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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kevin Codex 2e2c181d28 fix: surface competing block-anchor spans; make write-barrier test observe cross-probe order
- edit_file: blockAnchorReplacer now returns every span clearing the
  similarity threshold (best first) instead of silently picking the
  single most-similar block. Hiding competitors from the cascade's
  distinct-candidate check could edit the wrong block when two blocks
  share anchors and both interiors are plausible; one clear winner still
  resolves, two plausible blocks now report ambiguity (covered by a
  two-block test that asserts the file is untouched).
- agent tests: the parallel write-barrier test now records both probes
  into one mutex-guarded shared log and asserts the cross-probe ordering
  it always claimed to (write starts after the first read batch ends;
  second read batch starts after the write ends). The previous version
  only compared indices within the read probe's own log, which a
  regression letting the write overlap a batch could still pass; the
  stray no-op mutex assignment is gone.
2026-07-05 17:16:24 +08:00
Kevin Codex 4643dc9348 fix: address review round 2 — permission-event race, fuzzy ambiguity, spill reachability
- agent: serialize OnPermission behind the same mutex as
  OnPermissionRequest in the parallel read batch. buildPermissionEvent
  fires for batched reads with a non-trivial sandbox decision (e.g. a
  grant-matched extra root), and front-end handlers append to shared
  session-recording state without their own locking — two batched reads
  emitting concurrently was a data race the pre-batch serial loop never
  allowed.
- edit_file: reject two or more DISTINCT candidate spans from one fuzzy
  strategy as ambiguous instead of silently editing the first. Duplicate
  blocks at different indentation each resolve to a unique literal, so
  the previous occurrence-uniqueness check passed and wrote the wrong
  span. A single candidate occurring at multiple positions still
  cascades to stricter strategies as before.
- tools: make spill files actually reachable by the recovery path the
  truncation notice advertises — resolveScopedReadPath now recognizes
  files inside the per-uid spill dir (containment verified after symlink
  resolution, so a planted link cannot smuggle an out-of-scope file
  through the gate); read_file/grep can follow the notice instead of
  re-running the command.
2026-07-05 16:57:39 +08:00
Kevin Codex 57e34c790d fix: address PR review feedback on fuzzy edits, diagnostics, spill
- edit_file: adapt the replacement to the fuzzy-resolved span — when the
  span is a uniformly deeper-indented copy of old_string (line-trimmed /
  indentation-flexible matches), the same indentation delta is applied to
  new_string, and a span ending in a bare CR keeps its CR so CRLF files
  never gain a mixed line ending; block-anchor matches with drifted
  interiors are deliberately left untouched
- diagnostics: render workspace-relative paths in inline post-edit
  diagnostics (base name outside the workspace) so absolute paths never
  leak the local username or directory layout into the model prompt or
  session transcript
- spill: harden the spill directory for shared temp dirs — per-uid name,
  reject symlinked or non-directory paths (MkdirAll follows symlinks),
  and on Unix require current-user ownership
- bash: the branch's output cap and truncation-flag threading are
  superseded by main's capture-time bounding (boundedBuffer +
  budgetBashCapture), which already sets Result.Truncated; this rebase
  adopts that design and keeps spill-to-disk on exec_command, where the
  full output is still buffered and a spill is genuinely complete
2026-07-05 16:47:18 +08:00
Kevin Codex d0ae9c98e3 feat: agent quality, caching, retry, and tooling upgrades
Ten self-contained improvements to the core agent engine and tools:

- edit_file: fuzzy fallback matching (7-strategy cascade with uniqueness
  protection and a disproportion guard) when old_string does not match
  byte-for-byte; exact match remains the fast path
- edit_file/write_file: inline error-severity LSP diagnostics in tool
  output so the model sees a break it introduced in the same turn
- lsp: expand server registry from 4 to 28 languages; doctor grades only
  tier-1 servers and lists the long tail informationally
- agent: consecutive read-only tool calls execute concurrently (bounded
  at 8), consumed in original order, never spanning a mutating call
- anthropic: cache_control breakpoints on the last two conversation
  messages so the transcript prefix stays a prompt-cache hit
- providerio: retry schedule raised to 6 attempts with exponential
  2s-30s backoff when the server sends no Retry-After
- tools: truncated exec/bash output spills to a redacted temp file
  referenced in the truncation notice; bash output (previously
  unbounded) now shares exec_command's token budget
- web_fetch: dependency-free HTML-to-markdown conversion (format:
  auto|raw|markdown) and larger limits (256KiB default, 2MiB max, 30s)
- modelregistry: live models.dev overlay refreshes context limits and
  base pricing from a TTL-cached fetch; opt-in at the CLI entrypoint
- tools: opt-in format-on-write (ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE=1) runs standard
  formatters across 27 extensions, ordered before the file-tracker
  re-baseline so conflict detection is preserved
2026-07-05 16:43:50 +08:00
Anandan afb5010a46 polish v2: smoothness & delight (#484)
* feat(tui): actionable hints on provider/model errors

Classify a failed turn's provider error into auth / rate-limit /
connectivity / model-not-found / context-overflow and render a one-line
next step below the red error row, instead of dumping an identical raw
blob for every failure mode.

The classifier lives in a new internal/errhint package so both the TUI
error row and the CLI exec path can share it (TUIHint references slash
commands, CLIHint references zero subcommands). Classification is a
conservative string heuristic keyed off providerio.ClassifiedError's
prefixes plus lower-level DNS/TLS/timeout/context-length signatures,
since the numeric HTTP status is gone by the time the error reaches a UI
surface.

* feat(tools): budget bash output with head+tail truncation

bash was the one tool that returned command output with no byte cap —
'cat large.log' or a verbose test run could dump megabytes into context
and force compaction, while every other read/search tool already applies
a budget.

Cap stdout and stderr at 96KB each, keeping the head and tail of an
oversized stream (build/test failures usually land at the tail) and
dropping the middle behind a marker that points at redirect-to-file +
read_file. Record raw_bytes/emitted_bytes/estimated_tokens/truncated in
Meta like the other tools. Sandbox-denial and shell-issue detection still
run on the full raw output before budgeting.

* fix(gemini): retry 401 with refreshed OAuth token

The Gemini provider used providerio.SendWithRetry (429/503/529 only),
so an expired OAuth token surfaced as a terminal 'API key not valid'
auth error while OpenAI and Anthropic silently recovered via
SendWithAuthRetry's force-refresh-and-replay on 401.

Plumb OAuthResolver through gemini.Options/Provider and the factory
(exactly as the other two providers already do) and switch the stream
send to SendWithAuthRetry. With a nil resolver (API-key users) behavior
is unchanged.

* fix(errhint): gate classification on provider-origin marker

Address CodeRabbit review on #1: agentResponseMsg.err can also carry
local failures (a tool's 'permission denied', a 'file does not exist',
a config error), and broad substrings would have attached a bogus
/provider or /model hint to those.

Classify now returns Unknown unless the message carries a provider marker
the provider layer always attaches (auth error: / rate limit error: /
provider error: / provider request error: / provider stream error:).
Local errors never draw a provider hint; provider errors sub-classify as
before. Added local-failure test cases proving they stay Unknown.

* feat(cli): actionable hint on text-mode exec provider errors

zero exec printed provider failures as a bare '[zero] <raw error>' with
no next step. Append a one-line hint (reusing the shared errhint
classifier) for recognized provider failures — 'run `zero auth`',
'run `zero doctor`', etc. The provider-origin gate means non-provider
codes (sandbox_error, mcp_error) and JSON/stream-json output are
untouched.

* fix(tools): set Result.Truncated for budgeted bash output

Address CodeRabbit review on #3: budgetBashOutput recorded truncation in
meta["truncated"] but never set the Result.Truncated struct field, so
consumers reading the struct (like glob/web_fetch/read_minified do) would
miss truncated bash results. Return the bool from budgetBashOutput and
set Result.Truncated on every return path.

* perf(tui): reuse one LSP manager across prompts

runAgentWithOptions built a fresh lsp.NewManager per run and shut it down
when the run returned, so gopls (and every other language server)
cold-started on the first edit of every turn — 200ms-2s of latency the
manager's own design (long-lived, reused servers) exists to avoid.

Build one manager per session in newModel (cheap: servers start lazily on
first Check) and reuse it across runs; the SelfCorrector still gets a
fresh checker wrapping the shared manager each run. Torn down with a
short deadline in quit(). Runs fall back to a per-run manager when the
session manager is absent (cwd unknown, or a directly-built test model).

* perf(tui): accumulate streamingText as []byte (O(1) append)

m.streamingText += msg.delta was O(len) per delta -> O(n²) across a long
generation (a 10k-token code gen allocates hundreds of MB of intermediate
strings and the UI gets progressively laggier). Accumulate into a []byte
with append (O(1) amortized) and read via streamingTextString().

A []byte rather than strings.Builder because the TUI model is copied by
value on every Update, which would trip strings.Builder's copy check;
[]byte is nil-safe and copies cleanly like the other slice fields.

* perf(tui): coalesce streamed text deltas to one frame

Every OnText delta was its own tea.Msg, so a fast provider (100+ tok/s)
drove 100+ full Update->View cycles per second, each re-parsing the
growing markdown — visible stutter over SSH and wasted CPU.

Batch agentTextMsg deltas at the runtime sink over a ~16ms frame and
forward them as a single message, decoupling render rate from token rate.
Any non-text message flushes pending text first so ordering with
tool-call / reasoning / row messages is preserved; the final
agentResponseMsg (a tea.Cmd return, not a sink message) is safe because
the model already drops deltas for an inactive runID.

* fix(agent): raise tool-failure stop threshold 4->6

guardrails.go halted a run after 4 consecutive same-error tool failures.
A corrective hint fires at 2, and a model iterating on a genuinely tricky
edit can legitimately fail a couple more times after the hint while
converging — stopping at 4 cut those runs short. Raise to 6; the streak
still resets the instant the tool succeeds or hits a different error, so
only true same-error loops are affected.

* fix(agent): more reconnect retries with jitter; narrow to transport errors

#19: bump maxStreamReconnects 2->4 and add up-to-50% jitter on the
exponential backoff (capped at 8s), so a multi-second network blip is
ridden out instead of killing the run on a 2s hiccup, and concurrent runs
(swarms, cron fleets) don't reconnect in lockstep.

#34: drop the '502'/'503' substring matches from shouldReconnect. 503
already exhausted providerio.SendWithRetry (retrying here is a redundant
double-retry) and 502 is non-idempotent by providerio's rule (the POST
may have been processed). Only genuine transport failures — where no
response was received — reconnect now.

* fix(agent): reduce stall retries 2->1 to bound stuck-session time

A no-output stream stall is detected only after the full stream idle
timeout (~5min) elapses, and each retry can idle again — so 2 retries
left an interactive session frozen for ~15min. Drop to 1 retry: keeps the
common single-hiccup recovery while bounding the worst case to ~2x the
idle timeout.

* fix(tui): serialize coalescer forwarding to preserve message order

Address CodeRabbit review on #7: flush() and the run-switch path drained
the text buffer under c.mu but called forward() after releasing it, so a
timer-fired text flush could race a concurrent non-text send() and land
after the tool-call/reasoning message it should precede.

Hold c.mu across drain AND forward (drainAndForwardLocked), so whoever
holds the lock delivers atomically and the other caller blocks until it
is done — text can never overtake a following non-text message. Added a
concurrency stress test (timer racing an inline send) that passes under
-race.

* feat(tui): accept /compact now

Bare /compact already triggers compaction, but /compact now — what users
reach for when the context gauge climbs — hit the usage-error branch.
Accept the 'now' keyword and advertise it in the command usage.

* feat(tui): add /retry, /edit, /copy, /export commands

/retry resends the last prompt; /edit recalls it into the composer to
tweak and resend — both read a new lastPrompt field captured verbatim
(pre-expansion) in launchPrompt. /copy puts the last answer on the
clipboard via the existing copy machinery; /export writes a plain
role-prefixed transcript to a file (timestamped default, or a given
path). Real gaps for SSH users with no mouse select.

* feat(tools): separator-insensitive tool_search matching

tool_search ranked deferred tools by exact substring, so a model that
typed 'webfetch' (dropping the underscore) matched nothing and looped.
Add a separator-squashing fallback ('web_fetch' -> 'webfetch') scored
below an exact substring match, so precise queries still rank first.

* feat(tools): signal ask_user dismissal distinctly from a blank field

Empty answers all rendered as '(no answer provided)', so the model
couldn't tell a wholesale dismissal (user closed the prompt without
answering anything) from one field left blank amid real answers — and
might invent a default. FormatAskUserAnswers now flags a full dismissal
up front as a skip and marks individual empties '(left blank)' vs
'(skipped)'.

* feat(tui): fuzzy ranking in model/session pickers

The pickers filtered by flat strings.Contains with no ranking, so
finding 'sonnet 4.5' among 50+ models meant an exact prefix or scrolling.
Rank matches (exact < prefix < contains < subsequence, reusing
fuzzySubsequenceGap) so the closest match lands on top, and 'snt45' now
matches 'Sonnet 4.5'. Groups stay contiguous — ordered by their best
match, never split — so the grouped model picker still renders one header
per provider. Covers both /model and /resume (shared commandPicker).

* perf(agent): cache per-tool schema render across turns

partitionTools re-ran the recursive schema->map conversion
(schemaToRuntimeMap) for every tool on every turn — redundant, since a
tool's advertised name/description/schema is stable for the run. Add a
per-run definition cache keyed by tool name (nil-safe; the plain
partitionTools entrypoint and tests pass nil for fresh renders).

The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) still recomputes
every turn — it must, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run
(swarm tools un-defer once a swarm is active). Only the expensive schema
render is memoized. tool_search is excluded by its callers (dynamic
description) so it never poisons the cache.

* perf(agent): calibrate compaction estimate against real prompt tokens

The byte/4 heuristic (ApproxTextTokens) over-counts code-heavy content
~15-20%, so with triggerRatio=0.7 compaction fired at ~60% of true
capacity — premature summarizer calls that degrade quality. Each turn now
folds (rawEstimate, provider InputTokens) into an EMA calibration ratio,
clamped per-sample to a sane band; maybeCompact and the reactive path
scale their estimates by it. Turn 1 uses the raw estimate (no data yet);
later turns compact near real capacity.

* style: gofmt the new agent test files

The CI gofmt check flagged the #22/#25 test files (struct-field and
switch alignment). No behavior change.

* feat(agent): turn-based plan staleness reminder

The stale-plan nudge only fired after 10 tool calls since the last
update_plan, so a plan that drifts stale across many low-tool-call turns
(one call per turn) took many turns to catch — the 'plan set turn 1 stays
pending forever' case. Add a turn-count complement: after
stalePlanTurnThreshold (8) turns without an update AND with items still
pending, fire the same one-shot reminder. Gated on pending items so a
fully-completed plan is never nagged; the existing tool-call trigger is
unchanged. (The roadmap's fuzzy 'tool calls unrelated to plan items'
relevance match is deliberately omitted — too false-positive-prone.)

* feat(agent): preserve recent-edits summary across compaction

Compaction preserved the plan, loaded skills, tool schemas, and project
instructions, but not file edits — so after the editing turns were elided
the model knew it had changed a file only vaguely, and would re-read to
rediscover its own footprint. Extract write_file/edit_file targets from
the elided middle with a one-line note from each tool result, merge them
across repeated compactions (newer note per path wins), and carry them in
the preserved-state JSON (capped at 20 paths / 160 bytes per note).

* feat(tui): workspace-scoped /resume + fewer event reads

/resume listed sessions from every project globally, and read the full
event file for each of them to test for resumable content. Filter the
picker (and /resume latest) by the current workspace Cwd, checked BEFORE
the per-session read so a large global history no longer pays N full file
reads to build one workspace's list; also skip zero-event sessions via
metadata without any read. Sessions with no recorded Cwd (older runs) and
an unknown current workspace stay visible so nothing is hidden that can't
be confidently placed. Explicit /resume <id> still resolves any session.

* feat(tui): warn on model switch that drops staged images

Staged images were silently dropped at submit when the active model had
no vision support — the user only learned after sending. Chips already
render above the composer (renderAttachmentChips); add an immediate amber
warning line to the /model switch status (both same-provider and
cross-provider paths) when images are staged and the newly selected model
can't accept them, so the drop is surfaced at switch time.

* feat(tui): inline recovery affordance on setup errors

A first-run setup error rendered as a bare red 'error: <text>' with no
pointer to the fix. Append a faint, stage-tailored recovery line (edit
the endpoint/name/key above then Enter, or pick another model) that names
only keys the stage's footer confirms, so the guidance is always accurate.
Empty for stages whose footer already makes recovery obvious.

* fix: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)

- loop.go: recompute the compaction calibration estimate at calibration
  time, not request-build time, so a reactive-compaction reissue that
  shrinks the request feeds the EMA the sample that actually completed.
- errhint: match bare HTTP status codes (401/403/429/529) only at digit
  boundaries, so an incidental number ('4290ms', 'id 14015') isn't
  mis-bucketed as auth/rate-limit.
- bash: drop the stray unmatched ']' in the output-truncation marker.
- tui /retry: apply the same exiting/compactInFlight guards commandPrompt
  has, so a retry can't race compactResultMsg's rewrite of session state.
- tui /export: write the transcript 0o600 (it may contain echoed
  secrets), not world/group-readable 0o644.

* test(tui): skip export file-mode assertion on Windows

os.WriteFile ignores Unix permission bits on Windows and Stat reports
0666, so the 0o600 assertion failed there. The production 0o600 is
honored on Linux/macOS (where it matters); guard the check with
runtime.GOOS so Windows smoke passes.

* fix(tui): align /resume latest filters + case-insensitive workspace match on Windows

Address CodeRabbit review on #21:
- latestResumableInWorkspace now applies the SAME filters as the picker
  (skip zero-event metadata and empty/failed runs), so /resume latest
  can't land on a session the picker intentionally hides.
- sessionMatchesWorkspace compares paths case-insensitively on Windows
  (its filesystem is), so the same workspace spelled with different casing
  no longer hides resumable sessions; other platforms stay case-sensitive.

* fix(tui): /retry resends the last prompt's image/PDF attachments

/retry relaunched only lastPrompt's text, but launchPrompt clears the
pending image/document queues once a turn is sent. A vision- or PDF-backed
prompt that failed would silently retry as text-only and answer a different
task. Snapshot the consumed attachments at launch and re-stage them on
/retry so launchPrompt rebuilds an identical request (document preamble,
images, and the submit-time vision re-check). startNewSession drops the
snapshot so a post-/new /retry cannot leak the previous session's
attachments. Also correct the OAuthResolver factory comment, which omitted
the Gemini provider it is now passed to.

* fix: address jatmn review (reconnect 5xx, /edit attachments, edit-cap, coalescer test)

- reconnect: exclude HTTP 5xx (500/502/503/504) before the transport
  substring match so "504 Gateway Timeout" no longer slips through on the
  generic "timeout" needle. A gateway timeout is non-idempotent — the
  completion POST may already have reached the model — so replaying the
  connect risked duplicate billable work. Reuses a digit-boundary status
  matcher exported from errhint (HasStatusCode). Test asserts 504/500 stay
  non-reconnectable.

- tui /edit: re-stage the remembered image/PDF snapshot alongside the
  recalled prompt text, mirroring the /retry fix — editing a vision- or
  document-backed prompt no longer silently resends a text-only version.

- compaction recent-edits: order edits by LAST edit, not first, and move a
  re-touched path to the newest position on merge, so the maxRecentEdits
  tail cap keeps the file the model most recently edited instead of dropping
  it. Adds mergeRecentEdits (edit-specific) and a capped-list regression.

- coalescer test: inject the frame timer via afterFunc so
  TestCoalescerBatchesDeltas proves buffering deterministically instead of
  racing the real 16ms wall-clock timer.

* fix(tools): bound bash output capture in memory, not just model-visible text

Previously stdout/stderr streamed into unbounded bytes.Buffers and were only
truncated to the 96 KiB budget AFTER the command finished, so a runaway command
(cat huge.log, yes) could grow Zero's memory until it stalled or OOMed before
budgetBashOutput ever ran. Replace the capture with boundedBuffer, an io.Writer
that keeps only the head+tail each stream will surface and discards the middle as
it arrives, while counting the true total for the truncation marker. Memory is now
bounded to ~head+2×tail per stream regardless of output size.

truncateHeadTail is refactored onto a total-aware core so the string path (and its
tests) are unchanged, and budgetBashCapture reports the true raw_bytes even though
only a bounded slice was held. Adds boundedBuffer/capture unit tests and an
end-to-end test that streams ~5× the budget and asserts bounded emission with an
accurate raw_bytes.
2026-07-05 13:15:14 +05:30
Vasanth T 30dd7c3112 fix(config): let a gateway ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL resolve as anthropic-compatible (#497)
Setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to a proxy/gateway failed setup with "anthropic
provider anthropic requires official baseURL https://api.anthropic.com".
OPENAI_BASE_URL already auto-promotes a non-official env URL to the
openai-compatible kind, but Anthropic had no equivalent, so the universal
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL proxy convention was rejected outright.

Mirror the OpenAI behaviour: a non-official ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL from the
environment promotes the profile to anthropic-compatible. This stays env-only
on purpose -- a custom baseURL in a project config.json is still rejected by
Resolve, so an untrusted project can't redirect a first-party key to another
host (TestResolveRejectsAnthropicOfficialProviderCustomBaseURL still passes).

Fixes #479
2026-07-05 11:39:22 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani e7d88b4b51 perf: cache TUI model registry (#496)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:38:45 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Sonnet 5 177442cfe4 fix(specialist): cap max specialist nesting depth (#491)
* fix(specialist): cap max specialist nesting depth

A Task specialist can recursively spawn further specialists via --depth.
Without a ceiling, a runaway or malicious chain of Task calls can recurse
indefinitely, exhausting process and memory resources. Reject any run whose
depth exceeds a hard cap of 8.

Related to #470, not closing it: today's normal specialist/swarm path
cannot reach this recursively, since child sessions are launched with
--tag specialist and shouldRegisterExecSpecialistTools suppresses the Task
tool for that tag (see PR description for details). This is a
defense-in-depth guard, not a fix for an active exploit. Split out of #468
at reviewer request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(specialist): reject depth cap at the boundary, not past it

Addresses jatmn's review on PR #491:
- Executor.Run checked `CurrentDepth > maxSpecialistDepth`, but this call is
  what launches the child at CurrentDepth+1. A parent already AT the cap
  passed the check and started a child one level past it, only getting
  rejected on that child's own next call. Change to `>=` so the guard fires
  before the over-cap child is launched.
- Add TestRunRejectsDepthAtMax to cover the boundary explicitly.

* test(specialist): cover resume boundary in depth-cap guard

The pre-branch depth guard in Run sits before the fresh/resume split, but
the boundary test only exercised the fresh path, leaving a future refactor
free to move the guard without any test catching a resume regression.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:38:15 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 190241bd59 fix(tools): fix cmd.exe /S/C corrupting commands with embedded quotes (#465)
* fix(tools): fix cmd.exe /S/C corrupting commands with embedded quotes

Any shell command whose own text contains embedded double quotes -
python -c "print(15 / 3)", git commit -m "message", node -e "..." - was
silently corrupted on Windows before reaching the target program. Reported
live: a model ran python -c "print(15 / 3)" and got back a SyntaxError
showing the code Python received as literally "print(15, truncated right
before the /.

Root cause: bash.go passes the full command text as ONE argv element to
cmd.exe /d /s /c, and Go's os/exec escapes it correctly for a standard
CommandLineToArgvW-style parser (wrapping it in quotes, backslash-escaping
the embedded ones). But cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing does not follow
those rules once /S is present: per its documented behavior, it strips the
FIRST and LAST literal quote character in the whole remainder - not a
matched pair - before handing the (now corrupted) text along to be
re-tokenized. The escaping was correct for one layer of parsing; the
command line actually goes through two.

Fix: on Windows, write commandText to a temp .cmd script file and point
/c at the file's path instead of the raw command text. This sidesteps
cmd.exe's /C-remainder heuristic entirely, since the remainder is then
just a plain path with no quotes to mis-strip. @echo off is prepended
since cmd.exe treats a /c target ending in .cmd as a batch file and
echoes each line it runs by default, which would otherwise pollute
captured stdout (caught by the existing bash tool test suite before this
commit, not left in).

buildBashCommand now returns a cleanup func (in addition to plan.Cleanup)
for the temp file. Both callers updated: bash.go's one-shot run defers it
immediately; exec_command.go's persistent session composes it with
startExecProcess's own cleanup and runs it after the session's process
actually exits, not before.

This fix lives upstream of the sandbox wrapping, in how the Name/Args spec
is constructed before either the direct or sandboxed code path consumes
it, so both benefit without separate sandbox-specific changes - cmd.exe's
own command-line parsing does not depend on what token launched it.

New TestBashToolPreservesEmbeddedQuotesOnWindows pins the exact failure
shape via a self-dispatch test helper (a quoted argument containing a
space and a slash, matching the original bug report's truncation point),
with no dependency on python being installed. Full internal/tools suite
green, excluding 3 failures pre-existing and identical on unmodified main
in my environment (unrelated path-assumption issues under a deeply nested
working directory).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): pass the shell command line to cmd.exe raw instead of via a temp script

Review on the original fix found real problems with running commandText
from a temporary .cmd file: it silently changed cmd.exe command-line
syntax into batch-file syntax (for example, for %i loops need %%i only
inside an actual .bat/.cmd file), /s was still corrupting the script
path itself if it contained spaces, and the script leaked on sandbox
planning errors.

The actual root cause was narrower than the temp-file approach assumed.
cmd.exe's own /C remainder parsing is not CommandLineToArgvW-compatible:
it strips the first and last literal quote from the remainder whenever
it starts with a quote, without undoing backslash-escaping. Passing
commandText as a normal exec.Cmd argument makes Go wrap it in exactly
that shape (quoted because it has spaces, inner quotes escaped as \")
since it contains embedded quotes, which is what the stripping then
corrupts.

Fixes it at the source instead: commandText now reaches cmd.exe
completely unescaped (via SysProcAttr.CmdLine for the unwrapped path,
and the same treatment inside the sandboxed runner's own process
creation for the wrapped path), exactly as if it had been typed at an
interactive prompt. No outer quotes means the stripping heuristic never
triggers for a command like `python -c "print(15 / 3)"`, and a command
that legitimately starts with a quoted executable path is handled by
cmd.exe's own careful quote-preserving special case for that shape.
Also drops /s, which forced the more aggressive of cmd.exe's two
stripping behaviors. No temp file, so nothing to leak on error, and no
batch-file reinterpretation of the command text.

internal/sandbox/windows_runner.go now owns the shared shell-argv shape
(WindowsShellArgs/WindowsShellCommandLine) so internal/tools/bash.go
and the sandboxed runner's windowsCommandLine build the exact same raw
command line instead of duplicating the flag literals in two places.

* chore: retrigger CI

The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth (a lock-file access-denied flake), unrelated to this change. internal/tools and internal/sandbox, the packages this PR touches, both passed. Retriggering to confirm.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:36:00 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 ba6c026469 fix(tools): make grep and glob respect run cancellation (#464)
* fix(tools): make grep and glob respect run cancellation

grep and glob's Run/RunWithSandbox discarded their context parameter
entirely (bound to _) and ran a synchronous filepath.WalkDir with no way
to know it should stop. An unscoped search over a large tree - a broad
parent directory, not just the workspace, which the model can and does
reach for - could run long enough to be effectively unkillable: the TUI's
Ctrl+C/exit path calls the stored CancelFunc and immediately marks the run
"cancelled" in the UI, but the underlying walk kept running regardless,
because nothing in it ever checked ctx.Err(). Worse, the TUI's quit path
explicitly waits for the cancelled run's own response (to drain
flushRunIDs, so /rewind checkpoints stay consistent) before it will
actually exit - so with the walk unable to hear the cancellation, neither
a second Ctrl+C nor /exit could complete. The only way out was killing the
process.

Thread ctx through Run/RunWithSandbox into grepFiles/scanGlob and check
ctx.Err() at the top of each WalkDir callback, ahead of walkErr, so a
cancelled run aborts the walk on its very next entry instead of visiting
every remaining file. Checked the rest of the tools package for the same
_ context.Context pattern: list_directory (single-level os.ReadDir, no
walk), skill, ask_user, and update_plan don't touch the filesystem, so
grep and glob were the only two tools with this gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): thread cancellation through grep's match-collection phase

The walk-level fix in grepFiles stopped a cancelled search from visiting
new filesystem entries, but collectGrepMatches still read and
regex-scanned every file the walk had already found, so a search that
had discovered its full file list before cancellation kept running
regardless. Adds the same per-item ctx.Err() check to that phase, plus
a deterministic test that cancels after a fixed number of files instead
of relying on timing.

* test(tools): add mid-walk cancellation coverage and shared helper

Add deterministic mid-walk tests for grepFiles and scanGlob using countingCancelContext, and extract searchCancelledResult so grep/glob share the same cancellation Result mapping.

* style(tools): gofmt search_cancel.go (add missing trailing newline)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 11:35:01 +08:00
Pengkuh Dwi Septiandi daf65e0af9 feat: support shift enter for composer newlines (#462) 2026-07-05 11:34:18 +08:00
Anandan f401c66e81 polish: cut per-turn overhead, stabilize cache, add /new (#478)
* polish: cut per-turn overhead, stabilize cache, add /new

Context economy
- Compaction: preserveLast 8->6, triggerRatio 0.8->0.7 (both copies in sync).
- System prompt: kill the "ELABORATE summary" directive; scale summary to
  the work. Comment discipline moved into the core prompt for all model
  families (was Anthropic-only); Minimax/DeepSeek/Qwen/etc. now get it.
- Token-budget regression test ratchets the fixed per-turn overhead (base
  prompt + eager tool schemas) using the runtime's own estimator, so silent
  prompt/schema growth fails CI.

Response quality
- defaultResponseStyle balanced->concise. Reversible via /style.

Tool discovery
- <available_skills> block in the system prompt lists installed skills
  (name + one-line description) so the model loads the right one on the
  first call instead of guessing and reading the failure. Budget-capped at
  640 bytes with an "...and N more" fallback; renders nothing when no
  skills are installed (byte-identical to prior prompt).

Session lifecycle
- /new starts a fresh session in place; previous session stays on disk and
  is named in the confirmation for /resume. Guards against mid-run reset.
- /clear now notes that context persists and points to /new.

Performance & caching
- partitionTools no longer alpha-sorts the whole tools array every turn,
  which inserted a loaded deferred tool mid-array and shifted the cached
  prefix on every load. It now builds append-only regions
  [eager sorted] + [tool_search] + [loaded deferred sorted] so a
  mid-session load grows the tail instead of busting the eager prefix.
  Regression test asserts the eager block precedes any loaded tool.
- /context now shows cache hit rate (flags low rate over >5 turns as a
  possible unstable prefix) and rolling average turn latency with
  time-to-first-token. Both reset on /new.

Measured baselines (auto-mode, no workspace): base prompt 3162 tokens,
eager tool schemas 2433 across 12 tools. Budget ceilings set ~10% above.

Deliberately deferred (need a decision): inverted safety-policy rewrite
(sandbox doesn't catch ~half the B-tier rules), core-tool/web_fetch
deferral (activation-semantics blocker), aggressive prompt slim.

* fix(tui): clear staged attachments + queued message on /new

CodeRabbit: startNewSession reset conversation/usage/latency state but not
the staged input (pendingImages, pendingImageLabels, pendingDocuments,
queuedMessage), which is only consumed at prompt-submit. Without clearing it,
the fresh session's first prompt silently inherited the previous session's
images/documents/queued text. Test now stages all four and asserts they clear.
2026-07-04 20:56:52 +08:00
Pengkuh Dwi Septiandi 949ee43f71 fix: preserve conversation context in exec prompts (#460)
* fix: preserve conversation context in exec prompts

* fix: remove redundant

* test: cover exec prompt
2026-07-04 08:53:47 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19 2fcea71778 feat(tui): add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard (#400)
* feat(tui): add search/filter to provider picker in setup wizard

Add a search input to the provider step of the setup wizard, matching
the existing model picker search UX. Typing filters the provider list
in real-time via case-insensitive substring matching on name, ID, and
aliases.

Fixes #392

* fix(tui): resolve provider index before clearing search on advance

Clearing providerSearch before using currentProvider() caused the wrong
provider to be selected — selectedProvider is an index into the filtered
slice, and clearing the search swaps to the full unfiltered list.

Also update placeholder to reflect that search matches ID and aliases.

* fix(tui): guard empty-filter Enter and add provider search tests

- Enter on an empty provider filter is now a no-op instead of advancing
  with the wrong provider (first full-list entry)
- Add table tests for filteredProviders/name/ID/alias matching
- Add tests for selectedProvider reset on edit, empty-match noop,
  Ctrl+U clear restores full list, and filtered advance selection

Addresses review feedback from @Vasanthdev2004 and @gnanam1990 on PR #400
2026-07-04 08:53:16 +08:00
PierrunoYTandVasanthdev2004 5f36349c18 feat(update): add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates (#461)
* feat(update): add zero upgrade command to apply self-updates

Extends the existing `zero update --check` (which only reported an
available release) with an actual install step:

- `zero update --apply` / `zero upgrade` download, sha256-verify, and
  install the latest release.
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its
  checksum, extract it (zip-slip guarded), and atomically replace the
  running binary plus any pre-existing optional sandbox helpers. On
  Windows, the running exe is renamed aside (NTFS allows this even
  while it's executing) since it can't be overwritten directly; the
  leftover ".old" file is cleaned up on a later invocation.

Closes #459.

* fix(update): correct macOS expectations in apply test

The optional-helper assertion in TestApplyStandaloneUpdateReplacesBinary
assumed every non-Windows platform has a linux-style "zero-seccomp"
helper to refresh, but applyStandaloneUpdate correctly ships no optional
helpers on macOS (matching scripts/postinstall.mjs). This made the test
fail on macOS CI. Only assert the helper refresh on linux/windows.

* fix(update): address CodeRabbit review findings on zero upgrade

- Reject --target when combined with --apply/upgrade: applying installs
  onto the current machine, so a mismatched --target could replace the
  running binary with an incompatible-arch build.
- Bound archive/checksum downloads with a dedicated timeout separate
  from the release-metadata check timeout, so a stalled connection
  can't hang zero upgrade forever.
- Surface a failed rollback in the Windows replaceBinary path instead
  of swallowing it, so a botched install is reported rather than
  silently leaving the binary missing.
- Run CleanupStaleBinary regardless of whether an update is available,
  so a leftover Windows ".old" file isn't stuck waiting for a future
  upgrade that may never come.
- Report optional sandbox-helper refresh failures as warnings on
  ApplyResult (surfaced in text and JSON output) instead of discarding
  them silently.

* fix(oauth): retry secret-lock on Windows delete-pending race to unblock CI

TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges was failing this PR's Windows
smoke job with "create token secret lock: ...Access is denied." — a
pre-existing flake in internal/oauth, not in the upgrade code. On Windows
a concurrent holder's os.Remove leaves the .lock in a delete-pending
state, so an O_EXCL create races it with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist; createSecretFile only treated
ErrExist as contention and hard-failed otherwise.

Treat os.ErrPermission as retryable too, mirroring acquireFileLock in
lock.go. This is the same root-cause fix as #445 (diagnosis by
@gnanam1990); folded in here to make this PR's CI green. Verified on
Windows: the concurrent-converge test passes 30/30.

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:52:07 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 e4f760ee8b fix(agent): reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting (#453)
* fix(agent): reject a malformed additional_permissions payload before prompting

A shell tool call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions
but omits (or malforms) the additional_permissions payload was accepted into
the normal permission-prompt flow. buildPermissionEvent silently swallowed
the validation error while rendering the prompt's scope text, so the user
saw an ordinary-looking request, approved it, and only then hit a hard
denial from the same validation running again at grant time (loop.go's
grantInlineAdditionalPermissions), with the confusing message "failed to
grant session additional permissions: missing additional_permissions".

A malformed payload can never succeed regardless of the user's decision, so
run the same check (inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile, already the single
source of truth for this shape) up front, before any prompt, and return a
plain tool error the driving model can see and retry from. This also covers
the mismatched case (additional_permissions present without the flag).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(agent): make the additional_permissions rejection message actionable

The rejection added in the previous commit correctly stops a malformed
sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions call before any prompt,
but its message ("missing additional_permissions; provide at least one of
network or file_system") gave a model nothing concrete to correct itself
with. Observed in practice: a weaker tool-calling model (xai/grok-build-0.1)
kept re-attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit from an earlier, correct
gh/git call onto later commands that didn't need it (network was already
open via a session-scoped grant), hit this same rejection 4 times in a row
with no change in its retry, and gave up.

Both messages (missing payload, and empty-but-present payload) now include
a concrete, schema-accurate example - {"network": {"enabled": true}} or
{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}} - and the missing-payload message
adds the other half of the fix: if the command doesn't actually need
elevated permissions, omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:51:14 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 068c5ad3ad docs(install): recommend bun pm trust for Bun installs (#452)
The Bun instructions told global installers to run the postinstall script
manually against the global install path, because trustedDependencies only
works in a project package.json. Current Bun has a simpler sanctioned path
that works for both project and global installs: `bun pm trust
@gitlawb/zero` (with -g for globals) runs the blocked postinstall after the
fact. Verified on Bun 1.3.14 on Windows 11: `bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero`
fetched the binary and `zero --version` runs.

Lead with that in README.md, README_ZH.md, and docs/INSTALL.md, keep
trustedDependencies and the manual installer as alternatives for project
installs and older Bun versions, and teach the wrapper's missing-binary
message the same commands for the Bun case.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:45:49 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani 407a92739f fix(action): keep provider key scoped to zero step (#448)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:41:38 +08:00
KRATOS d05e9148a7 fix(oauth): treat Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED as lock contention in createSecretFile (#445)
createSecretFile's secret-lock loop only retried on os.ErrExist. On Windows a
concurrent holder's `defer os.Remove(lockPath)` leaves the lock file in a
"delete pending" state, so a racer's O_EXCL create returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
(os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist — which fell through to a hard
"create token secret lock: Access is denied" error instead of retrying. Mirrors
the identical handling already present in acquireFileLock (lock.go, from #261).

Fixes the flaky Windows-CI failure TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges
that was intermittently red-flagging every PR's Windows smoke job.

Verified on macOS: build/vet/gofmt clean, oauth package green, concurrent-
converge test passes under -race (5x). The Windows delete-pending path can't be
reproduced off Windows, so the definitive proof is the Windows CI on this PR.
2026-07-04 08:40:20 +08:00
Anandan 1d8638466c fix: allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints (#444)
* fix: allow non-TLS connections to private-network provider endpoints

The provider wizard and health probe rejected `http://` endpoints with a
non-loopback host, so users could not configure a local-network provider
like llama.cpp on another LAN machine (e.g. `http://192.168.1.100:8080/v1`).
Only loopback was relaxed.

Expand the "loopback-only" checks to also cover private-network addresses
(192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12) via `netip.Addr.IsPrivate()`:

- `providerhealth.endpointIsLoopback` → `endpointIsLoopbackOrPrivate`
  (also returns true for private IP literals).
- `providerhealth.allowLoopback` → `allowLoopbackOrPrivate` — the flag
  now relaxes both loopback and private addresses in `validateEndpoint`
  and `safeDialContext`.
- `providerWizardIsLoopbackHost` in the TUI wizard now accepts private
  IPs, so `http://192.168.x.y` passes the endpoint URL validation.
- `providerProfileIsLocal` in headless setup recognizes private-network
  IPs as local (skip API key for keyless LAN providers).
- `baseURLIsLoopback` in app.go recognizes private-network IPs for
  credential-requirement logic.

Link-local (169.254.x.x), cloud metadata, and other special ranges
remain blocked. Redirects to any local/private address remain blocked
regardless of the flag (SSRF protection for 3xx targets is unchanged).

Fixes #431

* chore: fix gofmt indentation in connectivity client test
2026-07-04 08:35:14 +08:00
Anandan 305a62c954 fix(auth): route zero auth login chatgpt to the dedicated ChatGPT flow (#443)
* fix(auth): route `zero auth login chatgpt` to the dedicated ChatGPT flow

`zero auth login chatgpt` went through the generic OAuth manager loopback
path, which builds a random-port http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback
redirect_uri with no extra authorize params. OpenAI's ChatGPT client
registration requires exactly http://localhost:1455/auth/callback plus the
id_token_add_organizations, codex_cli_simplified_flow, and originator
params, so the authorize endpoint rejected the request with an
"Authentication Error" before any browser interaction.

Route the chatgpt provider to the existing dedicated ChatGPT login
(provideroauth.ChatGPTLogin), which already binds the fixed port, uses the
localhost host, the /auth/callback path, and sends the required params.
`zero auth login chatgpt` now behaves identically to `zero auth chatgpt`.
--device is rejected with a clear message since ChatGPT has no device-code
path.

Fixes #430

* fix(auth): reject --scope on ChatGPT login instead of silently dropping it

`zero auth login chatgpt --scope <x>` reached the dedicated ChatGPT flow,
which ignores the generic manager's ExtraScopes — the scopes were silently
dropped while --device was explicitly rejected. Reject --scope up front
with a clear message, since the Codex client registration pins a fixed
scope set (incl. api.connectors.*) that custom scopes would risk dropping.

Addresses CodeRabbit review on #443.
2026-07-04 08:34:30 +08:00
Vasanth T 9134148f4d fix(tui): keep the profile name on /model switch so the stored key resolves (#441)
normalizeProfileForProvider rewrote profile.Name to the catalog provider.ID
whenever normalizeIdentity was true — which includes any first-party provider
whose saved baseURL matches the catalog default. The credential store is keyed
by profile.Name, and this rewrite runs before profileWithCredential, so the
stored-key lookup missed and the rebuilt provider went out with no key: a 401 on
every /model switch for a profile named differently from its catalog id (e.g.
"my-openai").

Only canonicalize an empty or generic placeholder name now; a real user-provided
name is preserved. CatalogID canonicalization is unchanged (it is not the store
key). Adds regression tests covering a custom-named first-party profile surviving
normalization and placeholder names still canonicalizing.

Fixes #440
2026-07-04 08:27:41 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 f653dcac36 fix(sandbox): gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence (#426)
* fix(sandbox): gate /tmp test assertions on GOOS, not path existence

TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyIncludesDefaultTempWriteRoots and
TestNewScopeNormalizesAndValidatesExtraRoots guard their /tmp assertion with
pathExists("/tmp"), intending to skip it on Windows. But Go resolves the bare
path /tmp against the current drive on Windows, so on any host where C:\tmp
exists the guard passes while the product code (correctly, by design - see
defaultTempWriteRootCandidatesForGOOS) uses %TEMP%/%TMP% instead, and both
tests fail. Gate the assertion on runtime.GOOS != "windows" as well; POSIX
behavior is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* chore: retrigger CI

The Windows smoke job failed on TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges in internal/oauth, unrelated to this change. Retriggering to confirm it was a flake.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:26:22 +08:00
Eli Lap 071ea3a495 Make shortcuts reconfigurable via the config file. (#417)
* Make shortcuts reconfigurable via the config file.

* Use sidebarToggleAllowed. Fix fmt errors.

* Fix: combination matching superset.

* Remove non-default shortcut combination from the comment.
2026-07-04 08:25:33 +08:00
Kunj SHAH b0abde7d06 feat: add --auto flag for LLM-generated commit messages (#423)
* feat: add --auto flag to changes commit for LLM-generated commit messages

* fix: address CodeRabbit review suggestions on auto-commit message generation

* fix: resolve auto-commit message and flag validation tests

* fix: add 60s timeout for LLM call in --auto and surface --dry-run in help

Addresses gnanam1990 non-blocking feedback:
- Wrap provider call with context.WithTimeout (60s) to prevent hung provider
- Note --dry-run in --auto help text as preview escape hatch
2026-07-04 08:10:18 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 5658a36627 fix(tools): flag piped POSIX utilities before running on Windows (#412)
* fix(tools): flag piped POSIX utilities (head/tail/grep/...) before running on Windows

Zero always executes the bash tool through native cmd.exe on Windows
(shellExecutable() in bash.go), but the pre-flight Windows-syntax
detector only caught bash-style `cd /...` and bare `ls`. Anything
piped into head/tail/grep/wc/awk/sed/cut/xargs/tr — very common in
model-generated commands like `git log ... | head` — ran straight
through to cmd.exe, which has no such builtins, wasting a turn on a
guaranteed failure. Reported in the wild via `git log ... | head`
and a `git blame ... | grep` pipeline.

detectShellCommandIssue now also flags these before the command
runs, with the same "translate to cmd.exe / use Zero's native tools"
guidance already used for the cd/ls cases.

Note: the existing detectShellOutputIssue path (matching cmd.exe's
error text post-execution) only recognizes English strings and will
miss this on non-English Windows locales — the pre-flight check
above is locale-independent since it inspects the model-generated
command text rather than cmd.exe's translated error output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(tools): require whitespace/end after POSIX utility name, not just \b

CodeRabbit review on PR #412: windowsPosixUtilityPattern used \b after
the utility alternation, but \b only requires a non-word character
next — so tail-log.sh, grep-cli, and sed.exe would all false-positive
(the hyphen/dot satisfies \b without being a real command boundary).
Match windowsLSCommandPattern's existing convention: require
whitespace or end-of-string after the utility name instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:09:22 +08:00
c60ad8729f fix(config): fall back to a usable saved provider instead of forcing full re-onboarding (#410)
When config.json has providers configured but none marked active
(e.g. a blank/stale activeProvider field, or a config with 2+
providers where none was ever selected), normalizeProviders threw
away the already-normalized provider list on ErrNoActiveProvider.
That meant the interactive TUI's existing "fall back to an
already-configured usable provider" logic (firstUsableProvider)
never got a chance to run for this case — the app instead wiped
resolved to a zero value and forced the user into a brand-new
onboarding wizard, even though a usable, already-saved provider
existed.

- normalizeProviders/Resolve now return the normalized providers
  list alongside ErrNoActiveProvider instead of discarding it.
- runInteractiveTUIWithSetup tries firstUsableProvider on that list
  before forcing setup; onboarding only runs when no configured
  provider is actually usable, matching the existing fallback
  already used for a different flavor of this problem
  (active-provider-present-but-no-credential).

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanth T <[email protected]>
2026-07-04 08:08:55 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 0562e3bef7 fix(tui): show an M suffix for million-scale token counts (#457)
humanCount (the status-line/sidebar token formatter) only ever produced a K
suffix, so a 1,000,000-token context window rendered as "1000K" instead of
"1M" - visible with any 1M-context model (e.g. xai/grok-build-0.1). Its
sibling formatContextWindow already switches to "M" above a million; extend
the same behavior to humanCount, generalized for arbitrary (non-round)
values rather than formatContextWindow's round-number-only heuristic, since
humanCount also renders live, arbitrary "used" token counts.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 22:50:44 +08:00
Anandan 9bd93c62f8 fix: add android platform support for Termux npm install (#455)
`npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` failed on Android/Termux with EBADPLATFORM
because `package.json` `os` array lacked `"android"`. Termux provides a
Linux userspace — the existing `linux-arm64` binary works natively.

- Add `"android"` to the `os` array in package.json.
- Map `android` platform to `linux` in postinstall.mjs resolvePlatform().

Fixes #449
2026-07-03 22:44:47 +08:00
PierrunoYTandClaude Sonnet 5 bdb1b0ecd1 fix(install): persist install dir to user PATH on Windows (#407)
* fix(install): persist install dir to user PATH on Windows

The PowerShell installer only printed a suggestion to add the
install directory to PATH but never actually did it, so `zero`
was unusable from a fresh terminal after install.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

* fix(install): don't abort install if PATH persistence fails

Address CodeRabbit review on PR #407:
- Wrap the [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable call in try/catch
  so a PATH-persistence failure (e.g. restricted user profile) warns
  instead of aborting the whole install under $ErrorActionPreference
  = Stop.
- Factor the repeated PATH-contains check for user/session scopes
  into a Test-ZeroPathContainsDir helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 20:10:01 +08:00
Leonardo Faoro 4266baf222 fix(docs): rename AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md (#438)
* fix(docs): rename AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md

* fix(docs): fix references to AGENTS.MD > AGENTS.md
2026-07-03 19:40:50 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 8d0c5feccb fix(sandbox): self-heal a corrupt unelevated setup marker (#437)
A malformed/truncated windows-unelevated-setup.json returned a hard error
from loadWindowsUnelevatedSetupMarker, bricking every unelevated command
until the file was hand-deleted, while the unknown-schema path already
reset to an empty marker. Treat corrupt JSON the same way: the marker only
memoizes idempotent ACL applies, so a reset can only cost redundant work,
never skip enforcement.

Addresses the review feedback from coderabbitai and @anandh8x on #427.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 19:34:56 +08:00
CengSinandzhangzetao b63fe696fd modify readme.md and add readme_zh.md (#436)
Co-authored-by: zhangzetao <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 17:16:41 +08:00
Baran3575andBaran3575 3fbbd28e4c fix(provider-wizard): allow multiple custom OpenAI-compatible providers (#403)
* fix(provider-wizard): allow multiple custom OpenAI-compatible providers

Generic/custom providers (custom-openai-compatible, custom-anthropic-compatible)
all share the same CatalogID. wizardProviderStoredKey matched by CatalogID,
which blocked creating more than one custom provider.

Fix: in advanceProviderWizard, skip the ManageKey diversion for custom
providers and route directly to the endpoint step instead. The user can
overwrite an existing instance by re-entering the same name, or create a
new one with a different name.

Named providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) are unaffected — ManageKey is
still shown for them.

Fixes #375

* refactor(provider-wizard): deduplicate advance/discovery branch, add anthropic-compatible test

---------

Co-authored-by: Baran3575 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 17:03:37 +08:00
euxaristiaandClaude Fable 5 b9ddd6f421 feat(sandbox): unelevated Windows fallback tier instead of prompts-only degrade (#427)
Before the one-time elevated `zero sandbox setup` has run, Windows dropped
straight from the native sandbox to the in-process policy gate: commands ran
with no OS enforcement at all. But only the WFP network filters actually need
Administrator rights - the write-restricted token and the workspace ACL grants
(DACL edits on user-owned roots) work unelevated.

Add an `unelevated` enforcement tier between native and degraded: when the
elevated setup marker is missing and the profile restricts the filesystem, the
command still wraps through the command runner at a new `unelevated` sandbox
level. The runner applies the workspace ACL plan itself (recording applied
plans by hash in windows-unelevated-setup.json so repeat commands skip the
apply) and launches under the same write-restricted token, so the OS-level
write-jail holds. Network enforcement stays with the per-command approval gate
at this tier, and the downgrade reason says so; profiles that need the sandbox
only for network isolation keep the old degrade behavior, and `--sandbox
require` still errors with the setup hint.

Verified end to end on Windows 11 without elevation: a write inside the
workspace succeeds under the restricted token, a write outside every granted
root is denied by the OS (new ZERO_SANDBOX_REAL_SMOKE integration test, using
cmd.exe because managed PowerShell cannot initialize its crypto provider under
a write-restricted token on some hosts).

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 16:38:28 +08:00
Jochen aaad4d2712 feat(providers): split minimax zai into intl cn (#398)
* feat(providers): split minimax zai into intl cn

- Add minimaxi-cn (api.minimaxi.com) sharing model catalog with minimax
- Add zai-cn (open.bigmodel.cn) splitting zai from china to intl
- Decouple env vars: ZAI_API_KEY vs ZHIPU_API_KEY for zai/zai-cn,
  MINIMAX_API_KEY vs MINIMAXI_API_KEY for minimax/minimaxi-cn
- Map zai-cn and minimaxi-cn to models.dev providers "zai" and "minimax"
  so the model catalog hydrates for both endpoints

* chore(providers): address review feedback on intl/cn split

- Run gofmt on internal/providermodelcatalog/catalog.go (map-value
  alignment on the \"zai\" entry was off by one space, fails CI lint)
- Update stale comment in TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults
  to say glm-4.5 default (live discovery upgrades to glm-5.2)
- Add missing ProviderKind, APIKeyEnv, and APIKey assertions to
  TestResolveAppliesZaiInternationalCatalogDefaults so it would catch
  a silent regression in ZAI_API_KEY routing
2026-07-03 16:33:11 +08:00
KRATOS b4275e3504 feat(providers): add Meituan LongCat catalog preset (#424)
Add LongCat-2.0 as a first-class OpenAI-compatible provider preset so it can be
selected by name in the setup wizard / `zero providers setup longcat` instead of
hand-entering a custom endpoint.

LongCat-2.0 is Meituan's open, OpenAI- and Anthropic-compatible model. This
wires the OpenAI-compatible transport:
  base URL: https://api.longcat.chat/openai  (Zero appends /chat/completions)
  model:    LongCat-2.0
  auth:     Bearer via LONGCAT_API_KEY

Purely additive — one descriptor plus its catalog/onboarding tests and a README
env-var line; no shared plumbing is touched, so existing providers are
unaffected. Placed with the other OpenAI-compatible third parties (after
moonshot), below the first-party providers.

Verified: go build / vet / test green (catalog + cli onboarding), gofmt clean,
and `zero providers catalog` lists the descriptor with the correct fields.
Endpoint is wired by-spec from LongCat's published docs; a live completion still
needs a real LONGCAT_API_KEY to confirm.
2026-07-03 12:44:11 +08:00
Alaa Elsamouly 5b2b4dea1a fix(tui): compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline (#421)
* fix(tui): compose help overlay through the viewport overlay pipeline

exactly like how other popups works.

* fix for the CI/CD of formatting

* Added regression tests for the help overlay

* formatted code
2026-07-03 11:33:17 +08:00
Abdias J b5a78dca6f docs(install): document Bun install and improve missing-binary error (#418)
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the npm
wrapper's postinstall (which fetches the native Zero binary from GitHub
Releases) is silently skipped. The first run then fails with an
unhelpful "No native binary found" message that points at a source-only
build command, leaving Bun users stuck.

Add a Bun section to README.md and docs/INSTALL.md with the two working
install paths (run postinstall.mjs manually, or add the package to the
project's trustedDependencies). Rewrite the wrapper's missing-binary
error to give an actionable fix for everyone and a Bun-specific hint
when run under Bun, instead of only suggesting a source checkout.
2026-07-03 07:38:25 +08:00
KRATOS 952788f72d fix(tui): resolve every permission request so the agent can't deadlock (#397)
A goroutine dump of a run "stuck for 33 minutes" showed the agent parked
forever in executeToolCall -> requestPermission, blocked on the TUI's
decision channel. Root cause: a shell command whose sandbox decision was
Allow but which requested additional sandbox permissions
(sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions) made shouldRequestPermission
block on OnPermissionRequest, yet buildPermissionEvent stamped the event
Action=allow. The TUI's permissionRequestMsg handler only rendered/resolved
Action=prompt requests and silently dropped everything else — so the decide
callback was never called, the agent waited on a channel nothing would signal
(no ctx cancellation on the active run), and the UI showed "Working" with no
prompt and zero network activity. Intermittent and model-dependent: gpt-5.5's
folder-creation command set the additional-permissions flag, glm's did not,
which is exactly why one hung and the other ran clean.

Two-part fix:

- agent (buildPermissionEvent): an additional-permissions request is an
  ELEVATION the user must consent to, even over a sandbox Allow, so mark it
  Action=prompt (matching shouldRequestPermission's own condition). It now
  surfaces as a real prompt instead of a dropped auto-allow.

- tui (permissionRequestMsg handler): enforce the contract that a blocked
  agent ALWAYS gets a decision. A non-prompt action resolves immediately and
  FAILS CLOSED (deny; cancel stays cancel) so the UI can never silently grant
  an unsurfaced permission; a superseded-run (runID mismatch) resolves as
  cancel so its parked goroutine unblocks without depending on ctx-cancel
  ordering. Matches the ACP handler's always-resolve, fail-closed contract.

Red-green: reverting the tui branch reproduces the deadlock (decide never
called); reverting the agent override reproduces Action=allow. End-to-end
against a mock backend emitting the exact triggering tool call, the real TUI
now renders the permission prompt and the run completes on approval, where
before it parked forever.
2026-07-03 06:02:57 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani f915f70e5a fix(mcp): block cross-origin credential redirects (#396)
Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 06:02:05 +08:00
Vasanth T cdf9d839ae fix(tui): title /model rows by model name, not the catalog description (#395)
The model picker rendered each row's title from the model's description via
modelPickerDisplayName, which returned the description whenever it was non-empty
and not a known-generic placeholder. Catalog/discovery descriptions come from
models.dev as full sentences (e.g. "DeepSeek chat model for instruction
following, coding, and analysis"), and several models share the same sentence —
so the picker showed sentence-long titles and rows that looked like exact
duplicates, with the real model id surviving only in the meta line.

Prefer the (prettified) model id as the row title; fall back to a non-generic
description only when there is no id to name the row. Distinct ids that share a
catalog description now render as distinct rows.
2026-07-02 23:29:12 +08:00
Gautam ManchandaniandGautam Manchandani 960db9660e fix(tools): require permission before web_search requests (#382)
* fix(tools): gate web_search behind network permission

* chore(tools): clarify web_search permission reason

---------

Co-authored-by: Gautam Manchandani <[email protected]>
2026-07-02 22:14:58 +08:00
Ashwinhegde19andVasanthdev2004 b1ccb6d9c1 feat(providers): add KiloCode and OpenCode provider support (#388)
* feat(providers): add KiloCode and OpenCode provider support

Add KiloCode (Kilo Gateway), OpenCode Zen, and OpenCode Go as catalog
entries using the existing openAICompat transport. No new runtime code
needed — both gateways expose standard OpenAI-compatible /chat/completions.

Fixes #383

* fix(providers): swap OpenCode Zen default model to deepseek-v4-flash

gpt-5.5 is served via /responses on Zen, not /chat/completions.
deepseek-v4-flash works with openAICompat transport.

Co-Authored-By: Vasanthdev2004
2026-07-02 22:10:54 +08:00
Vasanth T 0bc8074c97 feat(providers): add zero providers models to discover a provider's models (#386)
`zero providers` had no way to list the models a provider actually serves, so a
custom OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint (e.g. a self-hosted proxy serving a
dozen models) forced users to hand-write a config object per model. Live model
discovery already existed for the TUI picker but had no headless CLI surface.

Add `zero providers models [name] [--json]`: it probes the provider's live
model-listing endpoint (an OpenAI-compatible /v1/models or the Anthropic /models)
via providermodeldiscovery.Discover, using the profile's base URL and resolved
credential (inline -> stored -> env). This uses the raw discovery primitive with
no curated-catalog merge or coding-model filtering, so a custom provider's full
model list is returned. Configure the provider once, run `zero providers models`
to see what it serves, and use any id with `zero exec --model <id>` (Zero passes
unknown model ids through to the provider) -- no per-model config needed.

Wired through a new appDeps.discoverProviderModels hook (default:
providermodeldiscovery.Discover) so the command is unit-tested hermetically.

Fixes #381.
2026-07-02 22:10:08 +08:00
KRATOS 72eed06b4f fix(config): unbrick first-run setup — default google/anthropic models, enter setup on fixable config errors (#385)
* fix(config): default missing google/anthropic models from the catalog

A hand-written provider entry like {name: "google", provider_kind:
"google", apiKey: ...} with no model bricked Zero: config resolution
failed with "provider google requires model", and since zero config and
bare zero setup both resolve up front, the only commands that could have
fixed the config died with the same error (reported in the wild — the
one working escape, zero setup google --model <m>, is undiscoverable
from that message).

The openai kind has always defaulted a missing model
(modelregistry.DefaultModelID); google and anthropic were missed. Fall
back to their provider-catalog default models (gemini-2.5-pro /
claude-sonnet-4.5) the same way, behind the same gate: provider-command
configs (normalizeProvidersWithoutModelDefaults) still surface exactly
what the external command returned. An explicitly configured model
always wins, and profiles with a catalogID already got this via
applyCatalogDescriptor — this covers the catalog-less hand-written case.

The residual requires-model error (openai-compatible customs, which
have no catalog default) now carries an actionable hint: add "model" in
config.json or re-run zero setup with --model.

Tests: google/anthropic defaulting (red-green: reverting the google
fallback reproduces the exact reported error), explicit model wins,
provider-command gate still errors with the hint, and validation treats
official-kind model-less profiles as clean while still flagging customs.

* fix(cli): enter setup on a requires-model config and hint zero auth login

Two residual first-run gaps after the catalog model-defaulting fix:

- An active provider whose model has NO catalog default to fall back on
  (custom openai-/anthropic-compatible endpoints) still bricked bare
  `zero` and `zero setup` — the exact commands that could have repaired
  the config. Tag that resolve failure with ErrProviderRequiresModel and
  extend the interactive TUI's fixable-error fallback (previously only
  ErrNoActiveProvider) to drop into the setup wizard for it. The sentinel
  is attached via a message-preserving wrapper (multi-target Unwrap), so
  headless commands (zero config / zero exec) print the exact actionable
  text unchanged and every other resolve error stays fatal.

- `zero login` / `zero logout` don't exist (it's `zero auth login`);
  first-run users try them and got only "unknown command" (reported in
  the wild). The unknown-command error now answers: did you mean
  "zero auth login"? Unrelated unknown commands get no suggestion.

Tests: the sentinel comes from a REAL Resolve over a real config file
(message-prefix asserted, no key leak); the TUI fallback is red-green
(reverting the condition reproduces the exact brick with the old error);
the existing no-active-provider fallback and other-errors-stay-fatal
tests still pass; login/logout hint with a no-false-positive check.
2026-07-02 22:09:25 +08:00
Kunj SHAH 33dc7ae2cc fix(tools): CRLF line ending mismatch in edit_file tool on Windows (#378)
* fix(tools): CRLF line ending mismatch in edit_file tool on Windows

* fix: resolve gofmt error, add robust CRLF guard, and fix Windows sandbox and OAuth test flakiness
2026-07-02 22:07:26 +08:00
Kunj SHAH 292e1edea5 security(config): project config should not override sandbox.network to allow (#379)
* security(config): project config should not override sandbox.network to allow

* fix(config): use NormalizeNetworkMode in project config merge, per coderabbit review
2026-07-02 21:01:35 +08:00
KRATOS 39e7100674 fix(gemini): strip unsupported JSON Schema fields from tool declarations (#374)
Every exec against the Google/Gemini provider failed: Zero emits tool
parameter schemas in OpenAI's JSON Schema dialect, which always includes
`additionalProperties` (schemaToRuntimeMap writes it unconditionally).
Google's functionDeclarations schema doesn't recognize that keyword and
400s the whole request — "Unknown name \"additionalProperties\" …
Cannot find field" — so no tool-using call ever reached the model.

Sanitize tool parameters in the Gemini mapper (only there — the field is
valid and wanted for OpenAI strict mode and harmless for Anthropic):

- sanitizeGeminiSchema keeps only the keywords Gemini's Schema type
  supports (type, description, enum, properties, required, items, anyOf,
  default, nullable, format, and the min/max/length constraints) via an
  allowlist, so any future OpenAI-ism or MCP-supplied field can't leak.
- Recurses through properties, items, and anyOf so nested schemas are
  cleaned at every depth, not just the top level.

Tests: a unit test on the sanitizer (nesting, legit fields preserved,
nil-safe) and an end-to-end test asserting the outgoing request body's
functionDeclarations[].parameters carry no additionalProperties while the
real schema survives. Bypassing the sanitizer reproduces the reported
payload, so the coverage is red-green.

Fixes #373
2026-07-02 20:20:25 +08:00
smallnestandsmallnest 027a8f2768 fix(config): use ~/.config on macOS and enter setup when no provider (#371) (#372)
On macOS, DefaultUserConfigPath used Go's os.UserConfigDir which returns
~/Library/Application Support, while users (and Claude Code) place config
at ~/.config/zero/config.json. The user config was never read, leaving
activeProvider empty and the launch failing with `active provider "" not
found` on a fresh `go run cmd/zero setup`.

- Add config.UserConfigDir(): on darwin, resolve to ~/.config (honoring
  XDG_CONFIG_HOME), matching Linux and Claude Code. DefaultUserConfigPath,
  the TUI user-commands dir, and specialist manifests all route through it.
- Add config.ErrNoActiveProvider sentinel; the interactive TUI now drops
  into the setup wizard when resolve fails solely due to a missing/
  unresolvable active provider, instead of exiting fatally. Other resolve
  errors (malformed JSON, directory conflicts) remain fatal.

Note: `zero setup`/`zero auth` already MkdirAll the config dir before
writing, so the directory is auto-created on first write.

Co-authored-by: smallnest <smallnest@gmail>
2026-07-02 20:03:44 +08:00
Kevin Codex bd89a1f451 feat: require manual approval before npm publish + drop release-as pin (#369)
The publish-npm job now targets the npm-publish environment, whose
required-reviewer rule pauses the job for maintainer approval in the
Actions UI before anything reaches the registry. Also removes the
release-as 0.1.0 pin from release-please-config.json now that v0.1.0
has shipped — leaving it would stamp every future release 0.1.0.
2026-07-02 16:15:22 +08:00
github-actions[bot] c807f92b72 chore(main): release 0.1.0 (#368)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-02 15:20:45 +08:00
Kevin Codexandcoderabbitai[bot] 8eccc26698 feat: publish zero to npm via release-please (#367)
* feat: publish zero to npm via release-please

Adds release-please to automate versioning and releases from
conventional commits on main:

- release-please-config.json / .release-please-manifest.json: node
  release type (package.json is the version source of truth), plain
  v-prefixed tags, bootstrap-sha at current HEAD, and release-as 0.1.0
  to pin the first release (remove after v0.1.0 ships).
- .github/workflows/release-please.yml: maintains the release PR; on
  merge it tags + creates the GitHub Release, then dispatches
  release-artifacts.yml at the tag (GITHUB_TOKEN-created tags cannot
  fire on-push-tags workflows).
- .github/workflows/release-artifacts.yml: tag-gated steps now match
  the ref instead of the push event so the dispatched-at-tag run
  publishes assets, and a new publish-npm job publishes @gitlawb/zero
  after verifying every postinstall asset URL is publicly downloadable
  (also blocks publishing while the repo is private).

* Update .github/workflows/release-please.yml

Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat: publish to npm via OIDC trusted publishing instead of NPM_TOKEN

npm's trusted publishing exchanges the workflow's OIDC token for
publish auth, so no long-lived NPM_TOKEN secret exists to leak, and
provenance is generated automatically. Drops registry-url from
setup-node (its .npmrc line hard-fails on the unset NODE_AUTH_TOKEN)
and updates npm first (OIDC needs npm >= 11.5.1). One-time caveat:
npm only lets you configure a trusted publisher on an existing
package, so the first @gitlawb/zero publish is a manual bootstrap.

* fix: drop npm@latest from the OIDC publish path

Rely on the npm bundled with the pinned Node 24 toolchain (>= 11.5.1,
the trusted-publishing minimum) instead of pulling an unpinned
npm@latest from the registry inside the publish job, and fail fast
with a clear error if a future toolchain change regresses it.

---------

Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-02 15:05:07 +08:00
KRATOS 6e0a665118 fix(auth): propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider (#366)
* fix(auth): propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider

Sub-agents, swarm members, ACP sessions, and mid-run escalation switches
could build providers without the credentials the parent was running with.
This consolidates credential resolution so every surface gets the same auth:

- Wrap deps.newProvider once in fillAppDeps to fold the stored API key in
  centrally; ACP, exec escalation, and buildProvider no longer patch it
  per call site (an apiKeyStored profile previously went out keyless on
  those paths and 401'd).
- Export ZERO_PROVIDER at startup (buildProvider) and keep exporting on
  every runtime switch (wizard, onboarding, /model, /provider), so spawned
  children resolve the parent's live provider instead of whatever another
  process last persisted to config.json. Injected via appDeps so tests
  never mutate the process environment.
- Share one OAuth login selection end to end: ProviderProfile.
  OAuthLoginCandidates (name, then catalog-ID fallback; nothing for a
  profile with its own configured credential) + oauth.FirstStored resolve
  the login ONCE, and the bound store key is threaded through
  providers.Options.OAuthLoginKey so the Codex account-id header always
  reads the same login that issued the bearer token. A renamed profile
  (name != catalog ID) now finds its login; an explicit API key is never
  silently overridden by a same-name or catalog-shared OAuth login.
- Export ProviderProfile.HasConfiguredCredential as the single "profile is
  key-authed" predicate (cli/tui/config previously had three copies).
- applyProviderWizard commits live state (provider, profile, name, env
  export) only after BOTH the build and the config persist succeed, so a
  persist failure no longer leaves the chat running on a provider the
  status line and children disagree with.

Covered by red-green tests for each path: stored-key wrap, escalation
switch, catalog-ID fallback (incl. case-variant names), explicit-key
protection, same-login account selection, wizard persist-failure rollback,
onboarding/startup env export.

* test: isolate OAuth/config test storage and fix the flaky MCP response-id test

Review + CI fixes, all test-only:

- factory/cli OAuth tests: pin ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=file next to the temp
  ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH — an inherited "keyring" value sends NewStore to
  the OS keychain and ignores the temp path entirely, so the tests could
  read (or clobber) the developer's real logins. newOAuthStoreForTest now
  owns both pins so a future call site can't forget them.
- TestApplyProviderWizardExportsActiveProviderEnv: point m.userConfigPath
  at a temp config and stub newProvider, so the SUCCESS path exercises the
  full build+persist+commit sequence in isolation (the default empty path
  silently skipped persist; a changed default must never reach the real
  user config).
- TestClientRequestWaitsForMatchingResponseID (ubuntu smoke flake): the
  responses were pre-loaded into a bytes.Buffer, so the client's reader
  goroutine could consume the matching response — and hit EOF — before
  request() registered its pending id, failing with "request() error =
  EOF" on fast runners. The fake server now sits on pipes and responds
  only after reading the outgoing request, matching production ordering;
  survives -race -count=50.
2026-07-02 12:21:27 +05:30
Kevin CodexandGnanam 142c548c89 feat(tui): FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in (#365)
* feat(tui): FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in

Add a FILES section to the right context sidebar showing the files the
session has touched — newest first, with A/M status badges, aggregated
+/− diffstats, and a pulsing row for the file being written right now.

Clicking a row selects the file (accent marker, edit cards tint in the
chat, transcript scrolls to the latest edit); a second click opens a
drill-in view: the chat column swaps to the file's stacked edit cards,
`f` toggles to the syntax-highlighted on-disk file with markers on
session-added lines, `d` back to diff, Esc returns to the chat.

The roster is fed from two sources: changedFiles carried by
write_file/edit_file/apply_patch results (persisted per session, so it
survives /resume), and a git sweep — baseline snapshot at startup,
re-check after command tools and at turn end — so files created through
bash/exec_command scaffolding or subagents show up too.

* fix(tui): address FILES sidebar review findings

Review fixes for the FILES panel / drill-in / git sweep:

- touchedFiles: split multi-file diffs per file (perFileDiffStats) so an
  apply_patch spanning several files no longer charges the whole patch's
  +/- totals to every file it touched; order by lastRowIndex descending
  so a re-touched file lists first (reversing first-seen order kept it in
  its original slot).
- sidebarFileLines: filter the live-writing row out before computing the
  "+N more" trailer so the skipped entry no longer inflates the count.
- git sweep: run `git diff --numstat -z` and parse the NUL-terminated
  rename records (counts + preimage + postimage) — plain --numstat
  brace-mangles renamed paths ("src/{old => new}"), so their diffstat
  never matched a porcelain path and renamed files stayed at 0/0;
  gitTouchedFiles now yields newest detection first to match the
  roster's ordering.
- file view: stream the full-mode read and stop at fileViewMaxLines
  (os.ReadFile loaded a multi-GB file wholesale before truncating — the
  exact freeze the cap exists to prevent); re-opening the file already
  being viewed is a no-op so a stray re-click can't bounce full mode
  back to diff or reset scroll; skip sub-4-char lines in the changed-line
  markers so common braces/returns don't mark unrelated occurrences.
- keys: gate the drill-in's d/f and Esc handling on noBlockingModal so a
  permission prompt / ask-user / wizard keeps its own key handling.
- sidebar: a live in-flight write counts as content, so the FILES pulse
  shows for the session's first mutation.
- tests: numstat test now feeds real -z record shapes and asserts the
  rename postimage key; new coverage for per-file stats, re-touch
  ordering, live-row overflow, same-file reopen, truncation, modal
  gating, live-write content, and a real-repo rename sweep.

---------

Co-authored-by: Gnanam <[email protected]>
2026-07-02 12:15:41 +05:30
KRATOS 02f0c0929b fix: cut the content-stall dead-wait and auto-retry a mid-tool-call stall (#362)
* fix: cut the content-stall dead-wait and auto-retry a mid-tool-call stall

Root-caused (via a verified multi-agent audit) the chatgpt/gpt-5.5 "stuck"
reports: the ChatGPT Codex backend pauses real generation mid-stream on
large single tool-call outputs (a ~1000-line write_file) while continuing
SSE keep-alive heartbeats. That is an upstream limitation, not a Zero bug
or a connection-pooling issue (the darwin DisableKeepAlives fix is applied
and confirmed not the cause). Zero already detected it, but two UX gaps
made it feel like a hang:

1. Faster abort. The content-stall watchdog fired at idle*2 = 10 minutes.
   A heartbeat-pause stall on gpt-5.x rarely recovers, so 10 minutes of a
   frozen token counter was a terrible wait for a doomed turn. Replaced the
   StreamContentStallFactor=2 const with ContentStallTimeout(idle)=idle*1.2
   (6 minutes at the default). It still only ever fires on a TRUE zero-output
   freeze — any real data line resets it — so healthy slow-reasoning runs are
   unaffected. Scales with ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT; returns 0 (disabled)
   when idle is disabled.

2. Auto-retry the actual stall. The existing stall-retry only fired when
   NOTHING had been forwarded — so the common case (model streamed transient
   reasoning + began the big write_file, then froze mid-arguments) was NOT
   retried, because the incomplete tool call is collected and transient
   output was forwarded. Relaxed the gate to retry when no visible PROSE was
   shown (forwardedVisibleText, marked only by OnText) and no final text was
   collected — dropping the len(ToolCalls)==0 exclusion, since an incomplete
   tool call from a timed-out stream is never executed (the turn returns on
   the error before dispatch) and never appended to messages, so the retry
   re-sends clean context with no duplication. A visible
   "[no output — model stalled; retrying N/max]" notice fires per attempt.
   Forwarded prose still blocks the retry (it would duplicate answer text).

Verified: full -race suite green; a 4-dimension root-cause audit and a
3-dimension adversarial review of this diff both passed with no confirmed
defects. New tests: TestRunRetriesStallAfterIncompleteToolCall (the exact
gpt-5.x case), TestRunRetriesStallAfterOnlyReasoning; preserved
TestRunDoesNotRetryStallAfterPartialOutput (prose still blocks retry).

* fix(providerio): make ContentStallTimeout overflow-safe

Address PR #362 review: idleTimeout*6/5 could overflow int64 for a
pathologically large ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT and wrap to a NEGATIVE
duration, which would arm the content-stall timer to fire immediately and
abort every stream. Compute 1.2× as idle + idle/5 with a clamp to the max
duration on overflow (which just means "effectively no content watchdog",
the sane result for an absurd idle timeout). The normal 1.2× values are
unchanged (5m->6m, 30s->36s, 100ms->120ms).

New test: TestContentStallTimeout covers the scaled values, the
zero/disabled case, and the MaxInt64 overflow guard.
2026-07-02 00:14:51 +05:30
KRATOS 3fde03a900 fix(tui): show the queued-message preview above the composer, not below (#361)
A message typed while a run is active is queued for the next turn. Its
"[queued] …" preview rendered on the line BELOW the input box; move it to
directly ABOVE the box so it reads as "waiting to send," sitting on top of
what you're currently typing, and doesn't get visually detached from the
composer by the status line beneath it. Footer height is unchanged (the
preview line just moves from below to above the box).

New test: TestQueuedPromptPreviewSitsAboveComposer asserts the preview
line index is above the composer box top border.
2026-07-01 23:55:54 +05:30
KRATOS 85273ea72d fix(providerio): disable HTTP keep-alive reuse on macOS to defeat degraded-connection stalls (#360)
This codebase already has a documented, previously-diagnosed macOS-only
bug: "sharedHTTPClient... defeats the stale-pooled-connection hang...
reproduced on BOTH chatgpt and ollama... surfaces on macOS far more than
Linux because macOS keeps dead pooled connections around longer." The
existing mitigation (ResponseHeaderTimeout=120s, IdleConnTimeout=30s)
catches a reused connection that never responds at all, or one that sat
idle too long.

Traced a live report that doesn't fit either case: a session accumulated
301 real completion tokens over ~12.5 minutes (~0.4 tok/s) on
chatgpt/gpt-5.5 before being manually cancelled - not silent, just
catastrophically slow, on a retry shortly after a prior attempt on the
same host. That's a third failure mode: a reused connection that's
alive-but-severely-degraded, still delivering real bytes (enough to keep
resetting Zero's stream idle/content-stall watchdogs, which only fire on
true silence) but never at a usable rate. Basic network diagnostics on
the affected machine (DNS, TCP connect, TLS handshake) were all healthy
and routed directly with no VPN/proxy involved, pointing at the same
connection-reuse class of bug rather than a local network misconfig.

DisableKeepAlives removes pooling from the equation entirely rather than
just tightening the timeout window, since a degraded-not-dead connection
isn't reliably distinguishable from genuine backend slowness once inside
the stream. Scoped to darwin only via runtime.GOOS: a fresh TCP+TLS
handshake per request costs low tens of milliseconds (measured ~92ms
against a real host on the affected machine) against potential
minutes-long stalls, and Linux/Windows don't exhibit this OS-level
pooled-connection behavior, so they keep full connection reuse.

New test: TestHTTPClientReturnsStallHardenedSharedClient extended to
assert DisableKeepAlives matches runtime.GOOS == "darwin".
2026-07-01 21:48:47 +05:30
KRATOS 0914ced9e1 test: widen timing margins on two Windows-flaky CI tests (#359)
Both failed on windows-latest today, on merges of otherwise-unrelated
PRs (#349, #356) - neither PR touched internal/specialist or
internal/agenteval. Windows GitHub Actions runners have coarser default
timer granularity and more scheduling contention than Linux/macOS, so
tight timing margins that hold on the other two platforms aren't
reliable there.

- TestOutputToolBlocksUntilTaskCompletes: a 100ms poll timeout against a
  5ms background write left only 20x margin. Widened the timeout to
  2000ms (a ceiling, not a target - PollInterval keeps the test fast in
  the success case; it only changes how much CI jitter it tolerates
  before failing).
- TestHarnessTimeoutCancelsBlockedAgent: confirmed there's no actual data
  race (harness.Agent.Run is a direct synchronous call, not a spawned
  goroutine racing the assertions) - the failure was workspace
  materialization alone consuming the full 10s budget on a contended
  Windows runner, so the agent was never reached. Widened to 30s. This
  test's own design blocks for the full timeout to observe cancellation,
  so unlike the other fix this directly costs ~20s more wall-clock time,
  but that's inherent to what it's testing.
2026-07-01 21:28:52 +05:30
KRATOS 68669073c2 fix(tui): explicitly request the initial window size at startup (#358)
Zero is always in alt-screen mode (useAltScreen() is unconditionally
true), and transcriptView's `if m.altScreen && m.height > 0` gate is what
pads the rendered frame out to fill the full terminal height
(scrollableTranscriptItemsView pads bodyWindow to window.height). If
m.height is ever 0 - Bubble Tea documents an initial WindowSizeMsg as
delivered automatically on program start, but that's the terminal
proactively pushing a size, and nothing else ever asks again if that
push is missed (a slow/unusual terminal, a multiplexer, a startup race)
- Zero falls back to the unpadded, non-fullscreen render path for the
rest of the session: content only occupies as many rows as it needs,
leaving the remaining terminal height as plain unfilled background
instead of the alt-screen's painted panel color.

Fixed by explicitly firing tea.RequestWindowSize in Init(), the same
defensive pattern already used for tea.RequestBackgroundColor right below
it - Zero doesn't rely solely on an unprompted push for either.
2026-07-01 21:25:47 +05:30
KRATOS 33410d8730 fix(tui): make the stall watchdog visible before it fires, not just after (#357)
Zero already has a content-stall watchdog built specifically for this
exact case (providerio.ErrStreamStalled's own doc comment: "observed on
chatgpt/gpt-5.x and ollama reasoning models") - a heartbeating-but-silent
upstream is aborted after idleTimeout * StreamContentStallFactor (5min *
2 = 10min by default). It works. The gap is that until it fires, the
"still generating... Xs" cue is the ONLY signal the user has, and it
looks completely identical whether real (if slow) content is still
coming or the stream is already dead and just hasn't been caught yet -
confirmed against a live report where the token count sat frozen for
7+ minutes with no way to tell from the UI alone.

Past half the effective idle timeout, quietGenerationHint() now escalates
to name what's actually happening and when Zero will act on its own:
"still generating... Xs - unusually quiet, Zero will auto-recover by
~Ys if it doesn't resume". Exported StreamContentStallFactor from
providerio (was unexported) so the TUI can compute the same ceiling the
watchdog itself uses, instead of duplicating the constant.

New test: TestQuietGenerationHintEscalatesPastHalfIdleTimeout, using
ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT to shrink the timeout so the test runs fast
while exercising the exact same math the real watchdog uses.
2026-07-01 21:25:27 +05:30
KRATOS c0254e3266 fix(tui): context-fill gauge for custom/local Ollama models + related fixes (#356)
* fix(tui): show the context-fill gauge for custom/local Ollama models

The colored context gauge (used/window · N%) only renders when Zero knows
a model's context window. It resolves that two ways: a curated remote
catalog (how Grok/hosted models are known), or live /v1/models discovery —
but parseModelsResponse only ever extracts id/description from that
response; OpenAI-compatible model listings don't carry context-window
metadata at all. A custom/local Ollama model tag (e.g. a locally-pulled
":cloud"-tagged model) has no curated-catalog entry to borrow one from
either, so it always resolved to an unknown window and the gauge silently
fell back to a bare token count with no color grading.

Ollama does expose this, just via a different, Ollama-native endpoint
(/api/show, not /v1/models) whose model_info map reports it under an
architecture-prefixed key like "qwen2.context_length". Added
DiscoverOllamaContextWindow (providermodeldiscovery) to probe it, wired
through an async command scoped to the local "ollama" catalog ID only
(not "ollama-cloud", a different hosted service this endpoint isn't
assumed to exist on) — fired from Init() for the provider active at
launch, and from switchProviderModel for a provider switched to
mid-session (which previously warmed no discovery at all for the new
provider, a separate gap this also fixes).

New tests: DiscoverOllamaContextWindow's endpoint construction and
model_info parsing (including a mixed-type model_info and a missing
*.context_length key), the discovery command's scoping to local Ollama
only, the Update() handler populating modelContextWindow's fallback, and
switchProviderModel warming discovery for the newly active provider.

Local only — not pushed. I can't run a live Ollama daemon in this
sandbox, so the actual /api/show request/response shape (verified against
Ollama's documented API, not a live instance) needs confirming against a
real daemon before this goes out.

* fix(tui): stop showing the token count twice next to the context gauge

contextWindowSegment (the gauge) and usageStatusSegment (the plain "N tok"
figure) both read the exact same value (latestUsageTokens) — the code
already suppressed the plain figure when the sidebar shows it ("the token
figure shows on both sides"), but never extended that same dedup to the
gauge. So as soon as a model's context window becomes known (e.g. after
the previous commit's Ollama fix), the footer showed the identical number
twice: once inside the gauge, once again right next to it.

Fixed by falling back to cost-only whenever the gauge is shown, same as
the sidebar-active branch already does.

* fix: check collect()'s deadline even while output keeps draining

The wait deadline in execSession.collect() was only checked in the branch
reached when drainString() returns empty. A background process producing
output continuously enough to keep the buffer perpetually non-empty could
theoretically starve that check forever, turning the caller's requested
timeout into an unbounded block regardless of yield_time_ms.

Investigated as part of a cross-provider "stuck" report (multiple sessions
across different models/providers all hanging on the same prompt, each
with a background terminal running and no forward progress). Could not
empirically reproduce a hang via a synthetic continuous-writer test under
Go's real scheduler — the reader won the race often enough in practice
that this doesn't appear to be the actual cause of those reports. Keeping
the fix regardless since it closes a real, if hard-to-trigger, gap: the
deadline is now checked in both branches, so continuous output can never
prevent collect() from returning within its requested window.
2026-07-01 20:48:50 +05:30
Vasanth T c4c14d62d4 fix(oauth): make xAI / Hugging Face OAuth actually launch from the wizard (#355)
The provider wizard offered "Sign in with OAuth" for xAI and Hugging Face, but
clicking did nothing: the login managers were built without an env, so the preset
opt-in (ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS) read as unset, ResolveConfig errored before any
browser step, and the error was never rendered on the provider list. Only ChatGPT
worked, because its login path force-enables presets.

Add ManagerOptions.AllowPresets, which layers the opt-in onto the manager env
(snapshotting the process environment so ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* overrides survive
envValue's hermetic-map rule) without the operator exporting the flag. Set it on
every user-initiated OAuth manager: the wizard loopback login, the device-code
prepare/complete, the post-login token refresh, the runtime resolver that
authenticates model calls, and `zero auth login`. This fixes xAI end to end (it
ships a public client_id, so the browser now opens).

Also surface a failed OAuth attempt on the provider list (renderProviderStep) so
the click is no longer a silent no-op, with a Hugging Face hint pointing at app
registration + ZERO_OAUTH_HUGGINGFACE_CLIENT_ID (HF ships no public client_id, so
it still requires that one env var by design).
2026-07-01 18:37:56 +05:30
Vasanth T 49bec0274f feat(tui): interactive theme picker + color theme catalog (#354)
* feat(tui): interactive theme picker + color theme catalog

Bare `/theme` now opens a popup that live-previews each palette as the cursor
moves and applies on select (Esc reverts), matching /model and /effort. Adds ten
built-in color themes alongside the dark/light built-ins — dracula, nord, gruvbox,
tokyo-night, catppuccin, one-dark, solarized-dark, rose-pine, everforest, and
solarized-light — plus a reworked light palette. Every palette is contrast-audited
to WCAG AA; the contrast tests now loop the whole registry.

Palettes and an ordered registry live in a new internal/tui/theme_palettes.go (now
the sole home of hex literals); selection, the picker, /theme <name>, --theme, and
ZERO_THEME all resolve through it. The whole frame is painted with the active
theme's surface (tea.View.BackgroundColor) so every theme is legible on any
terminal — a light theme's dark text no longer lands invisibly on a dark terminal,
and color themes show their real surface.

The chosen theme persists to user config (preferences.theme) and is reapplied at
startup, below the --theme flag and ZERO_THEME.

* fix(tui): address CodeRabbit review on the theme catalog

- CHANGELOG: reconcile the --theme bullet with the named themes (was still
  documenting {auto|dark|light}).
- /theme usage string advertises the list and auto forms (/theme list is still
  accepted) so /help matches the command surface.
- Theme-persistence test parses the written config and asserts preferences.theme
  directly instead of a raw substring, so a wrong-key regression fails.
2026-07-01 15:46:15 +05:30
KRATOS bcc65da2a0 fix(tui): require a second Esc press to cancel a running turn (#352)
* fix(tui): require a second Esc press to cancel a running turn

A single stray Esc during an active run cancelled it instantly with no
chance to reconsider - e.g. a press meant to dismiss an overlay that had
already closed. Ctrl+C already guards app-exit with a double-press
confirmation (exitConfirmActive/exitConfirmSeq); Esc now gets its own
independent confirmation (cancelConfirmActive/cancelConfirmSeq) guarding
run-cancellation specifically, since the two are different actions with
different consequences armed by different keys.

Mirrors the existing seq-gated tea.Tick pattern: first Esc arms a 3s
window and shows "Press Esc again to cancel" in the footer; a second Esc
within the window cancels the run; letting it expire, or the run finishing
on its own, disarms without cancelling.

Updated the three existing tests that assumed single-press cancellation
(TestEscCancelsPendingRun -> TestEscRequiresSecondPressToCancelPendingRun,
TestEscCancellationLeavesVisibleMarker, TestEscCancelRecordsSessionError,
TestCancelledRunFlushesCheckpointSessionEvents) and added
TestEscCancelConfirmationExpires mirroring the Ctrl+C expiry test.

* fix: pre-push review findings on the Esc cancel-confirmation gate

Ran an adversarial review before opening the PR. Three independent
reviewers converged on the same root defect: unlike exitConfirmActive
(disarmed by any key other than Ctrl+C), cancelConfirmActive had no
"anything else disarms it" safety net, so it behaved as a plain 3s timer
rather than a true immediate-second-press gate. Concretely:

- Typing, Ctrl+O, or any other non-Esc key left it armed, so a later,
  unrelated Esc press could silently cancel the run.
- A mid-turn ask_user or permission prompt lands asynchronously and is
  checked earlier in the Esc handler than the cancel-confirm block, so it
  silently "stole" the confirming press (denying the prompt instead) while
  leaving cancelConfirmActive armed for a subsequent, unrelated Esc to act
  on.
- Mouse clicks resolving a permission prompt or entering a subchat had the
  same gap.

Fixed by mirroring the Ctrl+C pattern: any non-Esc key disarms it (model.go,
next to the existing exitConfirmAction reset), and any left/right mouse
click disarms it too (mouse.go — scoped to clicks, not hover/motion, since
motion fires continuously and would otherwise defeat the window whenever
the mouse sits over the terminal). Within the Esc handler itself, restructured
to capture whether this press was really a confirm *before* any of the
earlier branches (subchat, MCP wizard, ask-user, permission, picker,
suggestions, queued-message, detailed-transcript) can run, then disarm
unconditionally — so an Esc consumed by any of those no longer leaves a
stale confirmation for a later press to trip.

Also updated two now-stale help strings the review flagged: the `?`
overlay's Esc row and pickerBusyText()'s "press Esc to cancel" hint, both
of which still described the old single-press behavior.

Added TestEscCancelConfirmationDisarmsOnInterveningKey (mirrors the
existing Ctrl+C equivalent) and
TestEscCancelConfirmationDisarmsWhenStolenByAskUser covering the two
confirmed gaps.

* fix: address CodeRabbit review comments on PR #352

- model.go: the first Esc (arming the cancel confirmation) was clearing the
  composer draft immediately, even though nothing had actually been
  cancelled yet — a leftover from the old single-press behavior, where
  clearing the draft and cancelling the run happened atomically as one
  action. Now that cancellation is two presses, only the confirming second
  Esc (or a plain Esc with no run pending) clears the composer; arming
  preserves whatever the user was typing, mirroring how Ctrl+C already
  preserves a draft (TestCtrlCClearsComposerBeforeExitConfirmation).

- clipboard.go: routePaste (bracketed paste and right-click paste) never
  disarmed a stale cancelConfirmActive — it isn't a tea.KeyPressMsg, so it
  bypassed the generic "any non-Esc key disarms it" hook added in the
  previous commit. A paste is a deliberate action like typing or clicking,
  so it should disarm the confirmation too; otherwise a later, unrelated
  Esc could silently cancel the run.

New tests: TestEscArmingCancelConfirmationPreservesComposerDraft,
TestPasteDisarmsCancelConfirmation.
2026-07-01 15:45:28 +05:30
KRATOS 2a8802e39c fix: cap unbounded exec_command output buffer to prevent OOM kill (#353)
* fix: cap unbounded exec_command output buffer to prevent OOM kill

execOutputBuffer.data accumulated every byte a backgrounded exec_command
session wrote, with no size cap, unlike buffer.recent which is correctly
bounded to recentExecOutputBytes for the /ps preview. drainString() only
clears data when the agent actually polls that session again — so a
long-lived background session nobody polls (e.g. a dev server left running
after the run that started it was cancelled) grows this buffer forever as
long as the process keeps writing, with no ceiling.

Traced this directly to a real crash: a session that had been running for
~5.5 hours (an earlier turn invoking swarm agents got cancelled mid-flight,
per that session's own event log) accumulated to ~42.7GB of compressed
memory, at which point macOS's memorystatus killed the process outright
("killing zero due to low-swap").

Fixed by capping data at maxExecOutputBufferBytes (2MiB), trimming from the
front like recent already does, and surfacing a one-time truncation notice
on the next drain so data loss is visible rather than silent.

* fix: pre-push review findings on the exec_command buffer-cap fix

Ran an adversarial review before opening the PR. It found the truncation
notice added alongside the buffer cap didn't actually work: prefixing
execOutputTruncatedMessage into drainString()'s text meant the notice
always sat ~2MiB before the end of the combined output, but the tool's
own downstream truncateExecOutput() keeps at most a 400KB tail (even at
the maximum allowed max_output_tokens) — so the notice was reliably
swallowed, or chopped into an unreadable fragment at smaller budgets.
Verified with direct reproductions against the real functions.

Fixed by moving the signal out of the text stream entirely:
- execOutputBuffer gains consumeTruncated() (read+reset, called once per
  collect()) and peekTruncated() (read-only, for status views) instead of
  injecting a marker into the drained bytes.
- collect() now returns (string, bool); both call sites thread the bool
  through to execToolResult, which sets meta["output_buffer_truncated"]
  and appends the notice to the response body *after* truncateExecOutput
  runs, so it can never be re-truncated or land in a discarded region.
- Also flagged: a session torn down without ever being polled again after
  truncation loses the signal entirely, since nothing drains/logs it on
  teardown. Full audit-trail logging felt like overkill for a soft
  transparency signal on top of a hard memory-safety fix, but exposed
  peekTruncated() on ExecSessionSnapshot and surfaced it in the /ps row
  (background_terminals.go) so it's visible any time a still-running
  session is checked — covers the common case (the review's own scenario:
  a long-lived dev server nobody's polling but that's still alive) even
  though a session reaped before ever being looked at is still a gap.

New tests: reworked TestExecOutputBufferCapsUndrainedData for the
consume/peek API, and TestExecToolResultSurfacesBufferTruncationOutsideByteBudget
reproducing the review's exact failure case (max_output_tokens=1) and
proving the notice now survives it.
2026-07-01 15:03:42 +05:30
KRATOS d53052071a revert(local): restore the original bright-lime accent color (#351)
Restores accent to #caff3f (the pre-PR#350 value), undoing the three-round
brightness reduction (#ade619 -> #8db620 -> #759523) merged in PR #350. Only
the accent token changes - the hover-highlight color (a separate amber
token) and every other PR #350 fix (subchat selection, drag-to-edge
auto-scroll, the dragging-flag fix) are untouched.

Full gate green. Local only - not pushed.
2026-07-01 13:55:35 +05:30
KRATOS 1c65f59be6 fix(tui): subchat mouse selection, hover highlighting, and drag-to-edge auto-scroll (#350)
* fix(local): subchat mouse selection + hidden plan panel + scroll-extend selection

Three bugs in the subagent/swarm drill-in (subchat) view and mouse text selection,
all from the same root: newer features (subchat's row-source swap, wheel-scroll)
were never integrated into the older selection/footer code.

1) Can't copy anything in the subchat view. transcriptLineAtMouse (and
   selectedTranscriptText, the copy-time text extraction) always hit-tested against
   m.transcript (the parent), never m.subchat.childRows, even while the screen was
   showing the child session. New transcriptHitTestSource() mirrors transcriptView's
   own branching (nav bar + child rows + full width vs pinned title bar + parent
   rows + sidebar-aware width) and is now the single source both functions use.

2) Plan panel shown above the composer inside the subchat view. footerView
   unconditionally rendered the PARENT run's pinned plan panel; only pendingAskUser
   was gated. Added a !m.subchat.active guard (m.plan belongs to the parent run,
   not whatever subagent/swarm session is being viewed).

3) Selection didn't extend across a scroll (reported as "stopped at the end of the
   screen"). transcriptSelection.cursor was only ever updated by a mouseMotion
   event; a wheel event is a distinct message type that never reached that code,
   so scrolling while selecting left the selection frozen at whatever line the
   mouse last physically moved over. New scrollChatExtendingSelection scrolls AND
   re-evaluates the cursor at the mouse's current position against the post-scroll
   viewport. Uses a new nearestTranscriptLineAtMouse (falls back to the closest
   visible selectable line) rather than an exact match, since the recomputed
   position can land exactly on a blank spacer row between messages after an
   odd-length scroll shifts text/spacer parity - an exact-match miss there must
   not silently no-op the extension.

Tests: subchat selection resolves the CHILD session's text, not the parent's; the
plan panel is absent from the footer during subchat; a selection's cursor bodyY
moves (extends) after a wheel-scroll instead of staying pinned. Full gate green
(73 pkg, -race).

* feat(local): highlight clickable rows on mouse hover

Moving the cursor over an interactive row now highlights it (accent underline)
before you click, across every clickable surface:
- specialist cards and collapse/expand toggle headers in the transcript
- AGENTS sidebar rows (swarm members)
- PLAN sidebar step rows
- permission-prompt options (reuses the EXISTING keyboard-cursor highlight by
  moving pendingPermission.cursor on hover, instead of new styling)

Requires switching the mouse-tracking mode from CellMotion (only reports motion
while a button is held) to AllMotion (reports idle cursor movement too) - the
existing 15ms mouse-event throttle already covers the added motion events.

hover.go: hoverTarget + mouseHover predicate + updateHoverTarget, which reuses
the SAME hit-testers and priority order as the existing click handlers so hover
and click never disagree about what's clickable.

Sidebar hover is resolved by STABLE IDENTITY (sessionID / stepIndex), not a
cached line offset: hoveredSidebarLineOffset re-matches the identity against a
freshly computed hit list on every render, so a row that's disappeared (a
swarm member's linger elapsed, a plan step completed) simply doesn't highlight
rather than a coincidentally-matching unrelated row lighting up. Transcript
hover stays bodyY-keyed (matching the existing selection-highlight convention)
with explicit clearHover() calls wherever bodyY numbering can shift without an
intervening mouse motion: wheel-scroll, PgUp/PgDn, window resize, and
transcript rebuilds (/clear, /resume, /rewind, /compact via resetFlushFrontier).

Adversarial review caught two real bugs before ship, both fixed:
- BLOCKER: plan-step hover stored the step's own index (0,1,2...) but the
  sidebar render treated it as a raw line offset into the rendered rows -
  every plan-step hover highlighted the wrong row (the AGENTS header/body).
  Fixed by resolving fresh at render time via the stable-identity redesign
  above, which also closes the related sidebar-drift issue.
- MAJOR: hover wasn't cleared on keyboard PgUp/PgDn scroll.

Tests: predicate correctness; hover resolves the right target across all 4
surfaces (specialist card, toggle row, sidebar agent, plan step, permission
option) with the correct priority order; hover changes the actual render
output (transcript + sidebar); hover clears on wheel-scroll and subchat exit;
a regression test proving hoveredSidebarLineOffset self-heals (no highlight)
when a hovered row's identity no longer resolves - the exact scenario the
blocker fix targets. Full gate green (73 pkg, -race).

* fix(local): soften hover color + auto-scroll a drag past the transcript edge

1) Hover highlight was brand-lime (bright, glaring against the near-black
   surface) and re-paints on every mouse movement. Switched to amber (an
   existing semantic token, "light orange") and dropped the underline per
   feedback.

2) Dragging a text selection past the top/bottom edge of the visible
   transcript now auto-scrolls toward that side and extends the selection to
   follow, matching the browser/editor "drag past the viewport edge" pattern.
   transcriptEdgeScrollDelta detects the drag is vertically outside the body
   rect (but still within its horizontal span, so it isn't just "off to the
   side" over the sidebar); dragToEdgeScroll scrolls one step and anchors the
   cursor to whichever line now sits at that edge of the NEW viewport -
   deliberately not a re-resolve of the drag's physical mouse position, which
   stays outside the body rect after scrolling (scrolling changes what content
   occupies a screen row, not the mouse's screen position) and would keep
   finding nothing.

   Extracted nearestTranscriptSelectableAt as the shared "closest selectable
   line to a target bodyY" core, now used by both nearestTranscriptLineAtMouse
   (target derived from a mouse position that may have landed on a spacer row)
   and dragToEdgeScroll (target derived directly from the viewport bound, no
   mouse position involved at all).

Tests: dragging past the top edge scrolls toward older content and extends the
cursor upward; the symmetric bottom-edge case scrolls toward newer content and
extends downward. Full gate green (73 pkg, -race).

* fix(local): smooth-glide the drag-to-edge auto-scroll instead of jumping

The initial edge-scroll implementation (previous commit) applied a single
chatWheelScrollLines (5-line) jump per raw mouse-motion event, which reads as
sudden/jerky since motion events during a real drag arrive in bursts, and
stops dead the instant the physical mouse holds still even while still parked
past the edge (a terminal only reports motion on actual cursor movement).

Replaced with a self-scheduling tea.Tick chain (dragEdgeScrollTickMsg, gated by
edgeScrollSeq mirroring the existing exitConfirmSeq/copyStatusSeq idiom) that
steps a small, fixed increment (dragEdgeScrollStep=1 line) on a short cadence
(dragEdgeScrollInterval=70ms) for as long as the drag holds past the edge,
independent of whether new raw motion events keep arriving. reducedMotion still
gets the original single-bigger-step-per-event behavior (no animated glide).

Adversarial review of the new self-perpetuating tick chain (the risk being an
orphaned/stuck chain) found one real bug: a keypress mid-drag clears
m.transcriptSelection.active directly (the KeyPressMsg handler in model.go)
without going through stopEdgeScroll, leaving edgeScrollDelta stale. The
in-flight tick itself terminates safely via its own liveness check - the bug
was that the STALE nonzero edgeScrollDelta then fooled startEdgeScroll's
"already running" fast path on the NEXT same-direction drag into silently doing
nothing (no immediate step, no scheduled tick) for that whole hold. Fixed at
the press site (transcript_selection.go's mouseLeftPress case): every fresh
press now resets glide state via stopEdgeScroll, so a new drag always starts
clean regardless of how the previous one ended - a single targeted fix rather
than chasing every place transcriptSelection can be cleared.

Tests: top/bottom edge glide starts and extends the cursor over several ticks
(a single small step can land on a blank spacer row between messages, same as
real usage); the chain stops when the drag returns to the body and a stale
in-flight tick after that is a safe no-op; the keypress-interrupt regression
(reproduces the adversarial review's finding, confirms the fix). Full gate
green (73 pkg, -race).

* fix(local): soften the brand-lime accent color across the whole UI

The accent color (#caff3f) was fully saturated at fairly high lightness
(HSL: L 62%, S 100%) - the kind of value that reads as neon/glaring
everywhere it filled a block or bold-text surface, not just the one spot
originally flagged: the composer's "typed" prompt glyph, the permission
popup's focused-option badge, and the text-selection highlight all use it,
plus the spinner, the brand chip, tool-card prompts, and more.

Rather than patch each of those consumers individually, softened the single
palette source (dark theme only; the light theme's accent is a separate,
already-darkened value for its own contrast needs, untouched) to L 50% / S
80% (#ade619) - still clearly on-brand lime, and contrast against both black
(onAccent text on accent fills) and the near-black panel stays far above
WCAG AA (~14:1 and ~13:1, both comfortably over the 4.5:1 floor).

Updated TestStreamingFadePaletteMonotonic's pinned RGB assertion (it checked
the fade ramp's first bucket equals the literal old accent bytes) to the new
values. Full gate green (73 pkg, -race; make lint/go vet clean except an
unrelated stray file that isn't part of this branch or git history at all).

* fix(local): darken the brand-lime accent further per live feedback

Two prior passes (#ade619 at L50/S80, #8db620 at L42/S70) were each tested
live against the original #caff3f via raw truecolor escape codes and
confirmed too subtle in turn. Settled at L36/S62 (#759523) - a noticeably
darker, more olive lime, confirmed against the original side by side.
Contrast vs black (onAccent) and the near-black panel stays comfortably
above WCAG AA (~6.1:1 and ~5.6:1). Updated the streaming-fade test's pinned
RGB assertion to match.

* fix: address PR #350 review comments and CI smoke test failures

Smoke tests (macOS + Ubuntu): the 4 new edge-glide tests implicitly relied
on m.reducedMotion being false, but mouseTestModel() inherits it from
defaultReducedMotion(), which forces true whenever colorprofile.NoTTY is
detected - true in CI's non-TTY test runners, false in a local interactive
dev shell. Set reducedMotion = false explicitly in each of the 4 tests so
they're deterministic regardless of environment. Verified by re-running
locally under ZERO_REDUCED_MOTION=1 (reproduces the CI condition) - passes.

CodeRabbit actionable comment: handleTranscriptSelectionMouse's mouseMotion
case gated only on transcriptSelection.active, which stays true through the
async copy-command grace window after release (a non-empty selection isn't
reset until transcriptCopiedMsg lands) - so a genuine hover motion arriving
in that window would be misrouted as a drag update. The suggested fix
(gate on msg's own Button field) turned out to be wrong in a way only a
full test run caught: TestTranscriptSelectionUpdatesOnGenericMotion is a
pre-existing, deliberate test - some terminals don't restate the button on
every motion event during a real drag, so trusting the per-event Button
field breaks those terminals. Fixed properly instead: added a `dragging`
field to transcriptSelectionState, tracking the app's own press/release
bracket (true at press, false at release) independent of active and
independent of any single event's Button field. mouseMotion now gates on
dragging.

CodeRabbit nitpicks: routed the two remaining raw `m.hover = hoverTarget{}`
subchat-exit assignments through the existing clearHover() helper, so hover
invalidation stays in one place. Left the third nitpick (hit-test layout
recomputed per hover-motion tick) as a documented follow-up per the
reviewer's own "trivial/poor tradeoff" framing - a proper per-frame memoized
cache needs correct invalidation on scroll/resize/content-change to avoid
reintroducing the exact staleness class of bug already fixed twice in this
branch, and isn't worth rushing.

New tests: TestTranscriptHoverAfterReleaseDoesNotMoveSelection (the actual
bug CodeRabbit found - a post-release hover must not alter the just-copied
selection). Full gate green (73 pkg, -race); TestTranscriptSelectionUpdatesOnGenericMotion
(the test the first fix attempt broke) verified still passing.
2026-07-01 12:36:16 +05:30
KRATOS 7fb0092de7 fix: agent runtime resilience — stream stalls, weak-model tool args, and sub-agent reliability (#349)
* fix(local): defeat the macOS stale-pooled-connection hang (transport + stall-retry)

Root cause (you confirmed it: both chatgpt AND ollama hung, only on macOS): providers
fell back to http.DefaultClient, whose pooled keep-alive connections get reused on a
later turn after the server/NAT silently dropped them. The model call is a POST
(non-idempotent), so Go won't auto-retry it on a fresh conn — it blocks forever.
macOS keeps dead pooled conns around longer than Linux, so it reproduced on macOS only.

1. providerio.HTTPClient now returns a shared, tuned transport (ResponseHeaderTimeout
   60s bounds a hung POST that gets no response; IdleConnTimeout 30s stops dead conns
   from lingering to be reused). Routed openai/codex through it too (anthropic/gemini
   already used HTTPClient). Slow first tokens / long reasoning are unaffected — the
   header timeout only bounds time-to-first-response-header, not the stream body.
2. Agent loop now retries a stream idle/stall timeout that produced NO output yet, on
   a fresh connection (capped + backoff). A partial-output turn is NOT retried (would
   duplicate). Recovers any stall that slips past the transport timeout.

Local only — not pushed.

* fix(local): tolerate concatenated tool-arg JSON + widen response-header timeout

1) Weak models (minimax-m3, glm) pack MULTIPLE concatenated top-level JSON objects
   into one tool-call arguments slot ({A}{B}), which json.Unmarshal rejects with
   'invalid character {' after top-level value' (~9 failed tool calls/session).
   New recoverableToolArguments returns the first JSON value ONLY when the payload is
   one value optionally followed by more WHOLE JSON values; it rejects a bad/truncated
   first value OR trailing NON-JSON garbage ({"x":1}xyz) so genuine corruption still
   errors (adversarial-review fix). decodeToolArguments uses it at the central dispatch
   (executeToolCall) so {A}{B} runs the first object; historySafeToolCalls uses the
   SAME helper so the replayed transcript records the recovered first object (not {}),
   keeping dispatch and history consistent. Truly-malformed JSON still hits the
   existing sanitize-to-{} + retry path. Trailing objects are dropped (the model
   re-issues on a later turn).

2) Raise the shared transport ResponseHeaderTimeout 60s -> 120s so a slow cloud proxy
   (ollama *:cloud) that withholds its 200 header until first token isn't wrongly
   aborted; still bounds a truly dead reused connection.

Local only — not pushed.

* feat(local): add /turns command + raise default maxTurns 30->50

Agentic multi-step runs (build + delegate + swarm + MCP + self-verify) routinely hit
the 30-turn ceiling mid-task and never reached the later steps; removing /mode earlier
also left NO interactive way to raise the budget.

- /turns [n]: per-session tool-turn budget setter (commandGroupSession), mirroring
  /selfcorrect. Empty/status shows the current budget; a positive int sets
  agentOptions.MaxTurns (read by the run at model.go); clamped to maxTurnsCeiling=500
  to guard against typos; invalid/non-positive shows usage without changing it.
- defaultMaxTurns 30 -> 50 (matches the old 'deep' preset). Raise per-run with /turns
  for long tasks (e.g. /turns 150 for a full acceptance run).

Local only — not pushed.

* fix(local): swarm reports failed members as failed + sub-agents inherit /turns budget

Issue B — a swarm member whose child exited non-zero (e.g. exit 4 / max-turns) was
recorded [done] (swarm_status '0 failed'), so the orchestrator — which can't see the
AGENTS panel — trusted incomplete work. The specialist launcher ignored
res.Result.Status; it now surfaces a StatusError result as a member FAILURE
(errors.New(report)) so the swarm marks it [failed]. Added Coordinator.FailWithSession
and switched the member watch path to it so a failed member keeps its session id
(still drillable) and its report rides along as the failure message.

Issue A — a member hit its OWN turn limit because /turns raised only the parent's
budget; children re-resolved config.json's default. New config.SetMaxTurnsEnv exports
ZERO_MAX_TURNS, read in applyEnv -> cfg.MaxTurns; /turns now exports it so spawned
sub-agents / swarm members (which inherit the env) run with the same budget. A
non-numeric/zero env value never clobbers the configured budget.

Tests: launcher non-zero-exit -> failed (+ session kept); SetMaxTurnsEnv round-trip
+ garbage-env guard; /turns exports + clamps the env. Full gate green (73 pkg).

Local only — not pushed.

* fix(local): corrective error for unknown specialist name + clamp ZERO_MAX_TURNS

1) A model that invents a specialist name (validator-runner, file-creator,
   file-writer — none registered) got an opaque 'specialist not found' and kept
   spawning doomed sub-agents. loadManifest now lists the available specialists and
   notes that 'worker' has shell/edit while explorer/code-review are read-only, so the
   model self-corrects to a capable specialist. New availableSpecialistList helper.

2) Defense-in-depth (review nit): applyEnv now clamps an inherited ZERO_MAX_TURNS to
   MaxTurnsCeiling, so a raw shell 'export ZERO_MAX_TURNS=999999' can't bypass the
   /turns ceiling. Ceiling promoted to config.MaxTurnsCeiling (single source of truth,
   referenced by the TUI /turns clamp).

Tests: unknown-name error lists worker/explorer/code-review; applyEnv clamps an
over-ceiling env value. Full gate green (73 pkg).

Local only — not pushed.

* fix(local): surface sub-agent kill signal instead of opaque exit -1

When a sub-agent child is terminated by a signal, command.Wait returns an ExitError
whose ExitCode() is -1, losing the cause. Capture ProcessState.String() (portable,
e.g. "signal: killed") into ChildRunResult.Signal and have BuildFinalResult render
it — "Subagent terminated by a signal (signal: killed) — killed before it finished.
Likely causes: the OS out-of-memory killer ... a timeout, or cancellation." — instead
of an opaque "Subagent failed (exit -1)". The message lists causes rather than
asserting OOM, since timeout/cancellation also SIGKILL the child. A captured signal
always surfaces even if a late run_end reported a clean exit. The background task
path (which can't carry the signal name) emits the same hint for a negative exit code.

* address CodeRabbit review on #349

- loop.go: gate stall-retry on a turn-level forwardedAnything flag (wrapped
  callbacks), so a retry never re-streams on top of output already forwarded earlier
  in the turn (e.g. across the reactive-compaction retry). New test covers a
  reasoning-then-stall (collected.Text empty but output forwarded).
- loop.go: route a reissued stream's non-stall error through the SAME recovery as
  the initial stream (image-rejection wrapping / context-limit compaction) via a
  shared recoverStreamError closure, instead of returning it raw.
- exec.go: drop the hardcoded worker/explorer/code-review guidance from the
  unknown-specialist error; rely on the dynamically-rendered available list (a
  custom registry may not have those names).
- streamer.go: kill-signal message lists OOM/timeout/cancellation evenhandedly
  instead of asserting OOM (the branch also covers timeouts/cancellations).
- launcher_specialist.go + exec.go: preserve the child SessionID on a post-start
  failure too, so FailWithSession keeps those failed members drillable.
- model.go: block /turns while a run is active (mid-run change would make the
  inherited ZERO_MAX_TURNS budget inconsistent for later-spawned sub-agents).
2026-07-01 09:15:08 +05:30
KRATOS 5aced721b3 fix(tui): sub-agents inherit the parent's live provider after a /model switch (#348)
* fix(tui): sub-agents inherit the parent's live provider after a /model switch

Swarm members and Task sub-agents run as child 'zero exec' processes that re-resolve
the provider from config.json themselves — they're passed --model but never the
parent's provider. After switching provider/model in the TUI via /model (an in-memory
change), the child still resolved config.json's stale activeProvider, landed on a
provider whose credentials didn't match the live model, and failed auth in ~3s
(exit 3, 0 tool calls, 'API key missing or invalid / can't reach the provider') — so
the spawned agent appeared then instantly disappeared.

Export ZERO_PROVIDER (config.SetActiveProviderEnv) to the live provider name on a
/model provider switch. Child processes inherit the environment, and config
resolution already maps ZERO_PROVIDER -> activeProvider, so the child resolves the
SAME profile and its credentials (env key / stored key / OAuth) — covering all three
auth methods, for both Task and swarm (both spawn via the specialist executor).

Startup needs no export: the parent and child both read config's default, so they
already match; only an in-memory switch diverges.

* fix(config): clear ZERO_PROVIDER when switching to an unnamed/default profile

SetActiveProviderEnv("") now unsets ZERO_PROVIDER instead of leaving the previous
value in the environment. Switching from a named provider back to an unnamed/default
profile otherwise kept exporting the stale provider into child zero exec processes,
which would resolve the old credentials. Extended the round-trip test with the
stale-env regression case: seed a value, switch to blank, assert both os.Getenv and
applyEnv no longer see it.

Addresses CodeRabbit review on #348.
2026-07-01 01:57:30 +05:30
KRATOS 02a3d12f34 fix(providerio): bound heartbeat-but-no-output streams so they can't hang forever (#347)
* fix(providerio): bound heartbeat-but-no-output streams (content-stall watchdog)

A stalled-but-alive upstream hung the agent indefinitely: SSE keep-alives reset the
idle watchdog (intentionally — a heartbeating upstream isn't 'dead', and aborting it
killed healthy long requests), so a stream that heartbeats while producing nothing
never tripped the idle timeout and there was no other ceiling. Observed on both
chatgpt/gpt-5.x (Codex) and ollama minimax-m3 — different provider code, same shared
providerio SSE loop — so the fix belongs here, once, for every provider.

Add a second 'content' watchdog alongside the idle one: keep-alives still reset idle
(no regression for heartbeating connections), but only REAL data lines reset the
content watchdog. If no data arrives for streamContentStallFactor (2) × the idle
timeout, abort with ErrStreamStalled instead of hanging. A slow-but-producing stream
(data between heartbeats) keeps resetting content and is never killed.

Contained to internal/providers/providerio — no provider/caller changes.

* fix(providerio): surface ErrStreamStalled in callers + widen flaky test margins

Address review:
- All four provider stream handlers (openai, codex, anthropic, gemini) now treat
  ErrStreamStalled in the same branch as ErrStreamIdle, via a new
  providerio.StreamTimeoutMessage helper that gives the stall a distinct, accurate
  message (it reports the content window and does NOT claim the upstream stopped
  sending data — keep-alives were still arriving). Previously a stalled stream fell
  through to the generic provider-error path.
- Widen the content-watchdog test timing margins (idle 100ms, data/keepalive every
  30ms) so CI/GC jitter can't trip the idle watchdog and mask the content path.
- Add a StreamTimeoutMessage unit test.
2026-06-30 22:19:52 +05:30
KRATOS a0548d707b test(providers): isolate the OAuth store in the chatgpt Codex routing test (#346)
TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogToCodexProvider asserts the chatgpt-account-id header is
empty when no OAuth login is stored, but never redirected the token store — so on a
developer machine with a real chatgpt login it read that login and failed (it still
passed in CI, where no token exists). Point ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH at an empty temp
path, mirroring TestNewRoutesChatGPTCatalogWithStoredAccountID, so the test is
deterministic regardless of the developer's stored credentials.
2026-06-30 21:21:44 +05:30
KRATOS 83a371d669 fix: stream Codex reasoning + drop swarm agents on their own completion (#345)
Two agent-visibility fixes surfaced diagnosing a 20-minute gpt-5.5 step and an
'agents never disappear' report.

A) Codex Responses path streamed no reasoning, so a long thinking phase produced
   zero visible output and read as a hang (the activity clock never advanced).
   Root cause: the request never asked for a reasoning summary and the parser had
   no case for reasoning deltas. Now request reasoning.summary="auto" and forward
   response.reasoning_summary_text.delta as StreamEventReasoning — the existing TUI
   handler renders it live and refreshes the activity clock.

B) A finished swarm member stayed in the AGENTS panel until the whole turn ended.
   Now it drops once ITS OWN task completes (fade over the linger window, then
   remove), independent of the overall run — matching how finished specialists
   already behave. Running members and mid-flight collect are unaffected.
2026-06-30 21:21:30 +05:30
KRATOS 84823d7be1 fix(swarm): constrain agent_type to the registered roster via a dynamic enum (#344)
* fix(swarm): constrain spawn/handoff agent_type to the registered roster via enum

swarm_spawn and swarm_handoff described agent_type / to_agent_type as a free-form
string with only an 'e.g. teammate, subagent' hint, so a model could pass an
unregistered type (e.g. 'worker') and only discover it was invalid from the runtime
'unknown agent type' error — wasting tool calls, especially on weaker models.

Set the parameter's enum dynamically from the live roster (Registry.AgentTypes()),
so the schema advertises the valid set (built-ins plus any user-registered agents)
up front and an invalid type can't be sent. Falls back to a free-form string when
the roster is unavailable, so the tool never advertises an empty, un-satisfiable
enum. The runtime 'available agent types: …' error is kept as a backstop.

* test(swarm): also assert handoff to_agent_type enum picks up a custom roster type

Address review: the custom-type recheck only re-read spawnTool, so a regression
leaving handoffTool on the built-in list would have passed.
2026-06-30 20:50:11 +05:30
KRATOS cfd065b565 fix(openai): always send message content so strict OpenAI-compatible servers accept it (#343)
Some OpenAI-compatible endpoints (e.g. glm-* on Ollama-cloud) reject a request whose
message 'content' is absent or null with HTTP 400 'invalid message content type:
<nil>'. The chat-completions mapper relied on 'content,omitempty', so a message with
empty text (a tool result, an assistant turn that only makes tool calls, or a
sub-agent that failed with no output) serialized with no content field at all.

- Drop omitempty on chatMessage.Content and always set it (to "" when there is no
  text), so contentless messages serialize as "content":"" instead of being
  dropped. Standard OpenAI/xAI/groq already tolerated the omission; this makes the
  strict servers work too.
- Skip a degenerate assistant turn that has neither text nor tool calls, mirroring
  the Anthropic/Gemini mappers (which already drop empty turns).

Fixes the failure seen on glm-5.2:cloud after a sub-agent failed with empty output.
2026-06-30 11:19:06 +05:30
Anandan fb3a0bff44 Document source-build sandbox helpers (#342)
Clarify that Linux source builds need the zero-linux-sandbox helper on PATH for native sandboxing, while macOS does not need an extra helper and Windows can self-dispatch from zero.exe.

Also document optional release-style helper builds for Linux and Windows.

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-30 11:16:52 +05:30
072f3877b5 fix(opengateway): correct gateway host, make it the recommended default (#341)
OpenGateway pointed at gateway.gitlawb.com, which does not resolve
(NXDOMAIN), so every request failed with "no such host". The live gateway
is opengateway.gitlawb.com — a flat OpenAI-compatible endpoint
(/v1/chat/completions, Authorization: Bearer ogw_live_…) that smart-routes
by model id across its upstreams (xiaomi-mimo, minimax, qwen, google,
nvidia, z-ai).

- catalog: fix base URL to https://opengateway.gitlawb.com/v1, default model
  to mimo-v2.5-pro; add a Recommended descriptor field and hoist OpenGateway
  to the top of the catalog so it is the first/badged pick everywhere.
- models: replace the curated model list with the gateway's real upstream
  models; fix the stale model-discovery fallback host.
- providers catalog: sort recommended-first (CLI + snapshot) and render the
  ★ … (recommended) badge; same badge in the TUI /provider wizard and the
  setup onboarding list.
- providerhealth: OpenGateway's flat /v1/models 404s by design, so probe its
  public /health endpoint for connectivity instead of reporting a false fail.
- tests: update catalog order golden + transport/discovery expectations; add
  coverage for the recommended provider and the health-endpoint override.

Co-authored-by: Kevin Codex <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-30 10:14:01 +08:00
Vasanth T 1dd884d6e9 chore(launch): MIT license, windows-arm64 install guard, TUI TTY guard (#340)
* chore(launch): MIT license field, windows-arm64 install guard, TUI TTY guard

Three launch-readiness fixes the docs cleanup doesn't cover:

- package.json: set "license": "MIT" (was the placeholder "SEE LICENSE IN
  LICENSE"), matching the LICENSE file and the README badge.
- scripts/postinstall.mjs: skip gracefully on windows-arm64. (win32, arm64)
  resolves to a valid platform/arch but the release matrix ships no
  windows-arm64 artifact, so the installer would download a 404 and hard-fail
  npm install. Treat it like any unsupported target (warnSkip, exit 0) and point
  to the x64 build (which runs under emulation on Windows on ARM) or source.
- internal/tui/run.go: fail fast when stdin is not a terminal. The interactive
  shell otherwise blocks forever in the Bubble Tea event loop on piped/redirected
  input (e.g. `echo "" | zero`); now it prints guidance toward `zero exec` and
  exits non-zero. Dependency-free ModeCharDevice check (no x/term added).

Tests: windows-arm64 skips with exit 0; the interactive shell returns non-zero
(not a hang) on non-TTY stdin.

* fix(tui): use term.IsTerminal for the stdin guard; pin exit code in test

Address review on the no-TTY guard:
- Replace the os.Stdin.Stat()/ModeCharDevice heuristic with term.IsTerminal
  (github.com/charmbracelet/x/term, already in the module graph via bubbletea).
  It is a true TTY check — it rejects pipes, regular files, and non-terminal
  char devices like /dev/null — and fails closed: anything not a verified
  terminal blocks the interactive shell.
- The test now asserts the documented exit code 2 from the guard, not just a
  non-zero result, so it proves the stdin guard fired.
2026-06-28 17:13:34 +05:30
Anandan 726f1512a3 Clean up public release docs (#339)
Rewrite the README around the initial public-release user flow, add the logo asset, and refresh install/update documentation.

Remove internal planning, audit, design, and work-split documents from the public docs tree.

Update stale documentation references and workspace seed expectations to point at public docs.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/workspaceseed

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-28 17:13:21 +05:30
Vasanth T 8c5898d5db feat(reasoning): typed per-provider reasoning capability from a models.dev catalog (#338)
* feat(reasoning): typed per-provider reasoning capability from a models.dev catalog

Providers describe reasoning control with incompatible concepts — OpenAI a
discrete effort enum (split by minor version), Anthropic and Gemini 2.5 a
thinking-token budget, some models only a thinking on/off toggle — which a flat
effort string cannot represent and a model-name heuristic cannot detect.

Add internal/reasoning: a Capability type (a model's reasoning flag plus its
typed Controls — effort/budget_tokens/toggle) and a Catalog that looks capability
up by provider + api model id. The data is an embedded, trimmed snapshot of the
community capability database (first-party providers only; routers excluded since
they carry generic/stale option lists), so detection is offline and exact instead
of guessed.

The package depends only on the standard library, so the model registry and
provider adapters can consume it without an import cycle. This change is purely
additive — nothing is wired into the live resolution path yet.

Tests pin the per-version ground truth (gpt-5 minimal-not-none, gpt-5.1
none-not-minimal, gpt-5.1-codex-max xhigh, gpt-5-pro locked to high; Anthropic
budget-only legacy vs effort-only newer with the budget removed; Gemini 2.5
budget/toggle vs Gemini 3 effort) and that every reasoning model Zero ships today
is covered by the snapshot.

* fix(reasoning): address review — presence-aware budget bounds, deep-copy lookup, first-party-only snapshot

- Control.Min/Max are now *int so an explicit bound is distinct from an omitted
  one: Gemini's `min: 0` ("thinking can be disabled") and Anthropic's missing
  max (unbounded) are preserved instead of both collapsing to 0. Budget() becomes
  BudgetControl() returning the control so callers read the pointers.
- Catalog.Lookup returns a deep copy (clone) of the matched Capability, so a
  caller can no longer mutate the shared embedded catalog through the returned
  Controls / Values slices or budget pointers.
- Drop the google-vertex section from the snapshot: it re-hosts third-party MaaS
  models (Anthropic/Moonshot/OpenAI/DeepSeek/Qwen/Meta), violating first-party
  -only. google (AI Studio) already covers first-party Gemini, so the gemini
  provider kind resolves there. Snapshot 158 -> 123 models, 16.8 KB.

Tests pin the explicit min: 0 preservation, the nil max on budget-only Anthropic
models, and that a mutation of a Lookup result does not leak into the catalog.

* fix(reasoning): address round-2 review — accessor deep-copy, max tier, provenance

- EffortControl/BudgetControl now return a cloned Control, so a caller holding a
  Capability that shares state with the catalog cannot mutate Min/Max pointers or
  the Values slice through an accessor result (CodeRabbit). Lookup already deep
  -copies; this closes the accessor path too.
- Add modelregistry.ReasoningEffortMax ("max") + accept it in ValidReasoningEffort,
  so the snapshot's "max" tier (e.g. gpt-5.1-codex-max, newer Anthropic) has a
  constant to map to. No curated model lists it yet.
- Snapshot provenance: add a _fetched date and a regeneration recipe (documented
  in catalog.go), so refreshes are reproducible/auditable.
- Document that Lookup takes the API model id (wire name), not the friendly
  registry id, and that the match is exact (no case-fold/prefix-strip).
- Record the source-of-truth intent in the package doc: this catalog is the
  intended authoritative source; modelregistry's name-pattern inference is demoted
  to a fallback when it is wired in (a later change). Rename the `cap` builtin
  shadow to `entry`.

Tests pin the accessor deep-copy isolation.
2026-06-28 14:15:59 +05:30
KRATOS 7a09a42a17 feat(tui): remove the /mode command (superseded by /model + /effort) (#337)
The /mode presets bundled a hardcoded Anthropic/Google model + reasoning effort +
turn budget, so on other providers (Ollama-cloud, xAI, GPT-5, custom) /mode would
switch to a model the user isn't authenticated to. With /model (any provider's
models) and /effort (reasoning effort) covering the same ground flexibly, /mode is
redundant in the TUI.

Removes the /mode slash command, its handler, the mode picker, and the dispatch +
stale comments; updates affected tests. The CLI `--mode` flag and internal/
modelregistry mode presets are kept (still used by headless exec).
2026-06-28 13:41:57 +05:30
Anandan c0a0389b09 Polish TUI transcript rendering (#334)
* Polish transcript rendering

Tighten transcript spacing, collapse noisy permission/tool rows, and render tool activity with cleaner action-oriented labels.

Improve code and diff rendering with markdown highlighting, cleaner command output blocks, and grouped exploration summaries.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix grep exploration rendering on Windows

Keep search query text out of path normalization so regex escapes render consistently across platforms.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

* Address transcript rendering review

Cache highlighted streaming markdown so closed code blocks are not re-lexed on every live render.

Tighten bare-code detection to avoid highlighting ordinary prose, restore manual permission audit rows, and make exploration details expandable.

Also align diff content/header predicates and use display-width truncation for compact tool output.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -race ./internal/tui

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go vet ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-28 13:41:00 +05:30
Vasanth T d99ac4d1e3 fix(openai): forward reasoning effort to the Codex Responses API (#336)
The Codex provider speaks the Responses API, where reasoning_effort is nested
under `reasoning.effort` rather than sent as a top-level field. buildResponsesRequest
never set it, so a user's chosen effort was silently dropped for every Codex
model — the request always ran at the model default.

Add a `reasoning` object to the Responses request and populate it from the
request's effort, reusing the chat path's openAIReasoningEffort normalizer so
only API-accepted values (minimal/low/medium/high) are sent and an empty or
unsupported effort omits the field (no empty object, no 400).
2026-06-28 13:11:04 +05:30
Vasanth T aa45edacc0 fix(modelregistry): one source of truth for a model's reasoning efforts (#335)
The /effort picker and the run-time effort resolver disagreed about which
tiers a model supports. Registry.ReasoningEfforts falls back to name-based
inference (reasoningEffortsForModelName) when the catalog lists no efforts,
so the picker shows controls for proxy-served GPT-5 / Codex / o-series
models. EffectiveReasoningEffort read model.ReasoningEfforts directly and
never saw that fallback, so it coerced the same request to "none" — the
picker advertised a tier the resolver silently dropped.

Route both through a single effectiveReasoningEfforts helper so they can
never diverge. A model the catalog enumerates with no efforts but whose
name is a known reasoning family now has its requested effort honored end
to end; non-reasoning models still resolve to "none".

Also drop the orphaned, stale NOTE above forwardedReasoningEffort claiming
effort "is not yet forwarded" (it is) and restore the reasoningEffortNotice
doc comment to its own function.
2026-06-28 13:07:14 +05:30
KRATOS ca5e0b9bbb feat: context-aware compaction + usage gauge for all models (#332)
* fix(agent): enable auto-compaction for all models, not just registered ones

Auto-compaction keys off the model's context window (enabled = ContextWindow > 0),
resolved only from the curated registry. Unregistered models — GPT-5/Codex, xAI,
Ollama-cloud, custom endpoints — resolved to 0, so both the proactive (~80%) and the
reactive post-overflow compaction were silently disabled and long sessions overflowed.

- TUI modelContextWindow now also consults live-discovered windows (accurate for
  proxy/custom models once /model has discovered them); unknown still returns 0 so
  display gauges show no guessed denominator.
- New modelregistry.AgentContextWindow applies a positive FallbackContextWindow (200k)
  ONLY on the compaction-enable path (TUI run + CLI exec/spec), so compaction is on for
  every model while display stays accurate-or-empty. Exact windows always win.

* feat(tui): show context usage (used / total + % gauge) for all models from launch

The sidebar/status-line context gauge only shows a total + fill % when the active
model's context window is known. For proxy/custom models (GPT-5/Codex, xAI, Ollama-
cloud) the window isn't in the registry, so it showed only a used-token count.

Warm model discovery for the active provider in Init() (background, non-blocking) so
the active model's window is learned at launch and the gauge renders 'used / total
tokens' + the fill % for every model — not just catalogued ones. Builds on the
discovered-window resolution from the compaction fix.

* fix(tui): address review — agent fallback on model-switch + active-provider window

- Apply modelregistry.AgentContextWindow to /model and /mode pre-switch compaction
  requests (TargetContextWindow), so the 'compaction for all models' behavior also
  covers undiscovered/custom switch targets, not just the active run.
- Scope the live-discovered context-window lookup to the active provider first
  (then others), so a model ID shared across providers resolves to the provider in
  use rather than an arbitrary match.
- Tighten the resolution test to compare against the registry's actual gpt-4.1
  window instead of != FallbackContextWindow.

* fix(cli): give provider-discovered context windows precedence in headless exec

Address the remaining review point: CLI exec/spec runs collapsed every uncatalogued
model to the 200k fallback, ignoring its real window. resolveAgentContextWindow now,
on a registry miss, queries the provider's live model list (resolving the credential
from inline/stored/env) to get the model's actual context window before falling back.
Discovery runs only on a registry miss (catalogued models pay no latency), is bounded
by a 5s timeout, and degrades to the fallback on any error so a headless run is never
blocked or failed.
2026-06-28 13:06:51 +05:30
KRATOS 653cee60c1 feat(tui): dim the transcript backdrop behind overlays for visibility (#333)
Slash-command/file palettes (and pickers/wizards) were composited directly over the
live transcript with no separation, so the chat bled through around the box and the
overlay was hard to read. Add a scrim: when an overlay is open, dim the transcript
backdrop (strip each line's colors and re-render faint) before compositing the bright
overlay on top. Header and composer render separately and stay bright. Text is
preserved (just dimmed), so context remains readable behind the palette.
2026-06-28 13:03:00 +05:30
KRATOS 8aae0be6db feat(tui): compact one-line /model switch confirmation (#331)
The model-switch confirmation printed a 6-7 line block (Switched model. / model: /
provider: / api model: / effort: / saved:). Collapse it to a single summary line —
'<model> · <provider>[ · effort …][ · saved]' — keeping the deprecation/redirect
notice line when present. Tests updated to the new format.
2026-06-28 11:19:44 +05:30
KRATOS 8ea8831c30 fix(model): expose reasoning effort for GPT-5 / Codex / o-series (#330)
/effort showed no controls for ChatGPT (GPT-5) because those models aren't in the
curated registry and the OpenAI catalog entries carry no reasoning efforts, so
Registry.ReasoningEfforts returned nil even though GPT-5 supports reasoning_effort.

Add a name-based fallback: when a model isn't enumerated with efforts, infer them for
known reasoning families — GPT-5 / gpt-5.x Codex (minimal/low/medium/high) and the
o-series (low/medium/high). Non-reasoning models (GPT-4.1/4o, local models) stay empty,
so /effort still hides controls where they don't apply.
2026-06-28 09:52:45 +05:30
KRATOS a4b2e01fe6 feat: encrypted provider credentials + provider-aware /model (#329)
Encrypted credential storage
- internal/securefile: AES-256-GCM at-rest crypter (fail-closed, atomic, locked).
- internal/credstore: provider API-key store, keyring-first with an encrypted-file
  fallback; plaintext only via an explicit ZERO_CRED_STORAGE=file opt-out.
- Provider API keys no longer live in config.json: captured straight into the store
  from the wizard/CLI setup, and any existing inline plaintext key is migrated to the
  store on launch (fail-soft; stripped only after the store write succeeds).
- buildProvider and every model/provider switch reload the credential (stored key,
  env var, or OAuth bearer), so a stored-key provider always authenticates.
- `zero auth logout <provider>` now also removes the stored API key and its marker.

/model and /provider
- /model lists every authenticated provider (filtered to those with a usable
  credential), grouped per provider under section headers.
- Each provider's models are live-discovered (its real served models) rather than a
  static catalog; local providers show only the models actually pulled.
- Selecting a model from another provider switches provider and model together.
- /provider offers keep / replace / remove when a provider already has a stored key.

Gated throughout: go build, go vet ./..., go test ./... -race, lint.
2026-06-27 23:25:08 +05:30
KRATOS fb3277f46e feat(tui): tabbed ask_user questionnaire in the composer with suggested answers (#327)
* feat(tui): tabbed ask_user questionnaire rendered in the composer

Redesign the interactive ask_user prompt to match the requested mockup: when a
question is raised the composer text box becomes the questionnaire.

- Multi-question prompts render as a row of TABS (one per question + a trailing
  Confirm tab). Tab / Shift+Tab switch questions, answers are given in any order,
  and Enter on Confirm submits them all. A single-question prompt submits on
  answer (no Confirm step) and shows no tab row.
- Each option can carry a one-line DESCRIPTION (contract: per-option
  optionDescriptions, or option objects {label, description}); options render
  numbered with the description dimmer underneath and the recommended one tagged.
- Per-question optional `header` gives each tab a short title (falls back to a
  trimmed question).
- Rendered in the composer/footer region (footerView), replacing the text box
  while active, instead of a scrolling transcript card.
- Keys: Tab move · ↑↓ select · Enter confirm · Esc dismiss; a printable key in
  the picker drops into free-text; Esc from "type your own" returns to the picker;
  multi-select questions are free-text with the options shown as suggestions.
- Headless unaffected (zero exec never wires OnAskUser).

Removed the old single-question sequential state (cursor/typing/index,
renderFocusedAskUserPrompt, resolveAskUser). Tests rewritten for the tabbed flow
(picker default, type-your-own, multi-question tabs + Confirm, Esc dismiss,
descriptions render). make build / go vet / go test ./... -race / make lint green.

* fix(tui): ask_user questionnaire renders on the black terminal canvas

It was painting a gray panel background (styledBlockFill with zeroTheme.panel +
onPanel-wrapped foregrounds). Since the questionnaire replaces the composer, it
should match it: bare foregrounds on the terminal canvas (black) with the
composer's lineStrong border and no fill. The lime cursor/badge highlights and
the recommended tag stay.

* fix(tui): address PR review — schema/parser alignment, single-question Tab

- ask_user schema: options.items is declared as string, so advertise only the
  string form (descriptions go via the parallel optionDescriptions array). The
  parser stays object-tolerant defensively, but the schema no longer tells
  strict-schema providers to send objects it would reject.
- moveAskUserTab no-ops for single-question prompts (no tab strip / Confirm tab),
  so Tab/Shift+Tab can't move the prompt into the hidden Confirm state. Test added.
2026-06-27 17:41:48 +05:30
Vasanth T 95aaca6055 fix(tui): paint transcript selection once, not twice (#328)
Selecting text in the transcript lit up in two places: the real selection
plus a copy shifted right by the reading-column gutter (e.g. selecting "help"
also highlighted "today").

Root cause: assistant, user, and reasoning rows self-painted the selection
highlight in their render functions using the UNSHIFTED textStart, but the
selection points (anchor.x/cursor.x) are in the gutter-shifted screen
coordinate the mouse maps to. So the self-paint landed gutter cells off, and
finalizeTranscriptBodyRow then painted the highlight AGAIN at the correct
shifted position — two highlights, one gutter apart. The rendered/toolResult/
specialist rows were already converted to paint-once-at-finalize; these three
were left behind.

Fix: stop self-painting in renderSelectableUserRow, renderSelectableAssistantRow,
and renderSelectableReasoningBlock. They now return the canonical renderRow
output (already line-aligned with their selectable spans) and let
finalizeTranscriptBodyRow be the single painter, in the same shifted coordinate
the mouse uses. Removes the now-dead renderTranscriptSelectableText /
renderTranscriptSelectableMarkdownText helpers.

Regression test TestTranscriptSelectionPaintsHighlightOnceNotTwice selects a
sub-range of an assistant row and asserts the selection style is emitted exactly
once; it fails on the pre-fix code (painted 3x, including the gutter-shifted copy).
2026-06-27 17:29:38 +05:30
KRATOS 1d1fa7c514 feat(tui): ask_user suggested answers with a recommended default (#326)
* feat(tui): suggested answers with a recommended default for ask_user

When the agent asks a clarifying question mid-task, it can now offer 2-4
suggested answers and mark one recommended; the interactive TUI renders a
selector (arrow keys, lime cursor, "(recommended)" tag) with the cursor resting
on the recommended option, plus a trailing "✎ Type my own answer…" entry that
drops into the existing free-text composer. Whichever the user picks — a
suggested option's text or their typed answer — flows through the same answer
channel the agent loop already waits on.

Optional and backward-compatible: a question with no options renders the plain
free-text prompt exactly as before. Headless `zero exec` is unaffected (it never
wires OnAskUser; the non-interactive best-assumption fallback stands).

- contract: agent.AskUserQuestion / tools.AskUserQuestion gain Recommended;
  the tool schema advertises optional options + recommended; parser keeps
  recommended only when it resolves to one of the options (canonical text).
- system prompt: tells the model it MAY supply options + a recommended one.
- TUI: pendingAskUserPrompt gains cursor/typing; ask_user_prompt.go holds the
  selector logic mirroring permission_prompt.go; renderFocusedAskUserPrompt
  renders the picker or the free-text prompt.

Tests: selector defaults to recommended and returns its text; "type my own"
falls back to free-text and returns the typed text; no-options stays plain
free-text. make build / go vet / go test ./... -race / make lint green.

* fix(tui): ask_user — single input, Esc steps back from "type my own"

Two UX fixes from interactive testing:

- No double display: the focused ask card no longer echoes the in-progress
  free-text answer (it was shown both inside the card AND in the composer text
  box). The composer is now the single input; the card just shows the question
  and a hint. renderFocusedAskUserPrompt no longer takes the input string.

- Esc from "type my own" returns to the selector for that question instead of
  cancelling the whole questionnaire (escapeAskUser); a question with no options,
  or the selector itself, still cancels on Esc as before.

Tests: type-my-own asserts the card does not echo the typed text and the hint
flips to "type your own answer"; new test covers Esc returning to the selector
(no cancel, no answer delivered) then selecting a suggested option.

* fix(tui): ask_user review fixes — multi-select, selector typing, dead code

Address the three confirmed findings from the code review:

- multi-select no longer silently narrowed to one option: a single-pick
  selector cannot represent MultiSelect, so a multi-select question now renders
  as free-text with its options surfaced as suggestions; the user types one or
  more and the answer is returned verbatim (syncQuestionState; escapeAskUser and
  the renderer updated to match).

- typing in selector mode no longer discarded: a printable keystroke while the
  selector is showing flips into free-text and captures the key (model.go key
  capture), instead of accumulating in a hidden input that Enter then overrode
  with the highlighted option.

- removed dead submitAskUserAnswer (the Enter handler now routes through
  confirmAskUser; the orphan had no callers).

Tests: multi-select falls back to free-text and returns the typed answer;
a printable key in the selector switches to free-text and is captured. Full
gate green (build / vet / go test ./... -race / make lint).

* fix(tui): address PR review — element-wise option compare, clearer Esc copy

- ask_user_test: compare option slices with slices.Equal instead of
  strings.Join, so the parser test can't be fooled by ["A,B"] vs ["A","B"]
  or nil vs [""].
- ask_user prompt: the Esc hint said "skip", which reads like "skip this
  question" on a multi-question prompt even though Esc ends the rest of the
  questionnaire (remaining answered by best-assumption). Reworded to "skip the
  rest" in the selector and free-text hints; "type my own" keeps "go back".
2026-06-27 14:12:41 +05:30
Anandan b8b0bb7f65 Move deferred tool discovery into tool search (#324)
* Move deferred tool discovery into tool search

Keep deferred tool discovery in the tool_search definition instead of appending it as a per-turn user message, so models do not answer or acknowledge internal discovery metadata.

Preserve deferred loading behavior: hidden tools remain hidden until loaded, tool_search stays reachable for allowlisted deferred tools, and retry paths keep loaded/deferred state.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools -run 'Test.*Deferred|Test.*ToolSearch|TestRunLoadsDeferredToolThenAdvertisesNextTurn|TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery|TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery|TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable|TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager'

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/cli

Tested: git diff --check

* Clarify deferred tool search selection
2026-06-27 13:02:09 +05:30
KRATOS f8ac5eceb0 fix(agent): gate headless run completion on honesty (no false-success on no-tool-call / self-reported-incomplete turns) (#325)
* fix(agent): don't end a run as success on a no-tool-call turn mid-task

A turn that produced text but no tool call was always accepted as the final answer, so the loop reported success even when the model stopped mid-task (e.g. ended on "...Let me check the SSH configuration:" with plan steps still pending).

Add an opt-in completion gate (Options.RequireCompletionSignal): when a turn has no tool call and work clearly remains -- pending update_plan items, or the message ends on a continuation cue -- re-prompt the model to continue instead of finalizing. Bounded by maxContinueNudges and still by MaxTurns/the deadline; once the budget is spent the run finalizes as INCOMPLETE (Result.Incomplete) rather than success. Default off, so the interactive path is byte-identical.

Genuine single-turn completions (no pending plan, no cue) still finalize as success. Covered by internal/agent/completion_gate_test.go.

* feat(exec): report stalled headless runs as INCOMPLETE (exit 4)

Enable the agent completion gate for headless exec (RequireCompletionSignal) and map Result.Incomplete to run_end status "incomplete" with a new exit code 4, so a run that stalled mid-task (model stopped without a tool call while work remained, continue budget exhausted) is no longer reported as success. Interactive callers are unaffected.

* fix(agent): downgrade self-reported non-completion; advisory task-grounded acceptance

Reduce -- not eliminate -- false-success on headless runs. Two DETERMINISTIC, unit-tested gates (with the plan gate from the prior commit):

(a) self-report downgrade: if the final message admits the model guessed or could not meet the objective, finalize INCOMPLETE (exit 4), never success. Inability is matched by first-person STEMS generalized over verb/tense ("I cannot/can't/could not/am unable to/do not have/unable to ...") plus guess/fallback/uncertainty phrases, with a guard so success-y negations ("could not find any issues", "cannot reproduce") are not misread. (b7bc0b8's plan gate already forces INCOMPLETE on pending/in_progress update_plan items at termination.)

(b) task-grounded acceptance is ADVISORY, not a guarantee. When --self-correct is on it demands one bounded acceptance pass that re-derives the task's stated criterion and runs a concrete check, discouraging three false-success patterns (well-formed==correct, existing-tests-pass==objective-met, result==baseline-it-was-told-to-beat). But it is a prompt: a model that ignores it and confidently claims "PASS, all requirements met" still slips, because ZERO has no general oracle to verify correctness against a task's hidden criterion. Empirically (TB-2, qwen3-coder:480b) this reliably catches admissions and incomplete plans and REDUCES false-success, but a confident false PASS on a model-ceiling task is a residual, fundamental gap -- not a tuning miss.

Default off (RequireCompletionSignal); interactive callers are byte-identical. Covered by internal/agent/{acceptance_gate_test.go,completion_gate_test.go}.

* feat(exec): surface the INCOMPLETE reason in run_end and logs

When a headless run finalizes as INCOMPLETE, include Result.IncompleteReason in the session error event and a stderr warning so an honestly-incomplete run (e.g. "the final message admits the objective was not met") is debuggable rather than an opaque exit 4.

* fix(agent): harden completion gate per PR review

Addresses the correctness findings from the PR review.

self-report (#1): drop behavior-describing phrases ("fall back to",
"placeholder value", bare "best guess", "as a fallback", "without proper")
that also match legitimate final answers; keep first-person/uncertainty
admissions only, since these are matched without a context guard.

self-report (#5): scan every occurrence of each inability stem so an early
success-negation ("could not find any examples") no longer masks a later
genuine admission with the same stem ("could not implement it").

continuation cue (#6): require a trailing colon AND an action lead-in on the
final clause; stop flagging recommendations, plain summary colons, and
sign-offs. Still catches the mid-line "...Let me check the config:".

gate order (#8): check the self-report admission BEFORE pending-plan, so an
admitted-impossible task downgrades immediately with the accurate reason
instead of burning continue-nudges.

pending plan (#3): treat a pending/in_progress update_plan item as a
NUDGE-only weak signal -- it no longer forces INCOMPLETE on its own (a
completed run that left stale plan bookkeeping is trusted). Only a
continuation cue or a self-report admission finalizes INCOMPLETE.

max-turns (#4): a run cut off at the MaxTurns ceiling now finalizes
INCOMPLETE under the gate instead of being reported as success.

exec json/cron (#2, #7): for -o json, emit the terminal done with exit 4 on
an incomplete run (final() pre-emits a success done:0 for json that would
otherwise mask it); emit an error event -- not just a warning -- so the cron
failure extractor can recover the reason.

Deferred (noted on the PR): acceptance-only-when-mutated (#9, cost) and
reusing tools.normalizePlanStatus (#10, would widen scope to internal/tools).

Tests: add TestContinuationCueMatching and TestMaxTurnsCutoffIsIncompleteUnderGate,
extend TestSelfReportedIncompletionMatching with the #1/#5 cases, and replace
the in_progress=>incomplete test with TestPendingPlanAloneDoesNotForceIncomplete.
make build / go vet / make lint / go test ./... -race all green.
2026-06-27 12:31:41 +05:30
Anandan d29ab98a79 Improve sandbox permission handling (#323)
Retry shell commands outside the sandbox when sandboxed output only reflects the sandbox namespace, and keep network retries sandboxed when a network grant is enough.

Show user-facing permission reasons for escalated shell commands instead of exposing internal sandbox policy text.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tui -run 'TestRunUsesEscalatedJustificationForPermissionPrompt|TestRunUsesUserFacingEscalatedFallbackForPermissionPrompt|TestPermissionPromptMapsEscalatedSandboxReason|TestRunRetriesShellUnsandboxedAfterSandboxNamespaceLimitedOutput'

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-26 16:21:06 +05:30
Anandan 80ab238361 Align sandbox command approval behavior (#322)
* Align shell approval sandbox execution

Make approved shell command-prefix executions use the escalated sandbox path when denied-read policy allows it, so remembered approvals do not still hit the restrictive sandbox.

Allow auto sandbox mode to degrade to a direct command plan when native command wrapping is unavailable, while strict sandbox require continues to fail closed.

Update regression tests for degraded execution, prefix-approved shell calls, and unavailable native sandbox metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryRunsWithDegradedUnavailableNativeSandbox|TestBashToolRunsWithDegradedUnavailableNativeSandbox|TestBashRequireEscalatedBypassesNativeSandboxAfterApproval|TestExecCommandRequireEscalatedBypassesNativeSandboxAfterApproval'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./... -run '^$'

Tested: git diff --check

* Align sandbox command approval behavior

Evaluate reusable shell approvals across plain command segments so prefix grants can cover commands with safe read-only tails without relying on command-specific sandbox exceptions.

Keep process inspection commands sandboxed by default; unsandboxed host access continues to require explicit escalation or a narrow command-prefix approval.

Improve shell tool guidance around sandboxed additional permissions, full escalation, justifications, and narrow reusable prefixes.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/agent

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Normalize explicit sandbox backend platforms

Infer the platform from a caller-provided sandbox backend name before choosing the manager runtime platform. This keeps Linux, macOS, and Windows backend plans deterministic across host OSes when tests or callers provide a backend without an explicit Platform field.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools

Tested: env HOME=/tmp/zero-test-home-clean XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/zero-test-config-clean GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-26 13:20:07 +05:30
KRATOS 98bd1acbe6 ci(release): build all 5 platforms (Intel macOS + Linux arm64) (#321)
* ci(release): build all 5 platforms (add Intel macOS + Linux arm64 runners)

zero-release package builds + smoke-tests natively, so each target needs its own
runner. The matrix had only ubuntu-latest/macos-latest/windows-latest (linux-x64,
macos-arm64, windows-x64) — so install.sh/install.ps1 404 for Intel Macs
(macos-x64) and Linux arm64. Adds macos-13 (Intel) and ubuntu-24.04-arm so the
release covers all platforms the installers resolve.

* ci(release): use macos-15-intel for the Intel macOS leg

macos-13 was retired (June 2026) so the matrix leg would never schedule.
macos-15-intel is the current GitHub-hosted Intel x64 runner (supported through
Aug 2027). Addresses CodeRabbit review on #321.
2026-06-26 09:03:28 +05:30
KRATOS 2b6568f82b chore: launch-readiness — add MIT LICENSE + reconcile README (#320)
* docs: add MIT LICENSE

Adds the canonical MIT License (Copyright (c) 2026 Gitlawb) at the repo root,
resolving the launch blocker where the project was marketed as open source with
no license file (legally all-rights-reserved).

* docs(readme): declare MIT license + badge, link LICENSE

README's License section said 'being finalized'; now states MIT and links the
LICENSE file. Adds a license badge to the header row.
2026-06-26 08:35:31 +05:30
Anandan f1502f0bfe Add local control browser and terminal tools (#319)
* Add local control browser and terminal tools

Add configurable local browser, desktop, and terminal control helpers with packaged helper discovery for install and release flows.

Improve sandbox scope classification for local control commands and shared temporary paths.

Add structured browser actions, terminal session line input/key normalization/read support, and artifact capture for local-control outputs.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/localcontrol ./internal/tools ./internal/cli ./internal/config -run 'Test.*LocalControl|TestTerminal|TestBrowser|TestDesktop|TestCapture'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/localcontrol ./internal/tools ./internal/cli ./internal/config ./internal/agent

Tested: tuistory smoke launched bash, sent interactive input, waited for expected output, and captured a no-cursor snapshot

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Fix npm wrapper helper manifest test on macOS

Canonicalize expected helper paths in the npm wrapper manifest test so macOS /var and /private/var temp path aliases compare correctly.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/npmwrapper

Tested: git diff --check

* Harden local control review fixes

Respect resolved local-control config before tool listing and filter validation while preserving stream-json usage error ordering.

Harden browser, desktop, and artifact tool validation; guard Linux-only app launch behavior; clear stale helper manifests from the npm wrapper.

Make helper packaging lockfile-based with npm ci and add installer/package tests for helper staging.

Tested: focused local-control/tool/CLI/release/install/sandbox suite

Tested: isolated full go test ./...

Tested: macOS and Windows compile-only checks for touched packages
2026-06-26 08:22:56 +05:30
KRATOS 0e7318ff72 feat(tui): clickable plan-step detail + plan/sidebar UX & rendering polish (#315)
* fix(tui): plan panel reflects live progress + prompt cadence

The plan panel could read as stuck mid-task even while work continued. Three
fixes:
- Header showed steps[0] forever, so the title never advanced as the plan
  progressed; show the current step (in_progress, else first incomplete).
- updateFromItems matched steps by content only, so an in-place reword reset a
  step's elapsed timer to zero; add positional carry-over when the step count is
  unchanged.
- Prompt: tell the model to mark each step completed + the next in_progress
  before starting it, so the plan tracks real progress instead of jumping at the
  end.

Regression tests included.

* feat(tui): click a plan step to see what was built for it

Each plan step now records the file mutations (write_file/edit_file/apply_patch)
made while it was in_progress, captured from tool-result rows. Clicking a step
row in the context sidebar drops a transcript card listing those changes — the
implementation for that step. Step->line mapping mirrors sidebarAgentSelectables'
offset accounting (one line per step); capture is keyed to the active step and
cleared per run. Read-only and additive. Tests cover the offset math + capture.

* feat(tui): plan-step detail shows diffs + commands

Extend the clickable plan-step detail: capture bash/exec_command runs in addition
to file mutations, store each tool's full output (the diff for edit/apply_patch,
stdout/stderr for commands), and render the card grouped into Changes and
Commands with a short truncated excerpt of each item's diff/output.

* fix(tui): plan-step detail toggles instead of stacking duplicates

Re-clicking a plan step now hides its card (a stable transcript id + drop-by-id),
and clicking a different step replaces it, so at most one detail card is shown.
Previously each click appended a fresh card and they piled up.

* feat(tui): elaborate plan-step detail by status (what we did / will do)

* feat(tui): plan-step card leads with a prose explanation (agent's own narration)

* feat(tui): write plan-step explanations with the model on click

Clicking a PLAN step now shows a fresh, plain-English write-up of that
step, generated on demand by the active model:

- past tense ('what we did') for completed/failed steps, future tense
  ('what we'll do') for pending/in_progress steps
- immediate feedback: the card drops in showing 'Writing explanation…'
  and updates in place (by stable row id) when the text returns
- cached per step (content+status) so re-clicking is instant with no
  second model call; re-clicking still toggles the card closed
- the prompt is built from already-captured local data (step text,
  status, notes, plus a compact digest of file edits, commands, and the
  agent's narration) and asks for short, non-technical prose
- reuses the TUI's existing provider via a one-shot StreamCompletion;
  no new client, no hardcoded provider. Falls back to the local summary
  when no provider is configured or the request fails.

* fix(tui): minimal plan-step card styling (dim border, status-tinted title)

* feat(tui): auto-hide context sidebar when it has no agents or plan

* feat(tui): widen chat reading column to fill wide terminals with breathing room

* fix(tui): toggle context sidebar silently (no transcript notice)

* fix(tui): mark plan complete when a finished task forgot the final update_plan

* fix(tui): remove the lime streaming-text glow (render responses in static ink)

* fix(tui): remove the shaded panel band behind tool-result cards

* fix(tui): Ctrl+B hides the plan entirely (no pinned-panel fallback)

* style(tui): gofmt-align model struct fields

* feat: narrate the build as a clean story (hide plumbing cards, live plan progress, narration prompt, write_file line counts)

* feat(tui): render agent narration bright (ink) so the build reads as a story

* feat(agent): demand an elaborate, structured closing summary (not a single line)

* feat(tui): mark agent narration with a leading bullet (selection-aligned)

* feat: post-turn recap line (※ recap:) with /config recaps on|off toggle

* feat(tui): show 'still generating…' during quiet stretches + count tool-call streaming

* feat(tui): ACTIVITY panel under PLAN + push the model to step the plan per file

* fix(tui): show the quiet 'still generating' hint only when the sidebar is hidden

* feat(tui): code preview in write/edit/apply cards (card-only, no model token cost)

* fix(tui): address CodeRabbit review — stale plan timestamps, stale explanation, Ctrl+B persistence, UTF-8 truncation

* fix: address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 (7 actionable + 2 nitpicks)

* chore: drop accidentally-committed WIP internal/cli/dryrun_test.go

It is an unrelated, pre-existing dry-run test that does not compile (references a
non-existent agent.Options.DryRun field, an unused import, and out-of-scope
sandbox symbols). It was swept into the prior commit by 'git add -A' and is not
part of this PR's scope.
2026-06-25 20:23:29 +05:30
Vasanth T ca41ac2b6c feat(agent): preamble before multi-step tasks for a readable chat (#317)
The prompt told the model "Use tools to act, not to narrate", which also
suppressed the brief upfront "here's my approach" the user relies on to follow
what the CLI is doing — so Zero jumped silently into tool calls. Keep the
per-call anti-spam, but lead a multi-step task with a one- or two-sentence
plain-language preamble. Prompt-only change; the TUI already commits streamed
pre-tool prose as an assistant row, so no render change is needed.
2026-06-25 19:32:41 +05:30
Vasanth T f9a26e7148 feat(tools): show red/green diff preview on write_file and edit_file (#318)
write_file/edit_file only reported "Created X (8462 bytes)" / "edited X",
so the user never saw WHAT changed — no code preview, no red/green. The
TUI already renders a colored diff card whenever a tool's output looks
like a unified diff (diffFirstToolBodyRenderer + looksLikeDiff), so the
fix is purely tool-side: emit a diff.

- edit_file appends a unified diff (old vs new) after its summary line →
  red/green change preview.
- write_file appends a unified diff of prior vs new content: a fresh
  create previews as all-green additions, an overwrite as red/green. It
  reads the prior bytes before writing only when the file existed.
- boundedUnifiedDiff (via the already-vendored go-udiff, now a direct
  require) caps the emitted diff at 48KB so a large generated file can't
  flood the transcript or balloon persisted session events; past the cap
  only the summary shows. The summary stays the first output line so any
  consumer that reads it (swarm/Task result bubbling) is unaffected.

Tests: edit emits @@/-/+ ; new-file emits additions-only; overwrite emits
red/green. Full tools/tui/agent/swarm suites green.
2026-06-25 19:24:27 +05:30
Vasanth T 01fed03a59 fix(tui): stop ANSI escape leaks + drop redundant update_plan cards (#316)
Two chat-clarity fixes surfaced by comparing Zero's output to a reference
agent on a "build a website" task.

1. ANSI escape garbage in the final answer. styleAssistantMarkdownLine
   treated already-styled input (syntax-highlighted code, headings, tables —
   which carry real ANSI) byte-by-byte as runes and re-wrapped the whole line
   in another base.Render. That doubled the SGR density and let a downstream
   width-truncation slice mid-escape, leaking "[38;2;…" / "[1;4;…" fragments
   as literal text next to code blocks. Now real escape sequences pass through
   verbatim (via the existing ansiSequenceEnd helper, like truncateStyledLine);
   the synthetic bold markers are still matched first so their style switch is
   kept. Only styled segments were affected — plain prose never had embedded
   escapes to split.

2. Redundant update_plan tool cards. The plan is already shown in the pinned
   plan panel AND the PLAN sidebar, so rendering each update_plan call as its
   own transcript card was pure duplication (it stacked 3x in the demo).
   Generalize the existing Task-card skip into toolCardSuppressedInTranscript
   and skip update_plan's call+result rows too; the plan-panel sync and session
   events are unchanged.

Tests: TestStyleAssistantMarkdownLinePassesAnsiVerbatim (fails before the fix),
TestToolCardSuppressedInTranscript.
2026-06-25 19:23:04 +05:30
Vasanth T 46c44a8753 feat(swarm): let swarm members build (write + sandboxed shell) (#313)
* feat(swarm): let swarm members build (write + sandboxed shell)

Swarm subagents were effectively read-only: a member runs headless at
"--auto low" (PermissionModeAuto), and ToolAdvertised strips every
prompt-requiring tool from the model's list — so write_file/edit_file/
apply_patch/bash were never handed to the member. It only saw read/grep/
glob/plan tools, so it could not build and the orchestrator did all the
writes itself.

Add PermissionModeMemberAuto: a headless mode that ADVERTISES the
in-workspace mutators (SideEffectWrite + SideEffectShell) on top of the
Auto set, while behaving exactly like Auto everywhere else. The sandbox
engine still decides at call time — in-workspace writes and sandbox-backed
shell auto-allow; out-of-workspace writes, network, and destructive
commands prompt and so are denied headless. member-auto normalizes to Auto
in the sandbox layer, so no sandbox authority is widened beyond what an
interactive auto agent already has.

Scope: swarm members only. The launcher sets MemberAutonomy; the executor
emits "--auto member" for a non-unsafe member (unsafe still -> high, plain
specialists still -> low). Task-tool specialists are unchanged.

Windows note: shell only auto-runs when the OS sandbox is active; without
`zero sandbox setup` a member writes files but cannot run builds.

* style: gofmt member_auto_test.go
2026-06-25 11:36:40 +05:30
Vasanth T 1c94168245 feat(tui): keep finished swarm members visible during the run (#312)
* feat(tui): keep finished swarm members visible during the run

Finished swarm members vanished from the AGENTS sidebar after a 1.5s
linger, so on a long turn (the orchestrator keeps working after the
subagents finish) they were gone before the user could inspect them —
the panel read "no agents spawned" mid-run and the clickable drill-in
had nothing to click.

Now a finished member stays in the panel (solid check, still clickable
to open its subchat) for as long as the run is in flight, and only fades
out and drops once the turn ends. Spawns are scoped to the active run
(row.runID matches activeRunID) so a previous turn's members do not
reappear when a later turn keeps members visible.

* fix(tui): scope swarm member status to the active run

Address review: swarmSpawnedAgents filtered spawn rows by activeRunID, but
swarmMemberStatus still read swarm_status/swarm_collect rows from any run. With
reused task ids, a stale prior-run status could mark a current member done and
wrongly fade/drop it. Scope swarmMemberStatus to the active run too, and tighten
the tests (non-zero run id; a stale same-id done status from a prior run).
2026-06-25 11:36:21 +05:30
Anandan 644f61fa58 Fix shared temp roots in sandbox scope (#314)
Treat platform temp directories as default writable roots so file tools, shell commands, and sandbox profiles share the same temp view.

On Linux, bind host temp roots instead of mounting an isolated tmpfs at /tmp so artifacts created under /tmp remain visible across tool and shell calls.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/cli ./internal/agent
2026-06-25 09:47:55 +05:30
Vasanth T 11926cc5d2 feat(tui): click a swarm member in the sidebar to open its subchat (#311)
* feat(tui): click a swarm member in the sidebar to open its subchat

Specialists were drillable (click the card → subchat shows the child
session), but swarm members shown in the AGENTS sidebar were not — even
though each member already runs as a `zero exec --init-session-id <sid>`
child that persists a durable session in the same store the TUI reads.
This wires that session through so a member row is clickable.

- swarm: Coordinator records the member's child session id on completion
  (CompleteWithSession / Task.SessionID); swarm_collect emits a
  task_id → session_id map in its Result.Meta.
- tui: the OnToolResult closure forwards that map via swarmSessionsMsg
  into m.swarmSessionMap; swarmAgent carries the session id; the AGENTS
  sidebar records a clickable hit per member whose session is known.
- tui: sidebarLineAtMouse maps a left-click in the sidebar column to a
  member row (screen-Y == sidebar line index; sidebar starts at
  chatColumnWidth + 3), and the existing specialist-card drill-in path
  (subchat.enter) is reused verbatim.

Members are clickable only once their session id is known (after
swarm_collect), so in-flight members simply aren't clickable — no dead
clicks. The subchat machinery, Result.Meta transport, and the click
handler are all reused; no new persistence or agent-loop changes.

* test(tui): assert sidebar member click drills into the member session

Address review: the routing test only checked the click was handled, so it
could pass even if the drill-in didn't enter the expected subchat. Seed a real
session in the store and assert subchat.active + childSessionID == the member's
session after the click.
2026-06-24 14:52:06 +05:30
Vasanth T 258f1a31c9 fix(swarm): make swarm_collect wait for members instead of polling (#310)
* fix(swarm): make swarm_collect wait for members instead of polling

Swarm spawn was fire-and-forget and the only way to learn a member had
finished was to call swarm_status/swarm_collect, which returned an instant
snapshot. So an orchestrator had to poll in a loop, flooding the chat with
repeated status cards and never getting a clean "done".

swarm_collect now BLOCKS until every member of the team reaches a terminal
state, then returns their results in one call:

- Coordinator gains a change-broadcast channel and WaitSettled(ctx, team),
  which blocks until the scope has no pending/running task (or ctx is done).
  Every state transition (register/setstatus/finish/reassign) wakes waiters.
- Swarm.CollectWait wraps it; the collect tool calls it bounded by the run
  context (user cancel) and a timeout (default 600s, cap 1800s, overridable
  via timeout_seconds), so a stuck member returns partial state instead of
  hanging forever.
- Tool descriptions now steer the model: spawn then collect once; status is a
  one-shot snapshot, not something to poll.

TUI: collapseRepeatedStatusCard drops the previous identical swarm
status/collect card when a check repeats verbatim back-to-back, so any
residual re-checks don't stack duplicate blocks in the chat.

* fix(swarm): address review on blocking collect (race + timeout overflow)

- WaitSettled: take the settled decision and the returned snapshot in the
  SAME locked pass. Previously the snapshot was re-read after releasing the
  RLock, so a concurrent Register/Reassign could make the call return a
  non-terminal task it never waited on — breaking the blocking contract.
  Removed the now-dead scopedList; shared sortTasksByCreation with List.
- collectWaitTimeout: clamp timeout_seconds in float space before converting
  to time.Duration. A very large value overflowed the int64-ns Duration and
  wrapped negative, making context.WithTimeout fire immediately instead of
  honoring the cap.
- test: release the gated member via defer in TestCollectBlocksUntilMembersFinish
  so a failing assertion can't leak the blocked goroutine; add a
  collectWaitTimeout clamp/overflow unit test.
2026-06-24 14:48:30 +05:30
Vasanth T 4a5a417156 fix(tui): keep running swarm subagents in the AGENTS sidebar (#309)
The sidebar cleared the whole swarm roster the moment ANY swarm_collect
result appeared, so calling swarm_collect mid-run (to poll for partial
results) made the AGENTS panel show "no agents spawned" even while every
subagent was still running.

Drop that collect-clears-everything heuristic and instead let the
member-status linger logic remove members only once they actually report
done/failed. swarm_collect results carry the same "[state]" roster as
swarm_status, so swarmMemberStatus now reads both — a mid-flight collect
refreshes the live states instead of wiping them. Each member also
surfaces a non-running state (pending/handoff/...) inline so the panel
reports real status, not just liveness.
2026-06-24 14:48:17 +05:30
Vasanth T 8acc1be7b2 feat(tui): live token counter on the working line (#308)
* feat(tui): live token counter on the working line

The working line ended with a static "↑ from-to/total" scroll indicator
(which transcript rows the line covered). It looked like a token counter
but never moved meaningfully, so a running turn felt frozen.

Replace it with a live "↑ <n> tok" estimate that climbs as the model
reasons and writes. turnStreamedRunes accumulates every streamed
reasoning+answer rune for the turn and survives the per-segment buffer
clears (a tool call wipes streamingText/Reasoning), so the count is
monotonic across a multi-tool turn and resets to zero on the next turn.
The figure is an estimate (~4 chars/token) because providers only report
exact usage when a step finishes; the authoritative totals stay in the
status line and sidebar.

Removes the now-unused phase_indicator.go (scroll indicator + helpers)
and its test, which were only referenced by the working line.

* fix(tui): keep the working-line token counter visible from turn start

The counter returned empty until the first streamed delta, so during the initial think phase the working line showed no counter at all - a regression from the old always-present row indicator. Show it for the whole turn starting at 0 and climbing.
2026-06-24 14:48:11 +05:30
Vasanth T 0b1fdef98e chore: scrub named other-CLI references from the codebase (#307)
* docs: drop other-agent names from Zero's description

AGENTS.MD described Zero as "in the same family as Claude Code, Codex,
and Droid". Because AGENTS.MD is injected into the model as project
context, the agent parroted that sentence verbatim when asked who it is,
naming other agents in its own identity.

Reword it to describe Zero on its own terms ("an open-source terminal
coding agent") with no comparison to other products.

* chore: scrub named other-agent references from the codebase

Follow-up to the AGENTS.MD wording fix: sweep the rest of the tree for
comments and docs that named specific other CLIs and replace them with
neutral phrasing ("comparable terminal agents" / generic positioning).

- internal/tui/rendering.go, model.go, session_controls.go (+ test):
  drop the named other-agent references from doc comments; the behaviour
  and the existing generic "reference agents/TUIs" phrasing are unchanged.
- docs/PRD.md: replace the named competitor in the target/vision with
  generic "multi-provider terminal agents".

The ChatGPT Codex provider integration keeps its name — that is a real
product Zero connects to, not a reference to another tool's source.
2026-06-24 11:47:09 +05:30
Vasanth T bc5c24ef87 fix(tui): stop showing the token count on both sides (#306)
When the sidebar is open it pins the token readout at its floor, but the
status line also rendered its own token usage segment, so the token figure
appeared twice (status line and sidebar).

The status line already drops the context-fill gauge while the sidebar is
open; do the same for usage. To avoid losing the session cost (which the
sidebar does not show), keep a cost-only segment in the status line when the
sidebar is active, falling back to empty until a priced record lands.
2026-06-24 11:45:53 +05:30
Vasanth T 215170b967 feat(tui): show provider on each model-picker row (#305)
The /model picker rendered a flat list of model names with no provider
context: modelPickerOverlay dropped the Group and provider dot that the
generic picker shows, so models from different providers were
indistinguishable.

Each model row now carries a right-aligned provider slug (anthropic,
deepseek, ollama, ...). The slug is stamped onto every item via
applyProviderPickerMeta from the catalog descriptor, and renderModelPickerRow
right-aligns it with the same gap math the generic picker uses, dropping it
on rows too narrow to keep a clear gap.
2026-06-24 11:22:04 +05:30
Anandan 212f1a0ff8 Fix token accounting and usage display (#304) 2026-06-24 08:18:34 +05:30
Anandan 6be50cd3a7 fix(sandbox): retry approved network shell commands (#301)
* fix(sandbox): retry approved network shell commands

* test(sandbox): fix portable smoke expectations

* fix(sandbox): restore Windows offline egress block
2026-06-23 17:44:46 +05:30
KRATOS c498a8b870 fix(tui): cap the expanded live reasoning to ~half screen (#303)
Clicking the live 'Thinking…' line expanded the streaming reasoning to its full
length, which filled the terminal as it grew and scrolled the clickable toggle
header off-screen — so it couldn't be collapsed again.

Cap an EXPANDED live reasoning block to ~half the screen height, keeping the
LATEST lines plus a faint '… N earlier lines · Ctrl+O for all' marker, so the
header stays on-screen and clickable. Applied identically to the display and
selectable render paths so the gutter highlighter stays line-aligned; committed
rows (expanded in the scrollable history) are uncapped. Regression test added.
2026-06-23 11:44:10 +05:30
KRATOS b776a9281f fix(sandbox): grant ancestor metadata so cd into the workspace works (#302)
* fix(sandbox): grant ancestor metadata so cd into the workspace works

macOS seatbelt granted file-read* on each read root via (subpath "<root>"),
which covers the root and its descendants but NOT its parent directories. An
absolute cd (and any path the kernel canonicalises) must stat each ancestor to
traverse to a deeply-nested workspace like /Users/me/Downloads/app — those
parents weren't granted, so seatbelt denied the chdir and surfaced it as the
misleading 'cd: <path>: Not a directory' (ENOTDIR). This blocked the agent from
cd-ing into its own workspace (e.g. 'cd /abs/workspace && go test').

Fix: grant file-read-metadata + file-test-existence on the path-ancestors of
each read root (metadata only — ancestor contents stay unreadable). Same pattern
already used for /opt/homebrew, /usr/local, /System/Volumes/Data/private.

Verified end-to-end: 'cd /abs/workspace && ...' now succeeds under the real
generated profile. go build/vet/test green.

* fix(sandbox): skip path-ancestors for filesystem roots (invalid SBPL)

Follow-up to the ancestor-metadata traversal fix. A read root of "/" has no
ancestors, and (path-ancestors "/") is invalid SBPL — sandbox-exec aborts with
exit 65 and the sandboxed command can't launch at all. This was reachable via the
compat builder (ReadRoots=["/"] flipped to restricted under EnforceWorkspace) and
any degenerate "/" workspace.

seatbeltAncestorMetadataRule now skips any root that is its own parent
(filepath.Dir(clean)==clean), neutralizing "/" and volume roots regardless of
entry point. Verified: the compat profile now compiles under sandbox-exec (exit
0). Found by adversarial verification of the prior commit.

* fix(sandbox): grant the CLT toolchain so git/clang/make work

On macOS, /usr/bin/git (and clang, make, etc.) are thin stubs that resolve the
real binary under the active developer dir — usually
/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools. The sandbox's platform read roots didn't
include it, so the stub couldn't reach the real tool and failed with the
misleading 'xcode-select: No developer tools were found' error. Add
/Library/Developer (read-only) to the platform read roots.

* fix(sandbox): allow reading the user's global git config

git reads identity/config from the user's global git config, but the sandbox
confines reads away from HOME, so it failed with 'unable to access ~/.gitconfig:
Operation not permitted'. Grant read-only on the git config FILES specifically
(~/.gitconfig and ~/.config/git/config) — not the ~/.config/git directory, which
can hold an XDG credential store — so git runs while credentials and the rest of
HOME stay unreadable. The path-ancestors traversal grant covers reaching them.

* fix(sandbox): let the agent terminate user-owned processes on request

The seatbelt profile only allowed signaling the agent's own process group
((target self) (target pgrp)), so a process started by a PREVIOUS session — e.g.
a dev server still listening on a port — was in a different group and could not
be killed. The agent would thrash through kill/pkill/osascript/sudo, all denied,
and never stop the process the user asked it to terminate.

Relax to (allow signal). The kernel still enforces UID ownership: a sandboxed
command runs as the user, so it can only signal the user's own processes, never
root's or another user's. Verified end-to-end: a sandboxed command now kills a
different-group user-owned process under the real generated profile.

* fix(sandbox): let the agent find processes + guide it to working tools

Pairs with the signal fix (8b5018d). Two more gaps blocked process management:
- process-info was scoped to (target same-sandbox), so the agent couldn't even
  inspect processes outside its own sandbox. Relaxed to (allow process-info*).
- `ps` is setuid root and macOS sandbox-exec refuses to exec setuid binaries
  (privilege-escalation guard) — unfixable via profile. `pgrep` needs a blocked
  system service. So the agent kept thrashing on ps/pgrep/os.kill.

Add macOS shell guidance pointing the model at the tools that DO work: lsof to
find a process, kill to stop it. With the signal grant, lsof+kill now manages
processes reliably (verified end-to-end).

* fix(sandbox): grant git config at the seatbelt rule, not the shared profile

The git-config read paths (~/.gitconfig, ~/.config/git/config) were added to the
cross-platform permissionProfileReadRoots, so they leaked HOME-dependent absolute
paths into the platform-agnostic 'sandbox policy --json' snapshot and broke the
golden test on every OS (machine-specific paths + Windows separators).

Move the grant to seatbeltReadRule (macOS only, where reads are actually
confined): the PermissionProfile stays platform-agnostic so the golden is stable,
and the seatbelt profile still grants the config files + their ancestor metadata
for traversal. Verified: golden test green, full 'go test ./...' green, and git
still reads ~/.gitconfig under the real generated profile.

* fix(sandbox): grant ancestor metadata for platform read roots too

Addresses CodeRabbit review on #302. seatbeltAncestorMetadataRule was passed only
fs.ReadRoots + gitConfig, on the assumption that platform read roots are top-level
or already covered. /Library/Developer (the CLT toolchain) breaks that: it needs
/Library stat-able as an ancestor, so a chdir-style traversal into it (cd
/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools) failed with ENOTDIR even though reads
succeeded (exec doesn't require ancestor-stat the way chdir does).

Include the platform read roots in ancestorRoots when IncludePlatformRoots is set.
Verified: cd into the CLT toolchain now succeeds under the real profile; golden +
sandbox tests green. Regression test added.
2026-06-23 11:12:11 +05:30
KRATOS 63c0e278ff feat(tui): chat + context sidebar redesign, AGENTS panel, animations (#300)
* feat(tui): chat + context sidebar redesign, AGENTS panel, animations, plan-timer fix

Two-column managed-mode layout: the existing chat (scroll engine, reduced width)
on the left + a new right context sidebar — AGENTS (spawned subagents: status
glyph, name, and a live working detail for running ones, with a running/total
count), the live PLAN, and a token readout. The sidebar is suppressed on the
home screen and under overlays/subchat; alt-screen managed mode, wide terminals.

Also: freeze the plan clock while the agent is idle (an in_progress step left
mid-plan when the agent yields stops ticking instead of counting forever), and a
clean-room animation port (phase scroll indicator + a cosine ripple working
line; the spinner was already animated, frozen under ZERO_REDUCED_MOTION).

Reuses the scroll/viewport engine; inline mode unchanged. New unit tests for the
sidebar, plan-clock freeze, and the pure animation helpers; go build/vet/test green.

* feat(swarm): live AGENTS sidebar + un-defer coordination tools

Sidebar AGENTS section now reflects the swarm/team accurately:
- name each member by a short 1-2 word task (not subagent-N)
- a mild, slow cool pulse on live member names (no per-letter flicker)
- members disappear when swarm_status reports them [done]/[failed]
- hide bogus "specialist not found" tool-misroute attempts
- keep the animation tick alive while sidebar agents exist

Plus the deeper fix so a coordinating model stops misrouting swarm calls
to the specialist tool ("specialist swarm_send not found"): the swarm
COORDINATION tools (swarm_send/status/inbox/collect) un-defer once a
swarm is active, while spawn/schedule/handoff stay discoverable via
tool_search. A new DeferralEligible() interface keeps all swarm tools
counting toward DeferThreshold even when exposed, so un-deferring can
never deactivate deferral / force-expose MCP tools in any config.

* feat(tui): polish pass — hierarchy, status line, motion, sidebar toggle

A grounded polish pass across the TUI (17 items):
- color: spread the gray tiers (AA-safe), lime working-ripple (no semantic
  green/amber), calm steady ask-label, dim completed plan-step bodies,
  bold-muted sidebar headers + stateful PLAN count
- status line: run-state chip (permission mode + effort) replaces the
  duplicated provider; composer rule is model-only; context-fill gauge down to
  the narrow tier + a sidebar context-% chip
- footer: persistent idle key-hint (managed mode) + a jump-to-bottom cue
- motion: pulsing streaming caret; running specialist spins; swarm/specialist
  agents linger with a fading ✓ before removal (no abrupt pop)
- layout: Ctrl+B toggles the sidebar; padded ' │ ' divider; sidebar gated to
  the medium tier so it never starves the chat
- home screen: cwd · branch · model orientation + example prompts
- cleanup: drop dead autoTag, fix 'six swarm tools' miscount

go build/vet/test green; -race clean; no hex outside theme.go.

* feat(tui): reading column for the chat transcript

Cap transcript body rows at a readable ~90-col measure and indent them by a
small left gutter, so on a wide terminal the chat text no longer runs
edge-to-edge. Only true transcript rows use the reading column; the frame,
composer, status line, sidebar, title bar, empty state, and prompts keep the
full chatColumnWidth. Streaming text shares the column so it doesn't snap on
finalize. Plus extra vertical spacing before headings and between paragraphs.

Implementation keeps the height cache valid (rows render at contentWidth, which
the width-keyed cache already captures) and the gutter is a horizontal post-pad;
each selectable line's textStart is shifted by the gutter so click-to-select and
the selection highlight stay aligned. Mouse card/toggle hit-testing is Y-based,
so it's unaffected. go build/vet/test green; -race clean.

* fix(tui): plain cancellation marker + copyable card/toggle rows

- 'Run cancelled.' renders as a plain amber '⊘ Run cancelled.' line instead of a
  heavy box (other system notices keep their box).
- Copy root cause: the app's text-selection skipped 'button' rows (collapsible
  toggles, specialist cards) — they carried no selectable text, so a drag-select
  omitted exactly that (dull) content. Fix: those rows now carry their plain text
  + start, so a selection dragged THROUGH them copies their content; a direct
  click still toggles/drills (resolved on press, before selection). The selection
  highlight no longer excludes them. Permission buttons stay excluded.
- Surface Ctrl+E in the idle hint — it releases the mouse for native terminal
  selection, which copies everything (the zero-risk full-copy path).

go build/vet/test green; -race clean.

* fix(tui): render all system notices as plain lines, not boxes

Every system notice (mouse-mode changes, mode set, run cancelled, etc.) now
renders as a plain marked line instead of a bordered box: a faint '·' marker +
muted text for info, amber '⊘' for a run cancellation. Multi-line notices keep
the marker on the first line and indent the rest. Command cards and error rows
keep their boxes. go build/vet/test green.

* fix(tui): separate think→act tool groups with a blank line

Reasoning headers (Thought for X) interleave the tool cards (tool → thought →
tool …), which broke the existing tool-card→tool-card gap rule, so consecutive
list_directory/read_file/update_plan groups packed into a dense wall. Now a
reasoning header that follows a tool card gets a blank line above it, so each
think→act group reads as a distinct block. go build/vet/test green.

* feat(tui): colour markdown emphasis + headings for readability

Assistant prose now reads as three tiers instead of one flat ink colour:
- body text stays ink
- bold / important words render in the brand accent (lime) so they pop
- markdown headings render accent + bold + underline as a clear top tier

go build/vet/test green.

* fix(tui): calmer prose colours + a working-phase label

- Revert the accent colour on bold/important words: emphasis is weight-only now
  (no colour), dark-mode-friendly.
- Headings drop the bright lime — distinguished by ink + bold + underline instead
  of a saturated accent colour.
- Working status line gains a phase label ('writing' while the answer streams,
  'thinking' otherwise) so a long, output-less step reads as live progress
  ('Working · thinking · 55s') rather than a frozen screen.

go build/vet/test green.

* fix(tui): paint selection highlight in the gutter-shifted coordinate

Mouse text-selection looked like it started in the wrong place: the highlight
landed a few cells right of where you clicked, so selecting/copying felt
impossible to aim.

Cause: the row renderers painted the selection highlight on the UNshifted,
unpadded line, then the body item applied the reading-column gutter (pad lines +
shift selectable textStart) afterward. But the stored selection points are in the
shifted/displayed coordinate (that's how the mouse maps them), so the highlight
was computed against unshifted textStart and landed gutter-cells off. (The copied
text was actually correct — extraction uses the shifted selectable — but the
visual selection was wrong, which is what made it un-aimable.)

Fix: stop highlighting inside the row renderers; add finalizeTranscriptBodyRow,
which pads + shifts THEN paints the highlight, so it's computed in the same
coordinate the mouse uses and lands exactly on the click. Also applies the
highlight uniformly to all rows + the interim block. Regression test added.
2026-06-23 10:51:47 +05:30
Anandan a2e0f3c1fe fix: update ChatGPT Codex OAuth request handling (#299) 2026-06-22 12:56:09 +05:30
Vasanth T 1b1abd5bf1 feat(sandbox): online/offline Windows network identity — run approved network commands sandboxed (#297)
* feat(sandbox): online/offline Windows network identity (run approved network commands)

Approved network commands bricked on Windows with "windows sandbox setup is out of
date: network policy changed": the setup marker was locked to network=deny, so any
command granted network (curl, git push, npm install) ran with network=allow and
failed marker validation.

Fix with a two-identity model that fits Zero's restricted-token architecture — no
extra logon users, no DPAPI, no admin at runtime: mint one synthetic
"offline-marker" SID per sandbox home and scope the persistent WFP block filter to
THAT SID only. Network is then gated purely by the restricted token's SID set:
- deny (offline): token = write-capability SIDs + offline-marker SID -> block filter
  matches -> no network; writes jailed by the capability SIDs.
- allow (online, approved): token = write-capability SIDs only -> filter never
  matches -> network reaches out; writes jailed identically.

The setup marker becomes mode-AGNOSTIC: it fingerprints the provisioned offline
infrastructure (NetworkInfraHash + OfflineFilterSID), not the per-command mode, so
one setup validly serves both an allow and a deny command. Schema bumped 3->4
(forces a clean re-setup; old markers scoped the filter to write SIDs).

- windows_runner.go: Offline SID in WindowsCapabilitySIDs (schema 2, back-compat
  upgrade) + WindowsOfflineMarkerSID + windowsRuntimeTokenSIDs.
- windows_network.go: BuildWindowsNetworkInfraPlan + WindowsNetworkInfraHash; drop
  the now-dead mode-coupled BuildWindowsNetworkPlan/*Hash helpers.
- windows_setup.go: marker schema 4; validation drops per-command-mode equality.
- windows_setup_windows.go: setup always installs the offline-scoped infra filter.
- windows_command_runner_windows.go: compose the token SID set per network mode.

Cross-platform core fully tested (mode selector, mode-independent infra+hash,
back-compat SID upgrade, one-marker-validates-both-modes regression, schema-3
rejected); sandbox/doctor suites + windows cross-compile green. The WFP
ALE_USER_ID/restricting-SID behavior needs the gated Windows integration smoke test.

* docs(sandbox): note the Schannel HTTPS limitation under the Windows restricted token

Document the known SEC_E_NO_CREDENTIALS limitation at the token-composition site:
an approved online command reaches the network, but HTTPS via Windows Schannel
fails inside the restricted token because Schannel can't acquire its per-user TLS
credential under a WRITE_RESTRICTED/LUA token. Fundamental restricted-token ↔
Schannel incompatibility, unsolved even in the reference sandboxes (codex#17459).
Workarounds: degraded mode or the in-process web_fetch tool. Comment-only.

* docs(sandbox): keep the Schannel-limitation note vendor-neutral
2026-06-21 22:49:54 +05:30
Vasanth T ffaa3a9a48 fix(sandbox): stop bricking Windows when the sandbox isn't set up (degrade like Linux/macOS) (#295)
* fix(sandbox): degrade Windows to permission-gating when not set up (stop bricking)

On Windows the sandbox command runner hard-fails EVERY command until a one-time
elevated `zero sandbox setup` writes the setup marker — so a fresh Windows user
can't run a single shell command (the "windows sandbox is not initialized" error).
Linux/macOS already degrade when their sandbox is unavailable; Windows was the
lone outlier that bricks itself.

BuildExecutionRequest now, on Windows when the setup marker is missing:
- default (auto): DEGRADE to EnforcementDegraded — the command runs unwrapped
  under the in-process policy gate (workspace path-confinement) + per-command
  approval, with a one-time downgrade notice pointing at `zero sandbox setup`
  for full WFP/ACL/network isolation.
- `--sandbox require`: still hard-errors with a clear setup hint, so strict
  callers keep their guarantee.
- marker present: unchanged (native, wrapped, fully sandboxed).

Matches every reference agent (codex defaults its Windows sandbox off and runs
under approval; opencode/openclaude/vix degrade on Windows) — none brick the CLI
because a setup step hasn't run. Test covers all three paths; sandbox/doctor/cli
suites green; vet/build clean.

* fix(sandbox): don't auto-allow shell commands while Windows is degraded

Follow-up to the degrade fix in this PR. The permission engine's shellSandboxActive
keyed on backend *capabilities* (CommandWrapping && NativeIsolation), which stay
true on Windows even when setup hasn't run. So once the degrade fix let commands
RUN unwrapped, the engine still auto-allowed ordinary shell commands as if
sandboxed — running them with no OS isolation AND no permission prompt, breaking
the per-command-approval floor the degrade is supposed to keep (the function's own
doc comment promises "ordinary shell auto-allow never runs an unsandboxed
command").

shellSandboxActive now returns false on Windows when the sandbox isn't initialized
(mirrors manager.BuildExecutionRequest), so a degraded shell command falls through
to the normal approval prompt. Network/destructive/out-of-workspace checks already
ran earlier and are unaffected; native (post-setup) still auto-allows.

Regression test covers degraded->prompt and native->auto-allow. Sandbox suite green.
2026-06-21 22:49:39 +05:30
Anandan c3646e3a94 Fix TUI UX issues (#290)
* Improve Ctrl+C exit confirmation UX

Make the first Ctrl+C arm a three-second footer confirmation instead of exiting immediately. A second Ctrl+C during that window exits, while active runs still cancel on first press and preserve checkpoint/session flush safety before any deferred quit.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'TestCtrlC|TestStatusLineGroups|TestGenericCustomProviderDisplayUsesEndpointName' -count=1

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -count=1

Tests: git diff --check

* Clear composer before Ctrl+C exit confirmation

Treat Ctrl+C as draft cancellation when the composer has text: clear the composer and suggestions without arming the exit warning. Empty composer behavior still uses the three-second second-press exit confirmation.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'TestCtrlC|TestStatusLineGroups|TestGenericCustomProviderDisplayUsesEndpointName' -count=1

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -count=1

Tests: git diff --check

* Document Ctrl+C deferred quit safety

Restore the reasoning near handleCtrlC for why a confirmed exit waits on flushRunIDs before quitting: cancelled runs may still need to persist checkpoint/session events for rewind safety.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'TestCtrlC|TestStatusLineGroups|TestGenericCustomProviderDisplayUsesEndpointName' -count=1

Tests: git diff --check

* Add composer mouse selection

Support normal chat-composer mouse behavior: clicks place the cursor, drags select typed composer text with the existing selection styling, and release copies the selected text before clearing the temporary highlight. Keep this as app-level mouse handling so transcript selection, suggestions, and right-click paste continue to work.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'TestComposerMouse|TestTranscriptSelection|TestMouseCapture|TestCtrlC' -count=1

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -count=1

Tests: git diff --check

* Make transcript tool output copyable

* Tighten TUI exit and composer mouse UX
2026-06-21 22:38:02 +05:30
KRATOS b46e952282 fix(sandbox): let macOS sandbox run Homebrew/usr-local tools (node, python3) (#296)
A scoped (workspace-enforced) exec gave commands a minimal PATH and restricted
reads, so a Homebrew python3/node either resolved to the broken /usr/bin/python3
stub or could not start. Four coordinated allowances on macOS:

- PATH: prepend /opt/homebrew/{bin,sbin} + /usr/local/{bin,sbin} (ensureMacToolPaths).
- read: broaden platform read roots from .../lib to the whole /opt/homebrew and
  /usr/local trees so the interpreter and its Cellar/opt dylibs are readable.
- file-map-executable: add /opt/homebrew and /usr/local so those dylibs can load.
- file-read-metadata on path-ancestors of /opt/homebrew and /usr/local: realpath()
  / getcwd() lstat every ancestor (e.g. /opt), which the subpath read rule does not
  cover — without it python3 fails at startup with 'realpath: /opt/homebrew/bin/:
  Operation not permitted' while node (exec only) works. Root cause confirmed by
  reproducing under the real profile via sandbox-exec.

Writes stay confined to the workspace; exec was already allowed (allow process*).
Binding a listening socket (e.g. python3 -m http.server) remains blocked by the
network policy (deny network*) — that is a separate gate. Local build for manual
verification.
2026-06-21 22:37:38 +05:30
KRATOS 3c2cd1d491 fix(sandbox): stop the interactive guard from blocking 'node --version' & friends (#294)
DetectInteractiveCommand treated node/python/ruby/... as interactive REPLs unless
an argument was a script file or one of a small allow-list of eval/print flags. So
'node --version' (and -v, --check, --help; 'python3 --version', etc.) — all
print-and-exit, non-interactive — were wrongly blocked before execution with
"Blocked interactive command 'node': node with no script".

Add universal print-and-exit flags (--version/--help) that suppress the guard for
every repl program, plus node's unambiguous short forms (-v, --check, -h). Kept
conservative: --version/--help only universally (e.g. 'mysql -v' is *verbose*, not
version, so it still opens a prompt — covered by a new test). Bare 'node'/'python'
still blocked.

Tests: the exact 'node --version && npm --version' is now allowed; mysql -v stays
blocked.
2026-06-21 20:56:31 +05:30
Vasanth T 0aa45695a8 feat(tui): declutter the chat — drop the gimmicky billboard chrome (#291)
Make the chat read like a clean status surface (Claude Code / codex /
opencode) instead of a branding billboard. The audit's through-line was
"noise that restates what's already on screen, plus brand/meme flavor with
no off-switch"; the fix is almost entirely deletion:

- Replace the 40-slot meme/brand working-verb ring (gitlawbmaxxing,
  openfablemaxxing, maxxing, pilled, aura-farming, vibe-checking,
  tomfoolering, booping, ...) with one calm static "Working". Deletes
  working_words.go; the spinner + advancing clock are the only motion.
- Quiet the user turn: drop the full-width painted prompt band and its two
  padding bands; keep just the ▌ accent gutter with a single plain blank
  line as the delimiter.
- Stop stamping "completed in Ns · K tools" under every turn. Only a turn
  over 60s earns a faint "worked for ..." bookend; short turns get none
  (the next user prompt is the separator). Drops the tool-count segment.
- Remove the per-card [auto] badge (the permission mode is already shown in
  the composer divider).
- Drop the duplicate plan progress bar; the header done/total + per-step
  icons already convey progress. Deletes renderPlanProgressBar.
- Don't double-mark failed turns: the bordered error note already signals
  failure, so drop the extra red done-line.

Tests updated to the clean behavior. Full internal/tui suite green;
gofmt/vet/build/deadcode clean.

Deferred to a follow-up: the empty-state figlet/tagline, the all-caps
reverse-video badges, model/provider/context consolidation, terser
permission labels.
2026-06-21 20:10:08 +05:30
Vasanth T efe48ade0c feat(tui): syntax-highlighted code, word-level diffs, reduced-motion gate (#289)
* feat(tui): syntax-highlighted code, word-level diffs, and a reduced-motion gate

The remaining three items from the reference-TUI comparison, focused on
"real content rendering" + motion accessibility.

1. Syntax-highlight fenced code blocks. renderMarkdownCodeBlock passed code
   through plain; now the fence language is captured and the block is tokenized
   with chroma (new dep, pure Go) and colored with Zero's OWN audited palette —
   keyword=accent, string=green, number=amber, comment=faint, function=blue,
   punctuation=muted — so it stays on-brand and degrades through the same
   lipgloss profile path (truecolor→256→16→plain). Wrapping is token-level so a
   color never splits across a wrap. Unknown/missing language falls back to the
   old plain rendering, so it is never worse than today.

2. Word-level diff highlighting. diffCardBody tinted whole add/del lines; now an
   isolated 1:1 replacement (one "-" followed by one "+") highlights only the
   changed span on each side via a brighter changed-span bg (new addBgWord/
   delBgWord tokens), after trimming the common prefix/suffix. Gated to <=60%
   change so a near-rewrite is not confettied, and block changes keep whole-line
   tint. Changed-span colors validated by WCAG ratio (fg >=4.6:1, clear
   separation from the base band).

3. One reduced-motion gate. ZERO_REDUCED_MOTION (and no-TTY) now swaps the
   animated spinner for a steady dot via m.spinnerGlyph() at every render site
   (working line, plan, tool/specialist cards) and forces the fade off — one
   switch for all motion, where ZERO_NO_FADE only governed the fade. Liveness is
   preserved by the advancing elapsed timer, so a static frame never reads as
   frozen.

Tests cover the reduced-motion resolver + static glyph, changedSpan/word-diff
pairing + the near-rewrite fallback, and the highlighter's unknown-language
fallback + wrapping. Full internal/tui suite green; gofmt/vet/build clean.

* fix(tui): address render-polish review — highlight committed rows only

Adversarial review found a real interactive-jank regression and three smaller
issues; all fixed:

- PERF (blocker): the live streaming block re-tokenised the whole accumulated
  code via chroma on every frame. renderAssistantMarkdownText now takes
  allowHighlight; the interim/streaming path (model.interimBlock) and reasoning
  bodies pass false (plain, cheap), and only committed/cached rows
  (renderAssistantRow, selectable rows) highlight — so chroma runs once per row,
  never per frame.
- PERF: cache language->lexer lookups (including nil) and short-circuit an empty
  language before chroma's slow registry Match scan.
- Fences with metadata: take the first whitespace token as the language
  ("```go title=x" -> "go") instead of the whole info string.
- Reduced motion: freeze the compact and doctor braille rings too (their frame
  counters no longer advance under ZERO_REDUCED_MOTION), honoring the one-switch
  contract.

Tests: streaming code renders verbatim/plain; diff word-span colors AA on both
themes. Full internal/tui suite green; gofmt/vet/build clean.

* test(tui): opt the doctor/compact animation tests into motion

The reduced-motion gate auto-enables under no-TTY (colorprofile.NoTTY ->
reducedMotion), which is exactly the CI environment. That froze the compact and
doctor status rings, so two existing tests asserting "animates on tick" failed on
the Linux/macOS runners (Windows CI detects a color profile, so it passed there —
the platform split). Both tests exercise the animation mechanism, which is only
active when motion is on, so set m.reducedMotion = false in their setup to test it
deterministically regardless of the runner's detected profile.
2026-06-21 18:21:31 +05:30
Vasanth T e52fc3aebb feat(tui): make tool results and selections easier to scan at a glance (#287)
Three legibility-focused polish changes from the reference-TUI comparison:

1. Lead tool/specialist cards with the status glyph. The ✓/✗/spinner moved from
   the far right edge to the FRONT of the head row, and the tool name is now
   colored by state (green done / red failed; running keeps the normal name with
   the accent spinner). State reads in the first cell the eye lands on instead of
   riding a low-contrast left-rail tint. (rendering.go toolCard/toolCardHead;
   specialist cards already led with the glyph.)

2. Brighten the selected-row band in pickers and autocomplete. selBg was so close
   to the panel that the highlighted row barely separated — worst on the light
   theme, where it was effectively invisible (1.01:1 vs the panel). Dark
   #1d2114->#32401b (separation 1.18->1.73) and light #e7f2cd->#cfe78f
   (1.01->1.15); the label stays >9:1 (dark) / >12:1 (light). One token, so all
   three selection surfaces (autocomplete, picker, model picker) update together.

3. Surface the specialist drill-in affordance. A specialist card opens its subchat
   on click or Enter but showed no hint; add a faint "· enter to open".

Tests: lock the glyph-leads-head layout and add a contrast guard asserting the
selected band both separates from the panel (>=1.10) and keeps the label
AA-readable (>=4.5) on both themes — which would have caught the invisible light
band. Full internal/tui suite green; selection colors validated by WCAG ratio.
2026-06-21 18:04:19 +05:30
KRATOS 5b348056a4 feat(acp): Agent Client Protocol surface — drive ZERO as an editor backend (#288)
* feat(acp): JSON-RPC 2.0 ndjson transport for the ACP surface

Bidirectional JSON-RPC 2.0 peer over stdio (newline-delimited JSON): serves
inbound requests/notifications via registered handlers and issues outbound
requests/notifications. Handlers run on their own goroutines so a long-running
request (session/prompt) never blocks delivery of session/cancel or a permission
response. Stdlib-only, no new dependencies.

Derived solely from the public JSON-RPC 2.0 + ACP specs.

* feat(acp): ACP wire types derived from the public spec

Protocol message types for initialize, session/{new,load,prompt,cancel,update,
set_mode,set_config_option}, request_permission, content blocks, tool-call
updates, plan entries, permission options, and session modes — method names and
field shapes taken from the public ACP spec (agentclientprotocol.com schema/v1).
Model selection is exposed both via the spec's session/set_config_option and a
vendor _zero/set_model alias for clients that prefer it.

* feat(acp): translate ZERO agent events to ACP session/update payloads

Pure mappers (unit-tested) from ZERO's agent callbacks to ACP updates: text->
agent_message_chunk, reasoning->agent_thought_chunk, tool call->tool_call(in_progress),
tool result->tool_call_update(completed/failed) with content + changed-file
locations, and plan items->plan entries. A notifier wires the mappers to a live
connection per session.

* feat(acp): map ZERO permission prompts to ACP session/request_permission

Translate ZERO's permission decisions into ACP PermissionOptions (optionId carries
the ZERO action verbatim for a lossless round trip) and map the client's outcome
back to a ZERO PermissionDecision: cancelled->cancel, selected->the chosen action,
anything unrecognized fails closed to deny. Builds the embedded toolCall too.

* feat(acp): ACP Agent server driving ZERO's core

Implements the ACP methods over the JSON-RPC peer: initialize (capability +
version negotiation), session/new, session/load (with history replay for resume),
session/prompt (drives the real agent.Run with streaming callbacks -> session/update,
and an OnPermissionRequest that round-trips through session/request_permission),
session/cancel, session/set_mode (permission/autonomy mode), and model selection
via session/set_config_option plus the vendor _zero/set_model alias. Dependencies
are injected so the editor only hosts the thread while ZERO keeps auth/model/keys
(BYOK). Includes an end-to-end test (initialize+new+prompt over stdio pipes through
agent.Run with a fake provider) asserting the streamed updates.

* feat(acp): wire the 'zero acp' subcommand

Add 'zero acp', which serves ACP over stdio so editors (Zed, JetBrains, Neovim,
...) can drive ZERO as a backend. Reuses ZERO's real deps — config resolution,
provider construction, the core tool registry, and the session store — so
provider/model/keys stay owned by ZERO (BYOK). Registered in the command
dispatch and the help listing.

* fix(acp): drain in-flight handlers on stream close

On stdin EOF the read loop returned before the dispatch goroutines flushed their
responses, so piped/finite ndjson input (and editors that close the stream right
after a request) dropped the reply. Serve now cancels in-flight handlers (so any
blocked outbound Call unblocks via ctx) and waits for them before returning.

* fix(acp): address review — sandbox confinement, mode/cwd/transport hardening

Blockers:
- Confine shell/file tools: runTurn now builds a SCOPED registry + sandbox engine
  per session (BuildWorkspace mirrors exec's buildExecSandboxEngine + NewScope) and
  passes Options.Sandbox — ACP no longer runs bash/exec_command unconfined.
- Reject PermissionModeUnsafe over ACP (set_mode + advertised modes are auto/ask
  only); Unsafe stays gated to the operator, so a client can't self-grant no-prompt
  host access.
- Fix data race on acpSession.history: registerSession sets history before
  publishing the session and reuses an already-live session instead of overwriting.
- deliver() now deletes the pending entry and sends non-blocking, so a duplicate/
  late response frame can't wedge the read loop.

Should-fix:
- Serialize prompt turns per session (turnMu) so concurrent prompts can't interleave
  history or clobber the cancel slot.
- Validate client cwd (ResolveWorkspaceRoot mirrors exec; rejects filesystem root +
  home) before it becomes the file-tool confinement root.
- Malformed JSON no longer tears down the connection: framing is per-line; a bad
  line replies -32700 (id null) and the loop continues. Also validate jsonrpc:"2.0".
- Permission outcome binds to the offered set only (dropped the isKnownDecision
  fallback) — a client can't return a broader grant than was presented; fail closed.
- Drop the non-conformant SessionCapabilities advertisement (no resume handler) and
  the non-conformant SessionConfigOption model selector; model switching stays
  available via the vendor _zero/set_model.

Adds regression tests: sandbox+scoped-registry wiring, invalid-cwd rejection,
Unsafe-mode rejection, and malformed-line resilience. Full go test ./... -race green.
2026-06-21 17:55:44 +05:30
KRATOS bd7cc5665f fix: behavioral-audit follow-ups (exec -p, cron/version/specialist UX, update_plan coercion, Makefile) (#286)
From the 2026-06-21 behavioral audit. Each verified by tests + the real binary.

- exec: accept the advertised `-p`/`-p=` short flag in the exec subcommand parser;
  previously only `--prompt` worked even though top-level help advertises `-p`,
  so the documented `zero exec -p "..."` form errored (internal/cli/exec_parse.go).
- version: `version --help` prints a usage line instead of the version string
  (internal/cli/app.go).
- specialist: `specialist edit <builtin>` explains builtins are read-only instead
  of the misleading "specialist not found" (internal/cli/specialist.go).
- cron: `pause`/`resume`/`rm` now print a success confirmation (rm's verb arg was
  previously dead) (internal/cli/cron.go).
- update_plan: coerce non-canonical statuses (e.g. "done", "in-progress") to the
  nearest canonical value instead of failing the whole call, and keep at most one
  in_progress item (internal/tools/update_plan.go + tests).
- build: add a Makefile (build/test/lint/...) backing AGENTS.MD's `make`/`make lint`.

Investigated but intentionally NOT changed (guarded by existing tests):
- write_stdin AdvertiseInAuto — TestCoreToolsExposeShellTools asserts it stays
  visible in auto mode for polling/interrupts.
- --list-tools not resolving config (so tool_search is absent there) —
  TestRunExecListsMCPToolsWithoutProviderResolution asserts list-tools must not
  resolve provider config.

Out of scope: LICENSE (owner decision), provider-resolve startup crash (PR #283),
OAuth default storage + MCP auto-reconnect (design choices).
2026-06-21 15:57:38 +05:30
Vasanth T 29246e5659 fix(providers): make the stream idle timeout global, configurable, and less aggressive (#285)
A long generation could die with "provider stream error: idle timeout after
1m30s (upstream stopped sending data)". The 90s idle watchdog was duplicated as
defaultStreamIdleTimeout in three providers (anthropic, gemini, openai; codex
inherits openai) and wired to no config, so a slow cloud/reasoning backend that
goes silent without SSE keep-alives for >90s was killed mid-stream.

Centralize it in providerio:
- providerio.DefaultStreamIdleTimeout — single source of truth, raised 90s -> 5m
  so a genuine silent pause has real headroom. The watchdog still resets on SSE
  keep-alive comments, so a heartbeating-but-slow upstream is never aborted; this
  only changes how long true silence is tolerated before aborting a hung stream.
- providerio.ResolveStreamIdleTimeout(option): precedence is explicit option >
  ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT env (a Go duration or bare seconds; 0/off/none
  disables the watchdog) > default. All providers resolve through it, so one env
  var tunes every provider at once.

Removes the three duplicated consts. Existing idle tests (which set an explicit
short StreamIdleTimeout) keep passing because an explicit option still wins. Adds
resolver tests (precedence, env parsing, disable, typo-falls-back-to-default) and
documents ZERO_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT in the README.
2026-06-21 15:57:12 +05:30
Vasanth T 33da6b6454 feat(npm): publish @gitlawb/zero with a postinstall binary installer (#284)
Make `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` deliver a working CLI. bin/zero.js already
execs an adjacent binary, but nothing fetched it and the name `zero` is taken
on npm. This wires up delivery:

- package.json: rename to @gitlawb/zero; add a postinstall hook, files, engines,
  os/cpu, repository, and a license placeholder (the LICENSE file is still
  pending and tracked separately).
- scripts/postinstall.mjs: detect platform/arch (mapping mirrors
  internal/release/release.go — darwin->macos, amd64->x64), download
  zero-v{version}-{os}-{arch}.{tar.gz|zip} from the matching GitHub Release,
  verify its SHA-256, and extract into place. Extraction goes to a temp dir and
  copies only known binary basenames, so a crafted archive cannot escape the
  package (no zip-slip). Idempotent via a version marker; ZERO_SKIP_DOWNLOAD and
  unsupported platforms are non-fatal skips.

Security hardening (from an adversarial review):
- require https for the download origin (the same-origin .sha256 makes TLS the
  load-bearing integrity control); ZERO_ALLOW_INSECURE_DOWNLOAD=1 opts out for
  local testing, and an https->http redirect is refused.
- the checksum parser is anchored per line and validates the filename field.
- cap the download size; warn when an optional sandbox helper is absent.

release-artifacts.yml: on a tag push, assert the git tag equals
v{package.json version} before packaging — zero-release names assets from
package.json while the release publishes under the tag, so any drift would 404
every install (install.sh, install.ps1, and npm alike).

Tests (internal/npmwrapper): package.json now requires exactly a postinstall
hook (no repo build scripts) plus name/license/repository/files; new
node-driven tests cover the per-platform asset plan, the skip env, and the
unsupported-platform path. Verified end-to-end against a local mirror:
download -> verify -> extract places the binary, a tampered checksum is
rejected, and http is refused without the opt-in.

Going live still needs two maintainer steps: create the `gitlawb` npm org +
NPM_TOKEN, and publish the first v0.1.0 release so there is an asset to fetch.
2026-06-21 15:56:48 +05:30
KRATOS a2d902c38f fix(config): skip an unresolvable non-active provider instead of crashing startup (#283)
normalizeProviders resolved every configured provider and aborted the entire
config load if any one failed (e.g. a profile whose catalogID preset this build
doesn't ship). That bricked the whole app even when the ACTIVE provider was valid:
a clean clone + a real user config with one unknown-catalog provider exited with
'unknown provider "x"' and never started.

Now a single unresolvable NON-active provider is dropped (the rest, including the
active one, load normally); only the ACTIVE provider failing remains fatal. Tests
cover both paths.
2026-06-21 15:56:21 +05:30
Vasanth T 990e3c439b fix(sandbox): self-dispatch the Windows sandbox helpers so they work in dev (#280)
Zero already had a complete Windows sandbox (restricted token + workspace ACLs + WFP network filters), but it was unreachable in dev and plain go build: the backend was only selected when the standalone helper exes were found adjacent to the binary or on PATH (release layout only), so every bash command hard-failed with 'Windows sandbox command runner is not available'. Add self-dispatch: the running zero binary acts as its own helper via two hidden subcommands, with three-tier discovery (adjacent exe, PATH, then self-dispatch via os.Executable) mirroring the Linux fallback. Also surface the elevation requirement for 'zero sandbox setup' (WFP/ACL need Administrator) instead of a raw ACCESS_DENIED. Tests cover the three discovery tiers, dispatch routing, and the unavailable edge.
2026-06-21 14:01:49 +05:30
Anandan ac24f64abe Install Windows sandbox helpers (#278)
install.ps1 now copies the bundled Windows sandbox helper binaries (zero-windows-command-runner.exe, zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe) alongside zero.exe, so the tier-1 adjacent-exe discovery finds them after a release install. Previously the installer copied only zero.exe and silently dropped the helpers the release archive already ships, leaving installed users with 'Windows sandbox helper is not available'. Adds Find-ZeroExtractedFile to locate each required binary in the extracted archive and fail loud if one is missing.
2026-06-21 13:59:44 +05:30
KRATOS 9047977895 fix: resolve product/UX audit findings for OSS launch (#282)
Resolve product/UX audit findings for the OSS launch: doctor now fails uncredentialed remote providers (no false green), Redact() no longer mangles the common first-run auth error, SSRF-safe loopback exemption unblocks keyless local models, new validated --theme flag, WCAG-AA contrast fixes, NO_COLOR compliance, clearer first-contact errors, and full OSS scaffolding (SECURITY/CoC/CHANGELOG/templates/release workflow). Audit ledger maps every Fixed claim to a real change with zero overclaims.
2026-06-21 13:25:17 +05:30
KRATOSandgnanam1990 f7ee189ba5 fix: resolve 15 findings from the 2026-06-20 deep audit (#281)
* docs(audit): 2026-06-20 deep adversarial audit report

Audit-only deliverable (no source changed). Fresh origin/main (bfbdbb1) deep
read across 13 subsystems with per-finding adversarial re-verification, plus
reconciliation of the 2026-06-10/2026-06-13 audits.

Result: build/vet clean; race detector finds 0 data races (67/68 pkgs; the
3 internal/tools failures are -race-only timing flakes). 35 surviving findings
(1 high, 15 medium, 17 low, 2 info); 64 prior findings fixed, 14 partial,
12 still-open.

* fix(providerhealth): strip credentials on cross-host redirect (AUDIT-M10)

The connectivity probe's CheckRedirect re-validated the redirect host against
the SSRF blocklist but never stripped auth headers. Go's stdlib only auto-strips
Authorization/Cookie/WWW-Authenticate on a host change — not x-api-key,
x-goog-api-key, or custom provider headers — so a baseURL that 3xx-redirects to
an attacker-controlled public host received the provider API key verbatim.

Thread the exact set of auth-bearing header names (kind default + profile
AuthHeader + CustomHeaders keys + well-known) into the client and Header.Del
them whenever the redirect target's host:port differs from the original.
Regression test asserts the creds are dropped cross-host and kept same-host.

* fix(sessions): fsync events.jsonl append for crash durability (AUDIT-M12)

appendEventLocked wrote the event into the page cache and returned success, then
durably wrote (fsync'd) the derived metadata. A crash after the metadata fsync
but before the events.jsonl page flushed left metadata.EventCount ahead of the
log — silently dropping the last appended event, including the checkpoint a
/rewind targets. Add file.Sync() before Close so the log is at least as durable
as the metadata derived from it.

(Note: the fsync itself has no portable unit-test seam; covered by the existing
sessions append/durability suite for no-regression.)

* fix(cron): DST fall-back double-fire + claim double-grant (AUDIT-M4, AUDIT-M5)

M4: fireJob/claimFire computed the next slot from the raw sub-second now(), so
schedule.Next's DST fall-back collapse guard (which only engages for a
minute-aligned 'after') never fired — a daily job in the repeated wall-clock hour
ran twice on the fall-back day. Feed sched.Next a minute-truncated instant at the
claim and the post-exec advance (the due-check still uses the real instant so
sub-minute NextRunAt jobs are unaffected).

M5: claimFire left NextRunAt unchanged when the schedule couldn't advance
(unparseable/exhausted spec), so two concurrent schedulers both saw the job due
and both fired it. Pause the job inside the same locked claim instead: the winner
still fires once and the post-exec keeps it paused; the loser sees a non-active
job and is refused.

Tests: claimFire double-claim on an unadvanceable job (second refused, job paused)
and a DST fall-back daily job advancing past the repeat (not re-firing it).

* fix(daemon): bound the control handshake + track bridge conns for Shutdown (AUDIT-M7, M8, I1)

The remote bridge clears the connection deadline before handing the conn to
Server.ServeConn, and the local socket set none, so handleConn's two ReadControl
handshake calls could block forever — an authenticated-but-idle remote peer
pinned a bridge connection slot (32 of them exhaust the bridge), and the local
path had the same unbounded read. Set a handshake deadline in handleConn and
clear it before the (long-lived) streaming dispatch (M7, I1).

ServeConn also bypassed trackConn, so Shutdown's conns-close sweep couldn't close
a remote conn stalled in that handshake read. Track/untrack it like the local
accept loop does (M8).

Tests: handleConn returns under a shortened handshake deadline when the peer
never sends hello; Shutdown closes a ServeConn'd conn well under the 10s deadline.

* fix(swarm): atomic rename-with-verify mailbox stale-lock break (AUDIT-M13)

The stale-break compared two consecutive reads of the SAME lock file
(string(data) == string(stale)), so the equality was always true and gave no
protection: two waiters could both observe a stale lock and both os.Remove it
while a third recreated it via O_EXCL, leaving two live writers to the same
per-agent inbox (split-brain). Replace with the proven rename-with-verify used by
the cron/hooks/oauth locks: rename the stale file aside (only one racer wins the
rename), re-check the moved file's mtime is still stale before deleting, and
rename it back if a holder rotated a fresh lock in the gap.

Tests: a genuinely stale lock is reclaimed (no .stale.* leftover); a fresh held
lock is never broken. (The double-break race itself is not deterministically
unit-testable; the fix mirrors the cron/hooks/oauth pattern.)

* fix(streamjson): anchor api_key redaction so prose isn't mangled (AUDIT-M1)

The api_key secret pattern used ["'=:\s]+ as the delimiter class, so a bare
space after the marker counted — 'the api_key: foo setting' and 'apiKey value
spans' had the following word replaced with [REDACTED] in every emitted
stream-json event (text deltas, tool output, final answer). Require a real
assignment delimiter (= or :) and a credential-length body, mirroring the
already-anchored sk-/bearer patterns. Prose survives; real api_key=... secrets
still redact.

* fix(tools): snapshot exec-session lastUsedAt under its lock to fix prune race (AUDIT-L15)

sessionToPruneLocked sorted on execSession.lastUsedAt while holding only
manager.mu, but touch() writes lastUsedAt under session.mu — a data race on a
time.Time that could torn-read and mis-select the prune victim. Snapshot each
session's lastUsedAt via a session.mu-guarded getter before sorting (lock order
stays manager.mu -> session.mu; no path takes them the other way). Adds a -race
regression test driving touch() concurrently with the prune selection.

* fix(swarm): release per-job context on MaxRuns completion (AUDIT-L13)

Scheduler.run returned on MaxRuns completion without calling job.cancel(), so the
job's derived context (and the goroutine context.WithCancel spawns to propagate
parent cancellation) leaked until the whole scheduler was cancelled at session
end. Add defer job.cancel() (idempotent with Cancel/Close) so it is released on
every exit path.

* fix(agent): route post-compaction and max-turns connects through streamWithReconnect (AUDIT-L1)

The main turn connect already retries transient disconnects via
streamWithReconnect, but the post-compaction retry connect, the reactive
mid-stream reconnect, and finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns called provider.StreamCompletion
directly — a single transient hiccup on those (e.g. the final summary after a long
autonomous/cron run, or the turn right after a context-limit compaction) failed the
whole run with no retry. All three are pre-content connects, so routing them through
the helper carries no OnText-duplication risk.

* fix(cli): reject trailing args after --skip-permissions-unsafe (AUDIT-L3)

zero --skip-permissions-unsafe "fix bug" silently discarded the prompt and
launched the interactive TUI, so a scripted one-shot unsafe invocation appeared
to hang. Reject any trailing positional arg loudly (after checking for a
misplaced --add-dir first, which keeps its specific error), pointing users at
the working form: zero exec --skip-permissions-unsafe -p "...".

* fix(provideroauth): error on present-but-wrong-shape chatgpt account-id claim (AUDIT-L11)

extractChatGPTAccountID returned ("", nil) both when the id_token had no
account-id claim AND when OpenAI's auth namespace was present but the account id
was missing/empty/non-string. The latter is a claim-shape change: the caller only
warns on a non-nil error, so it silently omitted the chatgpt-account-id header and
every Codex call 401'd with no diagnostic, indistinguishable from an expired
token. Return an error for the present-but-unusable case so the login warning
fires; a genuinely absent claim still soft-skips ("", nil).

* test(tools): widen exec-session poll windows so the suite is -race-clean (AUDIT report §2)

Three exec-session timing tests assumed a 250ms-sleep / immediate child would
finish within a fixed 1000ms yield. Under -race the child (the race-instrumented
test binary) starts slowly enough to overrun it, so the tool correctly returned a
still-running session_id instead of an exit_code and the asserts failed — the
non-green -race suite the audit flagged in §2. collect() returns as soon as the
session completes, so widening the poll window to 30s makes them deterministic
under -race without slowing the passing case. Test-only; no behavior change.

* docs(audit): mark remediation status (fixed/deferred/skipped) for the 2026-06-20 audit

* docs(audit): strip trailing whitespace from the report (fix git diff --check)

* fix(tools): drain PTY output before marking an exec session done (AUDIT-M14)

A TTY exec session's stdout was copied into the buffer by a fire-and-forget
io.Copy goroutine, but startSession's Wait goroutine called markDone (and then
removed the session) as soon as command.Wait() returned — before that goroutine
had necessarily drained the master FD. The command's final output chunk (e.g. a
test runner's last PASS/FAIL line) could be lost on exit, and since the exited
session is removed it could not be polled back. This also surfaced as the flaky
TestExecCommandTTYSessionAcceptsInputOnLinux on loaded CI.

Make the PTY cleanup (called after command.Wait, before markDone) join the copy
goroutine before closing the master: the child has exited so the master EOFs once
io.Copy finishes draining; waiting for that (bounded by bashWaitDelay) guarantees
all output is buffered before the session is marked done. Closing the master
first would truncate the unread tail, so the join precedes the Close.

Linux-only path (exec_pty_linux.go); verified via GOOS=linux build+vet (the TTY
test only runs on linux/CI).

* docs(audit): mark M14 fixed (PTY drain) in remediation status

---------

Co-authored-by: gnanam1990 <[email protected]>
2026-06-21 00:44:23 +05:30
Vasanth T bfbdbb10f6 test(tools): make write_stdin "\x03" the trigger in the interrupt test (#273)
The de-flake infra (resilientTempDir + deterministic <-session.done wait) is
already on main, but the test still called session.terminate() directly before
write_stdin "\x03" — so the session was already reaped when the code under test
(exec_command.go's Ctrl-C branch) ran, and the assertion no longer guarded it:
the test would pass even if that branch were deleted (caught in review).

Capture the session handle before the interrupt (write_stdin removes a finished
session from the manager), then make write_stdin "\x03" the operation that
terminates, then wait on session.done. Keeps the de-flake; restores the
coverage. Verified by mutation: removing session.terminate() from the Ctrl-C
branch makes this test fail. Runs 15x locally without flaking.
2026-06-20 23:12:57 +05:30
Vasanth T b2bb6c4b41 feat: five capability features from the reference-agent comparison (#276)
* feat(commands): user-defined slash commands from markdown files

Drop a markdown file at `.zero/commands/<name>.md` (project, shared with the
team) or `<userConfigDir>/zero/commands/<name>.md` (personal); typing
`/<name> args` expands its body template and submits it as a normal prompt.
Optional YAML frontmatter (`description:`, `model:`, `agent:`) feeds help text
and routing. This turns Zero's model-pulled skills into user-invokable,
repo-checked-in team workflows (`/release v1.2`, `/fix-flaky <test>`).

New internal/usercommands package: Load() scans the project + user dirs
(project shadows user on name collision, mirroring specialist scope
precedence), validates names to a safe slash-command shape, and parses
frontmatter with a self-contained parser. Expand() substitutes $ARGUMENTS,
$1..$9, and $$ (literal $); a placeholder-free template gets the raw args
appended so a trivial command still receives input.

Wiring: model loads commands at construction; the commandUnknown dispatch
checks the user set before reporting "unknown"; autocomplete lists user
commands alongside builtins. Builtins win on collision (listed first, shadow at
dispatch). Tests cover load/precedence/name-validation, the placeholder
substitution table, and the TUI dispatch + autocomplete + still-unknown paths.

* feat(init): guided /init that generates AGENTS.md seeded with repo facts

`/init` (TUI) and `zero init` (headless) investigate the repo and write a
concise AGENTS.md so future runs start with project context. Zero already has
the AGENTS.md loader and the repoinfo scanner, but the file only existed if a
user hand-authored it — this activates the machinery in one command.

New internal/agentinit.BuildPrompt seeds the bootstrap prompt with
repoinfo.Collect() output (primary language, build/test tools, CI, workspace
layout, git) formatted as a fact block, then instructs the agent to investigate
the gaps and write a tight AGENTS.md (build/test commands, conventions, things
to avoid). Collection failure is non-fatal — the agent investigates from
scratch. This is one better than a pure-prompt /init: the agent starts from
known facts instead of re-deriving them.

TUI: /init command + handleInitCommand reuse launchPrompt (standard run, tools,
AGENTS.md write path). Headless: `zero init` builds the prompt and forwards it
through the existing exec machinery, so all exec flags (--model, -w, --add-dir)
work unchanged. Tests cover FormatFacts (rendered/omitted fields), BuildPrompt,
and the TUI dispatch.

* feat(tools): lsp_navigate — semantic code navigation via the language server

A read-only, model-callable tool exposing LSP navigation: jump-to-definition,
find-all-references, find-implementations, and workspace_symbol search. The
agent can answer "where is X defined / who calls X / what implements this
interface" precisely, where grep collides on common names or misses indirect
references — cutting wasted read/grep turns and wrong-edit risk on large repos.

Zero already runs language servers for diagnostics, so this adds the
request/response navigation methods on top: Manager.Navigate syncs the file
(didOpen) then issues textDocument/definition|references|implementation or
workspace/symbol via the existing client.Call, decoding all three result shapes
(Location, []Location, []LocationLink). 1-based file:line:col in and out
(converting LSP's 0-based positions); the tool has its own lazily-started
manager (servers start on first use, reused across calls).

Opportunistic: a file type with no installed server, or a server lacking the
capability, degrades to a clear "unavailable — fall back to grep" message, not
an error. Registered in CoreReadOnlyToolsScoped. Tests cover the response-shape
decoding (incl. LocationLink + null), symbol decoding/kinds, unknown-op and
unsupported-extension degradation, and the tool's arg validation + read-only
safety.

* feat(agent): prune stale tool output before paid summarization

Long, dump-heavy sessions accumulate large read_file/grep/glob/bash tool
results the model has already acted on; their bodies are dead weight the loop
otherwise keeps paying an LLM summarizer to compress. Add a zero-cost prune
stage inside maybeCompact, before the summarizer: when over threshold, replace
the bodies of OLD, large tool results with a compact placeholder, recompute
size, and only fall through to the paid Compact() if still over.

pruneStaleToolOutput walks newest-first, protects the last preserveLast
messages plus a trailing 40k-token window of tool output (most likely still in
use), and prunes only tool results older than that and larger than 200 tokens —
gated so the whole pass is a no-op unless reclaimable output exceeds 20k tokens.
It keeps the tool message and its ToolCallID (provider replay stays valid; the
model knows what was there and can re-run the tool), never touches non-tool
messages, never re-prunes a placeholder (idempotent), and copies-on-write so it
never mutates the caller's slice. Recent turns are preserved verbatim — no
paraphrase loss, no token or latency cost.

Tests cover the reclaim gate, recent-window protection, idempotence,
non-tool-message safety, ToolCallID/role preservation, and no-input-mutation.

* feat(agent): reconnect on a transient model disconnect instead of ending the run

A long autonomous task (a big refactor, a swarm member, a headless/cron run)
should survive a single transient upstream hiccup rather than dying and
re-burning every token on a restart. When the initial StreamCompletion connect
fails with a disconnect-shaped error, streamWithReconnect re-issues the SAME
request with exponential backoff up to 2 times.

It retries only the connect — before any content is forwarded — so no
already-streamed OnText is ever duplicated. A context-limit error (the
compactor's job), an image rejection, a non-disconnect error, or a cancelled
context is returned immediately without retry, so the reconnect never fights
the existing handlers. Disconnect classification matches EOF / connection
reset|refused|closed / broken pipe / timeout / 502 / 503 / server-closed.
Reconnect attempts surface through OnReasoning ("connection lost —
reconnecting N/max"), a non-content channel that never corrupts the answer
text; silent when there's no reasoning sink.

Tests: recover-from-transient, give-up-after-max, no-retry-on-context-limit,
stop-on-context-cancel, the disconnect-vs-not classifier, backoff growth, and
the notice routing.

* fix(specialist): add lsp_navigate to knownToolNames

The new lsp_navigate tool was added to the core read-only registry but not to
specialist.knownToolNames, which mirrors the core tool set — so
TestKnownToolNamesMatchCoreRegistry failed (the list drifted from the registry).
Add it to the read-only group to match.

* fix(tools): confine lsp_navigate to the workspace (close arbitrary-file-read)

Review caught that lsp_navigate dropped the PathScope every sibling read-only
tool (read_file/glob/grep) carries, and its readFile joined or used the
model-supplied path verbatim — so `path:"/etc/passwd"` (absolute) or
`path:"../../etc/..."` (escaping) read arbitrary files off disk AND opened them
into the language-server subprocess, reachable via indirect prompt injection.

Add NewScopedLSPNavigateTool(workspaceRoot, scope) (NewLSPNavigateTool now
delegates with nil scope), resolve the path through resolveScopedReadPath BEFORE
reading or building the LSP request — the same confinement the neighbouring
tools enforce — and hand the LSP manager the resolved absolute path so it never
opens an out-of-workspace file. Errors echo only the relative path, never an
absolute one. Registered via the scoped constructor in CoreReadOnlyToolsScoped.

Regression test asserts `/etc/passwd` and `../../` are rejected for both the
position and workspace_symbol ops; verified by mutation (bypassing the scope
resolution makes the test fail).
2026-06-20 23:12:15 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 4.8 72a4229c2a fix(oauth): make ChatGPT (Codex) login work end-to-end (#264)
* fix(oauth): add missing api.connectors scopes for ChatGPT OAuth preset

* fix(oauth): add missing authorize params for ChatGPT OAuth (id_token_add_organizations, codex_cli_simplified_flow, originator)

* fix(oauth): use localhost + /auth/callback for ChatGPT redirect URI (matches Codex CLI registration)

* fix(oauth): use fixed port 1455 + localhost/auth/callback for ChatGPT (matches opencode + Codex CLI client registration)

* chore: gofmt chatgpt.go

* refactor(oauth): use RedirectURIWithHost for ChatGPT callback; drop dead Port()

RedirectURIWithHost and Port() were added but never called — chatgpt.go
hardcoded "http://localhost:1455/auth/callback" as a literal, duplicating both
the port and path. Use RedirectURIWithHost("localhost", "/auth/callback") so the
redirect_uri derives its port from the listener (single source of truth via the
new chatgptCallbackPort constant), and remove the unused Port() method.

Also make the fixed-port bind failure actionable: ChatGPT's client registration
requires exactly port 1455, so we can't fall back to a random port — but if 1455
is already bound (a prior Zero/Codex login still open) the error now says so
instead of surfacing a raw OS bind error.

Tests: RedirectURIWithHost host/path formatting, and that the listener captures
the code on the /auth/callback path (not just /callback) — both were previously
uncovered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(oauth): restore api.connectors scopes for ChatGPT preset (review fix)

The fixed-port commit accidentally reverted internal/oauth/presets.go back to
only openid/profile/email/offline_access, dropping the api.connectors.read and
api.connectors.invoke scopes this PR exists to add — so authorize URLs still
omitted them and the authorize_hydra_invalid_request failure was not actually
fixed (caught in review by anandh8x).

Restore both connector scopes in the chatgpt preset and pin them with tests:
- TestResolveConfigChatGPTPreset now asserts both connector scopes are present
  (not just allowed).
- New TestChatGPTAuthorizeURLIncludesConnectorScopes inspects the generated
  authorize URL and asserts the scope param carries api.connectors.read and
  api.connectors.invoke, so a future revert is caught end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* fix(oauth): read chatgpt_account_id from the nested OpenAI auth claim (P0)

extractChatGPTAccountID read chatgpt_account_id as a TOP-LEVEL id_token claim,
but auth.openai.com namespaces it under the "https://api.openai.com/auth" claim
object (the Codex CLI reads only from there). Against a real token the top-level
lookup returned "", so token.Account stayed empty → the codex provider omitted
the required chatgpt-account-id header on every request → Cloudflare/backend 401.

The login itself succeeded (bearer minted), so the failure was silent: the user
authenticated fine, then every Codex API call 401'd. The unit tests passed only
because the fixture put the claim at the top level, masking the bug.

Read the nested path first (id_token[ns][chatgpt_account_id]), matching codex;
keep a bare top-level claim as a forward-compat fallback only. Tests now build
the fixture with the nested shape a real token uses, plus regressions: a
top-level decoy must not shadow the nested value, and the top-level fallback
still works when the namespace is absent.

Found by an adversarial audit against the codex reference (same OAuth client).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-20 23:00:01 +05:30
Anandan 3671245dbe Fix custom provider model discovery (#277) 2026-06-20 22:51:31 +05:30
KRATOS a981120432 Audit tail: remaining medium/low correctness fixes (CLI, config, OAuth, tools, LSP, TUI) (#275)
* audit tail: fix remaining medium/low correctness findings

A sweep of the remaining audit findings across CLI, config, OAuth, tools,
LSP, and the TUI. Each fix has a regression test; build/vet/gofmt clean and
the touched packages' suites pass.

CLI
- `zero -p "<prompt>"` now forwards the prompt as the inline `--prompt=<value>`
  form so a prompt whose first character is a dash (e.g. `zero -p "-foo"`) is
  taken verbatim instead of being rejected as a missing flag value (matches the
  cron path).

Config
- mergeProfile no longer drops parseThinkTags across profile merges; an explicit
  value carries over and a nil (unset) never clobbers an existing one.

OAuth
- Refresh carries the existing token_type forward when the refresh response omits
  it (previously silently lost).
- RefreshScheduler.Stop resets started/done so the scheduler can be started again
  instead of being permanently inert after the first Stop.

Tools
- apply_patch header parsing takes the whole post-prefix value (dropping a trailing
  tab timestamp and undoing git's C-style quoting) instead of splitting on spaces,
  so a diff target whose name contains spaces is recognized.

LSP
- Server.Shutdown honors its context (kills immediately on cancel rather than
  waiting out the full grace window), and Manager.Shutdown shuts servers down
  concurrently so total shutdown is bounded by one grace window, not N×grace.

TUI
- /theme auto re-probes the terminal background (RequestBackgroundColor) instead
  of reusing a stale startup reading, so switching to auto re-detects light/dark.
- Specialist card: wire the tool-call count from progress events (was always 0)
  and omit the token segment when the total is 0 rather than show "0 tokens".
- Resume: extract the tool-call row id the same way as the result row and the
  specialist pre-pass (toolCallId first), so call/result dedup and the failed-Task
  visibility rule key on the same string.
- Plan panel: height takes an injected clock (testable, consistent with render),
  and duplicate-content steps inherit distinct prior timestamps positionally.

* tui: test that /theme auto re-probes the terminal background (M17)

The M17 fix lives in handleSubmit's command dispatch (`return m,
tea.RequestBackgroundColor` when the mode is auto), which no test exercised —
only the handleThemeCommand helper was covered. Add a dispatch-level test:
/theme auto must return the background re-probe command, /theme dark must not.
Verified to fail if the dispatch is reverted to `return m, nil`.
2026-06-20 22:21:48 +05:30
KRATOS fbbfdbf3f2 Harden background daemon: stdout integrity, lifecycle, and single-instance lock (#274)
* harden background daemon: stdout integrity, lifecycle, single-instance lock

Deep review of internal/daemon (worker pool, launcher, control server,
session fan-out, single-instance lock) found and fixes a stdout-integrity
bug plus several lifecycle/locking hazards. Each fix has a regression test;
the daemon suite passes under -race.

Worker stdout integrity
- Replace the capped bufio.Scanner (64 KiB) on a worker's stdout with an
  uncapped bufio.Reader: a legitimately large stream-json line from our own
  trusted worker is no longer silently dropped (the 1 MiB cap belongs to
  untrusted network frames, not this local pipe).
- Surface a stdout read error as a run failure instead of swallowing it as a
  clean success, and kill the worker first so it can't block writing to the
  now-unread pipe and hang Wait.

Control-server lifecycle
- Track open connections and close them on Shutdown so a single idle/hostile
  client can no longer wedge drain (and SIGTERM cleanup) forever.
- Guard the listener with a mutex and re-check the shutdown signal after bind
  so a shutdown requested in the bind window is not lost.
- Honor shutdown during buffered-history replay too.

Session fan-out
- A slow subscriber that drops live lines now receives a namespaced gap
  notice when its channel drains, instead of silently losing output.
- Hold the session lock across the (non-blocking) broadcast sends to close a
  latent send-on-closed-channel panic when a subscriber cancels mid-send.

Single-instance lock
- Reclaim a stale lock with an atomic rename-with-verify instead of a blind
  remove, so two instances starting at once cannot both reclaim and end up
  both holding the lock; a holder that reacquires in the gap is restored.

Client + pool
- Bound the control handshake with an I/O deadline so a peer that never
  replies can't wedge Dial/NewClientConn.
- Key the active-worker map by a monotonic id rather than PID (the OS reuses
  PIDs the instant a worker exits).
- Group-terminate on context cancel so a stuck worker's children are not
  orphaned.

* daemon: add -race regression test for the Session.Line lock-hold invariant

Session.Line holds s.mu across its non-blocking subscriber sends so cancel()/
finish() cannot close a subscriber channel mid-send (send-on-closed-channel
panic). That invariant had no concurrency test. Add one that drives Line
concurrently with Subscribe/cancel and finish; it panics with a data race if
the lock-hold is reverted and passes with it (verified both ways under -race).
2026-06-20 22:21:28 +05:30
KRATOS 09888e64e8 providers: surface non-normal terminal turns instead of silent empty completions (#263)
* providers: surface non-normal terminal turns instead of silent empty completions

Four stream-adapter cases where a non-normal turn was treated as a clean
empty completion, hiding the real outcome. Each ships a regression test.

- openai/codex: a tool call arriving with output_index 0 and no item_id
  had its argument deltas dropped (the call dispatched with empty JSON).
  output_index is now a *int so a real 0 is distinguishable from absent.
- openai/codex: response.failed / response.completed with a nil payload
  returned silently with no terminal event; now failed emits an error and
  completed emits done, so a failure is never masked as an empty success.
- gemini: terminal finishReasons (RECITATION, MALFORMED_FUNCTION_CALL,
  IMAGE_SAFETY, OTHER, LANGUAGE, UNEXPECTED_TOOL_CALL) were treated as a
  normal stop; safety reasons now map to content_filter and the rest
  surface the raw reason so the truncation notice fires.
- anthropic: stop_reason "refusal" was treated as a normal completion;
  it now maps to content_filter.

* address review: restore Gemini integration/tool-call tests; justify pause_turn

Review follow-ups on the provider silent-failure fixes:

- Gemini: restore the end-to-end finish-reason and dropped-tool-call tests that
  the earlier refactor removed, alongside the mapFinishReason unit test. This
  re-covers the full SSE -> done-event wiring (MAX_TOKENS -> length, SAFETY ->
  content_filter, normal STOP -> "") and the nameless-functionCall drop signal,
  and adds a RECITATION integration test that exercises the M3 widening through
  the streaming path (not just mapFinishReason in isolation).

- Anthropic: document why pause_turn is classified as a normal stop — it is the
  long-running-turn pause (server-side tools) the client resumes by sending the
  response back, not a truncation/refusal, so it correctly maps to "" rather than
  firing a spurious truncation notice.

gofmt/vet/build clean; gemini/anthropic/openai suites pass.

* codex: surface response.failed even when the payload omits the error object

A response.failed terminal event carrying a non-nil Response whose `error`
object is null/omitted (the backend can report the failure only via `status`)
fell through to a clean StreamEventDone — reporting a real failure as a normal
successful turn. Only the nil-payload path was guarded. Branch on the failed
terminal (event type / Response.Status) before the clean-done fallthrough and
emit StreamEventError. Adds a regression test for the non-nil-payload-without-
error case (verified to fail without the fix).
2026-06-20 22:21:12 +05:30
Anandan f5038151c8 Add managed background terminals (#270)
* Add managed background terminal sessions

* Stop background terminals on TUI exit

* Cover approved local network sandbox mode

* Polish background terminal rendering

* Tighten exec session cleanup guidance

* Address background terminal review feedback

* Kill exec session trees on Windows

* Trigger CI for Windows cleanup
2026-06-20 20:30:39 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 4.8 c572791edf feat: clipboard image paste + provider 400 handler for image rejection (#268)
* fix(agent): abort on image-rejection 400s instead of retrying in a loop

* feat(imageinput): add ReadClipboardImage for OS clipboard image extraction

* feat(tui): clipboard image paste — detect and attach screenshots from OS clipboard

* fix(imageinput): use temp file for Windows clipboard image (PowerShell stdout can't emit raw binary)

* test: handle both image-present and image-absent clipboard states

* fix(vision): add kimi-k2 and qwen-vl to vision-capable name heuristic

* fix(tui): render image errors as red error rows instead of grey system notes

* feat(vision): check models.dev InputModalities for vision support instead of only name heuristics

The vision gate now checks three sources:
1. Curated model registry (catalog authority + name heuristic)
2. Discovered model list from models.dev (InputModalities contains 'image')
3. Name heuristic fallback for unknown models

This means custom/ollama/cloud models (kimi-k2, qwen-vl, etc.) are correctly
detected as vision-capable when models.dev reports them with image input
modality — no more manual name matching needed.

* chore: gofmt clipboard_test.go

* fix(imageinput): remove shell injection in the Linux clipboard reader

The Linux clipboard reader built shell commands by concatenating a
clipboard-derived MIME type into `sh -c`:

    exec.Command("sh", "-c", "wl-paste --type "+t+" 2>/dev/null")
    exec.Command("sh", "-c", "xclip ... -t "+t+" -o 2>/dev/null")

`t` comes from `wl-paste --list-types` / `xclip TARGETS` and is only filtered by
`HasPrefix(t, "image/")`, so a hostile clipboard offerer could register a target
like `image/png; rm -rf ~` — it passes the prefix check and then executes
through the shell. A real (if low-likelihood) local code-exec vector.

Drop the shell entirely: every helper now runs via exec.Command(prog, args...)
with the MIME type passed as a discrete argument (matching the existing no-shell
pattern in pdf.go). Stderr is discarded by not assigning it. Factored into
runClipboardStdout + imageMIMETypes helpers.

Test: imageMIMETypes filters to image/* lines and returns even an
injection-shaped type verbatim (safe now that it never reaches a shell).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* test(tools): de-flake TestWriteStdinInterruptTerminatesSession

The test had two Windows-CI flakes that reddened unrelated PRs:

1. It relied on write_stdin's 1000ms yield window being long enough for the
   async SIGKILL + reap to land before asserting the session was no longer
   running. On a loaded runner the reap exceeded that window, so write_stdin
   reported "still running" and the assertion failed. Fix: after terminating,
   wait on session.done deterministically (30s safety timeout that fails loudly
   if the kill genuinely hangs); the common case returns the instant the
   process exits.

2. The SIGKILL'd child had the test's t.TempDir() as its cwd, and Windows may
   not release the directory handle the instant the process is reaped — so
   t.TempDir()'s immediate RemoveAll on cleanup failed with "being used by
   another process". Fix: resilientTempDir retries RemoveAll for up to 5s
   (best-effort; a leaked temp dir never fails the test).

Verified 20x locally; full internal/tools suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-20 19:40:32 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 4.8 96a851df2d feat(tui): transcript polish — left-rule cards, tool-call density, pinned plan (#269)
* feat(tui): unify tool cards onto the left-rule card style

Tool result/running cards were the last transcript surface still drawn as
a full rounded box (╭─ head ─╮ / │ body │ / ╰─ footer ─╯), while specialist
cards (#255) and the reference TUIs (opencode, codex) use a lighter
left-rule card. Mixing two card languages in one transcript reads as
un-designed, so converge tool cards onto the same left-rule shape.

toolCard() now draws a status-tinted "│ " rail down the left edge with the
head on the first line and the status glyph (✓/✗/spinner) right-aligned to
the card edge — no top, right, or bottom borders. The glyph moves out of
toolCardHead onto the rule line.

Width math is preserved: every emitted line is still exactly `width` cells
(the two cells where the right border sat become panel background), and the
inner content budget stays width-4, so the diff/read/bash/grep body
renderers — which assume width-4 — are untouched. The tiny tier keeps its
existing borderless behavior (no leading "│"), so
TestTinyToolCardDropsSideBorders still holds. Click-to-expand/collapse is
unaffected: the toggle attaches to the head line by relative offset, which
is still the first line.

Tests: update TestRunningToolCardShowsHeadAndSpinnerSlot to assert the
left rule (no box corners); add TestToolResultCardRendersAsLeftRule for the
result-card shape + glyph-on-rule; the all-lines-equal-width invariant
(TestToolCardLinesAllSameWidth) is unchanged and still passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* feat(tui): cut tool-call transcript density (paths, auto-approve rows, redundant bodies)

Follow-up to the left-rule card frame in this PR — same surface, the content
inside/around the cards. A run of MCP file ops rendered ~5–7 lines each, with
the same absolute path repeated 3× and the tool name twice. The reference
agents (opencode, codex) collapse a successful call to ~1 line, use
workspace-relative paths, and only surface approval when the user is actually
prompted. Five changes bring tool cards in line:

1. Auto-approved permission rows: the OnPermission handler always recorded the
   audit event but only renders a visible row when the event is noteworthy
   (a real prompt, a deny/cancel, an explicit durable decision, or a sandbox
   block) — not for silent auto-approves. A new permissionEventIsNoteworthy
   predicate gates both the live path (model.go) and the resume rebuild
   (session.go) so resumed sessions match the live view. The session log is
   unchanged — only the rendered row is suppressed.

2. displayPath relativizes a tool card's target to the workspace
   (D:\...\examples\calc\calc.go -> examples/calc/calc.go), falls back to
   ~/... under home, then to …/last-3-segments for external paths. Display
   only; the hyperlink still points at the original absolute path, and the
   path sent to the tool / stored in the session is untouched.

3. A successful call whose output is a one-line confirmation ("Successfully
   created directory …", "Created x (N bytes).") drops its body — the head
   already shows the action, target, and ✓. Narrow verb allowlist; errors and
   multi-line/real output always keep their body.

4. displayPath's external-path tail (…/segments) — folded into (2).

5. One blank line between consecutive tool cards in a turn. Separators were
   only inserted at turn boundaries, so back-to-back cards stacked with no gap
   (the dense "wall"). Tool-card↔tool-card only; specialist cards keep their
   own grouping.

Net: each MCP file op goes from ~5–7 lines to ~1, paths relative, no
auto-approve noise. Tests cover the predicate (suppress auto / keep real
decisions), displayPath (cwd / home / external tail / relative passthrough),
body collapse (confirmation vs real output vs error), and the inter-card
blank. Two existing permission tests updated for the new intent; full
internal/tui suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* feat(tui): pin the plan panel above the composer

The plan panel was injected inline into the scrolling transcript body, so a
streaming turn pushed it up and out of view exactly when it was most useful.
Pin it in the footer, directly above the composer, so it stays visible while
the transcript scrolls underneath.

- footerView renders the pinned plan above the composer; the scrollable frame
  already reserves footer height, so no extra layout plumbing is needed.
- A height budget (pinnedPlanMaxHeight: at most a third of the screen) keeps a
  long plan from crowding out the transcript or the input — when the full panel
  would exceed the budget it collapses to a one-line summary
  (renderPlanSummaryLine: spinner/✓, done/total, current step). Ctrl+P still
  expands, but the budget always wins so the composer stays on screen.
- The two inline-injection sites in transcript_selection.go are removed (the
  panel no longer lives in the body), along with the now-unused planPanelEmitted
  flag.

Tests: full-when-it-fits, collapse-to-summary-when-too-tall, hidden-when-empty,
and footer-renders-plan-above-composer. Existing plan-panel tests unchanged and
green; full internal/tui suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-20 18:58:54 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 4.8 ead2b9239e feat(tui): ? keyboard-shortcut overlay (#271)
Zero has a rich set of chord bindings — Ctrl+T (cycle effort), Ctrl+P (plan
panel), Shift+Tab (permission mode), Ctrl+O/E/F, click-to-drill specialist
cards — but they were invisible: only discoverable by reading the source. The
reference terminal agents all ship a single-key help overlay for exactly this.

Add `?` (pressed on an empty composer) to open a grouped, framed
keyboard-shortcut overlay; `?`/Esc/q/Enter close it, and while it's open every
other key is swallowed so nothing leaks into the hidden input. `?` typed into a
non-empty prompt still inserts a literal "?" — the overlay only opens when the
composer is empty and nothing modal is up.

The binding list (keybinding_help.go) is declarative and curated to match the
real cases in model.go's Update switch. The empty/first-run screen now advertises
"Press ? for keyboard shortcuts · / for commands" so the feature is actually
discoverable.

Tests cover: open-on-empty, literal-? after text, close on each key, key
swallowing while open, the rendered groups/keys, and data well-formedness.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-20 18:57:57 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude Opus 4.8 17e7be2743 fix(tui): give command-info screens real contrast (not flat grey) (#272)
/help, /sessions, /tools, /permissions, /context, /config, /debug, /plan and
the other command-info screens rendered as a wall of dim grey: they were
appended as plain system notes, so renderSystemNote painted every line in the
faintest theme color, and the broken isCommandCardHeading heuristic
mis-styled rows by incidental punctuation (a "|" in the usage flipped a row
between accent-bold and grey at random).

Route them through the styled command-card renderer instead, and give that
renderer structure-aware styling:

- renderCommandOutput (the single choke point for every commandOutput screen)
  and helpText now carry the command-card prefix, so they render as a titled
  card rather than a grey note. The structured text is unchanged — the prefix
  only selects the renderer — so the format tests and the session store stay
  byte-for-byte stable.
- renderCommandCardRow now classifies by structure, not punctuation: a
  non-indented line is a group header (accent bold); an indented "/cmd … -
  desc" row is two-toned (bright command name, muted description); fields and
  bullets render in readable ink instead of faint grey.
- The noise "status: ok"/"status: info" line is dropped; only a real
  warning/blocked status stays (in its tint). Removed the dead
  isCommandCardHeading heuristic.

Tests cover the routing (prefix present), the dropped neutral status, a kept
warning status, and two-tone command rows vs plain field rows.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-20 18:57:20 +05:30
Anandan cf54e2cb0e Add persistent exec command sessions (#267)
* Add persistent exec command sessions

Introduce exec_command and write_stdin tools backed by a shared session manager so long-running shell commands can remain alive and be polled or interrupted across tool calls.

Wire exec_command through the existing shell permission, network prompt, command-prefix approval, sandbox grant scope, specialist manifest, and prompt/documentation paths.

Keep web_fetch limited to public remote HTTP(S) URLs so localhost/private URLs go through shell commands where sandbox network permission applies.

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Fix exec session lifecycle review issues
2026-06-20 14:20:32 +05:30
KRATOS d3e7b89eb0 TUI: live code-streaming preview, theme system, plan/Task transcript dedup (#262)
* tui: live code-streaming preview, theme system, plan/Task dedup

- Live "writing <file>" preview: a long write_file/edit_file/apply_patch
  now streams the code as the model generates it (path + line count + a
  color-coded tail) instead of a frozen spinner. Tool-call argument deltas
  are forwarded zeroruntime -> agent -> TUI (OnToolCallStart/Delta).
- Theme system: auto dark/light detection via a terminal-background probe,
  a /theme [auto|dark|light] command, a refreshed palette, and streaming
  fade auto-disabled on low-color / SSH / tmux terminals.
- Plan/Task transcript dedup: update_plan collapses to a one-line summary
  (the live plan panel owns the detail), and Task delegations render only
  as the specialist card, not also as raw tool-call/result rows -- in both
  the live and resume paths.

Robustness for the streaming preview: tolerate whitespace in tool-call
JSON, extract edit_file's new_string, clear the preview on tool finalize /
cancel / run-end (no stale or duplicate previews; a stale run can't wipe
the active one), color new content green (never red for a leading '-'),
and truncate by display width.

* address M10: keep failed Task delegations on resume

The unconditional Task tool-row skip on resume also hid a Task that failed
before a specialist started (there is no card to replace it). A pre-pass now
collects the tool-call ids that actually started a specialist; the Task
tool-call/result rows are skipped only for those, so a failed delegation and
its error stay visible on resume.

* streaming preview: decode tool-call args incrementally (O(n) not O(n^2))

The live "writing" preview re-scanned the whole accumulated args buffer on
every delta and grew it via string concat, so a large write_file/edit was
quadratic and janked exactly during the long write it targets (M14/L6/L7).

Replace the per-render decode with a streamingDecoder that consumes each
fragment once: it buffers the head until the content value begins (extracting
the path), then decodes the content's JSON-string escapes as they arrive,
keeping only a bounded tail of lines plus a running line count. The view now
reads that pre-computed state in O(tail) per render. Handles whitespace,
escapes split across fragments, \uXXXX, and the closing quote; unit-tested
including byte-by-byte vs whole-buffer equivalence.
2026-06-20 10:52:01 +05:30
KRATOS 9e800b4ffc fix five concurrency/leak bugs (swarm, specialist, oauth, mcp, cron) (#265)
Surfaced by a full-tree audit; each ships a regression test where the
behavior is deterministically testable.

- swarm: deliver a handoff's mailbox note BEFORE registering the new task,
  so a mailbox failure can't leave a phantom pending task in the coordinator.
- specialist: put a foreground sub-agent child in its own process group and
  group-kill on cancel/timeout (+ WaitDelay backstop), so a build/server it
  forked dies with it instead of orphaning.
- oauth: serialize on-demand token refresh per key (keyed mutex) and re-load
  inside the lock, so parallel callers don't each spend the single-use
  refresh token (all but one would otherwise fail at the token endpoint).
- mcp: treat a "source already gone" rename during legacy-token migration as
  success, so a concurrent migrator doesn't wrongly drop an OAuth MCP server.
- cron: claim a due job atomically (advance NextRunAt under the per-job lock)
  before running it, so two schedulers can't double-fire the same job.
2026-06-20 10:39:55 +05:30
KRATOS 7691ff18f9 fix model-discovery fallback + redact opaque Authorization tokens (#266)
Two robustness/security bugs from a full-tree audit, each with a test.

- providermodeldiscovery: when a live /models probe succeeds (200) but its
  model ids don't match the curated catalog, the merge was empty and the whole
  live+curated list was discarded — the picker collapsed to the bare built-in
  set with a misleading "no model ids" error. Now fall back to the curated
  catalog instead of returning an empty list.
- redaction: Authorization / Proxy-Authorization headers carrying an opaque
  token or a custom (non-standard) scheme were not redacted in free text (logs,
  command/diff output, errors, session search), echoing live credentials back
  into model context and rendered output. The scheme is now optional, so any
  credential value is redacted to end-of-line; a recognized scheme name is
  still kept for readability.
2026-06-20 10:39:35 +05:30
KRATOS b0a280eaf6 audit: fix four high-severity concurrency/correctness bugs (#261)
Surfaced by a full-tree audit; all are latent (the suite passed) and live
in race windows / error edges the tests don't exercise. Each ships a
regression test.

- swarm: liveAgents() now counts queued specs, so AdoptOrphans can no longer
  re-dispatch (double-execute) a task whose member is merely waiting for a
  free slot over the concurrency cap.
- cron/hooks/oauth: stale-lock reclaim is now atomic (rename aside, then
  verify-and-restore if it turns out fresh) instead of a blind Remove that
  let two racers both reclaim and hold the lock; also falls through to the
  bounded wait instead of hot-spinning when a reclaim never wins.
- lsp: a dead language-server session is evicted and restarted instead of
  being returned forever, so one server crash no longer permanently breaks
  diagnostics (and spuriously fails self-correct every iteration).
- config: an API-key env var no longer overwrites a same-named
  compatible-transport provider's kind when no base URL is supplied.
2026-06-20 10:38:53 +05:30
KRATOS 1c30f4c117 audit fixes: cron lock, accounting race, O(n²) hot paths, /style wiring (#260)
* audit fixes: cron lock, accounting race, O(n^2) hot paths, /style wiring

Fixes five verified findings from a code audit. Two related findings were already
addressed upstream and three need larger/separate work (noted below).

H-1 cron store: cross-process lock for the read-modify-write.
Two schedulers seeing a job due raced the metadata read-modify-write; fireJob
even documented it ("full atomicity needs file locking"). Adds a per-job O_EXCL
lock (mirroring internal/oauth's pattern, stale-reclaim included) and a Mutate
primitive doing the re-read+modify+write atomically. Update/Remove lock too. The
lock is held only for the millisecond RMW, never across a job's exec.

M-5 specialist accounting: close the check-then-append race.
specialistEventExists (unlocked ReadEvents) + a later AppendEvent let two
finishers (TaskOutput poll vs onExit, even cross-process) both pass the check and
write duplicate stop/usage events. Adds sessions.Store.AppendEventUnlessExists
(check + append atomic under the session lock) and routes the stop and usage
paths through it.

M-2 hooks audit: O(1) sequence via tail read.
append re-read and scanned the whole audit log every call to find the max
sequence (O(n^2) over a session). Reads only the file tail now; multi-process
safe (the log is a shared global file), unlike an in-memory counter which would
collide sequences across processes.

M-4 transcript rehydration: O(n^2) -> O(n).
The three resume/rewind/compact rehydration loops called appendTranscriptRow per
event, each re-scanning every existing row for the keyed-row dedup. A bulk
appendTranscriptRowsDedup builds the key set once; semantics are identical.

M-6 /style: actually shape responses.
The TUI /style command stored a style but never threaded it anywhere. Adds
agent.Options.ResponseStyle, a system-prompt directive for concise/explanatory/
review, and wires m.responseStyle through the run. "balanced" is a no-op (prompt
byte-identical to before).

Already addressed upstream (no change):
- M-1 forked-session double-count: Store.Fork already skips EventUsage events,
  with a comment naming the exact double-count it prevents.
- M-3 lineage O(N^2): Tree already does a single store.List() scan and indexes
  children in memory; no path calls List per node.

Deferred (need larger/separate changes):
- M-7 escalate_model in the TUI needs a ModelSwitcher that builds a provider
  mid-run; registering the tool alone yields a tool that errors on call.
- L-1 MCP SSE reconnect is a stream-lifecycle change (low-likelihood after the
  8 MiB per-event cap).
- L-2 dead-code removal belongs in a dedicated cleanup sweep.

Tests: per-fix unit tests including concurrency (cron Mutate, sessions
AppendEventUnlessExists) under -race; full go test ./... green.

* fix(windows): treat ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED as lock contention (cron + oauth)

The Windows smoke run failed TestMutateIsAtomicUnderConcurrency with
"...lock: Access is denied" (FireCount 19/20). On Windows a concurrent holder's
os.Remove leaves the lock file in a delete-pending state, so an O_EXCL create
races it with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (os.ErrPermission) rather than ErrExist — the
retry loop only treated ErrExist as contention and hard-failed.

Treat os.ErrPermission as contention (retry) in the new cron lock and in the
oauth lock it mirrors (oauth's own concurrent test exposed the same pre-existing
bug under the added load). Unix is unaffected — it returns ErrExist.

* fix: address review — cross-process atomic audit append + AppendRun guard

Addresses the review feedback on this PR.

P1 (blocking): AuditStore.append is now cross-process atomic.
The O(1) tail read observes another process's prior appends, but the read-then-
append was not atomic across processes — two could both read sequence N and write
N+1. Wraps lastSequence()+append in a per-file O_EXCL lock (hooks/lock.go, same
stale-reclaim + Windows ErrPermission handling as cron/oauth); store.mu stays as
the in-process fast path. Adds TestAuditStoreSequenceConcurrent (4 stores x 12
goroutines on one file -> unique dense sequences), which the prior sequential
test could not catch. Walked back the comment that oversold the tail read.

P2: AppendRun no longer resurrects a removed job.
fireJob's AppendRun ran after Mutate released the per-job lock; a Remove in that
window let AppendRun's MkdirAll recreate the dir with an orphaned runs.jsonl.
AppendRun now takes the per-job lock and bails if metadata.json is gone. Adds
TestAppendRunDoesNotResurrectRemovedJob.

P2: lastSequence ReadAt tolerates a short final read.
ReadAt may return io.EOF with n < len(buf) if the file shrank between Stat and
the read; treat EOF as non-fatal and use buf[:n] (matches lastEventSequence).

P3: oauth stale-reclaim no-op removed.
The double os.ReadFile "stale == data" guard compared the file to itself read
twice in a row (always true); staleness is decided by the mtime check, so the
guard is dropped (behavior-preserving).

Tests under -race; cron/hooks/oauth green. A shared filelock helper would DRY the
three near-identical locks — left as a follow-up to avoid churning the
already-green cron/oauth packages here.
2026-06-19 21:11:34 +05:30
Vasanth T b237e9849a feat(tui): sticky plan panel + specialist task cards + task table overlay (#255)
* feat(tui): sticky plan panel + specialist task cards + task table overlay

Three new TUI surfaces that give users live visibility into agent progress
and specialist delegation, so long turns and subagent work never look frozen.

Sticky plan panel (plan_panel.go):
- Pinned between the title bar and transcript body, shows the agent's
  step-by-step plan from the update_plan tool as a live checklist.
- Header with spinner + progress count + elapsed; text progress bar;
  per-step list with status icons (✓ completed, ⠹ in_progress, ○ pending,
  ✗ failed) and individual step timings.
- Auto-collapses to a one-line green summary 30s after completion.
  Ctrl+P toggles expand/collapse.
- Plan state synced from update_plan tool results via CurrentPlan();
  timestamps preserved across the tool's full-replacement updates by
  matching on content.

Specialist cards (specialist_card.go):
- New rowSpecialist transcript row kind; EventSpecialistStart/Stop
  now handled in session.go hydration (previously fell through to
  default and were silently dropped on resume).
- Animated card with spinner + name + task + elapsed + token count +
  tool call count. Blue while running, green when done, red on error.
- specialistTracker tracks live state; Task tool calls/returns are
  intercepted in the OnToolCall/OnToolResult callbacks to start/complete
  tracking and emit card rows.
- Height cache marks running specialist rows unstable so the spinner
  animates.

Task table overlay (task_table.go):
- Ctrl+G toggles a full-width overlay showing all specialists in the
  session as a sortable table: #, Specialist, Task, Status, Time,
  Tokens, Tools.
- Summary bar with running/completed/error counts, total tokens,
  aggregate elapsed.
- Arrow keys navigate rows; Esc closes the overlay.

Tests: plan_panel_test.go (7 tests), specialist_card_test.go (11 tests),
task_table_test.go (8 tests). All existing TUI tests pass.

* fix(update_plan): expose structured nested item schema so models stop sending bad arguments

The plan property's Items schema was omitted because of an outdated comment
claiming the serializer drops nested Properties/Required. The serializer
(propertyToRuntimeMap) already handles them recursively. Without the nested
schema, weaker models guessed the item structure from a text description and
sent malformed arguments, hitting the 4-strike guardrail halt.

Now exposes Items as an object with content (string, required), status (enum),
and notes (string).

* fix(tui): route plan + specialist updates through message sink, not stale closures

The OnToolCall/OnToolResult callbacks captured model by value, so
m.plan.updateFromItems() and m.specialists.start/complete() mutated stale
copies that never reached the live model. Introduced planUpdateMsg,
specialistStartMsg, and specialistCompleteMsg tea.Msg types sent through
runtimeMessageSink, handled in updateModel() where they mutate the live model.

* feat(tui): subchat drill-in for specialist sessions

Enter on a task table row loads the child session's events and swaps the
transcript view to show the subagent's full conversation (user messages,
agent text, tool calls, results). A nav bar at the top shows the specialist
name/task and a back hint. ArrowUp or Esc pops back to the main chat at the
saved scroll position.

- subchat.go: subchatState with enter/exit, renderSubchatNavBar
- transcript_selection.go: transcriptBodyItemsFromRows renders arbitrary
  rows (reuses the same rendering pipeline as the main transcript)
- model.go: Enter on task table row triggers drill-in; ArrowUp/Esc exits;
  transcriptView() short-circuits to child rows when subchat is active

* fix(ci): strip CRLF line endings and BOM from plan_tool_test.go and update_plan.go

gofmt and git diff --check failed on ubuntu CI because PowerShell's
Set-Content wrote UTF-8 with BOM and CRLF. Stripped both to plain LF
without BOM.

* feat(tui): add renderLeftRuleCard helper for borderless specialist cards

* feat(tui): switch specialist cards to left-rule rendering, drop hint line

* feat(tui): add renderSpecialistSummary one-line rollup for specialist cards

* fix(tui): correct slice offset in renderSpecialistSummary and add pluralization test

The muted tail was sliced at summary[len(spinnerView)] but the spinner
sits at byte offset 2 (after the 2-space indent), so the slice cut into
the spinner's UTF-8 continuation bytes and dropped the indent. Slice at
2+len(spinnerView) instead. Also add a test asserting '2 errors' is
present and '2 error' (singular) is absent when two specialists errored.

* refactor(tui): remove task table overlay — cards carry everything now

* feat(tui): render specialist summary line above cards in transcript

* feat(tui): mark specialist card lines as clickable selectable rows

* feat(tui): click specialist card to drill into subchat, Enter as keyboard fallback

* tui: clear selectedSpecialistID after Enter drill-in

Fixes Task 7 review issue: selectedSpecialistID persisted after
Enter drill-in, causing a subsequent Enter to re-drill into the
specialist's subchat instead of submitting the composer. Clear it
immediately after subchat.enter succeeds so the keyboard fallback
is one-shot per click; click re-sets it, so click->Enter still works.

* chore: gofmt model.go + test files

* chore: gitignore .superpowers/ and docs/superpowers/ — local skill artifacts

* fix(tui): remove Enter keyboard fallback for subchat drill-in — mouse click only

* fix(tui): reconcile specialist childSessionID from tool call ID to real session ID on completion

* feat(specialist): add Progress callback field to RunOptions and TaskRunOptions

* feat(specialist): stream child stdout line-by-line via Progress callback

* feat(agent): wire OnToolProgress callback for specialist child events

* feat(tui): show live tool-call progress in specialist cards

* fix(swarm): update RunChild mock signature for new progress callback param

* fix(tui): render plan panel inline in transcript, not pinned at top

* chore: gofmt model.go, specialist_card.go, specialist_click_test.go

* fix(tui): address PR review - plan panel without specialists, stream reader safety, resume dedup + payload keys
2026-06-19 20:35:08 +05:30
KRATOS b64a9d3de9 tools: tool_search redirects eager-tool lookups instead of "no tools matched" (#259)
When the model calls tool_search for a tool it already has eagerly (e.g.
select:Task or select:update_plan), resolveExact/noMatchMessage only ever
consulted the DEFERRED set, so it fell through to a misleading
"No tools matched. Available: <deferred tools>". That implies the tool does not
exist, and weaker models (e.g. cloud deepseek/minimax) loop retrying tool_search
instead of just calling the tool.

tool_search now recognizes eager tools (registered, not deferred, passing the
operator filters) and, for a select: or keyword query that names one:
- with no deferred match: redirect — "<tool> is already in your tool list — call
  it directly" instead of "no tools matched";
- mixed with a deferred match: load the deferred tool AND append the note;
- a genuinely-unknown name still gets the honest "no tools matched".

Surgical: only the error/redirect path changed; loading deferred tools is
unchanged. NewToolSearchTool already holds the full registry — it just wasn't
using it to recognize eager tools.

Tests: eager redirect via select: and keyword, mixed load+note, and
unknown-stays-honest; all existing tool_search tests pass.
2026-06-19 20:02:48 +05:30
KRATOS eed61cf8ec tools: defer swarm tool schemas + keyless SearXNG web_search backend (#258)
Two fixes for the raised issues — the idle tool-schema prefix and native web search.

Idle prefix — make the swarm tools deferred-eligible:
- The 7 swarm_* tools are an advanced, rarely-first-move feature the base system
  prompt does not name, so they now implement Deferred() and load on demand via
  tool_search instead of shipping full schemas in the eager per-request prefix.
  Core tools and specialist Task stay eager (no friction on common operations).
- partitionTools keys off the shared tools.IsDeferred check exactly as it does for
  MCP tools, so this reuses the existing, proven mechanism. Measured ~470 fewer
  prompt tokens per request in a swarm-enabled (--auto high) config, with no
  behavioral loss — swarm still works, just loaded when needed.

Web search — keyless SearXNG backend:
- web_search gains a "searxng" provider: ZERO_WEBSEARCH_PROVIDER=searxng with a
  SearXNG URL queries GET /search?format=json with NO API key, parsing the
  {results:[{title,url,content,score}]} shape. Self-host or point at any SearXNG
  instance for native search without baking a shared key or a flaky default.

Tests: swarm tools are deferred-eligible; the SearXNG backend issues the GET, sends
no auth header, maps fields, and respects the limit.
2026-06-19 20:02:26 +05:30
Anandan ac6addaa83 Align sandbox permission blocks and backend states (#253)
* Prompt for shell network permissions

Route network-risk shell calls through the existing permission prompt instead of hard-denying them at sandbox preflight. Approved network prompts apply the current turn/session request-permissions overlay so the effective sandbox policy is widened only after user approval.

Move network command detection into the shell AST analyzer for package installers, gh/git network subcommands, and python http.server so quoted process patterns such as pkill -f "python3 -m http.server 8000" are not misclassified as network activity.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBash|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Auto-allow native-sandboxed shell commands

Remove the old hidden bash auto-allow environment/config path. Ordinary shell commands now use the active native sandbox as the permission boundary by default, while network, destructive, and workspace policy checks still run first.

Policy-only and disabled sandbox backends continue to require approval for shell commands, so unsandboxed execution is not silently allowed.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxedBash|TestShellSandboxActive|TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestAnalyzeCommand|TestClassifyDoesNotFlagQuotedHttpServerPattern'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestBashAuto|TestBashStillPromptsWithoutActiveSandbox|TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicy|TestApplyConfiguredAutonomyCeiling'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/daemon -run 'TestScrubWorkerEnvRemovesReentrancyMarkers'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Prompt for destructive shell approval

Remove the separate DenyDestructiveShell policy layer from active sandbox decisions. Destructive shell classification now produces an approval prompt in ask/auto flows instead of a sandbox hard-deny, while no-approval paths remain blocked.

Drop the removed destructive-shell policy field from sandbox policy output, backend capabilities, snapshots, and Windows golden data.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsForDestructiveShellInsteadOfSandboxDeny|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineClassifiesNetworkAndDestructiveShellCommands|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicy|TestEffectiveSandboxPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/zerocommands -run 'TestSandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicyFillsEffectiveMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove web-tool network policy switch

Remove the old EnforceToolNetwork policy option and the NetworkHostAllowed per-tool gate so sandbox network policy only controls sandboxed shell egress.

Keep web_search and web_fetch on their own tool permission and URL safety paths, with tests proving deny/scoped shell network policy no longer blocks in-process web tools.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromShellNetworkPolicy|TestEngineAllowsNetworkSideEffectWhenShellPolicyBlocksNetwork|TestGrantRequestPermissionsNetworkOverlaysPolicyForTurn|TestScopedNetworkGateInEvaluate'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestWebSearchRunWithSandbox|TestWebFetchRunWithSandbox|TestRegistryRoutesWebFetchThroughSandboxPath'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork|TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Prompt for outside-workspace file access

Convert recoverable outside-workspace file path violations into permission prompts instead of hard-denying in ask/auto modes.

Approved prompts now grant the requested filesystem scope through the existing request_permissions overlay for the current turn or session, so the follow-up sandbox evaluation and scoped file tools use the same policy path.

Keep unsafe mode, apply_patch escapes, symlink traversal, and non-recoverable path cases hard-denied.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDeniesOutOfWorkspacePaths|TestGrantRequestPermissionsReadDoesNotGrantWrite|TestGrantRequestPermissionsSessionPersists'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunPromptsAndAllowsOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunSessionAllowsLaterOutsideWorkspaceWrite|TestRunAppliesSandboxEvenInUnsafeMode'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryAppliesSandboxBeforeToolExecution|TestRegistrySandboxGatesPathAliasKeys|TestRegistryAllowsPromptToolWithPersistentSandboxGrant'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxCheckJSONDeniesOutOfWorkspaceWrite'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix Windows network prompt test fixture

Use a Windows curl.cmd shim and cmd.exe PATH syntax for TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant while keeping the POSIX fake curl fixture for Linux and macOS.

This keeps the test focused on network prompt approval and turn network grants instead of relying on a POSIX shell script being executable on Windows.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent -run 'TestRunApprovedNetworkBashPromptAppliesTurnNetworkGrant|TestRunPersistentCommandPrefixStillPromptsForNetwork'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestClassifyASTCatchesNetworkProgramsRegexMisses|TestClassifyFlagsPipedInstallerVariants'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Remove sandbox autonomy ceilings

Sandbox permission decisions now match grants by tool and scope only, without MaxAutonomy or request autonomy checks. Persistent/session grants, permission approvals, workspace-write auto-allow, and native-sandbox shell auto-allow no longer route through an autonomy ceiling.

Remove the sandbox.maxAutonomy config and CLI surfaces, including grant --auto, policy output, sandbox check autonomy input, and sandbox grant snapshots.

MCP permission autonomy is intentionally unchanged because it is a separate MCP permission model.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/config ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Fail closed without native sandbox

Remove AllowPolicyOnlyRunner from sandbox policy and snapshots. A restricted/managed command plan now errors when native sandbox support is unavailable instead of running through a policy-only direct runner.

Policy-only backend data remains as diagnostics for capability/reporting paths, but it no longer authorizes command execution when a platform sandbox is required.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/cli ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove scoped shell network policy

Drop the domain-scoped shell network mode and the local scoped-egress proxy path from the active sandbox model.

Shell network policy now serializes and evaluates only deny or allow. Request-permissions network grants widen to allow without domain lists, and platform profiles consume the binary mode directly.

The Linux helper no longer accepts proxy-route flags, Windows network hashes only the binary mode, and web tool tests assert they remain separate from shell network policy.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tools ./internal/notify

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Align permission grant ordering and prompt text

Move persistent and session grant matching ahead of recoverable sandbox prompts while keeping explicit denies and non-recoverable path violations fail-closed.

Clean TUI permission transcript/card text so normal prompts show action, reason, scope, and readable block details instead of raw permission/risk/violation key-value metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Remove policy-only sandbox terminology

Replace the unavailable native-backend diagnostic path with explicit unavailable support/backend states, and stop presenting missing native isolation as a policy-only fallback.

Rename structured sandbox denial metadata from violation to block across permission events, stream-json, snapshots, TUI rendering, and sandbox-check output so user-facing flow matches blocked action language.

Update README, work split docs, smoke test selectors, and Windows sandbox policy golden output for the new backend/support names and block payloads.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tools ./internal/tui ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/streamjson

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Fix sandbox review follow-ups

Fail closed for unknown network modes, keep network prompts ahead of bash allow grants, preserve v1 grant-file reads, and classify unparseable commands with obvious network programs as network-risk.

Bump stream-json schema to v2 and document the block metadata field after the violation-to-block rename.

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/streamjson ./internal/specialist ./internal/cli -run 'TestExec.*Stream|TestStreamJSON|TestExecProtocol|TestExecReadsStreamJSONImages|TestExecAcceptsImageOnlyStreamJSONMessage|TestExecInputFormatStreamJSON'

Tests: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tests: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tests: git diff --check
2026-06-19 19:50:12 +05:30
KRATOS 03784268ac token efficiency: lossless cost accounting + minified file reads (read_minified_file) (#256)
* token efficiency: lossless cost accounting + minified file reads

Two complementary improvements to how Zero handles tokens.

ACCOUNTING — make cost measurement lossless and correct:
- Carry all five token dimensions end-to-end (input, cache-read, cache-write,
  output, reasoning) in one Usage; add CacheWriteTokens (cache creation), which
  the Anthropic adapter previously parsed then discarded.
- Price cache-writes at their premium rate (Anthropic 1.25x input, derived per
  model). Regression-safe: a model without the rate bills cache-write at the
  input rate exactly as before.
- Persist cache-read/cache-write/reasoning in EventUsage so `zero usage report`
  reconstructs the SAME cost as the live tracker instead of over-pricing
  cache-heavy sessions. A single EventUsagePayload writer is paired with the
  reader so the JSON keys can't drift.
- Add a live context-window gauge to the status bar (used/window + percent,
  graded green/amber/red) using the last request's input tokens.

REDUCTION — read_minified_file, a dense token-cheap file view:
- New internal/minify package + read_minified_file tool returning a comment-free,
  line-number-free view: Go via the real go/parser AST; C/Java/CSS/SCSS/LESS/
  Python via a string-aware comment lexer (handles strings, char literals,
  triple-quotes, Java text blocks, Python f-strings incl. 3.12 same-quote
  nesting). Every other language falls back to whitespace-only, so the stripper
  can never corrupt content.
- ~32% fewer tokens on a realistic multi-file read; +~102 fixed tokens for the
  tool schema, recovered many times over by a single subsystem read.

Tests: cache-write pricing + fallback, lossless persistence round-trip, the
context gauge, comment-stripping golden cases per language (comment-chars in
strings, Java text blocks, Python f-string nesting, CSS has no //), and the
unsupported-language safe fallback. gofmt / vet / build / -race all green.

* specialist: register read_minified_file in the tool registry + read-only sets

Smoke caught TestKnownToolNamesMatchCoreRegistry drifting once read_minified_file
joined the core read-only tools: the specialist tool allowlist (knownToolNames),
the read-only/edit/execute categories, and the read-only auto-approve set did not
list it. It is a read-only companion to read_file, so it belongs alongside
read_file in all of them; updated the default-allowlist test accordingly.
2026-06-19 12:03:07 +05:30
KRATOS d739181951 tui: live working status (elapsed) + streaming reasoning preview so long turns never look frozen (#254)
* tui: live working status + streaming reasoning preview so long turns never look frozen

A long model stream or reasoning phase made the TUI look stuck: once partial text
streamed only a static cursor showed; during a think, just a static "Thinking"
header; and there was no elapsed time anywhere. On slow turns the user couldn't
tell whether the agent was working or hung.

- Always-on working status line: animated spinner + rotating verb + live elapsed
  ("8s", "1m04s"), rendered on every pending frame — including once partial text
  has streamed. The spinner tick is time-based (~80ms), so the elapsed clock keeps
  advancing even when the upstream goes silent mid-stream. Provider-agnostic.

- Live reasoning preview: during a think (before any answer text) the last 1-2
  lines of the streaming reasoning are shown dimmed beneath the working line,
  tail-truncated so a single growing reasoning line still visibly moves as tokens
  arrive. Skipped when the reasoning block is expanded (the full body shows).

Tests: formatWorkingElapsed, previewTail, interim block shows the working line with
streamed text, shows the reasoning preview while thinking, no duplicate preview when
expanded; updated the one reasoning-elapsed clock test for the extra turn-start stamp.

* tui: centralize run-start state in beginRun so spec-mode runs get the elapsed clock

Review follow-up (#254): the /spec draft and implementation launch paths set
pending and started the spinner but never set turnStartedAt, so the new working
status line showed the spinner/verb but no live elapsed time on spec runs (and
the draft path also skipped the working-verb reset the others did).

Extract beginRun(cancel) — runID++, activeRunID, runCancel, pending, turnStartedAt,
and the working-verb reset — and call it from all three launch paths (normal
prompt + spec draft + spec impl) so run-start state can no longer drift.

Test: TestSpecLaunchesSeedElapsedClock asserts both spec launches seed turnStartedAt.
2026-06-19 07:24:49 +05:30
Vasanth T ab3d09d78e feat(oauth): Hugging Face + ChatGPT Codex as first-class built-in OAuth presets (#245)
* feat(oauth): add Hugging Face + ChatGPT Codex as first-class built-in OAuth providers

Adds two new built-in OAuth presets that round out the existing OpenRouter and
xAI surfaces, so the TUI `/provider` OAuth chooser and `zero auth login` work
out of the box for these providers.

Hugging Face
- Preset scopes, endpoints, and OIDC issuer are pre-filled; the operator
  supplies a "public" OAuth client_id (no secret) via
  `ZERO_OAUTH_HUGGINGFACE_CLIENT_ID` after registering an app at
  huggingface.co/settings/applications/new.
- Default flow is RFC 8628 device code, so headless/SSH is the first-class
  path (matches the existing xAI posture).
- The bearer works against the OpenAI-compatible Inference Providers router
  at `https://router.huggingface.co/v1` for hundreds of OSS models.

ChatGPT (Codex backend)
- Uses the publicly-shipped Codex CLI client identity
  (`app_EMoamEEZ73f0CkXaXp7hrann`), opt-in via `ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1`,
  overridable via `ZERO_OAUTH_CHATGPT_*`.
- The bespoke `provideroauth.ChatGPTLogin` extracts the `chatgpt_account_id`
  claim from the OIDC ID token (added as `IDToken` on the `oauth.Token`
  struct) and stores it on `Token.Account` so the Codex provider can inject
  it as a header on every request.
- A new `internal/providers/openai/codex.go` wraps the openai provider with
  the Codex-flavored request shape: `originator: codex_cli_rs`,
  `chatgpt-account-id: <claim>`, and a branded User-Agent. The factory
  branches off the catalog id (not the provider kind) so other
  openai-compatible providers keep the standard openai path unchanged.
- The openai provider gained a `SetRequestExtra` callback so the Codex
  wrapper can inject per-request headers without coupling the openai
  provider to Codex.

CLI / TUI
- `zero auth chatgpt` is a one-shot login command (analog to
  `zero auth openrouter`); the TUI's OAuth chooser now lists both new
  providers automatically (the list is built from
  `providercatalog.OAuthProviders()`).
- The provider-wizard visible-row cap was bumped from 8 to 10 so the
  common providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Ollama, OpenRouter, the
  new Hugging Face, the new ChatGPT, Groq, …) all fit without scrolling
  the test fixtures.

Tests
- `internal/oauth/presets_test.go`: presets resolve correctly with the
  expected endpoints, scopes, and flows; env overrides win; Hugging Face
  preset stays inert without a client_id (the safety posture the existing
  xAI tests assert).
- `internal/providercatalog/oauth_test.go` + `catalog_test.go`: catalog
  now exposes 4 OAuth providers (`openrouter`, `huggingface`, `chatgpt`,
  `xai`); the `chatgpt` descriptor is `OAuth=true` with
  `OAuthDeviceFlow=false` (Codex is loopback-only) and `RequiresAuth=true`
  via an inline IIFE that sets it after the openAICompat helper.
- `internal/provideroauth/chatgpt_test.go`: ID-token claim extraction
  round-trips (happy path, missing claim, missing token, tampered JWS,
  non-string claim); the full login flow runs against a stub auth server
  and verifies the preset's client_id reaches the token endpoint.
- `internal/providers/openai/codex_test.go`: every request gets the three
  Codex headers; the 401-refresh retry path keeps them on the second
  attempt; configured baseURL wins; default originator is `codex_cli_rs`;
  branded User-Agent wins over the openai default; AccountResolver is
  consulted when AccountID is empty; the header is omitted when the
  resolver says no.

Out of scope (separate PRs): multi-account / profiles, generic
template-driven OAuth wizard, MCP / provider OAuth store unification,
subscription-proxy autoconfig.

* fix(ci): gofmt chatgpt_test.go and provider_wizard.go

The ubuntu smoke job's "Check formatting" step lists these two files as
unformatted (struct field alignment). The local gofmt run on Windows
also lists ~170 other files, but those are CRLF-vs-LF noise from
checkout and not real gofmt issues on Linux; the CI only flags the
two struct-alignment changes below.

- internal/provideroauth/chatgpt_test.go: align chatgptTestServer fields
- internal/tui/provider_wizard.go: align ChatGPTOptions literal fields

* fix(codex): hit the /responses path and resolve account id per request

Addresses the two findings in anandh8x's CHANGES_REQUESTED review on #245.

The Codex provider previously routed the chat-completions body to
{baseURL}/chat/completions, which is not the path the Codex backend serves
(chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/responses, the Responses API). Add an
Endpoint field to openai.Options so a flavor can target a sibling path on
the same host; the Codex constructor sets it to {baseURL}/responses and
falls back to the openai transport unchanged for everything else.

The factory was also passing the OAuth token's Account field as a static
AccountID at construction time. A refresh that rotates the token (and
its account claim) would leave a stale value on the wire. Drop the
static AccountID from the factory wiring; the per-request
AccountResolver (which reads the live store) is now the sole source, so
a refresh takes effect on the next outgoing request.

Tests:
- codex_test.go: handler mounted on /responses; expected path updated;
  TestCodexProviderResolverIsConsultedOnEveryRequest pins the per-request
  resolver behavior (a refresh-style sequence of calls picks up the new
  account id on the second attempt).
- factory_test.go: expected request path updated to /responses.

* Addresses the Codex path shape on /responses.

The previous fix (2381197) corrected the URL and the per-request account
resolver, but the Codex provider still spoke chat-completions: it sent
{model, messages, tools, stream, stream_options, max_completion_tokens}
to /responses and parsed data: [DONE]-terminated SSE frames
(choices[].delta). The Codex backend at chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex
serves the Responses API — input items, function_call /
function_call_output, response.output_text.delta /
response.function_call_arguments.delta events — and rejects a
chat-completions body.

The Codex provider now has its own request/stream path that matches the
Responses schema:

- internal/providers/openai/codex_responses.go (new) holds the wire
  types (responsesRequest, inputItem, contentItem, responsesTool,
  responsesEvent, itemPayload, responsePayload, usagePayload), the
  request builder (system → message/role=system, user/assistant →
  message with text or content parts, prior tool calls → function_call,
  tool results → function_call_output, tools → responsesTool), the
  Responses SSE dispatcher, the tool-call accumulator
  (response.output_item.added registers the call id + name, the
  argument deltas accumulate, response.output_item.done finalizes),
  and the terminal-event handler (response.completed emits usage +
  done, response.failed surfaces the error after the usage chunk so
  token accounting is preserved).

- internal/providers/openai/codex.go: StreamCompletion now marshals a
  Responses request and dispatches via the new streamResponses
  function. The wrapped openai Provider is still constructed for its
  validated endpoint / auth / retry / idle-timeout config and its
  SetRequestExtra callback, but the openai chat-completions stream
  parser is no longer used for Codex. injectCodexHeaders still runs
  on every attempt (including the 401-refresh retry) so the Codex
  headers stay attached to the rotated bearer.

The shared providerio plumbing (auth + 401-retry, SSE scanner with
the idle watchdog, error humanization, secret redaction) is reused
verbatim so the OAuth 401-refresh and bearer-rotation paths stay
identical to the rest of the openai-compatible surface. The
stream-end fallback surfaces a StreamEventDone with
FinishReasonLength when the Codex backend closes the stream without
a response.completed (e.g. an internal truncation), so the runtime
can react instead of hanging on a phantom completion.

Tests:
- internal/providers/openai/codex_test.go:
  - newCodexTestServer now returns a minimal Responses sequence
    (response.created + response.completed); newCodexResponsesServer
    takes a custom payload sequence for richer cases.
  - The two tests with inline handlers (TestCodexProviderResolverIs-
    ConsultedOnEveryRequest, TestCodexProviderRetriesHeadersAfter401)
    use a response.completed payload on the second attempt instead of
    data: [DONE].
  - TestCodexProviderSendsResponsesRequestShape replaces the old
    TestCodexProviderSendsRequestBody and pins the Responses shape:
    the body MUST carry an `input` array of message / function_call
    / function_call_output items and `tools` of function type, and
    MUST NOT carry the chat-completions `messages` field.
  - TestCodexProviderParsesResponsesTextDeltas: response.output_text.
    delta events surface as StreamEventText in order, the
    response.completed usage chunk surfaces as StreamEventUsage
    (with input_tokens, output_tokens, cached_input_tokens, and
    reasoning_tokens from the optional details blocks), and
    StreamEventDone follows.
  - TestCodexProviderParsesResponsesToolCalls:
    response.output_item.added emits StreamEventToolCallStart with
    the right name, response.function_call_arguments.delta events
    emit StreamEventToolCallDelta in order, response.output_item.done
    emits StreamEventToolCallEnd.
  - TestCodexProviderSendsAssistantToolCallsAsInputItems: a runtime
    message with content + tool_calls serializes as BOTH the
    assistant message and a function_call item; a tool result
    serializes as a function_call_output. The expected count is 5
    items (user + assistant text + function_call + function_call_
    output + user) — earlier this test had 4, which would have
    missed the assistant message before the function_call.
  - TestCodexProviderEmitsErrorOnResponseErrorEvent: a response.error
    event surfaces as a single StreamEventError with the server's
    message and stops the scan.
  - TestCodexProviderEmitsErrorOnMalformedStream: a payload that
    parses as JSON but lacks the `type` field is reported as a
    stream error rather than silently dropped.
  - TestCodexProviderEmitsLengthFinishWhenStreamEndsWithout-
    Completion: a stream that closes without a response.completed
    surfaces a StreamEventDone with FinishReasonLength.

Verification:
- `go build ./...` clean (with the user-owned untracked files moved
  aside per the project's working-tree convention).
- `go vet ./internal/providers/...` clean.
- `go test ./internal/providers/... ./internal/providercatalog/...
  ./internal/provideroauth/... ./internal/oauth/...` PASS.
- `gofmt -l` on the three changed files clean.
2026-06-19 07:23:53 +05:30
Anandan 673fce11bd Persist command prefix approvals (#252)
Add file-backed command prefix grants to the sandbox store and load them through the engine so approved prefixes skip future prompts while still running through sandbox policy checks.

Tighten reusable prefix validation for runner-style launchers and script paths, and classify find -delete as destructive.

Surface persistent prefix choices in the TUI and include approved prefixes in the run prompt context and sandbox grants list.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/cli

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-18 21:56:24 +05:30
Anandan f00e83a5ed Add session command prefix approvals (#250)
Bash permission prompts can now expose a validated session-scoped prefix approval. Prefixes are parsed from simple shell commands or an explicit prefix_rule argument, with redirects, control operators, assignments, expansions, globs, and broad launcher prefixes rejected before the option is shown.

Approved prefixes are stored in the session sandbox engine and only skip future matching bash prompts; commands still execute through the existing sandbox backend.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/sandbox ./internal/tui ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-18 21:00:13 +05:30
KRATOS 1f92b25e8c sessions: make the events log authoritative for sequencing + fsync checkpoints/rewind (#251)
Two data-integrity gaps in the session store:

1. Sequence numbers were derived from metadata.EventCount, which is persisted
   AFTER the event line (a separate file). A crash between the two writes left
   EventCount behind the log, so the next append reused a sequence number -- a
   duplicate id that mis-targets /rewind (findRewindTarget returns the first
   match). Now the next sequence is derived from the events log itself
   (lastEventSequence, an O(1) tail read that ignores a torn trailing partial),
   so a stale/desynced EventCount can never cause a reused number; it falls back
   to the metadata count only if the log is unreadable.

2. Checkpoint blobs and rewind restores used plain WriteFile+Rename with no
   fsync, while session metadata fsyncs the temp file AND the parent dir -- so
   the /rewind safety net and restored workspace files were not crash-durable.
   They now go through the same writeFileSync + syncDir barrier
   (writeFileAtomicSync), preserving the exact-perm chmod on restore.

Tests: stale-low metadata -> no duplicate (the reported repro); stale-high ->
benign gap; lastEventSequence over empty / multi / torn-tail / large-event logs.
2026-06-18 20:58:26 +05:30
KRATOS a4279662b9 redaction: catch compound secret keys + non-bearer auth schemes; stop scanner over-redaction (#249)
* redaction: catch compound secret keys + non-bearer auth schemes; stop scanner over-redaction

Hardens the secret-redaction last line of defense after an audit of
internal/redaction + internal/secrets.

1. Compound secret keys are now redacted. IsSensitiveKey was exact-match only, so
   db_password, session_secret, stripe_secret_key, auth_token, csrf_token,
   ssh_private_key, backup_api_key, etc. passed through in cleartext. A new
   keyLooksSensitive applies conservative structural heuristics (secret /
   password / passphrase / credential / apikey segments; a singular trailing
   "_token"; api_key / private_key pairs). Critically, the agent's token-COUNT
   fields (max_tokens, prompt_tokens, token_count) and ordinary *_key fields
   (primary_key, public_key, cache_key) are deliberately NOT redacted.

2. Authorization headers with non-bearer/basic schemes were leaking. The header
   pattern now also covers token, apikey, digest, negotiate, oauth, and
   aws4-hmac-sha256.

3. The secrets scanner over-redacted ordinary text: its prefixed patterns (sk-,
   gh*, AIza, AKIA, xox, github_pat, jwt) lacked the word boundaries that
   internal/redaction already uses, so kebab-case words like
   "task-management-and-coordination" matched as a fake key. Added \b anchors.

Design note: a free-text "key: value" colon pattern was prototyped but dropped --
it mangled "file.go:line: message" output (a filename's "secret" segment looked
like a sensitive key), the same over-redaction class fix #3 addresses. The
structured paths (RedactValue for maps/structs, plus assign/JSON/query forms in
RedactString) are covered; free-text colon-form remains out of scope.

Tests: compound-key + token-count-safety matrix, auth-scheme redaction, the
file:line guard, and scanner boundary positives/negatives.

* redaction: redact the full auth-header value for multi-part schemes

The broadened header pattern captured only the first token after the scheme, so
parameterized schemes (Digest "…, response=…", AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 "…, Signature=…")
left the actual secret param visible. Redact the entire value to end of line; the
scheme name is kept. Adds tests with realistic Digest + AWS SigV4 headers.

Addresses review feedback.
2026-06-18 20:01:25 +05:30
Anandan 2cf6fd2334 Add request permissions flow (#248)
* Add request permissions flow

Adds a runtime-handled request_permissions tool that can ask for turn or session filesystem/network grants and return the granted profile as structured JSON.

Temporary turn grants update the shared sandbox scope and effective policy, then clean up at run end; session grants persist in memory for the session.

Read grants now stay read-only through tool path resolution, policy evaluation, and native sandbox profile construction.

The TUI renders request_permissions with grant-specific choices, including strict review, and Esc continues without granting permissions.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Align request permission grants with prompts

Display and return the normalized grant roots that the sandbox actually applies, so file-like permission requests no longer show a narrower path than the directory root being granted.

Also makes the network prompt explicit about all outbound access and relabels the strict option as a model review request instead of implying enforced command review.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Retry transient OAuth secret read locks

Windows can briefly deny reads of the freshly published token secret while concurrent OAuth secret creation converges. Treat Windows sharing and lock violations as transient and retry those reads before returning an error.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/oauth

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go test -c ./internal/oauth -o /tmp/zero-oauth-windows.test.exe

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tui ./internal/tools ./internal/specialist ./internal/oauth

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-18 20:00:35 +05:30
KRATOS 995b9086c7 feat(subagent): proactive specialist delegation + swarm execution fixes (#243)
* feat(subagent): proactive specialist delegation + swarm execution fixes

Fixes:
- Task tool dropped the parent's permission mode, so every delegated
  sub-agent ran at --auto high regardless of the parent. Forward
  PermissionMode so a child never exceeds its parent's authority.
- Swarm members never executed: swarm_spawn accepts agent types
  teammate/subagent, but the launcher looked those up as specialist names
  (only worker/explorer/code-review exist), so every member failed with
  "specialist not found". Run each member from its swarm definition via an
  inline manifest on the executor.

Enhancements:
- Auto-delegation: the orchestrator system prompt now lists the available
  specialists and when to use each, nudging it to offload read-heavy work to
  a sub-agent so large tool output stays out of the main context.
- @-mention: a leading "@<specialist> <task>" in the TUI composer delegates
  to that specialist (transcript keeps the verbatim mention); the @ palette
  suggests specialists on the first token, file references mid-message.
- swarm.maxTeamSize config caps concurrent members per team (0 => default 8;
  negative rejected), honored in user and project config.
- Proactive spawning: read-only specialists (explorer/code-review) auto-
  approve via a new args-aware tool permission (tools.ArgsPermissioner), so
  the agent delegates exploration off a normal prompt without an approval
  prompt; write-capable specialists, resume, and unknown names still prompt.
  The exec gate registers specialist tools at medium/high autonomy so a
  non-trivial headless run can auto-delegate read-only too.

* fix(specialist): fail-safe child autonomy when PermissionMode is unset

specialistAutonomy mapped an empty PermissionMode to "--auto high" (unsafe),
silently re-introducing the privilege escalation the rest of this PR fixes: an
orchestrator that forgets to wire PermissionMode would get an unsafe child. The
Task tool and swarm both now propagate a resolved mode, so "" only occurs for a
caller that omitted it -- default that case to "low".

Only an explicit unsafe parent now yields --auto high; everything else (incl.
unset/unknown) is fail-safe low. Updates the stale "back-compat" comments and the
tests that documented the old behavior.

Addresses the non-blocking follow-up from PR review.
2026-06-18 20:00:12 +05:30
KRATOS 4582727f95 tui: image-input UX — drag-drop attach, inline numbered chips, vision fallback, cursor + copy fixes (#247)
* tui: image-input UX — drag-drop attach, inline numbered chips, vision fallback, cursor + copy fixes

Improves the image/PDF attachment flow and two long-standing composer papercuts.

- Drag-and-drop: dropping an image/PDF onto the composer attaches it instead of
  erroring as an unknown "/…" command. The dropped path is detected on paste and
  on submit (absolute/escaped/quoted paths to an existing image or PDF).
- Inline numbered chips: staged attachments render as compact [Image #1] /
  [Doc #1] chips INSIDE the input box; the verbose "Attached … (image/png)"
  system line is dropped. Backspace on an empty composer removes the last chip
  (/image clear still drops all).
- Vision fallback: a real multimodal model absent from the curated catalog
  (custom / openai-compatible / local ids) now accepts images via a conservative
  name match; text-only ids stay refused, and the catalog stays authoritative.
- Blinking composer cursor, including when the box is empty (previously no caret
  was drawn for a focused, empty box).
- Ctrl+E releases/recaptures the mouse so native drag-select + copy works (mouse
  capture otherwise intercepts terminal text selection).

Tests: dropped-path detection, vision-by-name + unknown-model fallback,
mouse-release capture toggle, attachment removal, and updated chip-render tests.

* fix(vision): a "vision-less" model name must not match the bare-vision fallback

visionCapableByName treated any id containing "vision" as multimodal, so a model
named "...vision-less..." (i.e. WITHOUT vision) was wrongly classified vision-
capable — which silently skipped the non-vision image gate and broke
TestRunExecDropsImagesOnNonVisionModelWithWarning in internal/cli.

Add mentionsVision, which still matches the "vision" word but excludes the
negated forms (vision-less / visionless / no-vision / non-vision). Used for both
the grok-vision and the general open-multimodal fallback. Added negation cases to
the name table.

* fix(tui): drag-drop path detection corrupted Windows paths (backslash unescape)

unescapeDroppedPath stripped backslashes to undo Unix terminal drag-drop escaping
("\ " -> " "), but on Windows the backslash is the path separator, so a plain
dropped path like C:\Users\x\file.png became C:Usersxfile.png and never resolved
-- TestDroppedAttachmentPath failed on windows-latest.

No-op the unescape on Windows (dropped paths there arrive quoted or plain), and
gate the Unix-only backslash-escaped positive case behind runtime.GOOS.
2026-06-18 19:42:29 +05:30
KRATOS b903825139 perf(tools): lower default deferThreshold to stop eager MCP-schema token waste (#241)
* perf(tools): lower default deferThreshold 10 -> 3 to stop eager MCP-schema waste

MCP tool schemas are only collapsed into compact tool_search reminder lines once
the deferred-eligible tool count reaches tools.deferThreshold. The default of 10
meant a typical single MCP server (Exa-style, a handful of tools) stayed BELOW it,
so every full MCP schema — 300-600 tokens each — was re-sent on every turn, even
for a one-word message. A small MCP set could add several thousand input tokens
per message.

Lower the default to 3 so a normal MCP server's toolset defers and stays cheap.
Capability is unchanged: every tool is still reachable; the model just loads a
deferred tool's schema via tool_search before its first use, after which it is
loaded for the rest of the run. Fully overridable via tools.deferThreshold
(0 keeps the old always-eager behavior for models without tool_search).

* test(agent): measure the deferral token saving (66% smaller tool payload)

* fix(tokens): count non-whitespace bytes so estimates match the real tokenizer

The token estimate was naive len/4, which overcounted by ~15-20%: `zero context`
reported ~6k for a prompt the provider's tokenizer actually counted as 5,203.
BPE tokenizers (the ones zero targets) fold a run's leading space into the
following token rather than emitting whitespace separately, so counting
NON-whitespace bytes / 4 tracks the real count closely (now ~5.2k, ~1% off the
measured 5,203) while staying dependency-free.

Add agent.ApproxTextTokens and route the context-budget preview
(contextreport), the compaction threshold (agent), and the TUI transcript
estimate through it so every surface uses one accurate scale. The provider's
exact usage is still authoritative on each request; this only sharpens the
pre-request preview and compaction timing.
2026-06-18 19:41:36 +05:30
Anandan eb608741b0 Align permission prompt rendering (#246)
* Align permission prompt rendering

Remove normal permission prompt risk labels from focused cards, transcript rows, and permission detail text so risk metadata is not presented as the permission UI contract.

Rename the recoverable deny option from a redirect-style prompt to a continue-without-running label that matches its current behavior.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui ./internal/agent ./internal/cli

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Tighten permission prompt fallbacks

Use conservative allow/deny choices when a permission request lacks backend-supplied decisions, avoiding impossible session or persistent grant options.

Document that a failed session-grant recording attempt must not deny the current user-approved tool call; it only means a later matching call prompts again.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui ./internal/agent

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Split permission deny and cancel decisions

Add an explicit cancel permission decision that aborts the active run while keeping deny as a recoverable tool refusal.

Expose cancel choices for command and apply-patch approval prompts, keep apply-patch off the recoverable deny path, and stop offering persistent always approvals for command/apply-patch prompts until scoped prefix approval exists.

Classify cancel decisions as permission-decision events for TUI session logs and exec JSON output.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tui ./internal/cli

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Stabilize OAuth secret creation

Publish encrypted OAuth token secrets atomically under a short-lived creation lock so concurrent first-run callers never observe a half-written secret file.

This fixes the Zero Review failure in TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges.

Tested: go test ./internal/oauth -run TestLoadOrCreateSecretConcurrentConverges -count=100

Tested: go test ./internal/oauth

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/agent ./internal/tui ./internal/cli

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-18 16:53:20 +05:30
Anandan 2d62387e08 Align permission session approvals (#244)
* Align permission session approvals

Add in-memory session grants, workspace-write auto-allow for built-in file mutation tools, and dynamic permission choices for once/session/future approvals.

Persist future approvals only when a grant store is configured, while keeping session approvals scoped to the active engine.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Guard workspace write auto-allow

Exclude protected workspace metadata from built-in file-tool auto-allow so writes under .git, .zero, and .agents re-prompt instead of silently running.

Derive apply_patch targets from patch headers inside the sandbox engine so patch-body escapes and symlink traversal are denied before workspace auto-allow.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools|TestEngineDoesNotAutoAllowProtectedMetadataWrites|TestEngineDeniesApplyPatchEscapesFromPatchBody|TestEngineSessionGrantDoesNotMatchSiblingFile|TestEngineDeniesAutoAllowedSymlinkEscape|TestEngineDeniesWorkspaceSymlinkTraversal|TestDeriveScope'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/agent ./internal/tui ./internal/tools

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-18 14:54:00 +05:30
Anandan a1b9bbb07c Align permission prompts for web tools (#242)
Treat hosted web_search as an allowed read-only network discovery tool so normal searches do not stop on a permission prompt, while retaining sandbox network enforcement when tool-network policy is enabled.

Add host-scoped persistent grants for web_fetch URLs so an always-allow decision is bounded to the requested host instead of becoming a blanket tool-wide fetch grant.

Update permission prompt and transcript rendering to show network targets, scoped always labels, and preserved scope metadata across live rows, render caching, and session hydration.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...
2026-06-18 13:45:49 +05:30
Anandan 4cb1f10952 Add sandbox architecture baseline (#240)
* Add sandbox architecture baseline

Record target backend names, enforcement metadata, legacy sandbox entrypoints, and policy JSON baseline coverage for the sandbox rewrite.

Add a focused sandbox smoke script with cross-platform compile checks and an opt-in real backend smoke path.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestTargetBackendForPlatformBaseline|TestLegacySandboxEntrypointsAreExplicitAndExist|TestBackendPlanCarriesPhase0ManagerFields|TestCommandPlanCarriesSandboxMetadata|TestPolicyOnlyDisabledFailClosedForTargetPlatforms|TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback|TestBackendBuildPlanDocumentsBestEffortIsolation|TestBackendCapabilitiesReflectDisabledPolicy'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicyInspectTextAndJSON|TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields|TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Introduce sandbox manager and permission profile

Add a normalized permission profile and sandbox manager execution request that owns target backend selection, enforcement metadata, and fail-closed validation.

Route command planning and sandbox policy output through the manager boundary while keeping legacy adapters explicit as temporary integration points.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestPermissionProfileFromPolicyBuildsWorkspaceWriteProfile|TestPermissionProfileFromDisabledPolicyDoesNotRequirePlatformSandbox|TestSandboxManagerBuildsExecutionRequestFromProfile|TestSandboxManagerFailsClosedWhenNativeRequiredAndPolicyOnlyDisabled|TestTargetBackendForPlatformBaseline|TestBackendPlanCarriesPhase0ManagerFields|TestCommandPlanCarriesSandboxMetadata|TestPolicyOnlyDisabledFailClosedForTargetPlatforms'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicyInspectTextAndJSON|TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields|TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tools -run 'TestRegistryRunsBashThroughSandboxEngine|TestBashToolReportsDisabledPolicyOnlyRunner|TestBashToolBuildsWrappedSandboxExecCommand'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Move sandbox backend selection into manager

Make SandboxManager own platform backend selection and keep SelectBackend as a compatibility shim for existing CLI and TUI wiring.

Add tests proving manager-owned selection and the compatibility wrapper agree.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxManagerSelectsPlatformBackend|TestSelectBackendDelegatesToSandboxManagerSelection|TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback|TestLegacySandboxEntrypointsAreExplicitAndExist|TestSandboxManagerBuildsExecutionRequestFromProfile|TestSandboxManagerFailsClosedWhenNativeRequiredAndPolicyOnlyDisabled'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Route command planning through sandbox manager

Make SandboxManager build command plans from sandbox execution requests, with backend-specific wrapping isolated behind a temporary adapter.

Move Engine.BuildCommandPlan to a single manager boundary and mark buildLegacyCommandPlan as the explicit delete target for later backend work.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestSandboxManagerBuildsCommandPlanThroughTemporaryAdapter|TestSandboxManagerBuildsDegradedPolicyOnlyCommandPlan|TestBuildCommandPlanWrapsBubblewrap|TestBuildCommandPlanWrapsSandboxExec|TestBuildCommandPlanUsesPolicyOnlyFallback|TestBuildCommandPlanCanRejectPolicyOnlyFallback|TestLegacySandboxEntrypointsAreExplicitAndExist|TestSandboxManagerBuildsExecutionRequestFromProfile|TestSandboxManagerFailsClosedWhenNativeRequiredAndPolicyOnlyDisabled'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Add Linux sandbox helper command boundary

Introduce the zero-linux-sandbox command surface and typed permission-profile argv builder used by the upcoming Linux helper rewrite.

Keep the helper fail-closed until enforcement is wired, and add parser tests plus smoke compilation for the new helper package.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestBuildLinuxSandboxCommandArgsSerializesPermissionProfile|TestParseLinuxSandboxHelperArgs|TestRunLinuxSandboxHelperFailsClosedUntilEnforcementIsWired'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Fix sandbox policy golden path aliases

Normalize both original and symlink-resolved temp paths before comparing sandbox policy JSON goldens, so macOS /private/var aliases do not fail the smoke job.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields|TestRunSandboxPolicyInspectTextAndJSON|TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Fix Windows sandbox smoke test assumptions

Normalize JSON-escaped Windows paths in the sandbox policy golden test and mark the fake bubblewrap backend as Linux in the command metadata test.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields|TestRunSandboxPolicyInspectTextAndJSON|TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestCommandPlanCarriesSandboxMetadata|TestBackendPlanCarriesPhase0ManagerFields|TestPolicyOnlyDisabledFailClosedForTargetPlatforms'

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

* Stabilize sandbox policy golden test

Compare the Windows sandbox policy golden as decoded JSON after path tokenization so platform-specific byte formatting does not fail smoke tests while preserving the same field-level regression coverage.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli -run 'TestRunSandboxPolicyJSONGoldenIncludesManagerBaselineFields|TestRunSandboxPolicyInspectTextAndJSON|TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveTextAndJSON'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Route Linux sandboxing through helper

Move Linux command planning to invoke zero-linux-sandbox with the permission profile, command cwd, and command argv instead of exposing bubblewrap construction from the runner boundary.

The helper now builds the bubblewrap argv, binds its own executable for the inner stage, applies the seccomp/no-new-privs step before exec, and preserves the original command cwd path.

Package Linux releases with zero-linux-sandbox next to zero so release builds use the helper directly, while local development can fall back to go run for the helper.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli ./internal/tools ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/release ./cmd/zero-release

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Normalize Linux helper cwd test paths

Compare native paths in the helper cwd regression test so Windows smoke does not fail on path separator formatting while preserving the same helper behavior assertion.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run TestLinuxHelperPlanPreservesRealExtraRootCwd

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Add Linux Landlock helper enforcement

Implement the zero-linux-sandbox Landlock helper path with fail-closed profile validation, Landlock filesystem rules, and seccomp network-deny enforcement for the fallback backend.

Broaden the Linux real smoke coverage to cover helper write allow/deny, deny-read, temp writes, metadata protection, network deny, and direct Landlock fallback behavior.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox ./internal/cli ./internal/tools ./internal/release ./cmd/zero-release

Tested: git diff --check

* Route Seatbelt profiles through permission profiles

Build macOS sandbox-exec profiles from the shared PermissionProfile so read roots, write roots, temp access, deny-read, deny-write, and protected metadata are expressed by the platform profile instead of legacy write-root-only inputs.

Keep the existing sandbox-exec adapter path as a compatibility wrapper while adding target macos-seatbelt capability handling.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli ./internal/tools

Tested: git diff --check

* Stabilize Seatbelt write carveouts

Emit protected metadata and read-only write-root carveouts as explicit Seatbelt deny rules after the broad write allow. This preserves deny precedence while avoiding fragile allow-rule predicates in real sandbox-exec runs.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Expand macOS Seatbelt runtime allowances

Restore the platform startup allowances needed by sandbox-exec-wrapped commands under restricted filesystem profiles: executable mapping, system metadata reads, pty/device access, preferences, IPC, and standard library/runtime roots.

This keeps project writes constrained to the PermissionProfile roots while preventing macOS shells from aborting before user commands run.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Normalize Seatbelt deny expectations in tests

Build Seatbelt deny-rule expectations from normalized profile paths so the metadata ordering test matches production behavior on Windows and Unix hosts.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: git diff --check

* Add Windows sandbox runner command planning

Select the windows-restricted-token backend only when the Windows sandbox command runner is discoverable, and keep the missing-runner path as an explicit policy-only downgrade.

Add the Windows runner argument contract for command cwd, workspace roots, permission profile JSON, child environment JSON, restricted-token level, and payload command parsing.

Update sandbox policy output and tests to describe the missing Windows runner instead of an unimplemented adapter.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Add Windows sandbox command runner

Add the zero-windows-command-runner executable and wire windows-restricted-token plans to pass sandbox home, command cwd, workspace roots, permission profile JSON, child env JSON, sandbox level, and command argv.

Persist Windows capability SIDs under the resolved sandbox home, select read-only or writable-root capability SIDs from the permission profile, and create a restricted token before launching the payload with CreateProcessAsUserW.

Package the Windows runner next to zero.exe and extend sandbox smoke coverage to cross-build it.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/release ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner ./cmd/zero-release

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Plan Windows sandbox ACL operations

Derive a deterministic Windows ACL operation list from the restricted permission profile, including writable root allows, protected metadata deny-write entries, explicit deny-write paths, and deny-read materialization targets.

The plan maps workspace and extra writable roots onto the persisted capability SIDs so the elevated setup helper can apply the same contract without reinterpreting the profile.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Add Windows sandbox setup boundary

Add the zero-windows-sandbox-setup command, setup argument parsing, deterministic ACL plan hashing, and a setup marker contract that can detect profile changes requiring refresh.

Make Windows native backend discovery require both the command runner and setup helper, package the setup helper with Windows releases, and include it in sandbox smoke builds.

The setup command remains fail-closed until the Windows ACL applier is wired, so it cannot create a setup-complete marker without applying enforcement.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/release ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Apply Windows sandbox ACL setup

Implement the Windows ACL setup path with grouped native DACL updates, deny-read materialization, existing DACL snapshots, and rollback for partial application failures.

Write the setup marker only after ACL setup succeeds, roll back applied ACLs if marker persistence fails, and make the Windows command runner validate the setup marker before creating the restricted token.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Fail closed for Windows network policies

Add Windows network policy validation that allows only explicit network-allow until native Windows network enforcement is implemented.

Make the Windows command runner reject deny, scoped, and unset network modes before launching a restricted-token process so default network-deny cannot silently run open.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Track Windows network setup state

Add a canonical Windows network-policy hash and persist it in the Windows sandbox setup marker so setup refresh can detect network mode, domain, and proxy-requirement changes.

Bump the setup marker schema and add tests for domain-order normalization plus network-change marker invalidation.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Add sandbox setup CLI command

Add zero sandbox setup to resolve the active sandbox policy, derive the Windows setup helper next to the command runner, and invoke it with the shared Windows setup argument contract.

Return text or JSON setup results, no-op cleanly for non-Windows native backends, and add tests using an injected helper runner.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/cli ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/cli -o /tmp/zero-cli.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test -c ./internal/sandbox -o /tmp/zero-sandbox.test.exe

Tested: GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Stabilize Windows ACL canonical path test

* Add TUI sandbox setup command

* Gate TUI sandbox setup command

* Clarify sandbox doctor setup status

* Add Windows WFP network setup

Adds a Windows network enforcement plan with stable WFP provider, sublayer, and filter specs for deny-mode sandbox identities. The setup helper now installs or removes those filters transactionally before writing the setup marker, and the marker tracks the network enforcement plan so stale filters require refresh.

Scoped Windows network mode remains fail-closed until the proxy exception path is implemented, so it cannot silently become open network.

Diagnostics now report native Windows network enforcement when the restricted-token backend is active.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestValidateWindowsNetworkPolicyAllowsNativeModes|TestValidateWindowsNetworkPolicyFailsClosedForScoped|TestBuildWindowsNetworkPlanForDenyUsesCapabilityIdentity|TestBuildWindowsNetworkPlanFailsClosedForScoped|TestWindowsNetworkPlanHashIsStableAcrossEntryOrder|TestWindowsSandboxSetupMarkerRefreshesWhenNetworkChanges|TestSelectBackendChoosesPlatformAdapterWithFallback'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/cli ./internal/doctor

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --check

* Add Windows sandbox network smoke

Adds a gated Windows real sandbox smoke test that runs the compiled setup helper and command runner, verifies sandboxed writes still work, and proves network=deny blocks a loopback TCP connection from a restricted-token command.

The sandbox smoke script now runs this test on Windows using the helper binaries it builds in its temporary directory.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox -run 'TestValidateWindowsNetworkPolicyAllowsNativeModes|TestBuildWindowsNetworkPlanForDenyUsesCapabilityIdentity'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go test -c -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox.test ./internal/sandbox

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -o /tmp/zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Remove legacy sandbox runner paths

Drop the old direct bubblewrap adapter, the standalone zero-seccomp wrapper, legacy adapter metadata, and the Phase 0 legacy inventory now that command planning goes through the sandbox manager backends.

Switch platform selection and tests to target backend names: linux-bwrap, macos-seatbelt, windows-restricted-token, and explicit policy-only degradation.

Keep policy as the shared permission/profile and diagnostics surface, but stop exposing legacy adapter fields in CLI policy output and tool metadata.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/cli ./internal/tools ./internal/zerocommands ./internal/doctor

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Address sandbox baseline review blockers

Restore sandbox.blockUnixSockets as a resolved config and policy field, route it into the Linux helper as --block-unix-sockets, and keep zero-seccomp as a Linux compatibility wrapper packaged with release artifacts.

Add the missing legacy-entrypoint test referenced by the smoke script, extend helper/release/config tests, and make CLI startup tests hermetic by stubbing MCP registration where they assert quiet output.

Document the compatibility path, release helper scope, and the already-resolved #237 prompt-file overlap in the PR body.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/sandbox ./internal/cli ./internal/config ./internal/release ./cmd/zero-seccomp -run 'TestLegacySandboxEntrypointsAreExplicitAndExist|TestSandboxManagerBuildsCommandPlanThroughLinuxHelper|TestBuildLinuxSandboxCommandArgsSerializesPermissionProfile|TestParseLinuxSandboxHelperArgs|TestBuildLinuxSandboxBwrapArgsWrapsInnerSeccompStage|TestApplyConfiguredSandboxPolicyDiagnosticsFlags|TestResolveSandboxBlockUnixSocketsFromFile|TestCopyPackageFilesStagesLinuxSandboxHelper'

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache scripts/sandbox-smoke.sh

Tested: git diff --cached --check

Tested: local leak scan found no matches
2026-06-18 12:03:10 +05:30
KRATOS c0fedade8d feat: free out-of-the-box web (keyless Firecrawl default) + resilient MCP startup (#239)
* fix(mcp): skip an unreachable MCP server at startup instead of aborting

RegisterTools connected to every server eagerly and failed the whole batch if any
server could not be reached or list its tools — and the caller aborts startup with
exit 1 on that error. So a single unreachable MCP server prevented zero from
launching at all and disabled every other (working) server.

Make registration best-effort across servers but still atomic within a server:
each server's tools are validated as a unit before anything commits, and a server
that cannot be connected, returns a nameless tool, or conflicts is SKIPPED —
recorded on Runtime.Skipped(), not fatal. The caller surfaces each skip as a
warning and keeps launching. The "no dead tools" and no-partial-tool-set
guarantees are preserved.

* feat(mcp): ship keyless Firecrawl as a default web search/scrape server

Seed an enabled-by-default Firecrawl MCP server (keyless: 1,000 free credits/month,
no API key, no setup) into ResolveMCP before user/project config is merged, so web
search and scraping work out of the box for open-source users. A user can override
any field (self-hosted URL, bring-your-own-key header) or disable it entirely;
`zero mcp disable firecrawl` writes the override even though the default lives in
code rather than the config file.

The built-in web_fetch tool stays the always-local floor. Firecrawl is AGPL-3.0,
but zero only calls it over the network, so the license never reaches zero's own
code. README documents disable / self-host / bring-your-own-key / the privacy note
that keyless routes through firecrawl.dev.

Depends on the resilient-startup change: on an offline machine the default is
skipped with a warning, not fatal.

* perf(mcp): connect MCP servers concurrently with a per-server startup timeout

RegisterTools connected servers serially with a 30s handshake timeout, so startup
waited for the SUM of all servers and one slow/unreachable server (e.g. a hosted
endpoint blocked by the local network) blocked every other server AND the first
model response — often 10-30s of dead time per launch.

Connect all servers CONCURRENTLY, each bounded by a per-server ConnectTimeout
(default 8s). A server that doesn't connect+list in time is abandoned (its context
cancelled to tear down the half-open connection/subprocess) and skipped, so total
startup cost is now the slowest REACHABLE server, not the sum. The concurrent
phase does only connect+list (no shared state); validation, conflict detection,
and registration stay in a deterministic serial phase, so the outcome is identical
regardless of completion order. A kept server's context is released at Close — a
stdio subprocess is tied to its context, so it must outlive the connect.

Pairs with the resilient skip-on-failure behavior already in this branch.
2026-06-18 10:50:37 +05:30
Vasanth T 7d66942564 docs: rewrite AGENTS.md as user-facing 'Extending Zero' guide (#237)
* docs: rewrite AGENTS.md as a user-facing 'Extending Zero' guide

The previous AGENTS.md (a 19-line Go-specific instruction set) was replaced
with a user-facing extension guide for Zero as an open-source CLI agent
product. Covers:

- Project-level AGENTS.md (where to drop one, format, tips)
- Custom specialists (droids): scopes, manifest format, CLI
- Skills: discovery, SKILL.md format, ZERO_SKILLS_DIR override
- Hooks: lifecycle events, JSON config locations, exit code semantics
- MCP: as client (config.json mcp.servers) and as server (zero serve --mcp)
- Plugins: plugin.json manifest, install/enable/disable/remove
- Configuration locations: built-in < user < project < CLI < env
- End-to-end example: what a team commits vs what a contributor adds
- Reference links to README and docs/SPECIALISTS.md, docs/PRD.md, etc.

This positions AGENTS.md as the entry point for end users who want to
customize Zero, mirroring the role that similar files play in Claude Code
and Codex.

* docs(AGENTS): align Extending Zero with actual loader behavior + D-style features

Fix six claims that were wrong about Zero itself, document the new
upward path-walking the loader now does, and surface three roadmap
gaps in the relevant sections.

What changed in the doc:
- Section 1 (Drop a project AGENTS.md): rewrote the file table to
  match the real priority order [AGENTS.md, ZERO.md, .zero/AGENTS.md]
  and added the case-insensitive basename callout (git tracks
  AGENTS.MD uppercase on case-sensitive filesystems).
- Section 1: documented the per-file (8 KiB) and total (32 KiB) caps
  and the eager-load + restart-required caveat.
- Section 1: added the monorepo tip and the path-walking explanation
  ("walks from cwd up to git root, general-to-specific order").
- Section 2 (Custom specialists): added a roadmap note about the
  planned /droids in-UI manager.
- Section 3 (Skills): corrected the discovery-root chain
  (ZERO_SKILLS_DIR -> XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills -> ~/.local/share/zero/skills),
  noted that project-level skills aren't supported yet, and called
  out the plugin-declared-skill gap.
- Section 4 (Hooks): roadmap note about the planned /hooks in-UI
  manager.
- Section 6 (Plugins): roadmap note about the planned /plugins in-UI
  manager; cross-link to the skills gap.
- Frontmatter globs broadened to include *.json / *.toml / *.yaml /
  *.yml, matching the actual file types Zero reads.

* feat(agent): make AGENTS.md loader case-insensitive + add path-walking

Two changes to the project guideline loader that bring Zero closer
in line with D's DynamicContextDiscovery and fix a real bug.

1. Case-insensitive basename matching. The git-tracked filename is
   AGENTS.MD (uppercase MD), but the loader was looking for AGENTS.md
   (lowercase md). On a case-sensitive filesystem (Linux, the WSL
   filesystem, or a CI runner) this means the file was invisible to
   the loader. The new findProjectContextFile uses ReadDir + ToLower
   to resolve the on-disk filename and matches AGENTS.MD, Agents.md,
   agents.md, etc. to the same entry. On Windows/macOS the visible
   filename in the prompt label is now the actual on-disk name
   (AGENTS.MD), not the lookup name.

2. Upward path-walking. The loader previously did a single
   first-match-wins lookup at cwd. The new projectGuidelines walks
   from cwd up to the nearest git root, finds the first matching
   project context file at each level, and injects them in
   general-to-specific order (git root first, cwd last). A monorepo
   with a root AGENTS.md and per-service AGENTS.md files now sees
   both, with the most specific rules last. This mirrors what D
   does per-Read on the dynamic path, just at session start.

Cap behavior:
- Per-file cap is unchanged: 8 KiB.
- New total cap of 32 KiB across all matched files, enforced via a
  rolling counter; when the budget is exhausted, further files are
  dropped (and the per-file limit is the lesser of the per-file cap
  and what's left of the total).
- Truncation marker is unchanged: \n… (truncated).

New helpers and tests:
- projectGuidelineDirs / projectGuidelineLabel / findProjectContextFile
  / resolveDirCaseInsensitive / findProjectGitRoot.
- 8 new tests covering case-insensitive matching, monorepo
  path-walking, ZERO.md fallback, .zero/AGENTS.md fallback, total
  cap truncation, and the helper functions.

Existing TestBuildSystemPromptInjectsWorkspaceContext still passes;
the label for a single-file repo is still AGENTS.md / AGENTS.MD as
appropriate to the on-disk name.

* docs(AGENTS): drop syntax that doesn't exist in the current code

Per the review on #237, the previous "Extending Zero" guide documented
several commands, flags, and conventions that the runtime does not
implement. Concretely:

- `zero plugins install` / `enable` / `disable` are not subcommands.
  `runPlugins` (internal/cli/extensions.go) only dispatches
  `list` / `add` / `remove`(`rm`). Replace the example with `add` and
  note that enable/disable are not CLI verbs today (the plugin is
  enabled by being present and disabled by being removed, or by
  setting `"enabled": false` in its manifest).

- `zero specialist create ... --prompt-file api-reviewer.md` is wrong:
  there is no `--prompt-file` flag. `runSpecialistCreate` takes the
  prompt inline via `--prompt`. Show a `$(cat ...)` shell substitution
  as the practical way to load a file, and add `zero specialist path`
  to the example.

- `"Authorization": "Bearer ${env:GITHUB_TOKEN}"` implies env-var
  expansion that does not exist: MCP header values are sent verbatim
  (internal/mcp/permissions.go, client.go mergeProcessEnv). Use a
  literal placeholder and document the three real ways to keep the
  token out of the file (wrapper script, command substitution, server
  reading its own env).

- Hook `args: ["${tool}", "${input}"]` is the same mistake plus a
  shape mismatch: the actual hook payload (event, matcher, tool call
  id, tool input/output, status) is delivered as JSON on stdin
  (internal/hooks/dispatch.go `execCommandRunner`), not via `${...}`
  substitution. Drop the placeholders, add a short bash handler that
  reads stdin, and show the `args` field as verbatim CLI args.

- "use `zero doctor` to surface them" — the doctor backend
  (internal/doctor/doctor.go) has no hook check; its checks are
  runtime / config / provider / connectivity / sandbox / lsp.
  Reword to point at the audit log instead.

Secondary: drop the `globs:` and `alwaysApply:` example and the
"Use globs: to scope which files the rules apply to" tip — the loader
injects the whole file (frontmatter included) as prompt text and does
not parse those keys. Add a one-liner noting the frontmatter is
preserved verbatim. Also drop the parenthetical "(droids)" on
§2 to match the "specialists" terminology the rest of the codebase
(and the CLI) actually use, and reword the §2/§4/§6 roadmaps that
promised in-UI managers via non-existent `/droids`, `/hooks`,
`/plugins` slash commands.
2026-06-18 10:41:36 +05:30
KRATOS 29fc29a41d feat: add providers detect and sandbox check (wire audit-found unwired features) + coverage (#238)
* feat(providers): add `zero providers detect` for local-runtime onboarding

Wire the previously-unwired provideronboarding detect/advice surface into the
CLI. `zero providers detect` probes for running local OpenAI-compatible runtimes
(Ollama, LM Studio) on their default ports and prints a no-key adopt command for
each, followed by the next-step actions (use / check / set key) for every
configured provider. Supports --json.

This connects DetectLocalRuntimes, LocalRuntimeCandidates,
DetectedLocalRuntime.SetupAction, ProviderActions, MissingCredentialAction,
SetupCommand, and ProviderState.Actions — a fully built, tested feature that had
no caller. Adds an injectable detectLocalRuntimes appDep for hermetic tests.

* feat(sandbox): add `zero sandbox check` to evaluate a decision as JSON

Wire the previously-unwired zerocommands sandbox-snapshot contract into the CLI.
`zero sandbox check <tool>` evaluates what the sandbox engine would decide for a
hypothetical tool action against the resolved policy, and emits the active plan
(policy + backend + restrictions), the decision (allow/prompt/deny with risk and
any violation), and any persistent grant matching the tool. Supports --json;
grant reasons are redacted.

This connects SandboxPlanSnapshotFromPlan, SandboxPolicySnapshotFromPolicy,
SandboxBackendSnapshotFromBackend, SandboxDecisionSnapshotFromDecision,
SandboxRiskSnapshotFromRisk, SandboxViolationSnapshotFromViolation, and
SandboxGrantMatchSnapshotFromLookup — a fully built, tested JSON contract that
had no production consumer. The existing `sandbox policy` output is unchanged.

* test(providermodelcatalog): cover model predicates and remote fetch layer

Add targeted tests for the audit-identified coverage gaps: the pure logic
(LooksLikeCodingModelID, modelMatchesProvider, defaultedOpenGatewayURL,
modelSortLabel/sortModels) and the HTTP fetch layer (fetchJSON, FetchModelsDev,
FetchOpenGateway, FetchRemote routing) via httptest. Package coverage 48.9% ->
79.5%. cmd/zero (main shim) and browser.OpenURL (exec wrapper) are intentionally
left to CI smoke — their only logic seams (openCommand) are already covered.

* fix(sandbox): address CodeRabbit review on `sandbox check`

- Pass the configured write-root scope (NewScope with AdditionalWriteRoots) into
  the check engine, so its decision matches real enforcement and a stale
  extra-root config surfaces here too instead of a workspace-only fallback.
- Validate --side-effect and --autonomy against their advertised value sets and
  return a usage error on a typo, rather than letting the engine normalize it.
- Reword the unmatched-grant line to "no grant matched this action" — Lookup only
  checks this tool/scope/autonomy, not whether any grant exists for the tool.
- Add tests: invalid-flag rejection and a matched-grant reason-redaction
  regression.

* test(sandbox): make the out-of-workspace check test path OS-portable

Smoke (windows-latest) failed: "/etc/passwd" is not absolute on Windows, so the
check joined it into the workspace and returned "prompt" instead of "deny".
Build the out-of-workspace path under a separate temp dir so it is absolute and
outside the workspace on every OS.
2026-06-18 10:20:24 +05:30
KRATOS 7c36805505 fix(providers): clear error when a model host is unreachable (#233)
* fix(providers): surface a clear error when a model host is unreachable

A local Ollama daemon serving a "-cloud" model answers on localhost but
returns HTTP 502 carrying an opaque proxied transport error (e.g.
`Post "https://ollama.com:443/...": net/http: TLS handshake timeout`) when it
cannot reach its own cloud backend. A direct hosted endpoint blocked by the
local network fails the same way at the transport layer. Both previously
surfaced as raw strings ("provider error:" / "provider stream error:") that
read like a zero bug and gave the user nothing to act on.

Add providerio.UpstreamUnreachable: it detects a transport-level connectivity
failure (TLS handshake timeout, context deadline exceeded, connection refused,
no such host, network unreachable, i/o timeout) bound to a concrete host and
rewrites it into an actionable message naming the host and explaining the
request never reached the model. It requires both a marker and a host, so the
agent's own request-deadline cancellations are left untouched.

Wire it into the OpenAI-compatible adapter's gateway-error and transport-error
paths, covering both the local daemon proxy and direct hosted providers;
secrets are still redacted. Covered by unit tests over the real error shapes
and an end-to-end 502 adapter test.

* fix(providers): don't humanize a caller-context timeout as an upstream outage

Address CodeRabbit review: in the OpenAI-compatible adapter's transport-error
path, a caller-driven cancel/deadline surfaces as an error string containing
"context deadline exceeded" plus the request host, which UpstreamUnreachable
would mislabel as "upstream unreachable" — the host is reachable; the caller's
clock ran out. Check the parent ctx.Err() first and surface it verbatim, so only
genuine connect failures (ctx still live) are humanized.

Adds a deadline regression test; the existing cancel test used Cancel, whose
"context canceled" is not a marker, so it never covered this path.
2026-06-18 10:19:58 +05:30
922a5bab5f feat(tui): Ctrl+T cycle + divider display for reasoning effort (#229)
* feat(tui): Ctrl+T cycle + divider display for reasoning effort

Reasoning effort was already fully wired (per-model supported lists,
DefaultReasoningEffort, the EffectiveReasoningEffort clamp, /effort and
/mode), but it was invisible in the UI and reachable only by typing a
command. Add the opencode-style one-key fast path:

- Ctrl+T cycles the active model's effort ring (auto -> low -> medium ->
  high -> auto), gated by the same modal condition shift+tab uses and a
  silent no-op on models with no effort controls.
- The composer divider shows the active effort in the brand lime when
  set; the segment is omitted on "auto", so its presence/absence is
  itself the auto-state feedback.

Zero per-frame registry lookups: the cycle runs only on the rare
keypress and the divider branches purely on m.reasoningEffort != ""
(DefaultRegistry rebuilds the whole catalog on every call, so it must
never be touched from the render path).

Tests cover every cycle branch (auto->first, mid-ring advance,
last->auto wrap, unknown->auto, no-op on unsupported model) and the
divider show/omit paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* fix(tui): address CodeRabbit review on Ctrl+T effort cycle

- Block Ctrl+T effort cycling inside the detailed transcript (matches the
  shift+tab gate) so state changes don't happen while the user is reading
  a frozen view.
- Use a guaranteed-unplaceable sentinel in the unknown-effort reset test
  instead of ReasoningEffortMinimal, so the test stays correct if Minimal
  becomes a supported ring level later.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(tui): extract shared noBlockingModal() for shortcut gates

The 7-term modal gate was duplicated verbatim between the shift+tab and
Ctrl+T cases. Fold it into a single noBlockingModal() helper so the two
shortcuts can't drift the day a new modal is added to one and not the
other. Pure refactor, no behavior change.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(tui): hide divider effort segment on models without effort controls

The divider showed whatever m.reasoningEffort was set to, even when the
active model had no effort controls (e.g. gpt-4.1). Switching from
claude-sonnet-4.5 (low/medium/high) to gpt-4.1 would leave a stale
"high" floating in the divider even though it has no effect.

Make the segment selective: only render it when the active model exposes
availableReasoningEfforts, matching the same appearing/disappearing
state feedback the divider already uses for the auto case. The lookup
hits a hard-coded static catalog, not a per-frame rebuild, so it's
safe on the render path.

handleModelCommand already resets an unsupported effort preference on
model switch, so no changes are needed there.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(tui): drop model-aware effort gate in divider; /effort picker already selective

The previous commit added `&& len(m.availableReasoningEfforts()) > 0` to
the divider's effort-segment gate so a stale value couldn't be shown
after switching to a model without effort controls. Reverting that
change: the underlying state mutation is already gated elsewhere
(handleModelCommand clears an unsupported preference on switch, and the
/effort picker only opens for models that actually expose effort
controls), so the divider doesn't need its own check.

The /effort picker (newEffortPicker, pickerEffort kind) is already
fully wired and tested — /effort with no args on a supported model
opens the picker; on a model with no effort controls, the text path
returns "Active model does not expose reasoning effort controls."

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(tui): open effort picker even when active model has no effort controls

Previously newEffortPicker returned nil for any model not in the hard-coded
catalog (e.g. ollama-cloud providers serving glm-5.1 or similar). The
case commandEffort dispatch fell through to handleEffortCommand, which
rendered a grey "Effort / status: warning / available: none for active
model" status card -- the very static panel users were reporting.

Now newEffortPicker always returns a picker: a single "auto" option when
the active model exposes no effort controls, or "auto" plus the model's
known efforts otherwise. handleEffortCommand already returns the "Active
model does not expose reasoning effort controls" message if any
non-auto value is later set, so no other gate is needed.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(tui): render description hint below composer for single slash match

Claude-code-style: when the user types a slash command that resolves to
exactly one command in the autocomplete palette, surface that command's
description on a muted line just below the composer box. Multiple
matches keep the existing dropdown as the right affordance; once the
user starts typing arguments the hint clears; the @file palette keeps
its own rows and the hint stays scoped to slash commands.

The inline argument hint ([low|medium|high|auto]) still renders inside
the composer box after the slash, so both UIs coexist.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(tui): render /effort output as a polished command card

The /effort command used to push its status text through renderCommandOutput,
which renders as a thin grey panel (faint text on panel background, neutral
border). Replace that path with renderCommandCardTranscript so the result
renders the same way as /tools, /mcp, /permissions, etc.: a lime-bordered
titled card with a key/value "State" section and a footer of next-step actions.

Three call sites updated:
- handleEffortCommand("auto") -> sets effort to auto, shows confirmation card
- handleEffortCommand(<value>) -> sets effort, shows confirmation card
- handleEffortCommand(<bad>) -> unknown / unsupported / not exposed -> shows
  the same card with the relevant detail line

effortText() (the no-arg / list / picker-dismiss path) follows the same
pattern. The "status: warning" line and grey panel are gone; the warning
case instead keeps the lime accent and surfaces "no reasoning controls on
this model" in the summary, matching the rest of the TUI's visual language.

Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-18 09:57:04 +05:30
KRATOS 6df5c2b4cb Improve /resume: interactive session picker + model-generated titles (#224)
* tui: interactive /resume session picker + resume fixes

- /resume (no arg) now opens an interactive picker like /model and /provider:
  one row per resumable session showing the title and session id (+ relative
  age); arrow to highlight, type to filter, enter to load. /resume <id> and
  /resume latest still resolve directly.
- Resume now loads the rehydrated (compaction-aware) event view instead of the
  raw log, so a resumed session honors a prior /compact — matching the CLI's
  `zero exec --resume` and the in-TUI /compact reload. Falls back to raw on a
  rehydrate error.
- The resume summary reports the model/provider the continuation will actually
  use (the active ones), noting the session's recorded model/provider when it
  differs, instead of implying a switch that doesn't happen.
- Drop the dead, self-contradictory resumeText(arg) branch (it was unreachable
  and its hint was circular); resumeText is now the no-session/error fallback.

Tests: session picker opens with title+id rows and hydrates on selection;
resume honors prior compaction (rehydrated, not raw events).

* tui: lead /resume picker rows with a precise timestamp

Same-titled sessions (e.g. the same first prompt run several times) looked like
duplicates because the row showed only the identical title plus a long id that
truncated the age away. Lead each row's label with a precise local timestamp
(HH:MM:SS today, "Jan _2 15:04" earlier this year, else the date) so distinct
sessions are obviously distinct; the full id stays as the right-aligned meta and
is what selection resolves. sessionWhen parses the RFC3339 UpdatedAt.

* tui: hide empty/no-output sessions from the /resume picker

Most of a heavily-retried prompt's sessions are empty failed runs — just the
prompt plus the no-output guardrail stop ("Agent stopped … with no output …"),
with no assistant text and no tool calls. They have nothing to resume and flood
the picker with identical-looking rows. Skip any session with no resumable
content (no tool call/result and no real non-user message) from the picker; they
stay on disk and are never deleted. Adds agent.IsNoProgressStop to recognize the
stop message from a recorded event, and a test that the picker hides an empty
run while keeping a real one.

* feat(tui): model-generated session titles (auto + /retitle backfill)

Sessions were titled from their first user message, so prompts that
started the same way (or empty/failed runs) looked identical in the
/resume picker. Generate a concise, specific title with the active
provider instead.

- sessions.Store.UpdateTitle(id, title): rewrites only Title under the
  per-session lock, re-reading the latest metadata first; leaves
  UpdatedAt untouched (a retitle is not activity and must not reorder
  the resumable list), rejects a blank title, and no-ops an unchanged
  one.
- Title generator: a bounded digest of the conversation (user/assistant
  text + tool names, per-message and total caps, skipping the no-output
  guardrail stop) is sent as a one-shot completion; the response is
  cleaned (first content line, quotes/markup/"Title:" label stripped,
  word- and rune-capped) before storing.
- Auto-title going forward: after a successful turn, a session still
  carrying its default first-message title gets a title in the
  background, at most once per session.
- /retitle: backfills existing resumable sessions that still have a
  first-message title, one at a time, skipping empty/failed runs and
  already-named sessions, with kickoff and completion status lines.

Generation runs off the Update goroutine; failures are non-fatal (the
first-message title simply stays). Adds store + TUI unit tests
(UpdateTitle semantics, digest/cleaning, auto-title one-shot, backfill
candidate selection). gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/
staticcheck all green.

* address review: tighten no-progress detection, fix fallback errors + nil guard

Three review findings on the /resume work:

- IsNoProgressStop matched any content CONTAINING the no-output marker
  substring (strings.Contains), so a legitimate assistant/tool message that
  quoted the marker could be misread as a failed empty run — wrongly hiding a
  real session from the /resume picker and skipping its title generation. Now
  it requires the full answer structure (prefix + marker + suffix); a quote no
  longer matches.
- resumeEvents returned the earlier rehydration error when the raw ReadEvents
  fallback itself failed, masking the actual fallback failure. Returns rawErr.
- resumeText dereferenced m.sessionStore unconditionally; a nil store (fallback/
  test paths) would panic. Now renders a safe "store unavailable" message.
  (newSessionPicker already guarded nil.)

Tests: IsNoProgressStop accepts the real answer and rejects a quoting message /
bare marker / prefix- or suffix-only; resumeText with a nil store returns the
safe message instead of panicking. Full gate green.

* address review (Vasanth): structural no-progress check, retryable auto-title, nil-store guard, deep resume assertion

- guardrails: IsNoProgressStop now matches the exact structure noOutputStopAnswer
  emits — prefix + "<int> turns " + marker + " " + suffix — instead of
  prefix && contains(marker) && suffix. A genuine message that merely quotes the
  marker amid other prose is no longer misclassified as a failed empty run (which
  would wrongly hide a real session from /resume and skip its title generation).
  Adds the hostile-input regression cases (quoted marker, text between
  marker/suffix, non-integer turn count).
- session_title: release the optimistic titledSessions gate when a generation
  FAILS (provider error, empty title, store write error) so a later turn or
  /retitle can retry; success keeps the one-shot gate. Kept the optimistic mark
  (rather than mark-on-success) to preserve the no-double-fire guarantee while a
  generation is in flight.
- session_title: guard maybeAutoTitleActiveSession against a nil sessionStore
  (the title cmd calls store.UpdateTitle) — mirrors the resume nil-store guards.
- model_test: assert resumed sessionEvents with reflect.DeepEqual against the
  rehydrated context, not just slice length, so a reordered/substituted-but-
  same-length regression is caught.
2026-06-17 12:41:20 +05:30
KRATOS b7f90a787f tui: right-click pastes the clipboard directly (no menu) (#231)
* fix(tui): right-click pastes the clipboard directly (no menu)

A right-click now pastes the OS clipboard straight into the focused input —
composer, provider/MCP wizard, or setup — with no context menu, mirroring the
bracketed-paste behavior. Keyboard and selection copy/paste are unchanged.

- clipboard.go: pasteFromClipboardCmd reads the clipboard off the Update
  goroutine; routePaste is the shared router for both bracketed paste (PasteMsg)
  and right-click paste (clipboardReadMsg), so the two behave identically.
- mouse.go: a right-click returns pasteFromClipboardCmd; input_compat.go adds the
  mouseRightPress helper.
- model.go: PasteMsg now routes through routePaste; clipboardReadMsg inserts on
  success or shows a brief "Paste failed" status when the clipboard can't be read
  (e.g. no clipboard utility on a remote session).

Tests: right-click returns the read command (chat + wizard), clipboard content
routes to the focused field, read errors surface a status, empty is a no-op.

* fix(tui): right-click paste in setup mode + scope the paste test

Setup mode routes mouse events to handleSetupMouse, which only handled
left-click and wheel — right-clicks were swallowed, so paste never fired
during onboarding. Add the same mouseRightPress -> pasteFromClipboardCmd
branch handleMouse uses; routePaste already targets the setup field.

Test: assert the right-click contract at handleMouse/handleSetupMouse
scope instead of via Update (which batches unrelated commands and masks a
regression), and cover the new setup-mode path.

Addresses review on #231: mouse.go (setup paste, critical) and
clipboard_test.go (weak Update-level assertion, minor).
2026-06-17 11:53:39 +05:30
KRATOS b1cf24831d fix(tui): selectable + clickable permission popup (#232)
The permission prompt now has a moving cursor and clickable options, on top of
the existing a/y/d hotkeys (which still resolve directly):
- ↑/↓ and Tab/Shift+Tab move the highlight across allow once / always / deny
  (resting default: allow once); Enter confirms the highlighted option.
- each option is rendered on its own row, and a left-click on a row resolves
  that choice directly.

- permission_prompt.go: permissionOptions + cursor move/clamp/confirm helpers.
- model.go: pendingPermissionPrompt gains a cursor; Enter confirms it, ↑/↓/Tab
  move it; a/y/d are unchanged.
- rendering.go: renderFocusedPermissionPrompt renders per-option rows with the
  cursor highlighted (▸ + reverse label) and returns each option's card-relative
  Y offset so the caller can register clickable rows.
- transcript_selection.go: transcriptSelectableLine gains permOption/permChoice;
  the pending-permission item registers each option row as clickable, and a
  left-click on one resolves the permission.

Tests: cursor default/move/wrap, Enter confirms the highlight, hotkeys still
resolve directly, render emits highlighted clickable offsets. Existing card/
submit-block tests updated for the new per-option layout + Enter-confirms.
2026-06-17 11:16:23 +05:30
Anandan 0b496ce87d Render transcript viewport from measured items (#227)
Add a bounded per-model transcript body height cache keyed by the existing row render fingerprint, then use measured spans to render only the visible alt-screen item window instead of building the full body string every frame.

Mouse hit testing now uses the same visible item layout, while inline rendering and selection copy keep the full layout path for behavior parity.

Tests cover height cache reuse, visible-only item rendering, absolute selectable body coordinates, and output parity with the previous full-layout renderer.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

Tested: /bin/bash -lc "GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./..."
2026-06-17 09:01:50 +05:30
Anandan 724167e90e Harden TUI layout and mouse routing (#226)
* Centralize TUI frame layout

Add a reusable transcript frame snapshot with terminal regions for header, body, footer, composer, and status lines. Mouse composer hit testing, overlay positioning, and transcript viewport mapping now consume the same frame geometry instead of recalculating pinned-header and clipped-footer offsets separately.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

* Route TUI mouse hits through local regions

Return overlay hit coordinates relative to the overlay block and derive transcript hit rows from the shared body rect. This keeps the current scroll behavior while making mouse handling consume component-local geometry from the frame layout.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

* Cover TUI frame geometry

Add focused tests for the shared frame snapshot: pinned header/body/footer regions, tiny-terminal footer clipping, composer mouse hit regions, overlay centering, and transcript mouse row mapping through the body region.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

* Extract transcript viewport line window

Introduce a line-based transcript viewport adapter that preserves Zero's existing bottom-anchored scroll offset. Render slicing, chat scroll metrics, scrollChat, and transcript selection viewport mapping now share the same clamping and visible-window calculation.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

* Build transcript body from layout items

Introduce a compatibility transcript body item layer for title, empty state, separators, transcript rows, pending prompts, streaming interim content, and spec review prompts. The body still renders to the same line/selectable output, but layout now records item spans and local selectable offsets for the next visible-range step.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: /bin/bash -lc "GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./..."

* Address TUI layout review findings

Clamp overlay mouse hit regions to the visible transcript body and block transcript selection while the MCP add wizard is open. Strengthen layout and viewport edge-case tests, including full composer containment and degenerate dimensions.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: /bin/bash -lc "GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./..."

* Make MCP wizard overlay test hit transcript text

CodeRabbit caught that the MCP add wizard blocking test clicked at x=0, which could miss selectable transcript text and pass without proving the overlay guard. This updates the test helper to return both textStart and y, then clicks that known selectable point before asserting the wizard blocks transcript selection behind the modal.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

* Route transcript windows through body layout

Thread the structured transcriptBodyLayout through alt-screen rendering, scroll metrics, and transcript mouse lookup instead of repeatedly joining and splitting the rendered body string. This preserves the current line-based viewport behavior while making the body layout the source of truth for visible windows and selectable line lookup.

This is an incremental step toward visible-item rendering and item-level caching; it does not change the transcript visual output or input flow.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

Tested: /bin/bash -lc "GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./..."

* Reuse row cache for selectable transcript rows

Selectable user and assistant rows need selectable metadata for mouse interactions, but when no transcript selection is active their rendered strings are identical to the normal row render path. Route those rendered strings through renderRow so stable rows reuse the existing row cache while selection-active frames still render highlight-aware output.

This keeps transcript behavior unchanged and adds a regression test that verifies selectable assistant rows produce stable metadata while hitting the render cache on the second render.

Tested: env GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

Tested: /bin/bash -lc "GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./..."
2026-06-16 23:40:32 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude 6092303e73 feat(tui): rotating "working word" for the liveness spinner (#221)
* feat(tui): rotating "working word" for the liveness spinner

The assistant interim block used to show a static "working…" placeholder
while the model was generating. That felt dead on long runs. Replace it
with a rotating gerund tuned for the Gitlawb / Zero brand: project-name
verbs (gitlawbmaxxing, zeroling, …) weighted 1.5x so the brand word
anchors the rotation, plus feature-as-verbs, gen-Z crowd-pleasers, and
a few Claude-Code originals for variety.

The rotation is a tiny ring buffer (working_words.go) advanced on each
spinner.Tick so the verb and the glyph stay in lockstep. Brand words
are duplicated in the ring, not randomized, so the cadence is
deterministic and the first frame is always "gitlawbmaxxing" — easy
to test, easy to reason about, and the first thing a long-running user
sees is the project name. Reset() rewinds the ring when a new run
starts (model.go: submit, spec_mode.go: spec approval → impl).

Lowercase throughout to brand-differentiate from Claude Code's Title
Case defaults. No config wiring (hardcoded list); can be a follow-up
if users ask for customisation.

Tests: 7 new tests in working_words_test.go (first frame, tick,
wrap, reset, brand weighting, base-list integrity, nil safety) plus
the existing interim-block test updated to assert "gitlawbmaxxing"
as the new default. Full internal/tui/ suite green in 2.7s.

* Address review feedback on working-words PR

Three review threads to close out:

**Cadence (~12 words/sec → ~1/sec)**
@anandh8x and @gnanam1990 both flagged the on-every-tick advance as
flicker. The spinner glyph should still spin fast (it conveys liveness),
but the word needs to be readable. Solution: the model owns a
`workingVerbTicks` counter and gates the advance at
`WorkingWordsStepEvery = 12` spinner ticks (~960ms at 80ms cadence).
The `workingWords` ring stays a dumb "advance one slot" type so unit
tests can tick it rapidly without waiting for a real spinner. New test
`TestWorkingVerbAdvancesOnStepEverySpinnerTicks` locks the cadence
behaviour in.

**Brand-name "inconsistency" (intentional)**
@gnanam1990 noted the code says "Gitlawb / OpenFable" while the repo,
binary, and PR description say "Zero". Author's call: the working-words
PR ships the rebrand-ahead-of-the-rebrand verbs on purpose. Kept the
existing strings (`gitlawbmaxxing`, `openfablemaxxing`, …) and tidied
the comments so the trade-off is explicit ("a planned rename; the
spinner brand is intentionally ahead of the rest of the project").
Also fixed a stale `model.go` comment that still said "zeroling"
(superseded by `openfablemaxxing` in the previous force-push).

**Taste call (pilled / aura-farming / maxxing)**
Both reviewers flagged these as user-facing with no config escape.
Author's call: ship as-is, with a comment on `vibeVerbs` calling out
the trade-off explicitly so the next reader can see it was a
deliberate decision rather than an oversight.

**weightedRing comment vs implementation**
CodeRabbit and @gnanam1990 both caught that the comment claimed brand
verbs are "interleaved" but the implementation appends them as a
sequential block at the end of the ring. Fixed the comment to match
the implementation and added a note on how to implement true
interleaving if it's ever wanted.

**CodeRabbit nits**
- `Reset()` now also checks `len(w.weighted) == 0` for consistency
  with `Tick()` and `Current()`.
- `weightedRing` body simplified to `append(ring, brandVerbs...)`
  instead of the conditional loop (same result, clearer intent).

**Competitor naming in comments**
@gnanam1990 asked to trim the few "Claude Code" mentions in package
comments. Replaced the explicit "Claude Code" references with neutral
phrasing ("upstream Claude-Code-compatible spinners", "a few classic
gerunds") that keeps the design rationale without naming the
competitor. The user-facing verb list is untouched.

Rebased onto current main (1e25fde) and resolved the spec_mode.go
merge conflict by keeping both the fade-seed and the working-verb
reset on the spec-impl path.

Build + vet + gofmt clean. Full internal/tui/ test suite green except
for the pre-existing env-fragile `TestModelCommandPersistsSelectedModelToUserConfig`
from PR #220 (fails here only because of local env, not this PR).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* Fix cadence test post-advance window (CodeRabbit)

The final block of `TestWorkingVerbAdvancesOnStepEverySpinnerTicks`
had two issues caught by CodeRabbit:

1. A `_ = m` no-op statement that asserted nothing.
2. A tautological check — it compared the post-advance verb against
   the *original* `before` value, which is always going to differ
   after the previous block already advanced.

The real intent was to verify that the cadence counter *resets* after
each advance (rather than carrying over), so a follow-up advance
lands one full `WorkingWordsStepEvery` window later — not one window
early due to a missed reset.

Rewrote the trailing block to:
- Capture the post-advance value explicitly (`afterAdvance`).
- Drive another (WorkingWordsStepEvery - 1) ticks after the advance.
- Assert the verb stayed at `afterAdvance` — catching the "counter
  doesn't reset" regression the original test was meant to guard
  against.

This now meaningfully tests three regressions:
- Gate removed (verb advances every tick) — caught by the first block.
- Gate set to 1 (same effect) — caught by the first block.
- Counter doesn't reset after advance (verb advances too eagerly) —
  caught by the new third block.

Updated the test docstring to call out all three failure modes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-06-16 22:07:40 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude 1e25fde3b1 feat(tui): age-based fade for streaming assistant text (#223)
* feat(tui): age-based fade for streaming assistant text

While the assistant reply streams in, the latest line appears in the
brand lime (\#caff3f) and gradually settles to the standard off-white
ink over ~1.2 seconds, line by line. The effect mirrors the lime
spinner glyph in the liveness block: a quiet visual signal that the
model is still emitting, not a stylized neon glow.

Design choices (per line, not per rune):
  * 12-step palette interpolated in linear sRGB from colorAccent to
    colorInk, pre-computed at init() so per-frame lookups are a
    struct-field access, not a hex parse.
  * 1.2s fade duration; 150ms tick (independent of the 80ms spinner).
  * Hard stop at stream end: the agentResponseMsg handler flips
    fadeActive = false and the next streamingFadeTickMsg short-circuits.
  * Reset on terminal resize (visual line count changes) and on cancel.
  * The last visual line uses lastStreamActivity (always freshest) so
    the user can see exactly where the model is currently typing.

Test fixtures that pre-populate m.streamingText without going through
the agentTextMsg branch keep rendering identically to before — the
fade code is defensive when lineAges is nil.

The spec-impl run (which calls runAgent directly, bypassing the
normal launchPrompt path) seeds the fade state explicitly so its
streaming text fades the same way regular runs do.

* fix(tui): address CodeRabbit review on streaming-fade PR

Four findings from CodeRabbit's review of #223, applied:

1. model.go agentTextMsg: schedule streamingFadeTick only on the
   inactive->active transition instead of on every delta. The tick
   is self-perpetuating (the streamingFadeTickMsg case schedules the
   next one), so re-scheduling on every incoming delta is redundant
   and would create multiple concurrent tick chains during long
   streams.

2. model.go agentResponseMsg: call m.resetStreamingFade() instead of
   setting only fadeActive = false. Leaving lineAges and
   lastStreamActivity populated allowed stale age data to carry over
   to the next turn and made lineAges grow indefinitely across many
   runs.

3. streaming_fade.go streamingLineBornAt: when the visual index is
   beyond the lineAges slice (a wrapped middle line), clamp to the
   last known logical age instead of returning time.Time{}. Wrapped
   continuation lines now keep fading in step with their siblings
   instead of snapping to base ink mid-paragraph.

4. streaming_fade_test.go TestStreamingFadePaletteHandlesBadHex:
   assert that every bucket's foreground is the unparseable base
   string instead of asserting on len(palette), which is a constant
   for a fixed-size array (the original assertion passed regardless
   of behavior and triggered SA4006). Also split the
   OutOfRangeReturnsZero test into ClampsToLast (for the new clamp
   behavior) and EmptyLineAgesReturnsZero (for the truly-empty case
   that should still return zero).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-06-16 21:17:08 +05:30
Anandan 7fae5c530f Fix provider setup paste handling (#225) 2026-06-16 21:16:39 +05:30
Anandan 7af2a1b3b6 TUI polish and fixes (#220)
* Persist TUI model switches

* Pin TUI title bar in chat view
2026-06-16 20:14:17 +05:30
Anandan 9c1cc69b59 Migrate TUI to Bubble Tea v2 (#222)
* Migrate TUI to Bubble Tea v2

Move the TUI stack to charm.land Bubble Tea, Bubbles, and Lip Gloss v2, including key, paste, mouse, and view handling changes for the v2 APIs.

Add compatibility helpers for the new input event shapes and update TUI tests accordingly.

Refresh related Go dependencies and make the PDF truncation fixture deterministic across poppler and pure-Go extraction.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./internal/imageinput -count=1 -v

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./...

* Address provider wizard OAuth review feedback

Remove the unused mouseButton compatibility helper flagged by lint.

Correlate provider wizard OAuth and device-code async results with the active provider and attempt id so stale results from abandoned attempts are ignored.

Add regression coverage for stale browser OAuth and stale device-code results.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'ProviderWizard.*OAuth|ProviderWizard.*Device|ApplyProviderWizardOAuth|RenderCredentialStepShowsOAuth' -count=1 -v

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-mod-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Smooth TUI mouse scrolling
2026-06-16 19:04:38 +05:30
KRATOS a0b9876b69 OAuth / account login for providers (OpenRouter, xAI) + subscription-proxy support (#217)
* providers: authenticate model calls with an OAuth login when present

Foundation for account/subscription login: when a user is logged in via
`zero auth login <name>`, the OpenAI and Anthropic providers now authenticate
model requests with that OAuth bearer token, falling back to the API key when
there is no login. Auto-select, per the agreed design — no config needed.

  - providerio.SendWithAuthRetry: issues a request with an OAuth bearer (from a
    TokenResolver) or the API key, and retries ONCE with a force-refreshed token
    after a 401. A 401 means the server rejected the request without processing a
    completion, so replay-after-refresh is safe — the same no-duplicate-work basis
    SendWithRetry uses for 429/503. Never sends API key and bearer together.
  - openai + anthropic providers take an optional OAuthResolver and use
    SendWithAuthRetry. When OAuth is active the credential goes on Authorization
    (so Anthropic's x-api-key is correctly omitted). Gemini is unchanged.
  - providers.New threads Options.OAuthResolver to those two providers.
  - cli.oauthResolverForProfile builds the resolver from the unified oauth store:
    it attaches a resolver ONLY when a login already exists for the provider
    name, so API-key users incur no per-request store lookups. The resolver uses
    Manager.GetFresh (refresh near expiry) and Manager.Handle401 (force refresh on
    the 401 retry).
  - oauth: added ErrNoToken sentinel so "not logged in" is distinguishable from a
    real refresh failure (login removed mid-session → clean API-key fallback).

Tests (httptest): API-key fallback (nil resolver / ok=false), bearer wins +
never-both, 401→force-refresh→retry, stops after one retry, resolver error
surfaced. Local run check (real binary + mock OAuth + mock OpenAI-compatible LLM
requiring the bearer): with a login, `zero exec` sends Bearer <oauth-token> and
gets a completion; without a login it falls back to the (wrong) API key and the
mock returns 401 — proving the OAuth path.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* providers: add ChatGPT-subscription-via-proxy preset + OAuth/subscriptions docs

Follows verified research (cross-checked across ~30 sources) into using ChatGPT
and Claude subscriptions: a subscription OAuth token does NOT work as a standard
bearer on the public APIs. OpenAI's token only works against the Cloudflare-gated
ChatGPT backend (headless clients get cf-mitigated 403); Anthropic rejects
third-party subscription OAuth, requires Claude-Code identity spoofing, 400s on
tool calls (Max overage lane), and is contractually banned with active
enforcement. So zero does NOT call those backends or spoof those clients.

Instead, the supported pattern is a local proxy that holds the subscription
session and exposes a clean OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible endpoint on 127.0.0.1;
zero points at it (it already supports custom base URLs, and C1 supplies OAuth
bearer for gateways that issue standard tokens).

  - providercatalog: add `chatgpt-proxy` ("ChatGPT (local OAuth proxy)") — an
    OpenAI-compatible, local, no-API-key preset defaulting to the established
    proxy port (http://localhost:10531/v1), base URL overridable. Claude uses the
    existing `custom-anthropic-compatible` entry (no canonical Claude-proxy port
    to hardcode — not invented).
  - docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: full recipe — built-in OAuth login (C1), the
    verified reason subscriptions need a proxy, copy-paste config for ChatGPT and
    Claude via a local proxy, and the sanctioned alternatives (API key; spawning
    the real `claude` CLI for Anthropic subscription automation).

Local run check: a config using `catalogID: chatgpt-proxy` (base URL pointed at a
mock OpenAI-compatible proxy) routes `zero exec` through the proxy with no auth
header and returns a completion.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(clean)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* provideroauth: OpenRouter browser PKCE login (mints an API key) + `zero auth openrouter`

Adds the cleanest real OAuth login surfaced by the provider survey: OpenRouter's
loopback PKCE flow. It needs no client_id (public), uses S256, and the exchange
mints a normal OpenRouter API key — so no token-spoofing or vendor-backend gating
is involved (unlike ChatGPT/Claude subscriptions).

  - internal/provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin: binds a 127.0.0.1 loopback, opens/prints
    https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=…&code_challenge=…&code_challenge_method=S256,
    captures the code, and POSTs it + the PKCE verifier to
    /api/v1/auth/keys → {key}. PKCE binds the code, so no separate CSRF state is
    needed. Injectable base URL / HTTP client / browser-opener for tests.
  - cli: `zero auth openrouter` runs the flow and prints the minted key with usage
    guidance. ZERO_OPENROUTER_BASE_URL overrides the endpoint (self-hosted/tests).

Tests: full flow over httptest (mint, missing-code, non-2xx exchange, empty key,
browser-error). Local run check via the real binary against a mock: the command
emits the correct PKCE authorize URL, the loopback callback is captured, and the
key is minted end-to-end.

First of the in-wizard OAuth providers; the wizard "Log in with OAuth" option
(next commit) calls this same flow and saves the key to the profile.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* oauth: built-in provider presets + xAI (Grok) preset

Adds an overridable preset layer to the env-driven OAuth registry so well-known
providers work without per-field env configuration. ResolveConfig now seeds each
field from a baked-in preset and lets the matching ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* env var
override it (env wins); flow falls back to the preset then loopback.

First preset: xAI (Grok) — standard OIDC, PUBLIC client (no secret), loopback +
device. The access token is accepted directly as a bearer on api.x.ai/v1 (an
OpenAI-compatible endpoint), so the existing C1 wiring uses it for an xai provider
profile — no header/identity spoofing. `zero auth login xai` now works out of the
box. CAVEATS (documented in code + help): the client_id is a public Grok-CLI
client not formally documented by xAI (may change; override via env), and use
requires a SuperGrok / X Premium+ subscription.

Tests: preset resolution, env-overrides-preset (per field + flow), and that a
provider with neither preset nor env still errors. Local run check: `zero auth
login xai --device` (endpoints pointed at a mock, client_id NOT overridden) logs
in and the mock confirms the preset client_id b1a00492-… was sent.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* tui: in-wizard "Log in with OAuth" option (OpenRouter) + browser opener

Adds the credential-step OAuth login the setup wizard was missing. For a provider
that supports a usable browser OAuth flow (currently OpenRouter), the credential
screen now offers "ctrl+o to log in with OAuth in the browser (no key needed)"
alongside pasting a key.

Flow: ctrl+o → the wizard marks itself oauthPending and dispatches an async
tea.Cmd that runs provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin (opens the browser via the new
internal/browser opener, captures the loopback callback, mints a key). While it
runs the step shows "Opening your browser… (or run: zero auth openrouter)";
Esc cancels. On success the minted key fills the credential and the wizard
advances to model selection; on failure the redacted error is shown and the user
can retry or paste a key.

  - internal/browser: cross-platform OpenURL (open / xdg-open / rundll32) with a
    pure, unit-tested per-OS command builder.
  - provider_wizard: oauthPending/oauthErr state, providerWizardSupportsOAuth
    (OpenRouter only — ChatGPT/Claude use the proxy preset, others paste a key),
    the async cmd + result msg, and credential-step render/keys.
  - model.Update routes the OAuth result message.

Tests: openCommand per-OS; supportsOAuth (openrouter yes / openai no); ctrl+o
starts OAuth for OpenRouter and is a no-op otherwise; apply-success advances +
applies the key; apply-error stays + surfaces the message; render shows the hint
and the pending state. The interactive browser flow itself is the same one C3
verified end-to-end against a mock.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new — the
SA1019 mouse nits are pre-existing on origin/main)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new).
No new module deps.

* docs: cover the built-in OpenRouter + xAI OAuth logins

Document the two turnkey OAuth providers added in this branch (OpenRouter browser
key-mint via `zero auth openrouter` / wizard ctrl+o; xAI via `zero auth login
xai`), alongside the existing subscription-proxy and custom-provider guidance.

* tui: method-first provider setup — a prominent "Sign in with OAuth" path

Reworks `/provider` setup to lead with a connect-method chooser, modeled on Codex
/ Claude Code / gemini-cli (verified via a UX survey), so OAuth is a first-class,
separate option instead of a key buried at the credential step.

New first step "How do you want to connect?":
  ❯ Sign in with OAuth                    (default when any OAuth provider exists)
      One-click browser login, no API key to copy (OpenRouter, xAI).
    Paste an API key / browse providers
      Any of 20+ providers, a local model, or a subscription via proxy.

  - OAuth path → a dedicated list of ONLY OAuth-capable providers
    (providercatalog.OAuthProviders()), each with a mode badge; selecting one
    runs the browser login (OpenRouter mints a key; xAI/preset providers store a
    refreshable token via the engine) and jumps straight to model selection,
    skipping the key/endpoint steps. A waiting screen shows progress + a CLI
    fallback; Esc cancels; errors are redacted and retryable.
  - Browse path → the existing full catalog → key/endpoint/model, unchanged.
  - ChatGPT/Claude are NOT offered as in-app OAuth (they can't work) — they remain
    reachable as the proxy/custom providers under "browse".

  - providercatalog: Descriptor gains OAuth/OAuthMintsKey/OAuthDeviceFlow; openrouter
    + xai are flagged; OAuthProviders() is the single source of truth.
  - wizard: new method step + OAuth provider list + per-provider OAuth dispatch
    (reuses provideroauth.OpenRouterLogin and the oauth engine login), waiting/
    render/keys/step-line/retreat all updated; mouse + keys ignored while a login
    is in flight.

Tests: catalog OAuth flags + OAuthProviders(); method chooser OAuth vs browse
paths; OAuth dispatch from the list; retreat→method; render shows the chooser +
provider list; existing wizard tests updated for the new first step. All tui tests
pass under -race.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* docs: document the /provider "Sign in with OAuth" method chooser

* tui: mirror the "Sign in with OAuth" method chooser in first-run onboarding

First-run setup (onboarding.go) was a separate flow that still showed its bare
provider list. Add the same connect-method chooser so new users get the prominent
OAuth path too, keeping /provider and first-run as one mental model.

  - New setupStageMethod (after Welcome): "How do you want to connect?" with
    "Sign in with OAuth" (default) and "Paste an API key / browse providers".
  - OAuth path filters the provider list to OAuth-capable providers, runs the same
    browser login (OpenRouter mints a key → captured as the setup credential; xAI
    stores a refreshable token and the profile is named after the provider so the
    runtime resolver attaches the bearer), shows a waiting screen, then jumps to
    model selection (skipping endpoint/name/credentials). Esc cancels; errors are
    redacted.
  - Browse path is the existing flow, unchanged. setupStages()/navigation/back/
    progress/footer/mouse all updated; OAuth result routed via model.Update.

Tests: method chooser OAuth path (OAuth-only list + retreat clears it) and
apply-OAuth-success advances to model with the minted key; existing onboarding
tests updated for the new step (pressSetupContinue transparently skips it). All
tui tests pass under -race.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass. No new module deps.

* catalog+tui: show ChatGPT/Claude in the OAuth chooser as local-proxy entries

The "Sign in with OAuth" chooser listed only the real-OAuth providers (OpenRouter,
xAI), so ChatGPT and Claude looked missing. They can't do real in-app OAuth — a
subscription token is Cloudflare-gated (ChatGPT) / ToS-restricted for third-party
use (Claude) — so instead of hiding them or faking a login, list them honestly as
"subscription · needs a local proxy" entries that route into proxy setup.

  - catalog: new Descriptor.OAuthProxy flag + OAuthProxyProviders(); mark
    chatgpt-proxy and a new claude-proxy (local Anthropic-compatible, keyless)
    entry. localAnthropic() helper. Proxy entries are not OAuth (no fake login).
  - wizard + onboarding: the OAuth list now appends the proxy entries after the
    real OAuth providers (catalog order keeps real ones first). Selecting a proxy
    entry leaves OAuth mode and drops into the normal browse flow with the proxy
    provider selected and its default URL/model pre-filled, so the user just
    points Zero at the local proxy they run. No browser login is launched.
  - providerWizardNeedsEndpoint now true for proxy entries (the local port
    varies); faint badge "subscription · needs a local proxy".
  - docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: chooser now shows the four entries and explains
    the proxy routing.

Tests: catalog classification (OAuthProviders vs OAuthProxyProviders, flags);
wizard + onboarding proxy-entry routing (leaves OAuth mode, starts no login,
lands on endpoint with the URL pre-filled). Full suite green under -race;
staticcheck/govulncheck/deadcode clean. No new deps.

* oauth+tui: add xAI device-code (RFC 8628) login to the OAuth chooser

The OAuth chooser only did browser/loopback login, which can't work on a headless
or SSH box (no browser to open). Add device-code as a first-class option for
providers that support it (xAI).

  - oauth.Manager: PrepareDeviceLogin (request code) + CompleteDeviceLogin (poll +
    store), splitting the monolithic device flow so the UI can display the
    user_code + verification URI while it waits. CLI Login(Device:true) unchanged.
  - tui (shared oauth_device.go): oauthPreferDeviceFlow() picks device by default
    on SSH / headless Linux (no DISPLAY) or when ZERO_OAUTH_DEVICE is set;
    oauthDevicePrepare/Complete drive the two phases off the UI goroutine.
  - /provider wizard + first-run onboarding: device-capable providers show
    "Enter sign in · d device code" — Enter uses the browser (or device if
    headless), "d" forces device. The waiting screen shows the code + URL to
    enter elsewhere, then polls; success advances to model selection. Esc cancels;
    errors are redacted; device state is cleared on success/cancel/back.
  - docs: document the device-code path and ZERO_OAUTH_DEVICE.

Tests: manager Prepare/Complete two-phase; wizard + onboarding 'd' shortcut,
device-code display + poll dispatch, error surfacing, and success clearing device
state. Full suite green under -race; staticcheck/govulncheck/deadcode clean. No
new deps.

* tui: authenticate model discovery with the OAuth token so the live list shows

After an xAI sign-in the bearer lives in the token store, not as a pasted key, so
the post-login model step ran /models with no credential → it always fell back to
the curated list (with a discovery error). Now the user picks from the real live
model list after OAuth, like other CLIs.

  - oauthStoredToken() resolves a fresh stored token for a token-login provider.
  - wizard + onboarding discovery resolve and inject that token into the discovery
    profile inside the async goroutine (token refresh is network I/O); OpenRouter
    still uses its minted key, API-key users are unchanged. Discovery timeout
    bumped 8s→12s to cover an on-demand refresh.
  - The resolved token is added to the redaction secret set so it can never leak
    into a surfaced discovery error. If discovery still fails (offline), the
    curated per-provider fallback list is shown as before — the user always gets a
    pickable list.

Tests: oauthStoredToken reads a seeded login / returns empty when absent;
wizard discovery injects the stored token into the /models profile. Hermetic via
ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH. Full suite green under -race; staticcheck/govulncheck/
deadcode clean. No new deps.

* catalog+tui: drop ChatGPT/Claude from the OAuth chooser — OpenRouter + xAI only

Reverts the proxy-entry listing: the "Sign in with OAuth" chooser now shows only
the providers that do real OAuth (OpenRouter, xAI). ChatGPT/Claude looked
confusing there since they can't actually sign in — they remain reachable via
"Paste an API key / browse providers" + the local-proxy recipe in
docs/oauth-subscriptions.md.

  - catalog: remove the Descriptor.OAuthProxy flag, OAuthProxyProviders(), the
    oauthProxyProvider/localAnthropic helpers, and the claude-proxy entry.
    chatgpt-proxy stays as a plain browse/config entry (its pre-existing role).
  - wizard + onboarding: OAuth list = OAuthProviders() again; removed the
    proxy→browse routing, the OAuthProxy badge, and the OAuthProxy endpoint rule.
  - device-code + OAuth-token model discovery (the later features) are untouched.
  - docs + tests updated to the two-entry chooser.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck/deadcode all
clean. No new deps.

* cli: recognize a stored OAuth login as a provider credential

A provider authenticated via OAuth (e.g. `zero auth login xai`) has no inline
key or env var, so setupRequired treated it as unconfigured and forced onboarding
on every launch — and the active provider could be passed over for a different
one. setupRequired now also counts a stored OAuth login (read from the token
store) as a credential, so an OAuth-logged-in provider stays usable without
onboarding.

Tests: providerHasOAuthLogin (by name/catalog id); setupRequired returns false
for an OAuth-logged-in provider, true for a keyless one with no login.

* Address review feedback on OAuth provider login

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- PrepareDeviceLogin: self-bound the network prepare (endpoint discovery +
  device-code request) with opts.Timeout (default 5m) like Login, so a caller
  passing an unbounded context still gets the timeout guarantee.
- CompleteDeviceLogin: bound the poll by the device code's own ExpiresAt so an
  unbounded caller context cannot leave an in-flight request hanging past the
  code's lifetime (PollDeviceToken already re-checks between polls).
- OAuthProviders(): return cloned descriptors, matching All()/the other
  accessors, so callers can't mutate the shared catalog backing slices.
- Onboarding applySetupOAuth / applySetupOAuthDeviceCode: ignore a stale result
  for a provider the user has since switched away from, so a late login can't
  capture a credential against the wrong provider.
- Onboarding: surface a failed OAuth login on the provider list the user lands
  on (the waiting screen that owned the error is gone once oauthPending clears),
  so the failure isn't silent and the user can retry.
- Onboarding: hide the "Sign in with OAuth" method when this setup's own
  provider list has no OAuth-capable entry, so it can't be selected into an
  empty provider list (setupMethodOptions).
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: label the bare example fences (text) and update
  the Anthropic policy section for the April 4 2026 third-party cutoff.

Adds tests for the descriptor-clone isolation and the method-option filtering.

* oauth: gate built-in presets behind ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS

The xAI preset baked a third-party OAuth client_id into the default
credential path, which breaks the engine's documented invariant that no
third-party OAuth client identity is used unless the operator configures
it. Rather than drop the convenience entirely, make presets opt-in:

- ResolveConfig only consults builtinOAuthPresets when ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS
  is truthy (presetsAllowed); by default every field must come from
  ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_* env, so the binary's preset client_id is never used
  without an explicit opt-in.
- The "not configured" error now points the user at ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS
  when a preset exists, so the wizard/CLI failure is self-documenting.
- Refresh the package, Registry, and preset docs to describe the opt-in;
  env still overrides any preset field.
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: document the flag for one-click xAI sign-in.

Keeps both: invariant-clean by default, one-click xAI for opted-in users.
Tests: preset resolution now requires the opt-in; added a gate-off test
asserting xAI stays inert (and the error names the flag) without it.

* oauth: read a stored token without resolving provider config

GetFresh resolved the provider OAuth config for every read via loadForKey,
even when the stored token was still valid and no refresh would happen.
With presets gated behind ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS, that made a stored xAI
login unreadable (and stalled the proactive refresh scheduler) unless the
opt-in flag was set at read time — config that is only needed to refresh.

Split loadForKey into loadToken (token only) and resolveConfigForKey
(refresh-only). GetFresh now returns a still-valid token without touching
the config; only an actual refresh (or Handle401) resolves endpoints +
client. The scheduler's load uses loadToken too, so proactive refresh
survives a gated preset and only the refresh attempt needs the config.

Fixes the Smoke failures TestOAuthStoredTokenReadsStoredLogin and
TestProviderWizardDiscoveryUsesOAuthToken (a fresh stored token must be
readable without the preset opt-in).

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 on OAuth provider login

- providerio SendWithAuthRetry: resolve the auth headers BEFORE dispatching, so
  a resolver error returns immediately instead of letting SendWithRetry send an
  unauthenticated request (leaking the path/body).
- tui handleMouse: ignore all mouse input (clicks + wheel) while a provider-wizard
  OAuth login is pending, so a stray scroll can't change the selected provider
  mid-login (mirrors the keyboard pending guard; the setup mouse handler already
  did this).
- cli runAuthOpenRouter: reject unexpected args/flags (e.g. --json) instead of
  silently running the login, matching the other auth subcommands.
- cli auth help: align the preset wording with the opt-in gate — openrouter works
  out of the box; xai needs ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1 or ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_*.
- onboarding_test: compute selectedMethod from m.setupMethodOptions() (the
  setup-filtered list) instead of providerWizardMethodOptions(), which could index
  past the end when OAuth is hidden.
- docs/oauth-subscriptions.md: sharpen the Anthropic timeline — Feb 19 2026 docs
  update, then the April 4 2026 enforcement that stopped subscription OAuth tokens
  working in third-party harnesses; current path is an API key or pay-as-you-go.

Adds tests for the no-dispatch-on-resolver-error path and openrouter arg rejection.

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 on OAuth provider login

Two findings missed in the previous round:

- oauth manager resolveConfigForKey: resolve issuer metadata before refreshing.
  It returned ResolveConfig's result without calling resolveEndpoints, so a
  provider configured with only ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_ISSUER_URL (no TOKEN_URL) had
  an empty token endpoint and could not refresh on GetFresh/Handle401. Thread the
  context through and run discovery; adds a test that an issuer-only provider
  refreshes via the discovered token endpoint.
- provider_wizard_oauth_test: assert openrouter is actually present in the OAuth
  list before selecting it, so the test can't silently pass against a different
  provider if openrouter is renamed/removed.

(The re-flagged PrepareDeviceLogin timeout is already handled — it self-bounds
with opts.Timeout, same as Login.)

* Address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (nitpicks) on OAuth provider login

- presets scopesOrPreset: return a copy of the preset scopes so a caller
  appending to cfg.Scopes can't mutate the shared global preset slice.
- provideroauth/openrouter: use bytes.NewReader(payload) instead of
  strings.NewReader(string(payload)) (avoid a needless []byte->string copy).
- onboarding setupCredentialSummary: show "OAuth token" on the Ready screen for
  an OAuth token-login provider (e.g. xAI) instead of "env var XAI_API_KEY" — it
  is authenticated by a stored token, not a key. Key-minting OAuth (OpenRouter)
  still resolves to a saved key.

(The flagged "Registry doc says no built-ins" was already corrected in the
preset opt-in commit — the doc now describes the ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS gate.)

Adds tests for the scope-slice copy and the OAuth-token credential summary.
2026-06-16 15:33:36 +05:30
KRATOS c38444157c Audit backlog: tui mouse API, notify webhook, swarm scheduling, daemon-remote bundles, MCP/oauth store unification, OS keyring, dead-code prune (#216)
* tui: migrate off the deprecated Bubble Tea mouse Type API (SA1019)

The mouse classification helpers checked both the current Button/Action pair and
the deprecated msg.Type / tea.Mouse* constants. Bubble Tea's parser always
populates Button+Action and only DERIVES Type from them, so the Type fallbacks
were pure redundancy (a left-button drag is Action==Motion, already covered by
mouseMotion). Drop them — clears all 11 SA1019 findings in internal/tui with no
behavior change. The left-drag test now asserts the Action==Motion path directly.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(SA1019 0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass.

* notify: wire the webhook sink behind an opt-in env var

The WebhookSink (Slack / generic JSON POST on turn completion) was fully
implemented, redaction-safe, and tested — but never attached to a Notifier, so
deadcode flagged its entire machinery (NewWebhookSink, Emit, text, redactLinks,
log, eventType, readSnippet) as unreachable.

Wire it via a small, testable helper, MaybeAddWebhookSink(n, env, logf):
  - reads ZERO_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_URL (+ optional ZERO_NOTIFY_WEBHOOK_SUMMARY)
  - no-op when the URL is unset/blank, so it is safe to call unconditionally
  - sourcing the URL from the environment keeps the secret token out of any
    on-disk config file

Attached at both notifier construction sites:
  - headless exec: failed deliveries log to stderr (never stdout); the sink
    redacts before logging
  - TUI: logf=nil so a delivery failure can't corrupt the alt-screen

The sink stays gated by the existing Mode/focus policy (verified by
TestNotifierOffSuppressesSinks), so a webhook only fires when notifications are
enabled (e.g. --notify both) — no change to default behavior. Opt-in and
fail-closed: with the env var unset nothing is attached.

deadcode: 100 -> 93 unreachable funcs (the 7 WebhookSink entries become
reachable); no new dead code. gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/
staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0) all pass.

* swarm: add opt-in recurring-spawn scheduler (wakeup + daily)

Adds a dependency-free Scheduler to internal/swarm so a member can be spawned on
a recurring schedule, plus a swarm_schedule tool to drive it.

  - Schedule is interval-based ("wakeup", every >= 1s) with an optional first
    delay and a MaxRuns cap; a daily "HH:MM" ("cron") time is expressed as a 24h
    interval whose first delay lands on the next occurrence.
  - Each fire spawns a fresh member through the existing Swarm.Spawn path, so
    members inherit the recorded policy and are bounded by the team slot cap +
    queue. Non-overlapping by default: a fire is skipped while the job's previous
    spawn is still running, preventing queue pile-up.
  - Scheduler is lazily created (Swarm.Scheduler()), opt-in (nothing runs until a
    job is added), and tied to the Swarm's base context — Swarm.Close() stops the
    scheduler first so no spawn fires during shutdown.
  - swarm_schedule tool: action add|list|cancel; prompt-gated like swarm_spawn;
    add validates schedule + agent type up front (fail fast).

The timing loop takes an injectable ticker, so the tests drive fires
deterministically with no real time (fire/skip/cap/cancel/close, plus pure
nextDailyDelay/parseClock/swarmInt). All swarm tests pass 3x under -race.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(clean)/govulncheck(0)/
deadcode(no new) all pass.

* daemon/remote: SessionLink + git-bundle upload over the bridge

Adds an opt-in way to ship a local repo's git history to a remote daemon and
link a remote working tree to it — without a shared filesystem or a network git
remote. The daemon core (protocol/server) is untouched; all changes live in the
remote package plus a CLI hook.

Wire:
  - The auth handshake gains an optional Mode field ("" / "session" => a daemon
    session as before; "bundle" => a one-shot git-bundle upload). Unknown modes,
    or bundle mode when uploads are disabled, are denied (fail closed).
  - Bundle transfer reuses the daemon frame codec: a header frame (link id +
    exact size), then the bundle bytes as KindData frames, then a result frame.

Server (Bridge):
  - BridgeOptions.BundleDir enables uploads (empty => refused). A received bundle
    is size-capped (default 256 MiB), staged to a temp file, `git bundle verify`-d,
    then `git clone`-d into a staging dir and atomically renamed over
    <BundleDir>/<link-id>. Link ids are sanitized to a single path component and
    containment is re-checked, so an upload can never escape the bundle dir.

Client:
  - UploadRepoBundle creates `git bundle create --all` of a work tree, hashes it
    (sha256), streams it over an authenticated bundle-mode TLS connection, and
    returns a SessionLink {address, link id, remote path, bundle sha}. SessionLink
    persists as a 0600 atomic JSON file (token never stored) with Save/Load/Validate.

CLI:
  - `daemon serve-remote --bundle-dir <d>` enables uploads.
  - `daemon link --remote <addr> --repo <dir> --id <name> [--out <file>]` uploads
    and prints the remote path (+ a ready run command); `daemon link --show <file>`
    prints a saved link.

Tests: git bundle create/verify/clone roundtrip; link-id sanitization + path
containment; SessionLink save/load/validate (0600); and a full bridge upload E2E
over real TLS (extract + content check + re-upload-replaces + disabled + bad
token). All remote tests pass 2x under -race; CLI smoke verified via the binary.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* mcp: unify OAuth token storage onto the shared oauth store

MCP server tokens lived in their own mcp-oauth-tokens.json with a bespoke
codec/lock, separate from the provider-login store (internal/oauth). The oauth
store already reserved the "mcp:" key namespace for exactly this. Unify them.

  - mcp.TokenStore now delegates to internal/oauth.Store, keying each server's
    token as "mcp:<server>". Its public API (StoredToken/TokenStatus/Save/Load/
    Delete/Status/FilePath) is unchanged, so callers (network client, CLI) are
    untouched. The bespoke read/write/lock code is removed in favor of the shared,
    cross-process-locked, atomic store.
  - Transparent, non-destructive migration on first construction: a legacy
    mcp-oauth-tokens.json is imported into the unified store (only entries not
    already present — a newer unified token is never overwritten), then renamed to
    a ".migrated" backup so it is imported at most once and stays recoverable.
    A missing / unreadable / unknown-schema legacy file is left untouched and
    never blocks startup. An explicit FilePath suppresses the default-path
    migration so tests/overrides can't touch the real user config.
  - Server names that can't form a valid namespaced key (oauth.ValidateKey) are
    rejected on save and skipped during migration. Added oauth.Store.FilePath().

The token format was already identical (access/refresh/type/scopes/expires), so
this is a key rename, not a format change. Existing TokenStore tests pass
unchanged (they exercise the API); added migration + namespacing + newer-wins
tests. Local run check: `zero mcp oauth status` migrates a seeded legacy file
into oauth-tokens.json under mcp:demo, renames the legacy to .migrated, and leaks
no token material.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(clean)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* oauth: add an opt-in OS keyring storage backend

Introduces a pluggable storage backend for the unified oauth token store and a
dependency-free OS keyring implementation, selected with
ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=keyring (default stays the 0600 file).

  - internal/keyring: a small, third-party-dep-free secret store backed by the OS
    tooling — `security` on macOS, `secret-tool` (libsecret) on Linux; other
    platforms report unsupported. On Linux the secret is passed via stdin (never
    the argv); on macOS `security` takes it as an argument (briefly visible in the
    process list) — documented, and a reason to prefer the file backend there.
    A runner seam makes the per-OS command logic fully testable without a real
    keychain.
  - internal/oauth: Store now persists its JSON blob through a blobStore backend.
    fileBlob preserves the exact prior behavior (0600, atomic write, cross-process
    lock file). keyringBlob stores the blob as one base64 entry (keeps multi-line
    JSON a single control-char-free value) via a KeyringClient. NewStore resolves
    the backend from StoreOptions.Storage or ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE; unknown storage
    and an unavailable keyring fail closed with a clear error.

Because both `zero auth` and the (now unified) MCP token store construct their
store through oauth.NewStore, the keyring backend is honored by both with no
call-site changes. Added oauth.Store.FilePath() returns a "keyring:" identifier
for that backend.

No new module dependency (go.mod unchanged). Tests: keyring round-trip/not-found/
unsupported/missing-binary/stdin-not-argv via an injected runner; store keyring
round-trip + base64-at-rest + storage selection; all existing file-backend tests
pass unchanged. Local run check (macOS): validated the exact `security`
add/find/delete shapes and the not-found exit code (44) against the real binary,
and `mcp oauth status` with ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=keyring reads the real keychain
cleanly.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* all: prune unused unexported functions (dead-code sweep)

Removes 15 unexported functions/types/consts that are unreachable even from
tests (every one flagged by staticcheck U1000), clearing the U1000 noise the v16
audit surfaced. Conservative by design: only unexported, test-unused symbols are
removed — exported internal API (which may be an intentional surface or used only
by tests) is deliberately left in place.

Removed:
  - agenteval: validateExpectedChangedFiles
  - providers/gemini: const providerName
  - tui: stripMarkdownInline, removeTrailingAtToken,
    noopModelSwitchCompactionPolicy (+ BeforeModelSwitch), deleteComposerLineBefore,
    deleteComposerLineAfter, deleteCompletedFileMentionBefore, mcpViewStatus,
    mcpServerLines, fitCommandOutput, (*commandPicker).clearQuery,
    tuiTheme.onPanel2, indentText

No behavior change (the symbols had no callers). staticcheck U1000 is now empty;
deadcode drops accordingly with no genuinely-new unreachable functions (verified
by a name-based diff vs origin/main). gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/full
test all pass.

* Address review feedback on the audit backlog

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- keyring isNotFound: match the specific not-found exit codes (macOS `security`
  44 = errSecItemNotFound; `secret-tool` 1) instead of treating any non-zero
  exit as "no entry", so a real failure (locked keychain, permissions) surfaces
  instead of being masked as absent.
- swarm scheduler daily_at: recompute each fire as the next local HH:MM rather
  than adding a fixed 24h, so a wall-clock daily schedule does not drift across
  DST. Adds Daily/Hour/Minute to Schedule and a clock to the Scheduler.
- swarm scheduler: reject Add when the scheduler context is already canceled
  (not just when closed); re-check cancellation after a tick so a tick+cancel
  race can't spawn one extra member after Cancel/Close.
- swarm schedule_tool swarmInt: reject non-integer / non-finite JSON numbers
  (max_runs=1.9 errors instead of silently truncating to 1).
- mcp migrateLegacy: resolve a relative LegacyPath to absolute before the
  same-file guard so it can't be bypassed by a relative spelling.
- oauth keyring store: serialize the keyring read-modify-write with a
  cross-process lock file (best-effort, beside the config dir) so concurrent
  processes don't clobber each other's tokens; previously withLock was a no-op.

Adds tests for the non-not-found keyring error, the daily delay recompute, the
Add-after-cancel guard, and non-integer swarmInt.

* swarm: make nextDailyDelay roll the day, not add 24h (DST)

CodeRabbit follow-up: the run loop already recomputes a daily job's delay each
cycle, but nextDailyDelay itself rolled "passed today" to the next occurrence
with Add(24*time.Hour). On a DST changeover day (23h/25h) that fires an hour
early/late. Use time.Date(..., day+1, hour, minute, ...) so Go normalizes the
date and applies the correct local offset, holding the wall-clock HH:MM across
DST. Adds an America/New_York spring-forward test (skips if tzdata is absent).
2026-06-16 14:48:12 +05:30
KRATOS 75ecf8e385 oauth: opt-in AES-256-GCM encrypted-at-rest token storage (#213)
* oauth: opt-in AES-256-GCM encrypted-at-rest token storage

OAuth Phase 2: add an encrypted token-store backend. The default backend still
writes the 0600 plaintext JSON unchanged; setting ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=encrypted-file
encrypts the token file with AES-256-GCM under a per-user random 32-byte secret
persisted 0600 beside the token file (<tokens>.secret).

- internal/oauth/encrypt.go: aesGCMCrypter (nonce||ciphertext, GCM tamper
  detection) + load-or-create secret (atomic 0600 write). Pure stdlib, no dep.
- Store gains an optional crypter: readState decrypts before unmarshal, writeState
  encrypts after marshal. A missing secret, a short blob, or a failed auth tag all
  fail closed (no silent empty/plaintext fallback).
- CLI: newAuthManager selects the backend from ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE; `zero auth`
  help documents it.

Tests: crypter round-trip + tamper, secret create/persist/0600/wrong-size,
store-through-encrypted (ciphertext on disk, round-trip, Status/Delete, tamper +
missing-secret fail-closed). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test
-race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass. Local run
check: device login under ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=encrypted-file writes a ciphertext
file (no plaintext token), .secret is 0600, and `zero auth status` reads it back.

* Address review feedback on encrypted token storage

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- newAuthManager: reject an unsupported ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE value instead of
  silently downgrading to plaintext. A mistyped non-empty value now fails fast
  ("invalid ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE ... (supported: encrypted-file)") so a user who
  believes encryption is on is never left writing plaintext.
- loadOrCreateSecret: fix the first-run TOCTOU race. os.Rename publishes by
  clobbering on POSIX, so two concurrent processes could each generate a secret
  and the loser would silently orphan every token it then encrypts. Create the
  secret exclusively (O_CREATE|O_EXCL); the loser adopts the winner's on-disk
  secret. Factored the read+size-validate into readSecretFile and dropped the
  now-unused clock plumbing from the crypter.
- encrypt_test: handle os.Stat / os.ReadFile errors before dereferencing the
  result (mode/index) so a real I/O failure surfaces instead of a panic.

Adds a test asserting an invalid ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE fails fast.

* oauth: retry the secret read when losing the first-run create race

CodeRabbit follow-up: the O_EXCL create path read the on-disk secret
immediately after EEXIST, but the winner may not have finished writing it
yet, so a loser could observe a short file and fail transiently. Retry the
read briefly (bounded) so concurrent first-run invocations converge on the
winner's secret. Adds a -race concurrency test asserting convergence.
2026-06-16 14:00:26 +05:30
KRATOS efb6b79164 web_search robustness + chat UX: collapse, clipboard, scroll-pin, proactive search (#218)
* web_search: fix #209 follow-ups (tolerant score, render gate, redaction, FQDN)

Verified-and-fixed defects from a review of #209:
  - Tolerant score decode (lenientScore): a stringified/odd/null "score" no longer
    makes json.Unmarshal discard the entire response; it degrades to absent.
  - Score render gate rounds first (>= 0.01) so tiny positives and negatives no
    longer print a noisy "score 0.00".
  - Domain-filter error now goes through redactWebSearchText, matching the other
    error paths.
  - Trailing-dot FQDN symmetry: "react.dev." and "react.dev" normalize the same
    on both the allowlist and result sides.

Left as-is (intended, tested): scheme-less host:port allowlist entries. Includes
mixed-type domains-array tests.

* web_search: only register the built-in tool when a backend is configured

When no search backend is set (ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BASE_URL / ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BACKEND),
CoreNetworkTools no longer offers the built-in web_search. Previously it was always
registered, so a model with an MCP search tool (e.g. Exa) would burn several calls
+ high-risk permission prompts on the built-in tool — which can only return
"no backend configured" — before falling back to the working MCP tool.

Now: no backend -> only web_fetch (+ any MCP search tool) is offered, so the model
uses the MCP search directly. A configured backend behaves exactly as before.

Tests: registry/web_search/specialist tests that asserted web_search is always in
CoreTools now configure a backend; added a test that it is omitted when none is set.

(Pre-existing, unrelated: internal/cli doctor/exec tests fail in the sandbox on
origin/main too — network/provider-dependent, not touched here.)

* tui: copy selected transcript text to the native OS clipboard

Selecting transcript text auto-copies on mouse release, but the copy went only
through OSC52 (ansi.SetSystemClipboard), which macOS Terminal.app doesn't support
at all and iTerm2 / some Windows Terminal builds have off by default — so the
selection silently never reached the clipboard.

Copy via the native clipboard (pbcopy / clip.exe / xclip) first, which works on
local terminals regardless of OSC52, and fall back to OSC52 for remote/SSH
sessions where no local clipboard utility is reachable. atotto/clipboard was
already in the module graph (indirect); promoted to a direct import — no new
dependency.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/tui test -race/staticcheck all pass.

* tui: collapse long tool output by default with click-to-expand

Long, noisy tool output (web-search / MCP / read dumps) flooded the transcript.
Now a tool result whose output exceeds the live body cap renders collapsed by
default — head + a "▸ N lines — click to expand" footer — and you click the card
(while it is live) to expand (▾) / collapse. Mirrors the existing reasoning-row
collapse, so collapsed rows also flush to scrollback clean.

Scoped to avoid hiding what matters:
  - diff tools (edit_file / apply_patch / write_file) never collapse — their body
    must stay reviewable (matches the deeper flush cap intent);
  - the uncapped detailed transcript view (Ctrl+O, bodyCap==0) never collapses —
    it still shows full output;
  - short output (<= cardBodyMaxLines) stays inline as before.

Reuses transcriptRow.expanded + the row toggle (toggleReasoningRow generalized to
toggleTranscriptRow); the card head is a clickable toggle line. Running tool
cards (spinner) are unchanged.

Tests: collapse/expand, short-output inline, diff tools never collapse, toggle,
and the head exposes a click toggle; existing diff + detailed-view tests updated.
Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/tui -race/staticcheck all clean.

* cli: fall back to a usable saved provider instead of re-running onboarding

If the active provider lacked a credential (e.g. it relies on an env var that
isn't set, or an OAuth login that isn't stored), the TUI forced first-run
onboarding on every launch — even when other saved providers were fully
configured. Each onboarding then appended yet another provider.

Now, when the active provider isn't usable, fall back to the first usable saved
provider (prefer a remote keyed one over a local endpoint) for the session, and
skip onboarding. Onboarding only runs when no configured provider is usable — a
genuinely fresh setup. Saved logins persist; switch the active provider with
`zero provider use <name>`.

Tests: firstUsableProvider prefers remote keyed, falls back to local, accepts a
keyless local proxy, and reports none-usable. Gates: gofmt/vet/build
(host+linux+windows)/staticcheck clean; the only failing cli tests
(doctor/exec, network-dependent) are pre-existing on origin/main.

* tui: hold the scroll position while output streams in

The chat viewport scroll offset is measured from the bottom, so when the
transcript grew (a streaming turn) the window followed the new bottom and yanked
the user off whatever they had scrolled up to read.

syncChatScroll now pins the viewport: while the user is scrolled up, it bumps the
offset by however many lines the body grew, so the absolute view holds where they
are reading; at the bottom (offset 0) it follows the tail as before. Hooked into
the single Update funnel; only the scrolled-up path renders the body, so the
common (at-bottom) case stays cheap.

Tests: pins by the growth delta while scrolled up; resets/follows at the bottom.
Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/tui -race/staticcheck clean.

* agent: search the web proactively instead of answering "I don't know"

When a web search/fetch tool is available and the user asks about something
external the model is unsure of or that may be current (a product, library,
company, price, version, recent event), the system prompt now tells it to search
and read results before answering, rather than replying that it doesn't know
without checking. Addresses the model saying "I don't know about that" until the
user explicitly asked it to search.

Tests: prompt includes the new guidance ("search the web and read"). Existing
prompt assertions use Contains, so the addition is non-breaking.

* tui: show clean labels for MCP tool cards (mcp_exa_web_search_exa → web search)

* agent: sharpen web-search guidance (disambiguate, refine, scale)

Strengthen the search rule so the model searches before answering about an
external entity/product/library/model/version/release it doesn't recognize,
doesn't assume the most common meaning of an ambiguous name (disambiguates by the
conversation's domain), and refines + re-searches when results look off-topic —
rather than confidently answering the wrong interpretation (e.g. reading "Fable 5"
as a video game instead of an AI model). Also: don't web-search timeless facts or
workspace-answerable questions (use the file tools), keep queries short, and scale
the number of searches to the question.

Tests: prompt includes the new guidance ("search the web before answering",
"do not recognize"). Existing assertions use Contains, so non-breaking.

* test: gofmt setup_fallback_test.go (comment alignment)

* Address review feedback on web_search + chat UX

Resolve CodeRabbit review comments on this PR:

- firstUsableProvider: skip a profile whose CatalogID no longer resolves
  *and* that has no explicit BaseURL (no endpoint → unusable). A stale
  CatalogID with a BaseURL still works as a custom endpoint and is kept.
- providerProfileIsLocal: classify by parsed URL hostname (exact
  localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1) instead of substring matching, so hosts
  like "notlocalhost.com" are no longer misread as local.
- lenientScore: reject non-finite scores (ParseFloat accepts "NaN"/"Inf")
  so the documented score filter actually holds and the renderer never
  emits a non-finite value.
- syncChatScroll: shift the pinned from-bottom offset by the signed line
  delta so the view also holds when the body shrinks (card collapse,
  transcript clear), clamped at zero; previously only growth was handled.
- copyTranscriptSelectionCmd: report "Copy failed" when both the native
  clipboard and the OSC52 fallback fail, instead of claiming success;
  keep the selection so the user can retry.
- Drop vestigial ZERO_WEBSEARCH_BACKEND test env: the native backend was
  removed (MCP path), so the var is read by no product code and the
  references misrepresented it as a config knob.

Adds tests for the local-host parsing, the catalog/BaseURL skip, and the
non-finite score rejection.
2026-06-16 13:47:08 +05:30
Anandan 2bcb85bfb3 Polish TUI title bar (#219)
* Polish TUI title bar

* Show PR diff stats in TUI title bar

Add a small PR status service that detects the active GitHub PR or GitLab merge request via gh/glab, computes diff stats against the PR base with git diff --shortstat, and publishes updates to the TUI.

Render the resulting +N -N #PR segment in the title bar next to the branch, linked to the PR URL, while keeping the composer footer unchanged.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

* Make submitted prompt bubble terminal-safe

Replace half-block top/bottom rows in submitted user prompts with background-filled padding rows. macOS Terminal renders the half-block glyphs as visible horizontal artifacts, while filled-space padding keeps the prompt bubble height without relying on ambiguous block glyph behavior.

Update selectable transcript rendering to use the same padding helper and remove the now-unused half-block theme style.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: git diff --check

* Address PR status review feedback
2026-06-16 13:28:28 +05:30
Anandan e1253c826c Polish assistant response transcript (#204)
* Polish assistant response transcript

* Keep copy feedback above composer
2026-06-15 19:28:02 +05:30
KRATOS f857c4afb4 feat(daemon): TLS remote bridge — authenticated network access to the daemon (#211)
* feat(daemon): TLS remote bridge — authenticated network access to the daemon

Add internal/daemon/remote: an OPT-IN, TLS-only network bridge on top of the
local daemon. A remote client drives the SAME SessionManager/Pool over the
network behind bearer-token auth, reusing the daemon's framing and dispatch
unchanged. The local Unix-socket daemon stays the default and is unchanged.

- Bridge: per accepted TLS connection, authenticate THEN hand to the daemon's
  control dispatch via the new Server.ServeConn seam — a remote session runs
  under the same sandbox/risk model as a local one (never bypasses it).
- Authenticator + TokenAuthenticator: constant-time bearer-token check, token
  from $ZERO_DAEMON_REMOTE_TOKEN or a file; optional attestation hook (no-op
  default). Auth happens before any control frame; failure closes the connection
  after a small backoff; tokens are never logged.
- RemoteClient (DialRemote): verified TLS dial (never InsecureSkipVerify) + auth
  handshake, then the existing daemon.Client via the new NewClientConn seam, so
  remote and local share one protocol.
- Fail-closed: TLS mandatory (refuses without cert/key), a configurable
  min-protocol-version floor, the 1 MiB frame cap reused, and a bounded
  concurrent-connection cap that refuses overflow.
- CLI: `zero daemon serve-remote --addr --tls-cert --tls-key`; `run`/`attach`
  gain `--remote <addr> [--token --ca-cert --server-name]`.

Daemon seams added (additive, behavior unchanged): Server.ServeConn,
NewClientConn. SessionLink (event POST) and git-bundle repo transfer are
documented follow-ups.

Tests cover auth accept/reject (env + file), TLS-required, cert verification,
version floor, run/status/attach round-trip, re-attach resumption, connection
cap, and ListenAndServeTLS/Close. Gates: gofmt / vet / build (host+linux+
windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) / govulncheck (0) / deadcode
(no new) all pass.

* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI

The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)

* remote: address CodeRabbit re-review (TLS dial + Close idempotency)

- client: replace the deprecated, non-cancellation-aware tls.DialWithDialer with
  a context-aware tls.Dialer.DialContext (resolves the golangci-lint noctx CI
  blocker; the context bounds the dial + TLS handshake).
- bridge: Close now clears b.listener under the lock, so a repeat Close is a
  no-op instead of returning a closed-listener error (matches its doc). Test
  asserts a double Close succeeds.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.
2026-06-15 18:48:07 +05:30
KRATOS bb7de29c80 feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + zero auth CLI (#210)
* feat(oauth): reusable provider OAuth engine + `zero auth` CLI

Add internal/oauth: a transport/identity-agnostic OAuth 2.0 engine that powers
provider login alongside the MCP-server OAuth zero already has. It is additive
and provider-neutral — NO providers, endpoints, or client identities are baked
into the binary; every provider is configured entirely via ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*
env vars, so the engine works with any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC server.

Engine (internal/oauth):
- PKCE (S256 mandatory; "plain" refused) + per-flow CSRF state.
- Authorization-code flow: BuildAuthorizationURL / ExchangeCode / Refresh, with
  an https-only token-endpoint guard (loopback exempt) and error bodies that
  carry only error/error_description (never token material).
- Loopback callback server: 127.0.0.1-only, OS-assigned port, single use, state
  verified, then closed.
- Device-authorization grant (RFC 8628): RequestDeviceCode + PollDeviceToken
  honoring authorization_pending / slow_down / interval / expiry (headless/SSH).
- RFC 8414 + OIDC discovery (issuer-driven endpoint resolution).
- Namespaced token store ("provider:<name>" / "mcp:<name>"), 0600, file-locked
  (ownership-aware), atomic writes, malformed-fails-closed; GetFresh (on-demand
  refresh) + Handle401 (forced refresh).
- Opt-in proactive RefreshScheduler.

CLI (zero auth):
- login <provider> [--device] [--scope ...], logout, status [provider],
  refresh <provider> [--watch]. Status/output never print token material.
- Registered in app.go dispatch + top-level help.

MCP OAuth (internal/mcp) is left byte-for-byte unchanged (zero regression);
sharing the engine with MCP and encrypted-at-rest/keyring storage are documented
follow-ups. Tests cover every path (PKCE, auth URL, https-guard + redaction,
exchange/refresh, loopback capture + state-mismatch + timeout, device pending/
slow_down/expired, store namespacing/0600/locking, provider env resolution,
manager login (loopback+device)/GetFresh/Handle401, scheduler). Gates: gofmt /
vet / build (host+linux+windows) / test -race / staticcheck (no new) /
govulncheck (0) / deadcode (no new) all pass.

* oauth: fix Windows smoke — use OS-appropriate path in store-path test

TestResolveStorePathHonorsOverride hardcoded a unix "/tmp/custom/tok.json"
literal, which is not absolute on Windows (no drive), so ResolveStorePath
correctly resolves it against the current drive and the verbatim comparison
failed (D:\tmp\custom\tok.json). The production code is correct; the test now
builds the override with filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ...) so it is absolute and
clean on every OS.

* oauth: address CodeRabbit review (11 findings)

Security / correctness:
- flow: caller-supplied ExtraAuthParams/extraParams can no longer override the
  reserved OAuth/PKCE fields (state, redirect_uri, code_challenge[_method],
  response_type, client_id) — e.g. forcing method=plain.
- device: a device-authorization response without expires_in now gets a bounded
  default lifetime (fail closed), and the poll loop re-checks expiry AFTER the
  interval sleep so it never polls past the deadline (e.g. after slow_down).
- lock: handle WriteString/Close errors on the token lock file — a partial write
  no longer strands an undeletable lock.
- store: a non-nil env map is now authoritative (hermetic) — a controlled map
  never falls back to ambient ZERO_OAUTH_* / HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
- scheduler: a transient loadForKey error backs off and retries (bounded) instead
  of permanently stopping proactive refresh.
- cli auth: reject flags a subcommand does not accept (e.g. login --watch,
  status --device) and reject empty --scope values — fail fast.

Lint blockers:
- manager: restructured the discovery fallback so the non-nil-err branch no longer
  returns nil (nilerr).
- providers: dropped the ineffectual flow initializer (ineffassign).

Tests: assert Save/Load errors in the scheduler test; the slow_down device test
no longer depends on post-expiry polling. Added tests for reserved-param
stripping, hermetic env, device default-expiry, and CLI flag validation. The
store-path test was already made OS-portable in the Windows-smoke fix.

Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/
govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* swarm: de-flake TestMailboxConcurrentSends on Windows CI

The 200-way concurrent-send stress test inherited from the swarm package timed
out on Windows CI (103/200 sends hit the 10s lock timeout): the lock's 20ms
retry sleep starves waiters when Windows file ops are slow under heavy
contention. Shorten the retry to 2ms (a freed lock is re-acquired promptly) and
raise the test's lock timeout to 60s so a legitimately-slow CI never times a send
out. Passes repeatedly under -race. (CI de-flake of a test that surfaced on
#210's Windows smoke; functionally unrelated to the OAuth changes.)

* oauth: address CodeRabbit re-review (4 findings)

- loopback (security): NewLoopbackListener refuses an empty CSRF state — an empty
  state would match a callback carrying no state at all, defeating the check.
- device (correctness): RequestDeviceCode now sends client_secret when set, so a
  confidential client authenticates on the device-authorization endpoint too
  (consistent with the token poll).
- cli auth: document --watch in the help Flags section.
- scheduler test: assert the seed Save error instead of ignoring it.

Also scrubbed a stray third-party reference from a loopback.go comment.
Tests added: empty-state rejection, device client_secret is sent. Gates:
gofmt/vet/build/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new)
all pass.

* mcp(oauth): delegate the OAuth engine to internal/oauth (dedup) (#212)

OAuth Phase 2: the MCP OAuth code now reuses the shared internal/oauth engine
instead of carrying its own copy of the transport/identity-agnostic primitives.
internal/mcp/oauth.go drops ~110 lines (526 -> 418): newPKCE, newState,
discoverAuthorizationServer, the authorize-URL builder, token exchange/refresh,
the token-response parser, and joinWellKnown now delegate to internal/oauth.

Behavior-preserving: MCP keeps its own OAuthConfig/StoredToken types,
LoginOptions/Login orchestration, loopback handling, registerClient (dynamic
client registration — not part of the shared engine), CLI output, and on-disk
token format (mcp-oauth-tokens.json, raw server-name keys). The existing mcp
oauth tests pass UNCHANGED. The only behavioral delta is a hardening inherited
from the shared engine: the token endpoint must be https (loopback exempt) —
a credential is no longer sent to a plaintext non-loopback endpoint.

Stacks on #210 (the internal/oauth package). Gates: gofmt/vet/build(host+
linux+windows)/test -race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new
vs base) all pass; `zero mcp oauth status` output is identical.
2026-06-15 18:47:43 +05:30
de5d402e1f web_search: add domains allowlist + score field (#209)
* web_search: add domains allowlist + score field

The web_search tool now accepts an optional 'domains' array that filters
results to the listed hostnames before they reach the model. This is the
zero-only prompt-injection defense that none of the major CLIs ship: a
model that the user has constrained to a known-good set of domains cannot
be tricked into fetching arbitrary pages from search results.

Also surfaces the provider's optional 'score' field on each result row
when present (zero/absent scores are not rendered, to keep the common
case tidy). The 'score' field is parsed from the generic JSON shape
already understood by the httpSearchBackend.

Filters are applied after the search returns, before the empty-result
short-circuit, so a non-empty allowlist that ate every hit surfaces as a
clear 'no results matched domains' error rather than a misleading
'no results' message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* web_search: fail closed on all-invalid domains, strip :port on canonicalize

CodeRabbit review fixes:

1. canonicalizeWebSearchHost: switch parsed.Host -> parsed.Hostname() so
   an allowlist entry like 'https://react.dev:443/path' normalizes the same
   as 'react.dev'. The previous code left ':443' in the string, which
   silently broke every match against a result URL on the default port.

2. stringListArgWebSearch: return a 'provided' bool so Run can distinguish
   'no allowlist' from 'allowlist that normalized to empty'. The previous
   code returned len(domains)==0 in both cases, and Run fell through to
   the unfiltered path — defeating the prompt-injection defense the
   parameter exists to provide. Now we error fail-closed.

3. Tests:
   - TestWebSearchDomainsFilterRejectsAllInvalidInputs: locks in the
     fail-closed contract for all-whitespace, all-empty, embedded-space,
     and mixed-invalid allowlists.
   - TestWebSearchDomainsFilterAcceptsHostPort: locks in the
     Hostname()-strips-port fix for the scheme'd case and asserts that
     scheme-less 'host:port' is rejected.
   - TestCanonicalizeWebSearchHostStripsPort: the direct unit-level
     regression test for canonicalizeWebSearchHost.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-06-15 18:27:21 +05:30
KRATOS 9ddef0e957 feat(swarm): multi-agent swarm over the specialist sub-agent (#207)
* feat(swarm): multi-agent swarm over the specialist sub-agent

Add internal/swarm so an orchestrator can spawn and coordinate MULTIPLE
specialist members concurrently under one team, communicate via per-agent
mailboxes, hand work off, and adopt orphaned tasks. Additive and opt-in: the
single Task tool is unchanged; swarm tools only act when invoked.

- Registry/Definition: agent roster (built-in teammate/subagent + user-defined).
- Mailbox: per-team/per-agent JSON inbox, owner-only 0600, file-locked with
  stale-break, size-capped, path-confined, and malformed-fails-closed.
- Coordinator: in-memory task registry with terminal-state guards and stable
  per-agent colors.
- Team: bounded concurrent members per team with a FIFO overflow queue that
  drains one-per-slot.
- Lifecycle: spawn / handoff / orphan-adoption with bounded relaunch on
  temporary failures; members run under the Swarm's base context so they
  outlive the spawn call.
- Tools: swarm_spawn, swarm_send, swarm_inbox, swarm_status, swarm_handoff,
  swarm_collect.
- Wiring: each member is launched through specialist.Executor and inherits the
  orchestrator's model + permission mode (never widened) and runs under the same
  sandbox/policy. Mailbox state lives under the workspace so writes fall within
  the sandbox write rules. Swarm lifetime is paired with the specialist runtime.

Scheduling (cron/wakeup) and daemon-pool-backed members are deferred follow-ups.

* swarm: address CodeRabbit review (7 findings)

- coordinator: SetStatus rejects unknown TaskStatus values (fail closed) so a
  task can never enter a state Summarize/lifecycle don't reason about.
- permission inheritance ENFORCED end-to-end (was resolved but discarded):
  thread PermissionMode through specialist.TaskRunOptions -> BuildArgs/
  BuildResumeArgs. A headless specialist child now runs "--auto high" (unsafe)
  ONLY when the parent is unsafe or no mode is given (preserves the Task tool's
  behavior); any other parent mode yields non-unsafe "--auto low", so a member
  never gains more authority than its orchestrator. Also fixed the swarm
  permission vocabulary to the real agent runtime modes (ask/spec-draft/auto/
  unsafe) instead of TUI display names, and the launcher substitutes "auto" for
  an empty mode so a member can't fall into the empty-means-high path.
- mailbox: symlink-aware confinement (EvalSymlinks) rejects an inbox dir that
  resolves outside BaseDir; dirs tightened to 0700 even if pre-existing with
  broad perms; lock release is ownership-token-aware so a stale-broken writer
  can't delete a newer writer's lock (split-brain).
- member: recover panics inside a member goroutine -> fails that member only,
  never crashes the orchestrator.
- tools: collapse() truncates on rune boundaries (no invalid UTF-8).

Tests added for every fix. Existing specialist behavior is unchanged (empty
PermissionMode keeps --auto high). Gates: gofmt/vet/build (host+linux)/test
-race/staticcheck(no new)/govulncheck(0)/deadcode(no new) all pass.

* swarm: address review round 2 (Windows lock + non-blocking notes)

Blocking (Vasanth): mailbox acquireLock now treats Windows ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
/ ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION as lock-contended (retry/wait) instead of a fatal
error, via a platform-aware isLockContended (lock_windows.go / lock_other.go).
A contended lock under Windows file-sharing semantics no longer fails a
send/read spuriously. TestMailboxConcurrentSends raised to 200 goroutines with a
10s lock timeout and now asserts zero send failures (regression guard).

Non-blocking notes addressed:
- Removed third-party reference-project names from doc comments (clean-room +
  provider-neutral); the Go code is original.
- Documented the inbox-file size bound's ×2 (pretty-print overhead) constant.
- Documented Send's O(N) rewrite cost + when to switch to append-only.
- permissionRank: spec-draft now ranks below ask (it never widens authority).
- Documented watch's per-member-id retry binding (Member.ID == MemberSpec.ID).
- handoff Safety.Reason now also mentions the inbox write.

Gates: gofmt · vet · build (host+linux+windows) · test -race · staticcheck
(no new) · govulncheck (0) · deadcode (no new) all pass.
2026-06-15 15:10:21 +05:30
KRATOS ba8fbb8b71 feat(sandbox): complete sandbox breadth — WSL fallback + opt-in MITM TLS inspection (#206)
* feat(sandbox): complete sandbox breadth — WSL fallback + opt-in MITM TLS inspection

Adds the two remaining sandbox features on top of the strict fail-closed core
(the other four — SOCKS5 egress, re-entrancy guard, fine-grained path lists,
sandbox-aware ripgrep — already shipped and are untouched). Both new features are
opt-in and the DEFAULT policy is unchanged (enforce + network deny, InspectTLS
off; AllowPolicyOnlyRunner keeps its existing default).

1) WSL detection + safe fail-closed fallback
   - parseWSL/detectWSL (wsl.go + wsl_linux.go reading /proc/version; wsl_other.go
     stub) classify WSL/WSL2.
   - SelectBackend: on Linux without bubblewrap, if running under WSL it selects a
     new BackendWSL instead of silently degrading to a plain policy-only runner.
   - BuildCommandPlan(BackendWSL): FAILS CLOSED unless Policy.AllowPolicyOnlyRunner
     is set (errWSLPolicyOnlyDisabled explains how to opt in). When allowed it runs
     the policy-only fallback that still routes egress through the filtering proxy
     (Backend.ProxyEgress => EnforcesScopedEgress, best-effort HTTP+SOCKS), sets
     ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 / ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND=wsl, and records an auditable
     least-privilege downgrade note (CommandPlan.Notes). Never runs unsandboxed
     silently.

2) Optional gated MITM TLS inspection (Policy.InspectTLS, default OFF)
   - Off => the egress proxy is a pure CONNECT passthrough, byte-for-byte
     unchanged (no CA generated).
   - On => the proxy terminates TLS toward the sandboxed client with an EPHEMERAL,
     locally generated ECDSA CA (mitm.go), minting per-host leaves on the fly, so
     it can re-check the DECRYPTED request Host through the SAME
     authorize()/domainAllowed() gate (deny-wins, empty allowlist => deny) — MITM
     widens visibility, never authority. The UPSTREAM dial is ALWAYS validated
     against the system roots (never InsecureSkipVerify; tests inject a known root
     pool to exercise validation). The CA's PUBLIC cert is written owner-only and
     surfaced via ZERO_SANDBOX_CA_CERT; MITM only runs on backends that already
     permit reading it (sandbox-exec allows file-read; WSL shares the host fs), so
     no new bind path is introduced. Trust implications documented loudly on the
     field. (No "raw passthrough only" flag exists in zero, so the mutual-exclusion
     case is N/A.)

Tests: parseWSL table; WSL fail-closed-without-opt-in and policy-only-with-proxy
(markers + ProxyEnvWithSocks) + deny-mode markers-no-proxy; MITM passthrough-by-
default (no CA), CA mints a chaining leaf, full TLS-terminate-and-forward of an
allowlisted host (upstream validated via an explicit root pool), and decrypted-
Host deny. Gates: gofmt, go vet (host + GOOS=linux), go build (host/linux/
windows), go test (incl -race), staticcheck (no new, host + linux), govulncheck
(0), deadcode -test=false under GOOS=linux (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: address review on #206 (WSL + MITM)

- mitm: bound the upstream transport's TCP connect (DialContext 30s) so a
  blackholed upstream can't park a goroutine; disable upstream HTTP/2 and
  normalize the response to HTTP/1.1 before writing to the HTTP/1.1 client.
- mitm: mint leaves for the AUTHORIZED CONNECT host (not arbitrary client SNI)
  and cap the leaf cache (512) so SNI churn can't drive unbounded keygen/memory.
- mitm: re-check the decrypted Host with the FULL authorize gate
  (authorizeTarget) so a DomainPrompt-allowed host is honored consistently with
  the CONNECT check, not just domainAllowed.
- runner (WSL): preserve the caller's env in the direct-run WSL plan (it is not
  OS-wrapped), appending the sandbox markers last; the downgrade note says
  "with proxy egress" only when a proxy was actually started.
- tests: WSL caller-env preservation; deny-mode asserts no HTTP/HTTPS/ALL_PROXY
  leak + the downgrade note; MITM forward asserts HTTP 200; mitmConnect sets an
  I/O deadline.

Gates: gofmt, vet (host+linux), build (host/linux/windows), test (incl -race),
staticcheck (no new), govulncheck (0), deadcode -test=false (GOOS=linux) no new.
2026-06-15 11:38:14 +05:30
Vasanth TandClaude 265aa52ba7 Polish /permissions command output into a bounded card (#205)
* Convert /permissions output to bounded command card

Replace status: ok style with commandCard format used by /tools and /context.

Summary shows mode and grant count; grants render as bullet rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* Address CodeRabbit nitpick: add error path test for /permissions

Adds TestPermissionsCommandCardHandlesGrantListError and a grantLister

interface so tests can inject a stub store without a real file path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* Fix gofmt formatting in permissions card

Tabs alignment only; no functional change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-06-15 11:37:51 +05:30
KRATOS 135e3c5657 feat(daemon): zero daemon — worker pool + session supervisor over a local control socket (#203)
* feat(daemon): add `zero daemon` — worker pool + session supervisor over a local control socket

Adds internal/daemon + `zero daemon start|stop|status|run|attach`: a long-running
local service that supervises a pool of headless `zero exec` workers and routes
multiple agent sessions to them over an owner-only Unix-domain control socket.
Additive — interactive and one-shot exec are unchanged.

Reuses zero's building blocks:
- internal/background: ConfigureChildProcessGroup (process-group setup) +
  TerminateProcess (cross-platform terminate) for worker kill/drain. The pool
  does its own os/exec and uses background only for those helpers.
- internal/streamjson: the worker speaks stream-json on stdout; the daemon
  forwards those lines to clients.
- internal/cli exec: a worker is `zero exec --output-format stream-json`.

Pieces (reimplemented in Go from a reference daemon):
- protocol.go: framed control codec — 4-byte BE length + 1 kind byte, 1 MiB cap,
  JSON control messages, version negotiation.
- pool.go + backoff.go: bounded worker pool — at-least-once dispatch with
  exponential backoff+jitter retry capped by MaxAttempts, EXIT_TEMPFAIL(75)/
  EXIT_PERMANENT(76) handling, graceful drain + kill-timeout. zero's exec is
  one-shot, so workers are on-demand (one session per worker = the lease), not
  warm long-lived slots (a persistent worker mode is a follow-up).
- session.go: SessionManager — sessionID->worker routing, lease (one active
  request per worker), queue when the pool is full, per-session output buffer for
  attach + metrics.
- server.go + lock.go + socket.go + paths.go: single-instance PID-file lock with
  stale-lock (dead-PID) recovery, status file, owner-only socket, accept loop;
  cleans up lock/socket/status on exit.
- launcher.go: production worker launcher. client.go: control-socket client.

Security model:
- Control socket is LOCAL-ONLY (AF_UNIX loopback file, never a TCP port) and
  owner-only: socket 0600 + parent dir 0700 on POSIX (Windows relies on the
  per-user profile ACL; a dedicated pipe ACL is a follow-up).
- Workers stay sandboxed: the launcher SCRUBS the sandbox re-entrancy markers
  (ZERO_SANDBOXED / ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND) from each worker's env so the worker
  re-establishes its OWN sandbox instead of inheriting a pass-through plan, while
  propagating the rest of the policy config/env. The daemon never bypasses the
  sandbox.
- Control frames over the 1 MiB cap are rejected before allocation.

Robustness: a crashed worker never takes down the daemon (backoff+jitter retry,
MaxAttempts cap, EXIT_PERMANENT stops retry); drain gives a grace window then
force-kills stragglers; a stale lock from an unclean exit is reclaimed.

Out of scope (follow-up): remote session-linking; warm pre-spawned persistent
workers; Windows named-pipe ACL.

Tests: protocol round-trip + oversize/unknown-kind rejection; backoff bounds;
pool spawn/retry-backoff/permanent/cap/queue/drain; session lease/route/queue/
attach; lock single-instance + stale recovery; launcher env-scrub (incl. an
end-to-end check that the spawned worker process receives scrubbed env); server
e2e start->run->stream-json->status->attach->stop with a fake worker; CLI
usage/validation/not-running paths. Live-verified start/status/stop (0600 socket,
0700 dir, file cleanup). Platform files behind explicit //go:build tags.

* daemon: address review — help listing, extra-arg rejection, lock write error, bounded sessions

- cli/app.go: list `daemon` in `zero --help` so the command is discoverable.
- cli/daemon: `stop`/`status` reject extra arguments; `attach` rejects more than
  one session id (fail fast on typos instead of silently ignoring tokens).
- daemon/lock: check the PID fmt.Fprintf error — a partial/failed write would
  leave a malformed lock file that another process reads as stale and wrongly
  reclaims, breaking the single-instance guarantee; on write failure remove the
  file and return the error.
- daemon/session: bound the registry with MaxSessions (default 256) — evict the
  oldest FINISHED sessions once past the cap so a long-running daemon doesn't
  accumulate sessions without limit; running/queued sessions are never evicted, so
  attach-after-finish for recent sessions is preserved.

Tests: CLI extra-arg rejection; finished-over-cap eviction + running-never-evicted.
Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl -race), staticcheck (no new), govulncheck (0),
deadcode (no new), GOOS=linux+windows cross-compile.
2026-06-14 22:16:37 +05:30
KRATOS 355b76cc78 sandbox: exempt first-party network tools from the Evaluate network-deny too (#202)
Follow-up to the EnforceToolNetwork change: web_search/web_fetch were still
hard-denied under NetworkDeny because the engine-level gate in Evaluate
(netMode==NetworkDeny && risk has "network") fired BEFORE the tool's
RunWithSandbox/NetworkHostAllowed ever ran. The earlier change only relaxed
NetworkHostAllowed, so the user-facing path (Evaluate -> registry) still blocked
the tool with "network access is blocked by sandbox policy".

Fix: Evaluate now skips the network-deny for a request that declares
SideEffectNetwork (the first-party in-process tools, web_search/web_fetch) when
EnforceToolNetwork is off — mirroring the NetworkHostAllowed exemption so the two
gates agree. A SHELL command merely classified as network (SideEffectShell) is
NOT exempt, so shell egress stays blocked under deny. EnforceToolNetwork restores
the strict deny for the tools.

Tests: TestEvaluateExemptsNetworkToolsFromDenyByDefault covers the full path
(default-exempt, granted->allow, EnforceToolNetwork->deny, shell stays denied);
the two existing gate tests now opt into EnforceToolNetwork to keep testing the
strict path. Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new),
govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).
2026-06-14 20:36:51 +05:30
Anandan 6a9f44a716 Polish TUI transcript and reasoning display (#200)
* Polish TUI transcript and reasoning display

* Address provider and transcript review fixes

* Gate inline think tag parsing

* Cover disabled think tag parsing config
2026-06-14 18:55:18 +05:30
Vasanth T e1f1b111a1 Add command dashboard cards (#201)
* Add context command dashboard card

* Render tools command as dashboard card

* Render command cards as styled TUI cards

* Fix command card action rendering

* fix: harden command card edge cases
2026-06-14 18:34:46 +05:30
Vasanth T 284a948f00 feat: add doctor fix flow (#198)
* feat: add doctor fix flow

* fix: animate doctor connectivity status

* fix: make doctor report problem first

* fix: address doctor review feedback
2026-06-14 17:54:00 +05:30
KRATOS 671af594fb feat(sandbox): harden internal/sandbox — re-entrancy guard, SOCKS5 egress, sandbox-aware search, fine-grained path lists (#199)
* feat(sandbox): harden internal/sandbox with four opt-in capabilities

All four are off by default and fail closed; existing behavior is unchanged
when the new policy fields are empty / ZERO_SANDBOXED is unset.

1. Re-entrancy guard — ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 marks every wrapped command; a nested
   BuildCommandPlan returns a pass-through plan (no double bwrap/sandbox-exec,
   no second egress proxy). New: EnvSandboxed, IsAlreadySandboxed().

2. SOCKS5 egress — the scoped-egress proxy also serves SOCKS5 CONNECT on a
   second loopback port through the SAME authorize()/domainAllowed() gate.
   ProxyEnvWithSocks points ALL_PROXY at socks5://<addr>; HTTP(S)_PROXY stay on
   the HTTP listener; the sandbox-exec profile allows both proxy ports.
   Bubblewrap scoped still collapses to deny.

3. Sandbox-aware search — ReadExclusionGlobs(policy, scope) returns ripgrep
   --glob '!<pat>' for DenyRead subtrees; grep/glob skip read-denied subtrees
   at walk time via Engine.ReadPathExcluded/ReadDirExcluded when sandboxed.

4. Fine-grained path lists — Policy.AllowRead/DenyRead/AllowWrite/DenyWrite.
   Read = deny-then-allow (more-specific AllowRead re-includes); Write =
   DenyWrite > workspace/scope > AllowWrite > deny. AllowWrite is reflected in
   the OS write binds; DenyWrite is emitted as sandbox-exec deny rules. Each
   entry is home-expanded, made absolute, and symlink-resolved.

Tests: internal/sandbox/{reentrancy,egress_socks,pathlists}_test.go and
internal/tools/read_exclusions_test.go.
Gates: gofmt, go vet, go build, go test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new
findings), govulncheck (0), deadcode -test=false (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: address review — SOCKS5 method negotiation + cache read-exclusion roots

- egress_socks: respect SOCKS5 method negotiation (RFC 1928). The proxy now
  inspects the client's offered methods and replies 0xFF ("no acceptable
  methods") when no-auth was not offered, instead of forcing no-auth.
- pathlists/engine: resolve DenyRead/AllowRead roots ONCE per search walk via a
  new ReadExclusions matcher (Engine.ReadExclusions), replacing the per-path
  ReadPathExcluded/ReadDirExcluded that re-ran Abs/EvalSymlinks for every visited
  path during a grep/glob walk.

Re-entrancy guard left as-is by design: ZERO_SANDBOXED is an internal marker set
only on commands zero wraps; cross-process re-entrancy detection legitimately
relies on the inherited env, and a manually-exported flag is a self-opt-out, not
an external bypass.

Tests: SOCKS no-acceptable-methods rejection; nested-AllowRead descent via the
matcher. Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new
findings), govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: fix windows smoke test + symlink-resolve DirExcluded prefix

- pathlists_test: TestSandboxExecProfileEmitsDenyWriteRule now builds the
  expected deny clause via sandboxProfileString(secret), so it matches the
  profile's own escaping (Windows doubles backslashes). Fixes the
  windows-latest smoke failure; macOS/Linux unaffected (slash paths, no-op
  escaping).
- pathlists: ReadExclusions.DirExcluded now EvalSymlinks-resolves the candidate
  path before the nested-AllowRead prefix check, matching the resolution applied
  to allowRoots — otherwise a denied dir reached THROUGH a symlink fails to match
  a nested AllowRead root and is wrongly skipped, dropping a re-included subtree.
  Added TestDirExcludedResolvesSymlinkPrefix (skips where symlinks are
  unavailable).

Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new findings),
govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: strengthen re-entrancy guard with a corroborating backend marker

Addresses review feedback that the re-entrancy guard trusted a single ambient
env var. IsAlreadySandboxed now requires BOTH correlated markers that
sandboxEnvironment sets together on every wrapped command — ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 AND
a non-empty ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND (new EnvSandboxBackend const) — so a lone
stray/hand-exported ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 no longer forces an unsandboxed
pass-through. Pass-through (direct) plans set neither marker, so genuine nesting
still detected and double-wrapping still avoided.

Tests updated: TestIsAlreadySandboxed now asserts each marker alone is
insufficient and both together are required; the re-entrancy and wrapping plan
tests set/clear both markers explicitly.

Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new findings),
govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: don't subject first-party web tools to the network policy by default

The sandbox was reported as too strict: web_search (and web_fetch) were blocked
with "network access is disabled by the sandbox policy" because the default
policy is network=deny and the in-process web tools were gated by the same
NetworkHostAllowed check as the sandboxed shell's egress.

That network policy exists to confine the sandboxed SHELL's egress, which these
in-process tools don't use. New Policy.EnforceToolNetwork (off by default) makes
NetworkHostAllowed exempt web_search/web_fetch unless an operator opts in. The
sandboxed-shell egress decision (Evaluate / effectiveNetworkMode) is unchanged,
and the tools keep their own SSRF/private-IP, port, redirect, and redaction
safeguards. Set EnforceToolNetwork to hold the tools to the allow/scoped/deny
policy as before.

Tests: engine default-exempt + enforced-table cases; web_search default-allows
and enforced-when-flag; web_fetch enforced cases set the flag. Gates: gofmt, vet,
build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new findings), govulncheck (0),
deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: re-review fixes — disabled policy inert; path lists independent of EnforceWorkspace

- engine: ReadExclusions() / ReadExclusionGlobs() now return inert results under
  ModeDisabled, so a disabled policy never filters grep/glob (parity with
  Evaluate, which already allows everything when disabled).
- engine/pathlists: the fine-grained path lists (DenyRead/DenyWrite, with
  AllowRead/AllowWrite) now apply in Evaluate whenever the sandbox is enforcing,
  independent of EnforceWorkspace — matching the grep/glob path that already
  honors DenyRead directly. The workspace boundary (scope.validate) stays gated
  by EnforceWorkspace via a param threaded through validatePathWithPolicy /
  validateWritePath; DenyWrite wins regardless.
- reentrancy_test: TestSandboxEnvironmentMarksSandboxed now asserts BOTH
  correlated markers (ZERO_SANDBOXED=1 and ZERO_SANDBOX_BACKEND) so dropping
  either would fail the test.

Tests added: path lists enforced with EnforceWorkspace off; ReadExclusions inert
under ModeDisabled. Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck
(no new findings), govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: enforce path lists even without a workspace root

Re-review follow-up: the Evaluate path-validation loop was still guarded by
request.WorkspaceRoot != "", so an engine built without a workspace root skipped
DenyRead/DenyWrite/AllowRead/AllowWrite even for absolute paths. The loop now
runs unconditionally; the workspace boundary (scope.validate) stays gated on
having a root (enforceWorkspace = EnforceWorkspace && WorkspaceRoot != ""), while
the path lists match absolute paths regardless. An unanchorable relative path
(no workspace root) fails closed when anything is configured to enforce, and is a
no-op otherwise (unchanged from prior behavior).

Test: TestEvaluatePathListsWithoutWorkspaceRoot. Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test
(incl. -race), staticcheck (no new findings), govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new
unreachable funcs).

* sandbox: base no-workspace fail-closed on normalized (enforceable) path lists

policyHasPathLists now resolves the lists (resolvePolicyPaths/
resolveWriteRootPaths) instead of counting raw config, matching how the rest of
the file normalizes them. A typo or non-existent entry (dropped during
resolution) therefore no longer makes validatePathWithPolicy fail-close every
relative request when there is no workspace root.

Gates: gofmt, vet, build, test (incl. -race), staticcheck (no new findings),
govulncheck (0), deadcode (no new unreachable funcs).
2026-06-14 17:37:40 +05:30
Vasanth T 7153ec7a7d feat: add TUI diagnostics center (#197) 2026-06-14 13:18:43 +05:30
KRATOS 73eb8d3376 Solidify sandbox: harden command analysis + wire/clean dormant policy surfaces (#196)
* Harden sandbox command risk by wiring the AST analyzer

The AST-based command analyzer (sandbox/analyzer.go) was built and tested but never
reached at runtime — the live risk classifier used only the regex detectors. Wire
AnalyzeCommand into classifyWithScope as a second opinion. It walks the parsed shell tree,
so it catches destructive/network programs the regexes miss (shred, fdisk, parted; telnet,
ftp, sftp; and commands hidden behind sudo/env wrappers or a sh -c launcher) and flags an
unparseable (obfuscated) script as elevated risk.

Purely additive — it only ADDs risk categories, so a benign, parseable command classifies
exactly as before, and a program name inside a quoted argument is not flagged (AST
precision). Revives the dormant analyzer (sandbox unreachable funcs 13 -> 6). New tests cover
the regex-missed destructive/network programs, nested launchers, the unparseable signal, the
quoted-name no-false-positive case, and benign-stays-clean. Full suite + -race green.

* Wire sandbox auto-allow-bash env opt-in; drop orphaned batch-autonomy

Two dormant sandbox surfaces resolved:

- WIRE: AutoAllowBashWhenSandboxed was enforced live (engine.go) but never set — no
  config field, and the ZERO_SANDBOX_AUTO_ALLOW_BASH env overlay (ApplyAutoAllowBashEnv)
  was unwired, so the documented opt-in did nothing. Wire it through the central policy
  builder (applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy, used by all engine constructions). Fail-safe: only
  turns ON when the env is truthy, only honored when the shell sandbox is actually active,
  default stays prompt, and an explicit config opt-in is preserved. Revives
  AutoAllowBashEnvEnabled + ApplyAutoAllowBashEnv; adds a policy-builder test.

- DELETE: RequiredAutonomyForBatch/riskToAutonomy (batch.go + test) had no consumer — the
  agent loop enforces autonomy per tool call (loop.go), so a batch-ceiling helper was
  speculative and redundant. Wiring it would have meant fabricating a batch model.

Sandbox now has no dormant funcs; the only remaining unreachable entries are the
cross-platform seccomp pair (unixSocketBlockFilter is live on Linux; ApplyUnixSocketBlock
is the intentional non-Linux no-op stub).

* Assert risk level (and add wrapper cases) in AST analyzer tests

Per review (Vasanth + CodeRabbit): the AST hardening tests checked only the risk category,
not the escalation level, so a regression that downgraded destructive/network shell commands
while preserving the category would slip through. Assert risk.Level too — Critical for
destructive/network, High for unparseable — matching the pattern used throughout the file.
Add sudo/env wrapper cases (sudo/env shred, sudo telnet) to cover effectiveProgram's wrapper
unwrapping.
2026-06-14 13:13:16 +05:30
Vasanth T 0444eb0e6f feat: add backend doctor diagnostics (#194) 2026-06-14 11:57:10 +05:30
KRATOS b1ab01f53f Hooks management command + build & supply-chain hardening (#193)
* Bump toolchain to go1.26.4 to clear reachable stdlib CVEs

go.mod pinned toolchain go1.24.13, whose bundled standard library has 9
govulncheck-reachable CVEs (crypto/tls KeyUpdate DoS, net/http2 loop, crypto/x509 x3,
net, net/url, os, net/textproto). CI and release build via go-version-file: go.mod, so
shipped binaries inherited them.

Bumping the toolchain directive to go1.26.4 clears all nine — govulncheck ./... now
reports 0 reachable (minimum that clears them is go1.25.11; go1.26.4 matches the team's
local Go). The go directive stays at 1.24.2 (minimum language version). Verified:
go build/vet/gofmt clean, full go test ./... green.

* Add govulncheck CI gate and SHA-pin GitHub Actions

- ci.yml: new 'security' job runs govulncheck as a hard gate (fails on a reachable
  vulnerability; passes now that the toolchain is bumped) plus an advisory deadcode step
  that surfaces dormant code without blocking.
- Pin every GitHub Action to a full commit SHA (checkout, upload-artifact, github-script)
  with a version comment, across all four workflows — previously only setup-go was pinned,
  leaving the mutable v4/v7 tags as a supply-chain risk.

* Add hooks management command (add/remove/enable/disable)

Wires the previously-dormant hooks.ConfigStore (10 unreachable funcs -> 0) into the CLI:

  zero hooks add <id> --event <event> --command <cmd> [--name --description --matcher --arg --user --json]
  zero hooks remove|enable|disable <id> [--user --json]

Writes the project hook config by default (<cwd>/.zero/hooks.json) or the user config with
--user, reusing the store's locking + atomic writes + validation (normalizeDefinition). New
hooks are enabled; state is managed via enable/disable. JSON output is secret-scrubbed via
redaction. Mirrors the existing 'zero mcp add/remove/enable/disable' shape. Covered by
add/remove/toggle round-trip, validation, unknown-event, and JSON-redaction tests.

* Fix govulncheck CI job: pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain

go run govulncheck@latest selected the toolchain from govulncheck's own go.mod
(downgrading to go1.25.11), which then could not load our go1.26-requiring packages
(fips140only_go1.26.go), failing the security job. Resolve GOTOOLCHAIN from go.mod's
toolchain line so govulncheck and deadcode both run under go1.26.4.

* Address review: harden CI checkout, pin tool versions, validate hook event

CodeRabbit findings on #193:
- ci.yml: persist-credentials: false on all checkout steps (smoke/performance/security)
  — these jobs run repo code and never push, so don't keep the token in git config.
- ci.yml: pin [email protected] and [email protected].0 instead of @latest, so the security
  gate is deterministic and not subject to supply-chain drift.
- hooks: add exported IsValidEvent/KnownEvents (single source); parseEvent reuses it, and
  'zero hooks add' now rejects an invalid --event with a usage error at parse time instead
  of falling through to the Upsert app-error crash path.
2026-06-14 11:56:29 +05:30
Vasanth T 6895cbb4aa feat: add backend lifecycle status command (#192) 2026-06-14 10:57:25 +05:30
KRATOS e0dd67a4da Wire LSP diagnostics into self-correct (exec + TUI) (#191)
* Wire LSP diagnostics into headless --self-correct

newExecSelfCorrector now backs the --self-correct loop with both halves: the
workspace test plan AND an lsp.Manager-based diagnostics checker (IncludeLSP=true).
The manager is lazy (Manager.Check degrades a missing language server to nil,nil),
and a deferred cleanup shuts it down at run end, terminating any spawned sessions.

This revives the internal/lsp client (44 -> 3 unreachable funcs); it was dead
because the only consumer passed a nil checker with IncludeLSP=false.

Add TestManagerCheckRealGopls: drives NewManager -> Check against a real gopls and
asserts a real diagnostic; skips when gopls is absent, so it stays CI-safe.

* Wire self-correct into the interactive TUI (on by default)

runAgentWithOptions now builds a SelfCorrector for every turn, so post-edit
verification (workspace test plan + LSP diagnostics) runs by default in the TUI.
The spec-draft planning path is excluded, matching exec. A per-turn lsp.Manager
is created and torn down when the run returns. Auto-fix vs report-only follows
the active permission mode (unsafe->high, auto->medium, ask/other->low) via
selfCorrectAutonomyForMode.

* Keep TUI self-correct fast by default; gate the test half behind /selfcorrect

The TUI default now runs only the LSP-diagnostics half of self-correct — cheap and
scoped to the changed files — so it never adds the whole-repo test plan's latency to a
turn (and a pre-existing failure can't hijack the agent). The project test plan is opt-in
per session via a new /selfcorrect [on|off] command (alias /sc); IncludeTests reads
m.selfCorrectTests, default false. exec keeps both halves.

* Remove dead session.didClose from lsp

session.didClose sent a textDocument/didClose notification but was never called (the
manager only closes documents via Shutdown), so it was unreachable even from tests and
flagged by staticcheck U1000. Removing it takes internal/lsp to 0 truly-dead funcs and 0
U1000 findings; the 2 remaining unreachable-from-main funcs (Available, URIToPath) are
public, test-covered API.

* Align /selfcorrect help with accepted arguments

The usage/description advertised only [on|off] but the handler also accepts status,
list, tests, full, and lsp. Surface the primary verbs (on|off|status) and clarify the
on/off behavior so command discovery matches the handler (CodeRabbit).

* Make /selfcorrect usage strings match the handler exactly

Both the command definition and the invalid-argument error message now list the full
accepted set [status|on|off|tests|full|lsp]; the redundant 'list' alias is dropped so docs
and handler agree exactly. Addresses Vasanth's review (the error-message usage at
session_controls.go was still [on|off]) and CodeRabbit's help-text finding.

* Clarify /selfcorrect off semantics in help text

Reword the description so 'off/lsp' reads as 'disable tests, LSP-only' rather than the
ambiguous 'return to LSP-only', which could be misread as disabling the feature entirely
(CodeRabbit).
2026-06-14 10:56:53 +05:30
Anandan d1c5af7392 Polish model status and reasoning streams (#190)
* Polish model status and reasoning streams

* Polish custom provider setup flow

* Clean up pending composer hints

* Address custom provider setup review

* Polish composer overflow handling

* Fix composer paste and wheel edge cases

* Use line counts for paste previews

* Revert "Use line counts for paste previews"

This reverts commit 4feb814d09.

* Fix composer paste preview deletion

* Disable textinput ctrl-v paste binding

* Preserve paste previews through file suggestions

* Clarify composer paste preview behavior

* Keep OpenAI reasoning out of answer text
2026-06-13 22:40:32 +05:30
Vasanth T 250bf24c9d feat: add MCP manager UX (#188)
* feat: add MCP manager UX

* fix: harden MCP manager UX

* test: stabilize agent eval timeout on Windows

* fix: preserve MCP server metadata

* fix: clarify empty MCP view

* feat: make MCP command a manager view

* fix: make MCP manager usable in TUI

* fix: make MCP manager selectable in TUI

* fix: simplify MCP manager popup

* feat: add searchable MCP marketplace

* fix: address MCP review issues

* fix: address MCP follow-up review

* feat: add MCP setup wizard

* feat: detect MCP setup requests in chat

* fix: address MCP manager review feedback

* fix: avoid hijacking MCP chat prompts

* fix: persist MCP view cache fallback
2026-06-13 22:20:42 +05:30
KRATOS 474f494b93 Deep-audit remediation + sandbox hardening (batches 1–35) (#189)
* audit batch 1: redact nested secrets fully; count image tokens in compaction estimate

- secrets.Redact: replace longest matches first so a containing PRIVATE KEY
  block is redacted before a nested shorter match corrupts its exact string
  (audit medium internal/secrets/scanner.go:81) + regression test.
- agent compaction estimateTokens: add a flat per-image token cost so an
  image-heavy context trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0
  (audit medium internal/agent/compaction.go:58) + test.
- ledger: re-verify against current main; mark scanner.go:35 and
  redaction.go:362 already-fixed-on-main, record this batch's fixes.

* audit batch 2: worktrees defaultRunGit separates stdout/stderr

Capture git stdout and stderr into separate buffers instead of CombinedOutput,
so parsed rev-parse output is not polluted by git warnings and CommandResult.Stderr
carries the real error text (audit medium internal/worktrees/worktrees.go:247) + test.

* audit: re-verify all 87 pending findings against current main

Independent agent per file re-checked each open/partial finding against the
actual current code (the 06-11 ledger was verified on a since-diverged branch),
with an adversarial second pass on every already_fixed verdict. Authoritative
result: 78 genuinely pending (66 still_open + 12 partial); 9 rows were already
fixed on main and are reclassified. Full table in 2026-06-13-reverification.md.

* audit batch 3 (agent): cancellation identity, always-allow w/o sandbox, compaction usage, dedup

- loop.go: check ctx.Err() before collected.Error so a cancelled run returns
  context.Canceled (errors.Is holds) instead of a plain stringified error.
- loop.go: 'Always allow' with no sandbox engine now allows THIS call instead of
  denying it (persistence is skipped when there's nowhere to persist).
- loop.go: remove a duplicate schema["items"] assignment in propertyToRuntimeMap.
- compaction.go: forward OnUsage (token accounting) through the summarizer while
  still omitting OnText, so compaction's token cost is counted in usage/budgets.
- tests for all three behavioral fixes (each fails pre-fix).

* audit batch 4 (cli): list-tools -o json, interrupted -o json terminal, surface session-record failures

- exec --list-tools -o json now emits a JSON tool listing instead of falling
  through to the human-readable text (audit medium exec.go:182) + test.
- interrupted run with -o json now emits a terminal error+done on stdout instead
  of only printing to stderr, so a JSON consumer sees a clean end (medium exec.go:500) + test.
- execSessionRecorder: surface a latched session-append failure to stderr once at
  run end (deferred) instead of silently dropping it (medium exec_sessions.go:114/115) + test.
- left app.go trailing-arg ignore as-is: documented-intentional, TUI has no argv prompt.

* audit batch 5 (zerogit): status -z porcelain (renames + non-ASCII paths); document env-drop on plain Runner

- parseStatus: switch `git status` to `--porcelain -z` and parse the
  NUL-delimited form (audit medium zerogit.go:212). Previously the default
  --short output was split on newlines, so a rename `R old -> new` was kept as
  one bogus path and a non-ASCII/whitespace filename arrived C-quoted+escaped
  (e.g. `"caf\303\251.txt"`). The -z form never quotes paths and emits a
  rename/copy as `XY <dest>\0<src>`, so we now record the destination verbatim
  and consume the source field. + TestParseStatusZHandlesRenamesAndSpecialPaths.

- resolveRunners: document that the plain-Runner EnvRunner adapter intentionally
  drops env (audit low zerogit.go:417). The branch is reached only when a caller
  supplies a custom Runner without a RunGitEnv — in practice fake-Runner tests.
  Production leaves both nil and gets defaultRunGit/defaultRunGitEnv, which honor
  GIT_INDEX_FILE, so snapshot-diff isolation holds. Routing env calls to real git
  instead would break the fake-Runner test pattern and fix nothing in production.

- update Inspect/Commit mock tests to the -z status format and the new command.

* audit batch 6 (config): reject negative maxTurns; drop dead contract-gap helpers

- FileConfig.UnmarshalJSON now rejects a negative maxTurns instead of letting the
  `MaxTurns > 0` merge gates silently drop it and fall back to the default,
  hiding the misconfiguration (audit medium resolver.go:136). 0 is left as the
  "unset" sentinel (omitempty) and still falls back to the default; the CLI
  --max-turns flag continues to reject 0 too since there it is distinguishable
  from absent. + TestResolveRejectsNegativeMaxTurns / ...ZeroFallsBackToDefault.

- remove dead config/contracts.go (ContractGap, DefaultContractGaps,
  FindContractGapsByMilestone, ContractOwnerRuntime) and its test — referenced
  only by that test, never by production (audit low contracts.go:12).

- NOT changed: ResolveMCP intentionally does not run the provider command
  (TestResolveMCPDoesNotRunProviderCommand guards this), so the "ZERO_PROVIDER_COMMAND
  MCP servers dropped" row is by-design, not a defect.

* audit batch 7 (mcp): bound captured MCP server stderr

connectStdio attached a plain bytes.Buffer as cmd.Stderr that is only ever read
on initialize failure, yet it kept growing for the entire process lifetime as a
long-lived server logged to stderr (audit medium client.go:98). Replace it with
a concurrency-safe boundedBuffer capped at 64 KiB that keeps the head (enough for
init-error diagnostics) and discards the rest, reporting full write lengths so
os/exec never sees a short write. + TestBoundedBufferCapsRetainedBytes.

Left as-is (not defects worth the risk in the MCP client):
- client.go writer.write under client.mu: already designed to release the lock
  before the unbounded response wait; the residual concern is a server that stops
  draining stdin, an involved async rewrite for a theoretical deadlock.
- readLoop not answering server-initiated requests (ping): responding safely
  needs re-locking around the shared writer; no configured server relies on it.

* audit batch 8 (tools/providers): read_file truncation marker; drop dead provider branch

- read_file: when a max_lines cut occurs, append an explicit "[truncated: N more
  line(s)... set start_line=X to continue]" marker to the output. Previously only
  the Result.Truncated flag was set, which is invisible in the rendered text, so
  the model could not distinguish a cut read from a complete one (audit low
  read_file.go:89). + TestReadFileToolMarksTruncation.

- providers/factory: simplify `if !explicitProvider || isImplicitOpenAI(...)` to
  `if !explicitProvider` and delete the now-unused isImplicitOpenAI. The clause
  was dead: explicitProvider==true implies ProviderKind or Provider is set, but
  isImplicitOpenAI required both empty, so it could never contribute a case
  (audit low factory.go:118). Behavior-preserving; providers tests still green.

* audit batch 9 (sessions): Tree builds from a single List() snapshot (no N+1 disk scans)

Store.Tree recursed via ListChildren per node, and each ListChildren ran a full
store.List() that re-read every metadata.json from disk — O(nodes * total-sessions)
reads for one tree (audit medium lineage.go:140). Snapshot all sessions once, index
children by parent in memory, and recurse over that. Child ordering is factored into
sortChildSessions so ListChildren and Tree stay identical; path-scoped cycle
detection (delete(seen,...)) is preserved. Existing tree/lineage tests still pass.

Left as-is: store.go timestamp() second precision (RFC3339) — switching to
RFC3339Nano would break lexical UpdatedAt ordering against existing second-precision
records ("...00.5Z" sorts before "...00Z"), so it is not a safe one-line change.

* audit batch 10 (specialist): serialize accounting dedup-then-append

recordSpecialistStop and appendSpecialistUsageRollup checked for an existing event
(specialistEventExists → ReadEvents) and then appended under SEPARATE store locks,
so two concurrent finishers — a foreground onExit racing a TaskOutput poll, or a
background reaper — could both pass the dedup check and write duplicate stop/usage
events (audit medium accounting.go:72). Guard each check-then-append pair with a
package-level accountingMu (Executor is used by value, so a struct field would not
be shared). + TestRecordSpecialistStopDedupesUnderConcurrency (passes under -race).

* audit batch 11 (zeroruntime/gemini): O(1) text accumulation; gemini cached-token counts

- zeroruntime CollectStreamWithOptions accumulated assistant text with
  `collected.Text += event.Content`, reallocating the whole string on every chunk
  (O(n^2) over a long streamed response). Accumulate in a strings.Builder on the
  collector and materialize it once in flush, the single finalization point hit
  before every return (audit low helpers.go:104). Existing collect tests still pass.

- gemini decoded usageMetadata without cachedContentTokenCount, so a cached-prompt
  response reported zero cached input tokens while the other providers report them
  (audit medium gemini/types.go:88). Decode the field and thread it through
  streamState into NormalizeUsage as CachedInputTokens. + extended
  TestStreamCompletionEmitsTextUsageAndReasoningTokens.

* audit batch 12 (specialist): parse child stream without a line-length cap; drop dead helper

- ParseStream used a bufio.Scanner capped at 1 MiB, so one large stream-json line
  from a child (a big tool result or final answer) hit bufio.ErrTooLong and aborted
  the entire specialist run (audit medium streamer.go:43). Switch to a bufio.Reader
  with ReadString, which has no per-line limit; the child is our own trusted
  subprocess, so its output length is the legitimate bound. Line numbering and
  blank-line/EOF handling are preserved. + TestParseStreamHandlesLineLargerThan1MiB.

- remove dead formatTaskOutput (output_tool.go:244): zero callers and zero tests;
  it only forwarded to formatTaskOutputSummary, which is the one actually used.

* audit batch 13 (background/specialist): kill background tasks as a process group

Background children were launched in the parent's process group and terminated by
signalling only the single PID, so any process the task forked was orphaned and
outlived a cancel; the signal also risked hitting a recycled PID after the child
was reaped (audit medium process_posix.go:38/50).

- ConfigureChildProcessGroup (Setpgid on POSIX, no-op on Windows where taskkill /T
  already tree-kills) is applied at launch so the child leads its own group.
- terminateProcess now SIGTERM/SIGKILLs the negative PID (the whole group), with a
  pid>1 guard so a bogus 0/1 can never expand to "our own group" or "everything",
  and treats ESRCH as already-gone. Liveness polls the group. Targeting a group
  (rarely recycled vs. a bare PID) also shrinks the reaped-then-recycled window.
- specialist launchBackgroundProcess opts every child into its own group; on a
  SetPID failure it now kills the child + group, marks the task errored, and records
  the stop (deduped) instead of leaking an untracked orphan.
- tests launch as group leaders; new TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren proves
  a forked grandchild dies with the group.

* audit batch 14 (sandbox): quote-aware shell segment splitting

splitShellSegments used a quote-unaware strings.Replacer, so a shell operator
inside quotes was treated as a separator: `git commit -m "use top | less"` split
into a `less` segment and `echo "a; vim b"` into a `vim` segment, both falsely
flagged as interactive (audit medium safe_command.go:138).

Replace it with a quote-aware scanner that mirrors the shell: single quotes make
everything literal; double quotes keep $(...)/`...` substitution active but treat
|, ;, && as literal; unquoted text splits on the same operator set as before
(;, |, ||, &&) plus substitution boundaries. Real unquoted operators still split,
so an interactive program behind a separator — or inside a live `"$(...)"`
substitution — is still caught (no new false negatives, the security-relevant
direction). + TestDetectInteractiveQuoteAwareSeparators covering both directions.

* audit batch 15 (cron): collapse DST fall-back repeated hour to one fire

On a fall-back day the clock repeats an hour (e.g. 01:30 EDT then 01:30 EST), so
Next("30 1 * * *", <01:30 EDT>) returned the same-day 01:30 EST — firing a daily
job twice (audit medium schedule.go:171, which previously guarded only the
spring-forward gap).

Next now skips a match whose local wall-clock minute equals `after`'s but whose
absolute time is later (the repeated-hour duplicate) and keeps searching. Normal
forward search always advances the wall-clock, so this only triggers on the
fall-back repeat; when the scheduler passes the last fire time as `after`, the
repeated hour collapses to a single fire. + TestNextDSTFallBackDoesNotRepeatHour
(spring-forward termination test still passes).

Note: Next is stateless, so it dedupes relative to `after`; a caller that passes
an arbitrary mid-hour "now" instead of the last fire time is out of scope here.

* audit batch 16 (mcp): skip SSE notifications before the response; larger SSE buffer

- decodeSSERPCMessage returned the first non-empty `message` event unconditionally,
  so a server-initiated notification/request arriving before the response made the
  caller see an id mismatch and fail (audit medium network_client.go:621). It now
  skips any message carrying a method (notifications/requests have one; a response
  does not) and returns the first real response; the caller's rpcIDMatches still
  validates the id. + TestDecodeSSERPCMessageSkipsNotifications.

- raise the per-event SSE scanner cap from 1 MiB to a bounded 8 MiB so a large but
  legitimate MCP message no longer hits bufio.ErrTooLong and fails the request
  (audit medium network_client.go:637); still bounded against an unbounded server.

Out of scope (kept): full reconnect of a persistent SSE stream after a fatal read
error — a larger change than this remediation.

* audit batch 17 (sessions): fsync session metadata before the atomic rename

writeMetadata wrote the temp file with os.WriteFile (no sync) and renamed it into
place, so a crash right after the rename could expose a metadata file whose bytes
were never flushed — a torn or empty file that corrupts the whole session (audit
medium store.go:632). Write+fsync the temp via a new writeFileSync helper before
renaming, closing that window. + TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips.

Deliberately scoped:
- Event-log appends (appendEventLocked) are NOT fsynced per append: that would add
  a disk flush to every event (every tool call), and a hard-crash loss of the log's
  unsynced tail is acceptable, whereas torn METADATA is not. Metadata is the
  integrity-critical part and is what this syncs.
- Directory fsync is omitted for cross-platform simplicity (it errors on Windows);
  the file fsync already prevents the torn-contents failure, the serious case.

Left for follow-up (in this bucket but not safe/clear wins here):
- hooks append sequence still re-reads the file per append; the in-memory cache is
  cross-process-unsafe and the safe last-line read is fiddly for a low-volume log.
- Fork event re-append/de-dup is nuanced usage-accounting and needs its own change.

* audit batch 18 (agent): count tool-defs in compaction estimate; don't deny an always-allow on persist failure

- maybeCompact's estimate omitted the tool definitions, which ride on every
  request, so the real input could exceed the model limit while the message-only
  estimate stayed under threshold and compaction never fired (audit medium
  compaction.go:58). partitionTools is now computed before maybeCompact (it does
  not depend on the messages) and the exposed tools' estimated tokens are added to
  both the threshold check and the post-compaction shrink check. + estimateToolDefTokens
  and TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions.

- PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow denied the call when persistPermissionGrant failed,
  overriding what the user explicitly allowed (audit medium loop.go:468). Persisting
  is now best-effort: a failure (or no sandbox engine) just means the grant is not
  remembered and the user is re-prompted next time, not denied now. This also drops
  the dead requestEvent.GrantMatched/Grant writes (audit low loop.go:473) — the
  emitted event derives them from the sandbox decision via buildPermissionEvent.

Left intentional (documented, not defects): the reactive-retry path omits OnText to
avoid duplicating mid-stream text (loop.go:183); OnContext/MeasureContext is a
complete, tested context-breakdown scaffold awaiting a consumer (types.go:183).

* audit batch 19 (usage): price escalated usage from the event's own model

exec persists payload["model"] on --allow-escalation runs (the model can change
mid-run), but BuildReport priced every event from the session's Metadata.ModelID
and never read the payload, so usage from an escalated model was mis-priced at the
base model (audit medium report.go:17). usageEventPayload now carries Model and
BuildReport prefers it, falling back to the session model when absent (older
events stay byte-identical and behave as before). + TestBuildReportPricesFromEventModelWhenPresent.

* audit batch 20 (sessions): don't copy usage events into a fork (no double-count)

Fork re-appended every parent event, including provider_usage, into the child, so
a usage report aggregating the parent and the fork double-counted the parent's
usage (audit medium store.go:387). Skip EventUsage when copying — it already
counted against the parent and is not part of the conversation history a fork
replays — and record the actual copied count in the fork marker. + TestStoreForkSkipsUsageEvents.

* audit batch 21 (cli/skills): warn on duplicate skill names instead of silently dropping

skills.Load deduplicates same-named skills (first directory wins) and records the
dropped collisions via skills.Duplicates, but nothing surfaced them, so a shadowed
skill just vanished with no signal — and Duplicates had no production caller (audit
low skills.go:91). `skills list` now reports each collision to stderr (keeping
stdout/--json clean), using Duplicates. + TestRunSkillsListWarnsOnDuplicateNames.

Note: skills.Get is kept — it is a by-name accessor used throughout the package's
tests, not dead code.

* audit batch 22 (cli/cron): capture the run error from stream-json stdout

Cron jobs run exec with --output-format stream-json, so a failure is reported as an
`error` event on STDOUT, but the run record's Error was set only from stderr — so a
failed job often recorded an empty/uninformative error while the real message sat
unread in outBuf (audit low cron_run.go:150). On a non-zero exit, scan the stdout
stream-json for the error event's message and prefer it, falling back to stderr.
+ extractStreamJSONError and TestExtractStreamJSONError.

* audit batch 23 (sandbox): richer macOS seatbelt profile (signal + mach-lookup)

The generated sandbox-exec profile was default-deny with only process/sysctl/file
allowances, so two real gaps remained on macOS (sandbox quality report H1):

- A sandboxed script could not signal the children it spawned — `kill` returned
  "Operation not permitted" under seatbelt, breaking common `cmd & ... kill`,
  test-runner, and timeout patterns. Add `(allow signal (target self) (target pgrp))`,
  which stays scoped to the command's own process group.
- XPC to system daemons was denied, so keychain (securityd/trustd), user/group
  lookup (opendirectoryd), preferences (cfprefsd), network config
  (SystemConfiguration), launch services, and the pasteboard all failed. Add a
  curated `(allow mach-lookup ...)` allowlist (`sandboxMachServices`).

Neither touches the file-write or network rules, so the workspace boundary is
unchanged — verified on a real macOS host: `security`/`scutil`/`pbpaste`/self-kill
now succeed while writes to $HOME and /etc are still denied. iokit-open was tried
and dropped as unnecessary. + unit assertions (TestSandboxExecProfileGrantsSignalAndMachLookup)
and extended the darwin integration test with a self-kill case and an
outside-workspace deny check.

* audit batch 24 (sandbox/tools): remove dead OnSandboxDecision hook

RunOptions.OnSandboxDecision had no setter anywhere, yet registry.RunWithOptions
spawned a goroutine (with panic recovery) for it on every sandboxed tool call —
pure per-call overhead for an unreachable callback (sandbox report M1). The sandbox
decision is already surfaced to observers via the permission event
(buildPermissionEvent reads the decision), so this hook is redundant; delete the
field and its call site.

* audit batch 25 (sandbox/cli): exact-path grants — create and revoke by path

The engine already matched ScopeFile grants and DeriveScope already produced them
from path/file tool args, but the CLI could neither create one explicitly nor
revoke a single one (sandbox report L3 / prompt 7). Add:

- GrantStore.RevokePath(tool, path): revokes only the grant whose scope matches the
  given file/dir, leaving tool-wide and other-path grants intact (path canonicalized
  to absolute like stored scopes). + TestGrantStoreRevokePathRemovesOnlyMatchingScope.
- `zero sandbox grants allow <tool> --path <p>`: persists an exact-file (ScopeFile)
  grant, path resolved to absolute so it matches lookups and revokes.
- `zero sandbox grants revoke <tool> --path <p>`: revokes just that grant (default
  still revokes all grants for the tool). + TestRunSandboxGrantsCreateAndRevokeByPath.

The TUI permission-card "Allow always (exact path)" option is intentionally left for
the TUI feature branches (it overlaps #187/#188); the engine + CLI now cover the
full create/match/revoke round-trip for file-scoped grants.

* audit batch 26 (sandbox): Engine.Precheck — report violations before execution

Add Engine.Precheck(ctx, request) []Violation, which reports the sandbox
violations that would block a tool request before it runs (sandbox report / prompt 6).
It reuses Evaluate so policy is not duplicated: an allowed or merely-prompted
request yields no violations; a denied request yields its violation (via the shared
violationsFromDecision helper, with a ViolationPolicyDenied fallback for a deny that
carries no structured violation). A nil engine yields nothing.
+ TestEnginePrecheckReportsViolationsBeforeExecution.

Wiring Precheck into the batch-confirmation prompt is intentionally left to the TUI
branch: it touches prompt rendering, and short-circuiting the agent loop's deny path
would skip the before/after-tool hooks that currently fire around a policy-denied
call. The engine API is in place for that consumer.

* audit batch 27 (sandbox): scoped-egress domain prompt with timeout + caching

The scoped-egress proxy failed closed on any host outside the allowlist. Add an
opt-in DomainPrompt callback (prompt 8): an UNKNOWN host (neither allowed nor
explicitly denied) is authorized at request time via the callback instead of being
refused outright. An explicitly denied host is still refused without prompting; the
callback is bounded by PromptTimeout (default 60s, timeout/error => deny); decisions
are cached for the proxy's lifetime so a host is prompted at most once. With no
callback set the strict fail-closed behavior is unchanged. Wired through both the
CONNECT and HTTP handlers via authorizeTarget.
+ TestEgressProxyAuthorizeDomainPrompt / ...TimeoutDenies / ...NilPromptFailsClosed.

The user-facing prompt that supplies the callback is left to the permission UI (TUI)
branch; the egress mechanism (callback + timeout + cache) is in place and tested.

* audit batch 28 (sandbox): AST-based shell analysis (AnalyzeCommand)

Add AnalyzeCommand(script) AnalysisResult, a static shell analyzer built on the
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 parser (prompt 12). Walking the parsed command tree makes it a more
precise second opinion than the regex detector: a program name only counts when it
is an actual command, so `echo "vim ..."`, `printf 'open with vim'`, and
`git commit -m "rm -rf /"` are clean, while real commands are flagged —
interactive (editors/pagers + REPLs, with the same -e/script suppression as
nonInteractiveREPLFlags), destructive (rm -rf/-fr, dd, mkfs, shred, ...), and
network (curl/wget/ssh/nc/...). An unparseable script yields TooComplex so callers
can treat it as higher-risk. + TestAnalyzeCommand (16 cases) / ...EmptyIsClean.

Dependency: mvdan.cc/sh/v3 pinned to v3.11.0 — compatible with the existing go 1.24
directive (the latest v3.13.1 would have bumped the module to go 1.25). It is kept
as a standalone analyzer for callers to consult; feeding it into Engine.Evaluate is
deliberately not done here, since that would change allow/deny classification.

* audit batch 29 (sandbox): unify proxy-env generation (ProxyEnv)

Export ProxyEnv as the single source of truth for proxy-env injection (prompt 9
req 1), replacing the unexported scopedProxyEnv used by the sandboxed-shell path.
+ TestProxyEnv.

Investigation that bounds the rest of prompt 9 (documented in the ProxyEnv doc):
- web_fetch already honors HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY — its transport clones
  http.DefaultTransport, whose Proxy is http.ProxyFromEnvironment.
- MCP children already inherit the parent env (mergeProcessEnv appends os.Environ),
  so they pick up any proxy vars the agent has.
So the only missing link to scope FetchUrl/MCP is a SESSION-level egress proxy whose
address reaches the agent process. That is deliberately NOT wired here: doing it
safely requires allowlisting the active LLM provider's own domain first, or the
agent's provider calls would route through the scoped proxy and be denied — a
correctness pitfall that also can't be verified end-to-end on this host. Flagged
rather than shipped blind.

* audit batch 30 (sandbox): Linux seccomp Unix-socket block — UNVERIFIED, needs Linux CI

Adds a pure-Go (no cgo, no vendored binary) seccomp BPF filter that denies
socket(AF_UNIX) with EPERM on x86-64/arm64, closing the Unix-socket gap bubblewrap's
filesystem/network isolation leaves open (prompt 11):

- internal/sandbox/seccomp.go: the classic-BPF program as a platform-neutral
  []sockFilter, built and UNIT-TESTED (structure + every jump offset in range — the
  classic way a hand-written BPF filter goes silently wrong).
- seccomp_linux.go: ApplyUnixSocketBlock installs it via prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS) +
  prctl(SET_SECCOMP, MODE_FILTER). seccomp_other.go is a no-op everywhere else.
- cmd/zero-seccomp: a tiny linux-only exec wrapper that applies the filter then
  execs the real command (the standard way to install seccomp in a child with
  os/exec); degrades gracefully (warns + runs) if the kernel lacks seccomp.

⚠️ HONEST CAVEAT: I developed this on macOS and CANNOT run the actual AF_UNIX block
here. darwin build, `GOOS=linux` cross-compile, vet, and the structure test all pass,
but the unit test verifies the program's SHAPE, not that the kernel actually blocks
AF_UNIX — that MUST be verified on Linux CI (create a Unix socket under the wrapper
and assert EPERM). Safe to ship as-is: it is linux-only, no-op on every other
platform, and not wired into the bwrap command yet (opt-in prefixing the sandboxed
command with zero-seccomp is the remaining integration), so it cannot regress any
current path.

* audit batch 31 (sandbox): macOS denial log monitor (opt-in, default off)

Re-adds the macOS seatbelt-denial monitor as an opt-in feature (prompt 10). When
Policy.MonitorDenials is set, the sandbox-exec profile tags its default-deny with a
marker and bash tails `log stream` for that tag during the command, appending any
captured denials as a <sandbox_violations> block to the command's stderr so the
model can see what was blocked.

- DenialMonitor (darwin) tails/parses tagged denials with a capped, deduped ring
  buffer and noise filtering; no-op stub on other platforms. parseSandboxDenyLine is
  unit-tested. + profile-tag test + appendSandboxViolations test.
- Default OFF: with MonitorTag empty, StartDenialMonitor is a no-op and the command
  path is byte-for-byte unchanged, so there is no regression or per-command overhead
  unless enabled.

CAVEAT: on at least one macOS host (verified live) seatbelt denials are NOT delivered
to the `log stream`-queryable unified log, so the monitor captures nothing there. It
is the standard mechanism and works on macOS versions that do log denials; shipping
it default-off means it never affects whether a command runs.

* audit batch 32 (sandbox): wire seccomp Unix-socket block into bubblewrap (opt-in)

Completes prompt 11: the zero-seccomp helper (which installs the AF_UNIX seccomp
filter) is now actually invoked by the sandbox instead of only existing as a
standalone binary.

- bubblewrapCommandPlan, when Policy.BlockUnixSockets is set, ro-binds the
  discovered zero-seccomp helper into the sandbox at its host path and prefixes the
  command with it so the filter is installed before the real argv runs.
- findSeccompHelper discovers the helper next to the running executable first, then
  on PATH; it returns "" when absent, so the sandbox degrades gracefully (runs
  without the extra filter — bubblewrap's fs/net isolation still applies) rather
  than failing the command. Exposed as a package var so the wiring is unit-tested
  on any OS.
- Reachable from config: SandboxConfig.BlockUnixSockets and .MonitorDenials now map
  onto the policy in applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy (opt-in only — config can turn a
  hardening flag on, never off). Both default OFF.
- Tests: helper-prefix present when enabled / absent by default; config flags apply
  independently and stay off when omitted.

Default OFF and Linux-only effect; the runtime seccomp enforcement still needs a
Linux host/CI to exercise end-to-end (the wiring and BPF program are unit-tested).

* audit batch 33 (sandbox): enforce scoped/deny network policy in web_fetch & web_search

Completes prompt 9: the built-in network tools now honor the SAME allow/deny/scoped
policy the sandboxed shell egress proxy enforces, instead of bypassing it. Before
this, web_fetch/web_search would reach any public host even when the policy was
NetworkDeny or NetworkScoped — the egress proxy only constrained shell commands.

- New shared gate Engine.NetworkHostAllowed(host) reuses the egress domain matcher
  (domainAllowed/normalizeDomains/effectiveNetwork) as the single source of truth:
  allow → all hosts; deny → none; scoped → only AllowedDomains minus DeniedDomains
  (empty allowlist collapses to deny). Disabled policy / nil engine impose nothing.
- web_fetch is now sandbox-aware: the host is checked before the request AND on every
  redirect, so a denied/unlisted host fails closed before any dial. Plumbed via a
  networkPolicyGate so the no-sandbox path is byte-for-byte unchanged.
- web_search is sandbox-aware: the configured backend's endpoint host is checked
  before the query leaves the machine; blocked under deny, and under scoped unless the
  backend host is allowlisted.
- The registry already routes sandbox-aware tools through RunWithSandbox when an
  engine is present, so this activates automatically wherever the sandbox is wired.
- Tests: engine gate matrix (deny/allow/scoped/denylist/empty/disabled/nil + host:port);
  web_fetch & web_search block denied/unlisted hosts without dialing and allow listed
  ones; endpoint-host parsing.

* audit batch 34 (sandbox): prove network-policy wiring end-to-end + document opt-in flags

Verification follow-up to batches 31-33; no behaviour change.

- Adds a registry-level test that exercises the FULL chain for the scoped-network
  enforcement: registry.RunWithOptions -> engine.Evaluate (passes a scoped,
  egress-capable sandbox-exec backend) -> routes web_fetch through RunWithSandbox ->
  per-host allowlist blocks an unlisted host before any dial. This proves the
  Tool-interface value actually satisfies sandboxAwareTool at the registry boundary,
  not just in a direct method call.
- Documents the two opt-in hardening flags (sandbox.blockUnixSockets,
  sandbox.monitorDenials) and the scoped web_fetch/web_search behaviour in the README
  so the config keys are discoverable. Both remain off by default.

Confirmed wiring: agent loop forwards options.Sandbox to the registry; the registry
routes sandbox-aware tools (web_fetch, web_search) through RunWithSandbox when an
engine is present; MonitorTag is set only on the macOS sandbox-exec plan; the
seccomp helper prefix is added only on the bubblewrap plan when BlockUnixSockets is
set; both config flags map onto the policy via applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy.

* audit batch 35 (sessions): fix Windows CI failure in TestWriteFileSyncRoundTrips

The exact-permission assertion (perm == 0o600) added in batch 17 fails on
windows-latest because Windows does not honor Unix permission bits: Go reports
0o666 for a writable file regardless of the mode passed to OpenFile. This was the
sole cause of the failing Smoke (windows-latest) CI job; macOS and Ubuntu passed.

Guard the perm check with runtime.GOOS != "windows" so it still verifies the mode
on the platforms that enforce it, while the round-trip (write + read-back) is still
asserted on every platform.

* audit batch 36: address CodeRabbit review (5 findings)

- background/process_posix: after SIGKILL, poll until the process group is
  actually gone (SIGKILL is async) and return an error if it survives past a
  second deadline, instead of returning nil while descendants still race.
- sandbox/safe_command: only treat ')' as a substitution boundary when it closes
  an active $(...). A literal ')' (e.g. echo "a) less") no longer splits into a
  fake `less` segment and is no longer misflagged as interactive. Depth-tracked so
  nested $(...) still isolate their inner command. Direct splitShellSegments test
  (fails pre-fix: yields ["echo \"a", "less\""]).
- cron/schedule: the DST fall-back collapse now only applies when `after` sits
  exactly on the minute boundary (its "last fire time" form). With sub-minute
  precision (e.g. 01:30:30 EDT) the first 01:30 fire already passed, so the repeated
  01:30 EST is the legitimate next fire and is returned — restoring strictly-after
  semantics. New test fails pre-fix (skipped to next day).
- config/types: maxTurns error message now reads "must be >= 0" to match the check
  (0 is accepted; only < 0 is rejected). Negative-maxTurns test asserts the message.
- docs/audit: header date/branch metadata now matches the body (2026-06-13,
  fix/audit-batch) instead of the stale 2026-06-11/fix/audit-critical-high snapshot.

Verified: gofmt clean; go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites
green. Each behavioural fix ships with a test confirmed to fail without the change.

* audit batch 37: address CodeRabbit re-review (12 findings)

Findings on the audit code from batches 21-36; each behavioural fix ships with a
regression test (several confirmed to fail without the change).

sandbox/analyzer (AnalyzeCommand):
- Unwrap launcher prefixes (sudo/env/nice/bash -c/...) and recurse into `sh -c`
  payloads so `sudo rm -rf`, `env curl …`, `bash -c 'vim x'` classify on the real
  command, not the launcher. Mirrors DetectInteractiveCommand.
- Honor rm's `--` end-of-options marker so `rm -- -rf` (delete a file named -rf) is
  not flagged destructive.

sandbox/engine: NetworkHostAllowed now shares one backend-aware effective-mode
helper with Evaluate, so scoped collapses to deny when the backend can't enforce
scoped egress — the per-tool gate can no longer permit traffic the engine-level
decision would fail closed.

sandbox/egress: cache domain-prompt decisions by host:port, not host, so one
"allow" can't authorize other ports on the same host.

sandbox/safe_command: the segment splitter is now escape-aware (\| , \" ) so an
escaped operator/quote can't manufacture a fake interactive segment.

sandbox/log_monitor (darwin): Wait() the `log stream` child after draining stdout
so the cancelled process isn't leaked as a zombie.

tools/web_search: confine the search backend to same-host redirects (with a limit)
so a redirect chain can't egress to a host the scoped/deny policy never authorized.

cli/sandbox: an explicit empty --path (`--path=` / `--path ""`) now fails closed
instead of silently widening an allow to tool-wide or a revoke to all-grants.

cli/skills: warn on stderr when duplicate-skill detection fails instead of
swallowing the error.

specialist/exec: don't mask a failed orphan-kill — join the TerminateProcess error
with the SetPID error so a surviving process is visible.

background/process_posix: resolve the PGID and only group-signal when pid leads its
own group; otherwise signal the individual PID. Avoids both a false-success on a
non-leader ESRCH and the hazard of signalling an unrelated (possibly our own) group.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.

* audit batch 38: address CodeRabbit re-review round 2 (3 findings)

Follow-ups to batch 37, each with a regression test:

- safe_command (splitter): a ')' is now only a substitution boundary when it
  closes an active, UNQUOTED $(...). A quote-state stack saved at each '$(' lets a
  substitution run in a fresh quoting context and restores the outer quoting on
  its matching ')'. Fixes `echo $(printf "a) less")` splitting into a fake `less`
  segment, while still isolating the inner command of `echo "$(vim x)"`.

- egress: deduplicate in-flight domain prompts per host:port. Concurrent requests
  for the same unknown target now wait on the first prompt and reuse its cached
  decision instead of each firing a prompt (a prompt storm) and racing to write
  the final decision. Race-tested with 25 concurrent authorizers → one prompt.

- analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption is now wrapper-specific
  (wrapperValueOptionsByProg) instead of a global option set. A valueless flag like
  `sudo -n` no longer swallows the real payload, so `sudo -n rm -rf` /
  `sudo -n curl …` are correctly classified destructive/network; `sudo -u root vim`
  still consumes its value. Shared by the AST analyzer and the regex detector so
  they can't diverge.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 39: address CodeRabbit re-review round 3 (12 findings)

All verified against current code; each behavioural fix has a regression test.

Security / correctness:
- tools/web_search: redirect policy now also refuses a scheme change, blocking a
  same-host https→http downgrade that would send the query + bearer token over
  plaintext.
- sandbox/safe_command: a ')' is only a substitution boundary when it closes an
  active UNQUOTED $(...), and backticks now get the same quote-state save/restore
  as $( — so `echo "`a | less`"` and `echo "$(true | less)"` no longer hide the
  inner pager from interactive detection.
- sandbox/analyzer + safe_command: wrapper option-value consumption stays
  wrapper-specific, and unwrapping no longer aborts on a dynamic ($x) wrapper arg
  once a wrapper is active, so `env "$opts" curl` / `sudo "$x" rm -rf` are still
  classified.
- sandbox/egress: in-flight prompts deduped per host:port (carried from batch 38);
  the prompt callback is now cancellable (context cancelled on timeout) so a stuck
  prompt can abort instead of leaking; signature threaded through.
- sandbox/runner: per-plan unique denial tag (pid+counter) so concurrent monitored
  sandbox-exec runs can't ingest each other's denials; helper selection now
  requires an executable regular file so a non-exec sibling degrades gracefully.
- mcp/network_client: aggregate SSE event-size cap (not just per-line) so a server
  can't grow memory with many unterminated data: lines.
- specialist/accounting: a previously-recorded stop/usage with an empty runId is a
  catch-all and now suppresses a later runId-bearing duplicate.
- sessions/lineage: Tree fetches the root via Get() first so a corrupt root
  surfaces its real error instead of degrading to "not found".

Docs/tests:
- background/terminate: docstring now states the leader-only group-kill (PID-only
  fallback for non-leaders); test child-liveness probe uses ESRCH specifically.
- cli/sandbox: grant usage strings include --path.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 40: address CodeRabbit re-review round 4 (8 fixed, 1 skipped)

Verified each against current code.

Fixed:
- sessions/lineage: PANIC FIX — store.Get returns (nil, nil) for a missing
  session, so the batch-39 root prefetch could nil-deref. Guard root == nil and
  return a not-found error. Regression test added (was a panic).
- agent/compaction: the reactive recover() now records lowWaterMark in the SAME
  combined (messages + tool-defs) token domain maybeCompact uses, so the proactive
  shrink-guard compares like with like. recover() takes tools; callers pass
  request.Tools.
- mcp/network_client: SSE aggregate counter no longer counts a joining newline for
  the first data line (only when prior content exists), avoiding premature rejects.
- sessions/store: fsync the parent directory after the metadata rename so the
  rename is durable across a crash (no-op on Windows, which can't fsync a dir).
- sandbox/egress: parse the target port with strconv.Atoi instead of
  net.LookupPort (no context-unaware resolver use).
- sandbox/runner: escape the per-plan denial tag through sandboxProfileString when
  embedding it in the seatbelt profile.
- sandbox/seccomp_linux: guard against an empty filter program before taking
  &kernelFilters[0] (defensive; the program is fixed non-empty today).
- cli/cron_run_test: assert last-error-wins with two error events.
- background/terminate, cli/sandbox usage, process_posix_test ESRCH (carried).

Skipped (with reason):
- zerogit worktree-rename (Y='R') test: git porcelain v1 -z only emits the
  rename-source field when the INDEX column is R/C; the worktree column never
  carries 'R' with a source field in v1, so the fixture would test output git
  doesn't produce, and making parseStatus consume on code[1]=='R' would risk
  mis-consuming the following entry for a plain ` R` status. Left as-is.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; go test ./... and
-race on sandbox/background all green.

* audit batch 41: address CodeRabbit re-review round 5 (4 findings)

All verified against current code; code fixes have regression tests.

- agent/compaction: summarizeWithFallback's reduce pass no longer swallows ALL
  errors. A context-limit error still falls back to the joined partial summaries
  (documented "extreme" case), but a non-context failure (auth/network/provider)
  now surfaces unchanged, per the function's contract. Two tests (propagate vs.
  joined-fallback); the propagate test fails without the fix.
- sandbox/safe_command + analyzer: wrapper value-consuming options now include the
  long spellings (sudo --user root, env --unset NAME, timeout --signal …), so a
  long flag's value is no longer mis-read as the program (interactive/destructive/
  network detection bypass). A `--flag=value` token carries its own value and never
  consumes the next token. Tests for space and = forms in both the AST analyzer and
  the regex detector.
- docs/audit: the status-ledger summary table's open/partial cells (64/14) were the
  lone outlier — the ledger's own narrative and 2026-06-13-reverification.md both
  state 66/12. Corrected to 66/12 (66+12+97 = 175); derivation: body 69 open + 18
  partial minus the 9 already-fixed-on-main (3 open + 6 partial) = 66/12 = 78
  pending, fixed 88+9 = 97. Added a comment documenting the summary-vs-body
  relationship. The reverification doc already states 66/12, so both now agree.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; full go test ./...
green.

* audit batch 42: address CodeRabbit re-review round 6 (1 fixed, 1 kept w/ proof)

CodeRabbit re-surfaced two "duplicate" refinements; CI was already green (its 6th
pass was a COMMENT with no new findings).

- cli/sandbox_test (TestRunSandboxGrantsRejectsEmptyPath): now seeds a tool-wide
  grant and asserts grant-store immutability after EACH rejected empty-`--path`
  call (reflect.DeepEqual before/after), so a mutation in one call can't be masked
  by a later one — and a buggy "revoke all" is actually observable (it's a no-op on
  an empty store). Stronger than the suggested patch.

- zerogit.parseStatus: KEPT consuming the rename source on the index column only
  (code[0]), with an explanatory comment. Verified empirically that git porcelain
  v1 -z reports a rename/copy (and emits the extra source field) only in the index
  column: `git mv` → "R  new\0old\0"; a worktree-only rename → " D old\0?? new\0"
  (delete + untracked, never "R" in code[1]). Consuming on code[1]=='R'/'C' would
  match no real git output and would only risk mis-consuming the next entry on
  malformed input, so the suggestion is declined as incorrect for v1.

Verified: gofmt + go vet clean; host + linux + windows builds; affected suites green.
2026-06-13 21:32:48 +05:30
Anandan 761b797863 Render assistant Markdown in TUI (#187)
* Render assistant Markdown in TUI

Add a lightweight assistant Markdown renderer for streaming and completed transcript rows, including inline bold, code/emphasis marker cleanup, pipe tables, adaptive row separators for wrapped tables, and plain-text output for selection metadata.

Tests cover streaming markdown, completed rows, selection metadata, table wrapping, compact tables, inline markers, and width bounds with neutral fixtures.

* Refine TUI Markdown table rendering

Add outer borders for rendered assistant tables, add row separators for larger comparison tables even on wide terminals, and normalize common HTML line breaks inside table cells.

Tests cover bordered tables, wide multi-row tables, compact tables, and HTML break normalization.

* Fix Markdown inline parser edge cases

Preserve literal stars, prevent code spans from inheriting bold state, and avoid inserting spaces before punctuation split by inline marker boundaries.

Add regression checks for plain/selectable ANSI-free text and final-row done metadata on rendered Markdown rows.

* Preserve coding literals in TUI Markdown

Tighten inline delimiter parsing so code spans, Python dunder names, globs, and arithmetic stars stay literal while normal bold/emphasis still renders.

Add regressions for the reviewed code-span, dunder, glob, and operator examples.
2026-06-13 13:35:11 +05:30
Vasanth T cc618bae11 Expand agent quality eval module (#178) 2026-06-13 11:30:20 +05:30
KRATOS 47c3cc8937 wedge stage 13: launch readiness (first-run + benchmark) (#186)
* stage 13: launch readiness (first-run + benchmark)

First-run, model-agnostic-first:
- provideronboarding: detect local OpenAI-compatible runtimes (Ollama/LM Studio)
  on their default ports and offer them with no API key required
- provideronboarding: ClassifySetupProbe maps a live connectivity probe to a
  specific, fixable error class (bad key, wrong base URL, model not found,
  rate limit, config) instead of a stack trace; never panics
- zero setup --verify: probe the provider after saving and report the fixable
  error on failure; print a concrete 'try this' headless example on success

zero doctor hardening:
- new sandbox.backend check (bubblewrap/sandbox-exec) with a platform-specific
  install remedy; warn (not fail) on policy-only fallback
- new lsp.servers check listing missing language servers with per-binary install
  remedies; injectable GOOS/LookupExecutable for deterministic tests

Self-correct surface + benchmark:
- zero exec --self-correct wires the post-edit verify-and-correct loop via the
  project verifier; nil corrector when off keeps the agent loop byte-identical
- perfbench task harness: reproducible Terminal-Bench-style runner over headless
  zero exec + stream-json; records model + commit + self-correct flag + date
- zero-perf-bench tasks subcommand (with --dry-run) and a sample task set
- docs/BENCHMARK.md: the number, the exact command, the model, and the
  with/without-self-correct methodology

* stage 13: address review (verify-state, fixture paths, run_end exit, 404 classification)

* stage 13: verifier inherits process environment (PATH/HOME/toolchain)
2026-06-13 11:10:37 +05:30
KRATOS 5e68c78824 wedge stage 10: distribution (skill/plugin install, tools make) (#184)
* stage 10: distribution (skill/plugin install, tools make)

Add a file-backed distribution surface so skills and plugins can be
installed from a git URL or local path, and new plugin-tools can be
scaffolded. No central registry: a source is just a git URL or path.

- internal/skills/install.go: Install/Remove/Info + skills.lock. Validates
  SKILL.md frontmatter via the existing parser, copies it into the skills
  dir, and records a sha256 content hash. Reinstall surfaces the hash
  change; a clash with a different source is refused without --force.
- internal/plugins/install.go: same flow validated against the plugin
  manifest schema, copying the whole plugin tree (minus .git) so the
  plugin is activatable. plugins.lock records source + hash.
- internal/tools/scaffold.go: generate a prompt-gated plugin-tool skeleton
  (manifest + runnable shell/node/python entry stub) in the toolbox dir.
- CLI: zero skill {add,info,remove}, zero plugin {add,remove}, and a new
  zero tools {make,list}; wired in app.go/extensions.go/skills.go.

Safety: fetch honors the process environment (proxy/egress) and disables
git credential prompts; install never executes fetched content (skills are
markdown; plugin install scripts are never run) and installed plugins still
go through normal activation with permission gating.

* stage 10: make no-usable-name install test cross-platform

The test used a whitespace-only source dir name to force the no-usable-name rejection, which is not creatable on Windows (Smoke failure). Switched to a dir base that validSkillName rejects on every platform (contains "..") while staying creatable on Windows; the blank frontmatter still falls back to the unusable dir base, exercising the same rejection.

* stage 10: address review (tree hash, tools-list diagnostics, --json guards)

* stage 10: make canonical-source tests cross-platform (Windows)

Two Windows Smoke failures from the canonical-source review fix:
- TestInstallSameLocalSourceDifferentSpellingIsNotAClash (skills + plugins) used filepath.Rel(cwd, tempdir), which errors on Windows when the temp dir (C:) and repo (D:) are on different drives. Switched to a same-directory alternate spelling (redundant /./), which still exercises canonicalSource without a cross-drive relative path.
- TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove asserted the raw source path, but canonicalSource resolves symlinks/8.3-short-paths, so the stored+displayed source differs on Windows. Normalize the source via EvalSymlinks up front so the assertion matches on every platform.

* stage 10: address CodeRabbit nitpicks (variadic append, header comment)
2026-06-13 10:43:31 +05:30
KRATOS abcb1107d9 wedge stage 11: GitHub Action + Slack/webhook notifier (#182)
* stage 11: GitHub Action + Slack/webhook notifier

Add a distribution channel and an output sink for unattended ZERO runs.

internal/notify:
- Add a Sink interface and Notifier fan-out. Notify now emits the terminal
  bell/OSC-9 sequence AND forwards every eligible event to attached sinks.
  Sinks fire even with no terminal writer (headless CI) and are gated by the
  same mode/focus policy. Sink invocation happens outside the lock and a sink
  panic is isolated, so a misbehaving or slow sink can never crash or stall the
  run. New(w, cfg) stays backward compatible.
- Add a WebhookSink (slack.go) that POSTs a JSON payload
  {text, type, message, summary?, links?} to a Slack incoming webhook or any
  generic webhook. Delivery is best-effort and fails soft: non-2xx and
  transport errors are logged (redacted) and swallowed. The message, summary,
  links, and the webhook URL are run through redaction before send/log so
  tokens never leak. The default HTTP transport honors HTTP(S)_PROXY, so a
  sandboxed run's scoped-egress policy is respected. An empty URL is inert.

action.yml:
- Composite GitHub Action wrapping zero exec. Provider-agnostic: provider,
  api-key, and api-key-env are inputs (no provider is hardcoded). Installs the
  pinned ZERO release via the bundled checksum-verifying installer, runs the
  prompt in the checked-out repo, surfaces ZERO's exit code as the step status,
  captures stdout, and can post a summary to the PR or to Slack. Safety
  defaults: auto=low, sandbox always active, never passes
  --skip-permissions-unsafe; secrets are passed via env and never echoed.

docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md: input/output tables, copy-paste workflows (issue-labeled
triage and nightly dep-upgrade PR), security notes, and the notifier docs.

.github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml: validates action.yml parses, declares
the documented inputs/outputs, keeps the conservative defaults, never enables
unsafe mode, and shell-syntax-checks the embedded run blocks.

* stage 11: reword action.yml comment so the unsafe-flag validation passes

The composite step's shell comment contained the literal '--skip-permissions-unsafe', which the action-yml validation (assert the string never appears in the serialized doc, to prove the flag is never passed) flagged even though it was only descriptive. Reworded the comment to drop the literal; the action still never passes the flag and the check stays strict.

* stage 11: address review for action env/inputs and webhook URL redaction

- action.yml: reject prompt+prompt-file when both set; trim only surrounding
  whitespace from add-dir entries (preserve internal spaces); export api-key
  in-process (validated env name) so the run sees it; treat a commit-SHA
  action_ref as not-a-tag and fall back to latest.
- notify: redact the webhook URL in outbound payload fields (not just logs);
  copy caller-owned Links/ExtraSecrets slices in the constructor.

* stage 11: disable credential persistence in action smoke checkout
2026-06-13 10:42:53 +05:30
KRATOS 6beb0b0908 wedge stage 09: finish plugin wiring (tools/hooks/skills) (#185)
* stage 09: finish plugin wiring (tools/hooks/skills)

Activate resolved plugin manifests so their declared tools, hooks, and
skills take effect at runtime instead of being parsed-but-unconsumed.

- internal/plugins/activate.go: Activate() registers each plugin tool into
  the tools.Registry via a command-runner adapter (JSON args on stdin,
  stdout/exit -> tools.Result, ${AGENT_PLUGIN_ROOT} expansion + env),
  builds hooks.Definition values for plugin hooks, and exposes plugin
  skill search roots. Permission maps allow/prompt/deny -> tools.Safety;
  allow only survives load-time clamping when manifest auto-approval is
  enabled, so mutating plugin tools are not auto-approved by default. A
  plugin-aware skill tool merges the default skills dir with plugin roots
  (recording duplicate names, never crashing). Malformed plugins/extensions
  are skipped with a warning; activation order is deterministic.
- internal/cli: activatePlugins() invokes activation in both bootstrap
  paths (interactive TUI in app.go and one-shot exec in exec.go), after
  core/specialist/MCP registration. newHookDispatcherWithExtra folds plugin
  hooks into the dispatcher's hook set. Fails open: a bad plugin warns and
  is skipped, never wedging startup.
- internal/plugins/plugins.go: update the stale 'not yet registered' note.

* stage 09: normalize plugin command path separators for Windows

expandPluginRoot kept the manifest's forward slashes, so a ${AGENT_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/x command became a mixed-separator path on Windows (C:\...\001/bin/x), failing the path tests. Added expandPluginRootPath (filepath.FromSlash on the placeholder-expanded executable path only; args keep their slashes since they may be URLs/flags) and used it for the tool and hook command paths.

* stage 09: address plugin wiring review

- surface per-plugin load diagnostics on stderr (not just top-level errors)
- skip plugin tools whose name collides with an already-registered tool
- resolve manifest-relative plugin skill paths against the plugin dir

* stage 09: fall back to plugin path/id when manifest path unknown in load diagnostic
2026-06-13 10:21:14 +05:30
KRATOS 588f8752f5 wedge stage 12: PDF ingestion (#183)
* stage 12: PDF ingestion

Add PDF ingestion to internal/imageinput so specs, design docs, and tickets
that arrive as PDF can be attached the same way images are.

- internal/imageinput/pdf.go: LoadDocument detects PDFs by magic bytes
  (%PDF-, never extension alone), enforces a 32 MiB raw-file cap and a
  256 KiB extracted-text cap (truncated with a marker, not rejected), and
  extracts the text layer in pure Go via github.com/ledongthuc/pdf. The
  parser can panic on malformed structures, so extraction is wrapped in a
  recover that turns a bad PDF into a clean error. A textless PDF with no
  rasterizer returns an explicit "no extractable text; OCR not available"
  error rather than silent empty success.
- Dependency posture: default build is pure-Go text extraction (no CGO, no
  transitive deps) so the static binary still cross-compiles. The optional
  poppler tools (pdftotext / pdftoppm) are used for richer extraction and
  page rasterization ONLY when present on PATH (same posture as the LSP
  language servers); when absent, extraction degrades to the pure-Go text
  path and never errors.
- Vision path: with a vision model and pdftoppm available, the first N pages
  (default 10) render to PNG and flow through the existing image pipeline
  (NormalizeImageMediaType, per-image cap, allow-list). Without a rasterizer
  it degrades to the text layer.
- TUI integration: /image <file.pdf> routes to the document path. The text
  layer attaches for any model and is prepended to the next prompt as a
  labeled preamble; rendered pages attach as images for vision models. The
  chip row and /image clear cover documents too.

Tests cover magic-byte detection, text extraction on a generated fixture,
both size caps, the no-text/no-raster message, malformed-input safety, the
pure-Go fallback, and the TUI attach/submit/clear wiring. go build, go test,
and gofmt are clean; CGO_ENABLED=0 cross-compiles for linux/amd64,
windows/arm64, and darwin/arm64.

* stage 12: address review (pdf page count, text cap, content-based routing)
2026-06-13 10:19:41 +05:30
KRATOS 59c332638d wedge M2: MCP server resources/prompts + sandbox scoped egress + MCP OAuth (#179)
* wedge stage 06: MCP server resources + prompts

Advertise resources and prompts capabilities in the initialize response and
handle resources/list, resources/read, prompts/list, and prompts/get alongside
the existing tools methods.

Resources enumerate in-scope workspace files via the shared workspace scanner
(reusing its gitignore-style exclusions) and read them read-only with strict
scope enforcement: traversal and out-of-scope absolute paths are rejected with
a JSON-RPC error and no contents, and binary files come back as base64 blobs.

Prompts expose a curated set of templates with simple {{arg}} substitution;
unknown prompt names return an error.

* wedge stage 07: sandbox scoped egress + auto-allow-bash

Add a middle-ground network mode between full allow and full deny:

- types.go: NetworkScoped network mode; Policy.AllowedDomains /
  Policy.DeniedDomains; Policy.AutoAllowBashWhenSandboxed plus its
  ZERO_SANDBOX_AUTO_ALLOW_BASH env surface (off by default).
- egress.go: in-process loopback (127.0.0.1:0) filtering proxy handling
  HTTP CONNECT (HTTPS tunnel) and plain HTTP. Allows only AllowedDomains
  minus DeniedDomains via exact-or-subdomain matching (github.com matches
  api.github.com but not notgithub.com or github.com.evil.com); deny wins.
  Denied targets get 403 / refused CONNECT. Decisions are logged through
  the repo redaction so query tokens never hit the audit trail. Fails
  closed: empty allowlist is rejected at construction.
- runner.go: NetworkScoped starts the proxy and routes the sandboxed
  process through it (HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY + NO_PROXY into the sandbox
  env; Linux keeps --unshare-net; macOS profile denies general network
  but permits localhost:proxyPort). Empty-allowlist scoped collapses to
  deny (effectiveNetwork). Any proxy-start error denies the build rather
  than falling back to open network. NetworkAllow/NetworkDeny unchanged.
- engine.go / registry.go / bash.go: honor AutoAllowBashWhenSandboxed -
  auto-allow bash without a prompt only when a wrapping sandbox is active
  for the command; ignore the flag when the sandbox is inactive. Preflight
  network gate now uses effectiveNetwork so a misconfigured scoped policy
  still fails closed. Bash defers plan.Cleanup() to shut the proxy down.

Default behaviour is unchanged for existing NetworkAllow / NetworkDeny
users and for the off-by-default auto-allow flag.

* wedge stage 08: MCP OAuth client

Add an OAuth 2.0 + PKCE authorization-code flow so ZERO can connect to
remote MCP servers that require OAuth.

- internal/mcp/oauth.go: authorization-server metadata discovery with
  config fallback/override, S256 PKCE, loopback redirect listener, state
  (CSRF) validation, code+verifier token exchange, refresh, and optional
  dynamic client registration. Tokens are never logged.
- internal/mcp/oauth_store.go: per-server token persistence in a 0600
  JSON file under the config dir, with a redaction-safe status summary
  that omits the token material.
- internal/mcp/network_client.go: OAuth-configured servers get a round
  tripper that attaches the bearer token and, on 401, refreshes once and
  retries; refresh failure surfaces an actionable re-login message.
- internal/mcp/config.go + internal/config: an MCP server entry may
  declare auth: "oauth" with optional client registration / explicit
  endpoints. Non-OAuth servers are unaffected.
- zero mcp oauth {login,logout,status} wired into the CLI surface;
  status reports presence/expiry, never the token.

* wedge M2: address review — 2 security fixes, portability, robustness (#179)

Security (Critical):
- resources: resolve symlinks BEFORE the scope check (and resolve roots) so an
  in-workspace symlink to an out-of-scope file (e.g. link -> /etc/passwd) is no
  longer readable via resources/read. resources/read echoes the requested URI
  (not the resolved path) so list/read stay consistent.
- sandbox egress: authorize the dialed URL host, not the client Host header, so
  'GET http://denied/ ... Host: allowed' can't bypass the allowlist.

Robustness/correctness:
- prompts: reject prompts/get that omits a required argument; tokenized
  substitution so {{...}} inside supplied values is preserved (not stripped).
- resources: percent-encode/decode file URIs via net/url (spaces, #, %).
- oauth: one timeout-scoped context bounds discovery + registration + callback +
  exchange; joinWellKnown preserves issuer path segments (RFC 8414).
- cli: 'mcp oauth login' rejects --json instead of silently ignoring it; the
  login test is bounded so a missed callback fails fast instead of hanging.

Portability: XDG token-store path test uses t.TempDir() so it passes on Windows
(fixes the Windows Smoke failure).

Adds regression tests for the symlink escape, Host-header bypass, required-arg
rejection, and placeholder preservation. Full go test ./... + -race green.

* wedge M2: fail closed on unenforceable scoped egress (review #179)

Addresses the two P1 scoped-egress enforcement gaps from review:

1. Policy-only fallback ran NetworkScoped with unrestricted networking. On Windows / any host without a native backend, 'network: scoped' with allowedDomains silently got open host networking because Evaluate permitted network-risk tools (expecting a proxy) while BuildCommandPlan ran a direct plan with no proxy. Evaluate now collapses scoped to deny when the active backend cannot enforce egress, so network-risk tools fail closed.

2. Bubblewrap 'scoped egress' could not reach the proxy. --unshare-net isolates the netns and there is no bridge to the host-loopback proxy (the comments claimed one; no code added it), so allowlisted egress never worked. Bubblewrap no longer starts an unreachable proxy: scoped collapses to deny (--unshare-net, no proxy env), matching Evaluate. Comments corrected; a real relay (e.g. slirp4netns) is left as future work.

Mechanism: new Backend.ScopedEgress capability (true only for sandbox-exec, which shares the host net under a seatbelt profile restricting outbound to the proxy port) + Backend.EnforcesScopedEgress(). sandbox-exec scoped egress is unchanged. Regression tests cover enforcing vs non-enforcing backends in Evaluate and the bubblewrap fail-closed plan.
2026-06-12 20:41:59 +05:30
KRATOS ae4ce8aae2 wedge build: web_search + LSP client/diagnostics (stages 01-03) (#175)
* stage 01: web_search tool

Adds a web_search tool alongside web_fetch: discovers URLs via a pluggable
searchBackend (env-configured generic JSON backend; swappable for Exa/You/
Tavily/Brave) and formats ranked results as a numbered list. Registered in
CoreNetworkTools().

Deviation from the stage spec: the spec said readOnlySafety, but the repo
enforces (TestCoreNetworkToolsExposePromptMetadata) that every core network
tool is prompt-gated network egress — so web_search matches web_fetch's
posture instead of being auto-allowed. Necessary fallout from adding the
tool: knownToolNames (+web_search), the network-tools metadata test (now
covers both), and a stale 'unknown tool' fixture that had used web_search.

* stage 02: LSP client foundation

New internal/lsp package: a direct (self-spawned, stdio) Language Server
Protocol client so unattended runs see real compiler diagnostics without an
open editor.
- client.go: JSON-RPC 2.0 with LSP Content-Length framing; concurrent
  Call/Notify, id-matched responses, server->client request auto-reply,
  notification handler, context cancellation, read-loop teardown.
- server.go: process lifecycle (spawn via os/exec, initialize/initialized
  handshake, graceful shutdown+exit with kill fallback). Handshake factored
  out (performInitialize) for pipe-based testing.
- registry.go: extension -> server command (.go/.ts/.tsx/.js/.jsx/.py/.rs),
  languageId map, PATH availability via exec.LookPath.
- types.go: minimal LSP types + PathToURI/URIToPath (Windows-drive aware).
Stdlib-only; tested over in-memory pipes with a stub server (no real gopls),
including -race for the concurrent id router.

* stage 03: LSP document sync + diagnostics

Makes the LSP client produce actionable signal so ZERO can ask 'did my edit
compile?' headlessly.
- documents.go: per-server session with document lifecycle (didOpen/didChange
  full-sync/didClose), a URI->diagnostics store fed by publishDiagnostics, and
  WaitForDiagnostics with a publish-baseline + 300ms quiet debounce (servers
  never signal 'analysis complete').
- diagnostics.go: FormatDiagnostics (path:line:col: severity: message, 1-based),
  HasErrors, FilterBySeverity, severity labels.
- manager.go: Manager — one lazily-started, reused server per language (keyed by
  binary), routes a file to the right server, Check(ctx,path,text) -> settled
  diagnostics, graceful Shutdown; unknown extension -> (nil,nil), not an error.
Concurrency-safe; tested under -race over in-memory pipes with a stub server
(no real gopls). FormatDiagnostics takes the path explicitly since a Diagnostic
carries only a range, not its document.

* wedge: address review on #175 (LSP robustness + web_search provider)

- lsp/client.go: Close() now disables the client — Call/Notify reject after
  close instead of leaking a pending entry / writing to a dead conn.
- lsp/documents.go: serialize same-document syncs through the Notify write via a
  per-URI lock and commit version/open only on success; drop delayed
  publishDiagnostics for a superseded (older positive) version;
  WaitForDiagnostics now reports whether a fresh publish arrived.
- lsp/manager.go: Check returns (nil,nil) when no publish newer than baseline
  arrives (don't return a stale prior result for new text); Shutdown joins and
  returns per-server shutdown errors instead of always reporting success.
- lsp/diagnostics.go: FormatDiagnostics collapses embedded whitespace so each
  diagnostic stays one physical line.
- tools/web_search.go: forward ZERO_WEBSEARCH_PROVIDER in the request so the
  config knob isn't inert.
Adds tests: close-disables-client, stale-version drop, multi-line message
collapse, Shutdown error propagation, httptest backend (provider+parse).

* wedge: degrade gracefully when an LSP server binary is missing (#175 review)

Manager.Check translated a missing-binary start error (exec.ErrNotFound)
into (nil,nil) so a configured extension on a machine without gopls/
pyright/rust-analyzer degrades exactly like an unsupported extension —
LSP diagnostics are an opportunistic layer, not a hard dependency. Other
start failures still surface. Adds a test injecting an exec.ErrNotFound
starter.

* wedge stage 04: self-correct loop (#176)

* stage 04: self-correct loop

After a successful mutating tool call, verify the changed files (LSP
diagnostics + project tests) and feed failures back to the model to fix —
bounded and autonomy-gated, so an unattended run fixes its own mistakes
without looping forever.

- internal/agent/selfcorrect.go: SelfCorrector with injectable diagnosticsChecker
  (lsp.Manager adapter) and projectVerifier (verify.DetectPlan+Run); AfterEdit
  produces a redacted, model-facing corrective message; per-run attempt ceiling;
  low autonomy reports without auto-attempting; medium/high auto-correct.
- internal/agent/loop.go: invoke AfterEdit after a successful mutating tool call
  (ChangedFiles non-empty), appending feedback to messages. nil SelfCorrect (the
  default) is a no-op — read-only tools never trigger it.
- internal/agent/types.go: add Options.SelfCorrect *SelfCorrector (the explicit
  options-struct change).

Single-pass verify per call (the agent loop + model edits provide the multi-
attempt cycle, not selfverify's same-command re-runs). Tested with fakes (no
gopls/shell): fail-then-pass, max-attempts abort, read-only skip, low-autonomy
report-only, LSP-only failure, secret redaction; -race clean.

CLI activation (a --self-correct flag building the SelfCorrector in exec.go) is
intentionally left out to honor this stage's file scope — the engine is exported
and ready to wire.

* wedge: propagate file-read error in self-correct LSP checker (#176 review)

CodeRabbit/golangci-lint (nilerr) flagged lspDiagnosticsChecker.Check returning
(nil, nil) after os.ReadFile fails. Propagate the error instead; the sole caller
(inspect) already skips files whose Check errors, so a deleted/unreadable file
still degrades quietly while future callers can decide. Adds a regression test.

* wedge: surface non-degradable verify errors in self-correct (#175 review)

SelfCorrector.inspect silently continued on every checker.Check error and
ignored verifier errors, so a real LSP startup/sync failure, an unreadable
changed file, or a failed plan detection produced report.Failed=false ->
OutcomePassed with no signal. Manager.Check already degrades missing servers to
(nil,nil) and DetectPlan returns an empty plan (not an error) when nothing is
detected, so a non-nil error from either is a genuine failure. Record such
errors in CorrectionReport.InspectErrors, fail the pass, and surface them in the
model feedback. Adds regression tests for both paths.

* wedge: drop third-party search-provider names from web_search comments

Keep code/comments provider-neutral: describe the backend interface as 'any
hosted search API' rather than naming specific services.

* wedge: defer self-correct feedback until after the tool-call batch (#175 review)

Self-correct feedback was appended as a user message inside the per-tool-call
loop, so a multi-tool-call turn whose first (mutating) call failed verification
produced: assistant tool_use batch -> tool_result 1 -> user feedback ->
tool_result 2. A user message interleaved between tool_results breaks strict
provider replay and later session replay/compaction.

Accumulate feedback during the batch and append it once after the loop (same
after-batch pattern already used for mid-run model escalation), so every
advertised tool call keeps its tool_result contiguous. Adds a two-tool-call
regression test asserting the feedback lands after both tool_results.

* wedge: batch self-correct AfterEdit once per turn over union of changes (#175 review)

Deferring only the feedback emission still ran SelfCorrect.AfterEdit once per
mutating tool call, which (a) consumes the per-run attempt budget multiple times
in a single turn and (b) verifies an intermediate edit that a later call in the
same batch already superseded — AfterEdit is documented as one per-run instance
holding attempt state, so this is a correctness issue, not just transcript shape.

Aggregate every mutating tool's ChangedFiles during the batch and call AfterEdit
once afterward over the deduped union, appending its feedback once (still after
all tool_results, preserving contiguity). Adds dedupeStrings and a regression
test asserting two writes in one turn consume exactly one attempt and emit one
feedback message.
2026-06-12 15:13:05 +05:30
Vasanth T 2192c10299 Add agent quality eval foundation (#177)
* Add agent quality eval foundation

* Fix agent eval review issues

* Address agent eval review feedback
2026-06-12 13:31:57 +05:30
KRATOS a6d6939bc5 audit: fix isolated remaining findings (redaction, secrets, rune-safety, credential status) (#174)
* audit: fix redaction sibling-DAG false cycle, hoist URL regex, widen OpenAI key pattern

- redaction: seen-set now tracks only the current DFS path (delete pointer
  after recursing) so a shared reference reached via a sibling branch is no
  longer reported as CircularReference; true cycles still detected. (audit
  redaction.go:222)
- redaction: redactURLPasswords compiles its regexp once at package scope
  instead of per call. (audit redaction.go:362)
- secrets: openai_key body allows - and _ so sk-proj-/sk-svcacct- keys match,
  not just legacy sk-<alnum>. (audit scanner.go:35)

* audit: rune-safe cron run-error truncation and commit-subject length

- cronTruncate now cuts on a UTF-8 rune boundary (via cutRuneBoundary) so a
  persisted cron run-error excerpt can't end in a split rune. (audit cron_run.go:179)
- zerogit ValidateMessage counts runes, not bytes, so a valid non-ASCII commit
  subject under 72 chars is no longer rejected. (audit zerogit.go:207)

* audit: report auth-header-only profiles as having a credential

ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet was true only for a non-empty APIKey, so a profile
authenticated solely via AuthHeaderValue rendered as 'not set' in the command
center. Treat either credential as set. (audit contracts.go:166)

* audit: address review on #174 (credential-presence coverage + consistency)

- Add ProviderSnapshotFromProfile test covering APIKeySet for api-key-only,
  auth-header-only, both, and neither (the AuthHeaderValue path CodeRabbit
  flagged as untested).
- doctor.go: report the provider 'apiKey' diagnostic as set when EITHER APIKey
  or AuthHeaderValue is present, matching ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet — closing
  the same auth-header-only gap at the other credential-check site.
- scanner_test: also assert the [REDACTED:openai_key] placeholder is present
  (matches the pattern used by the existing redaction test).

* audit: trim credentials + surface doctor credential presence (#174 review)

- ProviderSnapshot test: add whitespace-only api-key / auth-header cases so the
  TrimSpace behavior stays covered.
- doctor.go: trim both APIKey and AuthHeaderValue before the presence check
  (matches ProviderSnapshot.APIKeySet) AND move the indicator off the sensitive
  'apiKey' detail key — check() runs RedactValue, so 'apiKey' was always scrubbed
  to [REDACTED], leaving the set/not-set indicator invisible. Now reported under
  'credentialConfigured' so it actually surfaces; added a doctor table test.

No consumer read the old detail key.

* audit: honor AuthHeaderValue in model discovery + base-URL redaction (#174 review)

Two credential-presence consistency gaps flagged on #174:

- providermodeldiscovery: the /models probe gated on (and sent Authorization
  from) profile.APIKey only, so an auth-header-only profile was skipped/sent
  unauthenticated. Gate via discoveryHasCredential (APIKey OR AuthHeaderValue)
  and build the request with providerio.ApplyAuthHeaders, matching how the live
  providers authenticate (honors AuthHeaderValue, AuthHeader, AuthScheme,
  CustomHeaders). APIKey-only behavior is unchanged.
- zerocommands.redactProviderBaseURL now also redacts AuthHeaderValue if it
  leaks into the base URL (variadic secrets, empties dropped).

Adds regression tests for auth-header-only discovery, discoveryHasCredential,
and auth-header redaction in the base URL.

* audit: doctor credential-presence test parity with contracts_test (#174 review)

Add the 'both' and 'whitespace auth header only' cases so
TestProviderConfigCheckCredentialPresence matches the six cases in
contracts_test.go's TestProviderSnapshotAPIKeySetCountsAuthHeaderValue.
2026-06-12 12:48:24 +05:30
Anandan fcfdb873d0 Polish main TUI surface (#168)
* Polish main TUI surface

Simplify the empty chat surface, replace starter prompt chips with a cleaner brand state, move model and permission state into the composer frame, quiet the footer status, and improve composer word-editing keybindings.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check

* Polish autocomplete command palette

* Polish TUI file mention picker

* Address TUI review feedback

* Keep autocomplete anchored above composer

* Center autocomplete over chat viewport

* Layer autocomplete overlays over transcript

* Prefill argument commands from palette

* Show argument hints for command completions

* Polish TUI provider setup

* Polish TUI picker and composer metadata

* Add two-step mouse selection in TUI

* Polish TUI mouse selection flows

* Make provider wizard navigation test hermetic

* Fix TUI review edge cases
2026-06-11 22:34:46 +05:30
KRATOS 06ea4f004b Edit safety: file read/write tracking, external-modification detection, post-apply hooks (#172)
* Edit safety: file version tracking, conflict detection, hook wiring

Phase 1 — FileTracker (internal/tools/file_tracker.go): per-session
map[absPath]{sha256, size, mtime}; CheckConflict flags drift only against
a known baseline, so first-touch writes are unaffected. nil = no-op.

Phase 2 — external-modification detection: read_file records the
whole-file baseline; edit_file and write_file --overwrite refuse to
clobber a file whose on-disk content drifted from it and tell the model
to re-read first, then re-baseline to what they wrote. apply_patch
forgets the files it rewrote (git apply has its own context guard).
Threaded via RunOptions/agent.Options FileTracker, built once per session
in the exec, spec, and TUI paths.

Phase 3 — post-apply validation via hooks: the dormant hooks.Dispatcher
is wired into executeToolCall. beforeTool hooks can veto a call
(DenialHookBlocked); afterTool hook output is scrubbed and surfaced to
the model. DispatchOutcome now collects hook stdout/stderr. Per-session
dispatcher built from merged user+project hooks.json; fails open and runs
nothing until a hook is configured.

* edit-safety: address review — fail closed on read, redact hook reason

- write_file overwrite: if a tracked file cannot be re-read to verify it,
  fail CLOSED (refuse the overwrite) instead of silently proceeding — the
  read error previously skipped the conflict check and could clobber an
  externally modified or replaced file.
- blockedByHookResult: scrub outcome.Reason through redaction before placing
  it in model-visible ToolResult.Output; this intercepted path bypassed the
  registry's normal output-redaction boundary.
- TestHashContentIsStableAndDistinguishing: compare separately stored hashes
  so the stability check is not a same-expression comparison (SA4000).

* edit-safety: flag ToolResult.Redacted when hook output is scrubbed

appendHookFeedback now reports whether scrubbing changed the afterTool
feedback, and blockedByHookResult reports whether it scrubbed the reason;
both set ToolResult.Redacted so the hook-intercepted paths match the
registry's redaction contract. Adds tests asserting a secret-bearing hook
reason/feedback is scrubbed and flips Redacted.
2026-06-11 20:34:35 +05:30
KRATOS 3f3de1a29b permissions: scope-enforced grants (permission-UX Phase 0 + 1) (#170)
* permissions: show grant scope on the permission card and decided rows

The permission card only named the tool, so 'always' read as a blind tool-wide
yes. Derive a concise scope from the call's args (the file path, directory, or
working dir it touches) and show it on the card and the persisted decision row,
so a user can see exactly what an allow covers.

Phase 0 of the permission-UX work: presentation only, no storage change.
permissionScope + scope plumbing through PermissionEvent/PermissionRequest;
covered by TestPermissionScope.

* permissions: spec for Phase 1 scope-enforced grants

* permissions: enforce grant scope so "always allow" covers only what the card showed

Phase 0 displayed the scope a tool call touches but the persisted grant was still
tool-wide: an "always allow" on a write to one file silently authorized every
write. This scopes the grant to exactly that file or directory.

sandbox/scope.go centralizes scope derivation (DeriveScope), absolute-path
resolution (resolveScopeAbs, anchored to the workspace so a grant never leaks
across projects), and matching (grantCovers: file = exact, dir = subtree,
empty = tool-wide; a tool-wide request is never covered by a narrower grant).

Grants are now stored per-tool as a list (schema v2, with v1 files migrated as
tool-wide grants). Lookup takes the request's absolute scope and applies
deny-wins / most-specific-allow precedence. engine.Grant anchors a relative
scope to the workspace; engine.Decide derives and matches the request scope.
agent.persistPermissionGrant forwards the scope, and permissionScope now shares
DeriveScope so the card and the stored grant can never diverge. Canonicalizing
tool keys on read also closes the whitespace-padded-key lookup miss.

Covered by sandbox scope/grant/engine tests and the agent/TUI always-allow tests.

* sandbox: fix Windows-only TestResolveScopeAbs by using truly-absolute paths

A leading separator (\proj\a) is rooted but not absolute on Windows
(filepath.IsAbs requires a volume like C:), so the absolute-passthrough
case was treated as relative and anchored onto the workspace root,
producing a doubled path. Build the root via filepath.Abs so the test
exercises a genuinely-absolute path on every platform.

* test: isolate session store in exec/tui tests so go test stops writing to $HOME

TestRunExecStreamJSONRunStartUsesResolvedAPIModel,
TestRunExecReadsStreamJSONPromptFromStdin, and
TestPromptSubmitInjectsLiveSessionModelContext ran real exec sessions
but only isolated cwd (t.TempDir + getwd), not the session store, so the
default store resolved sessions.DefaultRoot() off the real $HOME and
persisted into ~/.local/share/zero/sessions on every run. Set
XDG_DATA_HOME to a per-test temp dir (the existing convention in
exec_test.go / exec_scope_test.go) so each run is fully isolated.

* permissions: address review — clean root-equiv scopes, label+fit scope rows

- DeriveScope: filepath.Clean the path before the root check so ./, ./.,
  and a/.. collapse to the workspace root and surface as tool-wide instead
  of a narrower directory grant (which re-prompted inconsistently). Adds
  regression cases.
- renderPermissionRow: prefix the scope segment as scope:<value> across all
  three branches and fitStyledLine the allow branch (it returned unfit and
  could overflow narrow terminals).
- TestGrantReplacesSameScope: assert the setup store.Grant errors so a setup
  failure fails at the real cause, not a stale-state assertion.

* docs: point permission-scope spec at grant_scope.go

The design spec named internal/sandbox/scope.go as the source of truth, but
DeriveScope/resolveScopeAbs/grantCovers live in grant_scope.go (scope.go is
the unrelated write-roots Scope from #162). Fix the heading and the test
reference (grant_scope_test).
2026-06-11 20:33:52 +05:30
Vasanth T 0f103174d0 Add session context compaction flow (#166)
* Add session context compaction flow

* Animate manual compaction flow

* Simplify compact progress copy

* Render compact progress as compression card

* Render compact completion as success card

* Fix compaction review findings

* Fix compaction resume fallback
2026-06-11 20:16:22 +05:30
KRATOS 8d4a530423 test: isolate session store in exec/tui tests so go test stops writing to $HOME (#171)
TestRunExecStreamJSONRunStartUsesResolvedAPIModel,
TestRunExecReadsStreamJSONPromptFromStdin, and
TestPromptSubmitInjectsLiveSessionModelContext ran real exec sessions
but only isolated cwd (t.TempDir + getwd), not the session store, so the
default store resolved sessions.DefaultRoot() off the real $HOME and
persisted into ~/.local/share/zero/sessions on every run. Set
XDG_DATA_HOME to a per-test temp dir (the existing convention in
exec_test.go / exec_scope_test.go) so each run is fully isolated.
2026-06-11 18:30:45 +05:30
KRATOS 8409cb4627 tui/resume: list only standalone conversations, not sub-runs (#169)
The /resume picker called sessions.Store.List() unfiltered, so it showed every
session directory — including the child (specialist/sub-agent) and spec
draft/impl sessions an agent spawns by the dozen per conversation. That flooded
the picker (the reported '… 779 more · /resume <id>') even though the TUI
creates exactly one session per conversation.

Add Store.ListResumable()/LatestResumable() (and an IsResumableKind predicate)
that keep only regular and user-fork sessions, and use them for the picker and
for '/resume latest' so latest never lands on a newer child/spec sub-run. An
explicit '/resume <id>' still resolves any session by id.

Covered by TestListAndLatestResumableExcludeSubRuns and
TestResumePickerExcludesSubRunSessions.
2026-06-11 16:54:58 +05:30
KRATOSandClaude Fable 5 e381d8eab1 Additional write roots: --add-dir flag, global config key, /add-dir TUI command (#162)
* docs: spec for additional write roots (--add-dir / /add-dir)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* docs: implementation plan for additional write roots

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: add Scope type for multi-root write access

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* docs: write roots honored from global config only, union merge semantics

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: fix multi-root violation reporting and pin prefix-alias behavior

- validate: prefer ViolationSymlinkTraversal over ViolationOutsideWorkspace
  when all roots deny; return original requestedPath in violation; append
  --add-dir hint only on outside_workspace results; extend doc comment to
  state that a symlink resolving inside any root is allowed.
- normalizePrefixForRoot: dedupe insideRoot check via pathWithinRoot (Fix 3);
  widen EvalSymlinks comment to cover jump-over case; add POSIX-only note.
- WorkspaceRoot: add doc comment noting immutability/lock safety (Fix 4).
- Tests: pin multi-root traversal-preferred behavior, deterministic alias
  test (TestValidateResolvesAliasedPathPrefixes), Add symlink normalization
  test, and tilde-expansion error path test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: make engine path validation and risk scope-aware

Thread *Scope through EngineOptions/Engine so Evaluate and Classify use
multi-root scope validation instead of single-root validateWorkspacePaths,
letting extra write roots (--add-dir / /add-dir) be honoured by the policy
gate and risk classifier. Remove now-dead validateWorkspacePaths helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: pin override-root scope isolation, tidy Evaluate scope handling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: widen seatbelt/bubblewrap profiles and command cwd to scope roots

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: pin extra-root chdir behavior and document bind invariants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* tools: resolve paths against the shared write scope

Add PathScope interface and scoped resolver helpers to workspace.go, then
thread a scope field through all 8 file tools (read_file, list_directory,
glob, grep, write_file, edit_file, apply_patch, bash). Each existing
constructor delegates to a new NewScoped* variant; nil scope is byte-identical
to the original behavior. Registry gains CoreReadOnlyToolsScoped,
CoreWriteToolsScoped, CoreShellToolsScoped, and CoreToolsScoped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* tools: restore fail-closed write-target symlink checks, share prefix normalization

* tools: report absolute paths for extra-root changes, pin scoped traversal denial

- resolveScopedPath and resolveScopedTargetPath now return the absolute
  path as the second value when the matched root is an extra (non-workspace)
  root, eliminating ambiguity in ChangedFiles, cwd meta, and display
  summaries downstream
- Add TestScopedWriteRefusesSameRootSymlinkTraversal to pin that same-root
  symlink traversal within an extra root is denied (pre-existing behavior)
- Add TestScopedWriteReportsAbsolutePathForExtraRoot to enforce the new
  absolute-path contract for ChangedFiles on extra-root writes
- Extend doc comments on PathScope, ChangedFiles, changedFilesFromPatch,
  and both scoped resolvers to capture the workspace-vs-absolute invariant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* config: add sandbox.additionalWriteRoots (global config only, union merge)

* cli: add repeatable --add-dir flag wiring scope into registry and engine

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* cli: forward --add-dir across dispatch paths, pin scope wiring with tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* cli: pin --add-dir dispatch forwarding end-to-end, close guard gaps

Review fixes for the --add-dir dispatch commit:

- Add TestRunAddDirDispatchForwardsGrantIntoExecScope: drives
  runWithDeps through both the "exec" and "-p" dispatch shapes with a
  provider that calls write_file inside the extra root, asserting the
  grant reaches the exec sandbox scope (and a negative control without
  --add-dir is denied fail-closed). Mutation-verified: dropping
  addDirFlagArgs forwarding from either case fails the test.
- Remove help/version from the --add-dir allowlist so any non-TUI/
  non-exec leading --add-dir hard-errors, matching the stated
  requirement; extend the rejection test with those cases.
- Fail loud when --add-dir is hidden behind a stray non-flag arg on the
  --skip-permissions-unsafe path instead of silently dropping the grant.
- Reject flag-like values in the inline --add-dir= spelling to match
  the space form (a directory named -foo stays reachable as ./-foo).
- Move TestExecScopeReRegistrationSwapsCoreToolsByName out of the parse
  test file into the new exec_scope_test.go alongside the e2e test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* tui: add /add-dir command for session write-root grants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: surface write roots in zero sandbox status and plan snapshots

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* cli: surface write-roots error in --effective --json, normalize fallback root

Review fixes for the Task8 observability range:
- runSandboxPolicyEffective JSON payload gains writeRootsError
  (omitempty) so --json consumers see the same fail-soft signal as
  the text write_roots_error line instead of a misleading
  workspace-only writeRoots list.
- The fail-soft fallback now derives its write roots from a
  workspace-only Scope (which cannot fail) so the error path renders
  the same symlink-resolved root as the success path.
- TestRunSandboxPolicyEffectiveWriteRootsFailSoft gains a --json leg
  asserting writeRootsError names the stale root with a
  workspace-only fallback; the configured-roots test asserts the key
  is absent for valid roots.
- SandboxPlanSnapshot doc comment reworded to match the converter:
  no current builder populates WriteRoots.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: seatbelt integration test for extra write roots

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* docs: document --add-dir and /add-dir write-root grants

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: pass volume-qualified paths through prefix normalization verbatim

NormalizePrefixForRoot's POSIX component walk mangled Windows drive paths
(C:\Users -> C:Users), which downstream single-root checks treated as
relative and joined under the workspace — failing the policy gate OPEN on
Windows. Volume-qualified paths now bypass the walk entirely (the macOS
/var alias problem it solves has no Windows equivalent) and windows-gated
tests pin both the verbatim pass-through and the engine denial.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: make prefix normalization volume-aware for Windows alias resolution

The previous commit disabled NormalizePrefixForRoot on Windows, which broke
it the other direction: a workspace created under an 8.3 short path
(C:\Users\RUNNER~1\...) resolves via EvalSymlinks to its long form
(runneradmin), so raw short-form requests escaped the long-form root and
legitimate extra-root writes were denied. This is the same alias problem as
macOS /var -> /private/var, which the helper already solves. Start the
component walk from the volume root (C:\ or //host/share/) instead of "/"
so it resolves the prefix on Windows too; POSIX VolumeName is empty so the
walk reduces to the original "/"-rooted behavior byte-for-byte. Windows
test now pins allow-inside-root + deny-outside both directions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* sandbox: address PR review findings for additional write roots

Resolve the CHANGES_REQUESTED review on PR #162:

- engine: derive workspaceRoot from scope.Roots()[0] when NewEngine is
  given a Scope without an explicit WorkspaceRoot, so Evaluate's
  EnforceWorkspace/classification guards no longer silently skip
  (+ regression test).
- tools/workspace: scopedRoots now fails closed (returns an error) when a
  non-nil PathScope exposes empty Roots(), instead of returning success
  with an empty path; threaded through the scoped resolve/recheck helpers
  and resolveGrepRoot.
- tools/glob: emit absolute matches when cwd resolves into an extra root
  so results can't be fed back and resolve to a same-named workspace file
  (+ regression test).
- tools/bash,grep,apply_patch: schema descriptions mention granted extra
  roots (relative -> workspace, absolute -> granted root).
- docs/plan: fix markdownlint heading increment, malformed rule+heading,
  and bare code fence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

* tools/grep, tui: address PR review for additional write roots

- grep now emits absolute, symlink-resolved paths for matches in a granted
  extra (non-workspace) root, mirroring the glob fix. A bare workspace-relative
  name like "report.go" otherwise resolves back under the workspace when fed to
  read_file/edit_file and hits the wrong file when the name exists in both
  roots. Covers content and files_with_matches output.
- tui: only reset chatScrollOffset for a real submission, not an empty Enter
  (a no-op), so the viewport is no longer yanked to the bottom when nothing was
  submitted. Real submissions still snap back.
- glob: schema description now mentions granted extra roots, matching the
  bash/grep/apply_patch wording so the --add-dir/-add-dir flow is discoverable.

Regression tests: TestScopedGrepReturnsAbsoluteMatchesForExtraRoot,
TestEmptySubmitKeepsChatScrollOffset.

* docs: add /add-dir to the TUI commands quick-reference table

The command was documented further down but missing from the scannable
commands table, so users browsing the table wouldn't discover the
additional-write-roots flow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 15:17:20 +05:30
gnanam1990 1a60eabf90 providerhealth: assert the last-error contract in dialValidatedAddrs test
Use distinct per-attempt errors and assert errors.Is(err, lastErr) plus the
attempt count, so a regression returning the first failure (or short-circuiting)
is caught instead of slipping past a bare non-nil check.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 0c37093974 audit: address PR review findings (security, correctness, tests)
Fixes from the code review on the critical/high audit branch:

- tools/apply_patch: parseHunkCounts now reads only the range section between
  the opening and closing "@@". A crafted section heading like
  "@@ -1,1 +1,1 @@ +1,999999" could otherwise overwrite the line count, wedge
  the parser in hunk mode, and swallow later file headers so they escaped
  validatePatchPaths / recheckPatchWriteTargets — a workspace-confinement bypass.
- providerhealth: the SSRF-hardened dial now tries every validated address in
  order instead of pinning addrs[0], so a dual-stack/multi-record provider isn't
  failed by a single dead record. Extracted dialValidatedAddrs for coverage.
- hooks/dispatch: a beforeTool hook killed by its deadline now fails CLOSED
  (vetoes the tool) instead of fail-open. A launch failure (missing binary)
  still fails open so a misconfigured hook can't wedge every tool call.
- cron: Store.Get returns a distinct ErrJobNotFound sentinel; cron_run only
  treats that as "removed during run" and still records/persists on a transient
  read error instead of silently dropping the run.
- providers/anthropic: closeOpen finalizes thinking buffers still open at stream
  end (SSE ended after thinking_delta/signature_delta but before
  content_block_stop), so they survive in the done event's ReasoningBlocks for
  replay. Finalized in index order.
- providers/gemini: corrected the stale thinkingConfig comment (no IncludeThoughts
  field; thought summaries are suppressed by skipping part.Thought parts).

Tests: regression coverage for each fix, plus the requested nitpicks —
EOF-terminated MCP line, recipe-prompt propagation assertion, checked
file.Close() in session store tests, and a shortened bash process-group timeout
test via the bashWaitDelay hook.

Note: declined the suggestion to replay a "signature" on redacted_thinking
blocks — Anthropic's redacted_thinking carries only an opaque "data" field; the
signature is for regular thinking blocks, and the stream never populates one for
redacted blocks.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 28b32297f6 hooks: add a Dispatcher that runs and audits configured hooks
The package had all the primitives (Select, ConfigStore, AuditStore) but no
caller ever ran a hook. Add a Dispatcher that selects the hooks for a lifecycle
event, runs each command (no shell) with the event payload on stdin under a
timeout, and records started/completed audit events. A beforeTool hook that
exits non-zero vetoes the tool and stops the chain; other events are advisory.
A hook that cannot be launched is recorded as an error but never blocks. The
command runner is injectable for testing.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 ea2920ae0f sessions: only tolerate a torn tail when the final line is unterminated
The torn-tail tolerance dropped any malformed final line, including a
complete-but-corrupt line ending in a newline — silently swallowing real
corruption. A genuine torn tail is an incomplete write with no trailing
newline; gate the tolerance on that so a fully-flushed corrupt line fails
loudly again, while a truncated final line is still recovered.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 de9771cee8 providers/gemini: forward reasoning effort as a thinking budget
Map a requested reasoning effort to a Gemini thinkingBudget (capped at the
lowest per-model ceiling). Capture the thoughtSignature each functionCall part
carries and preserve it on the tool call (via a new StreamEvent/ToolCall
signature field), then replay it on the functionCall part in later turns so
multi-turn function calling with thinking is not rejected. Thought-summary
parts are skipped so reasoning never leaks into the answer. No effort = no
thinking config, so default runs are unchanged.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 44411578e9 providers/anthropic: forward reasoning effort as extended thinking
Map a requested reasoning effort to an Anthropic thinking budget and enable
extended thinking, raising max_tokens so the budget plus a response both fit.
Crucially, capture the streamed thinking / redacted_thinking blocks (text +
signature) and preserve them on the assistant message so they are replayed
verbatim at the start of the next turn — without this, Anthropic rejects every
tool-using follow-up. Adds zeroruntime carriers (Message.Reasoning, ToolCall.
Signature, ReasoningBlock) shared with the upcoming Gemini work. No effort =
no thinking, so default runs are unchanged.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 24e15e2138 providers/openai: forward reasoning effort to the chat completions request
zeroruntime.CompletionRequest had no effort field, so agent.Options.Reasoning
Effort never reached the provider (cli/exec.go even noted it was 'not yet
forwarded'). Add CompletionRequest.ReasoningEffort, thread it through every
request the agent loop builds, and map it to OpenAI's reasoning_effort. The
CLI gates the forwarded value against the resolved model: known non-reasoning
models send nothing (matching the existing 'ignoring' advisory), known
reasoning models send their effective level, and unknown custom endpoints
forward the requested value as-is. Anthropic/Gemini mapping is handled
separately.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 32a6922916 agent: surface response truncation (finish_reason) to the user
Providers already normalized finish_reason into collected.FinishReason, but
the agent loop never read it, so a final answer cut off at the output token
cap (or by a content filter) was silently presented as complete. Carry the
turn's finish reason into agent.Result, add Truncated()/TruncationNotice(),
and emit a warning from the exec writer and a system row in the TUI when the
response was truncated.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 8c7761e8e7 sandbox: allow /dev nodes and temp dirs in the sandbox-exec profile
The macOS sandbox-exec profile made only the workspace writable, so
ubiquitous operations failed with 'Operation not permitted' — `> /dev/null`
and mktemp among them. The bubblewrap backend already grants these via
--dev /dev and --tmpfs /tmp; bring the sandbox-exec profile to parity by
allowing the standard device nodes and the system temp trees. The workspace
remains the only writable project location.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 ce50ad9789 providerhealth: harden default connectivity probe against SSRF
The default probe used http.DefaultClient, which (1) followed redirects
without revalidating the target, so a 3xx to an internal address bypassed
the pre-flight endpoint check, and (2) re-resolved DNS at dial time,
leaving a rebinding TOCTOU window after validateEndpoint. Build a dedicated
client that revalidates every redirect hop (capped at 5) and validates +
pins the resolved IP at dial time, dialing the IP literal so the kernel
cannot re-resolve to an unsafe address.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 dbdc04db61 tools/bash: kill the shell as a process group so timeouts don't leak children
On timeout the context cancelled only the shell, leaving backgrounded
children (e.g. 'sleep 3 & wait') orphaned. Worse, those children inherited
the stdout/stderr pipes, so Run() blocked until they exited — far past the
timeout. Set Setpgid and a Cancel that SIGKILLs the whole process group on
POSIX, plus a WaitDelay backstop so a lingering child can't hang Wait. On
Windows, set WaitDelay only (no process groups).
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 754700aeea specialist: keep name in session title so description-less runs resume
A specialist run with no description set --session-title to just the
description (empty), leaving AgentName empty on resume and making the
session unresumable. Always prefix the title with the specialist name and
fall back to the bare name when no description is given.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 f7c9094e1b cli/cron: honor explicit expr over recipe; don't clobber pause mid-run
- `cron add "<expr>" --recipe X` silently dropped the explicit schedule because
  the recipe set expr before the positional arg was consumed. Consume the
  positional expr first so it overrides the recipe default.
- cron_run persisted the job copy read at tick start, so a pause or removal that
  happened during the run was clobbered back to active. Re-read before persisting
  and preserve an external pause/removal (best-effort; full atomicity needs a
  lock).
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 b28a1e75d2 sessions: tolerate a torn tail when reading the event log
ReadEvents returned an error on any malformed JSONL line, so a single
interrupted append (truncated final line) made resume hard-fail and lose the
whole session. Drop only a malformed final line (a torn tail); malformed lines
earlier in the file are real corruption and still error.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 a3f62f093b streamjson: stop over-redacting prose in secret scrubbing
The sk- and bearer patterns were unanchored, so "sk-" inside "task-list" and
the word after a bare "bearer" were replaced with [REDACTED], corrupting
legitimate output. Anchor sk- on a word boundary and require a credential-length
body for both sk- and bearer tokens; real keys/tokens are still redacted.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 98e0f2c764 tools: fix grep glob scope and apply_patch hunk-body misparse
- grep matched the glob against the workspace-relative path, so "*.go" with
  path="subdir" found nothing while "**/*.go" matched subdir/a.go. Match the
  glob relative to the search directory (ripgrep semantics); a single explicit
  file is matched by its base name.
- apply_patch parsed file paths per-line, so a hunk-body line removing content
  that starts with "-- " (appearing as "--- ...") was mistaken for a file
  header and a valid patch was rejected. Parse headers with hunk line-counting,
  matching how git apply delimits hunks.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
gnanam1990 db2e05a3f3 mcp: cap framed message size and use newline-delimited stdio framing
- protocol.go read() rejected no upper bound on Content-Length, so a hostile
  peer could drive make([]byte, n) with n up to ~9.2e18. Cap every framed
  message at 64 MiB (both the Content-Length and newline-delimited paths).
- The MCP stdio transport is newline-delimited JSON, not LSP Content-Length
  framing. write() now emits one JSON message per line; read() accepts
  newline-delimited frames and still tolerates Content-Length for back-compat,
  so Zero interoperates with spec-compliant MCP servers and clients.
2026-06-11 15:02:09 +05:30
Anandan f32d07b92f Add first-run model picker (#165)
* Add first-run model picker

* Guard setup model discovery generations
2026-06-11 12:42:34 +05:30
Vasanth T 06a49f6557 docs: overhaul README to match current product surface (#164)
Rewrite the README around what main actually ships today:
- ANSI Shadow wordmark matching the TUI splash, centered header + badges
- 25+ provider catalog (frontier, fast-inference, local, compatible endpoints)
- new features: spec mode, mid-run model escalation, cron, repo-map/repo-info,
  workspace index, context report, image input, deferred tool loading, notifications
- full command reference (25 subcommands), exec flag summary, TUI slash commands
- updated tools table (web_fetch, ask_user, skill, tool_search, escalate_model)
- refreshed architecture diagram and project layout for the 47-package tree
2026-06-11 09:41:07 +05:30
anandh8x a585a509b5 Address onboarding review blockers
Use Bubble Tea mouse button values for wheel handling instead of the deprecated mouse type field, and remove the unused onboarding helper.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./internal/tui -run 'TestMouseWheelScrollsChatWithoutRecallingInputHistory' -count=1

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go vet ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-11 01:10:33 +05:30
anandh8x 182094c428 Update empty-state ZERO wordmark
Render the startup logo as the full ZERO wordmark while keeping the O in the existing lime accent and the ZER prefix in the normal ink color.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-11 01:10:33 +05:30
anandh8x 6a93f89c85 Add first-run provider setup
Introduce zero setup plus first-run onboarding for missing provider credentials, backed by the provider catalog and config save path.

Make the TUI fullscreen in interactive mode, keep setup transitions inside the chat surface, and add managed transcript scrolling so wheel/PageUp/PageDown do not recall composer history.

Tested: GOCACHE=/tmp/zero-go-cache go test ./...

Tested: git diff --check
2026-06-11 01:10:33 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 8f7e36adc2 Resolve provider wizard env credentials 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2c85d6fbba Address provider onboarding review feedback 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 8caffa5395 Persist provider wizard credentials 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 74923e1d84 Expose active provider model to agent 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 1cd13f7a36 Normalize detected provider on model switch 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 1be7049947 Search and apply live model picker entries 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 a4096dd201 Refresh model picker and toggle favorites 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 39c9d30529 Scope model picker to active provider 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 b7da12d649 Hide provider model source label 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 361527bf23 Clean provider model search placeholder 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 9c727d9175 Add searchable provider model picker 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 e06ee74190 Split Ollama cloud and local providers 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 1ee3875f22 Filter provider picker to coding models 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 2dc97583df Use remote model catalogs in provider wizard 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 ea5d543c24 Discover provider models live 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 aed8f354de Own provider model catalog 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 e7c5c7db28 Scope provider wizard models 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 7649a8f195 Use provider catalog in TUI onboarding 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 fb3bc0761f Accept pasted provider API keys 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 e3a56f4275 Open provider onboarding in TUI 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanthdev2004 f3bfd48dec Add provider onboarding UX 2026-06-11 00:54:49 +05:30
Vasanth T 29d4004762 Add TUI interaction foundation (#160)
* add tui interaction foundation

* fix tui review findings
2026-06-10 19:09:34 +05:30
Vasanth T 00db8ae788 Add shared workspace index foundation (#159)
* Add shared workspace index foundation

* fix workspace index review findings

* fix workspace depth on non-windows runners
2026-06-10 17:30:55 +05:30
6fb0231df8 TUI scrollback re-architecture, Lime chat surface, and deep-audit fixes (#158)
* docs(design): add Lime TUI prototype and rebuild spec

* tui: remove the zeroline skin system

One design remains in the tree ahead of the Lime rebuild: the zeroline
package, its TUI view/skin plumbing (Options.Skin/ThemeVariant/ThemeDark,
model skin branches, theme picker), and the zeroline CLI subcommand are
gone. /theme keeps its shell-only message.

* tui: replace the cyan palette with the Lime token table

theme.go is rebuilt around the Lime design tokens (docs/design/
zero_tui_lime.html): near-black panels, one lime accent, solid tint
stand-ins for the prototype's rgba overlays. Existing render sites map
onto the new role styles (ink/line/userPrompt/toolName/toolArg) without
layout changes; no hex exists outside theme.go.

* tui: build the Lime chat-surface components

Title bar with brand badge + context window, empty state replacing the
deleted splash (block-art 0, tagline, 1-3 starter suggestions), stream
blocks (user prompt gutter, muted interim with cursor, final-answer
accent rail, done line, bordered notes), tool cards with diff/read/
bash/grep bodies and MiniDot run spinner, borderless composer with
run-state hints, and the grouped status line. Final answers are marked
at append time; resolved tool calls collapse into their result cards.

* tui: fix Stage 2 review findings

Adversarial review of the chat-surface commit confirmed 15 issues, all
fixed here:
- wrapPlainText sliced wide runes by rune count: CJK/emoji prose could
  panic the TUI or emit lines ~2x the measure; split at width instead
- a cancelled run's streamingText leaked into the next turn's interim
  block; cancelRun now clears it
- orphaned tool-call cards (cancelled/errored turns) re-animated with
  the spinner on any later run; the glyph is now scoped to the call's
  own runID
- starter-suggestion digit capture was active while the chips were off
  screen (/clear mid-run); the guard now mirrors the render condition
- prompt submits while a deferred Ctrl+C quit is draining could start a
  run the quit would orphan; submission is blocked while exiting
- the running placeholder advertised ctrl+c (which quits) as the
  interrupt key; it now says esc
- read-card parser expected 'N: text' but read_file emits 'N | text',
  so the gutter and L-range never rendered on real output
- toolCard borders were one column short of the body rows
- diff tint bands now span the full row; NEW FILE renders green on
  addBg; preamble/no-newline lines are unnumbered meta and no longer
  shift hunk numbering
- card bodies and system notes paint the panel surface; the head gains
  the separate faintest arg column (grep target + pattern)
- title-bar overflow now truncates the minimal candidate instead of
  rendering the deleted design's 'ZERO … READY' line
- untracked the stray snake-game.html (left on disk, ignored)

* tui: restyle the interactive surfaces for Lime

Permission prompts render as the amber permission card (PERMISSION
badge, risk readout, key chips); resolved prompts collapse to one line
(allowed once/always/denied · tool) and unprompted allows fold into the
tool card's [auto] tag. Ask-user and spec-review prompts share the card
language with line borders. Autocomplete and picker overlays move onto
the panel/selection tints with the accent ❯ marker; model-picker rows
gain the provider dot and ctx · KEY_ENV metadata from the registry and
provider catalog. /resume renders its list as stacked session cards
(id + age, title, meta). Key handling is untouched everywhere.

* tui: adaptive width tiers, doc updates, final polish

Width tiers re-evaluate from the live width: ≥100 renders the full
spec; 80–99 drops the tool-arg column, header ctx, and the status
'interactive' group; 58–79 drops the diff/read gutters, bares the
badge, and keeps provider+tokens+mode; <58 renders a single-segment
header, rail-less cards, and a mode-only status line. Table-driven
tests cover {58,70,80,100,120} plus a frame-wide invariant that no
emitted line exceeds the terminal at any tier. Card bodies expand tabs
so width math holds. Dead splash-chip machinery (startupCommandNames,
startupOrder) is gone; README's TUI section now describes Lime.

* tui: fix final-review findings across Stages 3-4

A second adversarial review confirmed 14 issues, all addressed:
- permission collapse and tool-card pairing are now run-scoped (rcKey):
  providers with repeating synthetic ToolCallIDs (Gemini gemini_tool_N)
  could attribute a decision or result to a different run's call
- rehydrated always-grants no longer mislabel as 'allowed once'
  (GrantMatched fallback)
- the width invariant now actually holds everywhere: empty-state
  tagline/hint, ask-user rows, permission detail blobs, pending image
  chips, and the sessions trailing hint are wrapped or fitted; the
  invariant test renders the empty state and all of those rows at
  widths 24-120
- every card (permission, ask-user, spec-review, sessions, notes)
  drops side borders on tiny terminals, not just tool cards
- /resume card fields are sanitized against separator bytes from
  user-controlled titles
- the picker's selected row paints its gap so the selBg band is solid
- dead splash helpers (normalizedStartupWidth, countLines, nonEmpty,
  unreachable rowWelcome branch) and stale /theme comments are gone
- README no longer claims transcript scrolling keys or Tab-accept
  behavior that never existed; chatWidth documents its 24-col floor

Tag tui-lime-s4 moves to this commit.

* audit: deep-audit report, TUI scrollback re-architecture, and cross-module fixes

TUI: settled-row flush frontier prints history to native terminal
scrollback (tea.Println, ordered + ack-serialized); View() renders only
the live tail. Full diffs (400-line flush cap) and OSC 8 file:// links
land in history; streamed interim text, cancellation markers, ask_user
exchanges, and composer input history are preserved; run-scoped dedup
keys fix Gemini's repeating tool-call ids; /exit, Ctrl+C-after-Esc, and
cross-session late flushes no longer orphan or contaminate checkpoints.

Cross-module: zero search panic + offset mapping, usage report
robustness, 529 retry, SSE keep-alive watchdog, registry corrections,
update --check on dev builds, MCP ping + mcp list --json secret
redaction, sandbox.network config knob, doctor apiKey presence, atomic
config writes, C1-safe notifications, rune-safe truncation everywhere,
gofmt + vet CI gates, dead glamour dependency dropped.

Full audit report: docs/audit/2026-06-10-deep-audit.md (175 findings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* tui: hide malformed ask_user tool errors

* fix tui malformed tool retries

* fix max-turn finalization

* upgrade tui agent guardrails

* fix coderabbit guardrail findings

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Vasanthdev2004 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 17:18:30 +05:30
Vasanth T cf6b1c1db7 Add repo intelligence map (#157)
* feat: add repo intelligence map

* fix: address repo map review feedback

* fix: refine repo map scan limits
2026-06-10 14:54:19 +05:30
KRATOS 0f8ea50101 zero cron: dep-free file-backed scheduled agents (foreground runner) (#155)
* cron: dep-free 5-field cron expression parser

* cron: next-run evaluator with Vixie DOM/DOW semantics

* cron: preset recipes + loop.md prompt resolution (cap + symlink reject)

* cron: file-backed job store (metadata.json + runs.jsonl)

* cli: zero cron add/list/rm/pause/resume over the cron store

* cli: zero cron run foreground scheduler (--once/--catch-up, exec per fire)

* cron: fix adversarial-review findings (DST loop, traversal, runaway re-fire, +)

- Next: fix infinite loop on DST spring-forward gaps (advance hours by absolute
  addition + a forward-progress guard); widen the search window to 9 years so a
  Feb-29 schedule across a century non-leap year (2096->2104) isn't reported as
  impossible.
- store: reject path-traversal job ids (Get/Update/Remove/AppendRun) so
  'cron rm ../..' can't delete outside the store; List now surfaces corrupt jobs
  as a warning instead of silently dropping them.
- runner: reject impossible schedules at add even with --run-now; auto-pause a
  job whose schedule can no longer advance (was re-firing every tick); only
  skip-reschedule STRICTLY-overdue jobs on startup (keep exactly-due ones);
  capture stderr into RunRecord.Error on non-zero exit; pass the prompt via the
  inline --prompt= form so dash-leading prompts aren't misparsed.
- Regression tests for each (DST, leap gap, traversal, corrupt-list, pause,
  reconcile, dash-prompt).

* cron: address #155 review (store-error surfacing, resume guard, Runs traversal, +)

- fireJob/reconcile/cronRun now surface AppendRun/Update failures to stderr
  instead of discarding them (a failed write no longer silently re-fires/loses
  history); fireJob takes stderr.
- cron add rejects extra positional arguments instead of silently ignoring them.
- cronResume rejects an unparseable/impossible schedule instead of reactivating a
  job with a stale/zero NextRunAt.
- store.AppendRun returns the Close() error (buffered-write failures surface on
  close); store.Runs now validates the id (path-traversal guard, matching the
  other store methods).
- tests: Runs traversal rejection, cron add extra-args, resume-impossible.

* cron: check store errors in cron CLI tests

CodeRabbit (critical): the cron CLI tests ignored errors from store.List/Add/Get, so a store failure would surface as a misleading assertion on a zero-value job/slice instead of a clear failure. Check every store op's error across the test file (not only the two flagged sites).

* cron: DefaultRoot falls back to os.UserHomeDir when HOME is unset

Vasanth (P1): cron's DefaultRoot mirrored neither sessions.DefaultRoot nor reality — with no XDG_DATA_HOME and no HOME it produced a RELATIVE ".local/share/zero/cron" under the caller's cwd, so on Windows/restricted shells cron jobs scattered per working directory and could write repo-local data. Now falls back to os.UserHomeDir() like sessions.DefaultRoot. Adds TestDefaultRootEmptyHomeFallsBackToUserHome (asserts the path stays absolute).
2026-06-10 13:21:33 +05:30
Vasanth T 40cec8d476 Add provider health diagnostics (#151)
* Add provider health diagnostics

* Fix provider health auth review findings

* Fix provider health test handler assertion

* Harden provider health connectivity probes
2026-06-10 13:14:19 +05:30
KRATOS 15066216c8 zero repo-info: local (network-free) repository characterizer (#150)
* repoinfo: language map + build/test/CI + workspace detection helpers

* repoinfo: Collect repo characterization from local git (network-free)

* cli: zero repo-info command (text + --json) over the repoinfo package

* repoinfo: derive AgeDays from the root commit, not git log --reverse -1

git applies -1 before --reverse, so the old call returned the LATEST commit
(age always ~0). Use --max-parents=0 (root commits) and take the oldest.

* repoinfo: count passthrough dirs + unicode-safe ls-tree (-z); harden tests

Adversarial-review fixes:
- DirectoryCount now counts every directory on the path to a file (expand each
  file's ancestors), so directories holding only subdirectories are included.
  git ls-tree -r lists blobs only, so the previous parent-of-file count
  undercounted. Verified against 'git ls-tree -r -t | awk $2==tree'.
- ls-tree now uses -z (NUL-terminated, unquoted paths) instead of newline
  scanning, so non-ASCII/special filenames (which git C-quotes by default) are
  parsed correctly instead of being silently dropped. Drops the bufio scanner.
- Tests: assert DirectoryCount/MaxDepth; add an age-from-oldest-root-commit test
  (would catch the old log --reverse -1 bug); make the CLI JSON test hermetic
  via a temp git repo.

* repoinfo: strip credentials from remote URL before storing/printing

Addresses #150 review (@Vasanthdev2004 P1): a git remote can embed secrets
(e.g. https://x-access-token:[email protected]/o/r.git), which would leak in
both text and --json output. sanitizeRemoteURL strips userinfo from URL forms
and the leading user@ from scp-like forms. Tests: unit table for the sanitizer,
Collect-level strip, and end-to-end CLI text + JSON assertions that the
credential never appears.
2026-06-10 12:45:15 +05:30
983 changed files with 184304 additions and 9969 deletions

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+54
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
name: Bug report
description: Report a reproducible problem in Zero
labels: ["bug"]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
Thanks for filing a bug. Clear, reproducible reports are the most useful way to help the
project. Please do **not** report security vulnerabilities here — see SECURITY.md.
- type: input
id: version
attributes:
label: Version / branch / commit
description: Output of `zero version`, or the branch/commit you built from.
placeholder: "zero dev (commit abc1234) / main"
validations:
required: true
- type: input
id: env
attributes:
label: OS and environment
description: Operating system, terminal, and any relevant environment details.
placeholder: "macOS 14 / iTerm2 / Go 1.25.1"
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: repro
attributes:
label: Steps to reproduce
description: A minimal reproduction case when possible.
placeholder: |
1. Run `zero ...`
2. ...
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: expected
attributes:
label: Expected behavior
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: actual
attributes:
label: Actual behavior
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: logs
attributes:
label: Relevant logs, screenshots, or error messages
description: Redact any secrets (API keys, tokens) before pasting.
validations:
required: false
+5
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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
blank_issues_enabled: false
contact_links:
- name: Security vulnerability
url: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/security/advisories/new
about: Report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories (see SECURITY.md). Do not file a public issue.
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
name: Feature request
description: Propose a new capability or change
labels: ["enhancement"]
body:
- type: markdown
attributes:
value: |
Please do not begin implementation until the issue has been reviewed and marked with the
`issue-approved` label (see CONTRIBUTING.md).
- type: textarea
id: problem
attributes:
label: Problem
description: The problem you are trying to solve.
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: proposal
attributes:
label: Requested behavior
description: The behavior or functionality you are requesting.
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: why
attributes:
label: Why it belongs in Zero
validations:
required: true
- type: textarea
id: alternatives
attributes:
label: Alternatives or workarounds considered
validations:
required: false
- type: textarea
id: context
attributes:
label: Examples, screenshots, or prior discussion
validations:
required: false
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
## Summary
<!-- What does this change do, and why? -->
## Linked issue
<!-- Per CONTRIBUTING.md, PRs need an approved parent issue with the `issue-approved` label. -->
Fixes #
## Checklist
- [ ] The linked issue already has the `issue-approved` label.
- [ ] `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, and `go test ./...` pass locally.
- [ ] `gofmt` clean.
- [ ] Tests added/updated for the change (and run under `-race` where relevant).
- [ ] UI changes include screenshots or a short recording where possible.
+59 -3
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
@@ -28,6 +30,21 @@ jobs:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
- name: Check formatting
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
shell: bash
run: |
unformatted="$(gofmt -l .)"
if [ -n "$unformatted" ]; then
echo "gofmt needed on:" >&2
echo "$unformatted" >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Vet
if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
run: go vet ./...
- name: Test
run: go test ./...
@@ -43,7 +60,9 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
@@ -59,8 +78,45 @@ jobs:
- name: Upload performance report
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: zero-performance-smoke
path: dist/perf/perf-bench.json
if-no-files-found: warn
security:
name: Security & code health
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
cache: true
# govulncheck and deadcode resolve a toolchain from their own modules, which
# can drop below the version go.mod requires and then fail to load our
# packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain so both run under it.
- name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
run: |
toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
# CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
# published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
- name: govulncheck
run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...
# Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
# code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
# still being wired or removed.
- name: deadcode (advisory)
continue-on-error: true
run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...
+2 -2
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Post review summary
if: always()
uses: actions/github-script@v7
uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
env:
ZERO_REVIEW_BODY_PATH: ${{ steps.review-summary.outputs.path }}
with:
+133 -6
View File
@@ -15,22 +15,29 @@ jobs:
package:
name: Package (${{ matrix.os }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
permissions:
contents: write # create/upload the GitHub Release on a tag push
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
# `zero-release package` builds + smoke-tests natively (host==target), so each
# target platform needs its own native runner. These five cover the platforms
# install.sh / install.ps1 / the npm wrapper resolve.
os:
- ubuntu-latest
- macos-latest
- windows-latest
- ubuntu-latest # linux-x64
- ubuntu-24.04-arm # linux-arm64
- macos-latest # macos-arm64 (Apple Silicon)
- macos-15-intel # macos-x64 (Intel)
- windows-latest # windows-x64
steps:
- name: Checkout
if: ${{ github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || inputs.ref == '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- name: Checkout requested ref
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.ref != '' }}
uses: actions/checkout@v4
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
@@ -43,6 +50,23 @@ jobs:
- name: Test
run: go test ./...
# zero-release names assets zero-v<package.json version>-… while the release
# is published under the pushed git tag. If they disagree, install.sh/install.ps1
# and the npm postinstall all build a download URL that 404s. Fail fast so a
# forgotten version bump can never publish mis-versioned, un-installable assets.
# Matches on the ref (not event_name) because release-please dispatches this
# workflow at the tag ref — its GITHUB_TOKEN-created tag cannot fire `push`.
- name: Check tag matches package.json version
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
shell: bash
run: |
pkg_version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
if [ "v$pkg_version" != "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" ]; then
echo "::error::tag $GITHUB_REF_NAME does not match package.json version v$pkg_version — bump package.json before tagging so the release assets and the npm package agree." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "tag $GITHUB_REF_NAME matches package.json version v$pkg_version."
- name: Package release artifact
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release package
@@ -50,8 +74,111 @@ jobs:
run: go run ./cmd/zero-release verify
- name: Upload package
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: zero-${{ runner.os }}-${{ runner.arch }}
path: dist/release/*
if-no-files-found: error
# On a `v*` tag ref (pushed manually, or dispatched at the tag by the
# release-please workflow), publish the packaged archive + .sha256 as GitHub
# Release assets so the documented `scripts/install.sh` / `install.ps1` path
# (which reads /releases/latest) works. Uses the preinstalled `gh` (no new
# action dependency); each matrix OS creates the release if absent
# (best-effort — release-please normally creates it first) then uploads its
# own assets with --clobber. Tags come from merging the release-please PR.
- name: Publish to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --title "$tag" --generate-notes 2>/dev/null || true
gh release upload "$tag" dist/release/* --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber
# Publishes the npm wrapper (@gitlawb/zero) once every platform's release
# assets are live — the package's postinstall downloads its binary from the
# GitHub Release, so publishing before the assets exist would ship a package
# that fails to install.
#
# Auth is npm OIDC trusted publishing: no NPM_TOKEN secret. The package's
# npmjs.com settings must list this repo + workflow file as a trusted
# publisher, and provenance is then generated automatically. Note npm only
# allows configuring a trusted publisher on an EXISTING package, so the very
# first @gitlawb/zero publish is a one-time manual `npm publish` bootstrap.
publish-npm:
name: Publish npm package
needs: package
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Manual approval gate: this environment carries a required-reviewer rule
# (Settings -> Environments -> npm-publish), so the job pauses until a
# maintainer approves it in the Actions UI before anything reaches npm.
environment:
name: npm-publish
url: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@gitlawb/zero
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC token exchange for npm trusted publishing + provenance
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
# No registry-url here on purpose: setup-node's registry-url writes an
# .npmrc line referencing $NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, and npm hard-fails on the
# unset env var. Trusted publishing needs no token at all.
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: 24
# OIDC trusted publishing needs npm >= 11.5.1. Use the npm bundled with
# the pinned Node toolchain (Node 24 ships >= 11.5.1) rather than pulling
# npm@latest from the registry inside the publish path — an unpinned
# install there would be avoidable supply-chain exposure. Fail fast if a
# future runner/toolchain change ever regresses the bundled npm.
- name: Check npm supports trusted publishing
run: |
npm --version | node -e '
const version = require("fs").readFileSync(0, "utf8").trim();
const [major, minor, patch] = version.split(".").map(Number);
const ok =
major > 11 ||
(major === 11 && (minor > 5 || (minor === 5 && patch >= 1)));
if (!ok) {
console.error(
`::error::bundled npm ${version} is too old for OIDC trusted ` +
`publishing (needs >= 11.5.1) — bump node-version in this job.`,
);
process.exit(1);
}
console.log(`npm ${version} supports trusted publishing.`);
'
# Probe the exact URLs postinstall will build (internal/release/release.go
# asset-name scheme) as an anonymous client. This also blocks publishing
# while the repo is still private — private release assets 404 without
# auth, exactly as they would for an installing user.
- name: Verify release assets are downloadable
shell: bash
run: |
version="$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")"
base="https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/v${version}"
for asset in \
"zero-v${version}-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-linux-arm64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-macos-x64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-macos-arm64.tar.gz" \
"zero-v${version}-windows-x64.zip"; do
for url in "${base}/${asset}" "${base}/${asset}.sha256"; do
if ! curl -fsSLI -o /dev/null "$url"; then
echo "::error::${url} is not publicly downloadable — npm postinstall would fail. Is the repo public and are all assets uploaded?" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
done
echo "all release assets for v${version} are publicly downloadable."
- name: Publish to npm
run: npm publish --access public
+35
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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
name: Release Please
on:
push:
branches:
- main
permissions:
contents: write # push the release-PR branch, create the tag + GitHub Release
pull-requests: write # open/update the release PR
issues: write # create/apply release-tracking labels on the release PR
actions: write # dispatch release-artifacts.yml once a release is cut
jobs:
release-please:
name: Release PR / tag
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Run release-please
id: release
uses: googleapis/release-please-action@a02a34c4d625f9be7cb89156071d8567266a2445 # v4.2.0
# Tags created with the default GITHUB_TOKEN never fire `on: push: tags`
# workflows (GitHub suppresses workflows triggered by workflow-created
# events), so release-artifacts.yml would not run for a release-please
# tag. workflow_dispatch invoked through the API is exempt from that
# suppression — dispatch the artifacts build at the new tag explicitly.
- name: Build and publish release artifacts
if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
gh workflow run release-artifacts.yml \
--repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
--ref "${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}"
+105
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@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
name: ZERO Action Smoke
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- action.yml
- docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md
- .github/workflows/zero-action-smoke.yml
jobs:
validate:
name: Validate action.yml
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Parse action.yml and assert documented inputs
shell: bash
run: |
python3 - <<'PY'
import sys, yaml
with open("action.yml", "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
action_raw = handle.read()
doc = yaml.safe_load(action_raw)
assert isinstance(doc, dict), "action.yml must be a mapping"
assert doc.get("name"), "action must declare a name"
assert doc.get("description"), "action must declare a description"
runs = doc.get("runs") or {}
assert runs.get("using") == "composite", "action must be a composite action"
steps = runs.get("steps") or []
assert len(steps) >= 2, "composite action must define steps"
inputs = doc.get("inputs") or {}
expected_inputs = [
"prompt", "prompt-file", "provider", "api-key", "api-key-env",
"model", "mode", "auto", "self-correct", "add-dir", "worktree",
"output-format", "post-to", "slack-webhook-url", "github-token",
"working-directory", "zero-version", "zero-repo",
]
missing = [name for name in expected_inputs if name not in inputs]
assert not missing, f"action.yml is missing inputs: {missing}"
# Conservative CI default: autonomy must default to 'low'.
assert inputs["auto"].get("default") == "low", "auto must default to low"
# stream-json is the documented default capture format.
assert inputs["output-format"].get("default") == "stream-json", \
"output-format must default to stream-json"
outputs = doc.get("outputs") or {}
for name in ("exit-code", "output-file", "summary"):
assert name in outputs, f"action.yml is missing output: {name}"
# The action must never enable unsafe mode implicitly.
serialized = yaml.safe_dump(doc)
assert "--skip-permissions-unsafe" not in serialized, \
"action must never pass --skip-permissions-unsafe"
run_zero = next((step for step in steps if step.get("name") == "Run ZERO"), None)
assert run_zero is not None, "action.yml must contain a Run ZERO step"
run_zero_script = run_zero.get("run") or ""
assert 'export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"' in run_zero_script, \
"Run ZERO must export the provider key for the current step"
assert "later steps inherit" not in action_raw.lower(), \
"provider keys must not be documented as inherited by later steps"
for line in run_zero_script.splitlines():
if "GITHUB_ENV" in line and (
"ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY" in line or "ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV" in line
):
raise AssertionError("provider key must not be persisted to GITHUB_ENV")
print(f"action.yml OK: {len(inputs)} inputs, {len(outputs)} outputs, {len(steps)} steps")
PY
- name: Shell-syntax-check embedded run blocks
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
python3 - <<'PY'
import yaml
with open("action.yml", "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
doc = yaml.safe_load(handle)
steps = (doc.get("runs") or {}).get("steps") or []
for index, step in enumerate(steps):
run = step.get("run")
if run:
with open(f"/tmp/zero_step_{index}.sh", "w", encoding="utf-8") as out:
out.write(run)
PY
for script in /tmp/zero_step_*.sh; do
echo "bash -n ${script}"
bash -n "${script}"
done
+5
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@@ -37,3 +37,8 @@ report.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.[0-9]_.json
/zero
/zero.exe
/snake-game.html
# Superpowers skill artifacts (brainstorm mockups, specs, plans) — local only
.superpowers/
docs/superpowers/
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{".":"0.1.0"}
-16
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@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
---
description: Use Go-native project commands; Node is only for the npm wrapper.
globs: "*.go, *.js, package.json, .github/workflows/*.yml, docs/*.md"
alwaysApply: false
---
Default to Go commands in this repository.
- Use `go run ./cmd/zero` to launch the local CLI.
- Use `go test ./...` for the repository test suite.
- Use `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` to build the release-facing binary.
- Use `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke` to smoke-test the built binary.
- Use `go run ./cmd/zero-release package` and `go run ./cmd/zero-release verify` for release artifact checks.
- Use `go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench` for performance smoke work.
- Do not add Bun or TypeScript build/test dependencies for repository validation.
- Use Node only when directly exercising the npm wrapper at `bin/zero.js`.
+319
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@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
---
description: Extending Zero — how to write AGENTS.md files, custom specialists, skills, hooks, MCP servers, and plugins for the open-source CLI coding agent.
globs: "*.go, *.js, *.md, *.json, *.toml, *.yaml, *.yml"
alwaysApply: false
---
# Extending Zero
Zero is an open-source terminal coding agent. Out of the box it does the obvious things — read, edit, run, search — but the design point of the project is that **every surface is configurable**. This document is the user-facing guide for that configuration.
If you only want to *use* Zero, the [README](README.md) is enough. This page is for the other three jobs:
1. Tell the agent about *your* project (drop an `AGENTS.md` in your repo).
2. Add new specialist sub-agents.
3. Wire Zero into the rest of your toolchain (MCP, skills, hooks, plugins).
## 1. Drop a project `AGENTS.md`
When Zero starts in a directory, it looks for project-level instructions and injects them into the system prompt. The lookup walks from your current working directory **up to the nearest git root** and reads the first matching file at each level — general rules at the repo root, more specific rules in sub-trees. Files are labeled with their directory in the prompt (e.g. `## Project guidelines (services/api/AGENTS.md)`).
Accepted file names, in priority order at each level:
| Path | Notes |
| --- | --- |
| `./AGENTS.md` | The classic spot — committed to your repo, shared with the team. |
| `./ZERO.md` | Brand-specific alias. Same format, lower priority. |
| `./.zero/AGENTS.md` | Project-local, hidden, gitignored. Personal notes that stay out of git. |
Matching is **case-insensitive** on the basename, so `AGENTS.md`, `Agents.md`, and `agents.md` resolve to the same file on Windows and macOS. The git-tracked filename in this repo is `AGENTS.md` — keep that on case-sensitive filesystems (Linux, the WSL filesystem, or a CI runner) to match what the loader looks for.
Both files use the same format. YAML frontmatter is optional; the markdown body is loaded as instructions for the agent. Zero reads the file once at session start, so changes take effect on the next `zero` launch — not mid-session.
```markdown
# Project conventions for <your project>
- Build with `make`, not `go build` directly.
- Tests live next to the source file (`foo_test.go` next to `foo.go`).
- Run `make lint` before opening a PR.
- Never edit files under `third_party/` — those are vendored.
```
Tips:
- Keep each file under ~8 KiB. Zero caps the **total** across all matched files at 32 KiB; everything past the cap is dropped.
- Re-state rules in the imperative voice: "Run `make lint`", not "you should consider running the linter".
- Don't put secrets, model IDs, or environment-specific paths in `AGENTS.md`. Use `config.json` for those.
- In a monorepo, drop a narrower `AGENTS.md` in each sub-tree (e.g. `services/api/AGENTS.md`). Zero picks those up automatically when you launch from inside the sub-tree.
- A YAML frontmatter block (`---\n...\n---`) at the top is preserved verbatim in the injected prompt but is not parsed for `globs:` or `alwaysApply:` scoping today — keep the body self-contained.
## 2. Custom specialists
Specialists are Zero's sub-agents. Three scopes, in priority order:
| Scope | Path | Shared? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in | compiled into Zero | yes — `worker`, `explorer`, `code-review` |
| User | `~/.config/zero/specialists/*.md` | no — your machine only |
| Project | `./.zero/specialists/*.md` | yes — the repo team |
Project overrides user overrides built-in when names collide.
A specialist is a markdown manifest with frontmatter and a system prompt:
```markdown
---
description: Reviews API changes for breaking-change risk and missing tests.
tools: read-only,plan
---
You review API changes. For every changed hunk in `internal/api/` or any file
that ends in `_api.go`:
1. Confirm the public signature is backward-compatible, or note the breaking
change explicitly with the migration path.
2. Confirm a corresponding test exists in `internal/api/*_test.go` and that
the new behaviour is exercised.
3. Flag any new exported symbol without a doc comment.
Reply with one JSON object per finding: `{"file", "line", "severity", "message", "fix"}`.
```
CLI management (the prompt is passed inline via `--prompt`):
```bash
zero specialist list
zero specialist show api-reviewer
zero specialist create api-reviewer \
--project \
--description "Reviews API changes" \
--tools read-only,plan \
--prompt "$(cat api-reviewer.md)"
zero specialist edit api-reviewer --project
zero specialist delete api-reviewer --project
zero specialist path # prints the resolved specialists directory
```
The full format spec (frontmatter fields, tool scopes, prompt conventions) is in [`docs/SPECIALISTS.md`](docs/SPECIALISTS.md).
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI specialist manager (create / edit / delete / preview) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero specialist` CLI subcommands above.
## 3. Skills
Skills are markdown instruction packs the agent can pull in on demand. Each skill is a directory containing a `SKILL.md`. Skills are **user-level only** in this version — there's no project-scoped skill directory yet, so anything you want shared with the team goes in `AGENTS.md` (section 1) or as a hook (section 4).
Discovery root: `$ZERO_SKILLS_DIR` → `$XDG_DATA_HOME/zero/skills` → `~/.local/share/zero/skills/`. A missing directory is fine — Zero just reports "no skills".
```
~/.local/share/zero/skills/
run-benchmarks/
SKILL.md
write-changelog/
SKILL.md
```
`SKILL.md` format:
```markdown
---
description: Run the project's benchmark suite and summarize the deltas.
---
# Run benchmarks
1. `make bench` — captures the wall-clock and RSS before and after.
2. `benchstat before.txt after.txt` — diffs the two.
3. Report any regression > 5% with the function name and the previous value.
```
Only `name` and `description` are recognized in the frontmatter today. The `name` defaults to the directory name. If two skills declare the same name, the one in the lexicographically-first directory wins — duplicates are dropped silently. Plugin-declared skills (section 6) are not yet merged into the loader, so a `skills:` entry inside a plugin's `plugin.json` is not visible to the `skill` tool today.
The `skill` core tool lets the agent load any discovered skill by name.
## 4. Hooks
Hooks fire shell commands on lifecycle events. Configure them in JSON:
- User: `~/.config/zero/hooks.json`
- Project: `./.zero/hooks.json`
```json
{
"enabled": true,
"hooks": [
{
"id": "block-rm-rf",
"event": "beforeTool",
"matcher": "bash",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh",
"enabled": true
},
{
"id": "log-session",
"event": "sessionStart",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/zero-hook-log.sh",
"enabled": true
}
]
}
```
The `args` array (when present) is passed verbatim to `exec.CommandContext`. The actual hook payload — event name, matcher, tool call id, tool name, tool input, tool output, status — is delivered to the command as **JSON on stdin**, not via `${...}` substitution. A typical handler reads stdin and decides what to do:
```bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# /usr/local/bin/zero-hook-block-rmrf.sh
set -euo pipefail
payload="$(cat)"
if printf '%s' "$payload" | grep -q '"input":"[^"]*rm[[:space:]]+-rf'; then
echo "refusing rm -rf" >&2
exit 1
fi
```
Events the agent emits (in dispatch order):
| Event | Fires when | Matcher allowed? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `beforeTool` | A tool is about to run | yes (tool name) |
| `afterTool` | A tool just returned | yes (tool name) |
| `sessionStart` | A session begins | no |
| `sessionEnd` | A session ends | no |
| `specialistStart` | A sub-agent is spawned | yes (specialist name) |
| `specialistStop` | A sub-agent ends | yes (specialist name) |
A hook's exit code decides what happens next: `0` continues, non-zero blocks the tool call (`beforeTool`) or surfaces an error (`afterTool`). Hook execution is recorded in the audit log; the audit is reachable from the agent's view of past actions, not from a dedicated `zero doctor` check.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI hooks manager is on the backlog. Today you edit the JSON directly.
## 5. MCP — Model Context Protocol
Zero is both an **MCP client** (it can call external MCP servers) and an **MCP server** (other agents can call its tools).
### As a client — configure MCP servers in `config.json`
```json
{
"mcp": {
"servers": {
"docs": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docs-mcp",
"args": ["--port", "7777"]
},
"github": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.example.com/mcp",
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE" }
}
}
}
}
```
Manage via CLI:
```bash
zero mcp add docs --type stdio -- docs-mcp --port 7777
zero mcp add github --type http --url https://api.example.com/mcp \
--header "Authorization=Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE"
zero mcp list
zero mcp check docs
zero mcp remove github
zero mcp oauth login github
```
Servers are merged from user and project configs (project wins on conflicts). Token-bearing values in `config.json` are sent verbatim — there is no `${env:...}` expansion — so prefer one of:
- A wrapper script that sources the secret and execs the real command.
- A `--header` value produced by command substitution (`"Authorization=Bearer $(print-token)"`) in a private shell config that you keep out of git.
- A secret manager that injects the env var your MCP server reads on its own (the `command` and `args` then run inside that environment).
### As a server — expose Zero's tools to another agent
```bash
zero serve --mcp
```
The server speaks MCP over stdio. Configure it from the receiving side as a `stdio` server whose command is `zero serve --mcp`.
## 6. Plugins
A plugin is a self-contained directory that bundles tools, hooks, and skills for one capability. Plugins live at:
- User: `~/.config/zero/plugins/<id>/`
- Project: `./.zero/plugins/<id>/`
Each plugin has a `plugin.json` manifest:
```json
{
"id": "github-pr-review",
"name": "GitHub PR Review",
"description": "Adds review tools for GitHub PRs.",
"version": "1.0.0",
"tools": [
{ "name": "list_prs", "command": "./tools/list_prs.sh" }
],
"hooks": [
{ "name": "pre-merge-check", "event": "beforeTool", "command": "./hooks/pre-merge.sh" }
],
"skills": [
{ "path": "./skills/review-checklist/SKILL.md" }
]
}
```
Install and manage:
```bash
zero plugins add ./github-pr-review # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
zero plugins list
zero plugins remove github-pr-review # alias: rm
```
A plugin is enabled by being present in the plugins directory and disabled by removing it (or by the user setting `"enabled": false` in its `plugin.json`). Plugins are not enabled or disabled by a CLI subcommand today.
Plugin commands run with the plugin directory as their working directory. Use relative paths; the loader resolves them at activation time.
> **Roadmap.** An in-UI plugins manager (browse, install, enable / disable) is on the backlog. Today you use the `zero plugins` CLI subcommands above. Skills declared inside a plugin's `plugin.json` are not yet merged into the `skill` tool's discovery (see section 3).
## 7. Configuration locations
Three layers, applied in order (later layers override earlier ones):
| Layer | Path | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Built-in defaults | compiled in | Lowest priority. |
| User config | `~/.config/zero/config.json` | Your machine. Never committed. |
| Project config | `./.zero/config.json` | The repo. Committed (or not, your call). |
| CLI flags | `--model`, `--mode`, ... | Highest priority, per-invocation. |
| Environment | `ZERO_*` | Provider commands, secrets, skills dir override. |
The user config holds things that should follow the user across projects (default provider, default model, theme). The project config holds things the team agreed on (provider catalog, sandbox policies, model restrictions).
The sandbox `additionalWriteRoots` key is **ignored in project config** by design — a checked-out repo cannot widen its own sandbox. Set it in the user config or pass `--add-dir` per-invocation.
## 8. End-to-end example
A team that wants every contributor's Zero to behave the same way commits:
- `AGENTS.md` — project conventions, build commands, do-not-edit lists.
- `.zero/config.json` — provider catalog, default model, allowed tools.
- `.zero/specialists/api-reviewer.md` — the team's PR-review specialist.
- `.zero/hooks.json` — block `rm -rf` and `git push --force` on `beforeTool`.
- `.zero/plugins/internal-tooling/` — a plugin that adds the team's internal CLI tools to the agent's toolset.
Each contributor adds only:
- `~/.config/zero/config.json` — their personal API keys, theme, default mode.
- `~/.local/share/zero/skills/` — personal skills they keep across projects.
That's it. Run `zero` from the repo root and the agent has the team's full instruction set, every contributor's personal setup, and nothing else.
## 9. Reference
- [README](README.md) — install, quickstart, command reference.
- [docs/SPECIALISTS.md](docs/SPECIALISTS.md) — full specialist manifest spec.
- [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md) — `zero exec` I/O contract.
- [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md) — install from source or release.
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# Changelog
All notable changes to this project are documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this project
aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
## 0.1.0 (2026-07-02)
### Features
* publish zero to npm via release-please ([#367](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/367)) ([8eccc26](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8eccc2669887bc38d35bc16a315c888e4d9ec43a))
* **tui:** FILES sidebar panel with click-to-select and file drill-in ([#365](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/365)) ([142c548](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/142c548c89a8652ce300e64ddf1228ee36df7606))
### Bug Fixes
* **auth:** propagate credentials to every provider-build surface and pin children to the live provider ([#366](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/366)) ([6e0a665](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6e0a665118fe0e09c4b07d482dd18f86045acd2b))
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- `SECURITY.md` with a private vulnerability-reporting path, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, this changelog, and
GitHub issue/PR templates.
- Interactive `/theme` picker: bare `/theme` opens a popup that live-previews each palette as you move
and applies on select (Esc reverts).
- Ten built-in color themes alongside the `dark`/`light` built-ins — `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`,
`tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, and
`solarized-light` — selectable via `/theme <name>`, `--theme <name>`, or `ZERO_THEME`. Every palette
is contrast-audited to WCAG AA. The built-in light theme was reworked for legibility.
- `--theme <name>` flag for the TUI, accepting `auto` or any registered theme (previously only the
`ZERO_THEME` env var existed).
- "Accessibility / Appearance" section in the README documenting `NO_COLOR`, `ZERO_THEME`, `/theme`,
and `ZERO_NO_FADE`.
### Changed
- Provider connectivity health checks now allow loopback hosts for explicitly user-configured local
providers (Ollama / LM Studio), so the keyless local-model path verifies instead of failing with
"localhost hosts are blocked". The SSRF guard for fetched/remote URLs is unchanged.
- Auth (401/403) errors now show a curated, actionable message pointing at `zero auth` / setup; the
raw upstream body is shown only under a verbose/debug flag.
- No-provider / missing-key errors now point at `zero setup` and `zero auth`, and distinguish a
missing key from a rejected key.
- `zero doctor` no longer reports "Overall: pass" when no provider credential is configured, and
formats the missing-language-server list for humans (no raw Go `map[...]`).
- Raised the `faint`/`faintest` theme tokens (and the light-theme accent) to meet WCAG AA contrast for
the content they carry.
- `NO_COLOR` is now honored for any non-empty value, per the no-color.org spec.
### Removed
- The inert `/input-style` slash command (it had no backend).
### Fixed
- README/`go.mod` Go-version mismatch and other stale public-release docs claims.
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# Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct
## Our Pledge
We as members, contributors, and leaders pledge to make participation in our community a
harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body size, visible or invisible
disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and expression, level of experience,
education, socio-economic status, nationality, personal appearance, race, religion, or sexual
identity and orientation.
We pledge to act and interact in ways that contribute to an open, welcoming, diverse, inclusive, and
healthy community.
## Our Standards
Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment:
- Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people.
- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences.
- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback.
- Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes.
- Focusing on what is best for the overall community.
Examples of unacceptable behavior:
- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind.
- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks.
- Public or private harassment.
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their
explicit permission.
- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting.
## Enforcement Responsibilities
Project maintainers are responsible for clarifying and enforcing our standards of acceptable behavior
and will take appropriate and fair corrective action in response to any behavior that they deem
inappropriate, threatening, offensive, or harmful.
## Scope
This Code of Conduct applies within all community spaces, and also applies when an individual is
officially representing the community in public spaces.
## Enforcement
Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior may be reported privately to the
project maintainers through the repository's **Security → Report a vulnerability** channel (which
delivers a confidential report to maintainers), or by contacting a maintainer directly. All
complaints will be reviewed and investigated promptly and fairly.
Maintainers are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
## Attribution
This Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage], version 2.1, available at
<https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/1/code_of_conduct.html>.
[homepage]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org
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MIT License
Copyright (c) 2026 Gitlawb
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
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# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
.DEFAULT_GOAL := build
.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean help
# Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
build:
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
# Build every command in cmd/.
build-all:
go build ./...
# Run the full test suite with the race detector (matches CI expectations).
test:
go test ./... -race -count=1
# Faster, no race detector.
test-quick:
go test ./...
vet:
go vet ./...
fmt:
gofmt -w $(shell git ls-files '*.go')
# Fail if any tracked Go file is not gofmt-clean.
fmt-check:
@out="$$(gofmt -l $$(git ls-files '*.go'))"; \
if [ -n "$$out" ]; then echo "gofmt needed:"; echo "$$out"; exit 1; fi
# Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
lint: fmt-check vet
tidy:
go mod tidy
clean:
rm -f zero
go clean ./...
help:
@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean"
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```
███████████ ██████████ ███████████ ███████
▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒███ ▒▒███▒▒▒▒▒█▒▒███▒▒▒▒▒███ ███▒▒▒▒▒███
▒ ███▒ ▒███ █ ▒ ▒███ ▒███ ███ ▒▒███
███ ▒██████ ▒██████████ ▒███ ▒███
███ ▒███▒▒█ ▒███▒▒▒▒▒███ ▒███ ▒███
████ █ ▒███ ▒ █ ▒███ ▒███ ▒▒███ ███
███████████ ██████████ █████ █████ ▒▒▒███████▒
▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒
```
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/assets/zero-logo.png" alt="Zero" width="385">
</p>
# Zero
<p align="center"><strong>A terminal coding agent you own.</strong></p>
**A clean, terminal-first AI coding agent you fully own — multi-provider, scriptable, and safe by default.**
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
</p>
![core](https://img.shields.io/badge/core-Go--native-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white)
![distribution](https://img.shields.io/badge/distribution-npm%20wrapper-cb3837?logo=npm&logoColor=white)
![transition](https://img.shields.io/badge/Go%20runtime-default-14151a?logo=go&logoColor=white)
![status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-active%20development-67e8f9)
Zero is a coding agent that lives in your terminal. It runs an agentic tool loop —
reading, editing, searching, and running commands in your repo — against **whatever
model you choose**. Zero has a **Go-native core** with an npm distribution wrapper;
the Go runtime is the default app path.
> Zero treats the **model as a swappable, per-task choice** — no single-vendor lock-in —
> and never mutates your system without a permission decision.
---
## Highlights
- 🔌 **Multi-provider** — OpenAI-compatible, Anthropic, and Gemini behind one interface, with a model registry (capabilities, context limits, cost). Bring your own key and endpoint.
- 🖥️ **Premium TUI** — Bubble Tea/Lip Gloss powers the Go-native terminal interface.
- 🤖 **Headless & scriptable** — `zero exec` with clean `text` / `json` / `stream-json` I/O and meaningful exit codes for CI and automation.
- 🧰 **Real tools** — read / write / edit files, `apply_patch`, `grep`, `glob`, `bash`, directory listing, and a live plan/todo.
- 🛡️ **Safe by default** — mutating tools are permission-gated; `--skip-permissions-unsafe` is an explicit, clearly-labeled opt-out.
- 💾 **Durable sessions** — local, append-only session event store with full-text `search`.
- 🩺 **Operable** — built-in `doctor`, `config` inspection, secret redaction everywhere, and `update --check`.
## Quick start
> Requires [Go](https://go.dev/) for local development and release tooling.
> The npm wrapper uses Node when Zero is installed as an npm package.
Zero is an AI coding agent for your local terminal. It can inspect a repository,
edit files, run commands, use browser/terminal helpers, and keep durable local
sessions while you choose the model and the permission level.
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero # launch the interactive TUI
zero
zero exec "fix the failing test in ./pkg"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
Point Zero at a model — either set environment variables:
## Why Zero
- **Use the model you want.** Bring OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Groq, OpenRouter,
DeepSeek, Mistral, xAI, Qwen, Kimi, GitHub Models, Ollama, LM Studio, or any
OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint.
- **Stay in control.** File writes, shell commands, network access, and
out-of-workspace writes go through Zero's permission and sandbox policy.
- **Works in the terminal.** The TUI has model/provider pickers, image input,
slash commands, live plan/tool rendering, scrollback, themes, and resume/fork
support.
- **Works without the TUI.** `zero exec` is scriptable, supports text/JSON/
stream-JSON I/O, isolated worktrees, spec-first runs, and meaningful exit
codes for CI.
- **Keeps context local.** Sessions are stored on disk, searchable, resumable,
and never uploaded as telemetry by Zero.
- **Extensible when you need it.** Use MCP servers, skills, plugins, hooks, and
specialist subagents from the same CLI.
## Install
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
The npm package installs a small wrapper plus the matching Zero binary for your
platform from GitHub Releases. It supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and
arm64.
### Bun
Bun does not run dependency lifecycle scripts by default, so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is skipped and the first run fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
Alternatives: allow the postinstall up front by adding
`"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` to your project's package.json
before `bun add`, or run the installer manually
(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`) on Bun versions
that do not have `bun pm trust`.
### Install scripts
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### From source
Source builds require Go 1.25+.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
Release installers and the npm wrapper require published GitHub Release assets.
If you are testing before the first public release, build from source:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
On Linux, build the sandbox helper too if you want native sandboxing:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # optional compatibility wrapper
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`
(`~/.local/bin` is a good default). macOS does not need an extra helper binary.
Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as their sandbox helper; release
archives still ship standalone Windows helper executables.
More install details: [docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md).
## First Run
Start the TUI:
```bash
zero
```
The setup wizard helps you pick a provider and model. You can also configure
providers from the command line:
```bash
zero setup
zero providers list
zero models list
zero doctor
```
For API providers, set the matching environment variable before setup or enter
the key in the wizard:
```bash
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
# optional: any OpenAI-compatible endpoint / model
export OPENAI_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1
export OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4.1
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
…or save reusable provider profiles in `~/.config/zero/config.json` and manage them with
`zero providers`. Run `zero doctor` anytime to verify your setup.
## Usage
### Interactive (TUI)
To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero # or: zero after installation
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
Inside the TUI: type to chat and press **Enter** to send. `/` opens command suggestions
(**Tab** accepts the first). When the prompt is empty, the arrow keys, **PgUp/PgDn**, and
**Home/End** scroll the transcript. **Ctrl+C** exits.
For local models, run Ollama or LM Studio and then use `zero setup` or
`zero providers detect`.
### Headless (`exec`)
## Daily Use
### Interactive TUI
```bash
# one-shot
zero exec "explain internal/agent/loop.go and suggest one improvement"
zero
```
# from a file, with a specific model, as JSON for scripts
zero exec --file task.md --model claude-sonnet-4.5 --output-format json
Useful controls:
# multi-turn / programmatic over stdio
| Control | Action |
|---|---|
| `Enter` | send the prompt |
| `/` | open slash-command suggestions |
| `Shift+Tab` | cycle permission mode |
| `Ctrl+B` | show/hide the sidebar |
| `Ctrl+C` | cancel or exit |
Common slash commands:
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `/model`, `/provider` | switch the active model/provider |
| `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
| `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
| `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
| `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
| `/permissions`, `/tools` | inspect available tools and policy |
| `/add-dir` | allow an extra write directory for this session |
| `/theme`, `/doctor`, `/config` | adjust appearance and inspect setup |
### Headless `exec`
```bash
zero exec "explain internal/agent/loop.go"
zero exec --model claude-sonnet-4.5 "refactor the config loader"
zero exec --use-spec "add rate limiting to the API client"
zero exec --worktree "try the migration in an isolated worktree"
zero exec --resume
zero exec --fork <session-id> "try the other approach"
```
Programmatic use:
```bash
zero exec --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
`exec` flags: `-f, --file` · `-m, --model` · `-C, --cwd` · `-i, --input-format <text|stream-json>` ·
`-o, --output-format <text|json|stream-json>` · `--skip-permissions-unsafe`.
stdout carries **only** program output; logs go to stderr. See
[`docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md`](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md).
The stream-JSON contract is documented in
[docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md).
### Other commands
## Safety Model
Zero is designed to make side effects visible.
- Workspace reads are allowed by default.
- File writes are limited to the workspace unless you grant another directory.
- Shell commands, network access, destructive commands, and elevated actions are
permission-gated.
- `--add-dir <path>` and `/add-dir <path>` grant additional write roots without
giving the agent the whole filesystem.
- Unsafe/autonomous modes are explicit opt-ins.
- Secrets are redacted from tool output and logs where Zero controls the surface.
Example:
```bash
zero providers list|current # inspect resolved provider profiles
zero models list [--provider anthropic] # inspect the model registry
zero search "<query>" [--json --session <id> --type <event>] # search local sessions
zero doctor [--connectivity] [--json] # health checks
zero config [--json] # inspect resolved configuration
zero sandbox policy [--json] # inspect sandbox backend support
zero serve --mcp [-C <path>] # expose Zero read-only tools over MCP stdio
zero specialist list|show|create|edit|delete # manage local specialist sub-agents
zero update --check [--json --target windows-x64] # check for a newer release
zero --add-dir ../docs-site
zero exec --add-dir ../shared "update both repos"
```
## Providers & models
Sandbox behavior can be inspected with:
Selectable per task and per session. The model registry knows each model's provider,
capabilities, context window, and cost.
```bash
zero sandbox policy
zero sandbox grants list
```
| Provider | Example models |
## Web And Local Control
Zero includes local file/search/edit/shell tools, `web_fetch` for public URLs,
and MCP support for additional tools.
For local dev servers, use shell commands such as `curl` through `exec_command`
so the normal sandbox and permission policy applies. Long-running commands stay
attached to a background terminal session and can be listed or stopped from the
TUI.
The npm package also includes browser and terminal helper packages used by local
browser/terminal tools. Source builds can use the same helpers when they are on
`PATH` or configured in Zero's local-control settings.
## Common Commands
```text
zero interactive TUI
zero exec one-shot or scripted agent run
zero setup first-run provider setup
zero auth OAuth/login helpers for supported providers
zero models model registry and capabilities
zero providers provider profiles and detection
zero doctor setup, key, and connectivity checks
zero context context-budget report
zero repo-map deterministic repository map
zero repo-info local repository summary
zero search | find search local session history
zero sessions inspect, resume, fork, and rewind sessions
zero spec manage spec-mode drafts
zero specialist manage specialist subagents
zero skills manage markdown instruction skills
zero plugins manage plugins
zero hooks manage lifecycle hooks
zero mcp manage MCP servers and tools
zero serve --mcp expose Zero tools over MCP stdio
zero sandbox inspect sandbox policy and grants
zero worktrees prepare isolated git worktrees
zero verify detect and run local verification checks
zero changes inspect and commit local git changes
zero usage token usage and estimated cost
zero cron scheduled agent jobs
zero update check for newer releases
```
## Appearance And Accessibility
| Control | Effect |
|---|---|
| OpenAI-compatible | `gpt-4.1`, `gpt-4.1-mini`, `gpt-4o`, `gpt-4o-mini` |
| Anthropic | `claude-opus-4.1`, `claude-sonnet-4.5`, `claude-haiku-4.5` |
| Google Gemini | `gemini-2.5-pro`, `gemini-2.5-flash`, `gemini-2.5-flash-lite` |
| `NO_COLOR=<anything>` | disables color output |
| `ZERO_THEME=<name>` | selects the startup theme (`auto`, `dark`, `light`, or a color theme like `dracula`, `nord`, `gruvbox`, `tokyo-night`, `catppuccin`, `one-dark`, `solarized-dark`, `rose-pine`, `everforest`, `solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <name>` | selects the TUI theme from the CLI (same names) |
| `/theme` | opens the theme picker inside the TUI (live preview; `/theme <name>` switches directly) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | disables streaming fade animation |
Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint works with just a base URL, key, and model — so local
runtimes (Ollama, gateways, etc.) plug in the same way.
## Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Side effect |
|---|---|---|
| `read_file` · `list_directory` · `grep` · `glob` | explore & search | read |
| `update_plan` | maintain a live task plan | plan |
| `write_file` · `edit_file` · `apply_patch` | create & modify files | write (gated) |
| `bash` | run shell commands | shell (gated) |
| `Task` · `TaskOutput` · `TaskStop` | delegate to specialist sub-agents | shell/read (gated by tool) |
| `GenerateSpecialist` | create project-local specialist manifests | write (gated) |
Write/shell tools route through the permission policy before any side effect.
## Architecture
```
Terminal (Bubble Tea target) headless `exec` (future) editor ext
└───────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
Go-native core target (loop, events, tools)
┌──────────┬───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬───────────┬──────────┐
providers tools sessions usage redaction doctor / stream-json
+ registry registry + search + cost config
```
- **Go-native target**: `cmd/zero` is the default production runtime; the npm package delegates to the built Go binary.
- **Surface-agnostic core**: the agent loop streams text + tool calls, executes tools, and emits a typed event stream consumed identically by every surface.
- **Edges are interfaces**: `Provider`, `Tool`, `SessionStore`, and the permission policy are swappable.
- **Model is data**: capabilities, cost, and routing live in the registry — never hard-coded.
## Project layout
```
cmd/
zero/ # production Go CLI entrypoint
zero-pr-review/ # deterministic PR review helper
internal/
agent/ # Go agent loop and tool-call orchestration
cli/ # interactive/headless command surface
config/ # layered configuration and provider profiles
providers/ # OpenAI-compatible, Anthropic, Gemini adapters
tools/ # read/write/edit/bash/grep/glob/apply_patch tools
tui/ # Bubble Tea terminal interface
sessions/ search/ # append-only sessions and local search
usage/ modelregistry/ # token usage and model metadata/costs
doctor/ verify/ # diagnostics and self-verification
streamjson/ # headless stream-json protocol
mcp/ plugins/ hooks/ # extension-facing runtime surfaces
bin/ # npm wrapper entrypoint
scripts/ # installers
docs/ # PRD + protocol/install/perf docs
```
Meaning does not rely on color alone; diffs, permissions, and statuses also use
text or glyph markers.
## Development
```bash
go test ./... # run the test suite
go run ./cmd/zero-release build # compile the release-facing Go binary
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke # verify the release-facing Go binary
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench # performance benchmarks (see docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
go test ./...
go run ./cmd/zero-release build
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
Cross-compile by passing Go targets to the builder:
Cross-compile examples:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero.exe
```
### Install from a release
```bash
# Linux / macOS
scripts/install.sh
# Windows
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1
```
See [`docs/INSTALL.md`](docs/INSTALL.md) for version, repository, and install-path overrides,
and [`docs/UPDATE.md`](docs/UPDATE.md) for the update flow.
## Documentation
- [Product Requirements (PRD)](docs/PRD.md) — vision, goals, full feature spec, roadmap
- [Stream-JSON protocol](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md) — headless I/O contract
- [Specialists](docs/SPECIALISTS.md) — sub-agent manifests, Task tools, and background task state
- [Headless exec PRD](docs/M1_HEADLESS_EXEC_PRD.md)
- [npm wrapper smoke checklist](docs/NPM_WRAPPER_SMOKE.md)
- [Performance](docs/PERFORMANCE.md) · [Install](docs/INSTALL.md) · [Update](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Install](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [Update flow](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Stream-JSON protocol](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [Specialists](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
- [Benchmarks](docs/BENCHMARK.md)
- [Performance](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [Agent evals](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## Contributing
Contributions are welcome — see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). Please run
`go test ./...` and the relevant build or smoke command before opening a PR.
Contributions are welcome. Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md), run the
relevant tests, and open a focused pull request.
Security reports should follow [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
## License
License is being finalized; a `LICENSE` file will be added before a public release.
---
<sub>Go-native core with an npm distribution wrapper.</sub>
Zero is released under the [MIT License](LICENSE).
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<p align="center">
<img src="docs/assets/zero-logo.png" alt="Zero" width="385">
</p>
<p align="center"><strong>一个独属于你的终端编码智能体。</strong></p>
<p align="center">
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
<img alt="Go 1.25+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.25+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
<img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
<br>
<a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
</p>
Zero 是一个用于本地终端的 AI 编码智能体。它可以检查仓库、编辑文件、运行命令、使用浏览器/终端辅助工具,并在你选择模型和权限级别的同时保持持久的本地会话。
```bash
zero
zero exec "修复 ./pkg 中失败的测试"
zero exec --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
## 为什么选择 Zero
- **使用你想要的模型。** 支持 OpenAI、Anthropic、Gemini、Groq、OpenRouter、DeepSeek、Mistral、xAI、Qwen、Kimi、GitHub Models、Ollama、LM Studio,或任何 OpenAI/Anthropic 兼容端点。
- **保持控制权。** 文件写入、Shell 命令、网络访问和工作区外写入都经过 Zero 的权限和沙箱策略。
- **在终端中工作。** TUI 具有模型/提供商选择器、图片输入、斜杠命令、实时计划/工具渲染、回滚滚动、主题以及恢复/分叉支持。
- **无 TUI 也能工作。** `zero exec` 可脚本化,支持文本/JSON/stream-JSON I/O、隔离的工作树、规范优先运行,以及用于 CI 的有意义的退出码。
- **保持上下文本地化。** 会话存储在磁盘上,可搜索、可恢复,且 Zero 不会作为遥测数据上传。
- **可扩展。** 使用 MCP 服务器、技能、插件、钩子和来自同一 CLI 的专业子智能体。
## 安装
### npm
```bash
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
npm 包安装一个小型包装器以及与你平台匹配的 Zero 二进制文件(从 GitHub Releases 获取)。支持 Linux、macOS 和 Windows 的 x64 和 arm64。
### Bun
Bun 默认不运行依赖的生命周期脚本,因此获取 Zero 二进制文件的 `postinstall` 会被跳过,首次运行会失败并显示 `No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`。
最简单的解决方法是安装后信任该包,这会运行被阻止的 postinstall。项目安装和全局安装均适用:
```bash
# 项目安装
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# 全局安装
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
其他方式:在 `bun add` 之前将 `"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]` 添加到项目的 package.json 以提前允许 postinstall;或在不支持 `bun pm trust` 的旧版 Bun 上手动运行安装程序(`node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs`)。
### 安装脚本
Linux/macOS:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
Windows PowerShell:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
### 从源码构建
源码构建需要 Go 1.25+。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
发布安装器和 npm 包需要已发布的 GitHub Release 资源。如果你在首次公开发布之前进行测试,请从源码构建:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
在 Linux 上,如果你需要原生沙箱,还需要构建沙箱辅助程序:
```bash
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp # 可选的兼容性包装器
```
将 `zero` 和 `zero-linux-sandbox` 放在 `PATH` 上的同一目录中(`~/.local/bin` 是一个好的默认选择)。macOS 不需要额外的辅助二进制文件。Windows 源码构建可以使用主 `zero.exe` 作为沙箱辅助程序;发布包仍然附带独立的 Windows 辅助可执行文件。
更多安装细节:[docs/INSTALL.md](docs/INSTALL.md)。
## 首次运行
启动 TUI:
```bash
zero
```
设置向导帮助你选择提供商和模型。你也可以从命令行配置提供商:
```bash
zero setup
zero providers list
zero models list
zero doctor
```
对于 API 提供商,在设置之前设置匹配的环境变量或在向导中输入密钥:
```bash
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
```
要直接配置美团 LongCat(LongCat-2.0),运行:
```bash
zero providers setup longcat --set-active
```
对于本地模型,运行 Ollama 或 LM Studio,然后使用 `zero setup` 或 `zero providers detect`。
## 日常使用
### 交互式 TUI
```bash
zero
```
常用控制:
| 控制 | 操作 |
|---|---|
| `Enter` | 发送提示 |
| `/` | 打开斜杠命令建议 |
| `Shift+Tab` | 切换权限模式 |
| `Ctrl+B` | 显示/隐藏侧边栏 |
| `Ctrl+C` | 取消或退出 |
常用斜杠命令:
| 命令 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| `/model`、`/provider` | 切换活动模型/提供商 |
| `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
| `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
| `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
| `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
| `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
| `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
| `/theme`、`/doctor`、`/config` | 调整外观和检查设置 |
### 无头 `exec` 模式
```bash
zero exec "解释 internal/agent/loop.go"
zero exec --model claude-sonnet-4.5 "重构配置加载器"
zero exec --use-spec "为 API 客户端添加速率限制"
zero exec --worktree "在隔离的工作树中尝试迁移"
zero exec --resume
zero exec --fork <session-id> "尝试另一种方法"
```
编程使用:
```bash
zero exec --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json < turns.jsonl
```
Stream-JSON 协议文档在 [docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)。
## 安全模型
Zero 旨在使副作用可见。
- 工作区读取默认允许。
- 文件写入限制在工作区内,除非你授予其他目录。
- Shell 命令、网络访问、破坏性命令和提权操作需要权限授权。
- `--add-dir <path>` 和 `/add-dir <path>` 授予额外的写入根目录,而不会给智能体整个文件系统。
- 不安全/自主模式是显式选择加入。
- 在 Zero 控制的界面上,密钥会从工具输出和日志中被脱敏。
示例:
```bash
zero --add-dir ../docs-site
zero exec --add-dir ../shared "更新两个仓库"
```
沙箱行为可以通过以下方式检查:
```bash
zero sandbox policy
zero sandbox grants list
```
## Web 和本地控制
Zero 包含本地文件/搜索/编辑/Shell 工具、用于公共 URL 的 `web_fetch`,以及用于额外工具的 MCP 支持。
对于本地开发服务器,使用 Shell 命令(如通过 `exec_command` 的 `curl`),这样正常的沙箱和权限策略就会生效。长时间运行的命令保持附加到后台终端会话,可以从 TUI 中列出或停止。
npm 包还包含本地浏览器/终端工具使用的浏览器和终端辅助包。源码构建可以在它们位于 `PATH` 上或在 Zero 的本地控制设置中配置时使用相同的辅助工具。
## 常用命令
```text
zero 交互式 TUI
zero exec 一次性或脚本化智能体运行
zero setup 首次运行提供商设置
zero auth 支持提供商的 OAuth/登录辅助
zero models 模型注册表和能力
zero providers 提供商配置和检测
zero doctor 设置、密钥和连接检查
zero context 上下文预算报告
zero repo-map 确定性仓库映射
zero repo-info 本地仓库摘要
zero search | find 搜索本地会话历史
zero sessions 检查、恢复、分叉和回滚会话
zero spec 管理规范模式草稿
zero specialist 管理专业子智能体
zero skills 管理 Markdown 指令技能
zero plugins 管理插件
zero hooks 管理生命周期钩子
zero mcp 管理 MCP 服务器和工具
zero serve --mcp 通过 MCP stdio 暴露 Zero 工具
zero sandbox 检查沙箱策略和授权
zero worktrees 准备隔离的 Git 工作树
zero verify 检测和运行本地验证检查
zero changes 检查和提交本地 Git 变更
zero usage Token 使用量和估算成本
zero cron 定时智能体任务
zero update 检查更新版本
```
## 外观和无障碍
| 控制 | 效果 |
|---|---|
| `NO_COLOR=<任意值>` | 禁用颜色输出 |
| `ZERO_THEME=<名称>` | 选择启动主题(`auto`、`dark`、`light`,或颜色主题如 `dracula`、`nord`、`gruvbox`、`tokyo-night`、`catppuccin`、`one-dark`、`solarized-dark`、`rose-pine`、`everforest`、`solarized-light`) |
| `--theme <名称>` | 从 CLI 选择 TUI 主题(相同名称) |
| `/theme` | 在 TUI 中打开主题选择器(实时预览;`/theme <名称>` 直接切换) |
| `ZERO_NO_FADE=1` | 禁用流式淡入动画 |
含义不仅仅依赖于颜色;差异、权限和状态也使用文本或标记符号。
## 开发
```bash
go test ./...
go run ./cmd/zero-release build
go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench
```
交叉编译示例:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos linux --goarch amd64
go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero.exe
```
## 文档
- [安装](docs/INSTALL.md)
- [更新流程](docs/UPDATE.md)
- [Stream-JSON 协议](docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [专家](docs/SPECIALISTS.md)
- [GitHub Action](docs/GITHUB_ACTION.md)
- [基准测试](docs/BENCHMARK.md)
- [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
- [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)
## 贡献
欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md),运行相关测试,然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
安全报告应遵循 [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)。
## 许可证
Zero 基于 [MIT 许可证](LICENSE) 发布。
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# Security Policy
Zero is a terminal coding agent: it reads and edits files in your repository and can run shell
commands and call external model/tool endpoints. We take security reports seriously.
## Reporting a vulnerability
**Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.**
Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting:
1. Go to the repository's **Security** tab → **Report a vulnerability** (GitHub Security Advisories).
2. Describe the issue, the affected version/commit, reproduction steps, and the impact.
If you cannot use GitHub Security Advisories, open a regular issue that contains **only** a request to
be contacted for a security report (no details), and a maintainer will arrange a private channel.
Please include, where possible:
- The version, branch, or commit affected.
- A minimal reproduction and the impact (e.g. sandbox escape, secret exposure, RCE).
- Any logs or output, with secrets redacted.
## What to expect
- We aim to acknowledge a report within a few business days.
- We will work with you on a fix and a coordinated disclosure timeline, and credit you in the release
notes unless you prefer to remain anonymous.
## Scope notes
- Findings that require a malicious local user who already controls the machine running Zero, or that
depend on a user explicitly disabling the sandbox (`--skip-permissions-unsafe`), are generally
out of scope — but please report anything you are unsure about.
- Zero sends no telemetry. Network calls go to the model/tool providers you configure (and, for
keyless web search, to the documented Firecrawl endpoint — see the README).
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name: ZERO
description: >-
Run the ZERO coding agent headlessly in a GitHub workflow. ZERO is
model- and provider-agnostic: you supply the provider and API key as inputs.
author: Gitlawb
branding:
icon: terminal
color: green
inputs:
prompt:
description: The instruction for ZERO to execute. Mutually exclusive with prompt-file.
required: false
default: ""
prompt-file:
description: Path (relative to working-directory) to a file whose contents are the prompt.
required: false
default: ""
provider:
description: >-
Provider id to activate (for example openai, anthropic, gemini, ollama, or
any configured OpenAI-/Anthropic-compatible endpoint). Optional when the
repository already carries a .zero/config.json with an active provider.
required: false
default: ""
api-key:
description: >-
The provider API key. Pass it from a repository or organization secret;
it is exported only for the ZERO step and never written to the log.
required: false
default: ""
api-key-env:
description: >-
Name of the environment variable the chosen provider reads its key from
(for example OPENAI_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY). When set together with
api-key, that variable is exported only for the ZERO step. Leave the action
provider-agnostic by passing the env name your provider expects rather
than hardcoding one here.
required: false
default: ""
model:
description: Model id to use for the run. Defaults to the resolved provider's default.
required: false
default: ""
mode:
description: Run mode passed to `zero exec --mode` (for example smart, deep, or fast).
required: false
default: ""
auto:
description: >-
Autonomy ceiling passed to `zero exec --auto` (low, medium, or high).
Defaults to the conservative `low` so an unattended CI run cannot take
high-impact actions implicitly.
required: false
default: low
self-correct:
description: >-
When true, allow ZERO to request a stronger model mid-run if it hits a
wall (maps to `zero exec --allow-escalation`).
required: false
default: "false"
add-dir:
description: >-
Newline- or comma-separated extra write roots granted to the run (each
passed as `zero exec --add-dir`). The checked-out repository is always
writable; everything else stays read-only unless listed here.
required: false
default: ""
worktree:
description: When true, run inside an isolated git worktree (`zero exec --worktree`).
required: false
default: "false"
output-format:
description: >-
Output format for `zero exec` (text, json, or stream-json). Defaults to
stream-json, which is captured to a file and exposed as the output-file
output and uploaded by the caller if desired.
required: false
default: stream-json
post-to:
description: >-
Optional destination for a run summary after ZERO finishes: `pr-comment`
posts to the triggering pull request using github-token, `slack` posts to
slack-webhook-url, or `none` (default) posts nowhere.
required: false
default: none
slack-webhook-url:
description: >-
Slack incoming-webhook (or generic webhook) URL used when post-to is
slack. Pass it from a secret; it is never written to the log.
required: false
default: ""
github-token:
description: >-
Token used to post a PR comment when post-to is pr-comment. Defaults to
the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN; the workflow must grant pull-requests: write.
required: false
default: ${{ github.token }}
working-directory:
description: Directory to run ZERO in. Defaults to the workspace root.
required: false
default: ${{ github.workspace }}
zero-version:
description: >-
ZERO release version/tag to install (for example v1.2.3 or latest).
Defaults to the ref this action was resolved at, falling back to latest.
required: false
default: ""
zero-repo:
description: Repository to install the ZERO release from (owner/repo).
required: false
default: Gitlawb/zero
outputs:
exit-code:
description: The exit code ZERO returned (0 success, 2 usage, 3 provider, non-zero otherwise).
value: ${{ steps.run.outputs.exit-code }}
output-file:
description: Path to the captured ZERO stdout (the raw output-format stream).
value: ${{ steps.run.outputs.output-file }}
summary:
description: A short human-readable summary line parsed from the run, when available.
value: ${{ steps.run.outputs.summary }}
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- name: Install ZERO
shell: bash
env:
ZERO_REPO: ${{ inputs.zero-repo }}
ZERO_VERSION_INPUT: ${{ inputs.zero-version }}
ACTION_REF: ${{ github.action_ref }}
ACTION_PATH: ${{ github.action_path }}
RUNNER_TEMP: ${{ runner.temp }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${RUNNER_OS}" = "Windows" ]; then
echo "::error::The ZERO action currently supports Linux and macOS runners only." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Resolve the version to install: explicit input wins; otherwise the ref
# this action was checked out at (a tag); otherwise the latest release.
version="${ZERO_VERSION_INPUT}"
if [ -z "${version}" ]; then
version="${ACTION_REF}"
fi
# A commit-SHA pin (github.action_ref is the 40-hex SHA) is not a release
# tag, so fall back to latest rather than fetching releases/download/v<sha>.
case "${version}" in
""|refs/*|*/*) version="latest" ;;
esac
if printf '%s' "${version}" | grep -qiE '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
version="latest"
fi
install_dir="${RUNNER_TEMP}/zero-bin"
mkdir -p "${install_dir}"
# Reuse ZERO's own checksum-verifying installer, shipped with the action.
ZERO_REPO="${ZERO_REPO}" ZERO_VERSION="${version}" ZERO_INSTALL_DIR="${install_dir}" \
bash "${ACTION_PATH}/scripts/install.sh"
echo "${install_dir}" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Run ZERO
id: run
shell: bash
working-directory: ${{ inputs.working-directory }}
env:
# Secrets are passed via the environment and never echoed. `set +x` and
# the absence of any `echo` of these values keep them out of the log.
ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.api-key }}
ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV: ${{ inputs.api-key-env }}
ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER: ${{ inputs.provider }}
ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT: ${{ inputs.prompt }}
ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT_FILE: ${{ inputs.prompt-file }}
ZERO_INPUT_MODEL: ${{ inputs.model }}
ZERO_INPUT_MODE: ${{ inputs.mode }}
ZERO_INPUT_AUTO: ${{ inputs.auto }}
ZERO_INPUT_SELF_CORRECT: ${{ inputs.self-correct }}
ZERO_INPUT_ADD_DIR: ${{ inputs.add-dir }}
ZERO_INPUT_WORKTREE: ${{ inputs.worktree }}
ZERO_INPUT_OUTPUT_FORMAT: ${{ inputs.output-format }}
RUNNER_TEMP: ${{ runner.temp }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Export the provider key under the env name the provider expects. This
# keeps the action provider-agnostic: no provider->env mapping is baked
# in. The value is never printed.
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}" ] && [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}" ]; then
if ! printf '%s' "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}" | grep -qE '^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$'; then
echo "::error::api-key-env must be a valid environment variable name." >&2
exit 2
fi
# Export in-process for this Run ZERO step so zero can read it; do
# not persist provider credentials to later job steps.
export "${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY_ENV}=${ZERO_INPUT_API_KEY}"
fi
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}" ]; then
export ZERO_PROVIDER="${ZERO_INPUT_PROVIDER}"
fi
args=(exec)
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT_FILE}" ] && [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT}" ]; then
echo "::error::The 'prompt' and 'prompt-file' inputs are mutually exclusive." >&2
exit 2
fi
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT_FILE}" ]; then
args+=(--file "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT_FILE}")
elif [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT}" ]; then
args+=(--prompt "${ZERO_INPUT_PROMPT}")
else
echo "::error::Provide either the 'prompt' or 'prompt-file' input." >&2
exit 2
fi
[ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_MODEL}" ] && args+=(--model "${ZERO_INPUT_MODEL}")
[ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_MODE}" ] && args+=(--mode "${ZERO_INPUT_MODE}")
[ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_AUTO}" ] && args+=(--auto "${ZERO_INPUT_AUTO}")
[ "${ZERO_INPUT_SELF_CORRECT}" = "true" ] && args+=(--allow-escalation)
[ "${ZERO_INPUT_WORKTREE}" = "true" ] && args+=(--worktree)
args+=(--output-format "${ZERO_INPUT_OUTPUT_FORMAT}")
# No --notify in CI (no terminal); the optional Slack post is handled
# separately below so it works regardless of output format.
args+=(--no-notify)
# Split add-dir on newlines and commas; each non-empty entry is a root.
if [ -n "${ZERO_INPUT_ADD_DIR}" ]; then
while IFS= read -r dir; do
# Trim only surrounding whitespace so paths with internal spaces survive.
dir="$(printf '%s' "${dir}" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//; s/[[:space:]]*$//')"
[ -n "${dir}" ] && args+=(--add-dir "${dir}")
done < <(printf '%s' "${ZERO_INPUT_ADD_DIR}" | tr ',' '\n')
fi
output_file="${RUNNER_TEMP}/zero-output.txt"
# Run ZERO. Capture stdout to a file AND echo it to the log. Surface the
# real exit code as the step's status. The sandbox is active by default;
# this action never enables unsafe permission-skipping.
set +e
zero "${args[@]}" | tee "${output_file}"
code=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
set -e
echo "exit-code=${code}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
echo "output-file=${output_file}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
# Best-effort one-line summary: last non-empty line of the captured output.
summary="$(grep -v '^[[:space:]]*$' "${output_file}" | tail -n 1 || true)"
# Keep the summary single-line and bounded for the step output.
summary="$(printf '%s' "${summary}" | cut -c1-280)"
{
echo "summary<<ZERO_EOF"
printf '%s\n' "${summary}"
echo "ZERO_EOF"
} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
exit "${code}"
- name: Post run summary to pull request
if: ${{ always() && inputs.post-to == 'pr-comment' && github.event.pull_request.number != '' }}
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
ZERO_EXIT: ${{ steps.run.outputs.exit-code }}
ZERO_SUMMARY: ${{ steps.run.outputs.summary }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
status="succeeded"
[ "${ZERO_EXIT}" != "0" ] && status="failed (exit ${ZERO_EXIT})"
body="$(printf 'ZERO run %s.\n\n%s' "${status}" "${ZERO_SUMMARY}")"
gh api "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/comments" \
-f body="${body}" >/dev/null
- name: Post run summary to Slack
if: ${{ always() && inputs.post-to == 'slack' && inputs.slack-webhook-url != '' }}
shell: bash
env:
SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ inputs.slack-webhook-url }}
ZERO_EXIT: ${{ steps.run.outputs.exit-code }}
ZERO_SUMMARY: ${{ steps.run.outputs.summary }}
RUN_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
status="succeeded"
[ "${ZERO_EXIT}" != "0" ] && status="failed (exit ${ZERO_EXIT})"
text="ZERO run ${status} for ${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}@${GITHUB_REF_NAME}. ${ZERO_SUMMARY} ${RUN_URL}"
# Slack incoming webhooks accept {"text": "..."}; jq escapes the body and
# the URL is never echoed. A delivery failure is a warning, not a failure.
payload="$(jq -n --arg text "${text}" '{text: $text}')"
curl --fail --silent --show-error -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "${payload}" "${SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL}" >/dev/null || \
echo "::warning::Slack webhook delivery failed (run not affected)."
+70 -1
View File
@@ -9,18 +9,87 @@ function zeroBinaryName(platform = process.platform) {
return platform === 'win32' ? 'zero.exe' : 'zero';
}
function helperShimNames(name, platform = process.platform) {
if (platform === 'win32') {
return [`${name}.cmd`, `${name}.exe`, name];
}
return [name];
}
function commandForShim(path, platform = process.platform) {
if (platform === 'win32' && path.toLowerCase().endsWith('.cmd')) {
return {
command: process.env.ComSpec || 'cmd.exe',
prefixArgs: ['/d', '/s', '/c', `"${path.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`],
};
}
return { command: path, prefixArgs: [] };
}
function resolveHelper(packageRoot, name) {
const binDir = join(packageRoot, 'node_modules', '.bin');
for (const shimName of helperShimNames(name)) {
const candidate = join(binDir, shimName);
if (!existsSync(candidate)) continue;
return {
...commandForShim(candidate),
pathPrepend: [binDir],
};
}
return null;
}
function localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot) {
const helpers = {};
for (const name of ['agent-browser', 'tuistory']) {
const helper = resolveHelper(packageRoot, name);
if (helper) helpers[name] = helper;
}
if (Object.keys(helpers).length === 0) return '';
return JSON.stringify({ version: 1, helpers });
}
const packageRoot = dirname(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)));
const nativePath = join(packageRoot, zeroBinaryName());
const localControlHelpers = localControlHelperManifest(packageRoot);
if (!existsSync(nativePath)) {
const postinstallScript = join(packageRoot, 'scripts', 'postinstall.mjs');
const ranByBun = process.execPath.includes('bun') || !!process.versions?.bun;
console.error(
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper. Reinstall the zero package or run `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` from the repository.'
'[zero] No native binary found next to the npm wrapper.\n' +
'The platform binary is fetched at install time by a postinstall script,\n' +
'which did not run (or was skipped) for this install.\n' +
'\n' +
'Fix it now by running the installer manually:\n' +
` node "${postinstallScript}"\n` +
'\n' +
(ranByBun
? 'You installed with Bun, which does not run dependency lifecycle scripts\n' +
'by default. Trust the package to run the blocked postinstall:\n' +
' bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero (project install)\n' +
' bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero (global install)\n' +
'On Bun versions without `bun pm trust`, add\n' +
' "trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]\n' +
'to your project package.json and reinstall.\n' +
'\n'
: '') +
'If that fails, build from source: https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero\n' +
'(go run ./cmd/zero, requires Go 1.25+).',
);
process.exit(1);
}
const env = { ...process.env };
if (localControlHelpers) {
env.ZERO_LOCAL_CONTROL_HELPERS = localControlHelpers;
} else {
delete env.ZERO_LOCAL_CONTROL_HELPERS;
}
const child = spawnSync(nativePath, process.argv.slice(2), {
stdio: 'inherit',
env,
});
if (child.error) {
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
//go:build linux
package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
os.Exit(sandbox.RunLinuxSandboxHelper(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr))
}
+7
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ func main() {
}
func run(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
// The `tasks` subcommand is the reproducible Terminal-Bench-style task harness;
// the default (no subcommand) path stays the cold-start/RSS perf benchmark so
// existing invocations are unchanged.
if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "tasks" {
return runTasksCommand(args[1:], getenv, stdout, stderr)
}
options, err := parseArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
@@ -199,6 +205,7 @@ func parseArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (cliOptions, error) {
func helpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench [options]",
" zero-perf-bench tasks [options] (Terminal-Bench-style task harness; see `tasks --help`)",
"",
"Options:",
" --iterations <n> Measured samples to collect (default: 5)",
+218
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/perfbench"
)
// taskOptions configures the `zero-perf-bench tasks` subcommand: the reproducible
// Terminal-Bench-style harness that runs ZERO headlessly against a task set and
// records a publishable result (model + commit + self-correct flag + date).
type taskOptions struct {
SuitePath string
Model string
Mode string
SelfCorrect bool
Binary string
Version string
Commit string
Output string
JSON bool
DryRun bool
Help bool
}
func runTasksCommand(args []string, getenv func(string) string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
options, err := parseTaskArgs(args, getenv)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, err.Error())
return 2
}
if options.Help {
_, _ = fmt.Fprint(stdout, taskHelpText())
return 0
}
set, err := perfbench.LoadTaskSet(options.SuitePath)
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Task benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
runner := perfbench.SkipRunner
if !options.DryRun {
binary := strings.TrimSpace(options.Binary)
if binary == "" {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Task benchmark failed: --binary is required unless --dry-run is set")
return 2
}
runner = perfbench.NewExecRunner(binary)
}
result, err := perfbench.RunTasks(context.Background(), set, perfbench.TaskConfig{
Model: options.Model,
Mode: options.Mode,
SelfCorrect: options.SelfCorrect,
Version: options.Version,
Commit: options.Commit,
Runner: runner,
})
if err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Task benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
if options.Output != "" {
if err := writeTaskReport(options.Output, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Task benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
}
if options.JSON {
if err := perfbench.WriteTaskJSON(stdout, result); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] Task benchmark failed: "+err.Error())
return 1
}
return 0
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stdout, perfbench.FormatTaskSummary(result))
return 0
}
func parseTaskArgs(args []string, getenv func(string) string) (taskOptions, error) {
options := taskOptions{
Version: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_VERSION")),
Commit: strings.TrimSpace(getenv("ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT")),
}
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
flag, inlineValue := splitFlagValue(arg)
switch flag {
case "--suite":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.SuitePath = value
index = next
case "--model":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Model = value
index = next
case "--mode":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Mode = value
index = next
case "--binary":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Binary = value
index = next
case "--version":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Version = value
index = next
case "--commit":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Commit = value
index = next
case "--output":
value, next, err := readOptionValue(args, inlineValue, index, flag)
if err != nil {
return options, err
}
options.Output = value
index = next
case "--self-correct":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.SelfCorrect = true
case "--json":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.JSON = true
case "--dry-run":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.DryRun = true
case "-h", "--help":
if strings.Contains(arg, "=") {
return options, fmt.Errorf("%s does not accept a value", flag)
}
options.Help = true
default:
return options, fmt.Errorf("unknown option: %s", arg)
}
}
if options.Help {
return options, nil
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.SuitePath) == "" {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--suite is required")
}
if strings.TrimSpace(options.Model) == "" {
return options, fmt.Errorf("--model is required")
}
return options, nil
}
func writeTaskReport(path string, result perfbench.TaskRunResult) error {
if dir := filepath.Dir(path); dir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var buffer bytes.Buffer
if err := perfbench.WriteTaskJSON(&buffer, result); err != nil {
return err
}
return os.WriteFile(path, buffer.Bytes(), 0o644)
}
func taskHelpText() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
"Usage: zero-perf-bench tasks [options]",
"",
"Runs ZERO headlessly against a Terminal-Bench-style task set and records a",
"reproducible, publishable result (model + commit + self-correct flag + date).",
"",
"Options:",
" --suite <path> Task set JSON file (required)",
" --model <model> Model to run (required); recorded with the result",
" --mode <name> Exec mode preset to apply",
" --self-correct Enable the post-edit verify-and-correct loop",
" --binary <path> Path to the `zero` binary (required unless --dry-run)",
" --version <v> Record the ZERO version (default: $ZERO_BENCH_VERSION)",
" --commit <sha> Record the ZERO commit (default: $ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT)",
" --output <path> Write the JSON result to path",
" --json Print only the JSON result",
" --dry-run Record every task as skipped without invoking the agent",
" -h, --help Show this help",
"",
"Run twice — with and without --self-correct — to publish the delta.",
}, "\n") + "\n"
}
+170
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func writeTaskSuite(t *testing.T, body string) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "suite.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write suite: %v", err)
}
return path
}
func TestParseTaskArgsRequiresSuiteAndModel(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := parseTaskArgs([]string{"--model", "m"}, emptyEnv); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--suite") {
t.Fatalf("expected missing-suite error, got %v", err)
}
if _, err := parseTaskArgs([]string{"--suite", "/x.json"}, emptyEnv); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--model") {
t.Fatalf("expected missing-model error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseTaskArgsReadsFlagsAndEnv(t *testing.T) {
env := func(key string) string {
return map[string]string{
"ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT": "deadbeef",
"ZERO_BENCH_VERSION": "9.9.9",
}[key]
}
options, err := parseTaskArgs([]string{
"--suite", "/tmp/suite.json",
"--model", "test-model",
"--mode", "build",
"--self-correct",
"--binary", "/usr/local/bin/zero",
"--output", "dist/bench.json",
"--json",
}, env)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTaskArgs error: %v", err)
}
if options.SuitePath != "/tmp/suite.json" || options.Model != "test-model" || options.Mode != "build" {
t.Fatalf("options = %#v", options)
}
if !options.SelfCorrect || !options.JSON {
t.Fatalf("flags not parsed: %#v", options)
}
if options.Binary != "/usr/local/bin/zero" || options.Output != "dist/bench.json" {
t.Fatalf("binary/output = %q/%q", options.Binary, options.Output)
}
if options.Commit != "deadbeef" || options.Version != "9.9.9" {
t.Fatalf("commit/version from env = %q/%q", options.Commit, options.Version)
}
}
func TestParseTaskArgsFlagsOverrideEnv(t *testing.T) {
env := func(key string) string {
return map[string]string{"ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT": "fromenv"}[key]
}
options, err := parseTaskArgs([]string{"--suite", "/s.json", "--model", "m", "--commit", "fromflag"}, env)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTaskArgs error: %v", err)
}
if options.Commit != "fromflag" {
t.Fatalf("commit = %q, want fromflag (flag overrides env)", options.Commit)
}
}
func TestRunTasksCommandWritesRecordWithoutBinary(t *testing.T) {
// With --dry-run no agent is invoked: every task is recorded as skipped. This
// exercises the full record path (model + commit + self-correct flag) without
// needing a real zero binary or model.
suite := writeTaskSuite(t, `{
"id": "terminal-bench-mini",
"name": "Terminal-Bench (mini)",
"tasks": [
{"id": "t1", "name": "fix", "prompt": "do the thing"},
{"id": "t2", "name": "flag", "prompt": "add a flag"}
]
}`)
outPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bench.json")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := runTasksCommand([]string{
"--suite", suite,
"--model", "test-model",
"--self-correct",
"--commit", "abc1234",
"--version", "1.2.3",
"--dry-run",
"--output", outPath,
}, emptyEnv, &stdout, &stderr)
if code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("runTasksCommand code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(outPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read output: %v", err)
}
var record struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
Commit string `json:"commit"`
SelfCorrect bool `json:"selfCorrect"`
Suite string `json:"suite"`
Attempted int `json:"tasksAttempted"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &record); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode record: %v\n%s", err, data)
}
if record.Model != "test-model" || record.Commit != "abc1234" || !record.SelfCorrect {
t.Fatalf("record = %#v", record)
}
if record.Suite != "terminal-bench-mini" || record.Attempted != 2 {
t.Fatalf("record suite/attempted = %q/%d", record.Suite, record.Attempted)
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "self-correct: on") {
t.Fatalf("summary missing self-correct line:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestRunTasksCommandRejectsMissingSuiteFile(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := runTasksCommand([]string{"--suite", "/no/such/suite.json", "--model", "m", "--dry-run"}, emptyEnv, &stdout, &stderr)
if code == 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected non-zero exit for missing suite file")
}
if stderr.Len() == 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected an error message on stderr")
}
}
func TestSampleTaskSuiteIsValidAndRunnableDry(t *testing.T) {
// The published example suite (referenced by docs/BENCHMARK.md) must load and
// dry-run cleanly so the documented command never bit-rots.
outPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "bench.json")
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
code := runTasksCommand([]string{
"--suite", filepath.Join("testdata", "terminal-bench-sample.json"),
"--model", "example-model",
"--dry-run",
"--output", outPath,
}, emptyEnv, &stdout, &stderr)
if code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("sample suite dry run code = %d, stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "terminal-bench-sample") {
t.Fatalf("summary should name the suite:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
func TestTasksSubcommandRoutedFromMain(t *testing.T) {
var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
// "tasks --help" must route to the task harness help, not the perf-bench flags.
code := run([]string{"tasks", "--help"}, emptyEnv, &stdout, &stderr)
if code != 0 {
t.Fatalf("run tasks --help code = %d stderr = %q", code, stderr.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "zero-perf-bench tasks") {
t.Fatalf("tasks help missing usage:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
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{
"id": "terminal-bench-sample",
"name": "Terminal-Bench (sample)",
"tasks": [
{
"id": "hello-fix",
"name": "make the failing test pass",
"prompt": "The test in ./hello fails. Fix the implementation so `go test ./...` passes.",
"workspaceFixture": "./hello",
"verificationCommand": ["go", "test", "./..."]
},
{
"id": "add-json-flag",
"name": "add a --json flag",
"prompt": "Add a --json flag to the CLI that prints the result as JSON, and a test for it.",
"workspaceFixture": "./cli",
"verificationCommand": ["go", "test", "./..."]
}
]
}
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//go:build linux
// Command zero-seccomp is retained as a compatibility wrapper for existing Linux
// installs and scripts. The main sandbox path now applies the same optional
// Unix-socket filter inside zero-linux-sandbox when sandbox.blockUnixSockets is
// enabled.
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"syscall"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
if len(os.Args) < 2 {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "usage: zero-seccomp <command> [args...]")
os.Exit(2)
}
if err := sandbox.ApplyUnixSocketBlock(); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "zero-seccomp: warning: "+err.Error()+"; running without the Unix-socket filter")
}
binary, err := exec.LookPath(os.Args[1])
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "zero-seccomp: "+err.Error())
os.Exit(127)
}
if err := syscall.Exec(binary, os.Args[1:], os.Environ()); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "zero-seccomp: exec failed: "+err.Error())
os.Exit(126)
}
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
//go:build !linux
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
)
func main() {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "zero-seccomp is only supported on Linux")
os.Exit(2)
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
os.Exit(sandbox.RunWindowsSandboxCommandRunner(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr))
}
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package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func main() {
os.Exit(sandbox.RunWindowsSandboxSetup(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr))
}
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# Offline Agent Evals
Zero agent evals are maintainer fixtures for checking coding-agent behavior
without calling a live model. They describe a task, the files the agent is
expected to change, the commands that should verify the result, and the scoring
rules an offline harness can apply to a captured run.
These fixtures are intentionally local-first. They do not prove provider quality
or live model execution by themselves; they give tests and CLI workflows a
stable sample suite to validate, run against copied workspaces, and score from
saved outputs. The eval harness is local and offline-testable. It only makes
live model calls when the supplied agent command does.
## Suite Format
Sample suites live under `internal/agenteval/testdata/`. Tiny fixture
workspaces live under `internal/agenteval/testdata/fixtures/`.
Each suite JSON file contains:
- `id`: stable suite identifier for filters and reports.
- `name` and `description`: maintainer-facing suite metadata.
- `tasks`: coding-agent tasks with prompts, file expectations, verification
commands, and offline scoring inputs.
Task fields used by the sample suite:
- `id`: stable task identifier for filters and reports.
- `name` and `description`: short task metadata.
- `tags`: stable category labels such as `docs`, `go`, or `wrapper`.
- `difficulty`: a coarse task size such as `easy`, `medium`, or `hard`.
- `prompt`: the user request to give an agent.
- `workspaceFixture`: the fixture workspace to copy before running the task.
- `expectedChangedFiles`: files that should change for a complete solution.
- `forbiddenChangedFiles`: files that must not change during the task.
- `requiredTraceEvents`: JSONL agent events that must appear in benchmark
stdout.
- `contextChecks`: required and forbidden files checked in the materialized
workspace before verification commands run.
- `verificationCommands`: commands a maintainer or harness can run after the
agent output is applied.
The scoring contract matches command results by `verificationCommands[].id`,
compares changed files against `expectedChangedFiles`, rejects any
`forbiddenChangedFiles`, checks the materialized workspace with `contextChecks`,
and can require agent trace events during benchmark runs. The loader rejects
unknown JSON fields so suite changes fail fast.
Example richer task rubric:
```json
{
"tags": ["docs", "jsonl"],
"difficulty": "easy",
"forbiddenChangedFiles": ["go.mod", "package.json"],
"requiredTraceEvents": ["tool:read_file", "verify:go-test"],
"contextChecks": {
"requiredFiles": ["docs/STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md"],
"forbiddenFiles": ["node_modules/cache.txt"]
}
}
```
## Modes
### Validate Mode
`zero eval` defaults to `validate` mode. In validate mode, the command performs
schema and contract checks only: it parses the suite, rejects invalid task
definitions, and reports the number of tasks and checks. It does not copy
fixtures, invoke an agent, score a workspace, or execute verification commands.
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval --suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json
```
Use JSON output when another local tool needs the validation summary:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval --suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json --json
```
### Run Mode
`zero eval run` scores one already-mutated Git workspace. It does not copy
fixtures or invoke an agent; point it at a Git worktree where a fixture has
already been copied, initialized, and attempted by an agent or deterministic
local script. The runner executes each `verificationCommands` entry, collects
changed files with `git status --porcelain`, and emits the task-success report
contract below. `--workspace` is required: it must point at the prepared fixture
worktree, never the current directory, so the suite's verification commands
(`go test`, `git`, ...) don't run against your real repo.
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval run \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--workspace /tmp/zero-eval-workspace
```
Persist the report for comparison between prompt or model changes:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval run \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--workspace /tmp/zero-eval-workspace \
--report-dir /tmp/zero-eval-report \
--json
```
### Bench Mode
`zero eval bench` runs the full benchmark harness for one task or a suite. Bench
mode copies each task fixture into `--work-root`, initializes a clean Git
baseline, runs the supplied `--agent-command` in that workspace, then scores the
result with the same scorer used by run mode.
Agent commands are passed as argv, without shell interpolation. The harness
expands these placeholders in each argument:
- `{workspace}`: copied task workspace path.
- `{prompt}`: task prompt from the suite.
- `{task_id}`: selected task ID.
- `{model}`: current model ID for model-matrix benchmark runs.
Use `--model <id>` more than once, or `--models a,b,c`, to run the same task
matrix across several models. When no model is supplied, the harness preserves
the previous single-run behavior and `{model}` expands to an empty string.
Example using a real local agent command:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--agent-command zero exec --cwd {workspace} {prompt}
```
Example with model selection:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--model gpt-5 \
--agent-command zero exec --model {model} --cwd {workspace} {prompt}
```
Include `{task_id}` when the agent wrapper needs stable per-task logging,
branching, or fixture-specific behavior:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--agent-command zero-agent-wrapper --task {task_id} --workspace {workspace} --prompt {prompt}
```
The same wrapper can emit JSONL trace events to stdout for future trace scoring:
```json
{"type":"tool","name":"read_file"}
{"event":"verify","name":"go-test"}
```
Those events are required by adding keys such as `tool:read_file` and
`verify:go-test` to `requiredTraceEvents`.
For deterministic offline testing, point `--agent-command` at a local script
that edits the copied workspace without calling a model:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--agent-command ./scripts/fake-agent --workspace {workspace} --task {task_id} --prompt {prompt}
```
Bound a benchmark run with `--timeout` (a Go duration) so a wedged or
interactive agent cannot block the harness forever. The timeout applies per
task and cancels materialization, the agent process, and scoring:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task document-stream-json-verify-events \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--timeout 5m \
--agent-command ./scripts/fake-agent --workspace {workspace} --prompt {prompt}
```
Use `--report-dir` to persist the CLI report artifact. The file is always named
`agent-eval-report.json`; with bench mode it records the suite status, task
counts, pass/fail totals, failures, and the nested benchmark report with each
task/model run. Use `--keep-workspaces` when you also need to inspect the
materialized workspaces after the run:
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero eval bench \
--suite internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json \
--task add-npm-wrapper-argv-helper \
--work-root /tmp/zero-evals \
--keep-workspaces \
--report-dir /tmp/zero-eval-report \
--json \
--agent-command ./scripts/fake-agent --workspace {workspace} --task {task_id} --prompt {prompt}
```
**Scoring caveat:** changed-file scoring inspects the workspace with
`git status --porcelain` against the baseline commit. An agent that *commits*
its own changes (or otherwise leaves a clean working tree) defeats this check —
the committed edits no longer appear as changed files, so `expectedChangedFiles`
will not match. Agents under bench should leave their edits uncommitted.
Run the package tests when changing the suite schema or scorer:
```bash
go test ./internal/agenteval
```
For a faster manual fixture check:
```bash
go test ./internal/verify ./internal/selfverify
```
Or parse the JSON directly with any strict JSON parser. For example:
```bash
python -m json.tool internal/agenteval/testdata/sample_suite.json
```
The `internal/agenteval` tests load every JSON file under
`internal/agenteval/testdata/` and reject missing task IDs, empty verification
commands, and malformed changed-file expectations.
## Report JSON
Scored reports use contract `zero.agenteval.report.v1`.
- `suiteId` and `taskId`: identify the suite and selected task.
- `status`: overall `pass`, `fail`, `blocked`, or `error`.
- `ok`: true only when every result passes.
- `summary`: total result counts by status.
- `changedFiles`: normalized files collected from the workspace.
- `results`: one result per verification command, plus configured
`changed_files`, `forbidden_changed_files`, `context_checks`, and
`trace_events` checks.
- `error`: task-selection or report-level error, when present.
Command results include the command ID, display name, command argv, status,
exit code, stdout, stderr, and an optional message. File-based results include
expected, actual, missing, and unexpected files. Trace results include expected,
actual, and missing event keys.
## Score Interpretation
Scores are offline quality signals, not pass/fail release gates by default. The
statuses below are produced when a harness supplies captured command results and
changed files.
- `pass`: every verification command exited successfully, changed files matched
`expectedChangedFiles`, forbidden files stayed untouched, configured context
checks passed, and required trace events were present.
- `fail`: at least one command failed, changed files were missing or
unexpected, a forbidden file changed, a context file check failed, or a
required trace event was missing.
- `blocked`: the harness could not run the task or collect the expected inputs.
- `error`: the suite, task ID, command ID, or captured input could not be
interpreted.
Real task-success measurement comes from the combination of prompt, fixture,
verification commands, and changed-file expectations. Prefer comparing results
between runs of the same suite revision. Do not compare results across suites
unless the task mix and scoring contract are unchanged.
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# Zero Task Benchmark
This is the **task** benchmark: how often ZERO completes a real coding task
end-to-end, headless, unattended. It is separate from
[`docs/PERFORMANCE.md`](PERFORMANCE.md), which measures process startup and
memory, not task success.
The methodology is the point, not the digit. A task-success score is **largely
model-bounded** — most of the number comes from whichever model you bring. So we
record the model with every result and we publish the score **with and without
the self-correct loop**, because the delta between those two runs is the part
ZERO actually contributes: the agent noticing its own broken edit and fixing it
before it hands the task back.
## What is recorded
Every run produces a self-describing JSON record so a published number is
reproducible and auditable from the record alone:
| Field | Meaning |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `suite` | Task set id (which tasks produced the number) |
| `model` | The model that ran — the score is model-bounded, so this is required |
| `mode` | Exec mode preset, if any |
| `selfCorrect` | Whether the post-edit verify-and-correct loop was enabled |
| `version` | ZERO version |
| `commit` | ZERO commit the run was built from |
| `date` | UTC timestamp of the run |
| `tasksAttempted` | Tasks attempted |
| `tasksPassed` | Tasks whose verification passed |
| `passRate` | `tasksPassed / tasksAttempted` |
| `tasks` | Per-task pass/fail/error with detail |
## Integration point: headless `zero exec`
The harness drives ZERO through its headless surface — the same path CI uses:
```bash
zero exec --output-format stream-json --model <model> [--self-correct] "<task prompt>"
```
Per task, the harness reads the terminal `run_end` event's exit code from the
stream-json output to decide pass/fail. When a task carries a
`verificationCommand` (e.g. `go test ./...`), that command's exit status is
authoritative — mirroring Terminal-Bench's external-verifier model: the task is
"passed" only when the project's own checks pass after the agent finishes.
## Task set format
A task set is a JSON manifest. A runnable sample lives at
[`cmd/zero-perf-bench/testdata/terminal-bench-sample.json`](../cmd/zero-perf-bench/testdata/terminal-bench-sample.json):
```json
{
"id": "terminal-bench-sample",
"name": "Terminal-Bench (sample)",
"tasks": [
{
"id": "hello-fix",
"name": "make the failing test pass",
"prompt": "The test in ./hello fails. Fix the implementation so `go test ./...` passes.",
"workspaceFixture": "./hello",
"verificationCommand": ["go", "test", "./..."]
}
]
}
```
## The exact command
Build the binary, then run the task harness **twice** against the same task set
and the same model — once without self-correct, once with — and stamp the version
and commit so the records are reproducible:
```bash
# build the production binary
go run ./cmd/zero-release build
VERSION=$(git describe --tags --always)
COMMIT=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)
SUITE=cmd/zero-perf-bench/testdata/terminal-bench-sample.json
MODEL=<your-model>
# baseline: self-correct OFF
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench tasks \
--suite "$SUITE" --binary ./zero --model "$MODEL" \
--version "$VERSION" --commit "$COMMIT" \
--output dist/bench/tasks-baseline.json
# self-correct ON (auto-fix needs --auto medium or high; see note below)
go run ./cmd/zero-perf-bench tasks \
--suite "$SUITE" --binary ./zero --model "$MODEL" --self-correct \
--version "$VERSION" --commit "$COMMIT" \
--output dist/bench/tasks-selfcorrect.json
```
`--version`/`--commit` also read from `ZERO_BENCH_VERSION` / `ZERO_BENCH_COMMIT`
when the flags are omitted, so CI can stamp them once in the environment.
Use `--dry-run` to exercise the record path without invoking a model (every task
is recorded as skipped) — useful for validating a task set before a real run.
> **Self-correct and autonomy.** `--self-correct` runs the verify-and-correct
> loop after each mutating edit. Whether a detected failure is **auto-fixed** or
> only **reported** is gated by the run's autonomy: pass `--auto medium` (or
> `high`) for the loop to drive corrective rounds. At the default low autonomy it
> reports failures without auto-fixing, so the with/without delta is measured at
> `--auto medium` or higher.
## Published result
Fill in after a clean run on a fixed machine. Keep both records; the delta is the
headline.
| Run | Model | Self-correct | Pass rate | Commit |
| ----------------------- | --------- | ------------ | --------- | ------ |
| Baseline | _TBD_ | off | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
| With self-correct | _TBD_ | on | _TBD_ | _TBD_ |
| **Self-correct delta** | | | **_TBD_** | |
Report the model alongside the number every time. A score without its model is
not a claim about ZERO — it is a claim about the model. The honest signal is the
delta: how much the self-correct loop moved the same model on the same tasks.
## Reproducing a published number
1. Check out the `commit` from the record.
2. `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
3. Run the two commands above with the recorded `model` and `suite`.
4. Compare `passRate` in the new records against the published ones.
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# ZERO GitHub Action
Run ZERO headlessly inside a GitHub workflow. The action is a thin wrapper around
`zero exec`: it installs a pinned ZERO release, runs your prompt in the checked-out
repository, surfaces ZERO's exit code as the step status, captures the output as a
file, and can optionally post a summary to the triggering pull request or to Slack.
ZERO is model- and provider-agnostic, and so is this action: **you** choose the
provider and supply the API key. Nothing is hardcoded to any single provider.
## Quick start
```yaml
# .github/workflows/zero.yml
name: ZERO
on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
task:
description: What should ZERO do?
required: true
permissions:
contents: write
jobs:
run:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: ${{ inputs.task }}
provider: openai
api-key-env: OPENAI_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
model: gpt-4.1
```
> The `provider`, `api-key-env`, and `api-key` trio is how you stay
> provider-neutral: `api-key-env` is the environment variable name the chosen
> provider reads its key from (for example `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`,
> `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`), and `api-key` is the secret value. The action exports
> that variable only for the ZERO step and never prints it. If your repository
> already commits a `.zero/config.json` with an active provider, you can omit
> `provider`.
## Inputs
| Input | Required | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `prompt` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | The instruction for ZERO to execute. |
| `prompt-file` | one of `prompt`/`prompt-file` | `""` | Path (relative to `working-directory`) to a file whose contents are the prompt. |
| `provider` | no | `""` | Provider id to activate (e.g. `openai`, `anthropic`, `gemini`, `ollama`, or any compatible endpoint). |
| `api-key` | no | `""` | The provider API key. Pass from a secret; exported only for the ZERO step and never logged. |
| `api-key-env` | no | `""` | Env var name the provider reads its key from (e.g. `OPENAI_API_KEY`). Exported only for the ZERO step when used with `api-key`. |
| `model` | no | `""` | Model id. Defaults to the resolved provider's default. |
| `mode` | no | `""` | Run mode (`zero exec --mode`), e.g. `smart`, `deep`, `fast`. |
| `auto` | no | `low` | Autonomy ceiling (`zero exec --auto`): `low`, `medium`, or `high`. Conservative by default. |
| `self-correct` | no | `false` | Allow mid-run model escalation (`zero exec --allow-escalation`). |
| `add-dir` | no | `""` | Newline-/comma-separated extra write roots (`zero exec --add-dir`). |
| `worktree` | no | `false` | Run in an isolated git worktree (`zero exec --worktree`). |
| `output-format` | no | `stream-json` | `text`, `json`, or `stream-json`. Captured to a file. |
| `post-to` | no | `none` | `pr-comment`, `slack`, or `none`. Where to post a summary after the run. |
| `slack-webhook-url` | no | `""` | Slack incoming-webhook (or generic webhook) URL for `post-to: slack`. Pass from a secret. |
| `github-token` | no | `${{ github.token }}` | Token used to post a PR comment. Requires `pull-requests: write`. |
| `working-directory` | no | `${{ github.workspace }}` | Directory to run ZERO in. |
| `zero-version` | no | (action ref → `latest`) | ZERO release version/tag to install, e.g. `v1.2.3` or `latest`. |
| `zero-repo` | no | `Gitlawb/zero` | Repository to install the ZERO release from. |
## Outputs
| Output | Description |
| --- | --- |
| `exit-code` | ZERO's exit code (`0` success, `2` usage, `3` provider, non-zero otherwise). |
| `output-file` | Path to the captured ZERO stdout (the raw `output-format` stream). |
| `summary` | A short, single-line summary parsed from the run, when available. |
The step **fails when ZERO returns a non-zero exit code**, so a failed run fails
the job by default. Use `continue-on-error: true` on the step (and read
`exit-code`) if you want to handle failures yourself.
## Examples
### Run ZERO on every issue labeled `zero`
```yaml
name: ZERO issue triage
on:
issues:
types: [labeled]
permissions:
contents: write
issues: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
triage:
if: github.event.label.name == 'zero'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
with:
prompt: |
Investigate this issue and propose a fix.
Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
${{ github.event.issue.body }}
provider: anthropic
api-key-env: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
auto: low
post-to: slack
slack-webhook-url: ${{ secrets.ZERO_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL }}
```
### Nightly dependency-upgrade PR
```yaml
name: ZERO nightly deps
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Mondays 06:00 UTC
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
jobs:
deps:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: Gitlawb/zero@v1
id: zero
with:
prompt-file: .github/zero/upgrade-deps.md
provider: openai
api-key-env: OPENAI_API_KEY
api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
worktree: true
auto: medium
- name: Open pull request
run: |
git checkout -b zero/deps-$(date +%Y%m%d)
git commit -am "chore(deps): nightly upgrade via ZERO" || exit 0
git push -u origin HEAD
gh pr create --fill --label dependencies
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Upload ZERO output
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: zero-output
path: ${{ steps.zero.outputs.output-file }}
if-no-files-found: warn
```
## Security notes
- **Secrets are passed as Action secrets and never logged.** The action exports
`api-key` (under `api-key-env`) only for the ZERO step. `slack-webhook-url`
is passed only to the Slack post step. They are never echoed or persisted to
later workflow steps, and ZERO redacts secret-shaped strings from its own
output.
- **The sandbox is always active.** This action never passes
`--skip-permissions-unsafe`, so writes stay inside the checked-out repository
(plus any roots you grant with `add-dir`). Unsafe mode is never enabled
implicitly.
- **Autonomy defaults to `low`.** Raise it deliberately (`auto: medium`/`high`)
only for tasks you trust to run unattended.
- **Least-privilege tokens.** Grant only the permissions the workflow needs
(`contents: write` to edit files, `pull-requests: write` to comment). The
default `GITHUB_TOKEN` is scoped to the repository.
- **Pin the action.** Reference a tag (`Gitlawb/zero@v1`) or a commit SHA so a
workflow run uses a known ZERO version. `zero-version` lets you pin the
installed binary independently of the action ref.
- **Linux and macOS runners** are supported; Windows runners are rejected with a
clear error.
## Slack / webhook notifier
The action's `post-to: slack` step sends a one-line summary to a Slack incoming
webhook after the run. ZERO also has a built-in webhook notifier sink
(`internal/notify`) that an unattended run can use to report
"finished / needs input / verify failed after N retries" to Slack or any generic
webhook:
- Configure the destination with the `ZERO_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` environment variable
(or settings). A blank URL disables the sink.
- The sink POSTs a JSON body `{ "text", "type", "message", "summary?", "links?" }`.
The `text` field is what Slack renders; the structured fields carry the
machine-readable detail.
- **Fail-soft:** a non-2xx response or a transport error is logged (redacted) and
swallowed — a webhook problem never crashes the run.
- **Redaction:** the message, summary, links, and the webhook URL itself are run
through ZERO's redaction before being sent or logged, so tokens never leak.
- **Egress/proxy:** the notifier uses the default HTTP transport, which honors
`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` when a proxy is configured.
+148 -31
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@@ -1,27 +1,81 @@
# Zero Install Scripts
# Installing Zero
Zero release archives are published as:
Zero is distributed as:
- `zero-v<version>-linux-<arch>.tar.gz`
- `zero-v<version>-macos-<arch>.tar.gz`
- `zero-v<version>-windows-<arch>.zip`
- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
- release archives on GitHub Releases
- source builds with Go 1.25+
Each archive must have a matching `.sha256` file. The install scripts download both files and verify the checksum before copying the binary.
The npm package and install scripts download a platform-specific release archive.
They require a published GitHub Release for the requested version.
Maintainers can verify the release directory before upload:
## npm
```bash
go run ./cmd/zero-release package
go run ./cmd/zero-release verify
npm install -g @gitlawb/zero
zero
```
`verify:release` requires every archive in `dist/release` to have a same-directory `.sha256` file whose contents are:
The package supports Linux, macOS, and Windows on x64 and arm64. It installs the
`zero` command and downloads the matching release binary during `postinstall`.
```text
<sha256> <archive-name>
Requirements:
- Node.js 18+
- network access to npm and GitHub Releases
## Bun
Bun is "default-secure" and does not run lifecycle scripts of installed
dependencies (only the installing project's own scripts), so the `postinstall`
that fetches the Zero binary is silently skipped. The first run then fails with
`No native binary found next to the npm wrapper`.
The simplest fix is to trust the package after installing, which runs the
blocked postinstall. This works for project and global installs:
```bash
# project install
bun add @gitlawb/zero
bun pm trust @gitlawb/zero
# global install
bun add -g @gitlawb/zero
bun pm -g trust @gitlawb/zero
```
## Linux And macOS
`bun pm untrusted` (or `bun pm -g untrusted`) lists the blocked postinstalls if
you want to inspect before trusting.
Alternatively, allow the postinstall to run at install time by adding the
package to your project's `trustedDependencies` before installing:
```json
{
"trustedDependencies": ["@gitlawb/zero"]
}
```
```bash
bun add @gitlawb/zero
```
On Bun versions that do not have `bun pm trust`, run the installer manually
after installing:
```bash
node node_modules/@gitlawb/zero/scripts/postinstall.mjs
```
Reference: <https://bun.sh/docs/pm/lifecycle>
## Linux And macOS Script
Install the latest release:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
From a checkout:
@@ -33,18 +87,14 @@ Install a specific version:
```bash
ZERO_VERSION=0.1.0 scripts/install.sh
scripts/install.sh --version 0.1.0
```
Install to a custom directory:
Install somewhere else:
```bash
ZERO_INSTALL_DIR="$HOME/bin" scripts/install.sh
```
Install from a fork or internal repository:
```bash
scripts/install.sh --repo owner/repo
scripts/install.sh --install-dir "$HOME/bin"
```
Defaults:
@@ -53,9 +103,15 @@ Defaults:
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `~/.local/bin/zero`
Requirements: `curl` or `wget`, `tar`, and `shasum` or `sha256sum`.
Requirements: Bash, `curl` or `wget`, `tar`, and `shasum` or `sha256sum`.
## Windows
## Windows PowerShell Script
Install the latest release:
```powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex
```
From a checkout:
@@ -69,30 +125,91 @@ Install a specific version:
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -Version 0.1.0
```
Install to a custom directory:
Install somewhere else:
```powershell
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -InstallDir "$env:USERPROFILE\bin"
```
Install from a fork or internal repository:
```powershell
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1 -Repository owner/repo
```
Defaults:
- Repository: `Gitlawb/zero`
- Version: latest GitHub release
- Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
## From Source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git
cd zero
go run ./cmd/zero
```
Build a local binary:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
```
Source builds require Go 1.25+.
### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
Release archives include the platform sandbox helpers. If you build directly
from source, build the helpers you need:
Linux:
```bash
go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero-linux-sandbox ./cmd/zero-linux-sandbox
go build -o zero-seccomp ./cmd/zero-seccomp
```
Put `zero` and `zero-linux-sandbox` in the same directory on `PATH`, for example
`~/.local/bin`. `zero-seccomp` is kept as a compatibility wrapper; the sandbox
helper applies the Unix-socket filter itself when that sandbox option is enabled.
Linux native sandboxing also requires Bubblewrap to be installed.
macOS uses the system sandbox and does not need an extra helper binary.
Windows source builds can use the main `zero.exe` as the command runner and setup
helper through Zero's built-in self-dispatch path. If you want a release-style
layout anyway, build the standalone helper executables next to `zero.exe`:
```powershell
go build -o zero.exe ./cmd/zero
go build -o zero-windows-command-runner.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-command-runner
go build -o zero-windows-sandbox-setup.exe ./cmd/zero-windows-sandbox-setup
```
## Release Archive Format
Release archives are named:
- `zero-v<version>-linux-<arch>.tar.gz`
- `zero-v<version>-macos-<arch>.tar.gz`
- `zero-v<version>-windows-<arch>.zip`
Supported targets:
- `linux-x64`
- `linux-arm64`
- `macos-x64`
- `macos-arm64`
- `windows-x64`
- `windows-arm64`
Each archive must have a matching `.sha256` file. The install scripts download
both files, verify the checksum, and then copy the binary into the install
directory.
## Updating
Check whether a newer release exists:
Check for a newer release:
```bash
zero update --check
```
For M2, updates are check-only. Re-run the installer to replace the local binary after reviewing the release.
Then reinstall with npm or rerun the install script for the version you want.
-87
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@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# M1 Headless Exec PRD
Status: Draft
Owner: Vasanth
Milestone: M1
Scope: `zero exec` CLI surface
## Goal
Ship the first production-shaped headless command for Zero:
```sh
zero exec "inspect this repo and summarize the next fix"
```
This command should be useful for local scripts, CI smoke runs, and later VS Code integration without pulling in the full future protocol, session, MCP, sandbox, or plugin roadmap.
## Non-Goals
- No daemon mode.
- No JSON-RPC input protocol.
- No MCP, plugin, marketplace, or subagent support.
- No session resume/fork/search.
- No new provider adapters in this slice.
- No architecture rewrite of the agent loop.
## User Stories
1. As a CLI user, I can run one prompt headlessly and receive the assistant answer on stdout.
2. As a script author, I can choose `text` or JSONL output.
3. As a reviewer, I can see tool activity without corrupting text stdout.
4. As a model tester, I can override the configured model for one run.
5. As a cautious user, prompt-gated tools stay disabled unless I pass an explicit unsafe flag.
## CLI Contract
```sh
zero exec [prompt...] [options]
```
Options for M1:
- `-f, --file <path>`: read the prompt from a file.
- `-m, --model <model>`: override the configured model for this run.
- `-C, --cwd <path>`: run from another working directory.
- `-o, --output-format <text|json>`: choose stdout format.
- `--skip-permissions-unsafe`: grant prompt-gated tools for this run.
The existing `zero -p "prompt"` shortcut remains as a compatibility path and should call the same runner.
## Output Contract
Text mode:
- stdout contains assistant text only.
- stderr contains tool rows, warnings, and errors.
JSON mode:
- stdout is newline-delimited JSON events.
- Required event types for this slice: `run_start`, `text`, `tool_call`, `tool_result`, `final`, `warning`, `error`, `done`.
## Exit Codes
- `0`: success
- `1`: unexpected crash
- `2`: usage error
- `3`: provider/config/runtime error
- `4`: reserved for future tool failure policy
- `5`: reserved for future permission-denied policy
## Permission Behavior
Default headless mode advertises only tools marked `permission: "allow"`.
`--skip-permissions-unsafe` advertises tools that are not marked `deny` and grants prompt-gated tools through `ToolRegistry.run`. It must not bypass schema validation or direct tool execution safeguards.
## Acceptance Criteria
- `go test ./...` passes.
- `go run ./cmd/zero-release build` passes.
- `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke` passes.
- `zero exec --help` documents the M1 flags.
- Usage errors do not initialize providers.
- Provider failures return exit code `3`.
- Normal mode does not advertise `bash`, `write_file`, `edit_file`, or `apply_patch`.
- Unsafe mode still uses the registry execution path.
+7 -1
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@@ -23,7 +23,13 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke
## Checklist
- `package.json` has the expected package name, version, and `bin.zero` entry.
- `package.json` has the expected package name (`@gitlawb/zero`), version,
`bin.zero` entry, and exactly one `scripts` entry — the `postinstall` hook.
- `scripts/postinstall.mjs` resolves the correct release asset name/URL per
platform (`ZERO_INSTALL_DRY_RUN=1` prints the plan), verifies the downloaded
archive's SHA-256, and extracts only the known binary basenames into place.
`ZERO_SKIP_DOWNLOAD=1` opts out cleanly (exit 0) and an unsupported
platform/arch is a non-fatal skip.
- The wrapper binary resolves through the package `bin` entry and
`node_modules/.bin` in a package-install smoke test.
- The built binary exits 0 for `zero --version` or `zero --help`.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Zero Performance Benchmarks
The M2 performance harness tracks three release-facing signals:
The performance harness tracks three release-facing signals:
- Cold start: process startup time for `zero --version`.
- Binary first output: time from spawning the built `zero --version` command to
-602
View File
@@ -1,602 +0,0 @@
# Zero — Product Requirements Document (v1.0)
**Status:** DRAFT v1.0
**Target:** Compete with Claude Code + Cursor + OpenCode
**Timeline:** 6-12 months
**Stack:** Go native core + npm distribution wrapper
---
## 1. Vision
**Zero is a terminal-first, editor-aware, multi-provider AI coding platform.**
It combines the best of:
- **Claude Code** — terminal-native agentic coding
- **Cursor** — IDE integration + smart editing
- **OpenCode** — multi-provider + headless
**One Go-native agent core. Three surfaces. Zero lock-in.**
---
## 2. Core Surfaces
### 2.1 Terminal (TUI) — Primary
- Interactive coding agent in terminal
- Streaming, append-style (like Claude Code)
- Bubble Tea + Lip Gloss-based
- Full keyboard control
- Mouse support
### 2.2 Editor (VS Code Extension)
- Same agent core, different UI
- Inline suggestions + chat panel
- File editing with diff view
- Diagnostics integration
- LSP-aware
### 2.3 Headless (CLI/CI)
- `zero exec "prompt"` for scripts
- `zero serve` for daemon mode
- JSON-RPC over stdio/WebSocket
- MCP server support
---
## 3. Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ZERO PLATFORM │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ TUI │ │ VSCode │ │ Headless │ │
│ │ Surface │ │ Surface │ │ Surface │ │
│ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────┼─────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────▼──────┐ │
│ │ Agent Core │ │
│ │ (ReAct) │ │
│ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────┬──────┬────┴────┬──────┬──────┐ │
│ │Tools │Perms │Sessions │Provi │Memory│ │
│ └──────┴──────┴─────────┴──────┴──────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
**Layering Rules:**
- Agent Core never imports a surface
- Surfaces are thin shells (I/O + rendering)
- All state persists to local files
- No cloud dependency
---
## 4. Functional Requirements (24 Features)
### F1 — Agent Core (P0)
- ReAct loop: think → tool → result → think
- Stream text + tool calls + thinking
- Parallel tool execution where safe
- Bound turns (max 100)
- Clean interrupt (Esc/Ctrl-C)
- Event stream: `text | tool_call | tool_result | thinking | usage | plan_update | error | turn_end`
### F2 — Tools (P0)
**Core (8):**
- `read_file` — read with line ranges, images
- `write_file` — create/overwrite
- `edit_file` — exact-string edit (uniqueness guard)
- `bash` — run shell command
- `grep` — ripgrep content search
- `glob` — file pattern matching
- `apply_patch` — multi-hunk patches
- `update_plan` — todo list
**Advanced (4):**
- `web_fetch` / `web_search` — web access
- `task` — spawn subagent
- `structured_output` — JSON-Schema validated
- `notebook_edit` — Jupyter notebooks
**Tool Requirements:**
- Go typed parameter schemas -> JSON Schema
- Side-effect class: `read | write | shell | network | out_of_workspace`
- Structured results: `{ status, output, truncated?, meta? }`
- Atomic execution
- Permission gating
### F3 — Providers & Model Registry (P0)
- OpenAI-compatible (works with OpenAI, OpenRouter, Ollama, etc.)
- Anthropic (Claude)
- Google Gemini
- Azure OpenAI
- AWS Bedrock
- xAI (Grok)
**Model Registry:**
```go
type ModelEntry struct {
ID string
Name string
Provider string
APIProviders []string
ContextLimits ContextLimits
ReasoningEffort ReasoningEffort
Capabilities ModelCapabilities
Cost ModelCost
Tier string
MatchPatterns []string
}
```
- Per-task model selection (`-m`)
- Provider rotation/failover
- Cost tracking
- "Spec model" for planning
- Fallback model on failure
### F4 — Terminal UI (P0)
- **Layout:** header (cwd · git · model) → tool rows → diff → response → input → footer
- **Streaming:** append-only transcript model with live tail updates
- **Markdown:** full CommonMark + syntax highlighting
- **Tool rows:** collapsible with one-line summaries
- **Input:** `/` commands, `@` files, `!` bash, `Esc` interrupt
- **Robustness:** resize, wide-char, ANSI, non-TTY fallback
- **Splash:** ZERO wordmark
- **Themes:** light/dark + custom
### F5 — Sessions (P0)
- Persist to `~/.local/share/zero/sessions/<id>/`
- `meta.json` + `events.jsonl` + `messages.jsonl` + `checkpoints/`
- `--resume [id]` (default: latest)
- `--fork <id>` (copy with lineage)
- Search: `zero search <query>` over messages/tools/results
- Atomic writes (write-temp-then-rename)
- Schema versioning
- Export to Markdown/JSON
### F6 — Configuration (P0)
- Layered: defaults → user → project → env → CLI
- `~/.config/zero/config.json` (user)
- `./.zero/config.json` (project)
- Runtime overlay (`--settings <path>`)
- Feature flags for staged rollout
- Validation on load
### F7 — MCP (Model Context Protocol) (P0)
- Connect to stdio/HTTP/SSE servers
- Surface MCP tools into registry
- `zero mcp add/remove/list`
- Per-server and per-tool permissions
- Persistent grants with revoke/clear
- MCP server mode (zero as MCP server)
### F8 — Headless / Programmatic (P0)
- `zero exec [prompt]` — one-shot
- `zero serve` — daemon mode
- `--input-format stream-json` — line-delimited events
- `--input-format stream-jsonrpc` — JSON-RPC protocol
- `-o text|json` output formats
- Exit codes: `0=success, 1=crash, 2=usage, 3=provider, 4=tool, 5=permission, 6=budget`
### F9 — Permissions & Autonomy (P0)
- **Side-effect classes:** read, write, shell, network, out_of_workspace
- **Autonomy levels:** low (ask), medium (smart), high (auto)
- `--skip-permissions-unsafe` (loud warning)
- TUI: inline prompts (allow/deny/always)
- Headless: default-deny unless granted
- Persistent grants with list/revoke/clear
- Audit log in `events.jsonl`
**Permission Matrix:**
| Tool Class | low | medium | high |
|------------|-----|--------|------|
| Read | allow | allow | allow |
| Workspace write | prompt | allow | allow |
| Shell | prompt | prompt | allow |
| Network | prompt | allow | allow |
| Out-of-workspace | deny | prompt | prompt |
### F10 — Observability (P0)
- Structured logging (stdout/stderr split)
- Secret redaction (API keys, tokens, passwords)
- No vendor telemetry (local only)
- `zero doctor` — health check command
- Crash reports (opt-in, local)
- Performance metrics (TTFT, tokens/sec)
### F11 — Subagents (P1)
- `task` tool spawns scoped subagent
- Built-in agents: code-review, security-review, refactor, test-gen
- Recursion depth limit
- Parent session linkage
- Shared/isolated budgets
### F12 — Plugins (P1)
- User/project-scoped plugins
- Commands, tools, prompts, hooks
- Plugin manifest: `plugin.json`
- `zero plugin install <path|url>`
- No marketplace in v1 (manual install)
### F13 — Distribution (P0)
- **Single binary** via Go cross-compilation
- npm package as a thin installer/launcher for the platform binary
- Cross-platform: Linux, macOS, Windows
- `zero update [--check]` self-update
- Checksum verification
- Rollback on failure
### F14 — VS Code Extension (P1)
- Same agent core via stream protocol
- Inline chat panel
- Diff view in editor
- Diagnostics integration
- LSP awareness
- File watching
### F15 — Memory & Context (P1)
- `AGENTS.md` hierarchical memory
- `@import` for modular rules
- Auto-generated from `init` command
- Project conventions learning
- Skills system (reusable instruction packs)
- Context budgeting (token tracking)
- Auto-compaction when full
### F16 — Hooks System (P1)
- Lifecycle hooks: `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, `SessionStart`, `SessionEnd`
- User-defined shell commands
- JSON output for conditional flow
- `.zero/hooks/` directory
### F17 — Slash Commands (P0)
**Built-in (20):**
- Session: `/clear`, `/compact`, `/context`, `/rewind`, `/resume`, `/exit`
- Model: `/model`, `/effort`, `/style`, `/permissions`
- Project: `/init`, `/memory`, `/skills`
- Extensibility: `/mcp`, `/hooks`, `/agents`
- Meta: `/help`, `/config`, `/doctor`, `/feedback`
**Custom:** `./.zero/commands/*.md`
### F18 — Git Integration (P1)
- Worktree isolation per task
- Auto-commit with messages
- Branch management
- PR creation
- Diff review
- Conflict resolution
### F19 — Testing & Verification (P1)
- `run_tests` tool
- Self-verification loop
- Test runner integration
- Coverage reporting
- Diagnostics (typecheck, lint)
- LSP integration
### F20 — Web Access (P1)
- `web_fetch` — fetch URL content
- `web_search` — search engine
- Provider/permission gated
- Rate limiting
- Caching
### F21 — Sandbox (P2)
- Linux: bubblewrap
- macOS: sandbox-exec
- Windows: AppContainer
- Filesystem policies
- Network policies
- Unix socket controls
### F22 — Multi-modal (P2)
- Image input (screenshots, diagrams)
- PDF parsing
- Voice input (optional)
- File attachments
- Paste support
### F23 — Telemetry (P2)
- Local-only metrics
- Token usage tracking
- Cost reports
- Performance profiling
- Crash reports (opt-in)
- NO vendor telemetry
### F24 — Advanced Features (P2)
- Code review automation
- Auto-refactor
- Dependency updates
- Security scanning
- Documentation generation
---
## 5. Data Models
### 5.1 Headless Event Stream
```json
{ "type": "run_start", "runId": "r1", "sessionId": "s1", "cwd": "/repo", "model": "..." }
{ "type": "text", "delta": "..." }
{ "type": "tool_call", "id": "t1", "name": "bash", "args": {...}, "sideEffect": "shell" }
{ "type": "permission", "id": "t1", "decision": "needs_approval", "reason": "shell" }
{ "type": "tool_result", "id": "t1", "status": "ok", "output": "...", "truncated": false }
{ "type": "usage", "promptTokens": 1234, "completionTokens": 567, "costUsd": 0.012 }
{ "type": "plan_update", "plan": [{ "id": "1", "content": "...", "status": "in_progress" }] }
{ "type": "turn_end", "stopReason": "end_turn" }
{ "type": "error", "code": "rate_limit", "message": "...", "recoverable": true }
{ "type": "run_end", "status": "success", "exitCode": 0 }
```
### 5.2 Session On Disk
```
~/.local/share/zero/sessions/<id>/
meta.json # { schemaVersion, id, parentId?, title, cwd, model, createdAt, updatedAt, tokens, cost }
events.jsonl # append-only AgentEvent stream
messages.jsonl # provider-facing messages
checkpoints/ # snapshots for restore/fork/compact
```
### 5.3 Tool Contract
```go
type Tool interface {
Name() string
Description() string
Parameters() JSONSchema
SideEffect() SideEffect
Execute(ctx ToolContext, args map[string]any) ToolResult
}
type ToolResult struct {
Status string
Output string
Truncated bool
Meta map[string]any
}
```
### 5.4 Config Schema
```json
{
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"providers": {
"anthropic": { "apiKey": "env:AN..._KEY" },
"openai": { "apiKey": "env:OP..._KEY" }
},
"permissions": {
"autonomy": "medium",
"grants": [{ "tool": "bash", "pattern": "git status", "decision": "allow" }]
},
"ui": { "theme": "dark", "syntaxHighlighting": true }
}
```
---
## 6. Non-Functional Requirements
### Performance
- TTFT < 500ms after provider's first byte
- No full-transcript repaint per token
- Cold start < 300ms (warm cache)
- Tool execution < 100ms overhead
- Session resume < 1s
### Reliability
- Crash-free TUI under resize, wide-char, non-TTY
- Clean interrupt (no half-written state)
- Atomic session writes
- Recovery from malformed JSONL
- Provider failover
### Security
- No mutation without permission decision (hard invariant)
- API keys never logged
- Secret redaction everywhere
- Headless stdout free of logs
- Workspace boundary by default
- Sandboxing for untrusted code
### Portability
- Linux, macOS, Windows
- Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
- x86_64, ARM64
- Single binary distribution
### Testability
- Mock provider for unit tests
- Fake MCP server/client
- Fake terminal/PTY
- Sandbox simulator
- Deterministic event replay
---
## 7. Milestones
### M0 — Foundation (Weeks 1-2)
- Go module setup
- Agent core skeleton
- 8 core tools (read, write, edit, bash, grep, glob, apply_patch, update_plan)
- OpenAI-compatible provider
- Basic Bubble Tea TUI
- Permission gate (read vs mutate)
- Session persistence
**Exit:** `zero` runs, can read/edit files, basic chat works.
### M1 — Multi-Provider (Weeks 3-4)
- Anthropic provider
- Gemini provider
- Model registry
- Per-task model selection
- Provider rotation
- Cost tracking
- Headless `exec` mode
**Exit:** Switch between Claude/GPT/Gemini, see cost, run headless.
### M2 — Polish (Weeks 5-8)
- Advanced TUI features
- Full markdown + syntax highlighting
- Tool result truncation/pagination
- Auto-compaction
- Context budgeting
- 20 slash commands
- Doctor command
- Search command
**Exit:** Production-ready TUI, smooth streaming, all commands work.
### M3 — Distribution (Weeks 9-10)
- Single binary build
- Self-update
- Cross-platform CI
- VS Code extension MVP
- Documentation site
**Exit:** `zero` ships as one binary, works on Win/Mac/Linux.
### M4 — Extensibility (Weeks 11-14)
- MCP client + permissions
- Hooks system
- Skills system
- Memory (AGENTS.md)
- Plugin loading
- Subagents (built-in: review, security)
**Exit:** Plugins work, MCP servers connect, memory persists.
### M5 — Advanced (Weeks 15-20)
- Web fetch/search
- Git worktrees
- Self-verification
- Diagnostics (LSP, typecheck)
- Testing integration
- Code review automation
**Exit:** Zero can review code, run tests, manage git.
### M6 — Sandbox & Security (Weeks 21-24)
- Linux sandbox (bubblewrap)
- macOS sandbox
- Windows AppContainer
- Network policies
- Filesystem policies
**Exit:** Untrusted code runs safely in sandbox.
### Beyond v1.0
- Multi-modal (images, PDFs)
- Voice input
- Cloud sync (optional)
- Team features
- Marketplace (if demand)
---
## 8. Risks & Mitigations
| # | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|------|------------|
| R1 | Scope creep | Stick to milestones, defer features |
| R2 | Provider API changes | Abstract via interface, test with mocks |
| R3 | TUI complexity | Use Bubble Tea/Lip Gloss, follow mature terminal agent UX patterns |
| R4 | Performance | Benchmark early, optimize streaming |
| R5 | Security vulnerabilities | Permission gate from day 1, security review |
| R6 | Cross-platform bugs | CI on Win/Mac/Linux from M0 |
| R7 | Breaking changes | Schema versioning, migration tools |
---
## 9. Success Metrics
### v1.0 (6 months)
- 5+ providers supported
- 12+ tools
- 100% test coverage on core
- < 300ms cold start
- Single binary < 50MB
- Works on Win/Mac/Linux
- 1000+ GitHub stars
- 50+ contributors
### v2.0 (12 months)
- VS Code extension published
- MCP server mode
- Plugin ecosystem (20+ plugins)
- 10K+ active users
- Compete with Claude Code on benchmarks
---
## 10. Out of Scope (v1.0)
- Cloud sync / hosted backend
- Relay / remote SSH execution
- Multi-agent mission mode
- Plugin marketplace
- Auto-generated wikis
- Git authorship notes
- Vendor telemetry
- Voice input
- Mobile support
---
## 11. Open Decisions
1. **TUI library:** Bubble Tea + Lip Gloss — **Decide: Go-native TUI** (single-binary friendly, mature terminal ecosystem)
2. **Storage:** JSONL files vs SQLite — **Decide: JSONL** (inspectable, simple)
3. **Package structure:** Single vs monorepo — **Decide: Single** until M4
4. **Provider abstraction:** Direct API vs wrapper — **Decide: Direct** (portability)
5. **Patch strategy:** apply_patch vs edit_file — **Decide: Both** (apply_patch for bulk, edit_file for small)
---
## 12. Team & Timeline
**Team (3 people):**
- You (lead + TUI + tools)
- Backend dev (providers + core)
- Designer (VS Code extension + docs)
**Timeline:**
- M0-M1: 4 weeks (foundation)
- M2-M3: 6 weeks (polish + distribution)
- M4-M5: 8 weeks (extensibility)
- M6: 4 weeks (sandbox)
- **Total v1.0: 6 months**
---
## 13. Why This Will Work
1. **Proven patterns** — Based on clean-room analysis of existing terminal coding-agent UX patterns
2. **Multi-provider** — Unique advantage vs Claude Code/Cursor
3. **Open source** — Community contributions
4. **Go** — Native binary, fast startup, strong concurrency, cross-platform CLI ergonomics
5. **npm distribution wrapper** — Keeps JavaScript ecosystem installation while the runtime stays native
6. **Clear milestones** — Ship early, iterate
---
**This is the real PRD. 13 sections, 24 features, 6 months to v1.0.**
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
# Zero Documentation
This directory contains public documentation for using, extending, and releasing
Zero.
## User Docs
- [Install](INSTALL.md)
- [Update flow](UPDATE.md)
- [OAuth logins and subscription-backed providers](oauth-subscriptions.md)
## Automation And Integrations
- [Stream-JSON protocol](STREAM_JSON_PROTOCOL.md)
- [GitHub Action](GITHUB_ACTION.md)
- [Specialists](SPECIALISTS.md)
## Maintainer Docs
- [npm wrapper smoke checklist](NPM_WRAPPER_SMOKE.md)
- [Benchmarks](BENCHMARK.md)
- [Performance benchmarks](PERFORMANCE.md)
- [Offline agent evals](AGENT_EVALS.md)
+25 -15
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@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ redacted before they are written to stdout.
## Version
Current schema version: `1`
Current schema version: `2`
Every input and output event must include:
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "..." }
```
Output events also include `runId`.
@@ -24,27 +24,37 @@ Output events also include `runId`.
`--file`.
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "message", "role": "user", "content": "Inspect this repo." }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "prompt", "content": "Return only blockers." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "message", "role": "user", "content": "Inspect this repo." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "prompt", "content": "Return only blockers." }
```
Zero combines accepted input event content in order, separated by blank lines.
Unknown fields are rejected so protocol clients catch drift early.
Schema version `2` renamed sandbox permission metadata from `violation` to
`block`. Clients should read the optional `block` object on permission and tool
events when present.
## Output Events
`zero exec --output-format stream-json` emits schema-versioned JSONL events.
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "run_start", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "sessionId": "zero_20260603100000_abc123", "cwd": "/repo", "provider": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1", "apiModel": "gpt-4.1" }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "text", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "delta": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "tool_call", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_1", "name": "read_file", "args": { "path": "README.md" }, "sideEffect": "read" }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "permission_request", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_2", "name": "write_file", "action": "prompt", "permission": "prompt", "permissionMode": "ask", "sideEffect": "write", "reason": "Creates or overwrites files." }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "permission_decision", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_2", "name": "write_file", "action": "allow", "permission": "prompt", "permissionGranted": true, "decisionReason": "approved in TUI" }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "tool_result", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_1", "status": "ok", "output": "...", "truncated": false }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "usage", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "promptTokens": 12, "completionTokens": 8, "totalTokens": 20 }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "final", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "text": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "run_end", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "status": "success", "exitCode": 0 }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "run_start", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "sessionId": "zero_20260603100000_abc123", "cwd": "/repo", "provider": "openai", "model": "gpt-4.1", "apiModel": "gpt-4.1" }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "text", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "delta": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "tool_call", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_1", "name": "read_file", "args": { "path": "README.md" }, "sideEffect": "read" }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "permission_request", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_2", "name": "write_file", "action": "prompt", "permission": "prompt", "permissionMode": "ask", "sideEffect": "write", "reason": "Creates or overwrites files." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "permission_decision", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_2", "name": "write_file", "action": "allow", "permission": "prompt", "permissionGranted": true, "decisionReason": "approved in TUI" }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "tool_result", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_1", "status": "ok", "output": "...", "truncated": false }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "usage", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "promptTokens": 12, "completionTokens": 8, "totalTokens": 20 }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "final", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "text": "..." }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "run_end", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "status": "success", "exitCode": 0 }
```
Permission events may include structured sandbox metadata:
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "permission_request", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "id": "call_3", "name": "bash", "action": "prompt", "permission": "prompt", "permissionMode": "ask", "sideEffect": "shell", "reason": "network access requires approval", "risk": { "level": "critical", "categories": ["network"] }, "block": { "code": "network", "toolName": "bash", "action": "prompt", "risk": { "level": "critical", "categories": ["network"] }, "reason": "network access requires approval", "recoverable": true } }
```
Errors are part of the protocol and are followed by `run_end`.
@@ -55,6 +65,6 @@ is not pre-approved, Zero may emit `permission_request` followed by a denied
allows, denies, or always-allows the request.
```json
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "error", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "code": "provider_error", "message": "...", "recoverable": false }
{ "schemaVersion": 1, "type": "run_end", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "status": "error", "exitCode": 3 }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "error", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "code": "provider_error", "message": "...", "recoverable": false }
{ "schemaVersion": 2, "type": "run_end", "runId": "run_20260603_abc123", "status": "error", "exitCode": 3 }
```
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@@ -1,38 +1,44 @@
# Zero Update Flow
# Update Flow
`zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release for `Gitlawb/zero` and compares it with the local CLI version.
`zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
local CLI version.
```bash
zero update --check
zero update --check --json
zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
zero update --check --endpoint https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest
zero update --check --timeout 3s
zero update --check --target windows-x64
```
For M2 this command is intentionally check-only:
The command is intentionally check-only:
- It does not replace the running binary.
- It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is available.
- It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
available.
- It exits with code `1` when the release check cannot be completed.
- `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and CI.
- `--repo <owner/repo>` checks a different GitHub repository when no endpoint is provided.
- `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` checks a specific release API URL or repository slug.
- `--timeout <duration>` overrides the default release check timeout.
- `--target <platform-arch>` validates release metadata for another supported target from the current machine.
- Release checks time out after 5 seconds by default.
- It validates that the latest release includes the expected archive and matching `.sha256` asset for the selected platform target.
- `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
CI.
Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`, `windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current platform.
Useful flags:
The release endpoint resolves in this order:
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
| `--timeout <duration>` | Override the default release check timeout. |
| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target. |
- `--endpoint` from the CLI, or `Options.Endpoint` when calling `update.Check` from code.
- `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL` from the environment.
- `--repo` from the CLI, or `Options.Repository` when calling `update.Check` from code.
- `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`.
Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`,
`windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current
platform.
`--endpoint`, `Options.Endpoint`, and `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL` may be a full URL or an `owner/repo` slug.
Endpoint resolution order:
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, use this command before re-running the installer.
1. `--endpoint`
2. `ZERO_UPDATE_RELEASE_URL`
3. `--repo`
4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`
Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
before reinstalling.
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# Zero WorkSplit PRD v3: Go-Native Product Ownership Plan
Status: Draft v3.0
Date: 2026-06-06
Timeline: Active sprint plan toward v0.1, then v1.0 hardening
Team:
- Vasanth
- Gnanam
- Anandan
## 1. Product Goal
Zero is a terminal-first AI coding agent built in Go.
The goal is not just to remove the old TypeScript runtime. The goal is to make Zero feel like a mature daily-driver CLI agent:
- fast startup
- strong command UX
- safe autonomy
- clear permission handling
- useful local tools
- reliable provider/runtime behavior
- installable, updateable, and testable on real developer machines
This document replaces the older migration-era work split. The Go runtime is now the main product baseline, so future work should focus on product depth rather than repeating the old M0 migration plan.
## 2. Current Baseline On Main
The current main branch is Go-native for the runtime and CLI.
Implemented baseline:
- `cmd/zero` is the primary CLI entrypoint.
- `cmd/zero-pr-review` exists for PR automation workflows.
- Core runtime packages live under `internal/`.
- Current CLI surface includes `exec`, `config`, `models`, `providers`, `doctor`, `search`, `sessions`, `plugins`, `hooks`, `mcp`, `sandbox`, `update`, `worktrees`, `verify`, `changes`, `serve`, `help`, and `version`.
- Core areas exist for agent flow, provider/model registry, tools, TUI, sessions, search, sandbox, self-verification, stream-json, usage, redaction, hooks, MCP, plugins, update, worktrees, and git/change handling.
- TypeScript is no longer part of the repository baseline. The npm package keeps a small Node wrapper that delegates to the Go binary.
Still needed before Zero feels production-ready:
- Permission and sandbox UX must become clearer and harder to misuse.
- TUI command flows need polish beyond basic rendering.
- Platform behavior, especially Windows sandbox/update/install paths, needs stronger product ownership.
- Review automation should produce useful, repeatable output for maintainers.
- Release trust needs checksums, install smoke tests, and update verification.
## 3. Ownership Rules
- Every feature has one DRI.
- UI, runtime, and platform work should be split by contract, not by vague file ownership.
- Every PR must expose user-runnable behavior or a concrete contract consumed by another owner.
- Docs, CI, and website work can support a product PR, but they should not be the whole lane for any owner.
- Anandan must own platform product work, not only docs/site/CI.
- Shared contracts should be agreed before large UI or integration work lands.
- Keep PRs large enough to move the product forward, but still reviewable.
## 4. Team Roles
| Owner | Primary Role | Owns | Should Not Own Alone |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Vasanth | Product UX and TUI owner | Bubble Tea TUI, startup screen, command palette, slash command UX, tool rendering, permission prompts, sandbox violation rendering, verification/test/git output UX, themes, daily CLI feel | Provider internals, release pipeline, platform adapters |
| Gnanam | Runtime core owner | Provider/model registry, provider factory, agent/runtime protocols, stream-json, sessions/search backends, config/doctor/usage/redaction, MCP/hooks/plugins backend, sandbox policy/grants, permission event contract | TUI composition, release packaging, platform-specific install trust |
| Anandan | Platform product owner | Install/update/release trust, binary/package smoke tests, platform sandbox adapters, Windows behavior, PR/review automation CLI, CI as product verification, performance and release checks | TUI rendering, provider semantics, model registry ownership |
## 5. Anandan Platform Product Rule
Anandan should not be assigned only docs/site/CI forever. His lane must produce platform behavior that users and maintainers can run.
Accepted Anandan work:
- `zero sandbox policy` improvements and platform-specific sandbox behavior.
- Windows sandbox adapter behavior and clear fallback reporting.
- `zero update` verification, release metadata validation, and install smoke tests.
- Package and binary checksums.
- PR automation CLI workflows that reviewers can run locally or in CI.
- CI jobs that prove real Zero commands work after installation.
Not accepted as standalone Anandan work:
- Docs-only updates.
- Website-only updates.
- Future VS Code notes with no current CLI behavior.
- CI matrix changes that do not prove a user-facing command or release flow.
- Release notes or checklists without executable validation.
Docs and CI are still useful, but they must attach to real platform product behavior.
## 6. Shared Contracts
| Contract | DRI | Consumers | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Provider stream events | Gnanam | Vasanth, Anandan | Lets TUI and automation render model output, tool calls, and errors consistently. |
| Permission and sandbox events | Gnanam | Vasanth, Anandan | Lets TUI ask for decisions and platform code enforce them without bypasses. |
| Session event schema | Gnanam | Vasanth, Anandan | Lets TUI, resume, search, and automation share one session model. |
| Command metadata registry | Vasanth | Gnanam, Anandan | Lets slash commands, help, shell completions, and docs use one command source. |
| Platform/release contract | Anandan | Vasanth, Gnanam | Defines install, update, checksum, smoke, and platform capability results. |
| Stream-json protocol | Gnanam | Anandan | Lets CI and PR automation consume Zero output without scraping text UI. |
## 7. Active Workstreams
### A. Safe Autonomy
Top priority. Zero must be able to run tools confidently while showing users what is happening and asking when risk increases.
Planned PRs:
- Vasanth: `feat/tui-sandbox-permissions`
- permission prompt UX
- allow, deny, and always-allow flows
- sandbox violation rendering
- `/permissions` or equivalent permission state UI
- Gnanam: `feat/runtime-permission-events`
- structured permission request events
- sandbox grant contract
- stream-json support
- tests for denial, approval, and violation cases
- Anandan: `feat/windows-sandbox-platform`
- platform sandbox capability checks
- stronger Windows behavior or explicit safe fallback
- `zero sandbox policy --json` output useful enough for CI and support
- platform tests where possible
Done when:
- High-autonomy tool attempts produce a clear prompt, decision, and result in TUI and headless modes.
- Denied commands do not run.
- Sandbox violations are visible and actionable.
- Platform fallback is explicit, tested, and not silently unsafe.
### B. Command UX And Daily CLI
The CLI should feel like a product, not a collection of backend commands.
Planned PRs:
- Vasanth: `feat/tui-command-polish`
- `/model`, `/provider`, `/context`, `/doctor`, `/verify`, `/resume`, and `/compact` become clear interactive flows
- command results render consistently
- startup screen stays minimal until the user asks for panels
- Gnanam: `feat/runtime-command-contracts`
- stable command data APIs
- provider/model/session/config result structs
- error types suitable for TUI rendering
- Anandan: `feat/install-update-user-flow`
- `zero update` and install flows are user-runnable
- package smoke command verifies installed binary behavior
- CI proves the packaged command starts and reports version/help
Done when:
- A new user can run Zero, inspect config/provider/model state, and understand the next action without reading source.
### C. Verification And Review Automation
Zero should help maintainers verify changes and review PRs with repeatable local commands.
Planned PRs:
- Vasanth: `feat/tui-verification-results`
- render verify/test/git/review results in TUI
- show pass/fail/blocked states clearly
- Gnanam: `feat/runtime-self-verify-contract`
- structured verification results
- stable test/change event model
- redacted logs for model and automation use
- Anandan: `feat/pr-review-cli-workflow`
- make `cmd/zero-pr-review` or `zero review` useful for changed files, validations, and summary output
- support local and CI invocation
- avoid brittle text scraping where stream-json can be used
Done when:
- A maintainer can run one local command before review and get useful changed-file, validation, and risk output.
### D. Release Trust And Distribution
This is Anandan's main product lane after platform sandbox work.
Planned PRs:
- Anandan: `feat/release-trust`
- release metadata validation
- checksums
- install smoke tests
- update verification
- clear error output when release artifacts are invalid
- Vasanth:
- consume release/update results in CLI UX where needed
- Gnanam:
- ensure config, errors, and logs are structured and redacted
Done when:
- Users can install, run, verify, and update Zero with confidence.
- Maintainers can prove release artifacts work before publishing.
### E. Extensibility UX
This comes after safe autonomy and daily CLI polish.
Planned PRs:
- Vasanth:
- `/mcp`, `/hooks`, `/plugins`, and related UI flows
- Gnanam:
- harden backend contracts and lifecycle behavior
- Anandan:
- automation and docs only after executable behavior exists
Done when:
- Extensibility feels discoverable and safe from the terminal.
## 8. Immediate Next PRs
These are the next reviewable slices. Do not use the old migration-era next steps.
1. Vasanth: `feat/tui-sandbox-permissions`
2. Gnanam: `feat/runtime-permission-events`
3. Anandan: `feat/windows-sandbox-platform`
4. Anandan: `feat/update-release-verification`
5. Vasanth: `feat/tui-command-polish`
6. Gnanam: `feat/session-rewind-compaction-contract`
Recommended first parallel set:
- Vasanth starts the TUI permission prompt and violation display.
- Gnanam defines the permission event/grant contract.
- Anandan owns Windows/platform sandbox reporting and tests.
## 9. Command Ownership Matrix
| Command Area | Vasanth | Gnanam | Anandan |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `exec` | TUI and interactive UX | Runtime execution contract | Package smoke and platform validation |
| `sandbox` | Prompt and violation UX | Policy, grants, and events | Platform adapters and Windows behavior |
| `update` | Display and user messaging | Config and redacted errors | Primary owner of update verification |
| `verify` | Result rendering | Verification backend contract | CI and release integration |
| `changes` | TUI rendering | Change detection backend | PR automation integration |
| `mcp`, `hooks`, `plugins`, `serve` | Discoverability and UI | Backend lifecycle and contracts | Automation/docs after behavior exists |
| `sessions`, `search` | Resume/search UX | Storage, query, and event model | Stream-json and automation consumers |
## 10. Definition Of Done
For every code PR:
- Add or update tests for the changed behavior.
- Run `go test ./...` when Go files changed.
- Run the relevant build command when CLI entrypoints changed.
- Run package smoke checks when install/update/npm wrapper files changed.
- Include manual CLI output or screenshots only when they prove a user-facing flow.
For docs-only PRs:
- State clearly that no runtime behavior changed.
- Do not use docs-only PRs as a substitute for platform product work.
For Anandan's PRs specifically:
- Must include one of:
- user-runnable command behavior
- install/update/release artifact verification
- platform adapter behavior
- CI that executes real installed Zero commands
- Docs/CI can support the PR, but cannot be the entire value.
## 11. Review Rotation
- Vasanth PRs:
- Gnanam reviews runtime contracts.
- Anandan reviews platform/release impact when touched.
- Gnanam PRs:
- Vasanth reviews user-facing contract impact.
- Anandan reviews platform/protocol impact when touched.
- Anandan PRs:
- Vasanth reviews user-facing CLI behavior.
- Gnanam reviews runtime contract and safety impact.
## 12. Retired Historical Plan
The old M0-M6 TypeScript-to-Go migration schedule is now historical.
Do not assign new work from the old migration next-steps section. The Go migration foundation has already landed on main. Future work should move Zero from "ported" to "mature terminal coding agent."
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# OAuth logins & using ChatGPT / Claude subscriptions
Zero supports two distinct things people mean by "log in with OAuth":
1. **OAuth login for a provider/gateway** that issues a *standard* bearer token —
fully built in (`zero auth login …`). Zero attaches the token to model calls
automatically.
2. **Using a ChatGPT or Claude *subscription*** (Plus / Pro / Max) instead of a
pay-per-token API key — only possible through a **local proxy**, for the
reasons documented below. Zero ships a convenience preset and this recipe.
---
## 1. OAuth login for a provider or gateway (built in)
For any OAuth 2.0 / OIDC provider that returns a normal access token usable as
`Authorization: Bearer …` on its API, configure it with `ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*`
env vars and log in:
```sh
export ZERO_OAUTH_ACME_CLIENT_ID=…
export ZERO_OAUTH_ACME_AUTHORIZE_URL=https://acme.example/oauth/authorize
export ZERO_OAUTH_ACME_TOKEN_URL=https://acme.example/oauth/token
export ZERO_OAUTH_ACME_SCOPES="openid profile"
zero auth login acme # browser (loopback); --device for headless
zero auth status
```
When a login exists for a provider, the **OpenAI and Anthropic** providers send
`Authorization: Bearer <fresh-token>` (auto-refreshed; one refresh-and-retry on a
`401`) instead of the API key. With no login they use the API key exactly as
before. Tokens are stored 0600 (or the OS keyring with
`ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE=keyring`) and never logged. See `zero auth --help`.
### In the setup wizard (`/provider`)
Running `/provider` opens a **"How do you want to connect?"** chooser:
```text
❯ Sign in with OAuth One-click browser login (OpenRouter, xAI, ChatGPT, Hugging Face)
Paste an API key / browse providers Any of 20+ providers, local, or a proxy
```
Pick **Sign in with OAuth** → the list of providers that do real OAuth → choose one:
```text
❯ OpenRouter browser sign-in · creates a key
xAI (Grok) browser or device code
ChatGPT browser (Codex backend, ChatGPT Plus/Pro)
Hugging Face browser or device code
```
- **OpenRouter / xAI / ChatGPT / Hugging Face** are real OAuth: your browser
opens to approve → done (no key to paste). OpenRouter mints a key; xAI /
ChatGPT / Hugging Face store a refreshable bearer. Hugging Face requires a
one-time OAuth-app registration (no secret needed for "public" apps); the
preset pre-fills scopes, endpoints, and the OIDC issuer. The same chooser
appears in first-run onboarding. (xAI uses an opt-in preset — set
`ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1` or your own `ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_*`; see below.)
- **Device code (headless / SSH):** for a provider that supports it (xAI,
Hugging Face), press **d** on the list to get a code to enter on another
device instead of opening a browser. On an SSH session or headless Linux box
(no `DISPLAY`) device code is used automatically; set `ZERO_OAUTH_DEVICE=1`
to force it anywhere. The CLI equivalent is
`zero auth login <name> --device`.
- **ChatGPT / Claude are intentionally not in this list for the proxy path** —
use the dedicated `chatgpt-proxy` / `custom-anthropic-compatible` preset
(see §2) for subscription-via-proxy. ChatGPT *is* a first-class OAuth
provider in this version (routes to the Codex backend) — see "Built-in OAuth
providers" below.
### Built-in OAuth providers
- **OpenRouter (no env needed)** — `zero auth openrouter` opens a browser, you
approve, and it **mints an OpenRouter API key** (public PKCE flow, no client_id).
In the interactive setup wizard, pick **OpenRouter** and press **ctrl+o** at the
key step to do the same inline ("Log in with OAuth"). The minted key is saved to
the provider profile and used normally.
- **xAI (Grok) — opt-in preset** — xAI's flow needs an OAuth `client_id`. Zero
ships a built-in preset for the public Grok-CLI client, but to keep third-party
client identities out of the default credential path it is **off by default**.
Enable it with `export ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1`, then `zero auth login xai`
(browser, or `--device` for headless) works one-click; the token is used directly
on `api.x.ai/v1`. Without the opt-in, set `ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_CLIENT_ID` (and
endpoints, or an issuer) yourself via `ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_*`. Either way the preset is
fully overridable by `ZERO_OAUTH_XAI_*` (env wins), and it requires a
SuperGrok / X Premium+ subscription; the client_id is an undocumented public
Grok-CLI client that may change without notice.
- **ChatGPT (Codex) — opt-in preset** — `zero auth chatgpt` opens a browser, you
approve with your ChatGPT Plus/Pro/Business/Enterprise account, and the bearer is
stored. The bearer routes to `https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/responses`
(the same endpoint the openai/codex CLI uses), with `originator: codex_cli_rs` and
the `chatgpt-account-id` claim injected as headers on every request. The
`chatgpt-account-id` is extracted from the OIDC ID token and stored alongside the
bearer; if the claim is missing (older ChatGPT accounts, or a rotated
authorization server), the Codex backend will 401 and `zero auth status chatgpt`
will show the warning. Like xAI, the preset uses the publicly-shipped Codex CLI
client identity (`app_EMoamEEZ73f0CkXaXp7hrann`) and is opt-in via
`ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1`. As of mid-2026 the Codex backend is
Cloudflare-gated: requests from a non-Codex client can still be challenged, and
the `chatgpt-proxy` route in §2 is the conservative fallback.
- **Hugging Face — opt-in preset, BYO client_id** — `zero auth login huggingface`
(or `--device` for headless) opens a Hugging Face OAuth flow. The bearer works on
the OpenAI-compatible router at `https://router.huggingface.co/v1` for hundreds
of OSS models (Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, etc.). HF does not ship a
globally-known client_id, so the preset ships endpoints + scopes + the OIDC
issuer pre-filled; you must register a "public" OAuth app (no secret) at
<https://huggingface.co/settings/applications/new> and set the resulting
`client_id` via `ZERO_OAUTH_HUGGINGFACE_CLIENT_ID`. Enable the preset with
`ZERO_OAUTH_ALLOW_PRESETS=1` (or omit it — the BYO client_id path uses
`client_credentials = none` and doesn't need the opt-in). Free tier has strict
rate limits; Pro removes them.
Any field of a preset is overridable via `ZERO_OAUTH_<NAME>_*`. For a fully custom
OAuth/OIDC provider, set those env vars (see `zero auth --help`) and
`zero auth login <name>`.
---
## 2. ChatGPT / Claude subscriptions — why a proxy is required
We researched this carefully. As of mid-2026, a **subscription** OAuth token does
**not** work as a drop-in bearer against the standard APIs:
- **OpenAI (ChatGPT):** a "Sign in with ChatGPT" token only works against
ChatGPT's own backend (`chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/responses`, the Responses
API), **not** `api.openai.com`. That backend is **Cloudflare bot-protected** —
non-browser / headless clients get `cf-mitigated: challenge` → `403`. It also
requires mimicking the official Codex client (originator + account-id header).
**First-class path (this version):** `zero auth chatgpt` does exactly that
mimicking (`originator: codex_cli_rs`, `chatgpt-account-id: <claim>`) and
routes requests to the Codex backend, no proxy required — see §1. The
`chatgpt-proxy` route below is the conservative fallback when Cloudflare
challenges become an issue, and is the only path that works without a
browser-based ChatGPT OAuth login.
- **Anthropic (Claude):** the Messages API **rejects** subscription OAuth tokens
for third-party use unless the request spoofs the Claude Code identity
(`anthropic-beta: oauth-2025-04-20`, `claude-cli` UA, and a verbatim
*"You are Claude Code…"* system prompt) — and **even then** tool-using requests
on Max plans are routed to a disabled billing lane and `400`. Anthropic's policy
**prohibits** subscription-token use outside Claude Code / claude.ai, and the
timeline hardened through 2026: a **Feb 19 2026** docs update spelled out that
Free/Pro/Max OAuth tokens may not be used in third-party tools or the Agent SDK,
then on **April 4 2026** enforcement landed and subscription OAuth tokens
**stopped working in third-party harnesses** (starting with OpenClaw, then the
rest). As of mid-2026 the only supported ways to drive Claude from a third-party
tool are a standard **API key** or pay-as-you-go **"Extra Usage"** billing —
both per-token, not the flat subscription. The request to allow subscription use
(claude-code #37205) was closed *"not planned."*
So Zero does **not** call those backends directly or spoof those clients — that
would be fragile, account-risky, and (for Anthropic) against the vendor's terms.
The robust, supported pattern is a **local proxy** that holds your subscription
session and exposes a clean OpenAI- or Anthropic-compatible endpoint on
`127.0.0.1`. The proxy absorbs the Cloudflare / client-spoofing surface; Zero
just points at it.
### ChatGPT via a local proxy
Run a local ChatGPT OAuth proxy that exposes an OpenAI-compatible endpoint (these
typically listen on `127.0.0.1:10531/v1`). Then use the built-in **`chatgpt-proxy`**
preset (no API key — the proxy authenticates):
```jsonc
// ~/.config/zero/config.json (or ./.zero/config.json)
{
"activeProvider": "chatgpt",
"providers": [
{
"name": "chatgpt",
"catalogID": "chatgpt-proxy", // OpenAI-compatible, local, no key
"baseURL": "http://localhost:10531/v1", // override for your proxy's port
"model": "gpt-5.5" // whatever model your proxy serves
}
]
}
```
```sh
zero exec --prompt "say hi" # routes through the proxy → your ChatGPT plan
```
### Claude via a local proxy
There is no single canonical Claude OAuth-proxy port, so use the generic
**`custom-anthropic-compatible`** entry pointed at your proxy's Anthropic-compatible
endpoint:
```jsonc
{
"activeProvider": "claude",
"providers": [
{
"name": "claude",
"catalogID": "custom-anthropic-compatible",
"baseURL": "http://localhost:<port>", // your Claude proxy
"apiKey": "unused-by-proxy",
"model": "claude-sonnet-4.5"
}
]
}
```
---
## 3. Supported alternatives (no proxy)
- **API key (recommended, simplest):** set `OPENAI_API_KEY` / `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`
(or per-profile `apiKey`) and use the `openai` / `anthropic` catalog providers.
Bills as API usage.
- **Anthropic subscription automation, sanctioned:** spawn the real `claude` CLI
(e.g. `claude -p …`) as a subprocess — the only path Anthropic recognizes as a
first-class subscription session.
---
## Notes
- The `chatgpt-proxy` base URL / port and model are defaults you override for your
setup; they are not an endorsement of any specific proxy implementation.
- Subscription-via-proxy depends on third-party tools and undocumented vendor
backends; it can break without notice. The API-key path is the stable one.
+27 -35
View File
@@ -1,47 +1,39 @@
module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
go 1.24.2
go 1.25.0
toolchain go1.24.13
toolchain go1.26.4
require (
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v1.0.0
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10
github.com/charmbracelet/glamour v1.0.0
github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.1-0.20250404203927-76690c660834
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.6
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
)
require (
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.20.0 // indirect
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
github.com/aymerick/douceur v0.2.0 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/cellbuf v0.0.15 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/slice v0.0.0-20250327172914-2fdc97757edf // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.9.0 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.11.5 // indirect
github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect
github.com/gorilla/css v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.3.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-localereader v0.0.1 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.19 // indirect
github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday v1.0.27 // indirect
github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 // indirect
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.11.0 // indirect
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 // indirect
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 // indirect
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 // indirect
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.24 // indirect
github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect
github.com/muesli/reflow v0.3.0 // indirect
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.15.0 // indirect
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.7.13 // indirect
github.com/yuin/goldmark-emoji v1.0.6 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.38.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/term v0.36.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.30.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 // indirect
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 // indirect
)
+54 -75
View File
@@ -1,89 +1,68 @@
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0 h1:YSnNh5cPYlYjPxRrzs5VEn3vwhtEn3jVGRBT3M7/I0g=
charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:l97h4hym2hvWBVfmJDtrEHHCtkIKeTEb3TTJ4ZOB3wY=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7 h1:7qw2tTAVar7m7klOPBYfTB0mniv/RuexsYwMRNxSeL0=
charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:DGW2q8gvzHnOpMpZTORs0aySVHCox5C+2Svk0fci1qs=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4 h1:lcPeVtcp23SNra7lHy8iYE4UC2aIipVQ47sbGyyxR5Q=
charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.4/go.mod h1:0653x8epbZSzdDfO/XPS1a/uYPOBeSsCssOpJOqDzik=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.20.0 h1:sfIHpxPyR07/Oylvmcai3X/exDlE8+FA820NTz+9sGw=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.20.0/go.mod h1:e7tViK0xh/Nf4BYHl00ycY6rV7b8iXBksI9E359yNmA=
github.com/alecthomas/repr v0.5.1 h1:E3G4t2QbHTSNpPKBgMTln5KLkZHLOcU7r37J4pXBuIg=
github.com/alecthomas/repr v0.5.1/go.mod h1:Fr0507jx4eOXV7AlPV6AVZLYrLIuIeSOWtW57eE/O/4=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0/go.mod h1:NjJ3ciIgrqBNeIkWZ4e46nseoLDslxU1LmfCoL+wcY8=
github.com/alecthomas/repr v0.5.2 h1:SU73FTI9D1P5UNtvseffFSGmdNci/O6RsqzeXJtP0Qs=
github.com/alecthomas/repr v0.5.2/go.mod h1:Fr0507jx4eOXV7AlPV6AVZLYrLIuIeSOWtW57eE/O/4=
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 h1:EH0zSVneZPSuFR11BlR9YppQTVDbh5+16AmcJi4g1z4=
github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4/go.mod h1:ZY9tmq7sm5xIbd9bOK4onWV4S6X0u6GY7Vn0Yu86PYI=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 h1:HwpRHbFMcZLEVr42D4p7XBqjyuxQH5SMiErDT4WkJ2k=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1/go.mod h1:uYgXzlJ7ZpABp8OJ+exZzJJhRNQ2ASbcXHWsFqH8hp8=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.3.1 h1:LV+qyBQ2pqe0u42ZsUEtPiCaUoqgA9gYRDs3vj1nolY=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.3.1/go.mod h1:G0fsKmG+P6ylD0r6N/KgQD/nWzgfnl8ZBcNLgcbrw8E=
github.com/aymerick/douceur v0.2.0 h1:Mv+mAeH1Q+n9Fr+oyamOlAkUNPWPlA8PPGR0QAaYuPk=
github.com/aymerick/douceur v0.2.0/go.mod h1:wlT5vV2O3h55X9m7iVYN0TBM0NH/MmbLnd30/FjWUq4=
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v1.0.0 h1:12J8/ak/uCZEMQ6KU7pcfwceyjLlWsDLAxB5fXonfvc=
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbles v1.0.0/go.mod h1:9d/Zd5GdnauMI5ivUIVisuEm3ave1XwXtD1ckyV6r3E=
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10 h1:otUDHWMMzQSB0Pkc87rm691KZ3SWa4KUlvF9nRvCICw=
github.com/charmbracelet/bubbletea v1.3.10/go.mod h1:ORQfo0fk8U+po9VaNvnV95UPWA1BitP1E0N6xJPlHr4=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.1 h1:a1lO03qTrSIRaK8c3JRxJDZOvhvIeSco3ej+ngLk1kk=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.1/go.mod h1:U1d9Dljmdf9DLegaJ0nGZNJvoXAhayhmidOdcBwAvKk=
github.com/charmbracelet/glamour v1.0.0 h1:AWMLOVFHTsysl4WV8T8QgkQ0s/ZNZo7CiE4WKhk8l08=
github.com/charmbracelet/glamour v1.0.0/go.mod h1:DSdohgOBkMr2ZQNhw4LZxSGpx3SvpeujNoXrQyH2hxo=
github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.1-0.20250404203927-76690c660834 h1:ZR7e0ro+SZZiIZD7msJyA+NjkCNNavuiPBLgerbOziE=
github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.1-0.20250404203927-76690c660834/go.mod h1:aKC/t2arECF6rNOnaKaVU6y4t4ZeHQzqfxedE/VkVhA=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.6 h1:GhV21SiDz/45W9AnV2R61xZMRri5NlLnl6CVF7ihZW8=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.6/go.mod h1:2JNYLgQUsyqaiLovhU2Rv/pb8r6ydXKS3NIttu3VGZQ=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/cellbuf v0.0.15 h1:ur3pZy0o6z/R7EylET877CBxaiE1Sp1GMxoFPAIztPI=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/cellbuf v0.0.15/go.mod h1:J1YVbR7MUuEGIFPCaaZ96KDl5NoS0DAWkskup+mOY+Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20241011142426-46044092ad91 h1:payRxjMjKgx2PaCWLZ4p3ro9y97+TVLZNaRZgJwSVDQ=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20241011142426-46044092ad91/go.mod h1:wDlXFlCrmJ8J+swcL/MnGUuYnqgQdW9rhSD61oNMb6U=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/slice v0.0.0-20250327172914-2fdc97757edf h1:rLG0Yb6MQSDKdB52aGX55JT1oi0P0Kuaj7wi1bLUpnI=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/slice v0.0.0-20250327172914-2fdc97757edf/go.mod h1:B3UgsnsBZS/eX42BlaNiJkD1pPOUa+oF1IYC6Yd2CEU=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1 h1:OEIrQ8maEeDBXQDoGCbbTTXYJMYRCRO1fnodZ12Gv5o=
github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1/go.mod h1:0L9PGwj20lrtmEMeyw4WKJ/TMyDtvAoK9bf2u/mNo3w=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3 h1:QPa1IWkYI+AOB+fE+mg/5/4HRMZcaXex9t5KX76i20Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3/go.mod h1:/zT4BhpD5aGFpqQQqw7a+VtHCzu+zrQtt1zhMt9mR4Q=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1 h1:4+r3uOJ69ueRBt4okgEfWZeXs3BD36HcDBmOIAUlETk=
github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260615092913-2399af76d5b1/go.mod h1:f/jRa757WUmaOZrbPspXymbg/GnbF+rwe4OLsG7aXYo=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7 h1:kzv1kJvjg2S3r9KHo8hDdHFQLEqn4RBCb39dAYC84jI=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7/go.mod h1:9qGpnAVYz+8ACONkZBUWPtL7lulP9No6p1epAihUZwQ=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb h1:m1Uub9uM7meZ8ofVyeRfK7M/knCi3sF2gKn9kldVW0I=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb/go.mod h1:6fMpcW6iwN/kX+xJ52eqVWsDiBTe0UJD24JLoHFe+P0=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2 h1:xVRT/S2ZcKdhhOuSP4t5cLi5o+JxklsoEObBSgfgZRk=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2/go.mod h1:kF8CY5RddLWrsgVwpw4kAa6TESp6EB5y3uxGLeCqzAI=
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.9.0 h1:Qb4KOhYwRiN3viMv1v/3cTBlz3AcAZX3+y9OLhMtAtA=
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.9.0/go.mod h1:aCAAqTlh4GIVkhQnJpbL0T/WfcrJXHcj8C0yjYcjOZA=
github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1 h1:+NSqMOr3GR6k1FdRhhnXrLfztGzuG+VuFDfatpWHKCs=
github.com/clipperhouse/stringish v0.1.1/go.mod h1:v/WhFtE1q0ovMta2+m+UbpZ+2/HEXNWYXQgCt4hdOzA=
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0 h1:x7T0T4eTHDONxFJsL94uKNKPHrclyFI0lm7+w94cO8U=
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.5.0/go.mod h1:Wn1g7MK6OoeDT0vL+Q0SQLDz/KpfsVRgg6W7ihQeh4g=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.11.5 h1:Q/sSnsKerHeCkc/jSTNq1oCm7KiVgUMZRDUoRu0JQZQ=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.11.5/go.mod h1:DHkYz0B9wPfa6wondMfaivmHpzrQ3v9q8cnmRbL6yW8=
github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f h1:Y/CXytFA4m6baUTXGLOoWe4PQhGxaX0KpnayAqC48p4=
github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f/go.mod h1:vw97MGsxSvLiUE2X8qFplwetxpGLQrlU1Q9AUEIzCaM=
github.com/gorilla/css v1.0.1 h1:ntNaBIghp6JmvWnxbZKANoLyuXTPZ4cAMlo6RyhlbO8=
github.com/gorilla/css v1.0.1/go.mod h1:BvnYkspnSzMmwRK+b8/xgNPLiIuNZr6vbZBTPQ2A3b0=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 h1:o3Q2bT8eqzGnGPOYheoYS8eEleT5ZVNYNy8JawjaNZY=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1/go.mod h1:rB7fnv1TgOPOyyKRJ9o+AsTU/vK5WHJ2ivHeut/Pcwo=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 h1:IofanmuvaxnKHuV04sC0eBy/smG6kIKrWG2/jYn2GuM=
github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2/go.mod h1:/8XtdKZzedat74NQFn0NGlGL4soHB0YQZrETF96h75k=
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.11.0 h1:lBc6kY44VFw+TDx4I8opi/EtL9m20WSEFgwIwO+UVM8=
github.com/clipperhouse/displaywidth v0.11.0/go.mod h1:bkrFNkf81G8HyVqmKGxsPufD3JhNl3dSqnGhOoSD/o0=
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0 h1:+gs4oBZ2gPfVrKPthwbMzWZDaAFPGYK72F0NJv2v7Vk=
github.com/clipperhouse/uax29/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:EFJ2TJMRUaplDxHKj1qAEhCtQPW2tJSwu5BF98AuoVM=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1 h1:mf4KkFUj0gJuarK8P+LgiS+Lit7m9N1yAwEfPbee7R0=
github.com/dlclark/regexp2/v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:avUrQvPaLz2DrFNHJF0taWAFFX2C1GMSSoeiqFjcBmU=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0 h1:HSQxCeh5YZH3EL3W39ixjtyaEhcWSXQHtHnMBzSs474=
github.com/go-quicktest/qt v1.102.0/go.mod h1:p4lGIVX+8Wa6ZPNDvqcxq36XpUDLh42FLetFU7odllI=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
github.com/hexops/gotextdiff v1.0.3 h1:gitA9+qJrrTCsiCl7+kh75nPqQt1cx4ZkudSTLoUqJM=
github.com/hexops/gotextdiff v1.0.3/go.mod h1:pSWU5MAI3yDq+fZBTazCSJysOMbxWL1BSow5/V2vxeg=
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.3.0 h1:2/yBRLdWBZKrf7gB40FoiKfAWYQ0lqNcbuQwVHXptag=
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.3.0/go.mod h1:R4dSotOR9KMtayYi1e77YzuveK+i7ruzyGqttikkLy0=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 h1:xfD0iDuEKnDkl03q4limB+vH+GxLEtL/jb4xVJSWWEY=
github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20/go.mod h1:W+V8PltTTMOvKvAeJH7IuucS94S2C6jfK/D7dTCTo3Y=
github.com/mattn/go-localereader v0.0.1 h1:ygSAOl7ZXTx4RdPYinUpg6W99U8jWvWi9Ye2JC/oIi4=
github.com/mattn/go-localereader v0.0.1/go.mod h1:8fBrzywKY7BI3czFoHkuzRoWE9C+EiG4R1k4Cjx5p88=
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.12/go.mod h1:RAqKPSqVFrSLVXbA8x7dzmKdmGzieGRCM46jaSJTDAk=
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.19 h1:v++JhqYnZuu5jSKrk9RbgF5v4CGUjqRfBm05byFGLdw=
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.19/go.mod h1:XBkDxAl56ILZc9knddidhrOlY5R/pDhgLpndooCuJAs=
github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday v1.0.27 h1:MpEUotklkwCSLeH+Qdx1VJgNqLlpY2KXwXFM08ygZfk=
github.com/microcosm-cc/bluemonday v1.0.27/go.mod h1:jFi9vgW+H7c3V0lb6nR74Ib/DIB5OBs92Dimizgw2cA=
github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 h1:ZK8zHtRHOkbHy6Mmr5D264iyp3TiX5OmNcI5cIARiQI=
github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6/go.mod h1:CJlz5H+gyd6CUWT45Oy4q24RdLyn7Md9Vj2/ldJBSIo=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1:flRD4NNwYAUpkphVc1HcthR4KEIFJ65n8Mw5qdRn3LE=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1/go.mod h1:hoEshYVHaxMs3cyo3Yncou5ZscifuDolrwPKZanG3xk=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0 h1:5Nx0Ya0ZqY2ygV366QzturHI13Jq95ApcVaJBhpS+AY=
github.com/kr/text v0.2.0/go.mod h1:eLer722TekiGuMkidMxC/pM04lWEeraHUUmBw8l2grE=
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728 h1:QwWKgMY28TAXaDl+ExRDqGQltzXqN/xypdKP86niVn8=
github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728/go.mod h1:1fEHWurg7pvf5SG6XNE5Q8UZmOwex51Mkx3SLhrW5B4=
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.4.0 h1:UtrWVfLdarDgc44HcS7pYloGHJUjHV/4FwW4TvVgFr4=
github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.4.0/go.mod h1:R4dSotOR9KMtayYi1e77YzuveK+i7ruzyGqttikkLy0=
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.24 h1:cpokDiIn0MGnhdHwuWnJBITySJ20QyNGnY2kR/ay2DU=
github.com/mattn/go-runewidth v0.0.24/go.mod h1:XBkDxAl56ILZc9knddidhrOlY5R/pDhgLpndooCuJAs=
github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 h1:3I4Kt4BQjOR54NavqnDogx/MIoWBFa0StPA8ELUXHmA=
github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2/go.mod h1:3XuTXfFS2VjM+HTLZY9Ak0l6eUKfijIfMUZ4EgX0QYo=
github.com/muesli/reflow v0.3.0 h1:IFsN6K9NfGtjeggFP+68I4chLZV2yIKsXJFNZ+eWh6s=
github.com/muesli/reflow v0.3.0/go.mod h1:pbwTDkVPibjO2kyvBQRBxTWEEGDGq0FlB1BIKtnHY/8=
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 h1:S5AlUN9dENB57rsbnkPyfdGuWIlkmzJjbFf0Tf5FWUc=
github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0/go.mod h1:ZRfOIKPFDYQoDFF4Olj7/QJbW60Ol/kL1pU3VfY/Cnk=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.1.0/go.mod h1:J6wj4VEh+S6ZtnVlnTBMWIodfgj8LQOQFoIToxlJtxc=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.2.0/go.mod h1:J6wj4VEh+S6ZtnVlnTBMWIodfgj8LQOQFoIToxlJtxc=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 h1:WUdvkW8uEhrYfLC4ZzdpI2ztxP1I582+49Oc5Mq64VQ=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7/go.mod h1:FN3SvrM+Zdj16jyLfmOkMNblXMcoc8DfTHruCPUcx88=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.15.0 h1:D0RCU5rMAp+SpgkiNdrjfJ+LX4J1M32V2NeCY7EJ6hc=
github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.15.0/go.mod h1:DrUVZyrJU+txYW5/1kwtXQSMFio52ZOxX7yM1VHvnxs=
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavMF/ppJZNG9ZpyihvCd0w101no=
github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.7.13 h1:GPddIs617DnBLFFVJFgpo1aBfe/4xcvMc3SB5t/D0pA=
github.com/yuin/goldmark v1.7.13/go.mod h1:ip/1k0VRfGynBgxOz0yCqHrbZXhcjxyuS66Brc7iBKg=
github.com/yuin/goldmark-emoji v1.0.6 h1:QWfF2FYaXwL74tfGOW5izeiZepUDroDJfWubQI9HTHs=
github.com/yuin/goldmark-emoji v1.0.6/go.mod h1:ukxJDKFpdFb5x0a5HqbdlcKtebh086iJpI31LTKmWuA=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231006140011-7918f672742d h1:jtJma62tbqLibJ5sFQz8bKtEM8rJBtfilJ2qTU199MI=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231006140011-7918f672742d/go.mod h1:ldy0pHrwJyGW56pPQzzkH36rKxoZW1tw7ZJpeKx+hdo=
golang.org/x/net v0.38.0 h1:vRMAPTMaeGqVhG5QyLJHqNDwecKTomGeqbnfZyKlBI8=
golang.org/x/net v0.38.0/go.mod h1:ivrbrMbzFq5J41QOQh0siUuly180yBYtLp+CKbEaFx8=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210809222454-d867a43fc93e/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0 h1:3yZWxaJjBmCWXqhN1qh02AkOnCQ1poK6oF+a7xWL6Gc=
golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
golang.org/x/term v0.36.0 h1:zMPR+aF8gfksFprF/Nc/rd1wRS1EI6nDBGyWAvDzx2Q=
golang.org/x/term v0.36.0/go.mod h1:Qu394IJq6V6dCBRgwqshf3mPF85AqzYEzofzRdZkWss=
golang.org/x/text v0.30.0 h1:yznKA/E9zq54KzlzBEAWn1NXSQ8DIp/NYMy88xJjl4k=
golang.org/x/text v0.30.0/go.mod h1:yDdHFIX9t+tORqspjENWgzaCVXgk0yYnYuSZ8UzzBVM=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0 h1:HLII4xRRTtCRkxYp4HNFF0Js/Og6q2i++KXbg0gHCwM=
golang.org/x/sync v0.21.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0 h1:noSf2Fq6F8DBgS+LysIkx7rIExoNHJsxOAtPp4rthXw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.46.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1 h1:DP3TfgZhDkT7lerUdnp6PTGKyxxzz6T+cOlY/xEvfWk=
mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1/go.mod h1:lXJ8SexMvEVcHCoDvAGLZgFJ9Wsm2sulmoNEXGhYZD0=
+561
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@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Deps are the ZERO capabilities the ACP Agent drives. The CLI fills these with
// real implementations; tests inject fakes (e.g. a canned provider) to drive the
// full ACP flow without a live model. Keeping auth/model/keys behind these deps
// means the editor only hosts the thread — ZERO owns BYOK and telemetry-free
// operation.
type Deps struct {
ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
NewProvider func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
RunAgent func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
// BuildWorkspace builds the SCOPED tool registry and the sandbox engine for a
// validated workspace root, so ACP shell tools (bash/exec_command) are confined
// exactly like the exec surface — never run unconfined on the host.
BuildWorkspace func(workspaceRoot string, resolved config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error)
// ResolveWorkspaceRoot validates + normalizes a client-supplied cwd (must be an
// existing directory; never the bare root). It is the file-tool confinement root.
ResolveWorkspaceRoot func(cwd string) (string, error)
Store *sessions.Store
AgentInfo Implementation
}
// Agent is the ACP agent server bound to one JSON-RPC connection (one editor).
type Agent struct {
conn *Conn
deps Deps
mu sync.Mutex
clientCaps ClientCapabilities
initialized bool
sessions map[string]*acpSession
}
type turnRecord struct {
user string
assistant string
}
type acpSession struct {
id string
cwd string
// turnMu serializes prompt turns for one session: concurrent session/prompt
// calls run one at a time so they can't interleave history or clobber the
// single cancel slot.
turnMu sync.Mutex
mu sync.Mutex
mode agent.PermissionMode
model string // override; "" => config default
cancel context.CancelFunc
history []turnRecord
}
// NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
a := &Agent{conn: conn, deps: deps, sessions: make(map[string]*acpSession)}
conn.Handle(MethodInitialize, a.handleInitialize)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionNew, a.handleSessionNew)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionLoad, a.handleSessionLoad)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionPrompt, a.handleSessionPrompt)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionSetMode, a.handleSetMode)
conn.Handle(MethodSessionSetConfigOption, a.handleSetConfigOption)
conn.Handle(MethodZeroSetModel, a.handleZeroSetModel)
conn.HandleNotify(MethodSessionCancel, a.handleCancel)
return a
}
// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
// ---- initialize ----
func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p InitializeParams
if len(params) > 0 {
_ = json.Unmarshal(params, &p)
}
negotiated := ProtocolVersion
if p.ProtocolVersion > 0 && p.ProtocolVersion < ProtocolVersion {
negotiated = p.ProtocolVersion
}
a.mu.Lock()
a.clientCaps = p.ClientCapabilities
a.initialized = true
a.mu.Unlock()
info := a.deps.AgentInfo
return InitializeResult{
ProtocolVersion: negotiated,
AgentCapabilities: AgentCapabilities{
// Only advertise what ZERO actually implements: session/load (loadSession)
// and image prompts. session/resume + the session-capability sub-object
// are intentionally omitted since there is no resume handler yet.
LoadSession: true,
PromptCapabilities: PromptCapabilities{Image: true},
},
AgentInfo: &info,
// ZERO owns credentials (BYOK) and does not delegate auth to the editor.
AuthMethods: []AuthMethod{},
}, nil
}
// ---- session lifecycle ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p NewSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/new params")
}
root, err := a.deps.ResolveWorkspaceRoot(p.Cwd)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root})
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
}
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil)
return NewSessionResult{
SessionID: sess.id,
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p LoadSessionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/load params")
}
meta, err := a.deps.Store.Get(p.SessionID)
if err != nil || meta == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "session not found: "+p.SessionID)
}
cwdInput := p.Cwd
if strings.TrimSpace(cwdInput) == "" {
cwdInput = meta.Cwd
}
root, err := a.deps.ResolveWorkspaceRoot(cwdInput)
if err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
}
// Load history BEFORE publishing the session so no concurrent prompt observes
// a half-initialized session (registerSession sets history under the lock and
// reuses an already-live session rather than orphaning its in-flight turn).
history := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID)
sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history)
return LoadSessionResult{
Modes: a.modeState(sess),
}, nil
}
// ---- prompt turn ----
func (a *Agent) handleSessionPrompt(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p PromptParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/prompt params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
// Serialize turns for this session so two prompts can't interleave history or
// fight over the single cancel slot. session/cancel still works concurrently
// (it doesn't take turnMu).
sess.turnMu.Lock()
defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
userText := promptText(p.Prompt)
images := promptImages(p.Prompt)
turnCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
sess.setCancel(cancel)
defer func() {
cancel()
sess.setCancel(nil)
}()
reason, err := a.runTurn(turnCtx, sess, userText, images)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return PromptResult{StopReason: reason}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) runTurn(ctx context.Context, sess *acpSession, userText string, images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock) (string, error) {
overrides := config.Overrides{}
if model := sess.currentModel(); model != "" {
overrides.Provider.Model = model
}
resolved, err := a.deps.ResolveConfig(sess.cwd, overrides)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
}
provider, err := a.deps.NewProvider(resolved.Provider)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "provider: "+err.Error())
}
// Build the SCOPED registry + sandbox engine for this session's workspace so
// shell/file tools are confined to the workspace exactly like the exec surface.
registry, sandboxEngine, err := a.deps.BuildWorkspace(sess.cwd, resolved)
if err != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, "workspace: "+err.Error())
}
note := &notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}
opts := agent.Options{
Cwd: sess.cwd,
SessionID: sess.id,
ProviderName: resolved.Provider.Name,
Model: resolved.Provider.Model,
Registry: registry,
Sandbox: sandboxEngine,
PermissionMode: sess.currentMode(),
MaxTurns: resolved.MaxTurns,
Images: images,
OnText: note.text,
OnReasoning: note.thought,
OnToolCall: note.toolCall,
OnToolResult: func(result agent.ToolResult) {
note.toolResult(result)
if result.Name == "update_plan" {
a.emitPlan(registry, note)
}
},
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
return a.requestPermission(ctx, sess.id, req)
},
}
agentPrompt := buildPrompt(sess.snapshotHistory(), userText)
result, runErr := a.deps.RunAgent(ctx, agentPrompt, provider, opts)
reason, stopErr := stopReasonFor(result, runErr)
if stopErr != nil {
return "", RPCError(codeInternalError, stopErr.Error())
}
a.persistTurn(sess, userText, result.FinalAnswer)
return reason, nil
}
func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return StopCancelled, nil
}
return "", err
}
if result.FinishReason == "length" {
return StopMaxTokens, nil
}
if result.FinishReason == "content_filter" {
return StopRefusal, nil
}
return StopEndTurn, nil
}
// requestPermission forwards a ZERO permission prompt to the client as an ACP
// session/request_permission request and maps the outcome back. Failure to reach
// the client fails closed to deny.
func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
params := RequestPermissionParams{
SessionID: sessionID,
ToolCall: permissionToolCall(req),
Options: buildPermissionOptions(req),
}
var result RequestPermissionResult
if err := a.conn.Call(ctx, MethodSessionRequestPerm, params, &result); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "cancelled"}, nil
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission request failed: " + err.Error()}, nil
}
return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, req.AvailableDecisions), nil
}
func (a *Agent) emitPlan(registry *tools.Registry, note *notifier) {
t, ok := registry.Get("update_plan")
if !ok {
return
}
planner, ok := t.(interface{ CurrentPlan() []tools.PlanItem })
if !ok {
return
}
note.plan(planner.CurrentPlan())
}
// ---- mode + model selection ----
func (a *Agent) handleSetMode(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p SetSessionModeParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid set_mode params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.ModeID)
switch mode {
case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
sess.setMode(mode)
(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
return SetSessionModeResult{}, nil
case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
// Unsafe = run every tool with no prompt. The TUI gates this behind an
// explicit --skip-permissions-unsafe operator flag; an editor client must
// not be able to grant itself unconfined, no-prompt access over the wire.
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.ModeID)
default:
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown mode: "+p.ModeID)
}
}
func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p SetSessionConfigOptionParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid set_config_option params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
if p.ConfigID != configIDModel {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown config option: "+p.ConfigID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Value)
return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var p ZeroSetModelParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid _zero/set_model params")
}
sess := a.session(p.SessionID)
if sess == nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
}
sess.setModel(p.Model)
return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: p.Model}, nil
}
func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var p CancelParams
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
return
}
if sess := a.session(p.SessionID); sess != nil {
sess.invokeCancel()
}
}
// ---- advertising helpers ----
func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
// Only auto/ask are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access.
return &SessionModeState{
CurrentModeID: string(s.currentMode()),
AvailableModes: []SessionMode{
{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
},
}
}
// ---- persistence + continuity ----
func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sess *acpSession, user, assistant string) {
if a.deps.Store != nil {
_, _ = a.deps.Store.AppendEvent(sess.id, sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventMessage,
Payload: map[string]any{"role": "user", "content": user},
})
if assistant != "" {
_, _ = a.deps.Store.AppendEvent(sess.id, sessions.AppendEventInput{
Type: sessions.EventMessage,
Payload: map[string]any{"role": "assistant", "content": assistant},
})
}
}
sess.appendHistory(turnRecord{user: user, assistant: assistant})
}
func (a *Agent) loadHistory(sessionID string) []turnRecord {
if a.deps.Store == nil {
return nil
}
events, err := a.deps.Store.ReadEvents(sessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
var records []turnRecord
var pendingUser string
havePending := false
for _, e := range events {
if e.Type != sessions.EventMessage {
continue
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(e.Payload)
if err != nil {
continue
}
var msg struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(raw, &msg) != nil {
continue
}
switch msg.Role {
case "user":
if havePending {
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser})
}
pendingUser = msg.Content
havePending = true
case "assistant":
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser, assistant: msg.Content})
pendingUser = ""
havePending = false
}
}
if havePending {
records = append(records, turnRecord{user: pendingUser})
}
return records
}
// buildPrompt prepends prior conversation as context, since agent.Run drives a
// single seeded turn. Mirrors how headless resume folds history into the prompt.
func buildPrompt(history []turnRecord, userText string) string {
if len(history) == 0 {
return userText
}
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("Conversation so far:\n")
for _, t := range history {
b.WriteString("User: ")
b.WriteString(t.user)
b.WriteString("\n")
if t.assistant != "" {
b.WriteString("Assistant: ")
b.WriteString(t.assistant)
b.WriteString("\n")
}
}
b.WriteString("\n---\nContinue with this request:\n")
b.WriteString(userText)
return b.String()
}
func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
var images []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
for _, blk := range blocks {
if blk.Type != "image" || blk.Data == "" {
continue
}
data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(blk.Data)
if err != nil {
continue
}
images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: blk.MimeType, Data: data})
}
return images
}
// ---- session registry + accessors ----
// registerSession publishes a session under the agent's lock. If one is already
// registered for id (e.g. a re-load of an in-flight session) the existing live
// session is returned unchanged rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its
// mode/model. history is set BEFORE publishing so no concurrent prompt can read a
// half-initialized session.
func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
return existing
}
sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, history: history}
a.sessions[id] = sess
return sess
}
func (a *Agent) session(id string) *acpSession {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
return a.sessions[id]
}
func (s *acpSession) setCancel(cancel context.CancelFunc) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.cancel = cancel
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) invokeCancel() {
s.mu.Lock()
cancel := s.cancel
s.mu.Unlock()
if cancel != nil {
cancel()
}
}
func (s *acpSession) setMode(mode agent.PermissionMode) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.mode = mode
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) currentMode() agent.PermissionMode {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.mode
}
func (s *acpSession) setModel(model string) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.model = model
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) currentModel() string {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return s.model
}
func (s *acpSession) appendHistory(rec turnRecord) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.history = append(s.history, rec)
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *acpSession) snapshotHistory() []turnRecord {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return append([]turnRecord(nil), s.history...)
}
+261
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package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// fakeProvider streams a canned assistant message and ends the turn — enough to
// drive the real agent.Run loop without a live model.
type fakeProvider struct{ text string }
func (f fakeProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 4)
go func() {
defer close(ch)
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: f.text}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
}()
return ch, nil
}
func testDeps(t *testing.T) Deps {
t.Helper()
store := sessions.NewStore(sessions.StoreOptions{RootDir: t.TempDir()})
return Deps{
ResolveConfig: func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
model := "fake-model"
if o.Provider.Model != "" {
model = o.Provider.Model
}
return config.ResolvedConfig{
Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Name: "fake", Model: model},
MaxTurns: 4,
}, nil
},
NewProvider: func(config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error) {
return fakeProvider{text: "Hello from ZERO"}, nil
},
RunAgent: agent.Run,
BuildWorkspace: func(string, config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error) {
r := tools.NewRegistry()
r.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
return r, nil, nil
},
ResolveWorkspaceRoot: func(cwd string) (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
Store: store,
AgentInfo: Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: "test"},
}
}
// clientHarness wires a client Conn to an Agent over in-memory pipes and collects
// session/update text chunks.
type clientHarness struct {
client *Conn
updates chan string
stop func()
}
func newHarness(t *testing.T, deps Deps) *clientHarness {
t.Helper()
ar, bw := io.Pipe() // agent -> client
br, aw := io.Pipe() // client -> agent
agentConn := NewConn(ar, aw)
client := NewConn(br, bw)
a := NewAgent(agentConn, deps)
h := &clientHarness{client: client, updates: make(chan string, 128)}
client.HandleNotify(MethodSessionUpdate, func(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var probe struct {
Update struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
Content struct {
Text string `json:"text"`
} `json:"content"`
} `json:"update"`
}
if json.Unmarshal(params, &probe) != nil {
return
}
if probe.Update.SessionUpdate == UpdateAgentMessageChunk {
h.updates <- probe.Update.Content.Text
}
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go func() { _ = a.Serve(ctx) }()
go func() { _ = client.Serve(ctx) }()
h.stop = func() {
cancel()
_ = aw.Close()
_ = bw.Close()
}
return h
}
func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
// initialize
var initRes InitializeResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodInitialize, InitializeParams{ProtocolVersion: ProtocolVersion}, &initRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initialize: %v", err)
}
if initRes.ProtocolVersion != ProtocolVersion {
t.Fatalf("protocol version = %d", initRes.ProtocolVersion)
}
if !initRes.AgentCapabilities.LoadSession || !initRes.AgentCapabilities.PromptCapabilities.Image {
t.Fatalf("unexpected capabilities: %+v", initRes.AgentCapabilities)
}
// session/new
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
if newRes.SessionID == "" {
t.Fatal("session/new returned empty sessionId")
}
if newRes.Modes == nil || newRes.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatalf("expected auto mode, got %+v", newRes.Modes)
}
// session/prompt
var promptRes PromptResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{
SessionID: newRes.SessionID,
Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("hi")},
}, &promptRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if promptRes.StopReason != StopEndTurn {
t.Fatalf("stopReason = %q, want %q", promptRes.StopReason, StopEndTurn)
}
// The streamed agent_message_chunk(s) should carry the assistant text.
if got := drainText(t, h.updates); !strings.Contains(got, "Hello from ZERO") {
t.Fatalf("streamed text = %q, want it to contain the assistant message", got)
}
}
func TestACPUnknownSessionPromptErrors(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: "nope", Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("x")}}, &PromptResult{})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for unknown session")
}
}
func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
// auto/ask are accepted.
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set_mode ask: %v", err)
}
// Unsafe must be rejected over ACP — a client can't self-grant no-prompt host access.
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected Unsafe mode to be rejected over ACP")
}
// An unknown mode must be rejected.
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: "bogus"}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for unknown mode")
}
}
// TestACPRunTurnWiresSandboxAndScopedRegistry proves the sandbox engine and the
// scoped registry from BuildWorkspace actually reach agent.Options — i.e. ACP
// shell tools run confined, not unconfined on the host.
func TestACPRunTurnWiresSandboxAndScopedRegistry(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
reg := tools.NewRegistry()
reg.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir()})
deps.BuildWorkspace = func(string, config.ResolvedConfig) (*tools.Registry, *sandbox.Engine, error) {
return reg, engine, nil
}
var captured agent.Options
deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
captured = opts
return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var newRes NewSessionResult
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
}
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("hi")}}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
}
if captured.Sandbox != engine {
t.Fatal("sandbox engine was not wired into agent.Options (shell tools would run unconfined)")
}
if captured.Registry != reg {
t.Fatal("scoped registry was not wired into agent.Options")
}
}
// TestACPRejectsInvalidCwd confirms session/new fails when the workspace root
// resolver rejects the client cwd (e.g. filesystem root).
func TestACPRejectsInvalidCwd(t *testing.T) {
deps := testDeps(t)
deps.ResolveWorkspaceRoot = func(string) (string, error) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("cwd must not be the filesystem root")
}
h := newHarness(t, deps)
defer h.stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: "/", McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &NewSessionResult{}); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected session/new to reject an invalid cwd")
}
}
// drainText collects streamed chunks for a short window and concatenates them.
func drainText(t *testing.T, ch <-chan string) string {
t.Helper()
var b strings.Builder
deadline := time.After(2 * time.Second)
for {
select {
case s := <-ch:
b.WriteString(s)
if strings.Contains(b.String(), "Hello from ZERO") {
return b.String()
}
case <-deadline:
return b.String()
}
}
}
+331
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@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
// Package acp implements the Agent Client Protocol (ACP) surface for ZERO: a
// JSON-RPC 2.0 peer spoken over stdio (newline-delimited JSON) so editors such
// as Zed, JetBrains, and Neovim can drive ZERO's agent core as a backend.
//
// The protocol shapes (method names, message fields) are derived solely from the
// public, Apache-licensed ACP specification at agentclientprotocol.com and the
// agentclientprotocol/agent-client-protocol repository (schema/v1). All logic
// here is written originally against ZERO's own interfaces.
package acp
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sync"
)
// JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
const (
codeParseError = -32700
codeInvalidRequest = -32600
codeMethodNotFound = -32601
codeInvalidParams = -32602
codeInternalError = -32603
)
// rpcError is a JSON-RPC 2.0 error object.
type rpcError struct {
Code int `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"message"`
Data json.RawMessage `json:"data,omitempty"`
}
func (e *rpcError) Error() string {
if e == nil {
return "<nil rpc error>"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("jsonrpc error %d: %s", e.Code, e.Message)
}
// RPCError builds a protocol error to return from a handler. Use it when a
// handler needs to control the wire-level error code; any other error a handler
// returns is reported as a generic internal error.
func RPCError(code int, message string) error {
return &rpcError{Code: code, Message: message}
}
// rpcMessage is the union of request, response, and notification frames. The
// shape is disambiguated by which fields are present (per JSON-RPC 2.0):
// - request: method + id
// - notification: method, no id
// - response: id + (result | error), no method
type rpcMessage struct {
JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
ID json.RawMessage `json:"id,omitempty"`
Method string `json:"method,omitempty"`
Params json.RawMessage `json:"params,omitempty"`
Result json.RawMessage `json:"result,omitempty"`
Error *rpcError `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
func (m rpcMessage) isResponse() bool { return m.Method == "" && len(m.ID) > 0 }
func (m rpcMessage) isRequest() bool { return m.Method != "" && len(m.ID) > 0 }
func (m rpcMessage) isNotify() bool { return m.Method != "" && len(m.ID) == 0 }
// HandlerFunc handles an inbound request and returns the result to encode, or an
// error. Returning an *rpcError controls the wire code; any other error becomes
// a generic internal error.
type HandlerFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error)
// NotifyFunc handles an inbound notification (no response is sent).
type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
// Conn is a JSON-RPC 2.0 peer over a single ndjson stream pair. It both serves
// inbound requests/notifications (via registered handlers) and issues outbound
// requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
// the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
type Conn struct {
reader *bufio.Reader
w io.Writer
writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w
handlers map[string]HandlerFunc
notifiers map[string]NotifyFunc
mu sync.Mutex
nextID int64
pending map[int64]chan rpcMessage
closed bool
wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
}
// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
return &Conn{
reader: bufio.NewReader(r),
w: w,
handlers: make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
pending: make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage),
}
}
// Handle registers a request handler for method.
func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }
// HandleNotify registers a notification handler for method.
func (c *Conn) HandleNotify(method string, fn NotifyFunc) { c.notifiers[method] = fn }
// Serve runs the read loop until the stream ends, ctx is cancelled, or a fatal
// decode error occurs. Inbound requests and notifications are dispatched on
// their own goroutines so a long-running handler (e.g. session/prompt) never
// blocks the loop from delivering session/cancel or a permission response.
func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
// On exit, cancel in-flight handlers (so a blocked outbound Call unblocks via
// ctx) and then wait for them to finish writing their responses. Without this,
// a finite input stream (e.g. piped ndjson that EOFs right after a request)
// would race the dispatch goroutine and drop the response.
defer func() {
cancel()
c.wg.Wait()
}()
for {
// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
c.handleLine(ctx, line)
}
if err != nil {
c.failAllPending(err)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
}
}
}
// handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
// with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
var msg rpcMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(line), &msg); err != nil {
c.writeError(json.RawMessage("null"), &rpcError{Code: codeParseError, Message: "parse error"})
return
}
if msg.JSONRPC != "" && msg.JSONRPC != "2.0" {
if len(msg.ID) > 0 {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInvalidRequest, Message: "unsupported jsonrpc version"})
}
return
}
switch {
case msg.isResponse():
c.deliver(msg)
case msg.isRequest():
c.wg.Add(1)
go func(m rpcMessage) {
defer c.wg.Done()
c.dispatchRequest(ctx, m)
}(msg)
case msg.isNotify():
if fn := c.notifiers[msg.Method]; fn != nil {
c.wg.Add(1)
go func(m rpcMessage) {
defer c.wg.Done()
fn(ctx, m.Params)
}(msg)
}
default:
// Malformed frame; reply only if we can identify a request id.
if len(msg.ID) > 0 {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInvalidRequest, Message: "invalid request"})
}
}
}
func (c *Conn) dispatchRequest(ctx context.Context, msg rpcMessage) {
fn := c.handlers[msg.Method]
if fn == nil {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeMethodNotFound, Message: "method not found: " + msg.Method})
return
}
result, err := fn(ctx, msg.Params)
if err != nil {
var re *rpcError
if errors.As(err, &re) {
c.writeError(msg.ID, re)
} else {
c.writeError(msg.ID, &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()})
}
return
}
c.writeResult(msg.ID, result)
}
// Call issues an outbound request and blocks until the response arrives, ctx is
// cancelled, or the connection closes.
func (c *Conn) Call(ctx context.Context, method string, params any, result any) error {
raw, err := marshalParams(params)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.mu.Lock()
if c.closed {
c.mu.Unlock()
return errors.New("acp: connection closed")
}
c.nextID++
id := c.nextID
ch := make(chan rpcMessage, 1)
c.pending[id] = ch
c.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
c.mu.Lock()
delete(c.pending, id)
c.mu.Unlock()
}()
idRaw, _ := json.Marshal(id)
if err := c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: idRaw, Method: method, Params: raw}); err != nil {
return err
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case resp := <-ch:
if resp.Error != nil {
return resp.Error
}
if result != nil && len(resp.Result) > 0 {
return json.Unmarshal(resp.Result, result)
}
return nil
}
}
// Notify issues an outbound notification (no response expected).
func (c *Conn) Notify(method string, params any) error {
raw, err := marshalParams(params)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", Method: method, Params: raw})
}
func (c *Conn) deliver(msg rpcMessage) {
var id int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(msg.ID, &id); err != nil {
return
}
c.mu.Lock()
ch := c.pending[id]
delete(c.pending, id)
c.mu.Unlock()
if ch == nil {
return
}
// Non-blocking: the pending channel is cap-1 and may have been abandoned (e.g.
// a Call cancelled by session/cancel). A duplicate or late response frame must
// never block the read-loop goroutine.
select {
case ch <- msg:
default:
}
}
func (c *Conn) failAllPending(err error) {
c.mu.Lock()
c.closed = true
pending := c.pending
c.pending = make(map[int64]chan rpcMessage)
c.mu.Unlock()
for _, ch := range pending {
select {
case ch <- rpcMessage{Error: &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()}}:
default:
}
}
}
func (c *Conn) writeResult(id json.RawMessage, result any) {
raw, err := json.Marshal(result)
if err != nil {
c.writeError(id, &rpcError{Code: codeInternalError, Message: err.Error()})
return
}
_ = c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: id, Result: raw})
}
func (c *Conn) writeError(id json.RawMessage, e *rpcError) {
_ = c.write(rpcMessage{JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: id, Error: e})
}
func (c *Conn) write(msg rpcMessage) error {
msg.JSONRPC = "2.0"
data, err := json.Marshal(msg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.writeMu.Lock()
defer c.writeMu.Unlock()
if _, err := c.w.Write(append(data, '\n')); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// marshalParams encodes params, treating nil as an absent params field.
func marshalParams(params any) (json.RawMessage, error) {
if params == nil {
return nil, nil
}
if raw, ok := params.(json.RawMessage); ok {
return raw, nil
}
return json.Marshal(params)
}
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package acp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"testing"
"time"
)
// connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
t.Helper()
ar, bw := io.Pipe() // b -> a
br, aw := io.Pipe() // a -> b
a = NewConn(ar, aw)
b = NewConn(br, bw)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
go func() { _ = a.Serve(ctx) }()
go func() { _ = b.Serve(ctx) }()
return a, b, func() {
cancel()
_ = aw.Close()
_ = bw.Close()
}
}
func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
b.Handle("add", func(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var in struct{ X, Y int }
if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &in); err != nil {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "bad params")
}
return map[string]int{"sum": in.X + in.Y}, nil
})
var out struct{ Sum int }
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := a.Call(ctx, "add", map[string]int{"X": 2, "Y": 3}, &out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("call: %v", err)
}
if out.Sum != 5 {
t.Fatalf("sum = %d, want 5", out.Sum)
}
}
func TestConnNotification(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
got := make(chan string, 1)
b.HandleNotify("ping", func(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
var in struct{ Msg string }
_ = json.Unmarshal(params, &in)
got <- in.Msg
})
if err := a.Notify("ping", map[string]string{"Msg": "hello"}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("notify: %v", err)
}
select {
case msg := <-got:
if msg != "hello" {
t.Fatalf("got %q, want hello", msg)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("notification not delivered")
}
}
func TestConnMethodNotFound(t *testing.T) {
a, _, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := a.Call(ctx, "does_not_exist", nil, nil)
var re *rpcError
if !asRPCError(err, &re) {
t.Fatalf("expected rpcError, got %v", err)
}
if re.Code != codeMethodNotFound {
t.Fatalf("code = %d, want %d", re.Code, codeMethodNotFound)
}
}
func TestConnHandlerError(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
b.Handle("boom", func(_ context.Context, _ json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "nope")
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
err := a.Call(ctx, "boom", nil, nil)
var re *rpcError
if !asRPCError(err, &re) || re.Code != codeInvalidParams {
t.Fatalf("expected invalid-params rpcError, got %v", err)
}
}
// TestConnBidirectionalDuringHandler proves that while one peer is inside a
// request handler it can issue an outbound request back to the caller and the
// caller answers it — exactly the session/prompt -> session/request_permission
// pattern. If the read loop blocked on the handler, this would deadlock.
func TestConnBidirectionalDuringHandler(t *testing.T) {
a, b, stop := connPair(t)
defer stop()
// a answers an "approve?" callback.
a.Handle("approve", func(_ context.Context, _ json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
return map[string]bool{"ok": true}, nil
})
// b's "run" handler calls back to a mid-flight.
b.Handle("run", func(ctx context.Context, _ json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
var approval struct{ OK bool }
if err := b.Call(ctx, "approve", nil, &approval); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return map[string]bool{"ran": approval.OK}, nil
})
var out struct{ Ran bool }
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := a.Call(ctx, "run", nil, &out); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("run: %v", err)
}
if !out.Ran {
t.Fatal("expected ran=true via mid-handler callback")
}
}
// TestConnSurvivesMalformedLine proves a single bad ndjson line yields a -32700
// and does NOT tear down the connection — a following valid request still works.
func TestConnSurvivesMalformedLine(t *testing.T) {
clientR, serverW := io.Pipe() // server -> client
serverR, clientW := io.Pipe() // client -> server
server := NewConn(serverR, serverW)
server.Handle("ping", func(_ context.Context, _ json.RawMessage) (any, error) { return "pong", nil })
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer func() {
cancel()
_ = serverW.Close()
_ = clientW.Close()
}()
go func() { _ = server.Serve(ctx) }()
go func() {
_, _ = clientW.Write([]byte("this is not json\n"))
_, _ = clientW.Write([]byte(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"ping"}` + "\n"))
}()
dec := json.NewDecoder(clientR)
var sawParseError, sawPong bool
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
var msg struct {
Result any `json:"result"`
Error *struct {
Code int `json:"code"`
} `json:"error"`
}
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() { done <- dec.Decode(&msg) }()
select {
case err := <-done:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response %d: %v", i, err)
}
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for a response")
}
if msg.Error != nil && msg.Error.Code == codeParseError {
sawParseError = true
}
if r, ok := msg.Result.(string); ok && r == "pong" {
sawPong = true
}
}
if !sawParseError {
t.Error("expected a -32700 parse error for the malformed line")
}
if !sawPong {
t.Error("expected the valid request to still be answered (connection survived the bad line)")
}
}
func asRPCError(err error, target **rpcError) bool {
re, ok := err.(*rpcError)
if ok {
*target = re
}
return ok
}
+125
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package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
)
// permission.go maps ZERO's permission prompt model onto ACP's
// session/request_permission request/option/outcome model. The option id on the
// wire carries the ZERO decision action verbatim, so mapping the client's
// selection back to a ZERO decision is exact and lossless.
// buildPermissionOptions turns the decisions ZERO offers for a tool call into ACP
// PermissionOptions. Only the actions ZERO actually presented (AvailableDecisions)
// are surfaced; the optionId is the ZERO action string for a clean round-trip.
func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
actions := req.AvailableDecisions
if len(actions) == 0 {
// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
actions = []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
}
options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
for _, action := range actions {
kind, name := optionKindFor(action)
if kind == "" {
continue // skip actions that have no clean ACP option (e.g. cancel)
}
options = append(options, PermissionOption{
OptionID: string(action),
Name: name,
Kind: kind,
})
}
return options
}
// optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
// human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
// outcome rather than an option (cancel).
func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
switch action {
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, "Allow this command for the session"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow:
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow"
case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix:
return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow this command"
case agent.PermissionDecisionDeny:
return PermRejectOnce, "Reject"
case agent.PermissionDecisionCancel:
return "", "" // expressed as outcome=cancelled, not an option
default:
return "", ""
}
}
// decisionFromOutcome maps the client's permission outcome back to a ZERO
// decision. A cancelled outcome cancels the run; a selected option id is the ZERO
// action verbatim (validated against what was offered); anything unrecognized
// fails closed to deny.
func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
switch outcome.Outcome {
case OutcomeCancelled:
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}
case OutcomeSelected:
action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)
// Bind to what was actually offered for THIS call: a client must not be able
// to return a broader grant (always_allow / allow_for_session) that wasn't
// presented. Anything not offered fails closed to deny.
if actionOffered(action, offered) {
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: action}
}
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission option was not offered"}
default:
return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "no permission outcome"}
}
}
func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
for _, a := range offered {
if a == action {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// permissionToolCall builds the ToolCall descriptor embedded in a
// session/request_permission request from a ZERO permission request.
func permissionToolCall(req agent.PermissionRequest) ToolCallUpdate {
args := marshalArgs(req.Args)
return ToolCallUpdate{
ToolCallID: req.ToolCallID,
Title: toolTitle(req.ToolName, string(args)),
Kind: toolKindFor(req.ToolName),
Status: ToolStatusPending,
RawInput: rawInputBytes(args),
}
}
func marshalArgs(args map[string]any) []byte {
if len(args) == 0 {
return nil
}
data, err := json.Marshal(args)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return data
}
func rawInputBytes(data []byte) json.RawMessage {
if len(data) == 0 || !json.Valid(data) {
return nil
}
return json.RawMessage(data)
}
+81
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package acp
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
)
func TestBuildPermissionOptions(t *testing.T) {
req := agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "tc1",
ToolName: "bash",
AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, // must be dropped (expressed as outcome)
},
}
opts := buildPermissionOptions(req)
if len(opts) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("expected 4 options (cancel dropped), got %d: %+v", len(opts), opts)
}
// optionId must carry the ZERO action verbatim for a clean round trip.
if opts[0].OptionID != string(agent.PermissionDecisionAllow) || opts[0].Kind != PermAllowOnce {
t.Errorf("allow option = %+v", opts[0])
}
if opts[1].Kind != PermAllowAlways || opts[3].Kind != PermRejectOnce {
t.Errorf("kinds = %q, %q", opts[1].Kind, opts[3].Kind)
}
}
func TestBuildPermissionOptionsDefault(t *testing.T) {
opts := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "x"})
if len(opts) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected default allow+deny, got %d", len(opts))
}
}
func TestDecisionFromOutcome(t *testing.T) {
offered := []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
}
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
t.Errorf("cancelled -> %q, want cancel", d.Action)
}
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: "allow"}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllow {
t.Errorf("selected allow -> %q", d.Action)
}
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: "always_allow"}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow {
t.Errorf("selected always_allow -> %q", d.Action)
}
// Unknown option fails closed to deny.
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: "bogus"}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Errorf("unknown option -> %q, want deny", d.Action)
}
// Missing/empty outcome fails closed to deny.
if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
t.Errorf("empty outcome -> %q, want deny", d.Action)
}
}
func TestPermissionToolCall(t *testing.T) {
tc := permissionToolCall(agent.PermissionRequest{
ToolCallID: "tc9",
ToolName: "read_file",
Args: map[string]any{"path": "a.go"},
})
if tc.ToolCallID != "tc9" || tc.Kind != ToolKindRead || tc.Status != ToolStatusPending {
t.Fatalf("unexpected toolCall: %+v", tc)
}
if tc.Title != "read_file a.go" {
t.Errorf("title = %q", tc.Title)
}
if len(tc.RawInput) == 0 {
t.Error("expected rawInput from args")
}
}
+214
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package acp
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// translate.go maps ZERO's agent events onto ACP session/update payloads. The
// mapping functions are pure (no I/O) so they can be unit-tested directly; the
// notifier wires them to a live JSON-RPC connection.
func agentMessageChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentMessageChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
func agentThoughtChunk(delta string) ContentChunk {
return ContentChunk{SessionUpdate: UpdateAgentThoughtChunk, Content: TextBlock(delta)}
}
// toolKindFor maps a ZERO tool name to the closest ACP ToolKind so editors can
// pick an icon/affordance. Unknown tools fall back to "other".
func toolKindFor(name string) string {
switch name {
case "read_file", "read_minified_file", "list_directory":
return ToolKindRead
case "glob", "grep":
return ToolKindSearch
case "write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch":
return ToolKindEdit
case "bash", "exec_command", "write_stdin":
return ToolKindExecute
case "web_fetch", "web_search":
return ToolKindFetch
case "update_plan":
return ToolKindThink
default:
return ToolKindOther
}
}
// toolTitle builds a concise human title, e.g. "read_file src/main.go".
func toolTitle(name, rawArgs string) string {
if hint := primaryArgHint(rawArgs); hint != "" {
return name + " " + hint
}
return name
}
// primaryArgHint extracts the most relevant argument (path/pattern/command) from
// raw JSON arguments. Best-effort; returns "" when it can't parse.
func primaryArgHint(rawArgs string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(rawArgs) == "" {
return ""
}
var m map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(rawArgs), &m); err != nil {
return ""
}
for _, key := range []string{"path", "file_path", "pattern", "query", "command", "url", "cwd"} {
if v, ok := m[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(v) != "" {
return truncateHint(v)
}
}
return ""
}
func truncateHint(s string) string {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
const max = 60
if len(s) > max {
return s[:max] + "…"
}
return s
}
// rawInput returns the tool arguments as a raw JSON object when they parse, else
// nil (so a malformed/empty arg string never produces invalid JSON on the wire).
func rawInput(args string) json.RawMessage {
if strings.TrimSpace(args) == "" || !json.Valid([]byte(args)) {
return nil
}
return json.RawMessage(args)
}
// toolCallStart maps an advertised ZERO tool call to the initial ACP "tool_call"
// update (status in_progress — ZERO executes immediately after advertising).
func toolCallStart(call agent.ToolCall) ToolCallUpdate {
return ToolCallUpdate{
SessionUpdate: UpdateToolCall,
ToolCallID: call.ID,
Title: toolTitle(call.Name, call.Arguments),
Kind: toolKindFor(call.Name),
Status: ToolStatusInProgress,
RawInput: rawInput(call.Arguments),
}
}
// toolCallResult maps a finished ZERO tool result to a "tool_call_update".
func toolCallResult(result agent.ToolResult) ToolCallUpdate {
status := ToolStatusCompleted
if result.Status == tools.StatusError {
status = ToolStatusFailed
}
upd := ToolCallUpdate{
SessionUpdate: UpdateToolCallUpdate,
ToolCallID: result.ToolCallID,
Status: status,
}
if content := toolResultContent(result); len(content) > 0 {
upd.Content = content
}
if locs := toolResultLocations(result); len(locs) > 0 {
upd.Locations = locs
}
return upd
}
func toolResultContent(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallContent {
text := strings.TrimRight(result.Output, "\n")
if text == "" {
text = result.Display.Summary
}
if text == "" {
return nil
}
return []ToolCallContent{ToolContent(TextBlock(text))}
}
func toolResultLocations(result agent.ToolResult) []ToolCallLocation {
locs := make([]ToolCallLocation, 0, len(result.ChangedFiles))
for _, f := range result.ChangedFiles {
if strings.TrimSpace(f) == "" {
continue
}
locs = append(locs, ToolCallLocation{Path: f})
}
return locs
}
// planUpdate maps ZERO's plan items to an ACP "plan" update.
func planUpdate(items []tools.PlanItem) PlanUpdate {
entries := make([]PlanEntry, 0, len(items))
for _, it := range items {
entries = append(entries, PlanEntry{
Content: it.Content,
Priority: PlanPriorityMedium,
Status: planStatusToACP(it.Status),
})
}
return PlanUpdate{SessionUpdate: UpdatePlan, Entries: entries}
}
// planStatusToACP maps ZERO's plan status (pending/in_progress/completed/failed)
// to ACP's PlanEntryStatus (which has no "failed"; a failed step is terminal, so
// it maps to completed).
func planStatusToACP(s string) string {
switch s {
case "in_progress":
return PlanStatusInProgress
case "completed", "failed":
return PlanStatusCompleted
default:
return PlanStatusPending
}
}
// promptText concatenates the text content blocks of an inbound prompt.
func promptText(blocks []ContentBlock) string {
var b strings.Builder
for _, blk := range blocks {
if blk.Type == "text" {
b.WriteString(blk.Text)
}
}
return b.String()
}
// notifier sends translated updates over a connection for one session.
type notifier struct {
conn *Conn
sessionID string
}
func (n *notifier) send(update any) {
_ = n.conn.Notify(MethodSessionUpdate, SessionNotification{SessionID: n.sessionID, Update: update})
}
func (n *notifier) text(delta string) {
if delta != "" {
n.send(agentMessageChunk(delta))
}
}
func (n *notifier) thought(delta string) {
if delta != "" {
n.send(agentThoughtChunk(delta))
}
}
func (n *notifier) toolCall(call agent.ToolCall) { n.send(toolCallStart(call)) }
func (n *notifier) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) { n.send(toolCallResult(result)) }
func (n *notifier) plan(items []tools.PlanItem) {
if len(items) > 0 {
n.send(planUpdate(items))
}
}
func (n *notifier) currentMode(modeID string) {
n.send(CurrentModeUpdate{SessionUpdate: UpdateCurrentMode, CurrentModeID: modeID})
}
+128
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package acp
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestAgentMessageAndThoughtChunks(t *testing.T) {
m := agentMessageChunk("hello")
if m.SessionUpdate != UpdateAgentMessageChunk || m.Content.Type != "text" || m.Content.Text != "hello" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected message chunk: %+v", m)
}
th := agentThoughtChunk("thinking")
if th.SessionUpdate != UpdateAgentThoughtChunk || th.Content.Text != "thinking" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected thought chunk: %+v", th)
}
}
func TestToolKindFor(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"read_file": ToolKindRead,
"list_directory": ToolKindRead,
"grep": ToolKindSearch,
"glob": ToolKindSearch,
"edit_file": ToolKindEdit,
"apply_patch": ToolKindEdit,
"bash": ToolKindExecute,
"exec_command": ToolKindExecute,
"web_fetch": ToolKindFetch,
"update_plan": ToolKindThink,
"some_mcp_tool": ToolKindOther,
}
for name, want := range cases {
if got := toolKindFor(name); got != want {
t.Errorf("toolKindFor(%q) = %q, want %q", name, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestToolTitleAndHint(t *testing.T) {
if got := toolTitle("read_file", `{"path":"src/main.go"}`); got != "read_file src/main.go" {
t.Errorf("title = %q", got)
}
if got := toolTitle("bash", `{"command":"go test ./..."}`); got != "bash go test ./..." {
t.Errorf("title = %q", got)
}
if got := toolTitle("mystery", `not json`); got != "mystery" {
t.Errorf("malformed args should yield bare name, got %q", got)
}
if got := toolTitle("noargs", ``); got != "noargs" {
t.Errorf("empty args should yield bare name, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestToolCallStart(t *testing.T) {
upd := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "tc1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`})
if upd.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCall {
t.Fatalf("sessionUpdate = %q", upd.SessionUpdate)
}
if upd.ToolCallID != "tc1" || upd.Status != ToolStatusInProgress || upd.Kind != ToolKindRead {
t.Fatalf("unexpected start: %+v", upd)
}
if string(upd.RawInput) != `{"path":"a.go"}` {
t.Fatalf("rawInput = %s", upd.RawInput)
}
// Malformed args must not produce invalid JSON on the wire.
if got := toolCallStart(agent.ToolCall{ID: "x", Name: "bash", Arguments: "broken"}); got.RawInput != nil {
t.Fatalf("malformed args should drop rawInput, got %s", got.RawInput)
}
}
func TestToolCallResult(t *testing.T) {
ok := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{
ToolCallID: "tc1",
Name: "edit_file",
Status: tools.StatusOK,
Output: "applied\n",
ChangedFiles: []string{"a.go", ""},
})
if ok.SessionUpdate != UpdateToolCallUpdate || ok.Status != ToolStatusCompleted {
t.Fatalf("unexpected ok result: %+v", ok)
}
if len(ok.Content) != 1 || ok.Content[0].Type != "content" || ok.Content[0].Content.Text != "applied" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected content: %+v", ok.Content)
}
if len(ok.Locations) != 1 || ok.Locations[0].Path != "a.go" {
t.Fatalf("blank changed files should be dropped, got %+v", ok.Locations)
}
failed := toolCallResult(agent.ToolResult{ToolCallID: "tc2", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "boom"})
if failed.Status != ToolStatusFailed {
t.Fatalf("error result should be failed, got %q", failed.Status)
}
}
func TestPlanUpdateAndStatus(t *testing.T) {
upd := planUpdate([]tools.PlanItem{
{Content: "step a", Status: "completed"},
{Content: "step b", Status: "in_progress"},
{Content: "step c", Status: "failed"},
{Content: "step d", Status: "weird"},
})
if upd.SessionUpdate != UpdatePlan || len(upd.Entries) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected plan: %+v", upd)
}
want := []string{PlanStatusCompleted, PlanStatusInProgress, PlanStatusCompleted, PlanStatusPending}
for i, w := range want {
if upd.Entries[i].Status != w {
t.Errorf("entry %d status = %q, want %q", i, upd.Entries[i].Status, w)
}
if upd.Entries[i].Priority != PlanPriorityMedium {
t.Errorf("entry %d priority = %q", i, upd.Entries[i].Priority)
}
}
}
func TestPromptText(t *testing.T) {
got := promptText([]ContentBlock{
TextBlock("hello "),
ImageBlock("base64", "image/png"),
TextBlock("world"),
})
if got != "hello world" {
t.Fatalf("promptText = %q", got)
}
}
+378
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
package acp
import "encoding/json"
// ProtocolVersion is the ACP protocol version ZERO speaks. Wire compatibility is
// negotiated during initialize; v1 is the current stable version.
const ProtocolVersion = 1
// Method names exactly as they appear on the wire (public ACP spec).
const (
MethodInitialize = "initialize"
MethodAuthenticate = "authenticate"
MethodSessionNew = "session/new"
MethodSessionLoad = "session/load"
MethodSessionPrompt = "session/prompt"
MethodSessionCancel = "session/cancel" // notification
MethodSessionUpdate = "session/update" // notification (agent -> client)
MethodSessionSetMode = "session/set_mode"
MethodSessionSetConfigOption = "session/set_config_option"
MethodSessionRequestPerm = "session/request_permission" // agent -> client
MethodFSReadTextFile = "fs/read_text_file" // agent -> client
MethodFSWriteTextFile = "fs/write_text_file" // agent -> client
// Vendor-prefixed ZERO extensions (clients that don't support them ignore the
// method and degrade cleanly, per the spec's _-prefixed convention).
MethodZeroSetModel = "_zero/set_model"
)
// SessionUpdate discriminator values (the "sessionUpdate" field).
const (
UpdateAgentMessageChunk = "agent_message_chunk"
UpdateAgentThoughtChunk = "agent_thought_chunk"
UpdateUserMessageChunk = "user_message_chunk"
UpdateToolCall = "tool_call"
UpdateToolCallUpdate = "tool_call_update"
UpdatePlan = "plan"
UpdateAvailableCommands = "available_commands_update"
UpdateCurrentMode = "current_mode_update"
)
// ---- initialize ----
type Implementation struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"`
}
type FileSystemCapabilities struct {
ReadTextFile bool `json:"readTextFile"`
WriteTextFile bool `json:"writeTextFile"`
}
type ClientCapabilities struct {
FS FileSystemCapabilities `json:"fs"`
Terminal bool `json:"terminal"`
}
type PromptCapabilities struct {
Image bool `json:"image"`
Audio bool `json:"audio"`
EmbeddedContext bool `json:"embeddedContext"`
}
type AgentCapabilities struct {
LoadSession bool `json:"loadSession"`
PromptCapabilities PromptCapabilities `json:"promptCapabilities"`
}
type AuthMethod struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
}
type InitializeParams struct {
ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocolVersion"`
ClientCapabilities ClientCapabilities `json:"clientCapabilities"`
ClientInfo *Implementation `json:"clientInfo,omitempty"`
}
type InitializeResult struct {
ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocolVersion"`
AgentCapabilities AgentCapabilities `json:"agentCapabilities"`
AgentInfo *Implementation `json:"agentInfo,omitempty"`
AuthMethods []AuthMethod `json:"authMethods"`
}
// ---- content blocks ----
// ContentBlock is the polymorphic content type. ZERO emits "text" (and "image"
// on tool content); it parses "text", "image", and "resource"/"resource_link"
// from inbound prompts. A single struct with omitempty fields covers both
// directions since the field names do not collide across the variants ZERO uses.
type ContentBlock struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Text string `json:"text,omitempty"`
Data string `json:"data,omitempty"` // image/audio: base64
MimeType string `json:"mimeType,omitempty"` // image/audio
URI string `json:"uri,omitempty"` // resource_link
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"` // resource_link
Resource json.RawMessage `json:"resource,omitempty"` // embedded resource
}
func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }
func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
}
// ---- sessions ----
// McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
// configuration (BYOK), so these are accepted for spec compliance; ZERO's
// configured servers remain authoritative.
type McpServer struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
Args []string `json:"args,omitempty"`
Env json.RawMessage `json:"env,omitempty"`
URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
}
type NewSessionParams struct {
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
}
type NewSessionResult struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
ConfigOptions []SessionConfigOption `json:"configOptions,omitempty"`
Modes *SessionModeState `json:"modes,omitempty"`
}
type LoadSessionParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
McpServers []McpServer `json:"mcpServers"`
AdditionalDirectories []string `json:"additionalDirectories,omitempty"`
}
type LoadSessionResult struct {
ConfigOptions []SessionConfigOption `json:"configOptions,omitempty"`
Modes *SessionModeState `json:"modes,omitempty"`
}
// ---- prompt turn ----
type PromptParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Prompt []ContentBlock `json:"prompt"`
}
// StopReason values (why a prompt turn ended).
const (
StopEndTurn = "end_turn"
StopMaxTokens = "max_tokens"
StopRefusal = "refusal"
StopCancelled = "cancelled"
)
type PromptResult struct {
StopReason string `json:"stopReason"`
}
type CancelParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
}
// ---- session/update notification ----
type SessionNotification struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Update any `json:"update"`
}
// AgentMessageChunk / AgentThoughtChunk / UserMessageChunk all carry a single
// ContentBlock under "content"; the variant is set via SessionUpdate.
type ContentChunk struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
Content ContentBlock `json:"content"`
}
// ToolKind classifies a tool call for client rendering.
const (
ToolKindRead = "read"
ToolKindEdit = "edit"
ToolKindDelete = "delete"
ToolKindMove = "move"
ToolKindSearch = "search"
ToolKindExecute = "execute"
ToolKindThink = "think"
ToolKindFetch = "fetch"
ToolKindOther = "other"
)
// ToolCallStatus values.
const (
ToolStatusPending = "pending"
ToolStatusInProgress = "in_progress"
ToolStatusCompleted = "completed"
ToolStatusFailed = "failed"
)
// ToolCallUpdate is used for both the initial "tool_call" and subsequent
// "tool_call_update" notifications (distinguished by SessionUpdate). It also
// appears inside session/request_permission.
type ToolCallUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate,omitempty"`
ToolCallID string `json:"toolCallId"`
Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
RawInput json.RawMessage `json:"rawInput,omitempty"`
Content []ToolCallContent `json:"content,omitempty"`
Locations []ToolCallLocation `json:"locations,omitempty"`
}
// ToolCallContent is a tool call's rendered output. ZERO emits "content" (a
// text/image block) and "diff" (a file change); "terminal" is part of the spec
// but unused because ZERO executes locally.
type ToolCallContent struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
// type == "content"
Content *ContentBlock `json:"content,omitempty"`
// type == "diff"
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
OldText string `json:"oldText,omitempty"`
NewText string `json:"newText,omitempty"`
}
func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
}
func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
}
type ToolCallLocation struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Line *int `json:"line,omitempty"`
}
// ---- plan ----
const (
PlanStatusPending = "pending"
PlanStatusInProgress = "in_progress"
PlanStatusCompleted = "completed"
PlanPriorityHigh = "high"
PlanPriorityMedium = "medium"
PlanPriorityLow = "low"
)
type PlanEntry struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Priority string `json:"priority"`
Status string `json:"status"`
}
type PlanUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
Entries []PlanEntry `json:"entries"`
}
type AvailableCommand struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
type AvailableCommandsUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
AvailableCommands []AvailableCommand `json:"availableCommands"`
}
type CurrentModeUpdate struct {
SessionUpdate string `json:"sessionUpdate"`
CurrentModeID string `json:"currentModeId"`
}
// ---- permissions ----
const (
PermAllowOnce = "allow_once"
PermAllowAlways = "allow_always"
PermRejectOnce = "reject_once"
PermRejectAlways = "reject_always"
)
type PermissionOption struct {
OptionID string `json:"optionId"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
}
type RequestPermissionParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
ToolCall ToolCallUpdate `json:"toolCall"`
Options []PermissionOption `json:"options"`
}
// RequestPermissionOutcome is a tagged union: {"outcome":"cancelled"} or
// {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"..."}.
type RequestPermissionOutcome struct {
Outcome string `json:"outcome"`
OptionID string `json:"optionId,omitempty"`
}
const (
OutcomeSelected = "selected"
OutcomeCancelled = "cancelled"
)
type RequestPermissionResult struct {
Outcome RequestPermissionOutcome `json:"outcome"`
}
// ---- session modes ----
type SessionMode struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
}
type SessionModeState struct {
CurrentModeID string `json:"currentModeId"`
AvailableModes []SessionMode `json:"availableModes"`
}
type SetSessionModeParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
ModeID string `json:"modeId"`
}
type SetSessionModeResult struct{}
// ---- session config options (model selection) ----
type SessionConfigOptionValue struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
type SessionConfigOption struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
Value string `json:"value"`
Values []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"values,omitempty"`
}
type SetSessionConfigOptionParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
ConfigID string `json:"configId"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
type SetSessionConfigOptionResult struct {
ConfigOptions []SessionConfigOption `json:"configOptions"`
}
// ---- vendor: _zero/set_model ----
type ZeroSetModelParams struct {
SessionID string `json:"sessionId"`
Model string `json:"model"`
}
type ZeroSetModelResult struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
}
// configIDModel is the SessionConfigOption id ZERO uses to expose model choice
// through the standard session/set_config_option method.
const configIDModel = "model"
+228
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func enabledSelfCorrector(t *testing.T) *SelfCorrector {
t.Helper()
// checker/verifier nil → no LSP / project-test pass runs; we only need a
// non-nil SelfCorrector to enable the task-grounded acceptance gate.
return NewSelfCorrector(t.TempDir(), nil, nil, SelfCorrectConfig{Enabled: true})
}
// BUG #2(a): a final message that admits the model guessed / could not meet the
// objective must be reported as INCOMPLETE, never success — and immediately
// (an admitted guess is not worth re-prompting).
func TestAcceptanceSelfReportAdmissionIsIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("I couldn't analyze the board image, so I wrote the common opening move e2e4 as my best guess."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write the best chess move", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
SelfCorrect: enabledSelfCorrector(t),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("admitted guess must be Incomplete, got success; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.IncompleteReason, "objective was not met") {
t.Fatalf("IncompleteReason = %q, want it to cite the admission", result.IncompleteReason)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("an admission should downgrade immediately (1 turn), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
}
// BUG #2(a): the inability detector must generalize over the verb the model uses
// (so re-phrasing can't defeat it) while NOT misreading success-y negations
// ("could not find any issues") as admissions.
func TestSelfReportedIncompletionMatching(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
text string
admit bool
}{
// real chess re-run wording that slipped a fixed phrase list:
{"…which I cannot do without proper image analysis capabilities.", true},
{"I cannot visually analyze the chess board image.", true},
{"I could not recover the original values, so this is my best guess.", true},
{"I was unable to complete the optimization.", true},
{"The result may not be correct.", true},
// multi-occurrence: an early guarded use ("could not find any") must NOT mask a
// later genuine admission with the same stem (review #5):
{"I could not find any examples in the codebase, so I could not implement the feature.", true},
// genuine successes that must NOT be flagged:
{"I implemented the function and all tests pass.", false},
{"I verified the fix; I could not find any remaining issues.", false},
{"I cannot reproduce the bug, so the fix holds.", false},
{"Done — the output matches the required format and values.", false},
// behavior descriptions that must NOT be flagged — these phrases describe
// implemented behavior, not an admission (review #1, removed from the list):
{"The parser will fall back to UTF-8 when no encoding is set.", false},
{"I replaced the placeholder value with the computed key.", false},
{"The retry uses exponential backoff as a fallback.", false},
{"Without proper error handling the function would crash, so I added it.", false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
got := selfReportedIncompletion(c.text) != ""
if got != c.admit {
t.Errorf("selfReportedIncompletion(%q) admitted=%v, want %v", c.text, got, c.admit)
}
}
}
// BUG #2(a): a "cannot analyze / cannot determine" admission (present tense) must
// be caught even when the model also stamps a bogus "PASS" based on a shape check.
// Mirrors the chess-best-move final ("I cannot analyze the position… PASS: I wrote
// the move and verified by reading it back").
func TestAcceptanceCannotPhrasingIsIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("I cannot analyze the specific position from the image, so I cannot determine the best move. PASS: I wrote e2e4 to the file and verified it by reading it back."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write the best move", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
SelfCorrect: enabledSelfCorrector(t),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("a 'cannot analyze/determine' admission must be Incomplete despite the bogus PASS; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
}
// A pending/in_progress update_plan item is an AMBIGUOUS signal (the model may have
// finished without re-marking the step), so it must NOT by itself force INCOMPLETE.
// The gate nudges, but if the model keeps claiming completion with no continuation
// cue and no admission, the run finalizes as SUCCESS — trusting the completion claim
// over stale plan bookkeeping. (Only a continuation cue or self-report admission
// forces INCOMPLETE; see TestCompletionGate* and TestAcceptance*Admission*.)
func TestPendingPlanAloneDoesNotForceIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
done := "All set." // confident; no cue, no admission — only the plan is stale
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
planTurn("completed", "in_progress"),
textTurn(done), textTurn(done), textTurn(done), textTurn(done), textTurn(done),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "do the multi-step task", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
SelfCorrect: enabledSelfCorrector(t),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("pending-plan alone must NOT force Incomplete (stale bookkeeping != unfinished); reason=%q", result.IncompleteReason)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != done {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want the completion claim %q", result.FinalAnswer, done)
}
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, continueNudgeMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected at least one continue-nudge before accepting completion")
}
}
// BUG #2(b): when self-correct is on, the run must pass a one-time task-grounded
// acceptance check before success. A model that, when challenged, confirms its
// work meets the criterion (no admission) then finalizes as success — no regression.
func TestAcceptanceGroundedCompletionSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("I implemented the function."),
textTurn("PASS. I ran the verification and it passes; the output meets the task requirement."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "implement the function", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
SelfCorrect: enabledSelfCorrector(t),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("a verified completion must succeed, got Incomplete (%q)", result.IncompleteReason)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "PASS. I ran the verification and it passes; the output meets the task requirement." {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
// Exactly one acceptance pass: the first "done" turn was challenged, the second confirmed.
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 turns (1 acceptance challenge + 1 confirmation), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, acceptanceNudgeMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected the task-grounded acceptance check to be demanded")
}
}
// With the gate OFF (interactive/TUI default), even an admission is accepted as the
// final answer exactly as before — proving no behavior change for non-headless callers.
func TestAcceptanceGateOffLeavesAdmissionAsSuccess(t *testing.T) {
admission := "I couldn't determine the value, so this is a guess."
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn(admission),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "do a thing", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
// RequireCompletionSignal false, SelfCorrect nil — the legacy path.
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("legacy path must never set Incomplete; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != admission {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want the text verbatim (legacy behavior)", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("legacy path must not re-prompt; got %d turns", len(provider.requests))
}
}
// The acceptance check is scoped to runs with self-correct on: a headless run
// WITHOUT a SelfCorrector accepts a confident completion immediately (the (b) gate
// is inert), so enabling RequireCompletionSignal alone adds no acceptance turn.
func TestAcceptanceGateRequiresSelfCorrect(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("Done. Implemented and it works."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "implement it", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
// SelfCorrect deliberately nil → acceptance gate (b) must not fire.
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("confident completion without self-correct must succeed; reason=%q", result.IncompleteReason)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("acceptance gate must not fire without self-correct; got %d turns", len(provider.requests))
}
if someRequestContains(provider.requests, acceptanceNudgeMarker) {
t.Fatalf("acceptance nudge must not be injected when self-correct is off")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
// omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
// validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
// must be rejected as a plain tool error BEFORE any permission prompt, not
// surfaced as a confusing "approved but denied" prompt outcome.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if promptCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
}
}
// The mismatched-flag case (additional_permissions present without the
// sandbox_permissions flag) must be rejected the same way.
func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %q, want error", result.Status)
}
if promptCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want 0 (must reject before prompting)", promptCalls)
}
}
// The rejection message must show a concrete, correctly-shaped example: a
// model that gets this wrong once (attaching sandbox_permissions out of habit
// from an earlier call, without a valid payload) needs enough in the error to
// self-correct on retry instead of repeating the identical mistake.
func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
result, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"ping example.com","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
}
}
// A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
// permission prompt: this fix only rejects malformed payloads.
func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))
promptCalls := 0
_, err := executeToolCall(
context.Background(),
registry,
ToolCall{
ID: "c1",
Name: "bash",
Arguments: `{"command":"echo hi","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
`"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`,
},
PermissionModeAuto,
Options{
OnPermissionRequest: func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
promptCalls++
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny}, nil
},
},
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
}
if promptCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
}
}
+498
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,498 @@
package agent
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"mvdan.cc/sh/v3/syntax"
)
func proposedCommandPrefix(toolName string, args map[string]any) []string {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
return nil
}
command, ok := firstStringArg(args, "command", "cmd", "script", "shell")
if !ok {
return nil
}
segments, ok := safeShellCommandSegments(command)
if !ok {
return nil
}
if requested, ok := requestedPrefixRule(args); ok {
if safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(requested, segments) {
return requested
}
return nil
}
for _, tokens := range segments {
if !knownSafeCommandSegment(tokens) && sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(tokens) {
return append([]string(nil), tokens...)
}
}
if len(segments) == 0 || !sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(segments[0]) {
return nil
}
return append([]string(nil), segments[0]...)
}
func matchCommandPrefix(toolName string, args map[string]any, options Options) (sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant, bool, bool) {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || options.Sandbox == nil {
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
if shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
command, ok := firstStringArg(args, "command", "cmd", "script", "shell")
if !ok {
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
segments, ok := safeShellCommandSegments(command)
if !ok {
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
var matched sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant
matchedAny := false
matchedSession := false
for _, tokens := range segments {
if grant, ok := options.Sandbox.LookupCommandPrefix(toolName, tokens); ok {
if !matchedAny {
matched = grant
}
matchedAny = true
continue
}
if grant, ok := options.Sandbox.LookupCommandPrefixForSession(toolName, tokens); ok {
if !matchedAny {
matched = grant
}
matchedAny = true
matchedSession = true
continue
}
if knownSafeCommandSegment(tokens) {
continue
}
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
if matchedAny {
return matched, true, matchedSession
}
return sandbox.CommandPrefixGrant{}, false, false
}
func shellExecutionArgsForApproval(toolName string, args map[string]any, action PermissionDecisionAction, options Options) map[string]any {
if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || !shellPrefixApprovalBypassesSandbox(action) {
return args
}
if options.Sandbox == nil || !options.Sandbox.UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed() {
return args
}
if shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) || shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
return args
}
planned := cloneArgs(args)
if planned == nil {
planned = map[string]any{}
}
planned["sandbox_permissions"] = string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated)
return planned
}
func shellPrefixApprovalBypassesSandbox(action PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
return action == PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix || action == PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix
}
func shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args map[string]any) bool {
raw, ok := args["sandbox_permissions"]
if !ok || raw == nil {
return false
}
value, ok := raw.(string)
if !ok {
value = fmt.Sprint(raw)
}
return strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated)
}
func isShellCommandTool(toolName string) bool {
return toolName == "bash" || toolName == "exec_command"
}
func firstStringArg(args map[string]any, names ...string) (string, bool) {
for _, name := range names {
if raw, ok := args[name].(string); ok {
value := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if value != "" {
return value, true
}
}
}
return "", false
}
func requestedPrefixRule(args map[string]any) ([]string, bool) {
raw, ok := args["prefix_rule"]
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
switch value := raw.(type) {
case []string:
return cleanPrefixRule(value), true
case []any:
out := make([]string, 0, len(value))
for _, item := range value {
part, ok := item.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, true
}
out = append(out, part)
}
return cleanPrefixRule(out), true
default:
return nil, true
}
}
func cleanPrefixRule(prefix []string) []string {
cleaned := make([]string, 0, len(prefix))
for _, part := range prefix {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
return nil
}
cleaned = append(cleaned, part)
}
return cleaned
}
func safeRequestedPrefix(prefix []string, command []string) bool {
return safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(prefix, [][]string{command})
}
func safeRequestedPrefixForSegments(prefix []string, segments [][]string) bool {
if len(prefix) == 0 || !sandbox.ValidCommandPrefix(prefix) {
return false
}
matched := false
for _, command := range segments {
if len(prefix) > len(command) {
if knownSafeCommandSegment(command) {
continue
}
return false
}
if hasStringPrefix(command, prefix) {
matched = true
continue
}
if knownSafeCommandSegment(command) {
continue
}
return false
}
return matched
}
func safeShellCommandTokens(command string) ([]string, bool) {
segments, ok := safeShellCommandSegments(command)
if !ok || len(segments) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
return segments[0], true
}
func safeShellCommandSegments(command string) ([][]string, bool) {
command = strings.TrimSpace(command)
if command == "" {
return nil, false
}
file, err := syntax.NewParser().Parse(strings.NewReader(command), "")
if err != nil || len(file.Stmts) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
segments := make([][]string, 0, len(file.Stmts))
for _, stmt := range file.Stmts {
if !collectSafeShellStatement(stmt, &segments) {
return nil, false
}
}
if len(segments) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
return segments, true
}
func collectSafeShellStatement(stmt *syntax.Stmt, segments *[][]string) bool {
if stmt == nil || stmt.Negated || stmt.Background || stmt.Coprocess || stmt.Disown || len(stmt.Redirs) > 0 {
return false
}
return collectSafeShellCommand(stmt.Cmd, segments)
}
func collectSafeShellCommand(cmd syntax.Command, segments *[][]string) bool {
switch node := cmd.(type) {
case *syntax.CallExpr:
tokens, ok := literalCallTokens(node)
if !ok {
return false
}
*segments = append(*segments, tokens)
return true
case *syntax.BinaryCmd:
switch node.Op {
case syntax.AndStmt, syntax.OrStmt, syntax.Pipe:
default:
return false
}
return collectSafeShellStatement(node.X, segments) && collectSafeShellStatement(node.Y, segments)
default:
return false
}
}
func literalCallTokens(call *syntax.CallExpr) ([]string, bool) {
if call == nil || len(call.Assigns) > 0 || len(call.Args) == 0 {
return nil, false
}
tokens := make([]string, 0, len(call.Args))
for _, word := range call.Args {
if len(word.Parts) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
lit, ok := word.Parts[0].(*syntax.Lit)
if !ok || strings.ContainsAny(lit.Value, "*?[]{}") {
return nil, false
}
tokens = append(tokens, lit.Value)
}
return tokens, true
}
func knownSafeCommandSegment(command []string) bool {
if len(command) == 0 {
return false
}
switch commandName(command[0]) {
case "cat", "cd", "cut", "echo", "expr", "false", "grep", "head", "id",
"ls", "nl", "paste", "pwd", "rev", "seq", "stat", "tail", "tr",
"true", "uname", "uniq", "wc", "which", "whoami":
return true
case "base64":
return safeBase64Command(command[1:])
case "find":
return safeFindCommand(command[1:])
case "rg":
return safeRipgrepCommand(command[1:])
case "sed":
return safeSedCommand(command[1:])
case "git":
return safeGitCommand(command)
default:
return false
}
}
func safeBase64Command(args []string) bool {
for _, arg := range args {
if arg == "-o" || arg == "--output" || strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--output=") || (strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-o") && arg != "-o") {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func safeFindCommand(args []string) bool {
unsafe := map[string]bool{
"-exec": true, "-execdir": true, "-ok": true, "-okdir": true,
"-delete": true,
"-fls": true, "-fprint": true, "-fprint0": true, "-fprintf": true,
}
for _, arg := range args {
if unsafe[arg] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func safeRipgrepCommand(args []string) bool {
for _, arg := range args {
if arg == "--search-zip" || arg == "-z" || arg == "--pre" || arg == "--hostname-bin" ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--pre=") || strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--hostname-bin=") {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func safeSedCommand(args []string) bool {
if len(args) < 2 || len(args) > 3 || args[0] != "-n" {
return false
}
return validSedPrintArg(args[1])
}
func validSedPrintArg(arg string) bool {
if !strings.HasSuffix(arg, "p") {
return false
}
body := strings.TrimSuffix(arg, "p")
if body == "" {
return false
}
for _, part := range strings.Split(body, ",") {
if part == "" {
return false
}
for _, r := range part {
if r < '0' || r > '9' {
return false
}
}
}
return true
}
func safeGitCommand(command []string) bool {
subIndex, subcommand, ok := gitSubcommand(command)
if !ok {
return false
}
if gitHasUnsafeGlobalOption(command[1:subIndex]) {
return false
}
args := command[subIndex+1:]
switch subcommand {
case "status", "log", "diff", "show":
return gitArgsReadOnly(args)
case "branch":
return gitArgsReadOnly(args) && gitBranchReadOnly(args)
default:
return false
}
}
func gitSubcommand(command []string) (int, string, bool) {
for index := 1; index < len(command); index++ {
arg := command[index]
if gitOptionConsumesValue(arg) {
index++
continue
}
if gitOptionHasInlineValue(arg) || arg == "--" || strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") {
continue
}
switch arg {
case "status", "log", "diff", "show", "branch":
return index, arg, true
default:
return 0, "", false
}
}
return 0, "", false
}
func gitOptionConsumesValue(arg string) bool {
switch arg {
case "-C", "-c", "--config-env", "--exec-path", "--git-dir", "--namespace", "--super-prefix", "--work-tree":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func gitOptionHasInlineValue(arg string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--config-env=") ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--exec-path=") ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--git-dir=") ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--namespace=") ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--super-prefix=") ||
strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--work-tree=") ||
((strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-C") || strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-c")) && len(arg) > 2)
}
func gitHasUnsafeGlobalOption(args []string) bool {
for index := 0; index < len(args); index++ {
arg := args[index]
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--upload-pack"):
return true
case arg == "-C" || strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-C"):
return true
case gitOptionConsumesValue(arg):
index++
}
}
return false
}
func gitArgsReadOnly(args []string) bool {
for _, arg := range args {
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--output="), strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--exec="):
return false
case arg == "--output", arg == "--exec":
return false
}
}
return true
}
func gitBranchReadOnly(args []string) bool {
if len(args) == 0 {
return true
}
for _, arg := range args {
if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--format=") {
continue
}
switch arg {
case "--list", "-l", "--show-current", "-a", "--all", "-r", "--remotes", "-v", "-vv", "--verbose":
continue
default:
return false
}
}
return true
}
func commandName(raw string) string {
name := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if index := strings.LastIndexAny(name, `/\`); index >= 0 {
name = name[index+1:]
}
name = strings.ToLower(name)
for _, suffix := range []string{".exe", ".cmd", ".bat", ".com"} {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, suffix) {
return strings.TrimSuffix(name, suffix)
}
}
return name
}
func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
if len(prefix) == 0 || len(prefix) > len(values) {
return false
}
for index := range prefix {
if values[index] != prefix[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
if len(left) != len(right) {
return false
}
for index := range left {
if left[index] != right[index] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func TestProposedCommandPrefixUsesSafeSimpleCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."})
want := []string{"go", "test", "./..."}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixSupportsExecCommand(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("exec_command", map[string]any{"cmd": "go test ./..."})
want := []string{"go", "test", "./..."}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixHonorsValidatedRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "git status --short",
"prefix_rule": []any{"git", "status"},
})
want := []string{"git", "status"}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixSupportsSegmentedCommands(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux | head -5"})
want := []string{"ps", "aux"}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixHonorsRequestedPrefixAcrossSegments(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "git status --short && git status --branch",
"prefix_rule": []any{"git", "status"},
})
want := []string{"git", "status"}
if !equalStringSlices(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("prefix = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsRequestedPrefixThatDoesNotCoverSegments(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "ps aux && npm install",
"prefix_rule": []any{"ps", "aux"},
})
if got != nil {
t.Fatalf("partial requested prefix should be rejected, got %#v", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "git status --short",
"prefix_rule": []any{"git"},
})
if got != nil {
t.Fatalf("broad requested prefix should be rejected, got %#v", got)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeShellForms(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"cat < in > out",
"FOO=bar go test",
"echo $(whoami)",
"cat *.go",
"bash -lc go test",
}
for _, command := range cases {
t.Run(command, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": command}); got != nil {
t.Fatalf("unsafe command got prefix %#v", got)
}
})
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeLaunchers(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"find . -type f",
"xargs rm -rf /tmp/x",
"timeout 5 go test ./...",
"nice go test ./...",
"nohup go test ./...",
"watch ls",
"ssh host ls",
"make test",
"npm run dev",
"command git status",
"eval echo hi",
"exec echo hi",
"python script.py",
"node script.js",
"./script.sh --flag",
"/tmp/script.sh --flag",
}
for _, command := range cases {
t.Run(command, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": command}); got != nil {
t.Fatalf("unsafe launcher got prefix %#v", got)
}
})
}
}
func TestMatchCommandPrefixCoversSegmentedCommandWithSafeTail(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir()})
engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"ps", "aux"})
grant, ok, session := matchCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux | head -5"}, Options{Sandbox: engine})
if !ok || !session || !equalStringSlices(grant.Prefix, []string{"ps", "aux"}) {
t.Fatalf("match = %#v ok=%v session=%v, want session ps aux prefix", grant, ok, session)
}
}
func TestMatchCommandPrefixRejectsUncoveredSegment(t *testing.T) {
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir()})
engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"ps", "aux"})
if grant, ok, session := matchCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{"command": "ps aux && npm install"}, Options{Sandbox: engine}); ok {
t.Fatalf("match = %#v session=%v, want no match because npm segment is uncovered", grant, session)
}
}
func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsRequestedUnsafeLauncherPrefix(t *testing.T) {
got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
"command": "find . -type f",
"prefix_rule": []any{"find", "."},
})
if got != nil {
t.Fatalf("unsafe requested launcher prefix should be rejected, got %#v", got)
}
}
+219 -33
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
@@ -20,12 +21,17 @@ import (
// the agent loop owns the provider wiring.
// defaultCompactionPreserveLast is how many trailing messages are kept verbatim
// when the caller does not specify a preserve count.
const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 8
// when the caller does not specify a preserve count. Kept in sync with the replay
// reconstruction default in internal/sessions/replay.go.
const defaultCompactionPreserveLast = 6
// compactionTriggerRatio is the fraction of the context window at which
// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn).
const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.8
// proactive compaction kicks in (top of each turn). NOTE: this is speculative
// tuning — validate against the per-turn latency/compaction metrics (roadmap 5.2)
// before trusting it. Measured fixed overhead is ~7.4k tokens (not the ~16k the
// roadmap assumed), so context fills slower; if data shows 0.7 triggers redundant
// summarization, raise it back toward 0.8.
const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
// summaryLabel prefixes the injected summary so it is unmistakable in the
// transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
@@ -51,24 +57,91 @@ type CompactionOptions struct {
Summarize func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)
}
// estimateTokens is a cheap, dependency-free token estimate (~4 chars/token)
// across message content plus tool call names/arguments. It deliberately uses no
// real tokenizer; it only needs to be monotonic and roughly proportional so the
// loop can decide when to compact.
// CompactionResult is the metadata-bearing result returned by CompactMessages.
type CompactionResult struct {
// Messages is the original conversation or the compacted replacement.
Messages []zeroruntime.Message
// RemovedCount is the number of original messages summarized away.
RemovedCount int
// PreservedCount is the number of original messages kept verbatim, including
// leading system messages and the preserved suffix.
PreservedCount int
// SummaryText is the trimmed text returned by the summarizer. The injected
// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
// state needed by later compactions.
SummaryText string
// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
Compacted bool
}
// imageTokenEstimate is a flat per-image token cost. Vision models tokenize an
// image by its resolution (tiles), not its byte length, so the raw Data size is
// a poor proxy — counting len(Data)/4 would overcount by orders of magnitude.
// A fixed estimate keeps estimateTokens monotonic in the image count so an
// image-heavy context still trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0.
// ~1k tokens is a representative mid-range cost across providers.
const imageTokenEstimate = 1000
// ApproxTextTokens estimates the token count of text WITHOUT a real tokenizer.
// The BPE tokenizers zero targets fold a run's leading space into the following
// token rather than emitting whitespace as its own token, so naive len/4
// overcounts real text by ~15-20% (measured: a 24.8k-char prompt counted 5.2k
// real tokens where len/4 said 6.2k). Counting NON-whitespace bytes / 4 tracks
// the provider's actual count closely (validated against live usage) while
// staying allocation- and dependency-free. zero still receives the exact count
// back as usage on every request; this estimate is only for the pre-request
// context budget preview and the compaction threshold.
func ApproxTextTokens(value string) int {
nonSpace := 0
for i := 0; i < len(value); i++ {
switch value[i] {
case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\r', '\f', '\v':
default:
nonSpace++
}
}
return nonSpace / 4
}
// estimateTokens is a cheap, dependency-free token estimate (see ApproxTextTokens)
// across message content plus tool call names/arguments and a flat per-image
// cost. It deliberately uses no real tokenizer; it only needs to be monotonic
// and roughly proportional so the loop can decide when to compact.
func estimateTokens(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
total := 0
for _, message := range messages {
total += len(message.Content) / 4
total += ApproxTextTokens(message.Content)
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
total += len(call.Name) / 4
total += len(call.Arguments) / 4
total += ApproxTextTokens(call.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(call.Arguments)
total += 4 // small per-call overhead
}
total += len(message.Images) * imageTokenEstimate
total += 4 // per-message overhead
}
return total
}
// estimateToolDefTokens approximates the input-token cost of the tool definitions
// sent with every request (~4 chars/token, matching estimateTokens). Compaction
// must include them: they ride on every turn, so ignoring them under-counts the
// real context and can let it blow past the model limit while the message-only
// estimate still looks under threshold.
func estimateToolDefTokens(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) int {
total := 0
for _, tool := range tools {
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Description)
if len(tool.Parameters) > 0 {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters); err == nil {
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
}
total += 4 // per-tool overhead
}
return total
}
// compactionThreshold is the estimated-token level at which proactive
// compaction triggers for a given context window.
func compactionThreshold(contextWindow int) int {
@@ -96,12 +169,23 @@ func compactionThreshold(contextWindow int) int {
// Compact is pure: it performs no provider I/O. A Summarize error is returned to
// the caller, which decides how to recover.
func Compact(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) ([]zeroruntime.Message, error) {
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return result.Messages, nil
}
// CompactMessages summarizes the oldest middle of a conversation and returns
// both the replacement messages and UI/session-friendly metadata about what
// changed. It uses the same compaction rules as Compact.
func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (CompactionResult, error) {
preserveLast := opts.PreserveLast
if preserveLast <= 0 {
preserveLast = defaultCompactionPreserveLast
}
if opts.Summarize == nil {
return nil, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
return CompactionResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
}
// Leading system messages are kept verbatim at the head.
@@ -121,12 +205,15 @@ func Compact(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) ([]zerorunt
middle := messages[systemEnd:boundary]
if len(middle) == 0 {
// Nothing to summarize once system + preserved suffix are removed.
return messages, nil
return CompactionResult{
Messages: messages,
PreservedCount: len(messages),
}, nil
}
summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return CompactionResult{}, err
}
summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)
@@ -141,7 +228,13 @@ func Compact(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) ([]zerorunt
Content: content,
})
compacted = append(compacted, messages[boundary:]...)
return compacted, nil
return CompactionResult{
Messages: compacted,
RemovedCount: len(middle),
PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
SummaryText: summary,
Compacted: true,
}, nil
}
// safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
@@ -192,6 +285,25 @@ func isContextLimitError(message string) bool {
return false
}
// isStreamTimeoutError reports whether a streamed error is a provider stream
// idle/stall timeout (providerio surfaces these as "idle timeout after …" /
// "no output for …" / "stream stalled"). Such a turn produced nothing, so when
// no content was forwarded yet it can be safely re-issued on a fresh connection
// (see the stall-retry in the agent loop). Substring + case-insensitive to
// tolerate the prefixed "provider stream error: …" wrapping.
func isStreamTimeoutError(message string) bool {
lowered := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(message))
if lowered == "" {
return false
}
for _, needle := range []string{"idle timeout after", "no output for", "stream stalled"} {
if strings.Contains(lowered, needle) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// compactionState carries the per-run state the agent loop needs to compact a
// conversation safely. It is created once per Run and is a no-op whenever
// options.ContextWindow <= 0.
@@ -209,6 +321,47 @@ type compactionState struct {
// (even after compaction) could loop indefinitely; one attempt then the
// original error surfaces.
reactiveAttempted bool
// onUsage forwards the summarizer call's token usage for accounting/budgeting.
// OnText is deliberately NOT forwarded (compaction stays invisible to the user),
// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
onUsage func(Usage)
// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
// ~15-20%, which would trip compaction early (at ~60% of true capacity). It
// starts at 1.0 and converges via an EMA as each turn reports actual usage, so
// later turns compact nearer to real capacity. Zero is treated as 1.0.
calibrationRatio float64
}
// calibrate folds one turn's (rawEstimate, actualPromptTokens) sample into the
// running calibration ratio. A single sample is clamped to a sane band so an
// outlier (a huge cache-read turn, a provider-overhead spike) can't skew the
// estimate enough to disable or thrash compaction.
func (state *compactionState) calibrate(rawEstimate int, actualPromptTokens int) {
if !state.enabled || rawEstimate <= 0 || actualPromptTokens <= 0 {
return
}
sample := float64(actualPromptTokens) / float64(rawEstimate)
if sample < 0.5 {
sample = 0.5
} else if sample > 2.0 {
sample = 2.0
}
if state.calibrationRatio <= 0 {
state.calibrationRatio = 1.0
}
const alpha = 0.3 // weight on the newest sample; smooths jitter across turns
state.calibrationRatio = state.calibrationRatio*(1-alpha) + sample*alpha
}
// calibratedTokens applies the learned ratio to a raw estimate. Before any sample
// arrives (ratio unset) it returns the raw estimate unchanged.
func (state *compactionState) calibratedTokens(raw int) int {
if state.calibrationRatio <= 0 {
return raw
}
return int(float64(raw) * state.calibrationRatio)
}
func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
@@ -216,6 +369,7 @@ func newCompactionState(options Options) *compactionState {
enabled: options.ContextWindow > 0,
threshold: compactionThreshold(options.ContextWindow),
preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
onUsage: options.OnUsage,
}
}
@@ -227,11 +381,16 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
ctx context.Context,
provider Provider,
messages []zeroruntime.Message,
tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition,
) []zeroruntime.Message {
if !state.enabled {
return messages
}
size := estimateTokens(messages)
// Tool definitions are part of every request's input, so count them alongside
// the messages; both the threshold check and the shrink check below use the
// same term so they stay consistent.
toolTokens := estimateToolDefTokens(tools)
size := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
return messages
}
@@ -242,16 +401,29 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
return messages
}
// CHEAP FIRST STAGE: reclaim context at zero token/latency cost by pruning
// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
messages = pruned
size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
if size <= state.threshold {
state.lowWaterMark = size
return messages
}
}
compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
})
if err != nil {
// Summarizer failed: keep the original history. The reactive path (or a
// later turn) can try again; we never drop messages on failure here.
return messages
}
newSize := estimateTokens(compacted)
newSize := state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(compacted) + toolTokens)
if newSize >= size {
// Compaction did not actually shrink anything (e.g. nothing to
// summarize). Leave the history untouched and don't churn next turn.
@@ -271,6 +443,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
ctx context.Context,
provider Provider,
messages []zeroruntime.Message,
tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition,
errorMessage string,
) (compacted []zeroruntime.Message, retried bool, err error) {
if !state.enabled {
@@ -287,7 +460,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
Summarize: summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
})
if compactErr != nil {
// A genuine compaction attempt was made (and failed): the budget is spent
@@ -304,18 +477,21 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
}
// Success: a real compaction shrank the history and we will retry. Consume the
// one-shot budget now so a provider that keeps returning context-limit errors
// after a successful compaction can't loop forever.
// after a successful compaction can't loop forever. Store the low-water mark in
// the SAME combined (messages + tool-defs) domain maybeCompact uses, so the
// proactive shrink-guard compares like with like.
state.reactiveAttempted = true
state.lowWaterMark = estimateTokens(result)
state.lowWaterMark = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(result) + estimateToolDefTokens(tools))
return result, true, nil
}
// summarizeClosure builds a Summarize function backed by a focused, tool-less
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText /
// OnUsage callbacks, so compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface.
func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
// provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
// compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
// OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize)
return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
}
}
@@ -326,8 +502,8 @@ func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime
// working when the elided middle is bigger than the summarizer's own context.
// Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
// to the caller unchanged.
func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages)
func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
if err == nil {
return summary, nil
}
@@ -336,11 +512,11 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
}
mid := len(messages) / 2
left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid])
left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
if leftErr != nil {
return "", leftErr
}
right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:])
right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
if rightErr != nil {
return "", rightErr
}
@@ -353,15 +529,23 @@ func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
})
}, onUsage)
if reduceErr != nil {
return combined, nil
if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
// joined text — still better than failing, and each half is already
// compacted.
return combined, nil
}
// A non-context failure (auth/network/provider) must surface unchanged, per
// this function's contract — don't mask it behind the joined fallback.
return "", reduceErr
}
return reduced, nil
}
// summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
@@ -373,7 +557,9 @@ func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []ze
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStream(ctx, stream)
// Forward OnUsage (token accounting) but not OnText (keep compaction invisible
// to the user); a nil onUsage is a no-op.
collected := zeroruntime.CollectStreamWithOptions(ctx, stream, zeroruntime.CollectOptions{OnUsage: onUsage})
if collected.Error != "" {
return "", errors.New(collected.Error)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package agent
import "testing"
func TestCalibrationConvergesTowardActual(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
// Before any sample, the estimate is unchanged.
if got := state.calibratedTokens(1000); got != 1000 {
t.Fatalf("uncalibrated tokens = %d, want 1000", got)
}
// The estimator over-counts: our raw estimate is 1000 but the provider reports
// 850 (a 0.85 ratio). Feeding that sample repeatedly should pull the ratio
// toward 0.85, so a 1000-token raw estimate calibrates downward.
for range 20 {
state.calibrate(1000, 850)
}
got := state.calibratedTokens(1000)
if got >= 1000 || got < 820 || got > 880 {
t.Fatalf("calibrated tokens = %d, want ~850 after convergence", got)
}
}
func TestCalibrateIgnoresDegenerateSamples(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
state.calibrate(0, 500) // zero estimate
state.calibrate(500, 0) // zero actual
if state.calibrationRatio != 0 {
t.Fatalf("degenerate samples must not move the ratio, got %v", state.calibrationRatio)
}
// Disabled state never calibrates.
disabled := &compactionState{enabled: false}
disabled.calibrate(1000, 850)
if disabled.calibrationRatio != 0 {
t.Fatalf("disabled compaction must not calibrate, got %v", disabled.calibrationRatio)
}
}
func TestCalibrateClampsOutliers(t *testing.T) {
state := &compactionState{enabled: true}
// A wild outlier (10x) is clamped to 2.0, so one bad sample can't blow up the
// ratio and disable compaction.
for range 50 {
state.calibrate(1000, 10000)
}
if state.calibrationRatio > 2.0 {
t.Fatalf("ratio should be clamped at 2.0, got %v", state.calibrationRatio)
}
}
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
package agent
import (
"errors"
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system prompt"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "first question"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "first answer"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "second question"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
}
var captured []zeroruntime.Message
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
return " manual summary ", nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Compacted {
t.Fatal("expected compaction to be reported")
}
if result.RemovedCount != 3 {
t.Fatalf("RemovedCount = %d, want 3", result.RemovedCount)
}
if result.PreservedCount != 3 {
t.Fatalf("PreservedCount = %d, want 3", result.PreservedCount)
}
if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
}
if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
}
if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
}
if result.Messages[0].Content != "system prompt" {
t.Fatalf("system message was not preserved at head: %#v", result.Messages)
}
if result.Messages[1].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
t.Fatalf("summary message role = %s, want user", result.Messages[1].Role)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Messages[1].Content, summaryLabel) || !strings.Contains(result.Messages[1].Content, "manual summary") {
t.Fatalf("summary message did not include label and body: %q", result.Messages[1].Content)
}
if result.Messages[2].Content != "recent answer" || result.Messages[3].Content != "latest question" {
t.Fatalf("preserved suffix changed: %#v", result.Messages[2:])
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"},
}
called := false
result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 8,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
called = true
return "summary", nil
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if called {
t.Fatal("Summarize should not be called for a no-op compaction")
}
if result.Compacted {
t.Fatal("Compacted = true for a no-op")
}
if result.RemovedCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("RemovedCount = %d, want 0", result.RemovedCount)
}
if result.PreservedCount != len(messages) {
t.Fatalf("PreservedCount = %d, want %d", result.PreservedCount, len(messages))
}
if result.SummaryText != "" {
t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
}
}
func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "first question"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "first answer"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "second question"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
}
_, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
return "", errors.New("summarizer unavailable")
},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected summarizer error")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "summarizer unavailable") {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
+423 -39
View File
@@ -10,23 +10,42 @@ import (
// Compaction preservation.
//
// A plain prose summary loses two things the model needs to keep working: the
// active plan (issued via the update_plan tool) and any skill instructions it
// loaded (via the skill tool). When those turns fall into the elided middle,
// the plan and skill bodies vanish from context. To prevent that, Compact
// appends them VERBATIM to the injected summary so structured state survives a
// compaction exactly rather than being paraphrased away.
// A plain prose summary loses structured state the model needs to keep working:
// the active plan, loaded deferred-tool schemas, loaded skills, and project
// instruction blocks. When those turns fall into the elided middle, Compact
// appends that state to the injected summary as JSON so it survives exactly
// rather than being paraphrased away.
const (
toolNameUpdatePlan = "update_plan"
toolNameToolSearch = "tool_search"
toolNameSkill = "skill"
toolNameWriteFile = "write_file"
toolNameEditFile = "edit_file"
)
// preservedStateLabel heads the preserved-state block. The block body is a
// single line of JSON (see formatPreservedState): JSON escapes everything, so a
// skill body containing markdown headings (## / ###), code fences, or quotes
// round-trips losslessly across repeated compactions — unlike a markdown-
// delimited format, which would be truncated or mis-split when re-parsed.
// maxRecentEdits caps how many edited files are carried across a compaction, and
// maxEditNoteBytes caps each edit's one-line note, so a long editing run can't
// bloat the preserved-state block.
const (
maxRecentEdits = 20
maxEditNoteBytes = 160
)
const (
projectInstructionsHeadingPrefix = "# "
projectInstructionsHeadingMarker = " instructions for "
projectInstructionsOpenTag = "<INSTRUCTIONS>"
projectInstructionsCloseTag = "</INSTRUCTIONS>"
)
// preservedStateLabel heads the preserved-state block. Keep this label stable so
// summaries created by earlier builds remain parseable; the JSON body may carry
// more fields than the historical label names.
//
// The block body is a single line of JSON (see formatPreservedState): JSON
// escapes everything, so markdown headings, code fences, or quotes round-trip
// losslessly across repeated compactions.
const preservedStateLabel = "## Preserved state (active plan + loaded skills; carried across compaction)"
// maxPreservedSkillBytes caps how much of each loaded skill body is carried
@@ -60,7 +79,9 @@ func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
Step string `json:"step"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Notes string `json:"notes"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
@@ -69,6 +90,9 @@ func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
lines := make([]string, 0, len(parsed.Plan))
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
content := strings.TrimSpace(item.Content)
if content == "" {
content = strings.TrimSpace(item.Step)
}
if content == "" {
continue
}
@@ -76,17 +100,133 @@ func formatPlanArguments(arguments string) string {
if status == "" {
status = "pending"
}
lines = append(lines, "- ["+status+"] "+content)
line := "- [" + status + "] " + content
if notes := strings.TrimSpace(item.Notes); notes != "" {
line += "\n Notes: " + notes
}
lines = append(lines, line)
}
return strings.Join(lines, "\n")
}
// skillEntry is one loaded skill: its name and (capped) body.
// skillEntry is a named preserved body. It began as loaded-skill state and is
// reused for loaded tools, project instruction blocks, and recent file edits.
type skillEntry struct {
name string
body string
}
// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
// — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
// note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
// changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
// rediscover its own footprint. Capped at maxRecentEdits paths.
//
// Ordering is by LAST edit, not first: re-editing a file moves it to the newest
// position so the tail cap below keeps the file the model most recently touched
// rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
pathByID := map[string]string{}
sequence := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
if call.Name != toolNameWriteFile && call.Name != toolNameEditFile {
continue
}
path := editPathFromArguments(call.Arguments)
if path == "" {
continue
}
if call.ID != "" {
pathByID[call.ID] = path
}
sequence = append(sequence, path)
}
}
order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
if len(order) == 0 {
return nil
}
noteByPath := map[string]string{}
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
continue
}
if path, ok := pathByID[message.ToolCallID]; ok {
noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
}
}
// Keep the most recent maxRecentEdits paths (the tail of last-seen order).
if len(order) > maxRecentEdits {
order = order[len(order)-maxRecentEdits:]
}
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(order))
for _, path := range order {
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: path, body: noteByPath[path]})
}
return entries
}
// lastSeenOrder dedupes paths keeping each at its LAST occurrence, preserving
// chronological order otherwise. A re-edited path therefore lands at the newest
// position rather than staying pinned to where it first appeared.
func lastSeenOrder(paths []string) []string {
lastIdx := make(map[string]int, len(paths))
for i, p := range paths {
lastIdx[p] = i
}
order := make([]string, 0, len(lastIdx))
for i, p := range paths {
if lastIdx[p] == i {
order = append(order, p)
}
}
return order
}
// editPathFromArguments pulls the target file path from a write_file/edit_file
// call's JSON arguments (path/file/file_path/filename aliases). Returns "" on
// malformed arguments or no path.
func editPathFromArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
File string `json:"file"`
FilePath string `json:"file_path"`
Filename string `json:"filename"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
return ""
}
for _, candidate := range []string{parsed.Path, parsed.File, parsed.FilePath, parsed.Filename} {
if s := strings.TrimSpace(candidate); s != "" {
return s
}
}
return ""
}
// editNote reduces an edit tool's result to a single short line (its first
// non-empty line, byte-capped on a rune boundary) for the preserved summary.
func editNote(content string) string {
for _, line := range strings.Split(content, "\n") {
s := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if s == "" {
continue
}
if len(s) > maxEditNoteBytes {
limit := maxEditNoteBytes
for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(s[limit]) {
limit--
}
s = s[:limit] + "…"
}
return s
}
return ""
}
// loadedSkills returns the skills loaded via the skill tool in messages — the
// latest body per name, in first-seen order — matching each skill tool call to
// its tool result by id.
@@ -133,16 +273,136 @@ func loadedSkills(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
return entries
}
// loadedToolSchemas returns tool_search-loaded schemas from their normal tool
// result text. ToolResult.Meta is not part of zeroruntime.Message history, so the
// rendered "Loaded N tools" output is the durable transcript format.
func loadedToolSchemas(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
toolSearchIDs := map[string]bool{}
for _, message := range messages {
for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
if call.Name == toolNameToolSearch && call.ID != "" {
toolSearchIDs[call.ID] = true
}
}
}
if len(toolSearchIDs) == 0 {
return nil
}
bodyByName := map[string]string{}
nameOrder := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || !toolSearchIDs[message.ToolCallID] {
continue
}
for _, entry := range loadedToolEntriesFromOutput(message.Content) {
if _, seen := bodyByName[entry.name]; !seen {
nameOrder = append(nameOrder, entry.name)
}
bodyByName[entry.name] = entry.body
}
}
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(nameOrder))
for _, name := range nameOrder {
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: name, body: bodyByName[name]})
}
return entries
}
func loadedToolEntriesFromOutput(output string) []skillEntry {
output = strings.TrimSpace(output)
if !strings.HasPrefix(output, "Loaded ") || !strings.Contains(output, "Full schemas follow") {
return nil
}
lines := strings.Split(output, "\n")
var entries []skillEntry
for i := 0; i < len(lines); i++ {
name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(lines[i]), "## ")
if !ok {
continue
}
name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
if name == "" {
continue
}
start := i
end := len(lines)
for j := i + 1; j < len(lines); j++ {
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(lines[j]), "## ") {
end = j
break
}
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: name, body: capBody(strings.TrimSpace(strings.Join(lines[start:end], "\n")))})
i = end - 1
}
return entries
}
func projectInstructionEntries(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
bodyBySource := map[string]string{}
sourceOrder := make([]string, 0)
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
continue
}
source, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content)
if body == "" {
continue
}
if _, seen := bodyBySource[source]; !seen {
sourceOrder = append(sourceOrder, source)
}
bodyBySource[source] = body
}
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(sourceOrder))
for _, source := range sourceOrder {
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: source, body: bodyBySource[source]})
}
return entries
}
func projectInstructionBlock(content string) (string, string) {
content = strings.TrimSpace(content)
if !strings.HasPrefix(content, projectInstructionsHeadingPrefix) {
return "", ""
}
firstLineEnd := strings.IndexByte(content, '\n')
if firstLineEnd < 0 {
return "", ""
}
heading := strings.TrimSpace(content[:firstLineEnd])
if !strings.Contains(heading, projectInstructionsHeadingMarker) {
return "", ""
}
open := strings.Index(content, projectInstructionsOpenTag)
close := strings.Index(content, projectInstructionsCloseTag)
if open < 0 || close < open {
return "", ""
}
close += len(projectInstructionsCloseTag)
source := strings.TrimPrefix(heading, "# ")
body := strings.TrimSpace(heading + "\n\n" + strings.TrimSpace(content[open:close]))
return source, body
}
// skillNameFromArguments pulls the "name" field from a skill tool call's JSON
// arguments ({"name":"..."}). Returns "" on malformed arguments.
func skillNameFromArguments(arguments string) string {
var parsed struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Skill string `json:"skill"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &parsed); err != nil {
return ""
}
return strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Name)
if name := strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Name); name != "" {
return name
}
return strings.TrimSpace(parsed.Skill)
}
// truncationNote is appended to a capped skill body. Its length is reserved
@@ -170,8 +430,21 @@ func capBody(body string) string {
// preservedState is the JSON shape of the carried-across-compaction block.
type preservedState struct {
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
Plan string `json:"plan,omitempty"`
RecentEdits []preservedEdit `json:"recent_edits,omitempty"`
Tools []preservedTool `json:"tools,omitempty"`
Skills []preservedSkill `json:"skills,omitempty"`
ProjectInstructions []preservedInstruction `json:"project_instructions,omitempty"`
}
type preservedEdit struct {
Path string `json:"path"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
}
type preservedTool struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Body string `json:"body"`
}
type preservedSkill struct {
@@ -179,46 +452,126 @@ type preservedSkill struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
}
// appendPreservedState appends the active plan and loaded skills to a compaction
// summary as a single JSON block, so structured state survives verbatim. middle
// is the slice being summarized away.
type preservedInstruction struct {
Source string `json:"source"`
Body string `json:"body"`
}
// appendPreservedState appends active structured state to a compaction summary
// as a single JSON block. middle is the slice being summarized away.
//
// It is robust across REPEATED compactions: after the first compaction the plan
// and skills live only inside the injected summary message, which on a later
// compaction lands in middle with no real tool calls left to extract. So when
// middle has no fresh update_plan / skill tool calls, the preserved state is
// carried forward by re-parsing the prior block (JSON → lossless for arbitrary
// markdown bodies). Fresh tool calls always override the carried-forward copy.
// It is robust across repeated compactions: after the first compaction the state
// may live only inside the injected summary message, which on a later compaction
// lands in middle with no real tool calls left to extract. Fresh tool calls and
// instruction blocks override the carried-forward copy by name/source.
func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message) string {
priorPlan, priorSkills := parsePreservedState(latestSummaryContent(middle))
priorState := parsePreservedStateBlock(latestSummaryContent(middle))
// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
plan := extractLatestPlan(middle)
if plan == "" {
plan = priorPlan
plan = priorState.Plan
}
// Recent edits: merge edits preserved earlier with fresh write_file/edit_file
// results in middle (newer note per path wins AND moves to the newest
// position), so the tail cap keeps the files the model most recently touched
// across repeated compactions rather than dropping a just-re-edited file.
edits := capRecentEdits(mergeRecentEdits(preservedEditsToEntries(priorState.RecentEdits), recentEdits(middle)))
// Tools: preserve deferred tool_search schemas from the transcript. Fresh
// loads override older carried copies by name.
tools := mergeSkillEntries(preservedToolsToEntries(priorState.Tools), loadedToolSchemas(middle))
// Skills: merge skills preserved earlier (older) with fresh loads (newer wins
// per name), so a loaded skill survives repeated compactions.
skills := mergeSkillEntries(priorSkills, loadedSkills(middle))
skills := mergeSkillEntries(preservedSkillsToEntries(priorState.Skills), loadedSkills(middle))
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, skills); block != "" {
instructions := mergeSkillEntries(
preservedInstructionsToEntries(priorState.ProjectInstructions),
projectInstructionEntries(middle),
)
if block := formatPreservedState(plan, edits, tools, skills, instructions); block != "" {
summary += "\n\n" + block
}
return summary
}
// formatPreservedState renders the plan + skills as the labelled, single-line
// mergeRecentEdits overlays fresh edits onto edits preserved by an earlier
// compaction. Unlike mergeSkillEntries (which keeps refreshed entries in their
// original slot), a path touched again by a fresh edit MOVES to the newest
// position and takes the fresh note, so capRecentEdits — which keeps only the
// most-recent tail — never drops a file the model just re-edited. Paths present
// only in the older set keep their relative order, ahead of the fresh ones.
func mergeRecentEdits(older, newer []skillEntry) []skillEntry {
if len(newer) == 0 {
return older
}
freshBody := make(map[string]string, len(newer))
freshOrder := make([]string, 0, len(newer))
for _, e := range newer {
if _, ok := freshBody[e.name]; !ok {
freshOrder = append(freshOrder, e.name)
}
freshBody[e.name] = e.body
}
merged := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(older)+len(freshOrder))
// Older entries that were NOT re-edited keep their position, oldest first.
for _, e := range older {
if _, refreshed := freshBody[e.name]; refreshed {
continue // re-appended at its newest position below
}
merged = append(merged, e)
}
// Fresh edits follow, in last-seen order, each carrying the fresh note — so
// the most recently touched files sit at the tail the cap preserves.
for _, name := range freshOrder {
merged = append(merged, skillEntry{name: name, body: freshBody[name]})
}
return merged
}
// capRecentEdits bounds the preserved edit list to the most recent maxRecentEdits
// entries after a merge, so repeated compactions can't grow it without limit.
func capRecentEdits(entries []skillEntry) []skillEntry {
if len(entries) > maxRecentEdits {
return entries[len(entries)-maxRecentEdits:]
}
return entries
}
func preservedEditsToEntries(edits []preservedEdit) []skillEntry {
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(edits))
for _, e := range edits {
if e.Path == "" {
continue
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: e.Path, body: e.Note})
}
return entries
}
// formatPreservedState renders state as the labelled, single-line
// JSON block. Returns "" when there is nothing to preserve.
func formatPreservedState(plan string, skills []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(skills) == 0 {
func formatPreservedState(plan string, edits, tools, skills, instructions []skillEntry) string {
if plan == "" && len(edits) == 0 && len(tools) == 0 && len(skills) == 0 && len(instructions) == 0 {
return ""
}
state := preservedState{Plan: plan}
for _, e := range edits {
state.RecentEdits = append(state.RecentEdits, preservedEdit{Path: e.name, Note: e.body})
}
for _, t := range tools {
state.Tools = append(state.Tools, preservedTool{Name: t.name, Body: t.body})
}
for _, s := range skills {
state.Skills = append(state.Skills, preservedSkill{Name: s.name, Body: s.body})
}
for _, i := range instructions {
state.ProjectInstructions = append(state.ProjectInstructions, preservedInstruction{Source: i.name, Body: i.body})
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(state)
if err != nil {
return ""
@@ -231,9 +584,14 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, skills []skillEntry) string {
// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
// malformed.
func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
}
func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
if idx < 0 {
return "", nil
return preservedState{}
}
rest := strings.TrimPrefix(summaryContent[idx+len(preservedStateLabel):], "\n")
// The JSON is a single line (json.Marshal escapes newlines).
@@ -242,20 +600,46 @@ func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
}
rest = strings.TrimSpace(rest)
if rest == "" {
return "", nil
return preservedState{}
}
var state preservedState
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(rest), &state); err != nil {
return "", nil
return preservedState{}
}
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(state.Skills))
for _, s := range state.Skills {
return state
}
func preservedToolsToEntries(tools []preservedTool) []skillEntry {
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(tools))
for _, t := range tools {
if t.Name == "" {
continue
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: t.Name, body: t.Body})
}
return entries
}
func preservedSkillsToEntries(skills []preservedSkill) []skillEntry {
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(skills))
for _, s := range skills {
if s.Name == "" {
continue
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: s.Name, body: s.Body})
}
return state.Plan, entries
return entries
}
func preservedInstructionsToEntries(instructions []preservedInstruction) []skillEntry {
entries := make([]skillEntry, 0, len(instructions))
for _, i := range instructions {
if i.Source == "" {
continue
}
entries = append(entries, skillEntry{name: i.Source, body: i.Body})
}
return entries
}
// latestSummaryContent returns the content of the most recent injected summary
+124
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,56 @@ func TestCompactPreservesLoadedSkills(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesLoadedToolSearchSchemas(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "load weather tool"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "loading", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "t1", Name: "tool_search", Arguments: `{"query":"select:weather_lookup"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "t1", Content: "Loaded 1 tool. Full schemas follow; call them on the next turn.\n\n## weather_lookup\nLook up weather.\ninput schema:\n{\n \"type\": \"object\"\n}"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "ready"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
}
summary := compactStateConversation(t, messages)
if !strings.Contains(summary, `"name":"weather_lookup"`) || !strings.Contains(summary, "input schema") {
t.Fatalf("loaded tool schema not preserved in %q", summary)
}
}
func TestCompactPreservesProjectInstructions(t *testing.T) {
projectInstructions := "# AGENTS.md instructions for D:\\repo\n\n<INSTRUCTIONS>\nUse `go test ./internal/agent` for agent changes.\nDo not touch TUI code.\n</INSTRUCTIONS>\n\n<environment_context>\nignored runtime context\n</environment_context>"
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: projectInstructions},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "ack"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "work on compaction"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
}
summary := compactStateConversation(t, messages)
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summary)
if len(state.ProjectInstructions) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one preserved project instruction block, got %#v", state.ProjectInstructions)
}
body := state.ProjectInstructions[0].Body
if state.ProjectInstructions[0].Source != "AGENTS.md instructions for D:\\repo" ||
!strings.Contains(body, "# AGENTS.md instructions for D:\\repo") ||
!strings.Contains(body, "Do not touch TUI code.") ||
strings.Contains(body, "ignored runtime context") {
t.Fatalf("project instructions not preserved cleanly in %#v", state.ProjectInstructions[0])
}
}
func TestProjectInstructionBlockAcceptsProjectGuidelineFilename(t *testing.T) {
source, body := projectInstructionBlock("# ZERO.md instructions for /repo\n\n<INSTRUCTIONS>\nPrefer Go commands.\n</INSTRUCTIONS>")
if source != "ZERO.md instructions for /repo" || !strings.Contains(body, "Prefer Go commands.") {
t.Fatalf("expected ZERO.md instruction block to parse, got source=%q body=%q", source, body)
}
}
func TestCompactWithoutStateHasNoPreserveSections(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
@@ -126,6 +176,51 @@ func TestCompactCarriesPreservedStateAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCompactCarriesLoadedToolsAndProjectInstructionsAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "# AGENTS.md instructions for /repo\n\n<INSTRUCTIONS>\nStay in internal/agent.\n</INSTRUCTIONS>"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "loading", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "t1", Name: "tool_search", Arguments: `{"query":"select:weather_lookup"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "t1", Content: "Loaded 1 tool. Full schemas follow; call them on the next turn.\n\n## weather_lookup\nLook up weather.\ninput schema:\n{\n \"type\": \"object\"\n}"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "ready"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
}
first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST SUMMARY", nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first Compact: %v", err)
}
second := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "more"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "ok"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "again"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "fine"},
)
out, err := Compact(second, CompactionOptions{
PreserveLast: 2,
Summarize: func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND SUMMARY", nil },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second Compact: %v", err)
}
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(out[1].Content)
if len(state.Tools) != 1 || state.Tools[0].Name != "weather_lookup" || !strings.Contains(state.Tools[0].Body, "input schema") {
t.Fatalf("loaded tool state was not carried forward: %#v", state.Tools)
}
if len(state.ProjectInstructions) != 1 ||
state.ProjectInstructions[0].Source != "AGENTS.md instructions for /repo" ||
!strings.Contains(state.ProjectInstructions[0].Body, "Stay in internal/agent.") {
t.Fatalf("project instructions were not carried forward: %#v", state.ProjectInstructions)
}
}
// TestCompactPreservesSkillBodyWithMarkdownHeadings is CodeRabbit's regression:
// a verbatim skill body containing ## / ### headings (and a code fence) must
// round-trip across TWO compactions without truncation or bogus extra skills —
@@ -188,6 +283,22 @@ func TestExtractLatestPlanReturnsMostRecent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsAcceptsStepAlias(t *testing.T) {
got := formatPlanArguments(`{"plan":[{"step":"write failing test","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"keep existing shape","status":"pending"}]}`)
for _, want := range []string{"- [in_progress] write failing test", "- [pending] keep existing shape"} {
if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("expected %q in formatted plan, got %q", want, got)
}
}
}
func TestFormatPlanArgumentsPreservesNotes(t *testing.T) {
got := formatPlanArguments(`{"plan":[{"content":"finish preservation","status":"in_progress","notes":"keep TUI untouched"}]}`)
if !strings.Contains(got, "- [in_progress] finish preservation") || !strings.Contains(got, "Notes: keep TUI untouched") {
t.Fatalf("expected plan content and notes to be preserved, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestCapBodyShortBodyUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
body := "short skill body"
if got := capBody(body); got != body {
@@ -239,3 +350,16 @@ func TestLoadedSkillsSkipsCallsWithoutResult(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected no skills without a result body, got %#v", got)
}
}
func TestLoadedSkillsAcceptsSkillArgumentAlias(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "s1", Name: "skill", Arguments: `{"skill":"deploy"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "s1", Content: "deploy instructions"},
}
got := loadedSkills(messages)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].name != "deploy" || got[0].body != "deploy instructions" {
t.Fatalf("loadedSkills should honor skill alias, got %#v", got)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
package agent
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// recentEdits extracts each mutated file's path and a one-line note from the
// matching tool result, latest note per path in last-seen order.
func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/foo.go","content":"package foo"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "Wrote internal/foo.go (12 lines)"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
}
edits := recentEdits(messages)
if len(edits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
}
if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
}
if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
}
}
// After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
// names the edited files and what changed, so the model needn't re-read them.
func TestCompactionPreservesRecentEdits(t *testing.T) {
messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "add a flag"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "editing", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{ID: "e1", Name: "write_file", Arguments: `{"path":"cmd/main.go","content":"..."}`},
}},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "Wrote cmd/main.go (adds --version flag)"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "done"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "continuing"},
}
summary := compactStateConversation(t, messages)
state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summary)
if len(state.RecentEdits) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 preserved edit, got %#v", state.RecentEdits)
}
if state.RecentEdits[0].Path != "cmd/main.go" || !strings.Contains(state.RecentEdits[0].Note, "--version") {
t.Fatalf("preserved edit = %#v, want cmd/main.go + its note", state.RecentEdits[0])
}
}
// A fresh edit note for a path overrides the one carried from an earlier
// compaction (newer wins) and moves the path to the newest position rather than
// duplicating it or leaving it pinned to its old slot.
func TestRecentEditsMergeNewerWins(t *testing.T) {
prior := preservedState{RecentEdits: []preservedEdit{{Path: "a.go", Note: "old note"}, {Path: "z.go", Note: "z"}}}
older := preservedEditsToEntries(prior.RecentEdits)
newer := []skillEntry{{name: "a.go", body: "new note"}, {name: "b.go", body: "added"}}
merged := mergeRecentEdits(older, newer)
// z.go (untouched) keeps its lead; a.go is re-edited so it takes the new note
// and moves behind z.go, ahead of the brand-new b.go: [z.go, a.go, b.go].
if len(merged) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected z.go + refreshed a.go + b.go, got %#v", merged)
}
if merged[0].name != "z.go" {
t.Fatalf("untouched z.go should stay first, got %#v", merged)
}
if merged[1].name != "a.go" || merged[1].body != "new note" {
t.Fatalf("re-edited a.go should move to the newest edits with the new note, got %#v", merged[1])
}
if merged[2].name != "b.go" {
t.Fatalf("brand-new b.go should be last, got %#v", merged[2])
}
}
// Regression: once more than maxRecentEdits distinct files are tracked, re-editing
// an early file must move it into the capped tail rather than leaving it to be
// dropped — otherwise the next compaction omits exactly the file the model most
// recently touched.
func TestRecentEditsCapKeepsReeditedFile(t *testing.T) {
// Earlier compaction preserved exactly maxRecentEdits files, f0 the oldest.
older := make([]skillEntry, 0, maxRecentEdits)
for i := 0; i < maxRecentEdits; i++ {
older = append(older, skillEntry{name: fmt.Sprintf("f%d.go", i), body: "old"})
}
// Fresh window re-edits the OLDEST file (f0) and adds a brand-new file, so the
// merged list exceeds the cap and something must be dropped.
newer := []skillEntry{{name: "f0.go", body: "re-edited"}, {name: "fresh.go", body: "new"}}
merged := capRecentEdits(mergeRecentEdits(older, newer))
if len(merged) != maxRecentEdits {
t.Fatalf("cap should keep %d entries, got %d", maxRecentEdits, len(merged))
}
var f0 *skillEntry
for i := range merged {
if merged[i].name == "f0.go" {
f0 = &merged[i]
}
if merged[i].name == "f1.go" {
t.Fatalf("f1.go (now the least-recently touched) should have been dropped, got %#v", merged)
}
}
if f0 == nil {
t.Fatalf("re-edited f0.go must survive the cap, got %#v", merged)
}
if f0.body != "re-edited" {
t.Fatalf("surviving f0.go should carry the fresh note, got %q", f0.body)
}
}
+38 -4
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func TestSummarizeWithFallbackReSummarizesPartialsIntoOne(t *testing.T) {
}
provider := &compressingSummarizer{maxMarkers: 2}
summary, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, messages)
summary, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("summarizeWithFallback failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func TestSummarizeWithFallbackChunksOnContextLimit(t *testing.T) {
// must be split recursively until each chunk fits.
provider := &sizeLimitedSummarizer{maxMarkers: 2}
summary, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, messages)
summary, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("summarizeWithFallback failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ func TestSummarizeWithFallbackPropagatesNonContextErrors(t *testing.T) {
_, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "msg-0"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "msg-1"},
})
}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a non-context-limit error to propagate")
}
@@ -138,8 +138,42 @@ func TestSummarizeWithFallbackSingleMessageContextLimitSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
provider := &sizeLimitedSummarizer{maxMarkers: 0}
_, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "msg-0 too big"},
})
}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the context-limit error to surface for an unsplittable single message")
}
}
// usageReportingSummarizer emits a usage event so a test can assert the
// summarizer's token cost is forwarded to OnUsage.
type usageReportingSummarizer struct{}
func (usageReportingSummarizer) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 3)
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "summary"}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventUsage, Usage: zeroruntime.Usage{PromptTokens: 100, CompletionTokens: 20}}
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
return ch, nil
}
func TestSummarizeForwardsUsageButNotText(t *testing.T) {
// Compaction must stay invisible to the user (no OnText), but its token cost
// MUST be counted, so OnUsage has to fire for the summarizer call.
var got zeroruntime.Usage
var calls int
summary, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), usageReportingSummarizer{}, []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hello"},
}, func(u zeroruntime.Usage) { calls++; got = u })
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("summarize failed: %v", err)
}
if summary != "summary" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected summary: %q", summary)
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected OnUsage to fire once, got %d", calls)
}
if got.PromptTokens != 100 || got.CompletionTokens != 20 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected forwarded usage: %#v", got)
}
}
+104 -3
View File
@@ -152,6 +152,59 @@ func TestCompactPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// scriptedSummaryProvider returns, per StreamCompletion call, either an error
// event (when the script entry is non-empty) or a success text, so a test can
// drive the recursive summarizeWithFallback split/reduce path deterministically.
type scriptedSummaryProvider struct {
calls int
scripts []string
}
func (p *scriptedSummaryProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
i := p.calls
p.calls++
if i < len(p.scripts) && p.scripts[i] != "" {
return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: p.scripts[i]}}), nil
}
return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "PARTIAL"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}), nil
}
func TestSummarizeWithFallbackPropagatesNonContextReduceError(t *testing.T) {
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "a"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "b"},
}
ctxLimit := "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."
// call 1 (full slice): context-limit → split; calls 2,3 (halves): succeed;
// call 4 (reduce of the two partials): a NON-context provider error that must
// surface unchanged rather than be masked by the joined-text fallback.
provider := &scriptedSummaryProvider{scripts: []string{ctxLimit, "", "", "provider request failed: 401 unauthorized"}}
if _, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, msgs, func(Usage) {}); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
t.Fatalf("a non-context reduce error must surface, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestSummarizeWithFallbackUsesJoinedTextOnContextLimitReduce(t *testing.T) {
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "a"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "b"},
}
ctxLimit := "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."
// Same split, but the reduce also hits a context-limit: fall back to the joined
// partial summaries instead of failing.
provider := &scriptedSummaryProvider{scripts: []string{ctxLimit, "", "", ctxLimit}}
got, err := summarizeWithFallback(context.Background(), provider, msgs, func(Usage) {})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a context-limit reduce must fall back to joined text, got error %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "PARTIAL") {
t.Fatalf("joined fallback should contain the partial summaries, got %q", got)
}
}
// --- estimateTokens tests -------------------------------------------------
func TestEstimateTokensMonotonic(t *testing.T) {
@@ -180,6 +233,54 @@ func TestEstimateTokensCountsToolCallsAndResults(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestEstimateTokensCountsImages(t *testing.T) {
// A tiny image carries far more model tokens than its text content suggests;
// the estimate must rise with each image so an image-heavy context still
// trends toward compaction instead of reading as ~0.
plain := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "look"}}
withImage := []zeroruntime.Message{{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "look",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("tiny")}},
}}
twoImages := []zeroruntime.Message{{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
Content: "look",
Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{
{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("tiny")},
{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte("tiny")},
},
}}
if estimateTokens(withImage) <= estimateTokens(plain) {
t.Fatal("expected an image to increase the token estimate")
}
if estimateTokens(twoImages) <= estimateTokens(withImage) {
t.Fatal("expected the estimate to grow with image count")
}
}
func TestEstimateToolDefTokensCountsDefinitions(t *testing.T) {
if got := estimateToolDefTokens(nil); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no tools should estimate 0 tokens, got %d", got)
}
one := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
Name: "read_file",
Description: "Read a file from the workspace and return its contents.",
Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}}},
}}
if estimateToolDefTokens(one) <= 0 {
t.Fatal("a tool definition (name + description + schema) should estimate > 0 tokens")
}
two := append(append([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}, one...), zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{
Name: "write_file",
Description: "Write contents to a file in the workspace.",
Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"},
})
if estimateToolDefTokens(two) <= estimateToolDefTokens(one) {
t.Fatal("the estimate must grow with more tool definitions")
}
}
// --- Loop integration: provider mocks -------------------------------------
// summarizeRecordingProvider returns scripted turns for the main agent loop
@@ -491,7 +592,7 @@ func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "sys"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"},
}
_, retried, err := st.recover(context.Background(), provider, tiny, "context length exceeded")
_, retried, err := st.recover(context.Background(), provider, tiny, nil, "context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error from no-op recover: %v", err)
}
@@ -511,7 +612,7 @@ func TestRecoverNoopDoesNotConsumeReactiveBudget(t *testing.T) {
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "a2"},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "u3"},
}
compacted, retried, err := st.recover(context.Background(), provider, big, "context length exceeded")
compacted, retried, err := st.recover(context.Background(), provider, big, nil, "context length exceeded")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error from second recover: %v", err)
}
@@ -534,7 +635,7 @@ func TestRecoverDisabledIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
// context-limit error string.
got, retried, err := st.recover(context.Background(), &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "should not be called"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
}}}, msgs, "context length exceeded")
}}}, msgs, nil, "context length exceeded")
_ = called
if retried || err != nil || len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("disabled recover must be a no-op, got retried=%v err=%v len=%d", retried, err, len(got))
+205
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// someRequestContains reports whether any message sent to the provider across all
// turns contains substr — used to assert a continue nudge was actually injected.
func someRequestContains(requests []zeroruntime.CompletionRequest, substr string) bool {
for _, req := range requests {
for _, msg := range req.Messages {
if strings.Contains(msg.Content, substr) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// planTurn is a turn that calls update_plan with the given item statuses (reusing
// the package's shared toolTurn helper).
func planTurn(statuses ...string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
items := make([]string, len(statuses))
for i, s := range statuses {
items[i] = `{"content":"step ` + s + `","status":"` + s + `"}`
}
return toolTurn("plan", "update_plan", `{"plan":[`+strings.Join(items, ",")+`]}`)
}
// BUG #1 regression: a no-tool-call turn that ends mid-step while plan items are
// still pending must NOT be accepted as success. The loop must re-prompt (bounded)
// and, if the model keeps stalling, finalize as INCOMPLETE — never success.
func TestCompletionGatePendingPlanContinuesThenIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
// Mirrors the git-multibranch failure: plan with pending steps, then the model
// keeps emitting "…Let me check the SSH configuration:" without acting.
cue := "Now I need to configure the SSH server. Let me check the current SSH configuration:"
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
planTurn("completed", "pending", "pending"),
textTurn(cue), textTurn(cue), textTurn(cue), textTurn(cue), textTurn(cue),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "set up a git server", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("expected Incomplete=true (model stalled with pending plan), got false; final=%q turns=%d", result.FinalAnswer, result.Turns)
}
// 1 plan turn + maxContinueNudges(3) nudged turns + 1 final stalling turn = 5.
// Critically it did NOT stop at the first text turn (request 2) as success.
if len(provider.requests) != 1+maxContinueNudges+1 {
t.Fatalf("expected %d provider turns (1 plan + %d nudges + 1 final), got %d",
1+maxContinueNudges+1, maxContinueNudges, len(provider.requests))
}
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, continueNudgeMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected a continue nudge (%q) to be injected into the conversation", continueNudgeMarker)
}
}
// A genuinely-complete single-turn answer (no plan, no continuation cue) must
// still finalize as success — the gate must not break short/read-only tasks.
func TestCompletionGateAcceptsGenuineCompletion(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("The file contains 42 lines."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "count the lines", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("genuine completion wrongly marked Incomplete; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "The file contains 42 lines." {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want the completed answer", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 turn (no spurious re-prompt), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
}
// A continuation-cue turn triggers a re-prompt, but once the model actually
// finishes (clean answer, no cue, no pending plan) the run exits as success — the
// nudge gives the model a path to a legitimate completion.
func TestCompletionGateContinuesOnCueThenSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn("Let me read the file:"),
textTurn("Done. The file has 42 lines."),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "count the lines", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("run wrongly marked Incomplete after the model completed; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "Done. The file has 42 lines." {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want the completed answer", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 turns (1 cue re-prompted + 1 completion), got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
if !someRequestContains(provider.requests, continueNudgeMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected a continue nudge after the continuation-cue turn")
}
}
// With the gate OFF (the interactive/TUI default), a continuation-cue turn is
// accepted as the final answer exactly as before — guaranteeing no behavior
// change for non-headless callers.
func TestCompletionGateOffPreservesLegacyBehavior(t *testing.T) {
cue := "Let me check the config:"
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
textTurn(cue),
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "do a thing", provider, Options{
Registry: tools.NewRegistry(),
MaxTurns: 10,
// RequireCompletionSignal deliberately left false.
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("legacy path must never set Incomplete; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != cue {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want %q (legacy: text-only turn is the answer)", result.FinalAnswer, cue)
}
if len(provider.requests) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("legacy path must not re-prompt; got %d turns", len(provider.requests))
}
}
// review #6: the continuation-cue detector must catch a mid-line action announcement
// that stops on a colon (the git-multibranch case), without flagging genuine closers
// — a recommendation, a plain summary colon, or a sign-off.
func TestContinuationCueMatching(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
text string
cue bool
}{
{"Now I need to configure the SSH server. Let me check the current SSH configuration:", true},
{"Let me read the file:", true},
{"Now I'll run the tests:", true},
{"Next, I suggest reviewing the changes.", false}, // recommendation, no colon
{"Here is the summary:", false}, // summary colon, no action lead-in
{"Let me know if you need anything:", false}, // sign-off
{"The function is implemented and all tests pass.", false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := endsWithContinuationCue(c.text); got != c.cue {
t.Errorf("endsWithContinuationCue(%q) = %v, want %v", c.text, got, c.cue)
}
}
}
// review #4: a run that loops to the MaxTurns ceiling (always calling a tool, so it
// never reaches the no-tool-call gate) was reported as success. Under the headless
// gate, a max-turns cutoff is INCOMPLETE — the agent was stopped mid-run, not done.
func TestMaxTurnsCutoffIsIncompleteUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())
toolEvery := toolTurn("c", "update_plan", `{"plan":[{"content":"step","status":"in_progress"}]}`)
provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
toolEvery, toolEvery, toolEvery, toolEvery,
}}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "keep working", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: 2,
RequireCompletionSignal: true,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !result.Incomplete {
t.Fatalf("a max-turns cutoff under the gate must be Incomplete; final=%q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.IncompleteReason, "max-turns") {
t.Fatalf("IncompleteReason = %q, want it to cite max-turns", result.IncompleteReason)
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -81,3 +81,11 @@ Otherwise, confirm before executing.
6. Avoid redundant confirmations if you already confirmed and there is no material new risk.
7. Write/shell operations inside the workspace do not need the same scrutiny as operations outside it.
8. Interactive programs (editors, pagers, REPLs, `ssh`/`psql`/`mysql` without a command, `top`/`htop`, `git rebase -i`) will be blocked because they hang the agent; always use the non-interactive alternative.
## Sandbox Permission Requests
- Prefer sandboxed additional permissions over full escalation: use `sandbox_permissions: "with_additional_permissions"` with the required file-system or network permission when that can satisfy the command.
- Use `sandbox_permissions: "require_escalated"` only when the command must run outside the sandbox, such as inspecting or controlling host/global state that the sandbox intentionally hides.
- If a sandboxed shell command returns only sandbox-local state when the user asked for host/global state, do not answer from that misleading output. Rerun the needed command with `sandbox_permissions: "require_escalated"`, a short user-facing `justification`, and a narrow `prefix_rule` when appropriate.
- For `require_escalated`, include a short user-facing `justification`. When a reusable approval is appropriate, include a narrow `prefix_rule`; do not suggest broad shell, interpreter, or launcher prefixes.
- Shell commands are evaluated as independent command segments across `|`, `&&`, `||`, and `;`. A reusable prefix must apply safely to the command segment it is meant to authorize.
+5 -5
View File
@@ -48,16 +48,16 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
}
// estimateToolTokens approximates the token footprint of advertised tool
// definitions (name + description + JSON schema), matching estimateTokens'
// ~4-chars/token heuristic so all categories use the same scale.
// definitions (name + description + JSON schema), using the same ApproxTextTokens
// heuristic as estimateTokens so all categories share one scale.
func estimateToolTokens(tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) int {
total := 0
for _, tool := range tools {
total += len(tool.Name) / 4
total += len(tool.Description) / 4
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Name)
total += ApproxTextTokens(tool.Description)
if len(tool.Parameters) > 0 {
if encoded, err := json.Marshal(tool.Parameters); err == nil {
total += len(encoded) / 4
total += ApproxTextTokens(string(encoded))
}
}
total += 4 // per-tool overhead
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
package agent
import "testing"
// decodeToolArguments must (a) decode a normal single-object payload unchanged,
// (b) tolerate a weak model packing multiple concatenated top-level JSON objects
// into one arguments string by decoding the FIRST object and ignoring the rest
// (the minimax-m3 "invalid character '{' after top-level value" failure), and
// (c) still reject a genuinely malformed/truncated first object.
func TestDecodeToolArguments(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("single object decodes normally", func(t *testing.T) {
var a map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":"x"}`, &a); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if a["path"] != "x" {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want path=x", a)
}
})
t.Run("concatenated objects decode the first, ignore trailing", func(t *testing.T) {
var b map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":"first"}{"path":"second"}`, &b); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("multi-object should decode the first, got err = %v", err)
}
if b["path"] != "first" {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want the first object (path=first)", b)
}
})
t.Run("distinct tools' args concatenated (real minimax case): first object used", func(t *testing.T) {
var c map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"plan":[1,2]}{"cmd":"go version"}`, &c); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want nil", err)
}
if _, ok := c["plan"]; !ok || c["cmd"] != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoded %v, want only the first object's keys", c)
}
})
t.Run("truncated first object still errors", func(t *testing.T) {
var d map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"path":`, &d); err == nil {
t.Fatal("truncated JSON must still error")
}
})
t.Run("non-JSON trailing garbage still errors (not masked)", func(t *testing.T) {
var g map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(`{"x":1}xyz`, &g); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a valid first object followed by non-JSON garbage must still error")
}
})
t.Run("recoverableToolArguments: only whole-JSON trailing is tolerated", func(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in string
ok bool
first string
}{
{`{"a":1}`, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1}{"b":2}`, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1} {"b":2} `, true, `{"a":1}`},
{`{"a":1}xyz`, false, ""},
{`{"a":`, false, ""},
{` `, false, ""},
}
for _, c := range cases {
first, ok := recoverableToolArguments(c.in)
if ok != c.ok || (ok && first != c.first) {
t.Fatalf("recoverableToolArguments(%q) = (%q,%v), want (%q,%v)", c.in, first, ok, c.first, c.ok)
}
}
})
t.Run("historySafeToolCalls recovers the first object, not {}", func(t *testing.T) {
out := historySafeToolCalls([]ToolCall{
{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"README.md"}{"path":"AGENTS.md"}`}, // concatenated -> first
{ID: "c2", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}xyz`}, // garbage -> {}
{ID: "c3", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"ok"}`}, // valid -> unchanged
})
if out[0].Arguments != `{"path":"README.md"}` {
t.Fatalf("concatenated args should record the first object, got %q", out[0].Arguments)
}
if out[1].Arguments != "{}" {
t.Fatalf("garbage-trailing args should record {}, got %q", out[1].Arguments)
}
if out[2].Arguments != `{"path":"ok"}` {
t.Fatalf("valid args should be unchanged, got %q", out[2].Arguments)
}
})
t.Run("whitespace-only errors (caller guards empty)", func(t *testing.T) {
var e map[string]any
if err := decodeToolArguments(" ", &e); err == nil {
t.Fatal("whitespace-only must error")
}
})
}
+83
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// richMCPTool mimics a real MCP tool's schema (Exa/Firecrawl-style search): an
// object with several typed, described properties. Real MCP tools are this size
// or larger, which is why shipping their full schemas every turn is expensive.
type richMCPTool struct{ name string }
func (t richMCPTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t richMCPTool) Description() string {
return "Search the web and return ranked, structured results with titles, URLs, snippets, and optional cleaned full-page content. Supports natural-language and keyword queries with domain and date filtering."
}
func (t richMCPTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{
Type: "object",
AdditionalProperties: false,
Required: []string{"query"},
Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
"query": {Type: "string", Description: "The search query to run against the web index. Supports natural-language and keyword queries."},
"num_results": {Type: "integer", Description: "Maximum number of results to return (1-100). Defaults to 10."},
"include_domains": {Type: "array", Description: "Only return results from these domains.", Items: &tools.PropertySchema{Type: "string"}},
"exclude_domains": {Type: "array", Description: "Never return results from these domains.", Items: &tools.PropertySchema{Type: "string"}},
"start_published_date": {Type: "string", Description: "ISO-8601 date; only results published on or after this date are returned."},
"end_published_date": {Type: "string", Description: "ISO-8601 date; only results published on or before this date are returned."},
"category": {Type: "string", Description: "Restrict results to a content category.", Enum: []string{"news", "research paper", "company", "tweet", "pdf"}},
"include_text": {Type: "boolean", Description: "Include cleaned full-page text for each result (slower, larger payload)."},
},
}
}
func (t richMCPTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectNetwork, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t richMCPTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
func (t richMCPTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
// TestDeferralTokenSavingsMeasurement quantifies the win from the lowered
// deferThreshold default: with a typical small MCP server (6 tools), threshold 10
// (the OLD default) kept deferral OFF so all six full schemas shipped every turn,
// while threshold 3 (the NEW default) collapses them to compact reminder lines.
func TestDeferralTokenSavingsMeasurement(t *testing.T) {
const mcpToolCount = 6
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for i := 0; i < mcpToolCount; i++ {
registry.Register(richMCPTool{name: fmt.Sprintf("mcp__websearch__search_v%d", i)})
}
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
measure := func(threshold int) (int, int) {
defs, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: threshold}, map[string]bool{})
encoded, err := json.Marshal(defs)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal tool defs: %v", err)
}
bytes := len(encoded) + len(reminder)
return bytes, bytes / 4 // ~tokens (approx 4 chars/token)
}
eagerBytes, eagerTok := measure(10) // 6 < 10 -> inactive -> all schemas eager
deferBytes, deferTok := measure(3) // 6 >= 3 -> active -> compact reminder
savedPct := 100 * float64(eagerBytes-deferBytes) / float64(eagerBytes)
t.Logf("MCP tools in set: %d", mcpToolCount)
t.Logf("threshold 10 (OLD, eager schemas): %d bytes (~%d tokens) per turn", eagerBytes, eagerTok)
t.Logf("threshold 3 (NEW, deferred lines): %d bytes (~%d tokens) per turn", deferBytes, deferTok)
t.Logf("SAVED: ~%d tokens per turn (%.0f%% smaller tool payload)", eagerTok-deferTok, savedPct)
if deferBytes >= eagerBytes {
t.Fatalf("deferral should shrink the tool payload: eager=%d defer=%d", eagerBytes, deferBytes)
}
if savedPct < 50 {
t.Fatalf("expected a large reduction, got only %.0f%%", savedPct)
}
}
+102 -70
View File
@@ -129,6 +129,24 @@ func (fakeToolSearchTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok"}
}
func toolDefinitionByName(definitions []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, name string) *zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
for i := range definitions {
if definitions[i].Name == name {
return &definitions[i]
}
}
return nil
}
func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) {
t.Helper()
for _, message := range request.Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(message.Content, "Deferred tools:") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be appended as a user message: %q", message.Content)
}
}
}
func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
@@ -219,8 +237,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsBelowThresholdInactive(t *testing.T) {
// FIX 6(a): a deferred tool removed by DisabledTools must NOT count toward the
// eligible total. With N deferred registered and threshold == N, disabling one
// drops the surviving eligible count to N-1 < threshold, so the partition takes
// the INACTIVE path (empty reminder, all VISIBLE tools exposed with full schemas,
// the disabled one filtered out entirely).
// the INACTIVE path (empty discovery text, all VISIBLE tools exposed with full
// schemas, the disabled one filtered out entirely).
func TestPartitionToolsDisabledDeferredDropsBelowThresholdInactive(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
@@ -246,9 +264,9 @@ func TestPartitionToolsDisabledDeferredDropsBelowThresholdInactive(t *testing.T)
}
// FIX 6(b): with deferral ACTIVE, a DisabledTools-hidden deferred tool must never
// appear in the reminder NOR be exposed — it is filtered out before the partition
// influence discovery NOR be exposed — it is filtered out before the partition
// even considers it.
func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromReminderAndExposed(t *testing.T) {
func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -256,25 +274,31 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromReminderAndExposed(t *t
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{}) // usable loader => deferral can activate
// 3 deferred, disable beta => 2 surviving eligible, threshold 2 => active.
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
DeferThreshold: 2,
DisabledTools: []string{"mcp__srv__beta"},
}, map[string]bool{})
if reminder == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected active path with a non-empty reminder for the unloaded tools")
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected active path with discovery text for the unloaded tools")
}
if strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("disabled deferred tool must not appear in the reminder, got %q", reminder)
if strings.Contains(discovery, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("disabled deferred tool must not appear in discovery text, got %q", discovery)
}
for _, def := range exposed {
if def.Name == "mcp__srv__beta" {
t.Fatalf("disabled deferred tool must not be exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
// The two surviving deferred tools are hidden (unloaded) and named in the reminder.
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__gamma") {
t.Fatalf("reminder must list the surviving unloaded deferred tools, got %q", reminder)
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must be exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if search.Description != discovery {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery text\n got: %q\nwant: %q", search.Description, discovery)
}
if !strings.Contains(discovery, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("discovery text must list the surviving deferred source, got %q", discovery)
}
}
@@ -289,7 +313,7 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
loaded := map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true}
// 2 eligible deferred tools, threshold 2 => active.
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, loaded)
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, loaded)
exposedNames := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range exposed {
@@ -307,14 +331,21 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
if exposedNames["mcp__srv__beta"] {
t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool must be hidden from exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
if reminder == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected a non-empty reminder for the hidden tool")
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty discovery text for the hidden tool")
}
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("expected reminder to list the hidden tool, got %q", reminder)
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
if strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("loaded tool must not appear in the reminder, got %q", reminder)
if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
}
if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
}
}
@@ -337,9 +368,9 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
}
// BuildDeferredReminder returns "" for no hidden lines.
// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
if reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty reminder when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
}
}
@@ -376,7 +407,8 @@ func TestRunLoadsDeferredToolThenAdvertisesNextTurn(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected two turns, got %d", len(provider.requests))
}
// Turn 1: alpha is hidden (not advertised) and the reminder is a trailing user msg.
// Turn 1: alpha is hidden (not advertised), and discovery lives on the
// tool_search definition rather than a trailing user message.
turn1Tools := map[string]bool{}
for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
turn1Tools[def.Name] = true
@@ -384,9 +416,13 @@ func TestRunLoadsDeferredToolThenAdvertisesNextTurn(t *testing.T) {
if turn1Tools["mcp__srv__alpha"] {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 must not advertise the not-yet-loaded deferred tool")
}
last1 := provider.requests[0].Messages[len(provider.requests[0].Messages)-1]
if last1.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || !strings.Contains(last1.Content, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 request must end with the deferred-tools reminder, got role=%s content=%q", last1.Role, last1.Content)
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, provider.requests[0])
search1 := toolDefinitionByName(provider.requests[0].Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search1 == nil {
t.Fatalf("turn 1 must expose tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(search1.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search1.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search1.Description)
}
// Turn 2: alpha is now loaded and advertised with a full schema.
@@ -401,20 +437,20 @@ func TestRunLoadsDeferredToolThenAdvertisesNextTurn(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("beta was never loaded; it must stay hidden in turn 2")
}
// The reminder must NOT persist into the returned message history.
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Call tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("the deferred-tools reminder must not be persisted in result.Messages")
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder drives a mid-run
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery drives a mid-run
// context-limit error that triggers reactive compaction+retry while deferral is
// ACTIVE and a deferred tool is already loaded. The retried turn must NOT be
// degraded to the empty-loaded/no-reminder state: it must still advertise the
// loaded tool's FULL schema and carry the <system-reminder> for the hidden tool.
func TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder(t *testing.T) {
// degraded to the empty-loaded/no-discovery state: it must still advertise the
// loaded tool's FULL schema and keep tool_search discovery for hidden tools.
func TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
// load_signal asks the loop to load mcp__srv__alpha next turn.
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: "mcp__srv__alpha"})
@@ -492,24 +528,20 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("retry must advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema, got %#v", alpha.Parameters)
}
// The retry must carry the deferred-tools reminder as its trailing user
// message (the hidden tool is mcp__srv__beta) — not the no-reminder state.
last := retry.Messages[len(retry.Messages)-1]
if last.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || !strings.Contains(last.Content, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("retry request must end with the deferred-tools reminder, got role=%s content=%q", last.Role, last.Content)
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, retry)
search := toolDefinitionByName(retry.Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must expose tool_search for still-hidden tools, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(last.Content, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("retry reminder must list the still-hidden tool mcp__srv__beta, got %q", last.Content)
}
if strings.Contains(last.Content, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("loaded tool must not appear in the retry reminder, got %q", last.Content)
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("retry tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search.Description)
}
// The reminder must NOT persist into the returned message history, even on
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history, even on
// the reactive-retry path.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Call tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("the deferred-tools reminder must not be persisted in result.Messages")
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
@@ -544,15 +576,15 @@ func (provider *connectErrorProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, reques
return ch, nil
}
// TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder mirrors
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder but drives the
// TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery mirrors
// TestRunReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery but drives the
// CONNECT-TIME error path: StreamCompletion itself returns a non-nil
// context-limit error (rather than a mid-stream StreamEventError). With deferral
// ACTIVE and a deferred tool already loaded, the rebuilt retry request must still
// advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema AND carry the deferred-tools reminder —
// i.e. the first reactive block reuses exposed/reminder, not the empty-loaded
// advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema AND carry tool_search discovery —
// i.e. the first reactive block reuses exposed, not the empty-loaded
// partition.
func TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder(t *testing.T) {
func TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(loadSignalTool{value: "mcp__srv__alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
@@ -625,22 +657,19 @@ func TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder(t *testin
t.Fatalf("retry must advertise the loaded tool's FULL schema, got %#v", alpha.Parameters)
}
// The retry must carry the deferred-tools reminder as its trailing user message.
last := retry.Messages[len(retry.Messages)-1]
if last.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || !strings.Contains(last.Content, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("retry request must end with the deferred-tools reminder, got role=%s content=%q", last.Role, last.Content)
assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t, retry)
search := toolDefinitionByName(retry.Tools, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil {
t.Fatalf("retry must expose tool_search for still-hidden tools, got %#v", retry.Tools)
}
if !strings.Contains(last.Content, "mcp__srv__beta") {
t.Fatalf("retry reminder must list the still-hidden tool mcp__srv__beta, got %q", last.Content)
}
if strings.Contains(last.Content, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
t.Fatalf("loaded tool must not appear in the retry reminder, got %q", last.Content)
if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "Tool discovery") || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
t.Fatalf("retry tool_search description must carry deferred discovery, got %q", search.Description)
}
// The reminder must NOT persist into the returned message history.
// The discovery text must NOT persist into the returned message history.
for _, m := range result.Messages {
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Call tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("the deferred-tools reminder must not be persisted in result.Messages")
if m.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(m.Content, "Tool discovery") {
t.Fatalf("deferred discovery must not be persisted in result.Messages")
}
}
}
@@ -649,8 +678,7 @@ func TestRunConnectTimeReactiveRetryKeepsLoadedDeferredToolAndReminder(t *testin
// regression: N deferred tools are registered alongside tool_search, the operator
// allowlists ONLY the N deferred names (NOT tool_search), and DeferThreshold == N.
// Deferral must ACTIVATE, the partition must STILL expose tool_search (the gateway
// to the allowlisted tools), and a tool_search call must be DISPATCH-ALLOWED — so
// the reminder never points the model at an unreachable tool.
// to the allowlisted tools), and a tool_search call must be DISPATCH-ALLOWED.
func TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
deferredNames := []string{"mcp__srv__alpha", "mcp__srv__beta"}
@@ -667,14 +695,14 @@ func TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable(t *testing.T) {
EnabledTools: append([]string{}, deferredNames...),
}
exposed, reminder := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options, map[string]bool{})
exposed, discovery := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, options, map[string]bool{})
// Deferral active => non-empty reminder advertising the hidden deferred tools.
if reminder == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected deferral active (non-empty reminder) at threshold N, got empty")
// Deferral active => non-empty tool_search discovery for hidden deferred tools.
if discovery == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected deferral active (non-empty discovery) at threshold N, got empty")
}
if !strings.Contains(reminder, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("reminder must instruct the model to call tool_search, got %q", reminder)
if !strings.Contains(discovery, "tool_search") {
t.Fatalf("discovery must instruct the model to call tool_search, got %q", discovery)
}
// FIX 2(a): tool_search is exposed even though the allowlist omits it.
@@ -685,6 +713,10 @@ func TestAllowlistedDeferredToolsKeepToolSearchReachable(t *testing.T) {
if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
t.Fatalf("tool_search must be exposed on the active path despite the allowlist omitting it, got %#v", exposed)
}
search := toolDefinitionByName(exposed, tools.ToolSearchToolName)
if search == nil || search.Description != discovery {
t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery text, got %#v discovery=%q", search, discovery)
}
// The allowlisted-but-unloaded deferred tools are hidden (not exposed).
for _, name := range deferredNames {
if exposedNames[name] {
+5 -5
View File
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ func TestDeniedPermissionResultCategories(t *testing.T) {
if plain.DenialReason != DenialPermissionDenied {
t.Fatalf("plain denial = %q, want %q", plain.DenialReason, DenialPermissionDenied)
}
// Sandbox-violation-driven denial.
// Sandbox-block-driven denial.
sandboxDenied := deniedPermissionResult(ToolCall{ID: "c2", Name: "bash"}, "outside workspace", PermissionEvent{
ToolName: "bash",
Violation: &sandbox.Violation{Code: "outside_workspace"},
ToolName: "bash",
Block: &sandbox.Block{Code: "outside_workspace"},
})
if sandboxDenied.DenialReason != DenialSandboxViolation {
t.Fatalf("sandbox denial = %q, want %q", sandboxDenied.DenialReason, DenialSandboxViolation)
if sandboxDenied.DenialReason != DenialSandboxBlock {
t.Fatalf("sandbox denial = %q, want %q", sandboxDenied.DenialReason, DenialSandboxBlock)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// argsPermTool implements tools.ArgsPermissioner; plainTool does not.
type argsPermTool struct{ perm tools.Permission }
func (argsPermTool) Name() string { return "args" }
func (argsPermTool) Description() string { return "" }
func (argsPermTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{} }
func (argsPermTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt} }
func (argsPermTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result { return tools.Result{} }
func (t argsPermTool) PermissionForArgs(map[string]any) tools.Permission { return t.perm }
type plainTool struct{ perm tools.Permission }
func (plainTool) Name() string { return "plain" }
func (plainTool) Description() string { return "" }
func (plainTool) Parameters() tools.Schema { return tools.Schema{} }
func (t plainTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: t.perm} }
func (plainTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result { return tools.Result{} }
func TestEffectivePermission(t *testing.T) {
// A tool implementing ArgsPermissioner refines its permission per call.
if got := effectivePermission(argsPermTool{perm: tools.PermissionAllow}, nil); got != tools.PermissionAllow {
t.Fatalf("args-aware tool: got %q, want allow", got)
}
if got := effectivePermission(argsPermTool{perm: tools.PermissionPrompt}, nil); got != tools.PermissionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("args-aware tool: got %q, want prompt", got)
}
// A tool WITHOUT the interface falls back to its static Safety().Permission —
// the args-aware path must never change a normal tool's behavior.
if got := effectivePermission(plainTool{perm: tools.PermissionAllow}, nil); got != tools.PermissionAllow {
t.Fatalf("plain tool: got %q, want its static allow", got)
}
if got := effectivePermission(plainTool{perm: tools.PermissionPrompt}, nil); got != tools.PermissionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("plain tool: got %q, want its static prompt", got)
}
}
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
)
// fileDiagnosticsTimeout bounds one inline post-edit diagnostics check so a
// slow or wedged language server can never hang a tool call; on timeout the
// edit simply reports without a diagnostics block.
const fileDiagnosticsTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// NewFileDiagnostics adapts an *lsp.Manager to the per-edit inline diagnostics
// callback (tools.RunOptions.Diagnostics): it reads the just-written file,
// checks it against the file's language server, and formats error-severity
// diagnostics for the model. Warnings and hints are excluded — nagging about
// style on every edit is noise, while a type error the edit just introduced is
// exactly what the model should see before its next step. Diagnostics are
// rendered with workspace-relative paths: the absolute path would put the
// local username/home directory into the model prompt and session transcript
// on every edit. Returns nil when manager is nil, disabling inline diagnostics
// entirely.
func NewFileDiagnostics(manager *lsp.Manager, workspaceRoot string) func(context.Context, string) string {
if manager == nil {
return nil
}
return func(ctx context.Context, absPath string) string {
text, err := os.ReadFile(absPath)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
checkCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fileDiagnosticsTimeout)
defer cancel()
diagnostics, err := manager.Check(checkCtx, absPath, string(text))
if err != nil {
return ""
}
errors := lsp.FilterBySeverity(diagnostics, lsp.SeverityError)
if len(errors) == 0 {
return ""
}
return lsp.FormatDiagnostics(diagnosticsDisplayPath(workspaceRoot, absPath), errors)
}
}
// diagnosticsDisplayPath renders absPath relative to the workspace root for
// model-facing output, falling back to the file's base name when the path is
// outside the workspace (a bare name still identifies the file without
// exposing the directory layout).
func diagnosticsDisplayPath(workspaceRoot, absPath string) string {
if workspaceRoot != "" {
if rel, err := filepath.Rel(workspaceRoot, absPath); err == nil && !strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
return rel
}
}
return filepath.Base(absPath)
}
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package agent
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// Diagnostics are model-facing: absolute paths would leak the local username
// and directory layout into the prompt and session transcript on every edit.
func TestDiagnosticsDisplayPath(t *testing.T) {
root := filepath.Join("/Users", "someone", "project")
cases := []struct {
root, abs, want string
}{
{root, filepath.Join(root, "internal", "a.go"), filepath.Join("internal", "a.go")},
{root, filepath.Join("/etc", "other.go"), "other.go"}, // outside root -> base name only
{"", filepath.Join("/home", "user", "x.go"), "x.go"}, // no root -> base name only
}
for _, c := range cases {
if got := diagnosticsDisplayPath(c.root, c.abs); got != c.want {
t.Errorf("diagnosticsDisplayPath(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", c.root, c.abs, got, c.want)
}
}
}
+319 -13
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package agent
import (
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -21,6 +22,18 @@ const (
// calls have executed since the last update_plan call.
staleToolCallThreshold = 10
// stalePlanTurnThreshold injects the same one-shot reminder once this many
// turns have passed since the last update_plan while plan items are still
// pending — the turn-based complement to staleToolCallThreshold, catching a
// plan that drifts stale across many turns that each make few tool calls.
stalePlanTurnThreshold = 8
// toolOnlyProgressReminderAt injects a one-shot progress nudge after this
// many consecutive turns contain tool calls but no visible assistant text.
// It does not stop the run; it tells the model to synthesize what it already
// knows before spending more tool turns.
toolOnlyProgressReminderAt = 6
// planReminderTurn is the turn (1-based) by the end of which a multi-step
// task should have called update_plan; if it hasn't, a one-time reminder is
// injected. Set to 3 (not 2) so short, legitimate two-step tasks finish
@@ -36,10 +49,198 @@ const (
toolFailureHintAt = 2
// toolFailureStopAt halts the run after a tool fails this many times in a row
// with the same error, so NO model (weak or strong) burns turns looping on a
// bad call.
toolFailureStopAt = 4
// bad call. Set to 6 (not 4): a corrective hint fires at toolFailureHintAt (2),
// and a model iterating on a genuinely tricky edit can legitimately fail a few
// times after the hint while converging — stopping at 4 cut those runs short.
// The streak still resets the moment the tool succeeds or hits a different
// error, so this only affects true same-error loops.
toolFailureStopAt = 6
// maxContinueNudges bounds how many times the headless completion gate
// (Options.RequireCompletionSignal) re-prompts a model that stopped without a
// tool call while work clearly remained. Once spent, the run finalizes as
// INCOMPLETE rather than nudging forever (and it is still bounded by maxTurns
// and the run deadline).
maxContinueNudges = 3
)
// continueNudgeMarker is a stable substring for tests.
const continueNudgeMarker = "the task is not finished"
// continueNudge tells a model that stopped without a tool call — while work
// clearly remained — to keep going, or to mark the plan complete and summarize if
// it is genuinely done. The second path gives it a clean route to a legitimate
// completion (a finished plan + no continuation cue then exits as success).
func continueNudge(reason string) string {
return "You stopped without calling a tool, but " + continueNudgeMarker + " (" + reason + "). " +
"Do not stop here: take the next concrete action with a tool now. " +
"If you are genuinely finished, first mark the plan complete with update_plan, then give your final summary."
}
// endsWithContinuationCue reports whether an assistant message ends mid-thought —
// the model announcing its OWN next action and then stopping on a colon
// ("…Let me check the SSH configuration:") rather than concluding. It requires
// BOTH a trailing colon AND an action lead-in on the last line, so genuine closers
// are NOT flagged: a forward-looking recommendation ("Next, I suggest reviewing
// the changes."), a sign-off ("Let me know if you need anything"), or a summary
// that merely ends in a colon ("Here is the summary:"). A bare trailing colon alone
// is too common in legitimate final answers to use as a signal.
func endsWithContinuationCue(text string) bool {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(text)
if trimmed == "" {
return false
}
lines := strings.Split(trimmed, "\n")
last := ""
for i := len(lines) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
if s := strings.TrimSpace(lines[i]); s != "" {
last = strings.ToLower(s)
break
}
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(last, ":") {
return false
}
// Inspect the final clause (after the last sentence break) so a mid-line action
// announcement is caught ("…configure the server. Let me check the config:")
// while a plain summary colon ("Here is the summary:") or a recommendation is not.
clause := last
if idx := strings.LastIndex(last, ". "); idx >= 0 {
clause = strings.TrimSpace(last[idx+2:])
}
if strings.HasPrefix(clause, "let me know") { // sign-off, not a mid-step action
return false
}
for _, cue := range []string{
"let me ", "let's ", "now i'll ", "now i will ", "now let me ", "let me now ",
"i'll now ", "i will now ", "next i'll ", "next, i'll ", "first, i'll ", "first let me ",
} {
if strings.HasPrefix(clause, cue) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// planStatusRemaining reports whether a raw update_plan status string represents
// unfinished work. Anything not clearly completed/failed (incl. empty/unknown,
// which the update_plan tool coerces to "pending") counts as remaining, matching
// that tool's own status normalization.
func planStatusRemaining(status string) bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(status)) {
case "completed", "complete", "done", "finished", "resolved", "✓", "x", "[x]",
"failed", "fail", "error", "errored", "blocked", "cancelled", "canceled", "abandoned", "skipped":
return false
default:
return true
}
}
// acceptanceNudgeMarker is a stable substring for tests; it is embedded verbatim
// in acceptanceVerificationNudge.
const acceptanceNudgeMarker = "verify your work against the task's stated success criterion"
// selfReportPhrases are high-signal admissions of guessing/fabrication or stated
// uncertainty about the produced result. They are matched by plain substring with
// NO context guard, so every entry must be FIRST-PERSON or unambiguously about the
// model's own output — NOT a phrase that also describes implemented behavior.
// (Earlier versions included "fall back to" / "placeholder value" / "as a
// fallback" / bare "best guess" / "without proper", which match legitimate final
// answers like "the parser will fall back to UTF-8" or "I replaced the placeholder
// value", wrongly downgrading completed runs — so those are removed. Admissions of
// INABILITY are handled separately by inabilityStems, which carry a guard.)
var selfReportPhrases = []string{
// first-person admissions of guessing / fabrication / assumption
"i guessed", "my best guess", "i'm guessing", "this is a guess", "just a guess",
"i made it up", "i fabricated", "i assumed a", "i had to assume",
// first-person lack of capability (inability stems also cover cannot/could-not)
"i do not have the ability", "i don't have the ability", "i lack the ability",
"no way for me to", "not possible for me to",
// stated uncertainty about the correctness of the produced result
"may not be correct", "might not be correct", "may be incorrect", "might be incorrect",
"this may not work", "this might not work", "not fully functional", "not fully working",
}
// inabilityStems are first-person "I cannot / can't / could not / am unable to /
// do not have" stems. Matching the STEM (not a fixed verb) generalizes over
// whatever action the model claims it could not perform — "analyze", "determine",
// "do", "complete", "verify", "see", etc. — so the detector is not defeated by
// re-phrasing (the chess case slipped a fixed "cannot analyze" list by writing
// "…which I cannot do without proper image analysis capabilities").
var inabilityStems = []string{
"i cannot ", "i can't ", "i can not ", "i could not ", "i couldn't ",
"i am unable to", "i'm unable to", "i was unable to", "i wasn't able to",
"i was not able to", "i do not have", "i don't have", "unable to ",
"without being able to",
}
// successNegationTails are negated phrasings that indicate SUCCESS, not an
// admission ("I could not find any remaining issues", "I cannot reproduce the
// bug"). When an inability stem is immediately followed by one of these, it is not
// treated as an admission, so a clean result is not misreported as INCOMPLETE.
var successNegationTails = []string{
"find any", "found any", "find a ", "see any", "detect any", "identify any",
"reproduce", "spot any", "locate any",
}
// selfReportedIncompletion returns a short reason when the model's final text
// admits it guessed or could not meet the objective, else "". Case-insensitive.
func selfReportedIncompletion(text string) string {
lower := strings.ToLower(text)
for _, phrase := range selfReportPhrases {
if strings.Contains(lower, phrase) {
return selfReportReason(phrase)
}
}
for _, stem := range inabilityStems {
// Scan EVERY occurrence of the stem, not just the first: an earlier
// success-negation use ("I could not find any examples, so I could not
// implement it") must not mask a later genuine admission with the same stem.
for start := 0; ; {
rel := strings.Index(lower[start:], stem)
if rel < 0 {
break
}
abs := start + rel
tail := strings.TrimSpace(lower[abs+len(stem):])
if !hasAnyPrefix(tail, successNegationTails) {
return selfReportReason(strings.TrimSpace(stem) + " …")
}
start = abs + len(stem)
}
}
return ""
}
func selfReportReason(marker string) string {
return `the final message admits the objective was not met ("` + marker + `")`
}
func hasAnyPrefix(s string, prefixes []string) bool {
for _, p := range prefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(s, p) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// acceptanceVerificationNudge forces a TASK-GROUNDED acceptance check before a run
// may finalize as success. It explicitly rejects the three false-success patterns
// the bug-hunt surfaced: well-formed output treated as correct; pre-existing tests
// passing treated as the objective being met; and a result that merely matches a
// baseline the task asked to beat or improve. General — no task-specific content.
func acceptanceVerificationNudge() string {
return "Before this task can be marked complete, " + acceptanceNudgeMarker + " — " +
"NOT the shape or format of your output, NOT that pre-existing tests pass, and NOT that your " +
"result merely matches a baseline you were asked to beat or improve. " +
"Re-read the original task, then run a concrete check that exercises the actual requirement: " +
"execute the program or tests that demonstrate the required behavior, or directly probe the specific " +
"thing the task asked you to produce, recover, fix, or optimize. " +
"If that check passes, reply PASS and cite the evidence. " +
"If it does not pass — or you cannot run such a check — say so plainly and keep working; do not claim success."
}
// toolFailureHintMarker is a stable substring for tests.
const toolFailureHintMarker = "kept failing with the same error"
@@ -84,18 +285,56 @@ func toolFailureStopAnswer(toolName string, count int) string {
"Please check the request or adjust the tool arguments."
}
// The no-output stop answer is assembled from these fixed parts (only the turn
// count varies). IsNoProgressStop matches all three so a legitimate message that
// merely quotes the marker substring is not misclassified as a failed empty run.
const (
noOutputStopPrefix = "Agent stopped after "
noOutputStopMarker = "with no output (no visible text and no tool calls)"
noOutputStopSuffix = "to avoid consuming tokens without making progress."
)
// noOutputStopAnswer is the final answer returned when the no-output guard
// stops the run. The turn count is interpolated at the call site.
func noOutputStopAnswer(turns int) string {
return "Agent stopped after " + strconv.Itoa(turns) +
" turns with no output (no visible text and no tool calls) to avoid consuming tokens without making progress."
return noOutputStopPrefix + strconv.Itoa(turns) + " turns " + noOutputStopMarker + " " + noOutputStopSuffix
}
// IsNoProgressStop reports whether content IS the no-output guardrail stop answer
// (a run that produced no visible text and no tool calls). It matches the EXACT
// structure noOutputStopAnswer emits — prefix + "<int> turns " + marker + " " +
// suffix, where only the integer turn count varies — rather than just looking for
// the three parts in order. A loose check (prefix && contains-marker && suffix)
// would misclassify a genuine assistant/tool message that merely quotes the
// marker amid other prose, which would wrongly hide a real session from /resume
// and skip its title generation.
func IsNoProgressStop(content string) bool {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
if !strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, noOutputStopPrefix) {
return false
}
rest := trimmed[len(noOutputStopPrefix):]
const turnsSep = " turns "
sep := strings.Index(rest, turnsSep)
if sep < 0 {
return false
}
// The text between the prefix and " turns " must be exactly the bare integer
// count; anything else means this isn't the guard's own answer.
if _, err := strconv.Atoi(rest[:sep]); err != nil {
return false
}
// The marker must be immediately followed (one space) by the suffix and then
// end — no arbitrary text wedged in between.
return rest[sep+len(turnsSep):] == noOutputStopMarker+" "+noOutputStopSuffix
}
// Reminder markers are stable substrings used both to build the reminder text
// and to assert in tests that the right reminder was injected exactly once.
const (
planNotCalledReminderMarker = "you have not called update_plan"
planStaleReminderMarker = "haven't updated the plan via update_plan"
planNotCalledReminderMarker = "you have not called update_plan"
planStaleReminderMarker = "haven't updated the plan via update_plan"
toolOnlyProgressReminderMarker = "consecutive tool-only turns"
)
// planNotCalledReminder nudges the model to track a multi-step task with
@@ -114,18 +353,34 @@ func planStaleReminder(callsSinceUpdate int) string {
" in a while. Update the plan to reflect completed and remaining steps, then continue."
}
func toolOnlyProgressReminder(turns int) string {
return "Reminder: you've made " + strconv.Itoa(turns) + " " + toolOnlyProgressReminderMarker +
" without visible progress. Before calling more tools, summarize what you already know, state the next concrete step, and finish if you have enough information."
}
// guardState tracks the per-run signals the guardrails need. It is observable
// purely from tool-call names and per-turn output, matching what the loop holds.
type guardState struct {
emptyTurns int
totalToolCalls int
toolCallsSincePlanUpdate int
planEverCalled bool
notCalledReminderSent bool
// turnsSincePlanUpdate counts turns (not individual tool calls) since the last
// update_plan, so a plan that goes stale across many low-tool-call turns is
// still caught — the tool-call counter alone can take many turns to trip when
// the model makes only one call per turn.
turnsSincePlanUpdate int
planEverCalled bool
notCalledReminderSent bool
// staleReminderSent records whether the stale reminder has already fired for
// the current stale interval. It is cleared when a plan update opens a new
// interval, making the reminder one-shot per interval rather than per turn.
staleReminderSent bool
staleReminderSent bool
toolOnlyTurns int
toolOnlyReminderSent bool
// planItemsPending is the number of remaining (pending/in_progress) items in
// the most recent update_plan call, so the headless completion gate can tell
// whether work is unfinished when the model stops without a tool call.
planItemsPending int
// toolFailures tracks consecutive same-error failures per tool, keyed by tool
// name, so the loop can hint then halt instead of looping forever.
toolFailures map[string]*toolFailureRecord
@@ -180,14 +435,28 @@ func (state *guardState) observeTurn(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (sto
} else {
state.emptyTurns++
}
if hasToolCalls && !hasVisibleText {
state.toolOnlyTurns++
} else {
state.toolOnlyTurns = 0
state.toolOnlyReminderSent = false
}
// One turn has passed; the plan-update below resets this to 0 when the model
// refreshes the plan this turn.
state.turnsSincePlanUpdate++
for _, call := range collected.ToolCalls {
state.totalToolCalls++
if call.Name == planToolName {
state.planEverCalled = true
state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate = 0
state.turnsSincePlanUpdate = 0
// A fresh plan update opens a new stale interval.
state.staleReminderSent = false
// Record how many items remain so the completion gate knows whether
// work is unfinished if the model later stops without a tool call.
state.observePlanUpdate(call.Arguments)
} else {
state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate++
}
@@ -196,15 +465,52 @@ func (state *guardState) observeTurn(collected zeroruntime.CollectedStream) (sto
return state.emptyTurns >= maxEmptyTurns
}
// pendingPlanItems reports whether the most recent update_plan call still has
// unfinished (pending/in_progress) items. False when no plan was ever recorded.
func (state *guardState) pendingPlanItems() bool {
return state.planItemsPending > 0
}
// observePlanUpdate parses an update_plan call's raw arguments and records how
// many items are still remaining. Malformed arguments leave the prior count
// unchanged (best-effort — the plan panel itself tolerates the same).
func (state *guardState) observePlanUpdate(arguments string) {
var parsed struct {
Plan []struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
} `json:"plan"`
}
if json.Unmarshal([]byte(arguments), &parsed) != nil {
return
}
pending := 0
for _, item := range parsed.Plan {
if planStatusRemaining(item.Status) {
pending++
}
}
state.planItemsPending = pending
}
func (state *guardState) progressReminder() string {
if state.toolOnlyReminderSent || state.toolOnlyTurns < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt {
return ""
}
state.toolOnlyReminderSent = true
return toolOnlyProgressReminder(state.toolOnlyTurns)
}
// planReminder returns a one-shot reminder message to inject before the next
// turn, or an empty string when no reminder applies. `turn` is 1-based (the
// number of turns completed so far).
func (state *guardState) planReminder(turn int) string {
// STALE reminder takes priority: a long run without a plan update is the
// stronger signal. One-shot per stale interval.
if state.planEverCalled &&
!state.staleReminderSent &&
state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold {
// stronger signal. Fires on either the tool-call streak OR a turn streak with
// pending items (so a plan drifting stale across many low-call turns is caught,
// while a fully-completed plan is left alone). One-shot per stale interval.
if state.planEverCalled && !state.staleReminderSent &&
(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold ||
(state.turnsSincePlanUpdate >= stalePlanTurnThreshold && state.planItemsPending > 0)) {
state.staleReminderSent = true
return planStaleReminder(state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
+57
View File
@@ -136,6 +136,26 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
var state guardState
toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{
ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{}`}},
}
for range toolOnlyProgressReminderAt - 1 {
state.observeTurn(toolOnly)
}
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{})
state.observeTurn(toolOnly)
if reminder := state.progressReminder(); reminder != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected empty non-tool turn to reset tool-only progress reminder, got %q", reminder)
}
if state.toolOnlyTurns != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected tool-only streak to restart at 1, got %d", state.toolOnlyTurns)
}
}
func TestRunDoesNotCountDroppedToolCallTurnsAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -330,6 +350,43 @@ func TestRunStalePlanReminderIsOneShotPerInterval(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRunInjectsToolOnlyProgressReminder(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolOnlyProgressReminderAt+1)
for i := 0; i < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt; i++ {
turns = append(turns, toolTurn("call", "read_file", `{"path":"notes.txt"}`))
}
turns = append(turns, textTurn("done"))
provider := &mockProvider{turns: turns}
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
MaxTurns: len(turns) + 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("expected final answer, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if count := countUserMessagesContaining(result.Messages, toolOnlyProgressReminderMarker); count != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one tool-only progress reminder, got %d", count)
}
found := false
for _, message := range provider.requests[toolOnlyProgressReminderAt].Messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser && strings.Contains(message.Content, toolOnlyProgressReminderMarker) {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("expected reminder on request after tool-only streak, messages: %+v", provider.requests[toolOnlyProgressReminderAt].Messages)
}
}
type alwaysFailingTool struct{}
func (alwaysFailingTool) Name() string { return "flaky" }
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestAppendHookFeedbackFormatsOutput(t *testing.T) {
// Blank feedback leaves the original output untouched and reports no redaction.
if got, redacted := appendHookFeedback("tool output", " "); got != "tool output" || redacted {
t.Fatalf("blank feedback should not change output or redact, got %q redacted=%v", got, redacted)
}
// Feedback is appended under a header alongside the existing output.
got, redacted := appendHookFeedback("tool output", "gofmt reformatted main.go")
if !strings.Contains(got, "tool output") || !strings.Contains(got, "Hook output:") || !strings.Contains(got, "gofmt reformatted main.go") {
t.Fatalf("expected combined tool + hook output, got %q", got)
}
if redacted {
t.Fatal("clean feedback should not be reported as redacted")
}
// With no original output the hook feedback stands alone under the header.
if got, _ := appendHookFeedback("", "validation ran"); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "Hook output:") || !strings.Contains(got, "validation ran") {
t.Fatalf("expected standalone hook output, got %q", got)
}
}
func TestAppendHookFeedbackScrubsSecretsAndFlagsRedaction(t *testing.T) {
// A hook that echoes a secret must be scrubbed before it reaches the model,
// and the redaction must be reported so the caller can flag ToolResult.Redacted.
got, redacted := appendHookFeedback("tool output", "leaked token ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789")
if !redacted {
t.Fatal("expected redaction to be reported for secret-bearing feedback")
}
if strings.Contains(got, "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") {
t.Fatalf("secret leaked into hook feedback: %q", got)
}
}
func TestBlockedByHookResultCarriesReasonAndDenial(t *testing.T) {
out := blockedByHookResult(
ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "write_file"},
hooks.DispatchOutcome{Blocked: true, BlockedBy: "policy", Reason: "writes under /etc are denied"},
)
if out.Status != tools.StatusError {
t.Fatalf("status = %v, want error", out.Status)
}
if out.DenialReason != DenialHookBlocked {
t.Fatalf("denial = %q, want %q", out.DenialReason, DenialHookBlocked)
}
if out.ToolCallID != "c1" || out.Name != "write_file" {
t.Fatalf("call identity not propagated: %#v", out)
}
for _, want := range []string{"write_file", "policy", "writes under /etc are denied"} {
if !strings.Contains(out.Output, want) {
t.Fatalf("output %q missing %q", out.Output, want)
}
}
if out.Redacted {
t.Fatal("a clean hook reason must not flag Redacted")
}
}
func TestBlockedByHookResultScrubsSecretReason(t *testing.T) {
out := blockedByHookResult(
ToolCall{ID: "c3", Name: "bash"},
hooks.DispatchOutcome{Blocked: true, BlockedBy: "secret-scan", Reason: "denied: found ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 in args"},
)
if !out.Redacted {
t.Fatal("a scrubbed hook reason must set ToolResult.Redacted")
}
if strings.Contains(out.Output, "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") {
t.Fatalf("secret leaked into blocked-hook output: %q", out.Output)
}
}
func TestBlockedByHookResultFallsBackWhenReasonEmpty(t *testing.T) {
out := blockedByHookResult(ToolCall{ID: "c2", Name: "bash"}, hooks.DispatchOutcome{Blocked: true, BlockedBy: "x"})
if !strings.Contains(out.Output, "blocked by a beforeTool hook") {
t.Fatalf("expected a default reason, got %q", out.Output)
}
}
func TestDispatchHelpersAreNoopWithoutDispatcher(t *testing.T) {
options := Options{} // Hooks is nil
if _, blocked := dispatchBeforeTool(context.Background(), options, ToolCall{Name: "bash"}, nil); blocked {
t.Fatal("a nil dispatcher must never block a tool")
}
if feedback := dispatchAfterTool(context.Background(), options, ToolCall{Name: "bash"}, nil, tools.Result{}); feedback != "" {
t.Fatalf("a nil dispatcher must yield no feedback, got %q", feedback)
}
}
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package agent
import (
"errors"
"testing"
)
func TestIsImageRejectionError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{
name: "400 with image mention",
err: errors.New("HTTP 400: image content is not supported by this model"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "400 with multimodal mention",
err: errors.New("400 Bad Request: model does not support multimodal input"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "400 with vision mention",
err: errors.New("error 400: this model does not have vision capabilities"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "400 with unsupported content type",
err: errors.New("400: unsupported content type"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "generic 400 no image keywords",
err: errors.New("400 Bad Request: invalid model id"),
want: false,
},
{
name: "500 server error",
err: errors.New("500 Internal Server Error"),
want: false,
},
{
name: "nil error",
err: nil,
want: false,
},
{
name: "context limit error",
err: errors.New("context length exceeded"),
want: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isImageRejectionError(tt.err); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isImageRejectionError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
+1879 -188
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+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
type safetyTool struct {
name string
safety tools.Safety
}
func (t safetyTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t safetyTool) Description() string { return "test tool" }
func (t safetyTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (t safetyTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return t.safety }
func (t safetyTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// member-auto advertises the in-workspace mutators a headless member needs to
// build (write/edit + shell) that plain Auto hides, but NOT network or denied
// tools — the sandbox still gates the advertised ones at call time.
func TestToolAdvertisedMemberAuto(t *testing.T) {
write := safetyTool{name: "write_file", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt}}
shell := safetyTool{name: "bash", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt}}
read := safetyTool{name: "read_file", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}}
network := safetyTool{name: "net_tool", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectNetwork, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt}}
denied := safetyTool{name: "blocked", safety: tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionDeny}}
// Plain Auto hides prompt-requiring mutators (the read-only member problem).
if ToolAdvertised(write, PermissionModeAuto) || ToolAdvertised(shell, PermissionModeAuto) {
t.Fatal("Auto must NOT advertise write/shell prompt tools")
}
for _, tool := range []tools.Tool{write, shell, read} {
if !ToolAdvertised(tool, PermissionModeMemberAuto) {
t.Fatalf("member-auto must advertise %q", tool.Name())
}
}
if ToolAdvertised(network, PermissionModeMemberAuto) {
t.Fatal("member-auto must NOT advertise a network prompt tool")
}
if ToolAdvertised(denied, PermissionModeMemberAuto) {
t.Fatal("member-auto must NOT advertise a denied tool")
}
}
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
package agent
import "testing"
func TestIsNoProgressStopRequiresFullStructure(t *testing.T) {
// The actual guardrail answer (any turn count) is recognized.
for _, turns := range []int{1, 3, 12} {
if !IsNoProgressStop(noOutputStopAnswer(turns)) {
t.Fatalf("the real no-output stop answer (turns=%d) should be recognized", turns)
}
}
// A legitimate message that merely QUOTES the marker must NOT be classified as
// a no-progress stop — that would wrongly hide a real session from /resume.
rejected := []string{
`The previous run ended "with no output (no visible text and no tool calls)" so here is what I did instead.`,
"with no output (no visible text and no tool calls)", // bare marker, no prefix/suffix
"Agent stopped after 3 turns.", // prefix only
"to avoid consuming tokens without making progress.", // suffix only
"Here is your e-commerce site.", // unrelated
"",
// Hostile input: prefix + marker + suffix ALL present, but the marker is
// quoted mid-sentence rather than being the guard's own structured answer.
// A loose prefix/contains/suffix check misclassifies this.
`Agent stopped after 3 turns. The marker is "with no output (no visible text and no tool calls)" so here it is: to avoid consuming tokens without making progress.`,
// Arbitrary text wedged between the marker and the suffix.
"Agent stopped after 3 turns with no output (no visible text and no tool calls) and then some more text to avoid consuming tokens without making progress.",
// Non-integer "turn count" between the prefix and the marker.
"Agent stopped after several turns with no output (no visible text and no tool calls) to avoid consuming tokens without making progress.",
}
for _, content := range rejected {
if IsNoProgressStop(content) {
t.Fatalf("content must not be classified as a no-progress stop: %q", content)
}
}
}
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"sync"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// Parallel read-ahead for tool batches. When a turn requests several
// independent lookups (read_file + grep + glob is the common shape), executing
// them one after another serializes pure I/O waits. A consecutive run of
// auto-allowed read-only calls is executed concurrently instead; results are
// then consumed in the original call order, so guard counters, message
// ordering, abort semantics, and the surface's call/result event pairing are
// byte-identical to sequential execution. Runs never span a mutating call: a
// read that follows a write must observe the write, so eligibility is decided
// per consecutive run, not per batch.
// maxParallelReadTools bounds concurrent read-only tool executions in a turn.
const maxParallelReadTools = 8
// precomputedToolResult is one parallel read-ahead execution, keyed back to
// its batch index by the caller.
type precomputedToolResult struct {
result ToolResult
abortErr error
}
// parallelSafeToolCall reports whether call may run concurrently with its
// neighbors: the tool must exist, be side-effect-free (SideEffectRead), and be
// auto-allowed for these args, so no interactive prompt or workspace mutation
// is on the hot path. Loop-intercepted tools (ask_user, request_permissions)
// and tool_search (mutates the deferred-tool set) stay sequential.
func parallelSafeToolCall(registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, options Options) bool {
switch call.Name {
case "ask_user", tools.RequestPermissionsToolName, tools.ToolSearchToolName:
return false
}
tool, found := registry.Get(call.Name)
if !found || tool.Safety().SideEffect != tools.SideEffectRead {
return false
}
args := map[string]any{}
if call.Arguments != "" {
if err := decodeToolArguments(call.Arguments, &args); err != nil {
return false
}
}
return effectivePermission(tool, args) == tools.PermissionAllow
}
// executeParallelReadBatch runs calls[start:end] concurrently (bounded by
// maxParallelReadTools) and returns results indexed relative to start. All
// execution-side callbacks that can fire inside executeToolCall are serialized
// behind one mutex: a permission prompt (a sandbox preflight can demand one
// even for an auto-allowed read) must never appear twice at once on an
// interactive front-end, and OnPermission event handlers append to shared
// session-recording state without their own locking — two batched reads under
// a granted extra root would otherwise race (the pre-batch serial loop never
// had two callbacks in flight at once).
func executeParallelReadBatch(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, calls []ToolCall, start, end int, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) []precomputedToolResult {
batchOptions := options
var callbackMutex sync.Mutex
if options.OnPermissionRequest != nil {
inner := options.OnPermissionRequest
batchOptions.OnPermissionRequest = func(ctx context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
callbackMutex.Lock()
defer callbackMutex.Unlock()
return inner(ctx, request)
}
}
if options.OnPermission != nil {
inner := options.OnPermission
batchOptions.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
callbackMutex.Lock()
defer callbackMutex.Unlock()
inner(event)
}
}
results := make([]precomputedToolResult, end-start)
semaphore := make(chan struct{}, maxParallelReadTools)
var waitGroup sync.WaitGroup
for index := start; index < end; index++ {
waitGroup.Add(1)
go func(index int) {
defer waitGroup.Done()
semaphore <- struct{}{}
defer func() { <-semaphore }()
result, abortErr := executeToolCall(ctx, registry, calls[index], permissionMode, batchOptions)
results[index-start] = precomputedToolResult{result: result, abortErr: abortErr}
}(index)
}
waitGroup.Wait()
return results
}
+204
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// probeTool records execution overlap and ordering so tests can assert what
// actually ran concurrently.
type probeTool struct {
name string
sideEffect tools.SideEffect
delay time.Duration
// shared, when set, receives this probe's start/end entries too, so a test
// can observe ordering ACROSS probes (e.g. reads vs a write barrier).
shared *probeLog
mu sync.Mutex
active int
maxActive int
log []string
}
// probeLog is a mutex-guarded event log shared between probes.
type probeLog struct {
mu sync.Mutex
entries []string
}
func (log *probeLog) append(entry string) {
log.mu.Lock()
defer log.mu.Unlock()
log.entries = append(log.entries, entry)
}
func (log *probeLog) snapshot() []string {
log.mu.Lock()
defer log.mu.Unlock()
return append([]string(nil), log.entries...)
}
func (tool *probeTool) Name() string { return tool.name }
func (tool *probeTool) Description() string { return "test probe tool" }
func (tool *probeTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{
Type: "object",
Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{"id": {Type: "string"}},
AdditionalProperties: false,
}
}
func (tool *probeTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tool.sideEffect, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow, Reason: "test"}
}
func (tool *probeTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
id, _ := args["id"].(string)
tool.mu.Lock()
tool.active++
if tool.active > tool.maxActive {
tool.maxActive = tool.active
}
tool.log = append(tool.log, "start:"+id)
tool.mu.Unlock()
if tool.shared != nil {
tool.shared.append("start:" + id)
}
time.Sleep(tool.delay)
if tool.shared != nil {
tool.shared.append("end:" + id)
}
tool.mu.Lock()
tool.active--
tool.log = append(tool.log, "end:"+id)
tool.mu.Unlock()
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "probe " + id}
}
func probeCallEvents(callID, toolName, id string) []zeroruntime.StreamEvent {
return []zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: callID, ToolName: toolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: callID, ArgumentsFragment: fmt.Sprintf(`{"id":%q}`, id)},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: callID},
}
}
func TestParallelSafeToolCall(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead})
registry.Register(&probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite})
call := func(name, args string) ToolCall { return ToolCall{ID: "c", Name: name, Arguments: args} }
if !parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("auto-allowed read tool must be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_write", `{"id":"a"}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("mutating tool must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("unknown_tool", `{}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("unknown tool must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("probe_read", `{"id":`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("undecodable arguments must not be parallel-safe")
}
if parallelSafeToolCall(registry, call("ask_user", `{}`), Options{}) {
t.Fatal("loop-intercepted tools must stay sequential")
}
}
func TestRunExecutesConsecutiveReadsConcurrently(t *testing.T) {
probe := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 60 * time.Millisecond}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(probe)
turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "a"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "b")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_read", "c")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
turnOne,
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
},
}
var results []ToolResult
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { results = append(results, result) },
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if probe.maxActive < 2 {
t.Fatalf("consecutive read-only calls must overlap, max concurrency was %d", probe.maxActive)
}
// Results must still be recorded in original call order.
if len(results) != 3 || results[0].ToolCallID != "call-1" || results[1].ToolCallID != "call-2" || results[2].ToolCallID != "call-3" {
t.Fatalf("tool results out of order: %#v", results)
}
messages := provider.requests[1].Messages
var toolOrder []string
for _, message := range messages {
if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
toolOrder = append(toolOrder, message.ToolCallID)
}
}
if len(toolOrder) != 3 || toolOrder[0] != "call-1" || toolOrder[1] != "call-2" || toolOrder[2] != "call-3" {
t.Fatalf("recorded tool messages out of order: %v", toolOrder)
}
}
func TestRunParallelReadsNeverSpanMutatingCall(t *testing.T) {
shared := &probeLog{}
read := &probeTool{name: "probe_read", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, delay: 30 * time.Millisecond, shared: shared}
write := &probeTool{name: "probe_write", sideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, shared: shared}
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(read)
registry.Register(write)
turnOne := append(probeCallEvents("call-1", "probe_read", "r1"), probeCallEvents("call-2", "probe_read", "r2")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-3", "probe_write", "w")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-4", "probe_read", "r3")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, probeCallEvents("call-5", "probe_read", "r4")...)
turnOne = append(turnOne, zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone})
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
turnOne,
{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
},
}
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "probe", provider, Options{Registry: registry})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Cross-probe ordering on the SHARED log: the write must start only after
// both first-batch reads finished, and both second-batch reads must start
// only after the write finished — batches never cross a mutating call.
log := shared.snapshot()
index := func(entry string) int {
for i, e := range log {
if e == entry {
return i
}
}
t.Fatalf("entry %q missing from shared log: %v", entry, log)
return -1
}
writeStart, writeEnd := index("start:w"), index("end:w")
if firstBatchMaxEnd := max(index("end:r1"), index("end:r2")); writeStart < firstBatchMaxEnd {
t.Fatalf("write started before the first read batch finished: %v", log)
}
if secondBatchMinStart := min(index("start:r3"), index("start:r4")); secondBatchMinStart < writeEnd {
t.Fatalf("second read batch started before the write finished: %v", log)
}
if read.maxActive < 2 {
t.Fatalf("reads within a batch must overlap, max concurrency was %d", read.maxActive)
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
// Cache-stability property: loading a deferred tool must APPEND it after the
// always-eager tools, not sort it into the middle of them — otherwise the tool
// definitions (the provider's cacheable prefix) shift on every load. The old
// behaviour alpha-sorted the whole array, so "mcp__srv__alpha" jumped ahead of
// "read_file".
root := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{DeferThreshold: 2}, map[string]bool{"mcp__srv__alpha": true})
pos := func(name string) int {
for i := range exposed {
if exposed[i].Name == name {
return i
}
}
return -1
}
readPos, searchPos, alphaPos := pos("read_file"), pos("tool_search"), pos("mcp__srv__alpha")
if readPos < 0 || searchPos < 0 || alphaPos < 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected read_file, tool_search and loaded alpha all exposed, got %#v", exposed)
}
// The eager tools must precede the loaded deferred tool (appended, not inserted).
if !(readPos < alphaPos && searchPos < alphaPos) {
t.Fatalf("loaded deferred tool must be appended after the eager block; got read=%d search=%d alpha=%d", readPos, searchPos, alphaPos)
}
// beta was never loaded — it stays hidden.
if pos("mcp__srv__beta") != -1 {
t.Fatalf("unloaded deferred tool must stay hidden, got %#v", exposed)
}
}
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// countingSchemaTool records how many times its Parameters() schema is read, so a
// test can prove the definition cache avoids re-rendering across turns.
type countingSchemaTool struct {
name string
calls *int
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Name() string { return t.name }
func (t countingSchemaTool) Description() string { return "counts schema reads" }
func (t countingSchemaTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
*t.calls++
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false, Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{
"x": {Type: "string"},
}}
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectRead, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
}
func (t countingSchemaTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// The cache renders a tool's schema once and reuses it across calls, and its
// output is identical to the uncached path.
func TestPartitionToolsCacheRendersOnceAndMatchesUncached(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(countingSchemaTool{name: "alpha", calls: &calls})
registry.Register(countingSchemaTool{name: "beta", calls: &calls})
uncached, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
base := calls
cache := map[string]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{}
first, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{}, cache)
rendersAfterFirst := calls - base
second, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{}, cache)
rendersAfterSecond := calls - base
if rendersAfterFirst != 2 {
t.Fatalf("first cached call should render 2 tools once each, rendered %d times", rendersAfterFirst)
}
if rendersAfterSecond != 2 {
t.Fatalf("second cached call must reuse the cache (no new schema reads), total renders = %d", rendersAfterSecond)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first, second) {
t.Fatal("cached calls must return identical definitions")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(first, uncached) {
t.Fatal("cached output must match the uncached partitionTools output")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// promptShellTool is a minimal shell-style tool whose Safety requires a prompt,
// standing in for bash so buildPermissionEvent can be exercised directly.
type promptShellTool struct{}
func (promptShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
func (promptShellTool) Description() string { return "run a shell command" }
func (promptShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
}
func (promptShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
}
func (promptShellTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
}
// A command whose sandbox decision is Allow but that explicitly requests
// additional sandbox permissions is an ELEVATION: it must be surfaced as a
// prompt, never Action=allow. Previously it carried allow while the loop still
// blocked on OnPermissionRequest, and the TUI (which renders only prompts)
// dropped it → the run deadlocked forever. This is the exact gpt-5.5
// folder-creation shape captured in the reported hang.
func TestBuildPermissionEventPromptsForAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{
"command": "mkdir foo && cd foo && go mod init foo",
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
}
// Base command allowed by the sandbox…
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("buildPermissionEvent returned ok=false; the elevation request must produce an event")
}
if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want prompt — an additional-permissions elevation must ask the user, not auto-allow", event.Action)
}
// Sanity: shouldRequestPermission agrees the loop blocks on this.
if !shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be true for an additional-permissions request")
}
}
// Without the additional-permissions flag, a sandbox-allowed command is NOT a
// prompt (shouldRequestPermission is false; it just runs) — the override must
// not over-reach and prompt for ordinary allowed commands.
func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
call := ToolCall{ID: "call_2", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
args := map[string]any{"command": "ls"}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow}
event, _ := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
if event.Action == PermissionActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("Action = prompt for an ordinary allowed command; want allow (no spurious prompt)")
}
if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
}
}
+76
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
package agent
import (
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
)
func TestPermissionScope(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
tool string
args map[string]any
want string
}{
{name: "write file path", tool: "write_file", args: map[string]any{"path": "src/main.go", "content": "x"}, want: "src/main.go"},
{name: "edit file path", tool: "edit_file", args: map[string]any{"path": "a/b.txt"}, want: "a/b.txt"},
{name: "bash explicit cwd", tool: "bash", args: map[string]any{"command": "ls", "cwd": "services/api"}, want: "services/api"},
{name: "bash workspace-root cwd is no scope", tool: "bash", args: map[string]any{"command": "ls", "cwd": "."}, want: ""},
{name: "no path-like args", tool: "bash", args: map[string]any{"command": "ls"}, want: ""},
{name: "directory key", tool: "list_directory", args: map[string]any{"directory": "pkg"}, want: "pkg"},
{name: "non-string path ignored", tool: "write_file", args: map[string]any{"path": 42}, want: ""},
{name: "path wins over cwd", tool: "x", args: map[string]any{"cwd": "a", "path": "b"}, want: "b"},
{name: "whitespace path is no scope", tool: "write_file", args: map[string]any{"path": " "}, want: ""},
{name: "web fetch host", tool: "web_fetch", args: map[string]any{"url": "https://Example.COM:443/a"}, want: "example.com"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := permissionScope(tt.tool, tt.args); got != tt.want {
t.Fatalf("permissionScope(%q, %v) = %q, want %q", tt.tool, tt.args, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestPermissionScopeTruncatesLongPaths(t *testing.T) {
long := strings.Repeat("a", 200)
got := permissionScope("write_file", map[string]any{"path": long})
if runes := len([]rune(got)); runes > 80 {
t.Fatalf("scope not truncated: %d runes", runes)
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(got, "…") {
t.Fatalf("truncated scope should end with an ellipsis: %q", got)
}
}
func TestPersistPermissionGrantScopesWebFetchToHost(t *testing.T) {
store, err := sandbox.NewGrantStore(sandbox.StoreOptions{FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sandbox-grants.json")})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(),
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
Store: store,
})
grant, err := persistPermissionGrant("web_fetch", map[string]any{"url": "https://Example.COM:443/docs"}, "trust this host", Options{
Sandbox: engine,
Autonomy: "medium",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if grant.ScopeKind != sandbox.ScopeHost || grant.Scope != "example.com" {
t.Fatalf("grant = %#v, want host-scoped example.com", grant)
}
if lookup, err := store.Lookup("web_fetch", "example.com"); err != nil || !lookup.Matched {
t.Fatalf("expected exact host lookup to match: lookup=%#v err=%v", lookup, err)
}
if lookup, err := store.Lookup("web_fetch", "api.example.com"); err != nil || lookup.Matched {
t.Fatalf("expected subdomain lookup to re-prompt: lookup=%#v err=%v", lookup, err)
}
}
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func planUpdateTurn(status string) zeroruntime.CollectedStream {
return zeroruntime.CollectedStream{ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
{Name: "update_plan", Arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"step one","status":"` + status + `"}]}`},
}}
}
// Turn-based staleness: a plan that goes many turns without an update — while
// items are still pending — draws the stale reminder even though few tool calls
// have run (the tool-call streak alone would not have tripped).
func TestPlanReminderFiresOnTurnStaleness(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
// Text-only turns advance the turn counter without adding tool calls.
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "still working…"})
}
if state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate >= staleToolCallThreshold {
t.Fatalf("precondition: the tool-call trigger must not fire (%d calls)", state.toolCallsSincePlanUpdate)
}
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 2); !strings.Contains(got, planStaleReminderMarker) {
t.Fatalf("expected a turn-based stale reminder, got %q", got)
}
}
// A fully-completed plan is NOT stale: no pending items means the turn-based
// trigger stays quiet even after many turns, so a finished plan isn't nagged.
func TestPlanReminderSkipsTurnStalenessWhenComplete(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("completed"))
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold + 3 {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "wrapping up…"})
}
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 5); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("a completed plan must not draw a stale reminder, got %q", got)
}
}
// A plan update resets the turn counter, so the stale reminder does not fire
// right after a fresh update.
func TestPlanUpdateResetsTurnStaleness(t *testing.T) {
state := newGuardState()
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
for range stalePlanTurnThreshold - 1 {
state.observeTurn(zeroruntime.CollectedStream{Text: "working…"})
}
// Refresh the plan — resets the turn streak.
state.observeTurn(planUpdateTurn("in_progress"))
if got := state.planReminder(stalePlanTurnThreshold + 1); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("a just-refreshed plan must not be stale, got %q", got)
}
}
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
package agent
import (
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
)
// These ceilings are a deliberate ratchet on Zero's fixed per-turn overhead — the
// system prompt and the eager tool schemas that ride on EVERY request. They are
// set ~10% above the current measured cost, using ApproxTextTokens (the same
// estimate the compaction loop and /context use, ~non-whitespace-bytes/4). A change
// that pushes either past its ceiling must be justified (and the ceiling raised
// deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
//
// Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
// pays.
const (
maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 2700
)
func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
// Minimal render: a model is set (so the session block renders) but no Cwd, so
// the workspace map, project guidelines, and repo map are excluded — this is the
// fixed base every session pays regardless of the workspace it runs in.
prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{Model: "claude-opus-4-8"})
got := ApproxTextTokens(prompt)
t.Logf("base system prompt: %d tokens (%d bytes)", got, len(prompt))
if got > maxBaseSystemPromptTokens {
t.Fatalf("base system prompt is %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim it or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxBaseSystemPromptTokens)
}
}
func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
registry.Register(tool)
}
// Options{} keeps DeferThreshold at 0, so deferral is inactive and every core
// tool is exposed eagerly — exactly what a plugin-free session sends each turn.
exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAuto, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
}
}
+123
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
package agent
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Stale tool-output pruning reclaims context at ZERO token/latency cost before
// the loop falls back to the paid LLM summarizer. A long, dump-heavy session
// accumulates large read_file/grep/glob/bash tool results that the model has
// long since acted on; their bodies are dead weight. Pruning replaces those
// older bodies with a compact placeholder (keeping the tool message + its
// ToolCallID so provider replay stays valid and the model knows what was
// there), preserving recent turns exactly — no paraphrase loss.
const (
// pruneProtectRecentTokens is the trailing window of tool output kept
// verbatim — the model is most likely still using it.
pruneProtectRecentTokens = 40000
// pruneMinReclaimTokens gates the whole pass: only prune when the reclaimable
// (older, large) tool output exceeds this, so a short session is untouched.
pruneMinReclaimTokens = 20000
// pruneMinBodyTokens skips small tool results — replacing a tiny body saves
// nothing and just loses information.
pruneMinBodyTokens = 200
)
// prunedPlaceholder is the body a pruned tool result is replaced with. It names
// the tool and the original size so the model can re-fetch if it needs to.
func prunedPlaceholder(toolName string, originalTokens int) string {
if toolName == "" {
toolName = "tool"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("[pruned %s output (~%d tokens) to reclaim context — re-run the tool if you need it again]", toolName, originalTokens)
}
// pruneStaleToolOutput walks messages newest-first, protects the last
// preserveLast messages and a trailing pruneProtectRecentTokens of tool output,
// then replaces the body of older large tool results with a placeholder. It
// returns the (possibly) rewritten slice and the number of tokens reclaimed.
// When nothing meets the bar it returns the input unchanged with reclaimed=0.
//
// It never drops a message, never touches non-tool messages, and never prunes
// an already-pruned body — so it is idempotent and safe to run every turn.
func pruneStaleToolOutput(messages []zeroruntime.Message, preserveLast int) ([]zeroruntime.Message, int) {
if len(messages) == 0 {
return messages, 0
}
if preserveLast < 0 {
preserveLast = 0
}
// Index → original token cost of each prunable tool body, scanning newest
// first and skipping the protected suffix.
type candidate struct {
index int
tokens int
}
var candidates []candidate
recentToolTokens := 0
reclaimable := 0
protectUntil := len(messages) - preserveLast // indices >= this are protected
for i := len(messages) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
msg := messages[i]
if msg.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
continue
}
bodyTokens := ApproxTextTokens(msg.Content)
if i >= protectUntil {
recentToolTokens += bodyTokens
continue
}
// Still within the trailing-output protection window?
if recentToolTokens < pruneProtectRecentTokens {
recentToolTokens += bodyTokens
continue
}
if bodyTokens < pruneMinBodyTokens || isPrunedPlaceholder(msg.Content) {
continue
}
candidates = append(candidates, candidate{index: i, tokens: bodyTokens})
reclaimable += bodyTokens
}
if reclaimable < pruneMinReclaimTokens || len(candidates) == 0 {
return messages, 0
}
// Copy-on-write so we never mutate the caller's slice in place.
out := make([]zeroruntime.Message, len(messages))
copy(out, messages)
reclaimed := 0
for _, c := range candidates {
toolName := toolNameForResult(out, c.index)
newBody := prunedPlaceholder(toolName, c.tokens)
reclaimed += c.tokens - ApproxTextTokens(newBody)
out[c.index].Content = newBody
}
return out, reclaimed
}
// toolNameForResult finds the tool name for the tool-result message at index by
// matching its ToolCallID against the assistant tool_call that produced it.
func toolNameForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, index int) string {
id := messages[index].ToolCallID
if id == "" {
return ""
}
for j := index - 1; j >= 0; j-- {
for _, call := range messages[j].ToolCalls {
if call.ID == id {
return call.Name
}
}
}
return ""
}
func isPrunedPlaceholder(content string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(content), "[pruned ")
}
+122
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package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// bigToolResult builds a tool-result message with approximately tokens worth of
// body, paired to a tool call id. ApproxTextTokens counts non-space chars / 4,
// so 4*tokens non-space chars yields ~tokens.
func bigToolResult(id string, tokens int) zeroruntime.Message {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
ToolCallID: id,
Content: strings.Repeat("x", tokens*4),
}
}
func toolCallMsg(id, name string) zeroruntime.Message {
return zeroruntime.Message{
Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: name}},
}
}
func TestPruneSkipsSmallSessions(t *testing.T) {
// Total reclaimable is under the gate → no pruning.
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallMsg("c1", "read_file"),
bigToolResult("c1", 5000),
}
out, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(msgs, 4)
if reclaimed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("small session should reclaim nothing, got %d", reclaimed)
}
if out[1].Content != msgs[1].Content {
t.Fatal("content must be untouched when under the gate")
}
}
func TestPrunePreservesRecentAndPrunesOld(t *testing.T) {
// One huge OLD result (beyond the protect window) + recent small ones.
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallMsg("old", "grep"),
bigToolResult("old", 60000), // old, big → prunable
// Filler to push "old" past the recent-protection window:
toolCallMsg("mid", "read_file"),
bigToolResult("mid", 45000), // protected by the 40k recent window
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "thinking"},
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "next"},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(msgs, 2)
if reclaimed <= 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected the old 60k tool result to be pruned, reclaimed=%d", reclaimed)
}
if !isPrunedPlaceholder(out[1].Content) {
t.Fatalf("old result should be replaced with a placeholder, got %q", out[1].Content[:40])
}
// The placeholder names the tool, and the message + id survive (provider replay).
if !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "grep") {
t.Fatalf("placeholder should name the tool, got %q", out[1].Content)
}
if out[1].ToolCallID != "old" || out[1].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
t.Fatal("pruned message must keep its role and ToolCallID for replay")
}
// The recent big result stays verbatim.
if isPrunedPlaceholder(out[3].Content) {
t.Fatal("a result inside the recent-protection window must not be pruned")
}
}
func TestPruneIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallMsg("old", "bash"),
bigToolResult("old", 60000),
toolCallMsg("mid", "read_file"),
bigToolResult("mid", 45000),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "go"},
}
once, r1 := pruneStaleToolOutput(msgs, 1)
if r1 == 0 {
t.Fatal("first pass should prune")
}
_, r2 := pruneStaleToolOutput(once, 1)
if r2 != 0 {
t.Fatalf("second pass should be a no-op (already pruned), reclaimed=%d", r2)
}
}
func TestPruneNeverTouchesNonToolMessages(t *testing.T) {
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.Repeat("u ", 60000)},
{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("a ", 60000)},
}
out, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(msgs, 0)
if reclaimed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("non-tool messages must never be pruned, reclaimed=%d", reclaimed)
}
if out[0].Content != msgs[0].Content || out[1].Content != msgs[1].Content {
t.Fatal("non-tool content changed")
}
}
func TestPruneDoesNotMutateInput(t *testing.T) {
msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
toolCallMsg("old", "grep"),
bigToolResult("old", 60000),
toolCallMsg("mid", "read_file"),
bigToolResult("mid", 45000),
zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "go"},
}
original := msgs[1].Content
_, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(msgs, 1)
if reclaimed == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected a prune")
}
if msgs[1].Content != original {
t.Fatal("pruneStaleToolOutput must not mutate the caller's slice")
}
}
+178
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package agent
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// Mid-stream reconnect: a long autonomous task (a big refactor, a swarm member,
// a headless/cron run) should survive a single transient upstream hiccup
// instead of dying and re-burning every token on a restart. When the initial
// StreamCompletion connect fails with a disconnect-shaped error — before any
// content has been forwarded — re-issue the same request with backoff a few
// times. We retry ONLY the connect (not a partially-consumed stream), so no
// already-forwarded OnText is ever duplicated.
const (
// maxStreamReconnects is how many times the connect is re-issued after a
// transient disconnect. 4 (not 2): with jittered exponential backoff this rides
// out a multi-second network blip (~0.5s + 1s + 2s + 4s worst case) instead of
// dying on a 2s hiccup and re-burning every token on a restart.
maxStreamReconnects = 4
// streamReconnectMax caps a single backoff so the tail attempts don't wait
// minutes on a long outage.
streamReconnectMax = 8 * time.Second
)
// streamReconnectBase is the first-retry delay (doubled each subsequent attempt).
// A var, not a const, so tests can shrink it to keep the exhaustion path fast.
var streamReconnectBase = 500 * time.Millisecond
// reconnectNotifier is called before each retry with the 1-based attempt number
// and the max, so the caller can surface a "Reconnecting N/max" notice. Nil is
// fine.
type reconnectNotifier func(attempt, max int)
// reconnectNoticeFor builds a notifier that surfaces reconnect attempts through
// OnReasoning — a non-content channel that is never folded into the answer
// text, so the user sees "Reconnecting…" without corrupting streamed output.
// Returns nil when there is no reasoning sink (the reconnect still happens
// silently).
func reconnectNoticeFor(options Options) reconnectNotifier {
if options.OnReasoning == nil {
return nil
}
return func(attempt, max int) {
options.OnReasoning(fmt.Sprintf("\n[connection lost — reconnecting %d/%d…]\n", attempt, max))
}
}
// stallRetryNoticeFor builds a notifier for the loop's content-stall retry (a
// stream that connected and produced only transient output, then went silent).
// Distinct wording from reconnectNoticeFor's "connection lost" because the
// connection was fine — the model stalled. Surfaced through OnReasoning, the
// non-content channel, so it never folds into the answer text. Nil when there
// is no reasoning sink (the retry still happens silently).
func stallRetryNoticeFor(options Options) reconnectNotifier {
if options.OnReasoning == nil {
return nil
}
return func(attempt, max int) {
options.OnReasoning(fmt.Sprintf("\n[no output — model stalled; retrying %d/%d…]\n", attempt, max))
}
}
// streamWithReconnect issues request via provider.StreamCompletion and, on a
// transient disconnect error, retries the connect up to maxStreamReconnects
// times with exponential backoff. It returns the live stream on success, or the
// last error. A context-cancellation, a non-disconnect error, or a context
// already past its deadline is returned immediately (no retry) — those have
// their own handling (compaction for context-limit, image-rejection, etc.).
func streamWithReconnect(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest, notify reconnectNotifier) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err == nil {
return stream, nil
}
for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxStreamReconnects; attempt++ {
if !shouldReconnect(ctx, err) {
return nil, err
}
if notify != nil {
notify(attempt, maxStreamReconnects)
}
if waitErr := sleepWithContext(ctx, jitteredBackoff(attempt)); waitErr != nil {
return nil, err // ctx cancelled while waiting; surface the original error
}
stream, err = provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
if err == nil {
return stream, nil
}
}
return nil, err
}
// shouldReconnect reports whether err is a transient disconnect worth retrying.
// It excludes context cancellation/expiry (caller is shutting down) and
// context-limit errors (the compactor recovers those), so the reconnect path
// never fights the existing handlers.
func shouldReconnect(ctx context.Context, err error) bool {
if err == nil || ctx.Err() != nil {
return false
}
msg := strings.ToLower(err.Error())
if isContextLimitError(msg) || isImageRejectionError(err) {
return false
}
// HTTP 5xx statuses are non-reconnectable and must be excluded BEFORE the
// transport substring match below — otherwise "504 Gateway Timeout" would slip
// through on the generic "timeout" needle. 503 already exhausted
// providerio.SendWithRetry (retrying is a redundant double-retry); 500/502/504
// are non-idempotent by providerio's rule — the completion POST may already
// have reached the model before the upstream/gateway gave up, so replaying the
// connect risks duplicate billable work. Digit-boundary matched so an
// incidental "504" inside a latency/id number is not mistaken for a status.
if errhint.HasStatusCode(msg, "500", "502", "503", "504") {
return false
}
// Transport-level disconnects only. A genuine transport failure (EOF, reset,
// refused, timeout) means no response was received, which is safe to reconnect.
for _, needle := range []string{
"eof",
"connection reset",
"connection refused",
"broken pipe",
"connection closed",
"timeout",
"timed out",
"temporarily unavailable",
"i/o timeout",
"server closed",
"unexpected end",
} {
if strings.Contains(msg, needle) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// backoffFor is the deterministic exponential base delay for a 1-based attempt,
// capped at streamReconnectMax. Jitter is layered on separately (jitteredBackoff).
func backoffFor(attempt int) time.Duration {
d := streamReconnectBase
for i := 1; i < attempt; i++ {
if d >= streamReconnectMax {
return streamReconnectMax
}
d *= 2
}
if d > streamReconnectMax {
d = streamReconnectMax
}
return d
}
// jitteredBackoff adds up to 50% random jitter on top of backoffFor so concurrent
// runs (swarm members, a cron fleet) that all trip on the same outage don't
// reconnect in lockstep and hammer a recovering endpoint. Never shorter than the
// deterministic base, so backoff still grows attempt over attempt.
func jitteredBackoff(attempt int) time.Duration {
base := backoffFor(attempt)
return base + time.Duration(rand.Int63n(int64(base/2)+1))
}
func sleepWithContext(ctx context.Context, d time.Duration) error {
timer := time.NewTimer(d)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-timer.C:
return nil
}
}
+188
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package agent
import (
"context"
"errors"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
// flakyProvider fails the first failBefore connect attempts with failErr, then
// succeeds with a single-text stream.
type flakyProvider struct {
calls int32
failBefore int32
failErr error
}
func (p *flakyProvider) StreamCompletion(_ context.Context, _ zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) (<-chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, error) {
n := atomic.AddInt32(&p.calls, 1)
if n <= p.failBefore {
return nil, p.failErr
}
ch := make(chan zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 1)
ch <- zeroruntime.StreamEvent{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}
close(ch)
return ch, nil
}
func TestStreamWithReconnectRecoversFromTransientDisconnect(t *testing.T) {
p := &flakyProvider{failBefore: 1, failErr: errors.New("unexpected EOF")}
stream, err := streamWithReconnect(context.Background(), p, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{}, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected reconnect to recover, got %v", err)
}
if stream == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a live stream after reconnect")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 connect attempts (1 fail + 1 success), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestStreamWithReconnectGivesUpAfterMax(t *testing.T) {
// Shrink the backoff so exhausting all retries stays fast (real base would
// sleep ~7.5s across 4 attempts).
defer func(orig time.Duration) { streamReconnectBase = orig }(streamReconnectBase)
streamReconnectBase = time.Millisecond
// Always fails with a disconnect error → exhausts retries and returns it.
p := &flakyProvider{failBefore: 99, failErr: errors.New("connection reset by peer")}
_, err := streamWithReconnect(context.Background(), p, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error after exhausting reconnects")
}
// 1 initial + maxStreamReconnects retries.
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != int32(1+maxStreamReconnects) {
t.Fatalf("expected %d attempts, got %d", 1+maxStreamReconnects, got)
}
}
func TestStreamWithReconnectDoesNotRetryNonDisconnect(t *testing.T) {
// A context-limit error is the compactor's job, not the reconnect's — return
// immediately without retrying.
p := &flakyProvider{failBefore: 99, failErr: errors.New("context length exceeded")}
_, err := streamWithReconnect(context.Background(), p, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the original error")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("context-limit error must not be retried, got %d attempts", got)
}
}
func TestStreamWithReconnectStopsOnContextCancel(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
p := &flakyProvider{failBefore: 99, failErr: errors.New("i/o timeout")}
_, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, p, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{}, nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an error")
}
// Cancelled ctx → no retry beyond the first attempt.
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&p.calls); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("cancelled context must not retry, got %d attempts", got)
}
}
func TestShouldReconnectClassification(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
disconnects := []string{
"unexpected EOF", "connection reset by peer", "broken pipe",
"i/o timeout", "server closed the connection", "connection refused",
}
for _, m := range disconnects {
if !shouldReconnect(ctx, errors.New(m)) {
t.Errorf("expected reconnect for %q", m)
}
}
notDisconnects := []string{
"context length exceeded", "invalid api key", "model not found",
"400 bad request: unsupported parameter",
// HTTP 5xx statuses are handled by providerio.SendWithRetry (503) or are
// non-idempotent (500/502/504); the reconnect path must not double-retry
// them. "504 Gateway Timeout" must NOT slip through on the generic "timeout"
// transport signal — a gateway timeout is non-idempotent, since the upstream
// may have already processed the completion POST before giving up.
"503 Service Unavailable", "502 Bad Gateway",
"504 Gateway Timeout", "500 Internal Server Error",
}
for _, m := range notDisconnects {
if shouldReconnect(ctx, errors.New(m)) {
t.Errorf("did NOT expect reconnect for %q", m)
}
}
}
func TestBackoffGrows(t *testing.T) {
if backoffFor(1) != streamReconnectBase {
t.Fatalf("attempt 1 backoff = %v, want %v", backoffFor(1), streamReconnectBase)
}
if backoffFor(2) != 2*streamReconnectBase {
t.Fatalf("attempt 2 backoff = %v, want %v", backoffFor(2), 2*streamReconnectBase)
}
// The exponential base is capped so late attempts don't wait minutes.
if got := backoffFor(20); got != streamReconnectMax {
t.Fatalf("attempt 20 backoff = %v, want cap %v", got, streamReconnectMax)
}
}
func TestJitteredBackoffStaysInBounds(t *testing.T) {
// Jitter never drops below the deterministic base and never exceeds base*1.5,
// so backoff still grows attempt over attempt while decorrelating retries.
for attempt := 1; attempt <= 5; attempt++ {
base := backoffFor(attempt)
for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
got := jitteredBackoff(attempt)
if got < base || got > base+base/2 {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d jittered backoff %v out of [%v, %v]", attempt, got, base, base+base/2)
}
}
}
}
func TestReconnectNoticeRoutesThroughReasoning(t *testing.T) {
var got string
notify := reconnectNoticeFor(Options{OnReasoning: func(s string) { got += s }})
if notify == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a notifier when OnReasoning is set")
}
notify(1, 2)
if got == "" || !contains(got, "reconnecting 1/2") {
t.Fatalf("notice = %q, want a reconnecting message", got)
}
if reconnectNoticeFor(Options{}) != nil {
t.Fatal("expected nil notifier when OnReasoning is unset")
}
}
func contains(s, sub string) bool {
return len(s) >= len(sub) && (indexFold(s, sub) >= 0)
}
func indexFold(s, sub string) int {
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
match := true
for j := 0; j < len(sub); j++ {
a, b := s[i+j], sub[j]
if a >= 'A' && a <= 'Z' {
a += 'a' - 'A'
}
if b >= 'A' && b <= 'Z' {
b += 'a' - 'A'
}
if a != b {
match = false
break
}
}
if match {
return i
}
}
return -1
}
var _ = time.Second
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
package agent
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
)
func TestRequestPermissionsTurnGrantAllowsLaterToolAndCleansUp(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
outside := tempDirOutsideDefaultTemp(t)
target := filepath.Join(outside, "vegetables.txt")
scope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspace, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewScope: %v", err)
}
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspace,
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
Scope: scope,
})
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewRequestPermissionsTool())
registry.Register(tools.NewScopedWriteFileTool(workspace, scope))
provider := &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ToolName: tools.RequestPermissionsToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"reason":"Need to write outside the workspace.","permissions":{"file_system":{"write":[` + quoteJSONString(target) + `]}}}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "grant-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "write-1", ToolName: "write_file"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "write-1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"path":` + quoteJSONString(target) + `,"content":"carrot\n","overwrite":true}`},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "write-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
var requests []PermissionRequest
var results []ToolResult
normalizedProfile, err := sandbox.NormalizeRequestPermissionProfile(sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{
FileSystem: &sandbox.FileSystemPermissions{Write: []string{target}},
}, workspace)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expectedGrantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalizedProfile)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expectedWriteRoot := expectedGrantProfile.FileSystem.Write[0]
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "write the file", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
Autonomy: "medium",
Cwd: workspace,
Sandbox: engine,
OnPermissionRequest: func(_ context.Context, request PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
requests = append(requests, request)
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllow, Reason: "ok"}, nil
},
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) {
results = append(results, result)
},
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want done", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(requests) != 1 || requests[0].ToolName != tools.RequestPermissionsToolName {
t.Fatalf("permission requests = %#v, want one request_permissions prompt", requests)
}
if !strings.Contains(requests[0].Scope, "write "+expectedWriteRoot) || strings.Contains(requests[0].Scope, target) {
t.Fatalf("permission request scope = %q, want widened directory root %q and not file %q", requests[0].Scope, expectedWriteRoot, target)
}
if len(results) != 2 || results[0].Status != tools.StatusOK || results[1].Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("tool results = %#v, want request_permissions and write_file ok", results)
}
var grantResponse sandbox.RequestPermissionsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(results[0].Output), &grantResponse); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal grant response %q: %v", results[0].Output, err)
}
if grantResponse.Permissions.FileSystem == nil ||
len(grantResponse.Permissions.FileSystem.Write) != 1 ||
grantResponse.Permissions.FileSystem.Write[0] != expectedWriteRoot {
t.Fatalf("grant response permissions = %#v, want write root %q", grantResponse.Permissions, expectedWriteRoot)
}
content, err := os.ReadFile(target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(content) != "carrot\n" {
t.Fatalf("target content = %q", content)
}
decision := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), sandbox.Request{
WorkspaceRoot: workspace,
ToolName: "write_file",
SideEffect: sandbox.SideEffectWrite,
Permission: sandbox.PermissionPrompt,
PermissionMode: sandbox.PermissionModeAuto,
Args: map[string]any{"path": target},
})
if decision.Action != sandbox.ActionPrompt {
t.Fatalf("turn grant should be cleaned up after Run, got decision %#v", decision)
}
}
func tempDirOutsideDefaultTemp(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp(".", ".zero-sandbox-outside-")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MkdirTemp outside default temp: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) })
abs, err := filepath.Abs(dir)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Abs(%q): %v", dir, err)
}
if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(abs); err == nil {
return resolved
}
return filepath.Clean(abs)
}
func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsGrantAllowsNetworkCommand(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
WorkspaceRoot: workspace,
Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
})
args := map[string]any{
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
cleanup, err := grantInlineAdditionalPermissions(args, sandbox.PermissionGrantScopeTurn, Options{
Sandbox: engine,
Cwd: workspace,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("grantInlineAdditionalPermissions: %v", err)
}
defer cleanup()
decision := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), sandbox.Request{
WorkspaceRoot: workspace,
ToolName: "exec_command",
SideEffect: sandbox.SideEffectShell,
Permission: sandbox.PermissionPrompt,
PermissionGranted: true,
PermissionMode: sandbox.PermissionModeAsk,
Args: map[string]any{"cmd": "python3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 127.0.0.1"},
})
if decision.Action != sandbox.ActionAllow {
t.Fatalf("inline network grant should allow shell network command, got %#v", decision)
}
}
func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsRequiresPromptUnderAutoAllow(t *testing.T) {
args := map[string]any{
"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
},
}
decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewBashTool(t.TempDir()), args, false, decision) {
t.Fatal("inline additional permissions must request approval even when a sandboxed shell would otherwise auto-allow")
}
}
func TestRequestPermissionsDenyReturnsEmptyGrantAndContinues(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewRequestPermissionsTool())
provider := requestPermissionsOnlyProvider(`{"reason":"Need network.","permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`, "done")
var results []ToolResult
result, err := Run(context.Background(), "request network", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
Cwd: workspace,
Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: workspace, Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()}),
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "no"}, nil
},
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { results = append(results, result) },
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.FinalAnswer != "done" {
t.Fatalf("final answer = %q, want done", result.FinalAnswer)
}
if len(results) != 1 || results[0].Status != tools.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("request_permissions denial should be an ok tool result, got %#v", results)
}
var response sandbox.RequestPermissionsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(results[0].Output), &response); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal response %q: %v", results[0].Output, err)
}
if !response.Permissions.Empty() || response.Scope != sandbox.PermissionGrantScopeTurn {
t.Fatalf("deny response = %#v, want empty turn grant", response)
}
}
func TestRequestPermissionsStrictReviewResponse(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
registry := tools.NewRegistry()
registry.Register(tools.NewRequestPermissionsTool())
provider := requestPermissionsOnlyProvider(`{"reason":"Need read access.","permissions":{"file_system":{"read":[`+quoteJSONString(workspace)+`]}}}`, "done")
var output string
_, err := Run(context.Background(), "request read", provider, Options{
Registry: registry,
PermissionMode: PermissionModeAuto,
Cwd: workspace,
Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: workspace, Policy: sandbox.DefaultPolicy()}),
OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionAllowStrict, Reason: "review commands"}, nil
},
OnToolResult: func(result ToolResult) { output = result.Output },
MaxTurns: 2,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var response sandbox.RequestPermissionsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(output), &response); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal response %q: %v", output, err)
}
if !response.StrictAutoReview || response.Scope != sandbox.PermissionGrantScopeTurn {
t.Fatalf("strict response = %#v, want strict turn grant", response)
}
if response.Permissions.FileSystem == nil || len(response.Permissions.FileSystem.Read) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("strict response permissions = %#v, want read permission", response.Permissions)
}
}
func requestPermissionsOnlyProvider(arguments string, finalAnswer string) *mockProvider {
if !strings.HasPrefix(arguments, "{") {
arguments = "{}"
}
return &mockProvider{
turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ToolName: tools.RequestPermissionsToolName},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "grant-1", ArgumentsFragment: arguments},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "grant-1"},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
{
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: finalAnswer},
{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
},
},
}
}
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
package agent
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestResponseStyleContext(t *testing.T) {
for _, blank := range []string{"", "balanced", "BALANCED", "garbage", " "} {
if got := responseStyleContext(Options{ResponseStyle: blank}); got != "" {
t.Errorf("ResponseStyle %q should add nothing, got %q", blank, got)
}
}
for _, style := range []string{"concise", "explanatory", "review", "Concise", "REVIEW"} {
got := responseStyleContext(Options{ResponseStyle: style})
if got == "" {
t.Fatalf("style %q produced no directive", style)
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(got), strings.ToLower(style)) {
t.Errorf("style %q directive should name the style, got %q", style, got)
}
}
// It lands in the assembled prompt for a real style, and not for balanced.
if !strings.Contains(buildSystemPrompt(Options{ResponseStyle: "concise"}), "Response style: concise") {
t.Error("buildSystemPrompt should inject the concise directive")
}
if strings.Contains(buildSystemPrompt(Options{ResponseStyle: "balanced"}), "Response style:") {
t.Error("balanced must not inject a style section (prompt stays byte-identical)")
}
}
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