2026-07-22 18:18:43 -07:00

@expo/code-review-cli

A config-driven, multi-agent AI code reviewer. Specialist agents review a diff in parallel; a coordinator consolidates their findings into one structured review. The same engine runs locally (advisory) and in CI (posts one PR comment). The CLI is the engine — each repo supplies its own agents and settings under .expo-code-review/, so behavior is configured per-repo, not baked in.

Status: experimental. Comment-only and non-blocking — it never blocks a merge and never auto-approves. See ROADMAP.md.

Inspired in part by Cloudflare's How we built our AI code review bot.

flowchart TD
  SRC["Source<br/>local git · GitHub PR (gh)"] --> FILTER["Noise filter<br/>drop lockfiles · generated · binary"]
  FILTER --> CHUNK["Chunk<br/>by changed lines (large diffs only)"]
  CHUNK --> AGENTS["Agents (parallel)<br/>each .md in agents/ · read·grep·glob·list"]
  CHUNK --> XCUT["Cross-cutting pass<br/>multi-file issues (large diffs)"]
  AGENTS --> COORD["Coordinator<br/>dedupe · re-judge · decide"]
  XCUT --> COORD
  COORD --> VERIFY["Verify<br/>quote-ground · adversarially verify criticals"]
  VERIFY --> REPORT["Reporter<br/>one PR comment (CI) · terminal (local)"]

Usage

Run via npx @expo/code-review-cli <command> (or the ecr / expo-code-review binary once installed). On a repo that already has .expo-code-review/ set up, getting model credentials for local runs is one command:

npx @expo/code-review-cli setup-auth

Reviewing a PR (--pr/ci) needs the GitHub CLI — brew install gh && gh auth login. Everything else the reviewer needs (including the opencode runtime) ships with the package.

First-time setup

# 1. Scaffold .expo-code-review/ + a CI workflow (--no-workflow to skip)
npx @expo/code-review-cli init
# 2. Get model credentials — guided; prints the export lines for your shell config
npx @expo/code-review-cli setup-auth
# 3. Verify env, config, and credentials
npx @expo/code-review-cli doctor

setup-auth reads the repo's config and walks through each credential it needs. The scaffolded default is Anthropic via the Claude Code CLI: locally your claude login is enough, and for CI it helps you mint a token with claude setup-token. It also handles the alternatives (an OpenAI API key, a ChatGPT/Codex subscription sign-in). doctor offers to run it whenever a credential is missing.

In CI, store the credential as the repo secret the scaffolded workflow forwards (CLAUDE_CODE_REVIEW_SHARED_API_TOKEN by default — an sk-ant-oat… token from claude setup-token, or an sk-ant-api… Console key; the CLI reads either).

Prefer OpenAI (API key, or a ChatGPT/Codex subscription, or both mixed) or another provider? See Other providers & auth modes below.

Reviewing (already configured)

# Review working-tree changes; prints here, posts nothing
ecr review
# Review a GitHub PR by number (preview only)
ecr review --pr 123
# …and post it as the PR comment
ecr review --pr 123 --post
# Preview once, save the exact result, and post it later without another model run
ecr review --repo owner/repo --pr 123 --save-review --json
ecr post-review --artifact .expo-code-review/.runs/deferred/<artifact>.json --repo owner/repo --pr 123

Options (most to least common):

Flag What it does
--pr <n> Review GitHub PR #n by number (diff fetched via gh, no checkout); not combinable with --base/--head/--staged.
--post With --pr, also post the result as the PR comment (needs gh auth). Omit to preview only; re-run with --post to publish.
--save-review With explicit --repo + --pr, save the exact preview as a private postable artifact. Mutually exclusive with --post.
--staged Review only staged changes (index vs HEAD; not combinable with --base/--head).
--base <ref> Base ref to diff against (default: merge-base with the default branch).
--head <ref> Head ref to diff (default: working tree, incl. uncommitted changes).
--agents <a,b> Run only these agents (comma-separated ids); default: all.
--route Let an LLM router pick the relevant agents from the diff.
--repo <owner/repo> Repo for --pr (default: inferred from the current checkout).
--json Emit machine-readable JSON on stdout.
--no-fail Always exit 0 (otherwise a request_changes decision exits non-zero).
-h, --help Show help.

--pr uses the PR's diff (authoritative) and checks the PR head out into a throwaway worktree so the agents' surrounding-source reads and the verifier see the PR's versions of files — no manual gh pr checkout needed, and your working tree is left untouched. (If that materialization can't run — e.g. not a git checkout — it falls back to reading the current working directory.)

In CI it runs automatically from the scaffolded workflows — by label or a /review comment (see CI usage). From Claude Code (or another agent), add a slash command that runs it; eas-cli's /expo-review is a ready example to adapt.

Command reference

Command What it does
ecr init [--no-workflow] [--force] Scaffold .expo-code-review/ (config, agents, prompts) + a CI workflow.
ecr init --monorepo …and add a routing.jsonc routing manifest (one default scope).
ecr init --scope <dir> Scaffold a per-team scope under <dir> and register it in the manifest.
ecr setup-auth [--yes] Walk through getting model credentials for local runs (ChatGPT/Claude sign-in and/or API keys), printing the export lines for your shell config.
ecr review [options] Review local changes and print an advisory review (default command).
ecr review --scope <name> Review only one routing scope over just that scope's changed files.
ecr post-review --artifact <path> --repo <owner/repo> --pr <n> Post an exact saved PR preview without re-running models; refuses target, head, config, or break-glass drift.
ecr ci Review the current GitHub PR and post/update a comment. For GitHub Actions.
ecr doctor [--list-scopes] Check environment, config, credentials, and (with a manifest) scopes.
ecr feedback [--repo <owner/repo>] Report which findings PR authors pushed back on, across history. See below.
ecr ref-check [--json] Fail when the review setup cites code that moved or vanished. See below.

Extra flags for monorepos: review/ci --config-dir <dir> (load config from an alternate dir; also ECR_CONFIG_DIR), ci --scopes a,b (limit the fan-out to named scopes), ci --comment single|per-scope (override the manifest). Both review and ci also take --context-file <path> (inject a file's text as untrusted external context; see below).

(When developing this repo itself, use bun run src/cli.ts <command>.)


Keeping prompts true (ecr ref-check)

Good reviewer prompts cite real code: "the only session entry point is server/src/session.ts", "every webhook router must call sanitizeSecrets". Then the code moves and the prompt keeps citing a path that no longer exists — the reviewer reasons from a fiction, on every PR, with nothing to warn you.

ecr ref-check makes those citations checkable. Pin each one with a ref, in a comment of its own (<!-- … --> in Markdown, // in JSONC):

<!-- @ref server/src/session.ts#createSession — the only place a session is minted -->
<!-- @ref server/src/entities/oauth/ — every provider lives here -->
<!-- @ref glob:**/*WebhookRouter.ts — the routers this rule is about -->

A target is a file, a dir/, glob:<pattern>, file#symbol, or doc.md#heading — never a line number, since a line number rots without any signal. Symbol anchors are checked by whole-word match, so code moving inside its file is fine and a rename is not.

The check is strict on purpose: a backticked token in .expo-code-review/ that looks like a repo path must be a ref, because the stale citations are exactly the ones nobody thought to annotate. A token with no extension (eas-build-worker/terraform, general-central/{module,production}, finops) counts when it names something that exists — so those get pinned too, while anthropic/claude-opus-5, shaped the same way, stays prose. For a token that only looks like a path, say so once: <!-- @ref-ignore knex.raw() -->. It also checks what your config already declares — enforceAgents ids, scope config directories, scope path globs.

Refs are repo-root-relative, including in a scope's own setup dir. A scope prompt that cites general-central/module for infrastructure/general-central/module gets told the root-relative form to use.

Two run points:

  • ecr ref-check exits 1 on any problem. Run it in CI or a pre-commit hook.
  • ecr review / ecr ci run it too, and never fail a PR's checks with it. The comment carries a Review setup note instead: refs that no longer resolve, plus cited code this PR changes, where the ref still resolves but the guidance may not.

Providing context and research capabilities

@expo/code-review-cli includes review-research-mcp and exposes that one bundled, local MCP directly to reviewer and cross-file passes. The agent decides whether an external API contract needs research and can either search for an exact symbol or fetch an exact supported documentation URL already present in the review context. Coordinator, verifier, stack-verifier, and time-critical no-tools passes never receive the MCP.

Enable it only in the root config, which CI loads from the PR's trusted base:

{
  "research": {
    "enabled": true,
    "maxQueries": 8,
    "resultsPerQuery": 2,
    "timeoutMs": 15000
  }
}

Add a repository Actions secret named BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY. The generated automatic and command-triggered workflows pass only that search credential to the MCP. Expo uses its public documentation search and OkHttp uses its official static search index; neither consumes Brave quota.

ECR resolves the MCP entry point inside its own installed package and starts it with the current absolute Node executable, so a PR-owned PATH entry cannot replace either component. Each review gets an owner-only temporary MCP config and append-only audit. Claude receives that explicit config under --strict-mcp-config, with project settings and slash commands disabled; OpenCode receives the same fixed local command. The Brave credential is passed to the MCP child, not the model process.

The MCP is the outbound security boundary. Search queries are normalized before logging or networking: quoted literals, URLs, email addresses, paths, prose stop words, overlong/high-entropy tokens, and unsupported punctuation are removed; credential-shaped or secret-labeled input fails closed. The remaining query must be at most eight short tokens and contain an API-like symbol. Direct URLs must use plain HTTPS with no credentials, port, query string, or fragment; suspicious/high-entropy path segments fail closed. The fixed provider host/path allowlist and redirect, response-size, content-type, and timeout checks still apply after that first gate. These deterministic checks greatly reduce accidental exfiltration; they are not a proof that every low-entropy string is harmless, so reviewer prompts also forbid sending repository text and the review-wide MCP budget defaults to eight calls.

For non-Expo providers, discovery sends a fixed, provider-owned site: scope plus the bounded query to Brave's fixed Web Search endpoint. Search snippets and titles are never treated as evidence. ECR independently rejects off-allowlist result URLs, manually validates every redirect, fetches a few official pages, verifies content types and response sizes, extracts visible documentation text, and returns locally ranked bounded passages. Sparse search-engine coverage therefore produces an honest empty result rather than a loose guess.

Research is root-only in routed monorepos because it starts a host process; scope configs cannot alter its network behavior or limits. Result-cache reuse remains disabled while research is enabled because web results and documentation can change without a config change.

The fixed provider catalog covers Apple/Android APIs plus Media3, Glide, OkHttp, Kotlin coroutines, Gradle/AGP, Swift concurrency/evolution, platform release/API availability, Expo, React Native, Reanimated, Gesture Handler, Screens, and Worklets. Queries are short exact symbols plus at most one useful member or behavior term. For example, CameraView barcodeScannerSettings is useful; a source snippet, import path, or natural-language question is not. The MCP publishes the same guidance in its tool metadata. An empty result stays empty; it is not replaced with a loose semantic guess.

Direct clients can also call fetch_platform_doc with an exact documentation URL. The tool infers the narrowest matching provider (or accepts an explicit provider hint), then applies the same fixed HTTPS host/path allowlist, manual redirect checks, 10-second timeout, 5 MB response limit, content-type validation, extraction, and passage bounds as search-discovered pages. An optional query ranks passages only within that one page; it never broadens discovery. For example, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/swiftui/view/menustyle(_:) is resolved to Apple's DocC JSON and returned with the canonical page URL and API availability.

Every research-enabled review audits each sanitized outbound query and each returned result's title, provider, provenance class, and canonical URL. GitHub Actions receives the same audit trail in the step summary, while .runs/reviews.jsonl keeps the queries plus bounded returned passages for short-lived operational inspection. Reviewers are instructed to attach sources only when documentation materially supports a finding. ECR accepts only exact URLs returned during that review, restores canonical titles, carries citations through coordination, and renders them below the finding; invented or unrelated citations are dropped.

For a query routed to the expo provider, serve POSTs the already-sanitized query directly to Expo's public Algolia search endpoint and returns canonical docs.expo.dev hits. The endpoint, application id, and browser-visible search-only key are fixed in the package; redirects are rejected; response size, timeout, hit count, and returned URL host are bounded.

OkHttp's newly migrated documentation is still sparse in Brave, so its provider downloads the fixed official lysine.dev static search index, validates and indexes it in memory once per MCP process, and rejects any entry outside the existing OkHttp allowlist. Brave remains a fallback if that official index is unavailable.

An absolute research.indexPath remains available as an optional local fallback. The MCP and its trusted updater ship with ECR: build that fallback from this repository with bun run research:update, or from an installed package with review-research-mcp update. This is operator/scheduled offline tooling, not a step to run before each review. The built-in seed catalog lives in research/sources.json; seedUrls are deterministic starting pages for the bounded crawler, and extraction/indexing use no LLM. Installations requiring a fully offline review can supply a separately built, verified index and omit the Brave key. Installation-specific provider configuration is intentionally deferred: when added, it should follow the trusted root-config model used for agents without permitting PR-controlled URLs, commands, or executable parsers. Expo skills are complementary, not another search corpus: their pinned procedural guidance can later be supplied to review agents as separately labeled trusted context, while documentation search continues to return citable API evidence. Dynamic skills or instructions retrieved from documentation must never become executable reviewer instructions.

Monorepos (routing manifest)

A monorepo can route different subtrees to different reviewer rosters from a single infra-owned manifest. There is still one workflow, one ecr ci process per PR: it reads the changed files once, assigns each to exactly one scope, reviews each active scope over only its files, and renders one comment. Because it is a single writer in a single process there is no comment/check race and no locking.

your-monorepo/
  .expo-code-review/
    routing.jsonc          # the manifest — infra-owned, ordered scope list + locked defaults
    config.jsonc           # the default/root scope; the ONLY place auth/tokenEnv lives
    shared.md coordinator.md agents/
  apps/
    api/.expo-code-review/{config.jsonc(NO auth),coordinator.md,agents/}   # api team
    web/.expo-code-review/{config.jsonc(NO auth),coordinator.md,agents/}   # web team
  .github/workflows/expo-code-review.yml   # unchanged shape: one workflow, one `ecr ci`
// .expo-code-review/routing.jsonc
{
  // Central guardrails every scope inherits and CANNOT override.
  "defaults": {
    // The ONLY place auth/tokenEnv is honored (besides the root config.jsonc).
    "auth": { "providers": { "anthropic": { "tokenEnv": "CLAUDE_CODE_REVIEW_SHARED_API_TOKEN" } } },
    "enforceAgents": ["security"],            // always runs on every scope, roster or not
    "commentTag": "expo-ai-code-reviewer"     // per-scope markers derive from this
  },
  "comment": "single",   // "single" = one aggregated comment (default) | "per-scope"
  // Ordered; the LAST matching scope wins per changed file (CODEOWNERS discipline).
  "scopes": [
    { "name": "default",  "paths": ["**/*"],        "config": "." },
    { "name": "apps-api", "paths": ["apps/api/**"], "config": "apps/api" },
    { "name": "apps-web", "paths": ["apps/web/**"], "config": "apps/web" }
  ]
}
// apps/api/.expo-code-review/config.jsonc  (the api team owns this)
{
  // NO "auth" block — locked centrally; a tokenEnv here is rejected by loader + CI guard.
  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",
  "policy": { "includeSuggestions": false },
  "noise":  { "additionalIgnores": ["apps/api/**/__generated__/**"] }
  // shared.md, coordinator.md, agents/*.md live beside this file — the api team's roster.
}
  • Path glob dialect — ** crosses /, * matches within a segment. Keep a **/* catch-all scope so no changed file goes unreviewed (ecr doctor flags a coverage gap otherwise). Scopes are ordered and the last match wins, so put broad scopes first and specific ones after (CODEOWNERS/Renovate discipline).
  • Comment modes — single posts one aggregated comment (a scope summary table
    • a collapsed <details> per scope) under the existing marker; per-scope posts one cleanly-namespaced comment per scope. A scope with zero matched files gets its stale comment deleted.
  • Scoped flags — ecr ci --scopes a,b limits the fan-out; ecr ci --comment single|per-scope overrides the manifest; ecr review --scope <name> runs one scope locally; ecr review/ecr ci --config-dir <dir> (or ECR_CONFIG_DIR) load config from an alternate directory; ecr doctor --list-scopes prints the scope table. --config-dir designates an alternate ROOT config dir: both config.jsonc and routing.jsonc are read from it, so the root config and its manifest always travel together. Scope config paths stay repo-root-relative — the override swaps the root config/manifest against the real scope tree, it does not relocate the scopes themselves.
  • Passes budget — defaults-level budget bounds total review time: totalPassesMinutes (default 55) is split across active scopes (which run sequentially in one ecr ci), clamped up to minScopeMinutes (default 5) so a single scope still gets a workable window. When enough scopes are active that the floor would overshoot the total, ecr ci keeps the floor but warns, and ecr doctor flags the worst case (scopes × floor vs total) — raise the workflow timeout-minutes or trim scopes.
  • Adoption is incremental — with no routing.jsonc, behavior is exactly as before (single config). Add the manifest with just a default scope → still one comment, identical behavior. Land per-team scope dirs one at a time; everything else keeps hitting the default scope.

Security

  • auth and research are locked to the root. tokenEnv (which env var becomes the model credential) is honored in exactly one place: the root config.jsonc or routing.jsonc defaults.auth. A scope config declaring auth/breakGlass/research fails to parse (Zod-level rejection). A scope declaring research also fails, so PR-controlled routing cannot select a different host index. The CI guard step independently sweeps every .expo-code-review/config.jsonc/routing.jsonc repo-wide and refuses to run unless tokenEnv appears exactly once, in a root-owned file, equal to ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV. A routing manifest can never widen exposure — globs only choose which roster reviews a file, never which secret is sent.
  • enforceAgents can't be weakened. Agents listed in defaults.enforceAgents (e.g. security) are injected into every scope with alwaysRun, taken from the root roster — a scope defining a same-id agent gets the root one, so a team can't shadow the enforced reviewer with a weaker version on its own subtree.
  • Configuration comes from the PR's trusted base commit. In ecr ci, review policy and reviewer configuration — config.jsonc, routing.jsonc, prompts, models, and the auth mapping — load from the PR's immutable base commit, materialized via the GitHub API. The PR head is untrusted data: it is materialized separately (pinned to its immutable OID) purely as source content to read and verify against. A PR editing rosters, prompts, or routing is reviewed under the previous config; its changes activate after merge. If the base commit can't be materialized, the run fails closed (one terminal comment) — it never falls back to the checkout. A scope config that is new in a PR is reviewed with the root config until it merges.
  • The model runtime never sees PR-owned ambient config. The head worktree the agents read from is scrubbed of runtime configuration before the OpenCode server starts: opencode.json{,c}, .opencode/ (plugins), AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .claude/, .mcp.json, .cursor*, and .env* at every depth. A PR can't install a plugin, MCP server, instruction file, or .env into the process that holds the model credential and the comment token. (Changes to those files are still reviewed — their diffs are inlined in the prompt — but a finding citing one can't be re-read during verification; that's the tradeoff.)
  • The scaffolded workflows check out only the base commit with persist-credentials: false; the CLI's own git fetches authenticate through gh from GH_TOKEN, so the token never lands in .git/config or argv. The CLI enforces the trust model itself, so a custom workflow that checks out the PR head still gets base-commit configuration. The temporary escape hatch ecr ci --unsafe-config-from-head restores the old behavior with a loud security warning and will be removed on a minor boundary.

Ownership is enforced with CODEOWNERS: /.expo-code-review/routing.jsonc @your-infra (the single authoritative router) and /apps/api/.expo-code-review/ @your-api-team (each team owns only its own scope dir). Rerouting globs is gated behind infra review.


How it works
  • Source — local git (working tree, staged, or a ref range) or a GitHub PR (diff + metadata fetched over the gh API).
  • Noise filter — drops lockfiles, generated bundles/maps, snapshots, files matching the repo's additionalIgnores, and binary files (no textual diff to review). Filtered files are recorded, not silently dropped.
  • Chunking — small PRs run in a single pass; large PRs are split into chunks bounded by changed lines, plus one combined cross-cutting pass that looks for issues spanning multiple changed files across every agent's concern.
  • Agents — every .md file in .expo-code-review/agents/ is an agent. They run in parallel with read-only repo tools (read/grep/glob/list).
  • Coordinator — a single pass that dedupes, re-judges severity, and produces the final { decision, findings, summary }.
  • Verify — quote-grounds every finding against the real file and adversarially verifies criticals, so a confident-but-wrong finding doesn't ship.
  • Reporter — posts/updates a single fingerprinted PR comment (CI), or prints a grouped summary (local). Findings below the configured severity floor are suppressed.
  • Whole-review reuse — automated CI stores a hash of each review job's inputs in the hidden state of that comment. If a restack leaves a scope's files and review configuration unchanged, its complete prior result is reused. Manual /review, partial/failed reviews, stack-aware review, and model-adjudicated feedback always run fresh.

Built on the OpenCode SDK, which spawns the model provider and applies the provider's prompt caching automatically.

Tokens, cost & prompt caching

Every run reports what it spent and how much of it was served from the prompt cache, in three places:

  • Job log (stderr) — one line at the end of the run: Token usage — input …, output …, cache read …, cache write … (cost $…).
  • GitHub Actions step summary — a per-pass table (one row per agent, plus the cross-cutting pass, coordinator, and verifier), the run's cache hit rate, and the exact comment that was posted. The PR comment is updated in place on every run, so the step summary is where past runs' comments remain readable.
  • .expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl — one JSON line per run (uploaded as a CI artifact) with the same totals plus per-pass agentTokens, the raw per-agent findings, bounded reviewer traces, coverage notes, and what the verifier dropped.

Each reviewer can also return a compact trace with up to three concrete checks and two unresolved questions. The reporter stores it only inside the existing base64 <!-- <commentTag>:state=… --> comment marker as review.reviewTrace; it does not render in the visible review. Agents and other machine consumers can decode that state to see what a clean review covered. The payload declares trust: "unverified-model-diagnostics": it contains bounded conclusions, never a raw transcript or chain-of-thought, and must not be treated as a verified finding. The engine sorts agent ids and caps the complete decoded trace at 6 KB so this hidden diagnostic cannot crowd visible findings out of GitHub's comment-size limit.

How the caching works. Provider prompt caching is a prefix match: the provider caches the rendered prompt up to a point, and any byte change anywhere in that prefix invalidates everything after it. The reviewer is laid out so the prefix is stable — the system prompt (shared.md + the agent's own .md) is byte-identical for every chunk an agent reviews, while the volatile parts (the diff, file lists, PR metadata) travel in the user message after the prefix and never touch it. OpenAI caches automatically (no write premium; cached input is billed at a steep discount and shows up as cache read); Anthropic charges a small premium to write the cache (~1.25× input) and ~0.1× input to read it. Entries live minutes, refreshed on use — comfortably covering a run's concurrent calls.

Reading the numbers. Hit rate = cache read / (cache read + input) — the share of prompt tokens served from cache instead of being reprocessed at full price. Multi-chunk reviews should show a high rate; single-chunk reviews mostly show writes (there is nothing to re-read within the run).

Keeping hits high:

  • Keep shared.md and agents/*.md stable. Any edit writes a new prefix — one extra cache write per agent on the next run, then it is warm again. Never put varying text (dates, PR numbers) into prompt files.
  • Very short prompts may show cache read 0: prompts below the model's minimum cacheable size (~1–4K tokens depending on the model) are silently not cached. That is expected, not a bug.
Configuration — .expo-code-review/
.expo-code-review/
  config.jsonc        # model, policy, noise, auth, break-glass, comment tag
  shared.md           # instructions prepended to every agent (optional)
  coordinator.md      # the consolidation prompt (required)
  agents/
    correctness.md    # each .md here is an agent (id = filename)
    security.md
    consistency.md

shared.md and coordinator.md are reserved names; every other .md in agents/ becomes an agent. Per-agent overrides go in each file's frontmatter:

---
description: One line the router uses to decide relevance.
alwaysRun: true        # run even when the router would skip this agent
model: anthropic/claude-opus-5   # override the default model
temperature: 0.1
---

# Agent instructions in Markdown…

For a real-world example, see eas-cli's .expo-code-review/ — correctness/security/consistency agents, a stronger model for security, and per-repo noise.additionalIgnores.

config.jsonc (JSONC — comments + trailing commas supported):

{
  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-5",       // default model for the specialists
  "policy": { "includeSuggestions": false },  // suppress suggestion-severity findings
  "chunk": { "maxChangedLines": 1000, "maxFiles": 20 },  // concurrency defaults: 6 (API key) / 3 (subscription)
  "noise": { "additionalIgnores": ["packages/*/build/**"] },
  "review": { "trigger": "all",               // which PRs `ecr ci` reviews: "all"
              "label": "ai-review",            // (default, except ai-review:skip) or
              "skipLabel": "ai-review:skip" }, // "label" (only labeled PRs)
  "breakGlass": { "marker": "/skip-review" }, // PR body marker that skips the review
  "commentTag": "expo-ai-code-reviewer",      // hidden tag used to find/update the comment
  "auth": { "providers": {
    "anthropic": { "tokenEnv": "CLAUDE_CODE_REVIEW_SHARED_API_TOKEN" } } }
}
Model selection

Precedence: REVIEWER_MODEL env (global override) → per-file frontmatter model: → config.jsonc model (the default). So a repo can run a mixed setup, and a developer can override everything locally.

  • Specialist agents (correctness/security/consistency) benefit from a reasoning-tier model — anthropic/claude-sonnet-5 is the quality/speed sweet spot (the scaffolded default). The Opus tier finds more but is slower and more expensive, so scope it to the highest-stakes agent: security runs on anthropic/claude-opus-5 (set in security.md frontmatter), the rest on the default.
  • The coordinator makes the final call (dedupe / re-judge / decide) — worth a strong model; the scaffold pins it to anthropic/claude-opus-5 in coordinator.md frontmatter.
  • If latency/timeouts dominate on big PRs, moving the specialists to a faster model (e.g. anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5) is the most direct lever (a real recall tradeoff — measure it).
  • Every run logs which model actually answered each pass — in the job log (Models used — …), the Actions step summary table, and the run log's agentModels — and warns loudly if a pass ran on a different model than configured, so a provider-side substitution can never pass unnoticed.

There is no automatic cross-provider "equivalent" fallback — that would silently change which model reviewed your code. Use an explicit override instead.

Reliability — never hangs, never silently drops work
  • Per-task time caps — chunk passes 15 min; coordinator 10 min. A global passes budget (55 min) bounds all passes incl. the subdivision waves, fitting inside the CI job's timeout-minutes (90).
  • The cross-file pass is elastic — it gets whatever is left of the passes budget rather than a fixed cap, because it's the one pass whose scope can't be traded for convergence: halving its file set deletes exactly the coverage it exists for. Chunk passes run alongside it under their own caps, so a long cross-file pass doesn't starve them.
  • Tool-call cap — a pass that makes too many read/grep calls without finishing is wandering, not converging; hitting the cap trips the soft landing. The cross-file ceiling scales with the diff's file count (its diffs are inlined, so tool calls go to tracing, not fetching).
  • Stall detection — a pass whose reply stops changing entirely (no new tool call, no streamed text or reasoning, no token growth) has a wedged model request, not a hard problem. After 4 min of silence it's abandoned and retried once from a clean session, inside the same budget — instead of spending the whole cap on a dead request. Progress lines say how long a reply has been silent, so this is legible in the CI log.
  • Rate limits are detected and waited out, not fought. The reviewer watches the OpenCode server's own log for provider 429s (hard evidence, per run). A stall with recent 429 evidence is throttling, not a wedge — the pass waits in 90s beats (without consuming its one retry) instead of re-sending its whole context into a limited account; explicit 429 errors retry on a slow 15s/45s/90s schedule. Subscription (oauth) runs also default to concurrency 3 instead of 6, since one account may be serving several PRs' reviews at once. Rate-limit events are reported in the job log and the run log (rateLimitEvents), so throttling is a visible fact about a run, never a mystery slowdown.
  • Soft landing on timeout — at either cap, the run is interrupted and the agent is asked to return the findings it already has, rather than discarding its work. Tools are disabled for that request, so the salvage step can't resume investigating instead of answering.
  • Subdivide-on-timeout — a reviewer pass that times out with nothing to show has its chunk split in half and the halves re-reviewed (recursively, down to a single file), then a fast no-tools fallback over the inlined diff (the cross-file pass skips straight to the fallback, which still sees the whole diff). Only a genuinely un-reducible pass reports a coverage gap — and it is always reported, never silent.
  • Parse failures are retried (same session, then once in a bounded fresh session) — separate from the timeout path.
  • Transient API errors are retried (bounded backoff on 429/5xx/network) — distinct from both the timeout path (abandon) and the parse path; a one-off blip no longer drops an entire pass.
  • Auth failures surface once, and fail fast — ecr checks the configured provider's credential at startup and stops with one clear message if it's missing (rather than failing every pass); a credential rejected mid-run (401/403) collapses into a single actionable coverage note pointing at auth.tokenEnv/REVIEWER_MODEL.
  • A failed run never reads as "Approve" — all passes fail → "could not complete"; some fail → never a clean approve, and coverage-reduced.
  • The coordinator can't sink the run — if consolidation fails, findings are merged deterministically and still posted.
  • Coverage notes — passes that timed out/failed are listed (routine noise filtering is not flagged — it's expected and stays in the run log).
  • CI always gets a terminal state — on any failure the PR gets a "didn't run" comment, not a stuck reaction and silence.
CI usage

ecr init --with-workflow scaffolds a pull_request workflow. Split along a clean line: comments = one-shot actions, labels = persistent configuration.

  • command workflow — one-shot /review comments (maintainers): /review (router picks agents), /review all, /review correctness security. Never changes configuration.
  • auto workflow — continuous review. Which PRs get reviewed is set in config.jsonc → review.trigger: "all" (default) reviews every PR except those labeled ai-review:skip; "label" reviews only PRs labeled ai-review (or ai-review:<agent> to scope agents). ecr ci self-gates on this policy; the workflow's if: is an optional coarse gate layered on top. ai-review:skip always wins and is write-gated, so a contributor can't opt their own PR out.
  • dismiss workflow — /dismiss <id> [… -- reason] / /undismiss <id> (maintainers). Each finding shows a short `id:…`. Dismissal is a display filter only — the reviewer still analyzes everything, and a critical/secrets finding can never be hidden. (An inline expo-code-review-ignore comment on/above a line does the same, with the same critical/secrets carve-out.)

These workflows are comment-only (they never fail the PR's checks). The engine runs as the published package via npx, so no PR-controlled code is built.

Author feedback (replies to findings)

A PR author's reply to a finding is matched to it deterministically — by quoting the finding's title back, or by citing its short `id:…` token (only the id can clear a finding, see below) — and recorded in the comment's embedded state, no model involved in the matching itself. A matched finding shows 💬 @login replied (linked to the comment) and a visible count above the fold; the reply's own text is never stored or rendered, only the login, the comment link, and (optionally) an enum-valued verdict. Controlled by the root-only feedback block in config.jsonc:

"feedback": {
  "mode": "annotate",       // "off" | "annotate" | "adjudicate"
  "match": "both",          // "quote" | "id" | "both"
  "dismiss": "never",       // "never" | "maintainers" | "adjudicated"
  "protectedCategories": ["secrets", "security"],
  "maxAdjudications": 10    // cap on model calls per run, when mode is "adjudicate"
}
  • annotate (the default) matches and shows "author replied" with zero effect on the decision — safe and useful even if you never touch this block.
  • Clearing a finding always needs the `id:…` token, in the replier's own words (an id inside a > quote does not count). Quoting the title is enough to annotate, never to clear: GitHub's "Quote reply" copies the PR author's text verbatim, so a maintainer clicking it would otherwise dismiss a finding on words the author wrote — by accident, or because they were led to.
  • adjudicate additionally has a model re-check the reply against the actual source (distrust-by-default, like the finding verifier) and record a verdict. Whether that verdict can actually clear a finding is a separate, still-off-by- default choice — mode and dismiss are independent axes: dismiss: "maintainers" lets a maintainer's own reply dismiss with no model involved (it works under plain annotate too); dismiss: "adjudicated" additionally accepts an author reply the model confirmed (which does need mode: "adjudicate" for verdicts to exist). Either way the reply has to cite the finding's `id:…`. A critical finding, or one categorized secrets/ security, can never be cleared this way, whatever the config — that floor is enforced in code, not the prompt.
  • /undismiss <id> wins over a reply. Running it on a finding a reply cleared puts the finding back in the active list and keeps it there: another reply from the PR author can't clear it again. The restore is recorded against the FINDING in the comment state, not against the reply, so editing or deleting the reply doesn't drop it either. Only a maintainer lifts that — either /dismiss <id> on the same finding, or a maintainer's own reply to it.

ecr feedback mines this substrate retroactively, with no model call and no re-review: it crawls a repo's PRs, reads each one's existing reviewer comment (which already embeds its findings), matches non-bot replies against it, and reports totals, a reply-rate, breakdowns by category/severity/agent, and — the highest-value part — "repeat offenders": findings whose title recurred across 2+ PRs and drew a reply every single time.

ecr feedback --repo your-org/your-repo --limit 100 --since 2026-06-01
ecr feedback --as my-review-bot   # if CI posts under a PAT/app identity
ecr feedback --json               # for scripting

The crawl matches the reviewer's comments by author. CI posts them as github-actions[bot] (the default), so a locally-run crawl uses that identity — pass --as <login> when your workflow posts under something else.

ecr feedback always reads .expo-code-review/config.jsonc from the LOCAL checkout, even with --repo. If --repo points at a different repo, it warns that commentTag may not match, so a zero-findings result there is not read as zero pushback. It also warns when every scanned PR had no bot comment at all, instead of leaving that as an easy-to-miss "0 with a bot comment" in the totals.

See LLP 0011 for why matching is deterministic, why reply text is never echoed into the comment, and why the defaults are asymmetric.

External context (--context-file)

ecr review --context-file <path> and ecr ci --context-file <path> inject the file's UTF-8 text into the reviewer prompts as an explicitly UNTRUSTED external block (the reviewer is told to use it but never follow instructions in it). The main use is a CI-provided terraform plan. The text is sanitized like any untrusted prose and capped at 24k chars (head 16k + tail 8k, so a big plan keeps both its resource list and its Plan: N to add… summary); the read itself is bounded at 1 MiB.

Read errors differ by command on purpose. ecr review fails loud (exits 2) on a missing or oversized file, since you typed the path. ecr ci warns and continues with no context, because a CI run must never fail the PR's checks.

Atlantis terraform plans

templates/atlantis.yml is an opt-in workflow (not scaffolded by ecr init) that runs the reviewer when Atlantis posts a terraform plan comment on a PR and feeds the plan into the review as --context-file. The plan comment body is treated as untrusted data throughout. Copy it into .github/workflows/ and set two repo variables: ATLANTIS_BOT_LOGIN (the Atlantis bot's comment login, e.g. atlantis-app[bot]) and optionally ATLANTIS_PLAN_MARKER.

Run logs

Each run appends a JSON line to .expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl with the inputs, decision, finding count, duration, per-agent cost, and aggregate token usage (incl. prompt-cache read/write counts) — for auditing and measuring cost/latency/cache reuse over time. It also records the same bounded reviewTrace that the PR comment embeds for machine consumers. The same totals are printed as a one-line summary to the terminal / CI job log at the end of each run, so cache reuse is visible even in CI (where the run log is ephemeral).

ecr review --save-review additionally writes a versioned artifact under .expo-code-review/.runs/deferred/ with owner-only permissions. It contains the verified final review and bounded feedback metadata, but no credential. ecr post-review schema-validates it and refuses to post if its explicit repo/PR, live head commit, or local comment-policy fingerprint no longer matches.

Other providers & auth modes

The scaffolded default is Anthropic via the Claude Code CLI — see First-time setup above and the Anthropic bullet below for how it authenticates and is sandboxed. Everything is set in config.auth; non-anthropic providers get their credentials through OpenCode.

  • Anthropic / Claude (the default) — use anthropic/... model ids and every anthropic pass runs through the Claude Code CLI (claude -p --output-format stream-json --verbose), inferred from the model. The credential is (in order) a tokenEnv you name, an ambient CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, or your local claude login — an auth entry is entirely optional. Run claude setup-token for a Max/Team subscription token or point tokenEnv at an Anthropic Console API key (sk-ant-api…, forwarded as ANTHROPIC_API_KEY); the CLI reads either. ecr setup-auth walks you through it. Each pass is trust-isolated and read-only: it runs with --safe-mode (no CLAUDE.md/hooks/MCP/plugins), --strict-mcp-config, --permission-mode dontAsk, and only the Read/Grep/Glob tools — never Bash/Edit/Write/WebFetch/WebSearch. The child env is an allowlist that omits ambient ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN (only the configured credential is re-injected).

    // The scaffolded default. No anthropic entry at all falls back to your
    // `claude` login.
    "auth": { "providers": {
      "anthropic": { "tokenEnv": "CLAUDE_CODE_REVIEW_SHARED_API_TOKEN" }
    } }
    
  • OpenAI: ChatGPT/Codex subscription (OAuth) + usage-based API key — the recommended mix if you review with OpenAI. OpenAI permits subscription auth in third-party tools, and OpenCode ships the plugin for it — so the reviewer runs its default models on the subscription (zero marginal cost) and reserves the metered key for pro-tier models the subscription doesn't offer (gpt-5.5-pro is subscription-excluded). Use the per-provider map form:

    "auth": { "providers": {
      "openai":     { "mode": "oauth",   "tokenEnv": "CODEX_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN" },
      "openai-api": { "mode": "api-key", "tokenEnv": "OPENAI_API_KEY", "upstream": "openai" }
    } }
    

    openai-api is an alias the reviewer synthesizes in the OpenCode config (upstream names the SDK it's backed by): agents reference openai-api/gpt-5.5-pro in frontmatter while everything else stays on openai/gpt-5.5. Notes:

    • The oauth tokenEnv holds the ACCESS token from an opencode auth login ChatGPT sign-in (ecr setup-auth extracts it) — a plain bearer, valid for days, with no rotation involvement. Do not use the refresh token as a shared secret: refresh tokens are single-use (rotation), so a static copy is spent by its first use and the sign-in dies with it. Access tokens expire (~10 days observed), so CI secrets need periodic re-minting — see the token-rotator item in the roadmap; doctor and the run preflight warn before expiry.
    • The API key needs exactly two permissions — a Restricted key with Model capabilities: Responses → Request and Chat completions → Request; everything else (including List models) stays None. Create it in a dedicated, budget-capped project. (ecr setup-auth prints these instructions too.)
    • In CI, set the ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV repo variable to the comma-separated set of both env names (CODEX_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN,OPENAI_API_KEY) and pass both secrets in the workflow.
    • Auditability: every pass logs which provider/model answered it (job log, step summary, run log), so the subscription/API split is visible per run. One caveat: OpenCode can't price alias models (they're config-declared), so pro passes report $0 in the run log's cost column — token counts are correct, and the OpenAI project dashboard is the source of truth for spend.
  • Another provider — the current path is the REVIEWER_MODEL env override: opencode auth login once (pick the provider), then run with e.g. REVIEWER_MODEL=google/gemini-3-pro. It overrides every agent's model and uses your OpenCode login, so no auth block is needed.

Engines are inferred per agent from that agent's resolved model alone: an anthropic/… agent runs through the Claude Code CLI while other agents run through OpenCode — in the SAME run. So an anthropic model may coexist with an openai (or any other) OpenCode provider, and each agent's model selects its engine. REVIEWER_MODEL still overrides every agent's model (and therefore every agent's engine), converging the whole run onto one engine.

There is no shared fallback key; if a run fails for lack of credentials, log in with claude (the default) or authenticate a provider in OpenCode. ecr doctor diagnoses setup.

Setup errors fail fast, with the fix in the message. A bad credential or model id would otherwise fail every pass identically — a run that spends its whole budget rediscovering one fixable thing, then reports N coverage gaps. So before any pass runs:

  • The credential's shape is checked. OpenCode refuses a malformed credential by dropping the provider entirely, which then surfaces as "model not found" for every model, with nothing pointing at the credential. A truncated value, surrounding whitespace, or a token that can't work for the configured auth.mode is rejected by name.
  • Configured model ids for OpenCode-routed providers are checked against the running server, so a typo or an id the provider doesn't have is reported once, up front, with the close matches. anthropic/… (Claude Code) model ids aren't checked up front — Claude validates them per-request, so a typo there surfaces as a per-pass error instead.
  • ecr doctor reports the opencode version actually in use and warns when a different one is first on your PATH — runs use the version this package pins.
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Description
AI code reviewer engine (@expo/code-review-cli)
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2026-11-13 20:10:18 -10:00
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