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Author SHA1 Message Date
anandh8x e387deb516 Test held-message eviction callback 2026-08-09 17:17:27 +05:30
anandh8x 7288f4e383 Use null handle for Windows close failure test 2026-08-09 16:56:41 +05:30
anandh8x 3d7f0bd7dd Propagate Windows peer handle cleanup errors 2026-08-09 16:43:41 +05:30
anandh8x 2622f6ec67 Validate Windows peer ACL semantics 2026-08-09 16:32:36 +05:30
anandh8x 854e0dc8f4 Pin Windows ACL trustee SIDs 2026-08-09 16:22:31 +05:30
anandh8x 9d24a22465 Build Windows peer ACL explicitly 2026-08-09 16:13:46 +05:30
anandh8x 243fee66a8 Accept equivalent Windows ACL masks 2026-08-09 16:02:35 +05:30
anandh8x 7bba7f6ec0 Handle Windows token-owned peer directories 2026-08-09 15:54:54 +05:30
anandh8x 25d7247a84 Fix Windows peer directory traversal 2026-08-09 15:37:10 +05:30
anandh8x 7b58cf2d97 Harden peer messaging lifecycle 2026-08-09 15:17:16 +05:30
anandh8x 9067aa3b79 Fix macOS socket path regression test
Create the canonicalization fixture beneath a guaranteed short Unix path so it exercises the primary endpoint on macOS, and report temporary-directory cleanup failures.
2026-08-09 14:39:31 +05:30
anandh8x e4f8b43f26 Support canonical macOS socket paths
Resolve Unix transport directories to their physical path before applying strict no-symlink traversal, allowing the standard /var to /private/var macOS alias without weakening runtime-directory validation.
2026-08-09 14:29:07 +05:30
anandh8x 82e4c8f482 Harden cross-session messaging
Authenticate sender metadata against live registry records, bound peer lifecycle state, preserve records across transient discovery failures, and make receipt delivery direct and bounded.

Also serialize TUI peer approvals, harden platform runtime paths and transport deadlines, widen session references, and add regression coverage for identity spoofing, queue limits, path boundaries, and tool failures.
2026-08-09 14:15:28 +05:30
anandh8x ad17751c12 Add cross-session messaging 2026-08-09 13:21:35 +05:30
Anandan 7f39a63067 Centralize agent context planning (#879)
* Centralize agent context planning

* Fix context plan request accounting

* Freeze planned tool schemas
2026-08-08 16:40:17 +05:30
Anandan ff608c7834 Reduce compaction context while preserving task state (#873)
* Reduce compaction context while preserving task state

* Fix durable compaction evidence identity

* Preserve structured tool errors during compaction

* Unify manual and automatic compaction

* Report compaction truncation structurally

* Preserve automatic compaction metadata
2026-08-08 11:26:27 +05:30
Anandan 57858a31d1 Improve source read efficiency and model compatibility (#867)
* Improve source read efficiency and compatibility

* Preserve lexical context in ranged reads

* Fix bounded source read edge cases

* Prevent overflow in ranged minified reads

* Trim eager read tool schemas
2026-08-07 21:29:45 +05:30
euxaristia 1e73ecae8a docs(agents): Codify recurring review blockers in AGENTS.md (#857)
* docs(agents): codify recurring review blockers in AGENTS.md

Capture the high-frequency classes that drive multi-round maintainer reviews
(stale bases, path canonicalization, secret handling, partial setup, missing
regression tests, scope honesty) so coding agents fix them before first review.

Refs #856

* docs(agents): tighten security and atomic-write review guidance

Require open-time containment binding instead of pre-open EvalSymlinks, and
require temp-file then atomic replace rather than exclusive create alone.

Refs #856

* docs(agents): require traversal-wide containment for no-follow APIs

Final-component-only O_NOFOLLOW is insufficient on Linux and reparse
points need platform protections. Align the Security edges guidance
with the full-path containment requirement from review.
2026-08-07 20:18:11 +08:00
KRATOS cae0269e77 fix(tui): a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows (#876)
syscall.StringToUTF16 PANICS rather than returning an error when the
string contains a NUL — documented standard-library behaviour — and
github.com/atotto/clipboard's Windows path calls it directly. So one NUL
anywhere in a copied transcript selection killed the whole program:
"zero: tui error: program was killed: program experienced a panic",
reported from a real Windows machine.

The NUL reaches the clipboard because ansi.Strip removes escape
SEQUENCES and leaves C0 bytes untouched, and the transcript carries them
from two independent directions: tool output (a binary read, git's -z
NUL-separated listings — which this repo itself parses in
files_git_sweep.go) and Zero's own card protocol, whose row prefixes are
literally "\x00command-card\x00" and "\x00plan-card\x00".

Sanitised at the WRITE rather than at each source, because the sources
are unbounded: any tool result a user can select from is one, and a fix
per source is a fix the next tool re-breaks. The same pass protects the
OSC52 fallback, where a stray control byte terminates the escape
sequence early and silently corrupts the copy instead of crashing —
which is likely why this went unnoticed off Windows, where the identical
NUL produces a bad copy rather than a dead process.

\n and \t survive: a multi-line selection is the normal case and both
are legal clipboard content.

Fixes #875
2026-08-07 20:17:19 +08:00
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 5 cd0eb194e4 feat(tools): give tool results an image channel and add view_image (#843)
* feat(tools): give tool results an image channel and add view_image

Closes #824.

tools.Result carried only text, so no tool could hand the model a picture.
The sharpest edge was our own capture tooling: browser_screenshot,
desktop_screenshot and browser_pdf wrote a PNG, set Meta["artifact_path"]
and returned "Artifact captured: <path>". Nothing read that path
afterwards, so the model asked for a screenshot, was told one existed, and
could not look at it.

Zero was never image-blind on the way in — zeroruntime.ImageBlock,
Message.Images and internal/imageinput are mature. What was missing is the
model-initiated leg.

Result.Images is delivered as a following USER message, not on the tool
result itself. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message:
Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block whose content is a
string, Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image
content-parts to the user role with an explicit comment saying so. Attaching
them to the tool result would have plumbed the whole path and delivered
nothing. A separate message also keeps one tool result per tool call, which
the providers validate.

Blocks with no data, or a media type outside the provider allow-list, are
dropped rather than sent — a rejected image would fail the whole turn, and
the tool's text still stands on its own. The message names the tool, since
the images arrive detached from their result and nothing else says which
call produced them when several ran in one turn.

view_image resolves through resolveScopedReadPath before imageinput.LoadFile.
That scoping is load-bearing: LoadFile joins a relative path to the
workspace root and otherwise takes the path as given, so without it the tool
would read anywhere on disk. It is registered with the other scoped readers
and declared read-only and thread-safe, matching read_file.

The capture tools now attach what they wrote. A PDF or an unreadable file
yields no image and the text stands alone, so a capture is never failed over
its attachment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): keep tool results contiguous when a tool returns an image

The image messages are user-role, and the first version appended each one
immediately after its own tool result. With two tool calls in a turn that
produces tool_result, user, tool_result — and a user message between two
tool results breaks strict provider replay.

Anthropic makes it concrete. appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user
content into one block list, and tool_result blocks must come first in that
message, so the interleaved shape maps to:

    [tool_result, text, image, tool_result]

which the API rejects. loop.go already documents this exact rule three lines
below the change, for the self-correction feedback it defers for the same
reason.

Images are now collected during the tool loop and appended once every
tool_result is recorded — including the aborted placeholders on the abort,
stop-reason and repeated-failure paths, so an early exit cannot strand them
mid-sequence either.

The original test used a single tool call, which cannot exhibit the bug. The
new one runs two calls where the first returns an image and asserts the image
message does not fall between the first and last tool result.

Also from review: view_image joins the "execute" tool category, which grants
read_file but not view_image, so a specialist declared with tools: [execute]
could not look at a screenshot it had just captured. Covered by a test that
holds for every category granting read_file rather than naming one. And the
core read-only set is now asserted by tool name, not only by count — a count
still passes when one reader is swapped for another.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(agent): pin the tool-result/image ordering contract

The assertions only tracked the first and last tool-result index, so four
distinct broken orderings passed: a message wedged between the two tool results,
a duplicated image flush, a duplicated tool result, and both results answering
the same tool_call_id. Mutation-testing each of those against the real loop
confirmed the old assertions were green on all four.

Now it collects every tool-result index and id and requires exactly two, in
c1-then-c2 order, at adjacent indexes, with the image following the last one and
delivered exactly once. Adjacency is the assertion that carries the contract:
Anthropic needs every tool_result block ahead of any other block in the user
message they coalesce into, so anything between the two results is the 400 this
change exists to avoid.

The image is deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1. appendUserBlocks merges
consecutive user-role content, so [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] maps to
tool_result blocks first and replays fine; pinning would fail that valid shape
while killing nothing the adjacency and count assertions do not already catch.

messageShape reports the actual role ordering on failure, and the loop uses two
ifs rather than a switch so an image left on a tool-role message is reported as
the misplacement it is instead of "the image never reached the model".

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 21:35:41 +05:30
Vasanth T 4ca4fa75d3 fix(agent): end the additional_permissions retry loop (#864)
* fix(agent): end the additional_permissions retry loop

Asking the agent to run an ordinary read-only command on Windows could leave it
oscillating between two rejections instead of executing:

    additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to "with_additional_permissions"
    additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, ...

Both come from inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, and each names only the fix
that ADDS something. The first pushes the model toward setting the flag; the
second pushes it back toward requesting a permission the command does not need.
Neither ever says to omit the field, which is the correct action for a read-only
command, so the two messages form a two-state oscillator. Every rejection now
carries that remedy.

The schema half is why the object is attached at all. Neither field description
said to omit them for ordinary commands, so a model that legitimately used
with_additional_permissions once in a session had nothing telling it to stop
attaching a permission object to the next command. Both descriptions now lead
with "omit", and they are shared constants rather than duplicated verbatim in
bash.go and exec_command.go, where they were free to drift.

Rejection is still rejection. Nothing that was refused is now accepted on the
strength of an empty or mismatched payload, and sandbox_permissions is never
upgraded on the model's behalf; only the guidance changed.

The one behavioural change is that an explicit additional_permissions: null is
now treated as the omitted field, since a null grants nothing and carries no
flag. That flips three shapes from reject to execute: null with use_default,
with require_escalated, and with no mode at all. The escalated one still routes
through the normal escalation prompt and is not a new capability — the identical
request without the null key already behaved that way. A FLAGGED null still
errors, so with_additional_permissions plus null is not silently downgraded.

Fixes #845. Fixes #847.

* fix(tools): condition the omit guidance on needed access, not read-only

The description said to omit sandbox_permissions "for ordinary commands,
including every read-only one". That overstates it: curl and gh are read-only
and still need sandboxed network, so a model following it literally would omit
the override on a command that genuinely needs one and hit the opposite failure.

It now says to omit unless the command needs access the sandbox does not already
give it. That is the claim that is actually true, and it is one a model can act
on without first deciding what counts as read-only.

The schema test asserted the wrong half too — a bare substring check for
"read-only" pinned the overstatement rather than the contract. It now pins the
conditional, with the reasoning recorded so the weaker assertion does not come
back.

Reported by CodeRabbit on #864.
2026-08-06 21:34:54 +05:30
Anandan edf660ab85 perf: compact common test output (#846)
* perf: compact common test output

* test: strengthen command reducer guarantees

* fix: tighten command output summary detection
2026-08-06 20:35:13 +05:30
Vasanth T 91b413c514 fix(sandbox): stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths (#865)
* fix(sandbox): stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths

The restricted token put the World SID (S-1-1-0, Everyone) in its
restricted-SID list unconditionally, from the original sandbox baseline
and with no comment saying why.

A WRITE_RESTRICTED token runs two checks for a write and needs both: the
normal one against its enabled SIDs, and a second against the restricted
list. The write jail rests entirely on that second check only succeeding
where Zero has explicitly ACL'd a capability SID. Everyone is a SID every
principal carries, so on any path whose DACL grants Everyone write, the
restricted half passed for free and confinement fell back to the ordinary
user's own permissions -- the exact boundary this token exists to be
stricter than.

Reachable with no privilege, no symlink and no race: an Everyone-writable
directory is enough, and share roots opened with Everyone:F and loose
third-party installer ACLs supply them. Ruled out as the common case:
C:\Users\Public\Documents grants BATCH, not Everyone.

The runner already stated the rule this broke -- it declines to add the
user SID, Administrators or SYSTEM because "each has write access nearly
everywhere" -- while listing Everyone among the restricted SIDs.

Removed only from the WRITE_RESTRICTED token, because without that flag it
is load-bearing rather than gratuitous. The restricted-SID check then
applies to reads too, and default Windows DACLs grant BUILTIN\Users rather
than anything in this list, so a token with no Everyone cannot open cmd.exe
and dies at launch with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xC0000022). Dropping it
there was tried first and takes TestWindowsUnelevatedRealSandboxSmoke with
it. That path is taken only when a profile configures DenyRead, which is
already the posture trading capability for read-deny enforcement (#612), so
the bypass survives there deliberately and narrowly; closing it needs a
read-side grant that is not a universal group.

Verified against real tokens rather than reasoned about. The new smoke test
drives the real runner and asserts three outcomes that only agree when the
jail is intact: a granted root is writable, an ordinary outside path is
denied, and an Everyone-writable outside path is denied too. Before the
change its third case wrote the file with exit 0; the first two were
already correct, which is what made the gap invisible. Restoring the SID
unconditionally turns it red again.

* test(sandbox): make a denied write distinguishable from a runner failure

The denial assertions expected exit 1, which the runner also returns for
its own errors -- a failed marker validation, a bad argument, a token it
could not build. Written that way the test passes both when the sandbox
denies the write and when nothing ever ran, and the second case proves
nothing while being indistinguishable from success.

That is a poor property for any test and a bad one for this test, whose
entire job is to notice a confinement regression. The leading
"granted root is writable" assertion covered part of it, but said nothing
about whether the two later commands launched.

The denial commands now report a distinctive exit code the runner cannot
produce for itself, so the code proves cmd.exe actually ran and its
redirect was refused.

Re-checked in both directions rather than assumed: the test passes against
the fix, and restoring the World SID unconditionally fails it with
"exit code = 0, want 77" -- still catching the bug it was written for.

Raised by CodeRabbit on #865.
2026-08-04 18:51:35 +05:30
Vasanth T 021281ebba fix(cli): report MCP servers that failed to start (#822) (#827)
* fix(cli): report MCP servers that failed to start (#822)

`zero mcp check` inspected only the error returned by registration and then
printed "is reachable". RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a server
that fails to connect is recorded on the runtime and registration returns
nil. That is right for startup, where one bad server must not stop Zero
launching, and wrong here: this is the command a user runs when a server is
misbehaving, and it told them the broken server was fine.

The failure data already existed as SkippedServer{Name, Err}; nothing
consumed it in this path. The check now fails with the recorded error, in
both text and JSON output.

Covered by a test that spawns a genuinely missing command rather than
stubbing the runtime, because the defect was precisely a mismatch between
what registration returns and what it records. Reverting the fix makes it
print "MCP server broken is reachable. 0 tool(s) available."

* test(cli): cover the unreachable --json contract

The text path was covered and the JSON path was not, though the change
adds its own return with a different payload: status "unreachable" plus a
redacted error, rather than status "ok" with a tool count. A caller
parsing that shape was relying on something nothing pinned.

Reverting the fix now fails both cases. The JSON one is the more useful
of the two, because the wrong output is still valid JSON and would decode
cleanly into a caller expecting success.
2026-08-03 22:50:15 +05:30
8e266797a8 perf: improve harness context efficiency (#838)
* Improve harness context efficiency

* Address harness efficiency review findings

* Make recaps idle and cancellable

Delay recap generation until the session has been inactive, orient it around the active goal and next task, cancel stale work on activity, and render the result ephemerally above the composer.

Also strengthen the formatter safety regression to exercise formatter-modified edit output.

* Track every replace-all edit span

Translate each replacement into its post-edit line range, including cumulative shifts from earlier replacements, so follow-up edits remain authorized for every model-supplied change.

* Make review regressions cross-platform

Verify replace-all tracking through the canonical edit tool path instead of a platform-sensitive temp path, and cover cancellation when recaps are disabled during generation.

* fix(tools): derive SeenWhole from the recorded ranges

SeenWhole was a flag set only by a SINGLE read covering the file, while
SeenRange judged coverage from the accumulated ranges. The two then
disagreed about identical reads: after reading lines 1-50 and 51-100 of a
100-line file, SeenRange(1,100) was true and SeenWhole was false.

That matters because write_file gates overwrites on SeenWhole. A file past
the read byte budget cannot be read whole in one call — the read is
truncated and RecordSeenRange is correctly skipped, since the model did not
see those lines — so no sequence of reads could ever set the flag, and the
overwrite was refused permanently with:

    the intended change depends on content that has not been read exactly
    in this session. Read the affected lines with read_file, then retry.

Advice that could not change the answer. edit_file was unaffected because it
gates on SeenRange, so the escape was to edit rather than rewrite, but a
model following the error text would loop.

SeenWhole is now computed from the ranges against the file's recorded line
count, so scoped reads that together cover a file make it writable and the
error text becomes actionable. The observation carries that line count, and
a read reporting a different one clears the accumulated ranges: they
describe a shape the file no longer has.

Coverage is judged by merging sorted ranges rather than walking every line
against every range, which the previous SeenRange did — same answer, and it
no longer scans line-by-line over a large file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(tools): key the large-file test on the resolved path

read_file resolves the workspace root through EvalSymlinks before recording
anything, so the tracker is keyed on the resolved path. The test asserted
against the raw t.TempDir() path, which is the same string on Windows and a
different one on macOS, where the temp dir sits under /var — a symlink to
/private/var. The SeenWhole assertions would have looked up a key that never
existed: passing here, failing on macOS CI.

Also switches the line generator to fmt.Fprintf (staticcheck QF1012).

Both from CodeRabbit on #842.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>

* test(tools): actually switch the line generator to fmt.Fprintf

The previous commit's message claimed this was done. It was not: the edit
silently did not apply and I reported it fixed without re-reading the file,
so builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(...)) survived at the head — caught by
@anandh8x, not by me.

Verified this time by running the linter rather than by reading the diff:
golangci-lint --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./internal/tools/
reports 0 issues.

* fix: keep exact-read workflows recoverable

* test: cover permission normalization wiring

* fix: commit file observations after output budgeting

* fix: defer file observations across retries

* test: normalize patch line endings

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-31 23:30:03 +05:30
Anandan d37de9214b fix: use OAuth credentials in provider health checks (#828)
* fix: use OAuth credentials in provider health checks

* fix(providerhealth): verify OAuth login for all probes

* fix(providerhealth): retain API key redaction

* fix(providerhealth): redact bare OAuth tokens

* test(cli): isolate OAuth doctor config

* test(cli): isolate doctor config path
2026-07-30 22:32:58 +05:30
Anandan 588635487f feat(tui): replace /retitle with local /rename (#826)
* Improve session naming and resume picker

* Address session rename review feedback
2026-07-30 19:58:02 +05:30
Anandan 845df6c7d2 fix(tui): hide unavailable sidebar shortcut (#821)
* fix(tui): hide unavailable sidebar shortcut

* test(tui): cover medium sidebar footer hint
2026-07-30 17:33:08 +05:30
Anandan 15eb16f736 fix(tui): exclude permission waits from turn time (#820)
* fix(tui): exclude permission waits from turn time

* fix(tui): exclude permission waits from TTFT
2026-07-30 17:03:27 +05:30
github-actions[bot] 097c2652cb chore(main): release 0.6.0 (#786)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-29 09:56:37 +08:00
15b7a5475c fix(acp): interrupt idle reads on cancellation (#782)
* fix(acp): interrupt idle reads on cancellation

* fix(acp): make idle-read interruption per-Read, not per-Serve-call

Addresses the P2 on #782.

The previous design raced a single, whole-connection Once (endRead) between the
read loop's own "I have a terminal result" claim and a watcher goroutine's
"ctx is done, treat this as interrupted" claim. This has a real, deterministic
failure mode that has nothing to do with goroutine-scheduling luck: bufio.Reader
can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call (io.Reader
explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a line delimiter is found
within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for that call, but
bufio caches the error internally and returns it — without ever touching the
underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. If cancellation
happens in the gap between that first, successful read and the next one (e.g.
while a synchronously-dispatched handler is still writing its response), the
watcher's ctx.Done() case fires and claims the Once BEFORE the read loop ever
gets back to a ReadBytes call — so when the cached error then surfaces (with
zero contact with the underlying reader, let alone anything closing it), it is
misattributed as a cancellation-driven interruption and silently swallowed as a
clean shutdown, hiding a genuine broken transport.

The fix moves interruption-detection down to the Read call itself instead of
bracketing the whole Serve loop. interruptibleReader wraps the connection's
reader: each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it
against ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is
returned untouched — cancellation a moment later has no bearing on a call that
already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, the reader is closed (when
closable) to nudge a genuinely blocked read, a generation counter is bumped, and
the call still waits for and returns the underlying call's own result rather
than a synthesized one.

Serve then brackets each ReadBytes call (which may invoke the wrapped Read zero
or more times — zero when bufio answers from its own buffer, including a
previously-cached error) with a snapshot of that counter before and after. A
read whose bracket shows no change was never raced against cancellation — either
answered from the buffer or genuinely completed before ctx.Done() could matter —
so its outcome is reported truthfully regardless of the ctx state by the time it
surfaces. Only a bracket that changed proves this specific call actually took
the cancellation branch.

Verified the fix has teeth: reverted to the original implementation and
confirmed the new regression test (which forces the exact bufio-caching
sequence deterministically, with a panic guard proving the underlying reader is
never called a second time) fails 100% of the time against it, then restored
the fix and confirmed it passes.

Also applied the two open review threads on the existing tests: readStarted and
writeStarted are now buffered channels with non-blocking sends rather than
close(), so a future change causing an extra read or write can't panic on a
double-close.

Validated with go build/vet/test on Windows, plus go vet/build and
`go test -race ./internal/acp/... -count=50` (and count=100 focused on the
cancellation/error tests) under WSL/Linux — this session's Windows host has no
C toolchain for -race directly.

* fix(acp): preserve decided read results and require explicit reader ownership

Addresses jatmn's two #782 review findings:

- interruptibleReader.Read's select between resultCh and ctx.Done()
  chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready, so a real terminal read
  error decided just before cancellation could be misattributed to
  shutdown and silently swallowed. Re-check resultCh non-blockingly
  before claiming a call for cancellation.

- NewConn inferred reader ownership from an io.Closer assertion and
  closed any reader that happened to implement it, including one a
  caller merely borrowed. Split into NewConn (never closes r) and
  NewOwnedConn (explicit ownership, closes r on cancellation), and
  switch the sole production call site (process stdin) to the latter.

Also applies CodeRabbit's atomic.Int64 and leading-ctx-parameter nits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): synchronize read completion with cancellation

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-9e4e-7506-85ab-e151888bfd71

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): preserve read completion across cancellation

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(acp): bound buffered error synchronization

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-483a-7119-92aa-4953a72f2a76

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(acp): report shutdown transport errors

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* test(acp): inject cancellation context

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 09:46:55 +08:00
bdbda89f3e fix(swarm): close lifecycle admission on shutdown (#776)
* fix(swarm): close lifecycle admission on shutdown

* fix(swarm): admit lifecycle work without holding the lock across Launch

Addresses the P1 on #776 plus the two documentation P3s.

[P1] beginLifecycleAdmission returned with lifecycleMu.RLock() held for the
caller's entire duration — including the call into the injected
MemberLauncher.Launch. Close needs the write lock before it can call s.cancel(),
so a launcher that blocks in Launch waiting on its context (the ordinary shape of
a launcher that waits for a slot, a daemon connection, or a sandbox handshake)
deadlocked every Close caller: the launch held the read lock while Close waited
for the write lock to reach the very cancellation the launch needed to unblock.

beginLifecycleAdmission is now a counted ticket: it holds lifecycleMu only across
the closed check and a lifecycleWork.Add(1), then returns a release func
(lifecycleWork.Done) the caller defers. Close flips closed and releases the lock
BEFORE calling cancel, then waits out lifecycleWork (admitted-but-unfinished
work) followed by watchers (goroutines admitted work may still be starting) — so
it remains a true completion barrier without holding any lock across external
launcher code. Every call site (Spawn, Handoff, AdoptOrphans, the retry path in
watch, and afterExit) moved to the ticket pattern.

[P3] beginLifecycleAdmission's contract and the Scheduler/Close handoff are now
both documented at the point that matters: the func-returning signature makes
the release contract explicit in the type itself, and Scheduler's comment spells
out why the read/write lock ordering guarantees exactly one of Scheduler or
Close closes whatever scheduler ends up installed.

Tests: TestCloseCancelsLauncherBlockedInLaunch reproduces the exact deadlock
(spawn parked in Launch, Close in a second goroutine, both must complete once
cancellation reaches the launcher) — verified it hangs under the old held-lock
pattern by temporarily restoring it. TestCloseWaitsForAdmittedSpawn is the
converse: Close must not return while an admitted spawn is still running.

Validated with `go test -race ./internal/swarm/... -count=1` under WSL/Linux
(this session's Windows host has no C toolchain for -race directly), plus
`go vet ./...` under WSL and go build/vet/test on Windows.

* fix(swarm): fail late queue admissions and dequeues after shutdown

Addresses jatmn's two #776 review findings:

- Close swept (clearQueue) every team's queue before waiting for
  admitted-but-in-flight lifecycle operations to finish. A Spawn,
  Handoff, or AdoptOrphans call that got its ticket right before
  closed flipped could still append to a team's queue after the
  sweep ran, stranding that spec forever (never launched, since
  shutdown began; never failed, since the sweep won't run again).
  Reorder Close to wait for lifecycleWork before sweeping queues, so
  every queue append from already-admitted work is visible to the
  sweep.

- afterExitAdmitted dequeued a queued spec (t.onExit) and launched it
  unconditionally once its own ticket was granted, even though Close
  can flip closed in the gap between that dequeue (which makes the
  spec invisible to the clearQueue sweep) and the launch. Re-check
  closed after dequeuing so a spec pulled off the queue after
  shutdown began fails with ErrSwarmClosed instead of starting a new
  worker.

Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code
(confirmed by temporarily reverting each fix and rerunning).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): snapshot teams after lifecycle work stops

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-a4d5-7078-a80b-802bab23607e

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): reject late admitted launches during shutdown

Re-check the closed state at the final launcher boundary so lifecycle work admitted before Close cannot start or retry a member after shutdown has already won the race.

Add deterministic late-dispatch and scheduler-handoff coverage, stress concurrent Spawn and Close under the race detector, and keep the late-team snapshot regression isolated from launcher behavior.

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa55a-4f7f-766e-a312-a7db232b9987

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): reject post-close launch commits

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa7a0-1223-701d-9529-48ba5d7cf8c8

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

* fix(swarm): gate retry relaunch on the post-close commit

The post-Launch shutdown gate added for spawns and queue drains was missing
from the bounded-retry path, which called the launcher and swapped in the new
handle unguarded. Since FuncLauncher returns a live handle immediately without
consulting its context, a Close landing between the pre-check and Launch's
return left the watcher supervising a member relaunched after shutdown began —
and recording that member's outcome on the task.

Extract the commit gate as commitLaunch and route the relaunch through it via
relaunchAdmitted, so an initial launch and a retry pass the same three gates:
admission, the pre-Launch re-check, and the post-Launch commit. When shutdown
wins, the handle is reaped and the watcher records the terminal failure instead
of adopting it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 09:46:25 +08:00
Vasanth T 8acd42a3bd fix(providers): retry provably pre-send transport failures (#447) (#750)
* fix(providers): retry provably pre-send transport failures (#447)

A flaky link that failed the streaming completion POST at connect time
stopped the turn and forced a manual continue, because the shared retry
layer never retries transport errors: a completion POST is
non-idempotent, so a replay could duplicate billable work.

That rationale does not apply to a PROVABLY pre-send failure, where no
request bytes ever left this host: a replay cannot duplicate anything,
exactly like a 429/503 where the server told us it did not accept the
request. SendWithRetry now retries, with the existing backoff, only that
narrow class: DNS resolution failure, a refused or unreachable dial, and
a TLS handshake timeout. Every ambiguous or post-send failure stays
unretried and is checked first so a mixed message can never be misread:
connection reset, broken pipe, EOF, a bare i/o timeout, context
deadline. All three providers route their completion POST through this
layer, so one change covers them uniformly.

This deliberately narrows the issue's ask (which listed connection
reset) to the provably-safe subset, and keeps the reset-stays-unretried
test green. Tests cover the retry-on-pre-send, no-retry-on-ambiguous,
and predicate-classification paths.

NOTE FOR REVIEW: this refines a deliberately conservative, documented
no-retry stance. Opening it for the owner's sign-off on the stance, not
as a settled call.

* fix(providers): classify pre-send dials by errno so Windows retries too

CodeRabbit flagged that the pre-send predicate matched only POSIX dial
wording, so a refused or unreachable dial on Windows (whose text differs
entirely: 'No connection could be made because the target machine
actively refused it') would not be retried.

Match the syscall errno via errors.Is instead: Go maps ECONNREFUSED /
ENETUNREACH / EHOSTUNREACH / ECONNRESET to the host's real values,
including the WSA codes on Windows, so classification is identical on
every platform. Errno matching is also authoritative where the string
markers were only heuristic, closing the theoretical substring gap. The
string markers stay as a fallback for errors already flattened to text.
ECONNRESET is added to the post-send exclusions by identity so a Windows
reset is excluded too.

Tests build the production error shape (net.OpError -> os.SyscallError ->
errno) so the Windows path is exercised portably on every platform, plus
an end-to-end SendWithRetry case for an errno-wrapped refused dial. Cross
-compiled and vetted for linux and darwin.

* fix(providers): scope pre-send retry to the dial phase and fail fast on permanent errors

Addresses gnanam's two [Major] review findings on this PR.

[Major] Pre-send errno classification was not scoped to the dial, so a post-send
read/write carrying ECONNREFUSED/ENETUNREACH/EHOSTUNREACH (a route dropping
mid-generation) was misclassified "provably pre-send" and could replay a
non-idempotent completion POST up to 6 times. errors.Is matches an errno
anywhere in the chain regardless of which operation raised it, so
isPreSendTransportError now requires an Op=="dial" *net.OpError before admitting
those errnos or their POSIX wording. That makes "no request bytes were sent"
structural: a post-send failure can no longer replay a POST. The dial errno
match still covers Windows (Go maps the WSA* codes), so the platform coverage
this PR added is preserved.

[Major] Permanent failures hung the agent ~60s on the 429-tuned schedule.
NXDOMAIN (net.DNSError with IsNotFound) is now treated as permanent and not
retried, and the pre-send path gets its own short bound and sub-second schedule
(preSendMaxAttempts=3, 500ms/1s) instead of reusing the 2/4/8/16/30s rate-limit
backoff, so a mistyped host or a dead local daemon fails in about 1.5s.

[Minor] Fixed the stale SendWithRetry doc that still claimed transport errors are
never replayed.

Tests: post-send read/write errnos and NXDOMAIN now assert exactly 1 call (no
replay); dial errnos plus the string fallback assert the pre-send cap; added the
pre-send backoff schedule. Race detector and all provider packages green.

* fix(providers): match Windows WSA dial errnos so refused dials retry on Windows too

CodeRabbit caught a real Windows bug, which I verified with a real dial on
Windows: errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED) returns FALSE for a refused dial
there, because a real Windows dial carries the raw WSAECONNREFUSED (10061) while
Go's syscall.ECONNREFUSED is a distinct value the net package never produces. The
POSIX string fallback ("connection refused") does not match the Windows wording
("No connection could be made because the target machine actively refused it")
either. So the pre-send dial classification silently never fired on Windows, the
exact platform this PR set out to fix.

Move the dial errnos into a platform-specific list (dialPreSendErrnos): POSIX
everywhere, plus the WSA* codes on Windows. The existing wrapDialErrno fixtures
wrap the Go syscall constants, which is why they passed on both platforms and
missed this. Adds TestIsPreSendTransportErrorRealRefusedDial, which does a REAL
refused dial and asserts pre-send classification, so the platform's true error
shape is exercised on every OS.

* fix(providers): exclude Plan 9 from the POSIX dial-errno build tag

* fix(providers): keep the pre-send errno classification off Plan 9

retry.go referenced syscall.ECONNRESET and dialPreSendErrnos directly, but the
errno definitions live in build-tagged files that exclude Plan 9 (which has no
BSD-style errno constants), so the package stopped compiling for GOOS=plan9 on
this branch even though it builds on the merge base.

Move the two syscall touch-points behind per-platform helpers: retry.go now
calls isConnResetErrno and ranges dialPreSendErrnos, both provided by
retry_dialerrno.go, retry_dialerrno_windows.go, and a new
retry_dialerrno_plan9.go. The Plan 9 variant supplies an empty errno list and a
false isConnResetErrno, so retry.go falls back to its existing string-marker
heuristics there. Behavior on linux/darwin/windows is unchanged (isConnResetErrno
matches the same syscall.ECONNRESET as before). retry_test.go is tagged !plan9
because it constructs real syscall.Errno dial shapes.

Verified: GOOS=plan9 build and vet now pass; windows and linux build, vet, gofmt,
and the full providerio test suite stay green.

* fix(providers): stop pre-send retry from replaying a redirected POST

Addresses jatmn's review on #750.

[P1] client.Do could follow a 307/308 after already transmitting the original
POST, and a dial failure to the redirect target then satisfied
isPreSendTransportError and replayed the request, re-billing a completion the
first host already received. SendWithRetry now disables redirect following
(CheckRedirect returns http.ErrUseLastResponse on a cloned client), so any
dial/DNS/TLS error from Do can only come from the single initial request and
the pre-send classification is sound. A 3xx surfaces as the response for the
caller's existing non-2xx handling. Regression test asserts the POST is sent
once and the 307 is not followed.

[P2] The pre-send retry used the loop-wide attempt counter shared with 429/503
retries, so a couple of status retries exhausted the pre-send budget and the
first dial/DNS/TLS blip after them got no retry. Track pre-send failures and
their backoff ordinal in a separate counter. Regression test covers a
status-then-transport-failure sequence.

[P3] Correct the Plan 9 and wrapDialErrno comments: the Plan 9 string-marker
fallback keeps the pre-send inclusions and the separate reset exclusion, and
the errno fixtures do not reproduce a real Windows dial (that carries distinct
WSA errnos), which the real-dial test covers.

* fix(providers): decouple the status retry budget from pre-send retries

Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.

The previous change gave pre-send failures their own counter, but every retry
still advanced the loop-wide attempt counter that the 429/503 branch used. So
the coupling survived in the opposite direction: two safely replayed refused
dials shortened the later status retry window and started its backoff at a
later rung.

Give the status path its own statusAttempts counter and backoff ordinal. With
both budgets tracked separately the shared loop counter has no remaining
reader, so the loop no longer carries one. Behaviour is unchanged when only one
kind of failure occurs: the first retryable status still waits on rung 1 and
still gets maxAttempts requests.

Adds TestSendWithRetryStatusBudgetSurvivesPreSendRetries, the inverse of the
existing mixed-sequence test: two refused dials followed by rate limiting must
still leave the status path its full window.

* fix(providers): keep following redirects, but never replay a redirected POST

Addresses jatmn's follow-up on #750.

Blocking redirects outright was too blunt. SendWithRetry is the shared
completion path, so replacing every caller's CheckRedirect with
ErrUseLastResponse turned a legitimate 307/308 from a redirecting
OpenAI-compatible gateway into a terminal non-2xx that providers report as an
upstream error, and it discarded an injected client's redirect policy.

Observe the redirect instead of preventing it: a per-attempt flag is set from
CheckRedirect, which then delegates to the caller's policy when one is set and
otherwise mirrors net/http's default ten-hop cap. The pre-send retry is gated on
that flag, so an attempt that entered a redirect is never replayed while
redirecting endpoints keep working. The safety property is unchanged, since a
dial failure on a redirect hop follows a POST the origin already received.

Adds three regressions: a redirect is followed through to the final response, a
dial failure after a redirect is not replayed, and a caller-supplied
CheckRedirect still runs and still decides.

* test(providerio): pin the redirect asymmetry for retryable statuses

A reviewer read the redirect guard as incomplete, because it stops a redirected
POST being replayed after a transport error but not after a 429/503/529. The
asymmetry is intentional, and nothing recorded that, so the next reader would
reasonably reach the same conclusion.

The two cases differ in what is known about the request. A transport failure
after a redirect leaves it unknown whether the redirect target received and
began processing the POST, so replaying could duplicate billable work. A
retryable status means every hop answered: the 307/308 is the origin declining
and delegating, and the 429 is the target declining as well, so nothing accepted
the request and a replay duplicates nothing.

The exposure is also the same as a retryable status with no redirect involved,
which this package has always retried, so guarding here would not close a gap.
It would make a rate-limited completion behind a redirecting gateway fail
outright rather than back off, which is the regression class already raised
against disabling redirects wholesale.

Adds the case as a test asserting the intended behaviour, plus a comment at the
branch explaining why it is not guarded.

* fix(providers): retry connect timeouts and proxy CONNECT failures

Three classification gaps against #447, all raised in review.

A connect-phase timeout was never retried. It is provably pre-send for the same
structural reason a refused dial is, since the connection was never established
and no request bytes left this host, but it arrives carrying "i/o timeout" and
the blanket wording exclusion rejected it before the connect gate could admit
it. Intermittent connect timeouts are exactly the transient failure the issue
is about, so the most common case was the one not covered. It is now admitted
ahead of the wording exclusions, gated on the connect phase so a post-send read
timeout, which is also Timeout(), still cannot replay a POST.

A failed CONNECT through an HTTP proxy was never retried either. net tags it Op
"proxyconnect" rather than "dial", so it missed the gate entirely. Same
guarantee applies: the tunnel to the model host was never built. The gate now
accepts both, which matters most in the environment where transient connect
failures are most common.

ETIMEDOUT and WSAETIMEDOUT join the errno lists so a connect timeout still
classifies if it reaches us with the errno but without the timeout flag.

The pre-send budget also now resets after a hop that reaches the server. It is
meant to bound consecutive connect failures, not the lifetime of the call, and
without the reset an early run of blips permanently spent it, so a later blip
surfaced as a transport error while the status budget still had room. That is
the coupling the two counters were split apart to remove, in the one ordering
the earlier tests missed. Total work stays bounded, since every reset costs a
status attempt and those are capped.

Also corrects the SendWithAuthRetry comment, which still claimed the inner path
retried only 429/503/529.

Tests cover dial and proxyconnect timeouts as retryable and read/write timeouts
as not, a refused proxy CONNECT, and the interleaved pre-send/status/pre-send
sequence. Each fix fails its test when reverted.
2026-07-28 22:42:01 +08:00
Vasanth T 1c38e8cba5 fix(config): make the provider-command timeout an upper bound (#811) (#813)
providerCommandTimeout bounded only the wait, so the call could take arbitrarily
longer than the 5s its error text promised. Two phases sat outside it.

Starting the process ran before the clock began. On Windows that is
CREATE_SUSPENDED, job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread
snapshot, none of it fast on a cold or contended machine. The deadline is now
armed first and the start races it, so process creation is inside the budget.

Draining after termination was unbounded too: the timer path called Terminate
and then received on the wait with no limit. Terminate normally makes that
immediate, which is exactly why it survived unnoticed, but a tree that resists
termination held the call open long past the deadline that had just expired.
That receive is now bounded, and a call that gives up leaves cmd.Wait running,
so the output buffers are synchronised: the I/O pump keeps writing into buffers
the caller already holds, which a plain bytes.Buffer cannot survive.

The timeout error also carried nothing actionable. It was a bare string with the
underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped, so a user whose provider
command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or what the command had said.
It now names the phase, wraps the cause, and includes the redacted output the
failure path already had.

Both bounds are asserted on extracted helpers rather than end to end, because
end to end they are untestable: a terminated command stops writing and its wait
returns at once, so an unbounded drain and an unsynchronised buffer both pass a
whole-call test. The first version of these tests did exactly that and proved
nothing. Removing either bound now fails, as does arming the deadline after the
start, which reports the wrong phase.
2026-07-28 22:41:09 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 58daea7a48 feat(providers): add Fireworks AI provider preset (#772)
* feat(providers): add Fireworks AI provider preset

Add an OpenAI-compatible Fireworks catalog entry with curated coding
models, models.dev alias mapping, onboarding tests, and README setup.

* fix(provider): use correct Fireworks DeepSeek V3 model ID

Update default and catalog model IDs to deepseek-v3-0324 per Fireworks API.
2026-07-28 22:40:41 +08:00
Vasanth T 3e7692d8f0 fix(sandbox): scrub the daemon token file pointer (#677) (#818)
scrubSensitiveEnv removed ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN but not its file
counterpart. TokenFromEnv accepts either form, so a sandboxed command
still inherited the path to the bridge token, and the default posture is
read-all, so it could then read the token itself.

Scrubbing the pointer is the whole fix rather than half of one: the path
comes from this variable alone and TokenFromEnv has no default location
to fall back on, so a command that never sees the variable has nothing to
guess at. This mirrors GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, which is already
scrubbed for the same reason.

Extends the existing scrub table, which compares the surviving
environment exactly, so the case fails if the entry is dropped. Verified:
without the fix the assertion reports ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN_FILE
surviving into the scrubbed environment.
2026-07-28 21:56:28 +08:00
Vasanth T 33c94ec7a3 fix(sandbox): deny reads of git's credential stores (#815) (#816)
* fix(sandbox): deny reads of git's credential stores (#815)

git's credential-store backend keeps host passwords and personal access tokens
in cleartext, at ~/.git-credentials or ~/.config/git/credentials depending on
whether the user is on the XDG layout. Neither was on the deny list, so any
command the agent runs could read them.

Scoped to those two files deliberately. #815 also covers SSH private keys and
the GPG keyring, and those are a harder trade: denying ~/.ssh stops a sandboxed
git push over SSH from working, and excluding that directory is not even
sufficient, since an IdentityFile directive can point key material anywhere.
These two cost nothing by comparison, because git reads them to authenticate
rather than to know who the user is, so a sandboxed git keeps working and
simply cannot act as the user.

The XDG one denies the file rather than the directory around it, which is the
opposite of the choice made for ~/.config/zero and is deliberate: ~/.config/git
also holds the global git config, which userGitConfigReadPaths grants on
purpose so a sandboxed git can read user.name and aliases instead of failing
outright. Denying the directory would take that away.

Tests assert both stores are denied, that the git config beside the XDG one
stays readable, and that an explicit read grant still re-includes them like
every other entry. Dropping either entry fails the first; widening the XDG
entry to the directory fails the config assertion.

* test(sandbox): assert the credential deny exists before the grant lifts it

The allow-read case only checked that the credential store was absent from
the deny list once an explicit grant covered it. A deny rule that was never
added satisfies that just as well, so the test passed with the production
change reverted and proved nothing about the interaction it was named for.

Check both runs: denied with no grant, absent with one. The first leg is
what establishes there is something for the grant to override.
2026-07-28 18:31:33 +08:00
Vasanth T c9f9dc02ef test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows (#814)
* test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows

This package fails on every run on a Windows box without PowerShell 7, which
is what a stock install is: PowerShell 7 is a separate download. CI never sees
any of it, because the runners have 7. Three distinct causes, all surfaced by
the move to PowerShell in #804.

The stop-intent test waited a fixed second for a session to die and asserted on
whatever was true by then. Under cmd.exe that was enough; under PowerShell the
tree is slower to stand up and tear down, and the FIRST stop in a fresh process
pays the interpreter's cold start, so it routinely returned with termination
under way but unfinished. The assertion read that as a failed stop. It now
re-sends the stop until the session reports it has exited. Repeating is safe,
since Terminate is a no-op against an already-dead tree, and it keeps the
interrupt flag that a poll with empty chars would drop.

Separately, and pre-existing, every test that starts a session hit a teardown
race: a terminated process does not release its handles the instant the session
reports exited, and Windows refuses to remove a directory with an open handle
where POSIX does not. t.TempDir removes once and fails the test on the sharing
violation, so ordinary teardown timing was reported as a broken test. Those
roots now clean up with a bounded retry, and give up quietly rather than
failing: the process is already terminated, so the worst case is a stale
directory under the OS temp root.

Last, the MSYS guard test asserted a windows_shell_syntax block using a command
containing `&&`. On PowerShell 5.1 the windows_powershell_version preflight
added by #804 fires first and shadows it. The `&&` was incidental to what that
case is about, so it is gone. This one is worth noting as a shape rather than a
typo: a new preflight silently changed which block an older assertion got, and
only on the shell CI does not run.

Verified by running the package repeatedly rather than once: previously failing
on every run, now passing 3 of 3, and the stop-intent test passing 8 of 8 alone
and 6 of 6 under CPU contention. Disabling the terminate path still fails it,
so the assertion continues to bind.

* test(tools): assert the stop intent killed the session

The retry loop added to survive a slow PowerShell teardown also made the
test unfalsifiable. The helper sleeps 5s, well inside the 30s deadline, so
a terminate that did nothing at all would let the sleep end on its own and
every existing assertion would still hold: the session reports exited, it
reports an exit code, and the interrupted flag echoes the request rather
than the outcome. Neutering KillProcessTree confirmed it, the test passed.

Assert instead that the helper's completion line never appears, which
distinguishes a killed session from a finished one without depending on
how long the loop took. Output is accumulated across every poll rather
than read off the last result, because each continuation returns only what
the session produced since the previous collection.
2026-07-28 18:00:41 +08:00
Vasanth T ec3b822505 fix(tui): paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V (#534) (#807)
* fix(tui): paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V

Ctrl+V did nothing when the clipboard held a screenshot, while right-click
paste attached it. The image plumbing was already there: routePaste probes the
OS clipboard for an image whenever a paste arrives with empty text.

The gap is that a clipboard holding only an image produces no bracketed paste
at all, since the terminal has no text to send, so routePaste never runs and its
probe never fires. Right-click reached the probe only because that path always
delivers a clipboardReadMsg, empty or not. Bubble's own Ctrl+V binding stays
disabled, so nothing else was listening for the key.

Handle Ctrl+V by issuing the image probe directly. It reads image content only,
never text, so bracketed paste remains the single text path and a Ctrl+V with
text on the clipboard is unaffected. The probe yields no message when there is
no image, keeping it a silent no-op, and it is gated on noBlockingModal so a
permission prompt or picker still swallows the key.

readClipboardImage becomes a var so the tests stub it instead of depending on
the machine's real clipboard.

Fixes #534

* fix(tui): also probe the clipboard on Cmd+V, and test the real key route

Two things raised in review, both fair.

The handler matched keyCtrl only, which is ModCtrl. macOS reports Command as
ModSuper, as the rest of the TUI already models it, so Cmd+V never reached the
image probe even though the change claimed to cover it. It now matches both, via
a keySuper helper alongside the existing modifier helpers.

Worth being precise about the limit: this only helps where the terminal delivers
the key to the application. A terminal that handles Cmd+V itself pastes the
clipboard TEXT and sends no key event at all, so an image-only clipboard still
produces nothing for this to react to. That is a separate problem from the one
being fixed here.

The tests also did not exercise the route they were named for. One asserted that
Update returned some non-nil command and then ran a freshly built probe; the
other never called Update at all. Both now stub the reader BEFORE Update and run
the command Update actually returned.

That matters more than it sounds. Making the branch return a different non-nil
command leaves the old assertion passing and fails the new one, which is exactly
the hole: the old test proved a command was issued, not that it was the image
probe. Removing the route entirely, or reverting to ModCtrl only, also fails now.

* fix(imageinput): report an unreadable clipboard image instead of silence

On macOS the clipboard reader shells to pngpaste or a PyObjC one-liner, and
neither ships with the OS: pngpaste is Homebrew-only and Apple dropped the
bundled PyObjC. A stock Mac therefore fails every time, and the failure was
returned as (nil, nil), which the caller reads as "no image on the clipboard"
and treats as a silent no-op. Pressing Ctrl+V produced nothing at all: no
image, no error, no hint that anything was missing.

The darwin path already knows the difference. It probes with `clipboard info`
first and only reaches the extraction step once the clipboard is confirmed to
hold an image, so a failure there is not absence, it is "there is an image and
nothing here can read it". That now returns ErrClipboardImageUnreadable, which
the existing error path turns into a transcript notice naming what to install.

The defect predates this branch, but this branch is what makes the path
reachable from Ctrl+V, so shipping without it would close #534 with a feature
that is inert on one of the three platforms. Raised by gnanam, who measured it
on a real Mac rather than inferring it.

Deliberately narrow. The Linux arm cannot tell "no tool" from "no image"
without probing separately, and Windows uses PowerShell, which is always
present, so neither is touched.

The test drives the whole path: stubbed reader returns the error, Ctrl+V
issues the probe, and the assertion is that the failure reaches the transcript
as an error row rather than stopping earlier. Swallowing the error again makes
it fail.

* test(imageinput): cover the darwin unreadable-clipboard decision itself

The test added with the fix asserted around the change rather than on it. It
substituted ReadClipboardImage with a stub returning the error, which proves
the TUI surfaces an error handed to it, but never reaches
readClipboardImageDarwin, where the decision lives. Reverting both production
return sites to nil,nil left every package green, which is the definition of a
test that is not testing the change. Caught by gnanam.

readClipboardImageDarwin shells out twice and had no seam, so the two steps are
now package-level vars, the same shape as the readClipboardImage var this
change already relied on. That makes the case that matters reachable: the info
probe succeeds and reports an image, and the extractor then fails. It cannot be
arranged from outside the function, because from there both steps are one
opaque call.

Five cases, and the negative ones carry as much weight as the positive. An
image with no working extractor, and an extractor that exits 0 with no bytes,
must both be actionable. A clipboard offering no image, and a failing info
probe, must both stay silent, because turning those into a notice would make
every stray Ctrl+V nag the user. The extractor must not run at all in either
silent case.

Repeating gnanam's experiment now fails: reverting both return sites to nil,nil
fails the two actionable cases and leaves the silent ones passing, which is
exactly the discrimination the fix is supposed to add.
2026-07-28 17:51:28 +08:00
Anandan 81a5e6cb71 fix(sandbox): preserve user config and retry denied writes (#801)
* fix(sandbox): preserve user config and retry denied writes

Keep user identity and configuration paths discoverable while retaining managed cache and temporary storage. Classify native sandbox failures as typed recoverable denials so approved commands can retry outside the sandbox.

Add regression coverage for global Git ignores, typed denial handling, and permission retry behavior.

* fix(sandbox): tighten denial retry safeguards

* test(sandbox): assert denial contract

* fix(sandbox): trust typed denials and restore Cargo state

Stop promoting command output keywords into recoverable unrestricted denials, so only structured adapter facts can enter the approved unsandboxed retry path.

Restore the managed CARGO_HOME directory and environment override so Cargo remains writable while the caller's real home stays read-only.

* fix(sandbox): mask preserved credential configs

Preserving caller configuration made credential-bearing tool files discoverable under Linux's read-all sandbox profile. Add default and environment-overridden npm, GitHub CLI, netrc, Docker, Kubernetes, and Zero config paths to the credential deny set, with regression coverage.

Clarify the typed-denial retry and platform read-model comments without changing the approval behavior.

* fix(sandbox): protect custom gcloud config

CLOUDSDK_CONFIG can relocate gcloud credentials outside the XDG-derived default. Include the configured directory in the credential deny profile and cover the override with a regression test.

* fix(sandbox): deny zero credential directory

* test(sandbox): keep zero credential directory deny path expectations
2026-07-27 15:35:04 +05:30
Anandan 5d1869e7bc feat: add persistent session goals (#803)
* feat: add persistent session goals

* Fix goal run isolation and guards

* Strengthen loop goal isolation test

* Cover goal edit state transitions

* fix(goal): bound automatic continuations

Persist a provider-independent continuation limit, require approval for model-created goals, and keep resume, BTW, and loop runs from starting or charging unrelated goal work.

Also reject trailing lifecycle arguments and bound persisted objective length.

* fix(goal): resume continuations after btw
2026-07-27 13:22:09 +05:30
Anandan 518d2e53ba fix(windows): use PowerShell for command execution (#804)
* fix(windows): prefer PowerShell for command execution

Detect PowerShell 7 or Windows PowerShell before falling back to cmd.exe, and share the selected host shell across agent tools and the interactive shell escape.

Configure UTF-8 output, preserve restricted-sandbox MSYS safeguards, and add Windows coverage for pipelines, workspace writes, and interactive stdin sessions.

* test(windows): align shell coverage with PowerShell

Make Windows command fixtures and guidance assertions follow the selected host shell, preserve cmd fallback coverage, and use a genuine MSYS executable when PowerShell aliases are available.

Remove the unsupported non-TTY PowerShell stdin assertion; Windows interactive stdin requires a separate PTY transport.

* fix(sandbox): classify Windows executable suffixes

Normalize .exe, .cmd, .bat, and .com command names before safety and network lookup so PowerShell invocations such as curl.cmd receive the same network permission handling as curl.

Add analyzer and engine-level regressions for the Windows PowerShell command shape observed in CI.

* fix(sandbox): normalize absolute Windows command paths

Extract drive-letter and UNC basenames before removing shell escape characters so fully qualified Windows executables continue matching canonical safety and network classifications.

Cover both drive and UNC curl paths with analyzer regressions.

* fix(sandbox): normalize relative Windows paths

Recognize drive-relative, explicit relative, and suffixed backslash executable paths before generic shell escape removal so Windows commands continue to match canonical sandbox risk entries.

* fix(windows): harden PowerShell execution

* fix(sandbox): classify PowerShell removal aliases
2026-07-27 13:21:47 +05:30
Vasanth T d82b94defe test(cli): order the prewarm probe against the turn (#809)
* test(cli): order the prewarm probe against the turn

TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate intermittently sees zero prewarm HEAD
probes on the Windows runner. It polled for up to 5s after the run returned,
reasoning that the deadline exceeded the 3s prewarm timeout so a slow probe
could not flake it. That reasoning does not hold. The probe is issued on the
run's context and runExec cancels that context as it returns, because the stop
function signalContext hands back is a CancelFunc. Once the run is over the
probe is cancelled rather than slow, so polling cannot observe one that has not
already landed, at any deadline.

Against a mock server the turn finishes in microseconds, which leaves the probe
racing teardown. The turn now blocks until the probe arrives, giving it a
window while the run is still alive. The wait is bounded, so a probe that never
fires still fails the assertion with a useful message.

This widens the window rather than closing it: prewarmTimeout is armed inside
the probe goroutine, so holding the turn cannot extend it. The comment says so,
and names prewarmTimeout as the thing to look at if this ever recurs.

* test(cli): fail when the prewarm hold gives up

The bounded wait let the turn proceed after its guard expired, so a probe that
arrived late still left the count at 1 and the test passed. That proves the
probe was eventually received, not that it preceded the turn, which is the only
thing this test claims. Raised by CodeRabbit.

The expiry is now recorded and checked before the count, since the count cannot
tell the two apart.

Verified by suppressing the probe, which makes the guard expire: the assertion
fires with its own message rather than the count assertion, and the run takes
the full guard duration.
2026-07-27 12:12:34 +08:00
88fb7b6192 fix(sandbox): add platform-specific write lock around grant state file (#752) (#755)
* fix(sandbox): add platform-specific write lock around grant state file (#752)

Add grants_lock_unix.go and grants_lock_windows.go with a lockStateFile
method that serializes access to the persisted grant state across
processes. Wire the lock into Grant, GrantCommandPrefix, Revoke,
RevokePath, and Clear.

Also add .gitattributes to force LF line endings for Go files so
gofmt checks pass on Windows.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sandbox): do not lock the grants file when there is no notice to consume

Addresses jatmn's #755 finding.

ConsumeMigrationNotice took the interprocess lock unconditionally, and
lockStateFile MkdirAlls the grants directory and creates
<grants>.lockfile. Every startup and every 'zero exec' calls this, so it
turned reading the grant state into requiring a WRITABLE grants
directory: a user with no grants file whose ZERO_SANDBOX_GRANTS_PATH (or
its parent config directory) sits on a read-only mount failed outright
with 'failed to migrate sandbox grants', where the pre-lock code read an
empty state and wrote nothing.

Peek at the state without the lock first and return early when no
migration write is required. Only when one is — a schema/policy
migration, or clearing NoticePending — take the lock and re-read under
it, since the unlocked peek is a snapshot another process may have
already consumed or migrated, and is meaningless by contract when
needsMigration is set.

Both regression tests are verified to fail against the pre-fix code.
The read-only-directory test skips on Windows (mode bits do not deny
writes) and as root (permissions are bypassed), so a portable companion
asserts the same requirement by requiring that nothing is created at
all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 12:11:35 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 0125e70d0f Fix pinned Go quality tools on Go 1.26 (#689)
* fix pinned Go quality toolchain

* fix(make): use a POSIX GOTOOLCHAIN prefix for pinned tool targets

The Windows_NT branch used cmd.exe syntax (set "..." &&), but GNU Make
runs recipes through sh even on Windows (MSYS/Git Bash), where that
form fails and breaks make lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck. A plain
GOTOOLCHAIN=... prefix works everywhere, so the OS check is gone.

Also switch GO_VERSION/GO_TOOLCHAIN to recursive expansion so
'go list -m' only runs when a tool target actually needs it, instead
of at parse time for every target. Addresses PR review from CodeRabbit
and Copilot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(build): make pinned-tool targets shell-neutral, fix README drift

Address code review on PR #689:

- lint-static/deadcode/vulncheck previously set GOTOOLCHAIN via a
  POSIX `VAR=value cmd` recipe prefix. GNU Make on Windows runs
  recipes through whatever SHELL is configured, and under a native
  cmd.exe setup that syntax is invalid — cmd.exe treats the whole
  "GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.26.5" token as the program to run and fails before
  go ever executes (reproduced locally: cmd.exe errors with
  "'MYVAR' is not recognized..." for the equivalent pattern). Switched
  to a target-specific `export`, which sets the variable in the child
  process environment via Make itself, before  is invoked —
  works under sh, cmd.exe, and PowerShell alike (verified against all
  three targets with SHELL := cmd.exe).

- README.md's Code Quality and Security Checks section still told
  contributors to run the raw `go run ...@version` commands this PR
  identifies as selecting the wrong (older) toolchain and failing to
  load this Go 1.26.5 module — only CI and AGENTS.md had been updated
  to the new make targets. Points steps 3-4 at `make lint-static` /
  `make vulncheck` instead, matching AGENTS.md.

Verified end-to-end: `make vulncheck`, `make deadcode`, and `make
lint-static` all run successfully and reach their tools (deadcode's
advisory report and lint-static's 35 pre-existing findings match the
PR's documented baseline).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(build): support stock macOS make

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 12:09:37 +08:00
Vasanth T f5fa4ffc64 fix(config): stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout (#810)
Both background-child tests fail intermittently on the Windows runner, and
have since #690. #800 and #802 each relaxed an assertion, which is why neither
held: the deadline itself was the problem.

The tests drove LoadProviderCommand, so the fixture's own startup was billed to
the production 5s budget. On a loaded runner the outer timer won the select in
runProviderCommand, and both symptoms follow from that. The nonzero-exit test
saw a timeout instead of the exit status it asserts, because the timer
preempted the shell's exit. The other test lost its PID file, because the
timer's Terminate killed the background child before it could record a PID,
putting the file permanently out of reach however long the assertion polled.

Neither test is a claim about the 5s budget. They assert which error each
cmd.Wait path yields and that the leftover descendant is killed, so they now
call runProviderCommand directly with a budget of their own and the production
deadline stops competing with process startup. Making the child outlive that
budget lets both drop their elapsed-versus-lifetime bounds as well, so no
wall-clock assertion is left in either test.

That is only worth doing if the two timeout paths can be told apart, and they
could not: the WaitDelay path and the outer-timer path both returned the same
bare sentinel, so asserting on it would have been satisfied by the very timeout
the tests exist to rule out. The WaitDelay path now wraps rather than replaces.
Callers asking errors.Is for the sentinel are unaffected, so no user-visible
message changes.

The Windows fixture also waited for its ready marker by launching a second
PowerShell. That cold start is pure overhead added after the PID is already
written, so the wait now runs in cmd itself and is bounded.

Verified by looping both tests under CPU contention: 7 failures in 16
iterations before, none in 32 after, with per-iteration time going from a
spread of 2.3s to 66s down to a steady 2.1s. Removing the wrap makes the
WaitDelay assertion fail, so it is load-bearing rather than decorative.
2026-07-27 10:00:32 +08:00
Felix-Ayush 9fbdc34155 feat(skills): report hash drift in skill info (#795)
Mirror plugin info: compare on-disk SKILL.md to the skills.lock hash so
edited installs are visible. Also drop the nonexistent skills lock
command from EXTENDING.md.
2026-07-27 10:00:07 +08:00
583e6530bd fix(lint): resolve static analysis baseline (#769)
* fix(lint): resolve static analysis baseline

* fix(lint): clear linux staticcheck findings

Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-019fa018-b2ee-7442-8a31-80b2cf9dd270

Co-authored-by: Pierre Bruno <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Amp <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 09:59:33 +08:00
Anandan ac50a5a840 test(config): wait for background PID file (#802)
* test(config): wait for background PID file

* test(config): make delayed PID check deterministic
2026-07-25 23:02:07 +05:30
Anandan a4a805a6c8 fix(tui): reset quiet clock for new runs (#799)
New turns inherited lastStreamActivity from the prior turn, so a fresh request could immediately look stalled. Initialize stream activity from the same timestamp as turnStartedAt and cover the stale-clock case with a deterministic regression test.
2026-07-24 17:38:10 +05:30
Anandan 9fe02ae52e fix(sandbox): clarify scoped permission prompts (#798) 2026-07-24 17:37:32 +05:30
Anandan 9d5c82d441 test(config): remove Windows startup timing assumptions (#800)
Cold PowerShell startup under concurrent Windows CI can consume most of the provider timeout, so an unsynchronized PID file may never be written and a fixed four-second bound can fail despite correct process-tree cleanup. Treat an absent PID as a helper that never reached startup, retain strict liveness checks for synchronized children, and bound completion by the child's natural lifetime instead.
2026-07-24 15:43:51 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 97ef90d27a chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform (#706)
* chore: remove code unreachable on every supported platform

The Security and code health job's advisory deadcode step reports 152
unreachable functions on main. Running the same check under GOOS=linux,
windows, and darwin shows 13 of those are false positives whose callers
live in windows build-tagged files, so only functions unreachable on all
three platforms are touched.

Functions with no references anywhere are deleted, including the
internal/reasoning package, which nothing imports. Functions that only
tests reference move into per-package export_test.go files so tests keep
their seams while the production binary sheds the code. Test call sites
of deleted convenience wrappers are ported to the live APIs (scoped tool
constructors, tools.DeferredSource, FinishReason checks).

Kept despite the report: cron.Store.Runs (only reader of runs.jsonl,
which production writes), and agenteval.TraceEventKeys and
MissingTraceEvents (used across packages by the trace contract test).

* docs(config): correct ValidateFile's errors.As claim

Message is a flattened string (.Error() already called on the parse
error), not a wrapped error, so callers can't recover the concrete
json error type via errors.As. Fix the comment to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* chore(trace,skills): drop obsolete Sink adapters and fix stale doc references

The dead-code pass removed the Emit methods but left Sink, NDJSONSink, and
TextSink exported with a contract nothing implements; remove the types with
their contract. Also remove the stray blank line at EOF of trace.go flagged
by gofmt, and update skills package docs and HOW_ZERO_WORKS.md to stop
directing callers to DiscoveryRoots/Duplicates, which are now test seams.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: clean up remaining review nits on dead code removal

Replace a pointless fmt.Errorf(...%w...).Error() with fmt.Sprintf
using %v, since the wrapped error was discarded immediately anyway.
Remove a comment block that was duplicated verbatim.

* docs(skills): drop remaining references to test-only List/Get

Load and MergedSkills comments still named List/Get as production
entry points after they moved to export_test.go. Point callers at
Load and ListFromRoots instead.

* chore: remove now-unreferenced export_test.go seams

execSessionManager.len() and likelySandboxDenied/sandboxDenialKind had
no remaining callers after the sandbox unify-command-execution rebase;
the production code they wrapped for tests no longer exists.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:04:41 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 5c58256abc fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows (#690)
* fix(config): kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows

taskkill /T walks the process tree by parent PID in user space and can
miss descendants, leaving the sleeping child holding the inherited
stdout/stderr pipes so cmd.Wait() blocked until natural completion
(~10s instead of the 5s timeout).

Assign the started command to a job object with
JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE and terminate the job on timeout so
the kernel kills the whole tree atomically; taskkill remains as a
fallback. Also set cmd.WaitDelay so Wait can never hang on pipes held
by an escaped orphan, and add a regression assertion that the sleeping
child is actually gone after the timeout returns.

Fixes #683

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): harden provider-command tree termination

Address code review on PR #690: terminate the process tree when
cmd.Wait() returns exec.ErrWaitDelay (a background descendant kept
inherited pipes open, previously left running); start the Windows
process suspended and assign it to the job object before resuming its
main thread, closing the window where a fast child could escape the
job; drop JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE so a successful command's
detached helpers survive Close() instead of being reaped; escape
single quotes in generated PID-file paths; and correct a misnamed
Windows exit-code constant in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): avoid gofmt smart-quote rewrite in doc comment

gofmt's doc-comment formatter rewrites a trailing '' into a curly
closing quote, which CI's gofmt -l check flags as unformatted. Reword
to avoid the pattern instead of embedding a raw quote pair.

* fix(config): terminate leaked descendants on nonzero exit, avoid PID reuse

Terminate the process tree on any error returned from cmd.Wait, not only

exec.ErrWaitDelay. Go only returns ErrWaitDelay when the shell itself

exited successfully; a nonzero exit (e.g. sleep 600 & exit 7) yields the

bare *ExitError instead, so a detached background child that held the

inherited pipes open was never terminated on that path.

Also stop falling through to the taskkill/PID fallback once a job handle

successfully contained the tree: by the time Terminate runs on the

ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already reaped the root process, so its

PID may have been reused by an unrelated process, and taskkill /T /PID

against a reused PID would force-kill the wrong tree.

Addresses PR #690 review feedback.

* fix(config): surface suspended-thread resume failures instead of hanging

resumeMainThread now reports whether it actually resumed at least one

thread. If Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread all fail, the launched

process would otherwise sit suspended forever, never exit on its own,

and get misreported as a plain 5s provider-command timeout instead of

the real resume failure. attachCommandProcess now terminates the

process immediately in that case.

Also documents the known, non-regressive limitation that the taskkill

fallback (used only when job creation/assignment itself fails) can

still miss a descendant that has reparented away from the tree it

walks by PID.

Addresses remaining PR #690 review feedback; PR description corrected

separately to drop the outdated JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE claim.

* fix(config): guard taskkill with retained process identity

* fix(config): retain POSIX process group identity

* test(tui): match provider wizard shortcut

* test(tui): pin credential-step env for deterministic footer assertion

The credential step's footer only shows the /→ shortcut once a key
is present, whether typed or inherited from the provider's
AuthEnvVars. The previous commit changed the assertion to
"Enter/→ continue" without accounting for that, so the test only
passed by coincidence when ANTHROPIC_API_KEY happened to be set in the
environment — failing deterministically on a clean CI runner (as
smoke reported on all three OSes). Pin the env var empty and assert
the no-key footer text so the test is correct regardless of ambient
environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(config): preserve provider process attributes

* test(config): keep SysProcAttr coverage portable

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 09:03:59 +08:00
Felix-Ayush fa8734f179 fix(cli): include plugins info in shell completions (#794)
zero plugins info landed in #773 but the completions tree still only
offered list/add/remove, so generated bash/zsh/fish scripts omitted it.
2026-07-24 08:49:01 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 5bb1bc11c3 fix(tui): fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal (#709)
* fix(tui): disable bubbletea hard scroll optimization unconditionally

Vendors a patched charm.land/bubbletea/v2 (via a local go.mod replace)
with hard scroll optimization (using terminal scroll-region sequences
to shift existing lines instead of repainting) disabled unconditionally,
instead of only on GOOS=="windows".

That GOOS check only catches a Windows terminal driving the program
directly. It misses a Linux process running inside a multipass VM
whose output is ultimately displayed by Windows Terminal over a
remote shell, which corrupts rendering badly (garbled/overlapping
text, worse on resize) the same way the check exists to prevent.
There's no reliable way to detect that remote hop from inside the VM,
so scroll optimization is now off in all cases.

* fix(tui): force redraw on streamed newlines to clear stale caret

The streaming caret (appendStreamingCursor) is appended to whichever
visual line is currently last. Over a remote terminal chain
(multipass VM output displayed by Windows Terminal), the renderer's
incremental cell diff sometimes fails to clear the caret's old cell
when a newline moves it to a new line, leaving ghost carets behind.

Fire tea.ClearScreen when a streamed delta contains a newline: that's
exactly the moment the caret moves and the risk exists, so it forces
a full redraw right then instead of leaving it to the incremental
diff, without doing so on every animation tick.

* chore(tui): trim upstream repo metadata from vendored bubbletea fork

The vendored bubbletea-v2-patched module is ~99% byte-identical to
upstream charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8; only cursed_renderer.go
differs (one line disabling hard scroll optimization). The .github
workflows, README.md, UPGRADE_GUIDE_V2.md, Taskfile.yaml and CI config
files are upstream repo metadata that serve no purpose inside this
repo, so remove them to slim the PR. The Go source and testdata golden
files are kept because Go's replace directive requires the full module
to be present and buildable.

Refs #709

* fix(tui): address review round on the rendering workaround and vendored fork

Fork correctness fixes (all flagged by review):

- key.go: KeyMediaRecord repeated the previous const expression and
  decoded record presses as previous-track; map it to uv.KeyMediaRecord.
- mouse.go: MouseButton11 likewise collapsed onto MouseButton10.
- termios_unix.go: BSDLY/BS0 are output-delay bits; read them from Oflag
  instead of Lflag so useBackspace is set correctly.
- cursed_renderer.go: count wrapped rows with (lineWidth-1)/w so an
  exact terminal-width multiple no longer inserts a blank line; compare
  colors by normalized RGBA via a nil-safe helper instead of interface
  equality (which panics on non-comparable implementations); and make
  clearScreen invalidate lastView so the queued erase flushes with the
  next frame instead of deferring until an unrelated view change — the
  reordering that could leave the ghost caret in place.
- exec_test.go: implement reset() on the spy renderer and inject it
  before Run; assert exec preserves renderer state (releaseTerminal
  with reset=false).
- logging_test.go: restore the default logger's output/prefix/flags and
  fail fast on setup errors.
- tea_test.go: tie the Quit-pumping goroutine to a channel closed when
  Run returns instead of leaking it until process exit.

TUI scoping (review P2): the forced redraw on streamed newlines is now
rate-limited to ~10/s so heavy streaming output no longer turns every
newline into a full-screen repaint, and ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR=1 opts a
correctly-rendering terminal back into the fast incremental path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): guarantee deferred stream-clear redraw and other review fixes

A throttled stream-clear could drop the redraw entirely when a
newline arrived in the last delta of a turn, leaving a ghost caret on
screen. Add a one-shot deferred flush timer plus a flush on stream
end. Fix a stale comment and a test that leaked global logger state
in the vendored bubbletea fork.

* fix(tui): use m.now for stream-clear throttle and harden tests

Drive stream-clear rate limiting through the mockable clock and a
shared streamClearThrottle constant so both the agentTextMsg and
flush paths stay in sync. Add an explicit two-newline-within-window
regression and detect ClearScreen by function pointer so tests do not
evaluate Tick side effects.

* fix(tui): relocate bubbletea fork out of third_party

Move the maintained bubbletea/v2 hard-scroll patch from
third_party/bubbletea-v2-patched to patches/bubbletea-v2 and update the
root go.mod replace. third_party/ is immutable vendored content per
AGENTS.md; a maintained fork belongs outside that tree.

* fix(ci,docs): run vendored bubbletea fork tests and document unsupported go install path

patches/bubbletea-v2 is its own Go module so `go test ./...` from the repo
root never touched its 7 test files. Add a CI step (and a make test-patches
target for local use) that runs the fork's own suite across the smoke
matrix.

The root go.mod's local `replace charm.land/bubbletea/v2 =>
./patches/bubbletea-v2` also breaks `go install
github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@<version>`, since a versioned install can't
resolve a replace pointing at a filesystem path. Document that path as
unsupported in README.md and docs/INSTALL.md and point at git clone + go
build instead, per jatmn's review findings on PR #709.

* ci: run vendored bubbletea fork tests with -race

CodeRabbit review on this PR. The fork exists specifically to patch a
concurrency bug (charmbracelet/bubbletea#1690), so its regression test
needs the race detector to actually catch a reintroduced race instead
of just passing on a benign-looking run.

* fix(tui): drop vendored bubbletea fork; keep stream-clear workaround

Maintainers asked not to ship an in-tree bubbletea replace: it breaks
versioned go install and is a large maintenance surface for a narrow
multipass/Windows Terminal scroll bug. Remove patches/bubbletea-v2 and
the replace directive; keep the model.go full-redraw-on-streamed-newline
workaround (ZERO_NO_STREAM_CLEAR to opt out). Restore normal install docs.

Refs Gitlawb/zero#709

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-24 08:48:16 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 d9b882eb0a fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically (#686)
* fix(cron): reserve job IDs atomically

* fix(cron): hold the per-ID lock from reservation through persistence

Address code review on PR #686: reserveID made the timestamp directory
visible via os.Mkdir before metadata.json existed, but Remove (which
takes the per-ID lock before deleting) never coordinated with that
window. A concurrent `zero cron rm <id>` could delete the bare
reservation and report success right after Add reserved it; writeJob's
MkdirAll would then silently resurrect the directory and persist the
job anyway. A second Add could also re-reserve the same id while the
first writer was still running, putting two writers on the same
metadata path.

reserveID now acquires the same per-ID lock (used by Get/Update/
Mutate/Remove/AppendRun) for each candidate id before attempting
os.Mkdir, and returns it still held; Add releases it only after
writeReservedJob commits (or tears down) the reservation. A concurrent
Remove for that id now blocks until the reservation is resolved one
way or the other, and a concurrent Add attempting the same candidate
id serializes through the lock rather than only racing the Mkdir.

Adds two regression tests: one proving Remove waits for and removes
the committed job rather than the bare reservation, and one proving a
second reserveID call for the same candidate id blocks on the shared
lock and moves on to the next candidate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-22 19:28:04 +08:00
355 changed files with 22281 additions and 4379 deletions

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+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
*.go text eol=lf
*.mod text eol=lf
*.sum text eol=lf
+33 -12
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,36 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Install Make on Windows
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: pwsh
run: choco install make --no-progress -y
- name: Validate quality targets with stock macOS Make
if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest'
env:
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: 1
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: grep.patternType
GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: fixed
run: make -n vulncheck
- name: Check vulnerabilities through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
shell: cmd
run: make vulncheck
- name: Check dead code through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make deadcode
- name: Run static lint through native Windows Make
if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
continue-on-error: true
shell: cmd
run: make lint-static
- name: Check formatting
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
shell: bash
@@ -100,27 +130,18 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
# their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
# then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
# so all three run under it.
- name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
run: |
toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
# CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
# published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
- name: govulncheck
run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...
run: make vulncheck
# Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
# code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
# still being wired or removed.
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...
run: make deadcode
# Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
# doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
@@ -130,4 +151,4 @@ jobs:
# the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
- name: golangci-lint (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
run: make lint-static
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.5.0"}
{".":"0.6.0"}
+38 -4
View File
@@ -51,10 +51,8 @@ request, or completing an implementation task:
or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
6. **Advisory lint**:
`go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
7. **Security**:
`go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
6. **Advisory lint**: `make lint-static`.
7. **Security**: `make vulncheck`.
8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
tracked changes).
@@ -69,3 +67,39 @@ requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
it.
## 4. Common Review Blockers
These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
(`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
classification and side effects too.
+31
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,37 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
### Features
* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
+26 -4
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says to build and run quality checks
# with `make` — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean baseline help
GO_VERSION = $(word 2,$(shell git grep -G -h "^go[[:space:]]" -- go.mod))
GO_TOOLCHAIN = go$(GO_VERSION)
DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck tidy clean baseline help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
@@ -33,6 +39,22 @@ fmt-check:
# Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
lint: fmt-check vet
# Versioned tools select the toolchain from their own modules when invoked with
# package@version. Read this module's go directive directly, without invoking
# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
lint-static deadcode vulncheck: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
lint-static:
go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
deadcode:
go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode@$(DEADCODE_VERSION) -test=false ./...
vulncheck:
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
tidy:
go mod tidy
@@ -55,4 +77,4 @@ baseline: build
--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean, baseline"
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, tidy, clean, baseline"
+15 -14
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
@@ -147,6 +148,12 @@ To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
@@ -367,22 +374,16 @@ variable unset and set.
### Code Quality and Security Checks
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:
Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
1. **Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
2. **Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
3. **Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:
```bash
# Install golangci-lint
go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
# Install govulncheck
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
```
Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
pinned tool versions.
The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
+2 -2
View File
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skills add` / `remove` / `lock`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`.
A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
```text
~/.local/share/zero/skills/ # primary (install/remove/lock target)
~/.local/share/zero/skills/ # primary (install/remove target)
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
+1 -1
View File
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ flowchart TD
- **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
`LoadFromRoots` / `DiscoveryRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
`LoadFromRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
- **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.
## End-to-End Data Flow
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ require (
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
+2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
-3
View File
@@ -90,9 +90,6 @@ func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
return a
}
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
// ---- initialize ----
func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package acp
import "context"
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
+138 -6
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -80,8 +81,9 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
reader *bufio.Reader
w io.Writer
rawReader io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
readerCloser io.Closer
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
@@ -96,10 +98,15 @@ type Conn struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
// lifetime.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
reader: bufio.NewReader(r),
rawReader: r,
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
@@ -107,6 +114,18 @@ func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
}
}
// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
c := NewConn(r, w)
c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
return c
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
@@ -128,17 +147,36 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
c.wg.Wait()
}()
interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
//
// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
before := interruptible.generation()
line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
return nil
}
return err
@@ -146,6 +184,100 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
}
}
// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
//
// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
//
// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
type interruptibleReader struct {
inner io.Reader
closer io.Closer
ctx context.Context
closeOnce sync.Once
gen atomic.Int64
}
func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
type interruptibleReadResult struct {
n int
err error
}
// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
once sync.Once
}
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
return claimed
}
// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
// publishes a result for Read to join.
func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
}
decision.complete()
}()
res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
return res
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
go func() {
resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
}()
select {
case res := <-resultCh:
return res.n, res.err
case <-r.ctx.Done():
// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
if decision.interrupt() {
r.gen.Add(1)
if r.closer != nil {
r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
}
}
// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
// report) is what the caller should see.
res := <-resultCh
return res.n, res.err
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
+288
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,30 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
type testReadCloser struct {
read func([]byte) (int, error)
close func() error
}
func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
func (r testReadCloser) Close() error { return r.close() }
type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
// connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
t.Helper()
@@ -25,6 +44,275 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
}
}
func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
reader := testReadCloser{
read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return pipeReader.Read(p)
},
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return pipeReader.Close()
},
}
conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-readStarted
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "non-closable"
if closable {
name = "closable"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
})
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
var reader io.Reader = read
if closable {
reader = testReadCloser{
read: read,
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return nil
},
}
}
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
newConn := NewConn
if closable {
// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
newConn = NewOwnedConn
}
conn := newConn(reader, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-writeStarted
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
}
})
}
}
// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
//
// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
var readCalls atomic.Int32
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
readCalls.Add(1)
// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
// loop's next ReadBytes call.
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
t.Cleanup(release)
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
conn := NewConn(read, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
}
cancel()
release()
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
}
if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
resultReady := make(chan struct{})
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
defer close(resultReady)
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
go func() {
n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
}()
<-resultReady
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
cancel()
res := <-readDone
if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
}
if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
}
cancel()
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
readComplete := make(chan struct{})
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
go func() {
res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
close(readComplete)
resultCh <- res
}()
<-readComplete
if decision.interrupt() {
t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
}
res := <-resultCh
if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
panic("boom")
})
conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
}
}
func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
-8
View File
@@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ type ContentBlock struct {
func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
// ---- sessions ----
// McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
@@ -233,10 +229,6 @@ func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
}
func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
}
type ToolCallLocation struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Line *int `json:"line,omitempty"`
@@ -5,9 +5,29 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Description() string {
return "record normalized shell arguments"
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: true}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
@@ -16,7 +36,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -51,7 +71,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testi
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -88,7 +108,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *t
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
@@ -107,9 +127,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -117,7 +135,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -144,3 +162,237 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
}
}
// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
t.Helper()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
PermissionModeUnsafe,
Options{Cwd: root},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
return result
}
// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
// `git branch --show-current`.
//
// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
// The call both errors point at must actually work.
converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
}
}
// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
t.Helper()
if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
}
if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
}
}
// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"cmd": "git --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
},
}
_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
if !requested {
t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
}
// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
// error the model could not act on.
func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
}
}
// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
}
assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
}
func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
} {
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": mode,
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"deny_read": []any{},
"entries": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("mode %q retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", mode, args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("mode %q normalized to %q, want use_default", mode, got)
}
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallNormalizesProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
tool := &normalizationRecordingShellTool{}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tool)
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"./zero --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
`"additional_permissions":{"file_system":{"deny_read":[],"entries":[],"read":[],"write":[]},"network":{"enabled":false}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("provider-expanded empty permissions were rejected: %s", result.Output)
}
if len(tool.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("shell tool calls = %d, want 1", len(tool.calls))
}
args := tool.calls[0]
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode = %q, want use_default", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsPreservesRealRequest(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; !exists {
t.Fatal("non-empty additional_permissions was removed")
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsRemovesWorkspaceReadAlreadyCoveredBySandbox(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: root,
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
})
args := map[string]any{
"command": "./zero --version",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"file_system": map[string]any{
"entries": []any{
map[string]any{
"access": "read",
"path": map[string]any{
"type": "path",
"path": ".",
},
},
},
"deny_read": []any{},
"read": []any{},
"write": []any{},
},
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
},
}
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, root, engine)
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
t.Fatalf("already-covered additional_permissions was retained: %#v", args)
}
if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
}
}
-12
View File
@@ -501,15 +501,3 @@ func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
}
return true
}
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+89 -20
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
// transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
const summaryLabel = "[Summary of earlier conversation]"
// summaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to the summarizer model.
const summaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
// CompactionSummaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to both automatic
// and manually requested compaction summarizers.
const CompactionSummaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
"Write a dense, factual summary of the conversation so far. Preserve: the user's goals and explicit constraints; " +
"decisions made and why; files created or modified (with paths) and key code changes; commands run and their important " +
"results; and anything still in progress or unresolved. Omit pleasantries. Use terse bullet points. Do not invent details. " +
@@ -75,6 +76,12 @@ type CompactionResult struct {
// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
// state needed by later compactions.
SummaryText string
// ProjectedChars is the text content sent to the summarizer after semantic
// projection, excluding provider protocol framing.
ProjectedChars int
// Truncated reports whether projection dropped content to satisfy its
// bounded brief or previous-summary limits.
Truncated bool
// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
Compacted bool
}
@@ -216,11 +223,11 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
}, nil
}
summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
summaryResult, err := SummarizeCompactionMessages(middle, opts.Summarize)
if err != nil {
return CompactionResult{}, err
}
summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)
summary := summaryResult.SummaryText
// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
@@ -238,10 +245,53 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
RemovedCount: len(middle),
PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
SummaryText: summary,
ProjectedChars: summaryResult.ProjectedChars,
Truncated: summaryResult.Truncated,
Compacted: true,
}, nil
}
// CompactionSummaryResult describes the shared summarization input and output.
type CompactionSummaryResult struct {
SummaryText string
ProjectedChars int
Truncated bool
}
// SummarizeCompactionMessages applies the shared semantic projection before
// invoking a caller-supplied summarizer. Automatic context-pressure compaction
// and manual session compaction both use this path.
func SummarizeCompactionMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, summarize func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)) (CompactionSummaryResult, error) {
if summarize == nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
summaryInput := projection.messages
if len(summaryInput) == 0 {
summaryInput = messages
}
summary, err := summarize(summaryInput)
if err != nil {
return CompactionSummaryResult{}, err
}
return CompactionSummaryResult{
SummaryText: strings.TrimSpace(summary),
ProjectedChars: compactionMessageChars(summaryInput),
Truncated: projection.truncated,
}, nil
}
func compactionMessageChars(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
total := 0
for _, message := range messages {
total += len(message.Content)
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
total += len(call.Name) + len(call.Arguments)
}
}
return total
}
// safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
// the preserved suffix begins on a user or assistant message rather than a
// tool/tool_result message. A tool result with no preceding assistant tool call
@@ -331,6 +381,8 @@ type compactionState struct {
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
task *taskState
planner *contextPlanner
trace *trace.Recorder
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -377,6 +429,8 @@ func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
task: task,
planner: newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow}),
trace: options.Trace,
}
return state
}
@@ -413,6 +467,14 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
}
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
@@ -424,7 +486,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
@@ -475,7 +537,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
Summarize: state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
taskState: state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if compactErr != nil {
@@ -509,9 +571,12 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
// compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
// OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
if state.planner == nil {
state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
}
return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
}
}
@@ -523,7 +588,11 @@ func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage
// Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
// to the caller unchanged.
func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{}), nil)
}
func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, planner, recorder)
if err == nil {
return summary, nil
}
@@ -532,11 +601,11 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
}
mid := len(messages) / 2
left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
left, leftErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage, planner, recorder)
if leftErr != nil {
return "", leftErr
}
right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
right, rightErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage, planner, recorder)
if rightErr != nil {
return "", rightErr
}
@@ -549,7 +618,7 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
}, onUsage)
}, onUsage, planner, recorder)
if reduceErr != nil {
if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
@@ -565,15 +634,15 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
}
// summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
},
// No tools: this is a plain text summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
requestMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: CompactionSummaryInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
}
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
parts := systemPromptParts{prompt: CompactionSummaryInstructions, baseInstructions: CompactionSummaryInstructions}
plan := planner.planWithPromptParts(requestMessages, nil, "", parts)
recordContextPlanTrace(recorder, plan)
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, plan.Request)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
+43 -2
View File
@@ -43,8 +43,14 @@ func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
}
if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
if result.Truncated {
t.Fatal("Truncated = true for a projection within its limits")
}
if len(captured) != 1 || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "first question") || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "second question") {
t.Fatalf("summarized projection = %#v, want intent from the non-preserved middle", captured)
}
if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
@@ -96,11 +102,46 @@ func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
if result.SummaryText != "" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != 0 || result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("no-op projection metadata = (%d, %t), want zero values", result.ProjectedChars, result.Truncated)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsTruncatedProjectionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}}
for index := range 20 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: strings.Repeat("contextword ", 256) + string(rune('a'+index)),
})
}
messages = append(messages,
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
)
var captured []zeroruntime.Message
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
return "bounded summary", nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Compacted || !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("compaction metadata = compacted %t, truncated %t; want both true", result.Compacted, result.Truncated)
}
if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
+131 -21
View File
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
body string
}
// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
// recentEdits returns files mutated by editing calls in messages
// — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
// note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
// changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
// rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
pathByID := map[string]string{}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
sequence := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
@@ -129,12 +130,24 @@ func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
sequence = append(sequence, path)
}
}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || len(message.ChangedFiles) == 0 {
continue
}
for _, path := range message.ChangedFiles {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
continue
}
sequence = append(sequence, path)
noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
}
}
order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
if len(order) == 0 {
return nil
}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
continue
@@ -425,15 +438,20 @@ type preservedState struct {
}
type preservedTaskState struct {
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
Pending int `json:"pending,omitempty"`
InProgress int `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
Completed int `json:"completed,omitempty"`
Failed int `json:"failed,omitempty"`
VerificationPassed int `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
VerificationFailed int `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
VerificationOutcome Outcome `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
Constraints []string `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
UnresolvedFailures []taskFailureState `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
Approvals []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
Artifacts []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
@@ -468,7 +486,12 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
task := priorState.Task
if taskSnapshot != nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
Constraints: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskConstraints(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Constraints, maxTaskConstraints),
ChangedFiles: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskChangedFiles(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.ChangedFiles, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
UnresolvedFailures: mergeTaskFailures(priorTaskFailures(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.UnresolvedFailures, taskSnapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys),
Approvals: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskApprovals(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Approvals, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
Artifacts: mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskArtifacts(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Artifacts, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
}
// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
@@ -484,6 +507,13 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
}
}
freshConstraints := explicitConstraintsFromMessages(middle)
if len(freshConstraints) > 0 {
if task == nil {
task = &preservedTaskState{}
}
task.Constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(task.Constraints, freshConstraints, maxTaskConstraints)
}
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -517,6 +547,95 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
return summary
}
func explicitConstraintsFromMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
var constraints []string
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || strings.Contains(message.Content, preservedStateLabel) {
continue
}
if _, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content); body != "" {
continue
}
constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(constraints, extractExplicitConstraints(message.Content), maxTaskConstraints)
}
return constraints
}
func priorTaskConstraints(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Constraints
}
func priorTaskChangedFiles(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.ChangedFiles
}
func priorTaskFailures(task *preservedTaskState) []taskFailureState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.UnresolvedFailures
}
func priorTaskApprovals(task *preservedTaskState) []taskApprovalState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Approvals
}
func priorTaskArtifacts(task *preservedTaskState) []taskArtifactState {
if task == nil {
return nil
}
return task.Artifacts
}
func mergeTaskFailures(older, newer []taskFailureState, resolved []string) []taskFailureState {
resolvedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(resolved))
for _, key := range resolved {
resolvedSet[key] = struct{}{}
}
merged := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, failure := range append(append([]taskFailureState(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := resolvedSet[failure.Key]; ok {
continue
}
withoutSameKey := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(merged))
for _, existing := range merged {
if existing.Key != failure.Key {
withoutSameKey = append(withoutSameKey, existing)
}
}
merged = append(withoutSameKey, failure)
}
if len(merged) > maxTaskEvidenceEntries {
merged = merged[len(merged)-maxTaskEvidenceEntries:]
}
return merged
}
func mergeBoundedComparable[T comparable](older, newer []T, limit int) []T {
merged := make([]T, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
seen := make(map[T]struct{}, len(older)+len(newer))
for _, value := range append(append([]T(nil), older...), newer...) {
if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
continue
}
seen[value] = struct{}{}
merged = append(merged, value)
}
if len(merged) > limit {
merged = merged[len(merged)-limit:]
}
return merged
}
func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
@@ -610,15 +729,6 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, s
return preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
if idx < 0 {
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/db.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"},
}})
messages := stateConversation()
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
@@ -80,6 +84,69 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
}
if len(state.Task.ChangedFiles) != 1 || state.Task.ChangedFiles[0] != "internal/db.go" {
t.Fatalf("changed files were not preserved: %#v", state.Task.ChangedFiles)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesRuntimeEvidenceAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
task := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.", nil)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests failed",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession, Scope: "/tmp",
}})
messages := stateConversation()
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
}})
secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Never add background memory models."},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "understood"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
)
second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
taskState: task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
if state.Task == nil || len(state.Task.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || len(state.Task.Approvals) != 1 || len(state.Task.Artifacts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("runtime evidence did not survive repeated compaction: %#v", state.Task)
}
if got := state.Task.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary; got != "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence" {
t.Fatalf("newer failure evidence did not replace the older summary: %#v", state.Task.UnresolvedFailures)
}
for _, want := range []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never add background memory models."} {
if !containsString(state.Task.Constraints, want) {
t.Fatalf("constraint %q missing after repeated compaction: %#v", want, state.Task.Constraints)
}
}
}
func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if value == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+315
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
const (
compactionUserWordBudget = 256
compactionAssistantWordBudget = 200
compactionToolCallsPerTurn = 8
compactionToolArgumentBytes = 120
compactionErrorBytes = 150
compactionResultBytes = 1200
compactionPreviousSummaryBytes = 16 * 1024
compactionBriefMaxBytes = 24 * 1024
)
var compactionWordPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[\p{L}\p{N}]+`)
type compactionProjection struct {
messages []zeroruntime.Message
truncated bool
}
// projectCompactionInput removes reconstructible tool output before the model
// summary call. It retains a bounded transcript of user intent, assistant
// decisions, tool actions, and concise errors. Exact durable state is appended
// separately from the original messages after the summary returns.
func projectCompactionInput(messages []zeroruntime.Message) compactionProjection {
sections := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
previousSummary := ""
truncated := false
for index, message := range messages {
switch message.Role {
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser:
content := message.Content
if marker := strings.Index(content, preservedStateLabel); marker >= 0 {
content = content[:marker]
}
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel) {
fullSummary := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel))
previousSummary = clipHeadTailBytes(fullSummary, compactionPreviousSummaryBytes)
truncated = truncated || len(fullSummary) > compactionPreviousSummaryBytes
continue
}
if content = clipInformativeWords(content, compactionUserWordBudget); content != "" {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user #%d]\n%s", index, content))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant:
lines := make([]string, 0, 1+len(message.ToolCalls))
if content := clipInformativeWords(message.Content, compactionAssistantWordBudget); content != "" {
lines = append(lines, content)
}
calls := message.ToolCalls
omitted := 0
if len(calls) > compactionToolCallsPerTurn {
omitted = len(calls) - compactionToolCallsPerTurn
calls = calls[omitted:]
}
if omitted > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("* (%d earlier tool calls omitted)", omitted))
}
for _, call := range calls {
lines = append(lines, compactionToolCallLine(call))
}
if len(lines) > 0 {
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[assistant #%d]\n%s", index, strings.Join(lines, "\n")))
}
case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
// New tool-result messages carry the execution status directly, as the
// source ToolResult does. Keep the text check for older session history
// created before Message exposed IsError.
name := toolNameForResult(messages, index)
mustPreserve := name == "ask_user" || len(message.ChangedFiles) > 0
if !mustPreserve && !message.IsError && !isLikelyToolError(message.Content) {
continue
}
if name == "" {
name = "tool"
}
switch {
case message.IsError || isLikelyToolError(message.Content):
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_error #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
case name == "ask_user":
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user_answer #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(message.Content, compactionResultBytes)))
default:
sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_result #%d] %s changed %s\n%s", index, name,
clipBytes(strings.Join(message.ChangedFiles, ", "), compactionToolArgumentBytes), clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
}
}
}
if len(sections) == 0 && previousSummary == "" {
return compactionProjection{}
}
brief, briefTruncated := capCompactionBrief(strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"))
truncated = truncated || briefTruncated
if previousSummary != "" {
brief = "[previous summary]\n" + previousSummary + "\n\n" + brief
}
return compactionProjection{
messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.TrimSpace(brief)}},
truncated: truncated,
}
}
func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
if len(brief) <= compactionBriefMaxBytes {
return brief, false
}
marker := "\n\n...[middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget]...\n\n"
available := compactionBriefMaxBytes - len(marker)
// Keep both chronological edges: the oldest material has not necessarily
// been summarized before, while the newest material is most actionable.
headBytes := available * 2 / 5
tailBytes := available - headBytes
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(brief, headBytes)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(brief, tailBytes)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail), true
}
func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
detail := ""
var arguments map[string]any
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
detail = value
break
}
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "ask_user" {
detail = askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments)
}
if detail == "" && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
if patch, ok := arguments["patch"].(string); ok {
detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(patch), ", ")
}
}
}
if detail == "" {
detail = commandFromArguments(call.Arguments)
}
if detail == "" {
return "* " + call.Name
}
return fmt.Sprintf("* %s %q", call.Name, clipBytes(detail, compactionToolArgumentBytes))
}
func isLikelyToolError(content string) bool {
prefix := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if len(prefix) > compactionErrorBytes {
prefix = prefix[:compactionErrorBytes]
}
lower := strings.ToLower(prefix)
for _, prefix := range []string{"error:", "tool error:", "failed:", "permission denied", "command failed"} {
if strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func clipInformativeWords(text string, limit int) string {
flat := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
if flat == "" || limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
count := 0
for _, location := range compactionWordPattern.FindAllStringIndex(flat, -1) {
word := strings.ToLower(flat[location[0]:location[1]])
if compactionStopWords[word] {
continue
}
count++
if count > limit {
end := location[0]
return strings.TrimSpace(flat[:end]) + "...(truncated)"
}
}
return flat
}
func clipBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 3 {
end := limit
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return text[:end]
}
end := limit - 3
for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(text[:end]) + "..."
}
func clipHeadTailBytes(text string, limit int) string {
text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
marker := "\n...[middle omitted]...\n"
if limit <= len(marker) {
return clipBytes(text, limit)
}
available := limit - len(marker)
head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(text, available/2)
tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(text, available-available/2)
return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail)
}
func clipPrefixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
end := limit
for end > 0 && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
end--
}
if boundary := strings.LastIndex(text[:end], "\n\n["); boundary > 0 {
end = boundary
}
return text[:end]
}
func clipSuffixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
if limit <= 0 {
return ""
}
if len(text) <= limit {
return text
}
start := len(text) - limit
for start < len(text) && text[start]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
start++
}
if boundary := strings.Index(text[start:], "\n\n["); boundary >= 0 {
start += boundary + 2
}
return text[start:]
}
func askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments map[string]any) string {
raw, ok := arguments["questions"].([]any)
if !ok {
return ""
}
questions := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
for _, item := range raw {
object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
if !ok {
continue
}
if question, ok := object["question"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(question) != "" {
questions = append(questions, strings.TrimSpace(question))
}
}
return strings.Join(questions, " | ")
}
func patchPaths(patch string) []string {
var paths []string
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, line := range strings.Split(patch, "\n") {
for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, prefix) {
continue
}
path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, prefix))
if path != "" && !seen[path] {
seen[path] = true
paths = append(paths, path)
}
}
}
return paths
}
var compactionStopWords = map[string]bool{
"a": true, "an": true, "the": true, "is": true, "are": true, "was": true, "were": true,
"be": true, "been": true, "being": true, "have": true, "has": true, "had": true,
"do": true, "does": true, "did": true, "will": true, "would": true, "could": true,
"should": true, "may": true, "might": true, "shall": true, "can": true, "need": true, "must": true,
"to": true, "of": true, "in": true, "for": true, "on": true, "with": true, "at": true,
"by": true, "from": true, "as": true, "into": true, "through": true, "during": true,
"before": true, "after": true, "above": true, "below": true, "between": true, "under": true, "over": true,
"and": true, "but": true, "or": true, "nor": true, "not": true, "so": true, "yet": true,
"both": true, "either": true, "neither": true, "each": true, "every": true, "all": true,
"any": true, "few": true, "more": true, "most": true, "other": true, "some": true, "such": true, "no": true,
"that": true, "this": true, "these": true, "those": true, "it": true, "its": true,
"i": true, "me": true, "my": true, "we": true, "our": true, "you": true, "your": true,
"he": true, "him": true, "his": true, "she": true, "her": true, "they": true, "them": true, "their": true,
"who": true, "which": true, "what": true, "if": true, "then": true, "than": true,
"when": true, "where": true, "how": true, "just": true, "also": true,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
if clipped := clipBytes("世界", limit); len(clipped) > limit || !utf8.ValidString(clipped) {
t.Fatalf("clipBytes limit %d returned invalid result %q", limit, clipped)
}
}
}
func TestBoundaryClippersHandleNonPositiveLimits(t *testing.T) {
for _, clip := range []func(string, int) string{clipPrefixAtBoundary, clipSuffixAtBoundary} {
for _, limit := range []int{-1, 0} {
if got := clip("世界", limit); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("clipper limit %d = %q, want empty", limit, got)
}
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDropsRecoverableToolBodies(t *testing.T) {
largeBody := strings.Repeat("recoverable source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "I will inspect before editing.", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "read", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "read", Content: largeBody},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "test", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "test", Content: "Error: parser regression\nlong diagnostic details"},
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
projected := projection.messages
if len(projected) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("projection = %#v, want one compact message", projected)
}
content := projected[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Inspect the parser", `read_file "internal/parser.go"`, `exec_command "go test ./internal/parser"`, "Error: parser regression"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
if strings.Contains(content, "recoverable source line") || strings.Contains(content, "long diagnostic details") {
t.Fatalf("projection retained reconstructible or overlong tool output: %q", content)
}
if estimateTokens(projected)*20 >= estimateTokens(messages) {
t.Fatalf("projection did not materially reduce tokens: before=%d after=%d", estimateTokens(messages), estimateTokens(projected))
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsStructurallyMarkedToolErrors(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "git", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"git status"}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "git", Content: "fatal: not a git repository", IsError: true},
}
projected := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages
if len(projected) != 1 || !strings.Contains(projected[0].Content, "fatal: not a git repository") {
t.Fatalf("structured tool error was dropped from projection: %#v", projected)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "ask", Name: "ask_user", Arguments: `{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "patch", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"}},
}
content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
}
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCapsToolCallsPerTurn(t *testing.T) {
calls := make([]zeroruntime.ToolCall, 12)
for index := range calls {
calls[index] = zeroruntime.ToolCall{Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"file.go"}`}
}
projected := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: calls}}).messages
content := projected[0].Content
if strings.Count(content, "* read_file") != compactionToolCallsPerTurn || !strings.Contains(content, "4 earlier tool calls omitted") {
t.Fatalf("tool-call tail was not bounded: %q", content)
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputCarriesPreviousSummaryOutsideBriefCap(t *testing.T) {
previous := "keep the earlier architecture decision\n" + strings.Repeat("prior detail ", 2000) + "\nkeep the newest prior decision"
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\n" + previous + "\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n{}"}}
for index := range 500 {
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("later transcript detail ", 20)})
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "later request " + strings.Repeat("context ", 20) + string(rune('a'+index%26))})
}
projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
content := projection.messages[0].Content
if !strings.Contains(content, "[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision") || !strings.Contains(content, "keep the newest prior decision") {
t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q", content)
}
if !strings.Contains(content, "middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget") {
t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q", content)
}
if !projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
}
}
func TestProjectCompactionInputDoesNotInferTruncationFromUserText(t *testing.T) {
projection := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Keep this literal marker: [middle omitted]",
}})
if projection.truncated {
t.Fatal("literal user text produced a false truncation signal")
}
}
@@ -20,11 +20,15 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e3", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/baz.go"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e3", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/baz.go"}},
}
edits := recentEdits(messages)
if len(edits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
if len(edits) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
}
if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
@@ -32,6 +36,9 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
}
if edits[2].name != "internal/baz.go" || edits[2].body != "Done!" {
t.Fatalf("third edit = %#v, want apply_patch changed file with its note", edits[2])
}
}
// After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
+112 -9
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
@@ -58,12 +59,15 @@ func TestCompactKeepsSystemAndPreservedSuffix(t *testing.T) {
if last.Content != "most recent question" {
t.Fatalf("expected most recent message preserved, got %q", last.Content)
}
// The summarized middle excludes system and preserved suffix.
if len(captured) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 summarized messages, got %d: %#v", len(captured), captured)
// The summarizer receives a compact semantic projection of the middle rather
// than reconstructible raw tool output.
if len(captured) != 1 || captured[0].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Fatalf("expected one projected summary input, got %#v", captured)
}
if captured[0].Content != "first question" {
t.Fatalf("expected oldest non-system message first, got %#v", captured[0])
for _, want := range []string{"[user #0]", "first question", "[assistant #1]", "first answer", "second question"} {
if !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, want) {
t.Fatalf("projected summary input missing %q: %q", want, captured[0].Content)
}
}
// Compaction must shrink the conversation.
if estimateTokens(result) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
@@ -336,7 +340,7 @@ func TestRunProactiveCompactionTriggers(t *testing.T) {
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -364,7 +368,7 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
},
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
_, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
@@ -379,6 +383,43 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestMaybeCompactStopsAfterSupersededReadsReachThreshold(t *testing.T) {
body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
}
pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 {
t.Fatal("test setup did not reclaim superseded read output")
}
prunedSize := estimateTokens(pruned)
if estimateTokens(messages) <= prunedSize {
t.Fatal("test setup does not cross the compaction threshold")
}
provider := &summarizeRecordingProvider{}
state := &compactionState{
enabled: true,
threshold: prunedSize,
preserveLast: 2,
}
got := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
if provider.summarizeCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cheap pruning should avoid the summarizer, got %d calls", provider.summarizeCalls)
}
if state.lowWaterMark != prunedSize {
t.Fatalf("lowWaterMark = %d, want %d", state.lowWaterMark, prunedSize)
}
if !strings.Contains(got[2].Content, "superseded identical") || got[4].Content != body {
t.Fatalf("unexpected pruned messages: %#v", got)
}
}
// reactiveProvider builds up history with a tool call on turn 1, then errors
// with a context-limit message on turn 2 (once the history is large enough that
// compaction can shrink it), then succeeds on the same-turn retry. Summary
@@ -388,6 +429,7 @@ type reactiveProvider struct {
summarizeCalls int
turnRequests int
failedOnce bool
connectError bool
bigText string
finalText string
}
@@ -409,6 +451,9 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
return streamEvents(toolTurnWithText(provider.bigText, "1", "read_file", `{"path":"x"}`)), nil
case provider.turnRequests == 2 && !provider.failedOnce:
provider.failedOnce = true
if provider.connectError {
return nil, errors.New("context_length_exceeded")
}
return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."},
}), nil
@@ -417,6 +462,39 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
}
}
func TestRunConnectErrorCompactionRecordsReplacementPlan(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
connectError: true,
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("connect-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil || result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
t.Fatalf("connect-error compaction failed: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 || contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("replacement request context not reported: %#v", contextPlans)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 || gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("replacement request trace not recorded: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
provider := &reactiveProvider{
bigText: strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
@@ -427,7 +505,9 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
// the compaction closure. read_file also returns a sizeable result that
// bloats the history.
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
recorder := trace.NewRecorder("reactive-compaction", "run-1", "test")
var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -436,6 +516,10 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
PermissionMode: PermissionModeUnsafe,
ContextWindow: 10_000_000,
CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
Trace: recorder,
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected reactive compaction to recover the run, got error: %v", err)
@@ -446,6 +530,25 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
if provider.summarizeCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected reactive compaction to invoke the summarizer")
}
if len(contextPlans) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("main request context callbacks = %d, want initial turns plus compacted retry", len(contextPlans))
}
if contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
t.Fatalf("retry context was not updated after compaction: before=%d after=%d", contextPlans[1].MessageTokens, contextPlans[2].MessageTokens)
}
gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence count = %d, want two turns, compaction, and retry: %#v", len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes), gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected request-specific invalidation evidence: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].CompletePrefixHash == gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("compaction fingerprint reused the main request prefix: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
}
}
// midStreamReactiveProvider forwards some text BEFORE surfacing a context-limit
@@ -491,7 +594,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryDoesNotDoubleEmitText(t *testing.T) {
finalText: "recovered",
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
var deltas []string
result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
+36
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,24 @@ type ContextBreakdown struct {
TotalTokens int // SystemTokens + ToolTokens + MessageTokens
ContextWindow int // model context window; 0 when unknown
UsedFraction float64 // TotalTokens / ContextWindow; 0 when window unknown
// Blocks explain why each model-visible category is present without exposing
// its content. The planner currently preserves all three categories.
Blocks []ContextBlock
// CompletePrefixHash identifies the provider-visible system+tool prefix.
CompletePrefixHash string
// PrefixInvalidationReason is "initial", "unchanged", or a stable comma-
// separated list of changed prefix categories.
PrefixInvalidationReason string
}
// ContextBlock is content-free evidence for one model-visible context category.
type ContextBlock struct {
Kind string
Tokens int
CacheClass string
Authority string
Recoverable bool
Reason string
}
// MeasureContext estimates the per-category token footprint of a request: the
@@ -41,6 +59,24 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
ContextWindow: contextWindow,
}
breakdown.TotalTokens = breakdown.SystemTokens + breakdown.ToolTokens + breakdown.MessageTokens
if breakdown.SystemTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "system", Tokens: breakdown.SystemTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "required", Reason: "instructions, workspace policy, and safety policy",
})
}
if breakdown.ToolTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "tools", Tokens: breakdown.ToolTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
Authority: "capability", Reason: "currently permitted and selected tool definitions",
})
}
if breakdown.MessageTokens > 0 {
breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
Kind: "conversation", Tokens: breakdown.MessageTokens, CacheClass: "dynamic_tail",
Authority: "transcript", Reason: "valid provider replay history and current task context",
})
}
if contextWindow > 0 {
breakdown.UsedFraction = float64(breakdown.TotalTokens) / float64(contextWindow)
}
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
if breakdown.UsedFraction != wantFraction {
t.Fatalf("UsedFraction = %v, want %v", breakdown.UsedFraction, wantFraction)
}
if len(breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("Blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", breakdown.Blocks)
}
}
func TestMeasureContextUnknownWindowHasZeroFraction(t *testing.T) {
+183
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
type contextPlannerConfig struct {
contextWindow int
promptCacheKey string
promptParts systemPromptParts
}
// contextPlanner is the single seam for constructing model-visible requests.
// Planning is deterministic and does not retrieve content, execute tools, or
// change permissions. The initial implementation deliberately preserves every
// message and tool definition while making composition and cache drift
// inspectable; later selection policies must continue to cross this seam.
type contextPlanner struct {
config contextPlannerConfig
previousPrefix prefixFingerprint
hasPrevious bool
toolSnapshotKey string
toolSnapshot []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
}
type contextPlan struct {
Request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
Breakdown ContextBreakdown
PrefixFingerprint prefixFingerprint
}
func newContextPlanner(config contextPlannerConfig) *contextPlanner {
return &contextPlanner{config: config}
}
// Plan returns a provider request snapshot plus content-free accounting.
// It intentionally performs no relevance filtering: preserving current model
// capability is the baseline contract for future planner policies.
func (planner *contextPlanner) Plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, planner.config.promptParts)
}
// planWithPromptParts plans a request whose stable system sections differ from
// the planner's configured main-run prompt, such as a compaction summary call.
func (planner *contextPlanner) planWithPromptParts(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, parts)
}
func (planner *contextPlanner) plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
requestMessages := copyMessages(messages)
requestSystemPrompt := leadingSystemContent(requestMessages)
if parts.prompt != requestSystemPrompt {
// Component boundaries from a different request would make the detailed
// invalidation reason misleading. Retain the exact request prefix and
// classify it conservatively as an unstructured system prompt instead.
parts = systemPromptParts{prompt: requestSystemPrompt}
}
fingerprint := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts, toolDefs))
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: requestMessages,
Tools: planner.snapshotTools(toolDefs, fingerprint),
ReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: planner.config.promptCacheKey,
}
breakdown := MeasureContext(request.Messages, request.Tools, planner.config.contextWindow)
breakdown.CompletePrefixHash = fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash
var previous *prefixFingerprint
if planner.hasPrevious {
previous = &planner.previousPrefix
}
breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason = explainPrefixChange(previous, fingerprint)
planner.previousPrefix = fingerprint
planner.hasPrevious = true
return contextPlan{
Request: request,
Breakdown: breakdown,
PrefixFingerprint: fingerprint,
}
}
// snapshotTools freezes provider-visible tool definitions when their semantic
// fingerprint changes. Stable turns reuse the frozen schemas instead of
// recursively cloning every map and slice for every request.
func (planner *contextPlanner) snapshotTools(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, fingerprint prefixFingerprint) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
key := fingerprint.ToolsHash + "\x00" + fingerprint.SchemaHash
if planner.toolSnapshotKey != key {
planner.toolSnapshot = copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs)
planner.toolSnapshotKey = key
}
return planner.toolSnapshot
}
func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
if toolDefs == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(toolDefs))
for index, definition := range toolDefs {
copied[index] = definition
copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaMap(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
if schema == nil {
return nil
}
copied := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
for key, value := range schema {
copied[key] = copySchemaValue(value)
}
return copied
}
func copySchemaValue(value any) any {
switch typed := value.(type) {
case map[string]any:
return copySchemaMap(typed)
case []any:
copied := make([]any, len(typed))
for index, item := range typed {
copied[index] = copySchemaValue(item)
}
return copied
case []string:
return append([]string(nil), typed...)
default:
return value
}
}
func leadingSystemContent(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
contents := make([]string, 0, 1)
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem {
break
}
contents = append(contents, message.Content)
}
return strings.Join(contents, "\n\n")
}
func explainPrefixChange(previous *prefixFingerprint, current prefixFingerprint) string {
if previous == nil {
return "initial"
}
if previous.CompletePrefixHash == current.CompletePrefixHash {
return "unchanged"
}
reasons := make([]string, 0, 3)
if previous.SystemPromptHash != current.SystemPromptHash {
parts := make([]string, 0, 4)
if previous.BaseInstructionsHash != current.BaseInstructionsHash {
parts = append(parts, "base_instructions")
}
if previous.ConfirmationPolicyHash != current.ConfirmationPolicyHash {
parts = append(parts, "confirmation_policy")
}
if previous.ProjectContextHash != current.ProjectContextHash {
parts = append(parts, "project_context")
}
if previous.SkillsHash != current.SkillsHash {
parts = append(parts, "skills")
}
if len(parts) == 0 {
parts = append(parts, "system_prompt")
}
reasons = append(reasons, parts...)
}
if previous.ToolsHash != current.ToolsHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "tools")
}
if previous.SchemaHash != current.SchemaHash {
reasons = append(reasons, "schema")
}
if len(reasons) == 0 {
return "prefix_changed"
}
return strings.Join(reasons, ",")
}
+185
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
package agent
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "inspect this", Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte{1, 2, 3}}}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"main.go"}`}}, Reasoning: []zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{{Provider: "test", Type: "thinking", Signature: "sig"}}},
}
toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
Parameters: map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"required": []string{"path"},
"properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
"anyOf": []any{map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
},
}}
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
contextWindow: 128_000,
promptCacheKey: "session-1",
promptParts: systemPromptParts{prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "system"},
})
plan := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
want := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: toolDefs,
ReasoningEffort: "medium",
PromptCacheKey: "session-1",
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(plan.Request, want) {
t.Fatalf("planned request changed provider input:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.Request, want)
}
stable := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if &stable.Request.Tools[0] != &plan.Request.Tools[0] {
t.Fatal("stable tool fingerprint rebuilt the immutable schema snapshot")
}
// A plan owns its request snapshot; later caller mutation cannot change its
// messages or its recursively nested tool schema.
messages[1].Content = "changed"
messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] = 9
toolDefs[0].Name = "changed_tool"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
t.Fatalf("planned tools alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
next := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
if next.PrefixFingerprint == plan.PrefixFingerprint || next.Request.Tools[0].Name != "changed_tool" {
t.Fatalf("changed tool schema did not refresh snapshot: %#v", next)
}
if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" {
t.Fatalf("refresh mutated earlier request: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
}
}
func TestContextPlannerReportsInspectableBlocks(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: 100_000})
plan := planner.Plan([]zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: filler(400)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: filler(200)},
}, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file"}}, "")
if plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" || plan.Breakdown.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
t.Fatalf("prefix evidence = %#v", plan.Breakdown)
}
if len(plan.Breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", plan.Breakdown.Blocks)
}
wantKinds := []string{"system", "tools", "conversation"}
total := 0
for index, block := range plan.Breakdown.Blocks {
if block.Kind != wantKinds[index] || block.Tokens <= 0 || block.Reason == "" || block.Authority == "" || block.CacheClass == "" {
t.Fatalf("block %d = %#v", index, block)
}
total += block.Tokens
}
if total != plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens {
t.Fatalf("block tokens = %d, want total %d", total, plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerFingerprintsActualRequestSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "configured system", baseInstructions: "configured system",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "request-specific system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"},
}
plan := planner.Plan(messages, nil, "")
want := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(
systemPromptParts{prompt: "request-specific system"}, nil,
))
if plan.PrefixFingerprint != want {
t.Fatalf("fingerprint describes configured prompt instead of request:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.PrefixFingerprint, want)
}
}
func TestContextPlannerExplainsPrefixInvalidation(t *testing.T) {
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "base", projectContext: "project",
}})
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}, {Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"}}
tools := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "initial" {
t.Fatalf("first reason = %q, want initial", got)
}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "unchanged" {
t.Fatalf("stable reason = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
tools[0].Description = "Read an exact file"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "tools" {
t.Fatalf("tool reason = %q, want tools", got)
}
tools[0].Parameters["required"] = []any{"path"}
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "schema" {
t.Fatalf("schema reason = %q, want schema", got)
}
planner.config.promptParts.prompt = "system with changed project"
planner.config.promptParts.projectContext = "changed project"
messages[0].Content = "system with changed project"
if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "project_context" {
t.Fatalf("project reason = %q, want project_context", got)
}
}
func TestExplainPrefixChangeNamesEveryChangedComponent(t *testing.T) {
baseline := prefixFingerprint{
SystemPromptHash: "system",
BaseInstructionsHash: "base",
ConfirmationPolicyHash: "policy",
ProjectContextHash: "project",
SkillsHash: "skills",
ToolsHash: "tools",
SchemaHash: "schema",
CompletePrefixHash: "complete",
}
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*prefixFingerprint)
want string
}{
{name: "base instructions", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.BaseInstructionsHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "base_instructions"},
{name: "confirmation policy", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ConfirmationPolicyHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "confirmation_policy"},
{name: "project context", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
value.SystemPromptHash, value.ProjectContextHash = "changed", "changed"
}, want: "project_context"},
{name: "skills", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash, value.SkillsHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "skills"},
{name: "unclassified system prompt", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash = "changed" }, want: "system_prompt"},
{name: "tools and schema", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.ToolsHash, value.SchemaHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "tools,schema"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
current := baseline
test.mutate(&current)
current.CompletePrefixHash = "changed"
if got := explainPrefixChange(&baseline, current); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %q", got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
+8 -9
View File
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.Completi
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *
func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // non-deferred, must stay exposed
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
}
if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -368,9 +368,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
result, _ := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}`}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DisabledTools: []string{"read_file"},
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agent
import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
+7 -7
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectNotCalledReminderWhenPlanUsed(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsStalePlanReminderAfterManyToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
// Turn 1 calls update_plan (so the not-called reminder never triggers), then
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ func TestRunStalePlanReminderIsOneShotPerInterval(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
turns := [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsToolOnlyProgressReminder(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolOnlyProgressReminderAt+1)
for i := 0; i < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt; i++ {
+257 -129
View File
@@ -183,10 +183,22 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
defer runPermissions.cleanup()
promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
contextWindow: options.ContextWindow,
promptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
promptParts: promptParts,
})
messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)
guards := newGuardState()
task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
onPermission := options.OnPermission
options.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: event})
if onPermission != nil {
onPermission(event)
}
}
compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
defer func() {
// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
@@ -267,10 +279,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
})
}
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
@@ -279,42 +287,15 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
toolPartitionSpan.End()
// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
if options.Trace != nil {
fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fp.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fp.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fp.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fp.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fp.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fp.CompletePrefixHash,
})
}
// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
compactionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanCompaction)
messages = compactor.maybeCompact(ctx, provider, messages, exposed)
compactionSpan.End()
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
// Report the per-category context budget for this turn so a surface can
// show utilization. Opt-in: a no-op when OnContext is unset.
if options.OnContext != nil {
options.OnContext(MeasureContext(messages, request.Tools, options.ContextWindow))
}
plan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
request := plan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, plan)
// A transient upstream disconnect on the initial connect is retried with
// backoff (before any content is forwarded, so no OnText is duplicated);
@@ -339,12 +320,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// on registry+loaded, not on the messages, so they stay valid after
// compaction. Using the bare toolDefinitions here would route through an
// empty-loaded partition, re-hiding every already-loaded deferred tool.
request = zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
request = retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
// Pre-content connect after a context-limit compaction: route through the
// reconnect helper so a transient upstream hiccup here doesn't fail the
// whole run and re-burn every token (AUDIT-L1).
@@ -428,12 +406,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this turn rather
// than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on registry+loaded (not
// the messages), so it stays valid after compaction.
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryStreamErr != nil {
return collected, retryStreamErr
@@ -491,12 +466,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, err
}
retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(messages),
Tools: exposed,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}
retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if retryErr != nil {
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -660,6 +632,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
var changedFilesThisBatch []string
// Images produced by tools this turn, held until every tool_result is
// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
// interleaving yields [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and a 400.
// Same reason the self-correction feedback below is deferred.
var toolImageMessages []zeroruntime.Message
// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -695,7 +674,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: call.Arguments, toolResult: toolResult})
if options.OnToolResult != nil {
options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
}
@@ -709,10 +688,22 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
turnRequestedModel = toolResult.RequestedModel
}
messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.Output,
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: toolResult.Output,
ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
IsError: toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
})
// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
// which the providers validate.
if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(toolResult); ok {
toolImageMessages = append(toolImageMessages, imageMessage)
}
// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
// returns context.Canceled rather than fabricating a headless answer. Stop
@@ -723,11 +714,13 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
}
if abortErr != nil {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, abortErr
}
if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.Output
result.StopReason = stopReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -751,6 +744,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
return result, nil
@@ -769,6 +763,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
}
}
// Every tool_result for this turn is now recorded, including aborted
// placeholders, so the images can follow without splitting them.
messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
toolImageMessages = nil
// Run post-edit self-correction once over the union of files this turn
// changed, then append any feedback after every tool_result is recorded so
@@ -900,7 +898,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
})
}
finalExposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, planner, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
result.FinalAnswer = answer
result.FinishReason = finishReason
result.Messages = copyMessages(finalMessages)
@@ -942,7 +940,32 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
})
}
func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
func recordContextPlan(options Options, plan contextPlan) {
recordContextPlanTrace(options.Trace, plan)
if options.OnContext != nil {
options.OnContext(plan.Breakdown)
}
}
func recordContextPlanTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, plan contextPlan) {
if recorder == nil {
return
}
fingerprint := plan.PrefixFingerprint
recorder.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
SystemPromptHash: fingerprint.SystemPromptHash,
BaseInstructionsHash: fingerprint.BaseInstructionsHash,
ConfirmationPolicyHash: fingerprint.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
ProjectContextHash: fingerprint.ProjectContextHash,
SkillsHash: fingerprint.SkillsHash,
ToolsHash: fingerprint.ToolsHash,
SchemaHash: fingerprint.SchemaHash,
CompletePrefixHash: fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash,
InvalidationReason: plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason,
})
}
func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *contextPlanner, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
finalMessages := copyMessages(messages)
finalMessages = append(finalMessages, zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
@@ -951,12 +974,9 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages [
// The max-turns final-answer call is a pre-content connect, often after a long
// autonomous/cron run — route it through the reconnect helper so a single
// transient hiccup doesn't drop the final summary (AUDIT-L1).
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: copyMessages(finalMessages),
Tools: toolDefs,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
PromptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
}, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
plan := planner.Plan(finalMessages, toolDefs, options.ReasoningEffort)
recordContextPlan(options, plan)
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, plan.Request, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
if err != nil {
return "", messages, ""
}
@@ -1080,6 +1100,9 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
}, nil
}
}
if isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, options.Cwd, options.Sandbox)
}
// tool_search is the gateway to the allowlisted deferred tools, so a non-empty
// EnabledTools allowlist that omits it must NOT reject the call — otherwise the
// discovery tool exposed to the model rejects at dispatch time (an inescapable
@@ -1358,7 +1381,8 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
Cwd: options.Cwd,
// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
// Post-edit diagnostics are NOT forwarded to the tools: they used to run
// synchronously inside edit_file/write_file and block every mutating tool
// call on the language server (≥300ms debounce floor, 10s cap). The loop
@@ -1410,6 +1434,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
result = registry.RebudgetAfterHook(call.Name, args, result)
}
}
result = registry.CommitFileObservation(result, options.FileTracker)
// Stamp the sandbox risk classification for this EXECUTED call so run-policy
// observers can see the risk of an allowed mutation. Prefer the preflight
// decision's classification when the sandbox evaluated the call; otherwise
@@ -1435,6 +1460,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
Output: result.Output,
Truncated: result.Truncated,
Meta: result.Meta,
Images: result.Images,
Redacted: result.Redacted,
ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
@@ -1621,9 +1647,15 @@ func sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, re
func sandboxDeniedShellResult(result tools.Result) bool {
if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
// Typed denials must be handled by their exact capability path. Never
// turn a structured narrow denial into the legacy unrestricted retry.
return false
// Only a typed platform denial that explicitly requests unrestricted
// recovery may enter the legacy retry path. Narrow capability denials
// remain on their exact capability path.
denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
return denial != nil &&
denial.Source == execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox &&
denial.Capability.Kind == execution.CapabilityUnrestricted &&
denial.Recoverable &&
denial.NextAction == execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval
}
return result.Status == tools.StatusError && result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true"
}
@@ -1688,20 +1720,21 @@ func sandboxRestrictionRetryReason(result tools.Result) string {
func runToolForNetworkRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, cloneArgs(args), tools.RunOptions{
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
})
}
@@ -1716,20 +1749,21 @@ func unsandboxedRetryArgs(args map[string]any) map[string]any {
func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, args, tools.RunOptions{
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: string(permissionMode),
Autonomy: options.Autonomy,
Sandbox: options.Sandbox,
ToolCallID: toolCallID,
SessionID: options.SessionID,
Model: options.Model,
ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
Depth: options.Depth,
Cwd: options.Cwd,
FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
EnabledTools: options.EnabledTools,
DisabledTools: options.DisabledTools,
Progress: progressCallback,
})
}
@@ -2746,21 +2780,89 @@ func shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args map[string]any) bool {
return strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
// normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions treats a provider-expanded empty or
// already-covered additional_permissions object as if it had been omitted.
// Some strict-schema providers materialize every optional property and may add
// a workspace read that the default sandbox already grants; rejecting either
// no-op makes the model retry an otherwise valid command. Requests that broaden
// access and malformed payloads are left untouched so validation stays closed.
func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, engine *sandbox.Engine) {
raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]
if !exists {
return
}
// An explicit null is the field omitted, not a request: drop the key so the
// rest of the pipeline sees the same args a model that omitted it would send.
// sandbox_permissions is deliberately left alone — a flagged null must reach
// the same "no additional_permissions object was provided" error as a flagged
// absent field rather than being silently downgraded to a different outcome.
if raw == nil {
delete(args, "additional_permissions")
return
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
return
}
var profile sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &profile); err != nil {
return
}
normalized, err := sandbox.NormalizeRequestPermissionProfile(profile, basePath)
if err != nil {
return
}
noop := normalized.Empty()
if !noop && engine != nil {
if grantProfile, grantErr := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized); grantErr == nil {
noop = engine.CoversRequestPermissions(grantProfile)
}
}
if !noop {
return
}
delete(args, "additional_permissions")
if rawMode, ok := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); ok &&
strings.TrimSpace(rawMode) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault)
}
}
// omitAdditionalPermissionsHint is the one instruction that ends the retry loop
// in #845/#847. Every additional_permissions rejection must carry it: the model
// reaches these errors by attaching a permission object to a command that needs
// none, so "omit it and retry" is the answer in practice, and an error that
// only explains how to build a VALID permission object sends the model round
// the loop again with a different invalid shape.
const omitAdditionalPermissionsHint = "If this command does not need extra sandbox access — ordinary " +
"read-only commands such as `git branch --show-current` do not — omit both sandbox_permissions and " +
"additional_permissions entirely and retry; that is the fix in almost every case."
func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile, bool, error) {
if !shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to %q", tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
// An explicit null grants nothing and carries no flag, so it is
// indistinguishable from an omitted field; rejecting it would be a pure
// false positive against providers that materialize every optional
// property.
if raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists && raw != nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions was provided without sandbox_permissions set to %q, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
"Only if the command genuinely needs file or network access the sandbox denies, resend with "+
`sandbox_permissions: %q AND a non-empty additional_permissions, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
}
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, nil
}
raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
if !ok || raw == nil {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. %s "+
`Otherwise include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
if err != nil {
@@ -2776,8 +2878,10 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
}
if normalized.Empty() {
return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
"additional_permissions granted nothing, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
`Otherwise include a real permission, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
}
grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
if err != nil {
@@ -2866,19 +2970,6 @@ func permissionActionFromSandbox(action sandbox.Action) PermissionAction {
}
}
// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
// so the inactive path is stable.
func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
}
// partitionToolsCached is partitionTools with an optional per-tool definition
// cache. The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) is recomputed
// every call — it must be, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run (e.g.
@@ -2949,22 +3040,20 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
// 2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
// 3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
// transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
// tool_search's compact catalog also stays byte-stable as tools load, so only
// the appended full-schema tail changes.
eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
var deferredCatalog []tools.Tool
for _, tool := range visible {
name := tool.Name()
if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
}
if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
deferredCatalog = append(deferredCatalog, tool)
if loaded[name] {
loadedTail = append(loadedTail, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
} else {
hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
}
continue
}
@@ -2977,15 +3066,16 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
})
discovery := ""
if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
}
// Keep the catalog byte-stable as tools load. tool_search already redirects
// requests for an exposed tool back to the current tool list, so retaining
// loaded names costs only compact catalog lines and avoids invalidating the
// provider cache at the loader definition on every load.
discovery := tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferredCatalog)
// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
// eager block and carries the stable deferred-tool catalog.
description := loader.Description()
if discovery != "" {
description = discovery
@@ -3188,6 +3278,7 @@ func appendAbortedToolResults(messages []Message, remaining []ToolCall) []Messag
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
Content: abortedToolResultNotice,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
IsError: true,
})
}
return messages
@@ -3218,9 +3309,46 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
if message.Reasoning != nil {
copied[index].Reasoning = append([]zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{}, message.Reasoning...)
}
if message.ChangedFiles != nil {
copied[index].ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), message.ChangedFiles...)
}
// Deep-copy image attachments (slice AND each Data byte slice) so the
// raw image bytes are never aliased across history/request/result copies.
copied[index].Images = zeroruntime.CloneImageBlocks(message.Images)
}
return copied
}
// toolResultImageMessage builds the user message that carries a tool's images
// to the model, or reports false when the tool produced none.
//
// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
// result, so nothing else associates them.
func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
for _, image := range result.Images {
if len(image.Data) == 0 {
continue
}
mediaType := zeroruntime.NormalizeImageMediaType(image.MediaType)
if mediaType == "" {
// Outside the provider allow-list. Dropping it beats sending bytes a
// provider will reject and failing the whole turn.
continue
}
images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: mediaType, Data: image.Data})
}
if len(images) == 0 {
return zeroruntime.Message{}, false
}
label := result.Name
if label == "" {
label = "tool"
}
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
Images: images,
}, true
}
+147 -56
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@ func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("narrow protected-metadata denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
}
nonRecoverableDenial := protectedDenial
nonRecoverableDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "sandbox enforcement failed closed",
Recoverable: false,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
}
if sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, nonRecoverableDenial, options) {
t.Fatal("non-recoverable sandbox denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
}
networkDenial := protectedDenial
networkDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
@@ -288,6 +304,18 @@ func (tool *sandboxDeniedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any)
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "touch: cannot touch '/home/user/.npm/cache': Read-only file system",
ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
State: execution.StateDenied,
Kind: execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
Exit: &execution.Exit{Code: 1},
Denial: &execution.Denial{
Capability: execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
Source: execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
Reason: "sandbox blocked command execution",
Recoverable: true,
NextAction: execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
},
},
Meta: map[string]string{
"exit_code": "1",
tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta: "true",
@@ -304,7 +332,8 @@ type sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool struct {
func (tool *sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool) Name() string { return "exec_command" }
type sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
calls []map[string]any
deferFileObservationCommit []bool
}
func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
@@ -327,6 +356,7 @@ func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[str
}
func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
if shellNetworkAllowed(ctx, options.Sandbox, args) {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "server started"}
}
@@ -369,7 +399,8 @@ func agentNativeBackendStub() sandbox.Backend {
}
type sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool struct {
calls []map[string]any
calls []map[string]any
deferFileObservationCommit []bool
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
@@ -388,8 +419,12 @@ func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs shell commands"}
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tool.RunWithOptions(ctx, args, tools.RunOptions{})
}
func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
if args["sandbox_permissions"] == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "stdout:\nUSER PID COMMAND\nanaxy 42 firefox\nanaxy 43 Discord"}
}
@@ -455,6 +490,9 @@ func TestRunRetriesShellUnsandboxedAfterSandboxNamespaceLimitedOutput(t *testing
if retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"] != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
t.Fatalf("retry args = %#v, want require_escalated", retryTool.calls[1])
}
if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
}
if len(requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one unsandboxed retry approval", requests)
}
@@ -606,6 +644,9 @@ func TestRunRetriesNetworkDeniedShellWithNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
if _, escalated := retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"]; escalated {
t.Fatalf("network retry must stay sandboxed, got retry args %#v", retryTool.calls[1])
}
if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
}
if len(requests) != 1 || requests[0].Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one network approval", requests)
}
@@ -863,9 +904,6 @@ func TestRunReportsTruncationFinishReason(t *testing.T) {
if result.FinishReason != zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength {
t.Fatalf("FinishReason = %q, want %q", result.FinishReason, zeroruntime.FinishReasonLength)
}
if !result.Truncated() {
t.Fatal("Truncated() = false, want true for a length-capped response")
}
if result.TruncationNotice() == "" {
t.Fatal("TruncationNotice() empty for a truncated response")
}
@@ -883,7 +921,7 @@ func TestRunNormalCompletionIsNotTruncated(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Truncated() || result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
if result.TruncationNotice() != "" {
t.Fatalf("normal completion reported as truncated: reason=%q", result.FinishReason)
}
}
@@ -960,7 +998,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsUsageEvents(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAdvertisesRuntimeToolDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1167,9 +1205,9 @@ func TestRunRequestsPermissionBeforeWebSearchExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewGrepTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedGrepTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
@@ -1197,7 +1235,7 @@ func TestRunFiltersAdvertisedTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1234,7 +1272,7 @@ func TestRunRejectsFilteredToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRejectsToolCallsOutsideEnabledList(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1272,7 +1310,7 @@ func TestRunExecutesToolCallThroughRegistry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha\nbeta\n")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1356,7 +1394,7 @@ func TestRunPreservesRequestPrefixAcrossTurns(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunSanitizesMalformedToolCallArgumentsBeforeRetry(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1424,7 +1462,7 @@ func TestRunRecoversFirstObjectFromConcatenatedToolArgs(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -1471,8 +1509,8 @@ func TestRunDefersSelfCorrectFeedbackUntilAfterToolBatch(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1547,7 +1585,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
// after a later call in the same turn supersedes it.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -1604,7 +1642,7 @@ func TestRunBatchesSelfCorrectOncePerTurn(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1647,7 +1685,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWithoutUnsafePermission(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1703,7 +1741,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsPromptToolPermissionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1752,7 +1790,7 @@ func TestRunAllowsWorkspaceWriteWithoutPromptWhenSandboxPolicyPermits(t *testing
func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write denied")
var requests []PermissionRequest
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1800,7 +1838,7 @@ func TestRunDeniesPromptToolWhenPermissionRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write should not continue")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -1896,7 +1934,7 @@ func TestRunPersistsAlwaysAllowPermissionDecision(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
@@ -1968,7 +2006,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2049,7 +2087,7 @@ func TestRunSessionAllowSkipsMatchingPromptWithoutPersistentGrant(t *testing.T)
func TestRunCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsLaterMatchingBashPrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2251,7 +2289,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixApprovalSkipsFutureSessionPrompt(t *testing.T
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
policy.Network = sandbox.NetworkAllow
@@ -2358,7 +2396,7 @@ func TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("seed command prefix: %v", err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2407,7 +2445,11 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "PATH=.:$PATH curl https://example.com"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `$env:PATH = '.;' + $env:PATH; curl.cmd https://example.com`
} else {
command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
}
fakeCurl := filepath.Join(root, "curl.cmd")
if err := os.WriteFile(fakeCurl, []byte("@echo fake curl %*\r\n"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
@@ -2419,7 +2461,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
}
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2486,7 +2528,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -2528,13 +2570,17 @@ func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
command := "echo rm -rf /"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
command = `Write-Output 'rm -rf /'`
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"echo rm -rf /"}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":` + quoteJSONString(command) + `}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
@@ -2598,7 +2644,7 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
// prior code denied it because persistPermissionGrant errors when Sandbox==nil.
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write approved")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2630,6 +2676,12 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func windowsTestUsesPowerShell() bool {
executable, _ := tools.HostShellCommand("")
name := strings.ToLower(filepath.Base(executable))
return strings.Contains(name, "powershell") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "pwsh")
}
func containsPermissionDecision(decisions []PermissionDecisionAction, want PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, decision := range decisions {
if decision == want {
@@ -2662,7 +2714,7 @@ func TestRunCancellationPreservesContextCanceledIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunGrantsPromptToolInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2714,7 +2766,7 @@ func TestRunEmitsPermissionEventForPersistentSandboxGrant(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("write done")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2893,7 +2945,7 @@ func TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
outside := filepath.Join(tempDirOutsideDefaultTemp(t), "escape.txt")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWritePathThenAnswer(outside, "sandbox handled")
var permissionEvents []PermissionEvent
@@ -2942,7 +2994,7 @@ func TestRunStopsAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
@@ -2972,7 +3024,7 @@ func TestRunRequestsFinalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3163,22 +3215,17 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsHostShellContext(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected operating system in environment block, got %q", prompt)
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
for _, want := range []string{"Windows cmd.exe syntax", "cwd argument", "MSYS binaries", "grep", "require_escalated", "use double quotes around the value"} {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
wants := []string{"workdir/cwd", "MSYS binaries"}
if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
wants = append(wants, "PowerShell", "Get-ChildItem", "Select-String", "$env:NAME", "require_escalated")
} else {
wants = append(wants, "cmd.exe", "double quotes")
}
// The examples must themselves use the safe (double-quoted) form; a
// single-quoted example here would teach the model the exact syntax
// that fails under cmd.exe.
for _, want := range []string{`--jq ".a | b"`, `-run "A|B"`} {
for _, want := range wants {
if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected double-quoted example %q in Windows shell guidance, got %q", want, prompt)
t.Fatalf("expected selected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
}
}
if strings.Contains(prompt, `'.a | b'`) || strings.Contains(prompt, `'A|B'`) {
t.Fatalf("Windows shell guidance must not show the unsafe single-quoted form, got %q", prompt)
}
} else if !strings.Contains(prompt, "/bin/sh syntax") {
t.Fatalf("expected POSIX shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
}
@@ -3231,7 +3278,7 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptAllowsSpecModeOverride(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, root, nil)
@@ -3268,7 +3315,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftAdvertisesOnlySafeDraftTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewWriteFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("done")
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "draft", provider, Options{
@@ -3301,7 +3348,7 @@ func TestSpecDraftDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
func TestSpecDraftDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
@@ -3442,7 +3489,7 @@ func TestRunSurfacesDroppedToolCallAlongsideValidCall(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -3545,6 +3592,11 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(placeholder), "aborted") {
t.Fatalf("expected the placeholder result to mark the call as aborted, got %q", placeholder)
}
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.ToolCallID == "flaky-2" && !message.IsError {
t.Fatalf("aborted placeholder must carry error status: %#v", message)
}
}
// Every tool_use in the final assistant message must have a matching result.
for _, message := range result.Messages {
@@ -3559,6 +3611,33 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
}
}
func TestRunCarriesToolErrorStatusIntoMessageHistory(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(alwaysFailingTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "failed-call", ToolName: "flaky"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "failed-call"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.ToolCallID == "failed-call" {
if !message.IsError {
t.Fatalf("failed tool result lost its structured status: %#v", message)
}
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("failed tool result missing from message history: %#v", result.Messages)
}
type secretEmittingTool struct{ output string }
func (t secretEmittingTool) Name() string { return "leak" }
@@ -3650,6 +3729,8 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}
onUsageCalls := 0
onContextCalls := 0
var contextPlan ContextBreakdown
rec := trace.NewRecorder("tracing-session", "run-1", "test")
if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
SessionID: "tracing-session",
@@ -3658,6 +3739,10 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
Model: "test-model",
Trace: rec,
OnUsage: func(Usage) { onUsageCalls++ },
OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
onContextCalls++
contextPlan = breakdown
},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
@@ -3684,6 +3769,12 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
if onUsageCalls == 0 {
t.Fatal("wrapped OnUsage did not forward to the caller's callback")
}
if onContextCalls != 1 || len(contextPlan.Blocks) != 2 || contextPlan.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" {
t.Fatalf("context plan callback = calls %d, plan %#v", onContextCalls, contextPlan)
}
if len(tr.PrefixHashes) != 1 || tr.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" || tr.PrefixHashes[0].CompletePrefixHash != contextPlan.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatalf("trace context evidence = %#v, plan %#v", tr.PrefixHashes, contextPlan)
}
}
// TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage verifies a nil recorder leaves the loop
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -19,6 +20,16 @@ type propagationOutputTool struct {
func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
for index, arg := range os.Args {
if arg == "--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat" && index+1 < len(os.Args) {
repeats, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Args[index+1])
if err != nil {
os.Exit(2)
}
if _, err := os.Stdout.WriteString(strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)); err != nil {
os.Exit(2)
}
os.Exit(0)
}
if arg != "--zero-output-budget-hook" || index+1 >= len(os.Args) {
continue
}
@@ -30,25 +41,102 @@ func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
}
func largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher() *hooks.Dispatcher {
feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", 200)
return outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("propagation_output", 200)
}
func outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor(toolName string, repeats int) *hooks.Dispatcher {
feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)
hookArgs := []string{
"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
"--",
"--zero-output-budget-hook",
feedback,
}
if repeats > 1_000 {
hookArgs = []string{
"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
"--",
"--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat",
strconv.Itoa(repeats),
}
}
return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{Config: hooks.Config{
Enabled: true,
Hooks: []hooks.Definition{{
ID: "large-feedback",
Event: hooks.EventAfterTool,
Matcher: "propagation_output",
Matcher: toolName,
Command: os.Args[0],
Args: []string{
"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
"--",
"--zero-output-budget-hook",
feedback,
},
Args: hookArgs,
Enabled: true,
}},
}})
}
func TestExecuteToolCallCommitsReadObservationAfterFinalBoundary(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
}
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "read-small", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker})
if abortErr != nil || result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: result=%#v err=%v", result, abortErr)
}
if !tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
t.Fatal("unmodified final read output was not committed as observed")
}
}
func TestExecuteToolCallDoesNotCommitReadObservationBeforeHookBudget(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
root := t.TempDir()
targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
}
resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
ID: "read-hook", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker, Hooks: outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("read_file", 20_000),
})
if abortErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", abortErr)
}
if !result.Truncated {
t.Fatalf("precondition: hook feedback was not truncated: %#v", result)
}
if tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
t.Fatal("read observation committed before hook output was budgeted")
}
}
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Name() string { return "propagation_output" }
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Description() string { return "returns output for propagation tests" }
func (tool propagationOutputTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
// "read_file".
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (c *profileController) maybeEscalate() (PostureEscalation, bool) {
if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
if !(c.failureTripped || c.riskTripped || c.scTripped || c.uncertainTrip) {
if !c.failureTripped && !c.riskTripped && !c.scTripped && !c.uncertainTrip {
return PostureEscalation{}, false
}
c.escalated = true
+15
View File
@@ -123,6 +123,21 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversTransientSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
changed := base
changed.TransientSystemPrompt = "turn-only guidance"
fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change for transient system guidance")
}
if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must cover transient system guidance")
}
}
// TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
// substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
// which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
+64
View File
@@ -121,3 +121,67 @@ func toolNameForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, index int) string {
func isPrunedPlaceholder(content string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(content), "[pruned ")
}
var supersedableReadTools = map[string]bool{
"read_file": true,
"read_minified_file": true,
"grep": true,
"glob": true,
"list_directory": true,
}
// pruneSupersededReadResults removes only older byte-identical results of the
// same read call. It runs when context pressure already requires a rewrite, so
// it does not trade a warm provider-cache prefix for a small apparent saving.
func pruneSupersededReadResults(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]zeroruntime.Message, int) {
type seenResultKey struct {
call string
content string
}
seen := map[seenResultKey]struct{}{}
out := messages
reclaimed := 0
copied := false
for index := len(messages) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
message := messages[index]
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || isPrunedPlaceholder(message.Content) {
continue
}
call, ok := toolCallForResult(messages, index)
if !ok || !supersedableReadTools[call.Name] {
continue
}
key := seenResultKey{
call: call.Name + "\x00" + strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments),
content: message.Content,
}
if _, exists := seen[key]; exists {
placeholder := fmt.Sprintf("[superseded identical %s result — the newer result remains in context]", call.Name)
if !copied {
out = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), messages...)
copied = true
}
out[index].Content = placeholder
reclaimed += max(0, ApproxTextTokens(message.Content)-ApproxTextTokens(placeholder))
continue
}
seen[key] = struct{}{}
}
return out, reclaimed
}
func toolCallForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, resultIndex int) (zeroruntime.ToolCall, bool) {
id := messages[resultIndex].ToolCallID
if id == "" {
return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
}
for index := resultIndex - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
for _, call := range messages[index].ToolCalls {
if call.ID == id {
return call, true
}
}
}
return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
}
+73
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ func toolCallMsg(id, name string) zeroruntime.Message {
}
}
func toolCallWithArgs(id, name, args string) zeroruntime.Message {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: name, Arguments: args}},
}
}
func TestPruneSkipsSmallSessions(t *testing.T) {
// Total reclaimable is under the gate → no pruning.
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
@@ -120,3 +127,69 @@ func TestPruneDoesNotMutateInput(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("pruneStaleToolOutput must not mutate the caller's slice")
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsOnlyDropsIdenticalOlderReads(t *testing.T) {
body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("different", "read_file", `{"path":"b.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "different", Content: body},
toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
t.Fatalf("older duplicate was not pruned: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
}
if out[3].Content != body || out[5].Content != body {
t.Fatal("different call and newest result must remain exact")
}
if messages[1].Content != body {
t.Fatal("input slice was mutated")
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsKeepsChangedAndMutatingResults(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("r1", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r1", Content: "version one"},
toolCallWithArgs("r2", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r2", Content: "version two"},
toolCallWithArgs("e1", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "edited"},
toolCallWithArgs("e2", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "edited"},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unsafe results were pruned: %d", reclaimed)
}
for index := range messages {
if out[index].Content != messages[index].Content {
t.Fatalf("message %d changed unexpectedly", index)
}
}
}
func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsFindsMatchingBodyAcrossChangedRead(t *testing.T) {
bodyA := strings.Repeat("version a\n", 100)
bodyB := strings.Repeat("version b\n", 100)
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallWithArgs("old-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old-a", Content: bodyA},
toolCallWithArgs("middle-b", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "middle-b", Content: bodyB},
toolCallWithArgs("new-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new-a", Content: bodyA},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
t.Fatalf("older matching body was not pruned across a changed result: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
}
if out[3].Content != bodyB || out[5].Content != bodyA {
t.Fatal("changed middle result and newest matching result must remain exact")
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsRequiresPromptUnderAutoAllow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewBashTool(t.TempDir()), args, false, decision) {
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewScopedBashTool(t.TempDir(), nil), args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("inline additional permissions must request approval even when a sandboxed shell would otherwise auto-allow")
}
}
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ func TestSpecialistDelegationContext(t *testing.T) {
if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
}
for _, want := range []string{"reduce total context", "Do not delegate small direct work", "bounded assignment"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("missing evidence-driven delegation guidance %q: %q", want, got)
}
}
for _, unwanted := range []string{"delegate to it proactively", "launch several specialists in parallel"} {
if strings.Contains(got, unwanted) {
t.Fatalf("retained broad delegation guidance %q: %q", unwanted, got)
}
}
}
func TestSystemPromptIncludesDelegationOnlyWithSpecialists(t *testing.T) {
+12 -14
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
)
@@ -94,6 +95,9 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
core = fallbackSystemPrompt
}
sections := []string{core}
if transient := strings.TrimSpace(options.TransientSystemPrompt); transient != "" {
sections = append(sections, transient)
}
if addendum := modelPromptAddendum(options.Model); addendum != "" {
sections = append(sections, addendum)
}
@@ -178,21 +182,19 @@ func approvedCommandPrefixContext(options Options) string {
return "## Approved Command Prefixes\n\nThe following command prefixes have already been approved and do not need another permission prompt:\n" + strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
// specialistDelegationContext nudges the orchestrator to offload read-heavy or
// parallelizable work to a specialist sub-agent via the Task tool, keeping large
// tool outputs out of the main context. It renders only when specialists are
// known (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with
// no delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
// specialistDelegationContext describes when a specialist earns its extra
// context and coordination cost. It renders only when specialists are known
// (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with no
// delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
if len(options.Specialists) == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("<specialists>\n")
b.WriteString("Delegate focused or read-heavy work to a specialist sub-agent with the Task tool instead of doing it inline. ")
b.WriteString("When a request matches a specialist's purpose, delegate to it proactively — you do not need the user to ask first. ")
b.WriteString("This keeps large tool outputs — searches, file dumps, multi-step exploration — out of your own context, so you stay fast and token-efficient. ")
b.WriteString("Prefer delegating codebase search and exploration; for independent subtasks, launch several specialists in parallel. Handle small, direct edits yourself.\n")
b.WriteString("Use the Task tool when a specialist's focused context, expertise, or an independent parallel subtask is likely to improve quality or reduce total context. ")
b.WriteString("Do not delegate small direct work, duplicate exploration, or split sequential steps merely because a specialist is available. ")
b.WriteString("When delegating, give a bounded assignment and consume its concise evidence instead of importing a long transcript.\n")
b.WriteString("Available specialists (call Task with the matching name when the task fits its purpose):\n")
for _, info := range options.Specialists {
name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
@@ -310,11 +312,7 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
b.WriteString("<environment>\n")
b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools. To put | & > < etc inside an arg value, use double quotes around the value, not single quotes (single quotes do not protect metachars in cmd.exe): gh --jq \".a | b\", go test -run \"A|B\". Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required. Prefer the workdir/cwd argument over cd when changing directories.\n")
} else {
b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
}
b.WriteString(tools.HostShellEnvironmentGuidance() + "\n")
if branch := gitBranchForPrompt(cwd); branch != "" {
b.WriteString("Git branch: " + branch + "\n")
}
+16 -14
View File
@@ -30,16 +30,13 @@ work.
read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
read.
2. **Plan.** For multi-step work, call update_plan with an ordered checklist and
keep it live. The plan bar is the user's progress signal — call update_plan
after EACH concrete unit of work (every file written, every command run), not
just at coarse milestones: mark the finished item completed and the next one
in_progress before you start it. A plan stuck at 0/N while files are landing is
a bug, not economy — these calls are cheap, expected, and the update_plan cards
are hidden from the transcript, so frequent updates cost the user nothing and
never clutter the conversation. Keep at most one item in_progress, and never
batch the updates to the end of the turn. Skip the plan for trivial one-step
tasks.
2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for implementation or investigation that has at
least three meaningful dependent steps, then keep it current at milestones.
Mark completed work and the next in-progress step together when practical;
do not spend separate turns updating it after every file or command. Keep at
most one item in_progress. Skip plans for simple lookups, explanations, code
navigation, and other short tasks. Never create a plan after the work is
already complete merely to describe what you did.
3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -54,11 +51,16 @@ work.
## Editing discipline
- Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
file tools - read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file,
apply_patch - over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
shell or script invocation.
- Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
code while removing comments and redundant whitespace. Use read_file when
exact text, comments, or line numbers are needed.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
bulk shell or script rewrite.
- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
+2 -1
View File
@@ -71,5 +71,6 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
- Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
- Use update_plan only for work with at least three meaningful dependent steps;
skip it for simple lookups and never create one after the work is complete.
</model_guidance>`
+10
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTransientSystemPromptIsIncludedOnlyWhenProvided(t *testing.T) {
const transient = "Handle this peer request under the current session policy."
if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{}); strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
t.Fatal("ordinary system prompt unexpectedly contains transient instructions")
}
if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{TransientSystemPrompt: transient}); !strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
t.Fatalf("transient instructions missing from system prompt:\n%s", prompt)
}
}
func TestSystemPromptExplainsSandboxEscalationForHiddenHostState(t *testing.T) {
prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
for _, want := range []string{
+217 -10
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
package agent
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
@@ -52,17 +56,41 @@ type taskVerificationState struct {
LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
}
type taskFailureState struct {
Key string `json:"key,omitempty"`
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
Summary string `json:"summary"`
}
type taskApprovalState struct {
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Decision PermissionDecisionAction `json:"decision,omitempty"`
Scope string `json:"scope,omitempty"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
}
type taskArtifactState struct {
Tool string `json:"tool"`
Path string `json:"path"`
}
type taskStateSnapshot struct {
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
Revision int `json:"revision"`
Objective string `json:"objective"`
Status taskStatus `json:"status"`
Plan taskPlanState `json:"plan"`
Tools taskToolState `json:"tools"`
Verification taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
ChangedFiles []string `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
Constraints []string `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
UnresolvedFailures []taskFailureState `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
Approvals []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
Artifacts []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
ResolvedFailureKeys []string `json:"-"`
CompletionDecision CompletionDecision `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
CompletionReason string `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
PlanParity taskPlanParity `json:"plan_parity"`
}
type taskStateEventKind int
@@ -72,6 +100,7 @@ const (
taskStateEventToolResult
taskStateEventVerification
taskStateEventCompletion
taskStateEventPermission
)
type taskStateEvent struct {
@@ -80,6 +109,7 @@ type taskStateEvent struct {
toolResult ToolResult
verification Outcome
completion completionEvaluation
permission PermissionEvent
}
// taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
@@ -101,6 +131,7 @@ func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
},
changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
}
state.snapshotValue.Constraints = extractExplicitConstraints(objective)
state.recorder = recorder
return state
}
@@ -134,6 +165,7 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
}
}
state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
state.observeToolEvidence(event.arguments, event.toolResult)
changed = true
case taskStateEventVerification:
if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
@@ -160,6 +192,10 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
}
changed = true
case taskStateEventPermission:
state.markActive()
state.observePermission(event.permission)
changed = true
}
if changed {
state.snapshotValue.Revision++
@@ -183,9 +219,180 @@ func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
snapshot := state.snapshotValue
snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
snapshot.Constraints = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.Constraints...)
snapshot.UnresolvedFailures = append([]taskFailureState(nil), state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures...)
snapshot.Approvals = append([]taskApprovalState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Approvals...)
snapshot.Artifacts = append([]taskArtifactState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Artifacts...)
snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys...)
return snapshot
}
const (
maxTaskEvidenceEntries = 8
maxTaskEvidenceBytes = 320
maxTaskConstraints = 10
)
func (state *taskState) observeToolEvidence(arguments string, result ToolResult) {
command := capTaskEvidence(commandFromArguments(arguments))
key := taskFailureKey(result.Name, command, arguments)
if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
if hasTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key) {
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
} else {
state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = removeString(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key)
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = appendBounded(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, taskFailureState{
Key: key, Tool: result.Name, Command: command, Summary: capTaskEvidence(firstLine(result.Output)),
}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
for _, metaKey := range []string{"spill_path", "artifact_path"} {
if path := strings.TrimSpace(result.Meta[metaKey]); path != "" {
state.snapshotValue.Artifacts = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Artifacts,
taskArtifactState{Tool: result.Name, Path: capTaskEvidence(path)}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
}
}
func taskFailureKey(toolName, command, arguments string) string {
identity := command
if identity == "" {
canonical := []byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments))
var value any
if json.Unmarshal(canonical, &value) == nil {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(value); err == nil {
canonical = encoded
}
}
digest := sha256.Sum256(canonical)
identity = fmt.Sprintf("args:%x", digest[:8])
}
return strings.TrimSpace(toolName) + "\x00" + identity
}
func (state *taskState) observePermission(event PermissionEvent) {
decision := event.DecisionAction
if decision == "" {
decision = PermissionDecisionAction(event.Action)
}
state.snapshotValue.Approvals = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Approvals, taskApprovalState{
Tool: event.ToolName, Decision: decision, Scope: capTaskEvidence(event.Scope),
Reason: capTaskEvidence(firstNonEmptyString(event.DecisionReason, event.Reason)),
}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
}
func commandFromArguments(arguments string) string {
var object map[string]json.RawMessage
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
return ""
}
for _, key := range []string{"cmd", "command", "script", "shell"} {
var command string
if raw, ok := object[key]; ok && json.Unmarshal(raw, &command) == nil {
return strings.TrimSpace(command)
}
}
return ""
}
func firstLine(value string) string {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if index := strings.IndexByte(value, '\n'); index >= 0 {
value = value[:index]
}
return value
}
func capTaskEvidence(value string) string {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if len(value) <= maxTaskEvidenceBytes {
return value
}
limit := maxTaskEvidenceBytes - 3
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(value[limit]) {
limit--
}
return strings.TrimSpace(value[:limit]) + "..."
}
var explicitConstraintPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bprefer(?:s|red|ring)?\s+\w`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bdon'?t want\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\balways (?:use|do|run|prefer|keep|make|format|write|add|set|put|prefix|start|include|append)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bnever (?:use|do|run|push|commit|write|ignore|add|set|put|remove|delete|include|deploy)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bplease (?:use|avoid|keep|make|don'?t|do not|format|write)\b`),
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(?:style|format|language|naming)\s*[:=]\s*\S`),
}
func extractExplicitConstraints(text string) []string {
var constraints []string
for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if len(line) < 5 || len(line) > 200 || strings.HasSuffix(line, "?") || strings.Contains(line, "?...") {
continue
}
for _, pattern := range explicitConstraintPatterns {
if pattern.MatchString(line) {
constraints = appendBoundedUnique(constraints, line, maxTaskConstraints)
break
}
}
if len(constraints) == maxTaskConstraints {
break
}
}
return constraints
}
func appendBounded[T any](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
values = append(values, value)
if len(values) > limit {
values = values[len(values)-limit:]
}
return values
}
func appendBoundedUnique[T comparable](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
filtered := values[:0]
for _, existing := range values {
if existing != value {
filtered = append(filtered, existing)
}
}
return appendBounded(filtered, value, limit)
}
func hasTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) bool {
for _, value := range values {
if value.Key == key {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func removeTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) []taskFailureState {
out := values[:0]
for _, value := range values {
if value.Key != key {
out = append(out, value)
}
}
return out
}
func removeString(values []string, target string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(values))
for _, value := range values {
if value != target {
out = append(out, value)
}
}
return out
}
// observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
// calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
// parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
+62
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,68 @@ func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestTaskStateRecordsDurableRuntimeEvidence(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.\nNever commit generated reports.", nil)
arguments := `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/agent"}`
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "test-1", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError,
Output: "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed\nfull diagnostic",
Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt"},
}})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
Scope: "/tmp", DecisionReason: "write a temporary fixture",
}})
snapshot := state.snapshot()
if !reflect.DeepEqual(snapshot.Constraints, []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never commit generated reports."}) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected explicit constraints: %#v", snapshot.Constraints)
}
if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Command != "go test ./internal/agent" || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected failure evidence: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
}
if len(snapshot.Artifacts) != 1 || snapshot.Artifacts[0].Path != ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected artifact evidence: %#v", snapshot.Artifacts)
}
if len(snapshot.Approvals) != 1 || snapshot.Approvals[0].Decision != PermissionDecisionAllowForSession || snapshot.Approvals[0].Scope != "/tmp" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected approval evidence: %#v", snapshot.Approvals)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go is unavailable",
}})
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"b.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-b", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package b",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 2 || failures[1].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("success for a different target resolved the wrong failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "test-2", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 1 || failures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("successful retry did not resolve only its matching failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a-2", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package a",
}})
if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("successful non-command retry did not resolve its matching failure: %#v", failures)
}
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "read-a-3", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go failed again",
}})
snapshot = state.snapshot()
if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go failed again" {
t.Fatalf("a failure recurring after success was hidden: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
}
for _, key := range snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys {
if key == snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Key {
t.Fatalf("recurring failure retained a stale resolved key: %#v", snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys)
}
}
}
func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
+207
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// imageTool returns a tool result carrying an image, the way a screenshot tool
// should be able to.
type imageTool struct {
media string
data []byte
}
func (imageTool) Name() string { return "capture" }
func (imageTool) Description() string { return "Captures an image." }
func (imageTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (imageTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t imageTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "Captured a screenshot.",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: t.media, Data: t.data}},
}
}
// A tool that produces an image must get that image in front of the model.
//
// It cannot ride the tool-result message: every provider drops images there.
// Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block with string content,
// Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user
// role explicitly. So the image has to arrive as a following user message,
// which is also the only shape that keeps one tool result per tool call.
func TestRunDeliversToolResultImagesToTheModel(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I can see it."},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
for index := range result.Messages {
if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
carrier = &result.Messages[index]
break
}
}
if carrier == nil {
t.Fatal("no message carried the tool's image; the model never saw it")
}
if carrier.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Errorf("image rode a %q message; every provider only serializes images on the user role", carrier.Role)
}
if got := carrier.Images[0].MediaType; got != "image/png" {
t.Errorf("media type = %q, want image/png", got)
}
// The tool-result pairing must be untouched: one tool result per tool call.
toolResults := 0
for _, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults++
}
}
if toolResults != 1 {
t.Errorf("got %d tool-result messages for 1 tool call", toolResults)
}
}
// textTool is a second, image-free tool so a turn can carry two calls.
type textTool struct{}
func (textTool) Name() string { return "note" }
func (textTool) Description() string { return "Notes something." }
func (textTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
}
func (textTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow} }
func (textTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "noted"}
}
// Tool results for one assistant turn must stay contiguous. The image messages
// are user-role, and a user message between two tool_results breaks strict
// provider replay: Anthropic coalesces consecutive user content into one block
// list and requires tool_result blocks first, so interleaving produces
// [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and the request is rejected.
//
// The first version of this feature appended each image immediately after its
// own tool result, which is exactly that shape. A single-tool-call test passed
// and said nothing about it.
func TestRunKeepsToolResultsContiguousWhenAToolReturnsAnImage(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
registry.Register(textTool{})
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "capture"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c2", ToolName: "note"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c2", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c2"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "two calls", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
}
// Two separate ifs rather than a switch: a tool-role message that also
// carried images would match only the first arm of a switch, so a regression
// that put the image back on the tool result would read as "no image at all"
// instead of naming what actually happened.
type toolResult struct {
index int
id string
}
var toolResults []toolResult
imageIndex := -1
for index, message := range result.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolResults = append(toolResults, toolResult{index: index, id: message.ToolCallID})
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
if imageIndex >= 0 {
t.Fatalf("image delivered twice, at %d and %d; recorded %s", imageIndex, index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
imageIndex = index
}
}
if imageIndex < 0 {
t.Fatalf("the image never reached the model; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if len(toolResults) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d tool-result messages for 2 tool calls; recorded %s", len(toolResults), messageShape(result.Messages))
}
if toolResults[0].id != "c1" || toolResults[1].id != "c2" {
t.Errorf("tool results answered %q then %q, want c1 then c2", toolResults[0].id, toolResults[1].id)
}
// The contract Anthropic enforces: every tool_result block has to come before
// any other block in the user message it lands in. Anything wedged between
// the two results breaks that, which is the 400 this PR exists to avoid.
if toolResults[1].index != toolResults[0].index+1 {
t.Errorf("tool results at %d and %d are not adjacent; %q message at %d splits them; recorded %s",
toolResults[0].index, toolResults[1].index, result.Messages[toolResults[0].index+1].Role,
toolResults[0].index+1, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
// Follows the last tool result, deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1.
// appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user-role content, so
// [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] still maps to tool_result blocks
// first and replays fine; pinning would redden that valid shape for nothing.
if imageIndex <= toolResults[1].index {
t.Errorf("image message at %d does not follow the last tool result at %d; recorded %s",
imageIndex, toolResults[1].index, messageShape(result.Messages))
}
}
// messageShape renders the conversation as a compact role list so a failure says
// what the ordering actually was instead of dumping whole messages.
func messageShape(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
for index, message := range messages {
part := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", index, message.Role)
if message.ToolCallID != "" {
part += "(" + message.ToolCallID + ")"
}
if len(message.Images) > 0 {
part += "+image"
}
parts = append(parts, part)
}
return "[" + strings.Join(parts, " ") + "]"
}
+13 -12
View File
@@ -68,8 +68,11 @@ type ToolResult struct {
Output string
// Truncated reports that the tool's model-visible output omitted content.
// The full result may be recoverable through Meta["spill_path"].
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]string
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]string
// Images the tool produced, delivered to the model as a following user
// message rather than on this result. See tools.Result.Images.
Images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
Redacted bool
ChangedFiles []string
// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
@@ -280,6 +283,9 @@ type Options struct {
ReasoningEffort string
Cwd string
SystemPrompt string
// TransientSystemPrompt adds trusted runtime guidance for this run only.
// Empty preserves the ordinary system prompt byte-for-byte.
TransientSystemPrompt string
// ResponseStyle is the operator-selected reply style from the TUI /style
// command (e.g. "concise", "explanatory", "review"). It is rendered into the
// system prompt as a short directive. Empty or "balanced" adds nothing — the
@@ -330,9 +336,11 @@ type Options struct {
// specialist child process emits while running. The toolCallID identifies
// which Task tool call the progress belongs to. nil is a no-op.
OnToolProgress func(toolCallID string, event streamjson.Event)
// OnContext, when set, is called once per turn with the per-category context
// budget of the request about to be sent, so a surface (TUI/CLI) can show
// context utilization. Opt-in like the other callbacks; nil is a no-op.
// OnContext, when set, is called for each main agent request with its
// per-category context budget, including a replacement request after
// compaction or a stall retry. Internal summarizer requests are excluded so
// surfaces keep showing the active conversation budget. Opt-in like the other
// callbacks; nil is a no-op.
OnContext func(ContextBreakdown)
// ModelSwitcher, when set, lets a tool escalate the run to a stronger model
// mid-run: the loop calls it with the requested model id and, on success,
@@ -427,13 +435,6 @@ type Result struct {
IncompleteReason string
}
// Truncated reports whether the final response ended abnormally (cut off at the
// output token cap or withheld by a content filter) rather than completing
// naturally. Callers can use it to warn the user that FinalAnswer is incomplete.
func (result Result) Truncated() bool {
return result.FinishReason != ""
}
// TruncationNotice returns a user-facing warning when the final response was
// truncated, or "" for a normal completion. Shared by the CLI and TUI so the
// wording stays consistent.
-4
View File
@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ type AgentRunner interface {
type AgentRunnerFunc func(context.Context, AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
// defaultAgentOutputLimit caps captured stdout/stderr per stream so a chatty or
// runaway agent cannot exhaust memory or bloat the benchmark report.
const defaultAgentOutputLimit = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB per stream
+8
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package agenteval
import "context"
func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
return fn(ctx, input)
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -125,9 +125,7 @@ func Score(suite Suite, input ScoreInput) Report {
if len(task.RequiredTraceEvents) > 0 {
report.Results = append(report.Results, scoreTraceEvents(task.RequiredTraceEvents, input))
}
for _, result := range unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input) {
report.Results = append(report.Results, result)
}
report.Results = append(report.Results, unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input)...)
report.finishSummary()
return report
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ func FormatFacts(info repoinfo.Info) string {
b.WriteString("Pre-computed repository facts (from a local scan — verify and fill gaps):\n")
if info.PrimaryLanguage != "" {
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount)
}
if langs := topLanguages(info.Languages, 5); langs != "" {
b.WriteString("- Languages: " + langs + "\n")
}
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth)
if info.WorkspaceType != "" && info.WorkspaceType != "none" {
b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount))
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount)
}
if len(info.BuildTools) > 0 {
b.WriteString("- Build tools: " + strings.Join(info.BuildTools, ", ") + "\n")
+3 -6
View File
@@ -149,12 +149,9 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for {
// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
break // child no longer exists
}
// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
+7 -3
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ Usage:
Not meant to be run interactively — point your editor's ACP / external-agent
setting at "zero acp".`
var acpSignalContext = signalContext
// runACP serves ACP over stdio so an editor can drive ZERO's agent core. It
// speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 (newline-delimited JSON) on stdin/stdout; stderr stays free
// for human-readable diagnostics. The session lifecycle maps onto ZERO's own
@@ -42,7 +44,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
}
}
conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
// The process's own stdin belongs exclusively to this Conn for the life of
// the command, so cancellation may close it to interrupt an idle read.
conn := acp.NewOwnedConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
@@ -73,9 +77,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
AgentInfo: acp.Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: version},
})
ctx, stop := signalContext()
ctx, stop := acpSignalContext()
defer stop()
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "acp: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
return exitSuccess
+120
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
type acpTestReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r acpTestReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type acpTestWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w acpTestWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
func installACPTestContext(t *testing.T) context.CancelFunc {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
previous := acpSignalContext
acpSignalContext = func() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
return ctx, cancel
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
cancel()
acpSignalContext = previous
})
return cancel
}
func TestRunACPCancellationPreservesTerminalReadError(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
wantErr := errors.New("transport read failed")
reader := acpTestReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var stdout bytes.Buffer
writer := acpTestWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
writeStarted <- struct{}{}
<-releaseWrite
return stdout.Write(p)
})
var stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, writer, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not reach the response write")
}
// Keep Serve in the synchronous write until cancellation is observable. The
// regression requires the genuine read error to win over that cancellation.
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitCrash {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want crash %d", code, exitCrash)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after terminal read error")
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "acp: "+wantErr.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want terminal read error", got)
}
}
func TestRunACPIdleCancellationExitsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
pipeReader, pipeWriter := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pipeWriter.Close() })
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
reader := &acpNotifyingReadCloser{ReadCloser: pipeReader, readStarted: readStarted}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, &stdout, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-readStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not begin reading")
}
cancel()
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want success %d; stderr: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after cancellation")
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
}
}
type acpNotifyingReadCloser struct {
io.ReadCloser
readStarted chan<- struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (r *acpNotifyingReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
r.once.Do(func() { r.readStarted <- struct{}{} })
return r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -515,9 +515,7 @@ func agentEvalReportFromBenchmark(suite agenteval.Suite, report agenteval.Benchm
if task.Agent.Truncated {
converted.Truncated = true
}
for _, failure := range agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task) {
converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, failure)
}
converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task)...)
}
return converted
}
+26 -1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/peermsg"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
@@ -585,6 +586,9 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
baseProbeProviderHealth := deps.probeProviderHealth
deps.probeProviderHealth = func(ctx context.Context, options providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result {
options.Profile = applyStoredProviderKeyAt(options.Profile, userConfigPath)
if options.OAuthResolver == nil {
options.OAuthResolver, _ = oauthLoginForProfile(options.Profile)
}
return baseProbeProviderHealth(ctx, options)
}
return deps
@@ -783,6 +787,26 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
if permissionMode == "" {
permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeAsk
}
sessionStore := deps.newSessionStore()
peerClass := peermsg.PermissionPrompting
if permissionMode == agent.PermissionModeUnsafe {
peerClass = peermsg.PermissionBypass
}
peerService, peerErr := peermsg.New(peermsg.Options{
Identity: peermsg.Identity{
Cwd: workspaceRoot,
PermissionClass: peerClass,
},
InboundPolicy: peermsg.InboundPolicy(resolved.CrossSessionInbound),
})
if peerErr != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: cross-session messaging unavailable: %s\n", peerErr)
peerService = nil
} else {
for _, tool := range tools.NewPeerSessionTools(peerService) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
}
// Activate deferred MCP-tool loading for the interactive run only when the
// VISIBLE deferred-eligible count meets the resolved threshold, matching exec.
// The registry is complete (core + specialist + MCP + plugins) here, so the
@@ -834,7 +858,8 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
return scratchFileWarning(workspaceRoot, scratchBaseline)
},
Registry: registry,
SessionStore: deps.newSessionStore(),
SessionStore: sessionStore,
PeerService: peerService,
SandboxStore: sandboxStore,
MCPConfig: mcpConfig,
MCPPermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ var completionRoot = completionNode{
{names: []string{"delete", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"edit"}}, {names: []string{"path"}},
}},
{names: []string{"plugins", "plugin"}, children: []completionNode{
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
}},
{names: []string{"backends", "backend"}, children: leafNodes("doctor")},
{names: []string{"skills", "skill"}, children: []completionNode{
+2
View File
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ func TestCompletionTreeCoversAliasesNestingAndCommonFlags(t *testing.T) {
assertCandidates(t, byPath["mcp oauth"], "login", "logout", "status")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["sandbox grants"], "list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["completions"], "bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugins"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugin"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
}
func assertCandidates(t *testing.T, got []string, wants ...string) {
+5 -4
View File
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ func runContext(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
report, err := contextreport.Build(contextreport.Options{
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Provider: resolved.Provider,
Registry: newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
Provider: resolved.Provider,
Registry: newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
})
if err != nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
+3 -4
View File
@@ -77,11 +77,10 @@ func TestRegisterToolSearchIfEligibleSkipsWhenThresholdZero(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestDeferredEligibleCountIgnoresCoreTools(t *testing.T) {
func TestDeferredEligibleCountIncludesOptionalBuiltins(t *testing.T) {
registry := newCoreRegistry(t.TempDir())
// newCoreRegistry holds only built-ins; none implement Deferred().
if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want 0", got)
if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got < 2 {
t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want at least 2 optional built-ins", got)
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
}
if info.Hash != "" {
lines = append(lines, " hash: "+info.Hash)
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf(" hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
}
lines = append(lines, " path: "+info.Skill.Path)
if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
+42
View File
@@ -83,6 +83,48 @@ func TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(info, src) || !strings.Contains(info, "sha256:") {
t.Fatalf("info missing source/hash:\n%s", info)
}
if !strings.Contains(info, "hash drift: false") {
t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift status:\n%s", info)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info --json exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
var beforeJSON map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &beforeJSON); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse skill info json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if beforeJSON["hashDrift"] != false {
t.Fatalf("hashDrift before edit = %#v, want false", beforeJSON["hashDrift"])
}
skillPath := filepath.Join(skillsDir, "confirmation-policy", "SKILL.md")
if err := os.WriteFile(skillPath, []byte("---\ndescription: edited\n---\nchanged\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "hash drift: true") {
t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift after edit:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
stderr.Reset()
if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
t.Fatalf("skill info --json after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
}
var afterJSON map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &afterJSON); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse skill info json after edit: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
}
if afterJSON["hashDrift"] != true {
t.Fatalf("hashDrift after edit = %#v, want true", afterJSON["hashDrift"])
}
// remove deletes it
stdout.Reset()
+42 -7
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -24,12 +25,47 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
cwd := t.TempDir()
var heads, posts atomic.Int64
// Closed when the prewarm probe lands, so the turn can be held open until it
// does. See the POST handler for why that ordering has to be forced.
headSeen := make(chan struct{})
var headOnce sync.Once
var prewarmWaitTimedOut atomic.Bool
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodHead:
heads.Add(1)
headOnce.Do(func() { close(headSeen) })
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/chat/completions"):
// Hold the turn open until the prewarm probe arrives. The probe is
// issued on the run's context, and runExec cancels that context the
// moment it returns, because the stop function signalContext hands
// back is a CancelFunc. A probe that has not reached the wire by the
// end of the run therefore never reaches it at all. That is why the
// poll this replaced could not work at any deadline: once the run is
// over the probe is cancelled, not merely slow.
//
// This widens the window, it does not close it. Once the goroutine is
// scheduled it still has only prewarmTimeout to dial loopback and
// write the request, and that timeout is armed inside the goroutine
// itself, so holding the turn here cannot extend it. If this test
// ever fails again, prewarmTimeout is where to look, not this hold.
//
// No self-deadlock: the pinned transport leaves MaxConnsPerHost at 0,
// so the HEAD dials its own connection instead of queueing behind
// this held POST. Do not set a per-host connection limit there.
//
// Bounded, so a probe that genuinely never fires fails the assertion
// below with a useful message instead of hanging the test.
select {
case <-headSeen:
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
// Record it. A probe that shows up after this gave up would still
// leave heads at 1, so the count alone proves the probe was
// eventually received, not that it was ordered before the turn,
// which is the whole claim of this test.
prewarmWaitTimedOut.Store(true)
}
posts.Add(1)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("data: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"done\"}}]}\n\n"))
@@ -75,14 +111,13 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
if got := posts.Load(); got < 1 {
t.Fatalf("server saw %d chat-completions POSTs, want >= 1", got)
}
// The prewarm probe is asynchronous; it fires well before the model turn
// finishes, but poll rather than assuming scheduling order. The deadline
// exceeds the production prewarmTimeout (3s) so a slow probe cannot flake
// this assertion.
deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
for heads.Load() == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
// Checked before the count, because the count cannot tell the two apart: a
// probe that arrived only after the guard expired still leaves heads at 1.
if prewarmWaitTimedOut.Load() {
t.Fatal("the turn was not held until the prewarm probe arrived; the probe did not precede it")
}
// No polling: the turn above could not complete until the probe landed, so
// the count is settled by this point.
if got := heads.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("server saw %d prewarm HEAD probes, want exactly 1", got)
}
+28 -2
View File
@@ -308,6 +308,34 @@ func runMCPCheck(ctx context.Context, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io
}
defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
// A connect failure does not come back as err. RegisterTools is deliberately
// best-effort so one unreachable server cannot stop Zero launching: it records
// the failure on the runtime and returns nil. That is right for startup and
// wrong to ignore here, because this is the command a user runs precisely when
// a server is misbehaving, and reporting "is reachable" for a server that never
// started sends them looking somewhere else.
for _, skipped := range mcpRuntime.Skipped() {
if skipped.Name != serverName {
continue
}
message := fmt.Sprintf("MCP server %s is not reachable", serverName)
if skipped.Err != nil {
message = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", message, redaction.ErrorMessage(skipped.Err, redaction.Options{}))
}
if options.json {
payload := struct {
ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
}{ServerName: serverName, Status: "unreachable", Error: message}
if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(payload, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
return exitCrash
}
return exitCrash
}
return writeAppError(stderr, message, exitCrash)
}
items := mcpToolList(registry)
if options.json {
payload := struct {
@@ -734,14 +762,12 @@ func (cfg *mcpWritableConfig) setServerDisabled(name string, disabled bool) (boo
switch {
case legacyFound:
raw = legacyRaw
found = true
case config.IsDefaultMCPServer(name):
// A built-in default server isn't written to the file until the user
// overrides it. Treat it as present with an empty base so disabling it
// writes a minimal {"disabled":true} entry that merges over the default —
// letting `zero mcp disable <default>` work even though it lives in code.
raw = nil
found = true
default:
return false, false, nil
}
+79
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package cli
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -219,3 +220,81 @@ func TestRunMCPCheckNormalizeError(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("want normalize error, got %q", got)
}
}
// TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer covers the case the command exists
// for: a server that fails to start.
//
// RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a connect failure is recorded on
// the runtime and registration returns nil. runMCPCheck used to inspect only
// that nil error and then print "is reachable", which told the user their
// broken server was fine. The command is spawned for real here rather than
// stubbed, because the whole failure mode was a mismatch between what
// registration returns and what it records.
func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer(t *testing.T) {
setTrustConfigRoot(t)
deps := appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
}}, nil
},
}
var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("mcp check must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
}
if got := out.String(); strings.Contains(got, "is reachable") {
t.Fatalf("mcp check reported a failed server as reachable: %q", got)
}
if got := errBuf.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "not reachable") {
t.Fatalf("want an unreachable error naming the server, got %q", got)
}
}
// The --json contract for an unreachable server, which the text case above does
// not touch.
//
// The JSON branch is a separate return path with its own payload, so a caller
// parsing it would otherwise be relying on a shape nothing pins: reverting the
// check leaves it emitting status "ok" with a tool count, which is valid JSON
// and completely wrong.
func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServerJSON(t *testing.T) {
setTrustConfigRoot(t)
deps := appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
}}, nil
},
}
var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("mcp check --json must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
}
var payload struct {
ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Error string `json:"error"`
ToolCount int `json:"toolCount"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode mcp check --json output %q: %v", out.String(), err)
}
if payload.ServerName != "broken" {
t.Fatalf("serverName = %q, want the server that was checked", payload.ServerName)
}
if payload.Status != "unreachable" {
t.Fatalf("status = %q, want %q", payload.Status, "unreachable")
}
if !strings.Contains(payload.Error, "not reachable") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to say the server is not reachable", payload.Error)
}
// A reachable payload carries a tool count; an unreachable one must not
// imply zero tools were found, which reads as a server that simply exposes
// none.
if payload.ToolCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("toolCount = %d, want it absent from an unreachable payload", payload.ToolCount)
}
}
+62
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
@@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
)
@@ -109,6 +112,65 @@ func TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunDoctorConnectivityUsesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
tokenPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "oauth-tokens.json")
t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", tokenPath)
store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: tokenPath})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
}
if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("xai"), oauth.Token{
AccessToken: "oauth-doctor-token",
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed OAuth token: %v", err)
}
var gotAuth string
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[]}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
profile := config.ProviderProfile{
Name: "xai",
CatalogID: "xai",
ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
BaseURL: server.URL + "/v1",
Model: "grok-4",
}
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"doctor", "--connectivity"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
getwd: func() (string, error) {
return t.TempDir(), nil
},
resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
return config.ResolvedConfig{
Provider: profile,
Providers: []config.ProviderProfile{profile},
ActiveProvider: profile.Name,
}, nil
},
probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
now: fixedCLITime("2026-07-29T20:00:00Z"),
})
if exitCode != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("doctor exit = %d, want success; stderr=%q\n%s", exitCode, stderr.String(), stdout.String())
}
if gotAuth != "Bearer oauth-doctor-token" {
t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want OAuth bearer", gotAuth)
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "[pass] provider.connectivity") {
t.Fatalf("doctor did not report passing connectivity:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunDoctorConnectivityReportsProviderHealthFailure(t *testing.T) {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
{id: "fireworks", name: "Fireworks AI", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code"},
{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ func runProvidersDetect(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps
func parseProviderDetectArgs(args []string) (providerDetectOptions, bool, error) {
options := providerDetectOptions{}
for _, arg := range args {
switch {
case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
switch arg {
case "-h", "--help", "help":
return options, true, nil
case arg == "--json":
case "--json":
options.json = true
default:
return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected argument %q", arg)}
+9 -9
View File
@@ -244,19 +244,19 @@ func parseUsageArgs(args []string) (usageOptions, bool, error) {
func FormatReport(report usage.Report, insertions int, deletions int) string {
var builder strings.Builder
builder.WriteString("Usage report (cost is a reconstructed estimate)\n\n")
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%-12s %10s %14s %14s\n", "date", "requests", "tokens", "est. cost"))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%-12s %10s %14s %14s\n", "date", "requests", "tokens", "est. cost")
for _, bucket := range report.Buckets {
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
bucket.Date, bucket.Requests, groupThousands(bucket.TotalTokens), formatUSD(bucket.TotalCost)))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
bucket.Date, bucket.Requests, groupThousands(bucket.TotalTokens), formatUSD(bucket.TotalCost))
}
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
"total", report.Total.Requests, groupThousands(report.Total.TotalTokens), formatUSD(report.Total.TotalCost)))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "\n%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
"total", report.Total.Requests, groupThousands(report.Total.TotalTokens), formatUSD(report.Total.TotalCost))
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\nnet LOC (estimate): +%d / -%d = %d\n",
insertions, deletions, report.NetLOC))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "\nnet LOC (estimate): +%d / -%d = %d\n",
insertions, deletions, report.NetLOC)
if report.NetLOCPositive {
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("tokens per net LOC: %.1f\n", report.TokensPerNetLOC))
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("est. cost per net LOC: %s\n", formatUSD(report.CostPerNetLOC)))
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "tokens per net LOC: %.1f\n", report.TokensPerNetLOC)
fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "est. cost per net LOC: %s\n", formatUSD(report.CostPerNetLOC))
} else {
builder.WriteString("tokens per net LOC: n/a (net LOC <= 0)\n")
builder.WriteString("est. cost per net LOC: n/a (net LOC <= 0)\n")
+137 -16
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
@@ -17,7 +18,11 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {
stdout, stderr, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTimeout)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after 5s")
// Report which phase ran out of time, and anything the command
// managed to say. This used to be a bare string with the underlying
// error and stderr both dropped, which left a user whose command was
// slow on a cold machine with nothing to act on.
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after %s: %w%s", providerCommandTimeout, err, commandOutput(stderr))
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command failed: %w%s", err, commandOutput(stderr))
}
@@ -40,34 +45,150 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {
var errProviderCommandTimeout = errors.New("provider command timeout")
// providerCommandDrainGrace bounds how long the timeout path waits for cmd.Wait
// to return after the process tree has been terminated. Terminate normally makes
// that immediate; this exists so a descendant that refuses to die cannot extend
// a call whose deadline has already expired.
const providerCommandDrainGrace = 2 * time.Second
// syncBuffer serialises the command's I/O pump against reads from this package.
// On the timeout path runProviderCommand can return while cmd.Wait is still
// draining, so the buffers outlive the call and a plain bytes.Buffer would be
// read and written concurrently.
type syncBuffer struct {
mu sync.Mutex
buf bytes.Buffer
}
func (b *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.buf.Write(p)
}
// snapshot copies out what has been written so far. A copy rather than the
// buffer's own slice, which the pump may still append to.
func (b *syncBuffer) snapshot() []byte {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return append([]byte(nil), b.buf.Bytes()...)
}
// awaitWithGrace waits for done and gives up after grace, reporting whether the
// wait completed rather than expired.
//
// Split out from the timeout path so the bound can be asserted on its own. In
// place it is effectively untestable: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait returns
// promptly and an unbounded receive would behave identically in every test that
// is not pathological, which is exactly how the old unbounded receive survived.
func awaitWithGrace(done <-chan error, grace time.Duration) bool {
timer := time.NewTimer(grace)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-done:
return true
case <-timer.C:
return false
}
}
// runProviderCommand runs a provider command under a real deadline.
//
// "Real" is the point: timeout used to bound only the wait, so the call could
// take arbitrarily longer than it. Two phases sat outside it. Starting the
// process ran before the clock began, and on Windows that is CREATE_SUSPENDED,
// job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread snapshot, none of
// which is fast on a cold or contended machine. Draining after termination was
// unbounded as well. Both are inside the budget now, so the deadline is an upper
// bound rather than a floor.
func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
cmd := shellCommand(command)
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
// Bound the time Wait spends draining I/O pipes after the process exits,
// in case an orphaned descendant still holds the write ends open.
cmd.WaitDelay = time.Second
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
stdout := &syncBuffer{}
stderr := &syncBuffer{}
cmd.Stdout = stdout
cmd.Stderr = stderr
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
// Armed before the process is started, so process creation is inside the
// budget rather than ahead of it.
deadline := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer deadline.Stop()
type startResult struct {
proc *commandProcess
err error
}
// Buffered, so the goroutine can finish and exit even when nobody is left
// waiting on it because the deadline already fired.
started := make(chan startResult, 1)
go func() {
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
started <- startResult{proc: proc, err: err}
}()
var proc *commandProcess
select {
case result := <-started:
if result.err != nil {
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), result.err
}
proc = result.proc
case <-deadline.C:
// The start is still in flight and will eventually hand back whatever it
// created, so cleanup is handed off rather than abandoned. Wait reaps the
// process; without it a started-but-orphaned command becomes a zombie.
go func() {
result := <-started
if result.err != nil {
return
}
result.proc.Terminate()
_ = cmd.Wait()
result.proc.Close()
}()
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: starting the command exceeded %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
}
defer proc.Close()
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- cmd.Wait()
}()
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case err := <-done:
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), err
case <-timer.C:
terminateCommandProcess(cmd)
<-done
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
if err != nil {
// The shell exited (whether via ErrWaitDelay because a
// background descendant kept the inherited stdout/stderr pipes
// open, or via a nonzero exit status) but a leftover descendant
// may still be running. Terminate is a no-op against an
// already-dead tree, so always call it rather than gating on
// the specific error to avoid leaking that descendant.
proc.Terminate()
}
if errors.Is(err, exec.ErrWaitDelay) {
// Wrap rather than replace. A descendant holding the inherited pipes
// open and the command never finishing at all are different failures
// that both collapsed into the same bare sentinel, which left callers
// and tests unable to tell which one happened. Callers that only ask
// errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) are unaffected, so the
// message LoadProviderCommand reports is unchanged.
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errProviderCommandTimeout, err)
}
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), err
case <-deadline.C:
proc.Terminate()
// Bounded, unlike the bare receive this replaces. Terminate kills the
// tree so Wait almost always returns at once, but "almost always" was
// doing real work here: a tree that resists termination used to hold the
// call open indefinitely, long past the deadline that had just expired.
// Returning early leaves cmd.Wait running, which is why the buffers are
// synchronised.
awaitWithGrace(done, providerCommandDrainGrace)
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: the command did not finish within %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
}
}
+371 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
package config
import (
"errors"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -67,7 +70,8 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandFailureIncludesExitAndRedactsOutput(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 10})
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sleep.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 10, PidFile: pidFile})
start := time.Now()
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
@@ -85,6 +89,175 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
if elapsed > maxElapsed {
t.Fatalf("timeout returned after %s, want roughly 5s", elapsed)
}
assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
}
// providerCommandTestBudget bounds the two background-child tests below, and is
// deliberately NOT providerCommandTimeout. Those tests assert which error each
// cmd.Wait path yields and that the leftover descendant is killed; neither is a
// claim about how fast Windows can start a process. Driving them through
// LoadProviderCommand billed the fixture's own startup to the production 5s
// budget, so on a loaded runner the outer timer won the select in
// runProviderCommand: the nonzero-exit test saw a timeout instead of the exit
// status it asserts, and the timer's Terminate killed the background child
// before it recorded its PID, putting the PID file permanently out of reach no
// matter how long the assertion polled for it.
//
// This is a hang-breaker, not a tuned margin. Nothing in a healthy run waits on
// it, since both tests return about one WaitDelay after the fixture exits.
const providerCommandTestBudget = 60 * time.Second
// backgroundChildLifetime must exceed providerCommandTestBudget so that a child
// dying of old age is unobservable: any run where runProviderCommand has not
// returned yet trips the budget first. That is what lets both tests drop their
// old elapsed-versus-lifetime bounds. "Still alive when the call returned" is
// now true by construction, so a child found dead afterwards can only have been
// killed by proc.Terminate.
const backgroundChildLifetime = 120 * time.Second
// TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild covers a command that
// exits immediately but leaves a detached child holding the inherited
// stdout/stderr pipes open (e.g. `sleep 600 & exit`). cmd.Wait() only
// unblocks once WaitDelay elapses, and that path must still terminate the
// leftover child instead of just returning and leaking it.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stdout: `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-command","model":"gpt-command"}`,
BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(backgroundChildLifetime / time.Second),
BackgroundPidFile: pidFile,
})
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTestBudget)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("runProviderCommand() error = nil, want error from WaitDelay-bounded wait")
}
// Name the exact path. The outer-timer path reports the bare sentinel, so
// matching only that, or the "timed out after 5s" text this test used to
// match, would also be satisfied by a slow runner taking precisely the path
// this test exists to rule out.
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) || !errors.Is(err, exec.ErrWaitDelay) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errProviderCommandTimeout wrapping exec.ErrWaitDelay", err)
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
// TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChildOnFailure covers the same
// leaked-descendant scenario as TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild,
// but with a shell that exits nonzero. Go's exec.Cmd.Wait only returns
// exec.ErrWaitDelay when the command itself exited successfully; a nonzero
// exit yields the bare *ExitError instead, so the leftover child must still
// be terminated on that path.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChildOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg-fail.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stderr: "boom",
ExitCode: 7,
BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(backgroundChildLifetime / time.Second),
BackgroundPidFile: pidFile,
})
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTestBudget)
// The shell's own exit status has to survive. A timeout here means the
// budget swallowed it, which is exactly what this test kept reporting on CI.
if errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the shell's exit status rather than a timeout", err)
}
var exitErr *exec.ExitError
if !errors.As(err, &exitErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want *exec.ExitError from the nonzero exit", err)
}
if exitErr.ExitCode() != 7 {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 7", exitErr.ExitCode())
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
func TestAssertProcessTerminatedWaitsForDelayedPIDFile(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "delayed.pid")
firstMissing := make(chan struct{})
writeDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
<-firstMissing
tempFile := pidFile + ".tmp"
if err := os.WriteFile(tempFile, []byte("2147483647\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
writeDone <- err
return
}
writeDone <- os.Rename(tempFile, pidFile)
}()
missingObserved := false
assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t, pidFile, func() {
missingObserved = true
close(firstMissing)
})
if !missingObserved {
t.Fatal("PID file existed before the missing-file polling path was exercised")
}
if err := <-writeDone; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write delayed pid file: %v", err)
}
}
func assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
t.Helper()
// The basic timeout fixture is intentionally unsynchronized. On a loaded
// Windows runner, the cold PowerShell child can be terminated before it
// records its PID; the synchronized background-child tests below retain
// the strict PID and liveness checks.
if _, err := os.Stat(pidFile); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return
}
assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
}
func assertProcessTerminated(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
t.Helper()
assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t, pidFile, nil)
}
func assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t *testing.T, pidFile string, onMissing func()) {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
var data []byte
var err error
missingObserved := false
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
data, err = os.ReadFile(pidFile)
if err == nil {
break
}
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file: %v", err)
}
if !missingObserved {
missingObserved = true
if onMissing != nil {
onMissing()
}
}
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file before timeout: %v", err)
}
pid, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse sleeper pid %q: %v", data, err)
}
deadline = time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
if !processAlive(pid) {
return
}
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Fatalf("sleeper process %d still alive after timeout", pid)
}
func TestLoadProviderCommandInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,6 +291,14 @@ type commandScript struct {
Stderr string
ExitCode int
SleepSeconds int
PidFile string
// BackgroundSleepSeconds, if set, spawns a detached child that keeps the
// inherited stdout/stderr handles open well after the script itself
// exits, simulating a `sleep 600 & exit` style command. BackgroundPidFile
// records the detached child's PID.
BackgroundSleepSeconds int
BackgroundPidFile string
}
func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
@@ -128,7 +309,11 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "provider.cmd")
lines := []string{"@echo off"}
if script.SleepSeconds > 0 {
lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \"Start-Sleep -Seconds "+itoa(script.SleepSeconds)+"\"")
sleep := "Start-Sleep -Seconds " + itoa(script.SleepSeconds)
if script.PidFile != "" {
sleep = "Set-Content -Path '" + psSingleQuote(script.PidFile) + "' -Value $PID -Encoding Ascii; " + sleep
}
lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+sleep+"\"")
}
if script.Stdout != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo "+script.Stdout)
@@ -136,6 +321,40 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
if script.Stderr != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo "+script.Stderr+" 1>&2")
}
if script.BackgroundSleepSeconds > 0 {
readyFile := script.BackgroundPidFile + ".ready"
bgSleep := "Set-Content -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(script.BackgroundPidFile) + "' -Value $PID -Encoding Ascii; " +
"Set-Content -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(readyFile) + "' -Value ready -Encoding Ascii; " +
"Start-Sleep -Seconds " + itoa(script.BackgroundSleepSeconds)
lines = append(lines, "start /B powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+bgSleep+"\"")
// Wait for the child to record its PID before exiting, so the PID is
// on disk while the tree is still alive: runProviderCommand kills the
// tree one WaitDelay after the script exits, and a child that has not
// written by then never will.
//
// This waits in cmd itself. Spawning a second PowerShell just to poll
// cost another interpreter cold start, and that start is pure overhead
// added AFTER the PID is already written. On a loaded runner it pushed
// the script's exit past the 5s provider-command timeout, so the
// nonzero-exit test saw a timeout instead of the exit status it
// asserts. The wait is also bounded now: giving up and letting the PID
// assertion fail is far more diagnosable than blocking until the
// timeout fires and reporting an unrelated error. Each iteration is
// about a second, since `ping -n 2` sleeps between its two echoes,
// so the ceiling is roughly 15s: far longer than any cold PowerShell
// start seen on a runner, and far shorter than
// providerCommandTestBudget, so giving up surfaces a legible
// PID-file failure rather than a timeout that hides the real cause.
lines = append(lines,
":zeroWaitReady",
"if exist \""+readyFile+"\" goto zeroReady",
"set /a ZERO_READY_TRIES+=1",
"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ 15 goto zeroReady",
"ping -n 2 127.0.0.1 >nul",
"goto zeroWaitReady",
":zeroReady",
)
}
lines = append(lines, "exit /b "+itoa(script.ExitCode))
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\r\n")), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write command: %v", err)
@@ -146,6 +365,9 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "provider.sh")
lines := []string{"#!/bin/sh"}
if script.SleepSeconds > 0 {
if script.PidFile != "" {
lines = append(lines, "echo $$ > '"+shSingleQuote(script.PidFile)+"'")
}
lines = append(lines, "sleep "+itoa(script.SleepSeconds))
}
if script.Stdout != "" {
@@ -154,6 +376,10 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
if script.Stderr != "" {
lines = append(lines, "printf '%s\\n' '"+script.Stderr+"' >&2")
}
if script.BackgroundSleepSeconds > 0 {
lines = append(lines, "sleep "+itoa(script.BackgroundSleepSeconds)+" &")
lines = append(lines, "echo $! > '"+shSingleQuote(script.BackgroundPidFile)+"'")
}
lines = append(lines, "exit "+itoa(script.ExitCode))
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write command: %v", err)
@@ -161,6 +387,19 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
return path
}
// psSingleQuote escapes a value for interpolation inside a PowerShell
// single-quoted string literal, where a literal quote is doubled.
func psSingleQuote(value string) string {
return strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", "''")
}
// shSingleQuote escapes a value for interpolation inside a POSIX shell
// single-quoted string literal, where a literal quote must close the
// quoted section, emit an escaped quote, then reopen it.
func shSingleQuote(value string) string {
return strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", `'\''`)
}
func itoa(value int) string {
if value == 0 {
return "0"
@@ -175,3 +414,133 @@ func itoa(value int) string {
}
return string(digits[index:])
}
// The whole point of #811: providerCommandTimeout has to be an upper bound on
// how long the call takes, not a floor. Process creation used to run before the
// clock started and the post-termination drain was unbounded, so a slow or
// contended machine could block startup for far longer than the error text
// promised.
//
// This one guards the end-to-end contract against gross regressions. It is NOT
// the assertion that pins the drain bound: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait
// returns promptly and this passes even with the drain unbounded. That property
// is pinned by TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp, and the start-phase bound by
// TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline.
func TestRunProviderCommandBoundsTotalDuration(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bound.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 60, PidFile: pidFile})
const budget = 2 * time.Second
start := time.Now()
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, budget)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
}
// Budget, plus the bounded drain, plus room for a loaded runner. A failure
// here means some phase is outside the deadline again, which is the bug.
ceiling := budget + providerCommandDrainGrace + 8*time.Second
if elapsed > ceiling {
t.Fatalf("returned after %s with a %s budget; the timeout is not bounding the call (ceiling %s)", elapsed, budget, ceiling)
}
assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
}
// The timeout error has to carry something an operator can act on. It used to be
// a bare string with the underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped,
// so a user whose provider command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or
// what the command had said.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeoutReportsDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stderr: "provider is warming up",
SleepSeconds: 30,
PidFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "diag.pid"),
})
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want timeout")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "timed out") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want a timeout message", err.Error())
}
// Wrapped, so callers can still classify it.
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is against the timeout sentinel", err)
}
// And it must say which phase, rather than only that time ran out.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "did not finish") && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to name the phase that exceeded the deadline", err.Error())
}
}
// The output buffers are written by cmd.Wait's I/O pump, which keeps running
// after the timeout path has returned them to the caller, so a plain
// bytes.Buffer would be read and written concurrently. Asserted on the buffer
// directly: driving it end to end does not reliably produce the overlap, because
// a terminated command usually stops writing before the snapshot is taken, so
// such a test passes with the locking removed and proves nothing.
//
// Only meaningful under -race, which CI runs.
func TestSyncBufferAllowsConcurrentWriteAndSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
buffer := &syncBuffer{}
writing := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(writing)
for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
_, _ = buffer.Write([]byte("x"))
}
}()
for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
_ = buffer.snapshot()
}
<-writing
if len(buffer.snapshot()) != 2000 {
t.Fatalf("buffer holds %d bytes, want 2000", len(buffer.snapshot()))
}
}
// The drain after termination must be bounded. Asserted directly on the helper,
// because in place it is untestable without a tree that refuses to die: Wait
// normally returns at once, which is precisely why an unbounded receive sat
// there unnoticed. A channel that never fires is the pathological case made
// cheap.
func TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp(t *testing.T) {
never := make(chan error)
start := time.Now()
if awaitWithGrace(never, 50*time.Millisecond) {
t.Fatal("reported completion for a wait that never finished")
}
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > 5*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("gave up after %s, want roughly the grace period", elapsed)
}
// Still reports completion when the wait does finish, or the timeout path
// would always claim the tree hung.
done := make(chan error, 1)
done <- nil
if !awaitWithGrace(done, time.Second) {
t.Fatal("reported expiry for a wait that had already finished")
}
}
// Process creation has to be inside the budget. It used to run before the clock
// started, and on Windows that phase is CREATE_SUSPENDED plus job-object setup
// plus a system-wide thread snapshot, none of it fast on a contended machine.
//
// A budget that is already spent when the call begins can only be exceeded
// during the start, so the phase named in the error is what distinguishes the
// two orderings: with the clock started afterwards, the start would always
// complete first and the failure would come from the wait instead.
func TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{Stdout: `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-x","model":"m"}`})
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, time.Nanosecond)
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the start phase to be the one that exceeded the deadline; "+
"anything else means process creation is outside the budget again", err.Error())
}
}
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
)
// ToolsOverride builds a ToolsConfig that explicitly overrides the deferred-tool
// threshold (including to 0, which disables deferral). Use this for programmatic
// Overrides — a bare ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: 0} is indistinguishable from
// "unset" and will not override.
func ToolsOverride(deferThreshold int) ToolsConfig {
return ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: deferThreshold, deferThresholdSet: true}
}
// ValidateFile reads and parses path as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same
// semantic provider/model rules used during resolution. It returns the parsed
// config (zero value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse
// failure yields a single issue whose Message is the underlying JSON error's
// text (already flattened via Error(), not chained — callers cannot recover
// the original *json.SyntaxError / *json.UnmarshalTypeError via errors.As).
func ValidateFile(path string) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("read config %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
var cfg FileConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("invalid config JSON %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
// SetProviderDescription sets a provider's description VERBATIM — including to
// empty. The generic UpsertProvider merge treats empty fields as "leave
// unchanged", so clearing a description needs this dedicated setter.
func SetProviderDescription(path string, name string, description string) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("config path is required")
}
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider name is required")
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", path, err)
}
cfg := FileConfig{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err)
}
for index := range cfg.Providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Providers[index].Name), name) {
cfg.Providers[index].Description = strings.TrimSpace(description)
if err := writeConfigFile(path, cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, err
}
return cfg, nil
}
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found", name)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func mergeMCPServer(base MCPServerConfig, next MCPServerConfig, canReenable bool
// server the user explicitly enabled. The only layer allowed to
// override an explicit higher-scope decision is the CLI override scope
// (canReenable=true).
if canReenable || !(baseDisabledSet && baseDisabled != next.Disabled) {
if canReenable || !baseDisabledSet || baseDisabled == next.Disabled {
base.Disabled = next.Disabled
}
}
+48 -7
View File
@@ -3,18 +3,59 @@
package config
import (
"io"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
)
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
type commandProcess struct {
groupID int
anchor *exec.Cmd
anchorInput io.WriteCloser
}
func terminateCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
if cmd.Process == nil {
return
// startCommandProcess retains a live process-group leader until cleanup. The
// provider shell may be reaped before Wait finishes draining descendant-held
// pipes, so its PID cannot safely identify the group after Wait returns.
func startCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (*commandProcess, error) {
anchor := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "read _")
anchor.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
anchorInput, err := anchor.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_ = syscall.Kill(-cmd.Process.Pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
if err := anchor.Start(); err != nil {
_ = anchorInput.Close()
return nil, err
}
proc := &commandProcess{groupID: anchor.Process.Pid, anchor: anchor, anchorInput: anchorInput}
if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
}
cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid = true
cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid = proc.groupID
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
proc.Close()
return nil, err
}
return proc, nil
}
func (p *commandProcess) Terminate() {
if p.groupID != 0 {
_ = syscall.Kill(-p.groupID, syscall.SIGKILL)
}
}
func (p *commandProcess) Close() {
if p.anchorInput != nil {
_ = p.anchorInput.Close()
p.anchorInput = nil
}
if p.anchor != nil {
_ = p.anchor.Wait()
p.anchor = nil
}
p.groupID = 0
}
+66
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
//go:build !windows
package config
import (
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"testing"
)
func TestCommandProcessPreservesSysProcAttr(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
attr := &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
cmd.SysProcAttr = attr
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("startCommandProcess: %v", err)
}
defer proc.Close()
if cmd.SysProcAttr != attr {
t.Fatal("startCommandProcess replaced SysProcAttr")
}
if !cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid || cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid != proc.groupID {
t.Fatalf("process group = Setpgid %v, Pgid %d; want true, %d", cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid, cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid, proc.groupID)
}
if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Wait: %v", err)
}
}
func TestCommandProcessRetainsGroupIdentityAfterProviderWait(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 7")
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("startCommandProcess: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
proc.Terminate()
proc.Close()
}()
providerPID := cmd.Process.Pid
anchorPID := proc.groupID
if err := cmd.Wait(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Wait error = nil, want nonzero exit")
}
if anchorPID == providerPID {
t.Fatalf("group identity reused provider PID %d", providerPID)
}
if !processAlive(anchorPID) {
t.Fatalf("group leader %d exited before cleanup", anchorPID)
}
proc.Terminate()
proc.Close()
if processAlive(anchorPID) {
t.Fatalf("group leader %d still alive after cleanup", anchorPID)
}
}
func processAlive(pid int) bool {
err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0)
return err == nil || err == syscall.EPERM
}
+147 -5
View File
@@ -3,23 +3,165 @@
package config
import (
"context"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"syscall"
"time"
"unsafe"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
// configureCommandProcess starts the process suspended so it can be
// assigned to the job object before its main thread (and therefore any
// code it runs) executes. Without this, a fast command can spawn and
// detach a descendant before AssignProcessToJobObject runs, letting that
// descendant escape the job and survive termination.
func configureCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{CreationFlags: windows.CREATE_SUSPENDED}
}
func terminateCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
func startCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (*commandProcess, error) {
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return attachCommandProcess(cmd), nil
}
// commandProcess tracks a started provider command so its entire process
// tree can be terminated on timeout. It prefers a job object: taskkill /T
// walks the tree by parent PID in user space and can miss descendants,
// letting them run to completion while Wait blocks on inherited pipes.
type commandProcess struct {
cmd *exec.Cmd
job windows.Handle
processHandle windows.Handle
}
func attachCommandProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) *commandProcess {
proc := &commandProcess{cmd: cmd}
if cmd.Process == nil {
return proc
}
// The main thread is suspended (see configureCommandProcess); resume it
// once we're done attaching, however that turns out. If resuming fails
// outright (Toolhelp/OpenThread/ResumeThread errors are otherwise
// swallowed), the process would sit suspended forever and never exit on
// its own, making the failure look like an ordinary 5s provider-command
// timeout. Terminate it immediately instead so the real cause surfaces
// quickly and no suspended process is left behind.
defer func() {
if !resumeMainThread(cmd.Process.Pid) {
proc.Terminate()
}
}()
handle, err := windows.OpenProcess(windows.PROCESS_SET_QUOTA|windows.PROCESS_TERMINATE|windows.PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, false, uint32(cmd.Process.Pid))
if err != nil {
return proc
}
proc.processHandle = handle
job, err := windows.CreateJobObject(nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return proc
}
if err := windows.AssignProcessToJobObject(job, handle); err != nil {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
return proc
}
proc.job = job
return proc
}
// resumeMainThread resumes every (assumed suspended) thread of pid and
// reports whether at least one was actually resumed. Callers must treat a
// false result as a failed resume, not a benign no-op: a suspended process
// that's never woken up will neither exit nor produce output on its own.
func resumeMainThread(pid int) bool {
snapshot, err := windows.CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(windows.TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD, 0)
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer func() { _ = windows.CloseHandle(snapshot) }()
var entry windows.ThreadEntry32
entry.Size = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(entry))
resumed := false
for err := windows.Thread32First(snapshot, &entry); err == nil; err = windows.Thread32Next(snapshot, &entry) {
if entry.OwnerProcessID != uint32(pid) {
continue
}
thread, err := windows.OpenThread(windows.THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME, false, entry.ThreadID)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if _, err := windows.ResumeThread(thread); err == nil {
resumed = true
}
_ = windows.CloseHandle(thread)
}
return resumed
}
func (p *commandProcess) Terminate() {
if p.job != 0 {
// A job handle means the process tree was contained from launch, so
// TerminateJobObject alone kills every member atomically. Don't also
// fall through to the taskkill/PID path below: by the time
// Terminate runs on the ErrWaitDelay path, cmd.Wait has already
// reaped the root process, so its PID may have been reused by an
// unrelated process, and forcing /T /PID against a reused PID would
// kill the wrong tree.
_ = windows.TerminateJobObject(p.job, 1)
return
}
taskkill := taskkillPath()
_ = exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
if p.cmd.Process == nil {
return
}
if p.processHandle == 0 {
// Without a retained identity, never target a numeric PID that may
// have been reaped and reused. os.Process.Kill uses Go's original
// process state instead.
_ = p.cmd.Process.Kill()
return
}
// Fallback for the rare case where job creation or assignment failed:
// only invoke taskkill while the identity-preserving handle confirms the
// original root is still active. Keeping that handle open through Run
// prevents Windows from reusing its PID for an unrelated process.
var exitCode uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(p.processHandle, &exitCode); err == nil && exitCode == stillActive {
taskkill := taskkillPath()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
_ = exec.CommandContext(ctx, taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(p.cmd.Process.Pid)).Run()
cancel()
}
_ = windows.TerminateProcess(p.processHandle, 1)
}
// Close releases the retained handles without touching any still-running
// descendants: the job carries no KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE limit, so on the success
// path a provider command's detached helpers keep running exactly as they did
// before job objects were introduced. Descendant termination happens
// explicitly via Terminate, called only on timeout/error.
func (p *commandProcess) Close() {
if p.job != 0 {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(p.job)
p.job = 0
}
if p.processHandle != 0 {
_ = windows.CloseHandle(p.processHandle)
p.processHandle = 0
}
}
const stillActive = uint32(259) // STILL_ACTIVE
func taskkillPath() string {
systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
if systemRoot == "" {
+65
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
//go:build windows
package config
import (
"os/exec"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// TestResumeMainThreadReportsFailureForUnknownPID covers the contract
// attachCommandProcess relies on: when no thread belonging to pid can be
// found (here, because the pid doesn't correspond to a live process),
// resumeMainThread must report false rather than silently doing nothing,
// so a caller can react (e.g. terminate the process) instead of leaving it
// suspended indefinitely.
func TestResumeMainThreadReportsFailureForUnknownPID(t *testing.T) {
if resumeMainThread(0) {
t.Fatal("resumeMainThread(0) = true, want false for a pid with no threads")
}
}
func TestCommandProcessRetainsIdentityAfterWait(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command("cmd", "/C", "exit /b 0")
configureCommandProcess(cmd)
if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Start: %v", err)
}
proc := attachCommandProcess(cmd)
t.Cleanup(proc.Close)
if proc.processHandle == 0 {
t.Fatal("attachCommandProcess did not retain a process handle")
}
if err := cmd.Wait(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Wait: %v", err)
}
var code uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(proc.processHandle, &code); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetExitCodeProcess after Wait: %v", err)
}
if code == stillActive {
t.Fatalf("exit code = STILL_ACTIVE after Wait")
}
proc.Close()
if proc.job != 0 || proc.processHandle != 0 {
t.Fatalf("Close left handles open: job=%v process=%v", proc.job, proc.processHandle)
}
}
func processAlive(pid int) bool {
handle, err := windows.OpenProcess(windows.PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, false, uint32(pid))
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer func() { _ = windows.CloseHandle(handle) }()
var code uint32
if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(handle, &code); err != nil {
return false
}
return code == stillActive
}
+44 -13
View File
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
// here rather than in mergeConfig because that helper is shared with the
// trusted global-config merge, which must keep honouring the setting.
commandConfig.Sandbox.Enabled = nil
commandConfig.CrossSessionInbound = ""
mergeConfig(&cfg, commandConfig)
}
@@ -140,6 +141,13 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
return ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid notify.focusMode %q: expected unfocused, always, or focused", focusMode)
}
}
if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
switch inbound {
case "accept", "hold", "refuse":
default:
return ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid crossSessionInbound %q: expected accept, hold, or refuse", inbound)
}
}
if err := validateSTTConfig(cfg.STT); err != nil {
return ResolvedConfig{}, err
}
@@ -154,19 +162,20 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
}
return ResolvedConfig{
ActiveProvider: active.Name,
Providers: providers,
Provider: active,
MaxTurns: cfg.MaxTurns,
MCP: cfg.MCP,
Sandbox: cfg.Sandbox,
Notify: cfg.Notify,
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
LocalControl: cfg.LocalControl,
STT: cfg.STT,
ActiveProvider: active.Name,
Providers: providers,
Provider: active,
MaxTurns: cfg.MaxTurns,
MCP: cfg.MCP,
Sandbox: cfg.Sandbox,
Notify: cfg.Notify,
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
LocalControl: cfg.LocalControl,
STT: cfg.STT,
CrossSessionInbound: cfg.CrossSessionInbound,
}, nil
}
@@ -267,6 +276,9 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
mergeLocalControlConfig(&dst.LocalControl, src.LocalControl)
mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
mergeSTTConfig(&dst.STT, src.STT)
if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(src.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
dst.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
}
}
func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
@@ -325,6 +337,9 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
if src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize != 0 {
dst.Swarm.MaxTeamSize = src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize
}
if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(src.CrossSessionInbound); inboundPolicyRank(inbound) > inboundPolicyRank(dst.CrossSessionInbound) {
dst.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
}
mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
// Local control is intentionally user-config/override only. A cloned project
// must not be able to make browser, desktop, or terminal automation tools
@@ -727,6 +742,9 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
mergeLocalControlConfig(&cfg.LocalControl, overrides.LocalControl)
mergeKeyBindings(&cfg.KeyBindings, overrides.KeyBindings)
mergeSTTConfig(&cfg.STT, overrides.STT)
if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(overrides.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
cfg.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
}
for _, provider := range overrides.Providers {
mergeProvider(cfg, provider)
}
@@ -736,6 +754,19 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, overrides.MCP, true)
}
func inboundPolicyRank(policy string) int {
switch strings.TrimSpace(policy) {
case "refuse":
return 3
case "hold":
return 2
case "accept":
return 0
default:
return 1 // permission-mode parity
}
}
func mergeLocalControlConfig(dst *LocalControlConfig, src LocalControlConfig) {
if src.enabledSet {
dst.Enabled = src.Enabled
+37
View File
@@ -2199,3 +2199,40 @@ func TestResolveRequiresModelErrorIsSetupFixable(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("error leaked API key: %q", err.Error())
}
}
func TestCrossSessionInboundProjectConfigCanOnlyTighten(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
user string
project string
want string
}{
{name: "hold tightens accept", user: "accept", project: "hold", want: "hold"},
{name: "refuse stays refuse", user: "refuse", project: "accept", want: "refuse"},
{name: "accept cannot weaken parity", project: "accept", want: ""},
{name: "refuse tightens parity", project: "refuse", want: "refuse"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := FileConfig{CrossSessionInbound: test.user}
if err := mergeProjectConfig(&cfg, FileConfig{CrossSessionInbound: test.project}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if cfg.CrossSessionInbound != test.want {
t.Fatalf("crossSessionInbound = %q, want %q", cfg.CrossSessionInbound, test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveRejectsInvalidCrossSessionInbound(t *testing.T) {
path := writeConfig(t, `{
"activeProvider": "openai",
"providers": [{"name":"openai","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-x","model":"gpt-5"}],
"crossSessionInbound": "sometimes"
}`)
_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "expected accept, hold, or refuse") {
t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
}
}
+81 -82
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ type PreferencesConfig struct {
// ZERO_THEME, so a /theme choice survives restart. Empty = unset (defaults auto).
Theme string `json:"theme,omitempty"`
// Recaps is a tri-state: nil (unset) defaults to ON; an explicit false means
// the user turned post-turn recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
// the user turned idle recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
// custom unmarshal is needed (unlike ToolsConfig.DeferThreshold's int).
Recaps *bool `json:"recaps,omitempty"`
}
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ type RecentModelEntry struct {
// MaxRecentModels caps the persisted/displayed recent-selection history.
const MaxRecentModels = 5
// RecapsEnabled reports whether post-turn recaps are on. Unset defaults to ON.
// RecapsEnabled reports whether idle recaps are on. Unset defaults to ON.
func (p PreferencesConfig) RecapsEnabled() bool {
return p.Recaps == nil || *p.Recaps
}
@@ -322,14 +322,6 @@ type SwarmConfig struct {
MaxTeamSize int `json:"maxTeamSize,omitempty"`
}
// ToolsOverride builds a ToolsConfig that explicitly overrides the deferred-tool
// threshold (including to 0, which disables deferral). Use this for programmatic
// Overrides — a bare ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: 0} is indistinguishable from
// "unset" and will not override.
func ToolsOverride(deferThreshold int) ToolsConfig {
return ToolsConfig{DeferThreshold: deferThreshold, deferThresholdSet: true}
}
func (cfg *ToolsConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
type rawTools struct {
DeferThreshold *int `json:"deferThreshold"`
@@ -348,46 +340,49 @@ func (cfg *ToolsConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
}
type FileConfig struct {
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers,omitempty"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify,omitempty"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
STT STTConfig `json:"stt,omitempty"`
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers,omitempty"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify,omitempty"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
STT STTConfig `json:"stt,omitempty"`
CrossSessionInbound string `json:"crossSessionInbound,omitempty"`
}
func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
type rawConfig struct {
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers,omitempty"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify,omitempty"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
STT *STTConfig `json:"stt,omitempty"`
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers,omitempty"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify,omitempty"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
LocalControl *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
STT *STTConfig `json:"stt,omitempty"`
CrossSessionInbound string `json:"crossSessionInbound,omitempty"`
}
raw := rawConfig{
ActiveProvider: cfg.ActiveProvider,
Providers: cfg.Providers,
MaxTurns: cfg.MaxTurns,
MCP: cfg.MCP,
Sandbox: cfg.Sandbox,
Notify: cfg.Notify,
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
ActiveProvider: cfg.ActiveProvider,
Providers: cfg.Providers,
MaxTurns: cfg.MaxTurns,
MCP: cfg.MCP,
Sandbox: cfg.Sandbox,
Notify: cfg.Notify,
Tools: cfg.Tools,
Swarm: cfg.Swarm,
Preferences: cfg.Preferences,
KeyBindings: cfg.KeyBindings,
CrossSessionInbound: cfg.CrossSessionInbound,
}
if !cfg.LocalControl.Empty() {
raw.LocalControl = &cfg.LocalControl
@@ -412,33 +407,35 @@ type ResolveOptions struct {
}
type Overrides struct {
ActiveProvider string
Providers []ProviderProfile
Provider ProviderProfile
MaxTurns int
MCP MCPConfig
Sandbox SandboxConfig
Notify NotifyConfig
Tools ToolsConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
STT STTConfig
ActiveProvider string
Providers []ProviderProfile
Provider ProviderProfile
MaxTurns int
MCP MCPConfig
Sandbox SandboxConfig
Notify NotifyConfig
Tools ToolsConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
STT STTConfig
CrossSessionInbound string
}
type ResolvedConfig struct {
ActiveProvider string
Providers []ProviderProfile
Provider ProviderProfile
MaxTurns int
MCP MCPConfig
Sandbox SandboxConfig
Notify NotifyConfig
Tools ToolsConfig
Swarm SwarmConfig
Preferences PreferencesConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
STT STTConfig
ActiveProvider string
Providers []ProviderProfile
Provider ProviderProfile
MaxTurns int
MCP MCPConfig
Sandbox SandboxConfig
Notify NotifyConfig
Tools ToolsConfig
Swarm SwarmConfig
Preferences PreferencesConfig
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig
LocalControl LocalControlConfig
STT STTConfig
CrossSessionInbound string
}
type MCPConfig struct {
@@ -488,20 +485,21 @@ type MCPOAuthConfig struct {
func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
type rawConfig struct {
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl"`
STT STTConfig `json:"stt"`
MCPServers map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
MCPServersSnake map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
ActiveProvider string `json:"activeProvider"`
Providers []ProviderProfile `json:"providers"`
MaxTurns int `json:"maxTurns"`
MCP MCPConfig `json:"mcp"`
Sandbox SandboxConfig `json:"sandbox"`
Notify NotifyConfig `json:"notify"`
Tools ToolsConfig `json:"tools"`
Swarm SwarmConfig `json:"swarm"`
Preferences PreferencesConfig `json:"preferences"`
KeyBindings KeyBindingsConfig `json:"keybindings"`
LocalControl LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl"`
STT STTConfig `json:"stt"`
CrossSessionInbound string `json:"crossSessionInbound"`
MCPServers map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
MCPServersSnake map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
}
var raw rawConfig
@@ -528,6 +526,7 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
cfg.KeyBindings = raw.KeyBindings
cfg.LocalControl = raw.LocalControl
cfg.STT = raw.STT
cfg.CrossSessionInbound = raw.CrossSessionInbound
if cfg.MCP.Servers == nil && (len(raw.MCPServers) > 0 || len(raw.MCPServersSnake) > 0) {
cfg.MCP.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
}
-23
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
)
// Issue is a single structured problem found while validating a config file.
@@ -13,28 +12,6 @@ type Issue struct {
Message string `json:"message"`
}
// ValidateFile reads and parses path as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same
// semantic provider/model rules used during resolution. It returns the parsed
// config (zero value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse
// failure yields a single issue whose Message wraps the underlying JSON error
// so callers can extract *json.SyntaxError / *json.UnmarshalTypeError offsets
// via errors.As.
func ValidateFile(path string) (FileConfig, []Issue) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Sprintf("read config %s: %v", path, err)}}
}
var cfg FileConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, []Issue{{Message: fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err).Error()}}
}
issues := validateSemantics(cfg)
issues = append(issues, unknownFieldIssues(data)...)
return cfg, issues
}
// ValidateBytes parses data as a Zero FileConfig and runs the same semantic
// provider/model rules as ValidateFile. It returns the parsed config (zero
// value on parse failure) plus any structured issues. A parse failure yields a
+1 -34
View File
@@ -431,39 +431,6 @@ func EditProvider(path string, edit ProviderEdit) (FileConfig, error) {
return cfg, nil
}
// SetProviderDescription sets a provider's description VERBATIM — including to
// empty. The generic UpsertProvider merge treats empty fields as "leave
// unchanged", so clearing a description needs this dedicated setter.
func SetProviderDescription(path string, name string, description string) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("config path is required")
}
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider name is required")
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("read config %s: %w", path, err)
}
cfg := FileConfig{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid config JSON %s: %w", path, err)
}
for index := range cfg.Providers {
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Providers[index].Name), name) {
cfg.Providers[index].Description = strings.TrimSpace(description)
if err := writeConfigFile(path, cfg); err != nil {
return FileConfig{}, err
}
return cfg, nil
}
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider %q not found", name)
}
// migrateStoredProviderKey moves a credential-store entry to a new provider
// name: write-new-then-delete-old, so an interruption can leave a duplicate but
// never a missing key. A missing source entry is a no-op (the marker may be
@@ -579,7 +546,7 @@ func SetRecentModels(path string, entries []RecentModelEntry) (FileConfig, error
return cfg, nil
}
// SetRecapsEnabled persists the post-turn recap preference, mirroring
// SetRecapsEnabled persists the idle recap preference, mirroring
// SetFavoriteModels (read-modify-atomic-write).
func SetRecapsEnabled(path string, enabled bool) (FileConfig, error) {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
+40 -9
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ type Options struct {
Provider config.ProviderProfile
Registry *tools.Registry
ContextWindow int
DeferThreshold int
ProjectContextFiles []string
}
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ type Report struct {
FreeTokens int `json:"freeTokens"`
UsedFraction float64 `json:"usedFraction"`
ToolCount int `json:"toolCount"`
AvailableToolCount int `json:"availableToolCount,omitempty"`
DeferredToolCount int `json:"deferredToolCount,omitempty"`
ProjectGuidelineFile string `json:"projectGuidelineFile,omitempty"`
Categories []Category `json:"categories"`
}
@@ -113,8 +116,10 @@ func Build(options Options) (Report, error) {
categories = append(categories, category(CategoryWorkspaceMap, "Workspace map", estimateTextTokens(workspaceMap), report.ContextWindow))
}
toolCount, toolTokens := estimateRegistryTools(options.Registry)
toolCount, availableTools, deferredTools, toolTokens := estimateRegistryTools(options.Registry, options.DeferThreshold)
report.ToolCount = toolCount
report.AvailableToolCount = availableTools
report.DeferredToolCount = deferredTools
if toolTokens > 0 {
categories = append(categories, category(CategoryTools, "Tools", toolTokens, report.ContextWindow))
}
@@ -175,7 +180,11 @@ func Format(report Report) string {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("usage: %s tokens (context window unknown)", compactNumber(report.UsedTokens)))
}
if report.ToolCount > 0 {
lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("tools: %d", report.ToolCount))
toolLine := fmt.Sprintf("tools: %d exposed", report.ToolCount)
if report.AvailableToolCount > report.ToolCount {
toolLine += fmt.Sprintf(", %d available, %d deferred", report.AvailableToolCount, report.DeferredToolCount)
}
lines = append(lines, toolLine)
}
if report.ProjectGuidelineFile != "" {
lines = append(lines, "project_guidelines: "+report.ProjectGuidelineFile)
@@ -212,29 +221,51 @@ func category(key string, name string, tokens int, contextWindow int) Category {
return cat
}
func estimateRegistryTools(registry *tools.Registry) (int, int) {
func estimateRegistryTools(registry *tools.Registry, deferThreshold int) (int, int, int, int) {
if registry == nil {
return 0, 0
return 0, 0, 0, 0
}
all := registry.All()
sort.Slice(all, func(left int, right int) bool {
return all[left].Name() < all[right].Name()
})
total := 0
count := 0
var visible []tools.Tool
var deferred []tools.Tool
for _, tool := range all {
if tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionDeny {
continue
}
count++
visible = append(visible, tool)
if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
deferred = append(deferred, tool)
}
}
active := deferThreshold > 0 && len(deferred) >= deferThreshold
exposed := visible
if active {
exposed = make([]tools.Tool, 0, len(visible)-len(deferred)+1)
for _, tool := range visible {
if !tools.IsDeferred(tool) && tool.Name() != tools.ToolSearchToolName {
exposed = append(exposed, tool)
}
}
exposed = append(exposed, tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
}
total := 0
for _, tool := range exposed {
total += estimateTextTokens(tool.Name())
total += estimateTextTokens(tool.Description())
description := tool.Description()
if active && tool.Name() == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
description = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferred)
}
total += estimateTextTokens(description)
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters()); err == nil {
total += estimateTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
total += toolDefinitionOverheadTokens
}
return count, total
return len(exposed), len(visible), len(deferred), total
}
func readProjectGuidelines(root string, names []string) (string, string) {
+31 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ func TestBuildCountsProjectGuidelinesAndFreeBudget(t *testing.T) {
writeTestFile(t, root, "AGENTS.md", strings.Repeat("project rules\n", 200))
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func TestBuildHasStableJSONContractAndCategoryMath(t *testing.T) {
writeTestFile(t, root, "ZERO.md", strings.Repeat("zero rules\n", 16))
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreTools(root) {
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
@@ -130,6 +130,35 @@ func TestBuildHasStableJSONContractAndCategoryMath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBuildReportsInitialDeferredToolSurface(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
eager, err := Build(Options{WorkspaceRoot: root, Registry: registry})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
deferred, err := Build(Options{WorkspaceRoot: root, Registry: registry, DeferThreshold: 3})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if deferred.DeferredToolCount < 3 {
t.Fatalf("DeferredToolCount = %d, want at least 3", deferred.DeferredToolCount)
}
if deferred.AvailableToolCount != eager.ToolCount {
t.Fatalf("available tools = %d, want eager total %d", deferred.AvailableToolCount, eager.ToolCount)
}
if deferred.ToolCount >= deferred.AvailableToolCount {
t.Fatalf("initial exposed tools = %d, available = %d; expected a smaller initial surface", deferred.ToolCount, deferred.AvailableToolCount)
}
if categoryByKey(deferred, CategoryTools).Tokens >= categoryByKey(eager, CategoryTools).Tokens {
t.Fatalf("deferred tool schemas did not reduce the initial context")
}
}
func TestBuildClampsFreeBudgetWhenOverContextWindow(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeTestFile(t, root, "AGENTS.md", strings.Repeat("very large project rule\n", 1000))
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package cron
func (s Schedule) String() string { return s.expr }
-2
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ type Schedule struct {
expr string
}
func (s Schedule) String() string { return s.expr }
// full returns a bitset with every value in [min,max] set.
func full(min, max int) uint64 {
var m uint64
+42 -7
View File
@@ -99,35 +99,60 @@ func (s *Store) Add(job Job) (Job, error) {
job.Status = StatusActive
}
job.CreatedAt = s.now().UTC()
id, err := s.allocID()
id, unlock, err := s.reserveID()
if err != nil {
return Job{}, err
}
// Held from reservation through initial persistence: without this, Remove
// (which takes the same per-ID lock before deleting) could delete the
// bare reservation directory the instant after Mkdir and report success,
// then writeJob's MkdirAll would silently resurrect it and persist the
// job anyway — or a second Add could re-reserve the freed id while this
// writer is still running, putting two writers on the same metadata path.
defer unlock()
job.ID = id
if err := s.writeJob(job); err != nil {
if err := s.writeReservedJob(job); err != nil {
return Job{}, err
}
return job, nil
}
func (s *Store) allocID() (string, error) {
// reserveID atomically reserves an unused job id (by os.Mkdir-ing its
// directory) and returns the per-ID lock held for that id, still acquired.
// The caller must release it (via the returned unlock) only once the
// reservation has been committed (metadata.json written) or torn down —
// see Add.
func (s *Store) reserveID() (string, func(), error) {
if err := os.MkdirAll(s.root, 0o700); err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("create cron store root: %w", err)
}
base := s.now().UTC().Format("20060102-150405")
for n := 0; n < 100; n++ {
id := base
if n > 0 {
id = fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", base, n)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(s.root, id)); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return id, nil
unlock, err := s.lockJob(id)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
mkErr := os.Mkdir(s.jobDir(id), 0o700)
if mkErr == nil {
return id, unlock, nil
}
unlock()
if errors.Is(mkErr, os.ErrExist) {
continue
}
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("reserve cron job id %q: %w", id, mkErr)
}
return "", errors.New("could not allocate a unique cron job id")
return "", nil, errors.New("could not allocate a unique cron job id")
}
func (s *Store) jobDir(id string) string { return filepath.Join(s.root, id) }
// validID rejects ids that could escape the store root (path separators or
// traversal). allocID-generated timestamp ids always pass; this guards
// traversal). reserveID-generated timestamp ids always pass; this guards
// externally-supplied ids (get/update/remove/append).
func validID(id string) bool {
return id != "" && id != "." && id != ".." && !strings.ContainsAny(id, `/\`) && filepath.Base(id) == id
@@ -153,6 +178,16 @@ func (s *Store) writeJob(job Job) error {
return nil
}
func (s *Store) writeReservedJob(job Job) error {
if err := s.writeJob(job); err != nil {
if cleanupErr := os.RemoveAll(s.jobDir(job.ID)); cleanupErr != nil {
return errors.Join(err, fmt.Errorf("remove failed cron job reservation: %w", cleanupErr))
}
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *Store) Get(id string) (Job, error) {
if !validID(id) {
return Job{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid cron job id %q", id)
+156
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package cron
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -74,6 +76,160 @@ func TestStoreAddListGetRemove(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestStoreAddReservesUniqueIDsAcrossConcurrentStores(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
now := func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1000, 0).UTC() }
const adds = 32
start := make(chan struct{})
results := make(chan Job, adds)
errs := make(chan error, adds)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < adds; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func(index int) {
defer wg.Done()
store := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: root, Now: now})
<-start
job, err := store.Add(Job{Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: fmt.Sprintf("job-%d", index)})
if err != nil {
errs <- err
return
}
results <- job
}(i)
}
close(start)
wg.Wait()
close(results)
close(errs)
for err := range errs {
t.Errorf("concurrent Add: %v", err)
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, adds)
reader := NewStore(StoreOptions{RootDir: root, Now: now})
for job := range results {
if _, duplicate := seen[job.ID]; duplicate {
t.Errorf("concurrent Add returned duplicate ID %q", job.ID)
}
seen[job.ID] = struct{}{}
persisted, err := reader.Get(job.ID)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Get(%q): %v", job.ID, err)
continue
}
if persisted.Prompt != job.Prompt {
t.Errorf("Get(%q).Prompt = %q, want %q", job.ID, persisted.Prompt, job.Prompt)
}
}
if len(seen) != adds {
t.Fatalf("unique jobs = %d, want %d", len(seen), adds)
}
}
// TestAddDoesNotLeakReservationToConcurrentRemove reproduces the audit
// finding that Remove could observe and delete an in-flight Add's bare
// reservation directory (Mkdir'd but not yet holding metadata.json) and
// report success — after which Add's writeJob would silently resurrect the
// directory and persist the job anyway. Add now holds the same per-ID lock
// Remove takes, from reservation through initial persistence, so a
// concurrent Remove for that id must wait until the reservation is either
// committed or torn down, never observing the bare reservation in between.
func TestAddDoesNotLeakReservationToConcurrentRemove(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
// Simulate the in-flight window Add now holds the lock across: the id is
// reserved (its directory exists) but metadata.json has not been written.
id, unlock, err := store.reserveID()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reserveID: %v", err)
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(store.jobDir(id)); statErr != nil {
t.Fatalf("reservation directory missing: %v", statErr)
}
removeErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
removeErr <- store.Remove(id)
}()
// Remove cannot proceed past the shared per-ID lock we're holding, so it's
// safe to commit the job here, before releasing it: if Remove could race
// ahead of this write, it would delete the bare reservation instead of
// waiting to observe (and remove) the committed job.
job := Job{ID: id, Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "job", Status: StatusActive}
if err := store.writeJob(job); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("writeJob: %v", err)
}
unlock()
if err := <-removeErr; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Remove of the committed job: %v", err)
}
if _, err := os.Stat(store.jobDir(id)); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("job directory should be gone after Remove: %v", err)
}
if _, err := store.Get(id); !errors.Is(err, ErrJobNotFound) {
t.Fatalf("Get after Remove = %v, want ErrJobNotFound", err)
}
}
// TestReserveIDSerializesOnPerIDLock covers the other half of the audit
// finding: a second Add attempting the SAME candidate id while the first
// reservation is still held must block on the shared per-ID lock (not just
// race the directory Mkdir), so it never ends up writing metadata.json for
// an id whose first writer is still in flight. It moves on to the next
// candidate id instead.
func TestReserveIDSerializesOnPerIDLock(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
id, unlock, err := store.reserveID()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first reserveID: %v", err)
}
type reservation struct {
id string
err error
}
second := make(chan reservation, 1)
go func() {
id2, unlock2, err := store.reserveID()
if err == nil {
unlock2()
}
second <- reservation{id: id2, err: err}
}()
// The second reserveID cannot observe an id until this lock is released:
// it contends on the same per-ID lock file before ever attempting Mkdir.
unlock()
got := <-second
if got.err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second reserveID: %v", got.err)
}
if got.id == id {
t.Fatalf("second reserveID returned the first id %q while its reservation was still held", got.id)
}
}
func TestWriteReservedJobRemovesReservationOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
store := newTestStore(t)
job := Job{ID: "reserved", Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "job"}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(store.jobDir(job.ID), "metadata.json.tmp"), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := store.writeReservedJob(job); err == nil {
t.Fatal("writeReservedJob error = nil, want metadata write failure")
}
if _, err := os.Stat(store.jobDir(job.ID)); !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("failed reservation still exists: %v", err)
}
}
func TestStoreAppendRun(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestStore(t)
job, _ := s.Add(Job{Expr: "* * * * *", Prompt: "x", Status: StatusActive})
-10
View File
@@ -37,16 +37,6 @@ const (
StreamProviderOpenAI = "openai"
)
// BatchProviders lists valid stt.provider values, for config validation.
func BatchProviders() []string {
return []string{ProviderLocal, ProviderGroq, ProviderOpenAI}
}
// StreamProviders lists valid stt.streamProvider values, for config validation.
func StreamProviders() []string {
return []string{StreamProviderLocal, StreamProviderDeepgram, StreamProviderOpenAI}
}
// AudioFormat identifies a recorded container format, sniffed from the bytes —
// desktop recorders produce WAV, Termux's recorder produces M4A/AAC.
type AudioFormat string
+1 -1
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ func (d *deepgramTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks <-cha
}
default:
}
return compose(), fmt.Errorf("Deepgram stream error: %w", err)
return compose(), fmt.Errorf("Deepgram stream error: %w", err) //nolint:staticcheck // Preserve established user-facing error text.
}
if typ != websocket.MessageText {
continue
+62 -18
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package imageinput
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
@@ -16,6 +17,13 @@ import (
// clipboard, or (nil, "", nil) when the clipboard has no image. Called when
// text clipboard is empty (the user pasted a screenshot). The media type is
// sniffed from the bytes, not trusted from the clipboard.
// ErrClipboardImageUnreadable reports that the clipboard holds an image the host
// has no way to extract. It is deliberately distinct from "no image on the
// clipboard", which is an ordinary no-op: this one is actionable, and silence is
// the wrong response to it.
var ErrClipboardImageUnreadable = errors.New(
"the clipboard holds an image but no helper on this host can read it; on macOS install pngpaste (brew install pngpaste) or a Python with pyobjc")
func ReadClipboardImage() ([]byte, string, error) {
data, err := readClipboardImageBytes()
if err != nil {
@@ -95,35 +103,71 @@ func readClipboardImageWindows() ([]byte, error) {
// readClipboardImageDarwin uses osascript to check for and read a clipboard
// image. Returns (nil, nil) when no image is present.
func readClipboardImageDarwin() ([]byte, error) {
// Check clipboard info for image classes.
check := `osascript -e 'clipboard info'`
out, err := exec.Command("sh", "-c", check).Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil
// darwinClipboardInfo reports what the pasteboard is currently offering, and
// darwinClipboardExtract pulls the PNG bytes out of it.
//
// Both are vars so the two-step logic below can be driven in a test. The step
// that matters, "the clipboard holds an image and nothing here can extract it",
// only happens when the first succeeds and the second fails, which cannot be
// arranged by stubbing the caller: a test that substitutes ReadClipboardImage
// asserts the plumbing around this function rather than the decision inside it,
// and stays green with that decision reverted.
var (
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `osascript -e 'clipboard info'`).Output()
return string(out), err
}
info := string(out)
if !strings.Contains(info, "PNG") && !strings.Contains(info, "JPEG") && !strings.Contains(info, "TIFF") && !strings.Contains(info, "GIF") {
return nil, nil
}
// Write clipboard image to a temp file via AppleScript, then read it.
// Using pngpaste if available, falling back to a Python one-liner.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `pngpaste - 2>/dev/null || python3 -c "
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
// pngpaste if available, falling back to a Python one-liner. Neither
// ships with macOS: pngpaste is Homebrew-only and Apple dropped the
// bundled PyObjC, so a stock Mac fails here every time.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `pngpaste - 2>/dev/null || python3 -c "
import AppKit, sys
pb = AppKit.NSPasteboard.generalPasteboard()
data = pb.dataForType_(AppKit.NSPasteboardTypePNG)
if data:
sys.stdout.buffer.write(data.bytes())
"`)
var stdout bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return stdout.Bytes(), nil
}
)
// darwinClipboardOffersImage reports whether the pasteboard info line names an
// image class.
func darwinClipboardOffersImage(info string) bool {
for _, class := range []string{"PNG", "JPEG", "TIFF", "GIF"} {
if strings.Contains(info, class) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func readClipboardImageDarwin() ([]byte, error) {
info, err := darwinClipboardInfo()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil
}
if stdout.Len() == 0 {
if !darwinClipboardOffersImage(info) {
return nil, nil
}
return stdout.Bytes(), nil
// Past this point the clipboard is KNOWN to hold an image, because the probe
// above said so. A failure here is therefore not "no image", it is "there is
// an image and nothing on this host can extract it". Reporting that as
// absence is what left users staring at a paste that silently did nothing.
data, err := darwinClipboardExtract()
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable
}
if len(data) == 0 {
return nil, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable
}
return data, nil
}
// readClipboardImageLinux tries wl-paste (Wayland) then xclip (X11) to read
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
package imageinput
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
// Drives readClipboardImageDarwin's own decision rather than the plumbing around
// it. Both shell steps are substituted, so this runs on any platform and, more
// importantly, actually reaches the branch under test: a test that stubs
// ReadClipboardImage instead stays green with the production change reverted,
// which is how the first version of this coverage slipped through.
func TestReadClipboardImageDarwinDistinguishesUnreadableFromAbsent(t *testing.T) {
restore := func() func() {
info, extract := darwinClipboardInfo, darwinClipboardExtract
return func() { darwinClipboardInfo, darwinClipboardExtract = info, extract }
}()
t.Cleanup(restore)
const pngInfo = `«class PNGf», «class 8BPS»`
t.Run("image present but no extractor is actionable", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return nil, errors.New("exit status 127") }
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if !errors.Is(err, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrClipboardImageUnreadable; a stock Mac gets silence instead of a remedy", err)
}
if data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data = %q, want none", data)
}
})
t.Run("extractor producing nothing is also actionable", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
if _, err := readClipboardImageDarwin(); !errors.Is(err, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrClipboardImageUnreadable for an extractor that exits 0 with no bytes", err)
}
})
// The other half of the distinction, and the reason this cannot simply always
// report an error: an empty clipboard is an ordinary no-op, and turning that
// into a notice would make every stray Ctrl+V nag the user.
t.Run("no image on the clipboard stays silent", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return `«class utf8»`, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
t.Fatal("extractor ran despite the clipboard offering no image")
return nil, nil
}
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if err != nil || data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data=%q err=%v, want a silent no-op", data, err)
}
})
t.Run("probe failure stays silent", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return "", errors.New("osascript missing") }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
t.Fatal("extractor ran despite the info probe failing")
return nil, nil
}
if data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin(); err != nil || data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data=%q err=%v, want a silent no-op", data, err)
}
})
t.Run("working extractor returns the bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return []byte("png-bytes"), nil }
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want none", err)
}
if string(data) != "png-bytes" {
t.Fatalf("data = %q, want the extractor's bytes", data)
}
})
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func buildMinimalPDF(text string) []byte {
buf.WriteString("0 " + strconv.Itoa(len(offsets)+1) + "\n")
buf.WriteString("0000000000 65535 f \n")
for _, off := range offsets {
buf.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%010d 00000 n \n", off))
fmt.Fprintf(&buf, "%010d 00000 n \n", off)
}
buf.WriteString("trailer\n<< /Size " + strconv.Itoa(len(offsets)+1) + " /Root 1 0 R >>\n")
buf.WriteString("startxref\n" + strconv.Itoa(xrefStart) + "\n%%EOF\n")
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ func buildEmptyTextPDF() []byte {
buf.WriteString("0 " + strconv.Itoa(len(offsets)+1) + "\n")
buf.WriteString("0000000000 65535 f \n")
for _, off := range offsets {
buf.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%010d 00000 n \n", off))
fmt.Fprintf(&buf, "%010d 00000 n \n", off)
}
buf.WriteString("trailer\n<< /Size " + strconv.Itoa(len(offsets)+1) + " /Root 1 0 R >>\n")
buf.WriteString("startxref\n" + strconv.Itoa(xrefStart) + "\n%%EOF\n")
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
package lsp
import "os/exec"
// Available reports whether a configured server for the path exists on PATH.
func Available(path string) bool {
cmd, ok := ServerFor(path)
if !ok {
return false
}
_, err := exec.LookPath(cmd[0])
return err == nil
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package lsp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ func TestDecodeSymbols(t *testing.T) {
func TestNavigateUnknownOp(t *testing.T) {
m := NewManager(t.TempDir())
_, _, ok, err := m.Navigate(nil, NavRequest{Op: "bogus", Path: "x.go"})
_, _, ok, err := m.Navigate(context.TODO(), NavRequest{Op: "bogus", Path: "x.go"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error for an unknown nav op")
}
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ func TestNavigateUnknownOp(t *testing.T) {
func TestNavigateUnsupportedExtensionDegrades(t *testing.T) {
// A file type with no configured server degrades to ok=false, no error.
m := NewManager(t.TempDir())
_, _, ok, err := m.Navigate(nil, NavRequest{Op: NavDefinition, Path: "notes.unknownext", Line: 1, Character: 1})
_, _, ok, err := m.Navigate(context.TODO(), NavRequest{Op: NavDefinition, Path: "notes.unknownext", Line: 1, Character: 1})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unsupported extension should not error, got %v", err)
}
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