mirror of
https://github.com/esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix.git
synced 2026-11-07 02:36:01 -10:00
A workspace's reasonix.toml and .reasonix/settings.json are read as
untrusted input.
- [sandbox]: bash may only move to enforce and network only to false;
forbid_read and denied_domains add to the user's; allow_write entries
and workspace_root apply only when they resolve inside the workspace.
${VAR} in sandbox and proxy paths expands from the process environment
only.
- [permissions] mode, allow and allow_dynamic_bash, [network] proxy
settings and [desktop] default_tool_approval_mode are read from the
user config only; deny and ask add to the user's. An "always allow"
given in a workspace is stored under the Reasonix home
(project-grants.json) rather than in the checkout.
- Programs a workspace declares (hooks, language servers, providers,
tools.search.rg_path, tools.shell.path, [browser], tools.system_one
endpoints and the local Laya runtime) run only once approved for that
folder. An approval records the declaration and a digest of the files
it names, is kept under the Reasonix home, and is checked again before
each start; a change refuses the start with ErrProjectProgramChanged.
`reasonix trust` lists and approves them, and saving hooks from the
hooks page approves the block written. Model settings that named only
a held-back provider fall back to the user's choice.
- Single program paths may not point into the workspace, a temporary
directory, an allow_write root or a toolchain cache.
- Sandbox write roots and host write directories keep the identity they
had when first granted; a root whose identity changed is dropped with
sandbox.write_root_redirected or sandbox.write_root_changed. The
host-writable directory list lives in internal/base/hostwrite.
- Every ignored value is reported as a load warning with a typed reason
(Config.IgnoredProjectSettings); held-back programs raise the
project_programs_awaiting_approval notice.
161 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
161 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package boot
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"reasonix/internal/contract/event"
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"reasonix/internal/contract/provider"
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"reasonix/internal/runtime/agent/testutil"
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"reasonix/internal/safety/sandbox"
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"reasonix/internal/session/control"
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)
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func swapBash(id, cmd string) testutil.Turn {
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return testutil.Turn{ToolCalls: []provider.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: "bash", Arguments: fmt.Sprintf(`{"command":%s}`, strconv.Quote(cmd))}}}
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}
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// toolOutputs is every tool result the provider was last shown.
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func toolOutputs(prov *testutil.MockProvider) string {
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reqs := prov.Requests()
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if len(reqs) == 0 {
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return ""
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}
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var b strings.Builder
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for _, m := range reqs[len(reqs)-1].Messages {
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if m.Role == "tool" {
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b.WriteString(m.Content + "\n")
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}
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}
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return b.String()
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}
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// runSwapSession runs one jailed session over a checkout whose reasonix.toml
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// grants allow_write = ["later"], driving the given bash turns in order.
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func runSwapSession(t *testing.T, root string, laterExists bool, turns ...testutil.Turn) *testutil.MockProvider {
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t.Helper()
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writeUserConfig(t, userModel+"\n[sandbox]\nnetwork = false\nbash = \"enforce\"\n")
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writeFile(t, root, "reasonix.toml", "[sandbox]\nallow_write = [\"later\"]\n")
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if laterExists {
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if err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(root, "later"), 0o755); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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prov := testutil.NewMock("swap", append(turns, testutil.Turn{Text: "done"})...)
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registerBootTokenProfileTestProvider()
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setBootTokenProfileTestProvider(t, prov)
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ctrl, err := Build(context.Background(), Options{Sink: event.Discard})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Build: %v", err)
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}
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defer ctrl.Close()
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ctrl.SetToolApprovalMode(control.ToolApprovalYolo)
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_ = ctrl.Run(context.Background(), "go")
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return prov
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}
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// unjailedDir is a directory no jailed command may write: the package
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// directory, or the user's home where the checkout itself sits in temp.
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func unjailedDir(t *testing.T) string {
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t.Helper()
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if dir := outsideTempDir(t); !jailWritable(dir) {
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return dir
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}
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home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
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if err != nil {
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t.Skip("no directory outside every write root")
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}
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dir, err := os.MkdirTemp(home, "reasonix-swap-")
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if err != nil || jailWritable(dir) {
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t.Skip("no directory outside every write root")
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(dir) })
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return dir
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}
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func requireJail(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" || !sandbox.Available() {
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t.Skip("no OS sandbox on this host")
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}
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}
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// A write root the checkout names, missing or real when the session starts,
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// re-pointed from inside the jail at a directory outside it: neither a write
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// through it nor a direct one lands, and the model is told which root it lost.
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func TestEffectAWriteRootSwappedForALinkCarriesNoWritesOut(t *testing.T) {
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requireJail(t)
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for _, mode := range []string{"missing", "realdir", "missing-rel", "realdir-rel"} {
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t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
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outside := unjailedDir(t)
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isolateConfigHome(t)
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root := robustTempDir(t)
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t.Chdir(root)
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target := outside
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if strings.HasSuffix(mode, "-rel") {
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realRoot, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(root)
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realOut, _ := filepath.EvalSymlinks(outside)
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rel, err := filepath.Rel(realRoot, realOut)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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target = rel
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}
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ctl := filepath.Join(root, "ctl.txt")
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prov := runSwapSession(t, root, strings.HasPrefix(mode, "realdir"),
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swapBash("c", "printf ok > "+strconv.Quote(ctl)),
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swapBash("l", "rm -rf later && ln -s "+strconv.Quote(target)+" later"),
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swapBash("p", "printf x > later/pwn"),
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swapBash("d", "printf y > "+strconv.Quote(filepath.Join(outside, "direct"))))
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if _, err := os.Stat(ctl); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("control write inside the workspace failed: %v", err)
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}
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for _, name := range []string{"pwn", "direct"} {
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outside, name)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
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t.Errorf("outside/%s was written (stat err %v): the swapped link widened the jail", name, err)
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}
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}
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if out := toolOutputs(prov); !strings.Contains(out, sandbox.WriteRootRedirectedCode+": ") {
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t.Errorf("the model was not told the root was dropped:\n%s", out)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// A root left alone stays writable without a note; one replaced by another
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// directory is reported, and stays writable only through the workspace. The
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// old directory stays alive so the new one cannot reuse its inode.
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func TestEffectAWriteRootKeepsItsGrantUntilItsIdentityChanges(t *testing.T) {
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requireJail(t)
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isolateConfigHome(t)
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root := robustTempDir(t)
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t.Chdir(root)
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prov := runSwapSession(t, root, true,
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swapBash("a", "printf a > later/kept"))
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "later", "kept")); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("an untouched write root refused a write: %v", err)
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}
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if out := toolOutputs(prov); strings.Contains(out, "sandbox.write_root_") {
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t.Fatalf("an untouched write root was reported dropped:\n%s", out)
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}
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isolateConfigHome(t)
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root = robustTempDir(t)
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t.Chdir(root)
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prov = runSwapSession(t, root, true,
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swapBash("r", "mv later later.old && mkdir later"),
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swapBash("b", "printf b > later/after"))
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if out := toolOutputs(prov); !strings.Contains(out, sandbox.WriteRootChangedCode+": ") {
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t.Fatalf("a replaced write root was not reported:\n%s", out)
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}
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "later", "after")); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("the workspace stopped covering a replaced root inside it: %v", err)
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}
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}
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