test(config): remove Windows startup timing assumptions

Cold PowerShell startup under concurrent Windows CI can consume most of the provider timeout, so an unsynchronized PID file may never be written and a fixed four-second bound can fail despite correct process-tree cleanup. Treat an absent PID as a helper that never reached startup, retain strict liveness checks for synchronized children, and bound completion by the child's natural lifetime instead.
2026-11-08 09:49:34 -10:00 · 2026-07-24 11:14:56 +05:30
344 changed files with 1825 additions and 34301 deletions
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-*.go text eol=lf
-*.mod text eol=lf
-*.sum text eol=lf
@@ -30,36 +30,6 @@ jobs:
          go-version-file: go.mod
          cache: true

-      - name: Install Make on Windows
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        shell: pwsh
-        run: choco install make --no-progress -y
-
-      - name: Validate quality targets with stock macOS Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest'
-        env:
-          GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: 1
-          GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: grep.patternType
-          GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: fixed
-        run: make -n vulncheck
-
-      - name: Check vulnerabilities through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make vulncheck
-
-      - name: Check dead code through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        continue-on-error: true
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make deadcode
-
-      - name: Run static lint through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        continue-on-error: true
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make lint-static
-
      - name: Check formatting
        if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
        shell: bash
@@ -130,18 +100,27 @@ jobs:
          go-version-file: go.mod
          cache: true

+      # govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
+      # their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
+      # then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
+      # so all three run under it.
+      - name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
+        run: |
+          toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
+          echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
      # Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
      # CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
      # published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
      - name: govulncheck
-        run: make vulncheck
+        run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...

      # Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
      # code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
      # still being wired or removed.
      - name: deadcode (advisory)
        continue-on-error: true
-        run: make deadcode
+        run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...

      # Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
      # doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
@@ -151,4 +130,4 @@ jobs:
      # the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
      - name: golangci-lint (advisory)
        continue-on-error: true
-        run: make lint-static
+        run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"0.7.0"}
+{".":"0.5.0"}
@@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ request, or completing an implementation task:
   or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
 4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
 5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
-6. **Advisory lint**: `make lint-static`.
-7. **Security**: `make vulncheck`.
+6. **Advisory lint**:
+   `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
+7. **Security**:
+   `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
 8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
   tracked changes).

@@ -67,39 +69,3 @@ requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
 because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
 the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
 it.
-
-## 4. Common Review Blockers
-
-These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
-
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
-  before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
-  blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
-  behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
-  Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
-  assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
-  paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
-  checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
-  success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
-  and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
-  (`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
-  Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
-  traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
-  traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
-  final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
-  only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
-  not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
-  replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
-  Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
-  the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
-  regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
-  least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
-  normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
-  shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
-  unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
-  classification and side effects too.
@@ -6,73 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
 tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.

-## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **agent:** add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning ([#853](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/853)) ([0176ee4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0176ee49ffddcff6f7edf6ae2ade4967e5b22cc3))
-* **providers:** live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway ([#860](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/860)) ([fb4f293](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fb4f293c20eb860ca388a10d22fd566ce282ba1f))
-* **tools:** give tool results an image channel and add view_image ([#843](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/843)) ([cd0eb19](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cd0eb194e4df4b844785796c0701216740a56344))
-* **tui:** replace /retitle with local /rename ([#826](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/826)) ([5886354](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/588635487f22ef4d62d350140a219b7b8bb24119))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **agent:** end the additional_permissions retry loop ([#864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/864)) ([4ca4fa7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4ca4fa75d31b139dbe55a3badf17da86892ab001))
-* **agent:** tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox ([#885](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/885)) ([2ec5c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2ec5c3ae6b8fb543887bdeafdb34c4da057b8d36))
-* **cli:** report MCP servers that failed to start ([#822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/822)) ([#827](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/827)) ([021281e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/021281ebbab3f2bbe6a77b2dab4bf121bcfe6b52))
-* **lsp:** dispatch notifications off read loop ([#759](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/759)) ([936aa4e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/936aa4e77cf49738560a89395b8ba4d22263a396))
-* **mcp:** name the non-text blocks a tool result drops ([#874](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/874)) ([027a670](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a67080bea511b876c284bc911ef011eceb308))
-* **sandbox:** deny reads of Zero credential stores ([#681](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/681)) ([55fa05f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/55fa05f0ab5a01b495345d43464606cd19a31b4f))
-* **sandbox:** stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths ([#865](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/865)) ([91b413c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91b413c514cc1607d5b4e7936780d40569239814))
-* **secrets,worktrees:** fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees ([#855](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/855)) ([ff62f73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ff62f73b7f4dc5e2472db21acba43cf6140c06d1))
-* **specialist:** make overwrites atomic ([#757](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/757)) ([30f6d8f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30f6d8f591a0b81638b4182ff56c86c8a50a5c70))
-* suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands ([#848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/848)) ([c52db05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c52db055b0b213758a33c5c5627a411e052f8de4))
-* **tui:** a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows ([#876](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/876)) ([cae0269](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cae0269e77e7a0a493cf799b41c653c9ff9a19de)), closes [#875](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/875)
-* **tui:** exclude permission waits from turn time ([#820](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/820)) ([15eb16f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15eb16f736f903c94203207032f98aacbcf06318))
-* **tui:** fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable ([#872](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/872)) ([7fbd864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7fbd864e91433441489902571ea394ebc5b7bd0d))
-* **tui:** fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background ([#850](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/850)) ([020c28e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/020c28eaf95e2f38853f99fc06a13cd1568bf3c9))
-* **tui:** hide unavailable sidebar shortcut ([#821](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/821)) ([845df6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/845df6c7d28e02f475e90acfe838733eb37e6aa2))
-* use OAuth credentials in provider health checks ([#828](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/828)) ([d37de92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d37de9214b1ba86542f4f5ef3b060bb96849763b))
-
-
-### Performance Improvements
-
-* compact common test output ([#846](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/846)) ([edf660a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/edf660ab85131f90a452cee51dc2c3a5cf62d632))
-* improve harness context efficiency ([#838](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/838)) ([8e26679](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8e266797a8305e689806eadcf9698da2796481ab))
-
-## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
-* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
-* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
-* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
-* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
-* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
-* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
-* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
-* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
-* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
-* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
-* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
-* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
-* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
-* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
-* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
-* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
-* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
-* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
-* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
-
 ## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)


@@ -1,13 +1,7 @@
-# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says to build and run quality checks
-# with `make` — these targets back those instructions.
+# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
+# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := build
-GO_VERSION = $(word 2,$(shell git grep -G -h "^go[[:space:]]" -- go.mod))
-GO_TOOLCHAIN = go$(GO_VERSION)
-DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
-GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
-GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
-
-.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck tidy clean baseline help
+.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean baseline help

 # Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
 build:
@@ -39,22 +33,6 @@ fmt-check:
 # Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
 lint: fmt-check vet

-# Versioned tools select the toolchain from their own modules when invoked with
-# package@version. Read this module's go directive directly, without invoking
-# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
-# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
-# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
-lint-static deadcode vulncheck: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
-
-lint-static:
-	go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
-
-deadcode:
-	go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode@$(DEADCODE_VERSION) -test=false ./...
-
-vulncheck:
-	go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
-
 tidy:
 	go mod tidy

@@ -77,4 +55,4 @@ baseline: build
 		--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json

 help:
-	@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, tidy, clean, baseline"
+	@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean, baseline"
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
  <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
  <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
-  <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
  <br>
  <strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
 </p>
@@ -132,7 +131,6 @@ export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
 export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
 export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
 export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
-export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
 export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
 export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
 ```
@@ -149,12 +147,6 @@ To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
 zero providers setup longcat --set-active
 ```

-To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
-
-```bash
-zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
-```
-
 MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
 regions:

@@ -213,7 +205,6 @@ Common slash commands:
 | `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
 | `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
 | `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
-| `/new` | start a fresh session in place (previous session stays on disk) |
 | `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
 | `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
 | `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
@@ -310,8 +301,7 @@ zero verify           detect and run local verification checks
 zero changes          inspect and commit local git changes
 zero usage            token usage and estimated cost
 zero cron             scheduled agent jobs
-zero update --check   check for newer releases
-zero upgrade          download, verify, and install the latest release
+zero update           check for newer releases
 ```

 ## Extending Zero
@@ -377,16 +367,22 @@ variable unset and set.

 ### Code Quality and Security Checks

-Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
+Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:

-1. **Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
-2. **Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
-3. **Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
-4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
+1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
+2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
+3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
+4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.

-Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
-the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
-pinned tool versions.
+If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:
+
+```bash
+# Install golangci-lint
+go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
+
+# Install govulncheck
+go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
+```

 The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
 `$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
@@ -418,8 +414,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero

 ## Community

-Real-time chat happens on the [Discord server](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn).
-
 Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
 [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
  <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
  <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
-  <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
  <br>
  <a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
 </p>
@@ -142,7 +141,6 @@ zero
 | `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
 | `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
 | `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
-| `/new` | 原地开始一个新会话（之前的会话仍保留在磁盘上） |
 | `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
 | `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
 | `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
@@ -228,8 +226,7 @@ zero verify           检测和运行本地验证检查
 zero changes          检查和提交本地 Git 变更
 zero usage            Token 使用量和估算成本
 zero cron             定时智能体任务
-zero update --check   检查更新版本
-zero upgrade          下载、验证并安装最新版本
+zero update           检查更新版本
 ```

 ## 外观和无障碍
@@ -272,20 +269,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
 - [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
 - [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)

-## 社区
-
-实时交流在 [Discord 服务器](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn) 进行。
-
-提问、安装帮助、想法和分享都在
-[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions)：
-
-| 分类 | 用途 |
-|---|---|
-| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
-| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
-| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
-| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
-
 ## 贡献

 欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)，运行相关测试，然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
 2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
 3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)

-A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
+A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skills add` / `remove` / `lock`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`.

 ```text
-~/.local/share/zero/skills/          # primary (install/remove target)
+~/.local/share/zero/skills/          # primary (install/remove/lock target)
  run-benchmarks/
    SKILL.md
  write-changelog/
@@ -234,11 +234,10 @@ directory.

 ## Updating

-Check for a newer release, then download, verify, and install it in place:
+Check for a newer release:

 ```bash
 zero update --check
-zero upgrade
 ```

-See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
+Then reinstall with npm or rerun the install script for the version you want.
@@ -138,45 +138,3 @@ output or stop a still-running task by id.
 If Zero is restarted while a background task is still marked `running`, the new
 manager marks that task `error` and clears its PID. This avoids sending
 `TaskStop` to a stale PID that may now belong to an unrelated process.
-
-## Recovering an Interrupted Overwrite
-
-Zero writes and flushes a complete temporary file before publishing an overwrite,
-so a write failure before publication leaves the existing manifest unchanged
-instead of truncating it. On Unix, publication uses a same-directory rename and
-preserves the existing file's permission bits.
-
-On Windows, Zero uses `ReplaceFileW` to preserve the destination DACL instead of
-silently replacing it with the temporary file's inherited DACL. `ReplaceFileW`
-is not observer-atomic: another process can briefly observe the destination path
-as absent during replacement. Zero serializes specialist loads and managed
-mutations within one process, but cannot synchronize external processes or
-editors.
-
-Windows errors 1176 (`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT`) and 1177
-(`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2`) are partial replacement failures. With
-Zero's managed backup, 1176 leaves the original names intact and needs no manual
-recovery. For 1177, Zero has moved the original aside and tries to move it back.
-That rollback almost always succeeds, and the failed write changes nothing.
-
-If the rollback itself fails — typically because another process is holding a
-lock on the file — the original is not lost, but it is left under a name Zero
-does not read:
-
-```text
-<specialist dir>/.zero-replace-<random>.backup
-```
-
-Only `*.md` files are loaded as specialists, so until that file is renamed the
-specialist will not appear in `zero specialist list` or resolve by name. Zero's
-error message includes both the backup path and destination path. Recover by
-closing whatever holds the lock and renaming the backup back:
-
-```powershell
-Move-Item .zero-replace-<random>.backup <name>.md
-```
-
-A `.zero-replace-*.backup` can also linger after a *successful* overwrite if the
-backup could not be deleted afterward. That case is reported as a warning rather
-than an error — the new manifest is already in place, and the leftover file is
-safe to delete.
@@ -1,23 +1,16 @@
 # Update Flow

 `zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
-local CLI version. `zero update --apply` (or its shorthand, `zero upgrade`)
-downloads, verifies, and installs it.
+local CLI version.

 ```bash
 zero update --check
 zero update --check --json
 zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
 zero update --check --target windows-x64
-
-zero upgrade
-zero update --apply
 ```

-`--check` and `--apply` are mutually exclusive. `zero update` requires one of
-them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
-
-`--check` is check-only:
+The command is intentionally check-only:

 - It does not replace the running binary.
 - It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
@@ -26,35 +19,14 @@ them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
 - `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
  CI.

-`--apply` installs the update in place:
-
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
-  extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
-  optional sandbox helpers.
- On Windows, the running executable is renamed aside and cleaned up on the
-  next `zero update --apply` or `zero upgrade`, since it can't be overwritten
-  while running.
- `--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
-  since applying always installs onto the current machine.
- `--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
-  install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` and
-  takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
-  `--check` there.
- `--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
-  also write progress output to stdout, so neither
-  `zero update --apply --json` nor `zero upgrade --json` is guaranteed to
-  produce a single parseable JSON document. Use `--check --json` for
-  machine-readable automation.
-
 Useful flags:

 | Flag | Purpose |
 |---|---|
-| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Use another GitHub repository for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
-| `--endpoint <url\|owner/repo>` | Use a specific release API URL or repository slug for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
+| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
+| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
 | `--timeout <duration>` | Override the default release check timeout. |
-| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target (`--check` only). |
+| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target. |

 Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`,
 `windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current
@@ -68,5 +40,5 @@ Endpoint resolution order:
 4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`

 Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
-verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
-instead of reinstalling.
+verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
+before reinstalling.
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ require (
 	charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
 	charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
 	charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
-	github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
 	github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
 charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
 charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
 charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
-github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
-github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
 github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
 github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
 github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
@@ -349,11 +349,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetMode(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, e
 	if sess == nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
 	}
-	sess.turnMu.Lock()
-	defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
 	mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.ModeID)
 	switch mode {
-	case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
+	case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
 		sess.setMode(mode)
 		(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
 		return SetSessionModeResult{}, nil
@@ -383,13 +381,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
 			return nil, err
 		}
 	case configIDMode:
-		// Same turnMu as handleSetMode so the two advertised mode doors (session
-		// set_mode and set_config_option) serialize mode flips consistently.
-		sess.turnMu.Lock()
-		defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
 		mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.Value)
 		switch mode {
-		case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
+		case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
 			sess.setMode(mode)
 			(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
 		case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
@@ -445,16 +439,13 @@ func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
 // ---- advertising helpers ----

 func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
-	// auto/ask/plan are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
-	// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access. Plan
-	// only narrows what a client can do (read-only, no write/shell tools), so
-	// unlike Unsafe there is no elevation risk in letting a client select it.
+	// Only auto/ask are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
+	// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access.
 	return &SessionModeState{
 		CurrentModeID: string(s.currentMode()),
 		AvailableModes: []SessionMode{
 			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
 			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
-			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan), Name: "Plan", Description: "Read-only planning; write and shell tools are hidden."},
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -525,7 +516,6 @@ func (a *Agent) configOptions(s *acpSession) []SessionConfigOption {
 		Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{
 			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
 			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
-			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModePlan), Name: "Plan", Description: "Read-only planning; write and shell tools are hidden."},
 		},
 	}}
 }
@@ -393,32 +393,6 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := configured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
 		t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q", got)
 	}
-	// Plan is accepted: it only narrows capability (read-only), so unlike Unsafe
-	// there is no elevation risk in letting a client select it.
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_mode plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	// Configuration path is a separate contract from MethodSessionSetMode: the
-	// mode option is advertised via configOptions and applied by handleSetConfigOption.
-	var planConfigured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModePlan),
-	}, &planConfigured); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_config_option plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
-		t.Fatalf("configured mode after plan = %q, want plan", got)
-	}
-	hasPlanOption := false
-	for _, opt := range planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].Options {
-		if opt.Value == string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
-			hasPlanOption = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !hasPlanOption {
-		t.Fatalf("config mode options missing plan: %#v", planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].Options)
-	}
 	// Unsafe must be rejected over ACP — a client can't self-grant no-prompt host access.
 	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected Unsafe mode to be rejected over ACP")
@@ -429,37 +403,6 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// TestACPPlanModeWiresPermissionModeIntoAgentOptions confirms selecting "plan"
-// over ACP actually reaches agent.Options.PermissionMode for the next turn —
-// the same gap this test's TUI counterpart covers for /plan on.
-func TestACPPlanModeWiresPermissionModeIntoAgentOptions(t *testing.T) {
-	deps := testDeps(t)
-	var captured agent.Options
-	deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
-		captured = opts
-		return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
-	}
-
-	h := newHarness(t, deps)
-	defer h.stop()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var newRes NewSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_mode plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("plan it out")}}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
-	}
-	if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
-		t.Fatalf("agent.Options.PermissionMode = %q, want plan", captured.PermissionMode)
-	}
-}
-
 // TestACPRunTurnWiresSandboxAndScopedRegistry proves the sandbox engine and the
 // scoped registry from BuildWorkspace actually reach agent.Options — i.e. ACP
 // shell tools run confined, not unconfined on the host.
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 )

 // JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -81,9 +80,8 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
 // requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
 // the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
 type Conn struct {
-	rawReader    io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
-	readerCloser io.Closer
-	w            io.Writer
+	reader *bufio.Reader
+	w      io.Writer

 	writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w

@@ -98,15 +96,10 @@ type Conn struct {
 	wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
 }

-// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
-// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
-// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
-// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
-// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
-// lifetime.
+// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
 func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
 	return &Conn{
-		rawReader: r,
+		reader:    bufio.NewReader(r),
 		w:         w,
 		handlers:  make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
 		notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
@@ -114,18 +107,6 @@ func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
 	}
 }

-// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
-// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
-// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
-// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
-// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
-// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
-func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
-	c := NewConn(r, w)
-	c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
-	return c
-}
-
 // Handle registers a request handler for method.
 func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }

@@ -147,36 +128,17 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
 		c.wg.Wait()
 	}()

-	interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
-	reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
-
 	for {
 		// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
 		// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
 		// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
-		//
-		// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
-		// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
-		// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
-		// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
-		// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
-		// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
-		// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
-		// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
-		// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
-		// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
-		// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
-		// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
-		before := interruptible.generation()
-		line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
-		interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
-
+		line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
 		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
 			c.handleLine(ctx, line)
 		}
 		if err != nil {
 			c.failAllPending(err)
-			if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
+			if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
 				return nil
 			}
 			return err
@@ -184,100 +146,6 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}
 }

-// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
-// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
-// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
-//
-// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
-// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
-// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
-// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
-// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
-// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
-// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
-// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
-//
-// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
-// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
-// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
-type interruptibleReader struct {
-	inner  io.Reader
-	closer io.Closer
-	ctx    context.Context
-
-	closeOnce sync.Once
-	gen       atomic.Int64
-}
-
-func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
-	return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
-}
-
-func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
-
-type interruptibleReadResult struct {
-	n   int
-	err error
-}
-
-// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
-// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
-// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
-// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
-type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
-	once sync.Once
-}
-
-func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
-
-func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
-	d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
-	return claimed
-}
-
-// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
-// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
-// publishes a result for Read to join.
-func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
-	defer func() {
-		if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
-			res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
-		}
-		decision.complete()
-	}()
-	res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
-	return res
-}
-
-func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
-	var decision interruptibleReadDecision
-	go func() {
-		resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
-	}()
-	select {
-	case res := <-resultCh:
-		return res.n, res.err
-	case <-r.ctx.Done():
-		// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
-		// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
-		// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
-		if decision.interrupt() {
-			r.gen.Add(1)
-			if r.closer != nil {
-				r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
-			}
-		}
-		// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
-		// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
-		// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
-		// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
-		// report) is what the caller should see.
-		res := <-resultCh
-		return res.n, res.err
-	}
-}
-
 // handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
 // with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
 func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
@@ -3,30 +3,11 @@ package acp
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"io"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )

-type testReadCloser struct {
-	read  func([]byte) (int, error)
-	close func() error
-}
-
-func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
-func (r testReadCloser) Close() error               { return r.close() }
-
-type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
-
-type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
-
 // connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
 func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -44,275 +25,6 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
 	}
 }

-func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
-	pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
-	// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
-	// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
-	// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
-	readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
-	reader := testReadCloser{
-		read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-			select {
-			case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
-			default:
-			}
-			return pipeReader.Read(p)
-		},
-		close: func() error {
-			closeCalls <- struct{}{}
-			return pipeReader.Close()
-		},
-	}
-	conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-	<-readStarted
-	cancel()
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
-	}
-	if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
-		name := "non-closable"
-		if closable {
-			name = "closable"
-		}
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-			read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-				return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
-			})
-			closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-			var reader io.Reader = read
-			if closable {
-				reader = testReadCloser{
-					read: read,
-					close: func() error {
-						closeCalls <- struct{}{}
-						return nil
-					},
-				}
-			}
-			// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
-			// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
-			// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
-			writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-			releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-			writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-				select {
-				case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
-				default:
-				}
-				<-releaseWrite
-				return len(p), nil
-			})
-			newConn := NewConn
-			if closable {
-				// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
-				// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
-				// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
-				newConn = NewOwnedConn
-			}
-			conn := newConn(reader, writer)
-			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-			done := make(chan error, 1)
-			go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-			<-writeStarted
-			cancel()
-			close(releaseWrite)
-			select {
-			case err := <-done:
-				if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-					t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
-				}
-			case <-time.After(time.Second):
-				t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
-			}
-			if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
-// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
-// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
-// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
-//
-// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
-// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
-// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
-// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
-// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
-// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
-// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
-// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
-// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
-// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
-// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
-// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
-// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
-// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
-// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
-func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	var readCalls atomic.Int32
-	read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		readCalls.Add(1)
-		// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
-		// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
-		// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
-		// loop's next ReadBytes call.
-		return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
-	})
-	writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-	var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
-	release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
-	t.Cleanup(release)
-	writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		select {
-		case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
-		default:
-		}
-		<-releaseWrite
-		return len(p), nil
-	})
-	conn := NewConn(read, writer)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-	// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
-	// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
-	// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
-	// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
-	select {
-	case <-writeStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
-	}
-	cancel()
-	release()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
-	}
-	if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
-// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
-// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
-// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
-// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
-// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
-// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
-// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
-// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
-func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
-		resultReady := make(chan struct{})
-		read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-			defer close(resultReady)
-			return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
-		})
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-		r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
-
-		readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
-		go func() {
-			n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
-			readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
-		}()
-
-		<-resultReady
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
-		cancel()
-
-		res := <-readDone
-		if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
-			t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
-		}
-		if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
-		}
-		cancel()
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
-// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
-// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
-// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
-func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
-	})
-	r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
-	var decision interruptibleReadDecision
-	readComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
-	go func() {
-		res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
-		close(readComplete)
-		resultCh <- res
-	}()
-
-	<-readComplete
-	if decision.interrupt() {
-		t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
-	}
-	res := <-resultCh
-	if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
-	read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
-		panic("boom")
-	})
-	conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
-		if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	a, b, stop := connPair(t)
 	defer stop()
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 	}
 	options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
 	for _, action := range actions {
-		kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
+		kind, name := optionKindFor(action)
 		if kind == "" {
 			continue // skip actions that have no clean ACP option (e.g. cancel)
 		}
@@ -41,24 +41,18 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 // optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
 // human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
 // outcome rather than an option (cancel).
-//
-// escalates reports that approving a command prefix will also run the command
-// outside the sandbox. The two prefix options say so in their label, since the
-// label is all an ACP client shows and the option id carries no room for it. An
-// editor user is deciding on exactly the same terms as a terminal user, so the
-// disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
-func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
+func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
 	switch action {
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
 		return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
 		return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
-		return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Allow this command for the session", escalates)
+		return PermAllowAlways, "Allow this command for the session"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow:
 		return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix:
-		return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Always allow this command", escalates)
+		return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow this command"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionDeny:
 		return PermRejectOnce, "Reject"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionCancel:
@@ -129,13 +123,3 @@ func rawInputBytes(data []byte) json.RawMessage {
 	}
 	return json.RawMessage(data)
 }
-
-// withSandboxEscalationNote appends the escalation disclosure to a prefix
-// option's label. Kept parallel to the TUI's wording so the same consequence is
-// not described two different ways depending on which client the user runs.
-func withSandboxEscalationNote(name string, escalates bool) string {
-	if !escalates {
-		return name
-	}
-	return name + " (runs outside the sandbox)"
-}
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-package acp
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
-)
-
-func escalationRequest(escalates bool) agent.PermissionRequest {
-	return agent.PermissionRequest{
-		ToolName: "bash",
-		AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		},
-		PrefixApprovalEscalates: escalates,
-	}
-}
-
-// An ACP client renders only Name, so if the escalation is not in the label the
-// editor user approves it blind. They face exactly the outcome a terminal user
-// faces, so the disclosure has to reach both clients or it is not a fix.
-func TestACPPrefixOptionsDiscloseLeavingTheSandbox(t *testing.T) {
-	found := 0
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(true)) {
-		action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(option.OptionID)
-		if action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix && action != agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix {
-			if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
-				t.Errorf("option %q carries the disclosure but does not escalate", option.Name)
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		found++
-		if !strings.Contains(option.Name, "outside the sandbox") {
-			t.Errorf("prefix option %q does not say the command leaves the sandbox", option.Name)
-		}
-	}
-	if found != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected both prefix options, saw %d", found)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(false)) {
-		if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
-			t.Errorf("option %q warns about the sandbox when approving would not leave it", option.Name)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// The disclosure must live in the label only. The option id is the decision
-// action round-tripped verbatim, and decisionFromOutcome matches it against
-// what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
-func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	request := escalationRequest(true)
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(request) {
-		decision := decisionFromOutcome(
-			RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
-			request.AvailableDecisions,
-		)
-		if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
-			t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
-		}
-	}
-}
@@ -5,29 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 )

-type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
-	calls []map[string]any
-}
-
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Description() string {
-	return "record normalized shell arguments"
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: true}
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
-}
-
 // A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
 // omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
 // validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
@@ -127,7 +107,9 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
 	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
 		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
 	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
+	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
+		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
+	}
 }

 // A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -162,237 +144,3 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
 		t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
 	}
 }
-
-// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
-// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
-func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
-	t.Helper()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
-	result, err := executeToolCall(
-		context.Background(),
-		registry,
-		ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
-		PermissionModeUnsafe,
-		Options{Cwd: root},
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
-// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
-// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
-// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
-// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
-// `git branch --show-current`.
-//
-// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
-// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
-// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
-func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
-
-	// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
-	first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
-	if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
-
-	// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
-	// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
-	second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
-	if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
-
-	// The call both errors point at must actually work.
-	converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
-	if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
-	}
-}
-
-// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
-// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
-// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
-func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
-		t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
-		t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
-	}
-}
-
-// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
-// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
-// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
-// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
-// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
-func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"cmd":                 "git --version",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"network":     map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-			"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
-		},
-	}
-	_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
-	if !requested {
-		t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
-	}
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
-}
-
-// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
-// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
-// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
-// error the model could not act on.
-func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
-	result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
-	}
-}
-
-// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
-// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
-func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
-		`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
-		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, mode := range []string{
-		string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
-		string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-	} {
-		args := map[string]any{
-			"command":             "./zero --version",
-			"sandbox_permissions": mode,
-			"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-				"file_system": map[string]any{
-					"deny_read": []any{},
-					"entries":   []any{},
-					"read":      []any{},
-					"write":     []any{},
-				},
-				"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-			},
-		}
-		normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
-		if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-			t.Fatalf("mode %q retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", mode, args)
-		}
-		if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-			t.Fatalf("mode %q normalized to %q, want use_default", mode, got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExecuteToolCallNormalizesProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	tool := &normalizationRecordingShellTool{}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tool)
-
-	result, err := executeToolCall(
-		context.Background(),
-		registry,
-		ToolCall{
-			ID:   "c1",
-			Name: "bash",
-			Arguments: `{"command":"./zero --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
-				`"additional_permissions":{"file_system":{"deny_read":[],"entries":[],"read":[],"write":[]},"network":{"enabled":false}}}`,
-		},
-		PermissionModeAuto,
-		Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()},
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
-	}
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("provider-expanded empty permissions were rejected: %s", result.Output)
-	}
-	if len(tool.calls) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("shell tool calls = %d, want 1", len(tool.calls))
-	}
-	args := tool.calls[0]
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", args)
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode = %q, want use_default", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsPreservesRealRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
-		},
-	}
-	normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; !exists {
-		t.Fatal("non-empty additional_permissions was removed")
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsRemovesWorkspaceReadAlreadyCoveredBySandbox(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
-		WorkspaceRoot: root,
-		Policy:        sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
-	})
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"command":             "./zero --version",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"file_system": map[string]any{
-				"entries": []any{
-					map[string]any{
-						"access": "read",
-						"path": map[string]any{
-							"type": "path",
-							"path": ".",
-						},
-					},
-				},
-				"deny_read": []any{},
-				"read":      []any{},
-				"write":     []any{},
-			},
-			"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-		},
-	}
-
-	normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, root, engine)
-
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-		t.Fatalf("already-covered additional_permissions was retained: %#v", args)
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
-	}
-}
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
 // transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
 const summaryLabel = "[Summary of earlier conversation]"

-// CompactionSummaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to both automatic
-// and manually requested compaction summarizers.
-const CompactionSummaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
+// summaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to the summarizer model.
+const summaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
 	"Write a dense, factual summary of the conversation so far. Preserve: the user's goals and explicit constraints; " +
 	"decisions made and why; files created or modified (with paths) and key code changes; commands run and their important " +
 	"results; and anything still in progress or unresolved. Omit pleasantries. Use terse bullet points. Do not invent details. " +
@@ -76,12 +75,6 @@ type CompactionResult struct {
 	// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
 	// state needed by later compactions.
 	SummaryText string
-	// ProjectedChars is the text content sent to the summarizer after semantic
-	// projection, excluding provider protocol framing.
-	ProjectedChars int
-	// Truncated reports whether projection dropped content to satisfy its
-	// bounded brief or previous-summary limits.
-	Truncated bool
 	// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
 	Compacted bool
 }
@@ -223,11 +216,11 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
 		}, nil
 	}

-	summaryResult, err := SummarizeCompactionMessages(middle, opts.Summarize)
+	summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
 	if err != nil {
 		return CompactionResult{}, err
 	}
-	summary := summaryResult.SummaryText
+	summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)

 	// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
 	// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
@@ -245,53 +238,10 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
 		RemovedCount:   len(middle),
 		PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
 		SummaryText:    summary,
-		ProjectedChars: summaryResult.ProjectedChars,
-		Truncated:      summaryResult.Truncated,
 		Compacted:      true,
 	}, nil
 }

-// CompactionSummaryResult describes the shared summarization input and output.
-type CompactionSummaryResult struct {
-	SummaryText    string
-	ProjectedChars int
-	Truncated      bool
-}
-
-// SummarizeCompactionMessages applies the shared semantic projection before
-// invoking a caller-supplied summarizer. Automatic context-pressure compaction
-// and manual session compaction both use this path.
-func SummarizeCompactionMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, summarize func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)) (CompactionSummaryResult, error) {
-	if summarize == nil {
-		return CompactionSummaryResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
-	}
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	summaryInput := projection.messages
-	if len(summaryInput) == 0 {
-		summaryInput = messages
-	}
-	summary, err := summarize(summaryInput)
-	if err != nil {
-		return CompactionSummaryResult{}, err
-	}
-	return CompactionSummaryResult{
-		SummaryText:    strings.TrimSpace(summary),
-		ProjectedChars: compactionMessageChars(summaryInput),
-		Truncated:      projection.truncated,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func compactionMessageChars(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
-	total := 0
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		total += len(message.Content)
-		for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
-			total += len(call.Name) + len(call.Arguments)
-		}
-	}
-	return total
-}
-
 // safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
 // the preserved suffix begins on a user or assistant message rather than a
 // tool/tool_result message. A tool result with no preceding assistant tool call
@@ -381,8 +331,6 @@ type compactionState struct {
 	// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
 	onUsage func(Usage)
 	task    *taskState
-	planner *contextPlanner
-	trace   *trace.Recorder

 	// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
 	// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -429,8 +377,6 @@ func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
 		preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
 		onUsage:      options.OnUsage,
 		task:         task,
-		planner:      newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow}),
-		trace:        options.Trace,
 	}
 	return state
 }
@@ -467,14 +413,6 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
 	// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
 	// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
 	// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
-	if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
-		messages = pruned
-		size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
-		if size <= state.threshold {
-			state.lowWaterMark = size
-			return messages
-		}
-	}
 	if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
 		messages = pruned
 		size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
@@ -486,7 +424,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(

 	compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
-		Summarize:    state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
+		Summarize:    summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
 		taskState:    state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -537,7 +475,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(

 	result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
-		Summarize:    state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
+		Summarize:    summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
 		taskState:    state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
 	})
 	if compactErr != nil {
@@ -571,12 +509,9 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
 // provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
 // compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
 // OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
-func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-	if state.planner == nil {
-		state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
-	}
+func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
 	return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-		return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
+		return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
 	}
 }

@@ -588,11 +523,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Pro
 // Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
 // to the caller unchanged.
 func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
-	return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{}), nil)
-}
-
-func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
-	summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
 	if err == nil {
 		return summary, nil
 	}
@@ -601,11 +532,11 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 	}

 	mid := len(messages) / 2
-	left, leftErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
 	if leftErr != nil {
 		return "", leftErr
 	}
-	right, rightErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
 	if rightErr != nil {
 		return "", rightErr
 	}
@@ -618,7 +549,7 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 	combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
 	reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
-	}, onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	}, onUsage)
 	if reduceErr != nil {
 		if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
 			// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
@@ -634,15 +565,15 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 }

 // summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
-func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
-	requestMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: CompactionSummaryInstructions},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
+func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
+	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
+		},
+		// No tools: this is a plain text summarization call.
 	}
-	parts := systemPromptParts{prompt: CompactionSummaryInstructions, baseInstructions: CompactionSummaryInstructions}
-	plan := planner.planWithPromptParts(requestMessages, nil, "", parts)
-	recordContextPlanTrace(recorder, plan)
-	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, plan.Request)
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
@@ -43,14 +43,8 @@ func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
 	if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
 		t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
 	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
-	}
-	if result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatal("Truncated = true for a projection within its limits")
-	}
-	if len(captured) != 1 || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "first question") || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "second question") {
-		t.Fatalf("summarized projection = %#v, want intent from the non-preserved middle", captured)
+	if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
+		t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
 	}
 	if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
 		t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
@@ -102,46 +96,11 @@ func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 	if result.SummaryText != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
 	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != 0 || result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("no-op projection metadata = (%d, %t), want zero values", result.ProjectedChars, result.Truncated)
-	}
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
 		t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
 	}
 }

-func TestCompactMessagesReturnsTruncatedProjectionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}}
-	for index := range 20 {
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
-			Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
-			Content: strings.Repeat("contextword ", 256) + string(rune('a'+index)),
-		})
-	}
-	messages = append(messages,
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
-	)
-
-	var captured []zeroruntime.Message
-	result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-			captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
-			return "bounded summary", nil
-		},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !result.Compacted || !result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("compaction metadata = compacted %t, truncated %t; want both true", result.Compacted, result.Truncated)
-	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
-	}
-}
-
 func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
 	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
 	body string
 }

-// recentEdits returns files mutated by editing calls in messages
+// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
 // — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
 // note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
 // changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ type skillEntry struct {
 // rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
 func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
 	pathByID := map[string]string{}
-	noteByPath := map[string]string{}
 	sequence := make([]string, 0)
 	for _, message := range messages {
 		for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
@@ -130,24 +129,12 @@ func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
 			sequence = append(sequence, path)
 		}
 	}
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || len(message.ChangedFiles) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, path := range message.ChangedFiles {
-			path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
-			if path == "" {
-				continue
-			}
-			sequence = append(sequence, path)
-			noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
-		}
-	}
 	order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
 	if len(order) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}

+	noteByPath := map[string]string{}
 	for _, message := range messages {
 		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
 			continue
@@ -438,20 +425,15 @@ type preservedState struct {
 }

 type preservedTaskState struct {
-	Objective           string              `json:"objective"`
-	Status              taskStatus          `json:"status,omitempty"`
-	Pending             int                 `json:"pending,omitempty"`
-	InProgress          int                 `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
-	Completed           int                 `json:"completed,omitempty"`
-	Failed              int                 `json:"failed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationPassed  int                 `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationFailed  int                 `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationOutcome Outcome             `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
-	Constraints         []string            `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
-	ChangedFiles        []string            `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
-	UnresolvedFailures  []taskFailureState  `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
-	Approvals           []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
-	Artifacts           []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
+	Objective           string     `json:"objective"`
+	Status              taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
+	Pending             int        `json:"pending,omitempty"`
+	InProgress          int        `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
+	Completed           int        `json:"completed,omitempty"`
+	Failed              int        `json:"failed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationPassed  int        `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationFailed  int        `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationOutcome Outcome    `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
 }

 type preservedEdit struct {
@@ -486,12 +468,7 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 	task := priorState.Task
 	if taskSnapshot != nil {
 		task = &preservedTaskState{
-			Objective:          capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
-			Constraints:        mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskConstraints(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Constraints, maxTaskConstraints),
-			ChangedFiles:       mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskChangedFiles(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.ChangedFiles, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
-			UnresolvedFailures: mergeTaskFailures(priorTaskFailures(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.UnresolvedFailures, taskSnapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys),
-			Approvals:          mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskApprovals(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Approvals, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
-			Artifacts:          mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskArtifacts(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Artifacts, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
+			Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
 		}
 		// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
 		// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
@@ -507,13 +484,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 			task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
 		}
 	}
-	freshConstraints := explicitConstraintsFromMessages(middle)
-	if len(freshConstraints) > 0 {
-		if task == nil {
-			task = &preservedTaskState{}
-		}
-		task.Constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(task.Constraints, freshConstraints, maxTaskConstraints)
-	}

 	// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
 	// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -547,95 +517,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 	return summary
 }

-func explicitConstraintsFromMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
-	var constraints []string
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || strings.Contains(message.Content, preservedStateLabel) {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content); body != "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(constraints, extractExplicitConstraints(message.Content), maxTaskConstraints)
-	}
-	return constraints
-}
-
-func priorTaskConstraints(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Constraints
-}
-
-func priorTaskChangedFiles(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.ChangedFiles
-}
-
-func priorTaskFailures(task *preservedTaskState) []taskFailureState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.UnresolvedFailures
-}
-
-func priorTaskApprovals(task *preservedTaskState) []taskApprovalState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Approvals
-}
-
-func priorTaskArtifacts(task *preservedTaskState) []taskArtifactState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Artifacts
-}
-
-func mergeTaskFailures(older, newer []taskFailureState, resolved []string) []taskFailureState {
-	resolvedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(resolved))
-	for _, key := range resolved {
-		resolvedSet[key] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	merged := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
-	for _, failure := range append(append([]taskFailureState(nil), older...), newer...) {
-		if _, ok := resolvedSet[failure.Key]; ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		withoutSameKey := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(merged))
-		for _, existing := range merged {
-			if existing.Key != failure.Key {
-				withoutSameKey = append(withoutSameKey, existing)
-			}
-		}
-		merged = append(withoutSameKey, failure)
-	}
-	if len(merged) > maxTaskEvidenceEntries {
-		merged = merged[len(merged)-maxTaskEvidenceEntries:]
-	}
-	return merged
-}
-
-func mergeBoundedComparable[T comparable](older, newer []T, limit int) []T {
-	merged := make([]T, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
-	seen := make(map[T]struct{}, len(older)+len(newer))
-	for _, value := range append(append([]T(nil), older...), newer...) {
-		if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[value] = struct{}{}
-		merged = append(merged, value)
-	}
-	if len(merged) > limit {
-		merged = merged[len(merged)-limit:]
-	}
-	return merged
-}
-
 func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
 	objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
 	if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"unicode/utf8"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
 )

@@ -65,9 +64,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
 	objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
 	task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
 	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/db.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"},
-	}})
 	messages := stateConversation()
 	compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: 2,
@@ -84,69 +80,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
 		t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
 	}
-	if len(state.Task.ChangedFiles) != 1 || state.Task.ChangedFiles[0] != "internal/db.go" {
-		t.Fatalf("changed files were not preserved: %#v", state.Task.ChangedFiles)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCompactPreservesRuntimeEvidenceAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
-	task := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.", nil)
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests failed",
-		Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
-	}})
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
-		ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession, Scope: "/tmp",
-	}})
-	messages := stateConversation()
-
-	first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize:    func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
-		taskState:    task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence",
-		Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
-	}})
-	secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Never add background memory models."},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "understood"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
-	)
-	second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize:    func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
-		taskState:    task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
-	if state.Task == nil || len(state.Task.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || len(state.Task.Approvals) != 1 || len(state.Task.Artifacts) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("runtime evidence did not survive repeated compaction: %#v", state.Task)
-	}
-	if got := state.Task.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary; got != "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence" {
-		t.Fatalf("newer failure evidence did not replace the older summary: %#v", state.Task.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never add background memory models."} {
-		if !containsString(state.Task.Constraints, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("constraint %q missing after repeated compaction: %#v", want, state.Task.Constraints)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value == want {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
 }

 func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-const (
-	compactionUserWordBudget       = 256
-	compactionAssistantWordBudget  = 200
-	compactionToolCallsPerTurn     = 8
-	compactionToolArgumentBytes    = 120
-	compactionErrorBytes           = 150
-	compactionResultBytes          = 1200
-	compactionPreviousSummaryBytes = 16 * 1024
-	compactionBriefMaxBytes        = 24 * 1024
-)
-
-var compactionWordPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[\p{L}\p{N}]+`)
-
-type compactionProjection struct {
-	messages  []zeroruntime.Message
-	truncated bool
-}
-
-// projectCompactionInput removes reconstructible tool output before the model
-// summary call. It retains a bounded transcript of user intent, assistant
-// decisions, tool actions, and concise errors. Exact durable state is appended
-// separately from the original messages after the summary returns.
-func projectCompactionInput(messages []zeroruntime.Message) compactionProjection {
-	sections := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
-	previousSummary := ""
-	truncated := false
-	for index, message := range messages {
-		switch message.Role {
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser:
-			content := message.Content
-			if marker := strings.Index(content, preservedStateLabel); marker >= 0 {
-				content = content[:marker]
-			}
-			trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
-			if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel) {
-				fullSummary := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel))
-				previousSummary = clipHeadTailBytes(fullSummary, compactionPreviousSummaryBytes)
-				truncated = truncated || len(fullSummary) > compactionPreviousSummaryBytes
-				continue
-			}
-			if content = clipInformativeWords(content, compactionUserWordBudget); content != "" {
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user #%d]\n%s", index, content))
-			}
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant:
-			lines := make([]string, 0, 1+len(message.ToolCalls))
-			if content := clipInformativeWords(message.Content, compactionAssistantWordBudget); content != "" {
-				lines = append(lines, content)
-			}
-			calls := message.ToolCalls
-			omitted := 0
-			if len(calls) > compactionToolCallsPerTurn {
-				omitted = len(calls) - compactionToolCallsPerTurn
-				calls = calls[omitted:]
-			}
-			if omitted > 0 {
-				lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("* (%d earlier tool calls omitted)", omitted))
-			}
-			for _, call := range calls {
-				lines = append(lines, compactionToolCallLine(call))
-			}
-			if len(lines) > 0 {
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[assistant #%d]\n%s", index, strings.Join(lines, "\n")))
-			}
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
-			// New tool-result messages carry the execution status directly, as the
-			// source ToolResult does. Keep the text check for older session history
-			// created before Message exposed IsError.
-			name := toolNameForResult(messages, index)
-			mustPreserve := name == "ask_user" || len(message.ChangedFiles) > 0
-			if !mustPreserve && !message.IsError && !isLikelyToolError(message.Content) {
-				continue
-			}
-			if name == "" {
-				name = "tool"
-			}
-			switch {
-			case message.IsError || isLikelyToolError(message.Content):
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_error #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
-			case name == "ask_user":
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user_answer #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(message.Content, compactionResultBytes)))
-			default:
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_result #%d] %s changed %s\n%s", index, name,
-					clipBytes(strings.Join(message.ChangedFiles, ", "), compactionToolArgumentBytes), clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if len(sections) == 0 && previousSummary == "" {
-		return compactionProjection{}
-	}
-	brief, briefTruncated := capCompactionBrief(strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"))
-	truncated = truncated || briefTruncated
-	if previousSummary != "" {
-		brief = "[previous summary]\n" + previousSummary + "\n\n" + brief
-	}
-	return compactionProjection{
-		messages:  []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.TrimSpace(brief)}},
-		truncated: truncated,
-	}
-}
-
-func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
-	if len(brief) <= compactionBriefMaxBytes {
-		return brief, false
-	}
-	marker := "\n\n...[middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget]...\n\n"
-	available := compactionBriefMaxBytes - len(marker)
-	// Keep both chronological edges: the oldest material has not necessarily
-	// been summarized before, while the newest material is most actionable.
-	headBytes := available * 2 / 5
-	tailBytes := available - headBytes
-	head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(brief, headBytes)
-	tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(brief, tailBytes)
-	return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail), true
-}
-
-func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
-	detail := ""
-	var arguments map[string]any
-	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
-		for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
-			if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
-				detail = value
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if detail == "" && call.Name == "ask_user" {
-			detail = askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments)
-		}
-		if detail == "" && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
-			if patch, ok := arguments["patch"].(string); ok {
-				detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(patch), ", ")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = commandFromArguments(call.Arguments)
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		return "* " + call.Name
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("* %s %q", call.Name, clipBytes(detail, compactionToolArgumentBytes))
-}
-
-func isLikelyToolError(content string) bool {
-	prefix := strings.TrimSpace(content)
-	if len(prefix) > compactionErrorBytes {
-		prefix = prefix[:compactionErrorBytes]
-	}
-	lower := strings.ToLower(prefix)
-	for _, prefix := range []string{"error:", "tool error:", "failed:", "permission denied", "command failed"} {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func clipInformativeWords(text string, limit int) string {
-	flat := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
-	if flat == "" || limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	count := 0
-	for _, location := range compactionWordPattern.FindAllStringIndex(flat, -1) {
-		word := strings.ToLower(flat[location[0]:location[1]])
-		if compactionStopWords[word] {
-			continue
-		}
-		count++
-		if count > limit {
-			end := location[0]
-			return strings.TrimSpace(flat[:end]) + "...(truncated)"
-		}
-	}
-	return flat
-}
-
-func clipBytes(text string, limit int) string {
-	text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	if limit <= 3 {
-		end := limit
-		for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-			end--
-		}
-		return text[:end]
-	}
-	end := limit - 3
-	for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		end--
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(text[:end]) + "..."
-}
-
-func clipHeadTailBytes(text string, limit int) string {
-	text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	marker := "\n...[middle omitted]...\n"
-	if limit <= len(marker) {
-		return clipBytes(text, limit)
-	}
-	available := limit - len(marker)
-	head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(text, available/2)
-	tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(text, available-available/2)
-	return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail)
-}
-
-func clipPrefixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	end := limit
-	for end > 0 && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		end--
-	}
-	if boundary := strings.LastIndex(text[:end], "\n\n["); boundary > 0 {
-		end = boundary
-	}
-	return text[:end]
-}
-
-func clipSuffixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	start := len(text) - limit
-	for start < len(text) && text[start]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		start++
-	}
-	if boundary := strings.Index(text[start:], "\n\n["); boundary >= 0 {
-		start += boundary + 2
-	}
-	return text[start:]
-}
-
-func askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments map[string]any) string {
-	raw, ok := arguments["questions"].([]any)
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	questions := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
-	for _, item := range raw {
-		object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if question, ok := object["question"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(question) != "" {
-			questions = append(questions, strings.TrimSpace(question))
-		}
-	}
-	return strings.Join(questions, " | ")
-}
-
-func patchPaths(patch string) []string {
-	var paths []string
-	seen := map[string]bool{}
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(patch, "\n") {
-		for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
-			if !strings.HasPrefix(line, prefix) {
-				continue
-			}
-			path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, prefix))
-			if path != "" && !seen[path] {
-				seen[path] = true
-				paths = append(paths, path)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return paths
-}
-
-var compactionStopWords = map[string]bool{
-	"a": true, "an": true, "the": true, "is": true, "are": true, "was": true, "were": true,
-	"be": true, "been": true, "being": true, "have": true, "has": true, "had": true,
-	"do": true, "does": true, "did": true, "will": true, "would": true, "could": true,
-	"should": true, "may": true, "might": true, "shall": true, "can": true, "need": true, "must": true,
-	"to": true, "of": true, "in": true, "for": true, "on": true, "with": true, "at": true,
-	"by": true, "from": true, "as": true, "into": true, "through": true, "during": true,
-	"before": true, "after": true, "above": true, "below": true, "between": true, "under": true, "over": true,
-	"and": true, "but": true, "or": true, "nor": true, "not": true, "so": true, "yet": true,
-	"both": true, "either": true, "neither": true, "each": true, "every": true, "all": true,
-	"any": true, "few": true, "more": true, "most": true, "other": true, "some": true, "such": true, "no": true,
-	"that": true, "this": true, "these": true, "those": true, "it": true, "its": true,
-	"i": true, "me": true, "my": true, "we": true, "our": true, "you": true, "your": true,
-	"he": true, "him": true, "his": true, "she": true, "her": true, "they": true, "them": true, "their": true,
-	"who": true, "which": true, "what": true, "if": true, "then": true, "than": true,
-	"when": true, "where": true, "how": true, "just": true, "also": true,
-}
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"unicode/utf8"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
-		if clipped := clipBytes("世界", limit); len(clipped) > limit || !utf8.ValidString(clipped) {
-			t.Fatalf("clipBytes limit %d returned invalid result %q", limit, clipped)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBoundaryClippersHandleNonPositiveLimits(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, clip := range []func(string, int) string{clipPrefixAtBoundary, clipSuffixAtBoundary} {
-		for _, limit := range []int{-1, 0} {
-			if got := clip("世界", limit); got != "" {
-				t.Fatalf("clipper limit %d = %q, want empty", limit, got)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputDropsRecoverableToolBodies(t *testing.T) {
-	largeBody := strings.Repeat("recoverable source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "I will inspect before editing.", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "read", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "read", Content: largeBody},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "test", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "test", Content: "Error: parser regression\nlong diagnostic details"},
-	}
-
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	projected := projection.messages
-	if len(projected) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("projection = %#v, want one compact message", projected)
-	}
-	content := projected[0].Content
-	for _, want := range []string{"Inspect the parser", `read_file "internal/parser.go"`, `exec_command "go test ./internal/parser"`, "Error: parser regression"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
-		}
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(content, "recoverable source line") || strings.Contains(content, "long diagnostic details") {
-		t.Fatalf("projection retained reconstructible or overlong tool output: %q", content)
-	}
-	if estimateTokens(projected)*20 >= estimateTokens(messages) {
-		t.Fatalf("projection did not materially reduce tokens: before=%d after=%d", estimateTokens(messages), estimateTokens(projected))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsStructurallyMarkedToolErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "git", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"git status"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "git", Content: "fatal: not a git repository", IsError: true},
-	}
-
-	projected := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages
-	if len(projected) != 1 || !strings.Contains(projected[0].Content, "fatal: not a git repository") {
-		t.Fatalf("structured tool error was dropped from projection: %#v", projected)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "ask", Name: "ask_user", Arguments: `{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
-			{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
-			{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
-			{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
-		}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "patch", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"}},
-	}
-
-	content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
-	for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputCapsToolCallsPerTurn(t *testing.T) {
-	calls := make([]zeroruntime.ToolCall, 12)
-	for index := range calls {
-		calls[index] = zeroruntime.ToolCall{Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"file.go"}`}
-	}
-	projected := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: calls}}).messages
-	content := projected[0].Content
-	if strings.Count(content, "* read_file") != compactionToolCallsPerTurn || !strings.Contains(content, "4 earlier tool calls omitted") {
-		t.Fatalf("tool-call tail was not bounded: %q", content)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputCarriesPreviousSummaryOutsideBriefCap(t *testing.T) {
-	previous := "keep the earlier architecture decision\n" + strings.Repeat("prior detail ", 2000) + "\nkeep the newest prior decision"
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\n" + previous + "\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n{}"}}
-	for index := range 500 {
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("later transcript detail ", 20)})
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "later request " + strings.Repeat("context ", 20) + string(rune('a'+index%26))})
-	}
-
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	content := projection.messages[0].Content
-	if !strings.Contains(content, "[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision") || !strings.Contains(content, "keep the newest prior decision") {
-		t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q", content)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(content, "middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget") {
-		t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q", content)
-	}
-	if !projection.truncated {
-		t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputDoesNotInferTruncationFromUserText(t *testing.T) {
-	projection := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{
-		Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Keep this literal marker: [middle omitted]",
-	}})
-	if projection.truncated {
-		t.Fatal("literal user text produced a false truncation signal")
-	}
-}
@@ -20,15 +20,11 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 			{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
 		}},
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
-			{ID: "e3", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/baz.go"}`},
-		}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e3", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/baz.go"}},
 	}

 	edits := recentEdits(messages)
-	if len(edits) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected 3 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
+	if len(edits) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
 	}
 	if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
 		t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
@@ -36,9 +32,6 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
 		t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
 	}
-	if edits[2].name != "internal/baz.go" || edits[2].body != "Done!" {
-		t.Fatalf("third edit = %#v, want apply_patch changed file with its note", edits[2])
-	}
 }

 // After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
 )

@@ -59,15 +58,12 @@ func TestCompactKeepsSystemAndPreservedSuffix(t *testing.T) {
 	if last.Content != "most recent question" {
 		t.Fatalf("expected most recent message preserved, got %q", last.Content)
 	}
-	// The summarizer receives a compact semantic projection of the middle rather
-	// than reconstructible raw tool output.
-	if len(captured) != 1 || captured[0].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
-		t.Fatalf("expected one projected summary input, got %#v", captured)
+	// The summarized middle excludes system and preserved suffix.
+	if len(captured) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 3 summarized messages, got %d: %#v", len(captured), captured)
 	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"[user #0]", "first question", "[assistant #1]", "first answer", "second question"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projected summary input missing %q: %q", want, captured[0].Content)
-		}
+	if captured[0].Content != "first question" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected oldest non-system message first, got %#v", captured[0])
 	}
 	// Compaction must shrink the conversation.
 	if estimateTokens(result) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
@@ -383,43 +379,6 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestMaybeCompactStopsAfterSupersededReadsReachThreshold(t *testing.T) {
-	body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
-	}
-	pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed <= 0 {
-		t.Fatal("test setup did not reclaim superseded read output")
-	}
-	prunedSize := estimateTokens(pruned)
-	if estimateTokens(messages) <= prunedSize {
-		t.Fatal("test setup does not cross the compaction threshold")
-	}
-
-	provider := &summarizeRecordingProvider{}
-	state := &compactionState{
-		enabled:      true,
-		threshold:    prunedSize,
-		preserveLast: 2,
-	}
-	got := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
-
-	if provider.summarizeCalls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("cheap pruning should avoid the summarizer, got %d calls", provider.summarizeCalls)
-	}
-	if state.lowWaterMark != prunedSize {
-		t.Fatalf("lowWaterMark = %d, want %d", state.lowWaterMark, prunedSize)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(got[2].Content, "superseded identical") || got[4].Content != body {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected pruned messages: %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
 // reactiveProvider builds up history with a tool call on turn 1, then errors
 // with a context-limit message on turn 2 (once the history is large enough that
 // compaction can shrink it), then succeeds on the same-turn retry. Summary
@@ -429,7 +388,6 @@ type reactiveProvider struct {
 	summarizeCalls int
 	turnRequests   int
 	failedOnce     bool
-	connectError   bool
 	bigText        string
 	finalText      string
 }
@@ -451,9 +409,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
 		return streamEvents(toolTurnWithText(provider.bigText, "1", "read_file", `{"path":"x"}`)), nil
 	case provider.turnRequests == 2 && !provider.failedOnce:
 		provider.failedOnce = true
-		if provider.connectError {
-			return nil, errors.New("context_length_exceeded")
-		}
 		return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
 			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."},
 		}), nil
@@ -462,39 +417,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
 	}
 }

-func TestRunConnectErrorCompactionRecordsReplacementPlan(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := &reactiveProvider{
-		connectError: true,
-		bigText:      strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
-		finalText:    "recovered",
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
-	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("connect-compaction", "run-1", "test")
-	var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
-		Registry:               registry,
-		PermissionMode:         PermissionModeUnsafe,
-		ContextWindow:          10_000_000,
-		CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
-		Trace:                  recorder,
-		OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
-			contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
-		},
-	})
-	if err != nil || result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
-		t.Fatalf("connect-error compaction failed: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
-	}
-	if len(contextPlans) != 3 || contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("replacement request context not reported: %#v", contextPlans)
-	}
-	gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
-	if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 || gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("replacement request trace not recorded: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	provider := &reactiveProvider{
 		bigText:   strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
@@ -506,8 +428,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	// bloats the history.
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
-	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("reactive-compaction", "run-1", "test")
-	var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown

 	// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
 	// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -516,10 +436,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 		PermissionMode:         PermissionModeUnsafe,
 		ContextWindow:          10_000_000,
 		CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
-		Trace:                  recorder,
-		OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
-			contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
-		},
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("expected reactive compaction to recover the run, got error: %v", err)
@@ -530,25 +446,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	if provider.summarizeCalls == 0 {
 		t.Fatal("expected reactive compaction to invoke the summarizer")
 	}
-	if len(contextPlans) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("main request context callbacks = %d, want initial turns plus compacted retry", len(contextPlans))
-	}
-	if contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("retry context was not updated after compaction: before=%d after=%d", contextPlans[1].MessageTokens, contextPlans[2].MessageTokens)
-	}
-	gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
-	if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix evidence count = %d, want two turns, compaction, and retry: %#v", len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes), gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-	if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected request-specific invalidation evidence: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-	if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].CompletePrefixHash == gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].CompletePrefixHash {
-		t.Fatalf("compaction fingerprint reused the main request prefix: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
 }

 // midStreamReactiveProvider forwards some text BEFORE surfacing a context-limit
@@ -23,24 +23,6 @@ type ContextBreakdown struct {
 	TotalTokens   int     // SystemTokens + ToolTokens + MessageTokens
 	ContextWindow int     // model context window; 0 when unknown
 	UsedFraction  float64 // TotalTokens / ContextWindow; 0 when window unknown
-	// Blocks explain why each model-visible category is present without exposing
-	// its content. The planner currently preserves all three categories.
-	Blocks []ContextBlock
-	// CompletePrefixHash identifies the provider-visible system+tool prefix.
-	CompletePrefixHash string
-	// PrefixInvalidationReason is "initial", "unchanged", or a stable comma-
-	// separated list of changed prefix categories.
-	PrefixInvalidationReason string
-}
-
-// ContextBlock is content-free evidence for one model-visible context category.
-type ContextBlock struct {
-	Kind        string
-	Tokens      int
-	CacheClass  string
-	Authority   string
-	Recoverable bool
-	Reason      string
 }

 // MeasureContext estimates the per-category token footprint of a request: the
@@ -59,24 +41,6 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
 		ContextWindow: contextWindow,
 	}
 	breakdown.TotalTokens = breakdown.SystemTokens + breakdown.ToolTokens + breakdown.MessageTokens
-	if breakdown.SystemTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "system", Tokens: breakdown.SystemTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
-			Authority: "required", Reason: "instructions, workspace policy, and safety policy",
-		})
-	}
-	if breakdown.ToolTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "tools", Tokens: breakdown.ToolTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
-			Authority: "capability", Reason: "currently permitted and selected tool definitions",
-		})
-	}
-	if breakdown.MessageTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "conversation", Tokens: breakdown.MessageTokens, CacheClass: "dynamic_tail",
-			Authority: "transcript", Reason: "valid provider replay history and current task context",
-		})
-	}
 	if contextWindow > 0 {
 		breakdown.UsedFraction = float64(breakdown.TotalTokens) / float64(contextWindow)
 	}
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
 	if breakdown.UsedFraction != wantFraction {
 		t.Fatalf("UsedFraction = %v, want %v", breakdown.UsedFraction, wantFraction)
 	}
-	if len(breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("Blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", breakdown.Blocks)
-	}
 }

 func TestMeasureContextUnknownWindowHasZeroFraction(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-type contextPlannerConfig struct {
-	contextWindow  int
-	promptCacheKey string
-	promptParts    systemPromptParts
-}
-
-// contextPlanner is the single seam for constructing model-visible requests.
-// Planning is deterministic and does not retrieve content, execute tools, or
-// change permissions. The initial implementation deliberately preserves every
-// message and tool definition while making composition and cache drift
-// inspectable; later selection policies must continue to cross this seam.
-type contextPlanner struct {
-	config          contextPlannerConfig
-	previousPrefix  prefixFingerprint
-	hasPrevious     bool
-	toolSnapshotKey string
-	toolSnapshot    []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
-}
-
-type contextPlan struct {
-	Request           zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
-	Breakdown         ContextBreakdown
-	PrefixFingerprint prefixFingerprint
-}
-
-func newContextPlanner(config contextPlannerConfig) *contextPlanner {
-	return &contextPlanner{config: config}
-}
-
-// Plan returns a provider request snapshot plus content-free accounting.
-// It intentionally performs no relevance filtering: preserving current model
-// capability is the baseline contract for future planner policies.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) Plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string) contextPlan {
-	return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, planner.config.promptParts)
-}
-
-// planWithPromptParts plans a request whose stable system sections differ from
-// the planner's configured main-run prompt, such as a compaction summary call.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) planWithPromptParts(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
-	return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, parts)
-}
-
-func (planner *contextPlanner) plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
-	requestMessages := copyMessages(messages)
-	requestSystemPrompt := leadingSystemContent(requestMessages)
-	if parts.prompt != requestSystemPrompt {
-		// Component boundaries from a different request would make the detailed
-		// invalidation reason misleading. Retain the exact request prefix and
-		// classify it conservatively as an unstructured system prompt instead.
-		parts = systemPromptParts{prompt: requestSystemPrompt}
-	}
-	fingerprint := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts, toolDefs))
-	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
-		Messages:        requestMessages,
-		Tools:           planner.snapshotTools(toolDefs, fingerprint),
-		ReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort,
-		PromptCacheKey:  planner.config.promptCacheKey,
-	}
-	breakdown := MeasureContext(request.Messages, request.Tools, planner.config.contextWindow)
-	breakdown.CompletePrefixHash = fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash
-	var previous *prefixFingerprint
-	if planner.hasPrevious {
-		previous = &planner.previousPrefix
-	}
-	breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason = explainPrefixChange(previous, fingerprint)
-	planner.previousPrefix = fingerprint
-	planner.hasPrevious = true
-	return contextPlan{
-		Request:           request,
-		Breakdown:         breakdown,
-		PrefixFingerprint: fingerprint,
-	}
-}
-
-// snapshotTools freezes provider-visible tool definitions when their semantic
-// fingerprint changes. Stable turns reuse the frozen schemas instead of
-// recursively cloning every map and slice for every request.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) snapshotTools(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, fingerprint prefixFingerprint) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
-	key := fingerprint.ToolsHash + "\x00" + fingerprint.SchemaHash
-	if planner.toolSnapshotKey != key {
-		planner.toolSnapshot = copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs)
-		planner.toolSnapshotKey = key
-	}
-	return planner.toolSnapshot
-}
-
-func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
-	if toolDefs == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	copied := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(toolDefs))
-	for index, definition := range toolDefs {
-		copied[index] = definition
-		copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
-	}
-	return copied
-}
-
-func copySchemaMap(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
-	if schema == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	copied := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
-	for key, value := range schema {
-		copied[key] = copySchemaValue(value)
-	}
-	return copied
-}
-
-func copySchemaValue(value any) any {
-	switch typed := value.(type) {
-	case map[string]any:
-		return copySchemaMap(typed)
-	case []any:
-		copied := make([]any, len(typed))
-		for index, item := range typed {
-			copied[index] = copySchemaValue(item)
-		}
-		return copied
-	case []string:
-		return append([]string(nil), typed...)
-	default:
-		return value
-	}
-}
-
-func leadingSystemContent(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
-	contents := make([]string, 0, 1)
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem {
-			break
-		}
-		contents = append(contents, message.Content)
-	}
-	return strings.Join(contents, "\n\n")
-}
-
-func explainPrefixChange(previous *prefixFingerprint, current prefixFingerprint) string {
-	if previous == nil {
-		return "initial"
-	}
-	if previous.CompletePrefixHash == current.CompletePrefixHash {
-		return "unchanged"
-	}
-	reasons := make([]string, 0, 3)
-	if previous.SystemPromptHash != current.SystemPromptHash {
-		parts := make([]string, 0, 4)
-		if previous.BaseInstructionsHash != current.BaseInstructionsHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "base_instructions")
-		}
-		if previous.ConfirmationPolicyHash != current.ConfirmationPolicyHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "confirmation_policy")
-		}
-		if previous.ProjectContextHash != current.ProjectContextHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "project_context")
-		}
-		if previous.SkillsHash != current.SkillsHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "skills")
-		}
-		if len(parts) == 0 {
-			parts = append(parts, "system_prompt")
-		}
-		reasons = append(reasons, parts...)
-	}
-	if previous.ToolsHash != current.ToolsHash {
-		reasons = append(reasons, "tools")
-	}
-	if previous.SchemaHash != current.SchemaHash {
-		reasons = append(reasons, "schema")
-	}
-	if len(reasons) == 0 {
-		return "prefix_changed"
-	}
-	return strings.Join(reasons, ",")
-}
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "inspect this", Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte{1, 2, 3}}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"main.go"}`}}, Reasoning: []zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{{Provider: "test", Type: "thinking", Signature: "sig"}}},
-	}
-	toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
-		Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
-		Parameters: map[string]any{
-			"type":       "object",
-			"required":   []string{"path"},
-			"properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
-			"anyOf":      []any{map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
-		},
-	}}
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
-		contextWindow:  128_000,
-		promptCacheKey: "session-1",
-		promptParts:    systemPromptParts{prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "system"},
-	})
-
-	plan := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	want := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
-		Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
-		Tools:           toolDefs,
-		ReasoningEffort: "medium",
-		PromptCacheKey:  "session-1",
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(plan.Request, want) {
-		t.Fatalf("planned request changed provider input:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.Request, want)
-	}
-	stable := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	if &stable.Request.Tools[0] != &plan.Request.Tools[0] {
-		t.Fatal("stable tool fingerprint rebuilt the immutable schema snapshot")
-	}
-
-	// A plan owns its request snapshot; later caller mutation cannot change its
-	// messages or its recursively nested tool schema.
-	messages[1].Content = "changed"
-	messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] = 9
-	toolDefs[0].Name = "changed_tool"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
-	if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
-	}
-	if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
-		t.Fatalf("planned tools alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
-	}
-
-	next := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	if next.PrefixFingerprint == plan.PrefixFingerprint || next.Request.Tools[0].Name != "changed_tool" {
-		t.Fatalf("changed tool schema did not refresh snapshot: %#v", next)
-	}
-	if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" {
-		t.Fatalf("refresh mutated earlier request: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerReportsInspectableBlocks(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: 100_000})
-	plan := planner.Plan([]zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: filler(400)},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: filler(200)},
-	}, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file"}}, "")
-
-	if plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" || plan.Breakdown.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix evidence = %#v", plan.Breakdown)
-	}
-	if len(plan.Breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", plan.Breakdown.Blocks)
-	}
-	wantKinds := []string{"system", "tools", "conversation"}
-	total := 0
-	for index, block := range plan.Breakdown.Blocks {
-		if block.Kind != wantKinds[index] || block.Tokens <= 0 || block.Reason == "" || block.Authority == "" || block.CacheClass == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("block %d = %#v", index, block)
-		}
-		total += block.Tokens
-	}
-	if total != plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("block tokens = %d, want total %d", total, plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerFingerprintsActualRequestSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
-		prompt: "configured system", baseInstructions: "configured system",
-	}})
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "request-specific system"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"},
-	}
-
-	plan := planner.Plan(messages, nil, "")
-	want := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(
-		systemPromptParts{prompt: "request-specific system"}, nil,
-	))
-	if plan.PrefixFingerprint != want {
-		t.Fatalf("fingerprint describes configured prompt instead of request:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.PrefixFingerprint, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerExplainsPrefixInvalidation(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
-		prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "base", projectContext: "project",
-	}})
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}, {Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"}}
-	tools := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}}
-
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "initial" {
-		t.Fatalf("first reason = %q, want initial", got)
-	}
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("stable reason = %q, want unchanged", got)
-	}
-	tools[0].Description = "Read an exact file"
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "tools" {
-		t.Fatalf("tool reason = %q, want tools", got)
-	}
-	tools[0].Parameters["required"] = []any{"path"}
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "schema" {
-		t.Fatalf("schema reason = %q, want schema", got)
-	}
-	planner.config.promptParts.prompt = "system with changed project"
-	planner.config.promptParts.projectContext = "changed project"
-	messages[0].Content = "system with changed project"
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "project_context" {
-		t.Fatalf("project reason = %q, want project_context", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExplainPrefixChangeNamesEveryChangedComponent(t *testing.T) {
-	baseline := prefixFingerprint{
-		SystemPromptHash:       "system",
-		BaseInstructionsHash:   "base",
-		ConfirmationPolicyHash: "policy",
-		ProjectContextHash:     "project",
-		SkillsHash:             "skills",
-		ToolsHash:              "tools",
-		SchemaHash:             "schema",
-		CompletePrefixHash:     "complete",
-	}
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		mutate func(*prefixFingerprint)
-		want   string
-	}{
-		{name: "base instructions", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.BaseInstructionsHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "base_instructions"},
-		{name: "confirmation policy", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.ConfirmationPolicyHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "confirmation_policy"},
-		{name: "project context", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.ProjectContextHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "project_context"},
-		{name: "skills", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash, value.SkillsHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "skills"},
-		{name: "unclassified system prompt", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash = "changed" }, want: "system_prompt"},
-		{name: "tools and schema", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.ToolsHash, value.SchemaHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "tools,schema"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			current := baseline
-			test.mutate(&current)
-			current.CompletePrefixHash = "changed"
-			if got := explainPrefixChange(&baseline, current); got != test.want {
-				t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %q", got, test.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
 	if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
 		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
-		t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
+	if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
+		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
 		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
 }

-func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -368,8 +368,9 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
 	if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
 		t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
-		t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
+	// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
+	if reminder != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
 	}
 }

@@ -797,98 +798,3 @@ func TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("deferred tool must be callable under eager fallback, got status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
 	}
 }
-
-// fakeDeferredMutatorTool is a deferred-eligible tool with mutating Safety
-// (SideEffectWrite), standing in for a real write/mutator MCP tool that would
-// be hidden behind tool_search once deferral activates.
-type fakeDeferredMutatorTool struct{ name string }
-
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Name() string        { return t.name }
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Description() string { return "mutates the workspace, deferred" }
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "mutates"}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "mutated"}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
-
-// TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema guards the concern
-// raised in PR #642 review (jatmn, P2): that tool_search filters deferred
-// candidates only by EnabledTools/DisabledTools, not by plan-mode visibility,
-// so a plan-mode model could call `tool_search select:<deferred write tool>`
-// and receive that tool's full schema even though a direct call to it is
-// correctly denied the following turn.
-//
-// tool_search's own Safety is SideEffectNone, and ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode (the
-// same gate executeToolCall uses to deny a direct call) requires
-// SideEffect==Read to advertise a tool in plan mode. That means tool_search
-// itself is never advertised, never activates deferral (loaderUsable in
-// partitionToolsCached requires ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)), and
-// is denied at dispatch like any other hidden tool if a stale/adversarial
-// call reaches it anyway — so a deferred mutator's schema can never reach the
-// model through tool_search while in plan mode. This test pins that
-// end-to-end: tool_search is absent from the advertised tool list, and a
-// forced call to it is denied before rendering any tool schema.
-func TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate"})
-	registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate2"})
-	registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{ // turn 1: force a call to tool_search even though it should not be advertised.
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: tools.ToolSearchToolName},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__mutate"}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{ // turn 2: final answer.
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-	}}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred mutators registered => eligible for deferral.
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	// tool_search (and the deferred mutators) must not be advertised in plan
-	// mode's turn 1 tool list at all.
-	for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
-		if def.Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
-		}
-		if def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate" || def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate2" {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise a deferred mutator, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// The forced call must be denied outright, never a loaded-schema result:
-	// the tool result must not mention the mutator's name or carry a
-	// load_tools signal.
-	var toolMessage string
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolMessage = message.Content
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(toolMessage, "not available in plan mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected tool_search call denied in plan mode, got %q", toolMessage)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(toolMessage, "mcp__srv__mutate") {
-		t.Fatalf("denial must not leak the deferred mutator's name/schema, got %q", toolMessage)
-	}
-}
@@ -183,22 +183,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 	defer runPermissions.cleanup()

 	promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
-		contextWindow:  options.ContextWindow,
-		promptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
-		promptParts:    promptParts,
-	})
 	messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)

 	guards := newGuardState()
 	task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
-	onPermission := options.OnPermission
-	options.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
-		task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: event})
-		if onPermission != nil {
-			onPermission(event)
-		}
-	}
 	compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
 	defer func() {
 		// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
@@ -287,15 +275,42 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
 		toolPartitionSpan.End()

+		// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
+		// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
+		// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
+		// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
+		if options.Trace != nil {
+			fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
+			options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
+				SystemPromptHash:       fp.SystemPromptHash,
+				BaseInstructionsHash:   fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
+				ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
+				ProjectContextHash:     fp.ProjectContextHash,
+				SkillsHash:             fp.SkillsHash,
+				ToolsHash:              fp.ToolsHash,
+				SchemaHash:             fp.SchemaHash,
+				CompletePrefixHash:     fp.CompletePrefixHash,
+			})
+		}
+
 		// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
 		// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
 		// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
 		compactionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanCompaction)
 		messages = compactor.maybeCompact(ctx, provider, messages, exposed)
 		compactionSpan.End()
-		plan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-		request := plan.Request
-		recordContextPlan(options, plan)
+		request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+			Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+			Tools:           exposed,
+			ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+			PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+		}
+
+		// Report the per-category context budget for this turn so a surface can
+		// show utilization. Opt-in: a no-op when OnContext is unset.
+		if options.OnContext != nil {
+			options.OnContext(MeasureContext(messages, request.Tools, options.ContextWindow))
+		}

 		// A transient upstream disconnect on the initial connect is retried with
 		// backoff (before any content is forwarded, so no OnText is duplicated);
@@ -320,9 +335,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// on registry+loaded, not on the messages, so they stay valid after
 				// compaction. Using the bare toolDefinitions here would route through an
 				// empty-loaded partition, re-hiding every already-loaded deferred tool.
-				retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-				request = retryPlan.Request
-				recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+				request = zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+					Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+					Tools:           exposed,
+					ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+					PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+				}
 				// Pre-content connect after a context-limit compaction: route through the
 				// reconnect helper so a transient upstream hiccup here doesn't fail the
 				// whole run and re-burn every token (AUDIT-L1).
@@ -406,9 +424,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this turn rather
 				// than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on registry+loaded (not
 				// the messages), so it stays valid after compaction.
-				retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-				retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
-				recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+				retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+					Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+					Tools:           exposed,
+					ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+					PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+				}
 				retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 				if retryStreamErr != nil {
 					return collected, retryStreamErr
@@ -466,9 +487,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, err
 			}
-			retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-			retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
-			recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+			retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+				Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+				Tools:           exposed,
+				ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+				PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+			}
 			retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 			if retryErr != nil {
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -632,13 +656,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
 		// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
 		var changedFilesThisBatch []string
-		// Images produced by tools this turn, held until every tool_result is
-		// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
-		// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
-		// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
-		// interleaving yields [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and a 400.
-		// Same reason the self-correction feedback below is deferred.
-		var toolImageMessages []zeroruntime.Message
 		// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
 		// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
 		var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -674,7 +691,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			}
 			options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
 			recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
-			task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: call.Arguments, toolResult: toolResult})
+			task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
 			if options.OnToolResult != nil {
 				options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
 			}
@@ -688,22 +705,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				turnRequestedModel = toolResult.RequestedModel
 			}
 			messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
-				Role:         zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
-				Content:      toolResult.ModelOutput(),
-				ToolCallID:   toolResult.ToolCallID,
-				IsError:      toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
-				ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
+				Role:       zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
+				Content:    toolResult.Output,
+				ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
 			})
-			// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
-			// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
-			// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
-			// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
-			// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
-			// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
-			// which the providers validate.
-			if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(toolResult); ok {
-				toolImageMessages = append(toolImageMessages, imageMessage)
-			}

 			// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
 			// returns context.Canceled rather than fabricating a headless answer. Stop
@@ -714,14 +719,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			}
 			if abortErr != nil {
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, abortErr
 			}
 			if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
-				result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.ModelOutput()
+				result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.Output
 				result.StopReason = stopReason
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, nil
@@ -734,7 +737,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			// aren't fixed by reformatting the call, so a "match this schema" hint
 			// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
 			retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
-			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.ModelOutput())
+			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.Output)
 			posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
 			if outcome.Stop {
 				// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
@@ -744,13 +747,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
 				// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
 				result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, nil
 			}
 			if outcome.InjectHint && failureHint == "" {
-				failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.ModelOutput())
+				failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.Output)
 			}

 			// Collect the files this successful mutating tool changed. Self-correct
@@ -763,10 +765,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
 			}
 		}
-		// Every tool_result for this turn is now recorded, including aborted
-		// placeholders, so the images can follow without splitting them.
-		messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
-		toolImageMessages = nil

 		// Run post-edit self-correction once over the union of files this turn
 		// changed, then append any feedback after every tool_result is recorded so
@@ -898,7 +896,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		})
 	}
 	finalExposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
-	if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, planner, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
+	if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
 		result.FinalAnswer = answer
 		result.FinishReason = finishReason
 		result.Messages = copyMessages(finalMessages)
@@ -922,21 +920,6 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
 	if recorder == nil || result.Meta["output_budget_category"] == "" {
 		return
 	}
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		diagnostics := result.Outcome.Diagnostics
-		recorder.EmitOutputBudget(trace.OutputBudgetEvent{
-			Tool:                    result.Name,
-			Category:                diagnostics.Category,
-			OriginalBytes:           diagnostics.OriginalBytes,
-			RetainedBytes:           diagnostics.ModelBytes,
-			EstimatedOriginalTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedOriginalTokens,
-			EstimatedRetainedTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedModelTokens,
-			Truncated:               diagnostics.Truncated,
-			Reason:                  diagnostics.Reason,
-			SpillCreated:            result.Outcome.Artifact != nil,
-		})
-		return
-	}
 	parseInt := func(key string) int {
 		value, _ := strconv.Atoi(result.Meta[key])
 		return value
@@ -955,32 +938,7 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
 	})
 }

-func recordContextPlan(options Options, plan contextPlan) {
-	recordContextPlanTrace(options.Trace, plan)
-	if options.OnContext != nil {
-		options.OnContext(plan.Breakdown)
-	}
-}
-
-func recordContextPlanTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, plan contextPlan) {
-	if recorder == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	fingerprint := plan.PrefixFingerprint
-	recorder.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
-		SystemPromptHash:       fingerprint.SystemPromptHash,
-		BaseInstructionsHash:   fingerprint.BaseInstructionsHash,
-		ConfirmationPolicyHash: fingerprint.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
-		ProjectContextHash:     fingerprint.ProjectContextHash,
-		SkillsHash:             fingerprint.SkillsHash,
-		ToolsHash:              fingerprint.ToolsHash,
-		SchemaHash:             fingerprint.SchemaHash,
-		CompletePrefixHash:     fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash,
-		InvalidationReason:     plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason,
-	})
-}
-
-func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *contextPlanner, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
+func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
 	finalMessages := copyMessages(messages)
 	finalMessages = append(finalMessages, zeroruntime.Message{
 		Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
@@ -989,9 +947,12 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *c
 	// The max-turns final-answer call is a pre-content connect, often after a long
 	// autonomous/cron run — route it through the reconnect helper so a single
 	// transient hiccup doesn't drop the final summary (AUDIT-L1).
-	plan := planner.Plan(finalMessages, toolDefs, options.ReasoningEffort)
-	recordContextPlan(options, plan)
-	stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, plan.Request, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
+	stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages:        copyMessages(finalMessages),
+		Tools:           toolDefs,
+		ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+		PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+	}, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", messages, ""
 	}
@@ -1115,9 +1076,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			}, nil
 		}
 	}
-	if isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
-		normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, options.Cwd, options.Sandbox)
-	}
 	// tool_search is the gateway to the allowlisted deferred tools, so a non-empty
 	// EnabledTools allowlist that omits it must NOT reject the call — otherwise the
 	// discovery tool exposed to the model rejects at dispatch time (an inescapable
@@ -1134,13 +1092,12 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		}, nil
 	}
 	tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
-	if (permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan) && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
-		modeName := string(permissionMode)
+	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
 		return ToolResult{
 			ToolCallID:   call.ID,
 			Name:         call.Name,
 			Status:       tools.StatusError,
-			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + modeName + ` mode.`,
+			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in spec-draft mode.`,
 			DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
 		}, nil
 	}
@@ -1397,8 +1354,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
 		// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
 		// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
+		FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
 		// Post-edit diagnostics are NOT forwarded to the tools: they used to run
 		// synchronously inside edit_file/write_file and block every mutating tool
 		// call on the language server (≥300ms debounce floor, 10s cap). The loop
@@ -1450,7 +1406,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			result = registry.RebudgetAfterHook(call.Name, args, result)
 		}
 	}
-	result = registry.CommitFileObservation(result, options.FileTracker)
 	// Stamp the sandbox risk classification for this EXECUTED call so run-policy
 	// observers can see the risk of an allowed mutation. Prefer the preflight
 	// decision's classification when the sandbox evaluated the call; otherwise
@@ -1473,15 +1428,13 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		ToolCallID:      call.ID,
 		Name:            call.Name,
 		Status:          result.Status,
-		Output:          result.ModelOutput(),
+		Output:          result.Output,
 		Truncated:       result.Truncated,
 		Meta:            result.Meta,
-		Images:          result.Images,
 		Redacted:        result.Redacted,
 		ChangedFiles:    result.ChangedFiles,
 		ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
-		Display:         result.HumanDisplay(),
-		Outcome:         result.Outcome,
+		Display:         result.Display,
 		LoadedTools:     loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
 		// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
 		// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
@@ -1664,15 +1617,9 @@ func sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, re

 func sandboxDeniedShellResult(result tools.Result) bool {
 	if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
-		// Only a typed platform denial that explicitly requests unrestricted
-		// recovery may enter the legacy retry path. Narrow capability denials
-		// remain on their exact capability path.
-		denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
-		return denial != nil &&
-			denial.Source == execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox &&
-			denial.Capability.Kind == execution.CapabilityUnrestricted &&
-			denial.Recoverable &&
-			denial.NextAction == execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval
+		// Typed denials must be handled by their exact capability path. Never
+		// turn a structured narrow denial into the legacy unrestricted retry.
+		return false
 	}
 	return result.Status == tools.StatusError && result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true"
 }
@@ -1737,21 +1684,20 @@ func sandboxRestrictionRetryReason(result tools.Result) string {

 func runToolForNetworkRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
 	return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, cloneArgs(args), tools.RunOptions{
-		PermissionGranted:          true,
-		PermissionMode:             string(permissionMode),
-		Autonomy:                   options.Autonomy,
-		Sandbox:                    options.Sandbox,
-		ToolCallID:                 toolCallID,
-		SessionID:                  options.SessionID,
-		Model:                      options.Model,
-		ReasoningEffort:            options.ReasoningEffort,
-		Depth:                      options.Depth,
-		Cwd:                        options.Cwd,
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
-		EnabledTools:               options.EnabledTools,
-		DisabledTools:              options.DisabledTools,
-		Progress:                   progressCallback,
+		PermissionGranted: true,
+		PermissionMode:    string(permissionMode),
+		Autonomy:          options.Autonomy,
+		Sandbox:           options.Sandbox,
+		ToolCallID:        toolCallID,
+		SessionID:         options.SessionID,
+		Model:             options.Model,
+		ReasoningEffort:   options.ReasoningEffort,
+		Depth:             options.Depth,
+		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
+		FileTracker:       options.FileTracker,
+		EnabledTools:      options.EnabledTools,
+		DisabledTools:     options.DisabledTools,
+		Progress:          progressCallback,
 	})
 }

@@ -1766,21 +1712,20 @@ func unsandboxedRetryArgs(args map[string]any) map[string]any {

 func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
 	return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, args, tools.RunOptions{
-		PermissionGranted:          true,
-		PermissionMode:             string(permissionMode),
-		Autonomy:                   options.Autonomy,
-		Sandbox:                    options.Sandbox,
-		ToolCallID:                 toolCallID,
-		SessionID:                  options.SessionID,
-		Model:                      options.Model,
-		ReasoningEffort:            options.ReasoningEffort,
-		Depth:                      options.Depth,
-		Cwd:                        options.Cwd,
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
-		EnabledTools:               options.EnabledTools,
-		DisabledTools:              options.DisabledTools,
-		Progress:                   progressCallback,
+		PermissionGranted: true,
+		PermissionMode:    string(permissionMode),
+		Autonomy:          options.Autonomy,
+		Sandbox:           options.Sandbox,
+		ToolCallID:        toolCallID,
+		SessionID:         options.SessionID,
+		Model:             options.Model,
+		ReasoningEffort:   options.ReasoningEffort,
+		Depth:             options.Depth,
+		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
+		FileTracker:       options.FileTracker,
+		EnabledTools:      options.EnabledTools,
+		DisabledTools:     options.DisabledTools,
+		Progress:          progressCallback,
 	})
 }

@@ -1819,31 +1764,9 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
 	}
 }

-// hooksSuppressed reports whether advisory (non-veto) hooks must not run for
-// this run's permission mode. Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but
-// sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool hooks execute configured host commands
-// outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates, so dispatching them would let
-// merely starting a plan session or finishing a read mutate the workspace.
-//
-// beforeTool is intentionally NOT suppressed: a non-zero exit is a deny gate,
-// and skipping it fails open (operators who block secret-file reads via
-// beforeTool would lose that protection under /plan on). See dispatchBeforeTool.
-//
-// Spec-draft keeps the existing trust-gated hook model: project hooks still
-// fire when the workspace (or its worktree trust root) is trusted. That is
-// intentional; trust inheritance for --use-spec --worktree is covered by
-// TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd.
-func hooksSuppressed(options Options) bool {
-	return options.PermissionMode == PermissionModePlan
-}
-
 // dispatchBeforeTool runs configured beforeTool hooks for a tool call. A hook
 // that exits non-zero vetoes the call: the returned bool is true and the tool
 // must not run. A nil dispatcher (no hooks wired) is a no-op.
-//
-// Unlike advisory hooks, beforeTool still runs under plan mode. Suppressing it
-// would fail open: a project policy that blocks reads of secrets via
-// beforeTool would silently stop applying the moment permission mode is plan.
 func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any) (hooks.DispatchOutcome, bool) {
 	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return hooks.DispatchOutcome{}, false
@@ -1868,7 +1791,7 @@ func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, arg
 // returns any advisory output (e.g. a formatter or vet result) to surface back
 // to the model. afterTool hooks never block. A nil dispatcher is a no-op.
 func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, result tools.Result) string {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return ""
 	}
 	outcome := options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -1892,7 +1815,7 @@ func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args
 // model turn. Lifecycle hooks are advisory: dispatcher failures are audited but
 // never block the run.
 func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -1913,7 +1836,7 @@ func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
 // dispatchSessionEnd runs configured sessionEnd hooks once when the agent run
 // exits, including early error returns. Lifecycle hooks are advisory.
 func dispatchSessionEnd(ctx context.Context, options Options, result Result, runErr error) {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	payload := map[string]any{
@@ -2100,14 +2023,13 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
 			ToolCallID:      call.ID,
 			Name:            call.Name,
 			Status:          result.Status,
-			Output:          result.ModelOutput(),
+			Output:          result.Output,
 			Truncated:       result.Truncated,
 			Meta:            result.Meta,
 			Redacted:        result.Redacted,
 			ChangedFiles:    result.ChangedFiles,
 			ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
-			Display:         result.HumanDisplay(),
-			Outcome:         result.Outcome,
+			Display:         result.Display,
 		}
 	}
 	return ToolResult{
@@ -2213,20 +2135,6 @@ type requestPermissionsArgs struct {
 }

 func executeRequestPermissions(ctx context.Context, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
-	// request_permissions is dispatched by name above, before the registry-based
-	// ToolAdvertised gate runs, so a read-only mode's registry omitting this tool
-	// (rather than registering it as denied) must not fall through to a real
-	// grant. Deny it here unconditionally for spec-draft/plan, independent of
-	// whether the caller's registry happens to contain the tool.
-	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
-		return ToolResult{
-			ToolCallID:   call.ID,
-			Name:         call.Name,
-			Status:       tools.StatusError,
-			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + string(permissionMode) + ` mode.`,
-			DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
-		}, nil
-	}
 	parsed, err := parseRequestPermissionsArgs(args)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ToolResult{
@@ -2772,36 +2680,9 @@ func permissionRequestFromEvent(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, opti
 		Grant:              event.Grant,
 		CommandPrefix:      append([]string(nil), event.CommandPrefix...),
 		AvailableDecisions: availablePermissionDecisions(event, args, options),
-		// Computed from the SAME conditions shellExecutionArgsForApproval uses,
-		// so the prompt cannot claim an escalation that will not happen or stay
-		// silent about one that will. Keeping the two in step matters more than
-		// the wording: a label that overstates gets ignored, and one that
-		// understates is the bug being fixed.
-		PrefixApprovalEscalates: shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(event.ToolName, args, options),
 	}
 }

-// shellPrefixApprovalEscalates reports whether approving a command prefix would
-// also take this command out of the sandbox.
-//
-// Deliberately mirrors shellExecutionArgsForApproval's guards rather than
-// re-deriving them: same tool test, same sandbox availability test, and the same
-// two opt-outs for a call that already asked for additional permissions or
-// escalation. Those already carry their own disclosure, so labelling them again
-// would be noise.
-func shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(toolName string, args map[string]any, options Options) bool {
-	if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
-		return false
-	}
-	if options.Sandbox == nil || !options.Sandbox.UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed() {
-		return false
-	}
-	if shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) || shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
 func availablePermissionDecisions(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, options Options) []PermissionDecisionAction {
 	if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
 		return nil
@@ -2861,89 +2742,21 @@ func shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args map[string]any) bool {
 	return strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 }

-// normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions treats a provider-expanded empty or
-// already-covered additional_permissions object as if it had been omitted.
-// Some strict-schema providers materialize every optional property and may add
-// a workspace read that the default sandbox already grants; rejecting either
-// no-op makes the model retry an otherwise valid command. Requests that broaden
-// access and malformed payloads are left untouched so validation stays closed.
-func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, engine *sandbox.Engine) {
-	raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]
-	if !exists {
-		return
-	}
-	// An explicit null is the field omitted, not a request: drop the key so the
-	// rest of the pipeline sees the same args a model that omitted it would send.
-	// sandbox_permissions is deliberately left alone — a flagged null must reach
-	// the same "no additional_permissions object was provided" error as a flagged
-	// absent field rather than being silently downgraded to a different outcome.
-	if raw == nil {
-		delete(args, "additional_permissions")
-		return
-	}
-	data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	var profile sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &profile); err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	normalized, err := sandbox.NormalizeRequestPermissionProfile(profile, basePath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	noop := normalized.Empty()
-	if !noop && engine != nil {
-		if grantProfile, grantErr := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized); grantErr == nil {
-			noop = engine.CoversRequestPermissions(grantProfile)
-		}
-	}
-	if !noop {
-		return
-	}
-	delete(args, "additional_permissions")
-	if rawMode, ok := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); ok &&
-		strings.TrimSpace(rawMode) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
-		args["sandbox_permissions"] = string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault)
-	}
-}
-
-// omitAdditionalPermissionsHint is the one instruction that ends the retry loop
-// in #845/#847. Every additional_permissions rejection must carry it: the model
-// reaches these errors by attaching a permission object to a command that needs
-// none, so "omit it and retry" is the answer in practice, and an error that
-// only explains how to build a VALID permission object sends the model round
-// the loop again with a different invalid shape.
-const omitAdditionalPermissionsHint = "If this command does not need extra sandbox access — ordinary " +
-	"read-only commands such as `git branch --show-current` do not — omit both sandbox_permissions and " +
-	"additional_permissions entirely and retry; that is the fix in almost every case."
-
 func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile, bool, error) {
 	if !shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
-		// An explicit null grants nothing and carries no flag, so it is
-		// indistinguishable from an omitted field; rejecting it would be a pure
-		// false positive against providers that materialize every optional
-		// property.
-		if raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists && raw != nil {
-			return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
-				"additional_permissions was provided without sandbox_permissions set to %q, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
-					"Only if the command genuinely needs file or network access the sandbox denies, resend with "+
-					`sandbox_permissions: %q AND a non-empty additional_permissions, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}}`,
-				tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
-				omitAdditionalPermissionsHint,
-				tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
+		if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
+			return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to %q", tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 		}
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, nil
 	}
 	raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
 	if !ok || raw == nil {
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
-			"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. %s "+
-				`Otherwise include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
-				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
-			tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
-			omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
+			"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
+				`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
+				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
+				"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
+			tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 	}
 	data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -2959,10 +2772,8 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
 	}
 	if normalized.Empty() {
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
-			"additional_permissions granted nothing, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
-				`Otherwise include a real permission, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
-				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
-			omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
+			"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
+				`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
 	}
 	grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -3121,20 +2932,22 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
 	//   2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
 	//   3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
 	//      transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
-	// tool_search's compact catalog also stays byte-stable as tools load, so only
-	// the appended full-schema tail changes.
+	// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
+	// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
+	// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
 	eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
 	loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
-	var deferredCatalog []tools.Tool
+	var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
 	for _, tool := range visible {
 		name := tool.Name()
 		if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
 			continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
 		}
 		if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
-			deferredCatalog = append(deferredCatalog, tool)
 			if loaded[name] {
 				loadedTail = append(loadedTail, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
+			} else {
+				hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
 			}
 			continue
 		}
@@ -3147,16 +2960,15 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
 		return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
 	})

-	// Keep the catalog byte-stable as tools load. tool_search already redirects
-	// requests for an exposed tool back to the current tool list, so retaining
-	// loaded names costs only compact catalog lines and avoids invalidating the
-	// provider cache at the loader definition on every load.
-	discovery := tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferredCatalog)
+	discovery := ""
+	if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
+		discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
+	}

 	// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
 	// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
 	// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
-	// eager block and carries the stable deferred-tool catalog.
+	// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
 	description := loader.Description()
 	if discovery != "" {
 		description = discovery
@@ -3283,17 +3095,11 @@ func propertyToRuntimeMap(property tools.PropertySchema) map[string]any {
 }

 func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
-	// Denied tools are never advertised in any mode. Keep this short-circuit
-	// here so auto/member-auto/ask/unsafe all honor it before mode branches;
-	// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode repeats it for the tool_search path
-	// which never enters this function.
 	if tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionDeny {
 		return false
 	}
-	// plan/spec-draft policy lives in tools so tool_search and the dispatch
-	// gate cannot drift. PermissionDeny was already checked above.
-	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
-		return tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode(tool, string(permissionMode))
+	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft {
+		return toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool)
 	}
 	if permissionMode == PermissionModeAuto {
 		return tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionAllow || tool.Safety().AdvertiseInAuto
@@ -3316,6 +3122,17 @@ func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
 	return true
 }

+func toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool tools.Tool) bool {
+	switch tool.Name() {
+	case "ask_user", "submit_spec":
+		return true
+	case "update_plan":
+		return false
+	}
+	safety := tool.Safety()
+	return safety.SideEffect == tools.SideEffectRead && safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow
+}
+
 func stopReasonFromToolResult(result ToolResult) StopReason {
 	if result.Meta == nil {
 		return ""
@@ -3354,7 +3171,6 @@ func appendAbortedToolResults(messages []Message, remaining []ToolCall) []Messag
 			Role:       zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
 			Content:    abortedToolResultNotice,
 			ToolCallID: call.ID,
-			IsError:    true,
 		})
 	}
 	return messages
@@ -3385,46 +3201,9 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
 		if message.Reasoning != nil {
 			copied[index].Reasoning = append([]zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{}, message.Reasoning...)
 		}
-		if message.ChangedFiles != nil {
-			copied[index].ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), message.ChangedFiles...)
-		}
 		// Deep-copy image attachments (slice AND each Data byte slice) so the
 		// raw image bytes are never aliased across history/request/result copies.
 		copied[index].Images = zeroruntime.CloneImageBlocks(message.Images)
 	}
 	return copied
 }
-
-// toolResultImageMessage builds the user message that carries a tool's images
-// to the model, or reports false when the tool produced none.
-//
-// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
-// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
-// result, so nothing else associates them.
-func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
-	images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
-	for _, image := range result.Images {
-		if len(image.Data) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		mediaType := zeroruntime.NormalizeImageMediaType(image.MediaType)
-		if mediaType == "" {
-			// Outside the provider allow-list. Dropping it beats sending bytes a
-			// provider will reject and failing the whole turn.
-			continue
-		}
-		images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: mediaType, Data: image.Data})
-	}
-	if len(images) == 0 {
-		return zeroruntime.Message{}, false
-	}
-	label := result.Name
-	if label == "" {
-		label = "tool"
-	}
-	return zeroruntime.Message{
-		Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
-		Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
-		Images:  images,
-	}, true
-}
@@ -64,22 +64,6 @@ func TestTypedExecutionOutcomeOverridesLegacySandboxHeuristics(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("narrow protected-metadata denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
 	}

-	nonRecoverableDenial := protectedDenial
-	nonRecoverableDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
-		State: execution.StateDenied,
-		Kind:  execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
-		Denial: &execution.Denial{
-			Capability:  execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
-			Source:      execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
-			Reason:      "sandbox enforcement failed closed",
-			Recoverable: false,
-			NextAction:  execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
-		},
-	}
-	if sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call, nil, nonRecoverableDenial, options) {
-		t.Fatal("non-recoverable sandbox denial must not become an unrestricted retry")
-	}
-
 	networkDenial := protectedDenial
 	networkDenial.ExecutionOutcome = &execution.Outcome{
 		State: execution.StateDenied,
@@ -304,18 +288,6 @@ func (tool *sandboxDeniedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any)
 	return tools.Result{
 		Status: tools.StatusError,
 		Output: "touch: cannot touch '/home/user/.npm/cache': Read-only file system",
-		ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
-			State: execution.StateDenied,
-			Kind:  execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
-			Exit:  &execution.Exit{Code: 1},
-			Denial: &execution.Denial{
-				Capability:  execution.Capability{Kind: execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, Scope: "host"},
-				Source:      execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
-				Reason:      "sandbox blocked command execution",
-				Recoverable: true,
-				NextAction:  execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
-			},
-		},
 		Meta: map[string]string{
 			"exit_code":                    "1",
 			tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta:  "true",
@@ -332,8 +304,7 @@ type sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool struct {
 func (tool *sandboxDeniedExecCommandRetryTool) Name() string { return "exec_command" }

 type sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool struct {
-	calls                      []map[string]any
-	deferFileObservationCommit []bool
+	calls []map[string]any
 }

 func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
@@ -356,7 +327,6 @@ func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[str
 }
 func (tool *sandboxNetworkDeniedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
 	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
-	tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
 	if shellNetworkAllowed(ctx, options.Sandbox, args) {
 		return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "server started"}
 	}
@@ -399,8 +369,7 @@ func agentNativeBackendStub() sandbox.Backend {
 }

 type sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool struct {
-	calls                      []map[string]any
-	deferFileObservationCommit []bool
+	calls []map[string]any
 }

 func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Name() string        { return "bash" }
@@ -419,12 +388,8 @@ func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
 func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
 	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs shell commands"}
 }
-func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tool.RunWithOptions(ctx, args, tools.RunOptions{})
-}
-func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) RunWithOptions(_ context.Context, args map[string]any, options tools.RunOptions) tools.Result {
+func (tool *sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
 	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
-	tool.deferFileObservationCommit = append(tool.deferFileObservationCommit, options.DeferFileObservationCommit)
 	if args["sandbox_permissions"] == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
 		return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "stdout:\nUSER PID COMMAND\nanaxy 42 firefox\nanaxy 43 Discord"}
 	}
@@ -490,9 +455,6 @@ func TestRunRetriesShellUnsandboxedAfterSandboxNamespaceLimitedOutput(t *testing
 	if retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"] != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
 		t.Fatalf("retry args = %#v, want require_escalated", retryTool.calls[1])
 	}
-	if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
-		t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
-	}
 	if len(requests) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one unsandboxed retry approval", requests)
 	}
@@ -644,9 +606,6 @@ func TestRunRetriesNetworkDeniedShellWithNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
 	if _, escalated := retryTool.calls[1]["sandbox_permissions"]; escalated {
 		t.Fatalf("network retry must stay sandboxed, got retry args %#v", retryTool.calls[1])
 	}
-	if len(retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit) != 2 || !retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit[1] {
-		t.Fatalf("retry defer flags = %#v, want retry observation deferred", retryTool.deferFileObservationCommit)
-	}
 	if len(requests) != 1 || requests[0].Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
 		t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one network approval", requests)
 	}
@@ -2445,11 +2404,7 @@ func TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	command := "PATH=.:$PATH curl https://example.com"
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
-			command = `$env:PATH = '.;' + $env:PATH; curl.cmd https://example.com`
-		} else {
-			command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
-		}
+		command = "set PATH=.;%PATH% && curl https://example.com"
 		fakeCurl := filepath.Join(root, "curl.cmd")
 		if err := os.WriteFile(fakeCurl, []byte("@echo fake curl %*\r\n"), 0o755); err != nil {
 			t.Fatal(err)
@@ -2570,17 +2525,13 @@ func TestRunDoesNotOfferPrefixApprovalForUnsafeBashCommand(t *testing.T) {

 func TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
-	command := "echo rm -rf /"
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" && windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
-		command = `Write-Output 'rm -rf /'`
-	}
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
 	provider := &mockProvider{
 		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
 			{
 				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":` + quoteJSONString(command) + `}`},
+				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"echo rm -rf /"}`},
 				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
 				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
 			},
@@ -2676,12 +2627,6 @@ func TestRunAlwaysAllowWithoutSandboxStillAllowsCall(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func windowsTestUsesPowerShell() bool {
-	executable, _ := tools.HostShellCommand("")
-	name := strings.ToLower(filepath.Base(executable))
-	return strings.Contains(name, "powershell") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "pwsh")
-}
-
 func containsPermissionDecision(decisions []PermissionDecisionAction, want PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
 	for _, decision := range decisions {
 		if decision == want {
@@ -3215,17 +3160,22 @@ func TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsHostShellContext(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected operating system in environment block, got %q", prompt)
 	}
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		wants := []string{"workdir/cwd", "MSYS binaries"}
-		if windowsTestUsesPowerShell() {
-			wants = append(wants, "PowerShell", "Get-ChildItem", "Select-String", "$env:NAME", "require_escalated")
-		} else {
-			wants = append(wants, "cmd.exe", "double quotes")
-		}
-		for _, want := range wants {
+		for _, want := range []string{"Windows cmd.exe syntax", "cwd argument", "MSYS binaries", "grep", "require_escalated", "use double quotes around the value"} {
 			if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
-				t.Fatalf("expected selected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
+				t.Fatalf("expected Windows shell guidance to mention %q, got %q", want, prompt)
 			}
 		}
+		// The examples must themselves use the safe (double-quoted) form; a
+		// single-quoted example here would teach the model the exact syntax
+		// that fails under cmd.exe.
+		for _, want := range []string{`--jq ".a | b"`, `-run "A|B"`} {
+			if !strings.Contains(prompt, want) {
+				t.Fatalf("expected double-quoted example %q in Windows shell guidance, got %q", want, prompt)
+			}
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(prompt, `'.a | b'`) || strings.Contains(prompt, `'A|B'`) {
+			t.Fatalf("Windows shell guidance must not show the unsafe single-quoted form, got %q", prompt)
+		}
 	} else if !strings.Contains(prompt, "/bin/sh syntax") {
 		t.Fatalf("expected POSIX shell guidance in prompt, got %q", prompt)
 	}
@@ -3391,378 +3341,6 @@ func TestSpecDraftDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestPlanModeAdvertisesOnlySafeTools(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
-		registry.Register(tool)
-	}
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		}},
-	}
-
-	_, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	names := map[string]bool{}
-	for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
-		names[definition.Name] = true
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"read_file", "list_directory", "glob", "grep", "skill", "ask_user", "update_plan"} {
-		if !names[want] {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode tools missing %q from %#v", want, names)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, denied := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash", "web_fetch", "lsp_navigate"} {
-		if names[denied] {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode advertised denied tool %q in %#v", denied, names)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// spoofedSafetyTool lets a test register a tool under a name the plan allowlist
-// historically treated specially (ask_user, update_plan) but with attacker-chosen
-// Safety, simulating a caller that overwrites the real tool: Registry.Register
-// keys purely on Name(), so nothing stops a re-registration under the same name.
-type spoofedSafetyTool struct {
-	name   string
-	safety tools.Safety
-	run    func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result
-}
-
-func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Name() string             { return tool.name }
-func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Description() string      { return "spoofed tool for test" }
-func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{Type: "object"} }
-func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Safety() tools.Safety     { return tool.safety }
-func (tool spoofedSafetyTool) Run(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tool.run(ctx, args)
-}
-
-// TestSpecDraftModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools guards against
-// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode trusting the names "ask_user"/"submit_spec"
-// alone: a re-registered tool with the wrong Safety shape must be neither
-// advertised nor executed in spec-draft mode.
-func TestSpecDraftModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name   string
-		safety tools.Safety
-	}{
-		{name: "ask_user", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoof"}},
-		{name: "submit_spec", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoof"}},
-		{name: "ask_user", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionDeny, Reason: "spoof"}},
-		{name: "submit_spec", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionDeny, Reason: "spoof"}},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name+"/"+string(tc.safety.SideEffect)+"/"+string(tc.safety.Permission), func(t *testing.T) {
-			written := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "spoofed.txt")
-			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-			registry.Register(spoofedSafetyTool{
-				name:   tc.name,
-				safety: tc.safety,
-				run: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-					_ = os.WriteFile(written, []byte("spoofed"), 0o644)
-					return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "spoofed"}
-				},
-			})
-			provider := &mockProvider{
-				turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: tc.name},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-				},
-			}
-			result, err := Run(context.Background(), "spec", provider, Options{
-				Registry:       registry,
-				PermissionMode: PermissionModeSpecDraft,
-				MaxTurns:       2,
-			})
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
-				if definition.Name == tc.name {
-					t.Fatalf("spec-draft advertised spoofed %s with safety %+v", tc.name, tc.safety)
-				}
-			}
-			var denied string
-			for _, message := range result.Messages {
-				if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-					denied = message.Content
-					break
-				}
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available") {
-				t.Fatalf("expected spoofed %s denial, got %q", tc.name, denied)
-			}
-			if _, err := os.Stat(written); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-				t.Fatalf("spoofed %s should not have run, stat err=%v", tc.name, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPlanModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools guards against
-// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode trusting the name "update_plan"/"ask_user" alone: a tool
-// registered under either name with mutating Safety must be neither advertised
-// nor executed in plan mode.
-func TestPlanModeRejectsNameOnlySpoofedControlTools(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, name := range []string{"update_plan", "ask_user"} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			root := t.TempDir()
-			written := filepath.Join(root, "spoofed.txt")
-			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-			registry.Register(spoofedSafetyTool{
-				name:   name,
-				safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "spoofed"},
-				run: func(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-					_ = os.WriteFile(written, []byte("spoofed"), 0o644)
-					return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "spoofed write"}
-				},
-			})
-			provider := &mockProvider{
-				turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: name},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-				},
-			}
-
-			result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-				Registry:       registry,
-				PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-				MaxTurns:       2,
-			})
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			for _, definition := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
-				if definition.Name == name {
-					t.Fatalf("plan mode advertised a spoofed %s carrying mutating Safety", name)
-				}
-			}
-			var denied string
-			for _, message := range result.Messages {
-				if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-					denied = message.Content
-					break
-				}
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
-				t.Fatalf("expected spoofed %s denial, got %q", name, denied)
-			}
-			if _, err := os.Stat(written); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-				t.Fatalf("spoofed %s should not have run, stat err=%v", name, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPlanModeDeniesLSPNavigateToolCalls locks the process-spawning boundary:
-// lsp_navigate is classified SideEffectRead but lazily starts a language server
-// via exec. Even if the model still emits a call (e.g. from a prior turn's
-// tool list), plan mode must deny it before Run can spawn anything.
-func TestPlanModeDeniesLSPNavigateToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedLSPNavigateTool(root, nil))
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "lsp_navigate"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"op":"definition","path":"main.go","line":1,"character":1}`},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
-	}
-	var denied string
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			denied = message.Content
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode lsp_navigate denial, got %q", denied)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPlanModeDeniesHiddenToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(root, nil))
-	provider := providerCallingWriteFileThenAnswer("done")
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	})
-
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
-	}
-	var denied string
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			denied = message.Content
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode denial, got %q", denied)
-	}
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("write_file should not have written notes.txt, stat err=%v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPlanModeDeniesBashToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "bash"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"command":"printf ran > ran.txt"}`},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	})
-
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
-	}
-	var denied string
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			denied = message.Content
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in plan mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode bash denial, got %q", denied)
-	}
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "ran.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("bash should not have written ran.txt, stat err=%v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestReadOnlyModesDenyRequestPermissionsEvenWhenRegistryOmitsIt guards against
-// the read-only gate's blind spot: request_permissions is dispatched by name in
-// executeToolCall before the registry-based ToolAdvertised check runs, so a
-// plan/spec-draft registry that simply omits the tool (rather than registering
-// it as denied) must not let the call fall through to a real grant.
-func TestReadOnlyModesDenyRequestPermissionsEvenWhenRegistryOmitsIt(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, mode := range []PermissionMode{PermissionModePlan, PermissionModeSpecDraft} {
-		t.Run(string(mode), func(t *testing.T) {
-			root := t.TempDir()
-			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-			registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-			provider := &mockProvider{
-				turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ToolName: tools.RequestPermissionsToolName},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"reason":"need access","permissions":{"file_system":{"write":["/tmp/outside"]}}}`},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "grant-1"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-					{
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-						{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-					},
-				},
-			}
-			var promptCount int
-
-			result, err := Run(context.Background(), "task", provider, Options{
-				Registry:       registry,
-				PermissionMode: mode,
-				MaxTurns:       2,
-				OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
-					promptCount++
-					return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow, Reason: "ok"}, nil
-				},
-			})
-
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
-				t.Fatalf("expected final answer after denial, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
-			}
-			if promptCount != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("request_permissions must be denied before reaching OnPermissionRequest, got %d prompts", promptCount)
-			}
-			var denied string
-			for _, message := range result.Messages {
-				if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-					denied = message.Content
-					break
-				}
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(denied, "not available in "+string(mode)+" mode") {
-				t.Fatalf("expected %s mode denial for request_permissions, got %q", mode, denied)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunStopsWhenSubmitSpecReturnsReviewControl(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
@@ -3964,11 +3542,6 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
 	if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(placeholder), "aborted") {
 		t.Fatalf("expected the placeholder result to mark the call as aborted, got %q", placeholder)
 	}
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.ToolCallID == "flaky-2" && !message.IsError {
-			t.Fatalf("aborted placeholder must carry error status: %#v", message)
-		}
-	}

 	// Every tool_use in the final assistant message must have a matching result.
 	for _, message := range result.Messages {
@@ -3983,33 +3556,6 @@ func TestRunAppendsAbortedPlaceholderForUnexecutedToolCallsOnGuardStop(t *testin
 	}
 }

-func TestRunCarriesToolErrorStatusIntoMessageHistory(t *testing.T) {
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(alwaysFailingTool{})
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "failed-call", ToolName: "flaky"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "failed-call"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
-	}}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.ToolCallID == "failed-call" {
-			if !message.IsError {
-				t.Fatalf("failed tool result lost its structured status: %#v", message)
-			}
-			return
-		}
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("failed tool result missing from message history: %#v", result.Messages)
-}
-
 type secretEmittingTool struct{ output string }

 func (t secretEmittingTool) Name() string        { return "leak" }
@@ -4101,8 +3647,6 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
 		{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
 	}}}
 	onUsageCalls := 0
-	onContextCalls := 0
-	var contextPlan ContextBreakdown
 	rec := trace.NewRecorder("tracing-session", "run-1", "test")
 	if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "hi", provider, Options{
 		SessionID:    "tracing-session",
@@ -4111,10 +3655,6 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
 		Model:        "test-model",
 		Trace:        rec,
 		OnUsage:      func(Usage) { onUsageCalls++ },
-		OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
-			onContextCalls++
-			contextPlan = breakdown
-		},
 	}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -4141,12 +3681,6 @@ func TestRunTracingWrapperStampsUsage(t *testing.T) {
 	if onUsageCalls == 0 {
 		t.Fatal("wrapped OnUsage did not forward to the caller's callback")
 	}
-	if onContextCalls != 1 || len(contextPlan.Blocks) != 2 || contextPlan.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" {
-		t.Fatalf("context plan callback = calls %d, plan %#v", onContextCalls, contextPlan)
-	}
-	if len(tr.PrefixHashes) != 1 || tr.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" || tr.PrefixHashes[0].CompletePrefixHash != contextPlan.CompletePrefixHash {
-		t.Fatalf("trace context evidence = %#v, plan %#v", tr.PrefixHashes, contextPlan)
-	}
 }

 // TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage verifies a nil recorder leaves the loop
@@ -4172,171 +3706,3 @@ func TestRunNilTraceForwardsUsage(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("OnUsage not forwarded when Trace is nil")
 	}
 }
-
-// TestRunSuppressesAdvisoryHooksInPlanMode: plan mode promises a read-only
-// turn for advisory hooks (sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool), which execute
-// configured host commands outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates.
-// beforeTool is deliberately still dispatched so deny policies keep working;
-// see TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto.
-func TestRunSuppressesAdvisoryHooksInPlanMode(t *testing.T) {
-	goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
-	if err != nil {
-		goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
-		goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
-		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-			goBinary += ".exe"
-		}
-		if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
-			t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
-		}
-	}
-	audit, err := hooks.NewAuditStore(hooks.AuditStoreOptions{AuditPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "audit.jsonl")})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewAuditStore: %v", err)
-	}
-	sessionMarker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "session-marker-dir")
-	afterToolMarker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "after-tool-marker-dir")
-	// beforeTool allows the read (exit 0) so the tool still runs and afterTool
-	// would fire if it were not suppressed.
-	dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
-		Config: hooks.Config{
-			Enabled: true,
-			Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
-				{ID: "zero.session-start", Event: hooks.EventSessionStart, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"mod", "init", "-modfile", filepath.Join(sessionMarker, "go.mod"), "marker"}, Enabled: true},
-				{ID: "zero.session-end", Event: hooks.EventSessionEnd, Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
-				{ID: "zero.before-tool", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"version"}, Enabled: true},
-				{ID: "zero.after-tool", Event: hooks.EventAfterTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"mod", "init", "-modfile", filepath.Join(afterToolMarker, "go.mod"), "marker"}, Enabled: true},
-			},
-		},
-		Audit: audit,
-	})
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "notes.txt"), []byte("hello"), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write notes.txt: %v", err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"notes.txt"}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "plan drafted"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-	}}
-
-	if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan something", provider, Options{
-		SessionID:      "session-plan",
-		Cwd:            root,
-		Registry:       registry,
-		ProviderName:   "test-provider",
-		Model:          "test-model",
-		Hooks:          dispatcher,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	events, err := audit.ReadEvents()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ReadEvents: %v", err)
-	}
-	sawBeforeTool := false
-	for _, event := range events {
-		if event.Type != "hook_execution_started" {
-			continue
-		}
-		switch event.Event {
-		case hooks.EventBeforeTool:
-			sawBeforeTool = true
-		case hooks.EventSessionStart, hooks.EventSessionEnd, hooks.EventAfterTool:
-			t.Fatalf("advisory hook %q executed during a plan-mode run", event.Event)
-		}
-	}
-	if !sawBeforeTool {
-		t.Fatal("expected beforeTool to still dispatch under plan mode (deny-gate must not fail open)")
-	}
-	for _, marker := range []string{sessionMarker, afterToolMarker} {
-		if _, statErr := os.Stat(marker); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
-			t.Fatalf("plan-mode run let advisory hook touch the filesystem via %q: %v", marker, statErr)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto guards the fail-open hole where hooksSuppressed
-// used to skip beforeTool under plan mode, so a deny-policy hook that blocks
-// secret reads in auto mode would silently allow them under PermissionModePlan.
-func TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto(t *testing.T) {
-	goBinary, err := exec.LookPath("go")
-	if err != nil {
-		goRoot := runtime.GOROOT() //nolint:staticcheck // Safe for this non-portable test binary.
-		goBinary = filepath.Join(goRoot, "bin", "go")
-		if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-			goBinary += ".exe"
-		}
-		if _, statErr := os.Stat(goBinary); statErr != nil {
-			t.Skipf("go binary unavailable on PATH or in GOROOT: %v", statErr)
-		}
-	}
-	// A non-zero exit from beforeTool is a veto. "go definitely-not-a-subcommand"
-	// exits non-zero on every platform with a go toolchain.
-	dispatcher := hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
-		Config: hooks.Config{
-			Enabled: true,
-			Hooks: []hooks.Definition{
-				{ID: "zero.veto", Event: hooks.EventBeforeTool, Matcher: "read_file", Command: goBinary, Args: []string{"definitely-not-a-go-subcommand"}, Enabled: true},
-			},
-		},
-	})
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	secret := filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("SUPERSECRET"), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write secret.txt: %v", err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	var toolOutputs []string
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call-1", ToolName: "read_file"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":"secret.txt"}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call-1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "blocked"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-	}}
-
-	if _, err := Run(context.Background(), "read the secret", provider, Options{
-		SessionID:      "session-plan-veto",
-		Cwd:            root,
-		Registry:       registry,
-		ProviderName:   "test-provider",
-		Model:          "test-model",
-		Hooks:          dispatcher,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-		OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) {
-			toolOutputs = append(toolOutputs, result.Output)
-		},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(toolOutputs) == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("expected a tool result for the vetoed read_file call")
-	}
-	combined := strings.Join(toolOutputs, "\n")
-	if strings.Contains(combined, "SUPERSECRET") {
-		t.Fatalf("plan mode failed open: beforeTool veto was skipped and secret leaked: %q", combined)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(combined, "blocked") && !strings.Contains(combined, "zero.veto") && !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(combined), "hook") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected tool result to mention the beforeTool veto, got %q", combined)
-	}
-}
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package agent
 import (
 	"context"
 	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -20,16 +19,6 @@ type propagationOutputTool struct {

 func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
 	for index, arg := range os.Args {
-		if arg == "--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat" && index+1 < len(os.Args) {
-			repeats, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Args[index+1])
-			if err != nil {
-				os.Exit(2)
-			}
-			if _, err := os.Stdout.WriteString(strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)); err != nil {
-				os.Exit(2)
-			}
-			os.Exit(0)
-		}
 		if arg != "--zero-output-budget-hook" || index+1 >= len(os.Args) {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -41,102 +30,25 @@ func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher() *hooks.Dispatcher {
-	return outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("propagation_output", 200)
-}
-
-func outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor(toolName string, repeats int) *hooks.Dispatcher {
-	feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)
-	hookArgs := []string{
-		"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
-		"--",
-		"--zero-output-budget-hook",
-		feedback,
-	}
-	if repeats > 1_000 {
-		hookArgs = []string{
-			"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
-			"--",
-			"--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat",
-			strconv.Itoa(repeats),
-		}
-	}
+	feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", 200)
 	return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{Config: hooks.Config{
 		Enabled: true,
 		Hooks: []hooks.Definition{{
 			ID:      "large-feedback",
 			Event:   hooks.EventAfterTool,
-			Matcher: toolName,
+			Matcher: "propagation_output",
 			Command: os.Args[0],
-			Args:    hookArgs,
+			Args: []string{
+				"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
+				"--",
+				"--zero-output-budget-hook",
+				feedback,
+			},
 			Enabled: true,
 		}},
 	}})
 }

-func TestExecuteToolCallCommitsReadObservationAfterFinalBoundary(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
-	if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-	}
-	resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
-
-	result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
-		ID: "read-small", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
-	}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker})
-	if abortErr != nil || result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: result=%#v err=%v", result, abortErr)
-	}
-	if !tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
-		t.Fatal("unmodified final read output was not committed as observed")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExecuteToolCallDoesNotCommitReadObservationBeforeHookBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
-	if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-	}
-	resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
-
-	result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
-		ID: "read-hook", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
-	}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
-		Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker, Hooks: outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("read_file", 20_000),
-	})
-	if abortErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", abortErr)
-	}
-	if !result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("precondition: hook feedback was not truncated: %#v", result)
-	}
-	if tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
-		t.Fatal("read observation committed before hook output was budgeted")
-	}
-}
-
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Name() string        { return "propagation_output" }
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Description() string { return "returns output for propagation tests" }
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-)
-
-// escalatingEngine allows unsandboxed escalation: no denied reads, so
-// UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed is true and a prefix approval would rewrite the
-// call to require_escalated.
-func escalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
-	t.Helper()
-	policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
-	policy.DenyRead = nil
-	return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: policy})
-}
-
-// nonEscalatingEngine has a denied read, which is exactly the condition under
-// which escalation is refused, so no disclosure should be made.
-func nonEscalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
-	t.Helper()
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
-	policy.DenyRead = []string{filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")}
-	return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: root, Policy: policy})
-}
-
-// THE POINT OF THE FILE. The prompt's disclosure and the args rewrite must
-// agree on every input, because the defect being fixed is precisely that the
-// two disagreed: the rewrite escalated out of the sandbox while the prompt said
-// only "allow command prefix for session".
-//
-// Asserting agreement rather than asserting each side's expected value is what
-// makes this hold up. If someone later widens or narrows the rewrite's guards
-// and forgets the flag, the two diverge here and this fails, which a pair of
-// independent expected-value tests would not catch.
-func TestPrefixEscalationDisclosureMatchesTheArgsRewrite(t *testing.T) {
-	escalating := Options{Sandbox: escalatingEngine(t)}
-	denied := Options{Sandbox: nonEscalatingEngine(t)}
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name     string
-		toolName string
-		args     map[string]any
-		options  Options
-	}{
-		{"plain bash command", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, escalating},
-		{"plain exec_command", "exec_command", map[string]any{"cmd": "go build ./..."}, escalating},
-		{"not a shell tool", "read_file", map[string]any{"path": "go.mod"}, escalating},
-		{"no sandbox configured", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, Options{}},
-		{"escalation refused by denied reads", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, denied},
-		{
-			"call already asks for escalation",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated)},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		{
-			"call already asks for additional permissions",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		// An unrecognized value is NOT an opt-out: the rewrite overwrites it, so
-		// the disclosure has to fire. Included because the obvious reading of
-		// the guards says otherwise, and a case asserting the wrong thing here
-		// would have passed silently.
-		{
-			"unrecognized sandbox_permissions value",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": "all"},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		{"empty args", "bash", map[string]any{}, escalating},
-		{"nil args", "bash", nil, escalating},
-	}
-
-	for _, testCase := range cases {
-		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			disclosed := shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, testCase.options)
-
-			// What the user's approval would actually be turned into.
-			rewritten := shellExecutionArgsForApproval(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix, testCase.options)
-			escalates := shellCommandRequiresEscalated(rewritten) && !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(testCase.args)
-
-			if disclosed != escalates {
-				t.Fatalf("prompt discloses escalation=%v but approving actually escalates=%v; the prompt and the rewrite disagree, which is the consent gap this guards", disclosed, escalates)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// The two prefix decisions are the only ones that escalate, so a disclosure
-// attached to a request offering neither would be a false alarm. Checked
-// against the same predicate the rewrite consults.
-func TestOnlyPrefixDecisionsEscalate(t *testing.T) {
-	escalating := map[PermissionDecisionAction]bool{
-		PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:       true,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix: true,
-	}
-	for _, action := range []PermissionDecisionAction{
-		PermissionDecisionAllow,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
-		PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		PermissionDecisionCancel,
-	} {
-		if got := shellPrefixApprovalBypassesSandbox(action); got != escalating[action] {
-			t.Errorf("decision %q bypasses sandbox=%v, want %v", action, got, escalating[action])
-		}
-	}
-}
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (c *profileController) maybeEscalate() (PostureEscalation, bool) {
 	if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
 		return PostureEscalation{}, false
 	}
-	if !c.failureTripped && !c.riskTripped && !c.scTripped && !c.uncertainTrip {
+	if !(c.failureTripped || c.riskTripped || c.scTripped || c.uncertainTrip) {
 		return PostureEscalation{}, false
 	}
 	c.escalated = true
@@ -20,20 +20,7 @@ import (
 // without a session id. Higher-risk tools that do not opt into auto remain excluded.
 const (
 	maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
-	// Raised deliberately from 3550 on 2026-08-08. view_image (#843) took the set
-	// to 3588, and #867 trimmed it back to 3578: still 28 tokens over.
-	//
-	// The overrun is a rounding error rather than a regression. view_image costs
-	// 82 tokens, the second cheapest tool in the set, against exec_command's 909
-	// and request_permissions' 397; it is simply the one that crossed the line.
-	// Raised rather than paid down because the alternative was trimming a
-	// description to claw back 28 tokens, degrading a tool's usability to satisfy
-	// a line drawn against a 2026-07 measurement that predates two tools.
-	//
-	// The ratchet did its job: it caught the creep and forced a decision instead
-	// of a drift. That is the point of it, so keep raising it deliberately rather
-	// than reflexively.
-	maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3650
+	maxEagerToolSchemaTokens  = 3550
 )

 func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
@@ -59,11 +46,6 @@ func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
 	got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
 	t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
 	if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
-		// NOT "defer a tool": this test pins DeferThreshold at 0, so marking a
-		// tool deferred leaves it exposed here and changes nothing. Deferral is
-		// still worth doing for real sessions, it just cannot move this number.
-		// The levers that do are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
-		// deliberate raise.
-		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
+		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
 	}
 }
@@ -123,21 +123,6 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversTransientSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
-	base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
-	changed := base
-	changed.TransientSystemPrompt = "turn-only guidance"
-
-	fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
-	fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
-	if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
-		t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change for transient system guidance")
-	}
-	if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
-		t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must cover transient system guidance")
-	}
-}
-
 // TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
 // substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
 // which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
@@ -121,67 +121,3 @@ func toolNameForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, index int) string {
 func isPrunedPlaceholder(content string) bool {
 	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(content), "[pruned ")
 }
-
-var supersedableReadTools = map[string]bool{
-	"read_file":          true,
-	"read_minified_file": true,
-	"grep":               true,
-	"glob":               true,
-	"list_directory":     true,
-}
-
-// pruneSupersededReadResults removes only older byte-identical results of the
-// same read call. It runs when context pressure already requires a rewrite, so
-// it does not trade a warm provider-cache prefix for a small apparent saving.
-func pruneSupersededReadResults(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]zeroruntime.Message, int) {
-	type seenResultKey struct {
-		call    string
-		content string
-	}
-	seen := map[seenResultKey]struct{}{}
-	out := messages
-	reclaimed := 0
-	copied := false
-
-	for index := len(messages) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
-		message := messages[index]
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || isPrunedPlaceholder(message.Content) {
-			continue
-		}
-		call, ok := toolCallForResult(messages, index)
-		if !ok || !supersedableReadTools[call.Name] {
-			continue
-		}
-		key := seenResultKey{
-			call:    call.Name + "\x00" + strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments),
-			content: message.Content,
-		}
-		if _, exists := seen[key]; exists {
-			placeholder := fmt.Sprintf("[superseded identical %s result — the newer result remains in context]", call.Name)
-			if !copied {
-				out = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), messages...)
-				copied = true
-			}
-			out[index].Content = placeholder
-			reclaimed += max(0, ApproxTextTokens(message.Content)-ApproxTextTokens(placeholder))
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[key] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	return out, reclaimed
-}
-
-func toolCallForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, resultIndex int) (zeroruntime.ToolCall, bool) {
-	id := messages[resultIndex].ToolCallID
-	if id == "" {
-		return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
-	}
-	for index := resultIndex - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
-		for _, call := range messages[index].ToolCalls {
-			if call.ID == id {
-				return call, true
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
-}
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ func toolCallMsg(id, name string) zeroruntime.Message {
 	}
 }

-func toolCallWithArgs(id, name, args string) zeroruntime.Message {
-	return zeroruntime.Message{
-		Role:      zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
-		ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: name, Arguments: args}},
-	}
-}
-
 func TestPruneSkipsSmallSessions(t *testing.T) {
 	// Total reclaimable is under the gate → no pruning.
 	msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
@@ -127,69 +120,3 @@ func TestPruneDoesNotMutateInput(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("pruneStaleToolOutput must not mutate the caller's slice")
 	}
 }
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsOnlyDropsIdenticalOlderReads(t *testing.T) {
-	body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("different", "read_file", `{"path":"b.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "different", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
-	}
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
-		t.Fatalf("older duplicate was not pruned: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
-	}
-	if out[3].Content != body || out[5].Content != body {
-		t.Fatal("different call and newest result must remain exact")
-	}
-	if messages[1].Content != body {
-		t.Fatal("input slice was mutated")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsKeepsChangedAndMutatingResults(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("r1", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r1", Content: "version one"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("r2", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r2", Content: "version two"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("e1", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "edited"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("e2", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "edited"},
-	}
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("unsafe results were pruned: %d", reclaimed)
-	}
-	for index := range messages {
-		if out[index].Content != messages[index].Content {
-			t.Fatalf("message %d changed unexpectedly", index)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsFindsMatchingBodyAcrossChangedRead(t *testing.T) {
-	bodyA := strings.Repeat("version a\n", 100)
-	bodyB := strings.Repeat("version b\n", 100)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("old-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old-a", Content: bodyA},
-		toolCallWithArgs("middle-b", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "middle-b", Content: bodyB},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new-a", Content: bodyA},
-	}
-
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-
-	if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
-		t.Fatalf("older matching body was not pruned across a changed result: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
-	}
-	if out[3].Content != bodyB || out[5].Content != bodyA {
-		t.Fatal("changed middle result and newest matching result must remain exact")
-	}
-}
@@ -26,16 +26,6 @@ func TestSpecialistDelegationContext(t *testing.T) {
 	if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
 		t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
 	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"reduce total context", "Do not delegate small direct work", "bounded assignment"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("missing evidence-driven delegation guidance %q: %q", want, got)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, unwanted := range []string{"delegate to it proactively", "launch several specialists in parallel"} {
-		if strings.Contains(got, unwanted) {
-			t.Fatalf("retained broad delegation guidance %q: %q", unwanted, got)
-		}
-	}
 }

 func TestSystemPromptIncludesDelegationOnlyWithSpecialists(t *testing.T) {
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
 )

@@ -95,9 +94,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
 		core = fallbackSystemPrompt
 	}
 	sections := []string{core}
-	if transient := strings.TrimSpace(options.TransientSystemPrompt); transient != "" {
-		sections = append(sections, transient)
-	}
 	if addendum := modelPromptAddendum(options.Model); addendum != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, addendum)
 	}
@@ -121,9 +117,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
 	if project != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, project)
 	}
-	if modeCtx := permissionModeContext(options); modeCtx != "" {
-		sections = append(sections, modeCtx)
-	}
 	if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, delegation)
 	}
@@ -185,19 +178,21 @@ func approvedCommandPrefixContext(options Options) string {
 	return "## Approved Command Prefixes\n\nThe following command prefixes have already been approved and do not need another permission prompt:\n" + strings.Join(lines, "\n")
 }

-// specialistDelegationContext describes when a specialist earns its extra
-// context and coordination cost. It renders only when specialists are known
-// (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with no
-// delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
+// specialistDelegationContext nudges the orchestrator to offload read-heavy or
+// parallelizable work to a specialist sub-agent via the Task tool, keeping large
+// tool outputs out of the main context. It renders only when specialists are
+// known (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with
+// no delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
 func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
 	if len(options.Specialists) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	var b strings.Builder
 	b.WriteString("<specialists>\n")
-	b.WriteString("Use the Task tool when a specialist's focused context, expertise, or an independent parallel subtask is likely to improve quality or reduce total context. ")
-	b.WriteString("Do not delegate small direct work, duplicate exploration, or split sequential steps merely because a specialist is available. ")
-	b.WriteString("When delegating, give a bounded assignment and consume its concise evidence instead of importing a long transcript.\n")
+	b.WriteString("Delegate focused or read-heavy work to a specialist sub-agent with the Task tool instead of doing it inline. ")
+	b.WriteString("When a request matches a specialist's purpose, delegate to it proactively — you do not need the user to ask first. ")
+	b.WriteString("This keeps large tool outputs — searches, file dumps, multi-step exploration — out of your own context, so you stay fast and token-efficient. ")
+	b.WriteString("Prefer delegating codebase search and exploration; for independent subtasks, launch several specialists in parallel. Handle small, direct edits yourself.\n")
 	b.WriteString("Available specialists (call Task with the matching name when the task fits its purpose):\n")
 	for _, info := range options.Specialists {
 		name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
@@ -315,7 +310,11 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
 	b.WriteString("<environment>\n")
 	b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
 	b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
-	b.WriteString(tools.HostShellEnvironmentGuidance() + "\n")
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools. To put | & > < etc inside an arg value, use double quotes around the value, not single quotes (single quotes do not protect metachars in cmd.exe): gh --jq \".a | b\", go test -run \"A|B\". Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required. Prefer the workdir/cwd argument over cd when changing directories.\n")
+	} else {
+		b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
+	}
 	if branch := gitBranchForPrompt(cwd); branch != "" {
 		b.WriteString("Git branch: " + branch + "\n")
 	}
@@ -685,12 +684,3 @@ func gitBranchForPrompt(cwd string) string {
 	}
 	return ref
 }
-
-func permissionModeContext(options Options) string {
-	switch options.PermissionMode {
-	case PermissionModePlan:
-		return "Plan mode is active on this session. Your role is read-only exploration and planning: inspect the workspace and shape the plan with update_plan, but do not make changes to files or execute commands."
-	default:
-		return ""
-	}
-}
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@ work.
   read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
   tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
   read.
-2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for implementation or investigation that has at
-   least three meaningful dependent steps, then keep it current at milestones.
-   Mark completed work and the next in-progress step together when practical;
-   do not spend separate turns updating it after every file or command. Keep at
-   most one item in_progress. Skip plans for simple lookups, explanations, code
-   navigation, and other short tasks. Never create a plan after the work is
-   already complete merely to describe what you did.
+2. **Plan.** For multi-step work, call update_plan with an ordered checklist and
+   keep it live. The plan bar is the user's progress signal — call update_plan
+   after EACH concrete unit of work (every file written, every command run), not
+   just at coarse milestones: mark the finished item completed and the next one
+   in_progress before you start it. A plan stuck at 0/N while files are landing is
+   a bug, not economy — these calls are cheap, expected, and the update_plan cards
+   are hidden from the transcript, so frequent updates cost the user nothing and
+   never clutter the conversation. Keep at most one item in_progress, and never
+   batch the updates to the end of the turn. Skip the plan for trivial one-step
+   tasks.
 3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
   naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
   problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -51,16 +54,11 @@ work.
 ## Editing discipline

 - Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
-  file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
-  write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
-  cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
+  file tools - read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file,
+  apply_patch - over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
  They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
-  code while removing comments and redundant whitespace. Use read_file when
-  exact text, comments, or line numbers are needed.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
-  files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
-  bulk shell or script rewrite.
+- Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
+  shell or script invocation.
 - For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
  targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
  file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
@@ -71,6 +71,5 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
  equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
 - Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
  in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan only for work with at least three meaningful dependent steps;
-  skip it for simple lookups and never create one after the work is complete.
+- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
 </model_guidance>`
@@ -51,16 +51,6 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTransientSystemPromptIsIncludedOnlyWhenProvided(t *testing.T) {
-	const transient = "Handle this peer request under the current session policy."
-	if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{}); strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
-		t.Fatal("ordinary system prompt unexpectedly contains transient instructions")
-	}
-	if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{TransientSystemPrompt: transient}); !strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
-		t.Fatalf("transient instructions missing from system prompt:\n%s", prompt)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestSystemPromptExplainsSandboxEscalationForHiddenHostState(t *testing.T) {
 	prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
 	for _, want := range []string{
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
 package agent

 import (
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
 	"reflect"
-	"regexp"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
-	"unicode/utf8"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
@@ -56,41 +52,17 @@ type taskVerificationState struct {
 	LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
 }

-type taskFailureState struct {
-	Key     string `json:"key,omitempty"`
-	Tool    string `json:"tool"`
-	Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
-	Summary string `json:"summary"`
-}
-
-type taskApprovalState struct {
-	Tool     string                   `json:"tool"`
-	Decision PermissionDecisionAction `json:"decision,omitempty"`
-	Scope    string                   `json:"scope,omitempty"`
-	Reason   string                   `json:"reason,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type taskArtifactState struct {
-	Tool string `json:"tool"`
-	Path string `json:"path"`
-}
-
 type taskStateSnapshot struct {
-	Revision            int                   `json:"revision"`
-	Objective           string                `json:"objective"`
-	Status              taskStatus            `json:"status"`
-	Plan                taskPlanState         `json:"plan"`
-	Tools               taskToolState         `json:"tools"`
-	Verification        taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
-	ChangedFiles        []string              `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
-	Constraints         []string              `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
-	UnresolvedFailures  []taskFailureState    `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
-	Approvals           []taskApprovalState   `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
-	Artifacts           []taskArtifactState   `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
-	ResolvedFailureKeys []string              `json:"-"`
-	CompletionDecision  CompletionDecision    `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
-	CompletionReason    string                `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
-	PlanParity          taskPlanParity        `json:"plan_parity"`
+	Revision           int                   `json:"revision"`
+	Objective          string                `json:"objective"`
+	Status             taskStatus            `json:"status"`
+	Plan               taskPlanState         `json:"plan"`
+	Tools              taskToolState         `json:"tools"`
+	Verification       taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
+	ChangedFiles       []string              `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
+	CompletionDecision CompletionDecision    `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
+	CompletionReason   string                `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
+	PlanParity         taskPlanParity        `json:"plan_parity"`
 }

 type taskStateEventKind int
@@ -100,7 +72,6 @@ const (
 	taskStateEventToolResult
 	taskStateEventVerification
 	taskStateEventCompletion
-	taskStateEventPermission
 )

 type taskStateEvent struct {
@@ -109,7 +80,6 @@ type taskStateEvent struct {
 	toolResult   ToolResult
 	verification Outcome
 	completion   completionEvaluation
-	permission   PermissionEvent
 }

 // taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
@@ -131,7 +101,6 @@ func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
 		},
 		changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
 	}
-	state.snapshotValue.Constraints = extractExplicitConstraints(objective)
 	state.recorder = recorder
 	return state
 }
@@ -165,7 +134,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
 			}
 		}
 		state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
-		state.observeToolEvidence(event.arguments, event.toolResult)
 		changed = true
 	case taskStateEventVerification:
 		if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
@@ -192,10 +160,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
 			state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
 		}
 		changed = true
-	case taskStateEventPermission:
-		state.markActive()
-		state.observePermission(event.permission)
-		changed = true
 	}
 	if changed {
 		state.snapshotValue.Revision++
@@ -219,180 +183,9 @@ func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
 	snapshot := state.snapshotValue
 	snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
 	snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
-	snapshot.Constraints = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.Constraints...)
-	snapshot.UnresolvedFailures = append([]taskFailureState(nil), state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures...)
-	snapshot.Approvals = append([]taskApprovalState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Approvals...)
-	snapshot.Artifacts = append([]taskArtifactState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Artifacts...)
-	snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys...)
 	return snapshot
 }

-const (
-	maxTaskEvidenceEntries = 8
-	maxTaskEvidenceBytes   = 320
-	maxTaskConstraints     = 10
-)
-
-func (state *taskState) observeToolEvidence(arguments string, result ToolResult) {
-	command := capTaskEvidence(commandFromArguments(arguments))
-	key := taskFailureKey(result.Name, command, arguments)
-	if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
-		if hasTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key) {
-			state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
-			state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-		}
-	} else {
-		state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = removeString(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key)
-		state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
-		state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = appendBounded(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, taskFailureState{
-			Key: key, Tool: result.Name, Command: command, Summary: capTaskEvidence(firstLine(result.Output)),
-		}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-	}
-	for _, metaKey := range []string{"spill_path", "artifact_path"} {
-		if path := strings.TrimSpace(result.Meta[metaKey]); path != "" {
-			state.snapshotValue.Artifacts = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Artifacts,
-				taskArtifactState{Tool: result.Name, Path: capTaskEvidence(path)}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func taskFailureKey(toolName, command, arguments string) string {
-	identity := command
-	if identity == "" {
-		canonical := []byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments))
-		var value any
-		if json.Unmarshal(canonical, &value) == nil {
-			if encoded, err := json.Marshal(value); err == nil {
-				canonical = encoded
-			}
-		}
-		digest := sha256.Sum256(canonical)
-		identity = fmt.Sprintf("args:%x", digest[:8])
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(toolName) + "\x00" + identity
-}
-
-func (state *taskState) observePermission(event PermissionEvent) {
-	decision := event.DecisionAction
-	if decision == "" {
-		decision = PermissionDecisionAction(event.Action)
-	}
-	state.snapshotValue.Approvals = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Approvals, taskApprovalState{
-		Tool: event.ToolName, Decision: decision, Scope: capTaskEvidence(event.Scope),
-		Reason: capTaskEvidence(firstNonEmptyString(event.DecisionReason, event.Reason)),
-	}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-}
-
-func commandFromArguments(arguments string) string {
-	var object map[string]json.RawMessage
-	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	for _, key := range []string{"cmd", "command", "script", "shell"} {
-		var command string
-		if raw, ok := object[key]; ok && json.Unmarshal(raw, &command) == nil {
-			return strings.TrimSpace(command)
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func firstLine(value string) string {
-	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	if index := strings.IndexByte(value, '\n'); index >= 0 {
-		value = value[:index]
-	}
-	return value
-}
-
-func capTaskEvidence(value string) string {
-	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	if len(value) <= maxTaskEvidenceBytes {
-		return value
-	}
-	limit := maxTaskEvidenceBytes - 3
-	for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(value[limit]) {
-		limit--
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(value[:limit]) + "..."
-}
-
-var explicitConstraintPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bprefer(?:s|red|ring)?\s+\w`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bdon'?t want\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\balways (?:use|do|run|prefer|keep|make|format|write|add|set|put|prefix|start|include|append)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bnever (?:use|do|run|push|commit|write|ignore|add|set|put|remove|delete|include|deploy)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bplease (?:use|avoid|keep|make|don'?t|do not|format|write)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(?:style|format|language|naming)\s*[:=]\s*\S`),
-}
-
-func extractExplicitConstraints(text string) []string {
-	var constraints []string
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
-		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
-		if len(line) < 5 || len(line) > 200 || strings.HasSuffix(line, "?") || strings.Contains(line, "?...") {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, pattern := range explicitConstraintPatterns {
-			if pattern.MatchString(line) {
-				constraints = appendBoundedUnique(constraints, line, maxTaskConstraints)
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if len(constraints) == maxTaskConstraints {
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	return constraints
-}
-
-func appendBounded[T any](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
-	values = append(values, value)
-	if len(values) > limit {
-		values = values[len(values)-limit:]
-	}
-	return values
-}
-
-func appendBoundedUnique[T comparable](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
-	filtered := values[:0]
-	for _, existing := range values {
-		if existing != value {
-			filtered = append(filtered, existing)
-		}
-	}
-	return appendBounded(filtered, value, limit)
-}
-
-func hasTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) bool {
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value.Key == key {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func removeTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) []taskFailureState {
-	out := values[:0]
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value.Key != key {
-			out = append(out, value)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func removeString(values []string, target string) []string {
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value != target {
-			out = append(out, value)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 // observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
 // calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
 // parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
@@ -115,68 +115,6 @@ func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTaskStateRecordsDurableRuntimeEvidence(t *testing.T) {
-	state := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.\nNever commit generated reports.", nil)
-	arguments := `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/agent"}`
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "test-1", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError,
-		Output: "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed\nfull diagnostic",
-		Meta:   map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt"},
-	}})
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
-		ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
-		Scope: "/tmp", DecisionReason: "write a temporary fixture",
-	}})
-
-	snapshot := state.snapshot()
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(snapshot.Constraints, []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never commit generated reports."}) {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected explicit constraints: %#v", snapshot.Constraints)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Command != "go test ./internal/agent" || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected failure evidence: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.Artifacts) != 1 || snapshot.Artifacts[0].Path != ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected artifact evidence: %#v", snapshot.Artifacts)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.Approvals) != 1 || snapshot.Approvals[0].Decision != PermissionDecisionAllowForSession || snapshot.Approvals[0].Scope != "/tmp" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected approval evidence: %#v", snapshot.Approvals)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go is unavailable",
-	}})
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"b.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-b", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package b",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 2 || failures[1].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
-		t.Fatalf("success for a different target resolved the wrong failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "test-2", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 1 || failures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
-		t.Fatalf("successful retry did not resolve only its matching failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a-2", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package a",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("successful non-command retry did not resolve its matching failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a-3", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go failed again",
-	}})
-	snapshot = state.snapshot()
-	if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go failed again" {
-		t.Fatalf("a failure recurring after success was hidden: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	for _, key := range snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys {
-		if key == snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Key {
-			t.Fatalf("recurring failure retained a stale resolved key: %#v", snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
 	state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
 	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-// imageTool returns a tool result carrying an image, the way a screenshot tool
-// should be able to.
-type imageTool struct {
-	media string
-	data  []byte
-}
-
-func (imageTool) Name() string        { return "capture" }
-func (imageTool) Description() string { return "Captures an image." }
-func (imageTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
-}
-func (imageTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
-}
-func (t imageTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{
-		Status: tools.StatusOK,
-		Output: "Captured a screenshot.",
-		Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: t.media, Data: t.data}},
-	}
-}
-
-// A tool that produces an image must get that image in front of the model.
-//
-// It cannot ride the tool-result message: every provider drops images there.
-// Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block with string content,
-// Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user
-// role explicitly. So the image has to arrive as a following user message,
-// which is also the only shape that keeps one tool result per tool call.
-func TestRunDeliversToolResultImagesToTheModel(t *testing.T) {
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I can see it."},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
-		Registry: registry,
-		MaxTurns: 2,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
-	for index := range result.Messages {
-		if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
-			carrier = &result.Messages[index]
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if carrier == nil {
-		t.Fatal("no message carried the tool's image; the model never saw it")
-	}
-	if carrier.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
-		t.Errorf("image rode a %q message; every provider only serializes images on the user role", carrier.Role)
-	}
-	if got := carrier.Images[0].MediaType; got != "image/png" {
-		t.Errorf("media type = %q, want image/png", got)
-	}
-
-	// The tool-result pairing must be untouched: one tool result per tool call.
-	toolResults := 0
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolResults++
-		}
-	}
-	if toolResults != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("got %d tool-result messages for 1 tool call", toolResults)
-	}
-}
-
-// textTool is a second, image-free tool so a turn can carry two calls.
-type textTool struct{}
-
-func (textTool) Name() string        { return "note" }
-func (textTool) Description() string { return "Notes something." }
-func (textTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
-}
-func (textTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow} }
-func (textTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "noted"}
-}
-
-// Tool results for one assistant turn must stay contiguous. The image messages
-// are user-role, and a user message between two tool_results breaks strict
-// provider replay: Anthropic coalesces consecutive user content into one block
-// list and requires tool_result blocks first, so interleaving produces
-// [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and the request is rejected.
-//
-// The first version of this feature appended each image immediately after its
-// own tool result, which is exactly that shape. A single-tool-call test passed
-// and said nothing about it.
-func TestRunKeepsToolResultsContiguousWhenAToolReturnsAnImage(t *testing.T) {
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
-	registry.Register(textTool{})
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "capture"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c2", ToolName: "note"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c2", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c2"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
-	}}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "two calls", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Two separate ifs rather than a switch: a tool-role message that also
-	// carried images would match only the first arm of a switch, so a regression
-	// that put the image back on the tool result would read as "no image at all"
-	// instead of naming what actually happened.
-	type toolResult struct {
-		index int
-		id    string
-	}
-	var toolResults []toolResult
-	imageIndex := -1
-	for index, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolResults = append(toolResults, toolResult{index: index, id: message.ToolCallID})
-		}
-		if len(message.Images) > 0 {
-			if imageIndex >= 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("image delivered twice, at %d and %d; recorded %s", imageIndex, index, messageShape(result.Messages))
-			}
-			imageIndex = index
-		}
-	}
-	if imageIndex < 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("the image never reached the model; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	if len(toolResults) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("got %d tool-result messages for 2 tool calls; recorded %s", len(toolResults), messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	if toolResults[0].id != "c1" || toolResults[1].id != "c2" {
-		t.Errorf("tool results answered %q then %q, want c1 then c2", toolResults[0].id, toolResults[1].id)
-	}
-	// The contract Anthropic enforces: every tool_result block has to come before
-	// any other block in the user message it lands in. Anything wedged between
-	// the two results breaks that, which is the 400 this PR exists to avoid.
-	if toolResults[1].index != toolResults[0].index+1 {
-		t.Errorf("tool results at %d and %d are not adjacent; %q message at %d splits them; recorded %s",
-			toolResults[0].index, toolResults[1].index, result.Messages[toolResults[0].index+1].Role,
-			toolResults[0].index+1, messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	// Follows the last tool result, deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1.
-	// appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user-role content, so
-	// [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] still maps to tool_result blocks
-	// first and replays fine; pinning would redden that valid shape for nothing.
-	if imageIndex <= toolResults[1].index {
-		t.Errorf("image message at %d does not follow the last tool result at %d; recorded %s",
-			imageIndex, toolResults[1].index, messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-}
-
-// messageShape renders the conversation as a compact role list so a failure says
-// what the ordering actually was instead of dumping whole messages.
-func messageShape(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
-	parts := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
-	for index, message := range messages {
-		part := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", index, message.Role)
-		if message.ToolCallID != "" {
-			part += "(" + message.ToolCallID + ")"
-		}
-		if len(message.Images) > 0 {
-			part += "+image"
-		}
-		parts = append(parts, part)
-	}
-	return "[" + strings.Join(parts, " ") + "]"
-}
@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ const (
 	PermissionModeAsk       PermissionMode = "ask"
 	PermissionModeUnsafe    PermissionMode = "unsafe"
 	PermissionModeSpecDraft PermissionMode = "spec-draft"
-	// PermissionModePlan is an interactive, read-only planning mode. It applies
-	// to the CURRENT session (unlike spec-draft, which drafts in a separate
-	// session): the agent may inspect the workspace and shape the plan with
-	// update_plan/ask_user, but no mutating tool is advertised, so it cannot
-	// write files, run shell, or implement while planning. Entry points:
-	// the TUI's /plan on (exit with /plan off, which restores whatever mode
-	// was active before), `zero exec --plan`, and the ACP session mode
-	// selector ("plan").
-	PermissionModePlan PermissionMode = "plan"
 	// PermissionModeMemberAuto is a headless mode for swarm/specialist MEMBERS: it
 	// advertises the in-workspace mutators a member needs to build (write/edit +
 	// shell) on top of the Auto set, while the sandbox engine still gates them at
@@ -77,18 +68,14 @@ type ToolResult struct {
 	Output     string
 	// Truncated reports that the tool's model-visible output omitted content.
 	// The full result may be recoverable through Meta["spill_path"].
-	Truncated bool
-	Meta      map[string]string
-	// Images the tool produced, delivered to the model as a following user
-	// message rather than on this result. See tools.Result.Images.
-	Images       []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
+	Truncated    bool
+	Meta         map[string]string
 	Redacted     bool
 	ChangedFiles []string
 	// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
 	// command execution; callers must not schedule per-file work from them.
 	ChangeSummaries []execution.Change
 	Display         tools.Display
-	Outcome         tools.ToolOutcome
 	// DenialReason categorizes why a tool call was blocked (empty when it ran).
 	// It lets a surface distinguish the cause precisely instead of parsing Output.
 	DenialReason DenialCategory
@@ -109,24 +96,6 @@ type ToolResult struct {
 	RequestedModel string
 }

-// ModelOutput returns the bounded provider-facing result while preserving
-// compatibility with synthetic and restored results created before outcomes
-// were finalized.
-func (result ToolResult) ModelOutput() string {
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		return result.Outcome.ModelView
-	}
-	return result.Output
-}
-
-// HumanDisplay returns the presentation intended for interactive surfaces.
-func (result ToolResult) HumanDisplay() tools.Display {
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		return result.Outcome.HumanView
-	}
-	return result.Display
-}
-
 // DenialCategory classifies why a tool call was blocked before it executed.
 type DenialCategory string

@@ -204,22 +173,6 @@ type PermissionRequest struct {
 	Grant              *sandbox.Grant             `json:"grant,omitempty"`
 	CommandPrefix      []string                   `json:"commandPrefix,omitempty"`
 	AvailableDecisions []PermissionDecisionAction `json:"availableDecisions,omitempty"`
-	// PrefixApprovalEscalates reports that approving a command prefix will also
-	// run the command OUTSIDE the sandbox, not merely stop asking about it.
-	//
-	// It exists because that consequence was real but invisible. Approving a
-	// prefix rewrites the call to sandbox_permissions: require_escalated, which
-	// resolves to a nil engine and genuinely unsandboxed execution, and the
-	// engine's own escalation prompt is then satisfied by the approval just
-	// given for the sandboxed form. So the operator authorized one thing and got
-	// a wider one, having been shown only "allow command prefix for session".
-	//
-	// The escalation itself is deliberate and guarded: proposedCommandPrefix
-	// refuses to offer a prefix while any other segment of the command is not
-	// known-safe, precisely so an unreviewed segment cannot ride out of the
-	// sandbox on it. What was missing was telling the person deciding, so this
-	// surfaces it rather than removing it.
-	PrefixApprovalEscalates bool `json:"prefixApprovalEscalates,omitempty"`
 }

 type PermissionDecision struct {
@@ -327,9 +280,6 @@ type Options struct {
 	ReasoningEffort  string
 	Cwd              string
 	SystemPrompt     string
-	// TransientSystemPrompt adds trusted runtime guidance for this run only.
-	// Empty preserves the ordinary system prompt byte-for-byte.
-	TransientSystemPrompt string
 	// ResponseStyle is the operator-selected reply style from the TUI /style
 	// command (e.g. "concise", "explanatory", "review"). It is rendered into the
 	// system prompt as a short directive. Empty or "balanced" adds nothing — the
@@ -380,11 +330,9 @@ type Options struct {
 	// specialist child process emits while running. The toolCallID identifies
 	// which Task tool call the progress belongs to. nil is a no-op.
 	OnToolProgress func(toolCallID string, event streamjson.Event)
-	// OnContext, when set, is called for each main agent request with its
-	// per-category context budget, including a replacement request after
-	// compaction or a stall retry. Internal summarizer requests are excluded so
-	// surfaces keep showing the active conversation budget. Opt-in like the other
-	// callbacks; nil is a no-op.
+	// OnContext, when set, is called once per turn with the per-category context
+	// budget of the request about to be sent, so a surface (TUI/CLI) can show
+	// context utilization. Opt-in like the other callbacks; nil is a no-op.
 	OnContext func(ContextBreakdown)
 	// ModelSwitcher, when set, lets a tool escalate the run to a stronger model
 	// mid-run: the loop calls it with the requested model id and, on success,
@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ func Score(suite Suite, input ScoreInput) Report {
 	if len(task.RequiredTraceEvents) > 0 {
 		report.Results = append(report.Results, scoreTraceEvents(task.RequiredTraceEvents, input))
 	}
-	report.Results = append(report.Results, unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input)...)
+	for _, result := range unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input) {
+		report.Results = append(report.Results, result)
+	}
 	report.finishSummary()
 	return report
 }
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ func FormatFacts(info repoinfo.Info) string {
 	b.WriteString("Pre-computed repository facts (from a local scan — verify and fill gaps):\n")

 	if info.PrimaryLanguage != "" {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount)
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount))
 	}
 	if langs := topLanguages(info.Languages, 5); langs != "" {
 		b.WriteString("- Languages: " + langs + "\n")
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth)
+	b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth))
 	if info.WorkspaceType != "" && info.WorkspaceType != "none" {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount)
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount))
 	}
 	if len(info.BuildTools) > 0 {
 		b.WriteString("- Build tools: " + strings.Join(info.BuildTools, ", ") + "\n")
@@ -149,9 +149,12 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {

 	// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
-	// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
-	for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+	for {
+		// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
+		// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
+		if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+			break // child no longer exists
+		}
 		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
 			_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
 			t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ Usage:
 Not meant to be run interactively — point your editor's ACP / external-agent
 setting at "zero acp".`

-var acpSignalContext = signalContext
-
 // runACP serves ACP over stdio so an editor can drive ZERO's agent core. It
 // speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 (newline-delimited JSON) on stdin/stdout; stderr stays free
 // for human-readable diagnostics. The session lifecycle maps onto ZERO's own
@@ -44,9 +42,7 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
 		}
 	}

-	// The process's own stdin belongs exclusively to this Conn for the life of
-	// the command, so cancellation may close it to interrupt an idle read.
-	conn := acp.NewOwnedConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
+	conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
 	acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
 		ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
 		DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
@@ -77,9 +73,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
 		AgentInfo:            acp.Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: version},
 	})

-	ctx, stop := acpSignalContext()
+	ctx, stop := signalContext()
 	defer stop()
-	if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil {
+	if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, "acp: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
 	return exitSuccess
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-type acpTestReader func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (r acpTestReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
-
-type acpTestWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (w acpTestWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
-
-func installACPTestContext(t *testing.T) context.CancelFunc {
-	t.Helper()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	previous := acpSignalContext
-	acpSignalContext = func() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
-		return ctx, cancel
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		cancel()
-		acpSignalContext = previous
-	})
-	return cancel
-}
-
-func TestRunACPCancellationPreservesTerminalReadError(t *testing.T) {
-	cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
-	wantErr := errors.New("transport read failed")
-	reader := acpTestReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
-	})
-	writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	writer := acpTestWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		writeStarted <- struct{}{}
-		<-releaseWrite
-		return stdout.Write(p)
-	})
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	done := make(chan int, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- runACP(nil, writer, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-writeStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not reach the response write")
-	}
-	// Keep Serve in the synchronous write until cancellation is observable. The
-	// regression requires the genuine read error to win over that cancellation.
-	cancel()
-	close(releaseWrite)
-
-	select {
-	case code := <-done:
-		if code != exitCrash {
-			t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want crash %d", code, exitCrash)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after terminal read error")
-	}
-	if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "acp: "+wantErr.Error()) {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want terminal read error", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunACPIdleCancellationExitsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
-	cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
-	pipeReader, pipeWriter := io.Pipe()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pipeWriter.Close() })
-	readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	reader := &acpNotifyingReadCloser{ReadCloser: pipeReader, readStarted: readStarted}
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	done := make(chan int, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- runACP(nil, &stdout, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-readStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not begin reading")
-	}
-	cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case code := <-done:
-		if code != exitSuccess {
-			t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want success %d; stderr: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after cancellation")
-	}
-	if stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-type acpNotifyingReadCloser struct {
-	io.ReadCloser
-	readStarted chan<- struct{}
-	once        sync.Once
-}
-
-func (r *acpNotifyingReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	r.once.Do(func() { r.readStarted <- struct{}{} })
-	return r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
-}
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ func agentEvalReportFromBenchmark(suite agenteval.Suite, report agenteval.Benchm
 		if task.Agent.Truncated {
 			converted.Truncated = true
 		}
-		converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task)...)
+		for _, failure := range agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task) {
+			converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, failure)
+		}
 	}
 	return converted
 }
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/peermsg"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
@@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ type appDeps struct {
 	runSandboxSetupHelper  func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
 	registerMCPTools       func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
 	prepareWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
-	releaseWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error
 	detectVerifyPlan       func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
 	runVerify              func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
 	runSelfVerify          func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
@@ -189,7 +187,6 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 			return mcp.RegisterTools(ctx, registry, cfg, options)
 		},
 		prepareWorktree:  worktrees.Prepare,
-		releaseWorktree:  worktrees.Release,
 		detectVerifyPlan: verify.DetectPlan,
 		runVerify:        verify.Run,
 		runSelfVerify:    selfverify.Run,
@@ -535,9 +532,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	if deps.prepareWorktree == nil {
 		deps.prepareWorktree = defaults.prepareWorktree
 	}
-	if deps.releaseWorktree == nil {
-		deps.releaseWorktree = defaults.releaseWorktree
-	}
 	if deps.detectVerifyPlan == nil {
 		deps.detectVerifyPlan = defaults.detectVerifyPlan
 	}
@@ -591,9 +585,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	baseProbeProviderHealth := deps.probeProviderHealth
 	deps.probeProviderHealth = func(ctx context.Context, options providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result {
 		options.Profile = applyStoredProviderKeyAt(options.Profile, userConfigPath)
-		if options.OAuthResolver == nil {
-			options.OAuthResolver, _ = oauthLoginForProfile(options.Profile)
-		}
 		return baseProbeProviderHealth(ctx, options)
 	}
 	return deps
@@ -792,26 +783,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	if permissionMode == "" {
 		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeAsk
 	}
-	sessionStore := deps.newSessionStore()
-	peerClass := peermsg.PermissionPrompting
-	if permissionMode == agent.PermissionModeUnsafe {
-		peerClass = peermsg.PermissionBypass
-	}
-	peerService, peerErr := peermsg.New(peermsg.Options{
-		Identity: peermsg.Identity{
-			Cwd:             workspaceRoot,
-			PermissionClass: peerClass,
-		},
-		InboundPolicy: peermsg.InboundPolicy(resolved.CrossSessionInbound),
-	})
-	if peerErr != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: cross-session messaging unavailable: %s\n", peerErr)
-		peerService = nil
-	} else {
-		for _, tool := range tools.NewPeerSessionTools(peerService) {
-			registry.Register(tool)
-		}
-	}
 	// Activate deferred MCP-tool loading for the interactive run only when the
 	// VISIBLE deferred-eligible count meets the resolved threshold, matching exec.
 	// The registry is complete (core + specialist + MCP + plugins) here, so the
@@ -863,8 +834,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 			return scratchFileWarning(workspaceRoot, scratchBaseline)
 		},
 		Registry:           registry,
-		SessionStore:       sessionStore,
-		PeerService:        peerService,
+		SessionStore:       deps.newSessionStore(),
 		SandboxStore:       sandboxStore,
 		MCPConfig:          mcpConfig,
 		MCPPermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
@@ -1226,8 +1196,7 @@ Commands:
  mcp        Manage MCP backend settings
  auth       Log in to model providers via OAuth
  sandbox    Inspect sandbox policy and persistent grants
-  update     Check or apply Zero CLI updates (requires --check or --apply)
-  upgrade    Download, verify, and install available Zero CLI updates
+  update     Check for Zero CLI updates
  worktrees  Prepare isolated git worktrees
  verify     Detect and run local verification checks
  eval       Validate offline agent eval suites
@@ -1389,10 +1358,6 @@ Flags:
      --spec-model <model>           Override the draft model when --use-spec is set
      --spec-reasoning-effort <effort>
                                    Override draft reasoning effort when --use-spec is set
-      --plan                         Read-only planning mode: write and shell tools are hidden
-      --permission-mode <mode>       Set permission mode directly (plan, spec-draft, auto, member,
-                                    ask, unsafe). Outranks --auto; prefer --plan / --auto for
-                                    interactive use. Used by specialist/swarm child processes.
      --max-turns <number>           Override the maximum agent loop turns
      --exec-profile <name>          Apply an execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough): loop
                                    posture only (turn budget, effort, self-correction, escalation);
@@ -1457,20 +1457,6 @@ func TestRunUpdateHelpDocumentsCheckFlag(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTopLevelHelpDocumentsRequiredUpdateMode(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if got := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "update     Check or apply Zero CLI updates (requires --check or --apply)") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected top-level help to document required update mode, got %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunUpdateReportsUpToDate(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1674,7 +1660,6 @@ func assertHelpOutput(t *testing.T, args []string) {
 		"mcp",
 		"sandbox",
 		"update",
-		"upgrade",
 		"worktrees",
 		"verify",
 		"serve",
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import (

 func TestRunBackendsJSONUsesLifecycleSnapshotWithoutConnectingMCP(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ func TestRunBackendsTextAndHelp(t *testing.T) {

 func TestRunBackendsDoctorJSONAndTextWithoutConnectingMCP(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("b", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("b", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ var completionRoot = completionNode{
 	children: []completionNode{
 		{names: []string{"exec"}, flags: []string{
 			"-h", "--help", "-f", "--file", "--image", "--add-dir", "--mode", "-m", "--model",
-			"--use-spec", "--spec-model", "--spec-reasoning-effort", "--plan", "--permission-mode",
-			"--max-turns", "--exec-profile",
+			"--use-spec", "--spec-model", "--spec-reasoning-effort", "--max-turns", "--exec-profile",
 			"--auto", "--enabled-tools", "--disabled-tools", "--list-tools", "--profile", "-r",
 			"--reasoning-effort", "-C", "--cwd", "-w", "--worktree", "--worktree-dir", "-i",
 			"--input-format", "-o", "--output-format", "--prompt", "--resume", "--fork",
@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ var completionRoot = completionNode{
 		}},
 		{names: []string{"update"}},
 		{names: []string{"upgrade"}},
-		{names: []string{"worktrees", "worktree"}, children: leafNodes("prepare", "release")},
+		{names: []string{"worktrees", "worktree"}, children: leafNodes("prepare")},
 		{names: []string{"verify"}},
 		{names: []string{"trust"}, children: leafNodes("list", "remove")},
 		{names: []string{"eval"}, children: leafNodes("validate", "run", "bench")},
@@ -155,8 +155,6 @@ func TestCompletionTreeCoversAliasesNestingAndCommonFlags(t *testing.T) {

 	assertCandidates(t, byPath[""], "sessions", "session", "plugins", "plugin", "worktrees", "worktree", "--add-dir", "--theme", "-p", "--prompt")
 	assertCandidates(t, byPath["exec"], "--model", "--cwd", "--worktree", "--output-format", "--resume", "--skip-permissions-unsafe")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["worktrees"], "prepare", "release")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["worktree"], "prepare", "release")
 	assertCandidates(t, byPath["daemon"], "start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach")
 	assertCandidates(t, byPath["mcp oauth"], "login", "logout", "status")
 	assertCandidates(t, byPath["sandbox grants"], "list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")
@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ func runContext(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
 	report, err := contextreport.Build(contextreport.Options{
-		WorkspaceRoot:  workspaceRoot,
-		Provider:       resolved.Provider,
-		Registry:       newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
-		ContextWindow:  modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
-		DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
+		WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
+		Provider:      resolved.Provider,
+		Registry:      newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
+		ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
@@ -77,10 +77,11 @@ func TestRegisterToolSearchIfEligibleSkipsWhenThresholdZero(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestDeferredEligibleCountIncludesOptionalBuiltins(t *testing.T) {
+func TestDeferredEligibleCountIgnoresCoreTools(t *testing.T) {
 	registry := newCoreRegistry(t.TempDir())
-	if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got < 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want at least 2 optional built-ins", got)
+	// newCoreRegistry holds only built-ins; none implement Deferred().
+	if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want 0", got)
 	}
 }

@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
 	}
 	if info.Hash != "" {
 		lines = append(lines, "  hash: "+info.Hash)
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
 	}
 	lines = append(lines, "  path: "+info.Skill.Path)
 	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
@@ -83,48 +83,6 @@ func TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(info, src) || !strings.Contains(info, "sha256:") {
 		t.Fatalf("info missing source/hash:\n%s", info)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(info, "hash drift: false") {
-		t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift status:\n%s", info)
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info --json exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	var beforeJSON map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &beforeJSON); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse skill info json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if beforeJSON["hashDrift"] != false {
-		t.Fatalf("hashDrift before edit = %#v, want false", beforeJSON["hashDrift"])
-	}
-
-	skillPath := filepath.Join(skillsDir, "confirmation-policy", "SKILL.md")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(skillPath, []byte("---\ndescription: edited\n---\nchanged\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "hash drift: true") {
-		t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift after edit:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info --json after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	var afterJSON map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &afterJSON); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse skill info json after edit: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if afterJSON["hashDrift"] != true {
-		t.Fatalf("hashDrift after edit = %#v, want true", afterJSON["hashDrift"])
-	}

 	// remove deletes it
 	stdout.Reset()
@@ -78,18 +78,11 @@ type execOptions struct {
 	// fill-only-if-unset rule, so precedence is explicit flag > mode > profile.
 	// Distinct from the mode preset also named "fast" (which picks a model) and
 	// from the legacy inert --profile above. See internal/execprofile.
-	execProfile         string
-	reasoningEffort     string
-	useSpec             bool
-	specModel           string
-	specReasoningEffort string
-	// plan selects PermissionModePlan for this run: the same read-only,
-	// in-session planning mode the TUI enters with /plan on. Unlike --use-spec
-	// (a separate draft session with its own review flow), this only swaps the
-	// permission mode for the run already being made — ToolAdvertised gates
-	// write/shell tools generically for any mode, so no other exec plumbing
-	// needs to know about it.
-	plan                  bool
+	execProfile           string
+	reasoningEffort       string
+	useSpec               bool
+	specModel             string
+	specReasoningEffort   string
 	maxTurns              int
 	cwd                   string
 	inputFormat           execInputFormat
@@ -111,7 +104,6 @@ type execOptions struct {
 	worktreeName          string
 	worktreeDir           string
 	skipPermissionsUnsafe bool
-	permissionMode        string
 	// allowEscalation opts the run into mid-run model escalation: it registers
 	// the escalate_model tool and wires agent.Options.ModelSwitcher. Off by
 	// default — a run without the flag is byte-identical to before (no tool, nil
@@ -207,33 +199,11 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 			Name:    options.worktreeName,
 			BaseDir: options.worktreeDir,
 			Now:     deps.now,
-			// The worktree's lifetime is bound to this process (the deferred
-			// release below), so record the PID: if this process dies without
-			// releasing, Clean can expire the lease instead of skipping the
-			// locked worktree forever.
-			LeasePID: os.Getpid(),
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
 		}
 		workspaceRoot = preparedWorktree.Path
-		// When this run's own Prepare call took the worktree lock, its
-		// lifetime is bound to this function: release the lock once it returns
-		// so Clean can reclaim the worktree later if it goes stale. A reused
-		// worktree whose lock an external `zero worktrees prepare` caller
-		// still holds reports LockAcquired=false; releasing it here would
-		// clear that caller's lease and expose its workspace to Clean, so the
-		// matching release stays that caller's responsibility. A failed unlock
-		// leaves a lock Clean will permanently skip, so it must not pass
-		// silently; the run's primary result has already been emitted by the
-		// time the defer runs, so surface it as a diagnostic.
-		if preparedWorktree.LockAcquired {
-			defer func() {
-				if releaseErr := deps.releaseWorktree(context.Background(), worktrees.Options{Cwd: trustRoot}, preparedWorktree.Path); releaseErr != nil {
-					fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "zero: failed to release worktree lock on %s: %s\n", redactCLIString(preparedWorktree.Path), redactCLIString(releaseErr.Error()))
-				}
-			}()
-		}
 	}

 	registry := newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot)
@@ -270,9 +240,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	if options.useSpec {
 		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft
 	}
-	if options.plan {
-		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModePlan
-	}
 	var mcpRuntime mcpToolRuntime
 	var mcpSkip trustSkip
 	// Make local plugins live for this run: register their declared tools into the
@@ -339,13 +306,11 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 		_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
 	}
 	executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
-	if permissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
-		mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err = registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot, executionRunner)
-		if err != nil {
-			return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
-		}
-		defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
+	mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err = registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot, executionRunner)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
 	}
+	defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
 	pluginActivation = activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
 	registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
 	if err := validateExecToolFilters(options, registry); err != nil {
@@ -613,12 +578,8 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	// warned, so --auto high silently ran without notice.
 	if permissionMode == agent.PermissionModeUnsafe {
 		reason := "--auto high"
-		switch {
-		case options.skipPermissionsUnsafe:
+		if options.skipPermissionsUnsafe {
 			reason = "--skip-permissions-unsafe"
-		case strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "unsafe"),
-			strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "high"):
-			reason = "--permission-mode unsafe"
 		}
 		writer.warning(fmt.Sprintf("Unsafe permissions are active for this run because %s was passed.", reason))
 		if writer.err != nil {
@@ -20,19 +20,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 		switch {
 		case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
 			return options, true, nil
-		case arg == "--permission-mode":
-			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
-			if err != nil {
-				return options, false, err
-			}
-			options.permissionMode = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-			index = next
-		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--permission-mode="):
-			value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--permission-mode")
-			if err != nil {
-				return options, false, err
-			}
-			options.permissionMode = value
 		case arg == "--skip-permissions-unsafe":
 			options.skipPermissionsUnsafe = true
 		case arg == "--list-tools":
@@ -184,8 +171,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 			options.reasoningEffort = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--reasoning-effort="))
 		case arg == "--use-spec":
 			options.useSpec = true
-		case arg == "--plan":
-			options.plan = true
 		case arg == "--spec-model":
 			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -452,27 +437,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 	if !options.useSpec && options.specReasoningEffort != "" {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--spec-reasoning-effort requires --use-spec."}
 	}
-	// Plan mode may be entered via --plan or --permission-mode plan. Combination
-	// guards must key off both: otherwise --permission-mode plan bypasses the
-	// worktree/unsafe/use-spec rejects that --plan alone enforces, and worktree
-	// prep mutates the filesystem before the read-only mode is assigned.
-	planMode := options.plan || strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "plan")
-	if planMode && options.useSpec {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use either --plan or --use-spec, not both."}
-	}
-	if planMode && options.skipPermissionsUnsafe {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use either --plan or --skip-permissions-unsafe, not both."}
-	}
-	if planMode && options.worktree {
-		// Worktree prep (copying/branching the workspace) runs before the plan
-		// permission mode is assigned, so it would happen even under plan mode's
-		// read-only, no-side-effects promise. Reject the combination outright
-		// rather than let a mutation slip in ahead of the mode gate.
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--plan cannot be combined with --worktree."}
-	}
-	if options.plan && options.permissionMode != "" && strings.ToLower(options.permissionMode) != "plan" {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--plan cannot be combined with --permission-mode=" + options.permissionMode + "."}
-	}
 	if options.initSessionID != "" && (options.resume != "" || options.resumeLatest) {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use --init-session-id only when creating or forking a session."}
 	}
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-)
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRecognizesPlanFlag(t *testing.T) {
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parseExecArgs: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !options.plan {
-		t.Fatal("expected --plan to set options.plan")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithUseSpec(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--use-spec", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not both") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--use-spec validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithSkipPermissionsUnsafe(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not both") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--skip-permissions-unsafe validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithWorktree guards against worktree
-// preparation (a filesystem mutation) running ahead of the plan mode gate:
-// options.worktree is processed in runExec before the plan permission mode is
-// assigned, so the combination must be rejected during option validation,
-// before any worktree prep can occur.
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithWorktree(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--worktree", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--worktree") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--worktree validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithNonPlanPermissionMode(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--permission-mode=ask", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--permission-mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--permission-mode validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--permission-mode=plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan with --permission-mode=plan to succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !options.plan || options.permissionMode != "plan" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected options.plan=true and permissionMode=plan, got plan=%v mode=%q", options.plan, options.permissionMode)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseExecArgsPermissionModePlanSharesCombinationGuards ensures the
-// combination rejects that key off --plan also fire for --permission-mode plan,
-// which reaches PermissionModePlan without setting options.plan.
-func TestParseExecArgsPermissionModePlanSharesCombinationGuards(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		args []string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{"worktree", []string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "--worktree", "draft a plan"}, "--worktree"},
-		{"use-spec", []string{"--permission-mode=plan", "--use-spec", "draft a plan"}, "not both"},
-		{"skip-permissions-unsafe", []string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "draft a plan"}, "not both"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			_, _, err := parseExecArgs(tc.args)
-			if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want) {
-				t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan / %s validation containing %q, got %v", tc.name, tc.want, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	// Bare --permission-mode plan (no conflicting flags) still parses.
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected bare --permission-mode plan to succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if options.permissionMode != "plan" || options.plan {
-		t.Fatalf("expected permissionMode=plan and plan=false, got mode=%q plan=%v", options.permissionMode, options.plan)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRunExecPlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing drives the real --plan
-// flag through runExec (via --list-tools, so no provider is needed) and
-// confirms write_file and bash — advertised under every other mode covered by
-// TestRunExecListToolsAppliesModeBeforeListing-style tests — are hidden,
-// mirroring the TUI /plan on gating end to end from the CLI entry point.
-func TestRunExecPlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing(t *testing.T) {
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--plan", "--list-tools"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	listing := stdout.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "Tools visible to model") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan --list-tools to list tools, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "read_file") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode to still list read_file, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	for _, hidden := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash"} {
-		if strings.Contains(listing, hidden) {
-			t.Fatalf("expected --plan to hide %q from the tool listing, got %q", hidden, listing)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRunExecPermissionModePlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing covers the
-// --permission-mode plan entry path, which does not set options.plan and must
-// still hide write and shell tools the same way --plan does.
-func TestRunExecPermissionModePlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing(t *testing.T) {
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--permission-mode", "plan", "--list-tools"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	listing := stdout.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "Tools visible to model") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan --list-tools to list tools, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "read_file") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode to still list read_file, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	for _, hidden := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash"} {
-		if strings.Contains(listing, hidden) {
-			t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan to hide %q from the tool listing, got %q", hidden, listing)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveExecPermissionModePlanOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	options := execOptions{autonomy: "low", plan: true}
-	mode, err := resolveExecPermissionMode(options)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("resolveExecPermissionMode: %v", err)
-	}
-	// resolveExecPermissionMode itself only resolves --auto; the --plan override
-	// is applied by the caller (runExec) afterward, same as --use-spec. This
-	// pins the precondition: --plan must not interfere with autonomy resolution.
-	if mode != agent.PermissionModeAuto {
-		t.Fatalf("resolveExecPermissionMode with --plan = %q, want auto (override applied by the caller)", mode)
-	}
-}
@@ -73,24 +73,6 @@ func toolListContains(names []string, want string) bool {
 }

 func resolveExecPermissionMode(options execOptions) (agent.PermissionMode, error) {
-	if pm := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode)); pm != "" {
-		switch pm {
-		case "plan":
-			return agent.PermissionModePlan, nil
-		case "spec-draft", "spec_draft":
-			return agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft, nil
-		case "auto":
-			return agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil
-		case "member", "member-auto", "member_auto":
-			return agent.PermissionModeMemberAuto, nil
-		case "ask":
-			return agent.PermissionModeAsk, nil
-		case "unsafe", "high":
-			return agent.PermissionModeUnsafe, nil
-		default:
-			return "", execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("Invalid permission mode %q. Expected plan, spec-draft, auto, member, ask, or unsafe.", options.permissionMode)}
-		}
-	}
 	// Validate --auto first, regardless of --skip-permissions-unsafe, so an
 	// invalid autonomy value is always rejected. (Previously the unsafe path
 	// short-circuited before validation, letting "--auto bogus" slip through
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -25,47 +24,12 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()

 	var heads, posts atomic.Int64
-	// Closed when the prewarm probe lands, so the turn can be held open until it
-	// does. See the POST handler for why that ordering has to be forced.
-	headSeen := make(chan struct{})
-	var headOnce sync.Once
-	var prewarmWaitTimedOut atomic.Bool
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		switch {
 		case r.Method == http.MethodHead:
 			heads.Add(1)
-			headOnce.Do(func() { close(headSeen) })
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
 		case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/chat/completions"):
-			// Hold the turn open until the prewarm probe arrives. The probe is
-			// issued on the run's context, and runExec cancels that context the
-			// moment it returns, because the stop function signalContext hands
-			// back is a CancelFunc. A probe that has not reached the wire by the
-			// end of the run therefore never reaches it at all. That is why the
-			// poll this replaced could not work at any deadline: once the run is
-			// over the probe is cancelled, not merely slow.
-			//
-			// This widens the window, it does not close it. Once the goroutine is
-			// scheduled it still has only prewarmTimeout to dial loopback and
-			// write the request, and that timeout is armed inside the goroutine
-			// itself, so holding the turn here cannot extend it. If this test
-			// ever fails again, prewarmTimeout is where to look, not this hold.
-			//
-			// No self-deadlock: the pinned transport leaves MaxConnsPerHost at 0,
-			// so the HEAD dials its own connection instead of queueing behind
-			// this held POST. Do not set a per-host connection limit there.
-			//
-			// Bounded, so a probe that genuinely never fires fails the assertion
-			// below with a useful message instead of hanging the test.
-			select {
-			case <-headSeen:
-			case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-				// Record it. A probe that shows up after this gave up would still
-				// leave heads at 1, so the count alone proves the probe was
-				// eventually received, not that it was ordered before the turn,
-				// which is the whole claim of this test.
-				prewarmWaitTimedOut.Store(true)
-			}
 			posts.Add(1)
 			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("data: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"done\"}}]}\n\n"))
@@ -111,13 +75,14 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := posts.Load(); got < 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("server saw %d chat-completions POSTs, want >= 1", got)
 	}
-	// Checked before the count, because the count cannot tell the two apart: a
-	// probe that arrived only after the guard expired still leaves heads at 1.
-	if prewarmWaitTimedOut.Load() {
-		t.Fatal("the turn was not held until the prewarm probe arrived; the probe did not precede it")
+	// The prewarm probe is asynchronous; it fires well before the model turn
+	// finishes, but poll rather than assuming scheduling order. The deadline
+	// exceeds the production prewarmTimeout (3s) so a slow probe cannot flake
+	// this assertion.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for heads.Load() == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
 	}
-	// No polling: the turn above could not complete until the probe landed, so
-	// the count is settled by this point.
 	if got := heads.Load(); got != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("server saw %d prewarm HEAD probes, want exactly 1", got)
 	}
@@ -142,15 +142,13 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) checkpoint(event sessions.Event) {
 }

 func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
-	modelOutput := result.ModelOutput()
-	display := result.HumanDisplay()
 	if writer.format == execOutputJSON {
 		payload := map[string]any{
 			"type":         "tool_result",
 			"tool_call_id": result.ToolCallID,
 			"name":         result.Name,
 			"status":       string(result.Status),
-			"output":       modelOutput,
+			"output":       result.Output,
 		}
 		if len(result.Meta) > 0 {
 			payload["meta"] = result.Meta
@@ -164,14 +162,14 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
 		if len(result.ChangedFiles) > 0 {
 			payload["changed_files"] = result.ChangedFiles
 		}
-		if display.Summary != "" || display.Kind != "" {
-			payload["display"] = map[string]string{"summary": display.Summary, "kind": display.Kind}
+		if result.Display.Summary != "" || result.Display.Kind != "" {
+			payload["display"] = map[string]string{"summary": result.Display.Summary, "kind": result.Display.Kind}
 		}
 		writer.writeJSON(payload)
 		return
 	}
 	if writer.format == execOutputStreamJSON {
-		output, surfaceTruncated := truncateForStreamJSONOutput(modelOutput)
+		output, surfaceTruncated := truncateForStreamJSONOutput(result.Output)
 		truncated := result.Truncated || surfaceTruncated
 		event := streamjson.Event{
 			Type:         streamjson.EventToolResult,
@@ -188,13 +186,13 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
 			redacted := true
 			event.Redacted = &redacted
 		}
-		if display.Summary != "" || display.Kind != "" {
-			event.Display = &streamjson.Display{Summary: display.Summary, Kind: display.Kind}
+		if result.Display.Summary != "" || result.Display.Kind != "" {
+			event.Display = &streamjson.Display{Summary: result.Display.Summary, Kind: result.Display.Kind}
 		}
 		writer.writeStreamJSON(event)
 		return
 	}
-	writer.writeStderr("[result] " + truncateForStatus(modelOutput) + "\n")
+	writer.writeStderr("[result] " + truncateForStatus(result.Output) + "\n")
 }

 func (writer *execEventWriter) permission(event agent.PermissionEvent) {
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func TestRunPluginsListsJSONAndText(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestRunHooksListsRedactedJSONAndText(t *testing.T) {
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	result := hooks.LoadResult{
 		Config: hooks.Config{
 			Enabled: true,
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func TestRunHooksAddRejectsUnknownEvent(t *testing.T) {

 func TestRunHooksAddJSONRedactsSecretArgs(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("z", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("z", 24)
 	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
 	code := runHooksAdd([]string{"h1", "--event", "beforeTool", "--command", "sh", "--arg", "-c", "--arg", "echo " + secret, "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, hooksManageDeps(cwd))
 	if code != exitSuccess {
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ func TestRunMCPRemovePreservesUnrelatedConfigFields(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRunMCPListRedactsURLCredentialsAndSensitiveQueryParams(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
 	serverURL := "https://user:[email protected]/mcp?access_token=secret-token&api_key=secret-key&safe=value#access_token=fragment-secret"
-	commandSecret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	commandSecret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -308,34 +308,6 @@ func runMCPCheck(ctx context.Context, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io
 	}
 	defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)

-	// A connect failure does not come back as err. RegisterTools is deliberately
-	// best-effort so one unreachable server cannot stop Zero launching: it records
-	// the failure on the runtime and returns nil. That is right for startup and
-	// wrong to ignore here, because this is the command a user runs precisely when
-	// a server is misbehaving, and reporting "is reachable" for a server that never
-	// started sends them looking somewhere else.
-	for _, skipped := range mcpRuntime.Skipped() {
-		if skipped.Name != serverName {
-			continue
-		}
-		message := fmt.Sprintf("MCP server %s is not reachable", serverName)
-		if skipped.Err != nil {
-			message = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", message, redaction.ErrorMessage(skipped.Err, redaction.Options{}))
-		}
-		if options.json {
-			payload := struct {
-				ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
-				Status     string `json:"status"`
-				Error      string `json:"error,omitempty"`
-			}{ServerName: serverName, Status: "unreachable", Error: message}
-			if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(payload, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
-				return exitCrash
-			}
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-		return writeAppError(stderr, message, exitCrash)
-	}
-
 	items := mcpToolList(registry)
 	if options.json {
 		payload := struct {
@@ -762,12 +734,14 @@ func (cfg *mcpWritableConfig) setServerDisabled(name string, disabled bool) (boo
 		switch {
 		case legacyFound:
 			raw = legacyRaw
+			found = true
 		case config.IsDefaultMCPServer(name):
 			// A built-in default server isn't written to the file until the user
 			// overrides it. Treat it as present with an empty base so disabling it
 			// writes a minimal {"disabled":true} entry that merges over the default —
 			// letting `zero mcp disable <default>` work even though it lives in code.
 			raw = nil
+			found = true
 		default:
 			return false, false, nil
 		}
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package cli

 import (
 	"bytes"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -220,81 +219,3 @@ func TestRunMCPCheckNormalizeError(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("want normalize error, got %q", got)
 	}
 }
-
-// TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer covers the case the command exists
-// for: a server that fails to start.
-//
-// RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a connect failure is recorded on
-// the runtime and registration returns nil. runMCPCheck used to inspect only
-// that nil error and then print "is reachable", which told the user their
-// broken server was fine. The command is spawned for real here rather than
-// stubbed, because the whole failure mode was a mismatch between what
-// registration returns and what it records.
-func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer(t *testing.T) {
-	setTrustConfigRoot(t)
-	deps := appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
-		resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
-			return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-				"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
-			}}, nil
-		},
-	}
-	var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
-	}
-	if got := out.String(); strings.Contains(got, "is reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check reported a failed server as reachable: %q", got)
-	}
-	if got := errBuf.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "not reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("want an unreachable error naming the server, got %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// The --json contract for an unreachable server, which the text case above does
-// not touch.
-//
-// The JSON branch is a separate return path with its own payload, so a caller
-// parsing it would otherwise be relying on a shape nothing pins: reverting the
-// check leaves it emitting status "ok" with a tool count, which is valid JSON
-// and completely wrong.
-func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServerJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	setTrustConfigRoot(t)
-	deps := appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
-		resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
-			return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-				"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
-			}}, nil
-		},
-	}
-	var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check --json must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
-	}
-	var payload struct {
-		ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
-		Status     string `json:"status"`
-		Error      string `json:"error"`
-		ToolCount  int    `json:"toolCount"`
-	}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode mcp check --json output %q: %v", out.String(), err)
-	}
-	if payload.ServerName != "broken" {
-		t.Fatalf("serverName = %q, want the server that was checked", payload.ServerName)
-	}
-	if payload.Status != "unreachable" {
-		t.Fatalf("status = %q, want %q", payload.Status, "unreachable")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(payload.Error, "not reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to say the server is not reachable", payload.Error)
-	}
-	// A reachable payload carries a tool count; an unreachable one must not
-	// imply zero tools were found, which reads as a server that simply exposes
-	// none.
-	if payload.ToolCount != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("toolCount = %d, want it absent from an unreachable payload", payload.ToolCount)
-	}
-}
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
@@ -14,7 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
 )
@@ -112,65 +109,6 @@ func TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestRunDoctorConnectivityUsesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
-	tokenPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "oauth-tokens.json")
-	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", t.TempDir())
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", tokenPath)
-	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: tokenPath})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("xai"), oauth.Token{
-		AccessToken: "oauth-doctor-token",
-		ExpiresAt:   time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("seed OAuth token: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	var gotAuth string
-	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[]}`))
-	}))
-	defer server.Close()
-
-	profile := config.ProviderProfile{
-		Name:         "xai",
-		CatalogID:    "xai",
-		ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
-		BaseURL:      server.URL + "/v1",
-		Model:        "grok-4",
-	}
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"doctor", "--connectivity"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return t.TempDir(), nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{
-				Provider:       profile,
-				Providers:      []config.ProviderProfile{profile},
-				ActiveProvider: profile.Name,
-			}, nil
-		},
-		probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
-		now:                 fixedCLITime("2026-07-29T20:00:00Z"),
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("doctor exit = %d, want success; stderr=%q\n%s", exitCode, stderr.String(), stdout.String())
-	}
-	if gotAuth != "Bearer oauth-doctor-token" {
-		t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want OAuth bearer", gotAuth)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "[pass] provider.connectivity") {
-		t.Fatalf("doctor did not report passing connectivity:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunDoctorConnectivityReportsProviderHealthFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ func TestProviderCatalogRuntimeProvidersShowOnboardingSetupHints(t *testing.T) {
 		{id: "openai", name: "OpenAI", transport: "openai", defaultModel: "gpt-4.1"},
 		{id: "groq", name: "Groq", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama-3.3-70b-versatile"},
 		{id: "longcat", name: "LongCat", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "LongCat-2.0"},
-		{id: "fireworks", name: "Fireworks AI", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "accounts/fireworks/models/kimi-k2p7-code"},
 		{id: "ollama-cloud", name: "Ollama Cloud", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "qwen3-coder:480b"},
 		{id: "ollama", name: "Ollama Local", transport: "openai-compatible", defaultModel: "llama3.1"},
 	}
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ func runProvidersDetect(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps
 func parseProviderDetectArgs(args []string) (providerDetectOptions, bool, error) {
 	options := providerDetectOptions{}
 	for _, arg := range args {
-		switch arg {
-		case "-h", "--help", "help":
+		switch {
+		case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
 			return options, true, nil
-		case "--json":
+		case arg == "--json":
 			options.json = true
 		default:
 			return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected argument %q", arg)}
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ type sandboxCommandOptions struct {
 	path      string
 }

-const permissionProfileScopeNote = "permissionProfile is derived from this process's environment and working directory; a command run with its own environment can add further credential deny-read entries."
-
 func runSandbox(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
 	if len(args) == 0 {
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "sandbox subcommand required. Use `zero sandbox policy` or `zero sandbox grants list`.")
@@ -93,25 +91,16 @@ func runSandboxPolicy(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps ap
 		return runSandboxPolicyEffective(options, workspaceRoot, policy, backend, plan, store.FilePath(), writeRoots, writeRootsErr, stdout)
 	}
 	if options.json {
-		// The profile here is built from Zero's own environment and working
-		// directory, because that is all this command has: no command has been
-		// chosen yet. A nested command carries its own cwd and env, and the
-		// credential baseline resolves relative token overrides against those, so
-		// an executed command can carry MORE denyReadIfExists entries than this
-		// view lists. Say so in the payload rather than leaving a consumer to
-		// assume it is the whole picture (see PermissionProfileFromPolicy).
 		payload := struct {
-			Policy                zeroSandbox.Policy      `json:"policy"`
-			Backend               zeroSandbox.Backend     `json:"backend"`
-			Plan                  zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
-			GrantsPath            string                  `json:"grantsPath"`
-			PermissionProfileNote string                  `json:"permissionProfileNote"`
+			Policy     zeroSandbox.Policy      `json:"policy"`
+			Backend    zeroSandbox.Backend     `json:"backend"`
+			Plan       zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
+			GrantsPath string                  `json:"grantsPath"`
 		}{
-			Policy:                policy,
-			Backend:               backend,
-			Plan:                  plan,
-			GrantsPath:            store.FilePath(),
-			PermissionProfileNote: permissionProfileScopeNote,
+			Policy:     policy,
+			Backend:    backend,
+			Plan:       plan,
+			GrantsPath: store.FilePath(),
 		}
 		if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, payload); err != nil {
 			return exitCrash
@@ -258,22 +247,20 @@ func runSandboxPolicyEffective(options sandboxCommandOptions, workspaceRoot stri
 			// JSON consumers see the same signal as the text write_roots_error
 			// line: a stale sandbox.additionalWriteRoots entry means the real
 			// entrypoints would refuse to launch, not run workspace-only.
-			WriteRootsError       string                  `json:"writeRootsError,omitempty"`
-			Policy                zeroSandbox.Policy      `json:"policy"`
-			Backend               zeroSandbox.Backend     `json:"backend"`
-			Plan                  zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
-			Guards                sandboxGuards           `json:"guards"`
-			GrantsPath            string                  `json:"grantsPath"`
-			PermissionProfileNote string                  `json:"permissionProfileNote"`
+			WriteRootsError string                  `json:"writeRootsError,omitempty"`
+			Policy          zeroSandbox.Policy      `json:"policy"`
+			Backend         zeroSandbox.Backend     `json:"backend"`
+			Plan            zeroSandbox.BackendPlan `json:"plan"`
+			Guards          sandboxGuards           `json:"guards"`
+			GrantsPath      string                  `json:"grantsPath"`
 		}{
-			WorkspaceRoot:         workspaceRoot,
-			WriteRoots:            writeRoots,
-			Policy:                policy,
-			Backend:               backend,
-			Plan:                  plan,
-			Guards:                guards,
-			GrantsPath:            grantsPath,
-			PermissionProfileNote: permissionProfileScopeNote,
+			WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
+			WriteRoots:    writeRoots,
+			Policy:        policy,
+			Backend:       backend,
+			Plan:          plan,
+			Guards:        guards,
+			GrantsPath:    grantsPath,
 		}
 		if writeRootsErr != nil {
 			payload.WriteRootsError = writeRootsErr.Error()
@@ -297,7 +284,6 @@ func formatEffectiveSandboxPolicy(workspaceRoot string, policy zeroSandbox.Polic
 		"network: " + string(policy.Network),
 		"enforce_workspace: " + fmt.Sprintf("%t", policy.EnforceWorkspace),
 		"write_roots: " + strings.Join(writeRoots, ", "),
-		"permission_profile_note: " + permissionProfileScopeNote,
 	}
 	if writeRootsErr != nil {
 		// Fail soft, visibly: a stale sandbox.additionalWriteRoots entry must
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
-	"runtime"
-	"sort"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

@@ -485,23 +483,14 @@ func TestTUISandboxSetupCommandGatedToWindowsNativeBackend(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields(t *testing.T) {
-	// Point all user-config roots at an empty directory so the platform-specific
-	// credential deny baseline can be asserted without leaking host paths into
-	// the platform-neutral golden comparison.
+	// Point HOME at an empty directory so the default credential-store
+	// deny-read entries (which depend on what exists in the real home, e.g.
+	// ~/.aws on the macOS CI image) cannot leak host paths into the golden
+	// comparison.
 	emptyHome := t.TempDir()
 	t.Setenv("HOME", emptyHome)
 	t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", emptyHome)
-	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", filepath.Join(emptyHome, ".config"))
-	t.Setenv("CLOUDSDK_CONFIG", "")
 	t.Setenv("GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS", "")
-	t.Setenv("NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG", "")
-	t.Setenv("npm_config_userconfig", "")
-	t.Setenv("GH_CONFIG_DIR", "")
-	t.Setenv("NETRC", "")
-	t.Setenv("DOCKER_CONFIG", "")
-	t.Setenv("KUBECONFIG", "")
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", "")
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", "")
 	store := newSandboxTestStore(t)
 	workspace := t.TempDir()
 	deps := appDeps{
@@ -529,7 +518,7 @@ func TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields(t *testing.T) {
 	got := stdout.String()
 	got = replacePathToken(got, workspace, "$WORKSPACE")
 	got = replacePathToken(got, store.FilePath(), "$GRANTS")
-	gotBytes := normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t, []byte(got), workspace, emptyHome)
+	gotBytes := normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t, []byte(got), workspace)
 	wantBytes, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "sandbox_policy_windows_unavailable.golden.json"))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read golden: %v", err)
@@ -539,7 +528,7 @@ func TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t *testing.T, gotBytes []byte, workspace string, emptyHome string) []byte {
+func normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t *testing.T, gotBytes []byte, workspace string) []byte {
 	t.Helper()
 	scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, nil)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -560,56 +549,6 @@ func normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t *testing.T, gotBytes []byte, worksp
 	plan, _ := value.(map[string]any)["plan"].(map[string]any)
 	profile, _ := plan["permissionProfile"].(map[string]any)
 	fileSystem, _ := profile["fileSystem"].(map[string]any)
-	wantDenyRead := []string(nil)
-	credentialHome := emptyHome
-	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
-		if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(emptyHome); err == nil {
-			credentialHome = resolved
-		}
-		wantDenyRead = []string{
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".aws"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".azure"),
-			// git's cleartext credential stores, in both the home and XDG
-			// layouts (#816). Listed here so the exported policy JSON is what
-			// catches a regression: this baseline is the contract a user reads
-			// with `zero sandbox policy --json`.
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".git-credentials"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".config", "git", "credentials"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".npmrc"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".netrc"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".kube", "config"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".docker", "config.json"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".config", "gh", "hosts.yml"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".config", "gcloud"),
-			filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".config", "zero"),
-		}
-	}
-	gotDenyRead := jsonStringSlice(fileSystem["denyReadIfExists"])
-	sort.Strings(gotDenyRead)
-	sort.Strings(wantDenyRead)
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(gotDenyRead, wantDenyRead) {
-		t.Fatalf("manager credential deny baseline = %#v, want %#v", gotDenyRead, wantDenyRead)
-	}
-	wantCarveouts := []string(nil)
-	wantEnsureDirs := []string(nil)
-	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
-		zeroDir := filepath.Join(credentialHome, ".config", "zero")
-		wantCarveouts = []string{
-			filepath.Join(zeroDir, "plugins"),
-			filepath.Join(zeroDir, "specialists"),
-			filepath.Join(zeroDir, "commands"),
-		}
-		wantEnsureDirs = []string{zeroDir}
-	}
-	if gotCarveouts := jsonStringSlice(fileSystem["denyReadCarveouts"]); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotCarveouts, wantCarveouts) {
-		t.Fatalf("manager credential carveouts = %#v, want %#v", gotCarveouts, wantCarveouts)
-	}
-	if gotEnsureDirs := jsonStringSlice(fileSystem["ensureDenyReadDirs"]); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotEnsureDirs, wantEnsureDirs) {
-		t.Fatalf("manager credential ensure dirs = %#v, want %#v", gotEnsureDirs, wantEnsureDirs)
-	}
-	delete(fileSystem, "denyReadIfExists")
-	delete(fileSystem, "denyReadCarveouts")
-	delete(fileSystem, "ensureDenyReadDirs")
 	fileSystem["readRoots"] = filterJSONStringRoots(fileSystem["readRoots"], tempRoots)
 	fileSystem["writeRoots"] = filterJSONWriteRoots(fileSystem["writeRoots"], tempRoots)
 	normalized, err := json.MarshalIndent(value, "", "  ")
@@ -619,22 +558,6 @@ func normalizeSandboxPolicyGoldenTempRoots(t *testing.T, gotBytes []byte, worksp
 	return append(normalized, '\n')
 }

-func jsonStringSlice(value any) []string {
-	values, ok := value.([]any)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		text, ok := value.(string)
-		if !ok {
-			return nil
-		}
-		out = append(out, text)
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 func filterJSONStringRoots(value any, excluded map[string]struct{}) any {
 	roots, ok := value.([]any)
 	if !ok {
@@ -797,8 +720,7 @@ func TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
 				Network            bool `json:"network"`
 				Workspace          bool `json:"workspace"`
 			} `json:"guards"`
-			GrantsPath            string `json:"grantsPath"`
-			PermissionProfileNote string `json:"permissionProfileNote"`
+			GrantsPath string `json:"grantsPath"`
 		}
 		if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("decode effective JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
@@ -815,9 +737,6 @@ func TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
 		if payload.Plan.SupportLevel != string(sandbox.BackendSupportUnavailable) || payload.GrantsPath == "" {
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected effective plan/grants: %#v %q", payload.Plan, payload.GrantsPath)
 		}
-		if payload.PermissionProfileNote != permissionProfileScopeNote {
-			t.Fatalf("permissionProfileNote = %q, want %q", payload.PermissionProfileNote, permissionProfileScopeNote)
-		}
 	})
 }

@@ -829,9 +748,6 @@ func TestEffectiveSandboxPolicyListsWriteRoots(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(output, "enforce_workspace: true\nwrite_roots: /ws, /extra") {
 		t.Fatalf("write_roots should directly follow enforce_workspace, got:\n%s", output)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(output, "permission_profile_note: "+permissionProfileScopeNote) {
-		t.Fatalf("effective text missing permission profile scope warning:\n%s", output)
-	}
 	if strings.Contains(output, "write_roots_error") {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected write_roots_error line without an error:\n%s", output)
 	}
@@ -286,11 +286,7 @@ func runSpecialistCreate(paths specialist.Paths, name string, options specialist
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
 	}
-	return writeSpecialistCreateResult(manifest, options.json, stdout, stderr)
-}
-
-func writeSpecialistCreateResult(manifest specialist.Manifest, jsonOutput bool, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
-	if jsonOutput {
+	if options.json {
 		if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, manifest); err != nil {
 			return exitCrash
 		}
@@ -299,11 +295,6 @@ func writeSpecialistCreateResult(manifest specialist.Manifest, jsonOutput bool,
 	if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Created specialist %s at %s\n", manifest.Metadata.Name, manifest.FilePath); err != nil {
 		return exitCrash
 	}
-	for _, warning := range manifest.Warnings {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: %s\n", warning); err != nil {
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-	}
 	return exitSuccess
 }

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/specialist"
 )

 func TestRunSpecialistListShowAndPath(t *testing.T) {
@@ -188,42 +187,6 @@ func TestRunSpecialistCreateDeleteAndEdit(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestWriteSpecialistCreateResultSurfacesWarningsOnlyForHumanOutput(t *testing.T) {
-	manifest := specialist.Manifest{
-		Metadata: specialist.Metadata{Name: "triage"},
-		FilePath: "/specialists/triage.md",
-		Warnings: []string{"replacement backup /specialists/.triage.bak retained: access denied"},
-	}
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	if code := writeSpecialistCreateResult(manifest, false, &stdout, &stderr); code != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("human output exit code = %d", code)
-	}
-	if got, want := stdout.String(), "Created specialist triage at /specialists/triage.md\n"; got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	if got, want := stderr.String(), "warning: replacement backup /specialists/.triage.bak retained: access denied\n"; got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if code := writeSpecialistCreateResult(manifest, true, &stdout, &stderr); code != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON output exit code = %d", code)
-	}
-	var payload specialist.Manifest
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if len(payload.Warnings) != 1 || payload.Warnings[0] != manifest.Warnings[0] {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON warnings = %#v", payload.Warnings)
-	}
-	if stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON warning duplicated to stderr: %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunSpecialistEditRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		t.Skip("symlink creation needs extra privileges on Windows")
@@ -100,6 +100,5 @@
      "shell commands are not wrapped by a native platform sandbox"
    ]
  },
-  "grantsPath": "$GRANTS",
-  "permissionProfileNote": "permissionProfile is derived from this process's environment and working directory; a command run with its own environment can add further credential deny-read entries."
+  "grantsPath": "$GRANTS"
 }
@@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ func runTrust(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) i
 func trustCurrentDir(stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
 	cwd, err := deps.getwd()
 	if err != nil {
-		// Flatten with %s: ErrorMessage stringifies inline, so %w would be a no-op.
-		return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(fmt.Errorf("resolve workspace: %s", err), redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
+		return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(fmt.Errorf("resolve workspace: %w", err), redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
 	}
 	if err := workspacetrust.Trust(cwd); err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
@@ -87,8 +86,7 @@ func trustRemove(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 	case 0:
 		cwd, err := deps.getwd()
 		if err != nil {
-			// Flatten with %s: ErrorMessage stringifies inline, so %w would be a no-op.
-			return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(fmt.Errorf("resolve workspace: %s", err), redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
+			return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(fmt.Errorf("resolve workspace: %w", err), redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
 		}
 		target = cwd
 	case 1:
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ Flags:
      --check                 Check the latest GitHub release without installing
      --apply                 Download, verify, and install the latest release
      --json                  Print the update result as JSON
-      --repo <owner/repo>     Repository to use when no endpoint is provided (--check and --apply; ignored for the install source by an npm-managed apply)
-      --endpoint <url|repo>   Release API URL or owner/repo slug to use (--check and --apply; ignored for the install source by an npm-managed apply)
+      --repo <owner/repo>     Repository to check when no endpoint is provided
+      --endpoint <url|repo>   Release API URL or owner/repo slug to check
      --timeout <duration>    Release check timeout (default 5s)
      --target <platform>     Release target to verify with --check (for example windows-x64); not valid with --apply
  -h, --help                  Show this help
@@ -244,19 +244,19 @@ func parseUsageArgs(args []string) (usageOptions, bool, error) {
 func FormatReport(report usage.Report, insertions int, deletions int) string {
 	var builder strings.Builder
 	builder.WriteString("Usage report (cost is a reconstructed estimate)\n\n")
-	fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%-12s %10s %14s %14s\n", "date", "requests", "tokens", "est. cost")
+	builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%-12s %10s %14s %14s\n", "date", "requests", "tokens", "est. cost"))
 	for _, bucket := range report.Buckets {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
-			bucket.Date, bucket.Requests, groupThousands(bucket.TotalTokens), formatUSD(bucket.TotalCost))
+		builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
+			bucket.Date, bucket.Requests, groupThousands(bucket.TotalTokens), formatUSD(bucket.TotalCost)))
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "\n%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
-		"total", report.Total.Requests, groupThousands(report.Total.TotalTokens), formatUSD(report.Total.TotalCost))
+	builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\n%-12s %10d %14s %14s\n",
+		"total", report.Total.Requests, groupThousands(report.Total.TotalTokens), formatUSD(report.Total.TotalCost)))

-	fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "\nnet LOC (estimate): +%d / -%d = %d\n",
-		insertions, deletions, report.NetLOC)
+	builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\nnet LOC (estimate): +%d / -%d = %d\n",
+		insertions, deletions, report.NetLOC))
 	if report.NetLOCPositive {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "tokens per net LOC: %.1f\n", report.TokensPerNetLOC)
-		fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "est. cost per net LOC: %s\n", formatUSD(report.CostPerNetLOC))
+		builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("tokens per net LOC: %.1f\n", report.TokensPerNetLOC))
+		builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("est. cost per net LOC: %s\n", formatUSD(report.CostPerNetLOC)))
 	} else {
 		builder.WriteString("tokens per net LOC: n/a (net LOC <= 0)\n")
 		builder.WriteString("est. cost per net LOC: n/a (net LOC <= 0)\n")
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
-	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ func TestRunWorktreesPrepareReportsErrors(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestRunWorktreesPrepareRedactsPathsInOutput(t *testing.T) {
-	secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
 	cwd := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), secret, "repo")
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(cwd, 0o700); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
@@ -154,194 +153,6 @@ func TestRunWorktreesPrepareRejectsDuplicateNames(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestRunWorktreesRelease(t *testing.T) {
-	worktreeDir := t.TempDir()
-	var releasedPath string
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", worktreeDir}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			releasedPath = path
-			return nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if releasedPath != worktreeDir {
-		t.Fatalf("released path = %q, want %q", releasedPath, worktreeDir)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), worktreeDir) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected confirmation output to mention path, got %q", stdout.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseNormalizesRelativePath(t *testing.T) {
-	// git worktree unlock matches against the path git recorded when the
-	// worktree was created, so a relative argument (resolved against
-	// whatever directory the caller happens to be running `zero` from) can
-	// fail to match. Chdir into a known directory and pass a relative
-	// argument to confirm it reaches releaseWorktree as an absolute path.
-	origWd, err := os.Getwd()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	parent := t.TempDir()
-	worktreeDir := filepath.Join(parent, "task-a")
-	if err := os.Mkdir(worktreeDir, 0o700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Chdir(parent); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if err := os.Chdir(origWd); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	// filepath.Abs resolves against os.Getwd, whose spelling of the temp dir
-	// can differ from t.TempDir()'s (macOS reports /private/var for /var), so
-	// derive the expected value through the same resolution instead of
-	// joining onto the lexical parent path.
-	expectedPath, err := filepath.Abs("task-a")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	var releasedPath string
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", "task-a"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			releasedPath = path
-			return nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if releasedPath != expectedPath {
-		t.Fatalf("released path = %q, want absolute %q", releasedPath, expectedPath)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseRequiresPath(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		releaseWorktree: func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error {
-			t.Fatal("releaseWorktree should not be called without a path")
-			return nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitUsage {
-		t.Fatalf("expected usage exit %d, got %d", exitUsage, exitCode)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "requires a worktree path") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected missing-path error, got %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseWiresWorkspaceCwd(t *testing.T) {
-	// Release only consults Options.Cwd when the worktree directory itself is
-	// already gone (deleted by hand instead of released); git then has to run
-	// from the source repository to clear the orphaned lock. The CLI must
-	// wire the resolved workspace root through, or that advertised recovery
-	// path runs git from a possibly non-repository directory and the lock is
-	// never cleared (Clean skips locked entries).
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	var gotCwd string
-
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", filepath.Join(root, "already-deleted")}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return root, nil },
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			gotCwd = options.Cwd
-			return nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if gotCwd != root {
-		t.Fatalf("release Options.Cwd = %q, want workspace root %q", gotCwd, root)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseHonorsExplicitCwd(t *testing.T) {
-	// The deleted-path recovery cannot derive the source repository from the
-	// worktree path (the directory is gone and its name is a one-way hash),
-	// so -C names it explicitly; the resolved root must reach Release as
-	// Options.Cwd regardless of where the command was launched.
-	launchDir := t.TempDir()
-	repoDir := t.TempDir()
-	var gotCwd string
-
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", "-C", repoDir, filepath.Join(repoDir, "already-deleted")}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return launchDir, nil },
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			gotCwd = options.Cwd
-			return nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if gotCwd != repoDir {
-		t.Fatalf("release Options.Cwd = %q, want explicit -C root %q", gotCwd, repoDir)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseReportsErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", "/no/such/worktree"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		releaseWorktree: func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error {
-			return errors.New("unlock git worktree: not a valid worktree")
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitUsage {
-		t.Fatalf("expected usage exit %d, got %d", exitUsage, exitCode)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "not a valid worktree") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected underlying error, got %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunWorktreesReleaseRedactsErrorText(t *testing.T) {
-	// Release errors interpolate the caller-supplied path (see
-	// verifyZeroOwnedWorktree's "refusing to release %s" messages); unlike the
-	// success path, which redacts before printing, the error was previously
-	// forwarded to stderr verbatim, so a rejected path containing a key-shaped
-	// segment would reach terminal/model-visible output unredacted.
-	secret := "sk-proj-abcDEF123_ghiJKL456-mnoPQR789stu"
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"worktrees", "release", "/tmp/" + secret + "/task"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		releaseWorktree: func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error {
-			return fmt.Errorf("refusing to release /tmp/%s/task: not a registered worktree of this repository", secret)
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitUsage {
-		t.Fatalf("expected usage exit %d, got %d", exitUsage, exitCode)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), secret) {
-		t.Fatalf("release error leaked unredacted key-shaped path: %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "[REDACTED]") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected redaction placeholder in error output, got %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunVerifyTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
 	plan := verify.Plan{Root: cwd, Checks: []verify.Check{{ID: "go.test", Name: "Go tests", Command: []string{"go", "test", "./..."}}}}
@@ -427,7 +238,7 @@ func TestRunVerifyTextAndJSON(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestRunVerifyRedactsWorkspacePathsInOutput(t *testing.T) {
-	secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
 	cwd := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), secret, "workspace")
 	if err := os.MkdirAll(cwd, 0o700); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
@@ -810,157 +621,6 @@ func TestRunExecWorktreeUsesPreparedWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestRunExecWorktreeReleasesLockAfterRun(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	worktreeDir := t.TempDir()
-	var releasedPath string
-	releaseCalls := 0
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--worktree", "task-a", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return root, nil },
-		prepareWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error) {
-			return worktrees.Result{Name: "task-a", Path: worktreeDir, RepoRoot: root, SourceBranch: "main", SourceCommit: "abc1234", LockAcquired: true}, nil
-		},
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			releaseCalls++
-			releasedPath = path
-			return nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			return echoExecProvider{}, nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	// A `zero exec --worktree` run is the only user of the worktree it prepares:
-	// its own process created it and is now exiting, so it must release the
-	// Prepare lock itself rather than leaving it locked forever (unlike `zero
-	// worktrees prepare`, which hands the path to a longer-lived external
-	// caller and has no such end-of-life signal to act on).
-	if releaseCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("releaseWorktree call count = %d, want 1", releaseCalls)
-	}
-	if releasedPath != worktreeDir {
-		t.Fatalf("released path = %q, want %q", releasedPath, worktreeDir)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunExecWorktreeKeepsLockItDidNotAcquire(t *testing.T) {
-	// Defense in depth: Prepare now rejects an in-use lease outright, so a
-	// successful result always reports LockAcquired=true. Should that ever
-	// change, exec must still only release the ownership its own invocation
-	// established; releasing a lock it did not acquire would clear another
-	// caller's lease and let a later Clean force-delete a live workspace.
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	worktreeDir := t.TempDir()
-	releaseCalls := 0
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--worktree", "task-a", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return root, nil },
-		prepareWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error) {
-			return worktrees.Result{Name: "task-a", Path: worktreeDir, RepoRoot: root, SourceBranch: "main", SourceCommit: "abc1234", Reused: true, LockAcquired: false}, nil
-		},
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			releaseCalls++
-			return nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			return echoExecProvider{}, nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if releaseCalls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("releaseWorktree call count = %d, want 0 for a lock this run did not acquire", releaseCalls)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunExecWorktreeSurfacesReleaseFailure(t *testing.T) {
-	// A failed unlock leaves a lock Clean permanently skips, recreating the
-	// disk leak silently; the failure must reach the user with the affected
-	// path so the leaked lock can be cleared by hand.
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	worktreeDir := t.TempDir()
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--worktree", "task-a", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return root, nil },
-		prepareWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error) {
-			return worktrees.Result{Name: "task-a", Path: worktreeDir, RepoRoot: root, SourceBranch: "main", SourceCommit: "abc1234", LockAcquired: true}, nil
-		},
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			return errors.New("unlock git worktree: boom")
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			return echoExecProvider{}, nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), worktreeDir) || !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "boom") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected release failure with path on stderr, got %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunExecWorktreeRedactsReleaseFailureText(t *testing.T) {
-	// The release path argument was already redacted before this diagnostic
-	// was added, but the error's own text was forwarded verbatim; Release's
-	// ownership errors interpolate the caller-supplied path (see
-	// verifyZeroOwnedWorktree), so a key-shaped path reaching this message
-	// leaked unredacted onto stderr.
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	worktreeDir := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-abcDEF123_ghiJKL456-mnoPQR789stu"
-
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--worktree", "task-a", "hello"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return root, nil },
-		prepareWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error) {
-			return worktrees.Result{Name: "task-a", Path: worktreeDir, RepoRoot: root, SourceBranch: "main", SourceCommit: "abc1234", LockAcquired: true}, nil
-		},
-		releaseWorktree: func(ctx context.Context, options worktrees.Options, path string) error {
-			return fmt.Errorf("refusing to release /tmp/%s/task: not a registered worktree of this repository", secret)
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-		newProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
-			return echoExecProvider{}, nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), secret) {
-		t.Fatalf("deferred release diagnostic leaked unredacted key-shaped path: %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "[REDACTED]") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected redaction placeholder in deferred release diagnostic, got %q", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunExecRejectsForkWithWorktree(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1060,7 +720,7 @@ func TestRunChangesCommitAuto(t *testing.T) {
 		Root:   cwd,
 		Branch: "main",
 		Files:  []zerogit.FileChange{{Path: "README.md", Status: "modified"}},
-		Diff:   "some diff content with ghp_1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz",
+		Diff:   "some diff content with ghp_SECRETKEYHERE",
 	}

 	mockProv := &mockCommitMsgProvider{
@@ -1108,7 +768,7 @@ func TestRunChangesCommitAuto(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	// Verify that secret in the diff was redacted
 	promptContent := mockProv.req.Messages[0].Content
-	if strings.Contains(promptContent, "ghp_1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") {
+	if strings.Contains(promptContent, "ghp_SECRETKEYHERE") {
 		t.Fatal("expected secret in diff to be redacted, but it was found in the prompt")
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(promptContent, "[REDACTED]") && !strings.Contains(promptContent, "REDACTED") {
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -64,9 +63,6 @@ func runWorktrees(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
 		}
 		return exitSuccess
 	}
-	if command == "release" {
-		return runWorktreesRelease(args, stdout, stderr, deps)
-	}
 	if command != "prepare" {
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown worktrees command %q", command))
 	}
@@ -106,85 +102,6 @@ func runWorktrees(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
 	return exitSuccess
 }

-// runWorktreesRelease unlocks a worktree `zero worktrees prepare` created, so
-// Zero's automatic Clean pass can reclaim it once it goes stale. Prepare locks
-// every worktree it creates and nothing else in that command's own lifetime
-// unlocks it (its process exits right after printing the path, long before
-// whatever external caller actually finishes using the worktree), so that
-// caller is responsible for running this once it is done.
-func runWorktreesRelease(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
-	var path string
-	var cwdFlag string
-	for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
-		arg := args[index]
-		switch {
-		case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
-			if err := writeWorktreesHelp(stdout); err != nil {
-				return exitCrash
-			}
-			return exitSuccess
-		case arg == "-C" || arg == "--cwd":
-			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
-			if err != nil {
-				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
-			}
-			cwdFlag = value
-			index = next
-		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--cwd="):
-			cwdFlag = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--cwd="))
-		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-"):
-			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unknown worktrees release flag %q", arg))
-		default:
-			if path != "" {
-				return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "worktree path was provided more than once")
-			}
-			path = arg
-		}
-	}
-	path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
-	if path == "" {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "worktrees release requires a worktree path")
-	}
-	// git worktree unlock matches against the path git recorded when the
-	// worktree was created, so a relative argument here (resolved against
-	// whatever directory the caller happens to be running in, not
-	// necessarily the worktree's own) can fail to match. Resolve to absolute
-	// up front so the unlock target is unambiguous regardless of cwd.
-	absPath, err := filepath.Abs(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, redactCLIString(err.Error()))
-	}
-	// Release falls back to Options.Cwd as git's working directory when the
-	// worktree directory itself was deleted by hand instead of released; with
-	// no Cwd wired in, that recovery path runs `git worktree unlock` from
-	// wherever the caller happens to be, which outside the source repository
-	// leaves the orphaned lock behind forever (Clean skips locked entries).
-	// -C/--cwd names the source repository explicitly for exactly that case,
-	// since the deleted worktree path itself carries no way back to the repo;
-	// without the flag, resolve the launch directory best-effort (the
-	// ordinary existing-path case does not need it, so a resolution failure
-	// is not an error here).
-	releaseOptions := worktrees.Options{}
-	if cwdFlag != "" {
-		workspaceRoot, err := resolveWorkspaceRoot(cwdFlag, deps)
-		if err != nil {
-			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, redactCLIString(err.Error()))
-		}
-		releaseOptions.Cwd = workspaceRoot
-	} else if workspaceRoot, rootErr := resolveWorkspaceRoot("", deps); rootErr == nil {
-		releaseOptions.Cwd = workspaceRoot
-	}
-	if err := deps.releaseWorktree(context.Background(), releaseOptions, absPath); err != nil {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, redactCLIString(err.Error()))
-	}
-	// Print the absolute path that was released so relative arguments still
-	// show an unambiguous target in the confirmation line.
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "released %s\n", redactCLIString(absPath)); err != nil {
-		return exitCrash
-	}
-	return exitSuccess
-}
-
 func runVerifyCommand(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
 	options, help, err := parseVerifyCommandArgs(args)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -869,28 +786,15 @@ func formatCommitResult(result zerogit.CommitResult) string {
 func writeWorktreesHelp(w io.Writer) error {
 	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
  zero worktrees prepare [flags] [name]
-  zero worktrees release [flags] <path>

 Prepares an isolated git worktree for a Zero task.

-prepare locks the worktree it creates so Zero's automatic cleanup never
-removes it out from under you. release unlocks a worktree prepare created,
-once you are done with it, so cleanup can reclaim it later if it goes stale.
-If the worktree directory was deleted by hand, run release with -C pointing
-at the source repository so the orphaned lock can still be cleared.
-
-prepare flags:
+Flags:
      --name <name>       Worktree name; defaults to a timestamped task name
      --dir <path>        Base directory for Zero worktrees
  -C, --cwd <path>        Source repository directory
      --json              Print JSON output
  -h, --help              Show this help
-
-release flags:
-  -C, --cwd <path>        Source repository directory; needed when the
-                           worktree directory was already deleted and you
-                           are not running inside the source repository
-  -h, --help              Show this help
 `)
 	return err
 }
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"os/exec"
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"time"
 )

@@ -18,11 +17,7 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {
 	stdout, stderr, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
-			// Report which phase ran out of time, and anything the command
-			// managed to say. This used to be a bare string with the underlying
-			// error and stderr both dropped, which left a user whose command was
-			// slow on a cold machine with nothing to act on.
-			return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after %s: %w%s", providerCommandTimeout, err, commandOutput(stderr))
+			return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command timed out after 5s")
 		}
 		return FileConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("provider command failed: %w%s", err, commandOutput(stderr))
 	}
@@ -45,111 +40,20 @@ func LoadProviderCommand(command string) (FileConfig, error) {

 var errProviderCommandTimeout = errors.New("provider command timeout")

-// providerCommandDrainGrace bounds how long the timeout path waits for cmd.Wait
-// to return after the process tree has been terminated. Terminate normally makes
-// that immediate; this exists so a descendant that refuses to die cannot extend
-// a call whose deadline has already expired.
-const providerCommandDrainGrace = 2 * time.Second
-
-// syncBuffer serialises the command's I/O pump against reads from this package.
-// On the timeout path runProviderCommand can return while cmd.Wait is still
-// draining, so the buffers outlive the call and a plain bytes.Buffer would be
-// read and written concurrently.
-type syncBuffer struct {
-	mu  sync.Mutex
-	buf bytes.Buffer
-}
-
-func (b *syncBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	return b.buf.Write(p)
-}
-
-// snapshot copies out what has been written so far. A copy rather than the
-// buffer's own slice, which the pump may still append to.
-func (b *syncBuffer) snapshot() []byte {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	return append([]byte(nil), b.buf.Bytes()...)
-}
-
-// awaitWithGrace waits for done and gives up after grace, reporting whether the
-// wait completed rather than expired.
-//
-// Split out from the timeout path so the bound can be asserted on its own. In
-// place it is effectively untestable: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait returns
-// promptly and an unbounded receive would behave identically in every test that
-// is not pathological, which is exactly how the old unbounded receive survived.
-func awaitWithGrace(done <-chan error, grace time.Duration) bool {
-	timer := time.NewTimer(grace)
-	defer timer.Stop()
-	select {
-	case <-done:
-		return true
-	case <-timer.C:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-// runProviderCommand runs a provider command under a real deadline.
-//
-// "Real" is the point: timeout used to bound only the wait, so the call could
-// take arbitrarily longer than it. Two phases sat outside it. Starting the
-// process ran before the clock began, and on Windows that is CREATE_SUSPENDED,
-// job-object creation and assignment, and a system-wide thread snapshot, none of
-// which is fast on a cold or contended machine. Draining after termination was
-// unbounded as well. Both are inside the budget now, so the deadline is an upper
-// bound rather than a floor.
 func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
 	cmd := shellCommand(command)
 	// Bound the time Wait spends draining I/O pipes after the process exits,
 	// in case an orphaned descendant still holds the write ends open.
 	cmd.WaitDelay = time.Second

-	stdout := &syncBuffer{}
-	stderr := &syncBuffer{}
-	cmd.Stdout = stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = stderr
+	var stdout bytes.Buffer
+	var stderr bytes.Buffer
+	cmd.Stdout = &stdout
+	cmd.Stderr = &stderr

-	// Armed before the process is started, so process creation is inside the
-	// budget rather than ahead of it.
-	deadline := time.NewTimer(timeout)
-	defer deadline.Stop()
-
-	type startResult struct {
-		proc *commandProcess
-		err  error
-	}
-	// Buffered, so the goroutine can finish and exit even when nobody is left
-	// waiting on it because the deadline already fired.
-	started := make(chan startResult, 1)
-	go func() {
-		proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
-		started <- startResult{proc: proc, err: err}
-	}()
-
-	var proc *commandProcess
-	select {
-	case result := <-started:
-		if result.err != nil {
-			return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), result.err
-		}
-		proc = result.proc
-	case <-deadline.C:
-		// The start is still in flight and will eventually hand back whatever it
-		// created, so cleanup is handed off rather than abandoned. Wait reaps the
-		// process; without it a started-but-orphaned command becomes a zombie.
-		go func() {
-			result := <-started
-			if result.err != nil {
-				return
-			}
-			result.proc.Terminate()
-			_ = cmd.Wait()
-			result.proc.Close()
-		}()
-		return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: starting the command exceeded %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
+	proc, err := startCommandProcess(cmd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
 	}
 	defer proc.Close()

@@ -158,6 +62,9 @@ func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte,
 		done <- cmd.Wait()
 	}()

+	timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
+	defer timer.Stop()
+
 	select {
 	case err := <-done:
 		if err != nil {
@@ -170,25 +77,13 @@ func runProviderCommand(command string, timeout time.Duration) ([]byte, []byte,
 			proc.Terminate()
 		}
 		if errors.Is(err, exec.ErrWaitDelay) {
-			// Wrap rather than replace. A descendant holding the inherited pipes
-			// open and the command never finishing at all are different failures
-			// that both collapsed into the same bare sentinel, which left callers
-			// and tests unable to tell which one happened. Callers that only ask
-			// errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) are unaffected, so the
-			// message LoadProviderCommand reports is unchanged.
-			return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errProviderCommandTimeout, err)
+			return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
 		}
-		return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), err
-	case <-deadline.C:
+		return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), err
+	case <-timer.C:
 		proc.Terminate()
-		// Bounded, unlike the bare receive this replaces. Terminate kills the
-		// tree so Wait almost always returns at once, but "almost always" was
-		// doing real work here: a tree that resists termination used to hold the
-		// call open indefinitely, long past the deadline that had just expired.
-		// Returning early leaves cmd.Wait running, which is why the buffers are
-		// synchronised.
-		awaitWithGrace(done, providerCommandDrainGrace)
-		return stdout.snapshot(), stderr.snapshot(), fmt.Errorf("%w: the command did not finish within %s", errProviderCommandTimeout, timeout)
+		<-done
+		return stdout.Bytes(), stderr.Bytes(), errProviderCommandTimeout
 	}
 }

@@ -197,10 +92,8 @@ func shellCommand(command string) *exec.Cmd {
 		if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(command), `"`) {
 			command = "call " + command
 		}
-		/* #nosec G204 -- Provider commands are intentionally evaluated by a shell to support features like pipes and env expansions. The command string originates from the user's trusted local config. */
 		return exec.Command("cmd", "/C", command)
 	}
-	/* #nosec G204 -- Provider commands are intentionally evaluated by a shell to support features like pipes and env expansions. The command string originates from the user's trusted local config. */
 	return exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)
 }

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package config
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"os"
-	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"runtime"
 	"strconv"
@@ -92,29 +91,6 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 	assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
 }

-// providerCommandTestBudget bounds the two background-child tests below, and is
-// deliberately NOT providerCommandTimeout. Those tests assert which error each
-// cmd.Wait path yields and that the leftover descendant is killed; neither is a
-// claim about how fast Windows can start a process. Driving them through
-// LoadProviderCommand billed the fixture's own startup to the production 5s
-// budget, so on a loaded runner the outer timer won the select in
-// runProviderCommand: the nonzero-exit test saw a timeout instead of the exit
-// status it asserts, and the timer's Terminate killed the background child
-// before it recorded its PID, putting the PID file permanently out of reach no
-// matter how long the assertion polled for it.
-//
-// This is a hang-breaker, not a tuned margin. Nothing in a healthy run waits on
-// it, since both tests return about one WaitDelay after the fixture exits.
-const providerCommandTestBudget = 60 * time.Second
-
-// backgroundChildLifetime must exceed providerCommandTestBudget so that a child
-// dying of old age is unobservable: any run where runProviderCommand has not
-// returned yet trips the budget first. That is what lets both tests drop their
-// old elapsed-versus-lifetime bounds. "Still alive when the call returned" is
-// now true by construction, so a child found dead afterwards can only have been
-// killed by proc.Terminate.
-const backgroundChildLifetime = 120 * time.Second
-
 // TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild covers a command that
 // exits immediately but leaves a detached child holding the inherited
 // stdout/stderr pipes open (e.g. `sleep 600 & exit`). cmd.Wait() only
@@ -122,22 +98,24 @@ const backgroundChildLifetime = 120 * time.Second
 // leftover child instead of just returning and leaking it.
 func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild(t *testing.T) {
 	pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg.pid")
+	childLifetime := 10 * time.Second
 	command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
 		Stdout:                 `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-command","model":"gpt-command"}`,
-		BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(backgroundChildLifetime / time.Second),
+		BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(childLifetime / time.Second),
 		BackgroundPidFile:      pidFile,
 	})

-	_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTestBudget)
+	start := time.Now()
+	_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
 	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("runProviderCommand() error = nil, want error from WaitDelay-bounded wait")
+		t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want error from WaitDelay-bounded wait")
 	}
-	// Name the exact path. The outer-timer path reports the bare sentinel, so
-	// matching only that, or the "timed out after 5s" text this test used to
-	// match, would also be satisfied by a slow runner taking precisely the path
-	// this test exists to rule out.
-	if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) || !errors.Is(err, exec.ErrWaitDelay) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errProviderCommandTimeout wrapping exec.ErrWaitDelay", err)
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "timed out after 5s") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want timeout", err.Error())
+	}
+	if elapsed >= childLifetime {
+		t.Fatalf("returned after %s, want before the background child finishes naturally after %s", elapsed, childLifetime)
 	}
 	assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
 }
@@ -150,56 +128,29 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChild(t *testing.T) {
 // be terminated on that path.
 func TestLoadProviderCommandTerminatesBackgroundChildOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bg-fail.pid")
+	childLifetime := 10 * time.Second
 	command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
 		Stderr:                 "boom",
 		ExitCode:               7,
-		BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(backgroundChildLifetime / time.Second),
+		BackgroundSleepSeconds: int(childLifetime / time.Second),
 		BackgroundPidFile:      pidFile,
 	})

-	_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, providerCommandTestBudget)
-	// The shell's own exit status has to survive. A timeout here means the
-	// budget swallowed it, which is exactly what this test kept reporting on CI.
-	if errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the shell's exit status rather than a timeout", err)
+	start := time.Now()
+	_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want failure from nonzero exit")
 	}
-	var exitErr *exec.ExitError
-	if !errors.As(err, &exitErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want *exec.ExitError from the nonzero exit", err)
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exit status") {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want exit status failure", err.Error())
 	}
-	if exitErr.ExitCode() != 7 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want 7", exitErr.ExitCode())
+	if elapsed >= childLifetime {
+		t.Fatalf("returned after %s, want before the background child finishes naturally after %s", elapsed, childLifetime)
 	}
 	assertProcessTerminated(t, pidFile)
 }

-func TestAssertProcessTerminatedWaitsForDelayedPIDFile(t *testing.T) {
-	pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "delayed.pid")
-	firstMissing := make(chan struct{})
-	writeDone := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		<-firstMissing
-		tempFile := pidFile + ".tmp"
-		if err := os.WriteFile(tempFile, []byte("2147483647\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-			writeDone <- err
-			return
-		}
-		writeDone <- os.Rename(tempFile, pidFile)
-	}()
-
-	missingObserved := false
-	assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t, pidFile, func() {
-		missingObserved = true
-		close(firstMissing)
-	})
-	if !missingObserved {
-		t.Fatal("PID file existed before the missing-file polling path was exercised")
-	}
-	if err := <-writeDone; err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write delayed pid file: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
 func assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
 	t.Helper()

@@ -216,41 +167,16 @@ func assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
 func assertProcessTerminated(t *testing.T, pidFile string) {
 	t.Helper()

-	assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t, pidFile, nil)
-}
-
-func assertProcessTerminatedAfterMissing(t *testing.T, pidFile string, onMissing func()) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
-	var data []byte
-	var err error
-	missingObserved := false
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		data, err = os.ReadFile(pidFile)
-		if err == nil {
-			break
-		}
-		if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-			t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file: %v", err)
-		}
-		if !missingObserved {
-			missingObserved = true
-			if onMissing != nil {
-				onMissing()
-			}
-		}
-		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(pidFile)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file before timeout: %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("read sleeper pid file: %v", err)
 	}
 	pid, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(data)))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("parse sleeper pid %q: %v", data, err)
 	}

-	deadline = time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second)
 	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		if !processAlive(pid) {
 			return
@@ -327,33 +253,8 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
 				"Set-Content -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(readyFile) + "' -Value ready -Encoding Ascii; " +
 				"Start-Sleep -Seconds " + itoa(script.BackgroundSleepSeconds)
 			lines = append(lines, "start /B powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+bgSleep+"\"")
-			// Wait for the child to record its PID before exiting, so the PID is
-			// on disk while the tree is still alive: runProviderCommand kills the
-			// tree one WaitDelay after the script exits, and a child that has not
-			// written by then never will.
-			//
-			// This waits in cmd itself. Spawning a second PowerShell just to poll
-			// cost another interpreter cold start, and that start is pure overhead
-			// added AFTER the PID is already written. On a loaded runner it pushed
-			// the script's exit past the 5s provider-command timeout, so the
-			// nonzero-exit test saw a timeout instead of the exit status it
-			// asserts. The wait is also bounded now: giving up and letting the PID
-			// assertion fail is far more diagnosable than blocking until the
-			// timeout fires and reporting an unrelated error. Each iteration is
-			// about a second, since `ping -n 2` sleeps between its two echoes,
-			// so the ceiling is roughly 15s: far longer than any cold PowerShell
-			// start seen on a runner, and far shorter than
-			// providerCommandTestBudget, so giving up surfaces a legible
-			// PID-file failure rather than a timeout that hides the real cause.
-			lines = append(lines,
-				":zeroWaitReady",
-				"if exist \""+readyFile+"\" goto zeroReady",
-				"set /a ZERO_READY_TRIES+=1",
-				"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ 15 goto zeroReady",
-				"ping -n 2 127.0.0.1 >nul",
-				"goto zeroWaitReady",
-				":zeroReady",
-			)
+			waitForReady := "while (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath '" + psSingleQuote(readyFile) + "')) { Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 10 }"
+			lines = append(lines, "powershell -NoProfile -Command \""+waitForReady+"\"")
 		}
 		lines = append(lines, "exit /b "+itoa(script.ExitCode))
 		if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(strings.Join(lines, "\r\n")), 0o700); err != nil {
@@ -414,133 +315,3 @@ func itoa(value int) string {
 	}
 	return string(digits[index:])
 }
-
-// The whole point of #811: providerCommandTimeout has to be an upper bound on
-// how long the call takes, not a floor. Process creation used to run before the
-// clock started and the post-termination drain was unbounded, so a slow or
-// contended machine could block startup for far longer than the error text
-// promised.
-//
-// This one guards the end-to-end contract against gross regressions. It is NOT
-// the assertion that pins the drain bound: Terminate kills the tree, so Wait
-// returns promptly and this passes even with the drain unbounded. That property
-// is pinned by TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp, and the start-phase bound by
-// TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline.
-func TestRunProviderCommandBoundsTotalDuration(t *testing.T) {
-	pidFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bound.pid")
-	command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{SleepSeconds: 60, PidFile: pidFile})
-
-	const budget = 2 * time.Second
-	start := time.Now()
-	_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, budget)
-	elapsed := time.Since(start)
-
-	if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
-	}
-	// Budget, plus the bounded drain, plus room for a loaded runner. A failure
-	// here means some phase is outside the deadline again, which is the bug.
-	ceiling := budget + providerCommandDrainGrace + 8*time.Second
-	if elapsed > ceiling {
-		t.Fatalf("returned after %s with a %s budget; the timeout is not bounding the call (ceiling %s)", elapsed, budget, ceiling)
-	}
-	assertProcessTerminatedIfStarted(t, pidFile)
-}
-
-// The timeout error has to carry something an operator can act on. It used to be
-// a bare string with the underlying error and the command's stderr both dropped,
-// so a user whose provider command was slow got no clue which phase ran out or
-// what the command had said.
-func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeoutReportsDiagnostics(t *testing.T) {
-	command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{
-		Stderr:       "provider is warming up",
-		SleepSeconds: 30,
-		PidFile:      filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "diag.pid"),
-	})
-
-	_, err := LoadProviderCommand(command)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("LoadProviderCommand() error = nil, want timeout")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "timed out") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want a timeout message", err.Error())
-	}
-	// Wrapped, so callers can still classify it.
-	if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want errors.Is against the timeout sentinel", err)
-	}
-	// And it must say which phase, rather than only that time ran out.
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "did not finish") && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to name the phase that exceeded the deadline", err.Error())
-	}
-}
-
-// The output buffers are written by cmd.Wait's I/O pump, which keeps running
-// after the timeout path has returned them to the caller, so a plain
-// bytes.Buffer would be read and written concurrently. Asserted on the buffer
-// directly: driving it end to end does not reliably produce the overlap, because
-// a terminated command usually stops writing before the snapshot is taken, so
-// such a test passes with the locking removed and proves nothing.
-//
-// Only meaningful under -race, which CI runs.
-func TestSyncBufferAllowsConcurrentWriteAndSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
-	buffer := &syncBuffer{}
-	writing := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		defer close(writing)
-		for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
-			_, _ = buffer.Write([]byte("x"))
-		}
-	}()
-	for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
-		_ = buffer.snapshot()
-	}
-	<-writing
-	if len(buffer.snapshot()) != 2000 {
-		t.Fatalf("buffer holds %d bytes, want 2000", len(buffer.snapshot()))
-	}
-}
-
-// The drain after termination must be bounded. Asserted directly on the helper,
-// because in place it is untestable without a tree that refuses to die: Wait
-// normally returns at once, which is precisely why an unbounded receive sat
-// there unnoticed. A channel that never fires is the pathological case made
-// cheap.
-func TestAwaitWithGraceGivesUp(t *testing.T) {
-	never := make(chan error)
-	start := time.Now()
-	if awaitWithGrace(never, 50*time.Millisecond) {
-		t.Fatal("reported completion for a wait that never finished")
-	}
-	if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > 5*time.Second {
-		t.Fatalf("gave up after %s, want roughly the grace period", elapsed)
-	}
-	// Still reports completion when the wait does finish, or the timeout path
-	// would always claim the tree hung.
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	done <- nil
-	if !awaitWithGrace(done, time.Second) {
-		t.Fatal("reported expiry for a wait that had already finished")
-	}
-}
-
-// Process creation has to be inside the budget. It used to run before the clock
-// started, and on Windows that phase is CREATE_SUSPENDED plus job-object setup
-// plus a system-wide thread snapshot, none of it fast on a contended machine.
-//
-// A budget that is already spent when the call begins can only be exceeded
-// during the start, so the phase named in the error is what distinguishes the
-// two orderings: with the clock started afterwards, the start would always
-// complete first and the failure would come from the wait instead.
-func TestRunProviderCommandCountsProcessStartAgainstTheDeadline(t *testing.T) {
-	command := writeCommand(t, commandScript{Stdout: `{"name":"cmd","provider":"openai","apiKey":"sk-x","model":"m"}`})
-
-	_, _, err := runProviderCommand(command, time.Nanosecond)
-	if !errors.Is(err, errProviderCommandTimeout) {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want the timeout sentinel", err)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "starting the command") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want the start phase to be the one that exceeded the deadline; "+
-			"anything else means process creation is outside the budget again", err.Error())
-	}
-}
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func mergeMCPServer(base MCPServerConfig, next MCPServerConfig, canReenable bool
 		// server the user explicitly enabled. The only layer allowed to
 		// override an explicit higher-scope decision is the CLI override scope
 		// (canReenable=true).
-		if canReenable || !baseDisabledSet || baseDisabled == next.Disabled {
+		if canReenable || !(baseDisabledSet && baseDisabled != next.Disabled) {
 			base.Disabled = next.Disabled
 		}
 	}
@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 		// here rather than in mergeConfig because that helper is shared with the
 		// trusted global-config merge, which must keep honouring the setting.
 		commandConfig.Sandbox.Enabled = nil
-		commandConfig.CrossSessionInbound = ""
 		mergeConfig(&cfg, commandConfig)
 	}

@@ -141,13 +140,6 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 			return ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid notify.focusMode %q: expected unfocused, always, or focused", focusMode)
 		}
 	}
-	if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
-		switch inbound {
-		case "accept", "hold", "refuse":
-		default:
-			return ResolvedConfig{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid crossSessionInbound %q: expected accept, hold, or refuse", inbound)
-		}
-	}
 	if err := validateSTTConfig(cfg.STT); err != nil {
 		return ResolvedConfig{}, err
 	}
@@ -162,20 +154,19 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 	}

 	return ResolvedConfig{
-		ActiveProvider:      active.Name,
-		Providers:           providers,
-		Provider:            active,
-		MaxTurns:            cfg.MaxTurns,
-		MCP:                 cfg.MCP,
-		Sandbox:             cfg.Sandbox,
-		Notify:              cfg.Notify,
-		Tools:               cfg.Tools,
-		Swarm:               cfg.Swarm,
-		Preferences:         cfg.Preferences,
-		KeyBindings:         cfg.KeyBindings,
-		LocalControl:        cfg.LocalControl,
-		STT:                 cfg.STT,
-		CrossSessionInbound: cfg.CrossSessionInbound,
+		ActiveProvider: active.Name,
+		Providers:      providers,
+		Provider:       active,
+		MaxTurns:       cfg.MaxTurns,
+		MCP:            cfg.MCP,
+		Sandbox:        cfg.Sandbox,
+		Notify:         cfg.Notify,
+		Tools:          cfg.Tools,
+		Swarm:          cfg.Swarm,
+		Preferences:    cfg.Preferences,
+		KeyBindings:    cfg.KeyBindings,
+		LocalControl:   cfg.LocalControl,
+		STT:            cfg.STT,
 	}, nil
 }

@@ -276,9 +267,6 @@ func mergeConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) {
 	mergeLocalControlConfig(&dst.LocalControl, src.LocalControl)
 	mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
 	mergeSTTConfig(&dst.STT, src.STT)
-	if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(src.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
-		dst.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
-	}
 }

 func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
@@ -337,9 +325,6 @@ func mergeProjectConfig(dst *FileConfig, src FileConfig) error {
 	if src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize != 0 {
 		dst.Swarm.MaxTeamSize = src.Swarm.MaxTeamSize
 	}
-	if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(src.CrossSessionInbound); inboundPolicyRank(inbound) > inboundPolicyRank(dst.CrossSessionInbound) {
-		dst.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
-	}
 	mergeKeyBindings(&dst.KeyBindings, src.KeyBindings)
 	// Local control is intentionally user-config/override only. A cloned project
 	// must not be able to make browser, desktop, or terminal automation tools
@@ -742,9 +727,6 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
 	mergeLocalControlConfig(&cfg.LocalControl, overrides.LocalControl)
 	mergeKeyBindings(&cfg.KeyBindings, overrides.KeyBindings)
 	mergeSTTConfig(&cfg.STT, overrides.STT)
-	if inbound := strings.TrimSpace(overrides.CrossSessionInbound); inbound != "" {
-		cfg.CrossSessionInbound = inbound
-	}
 	for _, provider := range overrides.Providers {
 		mergeProvider(cfg, provider)
 	}
@@ -754,19 +736,6 @@ func applyOverrides(cfg *FileConfig, overrides Overrides) {
 	mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, overrides.MCP, true)
 }

-func inboundPolicyRank(policy string) int {
-	switch strings.TrimSpace(policy) {
-	case "refuse":
-		return 3
-	case "hold":
-		return 2
-	case "accept":
-		return 0
-	default:
-		return 1 // permission-mode parity
-	}
-}
-
 func mergeLocalControlConfig(dst *LocalControlConfig, src LocalControlConfig) {
 	if src.enabledSet {
 		dst.Enabled = src.Enabled
@@ -2199,40 +2199,3 @@ func TestResolveRequiresModelErrorIsSetupFixable(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("error leaked API key: %q", err.Error())
 	}
 }
-
-func TestCrossSessionInboundProjectConfigCanOnlyTighten(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name    string
-		user    string
-		project string
-		want    string
-	}{
-		{name: "hold tightens accept", user: "accept", project: "hold", want: "hold"},
-		{name: "refuse stays refuse", user: "refuse", project: "accept", want: "refuse"},
-		{name: "accept cannot weaken parity", project: "accept", want: ""},
-		{name: "refuse tightens parity", project: "refuse", want: "refuse"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			cfg := FileConfig{CrossSessionInbound: test.user}
-			if err := mergeProjectConfig(&cfg, FileConfig{CrossSessionInbound: test.project}); err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if cfg.CrossSessionInbound != test.want {
-				t.Fatalf("crossSessionInbound = %q, want %q", cfg.CrossSessionInbound, test.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveRejectsInvalidCrossSessionInbound(t *testing.T) {
-	path := writeConfig(t, `{
-		"activeProvider": "openai",
-		"providers": [{"name":"openai","provider_kind":"openai","apiKey":"sk-x","model":"gpt-5"}],
-		"crossSessionInbound": "sometimes"
-	}`)
-	_, err := Resolve(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path, Env: map[string]string{}})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "expected accept, hold, or refuse") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ type PreferencesConfig struct {
 	// ZERO_THEME, so a /theme choice survives restart. Empty = unset (defaults auto).
 	Theme string `json:"theme,omitempty"`
 	// Recaps is a tri-state: nil (unset) defaults to ON; an explicit false means
-	// the user turned idle recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
+	// the user turned post-turn recaps off. A *bool is its own tri-state, so no
 	// custom unmarshal is needed (unlike ToolsConfig.DeferThreshold's int).
 	Recaps *bool `json:"recaps,omitempty"`
 }
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ type RecentModelEntry struct {
 // MaxRecentModels caps the persisted/displayed recent-selection history.
 const MaxRecentModels = 5

-// RecapsEnabled reports whether idle recaps are on. Unset defaults to ON.
+// RecapsEnabled reports whether post-turn recaps are on. Unset defaults to ON.
 func (p PreferencesConfig) RecapsEnabled() bool {
 	return p.Recaps == nil || *p.Recaps
 }
@@ -340,49 +340,46 @@ func (cfg *ToolsConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 }

 type FileConfig struct {
-	ActiveProvider      string             `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
-	Providers           []ProviderProfile  `json:"providers,omitempty"`
-	MaxTurns            int                `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
-	MCP                 MCPConfig          `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
-	Sandbox             SandboxConfig      `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
-	Notify              NotifyConfig       `json:"notify,omitempty"`
-	Tools               ToolsConfig        `json:"tools,omitempty"`
-	Swarm               SwarmConfig        `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
-	Preferences         PreferencesConfig  `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
-	KeyBindings         KeyBindingsConfig  `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
-	LocalControl        LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
-	STT                 STTConfig          `json:"stt,omitempty"`
-	CrossSessionInbound string             `json:"crossSessionInbound,omitempty"`
+	ActiveProvider string             `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
+	Providers      []ProviderProfile  `json:"providers,omitempty"`
+	MaxTurns       int                `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
+	MCP            MCPConfig          `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
+	Sandbox        SandboxConfig      `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
+	Notify         NotifyConfig       `json:"notify,omitempty"`
+	Tools          ToolsConfig        `json:"tools,omitempty"`
+	Swarm          SwarmConfig        `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
+	Preferences    PreferencesConfig  `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig  `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
+	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
+	STT            STTConfig          `json:"stt,omitempty"`
 }

 func (cfg FileConfig) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
 	type rawConfig struct {
-		ActiveProvider      string              `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
-		Providers           []ProviderProfile   `json:"providers,omitempty"`
-		MaxTurns            int                 `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
-		MCP                 MCPConfig           `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
-		Sandbox             SandboxConfig       `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
-		Notify              NotifyConfig        `json:"notify,omitempty"`
-		Tools               ToolsConfig         `json:"tools,omitempty"`
-		Swarm               SwarmConfig         `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
-		Preferences         PreferencesConfig   `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
-		KeyBindings         KeyBindingsConfig   `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
-		LocalControl        *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
-		STT                 *STTConfig          `json:"stt,omitempty"`
-		CrossSessionInbound string              `json:"crossSessionInbound,omitempty"`
+		ActiveProvider string              `json:"activeProvider,omitempty"`
+		Providers      []ProviderProfile   `json:"providers,omitempty"`
+		MaxTurns       int                 `json:"maxTurns,omitempty"`
+		MCP            MCPConfig           `json:"mcp,omitempty"`
+		Sandbox        SandboxConfig       `json:"sandbox,omitempty"`
+		Notify         NotifyConfig        `json:"notify,omitempty"`
+		Tools          ToolsConfig         `json:"tools,omitempty"`
+		Swarm          SwarmConfig         `json:"swarm,omitempty"`
+		Preferences    PreferencesConfig   `json:"preferences,omitempty"`
+		KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig   `json:"keybindings,omitempty"`
+		LocalControl   *LocalControlConfig `json:"localControl,omitempty"`
+		STT            *STTConfig          `json:"stt,omitempty"`
 	}
 	raw := rawConfig{
-		ActiveProvider:      cfg.ActiveProvider,
-		Providers:           cfg.Providers,
-		MaxTurns:            cfg.MaxTurns,
-		MCP:                 cfg.MCP,
-		Sandbox:             cfg.Sandbox,
-		Notify:              cfg.Notify,
-		Tools:               cfg.Tools,
-		Swarm:               cfg.Swarm,
-		Preferences:         cfg.Preferences,
-		KeyBindings:         cfg.KeyBindings,
-		CrossSessionInbound: cfg.CrossSessionInbound,
+		ActiveProvider: cfg.ActiveProvider,
+		Providers:      cfg.Providers,
+		MaxTurns:       cfg.MaxTurns,
+		MCP:            cfg.MCP,
+		Sandbox:        cfg.Sandbox,
+		Notify:         cfg.Notify,
+		Tools:          cfg.Tools,
+		Swarm:          cfg.Swarm,
+		Preferences:    cfg.Preferences,
+		KeyBindings:    cfg.KeyBindings,
 	}
 	if !cfg.LocalControl.Empty() {
 		raw.LocalControl = &cfg.LocalControl
@@ -407,35 +404,33 @@ type ResolveOptions struct {
 }

 type Overrides struct {
-	ActiveProvider      string
-	Providers           []ProviderProfile
-	Provider            ProviderProfile
-	MaxTurns            int
-	MCP                 MCPConfig
-	Sandbox             SandboxConfig
-	Notify              NotifyConfig
-	Tools               ToolsConfig
-	KeyBindings         KeyBindingsConfig
-	LocalControl        LocalControlConfig
-	STT                 STTConfig
-	CrossSessionInbound string
+	ActiveProvider string
+	Providers      []ProviderProfile
+	Provider       ProviderProfile
+	MaxTurns       int
+	MCP            MCPConfig
+	Sandbox        SandboxConfig
+	Notify         NotifyConfig
+	Tools          ToolsConfig
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig
+	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig
+	STT            STTConfig
 }

 type ResolvedConfig struct {
-	ActiveProvider      string
-	Providers           []ProviderProfile
-	Provider            ProviderProfile
-	MaxTurns            int
-	MCP                 MCPConfig
-	Sandbox             SandboxConfig
-	Notify              NotifyConfig
-	Tools               ToolsConfig
-	Swarm               SwarmConfig
-	Preferences         PreferencesConfig
-	KeyBindings         KeyBindingsConfig
-	LocalControl        LocalControlConfig
-	STT                 STTConfig
-	CrossSessionInbound string
+	ActiveProvider string
+	Providers      []ProviderProfile
+	Provider       ProviderProfile
+	MaxTurns       int
+	MCP            MCPConfig
+	Sandbox        SandboxConfig
+	Notify         NotifyConfig
+	Tools          ToolsConfig
+	Swarm          SwarmConfig
+	Preferences    PreferencesConfig
+	KeyBindings    KeyBindingsConfig
+	LocalControl   LocalControlConfig
+	STT            STTConfig
 }

 type MCPConfig struct {
@@ -485,21 +480,20 @@ type MCPOAuthConfig struct {

 func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 	type rawConfig struct {
-		ActiveProvider      string                     `json:"activeProvider"`
-		Providers           []ProviderProfile          `json:"providers"`
-		MaxTurns            int                        `json:"maxTurns"`
-		MCP                 MCPConfig                  `json:"mcp"`
-		Sandbox             SandboxConfig              `json:"sandbox"`
-		Notify              NotifyConfig               `json:"notify"`
-		Tools               ToolsConfig                `json:"tools"`
-		Swarm               SwarmConfig                `json:"swarm"`
-		Preferences         PreferencesConfig          `json:"preferences"`
-		KeyBindings         KeyBindingsConfig          `json:"keybindings"`
-		LocalControl        LocalControlConfig         `json:"localControl"`
-		STT                 STTConfig                  `json:"stt"`
-		CrossSessionInbound string                     `json:"crossSessionInbound"`
-		MCPServers          map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
-		MCPServersSnake     map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
+		ActiveProvider  string                     `json:"activeProvider"`
+		Providers       []ProviderProfile          `json:"providers"`
+		MaxTurns        int                        `json:"maxTurns"`
+		MCP             MCPConfig                  `json:"mcp"`
+		Sandbox         SandboxConfig              `json:"sandbox"`
+		Notify          NotifyConfig               `json:"notify"`
+		Tools           ToolsConfig                `json:"tools"`
+		Swarm           SwarmConfig                `json:"swarm"`
+		Preferences     PreferencesConfig          `json:"preferences"`
+		KeyBindings     KeyBindingsConfig          `json:"keybindings"`
+		LocalControl    LocalControlConfig         `json:"localControl"`
+		STT             STTConfig                  `json:"stt"`
+		MCPServers      map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcpServers"`
+		MCPServersSnake map[string]MCPServerConfig `json:"mcp_servers"`
 	}

 	var raw rawConfig
@@ -526,7 +520,6 @@ func (cfg *FileConfig) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
 	cfg.KeyBindings = raw.KeyBindings
 	cfg.LocalControl = raw.LocalControl
 	cfg.STT = raw.STT
-	cfg.CrossSessionInbound = raw.CrossSessionInbound
 	if cfg.MCP.Servers == nil && (len(raw.MCPServers) > 0 || len(raw.MCPServersSnake) > 0) {
 		cfg.MCP.Servers = map[string]MCPServerConfig{}
 	}
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ func SetRecentModels(path string, entries []RecentModelEntry) (FileConfig, error
 	return cfg, nil
 }

-// SetRecapsEnabled persists the idle recap preference, mirroring
+// SetRecapsEnabled persists the post-turn recap preference, mirroring
 // SetFavoriteModels (read-modify-atomic-write).
 func SetRecapsEnabled(path string, enabled bool) (FileConfig, error) {
 	path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ type Options struct {
 	Provider            config.ProviderProfile
 	Registry            *tools.Registry
 	ContextWindow       int
-	DeferThreshold      int
 	ProjectContextFiles []string
 }

@@ -57,8 +56,6 @@ type Report struct {
 	FreeTokens           int        `json:"freeTokens"`
 	UsedFraction         float64    `json:"usedFraction"`
 	ToolCount            int        `json:"toolCount"`
-	AvailableToolCount   int        `json:"availableToolCount,omitempty"`
-	DeferredToolCount    int        `json:"deferredToolCount,omitempty"`
 	ProjectGuidelineFile string     `json:"projectGuidelineFile,omitempty"`
 	Categories           []Category `json:"categories"`
 }
@@ -116,10 +113,8 @@ func Build(options Options) (Report, error) {
 		categories = append(categories, category(CategoryWorkspaceMap, "Workspace map", estimateTextTokens(workspaceMap), report.ContextWindow))
 	}

-	toolCount, availableTools, deferredTools, toolTokens := estimateRegistryTools(options.Registry, options.DeferThreshold)
+	toolCount, toolTokens := estimateRegistryTools(options.Registry)
 	report.ToolCount = toolCount
-	report.AvailableToolCount = availableTools
-	report.DeferredToolCount = deferredTools
 	if toolTokens > 0 {
 		categories = append(categories, category(CategoryTools, "Tools", toolTokens, report.ContextWindow))
 	}
@@ -180,11 +175,7 @@ func Format(report Report) string {
 		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("usage: %s tokens (context window unknown)", compactNumber(report.UsedTokens)))
 	}
 	if report.ToolCount > 0 {
-		toolLine := fmt.Sprintf("tools: %d exposed", report.ToolCount)
-		if report.AvailableToolCount > report.ToolCount {
-			toolLine += fmt.Sprintf(", %d available, %d deferred", report.AvailableToolCount, report.DeferredToolCount)
-		}
-		lines = append(lines, toolLine)
+		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("tools: %d", report.ToolCount))
 	}
 	if report.ProjectGuidelineFile != "" {
 		lines = append(lines, "project_guidelines: "+report.ProjectGuidelineFile)
@@ -221,51 +212,29 @@ func category(key string, name string, tokens int, contextWindow int) Category {
 	return cat
 }

-func estimateRegistryTools(registry *tools.Registry, deferThreshold int) (int, int, int, int) {
+func estimateRegistryTools(registry *tools.Registry) (int, int) {
 	if registry == nil {
-		return 0, 0, 0, 0
+		return 0, 0
 	}
 	all := registry.All()
 	sort.Slice(all, func(left int, right int) bool {
 		return all[left].Name() < all[right].Name()
 	})
-	var visible []tools.Tool
-	var deferred []tools.Tool
+	total := 0
+	count := 0
 	for _, tool := range all {
 		if tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionDeny {
 			continue
 		}
-		visible = append(visible, tool)
-		if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
-			deferred = append(deferred, tool)
-		}
-	}
-	active := deferThreshold > 0 && len(deferred) >= deferThreshold
-	exposed := visible
-	if active {
-		exposed = make([]tools.Tool, 0, len(visible)-len(deferred)+1)
-		for _, tool := range visible {
-			if !tools.IsDeferred(tool) && tool.Name() != tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-				exposed = append(exposed, tool)
-			}
-		}
-		exposed = append(exposed, tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
-	}
-
-	total := 0
-	for _, tool := range exposed {
+		count++
 		total += estimateTextTokens(tool.Name())
-		description := tool.Description()
-		if active && tool.Name() == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-			description = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferred)
-		}
-		total += estimateTextTokens(description)
+		total += estimateTextTokens(tool.Description())
 		if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters()); err == nil {
 			total += estimateTextTokens(string(encoded))
 		}
 		total += toolDefinitionOverheadTokens
 	}
-	return len(exposed), len(visible), len(deferred), total
+	return count, total
 }

 func readProjectGuidelines(root string, names []string) (string, string) {
@@ -130,35 +130,6 @@ func TestBuildHasStableJSONContractAndCategoryMath(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestBuildReportsInitialDeferredToolSurface(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(root, nil) {
-		registry.Register(tool)
-	}
-
-	eager, err := Build(Options{WorkspaceRoot: root, Registry: registry})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	deferred, err := Build(Options{WorkspaceRoot: root, Registry: registry, DeferThreshold: 3})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if deferred.DeferredToolCount < 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("DeferredToolCount = %d, want at least 3", deferred.DeferredToolCount)
-	}
-	if deferred.AvailableToolCount != eager.ToolCount {
-		t.Fatalf("available tools = %d, want eager total %d", deferred.AvailableToolCount, eager.ToolCount)
-	}
-	if deferred.ToolCount >= deferred.AvailableToolCount {
-		t.Fatalf("initial exposed tools = %d, available = %d; expected a smaller initial surface", deferred.ToolCount, deferred.AvailableToolCount)
-	}
-	if categoryByKey(deferred, CategoryTools).Tokens >= categoryByKey(eager, CategoryTools).Tokens {
-		t.Fatalf("deferred tool schemas did not reduce the initial context")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestBuildClampsFreeBudgetWhenOverContextWindow(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeTestFile(t, root, "AGENTS.md", strings.Repeat("very large project rule\n", 1000))