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Author SHA1 Message Date
shum 374b116cc4 smp-server: limit forwards in flight per relay 2026-09-30 18:18:48 +00:00
shum e4a52f982e smp: do not keep sent command without msgQ 2026-09-30 18:18:26 +00:00
shum 933c539460 smp-server: process forwarded commands concurrently 2026-09-30 18:18:26 +00:00
shum c1c4f44926 smp-server: hold command slot until completion 2026-09-30 18:18:26 +00:00
shum ad694af988 smp-server: drop relay session after timeouts 2026-09-30 11:33:02 +00:00
shum 35767d74c5 smp: remove unsent and timed-out proxy requests 2026-09-30 11:30:42 +00:00
shum be5262d258 tests: reproduce proxy request leak, stuck relay 2026-09-30 11:30:24 +00:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat b4c288c597 docs: clarify security model (#1902)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 10:18:52 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 0e1ecdcff6 xftp server: validate paths in store log (#1894)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 09:36:45 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat c1776dc5a4 server: improve control port auth (#1898)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 09:04:28 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat e2df2e1b7c docs: update SMP protocol (#1900)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 08:10:35 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 267e2e0727 agent: fix ratchet - dont save if body auth failed (#1892)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 21:32:21 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 551a79d99b smp server: validate client version in forwarded command (#1890)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 19:52:15 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 972e50e768 docs: update XRCP doc to make code verification optional for known connections (#1891)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 18:08:54 +01:00
20 changed files with 239 additions and 61 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ note over CC, HC: TLS handshake
par
note over CC: validate client X509 credentials
CC->>CI: session code from tlsUnique
CI-->>CC: user confirmation
CI-->>CC: user confirmation (optional if known)
and
note over HC: validate server X509 credentials
HC->>HI: session code from tlsUnique
HI-->>HC: user confirmation
HI-->>HC: user confirmation (optional if known)
end
note over CI, HI: 3. Session verification and protocol negotiation
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@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
*cannot:*
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen, unless the database contains a new rotation queue that is not secured yet. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- undetectably communicate at the same time as Alice with her contacts. Doing so would result in the contact getting different messages with repeated IDs.
+2
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@@ -1120,6 +1120,8 @@ When the client receives PKEY response it MUST validate that:
- the fingerprint of the received certificate matches fingerprint in the router address - it mitigates MITM attack by proxy.
- the router session key is correctly signed with the received certificate.
`smpVersionRange` in `PKEY` is not signed.
The proxy router may respond with error response in case the destination router is not available or in case it has an earlier version that does not support proxied commands.
#### Send command via proxy
+18 -3
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@@ -121,9 +121,15 @@ During TLS handshake, parties validate certificate chains against previously kno
### Session verification and protocol negotiation
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user who must match them (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirm on the host device. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once the session is confirmed by the user, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
To verify the session, the user matches the codes (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirms the session on the host device.
The user MUST verify the first session with a new controller. The host stores the long-term identity of the controller (CA fingerprint and Ed25519 public key) only after this session is verified. A controller with the stored long-term identity is a known controller.
The user MAY verify the subsequent sessions with a known controller. In a session that the host confirms without user action, the controller is authenticated only by its long-term identity stored in the first session (see [Threat model](#threat-model)). SimpleX Chat mobile apps require user verification of sessions with known controllers only when the user enables the "Verify connections" option.
Once the session is confirmed, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
XRCP blocks inside TLS are padded to 16384 bytes.
@@ -305,7 +311,7 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
- prevent host and controller devices from establishing the session
*cannot:*
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band in the first session with the controller.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network:
@@ -324,6 +330,15 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
*cannot:*
- connect to the host or make host connect to itself.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network who also obtained the long-term private keys of a known controller (e.g., from the controller device):
*can:*
- make host connect to itself instead of the controller.
- access any data of the controlled host application, within the capabilities of the provided API, if the host confirms the session without user action.
*cannot:*
- access host application data, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
#### Compromised controller device:
*can:*
+1 -2
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@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import Control.Monad.Reader
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -594,7 +593,7 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
\used -> let used' = used + fromIntegral size in if used' <= quota then (True, used') else (False, used)
receive = do
path <- asks $ filesPath . config
let fPath = path </> B.unpack (B64.encode $ unEntityId senderId)
let fPath = path </> serverFileName senderId
receiveChunk (XFTPRcvChunkSpec fPath size digest) >>= \case
Right () -> do
stats <- asks serverStats
+10 -2
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@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
logDeleteFile,
logBlockFile,
logAckFile,
serverFileName,
)
where
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.::.))
@@ -35,10 +37,11 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import System.FilePath (takeFileName)
import System.IO
data FileStoreLogRecord
@@ -99,6 +102,9 @@ logBlockFile s fId = logFileStoreRecord s . BlockFile fId
logAckFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> RecipientId -> IO ()
logAckFile s = logFileStoreRecord s . AckFile
serverFileName :: SenderId -> FilePath
serverFileName = B.unpack . B64.encode . unEntityId
readWriteFileStore :: FilePath -> STMFileStore -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteFileStore = readWriteStoreLog readFileStore writeFileStore
@@ -115,7 +121,9 @@ readFileStore f st = mapM_ (addFileLogRecord . LB.toStrict) . LB.lines =<< LB.re
AddFile sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| size file > 0 -> addFile st sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| otherwise -> pure $ Left SIZE
PutFile qId path -> setFilePath st qId path
PutFile qId path
| takeFileName path == serverFileName qId -> setFilePath st qId path
| otherwise -> pure $ Left AUTH
AddRecipients sId rcps -> runExceptT $ addRecipients sId rcps
DeleteFile sId -> deleteFile st sId
BlockFile sId info -> blockFile st sId info True
+2 -1
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@@ -4388,8 +4388,9 @@ agentRatchetDecrypt' :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RatchetX
agentRatchetDecrypt' g db connId rc encAgentMsg = do
skipped <- liftIO $ getSkippedMsgKeys db connId
(agentMsgBody_, rc', skippedDiff) <- withExceptT (SEAgentError . cryptoError) $ CR.rcDecrypt g rc skipped encAgentMsg
agentMsgBody <- liftEither $ first (SEAgentError . cryptoError) agentMsgBody_
liftIO $ updateRatchet db connId rc' skippedDiff
liftEither $ bimap (SEAgentError . cryptoError) (,CR.rcRcvKEM rc') agentMsgBody_
pure (agentMsgBody, CR.rcRcvKEM rc')
newSndQueue :: UserId -> ConnId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> Maybe (C.APrivateAuthKey) -> AM' (NewSndQueue, C.PublicKeyX25519)
newSndQueue userId connId (Compatible (SMPQueueInfo smpClientVersion SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, queueMode, dhPublicKey = rcvE2ePubDhKey})) sndKey_ = do
+33 -13
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@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
ProxiedRelay (..),
getProtocolClient,
closeProtocolClient,
closeTimedOutClient,
pClientSentCommandsCount,
protocolClientServer,
protocolClientServer',
transportHost',
@@ -150,7 +152,8 @@ import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (find, isSuffixOf)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (catMaybes, fromMaybe)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (catMaybes, fromMaybe, isNothing)
import Data.Text (Text)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
@@ -512,7 +515,8 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig =
data Request err msg = Request
{ corrId :: CorrId,
entityId :: EntityId,
command :: ProtoCommand msg,
-- only kept to report a late response to msgQ, a forwarded command holds a whole block
command :: Maybe (ProtoCommand msg),
pending :: TVar Bool,
responseVar :: TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
}
@@ -658,10 +662,9 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
responseErr = atomically . putTMVar responseVar . Left . PCETransportError
receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ, lastReceived, timeoutErrorCount}} h = forever $ do
receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ, lastReceived}} h = forever $ do
tGetClient h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
getCurrentTime >>= atomically . writeTVar lastReceived
atomically $ writeTVar timeoutErrorCount 0
monitor :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()
monitor c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sendPings, lastReceived, timeoutErrorCount}} = loop smpPingInterval
@@ -708,7 +711,9 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
(pure False)
if wasPending
then pure Nothing
else sendMsg $ if entityId == entId then STResponse command clientResp else STUnexpectedError unexpected
else sendMsg $ case command of
Just cmd | entityId == entId -> STResponse cmd clientResp
_ -> STUnexpectedError unexpected
where
unexpected = unexpectedResponse respOrErr
clientResp = case respOrErr of
@@ -750,6 +755,15 @@ closeProtocolClient :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()
closeProtocolClient = mapM_ (deRefWeak >=> mapM_ killThread) . action
{-# INLINE closeProtocolClient #-}
-- | Disconnects client when maxCnt commands in a row timed out, 0 to disable.
closeTimedOutClient :: Int -> ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()
closeTimedOutClient maxCnt c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {timeoutErrorCount}} = do
cnt <- readTVarIO timeoutErrorCount
when (maxCnt > 0 && cnt >= maxCnt) $ closeProtocolClient c
pClientSentCommandsCount :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO Int
pClientSentCommandsCount ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sentCommands}} = M.size <$> readTVarIO sentCommands
-- | SMP client error type.
data ProtocolClientError err
= -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
@@ -1354,20 +1368,22 @@ sendProtocolCommand c nm = sendProtocolCommand_ c nm Nothing Nothing
--
-- Please note: if nonce is passed it is also used as a correlation ID
sendProtocolCommand_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> NetworkRequestMode -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> Maybe Int -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {blockSize, serviceAuth}} nm nonce_ tOut pKey entId cmd =
sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ, sentCommands}, thParams = THandleParams {blockSize, serviceAuth}} nm nonce_ tOut pKey entId cmd =
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission_ c nonce_ (entId, pKey, cmd)
where
-- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
sendRecv t_ r = case t_ of
Left e -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError e
sendRecv t_ r@Request {corrId} = case t_ of
Left e -> notSent e
Right t
| B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
| B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> notSent TELargeMsg
| otherwise -> do
nonBlockingWriteTBQueue sndQ (Just r, s)
response <$> getResponse c nm tOut r
where
s = tEncodeBatch1 serviceAuth t
where
notSent e = Left (PCETransportError e) <$ atomically (TM.delete corrId sentCommands)
nonBlockingWriteTBQueue :: TBQueue a -> a -> IO ()
nonBlockingWriteTBQueue q x = do
@@ -1375,7 +1391,7 @@ nonBlockingWriteTBQueue q x = do
unless sent $ void $ forkIO $ atomically $ writeTBQueue q x
getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> NetworkRequestMode -> Maybe Int -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount}} nm tOut Request {entityId, pending, responseVar} = do
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount, sentCommands, msgQ}} nm tOut Request {corrId, entityId, pending, responseVar} = do
r <- fromMaybe (netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout nm) tOut `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)
response <- atomically $ do
writeTVar pending False
@@ -1384,14 +1400,18 @@ getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, timeoutErrorCount}} n
-- See `processMsg`.
((r <|>) <$> tryTakeTMVar responseVar) >>= \case
Just r' -> writeTVar timeoutErrorCount 0 $> r'
Nothing -> modifyTVar' timeoutErrorCount (+ 1) $> Left PCEResponseTimeout
Nothing -> do
modifyTVar' timeoutErrorCount (+ 1)
-- a late response is delivered to msgQ, without msgQ it is only logged
when (isNothing msgQ) $ TM.delete corrId sentCommands
pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
pure Response {entityId, response}
mkTransmission :: Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
mkTransmission c = mkTransmission_ c Nothing
mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (entityId, pKey_, command) = do
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands, msgQ}} nonce_ (entityId, pKey_, command) = do
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entityId, command)
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) (useServiceAuth command) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
@@ -1406,7 +1426,7 @@ mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentC
Request
{ corrId,
entityId,
command,
command = command <$ msgQ,
pending,
responseVar
}
+5 -1
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@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser, (<?>))
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
import Data.Bits (xor)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import qualified Data.ByteString as BS
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64 as B64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
@@ -1323,7 +1324,10 @@ instance ProtocolTypeI p => FromJSON (ProtocolServer p) where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "ProtocolServer"
newtype BasicAuth = BasicAuth {unBasicAuth :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
deriving (Ord, Show)
instance Eq BasicAuth where
BasicAuth s == BasicAuth s' = BA.constEq s s'
instance IsString BasicAuth where fromString = BasicAuth . B.pack
+49 -26
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@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
import qualified Network.TLS as TLS
import Numeric.Natural (Natural)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClient (thParams), ProtocolClientError (..), SMPClient, SMPClientError, clientHandlers, forwardSMPTransmission, smpProxyError, temporaryClientError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (OwnServer, SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), closeSMPClientAgent, getSMPServerClient'', isOwnServer, lookupSMPServerClient, getConnectedSMPServerClient)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClient (thParams), ProtocolClientConfig (..), ProtocolClientError (..), SMPClient, SMPClientError, clientHandlers, closeTimedOutClient, forwardSMPTransmission, smpProxyError, temporaryClientError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (OwnServer, SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentConfig (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), closeSMPClientAgent, getSMPServerClient'', isOwnServer, lookupSMPServerClient, getConnectedSMPServerClient)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
@@ -1092,6 +1092,7 @@ controlPortAuth h user admin role auth = do
readTVarIO role >>= \case
CPRNone -> do
atomically $ writeTVar role $! newRole
when (newRole == CPRNone) $ logWarn "ControlPort: failed auth"
hPutStrLn h $ currentRole newRole
r -> hPutStrLn h $ currentRole r <> if r == newRole then "" else ", start new session to change."
where
@@ -1453,30 +1454,47 @@ client
Nothing -> ERR $ transportErr TENoServerAuth
_ -> ERR $ transportErr TEVersion
PFWD fwdV pubKey encBlock -> do
ProxyAgent {smpAgent = a} <- asks proxyAgent
ProxyAgent {smpAgent = a, relayForwards} <- asks proxyAgent
ServerStats {pMsgFwds, pMsgFwdsOwn} <- asks serverStats
let inc = mkIncProxyStats pMsgFwds pMsgFwdsOwn
liftIO (lookupSMPServerClient a sessId) >>= \case
Just (own, smp) -> do
inc own pRequests
forkProxiedCmd $ do
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
maxFwds <- asks $ proxyRelayConcurrency . config
-- reserved on the forked thread, so that the slot is released when the forward completes
forkProxiedCmd $
bracket (atomically $ reserve maxFwds relayForwards) (\r -> when r $ atomically $ release relayForwards) $ \case
-- the relay is not keeping up, the client retries TIMEOUT later
False -> ERR (smpProxyError PCEResponseTimeout) <$ inc own pErrorsOther
True ->
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
PCEResponseTimeout -> do
inc own pErrorsOther
liftIO $ closeTimedOutClient (smpPingCount $ networkConfig $ smpCfg $ agentCfg a) smp
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
Nothing -> inc False pRequests >> inc False pErrorsConnect $> Just (ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION)
where
forkProxiedCmd :: M s BrokerMsg -> M s (Maybe BrokerMsg)
forkProxiedCmd = forkCmd serverClientConcurrency corrId (EntityId sessId)
reserve maxFwds v = stateTVar v $ \fwds -> case M.lookup sessId fwds of
Just n | n >= maxFwds -> (False, fwds)
n_ -> (True, M.insert sessId (maybe 1 (+ 1) n_) fwds)
release v = modifyTVar' v $ M.update (\n -> if n > 1 then Just (n - 1) else Nothing) sessId
-- Run a slow command on a thread
forkCmd :: (ServerConfig s -> Int) -> CorrId -> EntityId -> M s BrokerMsg -> M s (Maybe a)
forkCmd concurrency corrId entId cmdAction = do
bracket_ wait signal . forkClient clnt (B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " cmd") $
-- commands MUST be processed under a reasonable timeout or the client would halt
cmdAction >>= \t -> atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ ([(corrId, entId, t)], [])
-- the forked thread releases the slot when the command completes, the caller only if the fork failed
mask $ \restore -> do
wait
forkClient clnt (B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " cmd") (restore cmd `finally` signal)
`onException` signal
pure Nothing
where
-- commands MUST be processed under a reasonable timeout or the client would halt
cmd = cmdAction >>= \t -> atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ ([(corrId, entId, t)], [])
wait = do
limit <- asks (concurrency . config)
atomically $ do
@@ -2127,6 +2145,7 @@ client
let proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
s' <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret proxyNonce s
FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith (const $ CMD SYNTAX) $ smpDecode s'
unless (fwdVersion `isCompatible` thServerVRange thParams') $ throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
@@ -2145,22 +2164,26 @@ client
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedTLength
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
pure $ RRES $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
-- the inner response, or Nothing if forked (RSLV).
r_ <- lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
Left r -> pure $ Just r
Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', cmd')) -> case cmd' of
Cmd SResolver (RSLV d) -> lift $ rslvNamesEnv >>= \case
Nothing -> pure $ Just (corrId', entId', ERR (NAME NO_RESOLVER))
Just nenv -> forkCmd serverResolverConcurrency corrId NoEntity $ do
msg <- resolveNameMsg (thVersion clntTHParams) nenv d
either ERR id <$> runExceptT (encodeResp (corrId', entId', msg))
-- INTERNAL because processCommand never returns Nothing for sender commands;
-- `fst` drops the empty message only returned for SUB.
_ -> Just . maybe (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) fst <$> lift (processCommand Nothing (Right (M.empty, M.empty, M.empty)) t'')
let forwarded =
lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
Left r -> pure r
Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', cmd')) -> case cmd' of
Cmd SResolver (RSLV d) ->
lift $
rslvNamesEnv >>= \case
Nothing -> pure (corrId', entId', ERR (NAME NO_RESOLVER))
Just nenv -> (corrId',entId',) <$> resolveNameMsg (thVersion clntTHParams) nenv d
-- INTERNAL because processCommand never returns Nothing for sender commands;
-- `fst` drops the empty message only returned for SUB.
_ -> maybe (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) fst <$> lift (processCommand Nothing (Right (M.empty, M.empty, M.empty)) t'')
-- commands of all clients of a proxy share its connection, so they are processed concurrently
concurrency = case t' of
Right (_, _, (_, _, Cmd SResolver _)) -> serverResolverConcurrency
_ -> serverClientConcurrency
stats <- asks serverStats
incStat $ pMsgFwdsRecv stats
traverse encodeResp r_
lift $ forkCmd concurrency corrId NoEntity $ either ERR id <$> runExceptT (forwarded >>= encodeResp)
where
rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmissionOrError ErrorType Cmd -> M s (VerifiedTransmissionOrError s)
rejectOrVerify clntThAuth = \case
+13 -4
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@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
defaultNtfExpiration,
defaultInactiveClientExpiration,
defaultProxyClientConcurrency,
defaultProxyRelayConcurrency,
defaultNameResolverConcurrency,
defaultMaxJournalMsgCount,
defaultMaxJournalStateLines,
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog.ReadWrite
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ASrvTransport, SMPVersion, THandleParams, TransportPeer (..), VersionRangeSMP)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ASrvTransport, SMPVersion, SessionId, THandleParams, TransportPeer (..), VersionRangeSMP)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, tshow, whenM, ($>>=))
import System.Directory (doesFileExist)
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ data ServerConfig s = ServerConfig
smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
allowSMPProxy :: Bool, -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
serverClientConcurrency :: Int,
-- | max forwarded commands awaiting a response from one destination relay
proxyRelayConcurrency :: Int,
-- | max concurrent name resolutions per connection, enforced in forkCmd.
-- Much higher than serverClientConcurrency: forwarded RSLVs from many clients
-- aggregate over a single proxy->relay connection (only servers send proxied
@@ -252,6 +255,9 @@ defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
defaultProxyClientConcurrency :: Int
defaultProxyClientConcurrency = 32
defaultProxyRelayConcurrency :: Int
defaultProxyRelayConcurrency = 512
defaultNameResolverConcurrency :: Int
defaultNameResolverConcurrency = 1000
@@ -441,8 +447,10 @@ data ClientSub
| CSDeleted QueueId (Maybe ServiceId) -- includes previously associated service IDs
| CSService ServiceId (Int64, IdsHash) -- only send END to idividual client subs on message delivery, not of SSUB/NSSUB
newtype ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
{ smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent 'Sender
data ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
{ smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent 'Sender,
-- forwarded commands awaiting a response, per relay session
relayForwards :: TVar (Map SessionId Int)
}
type ClientId = Int
@@ -731,7 +739,8 @@ mkJournalStoreConfig queueStoreCfg storePath msgQueueQuota maxJournalMsgCount ma
newSMPProxyAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO ProxyAgent
newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random = do
smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent SSender smpAgentCfg Nothing random
pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent}
relayForwards <- newTVarIO mempty
pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent, relayForwards}
readWriteQueueStore :: forall q. StoreQueueClass q => Bool -> (RecipientId -> QueueRec -> IO q) -> FilePath -> STMQueueStore q -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteQueueStore tty mkQ = readWriteStoreLog (readQueueStore tty mkQ) (writeQueueStore @q)
+1
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@@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ smpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath =
},
allowSMPProxy = True,
serverClientConcurrency = readIniDefault defaultProxyClientConcurrency "PROXY" "client_concurrency" ini,
proxyRelayConcurrency = readIniDefault defaultProxyRelayConcurrency "PROXY" "relay_concurrency" ini,
serverResolverConcurrency = readIniDefault defaultNameResolverConcurrency "NAMES" "resolver_concurrency" ini,
namesConfig = readNamesConfig ini,
information = serverPublicInfo ini,
@@ -154,6 +154,9 @@ iniFileContent cfgPath logPath opts host basicAuth controlPortPwds =
\# socks_mode = onion\n\n\
\# Limit number of threads a client can spawn to process proxy commands in parrallel.\n"
<> ("# client_concurrency = " <> tshow defaultProxyClientConcurrency)
<> "\n\n\
\# Limit number of messages forwarded to one destination server and awaiting its response.\n"
<> ("# relay_concurrency = " <> tshow defaultProxyRelayConcurrency)
<> "\n\n\
\[NAMES]\n\
\# Public-namespace resolution via the snrc-resolve.py REST resolver.\n\
-1
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@@ -865,7 +865,6 @@ forceCertChain :: CertChainPubKey -> CertChainPubKey
forceCertChain cert@(CertChainPubKey (X.CertificateChain cc) signedKey) = length (show cc) `seq` show signedKey `seq` cert
{-# INLINE forceCertChain #-}
-- This function is only used with v >= 8, so currently it's a simple record update.
-- * Note: it requires updating version-based parameters, to be consistent with smpTHandle_.
smpTHParamsSetVersion :: VersionSMP -> THandleParams SMPVersion p -> THandleParams SMPVersion p
smpTHParamsSetVersion v params =
+14 -1
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import SMPClient
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store (FileRec (..), FileRecipient (..), FileStoreClass (..), RoundedFileTime, STMFileStore (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (FileStoreLogRecord (..), readWriteFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (FileStoreLogRecord (..), readWriteFileStore, serverFileName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SMPServiceRole (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials (genCredentials)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import Util
@@ -269,6 +270,18 @@ fileStoreLogTests = do
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt Nothing EntityActive, BlockFile sId blockedWithNotice],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt Nothing (EntityBlocked blockedWithNotice)],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Nothing, EntityBlocked blockedWithNotice))]
},
SLTC
{ name = "put file with wrong file name",
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId "/etc/passwd"],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Just expiresAt, EntityActive))]
},
SLTC
{ name = "put file in another directory",
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId ("/srv/xftp" </> serverFileName sId)],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId ("/srv/xftp" </> serverFileName sId)],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Just expiresAt, EntityActive))]
}
]
+4 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore, importFileStore, exportFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (closeStoreLog, readWriteFileStore, writeFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (closeStoreLog, readWriteFileStore, serverFileName, writeFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo (..), BlockingReason (..), EntityId (..))
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (openWriteStoreLog)
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime (RoundedSystemTime (..))
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import UnliftIO.STM
import Util
@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ testMigrationRoundTrip = do
sId2 = EntityId "migration_file_2"
rId1 = EntityId "migration_rcp_1_"
addFile stmStore sId1 fileInfo1 testCreatedAt (Just testExpiresAt) EntityActive `shouldReturn` Right ()
void $ setFilePath stmStore sId1 "/tmp/file1"
void $ setFilePath stmStore sId1 ("/tmp" </> serverFileName sId1)
addRecipient stmStore sId1 (FileRecipient rId1 rcpKey1) `shouldReturn` Right ()
let testBlockInfo = BlockingInfo {reason = BRSpam, notice = Nothing}
addFile stmStore sId2 fileInfo2 testCreatedAt Nothing (EntityBlocked testBlockInfo) `shouldReturn` Right ()
@@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ testMigrationRoundTrip = do
case result1 of
Right (FileRec {fileInfo = fi, filePath, expiresAt, fileStatus}, _) -> do
size fi `shouldBe` 128000
readTVarIO filePath `shouldReturn` Just "/tmp/file1"
readTVarIO filePath `shouldReturn` Just ("/tmp" </> serverFileName sId1)
expiresAt `shouldBe` Just testExpiresAt
readTVarIO fileStatus `shouldReturn` EntityActive
Left e -> expectationFailure $ "getFile sId1 failed: " <> show e
+35
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@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@
module RSLVTests (rslvTests) where
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Control.Monad (forM_)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (ExceptT, runExceptT)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
import Data.IORef (IORef, readIORef)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
tPut,
)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.SimplexName (SimplexDomain)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
@@ -102,6 +106,8 @@ rslvTests = do
it "RSLV sends the 2LD as its hash" testRslvSendsTheHash
it "a name with subnames is sent as text" testSubnameKeepsItsLabels
it "a record naming a different name is rejected" testRslvWrongName
describe "RSLV resource use" $
it "one connection has at most resolver_concurrency lookups in flight" testRslvConnectionCap
-- | /v2/resolve answers 200, 400 or 502, so a 404 is a resolver that predates
-- the route, not a name that does not exist.
@@ -275,5 +281,34 @@ testRslvWrongName =
Left (PCEUnexpectedResponse _) -> pure ()
_ -> expectationFailure $ "expected Left (PCEUnexpectedResponse ..), got: " <> show r
-- The resolver answers after 3s and the server gives up after 1s, so a request
-- that reached the resolver stays in flight for the whole check.
testRslvConnectionCap :: IO ()
testRslvConnectionCap =
NRS.withResolverServerDelayed 3000 (NRS.resolveResp status200 "{}") $ \port reqs ->
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) (updateCfg (withNames port memCfg) $ \c -> c {serverResolverConcurrency = connCap}) testPort $ const $
testSMPClient @TLS $ \h -> do
sendRslvs h "cap" 16
threadDelay 800000
length <$> resolvePaths reqs `shouldReturn` connCap
recvResponses h 16 `shouldReturn` replicate 16 (Right (ERR (NAME (RESOLVER "timeout"))))
where
connCap = 4
-- | One RSLV per block, so no batch limit applies.
sendRslvs :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient -> String -> Int -> IO ()
sendRslvs h@THandle {params} prefix n =
forM_ [1 .. n] $ \i -> do
let TransmissionForAuth {tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId (B.pack $ prefix <> show i), NoEntity, Cmd SResolver (RSLV (NQDomain (domain "alice.simplex"))))
[Right ()] <- tPut h (Right (Nothing, tToSend) :| [])
pure ()
recvResponses :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient -> Int -> IO [Either ErrorType BrokerMsg]
recvResponses h n
| n <= 0 = pure []
| otherwise = do
rs <- map (\(_, _, r) -> r) . L.toList <$> tGetClient h
(rs <>) <$> recvResponses h (n - length rs)
runExceptT' :: Show e => ExceptT e IO a -> IO a
runExceptT' a = runExceptT a >>= either (fail . show) pure
+12
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@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ cfgMS msType = withStoreCfg (testServerStoreConfig msType) $ \serverStoreCfg ->
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {persistErrorInterval = 1, msgQSize = Nothing}, -- seconds
allowSMPProxy = False,
serverClientConcurrency = 2,
proxyRelayConcurrency = defaultProxyRelayConcurrency,
serverResolverConcurrency = defaultNameResolverConcurrency,
namesConfig = Nothing,
information = Nothing,
@@ -316,6 +317,9 @@ prevRange vr = vr {maxVersion = max (minVersion vr) (prevVersion $ maxVersion vr
prevVersion :: Version v -> Version v
prevVersion (Version v) = Version (v - 1)
nextVersion :: Version v -> Version v
nextVersion (Version v) = Version (v + 1)
proxyCfg :: AServerConfig
proxyCfg = proxyCfgMS (ASType SQSMemory SMSJournal)
@@ -346,6 +350,14 @@ proxyCfgShortTimeout =
nt = NetworkTimeout {backgroundTimeout = 4_000000, interactiveTimeout = 4_000000}
in cfg' {smpAgentCfg = aCfg {smpCfg = cCfg {networkConfig = (networkConfig cCfg) {tcpConnectTimeout = nt}}}}
proxyCfgForwardTimeout :: AServerConfig
proxyCfgForwardTimeout =
updateCfg proxyCfg $ \cfg' ->
let aCfg = smpAgentCfg cfg'
cCfg = smpCfg aCfg
nt = NetworkTimeout {backgroundTimeout = 1, interactiveTimeout = 1}
in cfg' {smpAgentCfg = aCfg {smpCfg = cCfg {networkConfig = (networkConfig cCfg) {tcpTimeout = nt}}}}
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn (t, msType) =
withSmpServerConfigOn t $ updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg' -> cfg' {storeNtfsFile = Just testStoreNtfsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}
+33
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad (forM, forM_, forever, replicateM_)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (ExceptT, runExceptT)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
@@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ smpProxyTests = do
testProxyRecoversWithoutDisconnect
it "reconnects to relay after sender disconnects mid-connection" $ \_ ->
testProxyReconnectAfterRelayRestart
it "must drop a stuck relay session after forward timeouts" $ \_ ->
testProxyForwardTimeoutStuckSession
it "does not keep oversized forwarded command" $ \_ ->
testForwardOversizedNotKept
describe "agent client reconnection" $ do
it "reconnects after a connect is cancelled mid-flight" $ \_ ->
testAgentClientReconnectAfterCancel
@@ -191,6 +196,8 @@ deliverMessagesViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg unsecuredMsgs securedMsgs = do
forM_ unsecuredMsgs $ \msg -> do
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Right ()
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess {prSessionId = "bad session"} Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Left (ProxyProtocolError $ SMP.PROXY SMP.NO_SESSION)
forM_ ([prevVersion minServerSMPRelayVersion, nextVersion currentServerSMPRelayVersion] :: [VersionSMP]) $ \v ->
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess {prVersion = v} Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Left (ProxyProtocolError $ SMP.PROXY $ SMP.PROTOCOL $ SMP.PROXY $ SMP.BROKER $ SMP.TRANSPORT TEVersion)
-- receive 1
(_tSess, _, [(_entId, STEvent (Right (SMP.MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody})))]) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
@@ -494,6 +501,32 @@ testProxyReconnectAfterRelayRestart =
race_ (threadDelay 1000000) requestRelaySession
requireProxyReconnect
testProxyForwardTimeoutStuckSession :: IO ()
testProxyForwardTimeoutStuckSession =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfgForwardTimeout testPort $ \_ -> do
g <- C.newRandom
ts <- getCurrentTime
let srv = SMPServer testHost testPort testKeyHash
vr = mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion
pc <- either (fail . show) pure =<< getProtocolClient g NRMInteractive (1, srv, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = vr} [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
sess <- runExceptT' $ connectSMPProxiedRelay pc NRMInteractive srv (Just "correct")
sId <- atomically $ SMP.EntityId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
rs <- forM ([1 .. 10] :: [Int]) $ \_ -> runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess Nothing sId noMsgFlags "hi")
rs `shouldSatisfy` elem (Left (ProxyProtocolError (SMP.PROXY SMP.NO_SESSION)))
testForwardOversizedNotKept :: IO ()
testForwardOversizedNotKept =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ -> do
g <- C.newRandom
ts <- getCurrentTime
let proxyClientCfg = defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = supportedProxyClientSMPRelayVRange, agreeSecret = True, proxyServer = True}
c <- either (fail . show) pure =<< getProtocolClient g NRMBackground (1, testSMPServer, Nothing) proxyClientCfg [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
(k, _) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
let et = SMP.EncTransmission $ B.replicate smpBlockSize 'a'
runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission c (SMP.CorrId "123456789012345678901234") currentClientSMPRelayVersion k et)
`shouldReturn` Left (PCETransportError TELargeMsg)
pClientSentCommandsCount c `shouldReturn` 0
-- Bug B (same root cause as the proxy, in the messaging agent): getSMPServerClient inserts an
-- empty SessionVar into smpClients, then connects inside newProtocolClient's tryAllErrors, which
-- rethrows async exceptions. If the connecting thread is cancelled mid-connect, putTMVar is