fix: strip HTML tags from the inline-finding excerpt in the main comment

The short-form excerpt escaped every <, so a model-written <br> showed as
literal text. Remove HTML formatting tags first, then escape what is left.

.expo-agents/code-review/agents/security.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ description: Security and secrets. Injection, credential or secret leakage, unsa
 alwaysRun: true
 # Security is the highest-stakes agent, so it runs on the Opus tier (included in
 # the Max/Team subscription the claude-code engine authenticates with).
-model: anthropic/claude-opus-5
+model: anthropic/claude-opus-5-5
 ---
 
 # Security & secrets

.expo-agents/code-review/config.jsonc

@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
   // Default model for every agent. Override per-agent via frontmatter in the
   // agent's markdown, or at runtime with the REVIEWER_MODEL env var
   // (e.g. REVIEWER_MODEL=anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5).
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-5-5",
 
   // Agents: every markdown file in agents/ is one reviewer (id = filename).
   // Add or remove files to change the roster — no list needed here.
   // shared.md (prepended to every agent + coordinator) and coordinator.md are
   // reserved filenames. Per-agent overrides go in each file's YAML frontmatter,
-  // e.g. `---\nmodel: anthropic/claude-opus-5\n---`.
+  // e.g. `---\nmodel: anthropic/claude-opus-5-5\n---`.
 
   "policy": {
     // Phase 1: keep signal high by surfacing only critical/warning.

.github/workflows/expo-code-review.yml

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ jobs:
       # like `opencode-ai` in package.json — an unpinned CLI would silently drift
       # on every CI run; bump it deliberately.
       - name: Install Claude Code CLI
-        run: bun install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]12
+        run: bun install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]80
 
       # SECURITY: the TRUSTED BASE checkout above includes .expo-code-review/
       # config.jsonc, whose auth.tokenEnv names the env var the CLI forwards as the

README.md

@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ your-monorepo/
 // apps/api/.expo-agents/code-review/config.jsonc  (the api team owns this)
 {
   // NO "auth" block — locked centrally; a tokenEnv here is rejected by loader + CI guard.
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-5-5",
   "policy": { "includeSuggestions": false },
   "noise":  { "additionalIgnores": ["apps/api/**/__generated__/**"] }
   // shared.md, coordinator.md, agents/*.md live beside this file — the api team's roster.
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ cacheable size (~1–4K tokens) show `cache read 0` — expected, not a bug.
 ---
 description: One line the router uses to decide relevance.
 alwaysRun: true        # run even when the router would skip this agent
-model: anthropic/claude-opus-5   # override the default model
+model: anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5   # override the default model
 temperature: 0.1
 ---
 
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ per-repo `noise.additionalIgnores`.
 
 ```jsonc
 {
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",       // default model for the specialists
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-5-5",       // default model for the specialists
   "policy": { "includeSuggestions": false },  // suppress suggestion-severity findings
   "chunk": { "maxChangedLines": 1000, "maxFiles": 20 },  // concurrency defaults: 6 (API key) / 3 (subscription)
   "noise": { "additionalIgnores": ["packages/*/build/**"] },
@@ -514,15 +514,17 @@ Precedence: **`REVIEWER_MODEL` env** (global override) → per-file **frontmatte
 `model:`** → **`config.jsonc` `model`** (the default). So a repo can run a mixed
 setup, and a developer can override everything locally.
 
-- **Specialist agents** (correctness/security/consistency) benefit from a
-  reasoning-tier model — **`anthropic/claude-sonnet-5`** is the quality/speed
-  sweet spot (the scaffolded default). The **Opus tier** finds more but is slower
-  and more expensive, so scope it to the highest-stakes agent: **security runs on
-  `anthropic/claude-opus-5`** (set in `security.md` frontmatter), the rest on the
-  default.
+- **Specialist agents** (correctness/security/consistency) run on
+  **`anthropic/claude-opus-5-5`**, the scaffolded default. It finds more than the
+  Sonnet tier but is slower and costs about twice as much per token, so
+  `anthropic/claude-sonnet-5` is the step down when a repo needs faster or cheaper
+  reviews. **Security stays pinned to `anthropic/claude-opus-5-5`** in `security.md`
+  frontmatter, so a lower default does not move the highest-stakes agent.
 - **The coordinator** makes the final call (dedupe / re-judge / decide) — worth a
-  strong model; the scaffold pins it to `anthropic/claude-opus-5` in
+  strong model; the scaffold pins it to `anthropic/claude-opus-5-5` in
   `coordinator.md` frontmatter.
+- **Opus 5.5 needs Claude Code 2.1.280 or newer.** Older CLIs reject it with a 400,
+  so keep the workflow's `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` pin at 2.1.280 or later.
 - If latency/timeouts dominate on big PRs, moving the specialists to a faster model
   (e.g. `anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5`) is the most direct lever (a real recall
   tradeoff — measure it).

llp/0003-model-runtimes-and-credentials.explainer.md

@@ -174,12 +174,22 @@ reads are denied by the unmatched-rule denial, and a withheld tool is denied by
 ([observed] `claude-code.ts:241-321`; behavior verified against `claude 2.1.212`).
 Write/exec/network tools (`Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `NotebookEdit`, `WebFetch`,
 `WebSearch`, `Task`, …) are always denied for every pass regardless of role, via the
-`ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS` enumeration. A deny **enumeration** is used rather than an
-allow-only model because permission rules cannot fail closed for tools outside the read
-set and a `*` deny breaks tool calling outright — both verified against `claude 2.1.212`.
-The residual (a future CLI version shipping a new read-capable tool this list does not
-name) is bounded by pinning the CLI version, so **the list must be revisited on every
-pinned-version bump** ([observed] `claude-code.ts:86-111`).
+`ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS` enumeration. Permission rules alone cannot fail closed for tools
+outside the read set, and a `*` deny breaks tool calling outright — both verified
+against `claude 2.1.212`.
+
+**`--tools` is the outer bound.** `--tools` is not a permission rule: it names the
+built-in tools the CLI **loads**. ecr passes exactly the granted read tools
+(`Read,Grep,Glob` or fewer), and `""` for the coordinator and the no-tools fallback.
+A tool that is not loaded cannot be called, so a new tool in a future CLI version
+stays out without anyone adding its name. The deny list was not enough on its own:
+against `claude 2.1.280`, `dontAsk` rejected `Monitor` and `Workflow`, but
+`EnterWorktree` created a git worktree, `RemoteTrigger` listed the logged-in
+account's cloud routines, and `SendMessage` and `Skill` ran, because those tools ask
+no permission. MCP tools (the research tools) and the CLI's `StructuredOutput` tool
+(used by `--json-schema`) are outside the built-in set and stay loaded — also verified
+against `2.1.280`. The scoped allow rules and `ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS` stay as inner
+layers ([observed] `claude-code.ts` `buildClaudeArgs`, `ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS`).
 
 **The env is an allowlist.** The child env is built from `CHILD_ENV_ALLOWLIST` (PATH,
 HOME, locale, tmp, proxies, config dirs — what a CLI needs and nothing else), never a

src/__tests__/claude-code.test.ts

@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ test("buildClaudeArgs: read-only, trust-isolated, subscription argv; never --bar
   );
   expect(joined).not.toContain(" Grep ");
   expect(joined).not.toContain(" Glob ");
+  // --tools loads only the granted read tools, so an ungranted built-in (a new one
+  // in a future CLI included) never reaches the model.
+  expect(args[args.indexOf("--tools") + 1]).toBe("Read,Grep,Glob");
   // Write/exec/net tools are denied outright; out-of-tree reads are denied by
   // dontAsk's unmatched-rule denial (NO explicit Read deny: `Read(~/**)` would
   // deny the whole tree whenever the repo lives under the home directory).
@@ -582,6 +585,7 @@ test("buildClaudeArgs: cross-cutting/verifier get Read+Grep scoped, Glob denied
   // withheld read tool must be denied BY NAME, not just left out of --allowedTools.
   expect(joined).toContain("--allowedTools Read(//work/repo/**) Grep(//work/repo/**)");
   expect(joined).not.toContain("Glob(/");
+  expect(args[args.indexOf("--tools") + 1]).toBe("Read,Grep");
   expect(joined).toContain(
     "--disallowedTools Glob Bash Edit Write NotebookEdit NotebookRead WebFetch WebSearch Task TodoWrite BashOutput KillShell ExitPlanMode",
   );
@@ -599,9 +603,9 @@ test("buildClaudeArgs: reviewer tools honor the configured read set (list ignore
     "--allowedTools Read(//work/repo/**) Grep(//work/repo/**) Glob(//work/repo/**)",
   );
   // `list` has no scoped Claude equivalent and is silently ignored (no crash, no rule).
-  expect(joined).not.toContain("List");
+  expect(args.some((arg) => arg.startsWith("List("))).toBe(false);
   expect(joined).toContain(
-    "--disallowedTools Bash Edit Write NotebookEdit NotebookRead WebFetch WebSearch Task TodoWrite BashOutput KillShell ExitPlanMode",
+    "--disallowedTools Bash Edit Write NotebookEdit NotebookRead WebFetch WebSearch Task TodoWrite BashOutput KillShell ExitPlanMode ListAgents",
   );
 });
 
@@ -616,6 +620,8 @@ test("buildClaudeArgs: empty tools (coordinator/no-tools fallback) deny every re
   // No --allowedTools at all, and Read/Grep/Glob explicitly denied so dontAsk's
   // default-allow can't grant a read.
   expect(joined).not.toContain("--allowedTools");
+  // An empty --tools value loads no built-in tool at all.
+  expect(args[args.indexOf("--tools") + 1]).toBe("");
   expect(joined).toContain(
     "--disallowedTools Read Grep Glob Bash Edit Write NotebookEdit NotebookRead WebFetch WebSearch Task TodoWrite BashOutput KillShell ExitPlanMode",
   );
@@ -643,6 +649,8 @@ test("buildClaudeArgs: explicit research MCP replaces safe mode without loading
   expect(joined).toContain("mcp__platform_docs__search_platform_docs");
   expect(joined).toContain("mcp__platform_docs__fetch_platform_doc");
   expect(joined).toContain("--mcp-config /private/mcp.json");
+  // MCP tools sit outside the built-in set, so --tools does not remove them.
+  expect(args[args.indexOf("--tools") + 1]).toBe("Read");
   expect(joined).toContain("--setting-sources  --disable-slash-commands");
   expect(joined).toContain("--strict-mcp-config");
   expect(joined).toContain("--no-session-persistence");

src/__tests__/inline-comments.test.ts

@@ -89,9 +89,17 @@ test("inlineStubBody: neutral — never claims resolved or dismissed", () => {
 
 // ---- oneLineRationale ----
 
-test("oneLineRationale: collapses whitespace, escapes <, truncates at a word boundary", () => {
+test("oneLineRationale: strips HTML tags, collapses whitespace, escapes <, truncates at a word boundary", () => {
   expect(oneLineRationale("a\n\nb   c")).toBe("a b c");
-  expect(oneLineRationale("<details>x</details>")).toBe("&lt;details>x&lt;/details>");
+  expect(oneLineRationale("<details>x</details>")).toBe("x");
+  expect(oneLineRationale("High — reason.<br>**Impact:** Medium<BR/>end")).toBe(
+    "High — reason. **Impact:** Medium end",
+  );
+  expect(oneLineRationale("<details><summary>Why</summary>\n\nbody</details>")).toBe("Why body");
+  // Non-formatting angle brackets stay, escaped.
+  expect(oneLineRationale("returns `Promise<void>` when a < b")).toBe(
+    "returns `Promise&lt;void>` when a &lt; b",
+  );
   const long = Array.from({ length: 60 }, (_, i) => `word${i}`).join(" ");
   const short = oneLineRationale(long);
   expect(short.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(161);

src/core/claude-code.ts

@@ -92,17 +92,16 @@ const READ_TOOL_MAP: Record<string, "Read" | "Grep" | "Glob"> = {
   glob: "Glob",
 };
 const ALL_READ_TOOLS = ["Read", "Grep", "Glob"] as const;
-// @ref LLP 0003#claude-code-cli-containment [implements] — deny enumeration (not allow-only) because an empty/absent --allowedTools list default-ALLOWS reads; verified against claude 2.1.212, revisit on every CLI version bump
+// @ref LLP 0003#claude-code-cli-containment [implements] — inner deny layer behind --tools, because an empty/absent --allowedTools list default-ALLOWS reads; verified against claude 2.1.212, tool list re-checked against 2.1.280 (ListAgents added)
 /**
- * Tools never available to a review pass, whatever the role. A DENY enumeration is
- * the only workable containment: permission rules cannot fail closed here — reads
+ * Tools never available to a review pass, whatever the role. The primary bound is
+ * `--tools` (see buildClaudeArgs), which loads only the granted read tools; this
+ * list is the inner layer behind it. Permission rules alone cannot fail closed — reads
  * inside the workspace are default-ALLOWED even when an allow list is present but
  * unmatched, and a `*` deny breaks tool calling outright (both verified against
- * claude 2.1.212). The residual risk — a FUTURE CLI version shipping a new
- * read-capable tool this list doesn't name — is bounded by pinning the CLI version
- * (the scaffolded workflow installs an exact @anthropic-ai/claude-code version;
- * bump it deliberately and revisit this list). Unknown names are ignored by the
- * CLI, so denying tools that don't exist in a given version is harmless.
+ * claude 2.1.212). A FUTURE CLI version shipping a new tool this list doesn't name
+ * is no longer the gap it was: `--tools` does not load it. Unknown names are ignored
+ * by the CLI, so denying tools that don't exist in a given version is harmless.
  */
 const ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS = [
   "Bash",
@@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ const ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS = [
   "BashOutput",
   "KillShell",
   "ExitPlanMode",
+  "ListAgents",
 ];
 
 /**
@@ -273,6 +273,16 @@ export function claudeModelMatches(requested: string, actualKey: string): boolea
  * tree itself (paths resolve to absolute), and `Read(~/**)` denies the whole tree
  * whenever the repo lives under the home directory — the common case.
  *
+ * `--tools` is the outer bound: it names the built-in tools the CLI LOADS, so
+ * everything else (including tools a future CLI version adds) never reaches the
+ * model. It is an availability allowlist, not a permission rule, so it fails closed
+ * where `--allowedTools` does not. Verified against claude 2.1.280: `dontAsk` does
+ * NOT stop tools that ask no permission — EnterWorktree created a git worktree,
+ * RemoteTrigger listed the account's cloud routines, SendMessage and Skill ran — and
+ * `--tools` removes them all. MCP tools (the research tools) and the CLI's own
+ * StructuredOutput tool (`--json-schema`) are not in the built-in set and stay
+ * loaded. The scoped allow rules and ALWAYS_DENIED_TOOLS stay as the inner layers.
+ *
  * This is NOT, by itself, a boundary against a symlink committed inside the PR-head
  * tree (e.g. `docs/notes.md -> ~/.claude/.credentials.json`): the permission rule
  * matches the literal path ARGUMENT, which is in-tree, but Read/Grep then follow the
@@ -324,6 +334,9 @@ export function buildClaudeArgs(opts: {
     "--append-system-prompt",
     opts.system,
     ...(opts.jsonSchema ? ["--json-schema", JSON.stringify(opts.jsonSchema)] : []),
+    // @ref LLP 0003#claude-code-cli-containment [implements] — load only the granted read tools; "" loads none
+    "--tools",
+    enabled.join(","),
     ...(allowedTools.length > 0 ? ["--allowedTools", ...allowedTools] : []),
     "--disallowedTools",
     ...deniedReadTools,

src/core/render.ts

@@ -385,14 +385,27 @@ function sourceLabel(value: string): string {
 const SHORT_RATIONALE_CHARS = 160;
 
 /**
- * A rationale reduced to one plain line for the short (inlined) form: whitespace
- * collapsed, every `<` escaped so a truncated HTML block (`<details>`) can never
- * leave an unclosed tag in the comment, cut at a word boundary with an ellipsis.
- * This excerpt is the audit trail that survives the PR author collapsing or
- * resolving the inline thread, so it must always be non-empty when the rationale is.
+ * HTML formatting tags a model writes into a rationale (`<br>`, `<details>`, ...).
+ * A fixed list, not "anything in angle brackets", so a type like `Promise<void>`
+ * in the prose survives.
+ */
+const FORMATTING_TAG_RE =
+  /<\/?(?:a|b|blockquote|br|code|del|details|div|em|h[1-6]|hr|i|kbd|li|ol|p|pre|s|span|strong|sub|summary|sup|table|tbody|td|th|thead|tr|u|ul)\b[^<>]*>/gi;
+
+/**
+ * A rationale reduced to one plain line for the short (inlined) form: HTML
+ * formatting tags removed (an escaped `<br>` would show as literal text),
+ * whitespace collapsed, every remaining `<` escaped so a truncated HTML block can
+ * never leave an unclosed tag in the comment, cut at a word boundary with an
+ * ellipsis. This excerpt is the audit trail that survives the PR author collapsing
+ * or resolving the inline thread, so it must always be non-empty when the rationale is.
  */
 export function oneLineRationale(text: string): string {
-  const flat = text.replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+  const flat = text
+    .replace(FORMATTING_TAG_RE, " ")
+    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
+    .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
+    .trim();
   if (flat.length <= SHORT_RATIONALE_CHARS) {
     return flat;
   }

templates/agents/security.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ alwaysRun: true
 # default model. Scoped to this one agent to limit the extra latency/rate-limit cost;
 # subdivide-on-timeout + the per-fetch deadline keep a slow Opus pass from hanging.
 # @ref LLP 0009#config-and-prompt-templates [implements]
-model: anthropic/claude-opus-5
+model: anthropic/claude-opus-5-5
 ---
 
 # Security & secrets

templates/atlantis.yml

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ jobs:
       # The anthropic/… models run through the Claude Code CLI (claude-code
       # engine). Pinned exactly — see workflow.yml (expo-code-review.yml).
       - name: Install Claude Code CLI
-        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]12
+        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]80
 
       # SECURITY: the base-ref checkout includes every .expo-code-review/ config,
       # whose auth.tokenEnv names the forwarded model credential. `ecr verify-config`

templates/command.yml

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ jobs:
       # engine). Pinned exactly — see workflow.yml (expo-code-review.yml).
       - name: Install Claude Code CLI
         if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true'
-        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]12
+        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]80
 
       # SECURITY: the base-ref checkout above includes every .expo-code-review/
       # config.jsonc + routing.jsonc, whose auth.tokenEnv names the env var the CLI

templates/config.jsonc

@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@
   // below for the credential. Override per-agent via frontmatter in the agent's
   // markdown, or at runtime with the REVIEWER_MODEL env var
   // (e.g. REVIEWER_MODEL=anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5).
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-5-5",
 
   // Agents: every markdown file in agents/ is one reviewer (id = filename).
   // Add or remove files to change the roster — no list needed here.
   // shared.md (prepended to every agent + coordinator) and coordinator.md are
   // reserved filenames. Per-agent overrides go in each file's YAML frontmatter,
-  // e.g. `---\nmodel: anthropic/claude-opus-5\n---`.
+  // e.g. `---\nmodel: anthropic/claude-opus-5-5\n---`.
 
   // @ref LLP 0009#config-and-prompt-templates [implements] — suggestions off by default, not a schema limit
   "policy": {

templates/coordinator.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # than the small serial-tail latency it adds (no repo tools, one bounded pass).
 # Override with a cheaper model if you'd rather trade decision quality for latency.
 # @ref LLP 0009#config-and-prompt-templates [implements]
-model: anthropic/claude-opus-5
+model: anthropic/claude-opus-5-5
 ---
 
 # Coordinator — consolidation & decision

templates/scope-config.jsonc

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 {
   // Default model for every agent in this scope. Override per-agent via frontmatter,
   // or at runtime with REVIEWER_MODEL.
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-5-5",
 
   // Agents: every markdown file in agents/ beside this file is one reviewer for this
   // scope (id = filename). shared.md + coordinator.md are this scope's prompts.

templates/workflow.yml

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ jobs:
       # would silently drift on every CI run; bump it deliberately. Remove this
       # step if you switch every model to an OpenCode-served provider.
       - name: Install Claude Code CLI
-        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]12
+        run: npm install -g @anthropic-ai/[email protected]80
 
       # SECURITY: the TRUSTED BASE checkout above includes every
       # .expo-code-review/config.jsonc + routing.jsonc, whose auth.tokenEnv names the