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Author SHA1 Message Date
Vasanthdev2004 aa7ce57a39 test(tools): assert the stop intent killed the session
The retry loop added to survive a slow PowerShell teardown also made the
test unfalsifiable. The helper sleeps 5s, well inside the 30s deadline, so
a terminate that did nothing at all would let the sleep end on its own and
every existing assertion would still hold: the session reports exited, it
reports an exit code, and the interrupted flag echoes the request rather
than the outcome. Neutering KillProcessTree confirmed it, the test passed.

Assert instead that the helper's completion line never appears, which
distinguishes a killed session from a finished one without depending on
how long the loop took. Output is accumulated across every poll rather
than read off the last result, because each continuation returns only what
the session produced since the previous collection.
2026-07-28 11:50:46 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 20032342e5 test(tools): stop internal/tools failing on stock Windows
This package fails on every run on a Windows box without PowerShell 7, which
is what a stock install is: PowerShell 7 is a separate download. CI never sees
any of it, because the runners have 7. Three distinct causes, all surfaced by
the move to PowerShell in #804.

The stop-intent test waited a fixed second for a session to die and asserted on
whatever was true by then. Under cmd.exe that was enough; under PowerShell the
tree is slower to stand up and tear down, and the FIRST stop in a fresh process
pays the interpreter's cold start, so it routinely returned with termination
under way but unfinished. The assertion read that as a failed stop. It now
re-sends the stop until the session reports it has exited. Repeating is safe,
since Terminate is a no-op against an already-dead tree, and it keeps the
interrupt flag that a poll with empty chars would drop.

Separately, and pre-existing, every test that starts a session hit a teardown
race: a terminated process does not release its handles the instant the session
reports exited, and Windows refuses to remove a directory with an open handle
where POSIX does not. t.TempDir removes once and fails the test on the sharing
violation, so ordinary teardown timing was reported as a broken test. Those
roots now clean up with a bounded retry, and give up quietly rather than
failing: the process is already terminated, so the worst case is a stale
directory under the OS temp root.

Last, the MSYS guard test asserted a windows_shell_syntax block using a command
containing `&&`. On PowerShell 5.1 the windows_powershell_version preflight
added by #804 fires first and shadows it. The `&&` was incidental to what that
case is about, so it is gone. This one is worth noting as a shape rather than a
typo: a new preflight silently changed which block an older assertion got, and
only on the shell CI does not run.

Verified by running the package repeatedly rather than once: previously failing
on every run, now passing 3 of 3, and the stop-intent test passing 8 of 8 alone
and 6 of 6 under CPU contention. Disabling the terminate path still fails it,
so the assertion continues to bind.
2026-07-27 19:14:02 +05:30
39 changed files with 139 additions and 3219 deletions

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+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{".":"0.6.0"}
{".":"0.5.0"}
-31
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@@ -6,37 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
### Features
* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
### Bug Fixes
* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
-7
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@@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
```
@@ -148,12 +147,6 @@ To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
```bash
zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
```
MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
regions:
+6 -138
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@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -81,9 +80,8 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
rawReader io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
readerCloser io.Closer
w io.Writer
reader *bufio.Reader
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
@@ -98,15 +96,10 @@ type Conn struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
// lifetime.
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
rawReader: r,
reader: bufio.NewReader(r),
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
@@ -114,18 +107,6 @@ func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
}
}
// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
c := NewConn(r, w)
c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
return c
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
@@ -147,36 +128,17 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
c.wg.Wait()
}()
interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
//
// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
before := interruptible.generation()
line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
@@ -184,100 +146,6 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
}
}
// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
//
// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
//
// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
type interruptibleReader struct {
inner io.Reader
closer io.Closer
ctx context.Context
closeOnce sync.Once
gen atomic.Int64
}
func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
type interruptibleReadResult struct {
n int
err error
}
// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
once sync.Once
}
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
return claimed
}
// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
// publishes a result for Read to join.
func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
defer func() {
if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
}
decision.complete()
}()
res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
return res
}
func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
go func() {
resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
}()
select {
case res := <-resultCh:
return res.n, res.err
case <-r.ctx.Done():
// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
if decision.interrupt() {
r.gen.Add(1)
if r.closer != nil {
r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
}
}
// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
// report) is what the caller should see.
res := <-resultCh
return res.n, res.err
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
-288
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@@ -3,30 +3,11 @@ package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
type testReadCloser struct {
read func([]byte) (int, error)
close func() error
}
func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
func (r testReadCloser) Close() error { return r.close() }
type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
// connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
t.Helper()
@@ -44,275 +25,6 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
}
}
func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
reader := testReadCloser{
read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return pipeReader.Read(p)
},
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return pipeReader.Close()
},
}
conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-readStarted
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "non-closable"
if closable {
name = "closable"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
})
closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
var reader io.Reader = read
if closable {
reader = testReadCloser{
read: read,
close: func() error {
closeCalls <- struct{}{}
return nil
},
}
}
// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
newConn := NewConn
if closable {
// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
newConn = NewOwnedConn
}
conn := newConn(reader, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
<-writeStarted
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
}
if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
}
})
}
}
// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
//
// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
var readCalls atomic.Int32
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
readCalls.Add(1)
// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
// loop's next ReadBytes call.
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
t.Cleanup(release)
writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
select {
case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
<-releaseWrite
return len(p), nil
})
conn := NewConn(read, writer)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
}
cancel()
release()
select {
case err := <-done:
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
}
if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
resultReady := make(chan struct{})
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
defer close(resultReady)
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
go func() {
n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
}()
<-resultReady
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
cancel()
res := <-readDone
if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
}
if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
}
cancel()
}
}
// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
})
r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
var decision interruptibleReadDecision
readComplete := make(chan struct{})
resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
go func() {
res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
close(readComplete)
resultCh <- res
}()
<-readComplete
if decision.interrupt() {
t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
}
res := <-resultCh
if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
panic("boom")
})
conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
}
}
func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
+3 -7
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ Usage:
Not meant to be run interactively — point your editor's ACP / external-agent
setting at "zero acp".`
var acpSignalContext = signalContext
// runACP serves ACP over stdio so an editor can drive ZERO's agent core. It
// speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 (newline-delimited JSON) on stdin/stdout; stderr stays free
// for human-readable diagnostics. The session lifecycle maps onto ZERO's own
@@ -44,9 +42,7 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
}
}
// The process's own stdin belongs exclusively to this Conn for the life of
// the command, so cancellation may close it to interrupt an idle read.
conn := acp.NewOwnedConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
@@ -77,9 +73,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
AgentInfo: acp.Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: version},
})
ctx, stop := acpSignalContext()
ctx, stop := signalContext()
defer stop()
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil {
if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
return writeAppError(stderr, "acp: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
}
return exitSuccess
-120
View File
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
package cli
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
type acpTestReader func([]byte) (int, error)
func (r acpTestReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
type acpTestWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
func (w acpTestWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
func installACPTestContext(t *testing.T) context.CancelFunc {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
previous := acpSignalContext
acpSignalContext = func() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
return ctx, cancel
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
cancel()
acpSignalContext = previous
})
return cancel
}
func TestRunACPCancellationPreservesTerminalReadError(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
wantErr := errors.New("transport read failed")
reader := acpTestReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
})
writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
var stdout bytes.Buffer
writer := acpTestWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
writeStarted <- struct{}{}
<-releaseWrite
return stdout.Write(p)
})
var stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, writer, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-writeStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not reach the response write")
}
// Keep Serve in the synchronous write until cancellation is observable. The
// regression requires the genuine read error to win over that cancellation.
cancel()
close(releaseWrite)
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitCrash {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want crash %d", code, exitCrash)
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after terminal read error")
}
if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "acp: "+wantErr.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want terminal read error", got)
}
}
func TestRunACPIdleCancellationExitsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
pipeReader, pipeWriter := io.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pipeWriter.Close() })
readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
reader := &acpNotifyingReadCloser{ReadCloser: pipeReader, readStarted: readStarted}
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
done := make(chan int, 1)
go func() {
done <- runACP(nil, &stdout, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
}()
select {
case <-readStarted:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not begin reading")
}
cancel()
select {
case code := <-done:
if code != exitSuccess {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want success %d; stderr: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after cancellation")
}
if stderr.Len() != 0 {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
}
}
type acpNotifyingReadCloser struct {
io.ReadCloser
readStarted chan<- struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (r *acpNotifyingReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
r.once.Do(func() { r.readStarted <- struct{}{} })
return r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
}
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
{id: "fireworks", name: "Fireworks AI", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code"},
{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
}
+16 -115
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"os/exec"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
@@ -18,11 +17,7 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {
stdout, stderr, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTimeout)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
// Report which phase ran out of time, and anything the command
// managed to say. This used to be a bare string with the underlying
// error and stderr both dropped, which left a user whose command was
// slow on a cold machine with nothing to act on.
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after %s: %w%s", providerCommandTimeout, err, commandOutput(stderr))
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after 5s")
}
return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command failed: %w%s", err, commandOutput(stderr))
}
@@ -45,111 +40,20 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {
var errProviderCommandTimeout = errors.New("provider command timeout")
// providerCommandDrainGrace bounds how long the timeout path waits for cmd.Wait
// to return after the process tree has been terminated. Terminate normally makes
// that immediate; this exists so a descendant that refuses to die cannot extend
// a call whose deadline has already expired.
const providerCommandDrainGrace = 2 * time.Second
// syncBuffer serialises the command's I/O pump against reads from this package.
// On the timeout path runProviderCommand can return while cmd.Wait is still
// draining, so the buffers outlive the call and a plain bytes.Buffer would be
// read and written concurrently.
type syncBuffer struct {
mu sync.Mutex
buf bytes.Buffer
}
func (b *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return b.buf.Write(p)
}
// snapshot copies out what has been written so far. A copy rather than the
// buffer's own slice, which the pump may still append to.
func (b *syncBuffer) snapshot() []byte {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
return append([]byte(nil), b.buf.Bytes()...)
}
// awaitWithGrace waits for done and gives up after grace, reporting whether the
// wait completed rather than expired.
//
// Split out from the timeout path so the bound can be asserted on its own. In
// place it is effectively untestable: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait returns
// promptly and an unbounded receive would behave identically in every test that
// is not pathological, which is exactly how the old unbounded receive survived.
func awaitWithGrace(done <-chan error, grace time.Duration) bool {
timer := time.NewTimer(grace)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-done:
return true
case <-timer.C:
return false
}
}
// runProviderCommand runs a provider command under a real deadline.
//
// "Real" is the point: timeout used to bound only the wait, so the call could
// take arbitrarily longer than it. Two phases sat outside it. Starting the
// process ran before the clock began, and on Windows that is CREATE_SUSPENDED,
// job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread snapshot, none of
// which is fast on a cold or contended machine. Draining after termination was
// unbounded as well. Both are inside the budget now, so the deadline is an upper
// bound rather than a floor.
func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
cmd := shellCommand(command)
// Bound the time Wait spends draining I/O pipes after the process exits,
// in case an orphaned descendant still holds the write ends open.
cmd.WaitDelay = time.Second
stdout := &syncBuffer{}
stderr := &syncBuffer{}
cmd.Stdout = stdout
cmd.Stderr = stderr
var stdout bytes.Buffer
var stderr bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
// Armed before the process is started, so process creation is inside the
// budget rather than ahead of it.
deadline := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer deadline.Stop()
type startResult struct {
proc *commandProcess
err error
}
// Buffered, so the goroutine can finish and exit even when nobody is left
// waiting on it because the deadline already fired.
started := make(chan startResult, 1)
go func() {
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
started <- startResult{proc: proc, err: err}
}()
var proc *commandProcess
select {
case result := <-started:
if result.err != nil {
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), result.err
}
proc = result.proc
case <-deadline.C:
// The start is still in flight and will eventually hand back whatever it
// created, so cleanup is handed off rather than abandoned. Wait reaps the
// process; without it a started-but-orphaned command becomes a zombie.
go func() {
result := <-started
if result.err != nil {
return
}
result.proc.Terminate()
_ = cmd.Wait()
result.proc.Close()
}()
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: starting the command exceeded %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
defer proc.Close()
@@ -158,6 +62,9 @@ func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte,
done <- cmd.Wait()
}()
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
@@ -176,19 +83,13 @@ func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte,
// and tests unable to tell which one happened. Callers that only ask
// errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) are unaffected, so the
// message LoadProviderCommand reports is unchanged.
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errProviderCommandTimeout, err)
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errProviderCommandTimeout, err)
}
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), err
case <-deadline.C:
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), err
case <-timer.C:
proc.Terminate()
// Bounded, unlike the bare receive this replaces. Terminate kills the
// tree so Wait almost always returns at once, but "almost always" was
// doing real work here: a tree that resists termination used to hold the
// call open indefinitely, long past the deadline that had just expired.
// Returning early leaves cmd.Wait running, which is why the buffers are
// synchronised.
awaitWithGrace(done, providerCommandDrainGrace)
return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: the command did not finish within %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
<-done
return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
}
}
-130
View File
@@ -414,133 +414,3 @@ func itoa(value int) string {
}
return string(digits[index:])
}
// The whole point of #811: providerCommandTimeout has to be an upper bound on
// how long the call takes, not a floor. Process creation used to run before the
// clock started and the post-termination drain was unbounded, so a slow or
// contended machine could block startup for far longer than the error text
// promised.
//
// This one guards the end-to-end contract against gross regressions. It is NOT
// the assertion that pins the drain bound: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait
// returns promptly and this passes even with the drain unbounded. That property
// is pinned by TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp, and the start-phase bound by
// TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline.
func TestRunProviderCommandBoundsTotalDuration(t *testing.T) {
pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bound.pid")
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 60, PidFile: pidFile})
const budget = 2 * time.Second
start := time.Now()
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, budget)
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
}
// Budget, plus the bounded drain, plus room for a loaded runner. A failure
// here means some phase is outside the deadline again, which is the bug.
ceiling := budget + providerCommandDrainGrace + 8*time.Second
if elapsed > ceiling {
t.Fatalf("returned after %s with a %s budget; the timeout is not bounding the call (ceiling %s)", elapsed, budget, ceiling)
}
assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
}
// The timeout error has to carry something an operator can act on. It used to be
// a bare string with the underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped,
// so a user whose provider command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or
// what the command had said.
func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeoutReportsDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
Stderr: "provider is warming up",
SleepSeconds: 30,
PidFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "diag.pid"),
})
_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want timeout")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "timed out") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want a timeout message", err.Error())
}
// Wrapped, so callers can still classify it.
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is against the timeout sentinel", err)
}
// And it must say which phase, rather than only that time ran out.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "did not finish") && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to name the phase that exceeded the deadline", err.Error())
}
}
// The output buffers are written by cmd.Wait's I/O pump, which keeps running
// after the timeout path has returned them to the caller, so a plain
// bytes.Buffer would be read and written concurrently. Asserted on the buffer
// directly: driving it end to end does not reliably produce the overlap, because
// a terminated command usually stops writing before the snapshot is taken, so
// such a test passes with the locking removed and proves nothing.
//
// Only meaningful under -race, which CI runs.
func TestSyncBufferAllowsConcurrentWriteAndSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
buffer := &syncBuffer{}
writing := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(writing)
for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
_, _ = buffer.Write([]byte("x"))
}
}()
for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
_ = buffer.snapshot()
}
<-writing
if len(buffer.snapshot()) != 2000 {
t.Fatalf("buffer holds %d bytes, want 2000", len(buffer.snapshot()))
}
}
// The drain after termination must be bounded. Asserted directly on the helper,
// because in place it is untestable without a tree that refuses to die: Wait
// normally returns at once, which is precisely why an unbounded receive sat
// there unnoticed. A channel that never fires is the pathological case made
// cheap.
func TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp(t *testing.T) {
never := make(chan error)
start := time.Now()
if awaitWithGrace(never, 50*time.Millisecond) {
t.Fatal("reported completion for a wait that never finished")
}
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > 5*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("gave up after %s, want roughly the grace period", elapsed)
}
// Still reports completion when the wait does finish, or the timeout path
// would always claim the tree hung.
done := make(chan error, 1)
done <- nil
if !awaitWithGrace(done, time.Second) {
t.Fatal("reported expiry for a wait that had already finished")
}
}
// Process creation has to be inside the budget. It used to run before the clock
// started, and on Windows that phase is CREATE_SUSPENDED plus job-object setup
// plus a system-wide thread snapshot, none of it fast on a contended machine.
//
// A budget that is already spent when the call begins can only be exceeded
// during the start, so the phase named in the error is what distinguishes the
// two orderings: with the clock started afterwards, the start would always
// complete first and the failure would come from the wait instead.
func TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline(t *testing.T) {
command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{Stdout: `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-x","model":"m"}`})
_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, time.Nanosecond)
if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the start phase to be the one that exceeded the deadline; "+
"anything else means process creation is outside the budget again", err.Error())
}
}
+18 -62
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package imageinput
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
@@ -17,13 +16,6 @@ import (
// clipboard, or (nil, "", nil) when the clipboard has no image. Called when
// text clipboard is empty (the user pasted a screenshot). The media type is
// sniffed from the bytes, not trusted from the clipboard.
// ErrClipboardImageUnreadable reports that the clipboard holds an image the host
// has no way to extract. It is deliberately distinct from "no image on the
// clipboard", which is an ordinary no-op: this one is actionable, and silence is
// the wrong response to it.
var ErrClipboardImageUnreadable = errors.New(
"the clipboard holds an image but no helper on this host can read it; on macOS install pngpaste (brew install pngpaste) or a Python with pyobjc")
func ReadClipboardImage() ([]byte, string, error) {
data, err := readClipboardImageBytes()
if err != nil {
@@ -103,71 +95,35 @@ func readClipboardImageWindows() ([]byte, error) {
// readClipboardImageDarwin uses osascript to check for and read a clipboard
// image. Returns (nil, nil) when no image is present.
// darwinClipboardInfo reports what the pasteboard is currently offering, and
// darwinClipboardExtract pulls the PNG bytes out of it.
//
// Both are vars so the two-step logic below can be driven in a test. The step
// that matters, "the clipboard holds an image and nothing here can extract it",
// only happens when the first succeeds and the second fails, which cannot be
// arranged by stubbing the caller: a test that substitutes ReadClipboardImage
// asserts the plumbing around this function rather than the decision inside it,
// and stays green with that decision reverted.
var (
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `osascript -e 'clipboard info'`).Output()
return string(out), err
func readClipboardImageDarwin() ([]byte, error) {
// Check clipboard info for image classes.
check := `osascript -e 'clipboard info'`
out, err := exec.Command("sh", "-c", check).Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil
}
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
// pngpaste if available, falling back to a Python one-liner. Neither
// ships with macOS: pngpaste is Homebrew-only and Apple dropped the
// bundled PyObjC, so a stock Mac fails here every time.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `pngpaste - 2>/dev/null || python3 -c "
info := string(out)
if !strings.Contains(info, "PNG") && !strings.Contains(info, "JPEG") && !strings.Contains(info, "TIFF") && !strings.Contains(info, "GIF") {
return nil, nil
}
// Write clipboard image to a temp file via AppleScript, then read it.
// Using pngpaste if available, falling back to a Python one-liner.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", `pngpaste - 2>/dev/null || python3 -c "
import AppKit, sys
pb = AppKit.NSPasteboard.generalPasteboard()
data = pb.dataForType_(AppKit.NSPasteboardTypePNG)
if data:
sys.stdout.buffer.write(data.bytes())
"`)
var stdout bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return stdout.Bytes(), nil
}
)
// darwinClipboardOffersImage reports whether the pasteboard info line names an
// image class.
func darwinClipboardOffersImage(info string) bool {
for _, class := range []string{"PNG", "JPEG", "TIFF", "GIF"} {
if strings.Contains(info, class) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func readClipboardImageDarwin() ([]byte, error) {
info, err := darwinClipboardInfo()
if err != nil {
var stdout bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
return nil, nil
}
if !darwinClipboardOffersImage(info) {
if stdout.Len() == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
// Past this point the clipboard is KNOWN to hold an image, because the probe
// above said so. A failure here is therefore not "no image", it is "there is
// an image and nothing on this host can extract it". Reporting that as
// absence is what left users staring at a paste that silently did nothing.
data, err := darwinClipboardExtract()
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable
}
if len(data) == 0 {
return nil, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable
}
return data, nil
return stdout.Bytes(), nil
}
// readClipboardImageLinux tries wl-paste (Wayland) then xclip (X11) to read
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
package imageinput
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
// Drives readClipboardImageDarwin's own decision rather than the plumbing around
// it. Both shell steps are substituted, so this runs on any platform and, more
// importantly, actually reaches the branch under test: a test that stubs
// ReadClipboardImage instead stays green with the production change reverted,
// which is how the first version of this coverage slipped through.
func TestReadClipboardImageDarwinDistinguishesUnreadableFromAbsent(t *testing.T) {
restore := func() func() {
info, extract := darwinClipboardInfo, darwinClipboardExtract
return func() { darwinClipboardInfo, darwinClipboardExtract = info, extract }
}()
t.Cleanup(restore)
const pngInfo = `«class PNGf», «class 8BPS»`
t.Run("image present but no extractor is actionable", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return nil, errors.New("exit status 127") }
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if !errors.Is(err, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrClipboardImageUnreadable; a stock Mac gets silence instead of a remedy", err)
}
if data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data = %q, want none", data)
}
})
t.Run("extractor producing nothing is also actionable", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
if _, err := readClipboardImageDarwin(); !errors.Is(err, ErrClipboardImageUnreadable) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrClipboardImageUnreadable for an extractor that exits 0 with no bytes", err)
}
})
// The other half of the distinction, and the reason this cannot simply always
// report an error: an empty clipboard is an ordinary no-op, and turning that
// into a notice would make every stray Ctrl+V nag the user.
t.Run("no image on the clipboard stays silent", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return `«class utf8»`, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
t.Fatal("extractor ran despite the clipboard offering no image")
return nil, nil
}
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if err != nil || data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data=%q err=%v, want a silent no-op", data, err)
}
})
t.Run("probe failure stays silent", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return "", errors.New("osascript missing") }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) {
t.Fatal("extractor ran despite the info probe failing")
return nil, nil
}
if data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin(); err != nil || data != nil {
t.Fatalf("data=%q err=%v, want a silent no-op", data, err)
}
})
t.Run("working extractor returns the bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
darwinClipboardInfo = func() (string, error) { return pngInfo, nil }
darwinClipboardExtract = func() ([]byte, error) { return []byte("png-bytes"), nil }
data, err := readClipboardImageDarwin()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want none", err)
}
if string(data) != "png-bytes" {
t.Fatalf("data = %q, want the extractor's bytes", data)
}
})
}
-1
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,6 @@ var descriptors = []Descriptor{
openAICompat("groq", "Groq", "https://api.groq.com/openai/v1", "llama-3.3-70b-versatile", []string{"GROQ_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("deepseek", "DeepSeek", "https://api.deepseek.com/v1", "deepseek-chat", []string{"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("together", "Together AI", "https://api.together.xyz/v1", "meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct-Turbo", []string{"TOGETHER_API_KEY"}),
openAICompat("fireworks", "Fireworks AI", "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1", "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code", []string{"FIREWORKS_API_KEY"}, "fireworks-ai"),
openAICompat("dashscope", "DashScope", "https://dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1", "qwen-plus", []string{"DASHSCOPE_API_KEY", "QWEN_API_KEY"}, "qwen"),
openAICompat("moonshot", "Moonshot AI", "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1", "kimi-k2-0905-preview", []string{"MOONSHOT_API_KEY"}, "kimi"),
openAICompat("atlascloud", "Atlas Cloud", "https://api.atlascloud.ai/v1", "qwen/qwen3.5-flash", []string{"ATLASCLOUD_API_KEY"}, "atlas cloud", "atlas"),
+1 -24
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var expectedCatalogIDs = []string{
"groq",
"deepseek",
"together",
"fireworks",
"dashscope",
"moonshot",
"atlascloud",
@@ -156,28 +155,6 @@ func TestLongCatDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFireworksDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
descriptor, err := Require("fireworks")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Require(fireworks) error = %v", err)
}
if descriptor.Name != "Fireworks AI" {
t.Fatalf("Name = %q, want Fireworks AI", descriptor.Name)
}
if descriptor.DefaultBaseURL != "https://api.fireworks.ai/inference/v1" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultBaseURL = %q, want Fireworks OpenAI-compatible endpoint", descriptor.DefaultBaseURL)
}
if descriptor.DefaultModel != "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code" {
t.Fatalf("DefaultModel = %q, want accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code", descriptor.DefaultModel)
}
if descriptor.Transport != TransportOpenAICompatible {
t.Fatalf("Transport = %q, want %q", descriptor.Transport, TransportOpenAICompatible)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(descriptor.AuthEnvVars, []string{"FIREWORKS_API_KEY"}) {
t.Fatalf("AuthEnvVars = %#v, want FIREWORKS_API_KEY", descriptor.AuthEnvVars)
}
}
func TestAtlasCloudDescriptor(t *testing.T) {
descriptor, err := Require("atlascloud")
if err != nil {
@@ -369,7 +346,7 @@ func TestListByTransportPreservesCatalogOrder(t *testing.T) {
TransportBedrock: {"bedrock"},
TransportVertex: {"vertex"},
TransportAnthropicCompat: {"minimax", "minimaxi-cn", "opencode-go-anthropic-compatible", "custom-anthropic-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "aimlapi", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "fireworks", "dashscope", "moonshot", "atlascloud", "longcat", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "zai-cn", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
TransportOpenAICompat: {"gitlawb-opengateway", "aimlapi", "ollama-cloud", "ollama", "lmstudio", "openrouter", "huggingface", "chatgpt", "groq", "deepseek", "together", "dashscope", "moonshot", "atlascloud", "longcat", "nvidia-nim", "mistral", "github", "xai", "venice", "xiaomi-mimo", "bankr", "zai", "zai-cn", "kilocode", "opencode", "opencode-go", "atomic-chat", "chatgpt-proxy", "custom-openai-compatible"},
}
for transport, wantIDs := range cases {
-8
View File
@@ -122,14 +122,6 @@ var curatedModels = map[string][]Model{
{ID: "deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1", Description: "reasoning model"},
{ID: "meta-llama/Llama-4-Maverick-17B-128E-Instruct-FP8", Description: "multimodal model"},
},
"fireworks": {
// Serverless-only curated set: ordinary API-key setups hit /inference/v1
// and cannot use on-demand deployment IDs.
{ID: "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v4-flash", Description: "fast coding model"},
{ID: "accounts/fireworks/models/gpt-oss-120b", Description: "general model"},
{ID: "accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v4-pro", Description: "reasoning model"},
},
"dashscope": {
{ID: "qwen-plus", Description: "catalog default"},
{ID: "qwen-max", Description: "strong general model"},
@@ -28,11 +28,6 @@ func TestModelsAreProviderScoped(t *testing.T) {
want: []string{"llama-3.3-70b-versatile", "openai/gpt-oss-120b"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "claude-sonnet-4.5"},
},
{
provider: "fireworks",
want: []string{"accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code", "accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v4-flash"},
notWant: []string{"gpt-4.1", "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
},
{
provider: "chatgpt",
want: []string{"gpt-5.5", "gpt-5.4", "gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.3-codex-spark"},
-2
View File
@@ -132,8 +132,6 @@ func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
return "zai"
case "minimaxi-cn":
return "minimax"
case "fireworks":
return "fireworks-ai"
default:
return strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID)
}
@@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
"ollama-cloud": "ollama-cloud",
"zai-cn": "zai",
"minimaxi-cn": "minimax",
"fireworks": "fireworks-ai",
}
for zeroID, want := range tests {
provider, ok := providercatalog.Get(zeroID)
+1 -3
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,7 @@ type TokenResolver func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (header string,
//
// base carries the API-key auth config (key + default header/scheme). setExtra
// (optional) sets the provider's non-auth headers on every attempt. Transient
// retries are handled by the inner SendWithRetry: 429/503/529 on their own
// budget, and provably pre-send transport failures (refused or timed-out
// connect, DNS, TLS handshake) on a separate, shorter one.
// retries (429/503/529) are handled by the inner SendWithRetry.
func SendWithAuthRetry(
ctx context.Context,
client *http.Client,
+28 -292
View File
@@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ package providerio
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -20,22 +17,13 @@ import (
// (previously only the OpenAI provider retried; Anthropic and Gemini surfaced the
// first failure).
//
// What is retried: 429 (rate limit) and 503 (service unavailable) — the statuses
// where the server explicitly did NOT accept the request — plus PROVABLY
// pre-send transport failures (DNS resolution, a refused/unreachable dial, a TLS
// handshake timeout) where no request bytes ever left this host. In every one of
// those cases we KNOW the server did not receive and process the request, so a
// replay cannot duplicate work. Other 5xx (500/502/504) and every ambiguous or
// post-send transport error (connection reset, broken pipe, EOF, a generic i/o
// timeout, context deadline) are NOT retried: a completion POST is
// non-idempotent and may already have reached and been processed by the server,
// so replaying it could duplicate (billable) work. Only the INITIAL request is
// ever in scope; once the response body starts streaming it is never re-issued.
// Pre-send classification is by syscall errno (portable across POSIX and
// Windows), scoped to an Op=="dial" *net.OpError so the same errno raised on a
// post-send read/write can't be misread as pre-send. NXDOMAIN is treated as
// permanent (not retried), and the pre-send path fails fast on its own
// sub-second schedule rather than the seconds-long 429 backoff.
// What is retried: ONLY 429 (rate limit) and 503 (service unavailable) — the
// statuses where the server explicitly did NOT accept the request, so replaying
// it cannot duplicate work. Other 5xx (500/502/504) and transport/network errors
// are NOT retried: a completion POST is non-idempotent and may have reached and
// been processed by the server, so replaying it could duplicate
// (billable) work. Only the INITIAL request is ever in scope; once the response
// body starts streaming it is never re-issued.
const defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 6
@@ -49,32 +37,12 @@ const maxBackoff = 30 * time.Second
// schedule is 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, then maxBackoff. A var so tests can shrink it.
var retryBackoffBase = 2 * time.Second
// preSendMaxAttempts bounds retries of a provably pre-send transport failure.
// Unlike a 429 (whose window is measured in seconds), a refused/unreachable dial
// either recovers within a few hundred ms or is a deterministic misconfiguration
// (wrong host/port, dead local daemon) that will never recover — so a short,
// low-count schedule fails fast instead of stalling the agent ~60s on the
// rate-limit schedule. This bounds the pre-send path independently of the caller's
// maxAttempts, which is tuned for 429/503.
const preSendMaxAttempts = 3
// preSendBackoffBase is the first wait before replaying a pre-send transport
// failure. Modeled on the mid-stream reconnect base (internal/agent/reconnect.go),
// it is sub-second so a transient dial blip recovers quickly and a permanent one
// fails fast. A var so tests can shrink it.
var preSendBackoffBase = 500 * time.Millisecond
// SendWithRetry issues an HTTP request, retrying ONLY the safe-to-replay server
// responses (429 and 503, see ShouldRetryStatus) up to maxAttempts — backing off
// between tries and honoring a server Retry-After header and context
// cancellation. The one transport-error exception is a PROVABLY pre-send failure
// (see isPreSendTransportError): a refused/unreachable dial or DNS failure where
// no request bytes left this host, retried on its own short schedule
// (preSendMaxAttempts / preSendBackoff). Every other 5xx and every ambiguous or
// post-send transport error is returned immediately, never replayed, because a
// non-idempotent completion POST may already have been received. The request is
// rebuilt from body each attempt; setHeader (if non-nil) sets headers on every
// attempt.
// cancellation. Other 5xx and transport/network errors are returned immediately,
// never replayed (see the package note). The request is rebuilt from body each
// attempt; setHeader (if non-nil) sets headers on every attempt.
//
// It returns the final *http.Response (which the caller inspects for a non-2xx
// status, exactly as before) or an error for a network failure / context
@@ -92,47 +60,7 @@ func SendWithRetry(
if maxAttempts <= 0 {
maxAttempts = defaultMaxRetryAttempts
}
if client == nil {
client = http.DefaultClient
}
// Redirects are still FOLLOWED, so a redirecting gateway keeps working, but
// entering one makes that attempt non-retryable. The hazard is that client.Do
// can transmit the original POST to the first host, follow a 307/308, and then
// fail the dial to the redirect target: that error is an Op=="dial" error, so
// isPreSendTransportError would read it as "nothing was sent" and replay a
// completion the first host already received. Observing the redirect rather
// than blocking it keeps both properties, since a request that was redirected
// is never replayed while redirecting endpoints stay usable. The caller's own
// CheckRedirect still runs and still decides whether to proceed.
redirected := false
callerCheckRedirect := client.CheckRedirect
redirectAwareClient := *client
redirectAwareClient.CheckRedirect = func(request *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
redirected = true
if callerCheckRedirect != nil {
return callerCheckRedirect(request, via)
}
// Mirror net/http's default policy, which a nil CheckRedirect would have
// applied: stop after 10 hops.
if len(via) >= 10 {
return errors.New("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
return nil
}
// The two retry budgets are fully independent, each with its own counter and
// its own backoff ordinal, because they answer different questions: a
// dial/DNS/TLS failure is a fast local blip (preSendMaxAttempts, sub-second
// schedule) while a 429/503 is a server-side window measured in seconds
// (maxAttempts, retryBackoffBase). A single shared loop counter coupled them
// in both directions: status retries starved the pre-send budget, and
// pre-send retries shortened the status window and started its backoff at a
// later rung. Neither kind of failure now consumes or advances the other.
preSendAttempts := 0
statusAttempts := 0
for {
// Per attempt: only a redirect entered by THIS attempt can make its own
// transport error unsafe to replay.
redirected = false
for attempt := 1; ; attempt++ {
request, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, url, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -142,78 +70,32 @@ func SendWithRetry(
}
connectSpan := trace.FromContext(ctx).Span(trace.SpanProviderConnect)
response, err := redirectAwareClient.Do(request)
response, err := client.Do(request)
connectSpan.End()
if err != nil {
// Context cancellation always surfaces as cancellation, never a retry.
// A transport failure on a POST does NOT mean the server didn't receive
// it — the request may have arrived and be generating a (billable,
// non-idempotent) completion while only the response/connection failed.
// Replaying it could duplicate that work, so surface the error instead
// of retrying. Only 429/503 responses (below), where we KNOW the request
// was not accepted, are safe to retry.
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
// A transport failure on a POST does NOT usually mean the server didn't
// receive it — the request may have arrived and be generating a
// (billable, non-idempotent) completion while only the response or
// connection failed. Replaying that could duplicate work, so it is
// surfaced immediately. The one safe exception is a PROVABLY pre-send
// failure (see isPreSendTransportError): the request never left this
// host, so a replay cannot duplicate anything — exactly like a 429/503
// where we KNOW the request was not accepted. The pre-send path uses
// its own short bound and sub-second schedule (preSendMaxAttempts /
// preSendBackoff), not the seconds-long 429 schedule, so a permanent
// dial failure fails fast instead of stalling the agent for ~60s.
// A redirect means the original POST already left this host, so the
// dial that failed belongs to a later hop and replaying would duplicate
// a completion the first host may already have processed.
if isPreSendTransportError(err) && !redirected {
preSendAttempts++
if preSendAttempts < preSendMaxAttempts {
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterRetryCount, 1)
}
if preSendBackoff(ctx, preSendAttempts) {
continue
}
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
return nil, err
}
// Deliberately NOT guarded on `redirected`, unlike the transport-error
// branch above. The two differ in what is known about the request. A
// transport failure after a redirect leaves it unknown whether the
// redirect target received and began processing the POST, so replaying
// could duplicate billable work. Here every hop answered: a 307/308 is the
// origin declining and delegating, and a retryable status is the target
// declining as well, so nothing accepted the request and a replay
// duplicates nothing.
//
// The exposure is also identical to a retryable status with no redirect in
// play, which this package has always retried. Guarding on redirects here
// would not close a gap, it would make a rate-limited completion behind a
// redirecting gateway fail outright instead of backing off.
// The transport hop succeeded, so the connect phase is healthy again and
// the pre-send budget starts over. It bounds CONSECUTIVE connect failures,
// not the lifetime of the call: without this reset, two early dial retries
// followed by a 429 and then one more dial blip would surface a transport
// error while the status budget still had room, which is the coupling
// these two counters were split apart to remove. Total work stays bounded,
// since every reset costs a status attempt and those are capped.
preSendAttempts = 0
if ShouldRetryStatus(response.StatusCode) {
statusAttempts++
if statusAttempts < maxAttempts {
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterRetryCount, 1)
}
wait := RetryAfter(response)
_ = response.Body.Close()
if Backoff(ctx, statusAttempts, wait) {
continue
}
// Backoff aborted: the only reason it returns false is ctx cancellation.
return nil, ctx.Err()
if ShouldRetryStatus(response.StatusCode) && attempt < maxAttempts {
if r := trace.FromContext(ctx); r != nil {
r.Counter(trace.CounterRetryCount, 1)
}
wait := RetryAfter(response)
_ = response.Body.Close()
if Backoff(ctx, attempt, wait) {
continue
}
// Backoff aborted: the only reason it returns false is ctx cancellation.
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
// Success, a non-retryable status, or retries exhausted on a retryable
@@ -227,119 +109,6 @@ func SendWithRetry(
}
}
// isPreSendTransportError reports whether a transport error PROVES no request
// bytes reached the server, so replaying the request cannot duplicate a
// billable completion. Only narrow, unambiguous pre-connect failures qualify: a
// recoverable DNS lookup failure, a refused/unreachable dial, and a TLS
// handshake timeout (the handshake completes before any HTTP request bytes are
// written).
//
// The refused/unreachable errnos (ECONNREFUSED/ENETUNREACH/EHOSTUNREACH) are
// matched by syscall errno via errors.Is — portable across platforms, since Go
// maps the WSA* codes on Windows too — but ONLY when carried by an Op=="dial"
// *net.OpError. errors.Is matches an errno anywhere in the chain regardless of
// which socket operation raised it, and the kernel raises these same errnos on
// an established connection when a route drops mid-generation; scoping to the
// dial phase is what makes "no request bytes were sent" structural rather than
// argued, so a post-send read/write can never replay a non-idempotent POST.
// NXDOMAIN is treated as permanent (deterministic) and is NOT retried.
//
// Ambiguous or post-send failures are deliberately excluded and checked FIRST,
// so an error that is both is never treated as pre-send: a reset or broken pipe
// can follow a request that was already sent, and a bare "i/o timeout" covers
// read timeouts after send as well as dial timeouts, so none of these prove the
// request was not received and a non-idempotent POST must not be replayed on
// them.
func isPreSendTransportError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// DNS resolution precedes any connection, so a lookup failure proves nothing
// was sent — but only retry a lookup that could plausibly succeed on a replay.
// NXDOMAIN (IsNotFound) is authoritative and deterministic (a mistyped or
// non-existent host), so retrying it just stalls the agent through the whole
// backoff schedule before failing anyway; a timeout or temporary SERVFAIL is
// worth another try. errors.As unwraps url.Error/OpError to reach the DNSError.
var dnsErr *net.DNSError
if errors.As(err, &dnsErr) {
return !dnsErr.IsNotFound
}
// Post-send / ambiguous failures, excluded first. EOF and reset are matched
// by identity so wording (or a hostname containing "eof") can't fool them.
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) || isConnResetErrno(err) {
return false
}
// A CONNECT-phase timeout is provably pre-send for the same structural reason
// a refused dial is: the connection was never established, so no request
// bytes left this host. It has to be admitted BEFORE the wording exclusions
// below, because net surfaces it with "i/o timeout" in the message, which the
// blanket exclusion would otherwise reject. The gate is what keeps that safe:
// a post-send read timeout is also Timeout(), but carries Op "read", so it
// never reaches here.
if opErr := connectOpError(err); opErr != nil && opErr.Timeout() {
return true
}
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
if strings.Contains(msg, "connection reset") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "broken pipe") ||
strings.Contains(msg, "i/o timeout") {
return false
}
// A refused/unreachable connection is provably pre-send ONLY when it was
// raised during the DIAL (connection-establishment) phase. The same errnos
// are also raised by the kernel on an ESTABLISHED connection — when a route
// drops or an ICMP unreachable arrives mid-generation — which is post-send.
// errors.Is matches an errno anywhere in the chain regardless of the
// operation, so we first require an Op=="dial" *net.OpError: that makes "no
// request bytes left this host" structural, so a post-send read/write carrying
// one of these can never replay a non-idempotent POST. dialPreSendErrnos is
// platform-specific: on Windows a refused dial carries the raw WSA* errno
// (WSAECONNREFUSED etc.), which does NOT satisfy errors.Is against the POSIX
// syscall.ECONNREFUSED, so the Windows list adds those codes. The string
// markers only catch a POSIX dial error already flattened past its errno.
if connectOpError(err) != nil {
for _, errno := range dialPreSendErrnos {
if errors.Is(err, errno) {
return true
}
}
switch {
case strings.Contains(msg, "connection refused"),
strings.Contains(msg, "network is unreachable"),
strings.Contains(msg, "no route to host"):
return true
}
}
// A TLS handshake times out after the TCP dial connects but before any HTTP
// request bytes are written, so it is structurally pre-send. net/http surfaces
// it as its own error string, not a *net.OpError, so it is matched by wording
// independent of the dial gate.
if strings.Contains(msg, "tls handshake timeout") {
return true
}
return false
}
// connectOpError returns the outermost *net.OpError in err's chain when it comes
// from the connection-establishment phase, else nil. Go tags a direct dial with
// Op "dial" and a failed CONNECT through an HTTP proxy with Op "proxyconnect";
// a failure on an already-established connection carries Op "read"/"write".
// This is how isPreSendTransportError scopes the pre-send match to the connect
// phase so a post-send failure can't be misclassified as pre-send.
//
// "proxyconnect" belongs here for the same reason "dial" does: when HTTPS_PROXY
// is set and the CONNECT fails, the tunnel to the model host was never built, so
// no request bytes reached it. Omitting it meant every pre-send failure behind a
// corporate proxy fell through to no-retry, which is the environment where
// transient connect failures are most common.
func connectOpError(err error) *net.OpError {
var opErr *net.OpError
if errors.As(err, &opErr) && (opErr.Op == "dial" || opErr.Op == "proxyconnect") {
return opErr
}
return nil
}
// ShouldRetryStatus reports whether an HTTP status is safe to retry for a
// non-idempotent completion POST: 429 (Too Many Requests), 503 (Service
// Unavailable), and 529 (Anthropic's "overloaded"). All mean the server
@@ -368,39 +137,6 @@ func Backoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int, retryAfter time.Duration) bool {
}
}
// preSendBackoff waits before pre-send retry attempt N (1-based) on a short
// sub-second schedule (500ms, 1s, ...), returning false if the context is
// cancelled during the wait. Separate from Backoff's seconds-long rate-limit
// schedule because a pre-send dial failure recovers in milliseconds or never.
func preSendBackoff(ctx context.Context, attempt int) bool {
timer := time.NewTimer(preSendBackoffWait(attempt))
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return false
case <-timer.C:
return true
}
}
// preSendBackoffWait computes the pre-send wait before retry attempt N (1-based):
// exponential from preSendBackoffBase (500ms, 1s, 2s, ...), capped at maxBackoff.
// The exponent is clamped so a large attempt count cannot overflow.
func preSendBackoffWait(attempt int) time.Duration {
exponent := attempt - 1
if exponent > 5 {
exponent = 5
}
if exponent < 0 {
exponent = 0
}
wait := preSendBackoffBase * time.Duration(1<<exponent)
if wait > maxBackoff {
wait = maxBackoff
}
return wait
}
// backoffWait computes the wait before retry attempt N (1-based): Retry-After
// when supplied, else exponential from retryBackoffBase, both capped at
// maxBackoff. The exponent is clamped so a large attempt count cannot overflow.
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows && !plan9
package providerio
import (
"errors"
"syscall"
)
// dialPreSendErrnos are the syscall errnos a refused or unreachable DIAL raises
// on this platform. On POSIX the standard syscall constants are exactly what the
// net package surfaces, so matching them via errors.Is is sufficient. Plan 9 is
// excluded because it does not define these BSD-style errno constants (it uses
// string errors), so the constants below would not compile there; Zero targets
// linux/darwin/windows, so no Plan 9 variant is needed.
var dialPreSendErrnos = []error{
syscall.ECONNREFUSED,
syscall.ENETUNREACH,
syscall.EHOSTUNREACH,
// A connect timeout is normally caught by the Timeout() check on the connect
// gate; this covers the case where the errno survives but the timeout flag
// does not, e.g. an error rebuilt from the errno alone.
syscall.ETIMEDOUT,
}
// isConnResetErrno reports whether err carries a connection-reset errno, the
// post-send exclusion in isPreSendTransportError. It lives here (per platform)
// so retry.go references no syscall constants and stays buildable on Plan 9,
// which defines none of them.
func isConnResetErrno(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNRESET)
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
//go:build plan9
package providerio
// Plan 9 has no BSD-style errno constants (it uses string errors), so the
// errno-based classification is unavailable here: isConnResetErrno returns false
// and dialPreSendErrnos is empty. retry.go still classifies via its string
// markers on this platform, the pre-send inclusions (connection refused /
// network unreachable / no route to host) and the separate post-send
// "connection reset" exclusion each keep working through the wording checks.
// Zero targets linux/darwin/windows, so this variant only keeps the package
// building on Plan 9 rather than adding real support.
var dialPreSendErrnos = []error{}
func isConnResetErrno(error) bool { return false }
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package providerio
import (
"errors"
"syscall"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// dialPreSendErrnos are the errnos a refused or unreachable DIAL raises on
// Windows. A real Windows dial failure carries the raw Winsock error
// (WSAECONNREFUSED = 10061, WSAENETUNREACH = 10051, WSAEHOSTUNREACH = 10065), and
// errors.Is against the POSIX syscall.ECONNREFUSED returns FALSE there because
// Go's Windows syscall.ECONNREFUSED is a distinct value the net package never
// produces. So the WSA codes must be matched explicitly, or a refused dial would
// silently never be retried on Windows. The POSIX constants stay in the list too
// so an error built with them (e.g. a test fixture) still classifies.
var dialPreSendErrnos = []error{
syscall.ECONNREFUSED,
syscall.ENETUNREACH,
syscall.EHOSTUNREACH,
syscall.ETIMEDOUT,
windows.WSAECONNREFUSED,
windows.WSAENETUNREACH,
windows.WSAEHOSTUNREACH,
// Same reasoning as the POSIX ETIMEDOUT entry, with the Winsock code a real
// Windows connect timeout actually carries.
windows.WSAETIMEDOUT,
}
// isConnResetErrno reports whether err carries a connection-reset errno, the
// post-send exclusion in isPreSendTransportError. It matches the same
// syscall.ECONNRESET the shared path used before the errno classification was
// split out per platform, so behavior on Windows is unchanged; it lives here
// so retry.go references no syscall constants and stays buildable on Plan 9.
func isConnResetErrno(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNRESET)
}
+3 -510
View File
@@ -1,34 +1,15 @@
//go:build !plan9
package providerio
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
)
// wrapDialErrno builds the error shape a dial failure has (a *net.OpError
// wrapping an *os.SyscallError wrapping the errno) so errors.Is reaches the
// errno exactly as in production. These fixtures use the POSIX syscall.Exxx
// constants, which do NOT reproduce a real Windows dial: that carries distinct
// windows.WSA* errnos (Go's syscall.ECONNREFUSED is a value the net package
// never produces on Windows). They still classify on Windows only because
// dialPreSendErrnos there also lists the POSIX constants for exactly this
// fixture reason; the real Windows dial branch is covered separately by
// TestIsPreSendTransportErrorRealRefusedDial, which makes an actual refused dial.
func wrapDialErrno(op string, errno syscall.Errno) error {
return &net.OpError{Op: op, Net: "tcp", Err: os.NewSyscallError("connectex", errno)}
}
type roundTripperFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f roundTripperFunc) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return f(r) }
@@ -54,152 +35,6 @@ func TestSendWithRetryDoesNotReplayTransportErrors(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A PROVABLY pre-send transport failure (no request bytes left this host) is
// safe to replay and must be retried, bounded by preSendMaxAttempts (its own
// short schedule), unlike an ambiguous post-send failure. Real dial failures
// arrive as an Op=="dial" *net.OpError, so the errno cases are the production
// shape on every platform (Windows included); the string case exercises the
// wording fallback for a dial error already flattened past its errno.
func TestSendWithRetryReplaysProvablyPreSendErrors(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
cases := map[string]error{
"errno refused (dial)": wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ECONNREFUSED),
"errno network unreachable": wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ENETUNREACH),
"errno host unreachable": wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH),
"dial string fallback": &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: errors.New("connect: connection refused")},
"tls handshake timeout": errors.New("net/http: TLS handshake timeout"),
"dns timeout": &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Name: "nope.invalid", IsTimeout: true},
}
for name, transportErr := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1)
return nil, transportErr
})}
// maxAttempts=6 (the default) proves the pre-send path is bounded by
// preSendMaxAttempts, not the caller's 429-tuned maxAttempts.
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "http://example.invalid", []byte("{}"), nil, 6)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the transport error to surface after retries are exhausted")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != preSendMaxAttempts {
t.Fatalf("pre-send error tried %d times, want %d (preSendMaxAttempts)", got, preSendMaxAttempts)
}
})
}
}
// An ambiguous transport failure that could have followed a sent request must
// NOT be replayed: a non-idempotent completion POST could duplicate billable
// work. This is the safety line the fix must not cross.
func TestSendWithRetryDoesNotReplayAmbiguousTransportErrors(t *testing.T) {
for name, transportErr := range map[string]error{
"generic i/o timeout": errors.New("dial tcp 1.2.3.4:443: i/o timeout"),
"broken pipe": errors.New("write tcp: broken pipe"),
"unexpected eof": io.ErrUnexpectedEOF,
// The pre-send errnos are also raised on an ESTABLISHED connection: a route
// dropping mid-generation surfaces on the pending read/write, which is
// post-send. Scoping to Op=="dial" must keep these from replaying the POST.
"host unreachable on read is post-send": wrapDialErrno("read", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH),
"net unreachable on write is post-send": wrapDialErrno("write", syscall.ENETUNREACH),
// NXDOMAIN is authoritative and deterministic, so retrying it would only
// stall the agent before failing anyway.
"dns nxdomain": &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: "nope.invalid", IsNotFound: true},
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1)
return nil, transportErr
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "http://example.invalid", []byte("{}"), nil, 3)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the transport error to surface")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("ambiguous transport error replayed %d times, want 1 (no retry)", got)
}
})
}
}
// A REAL refused dial (nothing listening on the target) must classify as
// pre-send on every platform. This is the regression the errno-constant fixtures
// miss: on Windows the kernel raises WSAECONNREFUSED, which errors.Is does NOT
// match against syscall.ECONNREFUSED, so before dialPreSendErrnos carried the WSA
// codes a refused dial returned false here and Windows never retried it. Using a
// real Dial exercises the platform's true error shape.
func TestIsPreSendTransportErrorRealRefusedDial(t *testing.T) {
// Reserve an ephemeral port, then close it, so a dial there is refused.
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
addr := ln.Addr().String()
if cerr := ln.Close(); cerr != nil {
t.Fatalf("close listener: %v", cerr)
}
conn, dialErr := (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 2 * time.Second}).Dial("tcp", addr)
if dialErr == nil {
_ = conn.Close()
t.Skip("expected a refused dial but the port accepted a connection")
}
if !isPreSendTransportError(dialErr) {
t.Fatalf("real refused dial not classified pre-send: %v", dialErr)
}
}
func TestIsPreSendTransportError(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil", nil, false},
// DNS: a lookup that could recover is pre-send; NXDOMAIN is permanent.
{"dns timeout", &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Name: "x.invalid", IsTimeout: true}, true},
{"dns temporary", &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Name: "x.invalid", IsTemporary: true}, true},
{"dns nxdomain is permanent", &net.DNSError{Err: "no such host", Name: "x.invalid", IsNotFound: true}, false},
{"tls handshake timeout", errors.New("net/http: TLS handshake timeout"), true},
// Errno-wrapped DIAL failures: how a real refused/unreachable dial arrives
// on EVERY platform, including Windows where the wording differs entirely.
{"errno refused (dial)", wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ECONNREFUSED), true},
{"errno network unreachable (dial)", wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ENETUNREACH), true},
{"errno host unreachable (dial)", wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH), true},
{"dial operror string fallback", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: errors.New("connect: connection refused")}, true},
// The SAME errnos raised on a post-send read/write are NOT pre-send — the
// kernel reports them on an established connection when a route drops.
{"host unreachable on read is post-send", wrapDialErrno("read", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH), false},
{"net unreachable on write is post-send", wrapDialErrno("write", syscall.ENETUNREACH), false},
{"errno reset is post-send", wrapDialErrno("read", syscall.ECONNRESET), false},
// A refused/unreachable error already flattened past its *net.OpError can't
// be proven pre-send, so it is NOT retried (conservative direction).
{"flattened refused, no opError", errors.New("dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused"), false},
{"connection reset", errors.New("read tcp: connection reset by peer"), false},
{"broken pipe", errors.New("write tcp: broken pipe"), false},
{"unexpected eof", io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, false},
{"eof", io.EOF, false},
{"generic io timeout", errors.New("dial tcp: i/o timeout"), false},
{"context deadline", context.DeadlineExceeded, false},
// Exclusion is checked before inclusion, even for a dial OpError: an "i/o
// timeout" in the message wins over the refused wording.
{"exclusion wins over inclusion", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: errors.New("connection refused / i/o timeout")}, false},
{"unrelated", errors.New("some other error"), false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := isPreSendTransportError(c.err); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("%s: isPreSendTransportError(%v) = %v, want %v", c.name, c.err, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestShouldRetryStatus(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[int]bool{
http.StatusOK: false,
@@ -259,17 +94,12 @@ func TestBackoffWaitsThenReturnsTrue(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// shrinkBackoff makes both retry schedules (429 and pre-send) negligible for the
// duration of a test.
// shrinkBackoff makes retry waits negligible for the duration of a test.
func shrinkBackoff(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
savedRetry, savedPreSend := retryBackoffBase, preSendBackoffBase
saved := retryBackoffBase
retryBackoffBase = time.Millisecond
preSendBackoffBase = time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() {
retryBackoffBase = savedRetry
preSendBackoffBase = savedPreSend
})
t.Cleanup(func() { retryBackoffBase = saved })
}
func TestBackoffWaitSchedule(t *testing.T) {
@@ -296,30 +126,6 @@ func TestBackoffWaitSchedule(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// The pre-send schedule is sub-second and doubles, far shorter than the 429
// schedule: a permanent dial failure fails in ~1.5s across preSendMaxAttempts
// (500ms + 1s) instead of stalling the agent ~60s on 2/4/8/16/30s. This is the
// second half of the fix for a mistyped host / dead local daemon hanging a turn.
func TestPreSendBackoffWaitSchedule(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
attempt int
want time.Duration
}{
{1, 500 * time.Millisecond},
{2, 1 * time.Second},
{3, 2 * time.Second},
// The exponent clamps at 5 (500ms<<5 = 16s) so a large attempt count can't
// overflow; in practice preSendMaxAttempts caps retries at attempt 2, so
// only the 500ms/1s rungs are ever reached.
{50, 16 * time.Second},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := preSendBackoffWait(c.attempt); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("preSendBackoffWait(%d) = %v, want %v", c.attempt, got, c.want)
}
}
}
func TestSendWithRetryRetriesThenSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
var hits int32
@@ -387,316 +193,3 @@ func TestSendWithRetryReturnsLastResponseAfterMaxAttempts(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("server hit %d times, want 2 (maxAttempts)", got)
}
}
// Redirects are still followed, so a gateway that answers the completion endpoint
// with a 307/308 keeps working: the caller gets the final response, not the 3xx.
func TestSendWithRetryFollowsRedirects(t *testing.T) {
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) == 1 {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
Header: http.Header{"Location": {"https://redirect-target.invalid/v1"}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: r,
}, nil
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://origin.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 3)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a redirected completion must succeed: %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 (the redirect should have been followed)", resp.StatusCode)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("transport called %d times, want 2 (origin then redirect target)", got)
}
}
// Once an attempt has entered a redirect, the original POST has already left this
// host, so a dial failure on the redirect hop must NOT be replayed even though it
// arrives as an Op=="dial" error that isPreSendTransportError would otherwise
// treat as provably pre-send. Replaying it would re-bill a completion the first
// host may already have processed.
func TestSendWithRetryDoesNotReplayAfterRedirect(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) == 1 {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
Header: http.Header{"Location": {"https://redirect-target.invalid/v1"}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: r,
}, nil
}
// The dial to the redirect target fails: pre-send in shape, but post-send
// in fact, because the origin already received the POST.
return nil, wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ECONNREFUSED)
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://origin.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 6)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the redirect-hop dial failure to surface as an error")
}
// Exactly two: the origin request and the single redirect hop. A third would
// mean the redirected POST was replayed.
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("redirected POST was replayed: transport called %d times, want 2", got)
}
}
// A caller that supplies its own CheckRedirect keeps it: the retry path observes
// redirects, it does not take the decision away from the caller.
func TestSendWithRetryPreservesCallerRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
var policyCalls int32
client := &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
atomic.AddInt32(&policyCalls, 1)
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
Header: http.Header{"Location": {"https://redirect-target.invalid/v1"}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: r,
}, nil
}),
}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://origin.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 3)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("caller policy asked to stop at the 3xx, so it must surface: %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTemporaryRedirect {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want the 307 surfaced per the caller's policy", resp.StatusCode)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&policyCalls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("caller CheckRedirect called %d times, want 1 (it must not be discarded)", got)
}
}
// The pre-send retry budget is independent of the 429/503 status retries: two
// rate-limit responses must not consume the pre-send allowance, so the first
// refused dial after them still gets its own preSendMaxAttempts tries.
func TestSendWithRetryPreSendBudgetSurvivesStatusRetries(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) <= 2 {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusTooManyRequests, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
}
return nil, wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ECONNREFUSED)
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://x.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 6)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the exhausted pre-send failure to surface as an error")
}
// Two status responses (calls 1-2), then the pre-send failure gets its own
// budget: preSendMaxAttempts=3 means it retries twice more before returning.
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 2+preSendMaxAttempts {
t.Fatalf("pre-send budget eaten by status retries: transport called %d times, want %d (2 status + %d pre-send)", got, 2+preSendMaxAttempts, preSendMaxAttempts)
}
}
// The inverse sequence: pre-send retries must not consume the 429/503 budget or
// advance its backoff rung either. Two safely replayed refused dials followed by
// rate limiting must still leave the status path its full maxAttempts window,
// otherwise a couple of dial blips silently shorten every later rate-limit wait.
func TestSendWithRetryStatusBudgetSurvivesPreSendRetries(t *testing.T) {
shrinkBackoff(t)
const maxAttempts = 3
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) <= 2 {
return nil, wrapDialErrno("dial", syscall.ECONNREFUSED)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusTooManyRequests, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://x.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, maxAttempts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("exhausted status retries surface the response, not an error: %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 429", resp.StatusCode)
}
// Calls 1-2 are the retried dial failures; the status path then gets its own
// full window (maxAttempts requests) before the 429 is surfaced.
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 2+maxAttempts {
t.Fatalf("status budget eaten by pre-send retries: transport called %d times, want %d (2 pre-send + %d status)", got, 2+maxAttempts, maxAttempts)
}
}
// A redirect followed by a RETRYABLE STATUS is still retried, and deliberately
// so. This is the case a reviewer flagged as a possible replay of billable work,
// and the asymmetry with the transport-error guard above is intentional rather
// than an oversight, so it is pinned here.
//
// The two situations differ in what is known about the request:
//
// - Transport error after a redirect: the original POST reached the origin and
// the dial to the redirect target then failed, so whether the target received
// and began processing it is UNKNOWN. Replaying could duplicate work, which
// is why that path refuses to retry.
// - Retryable status after a redirect: every hop answered. A 307/308 is the
// origin declining to process and delegating, and a 429/503/529 is the target
// declining as well. Nothing accepted the request, so replaying duplicates
// nothing.
//
// The risk here is also exactly the risk of a 429 without any redirect, which
// this package has always retried; the redirect adds no new ambiguity. Refusing
// to retry would instead make a rate-limited completion behind a redirecting
// gateway fail outright rather than back off.
func TestSendWithRetryRetriesRedirectedRetryableStatus(t *testing.T) {
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
switch atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) {
case 1, 3:
// The origin declines and delegates, both times.
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
Header: http.Header{"Location": {"https://redirect-target.invalid/v1"}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: r,
}, nil
case 2:
// The target declines too: rate limited, so nothing was accepted.
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusTooManyRequests, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
default:
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
}
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://origin.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 3)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a rate-limited completion behind a redirect must still retry: %v", err)
}
_ = resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200 after the retry succeeded", resp.StatusCode)
}
// origin, target(429), origin, target(200).
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 4 {
t.Fatalf("transport called %d times, want 4 (redirect, 429, redirect, 200)", got)
}
}
// A CONNECT-phase timeout is provably pre-send: the connection was never
// established, so no request bytes left this host. It reaches the classifier
// carrying "i/o timeout", which the blanket wording exclusion rejects, so
// admitting it depends on the connect gate running first.
//
// The post-send counterpart is the point of the table: a read timeout is also
// Timeout(), and must stay excluded, or a reply that timed out mid-generation
// would replay a completion the server already billed.
func TestPreSendClassifiesConnectTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
timeoutErr := &timeoutError{}
for name, testCase := range map[string]struct {
err error
want bool
}{
"dial timeout": {
err: &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: timeoutErr},
want: true,
},
"proxy connect timeout": {
err: &net.OpError{Op: "proxyconnect", Net: "tcp", Err: timeoutErr},
want: true,
},
"read timeout stays post-send": {
err: &net.OpError{Op: "read", Net: "tcp", Err: timeoutErr},
want: false,
},
"write timeout stays post-send": {
err: &net.OpError{Op: "write", Net: "tcp", Err: timeoutErr},
want: false,
},
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isPreSendTransportError(testCase.err); got != testCase.want {
t.Fatalf("isPreSendTransportError(%v) = %v, want %v", testCase.err, got, testCase.want)
}
})
}
}
// A failed CONNECT through an HTTP proxy is pre-send for the same structural
// reason a refused dial is, but net tags it Op "proxyconnect", so a gate
// matching only "dial" left every pre-send failure behind a corporate proxy
// unretried.
func TestPreSendClassifiesProxyConnectRefusal(t *testing.T) {
err := &net.OpError{Op: "proxyconnect", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}
if !isPreSendTransportError(err) {
t.Fatal("a refused proxy CONNECT was not classified pre-send; no request bytes reached the model host")
}
// The op still has to be a connect phase. The same errno on an established
// connection is post-send and must not replay a POST.
post := &net.OpError{Op: "read", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}
if isPreSendTransportError(post) {
t.Fatal("a read-phase error was classified pre-send")
}
}
// timeoutError is a net.Error whose Timeout() is true, matching the shape
// net/http surfaces for a connect deadline.
type timeoutError struct{}
func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "i/o timeout" }
func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
// The pre-send budget bounds CONSECUTIVE connect failures, not the lifetime of
// the call. Without a reset on a successful hop, an early run of dial blips
// permanently spends the budget, so a later blip surfaces as a transport error
// while the status budget still has room. That is the coupling the two counters
// were split apart to remove, in the one ordering the earlier tests did not
// cover: pre-send, then status, then pre-send again.
func TestPreSendBudgetResetsAfterSuccessfulHop(t *testing.T) {
refused := &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}
var calls int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripperFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
switch atomic.AddInt32(&calls, 1) {
case 1, 2:
// Two connect failures, spending the pre-send budget under the old
// lifetime accounting.
return nil, refused
case 3:
// A hop that reaches the server. It declines, so the request was not
// accepted and retrying stays safe.
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusTooManyRequests, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
case 4:
// One more connect blip. With a lifetime cap this surfaces as an
// error; the call should still recover.
return nil, refused
default:
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody, Request: r}, nil
}
})}
resp, err := SendWithRetry(context.Background(), client, http.MethodPost, "https://origin.invalid/v1", []byte("{}"), nil, 3)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("interleaved connect and status failures returned %v; the pre-send budget did not reset after the hop that reached the server", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode)
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&calls); got != 5 {
t.Fatalf("transport called %d times, want 5 (dial, dial, 429, dial, 200)", got)
}
}
-14
View File
@@ -212,14 +212,6 @@ func credentialDenyReadPathsForEnvironment(env credentialPathEnvironment, allowR
candidates = append(candidates,
filepath.Join(home, ".aws"),
filepath.Join(home, ".azure"),
// git's credential store backend, which holds host passwords and
// personal access tokens in cleartext. Denied rather than the whole
// of ~/.ssh, because these cost nothing functionally: git reads them
// through a credential helper for authentication, not for identity,
// so a sandboxed git still works and simply cannot authenticate as
// the user. SSH key material is a harder trade and is tracked
// separately (#815).
filepath.Join(home, ".git-credentials"),
)
}
npmUserConfig := strings.TrimSpace(env.NPMUserConfig)
@@ -241,12 +233,6 @@ func credentialDenyReadPathsForEnvironment(env credentialPathEnvironment, allowR
if configHome != "" {
candidates = append(candidates,
filepath.Join(configHome, "zero"),
// The XDG location of the same git credential store. Denying the file
// rather than the directory is deliberate: ~/.config/git also holds
// the global git config, which userGitConfigReadPaths grants on
// purpose so a sandboxed git can read user.name and aliases instead
// of failing outright.
filepath.Join(configHome, "git", "credentials"),
)
}
cloudSDKConfig := strings.TrimSpace(env.CloudSDKConfig)
-93
View File
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
package sandbox
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// git's credential store holds host passwords and personal access tokens in
// cleartext, in one of two locations depending on whether the user is on the
// XDG layout. Neither was denied, so a sandboxed command could read them
// (#815).
//
// Scoped to the credential files on purpose. Denying ~/.ssh as well would stop
// a sandboxed git push over SSH from working, which is a functional trade that
// issue tracks separately; these two cost nothing, because git reads them for
// authentication rather than identity.
func TestCredentialDenyReadPathsCoversGitCredentialStores(t *testing.T) {
home := t.TempDir()
configHome := filepath.Join(home, ".config")
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(configHome, "git"), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// The builder only emits paths that exist, so these have to be real.
gitCredentials := filepath.Join(home, ".git-credentials")
xdgCredentials := filepath.Join(configHome, "git", "credentials")
gitConfig := filepath.Join(configHome, "git", "config")
for _, path := range []string{gitCredentials, xdgCredentials, gitConfig} {
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
denied := credentialDenyReadPathsForEnvironment(credentialPathEnvironment{
Home: home,
ConfigHome: configHome,
}, nil)
covered := func(target string) bool {
norm := normalizeProfilePath(target)
for _, entry := range denied {
if entry == norm || pathWithinRoot(entry, norm) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
if !covered(gitCredentials) {
t.Fatalf("~/.git-credentials is readable; deny list = %v", denied)
}
if !covered(xdgCredentials) {
t.Fatalf("~/.config/git/credentials is readable; deny list = %v", denied)
}
// The global git config must stay readable. userGitConfigReadPaths grants it
// deliberately so a sandboxed git can read user.name and aliases rather than
// failing with "unable to access", so denying the directory instead of the
// credential file would break that on purpose-built setups.
if covered(gitConfig) {
t.Fatalf("~/.config/git/config was denied; a sandboxed git loses its identity config")
}
}
// An explicit read grant still wins, matching how every other entry behaves: a
// user who deliberately scopes a workspace over one of these paths is not
// overridden by the default deny.
//
// Asserted from both sides on purpose. Checking only that the path is absent
// under an allowRead is satisfied just as well by a deny rule that was never
// added, so the run without allowRead has to establish that there is something
// there for the grant to override.
func TestGitCredentialDenyYieldsToExplicitAllowRead(t *testing.T) {
home := t.TempDir()
gitCredentials := filepath.Join(home, ".git-credentials")
if err := os.WriteFile(gitCredentials, []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target := normalizeProfilePath(gitCredentials)
listed := func(entries []string) bool {
for _, entry := range entries {
if entry == target {
return true
}
}
return false
}
if !listed(credentialDenyReadPathsForEnvironment(credentialPathEnvironment{Home: home}, nil)) {
t.Fatalf("~/.git-credentials is not denied without an allowRead; nothing for the grant to override")
}
if listed(credentialDenyReadPathsForEnvironment(credentialPathEnvironment{Home: home}, []string{home})) {
t.Fatalf("explicit allowRead %q did not re-include the credential store", home)
}
}
-7
View File
@@ -1027,13 +1027,6 @@ func scrubSensitiveEnv(env []string, additionalKeys ...string) []string {
"GH_TOKEN",
"ZERO_WEBSEARCH_API_KEY",
"ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN",
// The file form of the same bridge token. TokenFromEnv accepts either,
// so scrubbing only the inline variable left the pointer readable, and
// the default sandbox posture is read-all. There is no fallback
// location to guess at, the path comes from this variable alone, so
// removing it closes the leak rather than half of it. Same reasoning as
// GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS below.
"ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN_FILE",
}
for _, descriptor := range providercatalog.All() {
for _, key := range descriptor.AuthEnvVars {
-5
View File
@@ -699,11 +699,6 @@ func TestScrubSensitiveEnv(t *testing.T) {
"XAI_API_KEY=xai-12345",
"HUGGINGFACE_API_KEY=hf_12345",
"GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=/home/user/sa-key.json",
// Both forms of the daemon bridge token. The inline one was already
// scrubbed; the file form was not, which left a sandboxed command the
// path to read it from (#677).
"ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN=bridge-token-inline",
"ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN_FILE=/home/user/.zero/remote-token",
"COMPANY_LLM_SECRET=custom-secret",
"ZERO_OAUTH_MY_SVC_CLIENT_SECRET=oauth-secret",
"zero_oauth_second_client_secret=case-insensitive-secret",
+27 -180
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,6 @@ import (
// team is at its slot cap the member is queued and launches when a slot frees
// (it stays pending in the coordinator until then).
func (s *Swarm) Spawn(pol Policy, teamName, agentType, task, cwd string) (string, error) {
release, err := s.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer release()
def, err := s.registry.Lookup(agentType)
if err != nil {
return "", err
@@ -29,44 +23,15 @@ func (s *Swarm) Spawn(pol Policy, teamName, agentType, task, cwd string) (string
}
s.rememberCwd(id, cwd)
spec := s.buildSpec(pol, id, id, team, def, task, cwd)
s.dispatchAdmitted(spec)
s.dispatch(spec)
return id, nil
}
// beginLifecycleAdmission admits one unit of lifecycle work if shutdown has not
// begun. On success it returns a release func the caller MUST call exactly once
// (a deferred call is the norm) — Close blocks until every admitted unit has
// released. On shutdown it returns a nil func and ErrSwarmClosed, and there is
// nothing to release.
//
// It deliberately does NOT keep lifecycleMu held for the caller's duration, which
// an earlier revision did. Close needs the write lock before it can cancel, so a
// launcher that blocks in Launch until its context is cancelled would deadlock
// against every Close caller: the launch holds the read lock while Close waits
// for the write lock to issue the cancellation neither side can reach. Holding the
// lock only across the flag check and the counter increment keeps the ordering
// guarantee (no admission once closed is set) without letting external launcher
// code sit inside the critical section.
//
// The read lock is enough to make the WaitGroup safe: Close flips closed under
// the write lock, so an Add here either completes before Close acquires it (and is
// therefore visible to the later Wait) or observes closed and is refused.
func (s *Swarm) beginLifecycleAdmission() (func(), error) {
s.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
if s.closed {
return nil, ErrSwarmClosed
}
s.lifecycleWork.Add(1)
return s.lifecycleWork.Done, nil
}
// dispatch admits a spec to its team (launching now or queuing for a slot).
// The caller must hold an admission ticket from beginLifecycleAdmission.
func (s *Swarm) dispatchAdmitted(spec MemberSpec) {
func (s *Swarm) dispatch(spec MemberSpec) {
t := s.team(spec.Team)
if t.admit(spec) {
s.launchAdmitted(t, spec)
s.launch(t, spec)
}
// Otherwise the spec is queued; the coordinator task stays pending until a
// slot frees and afterExit launches it.
@@ -74,73 +39,17 @@ func (s *Swarm) dispatchAdmitted(spec MemberSpec) {
// launch starts a member for spec and supervises it. A synchronous launch
// failure fails the task and frees the slot.
// The caller must hold an admission ticket from beginLifecycleAdmission.
func (s *Swarm) launchAdmitted(t *Team, spec MemberSpec) {
handle, err := s.launchMemberAdmitted(spec)
func (s *Swarm) launch(t *Team, spec MemberSpec) {
handle, err := s.launcher.Launch(s.baseCtx, spec)
if err != nil {
_ = s.coord.Fail(spec.TaskID, "launch: "+err.Error())
if err == ErrSwarmClosed {
t.releaseSlot()
return
}
s.afterExitAdmitted(t)
s.afterExit(t)
return
}
committed := s.commitLaunch(handle, func() {
m := &Member{ID: spec.ID, AgentType: spec.AgentType, TaskID: spec.TaskID, handle: handle}
t.addMember(m)
_ = s.coord.SetStatus(spec.TaskID, StatusRunning)
s.watchers.Add(1)
go func() {
defer s.watchers.Done()
s.watch(t, m, spec)
}()
})
if !committed {
_ = s.coord.Fail(spec.TaskID, "launch: "+ErrSwarmClosed.Error())
t.releaseSlot()
}
}
// commitLaunch closes the window between MemberLauncher.Launch returning and the
// swarm taking ownership of the handle it produced. Launch is external code and
// therefore runs without lifecycleMu held, so Close may have won after
// launchMemberAdmitted's pre-check but before Launch returned. adopt runs under
// the read lock so the shutdown check and everything the caller does to take
// ownership (registration, status transition, watcher Add, handle swap) are
// atomic with respect to Close setting closed and beginning its waits.
//
// It reports whether the handle was adopted. When shutdown won, the handle is
// reaped before returning false: its launch context was already cancelled by
// Close, and MemberHandle has no separate cancellation operation — Launch's
// context is its cancellation contract — so waiting is how a
// successfully-created process/goroutine avoids being abandoned. The caller
// records the terminal outcome for the task it was launching.
func (s *Swarm) commitLaunch(handle MemberHandle, adopt func()) bool {
s.lifecycleMu.RLock()
if s.closed {
s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
_, _ = handle.Wait()
return false
}
defer s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
adopt()
return true
}
// launchMemberAdmitted re-checks shutdown at the last internal boundary before
// invoking the external launcher. A lifecycle ticket proves the operation won
// admission before Close, but the caller may not reach its launch until after
// Close has set closed; in that case no new member should be started.
func (s *Swarm) launchMemberAdmitted(spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
s.lifecycleMu.RLock()
closed := s.closed
s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
if closed {
return nil, ErrSwarmClosed
}
return s.launcher.Launch(s.baseCtx, spec)
m := &Member{ID: spec.ID, AgentType: spec.AgentType, TaskID: spec.TaskID, handle: handle}
t.addMember(m)
_ = s.coord.SetStatus(spec.TaskID, StatusRunning)
go s.watch(t, m, spec)
}
// watch awaits a member, applies bounded relaunch on temporary failures, records
@@ -151,98 +60,42 @@ func (s *Swarm) launchMemberAdmitted(spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
// life (Member.ID == MemberSpec.ID); a retry never reuses the struct for a
// different spec.
func (s *Swarm) watch(t *Team, m *Member, spec MemberSpec) {
for {
res, err := m.handle.Wait()
if err != nil {
if isRetryable(err) && m.restarts < maxMemberRestarts && s.relaunchAdmitted(m, spec) {
continue
res, err := m.handle.Wait()
if err != nil {
if isRetryable(err) && m.restarts < maxMemberRestarts {
if nh, relErr := s.launcher.Launch(s.baseCtx, spec); relErr == nil {
m.restarts++
m.handle = nh
go s.watch(t, m, spec)
return
}
// Fall through if shutdown started or the relaunch failed.
// res.SessionID is preserved by the handle even on error, so a member that
// ran then failed stays drillable; a pure launch error carries an empty id.
_ = s.coord.FailWithSession(m.TaskID, memberError(err), res.SessionID)
} else {
_ = s.coord.CompleteWithSession(m.TaskID, res.Result, res.SessionID)
// fall through to record the original error if relaunch fails
}
break
// res.SessionID is preserved by the handle even on error, so a member that
// ran then failed stays drillable; a pure launch error carries an empty id.
_ = s.coord.FailWithSession(m.TaskID, memberError(err), res.SessionID)
} else {
_ = s.coord.CompleteWithSession(m.TaskID, res.Result, res.SessionID)
}
t.removeMember(m.ID)
s.afterExit(t)
}
// relaunchAdmitted performs one bounded relaunch of an existing member's spec,
// reporting whether the member was relaunched and its new handle adopted. A
// relaunch is lifecycle work like any other, so it runs the same three gates an
// initial launch does: admission (refused outright once shutdown began), the
// pre-Launch re-check, and the post-Launch commit — the last of which matters
// because the production FuncLauncher returns a live handle immediately without
// consulting its context, so a Close landing between the pre-check and the return
// would otherwise resume supervising a member started after shutdown. When any
// gate refuses, the caller records the member's terminal failure instead.
func (s *Swarm) relaunchAdmitted(m *Member, spec MemberSpec) bool {
release, err := s.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
return false
}
defer release()
handle, err := s.launchMemberAdmitted(spec)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return s.commitLaunch(handle, func() {
m.restarts++
m.handle = handle
})
}
// afterExit releases the just-vacated slot and launches the next queued spec, if
// any. Each exit drains at most one queued member; that member's own exit drains
// the next, so the queue empties one-per-slot without unbounded recursion.
func (s *Swarm) afterExit(t *Team) {
release, err := s.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
t.releaseSlot()
return
}
defer release()
s.afterExitAdmitted(t)
}
// afterExitAdmitted drains at most one queued spec while lifecycle admission is
// held open. The caller must hold an admission ticket from beginLifecycleAdmission.
func (s *Swarm) afterExitAdmitted(t *Team) {
next, ok := t.onExit()
if !ok {
return
}
// This call's own ticket only proves shutdown hadn't begun when it was
// granted; Close may have set closed in the meantime, and t.onExit above
// already removed next from t.queue, so Close's clearQueue sweep can no
// longer see it (nor will it wait for one, since this ticket is what Close's
// lifecycleWork.Wait() is blocked on). Re-check before launching so a dequeue
// that straddles the shutdown boundary fails the task in place of a launch a
// shutting-down swarm never wanted started.
s.lifecycleMu.RLock()
closed := s.closed
s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
if closed {
t.releaseSlot()
_ = s.coord.Fail(next.TaskID, ErrSwarmClosed.Error())
return
}
s.launchAdmitted(t, next)
s.launch(t, next)
}
// Handoff transfers a task to a fresh member of toAgentType, delivering a note to
// the new member's inbox and marking the original task handed-off. It returns the
// new task id. A handoff of an already-terminal task is rejected (fail closed).
func (s *Swarm) Handoff(pol Policy, teamName, taskID, toAgentType, note string) (string, error) {
release, err := s.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer release()
task, ok := s.coord.Get(taskID)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrUnknownTask, taskID)
@@ -278,7 +131,7 @@ func (s *Swarm) Handoff(pol Policy, teamName, taskID, toAgentType, note string)
// Retire the original task (it has been re-delegated).
_ = s.coord.SetStatus(taskID, StatusHandedOff)
spec := s.buildSpec(pol, newID, newID, team, def, handoffTask, cwd)
s.dispatchAdmitted(spec)
s.dispatch(spec)
return newID, nil
}
@@ -286,12 +139,6 @@ func (s *Swarm) Handoff(pol Policy, teamName, taskID, toAgentType, note string)
// (e.g. a crashed worker) onto fresh members of toAgentType, returning the
// adopted task ids. Terminal tasks and tasks with a live owner are left alone.
func (s *Swarm) AdoptOrphans(pol Policy, teamName, toAgentType string) ([]string, error) {
release, err := s.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer release()
def, err := s.registry.Lookup(toAgentType)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -314,7 +161,7 @@ func (s *Swarm) AdoptOrphans(pol Policy, teamName, toAgentType string) ([]string
cwd := s.cwdFor(task.ID)
s.rememberCwd(task.ID, cwd)
spec := s.buildSpec(pol, newAgent, task.ID, team, def, task.Description, cwd)
s.dispatchAdmitted(spec)
s.dispatch(spec)
adopted = append(adopted, task.ID)
}
return adopted, nil
-720
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package swarm
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@@ -218,141 +217,6 @@ func TestPermanentErrorNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLifecycleAdmissionRejectedAfterClose(t *testing.T) {
l := newLauncher(okFor)
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
sw.Close()
if _, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", ""); !errors.Is(err, ErrSwarmClosed) {
t.Fatalf("Spawn after Close error = %v, want ErrSwarmClosed", err)
}
if _, err := sw.Handoff(Policy{}, "team", "task", "teammate", "note"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSwarmClosed) {
t.Fatalf("Handoff after Close error = %v, want ErrSwarmClosed", err)
}
if _, err := sw.AdoptOrphans(Policy{}, "team", "teammate"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSwarmClosed) {
t.Fatalf("AdoptOrphans after Close error = %v, want ErrSwarmClosed", err)
}
if got := len(l.recorded()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("launches after Close = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestCloseDoesNotLaunchQueuedMembers(t *testing.T) {
gate := make(chan struct{})
l := newLauncher(okFor)
l.gate = gate
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
var ids []string
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
id, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Spawn %d: %v", i, err)
}
ids = append(ids, id)
}
if got := len(l.recorded()); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("initial launches = %d, want 2 with one queued", got)
}
sw.Close()
if got := len(l.recorded()); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("launches after Close = %d, want queued member not launched", got)
}
for _, id := range ids {
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get(id)
if !ok || !task.Status.terminal() {
t.Fatalf("task %s after Close = %+v, want terminal", id, task)
}
}
}
func TestClosePreventsMemberRetry(t *testing.T) {
started := make(chan struct{}, maxMemberRestarts+1)
release := make(chan struct{})
l := FuncLauncher{Run: func(context.Context, MemberSpec) (MemberResult, error) {
started <- struct{}{}
<-release
return MemberResult{}, ErrMemberTemporary
}}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
_, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Spawn: %v", err)
}
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("initial member did not start")
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
waitFor(t, "swarm closed state", func() bool {
sw.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer sw.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
return sw.closed
})
close(release)
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after retryable member exit")
}
select {
case <-started:
t.Fatal("member retried after Close")
default:
}
}
func TestCloseWaitsForMemberWatchers(t *testing.T) {
release := make(chan struct{})
l := FuncLauncher{Run: func(context.Context, MemberSpec) (MemberResult, error) {
<-release
return MemberResult{Result: "done"}, nil
}}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
id, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Spawn: %v", err)
}
waitFor(t, "task running", func() bool {
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get(id)
return ok && task.Status == StatusRunning
})
const callers = 3
closing := make(chan struct{}, callers)
closed := make(chan struct{}, callers)
for i := 0; i < callers; i++ {
go func() {
closing <- struct{}{}
sw.Close()
closed <- struct{}{}
}()
}
for i := 0; i < callers; i++ {
<-closing
}
select {
case <-closed:
t.Fatal("a Close caller returned before the member watcher exited")
case <-time.After(50 * time.Millisecond):
}
close(release)
for i := 0; i < callers; i++ {
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("all Close callers did not return after the member watcher exited")
}
}
}
func TestHandoffDeliversNoteAndRetiresOriginal(t *testing.T) {
gate := make(chan struct{})
l := newLauncher(okFor)
@@ -500,587 +364,3 @@ func TestSpawnUnknownAgentType(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("Spawn with unknown agent type must error")
}
}
// blockingLauncher blocks inside Launch until its context is cancelled — the
// shape of a real launcher that waits on a slot, a daemon connection, or a
// sandbox handshake before it can return a handle.
type blockingLauncher struct {
entered chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (l *blockingLauncher) Launch(ctx context.Context, spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
l.once.Do(func() { close(l.entered) })
<-ctx.Done()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
// TestCloseCancelsLauncherBlockedInLaunch is the regression test for holding
// lifecycle admission across MemberLauncher.Launch. When admission was a read lock
// held for the caller's whole duration, this deadlocked: the spawn sat inside
// Launch waiting for its context, while Close waited for the write lock it needed
// before it could cancel that very context. Neither side could progress, so both
// the spawn and every Close caller hung.
//
// Admission is now a counted ticket, so Close can flip the flag, cancel, and then
// wait the ticket out.
func TestCloseCancelsLauncherBlockedInLaunch(t *testing.T) {
launcher := &blockingLauncher{entered: make(chan struct{})}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, launcher)
spawned := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
spawned <- err
}()
select {
case <-launcher.entered:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("launcher never entered Launch")
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close deadlocked against a launcher blocked in Launch")
}
select {
case <-spawned:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Spawn never returned after Close cancelled the launch context")
}
}
// TestCloseWaitsForAdmittedSpawn pins the other half of the contract: Close is a
// barrier, so it must not return while an admitted spawn is still running. Without
// the lifecycleWork wait, Close could finish while this launch was mid-flight.
func TestCloseWaitsForAdmittedSpawn(t *testing.T) {
entered := make(chan struct{})
finish := make(chan struct{})
launcher := &gatedLaunchLauncher{entered: entered, finish: finish}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, launcher)
go func() {
_, _ = sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
}()
select {
case <-entered:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("launcher never entered Launch")
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
select {
case <-closed:
t.Fatal("Close returned while an admitted spawn was still in flight")
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
close(finish)
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after the admitted spawn finished")
}
}
// TestAdmittedDispatchDoesNotLaunchAfterClose covers an operation that won a
// lifecycle ticket before shutdown but did not reach dispatch until after Close
// set closed. The ticket keeps Close from returning early, but it must not permit
// a new external launch with the already-cancelled swarm context.
func TestAdmittedDispatchDoesNotLaunchAfterClose(t *testing.T) {
l := newLauncher(okFor)
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
sw.maxTeamSize = 1
if _, err := sw.coord.Register("late-task", "late-agent", "team", "late work"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Register late task: %v", err)
}
release, err := sw.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("beginLifecycleAdmission: %v", err)
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
waitFor(t, "swarm closed state", func() bool {
sw.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer sw.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
return sw.closed
})
sw.dispatchAdmitted(MemberSpec{
ID: "late-agent", TaskID: "late-task", AgentType: "teammate", Team: "team",
})
release()
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after the admitted dispatch finished")
}
if got := len(l.recorded()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("launches after closed was set = %d, want 0", got)
}
team := sw.team("team")
if got := team.Running(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("team running after rejected launch = %d, want 0", got)
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get("late-task")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("late task vanished")
}
if task.Status != StatusFailed || !strings.Contains(task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("late task after Close = %+v, want failed with ErrSwarmClosed", task)
}
}
// TestCloseBetweenLaunchPrecheckAndReturn rejects and reaps a handle created by
// a Launch that straddles shutdown. The launch has passed the pre-check when it
// enters the gate; Close then sets closed and cancels its context before the
// launcher is allowed to return successfully.
func TestCloseBetweenLaunchPrecheckAndReturn(t *testing.T) {
launcher := &closeRaceLauncher{
entered: make(chan struct{}),
finish: make(chan struct{}),
waited: make(chan struct{}),
}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, launcher)
spawned := make(chan string, 1)
go func() {
id, _ := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
spawned <- id
}()
select {
case <-launcher.entered:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("launcher never entered Launch")
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
waitFor(t, "swarm closed state", func() bool {
sw.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer sw.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
return sw.closed
})
close(launcher.finish)
var id string
select {
case id = <-spawned:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Spawn did not return after Launch")
}
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after late handle was reaped")
}
select {
case <-launcher.waited:
default:
t.Fatal("late handle was not reaped")
}
team := sw.team("team")
if got := team.Running(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("team running after close-raced Launch = %d, want 0", got)
}
if got := len(team.liveAgents()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registered members after close-raced Launch = %d, want 0", got)
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get(id)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("task vanished")
}
if task.Status != StatusFailed || !strings.Contains(task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("task after close-raced Launch = %+v, want failed with ErrSwarmClosed", task)
}
}
type closeRaceLauncher struct {
entered chan struct{}
finish chan struct{}
waited chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (l *closeRaceLauncher) Launch(ctx context.Context, spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
l.once.Do(func() { close(l.entered) })
<-l.finish
return &closeRaceHandle{id: spec.ID, ctx: ctx, waited: l.waited}, nil
}
type closeRaceHandle struct {
id string
ctx context.Context
waited chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (h *closeRaceHandle) ID() string { return h.id }
func (h *closeRaceHandle) Wait() (MemberResult, error) {
<-h.ctx.Done()
h.once.Do(func() { close(h.waited) })
return MemberResult{}, h.ctx.Err()
}
// TestCloseBetweenRetryLaunchPrecheckAndReturn is the retry counterpart of
// TestCloseBetweenLaunchPrecheckAndReturn: a bounded relaunch wins admission and
// passes the pre-check, then Close lands while the launcher is inside Launch. The
// relaunched handle must be reaped rather than adopted, so the watcher never
// resumes supervising a member started after shutdown began — a relaunch whose
// member goes on to succeed must not be recorded as the task's outcome.
func TestCloseBetweenRetryLaunchPrecheckAndReturn(t *testing.T) {
launcher := &retryCloseRaceLauncher{
entered: make(chan struct{}),
finish: make(chan struct{}),
late: &retryLateHandle{id: "teammate-1"},
}
sw := newSwarmFor(t, launcher)
id, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "task", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Spawn: %v", err)
}
// The first member exits retryable, so the watcher is now inside the relaunch.
select {
case <-launcher.entered:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("launcher never entered the relaunch Launch")
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
waitFor(t, "swarm closed state", func() bool {
sw.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer sw.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
return sw.closed
})
close(launcher.finish)
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after the late relaunch handle was reaped")
}
if got := launcher.launchCount(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("launch attempts = %d, want 2 (initial + one relaunch)", got)
}
if got := launcher.late.waitCount(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("late relaunch handle waits = %d, want 1 (reaped, not supervised)", got)
}
team := sw.team("team")
if got := team.Running(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("team running after close-raced relaunch = %d, want 0", got)
}
if got := len(team.liveAgents()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("registered members after close-raced relaunch = %d, want 0", got)
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get(id)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("task vanished")
}
if task.Status != StatusFailed {
t.Fatalf("task after close-raced relaunch = %+v, want failed, not the late member's outcome", task)
}
if task.Result != "" {
t.Fatalf("task result after close-raced relaunch = %q, want the late member's result discarded", task.Result)
}
}
// retryCloseRaceLauncher fails its first member with a retryable error, then
// blocks inside the relaunch's Launch until the test releases it.
type retryCloseRaceLauncher struct {
mu sync.Mutex
calls int
entered chan struct{}
finish chan struct{}
late *retryLateHandle
once sync.Once
}
func (l *retryCloseRaceLauncher) Launch(_ context.Context, spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
l.mu.Lock()
l.calls++
first := l.calls == 1
l.mu.Unlock()
if first {
return &temporaryHandle{id: spec.ID}, nil
}
l.once.Do(func() { close(l.entered) })
<-l.finish
return l.late, nil
}
func (l *retryCloseRaceLauncher) launchCount() int {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
return l.calls
}
// temporaryHandle exits immediately with a retryable error, driving the watcher
// into its bounded relaunch path.
type temporaryHandle struct{ id string }
func (h *temporaryHandle) ID() string { return h.id }
func (h *temporaryHandle) Wait() (MemberResult, error) {
return MemberResult{}, ErrMemberTemporary
}
// retryLateHandle models a member whose work does not consult the cancelled
// launch context and reports success. Adopting it after shutdown would record a
// post-close result on the task, so a correct shutdown reaps it exactly once and
// discards what it returns.
type retryLateHandle struct {
id string
mu sync.Mutex
waits int
}
func (h *retryLateHandle) ID() string { return h.id }
func (h *retryLateHandle) Wait() (MemberResult, error) {
h.mu.Lock()
h.waits++
h.mu.Unlock()
return MemberResult{Result: "late result", SessionID: "late-session"}, nil
}
func (h *retryLateHandle) waitCount() int {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
return h.waits
}
func TestCloseRacesLifecycleAdmission(t *testing.T) {
gate := make(chan struct{})
l := newLauncher(okFor)
l.gate = gate
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
const spawns = 64
start := make(chan struct{})
results := make(chan struct {
id string
err error
}, spawns)
var callers sync.WaitGroup
callers.Add(spawns)
for i := 0; i < spawns; i++ {
go func() {
defer callers.Done()
<-start
id, err := sw.Spawn(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "racing task", "")
results <- struct {
id string
err error
}{id: id, err: err}
}()
}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
<-start
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
close(start)
callers.Wait()
<-closed
close(results)
for result := range results {
if result.err != nil {
if !errors.Is(result.err, ErrSwarmClosed) {
t.Fatalf("Spawn racing Close error = %v, want ErrSwarmClosed", result.err)
}
continue
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get(result.id)
if !ok || !task.Status.terminal() {
t.Fatalf("admitted task %q after Close = %+v, want terminal", result.id, task)
}
}
for _, task := range sw.Coordinator().List() {
if !task.Status.terminal() {
t.Fatalf("task %q remained %s after Close", task.ID, task.Status)
}
}
}
// TestCloseFailsQueuedSpecOnLateCreatedTeam is the regression test for queue
// sweeping after shutdown begins. Spawn/Handoff/AdoptOrphans calls that obtained
// tickets before closed flipped can still create a team and append to its queue.
// Close must wait for those calls before both snapshotting teams and sweeping
// their queues, or a late-created team's queued task remains pending forever.
//
// This drives that interleaving directly: two operations obtain tickets before
// Close, then the first creates and fills a previously unseen one-slot team and
// the second queues behind it after Close has flipped closed.
func TestCloseFailsQueuedSpecOnLateCreatedTeam(t *testing.T) {
sw := newSwarmFor(t, newLauncher(okFor))
sw.maxTeamSize = 1
if _, err := sw.coord.Register("late-task", "late-agent", "team", "late work"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Register late task: %v", err)
}
firstRelease, err := sw.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first beginLifecycleAdmission: %v", err)
}
secondRelease, err := sw.beginLifecycleAdmission()
if err != nil {
firstRelease()
t.Fatalf("second beginLifecycleAdmission: %v", err)
}
runningSpec := MemberSpec{ID: "running-agent", TaskID: "running-task", AgentType: "teammate", Team: "team"}
queuedSpec := MemberSpec{ID: "late-agent", TaskID: "late-task", AgentType: "teammate", Team: "team"}
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sw.Close()
close(closed)
}()
waitFor(t, "swarm closed state", func() bool {
sw.lifecycleMu.RLock()
defer sw.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
return sw.closed
})
select {
case <-closed:
t.Fatal("Close returned while an admitted ticket was still open")
default:
}
// Neither operation touched a team before Close took its old, buggy snapshot.
// Finish the team-admission portion of both operations while their tickets are
// still held: the first creates the team and fills its only slot; the second
// appends to that late-created team's queue.
team := sw.team("team")
if !team.admit(runningSpec) {
t.Fatal("first spec should take the late-created team's only slot")
}
firstRelease()
if team.admit(queuedSpec) {
t.Fatal("second spec should queue on the late-created team")
}
secondRelease()
select {
case <-closed:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Close did not return after the admitted ticket released")
}
if got := team.QueueDepth(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("queue depth after Close = %d, want 0 (late spec swept)", got)
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get("late-task")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("late-queued task vanished")
}
if task.Status != StatusFailed {
t.Fatalf("late-queued task status = %v, want %v (failed, not stranded)", task.Status, StatusFailed)
}
if !strings.Contains(task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("late-queued task err = %q, want it to mention %q", task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error())
}
}
// TestAfterExitAdmittedFailsDequeuedSpecAfterClose is the regression test for
// jatmn's second #776 finding: afterExitAdmitted used to dequeue a queued spec
// (t.onExit) and launch it unconditionally once its own ticket was granted,
// even though Close can flip closed in the gap between that dequeue — which
// makes the spec invisible to Close's clearQueue sweep — and the launch. A
// launcher that performs work before honoring its cancelled context could then
// start a brand new worker after shutdown had already begun.
func TestAfterExitAdmittedFailsDequeuedSpecAfterClose(t *testing.T) {
l := newLauncher(okFor)
sw := newSwarmFor(t, l)
if _, err := sw.coord.Register("queued-task", "queued-agent", "team", "queued work"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Register: %v", err)
}
spec := MemberSpec{ID: "queued-agent", TaskID: "queued-task", AgentType: "teammate", Team: "team"}
// Occupy the only slot, then queue spec behind it.
team := &Team{Name: "team", members: map[string]*Member{}, maxSize: 1}
if !team.admit(MemberSpec{ID: "running-agent", TaskID: "running-task"}) {
t.Fatal("first spec should take the only slot")
}
if team.admit(spec) {
t.Fatal("second spec should queue, not launch, over the cap")
}
// Simulate shutdown racing in between this call's ticket admission (already
// granted, hence no beginLifecycleAdmission call here) and its dequeue+launch,
// exactly like the finding describes: closed is already set by the time
// afterExitAdmitted's post-dequeue check runs.
sw.lifecycleMu.Lock()
sw.closed = true
sw.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
sw.afterExitAdmitted(team) // running-agent "exits" -> dequeues spec
if got := team.Running(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("team running after close-raced drain = %d, want 0 (slot released, not held for a launch)", got)
}
task, ok := sw.Coordinator().Get("queued-task")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("dequeued task vanished")
}
if task.Status != StatusFailed {
t.Fatalf("dequeued task status = %v, want %v (failed, not launched)", task.Status, StatusFailed)
}
if !strings.Contains(task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error()) {
t.Fatalf("dequeued task err = %q, want it to mention %q", task.Err, ErrSwarmClosed.Error())
}
for _, s := range l.recorded() {
if s.ID == "queued-agent" {
t.Fatal("a spec dequeued after shutdown began must never launch")
}
}
}
// gatedLaunchLauncher blocks in Launch until the test releases it, ignoring
// context cancellation so the test controls exactly when the admitted work ends.
type gatedLaunchLauncher struct {
entered chan struct{}
finish chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (l *gatedLaunchLauncher) Launch(_ context.Context, spec MemberSpec) (MemberHandle, error) {
l.once.Do(func() { close(l.entered) })
<-l.finish
return &funcHandle{id: spec.ID, done: closedChan()}, nil
}
func closedChan() chan struct{} {
ch := make(chan struct{})
close(ch)
return ch
}
+13 -12
View File
@@ -121,12 +121,11 @@ type Scheduler struct {
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
mu sync.Mutex
jobs map[string]*scheduledJob
closed bool
seq atomic.Uint64
wg sync.WaitGroup
closeOnce sync.Once
mu sync.Mutex
jobs map[string]*scheduledJob
closed bool
seq atomic.Uint64
wg sync.WaitGroup
}
// newScheduler builds a Scheduler bound to sw. Its context derives from the
@@ -230,13 +229,15 @@ func (s *Scheduler) List() []JobStatus {
// Close cancels every job and waits for their loops to exit. Safe to call more
// than once.
func (s *Scheduler) Close() {
s.closeOnce.Do(func() {
s.mu.Lock()
s.closed = true
s.cancel()
s.mu.Lock()
if s.closed {
s.mu.Unlock()
s.wg.Wait()
})
return
}
s.closed = true
s.cancel()
s.mu.Unlock()
s.wg.Wait()
}
// run is one job's timing loop. It requests a fresh one-shot ticker per interval
-19
View File
@@ -164,25 +164,6 @@ func TestSchedulerCloseStopsJobs(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestSchedulerCreatedAfterSwarmCloseIsClosed(t *testing.T) {
sw := newSwarmFor(t, newLauncher(okFor))
sw.Close()
sched := sw.Scheduler()
sched.mu.Lock()
closed := sched.closed
sched.mu.Unlock()
if !closed {
t.Fatal("scheduler created after Swarm.Close was not closed")
}
if _, err := sched.Add(Policy{}, "team", "teammate", "t", "", Schedule{Every: time.Hour}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("Add on a scheduler created after Swarm.Close should fail")
}
if got := len(sched.List()); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("scheduler created after Swarm.Close has %d jobs, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSchedulerAddRejectedAfterContextCancel(t *testing.T) {
sw := newSwarmFor(t, newLauncher(okFor))
sched := sw.Scheduler()
+13 -103
View File
@@ -64,18 +64,6 @@ type Swarm struct {
baseCtx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
// lifecycleMu guards closed and orders admission against shutdown. It is held
// only for the flag check plus the lifecycleWork increment — never across a
// launcher call, which would deadlock Close (see beginLifecycleAdmission).
lifecycleMu sync.RWMutex
closed bool
// lifecycleWork counts admitted-but-unfinished lifecycle operations (spawn,
// handoff, adoption, retry, queue drain). Close waits it out so no admitted
// operation is still touching the swarm when Close returns.
lifecycleWork sync.WaitGroup
watchers sync.WaitGroup
closeOnce sync.Once
mu sync.Mutex
teams map[string]*Team
taskCwd map[string]string // taskID -> cwd, for handoff/adoption relaunch
@@ -149,93 +137,31 @@ func New(opts Options) (*Swarm, error) {
}
// Close cancels every running member's context and releases resources. It is
// safe to call more than once. It closes lifecycle admission before canceling
// members, fails queued tasks, and waits for every member watcher to exit.
// safe to call more than once. The scheduler is closed first so no new spawn
// fires after shutdown begins.
func (s *Swarm) Close() {
s.closeOnce.Do(func() {
// Closing admission and cancelling are separate steps on purpose. The flag
// flips under lifecycleMu so no further work is admitted, and the lock is
// released BEFORE cancelling: a member already being launched holds no lock
// here, but it may be blocked inside MemberLauncher.Launch waiting for the
// context this cancel provides, and it can only release its admission ticket
// once that cancellation lands.
s.lifecycleMu.Lock()
s.closed = true
s.mu.Lock()
sched := s.scheduler
s.mu.Unlock()
s.lifecycleMu.Unlock()
if s.cancel != nil {
s.cancel()
}
if sched != nil {
sched.Close()
}
// Wait for every already-admitted lifecycle operation (spawn, handoff,
// adoption, retry, queue drain) to finish BEFORE sweeping queues below.
// Such work can create teams as well as append to their queues, so snapshot
// the teams only after every ticket is back. At that point no team or queue
// can gain a new entry, and the sweep cannot miss late-admitted work.
s.lifecycleWork.Wait()
s.mu.Lock()
teams := make([]*Team, 0, len(s.teams))
for _, team := range s.teams {
teams = append(teams, team)
}
s.mu.Unlock()
for _, team := range teams {
for _, spec := range team.clearQueue() {
_ = s.coord.Fail(spec.TaskID, ErrSwarmClosed.Error())
}
}
// Every watcher is added while its admitting lifecycle ticket is still held,
// so lifecycleWork.Wait above also orders every Add before this Wait. The
// watcher itself can outlive that ticket, which is why both waits are needed.
s.watchers.Wait()
})
s.mu.Lock()
sched := s.scheduler
s.mu.Unlock()
if sched != nil {
sched.Close()
}
if s.cancel != nil {
s.cancel()
}
}
// Scheduler returns the swarm's recurring-spawn scheduler, creating it on first
// use. Scheduling is opt-in: until a job is added the scheduler does nothing.
//
// The post-close handoff between this method and Close relies on the ORDER in
// which each reads/writes s.scheduler and s.closed, not on holding one lock across
// both: Close takes lifecycleMu.Lock() (excluding this RLock), sets closed, reads
// whatever s.scheduler currently is, and only THEN releases lifecycleMu and calls
// sched.Close() on what it captured. So a call here either:
// - runs entirely before Close's write lock — sees closed == false, and the
// scheduler it creates/returns is exactly the one Close's later snapshot will
// capture and close; or
// - runs entirely after Close's write lock — sees closed == true (memory model:
// the RLock/Lock pair orders the read after Close's write) and closes the
// scheduler itself here, because Close already captured its own snapshot
// (possibly nil, if this call is what first creates one) and will not look
// again.
//
// Either way exactly one of the two call sites closes the scheduler that ends up
// installed, and neither can observe a "created after close but never closed"
// scheduler — that would require reading closed == false here while also reading
// a scheduler Close had already passed over, which the lock ordering rules out.
func (s *Swarm) Scheduler() *Scheduler {
s.lifecycleMu.RLock()
closed := s.closed
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if s.scheduler == nil {
s.scheduler = newScheduler(s)
}
sched := s.scheduler
s.mu.Unlock()
s.lifecycleMu.RUnlock()
if closed {
sched.Close()
}
return sched
return s.scheduler
}
// ErrSwarmClosed reports lifecycle work submitted after shutdown begins.
var ErrSwarmClosed = errors.New("swarm: closed")
// rememberCwd records a task's working dir so a handoff/adoption relaunch keeps it.
func (s *Swarm) rememberCwd(taskID, cwd string) {
s.mu.Lock()
@@ -362,22 +288,6 @@ func (t *Team) onExit() (MemberSpec, bool) {
return MemberSpec{}, false
}
func (t *Team) releaseSlot() {
t.mu.Lock()
if t.running > 0 {
t.running--
}
t.mu.Unlock()
}
func (t *Team) clearQueue() []MemberSpec {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
queued := t.queue
t.queue = nil
return queued
}
func (t *Team) addMember(m *Member) {
t.mu.Lock()
t.members[m.ID] = m
+1 -5
View File
@@ -23,16 +23,12 @@ type clipboardImageMsg struct {
err error
}
// readClipboardImage is the OS clipboard image reader. A var so tests can
// substitute a stub instead of depending on the developer's real clipboard.
var readClipboardImage = imageinput.ReadClipboardImage
// readClipboardImageCmd reads the OS clipboard for image content off the
// Update goroutine. Returns a clipboardImageMsg with the bytes, or nil (no
// command) if there is no image — the caller treats nil as a silent no-op.
func readClipboardImageCmd() tea.Cmd {
return func() tea.Msg {
data, mediaType, err := readClipboardImage()
data, mediaType, err := imageinput.ReadClipboardImage()
if err != nil {
return clipboardImageMsg{err: err}
}
+5 -112
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ import (
"testing"
tea "charm.land/bubbletea/v2"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/imageinput"
)
func TestComposerInsertNewlineAtCursor(t *testing.T) {
@@ -131,77 +129,22 @@ func TestSanitizeComposerPastePreservesNewlines(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// Ctrl+V must never insert TEXT: bracketed paste is the only text path, so
// letting Bubble's own Ctrl+V binding also read the clipboard would double-paste.
// It may return a command, but that command is the image probe below, never a
// text paste, so the composer contents are unchanged either way.
func TestCtrlVDoesNotPasteTextIntoComposer(t *testing.T) {
func TestCtrlVDoesNotPasteIntoComposer(t *testing.T) {
m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
m.input.SetValue("hello")
m.input.CursorEnd()
updated, _ := m.Update(testKeyCtrl('v'))
updated, cmd := m.Update(testKeyCtrl('v'))
next := updated.(model)
if cmd != nil {
t.Fatal("ctrl+v should not run the textinput clipboard paste command")
}
if got := next.composerValue(); got != "hello" {
t.Fatalf("composer value after ctrl+v = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
}
// Ctrl+V probes the clipboard for an image (#534). A clipboard holding a
// screenshot produces no bracketed paste at all, so without this the empty-paste
// image probe in routePaste never runs and Ctrl+V does nothing, which is exactly
// what users reported: right-click paste attached the image, Ctrl+V did not.
func TestCtrlVProbesClipboardForImage(t *testing.T) {
// Stubbed BEFORE Update, so the command Update returns is the one that runs.
// Asserting only that some command came back, then running a freshly built
// probe, would pass even if the key never reached the image route at all.
original := readClipboardImage
t.Cleanup(func() { readClipboardImage = original })
readClipboardImage = func() ([]byte, string, error) {
return []byte("png-bytes"), "image/png", nil
}
// Both modifiers: macOS reports Command as ModSuper, so a handler matching
// only ModCtrl leaves Cmd+V doing nothing on the platform where screenshots
// are most often on the clipboard.
for name, key := range map[string]tea.KeyPressMsg{
"ctrl+v": testKeyCtrl('v'),
"cmd+v": testKeyPressMod('v', tea.ModSuper),
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
_, cmd := m.Update(key)
if cmd == nil {
t.Fatal("no command issued; the clipboard image probe never ran")
}
image, ok := execCmd(cmd).(clipboardImageMsg)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("the command issued was not the clipboard image probe")
}
if string(image.data) != "png-bytes" || image.mediaType != "image/png" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected image message: %+v", image)
}
})
}
}
// With no image on the clipboard the probe stays silent: Ctrl+V while copying
// text must not emit a notice or disturb the composer. Driven through Update
// rather than by calling the probe directly, so this covers the real key route
// and not just the command in isolation.
func TestClipboardImageProbeSilentWithoutImage(t *testing.T) {
original := readClipboardImage
t.Cleanup(func() { readClipboardImage = original })
readClipboardImage = func() ([]byte, string, error) { return nil, "", nil }
m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
_, cmd := m.Update(testKeyCtrl('v'))
if msg := execCmd(cmd); msg != nil {
t.Fatalf("probe emitted %T with no image on the clipboard, want no message", msg)
}
}
func TestPastedMultilineComposerContentRendersAsPreview(t *testing.T) {
paste := strings.Join([]string{
"Create a book library dashboard page with the Bootstrap theme.",
@@ -522,53 +465,3 @@ func TestComposerTerminalWordKeybindings(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// A clipboard that holds an image the host cannot extract must say so. This is
// the macOS case: neither pngpaste nor PyObjC ships with the OS, so the reader
// fails on a stock Mac, and reporting that as "no image" meant Ctrl+V did
// nothing at all with no explanation. Silence is the wrong answer to a
// condition the user can act on.
func TestClipboardImageUnreadableSurfacesToUser(t *testing.T) {
original := readClipboardImage
t.Cleanup(func() { readClipboardImage = original })
readClipboardImage = func() ([]byte, string, error) {
return nil, "", imageinput.ErrClipboardImageUnreadable
}
m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
_, cmd := m.Update(testKeyCtrl('v'))
if cmd == nil {
t.Fatal("no command issued; the clipboard image probe never ran")
}
msg := execCmd(cmd)
image, ok := msg.(clipboardImageMsg)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("probe returned %T, want clipboardImageMsg carrying the failure", msg)
}
if image.err == nil {
t.Fatal("the unreadable-clipboard failure was swallowed; the user is told nothing")
}
// The message has to name the remedy, since the whole point is that the user
// can fix this by installing something.
if !strings.Contains(image.err.Error(), "pngpaste") {
t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to name what to install", image.err.Error())
}
// And it must reach the transcript as an error row rather than stopping at
// the message, which is where the old silent no-op ended.
updated, _ := m.Update(image)
next, ok := updated.(model)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("Update returned %T, want model", updated)
}
found := false
for _, row := range next.transcript {
if row.kind == rowError && strings.Contains(row.text, "Clipboard image read failed") {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatal("the failure never reached the transcript; the user still sees nothing")
}
}
-8
View File
@@ -34,14 +34,6 @@ func keyCtrl(msg tea.KeyMsg, code rune) bool {
return keyCode(msg) == code && keyHasMod(msg, tea.ModCtrl)
}
// keySuper matches the Command key on macOS, which the rest of the TUI models as
// ModSuper (see keybindings.go). Kept separate from keyCtrl because a binding
// that means Ctrl on Linux and Windows usually means Command on macOS, and the
// two arrive as different modifiers.
func keySuper(msg tea.KeyMsg, code rune) bool {
return keyCode(msg) == code && keyHasMod(msg, tea.ModSuper)
}
func keyCtrlArrow(msg tea.KeyMsg, code rune) bool {
return keyIs(msg, code) && keyHasMod(msg, tea.ModCtrl)
}
-21
View File
@@ -1703,27 +1703,6 @@ func (m model) updateModel(msg tea.Msg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
m.input.SetWidth(maxInt(20, m.chatColumnWidth()-14))
return m, nil
}
case keyCtrl(msg, 'v'), keySuper(msg, 'v'):
// Ctrl+V probes the clipboard for an IMAGE only. Text pasting stays
// exclusively on the terminal's bracketed-paste path (Bubble's own
// Ctrl+V binding is disabled in newModel for exactly that reason), so
// this cannot double-insert text. It is needed because a clipboard
// holding a screenshot produces no bracketed paste at all: the terminal
// has no text to send, so routePaste never runs and its empty-content
// image probe never fires. Right-click paste reached that probe only
// because it always delivers a clipboardReadMsg, empty or not.
// readClipboardImageCmd yields no message when the clipboard holds no
// image, so Ctrl+V with text on the clipboard stays a no-op here and is
// handled by the bracketed paste exactly as before.
//
// Cmd+V is matched too, since macOS reports Command as ModSuper rather
// than ModCtrl. That only helps on terminals that deliver the key to the
// application: one that handles Cmd+V itself pastes the clipboard TEXT
// and sends no key event, so an image-only clipboard still produces
// nothing for this to react to.
if m.noBlockingModal() {
return m, readClipboardImageCmd()
}
case keyCtrl(msg, 'f'):
if m.picker != nil && m.picker.kind == pickerModel {
if m.modelPickerIsLoading() {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "@gitlawb/zero",
"version": "0.6.0",
"version": "0.5.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "@gitlawb/zero",
"version": "0.6.0",
"version": "0.5.0",
"cpu": [
"x64",
"arm64"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "@gitlawb/zero",
"version": "0.6.0",
"version": "0.5.0",
"description": "Zero — a fast, multi-provider terminal coding agent.",
"type": "module",
"module": "bin/zero.js",