chore: refresh security context (#7688)

Co-authored-by: ehsandeep <[email protected]>
2026-11-07 09:46:03 -10:00 · 2026-09-01 22:16:44 +05:30
1 parent 3e1e0e81f0
commit 764f5a9744
@@ -81,4 +81,5 @@ Each protocol (HTTP, DNS, Network, etc.) implements:
 - **internal/tests/functional/** - CI-only native functional comparison suite and testcase assets
 - **pkg/fuzz/** - Fuzzing engine and DAST capabilities
 - **pkg/input/** - Input processing for various formats (Burp, OpenAPI, etc.)
- **pkg/reporting/** - Result export and issue tracking integrations
+- **pkg/reporting/** - Result export and issue tracking integrations
+See SECURITY_CONTEXT.md for this repo's known vulnerabilities and recurring weak spots. Check it before writing or reviewing security-sensitive code.
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+<!-- Generated by securitycontext.dev. Source HEAD: 3e1e0e81f091c7817bbf7af64bb8eec6e8c2bac1. -->
+# Security Context: projectdiscovery/nuclei @ dev
+
+> Reference context for editing projectdiscovery/nuclei. Before changing any component below, **preserve the listed guards and do not reintroduce these fixed issues**. Each fingerprint is a regression check, and each shared attack surface is a guard that must keep holding on every path.
+
+_Generated 2026-09-01 16:22 UTC by secc_
+
+_Analyzed commit: 3e1e0e81f091c7817bbf7af64bb8eec6e8c2bac1_
+
+**Remediation coverage: 56.7%**
+_17 of 30 historical fixes have no remaining unguarded variant; 368 open remediation leads to verify. Measures fix consistency, not a vulnerability verdict._
+
+- Commits analyzed: **4814**
+- Commits flagged for review: **235**
+- Confirmed historical security fixes: **32**
+- Known published CVEs: **0**
+
+## Summary
+
+Nuclei's historical security posture is dominated by sandbox escapes and code execution via unsigned or unverified templates, with recurring SSRF, path traversal, and auth bypass issues across JS libraries, loaders, and workflow paths. The most critical theme is inconsistent enforcement of signature verification and local-file-access (-lfa) guards across direct, workflow, DAST, and JS-sandbox entry points, enabling variant attacks. A second theme is network policy (host allowlist) gaps in LDAP dialing and proxy handling. The security context also includes dependency upgrades (Alpine, go-git) and output file permission hardening, but the highest-value focus is on template trust boundaries and sandbox enforcement parity.
+
+## Recurring Security Patterns
+
+**15.6% of classified fixes repeat a previously fixed pattern** (5 recurring, 27 first-seen). A recurring pattern means this repository fixed a similar issue before — not that the code is currently vulnerable.
+
+- **Code Execution:** [1c440e755a](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/1c440e755a97471c56fb0276ee8a8c4132974645) → [9de96e4dda](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9de96e4dda5a03da963b9ae6582f03ea55791a76) — matched on `class:code execution`, `component:pkg/catalog/loader/loader.go`
+- **Code Execution via Unsigned Template:** [fa56800fcc](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fa56800fcca3c8c8fe8e8dec28584210ca1527de) → [fac0b7196d](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fac0b7196d2fbca56c8af8ff8e1899c111041a37) — matched on `class:code execution via unsigned template`, `CWE-347`, `sink:loadtemplates`
+- **SSRF:** [a167e6c57b](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/a167e6c57b80f5dc7be231231b62d7c594ee2770) → [9def9af7e3](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9def9af7e3f7ebcf5cd561c37b623b9999ee7572) — matched on `class:ssrf`, `CWE-918`, `component:pkg/js/libs/ldap/ldap.go`
+- **Dependency Vulnerability:** [d93b4a01df](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/d93b4a01df9c218a36dd2fccfb1c2c1f96b181fe) → [fcd5c6b111](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fcd5c6b111ddcb746525f88b7d0bf4b4abbc2529) — matched on `class:dependency vulnerability`, `CWE-1104`, `component:dockerfile`
+- **Sandbox Escape:** [96049a32fa](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/96049a32fa70aef0483d4180d386a57b3c2d973a) → [cf2a98b03d](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/cf2a98b03d76327c20fb0183b7f1c849eb692c91) — matched on `class:sandbox escape`, `CWE-284`, `component:v2/internal/runner/processor.go`, `sink:stdlib allmodulenames`, `sink:stdlib getmodulemap`
+
+## Top Risks
+
+### 1. Sandbox Escape: `pkg/js/compiler/pool.go, v2/pkg/protocols/javascript/js.go, v2/pkg/protocols/headless/engine/engine.go, v2/internal/runner/processor.go` (high)
+
+Multiple sandbox escapes across JS require(), eval/ReadFile, headless browser flags, and tengo imports, indicating weak default sandbox boundaries that require consistent -lfa and safe-module enforcement.
+
+Evidence: 6f2ade6a9b427c284c15a43445f9c7f055e60e5d, c35162c8ef061a96dd74b54c8f022c1a41cf5833, df55f7a2eb591a7949b5c66a9c54db54aa28f450, cf2a98b03d76327c20fb0183b7f1c849eb692c91, 96049a32fa70aef0483d4180d386a57b3c2d973a
+
+### 2. Code Execution via Unsigned Template: `pkg/catalog/loader/loader.go, pkg/templates/workflows.go, pkg/templates/templates.go` (critical)
+
+Unsigned templates can execute code through direct loading, workflows, and DAST branches; signature verification was bypassed via cache poisoning and missing guards on specific paths.
+
+Evidence: 9de96e4dda5a03da963b9ae6582f03ea55791a76, 1c440e755a97471c56fb0276ee8a8c4132974645, fac0b7196d2fbca56c8af8ff8e1899c111041a37, e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d, fa56800fcca3c8c8fe8e8dec28584210ca1527de
+
+### 3. Auth Bypass: `pkg/templates/compile.go, pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go, pkg/catalog/loader/loader.go, pkg/protocols/http/request.go` (high)
+
+Signature verification can be bypassed via cached metadata, improper signature extraction, or missing checks on specific load paths, and cookie jar bypass via disabled cookie handling.
+
+Evidence: 4534e9cb3034ebe5cc7b0cecabe399b6fb9ce0e4, 0da993afe6d41b4b1b814e8fad23a2acba13c60a, 9bd4db3f74aedd067af568df4f9198a8a090f68b, a976ca8d3f6a18c9ca746c8ce73f28fdcd518642
+
+### 4. SSRF: `pkg/js/libs/ldap/ldap.go, v2/internal/runner/proxy.go` (high)
+
+SSRF via LDAP dialing to internal hosts and via proxy configuration; host allowlist checks were missing or applied to the wrong target (domain vs controller).
+
+Evidence: 9def9af7e3f7ebcf5cd561c37b623b9999ee7572, a167e6c57b80f5dc7be231231b62d7c594ee2770, 0e46d3e0410f89e4af41099f5cd38fa7f54ae54f
+
+### 5. Path Traversal: `pkg/catalog/config/nucleiconfig.go, v2/internal/runner/update.go, v2/pkg/protocols/common/protocolstate/headless.go` (high)
+
+Path traversal via lexical prefix checks, zip-slip in template extraction, and file:// scheme in headless mode; canonicalization and containment checks are required.
+
+Evidence: 20cbf0bd73893c1270582c9778b6b26a5cb11206, f9c214a66f37a00fc29fe64232b690e6285ec59c, d3928e080d819f25306bfbaecc399f03516db5aa
+
+### 6. Code Execution: `pkg/catalog/loader/loader.go, pkg/templates/workflows.go` (high)
+
+Code execution via cache poisoning and unverified code templates in workflows; requires -code flag and verified templates.
+
+Evidence: 9de96e4dda5a03da963b9ae6582f03ea55791a76, e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d
+
+## Shared Attack Surfaces
+
+Capabilities guarded by more than one past fix on different code paths. A guard enforced on one entry point is often missing on a sibling; verify each alternate path before assuming it's covered.
+
+### 1. Template signature verification and unsigned-template opt-in enforcement across all load paths
+
+- Guard that should hold everywhere: signature verification (template.Verified, Verify), DisableUnsignedTemplates flag, -code flag for code templates, cache invalidation on verification status/fingerprint/digest
+- Entry points: `pkg/catalog/loader/loader.go (LoadTemplatesWithTags, DAST branch)`, `pkg/templates/workflows.go (loadTemplates, workflowExecutor)`, `pkg/templates/templates.go (loadTemplates)`, `pkg/templates/compile.go (template.Verified)`, `pkg/templates/signer/tmpl_signer.go (Verify)`
+- Check: Inspect the DAST and workflow sub-loaders: they must enforce the same DisableUnsignedTemplates and -code checks as the direct loader, and must not rely on cached verification results without re-checking signatures.
+- Evidence: 9de96e4dda5a03da963b9ae6582f03ea55791a76, 1c440e755a97471c56fb0276ee8a8c4132974645, fac0b7196d2fbca56c8af8ff8e1899c111041a37, e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d, fa56800fcca3c8c8fe8e8dec28584210ca1527de, 4534e9cb3034ebe5cc7b0cecabe399b6fb9ce0e4, 0da993afe6d41b4b1b814e8fad23a2acba13c60a, 9bd4db3f74aedd067af568df4f9198a8a090f68b
+
+### 2. Local file access (read/write) outside the sandbox, gated by -lfa flag
+
+- Guard that should hold everywhere: -lfa flag enforcement, path canonicalization and containment (sandbox directory), file:// scheme blocking, allowAllFiles stripping, require() registry rebuild
+- Entry points: `pkg/js/libs/krbforge/krbforge.go (CreateTicket)`, `pkg/js/libs/mysql/mysql_private.go (sql.Open)`, `pkg/js/compiler/pool.go (require)`, `v2/pkg/protocols/javascript/js.go (ReadFile, eval)`, `v2/pkg/protocols/common/protocolstate/headless.go (file:)`, `v2/pkg/protocols/common/generators/load.go (loadPayloadsFromFile)`
+- Check: Verify that every JS library and protocol helper (krbforge, mysql, require, headless file://, payload loaders) enforces the -lfa flag and path containment; a sibling path that skips the -lfa check is a sandbox escape.
+- Evidence: 3a8b65cb45f121fcdf418f60e5177ed9f250c122, 9611926a9a1ca99e8ed554d1b26fbeff60e06368, 6f2ade6a9b427c284c15a43445f9c7f055e60e5d, c35162c8ef061a96dd74b54c8f022c1a41cf5833, d3928e080d819f25306bfbaecc399f03516db5aa, e7fb40a41308f6c41267e858d1781eb67f7e0572
+
+### 3. Network policy (host allowlist) enforcement before outbound connections
+
+- Guard that should hold everywhere: IsHostAllowed check on the actual target host (controller, not domain), proxy validation and connectivity check, ProxyInternal gate for HTTP_PROXY env
+- Entry points: `pkg/js/libs/ldap/ldap.go (Dial, newLdapSession)`, `v2/internal/runner/proxy.go (loadProxyServers, os.Setenv HTTP_PROXY)`
+- Check: Inspect other dialing paths (e.g., HTTP, headless) to ensure they apply the same host allowlist check on the resolved IP/host, not just a user-supplied domain, and that proxy settings cannot redirect traffic to internal hosts.
+- Evidence: 9def9af7e3f7ebcf5cd561c37b623b9999ee7572, a167e6c57b80f5dc7be231231b62d7c594ee2770, 0e46d3e0410f89e4af41099f5cd38fa7f54ae54f, 3f5c055aca1499642caf4f40e8cf55ad32bd4da9
+
+### 4. Path traversal in file extraction and template path trust boundaries
+
+- Guard that should hold everywhere: canonical path containment check (filepath.Rel, prefix), zip-slip validation against template directory, sandbox path prefix validation
+- Entry points: `pkg/catalog/config/nucleiconfig.go (IsCustomTemplate)`, `v2/internal/runner/update.go (os.OpenFile)`, `v2/pkg/protocols/common/generators/load.go (loadPayloadsFromFile)`
+- Check: Audit all file-write and file-read paths that accept template-controlled paths (e.g., template extraction, payload loading) to ensure they use canonical containment, not lexical prefix checks, and apply the same sandbox directory restriction.
+- Evidence: 20cbf0bd73893c1270582c9778b6b26a5cb11206, f9c214a66f37a00fc29fe64232b690e6285ec59c, e7fb40a41308f6c41267e858d1781eb67f7e0572
+
+## Historical Vulnerability Classes
+
+| Class | Count |
+|---|---|
+| Sandbox Escape | 7 |
+| Auth Bypass | 4 |
+| Code Execution | 3 |
+| Dependency Vulnerability | 3 |
+| Path Traversal | 3 |
+| SSRF | 3 |
+| Code Execution via Unsigned Template | 2 |
+| Arbitrary File Read | 1 |
+| Cryptographic Weakness | 1 |
+| Deserialization of Untrusted Data | 1 |
+| Information Disclosure | 1 |
+| Insecure File Permissions | 1 |
+| Race Condition | 1 |
+| Security Misconfiguration | 1 |
+
+## Fixed-Issue Fingerprints
+
+These are real security fixes mined from git history. Use them as regression checks.
+
+- **Auth Bypass** (high) [CWE-287]: Honors disable-cookie by preventing the shared cookie jar from being applied when cookie handling is disabled, closing a path where cookies could be reused across requests.
+  - sink: `SetCookieJar(input.CookieJar)`
+  - fix: Adds !request.DisableCookie check before applying shared cookie jar
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/a976ca8d3f6a18c9ca746c8ce73f28fdcd518642 (2026-08-25)
+- **Code Execution** (high) [CWE-347]: This commit fixes a cache poisoning vulnerability where unsigned templates could bypass signature verification and execute malicious code during compilation or request execution.
+  - sink: `template compilation and execution of JavaScript`
+  - fix: cache invalidation based on verification status, verifier fingerprint, and content digest
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9de96e4dda5a03da963b9ae6582f03ea55791a76 (2026-08-04)
+- **Code Execution via Unsigned Template** (high) [CWE-347]: Enforces signature verification on JavaScript templates, preventing execution of unsigned templates that could lead to arbitrary code execution.
+  - sink: `loading unsigned javascript templates into execution paths`
+  - fix: Require signature verification for javascript templates in direct loading and workflows when signing is enforced
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fac0b7196d2fbca56c8af8ff8e1899c111041a37 (2026-07-03)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-22]: Enforces nuclei's local file access policy on krbforge output paths, preventing arbitrary file writes outside the sandbox.
+  - sink: `gpkrb.CreateTicket(cfg) with cfg.OutputFile`
+  - fix: Path normalization into sandbox and denial of outside paths unless -lfa
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/3a8b65cb45f121fcdf418f60e5177ed9f250c122 (2026-06-24)
+- **SSRF** (high) [CWE-918]: Adds network policy host allowlist checks before LDAP dialing, preventing SSRF to restricted internal hosts.
+  - sink: `dialers.Fastdialer.Dial`
+  - fix: host allowlist check via IsHostAllowed before dialing
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9def9af7e3f7ebcf5cd561c37b623b9999ee7572 (2026-06-24)
+- **Arbitrary File Read** (high) [CWE-22]: Gates MySQL's allowAllFiles option behind the -lfa flag, preventing arbitrary local file reads via LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE.
+  - sink: `sql.Open("mysql", dsn) with AllowAllFiles=true`
+  - fix: DSN sandbox that strips allowAllFiles unless -lfa is set
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9611926a9a1ca99e8ed554d1b26fbeff60e06368 (2026-06-19)
+- **Code Execution** (critical) [CWE-94]: Moves the unsigned code-template guard ahead of the DAST branch, preventing unsigned code templates from being loaded and executed under DAST, which previously bypassed the signature check.
+  - sink: `Template loading and execution`
+  - fix: Hoisting unsigned code-template guard before DAST branch to ensure it applies on all load paths
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/1c440e755a97471c56fb0276ee8a8c4132974645 (2026-06-19)
+- **Path Traversal** (high) [CWE-22]: This commit replaces lexical prefix checks with canonical path containment checks across multiple filesystem trust boundaries, preventing path traversal where sibling paths were incorrectly treated as trusted.
+  - sink: `IsCustomTemplate`
+  - fix: path canonicalization and containment check
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/20cbf0bd73893c1270582c9778b6b26a5cb11206 (2026-06-04)
+- **Information Disclosure** (medium) [CWE-200]: This commit fixes a data leakage issue in workflows where sibling state could leak across concurrent executions, and race requests ignored dynamic values, by syncing context and cloning inputs.
+  - sink: `syncWorkflowInputToTemplateCtx`
+  - fix: context synchronization and input cloning
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/805bcfe76f3629dbe71021795d4ce865406c1555 (2026-05-08)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-284]: Fixes sandbox escape where require() bypassed local file access restrictions and reused privileged module cache across executions.
+  - sink: `require() using default host filesystem loader`
+  - fix: Rebuild require registry per execution and enforce allow-local-file-access sandbox rules
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/6f2ade6a9b427c284c15a43445f9c7f055e60e5d (2026-04-10)
+- **Cryptographic Weakness** (medium) [CWE-338]: Replaces predictable math/rand PRNG with cryptographically secure crypto/rand in JS helper functions.
+  - sink: `rand.Intn(255) / rand.Int63()`
+  - fix: Replace predictable math/rand with crypto/rand
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/44ef9ce34ffcfdfca3a96626abc73d99dd0e83ab (2026-03-15)
+- **Auth Bypass** (high) [CWE-347]: Caching signature verification results without cryptographic re-check allows a metadata index compromise to bypass template signature verification.
+  - sink: `template.Verified, template.TemplateVerifier`
+  - fix: cached verification data reuse
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/4534e9cb3034ebe5cc7b0cecabe399b6fb9ce0e4 (2026-01-21)
+- **Race Condition** (medium) [CWE-362]: Fixes a race condition in workflow execution caused by shared context callbacks, which could lead to data corruption or crashes; the primary impact is reliability, not a direct security breach.
+  - sink: `shared context callbacks in workflow execution`
+  - fix: fix race condition by making workflow execution sequential
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/24d1f58682027e23cb21a299a170abd2bdf20dc2 (2025-12-05)
+- **Auth Bypass** (high) [CWE-347]: Fixes template signature verification by centralizing signature extraction and requiring the signature to be at the end of the template, preventing bypass.
+  - sink: `Verify`
+  - fix: signature extraction and verification
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/0da993afe6d41b4b1b814e8fad23a2acba13c60a (2024-08-19)
+- **Dependency Vulnerability** (medium) [CWE-1104]: Upgrades Alpine base image from 3.18.5 to 3.18.6 to fix known security vulnerabilities in bundled packages.
+  - sink: `FROM alpine:3.18.5`
+  - fix: Upgrade base image to patched version
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fcd5c6b111ddcb746525f88b7d0bf4b4abbc2529 (2024-03-15)
+- **Dependency Vulnerability** (medium) [CWE-1104]: Upgrades Alpine base image from 3.18.2 to 3.18.5 to fix known security vulnerabilities in bundled packages.
+  - sink: `FROM alpine:3.18.2`
+  - fix: Upgrade base image to patched version
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/d93b4a01df9c218a36dd2fccfb1c2c1f96b181fe (2024-03-15)
+- **Dependency Vulnerability** (high) [CWE-1035]: Updates go-git to fix known vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-49569, CVE-2023-49568), which could be exploited when processing untrusted git data.
+  - sink: `go-git library usage`
+  - fix: dependency upgrade to patched version
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/1700cdf4e23128a358066364062246b58c1c013f (2024-03-14)
+- **Code Execution via Unsigned Template** (high) [CWE-347]: Introduces a flag to disable unsigned templates, preventing execution of unverified templates that could lead to arbitrary code execution.
+  - sink: `loading unsigned templates when -dut flag is set`
+  - fix: Adds -disable-unsigned-templates flag to skip unsigned templates and report them separately
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/fa56800fcca3c8c8fe8e8dec28584210ca1527de (2024-03-14)
+- **Auth Bypass** (medium) [CWE-347]: This commit introduces a flag to skip unsigned templates, closing a path where an attacker could execute untrusted templates by bypassing signature verification.
+  - sink: `parsed.Verified`
+  - fix: skip unverified templates when DisableUnsignedTemplates is set
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/9bd4db3f74aedd067af568df4f9198a8a090f68b (2024-03-10)
+- **Code Execution** (high) [CWE-94]: Prevents execution of unverified code templates in workflows, mitigating code execution risk.
+  - sink: `template.RequestsCode`
+  - fix: require -code flag and verified templates for code templates in workflows
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d (2024-03-01)
+- **SSRF** (high) [CWE-918]: Fixes SSRF by validating the actual LDAP controller host against the network policy instead of the domain name.
+  - sink: `newLdapSession`
+  - fix: host allowlist check on controller instead of domain
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/a167e6c57b80f5dc7be231231b62d7c594ee2770 (2024-01-20)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-94]: Disables eval and tightens file read validation in the JavaScript sandbox, preventing template-driven code execution and file access outside the sandbox.
+  - sink: `eval function and file read in sandbox mode`
+  - fix: Disable eval function and rewrite file validation in sandbox mode
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/c35162c8ef061a96dd74b54c8f022c1a41cf5833 (2023-10-13)
+- **Path Traversal** (high) [CWE-22]: Adds network policy and blocks file:// protocol in headless mode unless -lfa is set, preventing local file disclosure.
+  - sink: `file:// protocol access in headless browser`
+  - fix: Network policy validation and file:// scheme blocking when local file access is disabled
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/d3928e080d819f25306bfbaecc399f03516db5aa (2023-08-25)
+- **Deserialization of Untrusted Data** (medium) [CWE-502]: Fixes JSON deserialization by adding explicit UnmarshalJSON methods and correcting tags, preventing type confusion and potential logic bypasses.
+  - sink: `UnmarshalJSON on user-controlled fields like Type and Name`
+  - fix: Adds proper UnmarshalJSON implementations and corrects json tags to prevent type confusion
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/85090b75317977bb9301444c9dfd8e4c2dba667a (2023-02-07)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (medium) [CWE-22]: The commit adds sandbox mode that restricts payload file paths to the template directory, preventing arbitrary file reads when sandbox is enabled.
+  - sink: `loadPayloadsFromFile`
+  - fix: path prefix validation against template directory and template path directory
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/e7fb40a41308f6c41267e858d1781eb67f7e0572 (2022-11-16)
+- **Insecure File Permissions** (low) [CWE-732]: Fixes overly permissive file permissions on debug output files by changing from os.ModePerm (0777) to 0644.
+  - sink: `os.OpenFile`
+  - fix: restrict file mode to 0644
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/af4854f90de728bb08689d5cae3dec4acfdb6b9a (2022-06-20)
+- **Security Misconfiguration** (medium) [CWE-16]: Prevents setting HTTP_PROXY environment variable unless explicitly enabled, avoiding potential proxy hijacking.
+  - sink: `os.Setenv(types.HTTP_PROXY_ENV, proxyURL.String())`
+  - fix: Added check for options.ProxyInternal before setting HTTP_PROXY environment variable
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/3f5c055aca1499642caf4f40e8cf55ad32bd4da9 (2022-03-09)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-250]: The commit restricts the use of the --no-sandbox flag to Linux root users, preventing sandbox escape vulnerabilities in other environments.
+  - sink: `NoSandbox(true)`
+  - fix: Conditionally disable sandbox only on Linux as root
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/df55f7a2eb591a7949b5c66a9c54db54aa28f450 (2021-12-05)
+- **Path Traversal** (high) [CWE-22]: This commit fixes a zip-slip path traversal vulnerability by validating the extracted file path against the configured template directory.
+  - sink: `os.OpenFile`
+  - fix: path canonicalization and prefix check
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/f9c214a66f37a00fc29fe64232b690e6285ec59c (2021-11-25)
+- **SSRF** (high) [CWE-918]: Adds validation and connectivity checks for SOCKS5 proxies before launching a scan, preventing SSRF through proxy configuration.
+  - sink: `Proxy connection validation and loading`
+  - fix: Proxy server validation and connectivity check before scan launch
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/0e46d3e0410f89e4af41099f5cd38fa7f54ae54f (2021-11-10)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-284]: This commit adds a sandbox flag that, when enabled, restricts the tengo scripting engine to safe modules, preventing sandbox escape and arbitrary command execution.
+  - sink: `stdlib.GetModuleMap(stdlib.AllModuleNames()...)`
+  - fix: Added sandbox flag to restrict imports to safe modules when sandbox is enabled
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/cf2a98b03d76327c20fb0183b7f1c849eb692c91 (2020-12-13)
+- **Sandbox Escape** (high) [CWE-284]: This commit restricts the tengo scripting engine to a safe module list, preventing sandbox escape and arbitrary command execution via workflow templates.
+  - sink: `stdlib.GetModuleMap(stdlib.AllModuleNames()...)`
+  - fix: Restricted tengo script imports to a safe module list
+  - commit: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/96049a32fa70aef0483d4180d386a57b3c2d973a (2020-12-13)
+
+---
+_Fixed-issue fingerprints and CVE matches are derived from real data; LLM-written prose is advisory and should be verified against the cited commits._