We recently learned our Simon and Speck implementation was wrong. The removal will stop harm until we can loop back and fix the issue.
The issue is, the paper, the test vectors and the ref-impl do not align. Each produces slightly different result. We followed the test vectors but they turned out to be wrong for the ciphers.
We have one kernel test vector but we don't have a working implementation to observe it to fix our implementation. Ugh...
TweetNaCl is a compact reimplementation of the NaCl library by Daniel J. Bernstein, Bernard van Gastel, Wesley Janssen, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe and Sjaak Smetsers. The library is less than 20 KB in size and provides 25 of the NaCl library functions.
The compact library uses curve25519, XSalsa20, Poly1305 and SHA-512 as default primitives, and includes both x25519 key exchange and ed25519 signatures. The complete list of functions can be found in TweetNaCl: A crypto library in 100 tweets (20140917), Table 1, page 5.
Crypto++ retained the function names and signatures but switched to data types provided by <stdint.h> to promote interoperability with Crypto++ and avoid size problems on platforms like Cygwin. For example, NaCl typdef'd u64 as an unsigned long long, but Cygwin, MinGW and MSYS are LP64 systems (not LLP64 systems). In addition, Crypto++ was missing NaCl's signed 64-bit integer i64.
Crypto++ enforces the 0-key restriction due to small points. The TweetNaCl library allowed the 0-keys to small points. Also see RFC 7748, Elliptic Curves for Security, Section 6.
TweetNaCl is well written but not well optimized. It runs 2x to 3x slower than optimized routines from libsodium. However, the library is still 2x to 4x faster than the algorithms NaCl was designed to replace.
The Crypto++ wrapper for TweetNaCl requires OS features. That is, NO_OS_DEPENDENCE cannot be defined. It is due to TweetNaCl's internal function randombytes. Crypto++ used DefaultAutoSeededRNG within randombytes, so OS integration must be enabled. You can use another generator like RDRAND to avoid the restriction.
This also fixes the SPECK64 bug where CTR mode self tests fail. It was an odd failure because it only affected 64-bit SPECK. SIMON was fine and it used nearly the same code. We tracked it down through trial and error to the table based rotates.
We need to ensure SSE2 does not cross pollinate into other CPU functions since SSE2 is greater than the minimum arch. The minimum arch is i586/i686, and both lack SSE2 instructions
This broke MSbuild, which can no longer build a static library. Attempting to build with 'msbuild /t:Build cryptlib.vcxproj' results in:
...
X64\cryptlib\Debug\zinflate.obj
X64\cryptlib\Debug\zlib.obj
LINK : fatal error LNK1561: entry point must be defined [c:\Users\cryptopp\cryptlib.vcxproj]
Done Building Project "c:\Users\Jeff\Desktop\cryptopp\cryptlib.vcxproj" (Build target(s)) -- FAILED.
Microsoft tools are so fucked up. It should be illegal to sell them.
- don't enable SSE2 explicitly for x64, it's always enabled and causes
warnings (issue #445)
- remove newlines in project files that Visual Studio doesn't like and
removes on every change to project options
This is the reference implementation, test data and test vectors from the ARIA.zip package on the KISA website. The website is located at http://seed.kisa.or.kr/iwt/ko/bbs/EgovReferenceList.do?bbsId=BBSMSTR_000000000002.
We have optimized routines that improve Key Setup and Bulk Encryption performance, but they are not being checked-in at the moment. The ARIA team is updating its implementation for contemporary hardware and we would like to use it as a starting point before we wander too far away from the KISA implementation.
The remediations for CVE-2016-7420 removed the library's reliance on NDEBUG. The library now uses CRYPTOPP_ASSERT() instead of assert(), and it requires positive confirmation with CRYPTOPP_DEBUG, DEBUG or _DEBUG.
Some other projects may inadvertenly depend on our definition of NDEBUG. This restores the definition in case its needed by others
trap.h and CRYPTOPP_ASSERT has existed for over a year in Master. We deferred on the cut-over waiting for a minor version bump (5.7). We have to use it now due to CVE-2016-7420
