@expo/code-review-cli
A config-driven, multi-agent AI code reviewer. Specialist agents review a diff in
parallel; a coordinator consolidates their findings into one structured review.
The same engine runs locally (advisory) and in CI (posts one PR comment). The CLI
is the engine — each repo supplies its own agents and settings under
.expo-code-review/, so behavior is configured per-repo, not baked in.
Status: experimental. Comment-only and non-blocking — it never blocks a merge and never auto-approves. See
ROADMAP.md.
Inspired in part by Cloudflare's How we built our AI code review bot.
flowchart TD
SRC["Source<br/>local git · GitHub PR (gh)"] --> FILTER["Noise filter<br/>drop lockfiles · generated · binary"]
FILTER --> CHUNK["Chunk<br/>by changed lines (large diffs only)"]
CHUNK --> AGENTS["Agents (parallel)<br/>each .md in agents/ · read·grep·glob·list"]
CHUNK --> XCUT["Cross-cutting pass<br/>multi-file issues (large diffs)"]
AGENTS --> COORD["Coordinator<br/>dedupe · re-judge · decide"]
XCUT --> COORD
COORD --> VERIFY["Verify<br/>quote-ground · adversarially verify criticals"]
VERIFY --> REPORT["Reporter<br/>one PR comment (CI) · terminal (local)"]
Usage
Run via npx @expo/code-review-cli <command> (or the ecr / expo-code-review
binary once installed). On a repo that already has .expo-code-review/ set up,
getting model credentials for local runs is one command:
npx @expo/code-review-cli setup-auth
Reviewing a PR (--pr/ci) needs the GitHub CLI — brew install gh && gh auth login.
Everything else the reviewer needs (including the opencode runtime) ships with the
package.
First-time setup
# 1. Scaffold .expo-code-review/ + a CI workflow (--no-workflow to skip)
npx @expo/code-review-cli init
# 2. Get model credentials — guided; prints the export lines for your shell config
npx @expo/code-review-cli setup-auth
# 3. Verify env, config, and credentials
npx @expo/code-review-cli doctor
setup-auth reads the repo's config and walks through each credential it needs:
an OpenAI API key (the scaffolded default — it prints where to create the key
and the exact restricted permissions to grant), and/or a ChatGPT/Codex
subscription sign-in (it runs OpenCode's browser login and extracts the token
for you). doctor offers to run it whenever a credential is missing.
In CI, store the same values as repo secrets (OPENAI_API_KEY; plus
CODEX_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN for the mixed setup) — the scaffolded workflow
forwards them.
Have a ChatGPT Plus/Pro (Codex) subscription? Use both. The recommended production setup pairs the subscription (runs the default models at no marginal cost) with the usage-based key (covers only the pro-tier models the subscription excludes) — see the mixed setup below. Prefer Anthropic/Claude or another provider? Same section.
Reviewing (already configured)
# Review working-tree changes; prints here, posts nothing
ecr review
# Review a GitHub PR by number (preview only)
ecr review --pr 4057
# …and post it as the PR comment
ecr review --pr 4057 --post
Options (most to least common):
| Flag | What it does |
|---|---|
--pr <n> |
Review GitHub PR #n by number (diff fetched via gh, no checkout); not combinable with --base/--head/--staged. |
--post |
With --pr, also post the result as the PR comment (needs gh auth). Omit to preview only; re-run with --post to publish. |
--staged |
Review only staged changes (index vs HEAD; not combinable with --base/--head). |
--base <ref> |
Base ref to diff against (default: merge-base with the default branch). |
--head <ref> |
Head ref to diff (default: working tree, incl. uncommitted changes). |
--agents <a,b> |
Run only these agents (comma-separated ids); default: all. |
--route |
Let an LLM router pick the relevant agents from the diff. |
--repo <owner/repo> |
Repo for --pr (default: inferred from the current checkout). |
--json |
Emit machine-readable JSON on stdout. |
--no-fail |
Always exit 0 (otherwise a request_changes decision exits non-zero). |
-h, --help |
Show help. |
--pr uses the PR's diff (authoritative) and checks the PR head out into a
throwaway worktree so the agents' surrounding-source reads and the verifier see the
PR's versions of files — no manual gh pr checkout needed, and your working tree is
left untouched. (If that materialization can't run — e.g. not a git checkout — it
falls back to reading the current working directory.)
In CI it runs automatically from the scaffolded workflows — by label or a /review
comment (see CI usage). From Claude Code (or another agent), add a slash command
that runs it; eas-cli's
/expo-review
is a ready example to adapt.
Command reference
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
ecr init [--no-workflow] [--force] |
Scaffold .expo-code-review/ (config, agents, prompts) + a CI workflow. |
ecr init --monorepo |
…and add a routing.jsonc routing manifest (one default scope). |
ecr init --scope <dir> |
Scaffold a per-team scope under <dir> and register it in the manifest. |
ecr setup-auth [--yes] |
Walk through getting model credentials for local runs (ChatGPT/Claude sign-in and/or API keys), printing the export lines for your shell config. |
ecr review [options] |
Review local changes and print an advisory review (default command). |
ecr review --scope <name> |
Review only one routing scope over just that scope's changed files. |
ecr ci |
Review the current GitHub PR and post/update a comment. For GitHub Actions. |
ecr doctor [--list-scopes] |
Check environment, config, credentials, and (with a manifest) scopes. |
Extra flags for monorepos: review/ci --config-dir <dir> (load config from an
alternate dir; also ECR_CONFIG_DIR), ci --scopes a,b (limit the fan-out to
named scopes), ci --comment single|per-scope (override the manifest). Both
review and ci also take --context-file <path> (inject a file's text as
untrusted external context; see below).
(When developing this repo itself, use bun run src/cli.ts <command>.)
Monorepos (routing manifest)
A monorepo can route different subtrees to different reviewer rosters from a single
infra-owned manifest. There is still one workflow, one ecr ci process per PR:
it reads the changed files once, assigns each to exactly one scope, reviews each
active scope over only its files, and renders one comment. Because it is a single
writer in a single process there is no comment/check race and no locking.
your-monorepo/
.expo-code-review/
routing.jsonc # the manifest — infra-owned, ordered scope list + locked defaults
config.jsonc # the default/root scope; the ONLY place auth/tokenEnv lives
shared.md coordinator.md agents/
server/
www/.expo-code-review/{config.jsonc(NO auth),coordinator.md,agents/} # www team
website/.expo-code-review/{config.jsonc(NO auth),coordinator.md,agents/} # website team
.github/workflows/expo-code-review.yml # unchanged shape: one workflow, one `ecr ci`
// .expo-code-review/routing.jsonc
{
// Central guardrails every scope inherits and CANNOT override.
"defaults": {
// The ONLY place auth/tokenEnv is honored (besides the root config.jsonc).
"auth": { "mode": "api-key", "provider": "openai", "tokenEnv": "OPENAI_API_KEY" },
"enforceAgents": ["security"], // always runs on every scope, roster or not
"commentTag": "expo-ai-code-reviewer" // per-scope markers derive from this
},
"comment": "single", // "single" = one aggregated comment (default) | "per-scope"
// Ordered; the LAST matching scope wins per changed file (CODEOWNERS discipline).
"scopes": [
{ "name": "default", "paths": ["**/*"], "config": "." },
{ "name": "server-www", "paths": ["server/www/**"], "config": "server/www" },
{ "name": "server-website", "paths": ["server/website/**"], "config": "server/website" }
]
}
// server/www/.expo-code-review/config.jsonc (the www team owns this)
{
// NO "auth" block — locked centrally; a tokenEnv here is rejected by loader + CI guard.
"model": "openai/gpt-5.5",
"policy": { "includeSuggestions": false },
"noise": { "additionalIgnores": ["server/www/**/__generated__/**"] }
// shared.md, coordinator.md, agents/*.md live beside this file — the www team's roster.
}
- Path glob dialect —
**crosses/,*matches within a segment. Keep a**/*catch-all scope so no changed file goes unreviewed (ecr doctorflags a coverage gap otherwise). Scopes are ordered and the last match wins, so put broad scopes first and specific ones after (CODEOWNERS/Renovate discipline). - Comment modes —
singleposts one aggregated comment (a scope summary table- a collapsed
<details>per scope) under the existing marker;per-scopeposts one cleanly-namespaced comment per scope. A scope with zero matched files gets its stale comment deleted.
- a collapsed
- Scoped flags —
ecr ci --scopes a,blimits the fan-out;ecr ci --comment single|per-scopeoverrides the manifest;ecr review --scope <name>runs one scope locally;ecr review/ecr ci --config-dir <dir>(orECR_CONFIG_DIR) load config from an alternate directory;ecr doctor --list-scopesprints the scope table.--config-dirdesignates an alternate ROOT config dir: bothconfig.jsoncandrouting.jsoncare read from it, so the root config and its manifest always travel together. Scopeconfigpaths stay repo-root-relative — the override swaps the root config/manifest against the real scope tree, it does not relocate the scopes themselves. - Passes budget —
defaults-levelbudgetbounds total review time:totalPassesMinutes(default 55) is split across active scopes (which run sequentially in oneecr ci), clamped up tominScopeMinutes(default 5) so a single scope still gets a workable window. When enough scopes are active that the floor would overshoot the total,ecr cikeeps the floor but warns, andecr doctorflags the worst case (scopes × floorvs total) — raise the workflowtimeout-minutesor trim scopes. - Adoption is incremental — with no
routing.jsonc, behavior is exactly as before (single config). Add the manifest with just a default scope → still one comment, identical behavior. Land per-team scope dirs one at a time; everything else keeps hitting the default scope.
Security
- auth is locked to the root.
tokenEnv(which env var becomes the model credential) is honored in exactly one place: the rootconfig.jsoncorrouting.jsoncdefaults.auth. A scope config declaringauth/breakGlassfails to parse (Zod-level rejection), and the CI guard step independently sweeps every.expo-code-review/config.jsonc/routing.jsoncrepo-wide and refuses to run unlesstokenEnvappears exactly once, in a root-owned file, equal toECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV. A routing manifest can never widen exposure — globs only choose which roster reviews a file, never which secret is sent. - enforceAgents can't be weakened. Agents listed in
defaults.enforceAgents(e.g.security) are injected into every scope withalwaysRun, taken from the root roster — a scope defining a same-id agent gets the root one, so a team can't shadow the enforced reviewer with a weaker version on its own subtree. - Configuration comes from the PR's trusted base commit. In
ecr ci, review policy and reviewer configuration —config.jsonc,routing.jsonc, prompts, models, and the auth mapping — load from the PR's immutable base commit, materialized via the GitHub API. The PR head is untrusted data: it is materialized separately (pinned to its immutable OID) purely as source content to read and verify against. A PR editing rosters, prompts, or routing is reviewed under the previous config; its changes activate after merge. If the base commit can't be materialized, the run fails closed (one terminal comment) — it never falls back to the checkout. A scope config that is new in a PR is reviewed with the root config until it merges. - The model runtime never sees PR-owned ambient config. The head worktree the
agents read from is scrubbed of runtime configuration before the OpenCode
server starts:
opencode.json{,c},.opencode/(plugins),AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,.claude/,.mcp.json,.cursor*, and.env*at every depth. A PR can't install a plugin, MCP server, instruction file, or.envinto the process that holds the model credential and the comment token. (Changes to those files are still reviewed — their diffs are inlined in the prompt — but a finding citing one can't be re-read during verification; that's the tradeoff.) - The scaffolded workflows check out only the base commit with
persist-credentials: false; the CLI's own git fetches authenticate throughghfromGH_TOKEN, so the token never lands in.git/configor argv. The CLI enforces the trust model itself, so a custom workflow that checks out the PR head still gets base-commit configuration. The temporary escape hatchecr ci --unsafe-config-from-headrestores the old behavior with a loud security warning and will be removed on a minor boundary.
Ownership is enforced with CODEOWNERS: /.expo-code-review/routing.jsonc @your-infra
(the single authoritative router) and /server/www/.expo-code-review/ @your-www-team
(each team owns only its own scope dir). Rerouting globs is gated behind infra review.
How it works
- Source — local git (working tree, staged, or a ref range) or a GitHub PR
(diff + metadata fetched over the
ghAPI). - Noise filter — drops lockfiles, generated bundles/maps, snapshots, files
matching the repo's
additionalIgnores, and binary files (no textual diff to review). Filtered files are recorded, not silently dropped. - Chunking — small PRs run in a single pass; large PRs are split into chunks bounded by changed lines, plus one combined cross-cutting pass that looks for issues spanning multiple changed files across every agent's concern.
- Agents — every
.mdfile in.expo-code-review/agents/is an agent. They run in parallel with read-only repo tools (read/grep/glob/list). - Coordinator — a single pass that dedupes, re-judges severity, and produces
the final
{ decision, findings, summary }. - Verify — quote-grounds every finding against the real file and adversarially verifies criticals, so a confident-but-wrong finding doesn't ship.
- Reporter — posts/updates a single fingerprinted PR comment (CI), or prints a grouped summary (local). Findings below the configured severity floor are suppressed.
Built on the OpenCode SDK, which spawns the model provider and applies the provider's prompt caching automatically.
Tokens, cost & prompt caching
Every run reports what it spent and how much of it was served from the prompt cache, in three places:
- Job log (stderr) — one line at the end of the run:
Token usage — input …, output …, cache read …, cache write … (cost $…). - GitHub Actions step summary — a per-pass table (one row per agent, plus the cross-cutting pass, coordinator, and verifier), the run's cache hit rate, and the exact comment that was posted. The PR comment is updated in place on every run, so the step summary is where past runs' comments remain readable.
.expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl— one JSON line per run (uploaded as a CI artifact) with the same totals plus per-passagentTokens, the raw per-agent findings, coverage notes, and what the verifier dropped.
How the caching works. Provider prompt caching is a prefix match: the
provider caches the rendered prompt up to a point, and any byte change anywhere
in that prefix invalidates everything after it. The reviewer is laid out so the
prefix is stable — the system prompt (shared.md + the agent's own .md) is
byte-identical for every chunk an agent reviews, while the volatile parts (the
diff, file lists, PR metadata) travel in the user message after the prefix and
never touch it. OpenAI caches automatically (no write premium; cached input is
billed at a steep discount and shows up as cache read); Anthropic charges a
small premium to write the cache (~1.25× input) and ~0.1× input to read
it. Entries live minutes, refreshed on use — comfortably covering a run's
concurrent calls.
Reading the numbers. Hit rate = cache read / (cache read + input) — the
share of prompt tokens served from cache instead of being reprocessed at full
price. Multi-chunk reviews should show a high rate; single-chunk reviews mostly
show writes (there is nothing to re-read within the run).
Keeping hits high:
- Keep
shared.mdandagents/*.mdstable. Any edit writes a new prefix — one extra cache write per agent on the next run, then it is warm again. Never put varying text (dates, PR numbers) into prompt files. - Very short prompts may show
cache read 0: prompts below the model's minimum cacheable size (~1–4K tokens depending on the model) are silently not cached. That is expected, not a bug.
Configuration — .expo-code-review/
.expo-code-review/
config.jsonc # model, policy, noise, auth, break-glass, comment tag
shared.md # instructions prepended to every agent (optional)
coordinator.md # the consolidation prompt (required)
agents/
correctness.md # each .md here is an agent (id = filename)
security.md
consistency.md
shared.md and coordinator.md are reserved names; every other .md in
agents/ becomes an agent. Per-agent overrides go in each file's frontmatter:
---
description: One line the router uses to decide relevance.
alwaysRun: true # run even when the router would skip this agent
model: openai/gpt-5.5-pro # override the default model
temperature: 0.1
---
# Agent instructions in Markdown…
For a real-world example, see eas-cli's
.expo-code-review/
— correctness/security/consistency agents, a stronger model for security + the
coordinator, and per-repo noise.additionalIgnores.
config.jsonc (JSONC — comments + trailing commas supported):
{
"model": "openai/gpt-5.5", // default model for the specialists
"policy": { "includeSuggestions": false }, // suppress suggestion-severity findings
"chunk": { "maxChangedLines": 1000, "maxFiles": 20 }, // concurrency defaults: 6 (API key) / 3 (subscription)
"noise": { "additionalIgnores": ["packages/*/build/**"] },
"review": { "trigger": "all", // which PRs `ecr ci` reviews: "all"
"label": "ai-review", // (default, except ai-review:skip) or
"skipLabel": "ai-review:skip" }, // "label" (only labeled PRs)
"breakGlass": { "marker": "/skip-review" }, // PR body marker that skips the review
"commentTag": "expo-ai-code-reviewer", // hidden tag used to find/update the comment
"auth": { "mode": "api-key", "provider": "openai",
"tokenEnv": "OPENAI_API_KEY" }
}
Model selection
Precedence: REVIEWER_MODEL env (global override) → per-file frontmatter
model: → config.jsonc model (the default). So a repo can run a mixed
setup, and a developer can override everything locally.
- Specialist agents (correctness/security/consistency) benefit from a
reasoning-tier model —
openai/gpt-5.5is the quality/speed sweet spot (the scaffolded default). The pro tier finds more but is slower and more expensive, so scope it to the highest-stakes agent: security runs onopenai/gpt-5.5-pro(set insecurity.mdfrontmatter), the rest on the default. - The coordinator makes the final call (dedupe / re-judge / decide) — worth a
strong model; set it in
coordinator.mdfrontmatter. - If latency/timeouts dominate on big PRs, moving the specialists to a faster model
(e.g.
openai/gpt-5.4-mini) is the most direct lever (a real recall tradeoff — measure it). - Every run logs which model actually answered each pass — in the job log
(
Models used — …), the Actions step summary table, and the run log'sagentModels— and warns loudly if a pass ran on a different model than configured, so a provider-side substitution can never pass unnoticed.
There is no automatic cross-provider "equivalent" fallback — that would silently change which model reviewed your code. Use an explicit override instead.
Reliability — never hangs, never silently drops work
- Per-task time caps — chunk passes 15 min; coordinator 10 min. A global passes
budget (55 min) bounds all passes incl. the subdivision waves, fitting inside the
CI job's
timeout-minutes(90). - The cross-file pass is elastic — it gets whatever is left of the passes budget rather than a fixed cap, because it's the one pass whose scope can't be traded for convergence: halving its file set deletes exactly the coverage it exists for. Chunk passes run alongside it under their own caps, so a long cross-file pass doesn't starve them.
- Tool-call cap — a pass that makes too many
read/grepcalls without finishing is wandering, not converging; hitting the cap trips the soft landing. The cross-file ceiling scales with the diff's file count (its diffs are inlined, so tool calls go to tracing, not fetching). - Stall detection — a pass whose reply stops changing entirely (no new tool call, no streamed text or reasoning, no token growth) has a wedged model request, not a hard problem. After 4 min of silence it's abandoned and retried once from a clean session, inside the same budget — instead of spending the whole cap on a dead request. Progress lines say how long a reply has been silent, so this is legible in the CI log.
- Rate limits are detected and waited out, not fought. The reviewer watches the
OpenCode server's own log for provider 429s (hard evidence, per run). A stall
with recent 429 evidence is throttling, not a wedge — the pass waits in 90s
beats (without consuming its one retry) instead of re-sending its whole context
into a limited account; explicit 429 errors retry on a slow 15s/45s/90s schedule.
Subscription (oauth) runs also default to
concurrency3 instead of 6, since one account may be serving several PRs' reviews at once. Rate-limit events are reported in the job log and the run log (rateLimitEvents), so throttling is a visible fact about a run, never a mystery slowdown. - Soft landing on timeout — at either cap, the run is interrupted and the agent is asked to return the findings it already has, rather than discarding its work. Tools are disabled for that request, so the salvage step can't resume investigating instead of answering.
- Subdivide-on-timeout — a reviewer pass that times out with nothing to show has its chunk split in half and the halves re-reviewed (recursively, down to a single file), then a fast no-tools fallback over the inlined diff (the cross-file pass skips straight to the fallback, which still sees the whole diff). Only a genuinely un-reducible pass reports a coverage gap — and it is always reported, never silent.
- Parse failures are retried (same session, then once in a bounded fresh session) — separate from the timeout path.
- Transient API errors are retried (bounded backoff on 429/5xx/network) — distinct from both the timeout path (abandon) and the parse path; a one-off blip no longer drops an entire pass.
- Auth failures surface once, and fail fast —
ecrchecks the configured provider's credential at startup and stops with one clear message if it's missing (rather than failing every pass); a credential rejected mid-run (401/403) collapses into a single actionable coverage note pointing atauth.tokenEnv/REVIEWER_MODEL. - A failed run never reads as "Approve" — all passes fail → "could not complete"; some fail → never a clean approve, and coverage-reduced.
- The coordinator can't sink the run — if consolidation fails, findings are merged deterministically and still posted.
- Coverage notes — passes that timed out/failed are listed (routine noise filtering is not flagged — it's expected and stays in the run log).
- CI always gets a terminal state — on any failure the PR gets a "didn't run" comment, not a stuck reaction and silence.
CI usage
ecr init --with-workflow scaffolds a pull_request workflow. Split along a clean
line: comments = one-shot actions, labels = persistent configuration.
- command workflow — one-shot
/reviewcomments (maintainers):/review(router picks agents),/review all,/review correctness security. Never changes configuration. - auto workflow — continuous review. Which PRs get reviewed is set in
config.jsonc→review.trigger:"all"(default) reviews every PR except those labeledai-review:skip;"label"reviews only PRs labeledai-review(orai-review:<agent>to scope agents).ecr ciself-gates on this policy; the workflow'sif:is an optional coarse gate layered on top.ai-review:skipalways wins and is write-gated, so a contributor can't opt their own PR out. - dismiss workflow —
/dismiss <id> [… -- reason]//undismiss <id>(maintainers). Each finding shows a short`id:…`. Dismissal is a display filter only — the reviewer still analyzes everything, and acritical/secretsfinding can never be hidden. (An inlineexpo-code-review-ignorecomment on/above a line does the same, with the same critical/secrets carve-out.)
These workflows are comment-only (they never fail the PR's checks). The engine runs
as the published package via npx, so no PR-controlled code is built.
External context (--context-file)
ecr review --context-file <path> and ecr ci --context-file <path> inject the
file's UTF-8 text into the reviewer prompts as an explicitly UNTRUSTED external
block (the reviewer is told to use it but never follow instructions in it). The
main use is a CI-provided terraform plan. The text is sanitized like any untrusted
prose and capped at 24k chars (head 16k + tail 8k, so a big plan keeps both its
resource list and its Plan: N to add… summary); the read itself is bounded at
1 MiB.
Read errors differ by command on purpose. ecr review fails loud (exits 2) on a
missing or oversized file, since you typed the path. ecr ci warns and continues
with no context, because a CI run must never fail the PR's checks.
Atlantis terraform plans
templates/atlantis.yml is an opt-in workflow (not scaffolded by ecr init) that
runs the reviewer when Atlantis posts a terraform plan comment on a PR and feeds
the plan into the review as --context-file. The plan comment body is treated as
untrusted data throughout. Copy it into .github/workflows/ and set two repo
variables: ATLANTIS_BOT_LOGIN (the Atlantis bot's comment login, e.g.
atlantis-app[bot]) and optionally ATLANTIS_PLAN_MARKER.
Run logs
Each run appends a JSON line to .expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl with the
inputs, decision, finding count, duration, per-agent cost, and aggregate token
usage (incl. prompt-cache read/write counts) — for auditing and measuring
cost/latency/cache reuse over time. The same totals are printed as a one-line
summary to the terminal / CI job log at the end of each run, so cache reuse is
visible even in CI (where the run log is ephemeral).
Other providers & auth modes
The recommended setup is an OpenAI API key — see Usage above. Alternatives, all
set in config.auth (credentials come from OpenCode):
-
ChatGPT/Codex subscription (OAuth) + usage-based API key — the recommended mix. OpenAI permits subscription auth in third-party tools, and OpenCode ships the plugin for it — so the reviewer runs its default models on the subscription (zero marginal cost) and reserves the metered key for pro-tier models the subscription doesn't offer (
gpt-5.5-prois subscription-excluded). Use the per-provider map form:"auth": { "providers": { "openai": { "mode": "oauth", "tokenEnv": "CODEX_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN" }, "openai-api": { "mode": "api-key", "tokenEnv": "OPENAI_API_KEY", "upstream": "openai" } } }openai-apiis an alias the reviewer synthesizes in the OpenCode config (upstreamnames the SDK it's backed by): agents referenceopenai-api/gpt-5.5-proin frontmatter while everything else stays onopenai/gpt-5.5. Notes:- The oauth
tokenEnvholds the ACCESS token from anopencode auth loginChatGPT sign-in (ecr setup-authextracts it) — a plain bearer, valid for days, with no rotation involvement. Do not use the refresh token as a shared secret: refresh tokens are single-use (rotation), so a static copy is spent by its first use and the sign-in dies with it. Access tokens expire (~10 days observed), so CI secrets need periodic re-minting — see the token-rotator item in the roadmap;doctorand the run preflight warn before expiry. - The API key needs exactly two permissions — a Restricted key with
Model capabilities: Responses → Request and Chat completions →
Request; everything else (including List models) stays None. Create it
in a dedicated, budget-capped project. (
ecr setup-authprints these instructions too.) - In CI, set the
ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENVrepo variable to the comma-separated set of both env names (CODEX_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN,OPENAI_API_KEY) and pass both secrets in the workflow. - Auditability: every pass logs which provider/model answered it (job log,
step summary, run log), so the subscription/API split is visible per run.
One caveat: OpenCode can't price alias models (they're config-declared), so
pro passes report
$0in the run log's cost column — token counts are correct, and the OpenAI project dashboard is the source of truth for spend.
- The oauth
-
Anthropic / Claude — use
anthropic/...model ids and every anthropic pass runs through the Claude Code CLI (claude -p --output-format json), inferred from the model. The credential is (in order) atokenEnvyou name, an ambientCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, or your localclaudelogin — anauthentry is entirely optional. Runclaude setup-tokenfor a Max/Team subscription token (forwarded asCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) or pointtokenEnvat an Anthropic Console API key (sk-ant-api…, forwarded asANTHROPIC_API_KEY); the CLI reads either.ecr setup-authwalks you through it. Each pass is trust-isolated and read-only: it runs with--safe-mode(noCLAUDE.md/hooks/MCP/plugins),--strict-mcp-config,--permission-mode dontAsk, and only theRead/Grep/Globtools — neverBash/Edit/Write/WebFetch/WebSearch. The child env is an allowlist that omits ambientANTHROPIC_API_KEY/ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN(only the configured credential is re-injected).// Optional — no anthropic entry at all falls back to your `claude` login. "auth": { "providers": { "anthropic": { "tokenEnv": "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" } } } -
Another provider — the current path is the
REVIEWER_MODELenv override:opencode auth loginonce (pick the provider), then run with e.g.REVIEWER_MODEL=google/gemini-3-pro. It overrides every agent's model and uses your OpenCode login, so noauthblock is needed.
Engines are inferred per agent from that agent's resolved model alone: an
anthropic/… agent runs through the Claude Code CLI while other agents run through
OpenCode — in the SAME run. So an anthropic model may coexist with an openai (or
any other) OpenCode provider, and each agent's model selects its engine.
REVIEWER_MODEL still overrides every agent's model (and therefore every agent's
engine), converging the whole run onto one engine.
There is no shared fallback key; if a run fails for lack of credentials, authenticate
a provider in OpenCode. ecr doctor diagnoses setup.
Setup errors fail fast, with the fix in the message. A bad credential or model id would otherwise fail every pass identically — a run that spends its whole budget rediscovering one fixable thing, then reports N coverage gaps. So before any pass runs:
- The credential's shape is checked. OpenCode refuses a malformed credential by
dropping the provider entirely, which then surfaces as "model not found" for every
model, with nothing pointing at the credential. A truncated value, surrounding
whitespace, or a token that can't work for the configured
auth.modeis rejected by name. - Configured model ids for OpenCode-routed providers are checked against the running
server, so a typo or an id the provider doesn't have is reported once, up front,
with the close matches.
anthropic/…(Claude Code) model ids aren't checked up front — Claude validates them per-request, so a typo there surfaces as a per-pass error instead. ecr doctorreports theopencodeversion actually in use and warns when a different one is first on yourPATH— runs use the version this package pins.