mirror of
https://github.com/mvschwarz/openrig.git
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Mike Schwarz
c750304f73
Front-door documents re-verified against main for 0.6.6. Facts only; structure, voice and the README anchor are unchanged. - README: rig setup installs a missing harness (and cmux on macOS); rig seat continue for a seat stopped at a prompt; the npm install table names rig and openrig-tui and adds a bundle-install row; Codex network access on the plain sandbox; the OPENRIG_YOLO, builtin:auto and --non-interruptive launch effects; restore outcomes, bundle links and checks, and the default culture; later release notes in CHANGELOG.md. - CONTRIBUTING: tmux version in bug reports, the docs guard, context packs not committed, the UI suite runs in CI, and the skills locations. - SUPPORT: the agent help page URL, the support email already published in help.md, and tmux and harness details in bug reports. - SECURITY: the provider and project files OpenRig writes, and the tmux and cmux edits made by rig setup.
56 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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## Supported versions
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Only the latest published version on npm (`@openrig/cli`) is supported. Fixes are developed on
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`main` and released after verification; a merged fix is not necessarily in the published package.
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Include the affected version even when reporting a problem in an older installation.
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## What OpenRig touches
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OpenRig runs a local daemon, drives coding agents in tmux sessions on your machine, and writes
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configuration for those harnesses, including workspace trust records and executable hooks: for
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example `~/.claude.json`, skills under `~/.claude`, `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml` (default `~/.codex`),
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and, in the project, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `.mcp.json` and managed blocks in `CLAUDE.md`,
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`CLAUDE.local.md` or `AGENTS.md`. `rig setup` also edits `~/.tmux.conf` and, on macOS, cmux's
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settings. OpenRig's own state lives under `$OPENRIG_HOME` (default `~/.openrig`). The README
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section [What OpenRig changes on your machine](README.md#what-openrig-changes-on-your-machine)
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describes these effects and the trust/permission choices. Unexpected access, disclosure or
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permission changes are useful reports; include what you expected and what you observed.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.
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Open the repository's [Security page](https://github.com/mvschwarz/openrig/security). If
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**Report a vulnerability** is available, use it to send a private report to the maintainers.
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The reporter and authorized advisory collaborators can also see that report; it is not public.
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Availability depends on the repository setting, not on this file being present.
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If that option is unavailable, ask in [Discussions Q&A](https://github.com/mvschwarz/openrig/discussions/categories/q-a)
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for a private security contact. Post only the request for a channel: do not include the
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vulnerability details, reproduction, logs, credentials or affected private systems in public.
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Wait for the private channel before sharing the report.
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Include: the OpenRig version, the harnesses involved, the steps to reproduce, and what an attacker
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could do. A proof of concept is welcome; a working exploit against a third party's machine is not.
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## What to expect
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- We will acknowledge the report and coordinate assessment and next steps privately.
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- Assessment and fix timing depend on impact and reproduction; no fixed deadline is promised.
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- We will agree on disclosure and credit with you. You can ask to remain anonymous.
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## Scope notes
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- OpenRig is designed for your own machine or a trusted private network, for you and people you trust, not for the
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open internet. We assess reports by their practical impact on a user in that setup. Exposing an install to the open
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internet isn't a supported deployment. OpenRig's own gateway integrations with outside services, such as Slack, and
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anything that lets an untrusted party reach the daemon or an agent are in scope.
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- OpenRig assumes the machine and the accounts it runs under are trusted by their owner. Reports
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that require a hostile local user with the same account are still welcome but are unlikely to be
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treated as high severity.
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- A harness carrying out an intentionally authorized operation is not by itself evidence of an
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OpenRig vulnerability. Reports of OpenRig bypassing a chosen permission, changing trust
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unexpectedly, or routing data or actions to the wrong destination are in scope.
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