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fix: build issues with OpenSSL 4.0. (#2233)

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Closes #2232.
This commit is contained in:
Victor M. Alvarez
2026-07-27 14:14:35 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 129cdc43fb
commit 0da50fe5e6
3 changed files with 38 additions and 38 deletions
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libyara/modules/pe/authenticode-parser/authenticode.c
+17 -17
View File
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ static SpcIndirectDataContent* get_content(PKCS7* content)
if (!spcContent)
return NULL;
int len = content->d.other->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* data = content->d.other->value.sequence->data;
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(content->d.other->value.sequence);
const uint8_t* data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(content->d.other->value.sequence);
d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(&spcContent, &data, len);
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ static SpcIndirectDataContent* get_content(PKCS7* content)
static char* parse_program_name(ASN1_TYPE* spcAttr)
{
const uint8_t* spcData = spcAttr->value.sequence->data;
int spcLen = spcAttr->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* spcData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(spcAttr->value.sequence);
int spcLen = ASN1_STRING_length(spcAttr->value.sequence);
SpcSpOpusInfo* spcInfo = d2i_SpcSpOpusInfo(NULL, &spcData, spcLen);
if (!spcInfo)
return NULL;
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ static void parse_nested_authenticode(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO* si, AuthenticodeArray*
ASN1_TYPE* nested = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, i);
if (nested == NULL)
break;
int len = nested->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* data = nested->value.sequence->data;
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(nested->value.sequence);
const uint8_t* data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(nested->value.sequence);
AuthenticodeArray* auth = authenticode_new(data, len);
if (!auth)
continue;
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static void parse_pkcs9_countersig(PKCS7* p7, Authenticode* auth)
ASN1_TYPE* nested = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, i);
if (nested == NULL)
break;
int len = nested->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* data = nested->value.sequence->data;
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(nested->value.sequence);
const uint8_t* data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(nested->value.sequence);
Countersignature* sig = pkcs9_countersig_new(data, len, p7->d.sign->cert, si->enc_digest);
if (!sig)
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ static void parse_ms_countersig(PKCS7* p7, Authenticode* auth)
ASN1_TYPE* nested = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, i);
if (nested == NULL)
break;
int len = nested->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* data = nested->value.sequence->data;
int len = ASN1_STRING_length(nested->value.sequence);
const uint8_t* data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(nested->value.sequence);
Countersignature* csig = ms_countersig_new(data, len, si->enc_digest);
if (!csig)
@@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ static void parse_ms_countersig(PKCS7* p7, Authenticode* auth)
static bool authenticode_verify(PKCS7* p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO* si, X509* signCert)
{
const uint8_t* contentData = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence->data;
long contentLen = p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence->length;
const uint8_t* contentData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence);
long contentLen = ASN1_STRING_length(p7->d.sign->contents->d.other->value.sequence);
uint64_t version = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&version, p7->d.sign->version);
@@ -315,8 +315,8 @@ AuthenticodeArray* authenticode_new(const uint8_t* data, int32_t len)
int digestnid = OBJ_obj2nid(messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
auth->digest_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2ln(digestnid));
int digestLen = messageDigest->digest->length;
const uint8_t* digestData = messageDigest->digest->data;
int digestLen = ASN1_STRING_length(messageDigest->digest);
const uint8_t* digestData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(messageDigest->digest);
byte_array_init(&auth->digest, digestData, digestLen);
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(dataContent);
@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ AuthenticodeArray* authenticode_new(const uint8_t* data, int32_t len)
digestnid = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
signer->digest_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2ln(digestnid));
digestLen = digest->value.asn1_string->length;
digestData = digest->value.asn1_string->data;
digestLen = ASN1_STRING_length(digest->value.asn1_string);
digestData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(digest->value.asn1_string);
byte_array_init(&signer->digest, digestData, digestLen);
/* Authenticode stores optional programName in non-optional SpcSpOpusInfo attribute */
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ AuthenticodeArray* parse_authenticode(const uint8_t* pe_data, uint64_t pe_len)
continue;
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
int mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
#else
int mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
libyara/modules/pe/authenticode-parser/certificate.c
+5 -5
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
#include "helper.h"
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
/* Removes any escaping \/ -> / that is happening with oneline() functions
from OpenSSL 3.0 */
static void parse_oneline_string(char* string)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void parse_name_attributes(X509_NAME* raw, Attributes* attr)
const char* key = OBJ_nid2sn(OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(entryName)));
ByteArray array = {0};
if (byte_array_init(&array, asn1String->data, asn1String->length) == -1)
if (byte_array_init(&array, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(asn1String), ASN1_STRING_length(asn1String)) == -1)
break;
if (strcmp(key, "C") == 0 && !attr->country.data)
@@ -293,14 +293,14 @@ Certificate* certificate_new(X509* x509)
result->issuer = strdup(buffer);
/* This is a little ugly hack for 3.0 compatibility */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
parse_oneline_string(result->issuer);
#endif
X509_NAME* subjectName = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
X509_NAME_oneline(subjectName, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
result->subject = strdup(buffer);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
parse_oneline_string(result->subject);
#endif
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ Certificate* certificate_new(X509* x509)
EVP_PKEY* pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509);
if (pkey) {
result->key = pubkey_to_pem(pkey);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
result->key_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_get_base_id(pkey)));
#else
result->key_alg = strdup(OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)));
libyara/modules/pe/authenticode-parser/countersignature.c
+16 -16
View File
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
goto end;
}
size_t digestLen = messageDigest->value.octet_string->length;
size_t digestLen = ASN1_STRING_length(messageDigest->value.octet_string);
if (!digestLen) {
result->verify_flags = COUNTERSIGNATURE_VFY_DIGEST_MISSING;
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
goto end;
}
const uint8_t* digestData = messageDigest->value.octet_string->data;
const uint8_t* digestData = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(messageDigest->value.octet_string);
byte_array_init(&result->digest, digestData, digestLen);
/* By this point we all necessary things for verification
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
goto end;
}
uint8_t* encData = si->enc_digest->data;
size_t encLen = si->enc_digest->length;
uint8_t* encData = (uint8_t*) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(si->enc_digest);
size_t encLen = ASN1_STRING_length(si->enc_digest);
/* Decrypt the encrypted digest */
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(ctx);
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
/* compare the encrypted digest and calculated digest */
bool isValid = false;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
size_t mdLen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
#else
size_t mdLen = EVP_MD_size(md);
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
const uint8_t* data_ptr = decData;
DigestInfo* digest_info = d2i_DigestInfo(NULL, &data_ptr, decLen);
if (digest_info) {
isValid = !memcmp(digest_info->digest->data, calc_digest, mdLen);
isValid = !memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(digest_info->digest), calc_digest, mdLen);
DigestInfo_free(digest_info);
} else {
isValid = false;
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ Countersignature* pkcs9_countersig_new(
/* Now check the countersignature message-digest that should correspond
* to Signatures encrypted digest it countersigns */
calculate_digest(md, enc_digest->data, enc_digest->length, calc_digest);
calculate_digest(md, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(enc_digest), ASN1_STRING_length(enc_digest), calc_digest);
/* Check if calculated one matches the stored one */
if (digestLen != mdLen || memcmp(calc_digest, digestData, mdLen) != 0) {
@@ -269,8 +269,8 @@ TS_TST_INFO* IMPL_FUNC_NAME(get_ts_tst_info, cms)(CountersignatureImpl* impl)
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t* data = (*content)->data;
TS_TST_INFO* ts_tst_info = d2i_TS_TST_INFO(NULL, &data, (*content)->length);
const uint8_t* data = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(*content);
TS_TST_INFO* ts_tst_info = d2i_TS_TST_INFO(NULL, &data, ASN1_STRING_length(*content));
if (!ts_tst_info) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int IMPL_FUNC_NAME(verify_digest, pkcs7)(
TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(ctx, TS_VFY_VERSION | TS_VFY_IMPRINT);
TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, store);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_certs(ctx, impl->funcs->get_certs(impl));
#else
TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, impl->funcs->get_certs(impl));
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ int IMPL_FUNC_NAME(verify_digest, cms)(
return 0;
}
if (ts_imprint_digest->length != (int)digest_size ||
memcmp(ts_imprint_digest->data, digest, digest_size) != 0) {
if (ASN1_STRING_length(ts_imprint_digest) != (int)digest_size ||
memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ts_imprint_digest), digest, digest_size) != 0) {
TS_TST_INFO_free(ts_tst_info);
return 0;
}
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ Countersignature* ms_countersig_new(const uint8_t* data, long size, ASN1_STRING*
ASN1_STRING* rawDigest = TS_MSG_IMPRINT_get_msg(imprint);
int digestLen = rawDigest->length;
uint8_t* digestData = rawDigest->data;
int digestLen = ASN1_STRING_length(rawDigest);
uint8_t* digestData = (uint8_t*) ASN1_STRING_get0_data(rawDigest);
byte_array_init(&result->digest, digestData, digestLen);
@@ -571,9 +571,9 @@ Countersignature* ms_countersig_new(const uint8_t* data, long size, ASN1_STRING*
}
uint8_t calc_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
calculate_digest(md, enc_digest->data, enc_digest->length, calc_digest);
calculate_digest(md, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(enc_digest), ASN1_STRING_length(enc_digest), calc_digest);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3000000fL
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
int mdLen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
#else
int mdLen = EVP_MD_size(md);