating a secret containing a newline: `security -i` reads one command
// per line, so an embedded newline would split the write into two garbage
// commands. Set must reject this before ever invoking security, not store a
// corrupted value.
func TestKeyringSetRejectsMultilineSecretOnDarwin(t *testing.T) {
for _, secret := range []string{"line1\nline2", "line1\r\nline2", "trailing\n"} {
f := newFake("darwin")
k := f.keyring()
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", secret); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Set(%q) = nil error, want rejection of the embedded newline", secret)
}
if f.lastArgs != nil {
t.Fatalf("Set(%q) should be rejected before invoking security, got args=%v", secret, f.lastArgs)
}
}
}
// TestKeyringDarwinQuotesSpecialCharacters proves the quoting survives the
// real tool's parser: the fake tokenizes stdin with a faithful mirror of
// SecurityTool's split_line, so a secret full of quotes, backslashes, and
// spaces must round-trip unchanged.
func TestKeyringDarwinQuotesSpecialCharacters(t *testing.T) {
for _, secret := range []string{
`spa ced`,
`quo"te`,
`back\slash`,
`sin'gle`,
`mi"x'ed \" \\ end\`,
` leading and trailing `,
} {
f := newFake("darwin")
k := f.keyring()
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", secret); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Set(%q): %v", secret, err)
}
got, ok, err := k.Get("zero", "tokens")
if err != nil || !ok || got != secret {
t.Fatalf("Get after Set(%q) = %q ok=%v err=%v", secret, got, ok, err)
}
}
}
// TestKeyringSetRejectsOversizedSecretOnDarwin guards the `security -i` line
// budget: MAX_LINE_LEN is 4096 bytes, and an overlong line would be split and
// executed as two garbage commands. A payload comfortably under the budget
// must succeed; one over it must be rejected before invoking security.
func TestKeyringSetRejectsOversizedSecretOnDarwin(t *testing.T) {
f := newFake("darwin")
k := f.keyring()
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", strings.Repeat("a", 4000)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Set(4000 bytes): %v", err)
}
f = newFake("darwin")
k = f.keyring()
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", strings.Repeat("a", 5000)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Set(5000 bytes) = nil error, want rejection of the oversized line")
}
if f.lastArgs != nil {
t.Fatalf("oversized Set should be rejected before invoking security, got args=%v", f.lastArgs)
}
}
// TestKeyringSetAllowsMultilineSecretOnLinux confirms the newline restriction
// is macOS-specific: secret-tool reads the whole stdin payload as the secret,
// with no line-based prompt to corrupt an embedded newline.
func TestKeyringSetAllowsMultilineSecretOnLinux(t *testing.T) {
f := newFake("linux")
k := f.keyring()
secret := "line1\nline2"
if err := k.Set("zero", "tokens", secret); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Set: %v", err)
}
got, ok, err := k.Get("zero", "tokens")
if err != nil || !ok || got != secret {
t.Fatalf("Get = %q ok=%v err=%v, want %q", got, ok, err, secret)
}
}
func TestKeyringRoundTripLinuxUsesStdin(t *testing.T) {
f := newFake("linux")
k := f.keyring()
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
// Package lockutil provides the platform-specific file primitives behind the
// O_EXCL lock files in cron, daemon, hooks, oauth, and swarm: a no-overwrite
// restore for locks that were sidelined during a stale-reclaim attempt, and a
// lock file remover with one cross-platform contract (missing files are a
// no-op; Windows retries transient sharing violations).
package lockutil
import (
"io"
"os"
)
// restoreByCopy restores reclaimed to path without overwriting an existing
// path, as a fallback for when the platform's primary no-replace primitive
// (hard link on POSIX, MoveFileEx on Windows) fails for a reason other than
// the destination existing. It stages a full copy under a private name next
// to reclaimed and publishes it to path with publish (the same no-replace
// primitive the caller's platform uses for the primary restore), so path
// never appears in a partially-copied state: a crash between staging and
// publish leaves path exactly as it was (missing or, if a competing holder
// created it, untouched), never a truncated file that a PID/content-based
// liveness check could mistake for dead. Leaving path missing here would let
// the next O_EXCL create succeed while the sidelined holder is still live,
// breaking mutual exclusion. publish keeps the no-overwrite guarantee: a new
// holder that appeared in the meantime wins and this returns os.ErrExist. The
// copy resets the lock's mtime to now, which only makes the restored lock
// look fresher; that is safe, since it is being handed back to a live holder.
func restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path string, publish func(from, to string) error) error {
staged := reclaimed + ".copy"
src, err := os.Open(reclaimed)
if err != nil {
return err
}
dst, err := os.OpenFile(staged, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
if err != nil {
_ = src.Close()
return err
}
_, err = io.Copy(dst, src)
// Close the source before removing anything below: Go opens files without
// FILE_SHARE_DELETE on Windows, so deleting reclaimed or staged while src
// is open would fail with a sharing violation.
_ = src.Close()
if err != nil {
_ = dst.Close()
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
}
if err := dst.Close(); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
}
if err := publish(staged, path); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(staged)
return err
}
// publish may leave staged behind (a hard-link publish keeps both names),
// so remove it explicitly; a move-based publish already made this a no-op.
_ = os.Remove(staged)
// The lock is back at path, so the restore has succeeded; failing to clean
// up the sidelined name must not be reported as a failed restore.
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return nil
}
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
//go:build !windows
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"os"
)
// RestoreLockFile restores a sidelined lock file on non-Windows platforms. It
// uses os.Link so a competing lock created at path in the meantime wins: the
// link fails with os.ErrExist instead of overwriting it. If the link fails for
// any other reason (hardlink-incapable filesystems such as FAT or some
// FUSE/network mounts, ENOSPC, EPERM), it falls back to an O_EXCL copy rather
// than leaving path missing and the live holder's lock stranded in reclaimed.
// Once the lock is back at path the restore has succeeded, so a failed cleanup
// of the sidelined name is not reported as an error; the leftover file is
// invisible to the lock protocol.
func RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path string) error {
err := os.Link(reclaimed, path)
if err == nil {
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return nil
}
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return err
}
return restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link)
}
// isReclaimContended reports whether a failed rename-aside of a suspected
// stale lock means it was lost to a racer rather than a hard failure. POSIX
// rename has no contention errno (a lost race surfaces only as ENOENT, which
// ReclaimStaleLock already treats as benign), so nothing extra is benign here.
func isReclaimContended(error) bool { return false }
// RemoveLockFile removes a lock file on non-Windows platforms. Removing an
// already-missing file reports nil, matching the Windows implementation, so
// callers see one cross-platform contract.
func RemoveLockFile(path string) error {
if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return err
}
return nil
}
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestRestoreLockFile(t *testing.T) {
tempDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock")
reclaimed := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock.stale.token")
// 1. Successful restore when target does not exist
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RestoreLockFile failed: %v", err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err != nil || string(data) != "token" {
t.Fatalf("restored lock content = %q, err %v; want %q intact", data, err, "token")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to be cleaned up/removed: %v", err)
}
// 2. Fail when target already exists (prevent overwrite)
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err := RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected RestoreLockFile to fail when target exists")
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrExist, got: %v", err)
}
// The sidelined lock must still exist on failure, and the competing lock
// must be untouched.
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to still exist: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(path); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("competing lock was clobbered: %q", data)
}
}
func TestRestoreByCopy(t *testing.T) {
tempDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock")
reclaimed := filepath.Join(tempDir, "lock.stale.token")
// 1. Restores content and cleans up the sidelined file when the target is
// free (the fallback taken when the platform's no-replace primitive fails
// for a reason other than the destination existing).
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("restoreByCopy failed: %v", err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(path); err != nil || string(data) != "token" {
t.Fatalf("restored lock content = %q, err %v; want %q intact", data, err, "token")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to be cleaned up after copy: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed + ".copy"); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected staged copy to be cleaned up: %v", err)
}
// 2. Keeps the no-overwrite guarantee: a competing lock at the target wins
// and the sidelined lock survives for the caller's ErrExist cleanup.
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, os.Link); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected os.ErrExist when target exists, got: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(path); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("competing lock was clobbered: %q", data)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected sidelined lock to still exist: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed + ".copy"); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected staged copy to be cleaned up after a failed publish: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRemoveLockFile(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile failed: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected lock file to be removed: %v", err)
}
// Removing an already-missing lock file is a no-op on every platform.
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile on a missing file = %v, want nil", err)
}
}
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
//go:build windows
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"syscall"
"time"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// RestoreLockFile restores a sidelined lock file on Windows. It moves the file
// with a no-replace MoveFileEx so a competing lock created at path in the
// meantime wins: the move fails with os.ErrExist instead of overwriting it. If
// the move fails for any other reason (ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED under concurrent access to the file), it falls back to
// an O_EXCL copy rather than leaving path missing and the live holder's lock
// stranded in reclaimed.
func RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path string) error {
err := moveFileNoReplace(reclaimed, path)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return err
}
return restoreByCopy(reclaimed, path, moveFileNoReplace)
}
// moveFileNoReplace renames from to to, failing if to already exists. It calls
// MoveFileExW directly via golang.org/x/sys/windows (the standard library's
// syscall package does not export MoveFileEx on this platform) with no flags,
// so an existing destination fails with ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS, which satisfies
// errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) (pinned by
// TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist), instead of overwriting it
// the way os.Rename does on Windows (it passes MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING to
// match POSIX rename semantics cross-platform).
func moveFileNoReplace(from, to string) error {
fromPtr, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(from)
if err != nil {
return err
}
toPtr, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(to)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return windows.MoveFileEx(fromPtr, toPtr, 0)
}
// isReclaimContended reports whether a failed rename-aside of a suspected
// stale lock means the file was concurrently open or pending deletion (which
// surfaces as ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED on Windows)
// rather than a hard failure, so ReclaimStaleLock reports a lost race instead
// of an error. Neither errno satisfies errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), and
// ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION does not satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrPermission)
// either, so the classification compares raw errnos like RemoveLockFile below.
func isReclaimContended(err error) bool {
var errno syscall.Errno
return errors.As(err, &errno) && (errno == windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION || errno == windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED)
}
// RemoveLockFile removes a lock file on Windows, retrying on the sharing
// violation or access denied errors that are common under heavy concurrent
// contention. Removing an already-missing file reports nil, matching the
// non-Windows implementation, so callers see one cross-platform contract.
func RemoveLockFile(path string) error {
var err error
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
err = os.Remove(path)
if err == nil || os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
}
var errno syscall.Errno
if errors.As(err, &errno) && (errno == windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION || errno == windows.ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) {
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
continue
}
return err
}
return err
}
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
//go:build windows
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist pins the errno coupling
// every caller keys its cleanup on: with no flags, MoveFileEx fails with
// ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS when the destination exists, and that errno must
// satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist).
func TestMoveFileNoReplaceMapsAlreadyExistsToErrExist(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
from := filepath.Join(dir, "from")
to := filepath.Join(dir, "to")
if err := os.WriteFile(from, []byte("sidelined"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(to, []byte("competing"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err := moveFileNoReplace(from, to)
if !errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
t.Fatalf("MoveFileEx with an existing destination = %v, want ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS", err)
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
t.Fatalf("ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS must satisfy errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist), got: %v", err)
}
if data, _ := os.ReadFile(to); string(data) != "competing" {
t.Fatalf("destination was overwritten: %q", data)
}
}
// TestRemoveLockFileRetriesSharingViolation holds the file open briefly (Go
// opens files without FILE_SHARE_DELETE on Windows, so a concurrent DeleteFile
// fails with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION while the handle is open); RemoveLockFile
// must ride its retry loop (15 x 5ms) past the window and succeed once the
// handle closes.
func TestRemoveLockFileRetriesSharingViolation(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
go func() {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
_ = f.Close()
}()
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile should succeed once the contending handle closes: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected lock file to be removed: %v", err)
}
}
// TestRemoveLockFileSharingViolationExhausts verifies the retry loop is
// bounded: with the contending handle held for the whole call, RemoveLockFile
// surfaces the sharing violation instead of retrying forever.
func TestRemoveLockFileSharingViolationExhausts(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("token"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer f.Close()
if err := RemoveLockFile(path); !errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION) {
t.Fatalf("RemoveLockFile with a held handle = %v, want ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION", err)
}
}
+82
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
)
// restoreLockFile is swappable so tests can force the fail-closed path of
// ReclaimStaleLock, which requires both the fast restore and its no-replace
// fallback (with its own copy fallback) to fail; that cannot be provoked
// portably on a healthy filesystem.
var restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock
// restoreLiveLock puts a lock that turned out to be live back at path after
// ReclaimStaleLock moved it aside to inspect it. It first tries a fast,
// replacing rename straight from reclaimed to path: a single syscall, which
// keeps the window during which path does not exist (and so is open to a
// fourth process's unrelated O_EXCL create landing on it) as short as
// possible. RestoreLockFile's no-replace restore (with its slower copy
// fallback on some failures) is a correctness-preserving fallback for when
// the fast path itself fails (e.g. a cross-device sidelined name): it is a
// much longer version of the identical race, but still detects rather than
// silently clobbers a competing lock, which the fast path's replacing rename
// cannot do. Neither path makes the race impossible, only unlikely; see
// ReclaimStaleLock's doc comment.
func restoreLiveLock(reclaimed, path string) error {
if err := os.Rename(reclaimed, path); err == nil {
return nil
}
return RestoreLockFile(reclaimed, path)
}
// ReclaimStaleLock atomically reclaims a suspected-stale lock file. It renames
// lockPath aside to "<lockPath>.stale.<suffix>" (only one racer can win the
// rename of a given file, so two racers can never both reclaim the same lock),
// then consults isLive on the moved file; if the lock turns out to be live (a
// holder reacquired it in the gap between the caller's stale check and the
// rename) it is restored rather than stolen. The suffix must be unique per
// acquirer attempt. Returns true only when a genuinely stale lock was removed,
// so the caller knows it is safe to retry its exclusive create immediately; on
// a lost race it returns false. A non-nil error means either the rename aside
// failed for a reason that is not contention (so retrying cannot help and the
// caller should fail fast instead of spinning to its deadline), or a live
// holder's lock could not be restored (both restoreLiveLock's fast path and
// its no-replace fallback failed), so lockPath may be missing; callers must
// fail closed instead of re-acquiring. The sidelined file is removed on every
// restore failure: once the restore has failed it has no protocol function
// (release only consults the lock path), so keeping it would only leak files.
//
// The live-restore path has an inherent, unclosed race: between the rename
// aside above and restoreLiveLock putting the lock back, lockPath does not
// exist, so an unrelated caller's O_EXCL create can legitimately succeed
// there. restoreLiveLock's fast path then silently overwrites that new
// claimant's lock file, which does not corrupt release (it is
// ownership-aware, so the new claimant's later release safely no-ops against
// content it no longer owns) but does mean the new claimant can still run
// its critical section concurrently with the original live holder. Making
// this race actually impossible would need an OS-level advisory lock (flock
// / LockFileEx) held for a holder's whole critical section, checked
// non-destructively instead of by moving the file; restoreLiveLock only
// shrinks the window to roughly one syscall, it does not close it.
func ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, suffix string, isLive func(reclaimedPath string) bool) (bool, error) {
reclaimed := lockPath + ".stale." + suffix
if err := os.Rename(lockPath, reclaimed); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) || isReclaimContended(err) {
return false, nil // another racer already moved/removed it, or it vanished
}
return false, err
}
if isLive(reclaimed) {
// Put the live lock back instead of stealing it, and let the caller wait.
if rerr := restoreLockFile(reclaimed, lockPath); rerr != nil {
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
if !errors.Is(rerr, os.ErrExist) {
return false, rerr
}
}
return false, nil
}
_ = RemoveLockFile(reclaimed)
return true, nil
}
+31
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
//go:build !windows
package lockutil
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure pins the fail-fast contract of
// the rename aside: a failure that is not a lost race must reach the caller.
// Mapping it to the benign lost-race result would leave acquirers spinning
// until their deadline and reporting a timeout instead of the real cause. A
// directory squatting on the sidelined name makes os.Rename fail with EISDIR,
// which matches neither os.ErrNotExist nor a contention errno.
func TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("stale-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Mkdir(lockPath+".stale.tok", 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return false }); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a hard rename failure must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place on a failed rename: %v", err)
}
}
+112
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
package lockutil
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestReclaimStaleLock(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
dead := func(string) bool { return false }
live := func(string) bool { return true }
// A lock the predicate reports dead is reclaimed and removed.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("crashed-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-a", dead); err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("a dead lock should be reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("reclaimed dead lock should be gone, stat err=%v", err)
}
// A LIVE lock (a holder reacquired in the gap) must be RESTORED intact.
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-b", live); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a live lock must not be reclaimed (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if data, err := os.ReadFile(lockPath); err != nil || string(data) != "live-holder" {
t.Fatalf("live lock must be left intact, got %q err %v", data, err)
}
// A missing lock reports no reclaim (nothing to steal).
_ = os.Remove(lockPath)
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok-c", live); err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a missing lock should not report a reclaim (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
}
// restoreLiveLock's fast path is a single replacing rename, chosen to
// minimize (not eliminate) the window during which lockPath is absent and
// open to an unrelated O_EXCL create; see ReclaimStaleLock's doc comment for
// why that residual race exists. This test pins the resulting behavior: the
// fast path overwrites a competing file at path rather than detecting it,
// unlike RestoreLockFile's own no-replace contract.
func TestRestoreLiveLockFastPathOverwritesCompetingFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
reclaimed := filepath.Join(dir, "lock.stale.tok")
path := filepath.Join(dir, "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(reclaimed, []byte("original-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("new-claimant"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := restoreLiveLock(reclaimed, path); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("restoreLiveLock failed: %v", err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil || string(data) != "original-holder" {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, err %v; want the original holder's content restored", data, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(reclaimed); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("expected reclaimed to be consumed by the rename: %v", err)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockFailsClosedOnRestoreError(t *testing.T) {
// When both the no-replace restore and its copy fallback fail (only
// provokable via the seam; a healthy filesystem cannot produce it), the
// caller must receive an error so it fails closed instead of re-acquiring a
// missing lock path, and the sidelined file must not leak.
restoreLockFile = func(reclaimed, path string) error { return errors.New("restore failed") }
defer func() { restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock }()
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true })
if err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a failed restore must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if matches, _ := filepath.Glob(lockPath + ".stale.*"); len(matches) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a failed restore must not leak sidelined files: %v", matches)
}
}
func TestReclaimStaleLockDropsSidelinedWhenNewHolderWins(t *testing.T) {
// An os.ErrExist restore failure means a new holder recreated the lock
// path; that is not an error for the caller, and the sidelined file is
// dropped rather than leaked.
restoreLockFile = func(reclaimed, path string) error { return os.ErrExist }
defer func() { restoreLockFile = restoreLiveLock }()
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("live-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true })
if err != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("losing to a new holder is not an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if matches, _ := filepath.Glob(lockPath + ".stale.*"); len(matches) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the sidelined file must be dropped when a new holder wins: %v", matches)
}
}
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
//go:build windows
package lockutil
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// TestReclaimStaleLockTreatsSharingViolationAsLostRace pins the errno
// classification the Windows acquire loops depend on: a rename aside that
// fails because the lock file is concurrently open (Go opens files without
// FILE_SHARE_DELETE, so the rename fails with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION or
// ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) is contention, not a hard failure, and must report a
// benign lost race so the caller keeps waiting.
func TestReclaimStaleLockTreatsSharingViolationAsLostRace(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("held"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, err := os.Open(lockPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer f.Close()
if ok, rerr := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, "tok", func(string) bool { return true }); rerr != nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a sharing-violation rename must report a benign lost race (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, rerr)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place: %v", err)
}
}
// TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure pins the fail-fast contract of
// the rename aside on Windows: a failure that is not contention must reach
// the caller instead of masquerading as a lost race. A quote is an invalid
// filename character, so the sidelined name fails with ERROR_INVALID_NAME.
func TestReclaimStaleLockPropagatesRenameFailure(t *testing.T) {
lockPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "lock")
if err := os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte("stale-holder"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ok, err := ReclaimStaleLock(lockPath, `bad"name`, func(string) bool { return false }); err == nil || ok {
t.Fatalf("a hard rename failure must surface an error (ok=%v err=%v)", ok, err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(lockPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the lock file must be left in place on a failed rename: %v", err)
}
}
+4
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ type Server struct {
Auth string
OAuth *OAuthConfig
Identity string
// ProjectConfigured is true when project config touched this server. Runtime
// credential lookup uses it to avoid reusing legacy user tokens by name.
ProjectConfigured bool
// UnconfiguredDefault is true when this server is one of Zero's built-in
// defaults (e.g. keyless Firecrawl) that the user never touched in their
// config — no credentials, no overrides. Callers use it to avoid warning
@@ -88,6 +91,7 @@ func normalizeServer(name string, raw config.MCPServerConfig) (Server, error) {
Headers: copyStringMap(raw.Headers),
Auth: auth,
OAuth: normalizeOAuthConfig(raw.OAuth),
ProjectConfigured: raw.ProjectConfigured,
UnconfiguredDefault: config.IsUnconfiguredDefault(name, raw),
}
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