Compare commits

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Author SHA1 Message Date
sh 9a0a85a24c feat(bench): self-contained Docker Compose setup
Build benchmark binary inside container via multi-stage
Dockerfile. All-in-one: docker compose run bench.
2026-03-20 14:51:16 +00:00
sh 2a0af04ab8 feat(bench): add smp-server memory benchmark framework
Layered benchmark that isolates per-component memory cost:
- Phase 1: baseline (no clients)
- Phase 2: TLS connections only
- Phase 3: queue creation (NEW + KEY)
- Phase 4: subscriptions (SUB)
- Phase 5: message send
- Phase 6: message receive + ACK
- Phase 7: sustained load with time-series

Includes Docker Compose (PostgreSQL 17), run.sh with
--compare-rts mode for testing different GC configurations.
2026-03-20 14:48:11 +00:00
sh 4c8ace4db6 update findings 2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
sh 323be9c6a4 feat(smp-server): add per-client and RTS memory metrics
Add clientSubs, clientSndQ, clientMsgQ, clientThreads counts
and GHC RTS large objects, compact, fragmentation metrics
to identify memory growth not explained by server-level maps.
2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
sh c6d6e30e48 add memory-analysis-results based on the produced logs 2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
sh 646476f5fa smp-server: add periodic memory diagnostics logging
Log sizes of all in-memory data structures every 5 minutes
to help identify memory growth root cause on busy servers.
2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
sh 404dd10d4a further analysis 2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
sh 931b1cc725 smp-server: memory usage analysis 2026-03-20 12:01:01 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 1a255f2e2f Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-20 09:00:01 +00:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 8f4274763b smp: service fixes (#1737)
* smp: deliver service subscription to correct client

* tests: more resilient to concurrency

* optimize PostgreSQL query

* fix service re-association after server "downgrade"

* correctly handle service removed from server (and ID changed)

* remove unused

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-03-20 07:54:26 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 48eba591bc Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-12 17:05:51 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat b81670c414 docs: move implemented rfcs 2026-03-10 19:18:34 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat 98351cf097 docs: add missing encodings and other protocol corrections 2026-03-10 16:36:24 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat 01785d5de8 docs: add e2e encrypted message wire encoding to PQDR spec 2026-03-10 09:04:21 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat f745ce5ab6 docs: fix minor issues in protocols 2026-03-10 08:15:53 +00:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 583f4e059d update RFCs (#1730)
* update RFCs

* update

* update overview

* update terminology

* original language in threat model

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-03-09 23:35:41 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat 3c5752383d update protocol docs 2026-03-09 16:29:05 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 3a25561c78 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-09 12:25:52 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat c624a10e70 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-09 10:23:01 +00:00
Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat 8518f6087b docs: agent threat model 2026-03-07 15:47:46 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 1d3057985c Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-04 07:33:20 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin aebc01ba58 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-03-03 21:16:46 +00:00
Evgeny 84e8b72ca3 docs: update protocol (#1705) 2026-01-27 21:21:54 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin ac825b0ff3 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-01-24 14:10:51 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 502d923817 agent: minor fixes 2026-01-17 10:21:25 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d908404143 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2026-01-15 18:31:09 +00:00
Evgeny db4b27e88a agent: create user with option to enable client service (#1684)
* agent: create user with option to enable client service

* handle HTTP2 errors

* do not catch async exceptions
2025-12-27 09:12:22 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 9e813c26a7 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-25 21:52:07 +00:00
Evgeny bafdbc1dec smp protocol: fix encoding for SOKS/ENDS responses (#1683) 2025-12-25 13:00:29 +00:00
Evgeny 11ae20ea20 ntf server: use different client certs for each SMP server, remove support for store log (#1681)
* ntf server: remove support for store log

* ntf server: use different client certificates for each SMP server
2025-12-22 07:56:53 +00:00
Evgeny a1277bf6bf agent: remove service queue association when service ID changed, process ENDS event, test migrating to/from service (#1677)
* agent: remove service queue association when service ID changed

* agent: process ENDS event

* agent: send service subscription error event

* agent: test migrating to/from service subscriptions, fixes

* agent: always remove service when disabled, fix service subscriptions
2025-12-19 21:10:12 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin c8a72431c0 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-15 11:57:46 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 568500c6bc Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-14 23:14:18 +00:00
Evgeny f5eb735551 servers: service stats and logging, allow services without option (removed), report errors during service message delivery, remove threads when service subscription ended (#1676)
* smp server: always allow services without option

* smp server: maintain IDs hash in session subscription states

* smp server: service message delivery error handling

* ntf server: log subscription count and hash differences

* smp server: remove delivery threads when service subscription ended/client disconnected
2025-12-14 12:07:29 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 83894074b0 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-13 19:08:47 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 35fe5ac9e4 Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-05 21:30:28 +00:00
Evgenyandspaced4ndy 2ea9a9a143 agent: finalize initial service subscriptions, remove associations on service ID changes (#1672)
* agent: remove service/queue associations when service ID changes

* agent: check that service ID in NEW response matches session ID in transport session

* agent subscription WIP

* test

* comment

* enable tests

* update queries

* agent: option to add SQLite aggregates to DB connection  (#1673)

* agent: add build_relations_vector function to sqlite

* update aggregate

* use static aggregate

* remove relations

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <[email protected]>

* add test, treat BAD_SERVICE as temp error, only remove queue associations on service errors

* add packZipWith for backward compatibility with GHC 8.10.7

---------

Co-authored-by: spaced4ndy <[email protected]>
2025-12-05 20:46:48 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin ff7bdbcbeb Merge branch 'master' into rcv-services 2025-12-03 17:23:59 +00:00
Evgeny 38e899957f agent: service subscription events (#1671)
* agent: use server keyhash when loading service record

* agent: process queue/service associations with delayed subscription results

* agent: service subscription events
2025-11-27 21:37:19 +00:00
Evgeny 5e9b164f4e agent: fail when per-connection transport isolation is used with services (#1670) 2025-11-25 23:17:47 +00:00
Evgeny 3ccf854865 servers: maintain xor-hash of all associated queue IDs in PostgreSQL (#1668)
* servers: maintain xor-hash of all associated queue IDs in PostgreSQL (#1615)

* ntf server: maintain xor-hash of all associated queue IDs via PostgreSQL triggers

* smp server: xor hash with triggers

* fix sql and using pgcrypto extension in tests

* track counts and hashes in smp/ntf servers via triggers, smp server stats for service subscription, update SMP protocol to pass expected count and hash in SSUB/NSSUB commands

* agent migrations with functions/triggers

* remove agent triggers

* try tracking service subs in the agent (WIP, does not compile)

* Revert "try tracking service subs in the agent (WIP, does not compile)"

This reverts commit 59e908100d.

* comment

* agent database triggers

* service subscriptions in the client

* test / fix client services

* update schema

* fix postgres migration

* update schema

* move schema test to the end

* use static function with SQLite to avoid dynamic wrapper
2025-11-25 16:55:59 +00:00
Evgeny 1ca4677b28 smp server: messaging services (#1565)
* smp server: refactor message delivery to always respond SOK to subscriptions

* refactor ntf subscribe

* cancel subscription thread and reduce service subscription count when queue is deleted

* subscribe rcv service, deliver sent messages to subscribed service

* subscribe rcv service to messages (TODO delivery on subscription)

* WIP

* efficient initial delivery of messages to subscribed service

* test: delivery to client with service certificate

* test: upgrade/downgrade to/from service subscriptions

* remove service association from agent API, add per-user flag to use the service

* agent client (WIP)

* service certificates in the client

* rfc about drift detection, and SALL to mark end of message delivery

* fix test

* fix test

* add function for postgresql message storage

* update migration
2025-11-07 21:36:28 +00:00
201 changed files with 4144 additions and 19929 deletions
+12 -57
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,6 @@ on:
- "v*"
pull_request:
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
jobs:
# =============================
@@ -28,8 +24,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Clone project
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Build changelog
id: build_changelog
@@ -120,8 +114,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Clone project
if: matrix.should_run == true
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -181,7 +173,7 @@ jobs:
-v ${{ github.workspace }}:/project \
build/${{ matrix.os }}:latest
- name: Build smp-server, xftp-server (postgresql) and tests
- name: Build smp-server (postgresql) and tests
if: matrix.should_run == true
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: |
@@ -190,12 +182,12 @@ jobs:
cabal update
cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres
mkdir -p /out
for i in smp-server xftp-server simplexmq-test; do
for i in smp-server simplexmq-test; do
bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable)
chmod +x "$bin"
mv "$bin" /out/
done
strip /out/smp-server /out/xftp-server
strip /out/smp-server
- name: Copy simplexmq-test from container
if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -203,29 +195,19 @@ jobs:
run: |
docker cp builder:/out/simplexmq-test .
- name: Copy smp-server, xftp-server (postgresql) from container and prepare it
- name: Copy smp-server (postgresql) from container and prepare it
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.should_run == true
id: prepare-postgres
shell: bash
run: |
printf 'bins<<EOF\n' > bins.output
printf 'hashes<<EOF\n' > hashes.output
name="smp-server-postgres-ubuntu-${{ matrix.os_underscore }}-${{ matrix.arch }}"
docker cp builder:/out/smp-server $name
for i in smp-server xftp-server; do
name="${i}-postgres-ubuntu-${{ matrix.os_underscore }}-${{ matrix.arch }}"
docker cp builder:/out/$i $name
path="${{ github.workspace }}/$name"
echo "bin=$path" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
path="${{ github.workspace }}/$name"
hash="SHA2-256($name)= $(openssl sha256 $path | cut -d' ' -f 2)"
printf '%s\n' "$path" >> bins.output
printf '%s\n\n' "$hash" >> hashes.output
done
printf 'EOF\n' >> bins.output
printf 'EOF\n' >> hashes.output
cat bins.output >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
cat hashes.output >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
hash="SHA2-256($name)= $(openssl sha256 $path | cut -d' ' -f 2)"
printf 'hash=%s' "$hash" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Build everything else (standard)
if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -275,10 +257,10 @@ jobs:
fail_on_unmatched_files: true
body: |
${{ steps.prepare-regular.outputs.hashes }}
${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.hashes }}
${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.hash }}
files: |
${{ steps.prepare-regular.outputs.bins }}
${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.bins }}
${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.bin }}
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -305,30 +287,3 @@ jobs:
echo "All "$attempts" attempts failed."
exit 1
fi
# =============================
# Resolver test job
# =============================
# The SNRC resolver is Python, so this job needs none of the Haskell toolchain
# above and runs independently of it.
resolver-test:
name: "resolver (python)"
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Python
# Matches the runtime stage of scripts/resolver/service/Dockerfile.
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.13"
- name: Install resolver dependencies
# Must match scripts/resolver/service/pyproject.toml.
run: python -m pip install "eth-hash[pycryptodome]>=0.7"
- name: Test
run: python -m unittest discover -s scripts/resolver/service -v
-2
View File
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
uses: simplex-chat/docker-login-action@v3
-2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Get latest release
shell: bash
-1
View File
@@ -12,4 +12,3 @@ cabal.project.local~
*.tix
.coverage
__pycache__/
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
[submodule "cbits/libbbs"]
path = cbits/libbbs
url = https://github.com/simplex-chat/libbbs.git
[submodule "cbits/blst"]
path = cbits/blst
url = https://github.com/supranational/blst.git
-36
View File
@@ -1,39 +1,3 @@
# 6.5.1
Version 6.5.1.0
XFTP client:
- backwards compatible file header decoding.
# 6.5.0
Version 6.5.0.17
SMP agent:
- improve subscriptions
- reduce memory usage and retries during initial subscription (#1758)
- fix race resulting in pending subscriptions never subscribed (#1756)
- batch processing of subscription results and errors (#1652)
- reduce memory usage of active subscriptions.
- drop message after N reception attempts (#1762)
- fix possible deadlocks of queue overloading when processing messages (#1713)
- improved APIs for short link management and creation.
- support multiple link owners in link data (#1701)
SMP server:
- store messages in PostgreSQL (#1622).
- reduce memory usage with PostgreSQL database - do not use queue cache (#1637)
- fix in-memory server not restoring queue/service associations after 2+ restarts (#1618)
XFTP server:
- support PostgreSQL database.
- add server page.
- support uploads from web clients.
Servers:
- better socket leak prevention during TLS handshake, NetworkError type to bette diagnose connection errors (#1619)
- use "=" as default INI key-value separator (#1767)
# 6.4.4
Servers:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ To initialize the server use `smp-server init -n <fqdn>` (or `smp-server init --
SMP server uses in-memory persistence with an optional append-only log of created queues that allows to re-start the server without losing the connections. This log is compacted on every server restart, permanently removing suspended and removed queues.
To enable store log, initialize server using `smp-server -l` command, or modify `smp-server.ini` created during initialization (uncomment `enable = on` option in the store log section). Use `smp-server --help` for other usage tips.
To enable store log, initialize server using `smp-server -l` command, or modify `smp-server.ini` created during initialization (uncomment `enable: on` option in the store log section). Use `smp-server --help` for other usage tips.
Starting from version 2.3.0, when store log is enabled, the server would also enable saving undelivered messages on exit and restoring them on start. This can be disabled via a separate setting `restore_messages` in `smp-server.ini` file. Saving messages would only work if the server is stopped with SIGINT signal (keyboard interrupt), if it is stopped with SIGTERM signal the messages would not be saved.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -105,13 +105,13 @@
class="text-[16px] leading-[26px] tracking-[0.01em] nav-link-text text-black dark:text-white before:bg-black dark:before:bg-white">Server
information</span></a>
</li>
<!-- <x-xftpConfig>
<x-xftpConfig>
<li class="nav-link relative"><a href="/file"
class="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 lg:py-5 whitespace-nowrap"><span
class="text-[16px] leading-[26px] tracking-[0.01em] nav-link-text text-black dark:text-white before:bg-black dark:before:bg-white">File
transfer</span></a>
</li>
</x-xftpConfig> -->
</x-xftpConfig>
</ul><a target="_blank" href="https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#help-us-with-donations"
class="whitespace-nowrap flex items-center gap-1 self-center text-white dark:text-black text-[16px] font-medium tracking-[0.02em] rounded-[34px] bg-primary-light dark:bg-primary-dark py-3 lg:py-2 px-20 lg:px-5 mb-16 lg:mb-0">Donate</a>
</div>
+4 -4
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ xftpMediaContent = $(embedDir "apps/xftp-server/static/media/")
xftpFilePageHtml :: ByteString
xftpFilePageHtml = $(embedFile "apps/xftp-server/static/file.html")
xftpGenerateSite :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()
xftpGenerateSite :: XFTPServerConfig -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()
xftpGenerateSite cfg info onionHost path = do
let substs = xftpSubsts cfg info onionHost
Web.generateSite embeddedContent (render (Web.indexHtml embeddedContent) substs) [] path
@@ -50,15 +50,15 @@ xftpGenerateSite cfg info onionHost path = do
createDirectoryIfMissing True dir
forM_ content_ $ \(fp, content) -> B.writeFile (dir </> fp) content
xftpServerInformation :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> ByteString
xftpServerInformation :: XFTPServerConfig -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> ByteString
xftpServerInformation cfg info onionHost = render (Web.indexHtml embeddedContent) (xftpSubsts cfg info onionHost)
xftpSubsts :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> [(ByteString, Maybe ByteString)]
xftpSubsts :: XFTPServerConfig -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> [(ByteString, Maybe ByteString)]
xftpSubsts XFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration, logStatsInterval, allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth} information onionHost =
[("smpConfig", Nothing), ("xftpConfig", Just "y")] <> substConfig <> serverInfoSubsts simplexmqSource information <> [("onionHost", strEncode <$> onionHost), ("iniFileName", Just "file-server.ini")]
where
substConfig =
[ ("fileExpiration", Just . fromString . timedTTLText . ttl $ fileExpiration),
[ ("fileExpiration", Just $ maybe "Never" (fromString . timedTTLText . ttl) fileExpiration),
("statsEnabled", Just . yesNo $ isJust logStatsInterval),
("newUploadsAllowed", Just . yesNo $ allowNewFiles),
("basicAuthEnabled", Just . yesNo $ isJust newFileBasicAuth)
@@ -619,6 +619,7 @@ async function handleEncrypt(id, data, fileName) {
const digest = sha512Streaming([encData], (done) => {
self.postMessage({ id, type: "progress", done: source.length + done, total });
}, encDataLen);
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] encrypt: encData.len=${encData.length} digest=${_whex(digest, 64)} chunkSizes=[${chunkSizes.join(",")}]`);
const dir = await getSessionDir();
const fileHandle = await dir.getFileHandle("upload.bin", { create: true });
const writeHandle = await fileHandle.createSyncAccessHandle();
@@ -642,7 +643,9 @@ function handleReadChunk(id, offset, size) {
}
async function handleDecryptAndStore(id, dhSecret, nonce, body, chunkDigest, chunkNo) {
const bodyArr = new Uint8Array(body);
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] store chunk=${chunkNo} body.len=${bodyArr.length} nonce=${_whex(nonce, 24)} dhSecret=${_whex(dhSecret)} digest=${_whex(chunkDigest, 32)} body[0..8]=${_whex(bodyArr)} body[-8..]=${_whex(bodyArr.slice(-8))}`);
const decrypted = decryptReceivedChunk(dhSecret, nonce, bodyArr, chunkDigest);
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] decrypted chunk=${chunkNo} len=${decrypted.length} [0..8]=${_whex(decrypted)} [-8..]=${_whex(decrypted.slice(-8))}`);
if (useMemory) {
memoryChunks.set(chunkNo, decrypted);
self.postMessage({ id, type: "stored" });
@@ -657,6 +660,7 @@ async function handleDecryptAndStore(id, dhSecret, nonce, body, chunkDigest, chu
currentDownloadOffset += decrypted.length;
chunkMeta.set(chunkNo, { offset, size: decrypted.length });
const written = downloadWriteHandle.write(decrypted, { at: offset });
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] OPFS write chunk=${chunkNo} offset=${offset} size=${decrypted.length} written=${written}`);
if (written !== decrypted.length) {
console.warn(`[WORKER] OPFS write failed chunk=${chunkNo}: ${written}/${decrypted.length}, falling back to in-memory storage`);
for (const [cn, meta] of chunkMeta.entries()) {
@@ -680,16 +684,23 @@ async function handleDecryptAndStore(id, dhSecret, nonce, body, chunkDigest, chu
return;
}
downloadWriteHandle.flush();
const verifyBuf = new Uint8Array(Math.min(8, decrypted.length));
downloadWriteHandle.read(verifyBuf, { at: offset });
const verifyEnd = new Uint8Array(Math.min(8, decrypted.length));
downloadWriteHandle.read(verifyEnd, { at: offset + decrypted.length - verifyEnd.length });
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] OPFS verify chunk=${chunkNo} readBack[0..8]=${_whex(verifyBuf)} readBack[-8..]=${_whex(verifyEnd)} expected[0..8]=${_whex(decrypted)} expected[-8..]=${_whex(decrypted.slice(-8))}`);
self.postMessage({ id, type: "stored" });
}
async function handleVerifyAndDecrypt(id, size, digest, key, nonce) {
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] verify: expectedSize=${size} expectedDigest=${_whex(digest, 64)} useMemory=${useMemory} chunkMeta.size=${chunkMeta.size} memoryChunks.size=${memoryChunks.size}`);
const chunks = [];
let totalSize = 0;
const total = size * 3;
let done = 0;
if (useMemory) {
const sorted = [...memoryChunks.entries()].sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0]);
for (const [, data] of sorted) {
for (const [chunkNo, data] of sorted) {
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] verify memory chunk=${chunkNo} size=${data.length}`);
chunks.push(data);
totalSize += data.length;
done += data.length;
@@ -704,10 +715,12 @@ async function handleVerifyAndDecrypt(id, size, digest, key, nonce) {
const dir = await getSessionDir();
const fileHandle = await dir.getFileHandle("download.bin");
const readHandle = await fileHandle.createSyncAccessHandle();
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] verify: OPFS file size=${readHandle.getSize()}`);
const sortedEntries = [...chunkMeta.entries()].sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0]);
for (const [, meta] of sortedEntries) {
for (const [chunkNo, meta] of sortedEntries) {
const buf = new Uint8Array(meta.size);
readHandle.read(buf, { at: meta.offset });
const bytesRead = readHandle.read(buf, { at: meta.offset });
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] verify read chunk=${chunkNo} offset=${meta.offset} size=${meta.size} bytesRead=${bytesRead} [0..8]=${_whex(buf)} [-8..]=${_whex(buf.slice(-8))}`);
chunks.push(buf);
totalSize += meta.size;
done += meta.size;
@@ -732,9 +745,20 @@ async function handleVerifyAndDecrypt(id, size, digest, key, nonce) {
}
const actualDigest = r.crypto_hash_sha512_final(state);
if (!digestEqual(actualDigest, digest)) {
console.error(`[WORKER-DBG] DIGEST MISMATCH: expected=${_whex(digest, 64)} actual=${_whex(actualDigest, 64)} chunks=${chunks.length} totalSize=${totalSize}`);
const state2 = r.crypto_hash_sha512_init();
for (let i = 0; i < chunks.length; i++) {
const chunk = chunks[i];
for (let off = 0; off < chunk.length; off += hashSEG) {
r.crypto_hash_sha512_update(state2, chunk.subarray(off, Math.min(off + hashSEG, chunk.length)));
}
const chunkDigest = sha512Streaming([chunk]);
console.error(`[WORKER-DBG] chunk[${i}] size=${chunk.length} sha512=${_whex(chunkDigest, 32)}… [0..8]=${_whex(chunk)} [-8..]=${_whex(chunk.slice(-8))}`);
}
self.postMessage({ id, type: "error", message: "File digest mismatch" });
return;
}
console.log(`[WORKER-DBG] verify: digest OK`);
const result = decryptChunks(BigInt(size), chunks, key, nonce, (d) => {
self.postMessage({ id, type: "progress", done: size * 2 + d, total });
});
@@ -334,6 +334,11 @@ class WorkerBackend {
const nonceCopy = new Uint8Array(nonce);
const digestCopy = new Uint8Array(digest);
const buf = this.toTransferable(body);
const hex = (b, n = 8) => {
const u = b instanceof ArrayBuffer ? new Uint8Array(b) : b;
return Array.from(u.slice(0, n)).map((x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
};
console.log(`[BACKEND-DBG] chunk=${chunkNo} body.len=${body.length} body.byteOff=${body.byteOffset} buf.byteLen=${buf.byteLength} nonce=${hex(nonceCopy, 24)} dhSecret=${hex(dhSecretCopy)} digest=${hex(digestCopy, 32)} buf[0..8]=${hex(buf)} body[-8..]=${hex(body.slice(-8))}`);
await this.send(
{ type: "decryptAndStoreChunk", dhSecret: dhSecretCopy, nonce: nonceCopy, body: buf, chunkDigest: digestCopy, chunkNo },
[buf]
@@ -10908,12 +10913,14 @@ async function sendXFTPCommandOnce(client, privateKey, entityId, cmdBytes, chunk
const block = encodeAuthTransmission(client.sessionId, corrId, entityId, cmdBytes, privateKey);
const reqBody = chunkData ? concatBytes$1(block, chunkData) : block;
const fullResp = await client.transport.post(reqBody);
console.log(`[XFTP-DBG] sendOnce: fullResp.length=${fullResp.length} entityId=${_hex(entityId)} cmdTag=${cmdBytes[0]}`);
if (fullResp.length < XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE) {
console.error("[XFTP] Response too short: %d bytes (expected >= %d)", fullResp.length, XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE);
throw new Error("Server response too short");
}
const respBlock = fullResp.subarray(0, XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE);
const body = fullResp.subarray(XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE);
console.log(`[XFTP-DBG] sendOnce: body.length=${body.length} body.byteOffset=${body.byteOffset} body.buffer.byteLength=${body.buffer.byteLength}`);
const raw = blockUnpad(respBlock);
if (raw.length < 20) {
const text = new TextDecoder().decode(raw);
@@ -10932,13 +10939,18 @@ async function sendXFTPCommandOnce(client, privateKey, entityId, cmdBytes, chunk
}
return { response, body };
}
function _hex(b, n = 8) {
return Array.from(b.slice(0, n)).map((x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
}
async function sendXFTPCommand(agent, server, privateKey, entityId, cmdBytes, chunkData, maxRetries = 3) {
let clientP = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server);
let client = await clientP;
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxRetries; attempt++) {
try {
if (attempt > 1) console.log(`[XFTP-DBG] sendCmd: retry attempt=${attempt}/${maxRetries}`);
return await sendXFTPCommandOnce(client, privateKey, entityId, cmdBytes, chunkData);
} catch (e) {
console.log(`[XFTP-DBG] sendCmd: attempt=${attempt} failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)} retriable=${isRetriable(e)}`);
if (!isRetriable(e)) {
throw categorizeError(e);
}
@@ -10967,6 +10979,7 @@ async function downloadXFTPChunkRaw(agent, server, rpKey, fId) {
const { response, body } = await sendXFTPCommand(agent, server, rpKey, fId, cmd);
if (response.type !== "FRFile") throw new Error("unexpected response: " + response.type);
const dhSecret = dh(response.rcvDhKey, privateKey);
console.log(`[XFTP-DBG] dlChunkRaw: body.length=${body.length} nonce=${_hex(response.nonce, 24)} dhSecret=${_hex(dhSecret)} body[0..8]=${_hex(body)} body[-8..]=${_hex(body.slice(-8))}`);
return { dhSecret, nonce: response.nonce, body };
}
async function downloadXFTPChunk(agent, server, rpKey, fId, digest) {
@@ -10999,6 +11012,7 @@ function encryptFileForUpload(source, fileName) {
const encSize = BigInt(chunkSizes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0));
const encData = encryptFile(source, fileHdr, key, nonce, fileSize, encSize);
const digest = sha512Streaming([encData]);
console.log(`[AGENT-DBG] encrypt: encData.len=${encData.length} digest=${_dbgHex(digest, 64)} chunkSizes=[${chunkSizes.join(",")}]`);
return { encData, digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes };
}
const DEFAULT_REDIRECT_THRESHOLD = 400;
@@ -11155,7 +11169,9 @@ async function downloadFileRaw(agent, fd, onRawChunk, options) {
if (err) throw new Error("downloadFileRaw: " + err);
const { onProgress} = options ?? {};
if (fd.redirect !== null) {
console.log(`[AGENT-DBG] resolving redirect: outer size=${fd.size} chunks=${fd.chunks.length}`);
fd = await resolveRedirect(agent, fd);
console.log(`[AGENT-DBG] resolved: size=${fd.size} chunks=${fd.chunks.length} digest=${Array.from(fd.digest.slice(0, 16)).map((x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("")}…`);
}
const resolvedFd = fd;
let downloaded = 0;
@@ -11173,6 +11189,7 @@ async function downloadFileRaw(agent, fd, onRawChunk, options) {
const seed = decodePrivKeyEd25519(replica.replicaKey);
const kp = ed25519KeyPairFromSeed(seed);
const raw = await downloadXFTPChunkRaw(agent, server, kp.privateKey, replica.replicaId);
console.log(`[AGENT-DBG] chunk=${chunk.chunkNo} body.len=${raw.body.length} expectedChunkSize=${chunk.chunkSize} digest=${_dbgHex(chunk.digest, 32)} body.byteOffset=${raw.body.byteOffset} body.buffer.byteLength=${raw.body.buffer.byteLength}`);
await onRawChunk({
chunkNo: chunk.chunkNo,
dhSecret: raw.dhSecret,
+133
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module ClientSim
( SimClient (..),
connectClient,
createQueue,
subscribeQueue,
sendMessage,
receiveAndAck,
connectN,
benchKeyHash,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.Async (mapConcurrently)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad (forM_)
import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.List (unfoldr)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
data SimClient = SimClient
{ scHandle :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient,
scRcvKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
scRcvId :: RecipientId,
scSndId :: SenderId,
scDhSecret :: C.DhSecret 'C.X25519
}
benchKeyHash :: C.KeyHash
benchKeyHash = "LcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI="
connectClient :: TransportHost -> ServiceName -> IO (THandleSMP TLS 'TClient)
connectClient host port = do
let tcConfig = defaultTransportClientConfig {clientALPN = Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes}
runTransportClient tcConfig Nothing host port (Just benchKeyHash) $ \h ->
runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h Nothing benchKeyHash supportedClientSMPRelayVRange False Nothing) >>= \case
Right th -> pure th
Left e -> error $ "SMP handshake failed: " <> show e
connectN :: Int -> TransportHost -> ServiceName -> IO [THandleSMP TLS 'TClient]
connectN n host port = do
let batches = chunksOf 100 [1 .. n]
concat <$> mapM (\batch -> mapConcurrently (\_ -> connectClient host port) batch) batches
createQueue :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient -> IO SimClient
createQueue h = do
g <- C.newRandom
(rPub, rKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd448 g
(sPub, sKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
(dhPub, dhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-- NEW command
Resp "1" NoEntity (Ids rId sId srvDh) <- signSendRecv h rKey ("1", NoEntity, New rPub dhPub)
let dhShared = C.dh' srvDh dhPriv
-- KEY command (secure queue)
Resp "2" _ OK <- signSendRecv h rKey ("2", rId, KEY sPub)
pure SimClient {scHandle = h, scRcvKey = rKey, scRcvId = rId, scSndId = sId, scDhSecret = dhShared}
subscribeQueue :: SimClient -> IO ()
subscribeQueue SimClient {scHandle = h, scRcvKey = rKey, scRcvId = rId} = do
Resp "3" _ (SOK _) <- signSendRecv h rKey ("3", rId, SUB)
pure ()
sendMessage :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> SenderId -> ByteString -> IO ()
sendMessage h sKey sId body = do
Resp "4" _ OK <- signSendRecv h sKey ("4", sId, SEND noMsgFlags body)
pure ()
receiveAndAck :: SimClient -> IO ()
receiveAndAck SimClient {scHandle = h, scRcvKey = rKey, scRcvId = rId} = do
(_, _, Right (MSG RcvMessage {msgId = mId})) <- tGet1 h
Resp "5" _ OK <- signSendRecv h rKey ("5", rId, ACK mId)
pure ()
-- Helpers (same patterns as ServerTests.hs)
pattern Resp :: CorrId -> EntityId -> BrokerMsg -> Transmission (Either ErrorType BrokerMsg)
pattern Resp corrId queueId command <- (corrId, queueId, Right command)
pattern Ids :: RecipientId -> SenderId -> RcvPublicDhKey -> BrokerMsg
pattern Ids rId sId srvDh <- IDS (QIK rId sId srvDh _ _ Nothing Nothing)
pattern New :: RcvPublicAuthKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> Command 'Creator
pattern New rPub dhPub = NEW (NewQueueReq rPub dhPub Nothing SMSubscribe (Just (QRMessaging Nothing)) Nothing)
signSendRecv :: (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, EntityId, Command p) -> IO (Transmission (Either ErrorType BrokerMsg))
signSendRecv h pk t = do
signSend h pk t
(r L.:| _) <- tGetClient h
pure r
signSend :: (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, EntityId, Command p) -> IO ()
signSend h@THandle {params} (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId corrId, qId, cmd)
authorize t = (,Nothing) <$> case a of
C.SEd25519 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd25519 $ C.sign' pk t
C.SEd448 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd448 $ C.sign' pk t
C.SX25519 -> (\THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k} -> TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t) <$> thAuth params
Right () <- tPut1 h (authorize tForAuth, tToSend)
pure ()
tPut1 :: Transport c => THandle v c 'TClient -> SentRawTransmission -> IO (Either TransportError ())
tPut1 h t = do
rs <- tPut h (Right t L.:| [])
case rs of
(r : _) -> pure r
[] -> error "tPut1: empty result"
tGet1 :: (ProtocolEncoding v err cmd, Transport c) => THandle v c 'TClient -> IO (Transmission (Either err cmd))
tGet1 h = do
(r L.:| _) <- tGetClient h
pure r
chunksOf :: Int -> [a] -> [[a]]
chunksOf n = unfoldr $ \xs -> if null xs then Nothing else Just (splitAt n xs)
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
FROM haskell:9.6.3 AS build
WORKDIR /src
# Copy cabal file first for dependency caching
COPY simplexmq.cabal cabal.project* ./
RUN cabal update && cabal build --only-dependencies -f server_postgres smp-server-bench || true
# Copy full source
COPY . .
RUN cabal build -f server_postgres smp-server-bench \
&& cp $(cabal list-bin -f server_postgres smp-server-bench) /usr/local/bin/smp-server-bench
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
libgmp10 libpq5 libffi8 zlib1g ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /usr/local/bin/smp-server-bench /usr/local/bin/smp-server-bench
COPY tests/fixtures /app/tests/fixtures
WORKDIR /app
ENTRYPOINT ["smp-server-bench"]
+243
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@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module Main where
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Control.Concurrent.Async (async, cancel, forConcurrently_, mapConcurrently, mapConcurrently_)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad (forever, forM_, void, when)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.IORef
import Data.List (unfoldr)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime, utctDayTime)
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import System.Environment (getArgs)
import System.IO (hFlush, stdout)
import ClientSim
import Report
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServerBlocking)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM as Env
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration (ExpirationConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Postgres (PostgresMsgStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Config (PostgresStoreCfg (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (ServerCredentials (..), mkTransportServerConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import UnliftIO.Exception (bracket)
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo, withGlobalLogging, LogConfig (..), setLogLevel, LogLevel (..))
data BenchConfig = BenchConfig
{ numClients :: Int,
sustainedMinutes :: Int,
pgConnStr :: ByteString,
serverPort :: ServiceName,
timeSeriesFile :: FilePath
}
defaultBenchConfig :: BenchConfig
defaultBenchConfig =
BenchConfig
{ numClients = 5000,
sustainedMinutes = 5,
pgConnStr = "postgresql://smp@localhost:15432/smp_bench",
serverPort = "15001",
timeSeriesFile = "bench-timeseries.csv"
}
parseArgs :: IO BenchConfig
parseArgs = do
args <- getArgs
pure $ go args defaultBenchConfig
where
go [] c = c
go ("--clients" : n : rest) c = go rest c {numClients = read n}
go ("--minutes" : n : rest) c = go rest c {sustainedMinutes = read n}
go ("--pg" : s : rest) c = go rest c {pgConnStr = B.pack s}
go ("--port" : p : rest) c = go rest c {serverPort = p}
go ("--timeseries" : f : rest) c = go rest c {timeSeriesFile = f}
go (x : _) _ = error $ "Unknown argument: " <> x
main :: IO ()
main = withGlobalLogging LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True} $ do
setLogLevel LogInfo
bc@BenchConfig {numClients, sustainedMinutes, serverPort, timeSeriesFile, pgConnStr} <- parseArgs
putStrLn $ "SMP Server Memory Benchmark"
putStrLn $ " clients: " <> show numClients
putStrLn $ " sustain: " <> show sustainedMinutes <> " min"
putStrLn $ " pg: " <> B.unpack pgConnStr
putStrLn $ " port: " <> serverPort
putStrLn ""
snapshotsRef <- newIORef []
let snap phase clients = do
s <- takeSnapshot phase clients
modifyIORef' snapshotsRef (s :)
putStrLn $ " [" <> show phase <> "] live=" <> show (snapLive s `div` (1024 * 1024)) <> "MB large=" <> show (snapLarge s `div` (1024 * 1024)) <> "MB"
hFlush stdout
withBenchServer bc $ do
putStrLn "Phase 1: Baseline (no clients)"
snap "baseline" 0
putStrLn $ "Phase 2: Connecting " <> show numClients <> " TLS clients..."
handles <- connectN numClients "localhost" serverPort
putStrLn $ " Connected " <> show (length handles) <> " clients"
snap "tls_connect" (length handles)
putStrLn "Phase 3: Creating queues (NEW + KEY)..."
simClients <- mapConcurrently createQueue handles
putStrLn $ " Created " <> show (length simClients) <> " queues"
snap "queue_create" (length simClients)
putStrLn "Phase 4: Subscribing (SUB)..."
mapConcurrently_ subscribeQueue simClients
snap "subscribe" (length simClients)
-- Pair up clients: first half sends to second half
let halfN = length simClients `div` 2
senders = take halfN simClients
receivers = drop halfN simClients
pairs = zip senders receivers
putStrLn $ "Phase 5: Sending " <> show halfN <> " messages..."
g <- C.newRandom
forConcurrently_ pairs $ \(sender, receiver) -> do
(_, sKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
sendMessage (scHandle sender) sKey (scSndId receiver) "benchmark test message payload 1234567890"
snap "msg_send" (length simClients)
putStrLn "Phase 6: Receiving and ACKing messages..."
forConcurrently_ receivers receiveAndAck
snap "msg_recv" (length simClients)
putStrLn $ "Phase 7: Sustained load (" <> show sustainedMinutes <> " min)..."
writeTimeSeriesHeader timeSeriesFile
-- Logger thread: snapshot every 10s
logger <- async $ forever $ do
threadDelay 10_000_000
s <- takeSnapshot "sustained" (length simClients)
appendTimeSeries timeSeriesFile s
-- Worker threads: continuous send/receive
let loopDurationUs = sustainedMinutes * 60 * 1_000_000
workersDone <- newTVarIO False
workers <- async $ do
deadline <- (+ loopDurationUs) <$> getMonotonicTimeUs
sustainedLoop g pairs deadline
atomically $ writeTVar workersDone True
-- Wait for workers
void $ atomically $ readTVar workersDone >>= \done -> when (not done) retry
cancel logger
cancel workers
snap "sustained_end" (length simClients)
snapshots <- reverse <$> readIORef snapshotsRef
printSummary snapshots
putStrLn $ "\nTime-series written to: " <> timeSeriesFile
sustainedLoop :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> [(SimClient, SimClient)] -> Int -> IO ()
sustainedLoop g pairs deadline = go
where
go = do
now <- getMonotonicTimeUs
when (now < deadline) $ do
forConcurrently_ pairs $ \(sender, receiver) -> do
(_, sKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
sendMessage (scHandle sender) sKey (scSndId receiver) "sustained load message payload"
forConcurrently_ (map snd pairs) receiveAndAck
go
getMonotonicTimeUs :: IO Int
getMonotonicTimeUs = do
t <- getCurrentTime
pure $ round (utctDayTime t * 1_000_000)
withBenchServer :: BenchConfig -> IO a -> IO a
withBenchServer BenchConfig {pgConnStr, serverPort} action = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
let srvCfg = benchServerConfig pgConnStr serverPort
bracket
(async $ runSMPServerBlocking started srvCfg Nothing)
cancel
(\_ -> waitForServer started >> action)
where
waitForServer started = do
r <- atomically $ takeTMVar started
if r
then putStrLn $ "Server started on port " <> serverPort
else error "Server failed to start"
benchServerConfig :: ByteString -> ServiceName -> ServerConfig PostgresMsgStore
benchServerConfig pgConn port =
let storeCfg = PostgresStoreCfg
{ dbOpts = DBOpts {connstr = pgConn, schema = "smp_server", poolSize = 10, createSchema = True},
dbStoreLogPath = Nothing,
confirmMigrations = MCYesUp,
deletedTTL = 86400
}
in ServerConfig
{ transports = [(port, transport @TLS, False)],
smpHandshakeTimeout = 120_000_000,
tbqSize = 128,
msgQueueQuota = 128,
maxJournalMsgCount = 256,
maxJournalStateLines = 16,
queueIdBytes = 24,
msgIdBytes = 24,
serverStoreCfg = SSCDatabase storeCfg,
storeNtfsFile = Nothing,
allowNewQueues = True,
newQueueBasicAuth = Nothing,
controlPortUserAuth = Nothing,
controlPortAdminAuth = Nothing,
dailyBlockQueueQuota = 20,
messageExpiration = Just defaultMessageExpiration,
expireMessagesOnStart = False,
expireMessagesOnSend = False,
idleQueueInterval = 14400,
notificationExpiration = defaultNtfExpiration,
inactiveClientExpiration = Nothing,
logStatsInterval = Nothing,
logStatsStartTime = 0,
serverStatsLogFile = "bench/tmp/stats.log",
serverStatsBackupFile = Nothing,
prometheusInterval = Nothing,
prometheusMetricsFile = "bench/tmp/metrics.txt",
pendingENDInterval = 500_000,
ntfDeliveryInterval = 200_000,
smpCredentials =
ServerCredentials
{ caCertificateFile = Just "tests/fixtures/ca.crt",
privateKeyFile = "tests/fixtures/server.key",
certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
},
httpCredentials = Nothing,
smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
Env.transportConfig = mkTransportServerConfig True (Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes) True,
controlPort = Nothing,
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {persistErrorInterval = 1},
allowSMPProxy = False,
serverClientConcurrency = 16,
information = Nothing,
startOptions = StartOptions {maintenance = False, compactLog = False, logLevel = LogInfo, skipWarnings = True, confirmMigrations = MCYesUp}
}
+113
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@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Report
( Snapshot (..),
takeSnapshot,
printSummary,
writeTimeSeriesHeader,
appendTimeSeries,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Data.List (foldl')
import Data.Text (Text)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import qualified Data.Text.IO as T
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
import Data.Word (Word32, Word64)
import GHC.Stats (RTSStats (..), GCDetails (..), getRTSStats)
import System.IO (Handle, IOMode (..), hFlush, hSetBuffering, BufferMode (..), withFile)
import System.Mem (performMajorGC)
data Snapshot = Snapshot
{ snapTime :: UTCTime,
snapPhase :: Text,
snapLive :: Word64,
snapHeap :: Word64,
snapLarge :: Word64,
snapFrag :: Word64,
snapGCs :: Word32,
snapClients :: Int
}
takeSnapshot :: Text -> Int -> IO Snapshot
takeSnapshot phase clients = do
performMajorGC
threadDelay 1_000_000
rts <- getRTSStats
ts <- getCurrentTime
let GCDetails {gcdetails_live_bytes, gcdetails_mem_in_use_bytes, gcdetails_large_objects_bytes, gcdetails_block_fragmentation_bytes} = gc rts
pure
Snapshot
{ snapTime = ts,
snapPhase = phase,
snapLive = gcdetails_live_bytes,
snapHeap = gcdetails_mem_in_use_bytes,
snapLarge = gcdetails_large_objects_bytes,
snapFrag = gcdetails_block_fragmentation_bytes,
snapGCs = gcs rts,
snapClients = clients
}
printSummary :: [Snapshot] -> IO ()
printSummary [] = putStrLn "No snapshots collected."
printSummary snaps = do
putStrLn ""
putStrLn hdr
putStrLn $ replicate (length hdr) '-'
mapM_ printRow (zip (Snapshot {snapLive = 0, snapHeap = 0, snapLarge = 0, snapFrag = 0, snapGCs = 0, snapClients = 0, snapPhase = "", snapTime = snapTime (head snaps)} : snaps) snaps)
where
hdr = padR 20 "Phase" <> padL 12 "live_MB" <> padL 12 "large_MB" <> padL 12 "frag_MB" <> padL 12 "heap_MB" <> padL 10 "clients" <> padL 14 "d_live_MB" <> padL 14 "d_large_MB" <> padL 14 "KB/client"
printRow (prev, cur) =
putStrLn $
padR 20 (T.unpack $ snapPhase cur)
<> padL 12 (showMB $ snapLive cur)
<> padL 12 (showMB $ snapLarge cur)
<> padL 12 (showMB $ snapFrag cur)
<> padL 12 (showMB $ snapHeap cur)
<> padL 10 (show $ snapClients cur)
<> padL 14 (showDeltaMB (snapLive cur) (snapLive prev))
<> padL 14 (showDeltaMB (snapLarge cur) (snapLarge prev))
<> padL 14 (perClient cur)
showMB w = show (w `div` (1024 * 1024))
showDeltaMB a b
| a >= b = "+" <> show ((a - b) `div` (1024 * 1024))
| otherwise = "-" <> show ((b - a) `div` (1024 * 1024))
perClient Snapshot {snapClients, snapLive}
| snapClients > 0 = show (snapLive `div` fromIntegral snapClients `div` 1024)
| otherwise = "-"
padR n s = s <> replicate (max 0 (n - length s)) ' '
padL n s = replicate (max 0 (n - length s)) ' ' <> s
csvHeader :: Text
csvHeader = "timestamp,phase,rts_live,rts_heap,rts_large,rts_frag,rts_gc,clients"
snapshotCsv :: Snapshot -> Text
snapshotCsv Snapshot {snapTime, snapPhase, snapLive, snapHeap, snapLarge, snapFrag, snapGCs, snapClients} =
T.intercalate
","
[ T.pack $ iso8601Show snapTime,
snapPhase,
tshow snapLive,
tshow snapHeap,
tshow snapLarge,
tshow snapFrag,
tshow snapGCs,
tshow snapClients
]
writeTimeSeriesHeader :: FilePath -> IO ()
writeTimeSeriesHeader path = T.writeFile path (csvHeader <> "\n")
appendTimeSeries :: FilePath -> Snapshot -> IO ()
appendTimeSeries path snap =
withFile path AppendMode $ \h -> do
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
T.hPutStrLn h $ snapshotCsv snap
tshow :: Show a => a -> Text
tshow = T.pack . show
+46
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:17
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: smp
POSTGRES_DB: smp_bench
POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD: trust
volumes:
- ./init.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/init.sql
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U smp -d smp_bench"]
interval: 2s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
bench:
build:
context: ..
dockerfile: bench/Dockerfile
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
BENCH_PG: "postgresql://smp@postgres/smp_bench"
BENCH_CLIENTS: "${BENCH_CLIENTS:-5000}"
BENCH_MINUTES: "${BENCH_MINUTES:-5}"
command:
- "--pg"
- "postgresql://smp@postgres/smp_bench"
- "--clients"
- "${BENCH_CLIENTS:-5000}"
- "--minutes"
- "${BENCH_MINUTES:-5}"
- "--timeseries"
- "/results/timeseries.csv"
- "+RTS"
- "-N"
- "-A16m"
- "-T"
- "-RTS"
volumes:
- ./results:/results
volumes:
pgdata:
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS pgcrypto;
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS smp_server;
Executable
+60
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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -e
cd "$(dirname "$0")"
mkdir -p results
reset_db() {
docker compose down -v 2>/dev/null || true
docker compose up -d --wait postgres
echo "PostgreSQL ready."
}
if [ "$1" = "--compare-rts" ]; then
shift
docker compose build bench
for label_flags in \
"default:-N -A16m -T" \
"F1.2:-N -A16m -F1.2 -T" \
"F1.5:-N -A16m -F1.5 -T" \
"A4m:-N -A4m -T" \
"A4m-F1.2:-N -A4m -F1.2 -T" \
"compact:-N -A16m -c -T" \
"nonmoving:-N -A16m -xn -T"; do
label="${label_flags%%:*}"
flags="${label_flags#*:}"
echo ""
echo "=========================================="
echo " RTS config: $label ($flags)"
echo "=========================================="
reset_db
docker compose run --rm \
-e BENCH_CLIENTS="${BENCH_CLIENTS:-1000}" \
-e BENCH_MINUTES="${BENCH_MINUTES:-2}" \
bench \
--pg "postgresql://smp@postgres/smp_bench" \
--clients "${BENCH_CLIENTS:-1000}" \
--minutes "${BENCH_MINUTES:-2}" \
--timeseries "/results/bench-${label}.csv" \
"$@" \
+RTS $flags -RTS
done
echo ""
echo "Done. Results in bench/results/"
elif [ "$1" = "--local" ]; then
# Run natively (not in container) — requires local Postgres
shift
reset_db
cabal run smp-server-bench -f server_postgres -- \
--pg "postgresql://smp@localhost:15432/smp_bench" \
--clients "${BENCH_CLIENTS:-5000}" \
--minutes "${BENCH_MINUTES:-5}" \
"$@" \
+RTS -N -A16m -s -RTS
else
# Run fully in containers
reset_db
docker compose run --rm bench "$@"
fi
docker compose down
Submodule cbits/blst deleted from db3defd0d5
-24
View File
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
// getentropy() shim for Windows, where it is absent from the CRT.
// Follows the POSIX contract: fills `buffer` with `length` random bytes
// (length must not exceed 256), returns 0 on success or -1 with errno set.
#ifdef _WIN32
#include <errno.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include <bcrypt.h>
int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) {
if (length > 256) {
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
NTSTATUS status = BCryptGenRandom(NULL, (PUCHAR)buffer, (ULONG)length,
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG);
if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(status)) {
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
Submodule cbits/libbbs deleted from 59a0f4bf32
+100
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@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
## Memory Diagnostics Results
### Data Collection
Server: smp19.simplex.im, PostgreSQL backend, `useCache = False`
RTS flags: `+RTS -N -A16m -I0.01 -Iw15 -s -RTS` (16 cores)
### Mar 20 Data (1 hour, 07:19-08:19)
```
Time rts_live rts_heap rts_large rts_frag clients non-large
07:19 7.5 GB 8.2 GB 5.5 GB 0.03 GB 14,000 2.0 GB
07:24 6.4 GB 10.8 GB 5.2 GB 3.6 GB 14,806 1.2 GB
07:29 8.2 GB 10.8 GB 6.5 GB 1.8 GB 15,667 1.7 GB
07:34 10.0 GB 12.3 GB 7.9 GB 1.4 GB 15,845 2.1 GB
07:39 6.7 GB 13.0 GB 5.3 GB 5.6 GB 16,589 1.4 GB
07:44 8.5 GB 13.0 GB 6.7 GB 3.7 GB 16,283 1.8 GB
07:49 6.5 GB 13.0 GB 5.2 GB 5.8 GB 16,532 1.3 GB
07:54 6.0 GB 13.0 GB 4.8 GB 6.3 GB 16,636 1.2 GB
07:59 6.4 GB 13.0 GB 5.1 GB 5.9 GB 16,769 1.3 GB
08:04 8.3 GB 13.0 GB 6.5 GB 3.9 GB 17,352 1.8 GB
08:09 10.2 GB 13.0 GB 8.0 GB 1.9 GB 17,053 2.2 GB
08:14 5.6 GB 13.0 GB 4.5 GB 6.8 GB 17,147 1.1 GB
08:19 7.6 GB 13.0 GB 6.1 GB 4.6 GB 17,496 1.5 GB
```
non-large = rts_live - rts_large (normal Haskell heap objects: Maps, TVars, closures)
### Mar 19 Data (5.5 hours, 07:49-13:19)
rts_heap grew from 10.1 GB to 20.7 GB over 5.5 hours.
Post-GC rts_live floor rose from 5.5 GB to 9.1 GB.
### Findings
**1. Large/pinned objects dominate live data (60-80%)**
`rts_large` = 4.5-8.0 GB out of 5.6-10.2 GB live. These are allocations > ~3KB that go on GHC's large object heap. They oscillate (not growing monotonically), meaning they are being allocated and freed constantly — transient, not leaked.
**2. Fragmentation is the heap growth mechanism**
`rts_heap ≈ rts_live + rts_frag`. The heap grows because pinned/large objects fragment GHC's block allocator. Once GHC expands the heap, it never shrinks. Growth pattern:
- Large objects allocated → occupy blocks
- Large objects freed → blocks can't be reused if ANY other object shares the block
- New allocations need fresh blocks → heap expands
- Heap never returns memory to OS
**3. Non-large heap data is stable (~1.0-2.2 GB)**
Normal Haskell objects (Maps, TVars, closures, client structures) account for only 1-2 GB. This scales with client count at ~100-130 KB/client and does NOT grow over time.
**4. All tracked data structures are NOT the cause**
- `clientSndQ=0, clientMsgQ=0` — TBQueues empty, no message accumulation
- `smpQSubs` oscillates ~1.0-1.4M — entries are cleaned up, not leaking
- `ntfStore` < 2K entries — negligible
- All proxy agent maps near 0
- `loadedQ=0` — useCache=False confirmed working
**5. Source of large objects is unclear without heap profiling**
The 4.5-8.0 GB of large objects could come from:
- PostgreSQL driver (`postgresql-simple`/`libpq`) — pinned ByteStrings for query results
- TLS library (`tls`) — pinned buffers per connection
- Network socket I/O — pinned ByteStrings for recv/send
- SMP protocol message blocks
Cannot distinguish between these without `-hT` heap profiling (which is too expensive for this server).
### Root Cause
**GHC heap fragmentation from constant churn of large/pinned ByteString allocations.**
Not a data structure leak. The live data itself is reasonable (5-10 GB for 15-17K clients). The problem is that GHC's copying GC cannot compact around pinned objects, so the heap grows with fragmentation and never shrinks.
### Mitigation Options
All are RTS flag changes — no rebuild needed, reversible by restart.
**1. `-F1.2`** (reduce GC trigger factor from default 2.0)
- Triggers major GC when heap reaches 1.2x live data instead of 2x
- Reclaims fragmented blocks sooner
- Trade-off: more frequent GC, slightly higher CPU
- Risk: low — just makes GC run more often
**2. Reduce `-A16m` to `-A4m`** (smaller nursery)
- More frequent minor GC → short-lived pinned objects freed faster
- Trade-off: more GC cycles, but each is smaller
- Risk: low — may actually improve latency by reducing GC pause times
**3. `+RTS -xn`** (nonmoving GC)
- Designed for pinned-heavy workloads — avoids copying entirely
- Available since GHC 8.10, improved in 9.x
- Trade-off: different GC characteristics, less battle-tested
- Risk: medium — different GC algorithm, should test first
**4. Limit concurrent connections** (application-level)
- Since large objects scale per-client, fewer clients = less fragmentation
- Trade-off: reduced capacity
- Risk: low but impacts users
+225
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@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
## Root Cause Analysis: SMP Server Memory Growth (23.5GB)
### Environment
- **Server**: smp19.simplex.im, ~21,927 connected clients
- **Storage**: PostgreSQL backend with `useCache = False`
- **RTS flags**: `+RTS -N -A16m -I0.01 -Iw15 -s -RTS` (16 cores)
- **Memory**: 23.5GB RES / 1031GB VIRT (75% of available RAM)
### Log Summary
- **Duration**: ~22 hours (Mar 16 12:12 → Mar 17 10:20)
- **92,277 proxy connection errors** out of 92,656 total log lines (99.6%)
- **292 unique failing destination servers**, top offender: `nowhere.moe` (12,875 errors)
- Only **145 successful proxy connections**
---
### Known Factor: GHC Heap Sizing
With 16 cores and `-A16m`:
- **Nursery**: 16 × 16MB = **256MB baseline**
- GHC default major GC threshold = **2× live data** — if live data is 10GB, heap grows to ~20GB before major GC
- The server is rarely idle with 22K clients, so major GC is deferred despite `-I0.01`
- This is an amplifier — whatever the actual live data size is, GHC roughly doubles it
---
### Candidate Structures That Could Grow Unboundedly
Analysis of the full codebase identified these structures that either grow without bound or have uncertain cleanup:
#### 1. `SubscribedClients` maps — `Env/STM.hs:378`
Both `subscribers.queueSubscribers` and `ntfSubscribers.queueSubscribers` (and their `serviceSubscribers`) use `SubscribedClients (TMap EntityId (TVar (Maybe (Client s))))`.
Comment at line 376: *"The subscriptions that were made at any point are not removed"*
`deleteSubcribedClient` IS called on disconnect (Server.hs:1112) and DOES call `TM.delete`. But it only deletes if the current stored client matches — if another client already re-subscribed, the old client's disconnect won't remove the entry. This is by design for mobile client continuity, but the net effect on map size over time is unclear without measurement.
#### 2. ProxyAgent's subscription TMaps — `Client/Agent.hs:145-151`
The `SMPClientAgent` has 4 TMaps that accumulate one top-level entry per unique destination server and **never remove** them:
- `activeServiceSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TVar ...)` (line 145)
- `activeQueueSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap QueueId ...)` (line 146)
- `pendingServiceSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TVar ...)` (line 149)
- `pendingQueueSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap QueueId ...)` (line 150)
Comment at line 262: *"these vars are never removed, they are only added"*
These are only used for the proxy agent (SParty 'Sender), so they grow with each unique destination SMP server proxied to. With 292 unique servers in this log period, these are likely small — but long-running servers may accumulate thousands.
`closeSMPClientAgent` (line 369) does NOT clear these 4 maps.
#### 3. `NtfStore` — `NtfStore.hs:26`
`NtfStore (TMap NotifierId (TVar [MsgNtf]))` — one entry per NotifierId.
`deleteExpiredNtfs` (line 47) filters expired notifications from lists but does **not remove entries with empty lists** from the TMap. Over time, NotifierIds that no longer receive notifications leave zombie `TVar []` entries.
`deleteNtfs` (line 44) does remove the full entry via `TM.lookupDelete` — but only called when a notifier is explicitly deleted.
#### 4. `serviceLocks` in PostgresQueueStore — `Postgres.hs:112,469`
`serviceLocks :: TMap CertFingerprint Lock` — one Lock per unique certificate fingerprint.
`getCreateService` (line 469) calls `withLockMap (serviceLocks st) fp` which calls `getMapLock` (Agent/Client.hs:1029-1032) — this **unconditionally inserts** a Lock into the TMap. There is **no cleanup code** for serviceLocks anywhere. This is NOT guarded by `useCache`.
#### 5. `sentCommands` per proxy client connection — `Client.hs:580`
Each `PClient` has `sentCommands :: TMap CorrId (Request err msg)`. Entries are added per command sent (line 1369) and only removed when a response arrives (line 698). If a connection drops before all responses arrive, entries remain until the `PClient` is GC'd. Since `PClient` is captured by the connection thread which terminates on error, the `PClient` should become GC-eligible — but GC timing depends on heap pressure.
#### 6. `subQ :: TQueue (ClientSub, ClientId)` — `Env/STM.hs:363`
Unbounded `TQueue` for subscription changes. If the subscriber thread (`serverThread`) can't process changes fast enough, this queue grows without backpressure. With 22K clients subscribing/unsubscribing, sustained bursts could cause this queue to bloat.
---
### Ruled Out
1. **PostgreSQL queue cache**: `useCache = False` — `queues`, `senders`, `links`, `notifiers` TMaps are empty.
2. **`notifierLocks`**: Guarded by `useCache` (Postgres.hs:377,405) — not used with `useCache = False`.
3. **Client structures**: 22K × ~3KB = ~66MB — negligible.
4. **TBQueues**: Bounded (`tbqSize = 128`).
5. **Thread management**: `forkClient` uses weak refs + `finally` blocks. `endThreads` cleared on disconnect.
6. **Proxy `smpClients`/`smpSessions`**: Properly cleaned on disconnect/expiry.
7. **`smpSubWorkers`**: Properly cleaned on worker completion; also cleared in `closeSMPClientAgent`.
8. **`pendingEvents`**: Atomically swapped empty every `pendingENDInterval`.
9. **Stats IORef counters**: Fixed number, bounded.
10. **DB connection pool**: Bounded `TBQueue` with bracket-based return.
---
### Insufficient Data to Determine Root Cause
Without measuring the actual sizes of these structures at runtime, we cannot determine which (if any) is the primary contributor. The following exact logging changes will identify the root cause.
---
### EXACT LOGS TO ADD
Add a new periodic logging thread in `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs`.
Insert at `Server.hs:197` (after `prometheusMetricsThread_`):
```haskell
<> memoryDiagThread_ cfg
```
Then define:
```haskell
memoryDiagThread_ :: ServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
memoryDiagThread_ ServerConfig {prometheusInterval = Just _} =
[memoryDiagThread]
memoryDiagThread_ _ = []
memoryDiagThread :: M s ()
memoryDiagThread = do
labelMyThread "memoryDiag"
Env { ntfStore = NtfStore ntfMap
, server = srv@Server {subscribers, ntfSubscribers}
, proxyAgent = ProxyAgent {smpAgent = pa}
, msgStore_ = ms
} <- ask
let interval = 300_000_000 -- 5 minutes
liftIO $ forever $ do
threadDelay interval
-- GHC RTS stats
rts <- getRTSStats
let liveBytes = gcdetails_live_bytes $ gc rts
heapSize = gcdetails_mem_in_use_bytes $ gc rts
gcCount = gcs rts
-- Server structures
clientCount <- IM.size <$> getServerClients srv
-- SubscribedClients (queue and service subscribers for both SMP and NTF)
smpQSubs <- M.size <$> getSubscribedClients (queueSubscribers subscribers)
smpSSubs <- M.size <$> getSubscribedClients (serviceSubscribers subscribers)
ntfQSubs <- M.size <$> getSubscribedClients (queueSubscribers ntfSubscribers)
ntfSSubs <- M.size <$> getSubscribedClients (serviceSubscribers ntfSubscribers)
-- Pending events
smpPending <- IM.size <$> readTVarIO (pendingEvents subscribers)
ntfPending <- IM.size <$> readTVarIO (pendingEvents ntfSubscribers)
-- NtfStore
ntfStoreSize <- M.size <$> readTVarIO ntfMap
-- ProxyAgent maps
let SMPClientAgent {smpClients, smpSessions, activeServiceSubs, activeQueueSubs, pendingServiceSubs, pendingQueueSubs, smpSubWorkers} = pa
paClients <- M.size <$> readTVarIO smpClients
paSessions <- M.size <$> readTVarIO smpSessions
paActSvc <- M.size <$> readTVarIO activeServiceSubs
paActQ <- M.size <$> readTVarIO activeQueueSubs
paPndSvc <- M.size <$> readTVarIO pendingServiceSubs
paPndQ <- M.size <$> readTVarIO pendingQueueSubs
paWorkers <- M.size <$> readTVarIO smpSubWorkers
-- Loaded queue counts
lc <- loadedQueueCounts $ fromMsgStore ms
-- Log everything
logInfo $
"MEMORY "
<> "rts_live=" <> tshow liveBytes
<> " rts_heap=" <> tshow heapSize
<> " rts_gc=" <> tshow gcCount
<> " clients=" <> tshow clientCount
<> " smpQSubs=" <> tshow smpQSubs
<> " smpSSubs=" <> tshow smpSSubs
<> " ntfQSubs=" <> tshow ntfQSubs
<> " ntfSSubs=" <> tshow ntfSSubs
<> " smpPending=" <> tshow smpPending
<> " ntfPending=" <> tshow ntfPending
<> " ntfStore=" <> tshow ntfStoreSize
<> " paClients=" <> tshow paClients
<> " paSessions=" <> tshow paSessions
<> " paActSvc=" <> tshow paActSvc
<> " paActQ=" <> tshow paActQ
<> " paPndSvc=" <> tshow paPndSvc
<> " paPndQ=" <> tshow paPndQ
<> " paWorkers=" <> tshow paWorkers
<> " loadedQ=" <> tshow (loadedQueueCount lc)
<> " loadedNtf=" <> tshow (loadedNotifierCount lc)
<> " ntfLocks=" <> tshow (notifierLockCount lc)
```
Note: `smpSubs.subsCount` (queueSubscribers size) and `smpSubs.subServicesCount` (serviceSubscribers size) are **already logged** in Prometheus (lines 475-496). The log above adds all other candidate structures plus GHC RTS memory stats.
This produces a single log line every 5 minutes:
```
[INFO] MEMORY rts_live=10737418240 rts_heap=23488102400 rts_gc=4521 clients=21927 smpQSubs=1847233 smpSSubs=42 ntfQSubs=982112 ntfSSubs=31 smpPending=0 ntfPending=0 ntfStore=512844 paClients=12 paSessions=12 paActSvc=0 paActQ=0 paPndSvc=0 paPndQ=0 paWorkers=3 loadedQ=0 loadedNtf=0 ntfLocks=0
```
### What Each Metric Tells Us
| Metric | What it reveals | If growing = suspect |
|--------|----------------|---------------------|
| `rts_live` | Actual live data after last major GC | Baseline — everything else should add up to this |
| `rts_heap` | Total heap (should be ~2× rts_live) | If >> 2× live, fragmentation issue |
| `clients` | Connected client count | Known: ~22K |
| `smpQSubs` | SubscribedClients map size (queue subs) | If >> clients × avg_subs, entries not cleaned |
| `smpSSubs` | SubscribedClients map size (service subs) | Should be small |
| `ntfQSubs` | NTF SubscribedClients map (queue subs) | Same concern as smpQSubs |
| `ntfSSubs` | NTF SubscribedClients map (service subs) | Should be small |
| `smpPending` / `ntfPending` | Pending END/DELD events per client | If large, subscriber thread lagging |
| `ntfStore` | NotifierId count in NtfStore | If growing monotonically, zombie entries |
| `paClients` | Proxy connections to other servers | Should be <= unique dest servers |
| `paSessions` | Active proxy sessions | Should match paClients |
| `paActSvc` / `paActQ` | Proxy active subscriptions | If growing, entries never removed |
| `paPndSvc` / `paPndQ` | Proxy pending subscriptions | If growing, resubscription stuck |
| `paWorkers` | Active reconnect workers | If growing, workers stuck in retry |
| `loadedQ` | Cached queues in store (0 with useCache=False) | Should be 0 |
| `ntfLocks` | Notifier locks in store | Should be 0 with useCache=False |
### Interpretation Guide
**If `smpQSubs` is in the millions**: SubscribedClients is the primary leak. Entries accumulate for every queue ever subscribed to.
**If `ntfStore` grows monotonically**: Zombie notification entries (empty lists after expiration). Fix: `deleteExpiredNtfs` should remove entries with empty lists.
**If `paActSvc` + `paActQ` grow**: Proxy agent subscription maps are the leak. Fix: add cleanup when no active/pending subs exist for a server.
**If `rts_live` is much smaller than `rts_heap`**: GHC heap fragmentation. Fix: tune `-F` flag (GC trigger factor) or use `-c` (compacting GC).
**If `rts_live` ~ 10-12GB**: The live data is genuinely large. Look at which metric is the largest contributor.
**If nothing above is large but `rts_live` is large**: The leak is in a structure not measured here — likely TLS connection buffers, ByteString retention from Postgres queries, or GHC runtime overhead. Next step would be heap profiling with `-hT`.
-200
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@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
# SMP server database load: root causes and fixes
## Summary
The recurring `pMsgFwdsOwn_pErrorsOther` spikes are a symptom of chronic disk saturation of the
`smp_server` PostgreSQL database, not a proxy or forwarding bug. The baseline read load is the
Prometheus scrape running whole-table `COUNT` scans of `msg_queues` (48.5M rows) every 30 seconds,
compounded by the message-expiration sweep. The write load comes from indexing `updated_at`:
`updateQueueTime` stamps it on the first send to each active queue per UTC day, and these non-HOT
updates bloat the indexes to 104 GB and amplify WAL to about 425 GB per day (37% full-page images,
~31% from `updateQueueTime`). Because the stamp is day-granular, this write burst clusters at 00:00 UTC,
tipping the saturated disk into the observed spike and loading the pgBackRest backup repository.
Code fixes replace the largest metric scan with an estimate and index the sweep and notifier counts.
Reclaiming the index bloat, which also clears the remaining metric scan, and keeping it down are
operator actions, because PostgreSQL never shrinks indexes automatically.
## Environment
The affected deployment runs the pure PostgreSQL backend (`store_queues: database`,
`store_messages: database`), schema `smp_server`, `db_pool_size 20`, `prometheus_interval 30`,
`[NAMES]` enabled, own-server proxying enabled, and forwards routed over a SOCKS proxy.
`msg_queues`: 48.5M live rows, 12.3% dead tuples, 14 GB heap, 104 GB indexes, 118 GB total.
## Evidence
`pg_stat_statements` over a 5 minute window, ordered by disk reads (`track_io_timing` was off, so
`shared_blks_read` is the disk proxy; the two `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` rows are manual and excluded):
| query | calls | mean ms | reads | share of all reads |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `getEntityCounts` (the six-`COUNT` metric query) | 30 | 111,456 | 990 GB | 70.7% |
| queue-record load (`SELECT recipient_id, …`) | 47,027 | 121 | 89 GB | 6.3% |
| expiration sweep batch (`array_agg` in `expire_old_messages`) | 13 | 233,143 | 62 GB | 4.5% |
| message peek (`DISTINCT ON (recipient_id)`) | 46,932 | 76 | 43 GB | 3.0% |
| `updateQueueTime` (`UPDATE msg_queues SET updated_at`) | 172,885 | 4 | 7.7 GB | 0.5% |
| `write_message` | 110,911 | 5 | 7.0 GB | 0.5% |
`EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS)` of each `msg_queues` count inside `getEntityCounts`:
| count | plan | time |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `queue_count` (`deleted_at IS NULL`) | Parallel Seq Scan | 30 s |
| `notifier_count` (`deleted_at IS NULL AND notifier_id IS NOT NULL`) | Parallel Seq Scan | 32.6 s |
| `ntf_service_queues_count` (`ntf_service_id IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL`) | Parallel Seq Scan | 30.2 s |
| `rcv_service_queues_count` (`rcv_service_id IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL`) | Index Only Scan | 1.4 ms |
The expiration sweep batch: 229 s for one 10,000-row batch, walking `msg_queues_pkey` and discarding
809,729 rows by filter to find 10,000 expirable ones.
`pg_stat_wal` over the measurement window: 27 TB of WAL accumulated, 37.2% of records full-page
images, averaging about 425 GB per day; recent days reach ~470 GB (from the `archive-push` log) as
the queue count grows.
Per-statement WAL from `pg_stat_statements` (`wal_bytes`), leaf statements only (this instance runs
`pg_stat_statements.track = all`, so the `write_message` wrapper double-counts the `INSERT` and
`UPDATE` it runs, and is excluded):
| category | share of WAL | main statements |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `msg_queues` updates | ~42% | `updateQueueTime` ~31%, `msg_can_write` flags ~9%, insert/delete ~2% |
| `messages` insert and delete | ~34% | message `INSERT`, `DELETE` by `message_id` and `recipient_id` |
| read path (hint bits, FPIs on SELECT) | ~24% | message peek ~15%, `msg_queue_size`, `getEntityCounts` |
## Root causes
1. Prometheus scrape. `getEntityCounts` (`QueueStore/Postgres.hs:154`) runs six `COUNT(1)` subqueries
every `prometheus_interval` (30 s), called from the metrics path (`Server.hs:698`). Four count
`msg_queues`; three of those seq-scan the 48.5M-row heap. At 70.7% of all reads it is the dominant
disk consumer, and it runs continuously (mean 111 s per scrape exceeds the 30 s interval).
2. Message-expiration sweep. `expireMessagesThread` (`Server.hs:477`) calls the `expire_old_messages`
procedure (`server_schema.sql`), whose inner batch query selects expirable queues ordered by
`recipient_id`. With `oldQueue = 0` the `updated_at` filter matches everything, so the planner
walks the primary key and filters `msg_queue_expire`, discarding ~99% of rows per batch.
3. Index bloat. 104 GB of indexes on a 14 GB table. `updated_at` is part of
`idx_msg_queues_updated_at_recipient_id` (`server_schema.sql:526`) and `updateQueueTime`
(`QueueStore/Postgres.hs:443`) updates it on the day's first send per queue (172,885 times in the
window above). Updating an indexed column prevents HOT updates, so every update writes a new row
version plus new entries in every index on the table, and the old index entries accumulate as bloat.
4. WAL amplification. Only 15.6% of `msg_queues` updates are HOT, because its composite index covers
`updated_at` and `msg_queue_expire`, both changed on the hot path (cause 3); the rest rewrite every
index on the table. With the 104 GB of bloated indexes and frequent checkpoints (`max_wal_size 4GB`,
`checkpoint_timeout 5min`, `wal_compression off`), 37% of WAL records are full-page images, and the
server generates about 425 GB of WAL per day (27 TB accumulated; recent days near 470 GB).
`updateQueueTime`, stamping `updated_at` on the ~5.3M daily-active queues, is the single largest
statement at ~31% of WAL (see Evidence). pgBackRest `archive-push` ships all of it, loading the
primary disk and the backup repository. The load peaks
at 00:00 UTC because `getSystemDate` rounds `updated_at` to the UTC day, so the first send to each
active queue after midnight runs `updateQueueTime`, clustering these writes and the `archive-push`
volume in the 00h hour.
## Index bloat and autovacuum
Autovacuum is running (60 runs on this table) and is not misconfigured, but two limits apply.
Autovacuum reclaims heap dead tuples and refreshes planner statistics; it does not shrink indexes.
Only `REINDEX` or `pg_repack` rebuilds a bloated B-tree. Index bloat therefore has no automatic
remedy.
Default autovacuum pacing assumes moderate churn. `autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor = 0.2` waits until
20% of the table is dead (about 9.7M rows here) before vacuuming, and cost-based throttling caps its
I/O, so a hot table stays around 12% dead. Per-table tuning makes it run sooner and faster.
The amplifier is indexing `updated_at`, a column updated on every send, which the fixes and operator
actions below address.
## Implemented fixes (batch 1)
Branch `sh/leaks-batch-1`, two commits.
| commit | change | effect |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `88673eee` | migration `20260916_prometheus_indexes` adds partial indexes `idx_msg_queues_expire (recipient_id) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND msg_queue_expire` and `idx_msg_queues_notifier_active (notifier_id) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND notifier_id IS NOT NULL` | the sweep batch and `notifier_count` become index scans |
| `2912be1e` | `getEntityCounts.queue_count` uses `pg_class.reltuples` (`QueueStore/Postgres.hs:154`) | removes the 30 s, 990 GB whole-table `COUNT` on every scrape |
Verified: both indexes are created and used as index-only scans, the schema-dump test passes, and
`smp-server` builds. `queueCount` is consumed only by metrics, logs, and display
(`Server.hs:528,698,815,2369`), so an estimate is safe.
Not fixed by new indexes:
- `ntf_service_queues_count` seq-scans only because of index bloat; `idx_msg_queues_ntf_service_id`
already covers it. `REINDEX` restores the index-only scan, as proven by `rcv_service_queues_count`.
- `rcv_service_queues_count` and the two `services` counts are already cheap.
## Implemented fixes (batch 2)
Migration `20260917_msg_queues_hot` and `MsgStore/Postgres.hs`.
| change | effect |
| --- | --- |
| drop `idx_msg_queues_updated_at_recipient_id`, set `msg_queues` `fillfactor = 80` | `updateQueueTime` updates become HOT, so they rewrite no index entries; removes its index bloat and cuts its WAL |
| remove the dead `updated_at > p_old_queue` filter and its parameter from `expire_old_messages`, matching the `CALL` (`MsgStore/Postgres.hs:113`) | the sweep query runs as an index-only scan on `idx_msg_queues_expire`; `updated_at` is no longer read on the hot path |
| autovacuum reloptions on `msg_queues`, `messages` (and its TOAST), and `services` | keeps dead tuples and bloat low per table (see the table below) |
Verified on PostgreSQL 16 with the daily-active pattern (~11% of queues updated per day): `updateQueueTime`
goes from 0% HOT (indexed `updated_at`) to 100% HOT at `fillfactor = 80` (96.7% at 90), and per-update
WAL drops about 4x. The HOT ratio depends on how many rows per page change before autovacuum reclaims
space, so it is workload-dependent; `fillfactor = 80` reached 100% for this fraction, and updating a much
larger share of queues at once would need a lower value. `fillfactor` applies to pages rewritten after
the change, so the ratio ramps up as the heap turns over, or immediately after `pg_repack`.
Dropping the index regresses the deprecated journal message store's expiration (`foldRecentQueueRecs`,
`Journal.hs:434`) to a sequential scan; this is accepted because that store is being retired. The
Postgres message store does not read `updated_at`.
Autovacuum reloptions applied by the migration:
| table | reloptions | reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `msg_queues` | `fillfactor 80`, `autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor 0.02`, `autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor 0.01`, `autovacuum_vacuum_cost_limit 1000` | HOT headroom; vacuum/analyze at ~2%/1% churn instead of 20%/10%; faster vacuum |
| `messages` (and TOAST) | `autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor 0.02`, `autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor 0.01`, `toast.autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor 0.02` | high insert and delete churn; 152 GB, mostly TOASTed message bodies |
| `services` | `fillfactor 70`, `autovacuum_vacuum_threshold 1000`, `autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor 0` | tiny, very hot table was autovacuumed tens of thousands of times; make updates HOT and vacuum it far less |
## Operator actions
1. Reclaim index bloat (online, no lock; needs free disk near the index size; run largest first):
```
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_updated_at_recipient_id;
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_notifier_id;
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_ntf_service_id;
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_rcv_service_id;
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_sender_id;
REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY smp_server.idx_msg_queues_link_id;
ANALYZE smp_server.msg_queues;
```
Expect `pg_indexes_size('smp_server.msg_queues')` to drop from 104 GB to roughly 12 GB (measured
after reindexing). `ANALYZE` restores the index-only scan for `ntf_service_queues_count`. With the
batch-2 `fillfactor` the index bloat no longer rebuilds, so this is a one-time reclaim.
2. Autovacuum reloptions are applied by the batch-2 migration (`msg_queues`, `messages` and its TOAST,
`services`), so no manual `ALTER TABLE` is needed. Reclaim the current `messages` bloat once with
`pg_repack smp_server.messages` (152 GB heap and TOAST, roughly 30-50 GB reclaimable); running
`pg_repack` on `msg_queues` also makes `fillfactor = 80` effective immediately rather than as pages
turn over. With `fillfactor = 80` the `msg_queues` index bloat no longer rebuilds, so scheduled
reindexing is rarely needed. To automate it anyway, run `reindexdb --concurrently` or `pg_repack`
from a scheduler; `pg_cron` runs each job inside a transaction and cannot execute
`REINDEX ... CONCURRENTLY`, so use `pg_cron` only for `VACUUM`/`ANALYZE` or a non-concurrent
maintenance-window `REINDEX`.
3. Cut WAL and checkpoint pressure (all reloadable, no restart):
```
ALTER SYSTEM SET wal_compression = 'lz4';
ALTER SYSTEM SET max_wal_size = '32GB';
ALTER SYSTEM SET checkpoint_timeout = '30min';
SELECT pg_reload_conf();
```
Fewer checkpoints produce fewer full-page images; `wal_compression` shrinks those that remain.
Together these reduce the WAL written on the primary and shipped by `archive-push`. The message
insert and delete volume itself is fixed by traffic, but most of its WAL cost is amplification
(full-page images and hint-bit writes on bloated pages), which these settings and `REINDEX` reduce.
This is separate from pgBackRest repo-side compression, which does not reduce WAL on the primary.
Verify with `pg_stat_reset_shared('wal')`, wait, then re-check `wal_fpi` and `wal_bytes` in
`pg_stat_wal`.
4. Enable `track_io_timing = on` so disk wait time is measurable in `pg_stat_statements`.
@@ -1,472 +0,0 @@
# XFTP Server PostgreSQL Backend
## Overview
Add PostgreSQL backend support to xftp-server, following the SMP server pattern. Supports bidirectional migration between STM (in-memory with StoreLog) and PostgreSQL backends.
## Goals
- PostgreSQL-backed file metadata storage as an alternative to STM + StoreLog
- Polymorphic server code via `FileStoreClass` typeclass with IO-based methods (following `QueueStoreClass` pattern)
- Bidirectional migration: StoreLog <-> PostgreSQL via CLI commands
- Shared `server_postgres` cabal flag (same flag enables both SMP and XFTP Postgres support)
- INI-based backend selection at runtime
## Architecture
### FileStoreClass Typeclass
IO-based typeclass following the `QueueStoreClass` pattern — each method is a self-contained IO action, with the implementation responsible for its own atomicity (STM backend wraps in `atomically`, Postgres backend uses database transactions):
```haskell
class FileStoreClass s where
type FileStoreConfig s
-- Lifecycle
newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
-- File operations
addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-- Expiration (with LIMIT for Postgres; called in a loop until empty)
expiredFiles :: s -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
-- Storage and stats (for init-time computation)
getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
```
- STM backend: each method wraps its STM transaction in `atomically` internally.
- Postgres backend: each method runs its query via `withDB` / database connection internally.
No polymorphic monad or `runStore` dispatcher needed — unlike `MsgStoreClass`, XFTP file operations are individually atomic and don't require grouping multiple operations into backend-dependent transactions.
### PostgresFileStore Data Type
```haskell
data PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStore
{ dbStore :: DBStore,
dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
}
```
- `dbStore` — connection pool created via `createDBStore`, runs schema migrations on init.
- `dbStoreLog` — optional parallel log file (enabled by `db_store_log` INI setting). When present, every mutation (`addFile`, `setFilePath`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `addRecipient`, `ackFile`) also writes to this log via a `withLog` wrapper. `withLog` is called AFTER the DB operation succeeds (so the log reflects committed state only). Log write failures are non-fatal (logged as warnings, do not fail the DB operation). This provides an audit trail and enables recovery via export.
`closeFileStore` for Postgres calls `closeDBStore` (closes connection pool) then `mapM_ closeStoreLog dbStoreLog` (flushes and closes the parallel log). For STM, it closes the storeLog. Called from a `finally` block during server shutdown, matching SMP's `stopServer` → `closeMsgStore` → `closeQueueStore` pattern.
### STMFileStore Type
After extracting from current `Store.hs`, `STMFileStore` retains the file and recipient maps but no longer owns `usedStorage` (moved to `XFTPEnv`):
```haskell
data STMFileStore = STMFileStore
{ files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey)
}
```
`closeFileStore` for STM is a no-op (TMaps are garbage-collected; the env-level `storeLog` is closed separately by the server).
### Error Handling
Postgres operations follow SMP's `withDB` / `handleDuplicate` pattern:
```haskell
withDB :: Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
withDB op st action =
ExceptT $ E.try (withTransaction (dbStore st) action) >>= either logErr pure
where
logErr :: E.SomeException -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
logErr e = logError ("STORE: " <> err) $> Left INTERNAL
where
err = op <> ", withDB, " <> tshow e
handleDuplicate :: SqlError -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
handleDuplicate e = case constraintViolation e of
Just (UniqueViolation _) -> pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
_ -> E.throwIO e
```
- All DB operations wrapped in `withDB` — catches exceptions, logs, returns `INTERNAL`.
- Unique constraint violations caught by `handleDuplicate` and mapped to `DUPLICATE_`.
- UPDATE operations verified with `assertUpdated` — returns `AUTH` if 0 rows affected (matching SMP pattern, prevents silent failures when WHERE clause doesn't match).
- Critical sections (DB write + TVar update) wrapped in `uninterruptibleMask_` to prevent async exceptions from leaving inconsistent state between DB and TVars.
### FileRec and TVar Fields
`FileRec` retains its `TVar` fields (matching SMP's `PostgresQueue` pattern):
```haskell
data FileRec = FileRec
{ senderId :: SenderId,
fileInfo :: FileInfo,
filePath :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
recipientIds :: TVar (Set RecipientId),
createdAt :: RoundedFileTime,
fileStatus :: TVar ServerEntityStatus
}
```
- **STM backend**: TVars are the source of truth, as currently.
- **Postgres backend**: `getFile` reads from DB and creates a `FileRec` with fresh TVars populated from the DB row (matching SMP's `mkQ` pattern — `newTVarIO` per load). Mutation methods (`setFilePath`, `blockFile`, etc.) update both the DB (persistence) and the TVars (in-session consistency). The `recipientIds` TVar is initialized to `S.empty` — no subquery needed because no server code reads `recipientIds` directly; all recipient operations go through the typeclass methods (`addRecipient`, `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`), which query the `recipients` table for Postgres.
### usedStorage Ownership
`usedStorage :: TVar Int64` moves from the store to `XFTPEnv`. The store typeclass does **not** manage `usedStorage` — it only provides `getUsedStorage` for init-time computation.
- **STM init**: StoreLog replay calls `setFilePath` (which only sets the filePath TVar — the STM `setFilePath` implementation is changed to **not** update `usedStorage`). Similarly, STM `deleteFile` (Store.hs line 117) and `blockFile` (line 125) are changed to **not** update `usedStorage` — the server handles all `usedStorage` adjustments externally. After replay, `getUsedStorage` computes the sum over all file sizes (matching current `countUsedStorage` behavior).
- **Postgres init**: `getUsedStorage` executes `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files`.
- **Runtime**: Server manages `usedStorage` TVar directly for reserve/commit/rollback during uploads, and adjusts after `deleteFile`/`blockFile` calls.
**Note on `getUsedStorage` semantics**: The current STM `countUsedStorage` sums all file sizes unconditionally (including files without `filePath` set, i.e., created but not yet uploaded). The Postgres `getUsedStorage` matches this: `SELECT SUM(file_size) FROM files` (no `WHERE file_path IS NOT NULL`). In practice, orphaned files (created but never uploaded) are rare and short-lived (expired within 48h), so the difference is negligible. A future improvement could filter by `file_path IS NOT NULL` in both backends to reflect actual disk usage more accurately.
### Server.hs Refactoring
`Server.hs` becomes polymorphic over `FileStoreClass s`. Since all typeclass methods are IO, call sites replace `atomically` with direct IO calls to the store.
**Call sites requiring changes** (exhaustive list):
1. **`receiveServerFile`** (line 563): `atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)` → `setFilePath store senderId fPath`. The `reserve` logic (line 551-555) stays as direct TVar manipulation on `usedStorage` from `XFTPEnv`.
2. **`verifyXFTPTransmission`** (line 453): `atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId` — the `getFile` call and subsequent `readTVar fileStatus` are in a single `atomically` block. Refactored to: `getFile st party fId` (IO), then `readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)` from the returned `FileRec` (safe for both backends — STM TVar is the source of truth, Postgres TVar is a fresh snapshot from DB).
3. **`retryAdd`** (line 516): Signature `XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)` → `XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)`. The `atomically` call (line 520) replaced with `liftIO`.
4. **`deleteOrBlockServerFile_`** (line 620): Parameter `FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())` → `FileStoreClass s => s -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())`. The `atomically` call (line 626) removed — the store method is already IO. After the store action, server adjusts `usedStorage` TVar in `XFTPEnv` based on `fileInfo.size`.
5. **`ackFileReception`** (line 605): `atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr` → `deleteRecipient st rId fr`.
6. **Control port `CPDelete`/`CPBlock`** (lines 371, 377): `atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` → `getFile fs SFRecipient fileId`.
7. **`expireServerFiles`** (line 636): Replace per-file `expiredFilePath` iteration with batched `expiredFiles st old batchSize`, which returns `[(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]` — the `Word32` file size is needed so the server can adjust the `usedStorage` TVar after each deletion. Called in a loop until the returned list is empty. The `itemDelay` between files applies to the deletion loop over each batch, not the query itself. STM backend ignores the batch size limit (returns all expired files from TMap scan); Postgres uses `LIMIT`.
8. **`restoreServerStats`** (line 694): `FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store` accesses store fields directly. Refactored to: `usedStorage` from `XFTPEnv` via `asks usedStorage`, file count via `getFileCount store`. STM: `M.size <$> readTVarIO files`. Postgres: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files`.
### Store Config Selection
GADT in `Env.hs`:
```haskell
data XFTPStoreConfig s where
XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
#endif
```
`XFTPEnv` becomes polymorphic:
```haskell
data XFTPEnv s = XFTPEnv
{ config :: XFTPServerConfig,
store :: s,
usedStorage :: TVar Int64,
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
...
}
```
The `M` monad (`ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO`) and all functions in `Server.hs` gain `FileStoreClass s =>` constraints.
**StoreLog lifecycle per backend:**
- **STM mode**: `storeLog = Just sl` (current behavior — append-only log for persistence and recovery).
- **Postgres mode**: `storeLog = Nothing` (main storeLog disabled — Postgres is the source of truth). The optional parallel `dbStoreLog` inside `PostgresFileStore` provides audit/recovery if enabled via `db_store_log` INI setting.
The existing `withFileLog` pattern in Server.hs continues to work unchanged — it maps over `Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)`, which is `Nothing` in Postgres mode so the calls become no-ops.
### Main.hs Store Type Dispatch
The `Start` CLI command gains a `--confirm-migrations` flag (default `MCConsole` — manual prompt, matching SMP's `StartOptions`). For automated deployments, `--confirm-migrations up` auto-applies forward migrations. The import command uses `MCYesUp` (always auto-apply).
Following SMP's existential dispatch pattern (`AStoreType` + `run`), `Main.hs` selects the store type from INI config and dispatches to the polymorphic server:
```haskell
runServer ini = do
let storeType = fromRight "memory" $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini
case storeType of
"memory" -> run $ XSCMemory (enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath)
"database" ->
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
run $ XSCDatabase PostgresFileStoreCfg {..}
#else
exitError "server not compiled with Postgres support"
#endif
_ -> exitError $ "Invalid store_files value: " <> storeType
where
run :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()
run storeCfg = do
env <- newXFTPServerEnv storeCfg config
runReaderT (xftpServer config) env
```
**`newXFTPServerEnv` refactored signature:**
```haskell
newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO (XFTPEnv s)
newXFTPServerEnv storeCfg config = do
(store, storeLog) <- case storeCfg of
XSCMemory storeLogPath -> do
st <- newFileStore ()
sl <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath
pure (st, sl)
XSCDatabase dbCfg -> do
st <- newFileStore dbCfg
pure (st, Nothing) -- main storeLog disabled for Postgres
usedStorage <- newTVarIO =<< getUsedStorage store
...
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, usedStorage, storeLog, ...}
```
### Startup Config Validation
Following SMP's `checkMsgStoreMode` pattern, `Main.hs` validates config before starting:
- **`store_files=database` + StoreLog file exists** (without `db_store_log=on`): Error — "StoreLog file present but store_files is `database`. Use `xftp-server database import` to migrate, or set `db_store_log: on`."
- **`store_files=database` + schema doesn't exist**: Error — "Create schema in PostgreSQL or use `xftp-server database import`."
- **`store_files=memory` + Postgres schema exists**: Warning — "Postgres schema exists but store_files is `memory`. Data in Postgres will not be used."
- **Binary compiled without `server_postgres` + `store_files=database`**: Error — "Server not compiled with Postgres support."
## Module Structure
```
src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/
Store.hs -- FileStoreClass typeclass + shared types (FileRec, FileRecipient, etc.)
Store/
STM.hs -- STMFileStore (extracted from current Store.hs)
Postgres.hs -- PostgresFileStore [CPP-guarded]
Postgres/
Migrations.hs -- Schema migrations [CPP-guarded]
Config.hs -- PostgresFileStoreCfg [CPP-guarded]
StoreLog.hs -- Unchanged (interchange format for both backends + migration)
Env.hs -- XFTPStoreConfig GADT, polymorphic XFTPEnv
Main.hs -- Store selection, migration CLI commands
Server.hs -- Polymorphic over FileStoreClass
```
## PostgreSQL Schema
Initial migration (`20260325_initial`):
```sql
CREATE TABLE files (
sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
file_size INT4 NOT NULL,
file_digest BYTEA NOT NULL,
sender_key BYTEA NOT NULL,
file_path TEXT,
created_at INT8 NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active'
);
CREATE TABLE recipients (
recipient_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL REFERENCES files ON DELETE CASCADE,
recipient_key BYTEA NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX idx_recipients_sender_id ON recipients (sender_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_files_created_at ON files (created_at);
```
- `file_size` is `INT4` matching `Word32` in `FileInfo.size`
- `sender_key` and `recipient_key` stored as `BYTEA` using binary encoding via `C.encodePubKey` / `C.decodePubKey` (matching SMP's `ToField`/`FromField` instances for `APublicAuthKey` — includes algorithm type tag in the binary format)
- `file_path` nullable (set after upload completes via `setFilePath`)
- `ON DELETE CASCADE` for recipients when file is hard-deleted
- `created_at` stores rounded epoch seconds (1-hour precision, `RoundedFileTime`)
- `status` as TEXT via `StrEncoding` (`ServerEntityStatus`: `EntityActive`, `EntityBlocked info`, `EntityOff`)
- Hard deletes (no `deleted_at` column)
- No PL/pgSQL functions needed; `setFilePath` uses `WHERE file_path IS NULL` to prevent duplicate uploads (the `UPDATE` itself acquires a row-level lock)
- `used_storage` computed on startup: `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files` (matches STM `countUsedStorage` — all files, see usedStorage Ownership section)
### Migrations Module
Following SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres/Migrations.hs` pattern:
```haskell
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
( xftpServerMigrations,
)
where
import Data.List (sortOn)
import Data.Text (Text)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
xftpSchemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
xftpSchemaMigrations =
[ ("20260325_initial", m20260325_initial, Nothing)
]
xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]
xftpServerMigrations = sortOn name $ map migration xftpSchemaMigrations
where
migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up, down = down}
m20260325_initial :: Text
m20260325_initial =
[r|
CREATE TABLE files (
sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
...
);
|]
```
The `Migration` type (from `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared`) has fields `{name :: String, up :: Text, down :: Maybe Text}`. Initial migration has `Nothing` for `down`. Future migrations should include `Just down_migration` for rollback support. Called via `createDBStore dbOpts xftpServerMigrations (MigrationConfig confirmMigrations Nothing)`.
### Postgres Operations
Key query patterns:
- **`addFile`**: `INSERT INTO files (...) VALUES (...)`, return `DUPLICATE_` on unique violation.
- **`setFilePath`**: `UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL`, verified with `assertUpdated` (returns `AUTH` if 0 rows affected — file not found or already uploaded). The `WHERE file_path IS NULL` prevents duplicate uploads; the `UPDATE` acquires a row lock implicitly. Only persists the path; `usedStorage` managed by server.
- **`addRecipient`**: `INSERT INTO recipients (...)`, plus check for duplicates. No need for `recipientIds` TVar update — Postgres derives it from the table.
- **`getFile`** (sender): `SELECT ... FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?`, returns auth key from `sender_key` column.
- **`getFile`** (recipient): `SELECT f.*, r.recipient_key FROM recipients r JOIN files f ON ... WHERE r.recipient_id = ?`.
- **`deleteFile`**: `DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?` (recipients cascade).
- **`blockFile`**: `UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?`. When `deleted = True`, the server adjusts `usedStorage` externally (matching current STM behavior where `blockFile` only updates status and storage, not `filePath`).
- **`expiredFiles`**: `SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE created_at + ? < ? LIMIT ?` — batched query replaces per-file iteration, includes `file_size` for `usedStorage` adjustment. Called in a loop until no rows returned.
## INI Configuration
New keys in `[STORE_LOG]` section:
```ini
[STORE_LOG]
enable: on
store_files: memory # memory | database
db_connection: postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store
db_schema: xftp_server
db_pool_size: 10
db_store_log: off
expire_files_hours: 48
```
`store_files` selects the backend (`store_files` rather than `store_queues` because XFTP stores files, not queues):
- `memory` -> `XSCMemory` (current behavior)
- `database` -> `XSCDatabase` (requires `server_postgres` build flag)
### INI Template Generation (`xftp-server init`)
The `iniFileContent` function in `Main.hs` must be updated to generate the new keys in the `[STORE_LOG]` section. Following SMP's `iniDbOpts` pattern with `optDisabled'` (prefixes `"# "` when value equals default), Postgres keys are generated commented out by default:
```ini
[STORE_LOG]
enable: on
# File storage mode: `memory` or `database` (PostgreSQL).
store_files: memory
# Database connection settings for PostgreSQL database (`store_files: database`).
# db_connection: postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store
# db_schema: xftp_server
# db_pool_size: 10
# Write database changes to store log file
# db_store_log: off
expire_files_hours: 48
```
Reuses `iniDBOptions` from `Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI` for runtime parsing (falls back to defaults when keys are commented out or missing). `enableDbStoreLog'` pattern (`settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log"`) controls `dbStoreLogPath`.
### PostgresFileStoreCfg
```haskell
data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
{ dbOpts :: DBOpts,
dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
}
```
No `deletedTTL` (hard deletes).
### Default DB Options
```haskell
defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
defaultXFTPDBOpts =
DBOpts
{ connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
schema = "xftp_server",
poolSize = 10,
createSchema = False
}
```
## Migration CLI
Bidirectional migration via StoreLog as interchange format:
```
xftp-server database import [--database DB_CONN] [--schema DB_SCHEMA] [--pool-size N]
xftp-server database export [--database DB_CONN] [--schema DB_SCHEMA] [--pool-size N]
```
No `--table` flag needed (unlike SMP which has queues/messages/all) — XFTP has a single entity type (files + recipients, always migrated together).
CLI options reuse `dbOptsP` parser from `Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI`.
### Import (StoreLog -> PostgreSQL)
1. Confirm: prompt user with database connection details and StoreLog path
2. Read and replay StoreLog into temporary `STMFileStore`
3. Connect to PostgreSQL, run schema migrations (`createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`)
4. Batch-insert file records into `files` table using PostgreSQL COPY protocol (matching SMP's `batchInsertQueues` pattern for performance). Progress reported every 10k files.
5. Batch-insert recipient records into `recipients` table using COPY protocol
6. Verify counts: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files` / `recipients` — warn if mismatch
7. Rename StoreLog to `.bak` (prevents accidental re-import, preserves original for rollback)
8. Report counts
### Export (PostgreSQL -> StoreLog)
1. Confirm: prompt user with database connection details and output path. Fail if output file already exists.
2. Connect to PostgreSQL
3. Open new StoreLog file for writing
4. Fold over all file records, writing per file (in this order, matching existing `writeFileStore`): `AddFile` (with `ServerEntityStatus` — this preserves `EntityBlocked` state), `AddRecipients`, then `PutFile` (if `file_path` is set)
5. Report counts
Note: `AddFile` carries `ServerEntityStatus` which includes `EntityBlocked info`, so blocking state is preserved through export/import without needing separate `BlockFile` log entries.
File data on disk is untouched by migration — only metadata moves between backends.
## Cabal Integration
Shared `server_postgres` flag. New Postgres modules added to existing conditional block:
```cabal
if flag(server_postgres)
cpp-options: -DdbServerPostgres
exposed-modules:
...existing SMP modules...
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
```
CPP guards (`#if defined(dbServerPostgres)`) in:
- `Store.hs` — Postgres `FromField`/`ToField` instances for XFTP-specific types if needed
- `Env.hs` — `XSCDatabase` constructor
- `Main.hs` — database CLI commands, store selection for `database` mode, Postgres imports
- `Server.hs` — Postgres-specific imports if needed
## Testing
- **Parameterized server tests**: Existing `xftpServerTests` refactored to accept a store type parameter (following SMP's `SpecWith (ASrvTransport, AStoreType)` pattern). The same server tests run against both STM and Postgres backends — STM tests run unconditionally, Postgres tests added under `#if defined(dbServerPostgres)` with `postgressBracket` for database lifecycle (drop → create → test → drop).
- **Unit tests**: `PostgresFileStore` operations — add/get/delete/block/expire, duplicate detection, auth errors
- **Migration round-trip**: STM store → export to StoreLog → import to Postgres → export back → verify StoreLog equality (including blocked file status)
- **Tests location**: in `tests/` alongside existing XFTP tests, guarded by `server_postgres` CPP flag
- **Test database**: PostgreSQL on `localhost:5432`, using a dedicated `xftp_server_test` schema (dropped and recreated per test run via `postgressBracket`, following SMP's test database lifecycle pattern)
- **Test fixtures**: `testXFTPStoreDBOpts :: DBOpts` with `createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`, in `tests/XFTPClient.hs`
@@ -1,648 +0,0 @@
# XFTP PostgreSQL Backend — Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED: Use superpowers-extended-cc:subagent-driven-development (if subagents available) or superpowers-extended-cc:executing-plans to implement this plan. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Add PostgreSQL backend support to xftp-server as an alternative to STM + StoreLog, with bidirectional migration.
**Architecture:** Introduce `FileStoreClass` typeclass (IO-based, following `QueueStoreClass` pattern). Extract current STM store into `Store/STM.hs`, make `Server.hs` polymorphic, then add `Store/Postgres.hs` behind `server_postgres` CPP flag. `usedStorage` moves from store to `XFTPEnv` so the server manages quota tracking externally.
**Tech Stack:** Haskell, postgresql-simple, STM, fourmolu, cabal with CPP flags
**Design spec:** `plans/2026-03-25-xftp-postgres-backend-design.md`
---
## File Structure
**Existing files modified:**
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs` — rewritten: becomes typeclass + shared types
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs` — polymorphic `XFTPEnv s`, `XFTPStoreConfig` GADT
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs` — polymorphic over `FileStoreClass s`
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs` — update for IO store functions
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs` — INI config, dispatch, CLI commands
- `simplexmq.cabal` — new modules
- `tests/XFTPClient.hs` — Postgres test fixtures
- `tests/Test.hs` — Postgres test group
**New files created:**
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs` — `STMFileStore` (extracted from current `Store.hs`)
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs` — `PostgresFileStore` [CPP-guarded]
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs` — `PostgresFileStoreCfg` [CPP-guarded]
- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs` — schema SQL [CPP-guarded]
- `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs` — Postgres store unit tests [CPP-guarded]
---
## Task 1: Move `usedStorage` from `FileStore` to `XFTPEnv`
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Remove `usedStorage` from `FileStore` in `Store.hs`**
1. Remove `usedStorage :: TVar Int64` field from `FileStore` record (line 47).
2. Remove `usedStorage <- newTVarIO 0` from `newFileStore` (line 75) and drop the field from the record construction (line 76).
3. In `setFilePath` (line 92-97): remove `modifyTVar' (usedStorage st) (+ fromIntegral (size fileInfo))` — keep only `writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)`. Change pattern from `\FileRec {fileInfo, filePath}` to `\FileRec {filePath}` (fileInfo is now unused — `-Wunused-matches` error).
4. In `deleteFile` (line 112-119): remove `modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)`. Change outer pattern match from `FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage}` to `FileStore {files, recipients}`. Change inner pattern from `Just FileRec {fileInfo, recipientIds}` to `Just FileRec {recipientIds}` (`fileInfo` is now unused — `-Wunused-matches` error).
5. In `blockFile` (line 122-127): remove `when deleted $ modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)`. Change pattern match from `st@FileStore {usedStorage}` to `st`. The `deleted` parameter and `fileInfo` in the inner pattern become unused — prefix with `_` or remove from pattern to avoid `-Wunused-matches`.
- [ ] **Step 2: Add `usedStorage` to `XFTPEnv` in `Env.hs`**
1. Add `usedStorage :: TVar Int64` field to `XFTPEnv` record (between `store` and `storeLog`, line 93).
2. In `newXFTPServerEnv` (line 112-126): replace lines 117-118:
```
used <- countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
atomically $ writeTVar (usedStorage store) used
```
with:
```
usedStorage <- newTVarIO =<< countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
```
3. Add `usedStorage` to the `pure XFTPEnv {..}` construction.
- [ ] **Step 3: Update all `usedStorage` access sites in `Server.hs`**
1. Line 552: `us <- asks $ usedStorage . store` → `us <- asks usedStorage`.
2. Line 569: `us <- asks $ usedStorage . store` → `us <- asks usedStorage`.
3. Line 639: `usedStart <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st` → `usedStart <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage`.
4. Line 647: `usedEnd <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st` → `usedEnd <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage`.
5. Line 694: `FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store` → split into `FileStore {files} <- asks store` and `usedStorage <- asks usedStorage`.
6. In `deleteOrBlockServerFile_` (line 620): after `void $ atomically $ storeAction st`, add usedStorage adjustment — `us <- asks usedStorage` then `atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)` when file had a path (check `path` from `readTVarIO filePath` earlier in the function).
- [ ] **Step 4: Build and verify**
Run: `cabal build`
- [ ] **Step 5: Run existing tests**
Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
git commit -m "refactor(xftp): move usedStorage from FileStore to XFTPEnv"
```
---
## Task 2: Add `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`, `expiredFiles` functions
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add three new functions to `Store.hs`**
1. Add to exports: `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`, `expiredFiles`.
2. Remove `expiredFilePath` from exports AND delete the function definition (dead code → `-Wunused-binds` error). Also remove `($>>=)` from import `Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))` → `Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM)` — `$>>=` was only used by `expiredFilePath`.
3. Add import: `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` (needed for `M.foldl'` in `getUsedStorage` and `M.toList` in `expiredFiles`).
4. Implement:
```haskell
getUsedStorage :: FileStore -> IO Int64
getUsedStorage FileStore {files} =
M.foldl' (\acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} -> acc + fromIntegral size) 0 <$> readTVarIO files
getFileCount :: FileStore -> IO Int
getFileCount FileStore {files} = M.size <$> readTVarIO files
expiredFiles :: FileStore -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
expiredFiles FileStore {files} old _limit = do
fs <- readTVarIO files
fmap catMaybes . forM (M.toList fs) $ \(sId, FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}, filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt}) ->
if createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
then do
path <- readTVarIO filePath
pure $ Just (sId, path, size)
else pure Nothing
```
5. Add imports: `Data.Maybe (catMaybes)`, `Data.Word (Word32)` (note: `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` already added in item 3).
- [ ] **Step 2: Replace `countUsedStorage` in `Env.hs`**
1. Replace `countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)` with `getUsedStorage store` in `newXFTPServerEnv`.
2. Remove `countUsedStorage` function definition and its export.
3. Remove `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` import if no longer used.
- [ ] **Step 3: Update `restoreServerStats` in `Server.hs` to use `getFileCount`**
In `restoreServerStats` (line 694-696): replace `FileStore {files} <- asks store` and `_filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files` with `st <- asks store` and `_filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st` (eliminates the `FileStore` pattern match — `files` binding no longer needed).
- [ ] **Step 4: Replace `expireServerFiles` iteration in `Server.hs`**
1. Replace the body of `expireServerFiles` (lines 636-660). Remove `files' <- readTVarIO (files st)` and the `forM_ (M.keys files')` loop.
2. New body: call `expiredFiles st old 10000` in a loop. For each `(sId, filePath_, fileSize)` in returned list: apply `itemDelay`, remove disk file if present, call `atomically $ deleteFile st sId`, adjust `usedStorage` TVar by `fileSize`, increment `filesExpired` stat. Loop until `expiredFiles` returns `[]`.
3. Remove `Data.Map.Strict` import from Server.hs if no longer needed (was used for `M.size` and `M.keys` — now replaced by `getFileCount` and `expiredFiles`).
- [ ] **Step 5: Build and verify**
Run: `cabal build`
- [ ] **Step 6: Run existing tests**
Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
git commit -m "refactor(xftp): add getUsedStorage, getFileCount, expiredFiles store functions"
```
---
## Task 3: Change `Store.hs` functions from STM to IO
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Change all Store.hs function signatures from STM to IO**
For each of: `addFile`, `setFilePath`, `addRecipient`, `getFile`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`:
1. Change return type from `STM (Either XFTPErrorType ...)` to `IO (Either XFTPErrorType ...)` (or `STM ()` to `IO ()` for `deleteRecipient`).
2. Wrap the function body in `atomically $ do ...`.
3. Keep `withFile` and `newFileRec` as internal STM helpers (called inside the `atomically` blocks).
- [ ] **Step 2: Update Server.hs call sites — remove `atomically` wrappers**
1. Line 563 (`receiveServerFile`): change `atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)` → add `st <- asks store` then `void $ liftIO $ setFilePath st senderId fPath` (design call site #1 — `store` is not in scope in `receiveServerFile`'s `receive` helper, so bind via `asks`; `void` avoids `-Wunused-do-bind` warning on the `Either` result).
2. Line 453 (`verifyXFTPTransmission`): split `atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId` into: `liftIO (getFile st party fId)` (IO→M lift), then pattern match on result, use `readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)` instead of `readTVar`.
3. Lines 371, 377 (control port `CPDelete`/`CPBlock`): change `ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` → `ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` (inside `unliftIO u $ do` block which runs in M monad — `liftIO` required to lift IO into M).
4. Line 508 (`addFile` in `createFile`): the `ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts EntityActive` — `addFile` is now IO, `ExceptT` wraps IO directly. Remove any `atomically`.
5. Line 514 (`addRecipient`): same — `ExceptT . addRecipient st sId` works directly in IO.
6. Line 516 (`retryAdd`): change parameter type from `(XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a))` to `(XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a))`. Line 520: change `atomically (add fId)` to `liftIO (add fId)`.
7. Line 605 (`ackFileReception`): change `atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr` to `liftIO $ deleteRecipient st rId fr`.
8. Line 620 (`deleteOrBlockServerFile_`): change third parameter type from `(FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ()))` to `(FileStore -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ()))`. Line 626: change `void $ atomically $ storeAction st` to `void $ liftIO $ storeAction st`.
9. `expireServerFiles` `delete` helper: change `atomically $ deleteFile st sId` to `liftIO $ deleteFile st sId` (deleteFile is now IO; `liftIO` required because the helper runs in M monad, not IO).
- [ ] **Step 3: Update `StoreLog.hs` — remove `atomically` from replay**
In `readFileStore` (line 93), function `addToStore`:
1. Change `atomically (addToStore lr)` to `addToStore lr` — store functions are now IO.
2. The `addToStore` body calls `addFile`, `setFilePath`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `ackFile` — all IO now, no `atomically` needed.
3. For `AddRecipients`: `runExceptT $ mapM_ (ExceptT . addRecipient st sId) rcps` — `addRecipient` returns `IO (Either ...)`, so `ExceptT . addRecipient st sId` works directly.
- [ ] **Step 4: Build and verify**
Run: `cabal build`
- [ ] **Step 5: Run existing tests**
Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
git commit -m "refactor(xftp): change file store operations from STM to IO"
```
---
## Task 4: Extract `FileStoreClass` typeclass, move STM impl to `Store/STM.hs`
**Files:**
- Rewrite: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
- Modify: `simplexmq.cabal`
- [ ] **Step 1: Create `Store/STM.hs` — move all implementation code**
1. Create directory `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/`.
2. Create `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs`.
3. Move from `Store.hs`: `FileStore` data type (rename to `STMFileStore`), all function implementations, internal helpers (`withFile`, `newFileRec`), all STM-specific imports.
4. Rename all `FileStore` references to `STMFileStore` in the new file.
5. Module declaration: `module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` exporting only `STMFileStore (..)` — do NOT export standalone functions (`addFile`, `setFilePath`, etc.) to avoid name collisions with the typeclass methods from `Store.hs`.
- [ ] **Step 2: Rewrite `Store.hs` as the typeclass module**
1. Add `{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}` pragma to `Store.hs` (required for `type FileStoreConfig s` associated type).
2. Keep in `Store.hs`: `FileRec (..)`, `FileRecipient (..)`, `RoundedFileTime`, `fileTimePrecision` definitions and their `StrEncoding` instance.
3. Add `FileStoreClass` typeclass:
```haskell
class FileStoreClass s where
type FileStoreConfig s
-- Lifecycle
newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
-- File operations
addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-- Expiration
expiredFiles :: s -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
-- Stats
getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
```
4. Do NOT re-export from `Store/STM.hs` — this would create a circular module dependency (Store.hs imports Store/STM.hs, Store/STM.hs imports Store.hs). Consumers must import `Store.STM` directly where they need `STMFileStore`.
5. Remove all STM-specific imports that are no longer needed.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add `FileStoreClass` instance in `Store/STM.hs`**
1. Import `FileStoreClass` from `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store`.
2. Inline all implementations directly in the instance body (do NOT delegate to standalone functions — the standalone names collide with typeclass method names, causing ambiguous occurrences for importers):
```haskell
instance FileStoreClass STMFileStore where
type FileStoreConfig STMFileStore = ()
newFileStore () = do
files <- TM.emptyIO
recipients <- TM.emptyIO
pure STMFileStore {files, recipients}
closeFileStore _ = pure ()
addFile st sId fileInfo createdAt status = atomically $ ...
setFilePath st sId fPath = atomically $ ...
-- ... (each method's body is the existing function body, inlined)
```
3. Remove the standalone top-level function definitions — they are now instance methods. Keep only `withFile` and `newFileRec` as internal helpers used by the instance methods.
- [ ] **Step 4: Update importers**
1. `Env.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM (STMFileStore (..))`. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in `XFTPEnv` type and `newXFTPServerEnv`. Change `store <- newFileStore` to `store <- newFileStore ()` (typeclass method now takes `FileStoreConfig STMFileStore` which is `()`). Keep `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store` for `FileRec`, `FileRecipient`, `FileStoreClass`, etc.
2. `Server.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM`. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in any explicit type annotations. Import `FileStoreClass` from `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store`.
3. `StoreLog.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` to access concrete `STMFileStore` type and store functions used during log replay. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in `readWriteFileStore` and `writeFileStore` parameter types.
- [ ] **Step 5: Update cabal file**
Add `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` to `exposed-modules` in the `!flag(client_library)` section, alongside existing XFTP server modules.
- [ ] **Step 6: Build and verify**
Run: `cabal build`
- [ ] **Step 7: Run existing tests**
Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
- [ ] **Step 8: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs simplexmq.cabal
git commit -m "refactor(xftp): extract FileStoreClass typeclass, move STM impl to Store.STM"
```
---
## Task 5: Make `XFTPEnv` and `Server.hs` polymorphic over `FileStoreClass`
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
- Modify: `tests/XFTPClient.hs` (if it calls `runXFTPServerBlocking` directly)
- [ ] **Step 1: Make `XFTPEnv` polymorphic in `Env.hs`**
1. Add `XFTPStoreConfig` GADT: `data XFTPStoreConfig s where XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore`.
2. Change `data XFTPEnv` to `data XFTPEnv s` — field `store :: FileStore` becomes `store :: s`.
3. Change `newXFTPServerEnv :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO XFTPEnv` to `newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO (XFTPEnv s)`.
4. Pattern match on `XSCMemory storeLogPath` in `newXFTPServerEnv` body. Create store via `newFileStore ()`, storeLog via `mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath`.
- [ ] **Step 2: Make `Server.hs` polymorphic**
1. Change `type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a` to `type M s a = ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO a`.
2. Add `FileStoreClass s =>` constraint to all functions using `M s a`. Use `forall s.` in signatures of functions that have `where`-block bindings with `M s` type annotations — `ScopedTypeVariables` requires explicit `forall` to bring `s` into scope for inner type signatures (matching SMP's `smpServer :: forall s. MsgStoreClass s => ...` pattern). Full list: `xftpServer`, `processRequest`, `verifyXFTPTransmission`, `processXFTPRequest` and all its `where`-bound functions (`createFile`, `addRecipients`, `receiveServerFile`, `sendServerFile`, `deleteServerFile`, `ackFileReception`, `retryAdd`, `addFileRetry`, `addRecipientRetry`), `deleteServerFile_`, `blockServerFile`, `deleteOrBlockServerFile_`, `expireServerFiles`, `randomId`, `getFileId`, `withFileLog`, `incFileStat`, `saveServerStats`, `restoreServerStats`, `randomDelay` (inside `#ifdef slow_servers` CPP block). Also update `encodeXftp` (line 236) and `runCPClient` (line 339) which use explicit `ReaderT XFTPEnv IO` instead of the `M` alias — change to `ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO`.
3. Change `runXFTPServerBlocking` and `runXFTPServer` to take `XFTPStoreConfig s` parameter.
4. Add `closeFileStore store` call to the server shutdown path (in the `finally` block or `stopServer` equivalent — after saving stats, before logging "Server stopped"). This ensures Postgres connection pool and `dbStoreLog` are properly closed. For STM this is a no-op.
- [ ] **Step 3: Update `Main.hs` dispatch**
1. In `runServer`: construct `XSCMemory (enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath)`.
2. Add dispatch function that calls the updated `runXFTPServer` (which creates `started` internally):
```haskell
run :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()
run storeCfg = runXFTPServer storeCfg serverConfig
```
3. Call `run` with the `XSCMemory` config.
- [ ] **Step 4: Update test helper if needed**
If `tests/XFTPClient.hs` calls `runXFTPServerBlocking` directly, update the call to pass an `XSCMemory` config. Check the `withXFTPServer` / `serverBracket` helper.
- [ ] **Step 5: Build and verify**
Run: `cabal build && cabal build test:simplexmq-test`
- [ ] **Step 6: Run existing tests**
Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs simplexmq.cabal
git commit -m "refactor(xftp): make XFTPEnv and server polymorphic over FileStoreClass"
```
---
## Task 6: Add Postgres config, migrations, and store skeleton
**Files:**
- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs`
- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs`
- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- Modify: `simplexmq.cabal`
- [ ] **Step 1: Create `Store/Postgres/Config.hs`**
```haskell
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
( PostgresFileStoreCfg (..),
defaultXFTPDBOpts,
)
where
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
{ dbOpts :: DBOpts,
dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
}
defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
defaultXFTPDBOpts =
DBOpts
{ connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
schema = "xftp_server",
poolSize = 10,
createSchema = False
}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Create `Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs`**
Full migration module with `xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]` and `m20260325_initial` containing CREATE TABLE SQL for `files` and `recipients` tables plus indexes. Follow SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres/Migrations.hs` pattern exactly: tuple list → `sortOn name . map migration`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Create `Store/Postgres.hs` with stub instance**
1. Define `PostgresFileStore` with `dbStore :: DBStore` and `dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)`.
2. `instance FileStoreClass PostgresFileStore` with `error "not implemented"` for all methods except `newFileStore` (calls `createDBStore` + opens `dbStoreLog`) and `closeFileStore` (closes both). `type FileStoreConfig PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStoreCfg`.
3. Add `withDB`, `handleDuplicate`, `assertUpdated`, `withLog` helpers.
- [ ] **Step 4: Add `XSCDatabase` GADT constructor in `Env.hs` (CPP-guarded)**
```haskell
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config (PostgresFileStoreCfg)
#endif
data XFTPStoreConfig s where
XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
#endif
```
- [ ] **Step 5: Update cabal**
Add to existing `if flag(server_postgres)` block:
```
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
```
- [ ] **Step 6: Build both ways**
Run: `cabal build && cabal build -fserver_postgres`
- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs simplexmq.cabal
git commit -m "feat(xftp): add PostgreSQL store skeleton with schema migration"
```
---
## Task 7: Implement `PostgresFileStore` operations
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Implement `addFile`**
`INSERT INTO files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, status) VALUES (?,?,?,?,NULL,?,?)`. Catch unique violation with `handleDuplicate` → `DUPLICATE_`. Call `withLog "addFile"` after.
- [ ] **Step 2: Implement `getFile`**
For `SFSender`: `SELECT ... FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?`. Construct `FileRec` with `newTVarIO` per TVar field. `recipientIds = S.empty`.
For `SFRecipient`: `SELECT f.*, r.recipient_key FROM recipients r JOIN files f ON r.sender_id = f.sender_id WHERE r.recipient_id = ?`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implement `setFilePath`**
`UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL`. Use `assertUpdated`. Call `withLog "setFilePath"`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Implement `addRecipient`**
`INSERT INTO recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) VALUES (?,?,?)`. `handleDuplicate` → `DUPLICATE_`. Call `withLog "addRecipient"`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Implement `deleteFile`, `blockFile`**
`deleteFile`: `DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?` (CASCADE). `withLog "deleteFile"`.
`blockFile`: `UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?`. `assertUpdated`. `withLog "blockFile"`.
- [ ] **Step 6: Implement `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`**
`deleteRecipient`: `DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?`. `withLog "deleteRecipient"`.
`ackFile`: same + return `Left AUTH` if 0 rows.
- [ ] **Step 7: Implement `expiredFiles`, `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`**
`expiredFiles`: `SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE created_at + ? < ? LIMIT ?`.
`getUsedStorage`: `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files`.
`getFileCount`: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files`.
- [ ] **Step 8: Add `ToField`/`FromField` instances**
For `RoundedFileTime` (Int64 wrapper), `ServerEntityStatus` (Text via StrEncoding), `C.APublicAuthKey` (Binary via `encodePubKey`/`decodePubKey`). Check SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres.hs` for existing instances to import.
- [ ] **Step 9: Wrap mutation operations in `uninterruptibleMask_`**
Operations that combine a DB write with a TVar update (e.g., `getFile` constructs `FileRec` with `newTVarIO`) must be wrapped in `E.uninterruptibleMask_` to prevent async exceptions from leaving inconsistent state. Follow SMP's `addQueue_`, `deleteStoreQueue` pattern.
- [ ] **Step 10: Build**
Run: `cabal build -fserver_postgres`
- [ ] **Step 11: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs
git commit -m "feat(xftp): implement PostgresFileStore operations"
```
---
## Task 8: Add INI config, Main.hs dispatch, startup validation
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Update `iniFileContent` in `Main.hs`**
Add to `[STORE_LOG]` section: `store_files: memory`, commented-out `db_connection`, `db_schema`, `db_pool_size`, `db_store_log` keys. Follow SMP's `optDisabled'` pattern for commented defaults.
- [ ] **Step 2: Add `StartOptions` and `--confirm-migrations` flag**
```haskell
data StartOptions = StartOptions
{ confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
}
```
Add to `Start` command parser with default `MCConsole`. Thread through to `runServer`.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add store_files INI parsing and CPP-guarded Postgres dispatch**
In `runServer`: read `store_files` from INI (`fromRight "memory" $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini`). Add `"database"` branch (CPP-guarded) that constructs `PostgresFileStoreCfg` using `iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts` and `enableDbStoreLog'` pattern. Non-postgres build: `exitError`.
- [ ] **Step 4: Add `XSCDatabase` branch in `newXFTPServerEnv` (`Env.hs`)**
CPP-guarded pattern match on `XSCDatabase dbCfg`: `newFileStore dbCfg`, `storeLog = Nothing`.
- [ ] **Step 5: Add startup config validation**
Add `checkFileStoreMode` (CPP-guarded) before `run`: validate conflicting storeLog file + database mode, missing schema, etc. per design doc.
- [ ] **Step 6: Build both ways**
Run: `cabal build && cabal build -fserver_postgres`
- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
git commit -m "feat(xftp): add PostgreSQL INI config, store dispatch, startup validation"
```
---
## Task 9: Add database import/export CLI commands
**Files:**
- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add `Database` CLI command (CPP-guarded)**
Add `Database StoreCmd DBOpts` constructor to `CliCommand`. Add `database` subcommand parser with `import`/`export` subcommands + `dbOptsP defaultXFTPDBOpts`.
- [ ] **Step 2: Implement `importFileStoreToDatabase`**
1. `confirmOrExit` with database details.
2. Create temporary `STMFileStore`, replay StoreLog via `readWriteFileStore`.
3. Create `PostgresFileStore` with `createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`.
4. Batch-insert files using PostgreSQL COPY protocol. Progress every 10k.
5. Batch-insert recipients using COPY protocol.
6. Verify counts: `SELECT COUNT(*)` — warn on mismatch.
7. Rename StoreLog to `.bak`.
8. Report counts.
- [ ] **Step 3: Implement `exportDatabaseToStoreLog`**
1. `confirmOrExit`. Fail if output file exists.
2. Create `PostgresFileStore` from config.
3. Open StoreLog for writing.
4. Fold over file records: write `AddFile` (with status), `AddRecipients`, `PutFile` per file.
5. Close StoreLog, report counts.
- [ ] **Step 4: Build**
Run: `cabal build -fserver_postgres`
- [ ] **Step 5: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
git commit -m "feat(xftp): add database import/export CLI commands"
```
---
## Task 10: Add Postgres tests
**Files:**
- Modify: `tests/XFTPClient.hs`
- Modify: `tests/Test.hs`
- Create: `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs`
- [ ] **Step 1: Add test fixtures in `tests/XFTPClient.hs`**
```haskell
testXFTPStoreDBOpts :: DBOpts
testXFTPStoreDBOpts =
DBOpts
{ connstr = "postgresql://test_xftp_server_user@/test_xftp_server_db",
schema = "xftp_server_test",
poolSize = 10,
createSchema = True
}
```
Add `testXFTPDBConnectInfo :: ConnectInfo` matching the connection string.
- [ ] **Step 2: Add Postgres server test group in `tests/Test.hs`**
CPP-guarded block that runs existing `xftpServerTests` with Postgres store config, wrapped in `postgressBracket testXFTPDBConnectInfo`. Parameterize `withXFTPServer` to accept store config if needed.
- [ ] **Step 3: Create `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs` — unit tests**
Test `PostgresFileStore` operations directly:
- `addFile` + `getFile SFSender` round-trip.
- `addFile` duplicate → `DUPLICATE_`.
- `getFile` nonexistent → `AUTH`.
- `setFilePath` + verify `WHERE file_path IS NULL` guard.
- `addRecipient` + `getFile SFRecipient` round-trip.
- `deleteFile` cascades recipients.
- `blockFile` + verify status.
- `expiredFiles` batch semantics.
- `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount` correctness.
- [ ] **Step 4: Add migration round-trip test**
Create `STMFileStore` with test data (files + recipients + blocked status) → export to StoreLog → import to Postgres → export back → compare StoreLog files byte-for-byte.
- [ ] **Step 5: Build and run tests**
```bash
cabal build -fserver_postgres test:simplexmq-test
cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/" -fserver_postgres
```
- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
```bash
fourmolu -i tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs
git add tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs tests/Test.hs
git commit -m "test(xftp): add PostgreSQL backend tests"
```
-126
View File
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
# BBS+ Bindings for simplexmq
Haskell FFI bindings to libbbs for BBS+ signatures. General-purpose - the module knows nothing about specific applications.
## How BBS+ works
BBS+ signs a fixed list of N messages. Each message is an arbitrary byte array. The signer signs all N messages at once with one signature.
The holder of the signature can then generate a proof that selectively discloses some messages and hides others. The verifier learns the disclosed messages and confirms they were signed by the signer, but learns nothing about the hidden messages. Different proofs from the same signature are unlinkable.
Key constraint: the total number of messages N is fixed at signing time. The verifier must know N. A proof generated from a 3-message signature cannot be verified as a 2-message proof.
## Types
```haskell
newtype BBSSecretKey = BBSSecretKey ByteString -- 32 bytes
newtype BBSPublicKey = BBSPublicKey ByteString -- 96 bytes (BLS12-381 G2 point)
newtype BBSSignature = BBSSignature ByteString -- 80 bytes
newtype BBSProof = BBSProof ByteString -- 272 + 32 * numUndisclosed bytes
newtype BBSHeader = BBSHeader ByteString -- always-disclosed context (e.g. protocol identifier)
newtype BBSPresHeader = BBSPresHeader ByteString -- random nonce for proof unlinkability
```
All newtypes get StrEncoding (base64url), ToJSON/FromJSON (via strToJSON/strParseJSON), Eq, Show.
## Functions
```haskell
bbsKeyGen :: IO (Either String BBSKeyPair) -- BBSKeyPair = (BBSPublicKey, BBSSecretKey)
-- pk is derived from sk internally, so it is not a parameter
bbsSign
:: BBSSecretKey
-> BBSHeader -- always-disclosed context
-> [ByteString] -- all N messages
-> IO (Either String BBSSignature)
-- C order: pk, signature, header, presentation_header, disclosed_indexes, messages
bbsProofGen
:: BBSPublicKey
-> BBSSignature
-> BBSHeader -- must match what was signed
-> BBSPresHeader -- random nonce bound into the proof
-> [Int] -- disclosed indexes (0-based)
-> [ByteString] -- all N messages (needed internally, hidden ones not revealed in proof)
-> IO (Either String BBSProof)
-- C order: pk, proof, header, presentation_header, disclosed_indexes, n, messages
bbsProofVerify
:: BBSPublicKey
-> BBSProof
-> BBSHeader -- must match what was signed
-> BBSPresHeader -- must match what was used in bbsProofGen
-> [Int] -- disclosed indexes
-> Int -- total message count N
-> [ByteString] -- disclosed messages only
-> IO Bool
```
## How applications use it
An application defines:
- A message layout: which index means what
- Which indexes are disclosed vs hidden
- How to encode application values as ByteString messages
### Badge example (in simplex-chat, not in this module)
Message layout (always 3 messages):
- Index 0: master secret (32 random bytes) - HIDDEN
- Index 1: expiry (UTF-8 encoded timestamp string) - DISCLOSED
- Index 2: badge type (UTF-8 encoded, e.g. "supporter") - DISCLOSED
Signing (v2, on the server):
```
bbsSign sk header [ms, encodeUtf8 "2026-07-31", encodeUtf8 "supporter"]
```
Proof generation (v2, on the client):
```
bbsProofGen pk sig header presHeader [1, 2] [ms, encodeUtf8 "2026-07-31", encodeUtf8 "supporter"]
```
Proof verification (v1, on the recipient):
```
bbsProofVerify pk proof header presHeader 3 [1, 2] [encodeUtf8 "2026-07-31", encodeUtf8 "supporter"]
```
The recipient only sees the proof, presentationHeader, expiry string, and badge type string. They verify these were signed by the server (pk is hardcoded). They never see the master secret.
Expiry is always present as a string. Monthly badges use a date like `"2026-07-31"`, lifetime badges use `"lifetime"`. BBS+ doesn't interpret the bytes - expiry semantics are the application's responsibility. This keeps the message count fixed at 3 for all badge types.
## libbbs C API mapping
```c
int bbs_keygen_full(ciphersuite, sk, pk)
int bbs_sign(ciphersuite, sk, pk, signature, header, header_len, n, messages, message_lens)
int bbs_proof_gen(ciphersuite, pk, signature, proof, header, header_len, presentation_header, presentation_header_len, disclosed_indexes, disclosed_indexes_len, n, messages, message_lens)
int bbs_proof_verify(ciphersuite, pk, proof, proof_len, header, header_len, presentation_header, presentation_header_len, disclosed_indexes, disclosed_indexes_len, n, messages, message_lens)
```
We use `bbs_sha256_ciphersuite`. The header parameter is exposed in all Haskell functions - the application decides what to put there. Tests use `"SimpleX"` as header.
The `presentation_header` parameter is what we call `presentationHeader`.
In `bbs_proof_verify`, the `n` parameter is the total number of messages (not the number of disclosed messages). The `messages` array contains only the disclosed messages, and `disclosed_indexes` maps each to its position in the original message list.
## Build
Submodules in cbits/:
- `cbits/libbbs` - https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/libbbs
- `cbits/blst` - https://github.com/supranational/blst (libbbs dependency)
C sources in cabal: `cbits/blst/src/server.c`, `cbits/blst/build/assembly.S`, libbbs source files.
Include dirs: `cbits/blst/bindings/`, `cbits/blst/src/`, `cbits/libbbs/include/`, `cbits/libbbs/src/`.
C flags: `-D__BLST_PORTABLE__` for cross-CPU-generation compatibility.
## Tests
- Keygen produces keys of correct size
- Sign + proofGen + proofVerify roundtrip succeeds
- Tampered proof fails verification
- Tampered disclosed message fails verification
- Wrong public key fails verification
- Two proofs from same credential with different nonces both verify
- Proof size matches expected (272 + 32 * numUndisclosed)
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
## Root cause: orphaned `Sub` entries in the service client's `subscriptions` map
**The leak is service-specific and was introduced by PR #1667 "messaging services" (`f0b7a4be`).** A long-lived messaging-service connection accumulates per-queue `Sub` records in its `Client.subscriptions` map that are **never removed** when the associated queues are deleted or unassociated — only the counter is decremented. Over normal queue churn the map grows monotonically for the entire lifetime of the service connection.
### The proof — an asymmetry between two handlers in `serverThread`
Both individual queue subscriptions and service subscriptions store a `Sub` per queue in `Client.subscriptions` (= `clientSubs` for the SMP subscriber thread, wired at `Server.hs:189`). When a queue ends/is deleted, the two paths diverge:
**Individual subscriber — entry IS removed** (`Server.hs:332`, `346`):
```haskell
CSAEndSub qId -> atomically (endSub c qId) >>= a unsub_ -- :332
...
endSub c qId = TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c) >>= (removeWhenNoSubs c $>) -- :346
```
**Service subscriber — entry is NOT removed** (`Server.hs:336-340`):
```haskell
CSAEndServiceSub qId -> atomically $ do
modifyTVar' (clientServiceSubs c) decrease -- decrements serviceSubsCount
modifyTVar' totalServiceSubs decrease -- decrements global count
where decrease = subtractServiceSubs (1, queueIdHash qId)
-- never touches (clientSubs c) — the Sub for qId stays forever
```
### Where the orphaned entries are added (both new in this PR)
- `Server.hs:1860-1862` — on service subscribe (`SSUB`), one `Sub` inserted per queue that has a pending message.
- `Server.hs:2039-2043` (`newServiceDeliverySub`) — on **every** `SEND` to a service-associated queue with no existing sub, a `Sub` is inserted into the service client's `subscriptions`. After delivery the thread state resets to `NoSub` (`:2069`) but the map entry remains as a "already delivering" marker (`:1856-1859`).
### Why they leak
The only places the service client's `subscriptions` map is cleared are:
- `clientDisconnected` — `swapTVar subscriptions M.empty` (`Server.hs:1097`) — only on disconnect.
- `CSADecreaseSubs` — `swapTVar (clientSubs c) M.empty` (`Server.hs:343`) — only on full service takeover by another connection.
- `delQueueAndMsgs` — `TM.lookupDelete entId $ subscriptions clnt` (`Server.hs:2164`) — but `clnt` here is **the recipient deleting its own queue, not the service client**. The service's entry for that queue is reached only via the `CSDeleted → endServiceSub → CSAEndServiceSub` path (`Server.hs:306, 313, 336`), which decrements the counter but leaves the map entry.
**Concrete scenario (fully traced):** Service `S` subscribes (`SSUB`) and stays connected for days. Recipient `R` owns service-associated queue `Q`. A `SEND` to `Q` inserts a `Sub` into `S.subscriptions[Q]` (`:2042`). `R` later deletes `Q` → `delQueueAndMsgs` runs on `R`'s connection, removes `Q` from `R.subscriptions`, decrements counters, enqueues `CSDeleted Q (Just S)` (`:2167`) → `serverThread` runs `CSAEndServiceSub Q` for `S` (`:336`), decrementing `S.serviceSubsCount` but **leaving `S.subscriptions[Q]` in place**. Net: one orphaned `Sub` (record + 2 TVars) per service-associated queue ever deleted/unassociated, never reclaimed until `S` disconnects. The logical counter `serviceSubsCount` correctly drops, so the map size diverges from the counter — making the leak invisible to the existing service-sub metric.
### Verdict
This is a deterministic, static-provable memory leak — no production logging needed to confirm the existence; the asymmetry between `CSAEndSub` (removes) and `CSAEndServiceSub` (doesn't) is the smoking gun. It is specific to messaging-service certificate clients, which is exactly the population added by the services/certificate PR.
### Secondary findings (lower impact, same PR area, not the primary cause)
- **`forkClient` register-after-fork race** (`Server.hs:1356-1359`): if the forked action's `finally` delete (`:1358`) runs before the parent's `IM.insert` (`:1359`), a `Weak ThreadId` of a dead thread is left in `endThreads` until disconnect. Pre-existing, tiny per-entry, but exercised far more by the PR's higher END/DELD volume.
- **Wrong-client counter decrement** (`Server.hs:2166`): `delQueueAndMsgs` decrements `serviceSubsCount` of the *deleting* client, not the service; harmless for non-service deleters (floored at 0) but corrupts accounting if a service deletes its own queue.
---
### Recommended fix (mirror `endSub` in the service path)
Make `CSAEndServiceSub` also delete the per-queue `Sub` and cancel its delivery thread, exactly as `CSAEndSub`/`endSub` do for individual subscribers. Roughly:
```haskell
CSAEndServiceSub qId -> do
s_ <- atomically $ do
modifyTVar' (clientServiceSubs c) decrease
modifyTVar' totalServiceSubs decrease
TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c) <* removeWhenNoSubs c
forM_ unsub_ $ \unsub -> mapM_ unsub s_
where decrease = subtractServiceSubs (1, queueIdHash qId)
```
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
# Service RPC implementation plan
RFC: [../rfcs/2026-07-11-service-rpc.md](../rfcs/2026-07-11-service-rpc.md)
Depends on: [2026-07-12-address-dr-implementation.md](2026-07-12-address-dr-implementation.md). RPC establishes the double ratchet from the address exactly as address-DR does; this is the RPC layer on top of it.
**Status: implemented and tested in this repo.** Service-side idempotency (single execution by request hash) is deferred. The `simplex-chat` integration is a separate repo.
**Scope.** One request, one response — no continuation, no streaming.
One DR-advertising contact address serves both flows: the owner branches per incoming request on the decrypted inner message — `AgentConnInfoReply` opens a connection (`REQ`), `AgentServiceRequest` answers an RPC (`SREQ`). A request gets exactly one reply, a response or a rejection; both are the single confirming message on the requester's reply queue Q_A, after which the ephemeral reply connection is torn down. Response and rejection are the same operation parameterized by the inner message (`AgentServiceResponse` payload vs `AgentRejection` reason) and outcome (the call returns the payload vs throws an agent error).
## RPC messages
No new outer envelope: the request reuses `AgentContactRequest` (tag `'A'`); the reply reuses `AgentConfirmation` (the only message on Q_A).
Inner `AgentMessage` (ratchet-encrypted, parsed by `parseMessage`), siblings of `AgentConnInfoReply`:
```haskell
| AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) MsgBody -- 'A': reply queue Q_A + opaque payload
| AgentServiceResponse MsgBody -- 'P': response payload (single, terminal)
| AgentRejection ByteString -- 'J': refusal reason (single, terminal)
```
`AgentServiceRequest` carries Q_A (as `AgentConnInfoReply` does); its constructor is the only thing that distinguishes `REQ` from `SREQ`. Delivery `msgType`: `AM_SRV_RESP` routes to `sendConfirmation` (the reply is the confirming first message on Q_A). `AM_SRV_REQ` is never stored — the request is sent synchronously inside `joinConnSrv'` via `sendInvitation`, so its arms in the delivery worker are unreachable and assert (`logError`).
## Ratchet establishment — reuse of the address-DR flow
`joinConnSrv'` takes `mkInner :: SMPQueueInfo -> AgentMessage`; `joinConnSrv` is the one-line wrapper passing `AgentConnInfoReply`. `sendServiceRequest'` passes `AgentServiceRequest`.
**Request (client).** `serviceRequest_` fails fast with `A_SERVICE ASENotDRAddress` if the address carries no ratchet keys, then creates the client connection via `newConnToJoin` with `serviceRequestExpiresAt = Just (now + reqTimeout)` (the persisted per-request deadline), registers a one-shot `TMVar` in `serviceRequests`, sends the request, and blocks on the `TMVar` up to `reqTimeout`. The connection is `RcvConnection` (Q_A) with the send ratchet.
**Request (service).** `smpContactRequest` decrypts `encConnInfo` and branches on the inner message; both branches call the same `storeInvitation` → `conn_invitations`, differing only in the kind column and event:
- `AgentConnInfoReply` → `REQ` (`service_request = 0`).
- `AgentServiceRequest _ payload` → `SREQ invId payload` (`service_request = 1`).
Before storing, it **deduplicates** by the sender's ratchet-key hash (`checkRatchetKeyHashExists`/`addProcessedRatchetKeyHash`, the mechanism `newRatchetKey` uses): a redelivered/retried request reuses the same Q_A and the same `e2eSndParams`, so the hash matches and the duplicate is dropped — one invitation and one `REQ`/`SREQ` per request. Receive-time establishment on unauthenticated input — the address-DR abuse bound applies.
**The reply (service).** `prepareReply` fetches the invitation, enforces the kind (`CMD PROHIBITED` on the wrong one), and rejects a stale request (`A_SERVICE ASETimeout` + delete) older than `serviceResponseTimeout`; then `newConnToAccept` + `startJoinInvitationDR` build the one-directional `SndQueue` to Q_A (no reply queue back), and `storeConfirmation` queues the inner message. `sendReplySync` secures Q_A, submits the message, and deletes the connection with wait-for-delivery — **deleting the connection on failure too** (`catchAllErrors`), so a failed secure/submit does not orphan it. `sendServiceReplyAsync` defers secure+deliver+delete to the `ICReplyDel` command (retried, survives a down server). `sendServiceReply`/`Async` and `replyRequest_` return the reply `ConnId` so the caller can correlate the `SENT` event on that throwaway connection.
**The response (client).** The single `AgentConfirmation` on Q_A reaches `processConnInfo` (the `RcvConnection … New` branch). Dispatch is gated on `serviceRequestExpiresAt` and the kinds are mutually exclusive:
- `AgentConnInfoReply` **only when `isNothing serviceRequestExpiresAt`** (a contact connection) → `processConf`.
- `AgentServiceResponse` only when `isJust` → the request `TMVar` gets `Right payload`.
- `AgentRejection` when `isJust` → `Left (A_SERVICE (ASERejected reason))`; when `isNothing` → contact `RJCT`.
- anything else → `prohibited`.
The `isNothing` guard on `AgentConnInfoReply` is a security boundary: without it a malicious service could send `AgentConnInfoReply` on an RPC reply queue and drive it into the contact-`CONF` path. `dispatchServiceReply` puts the result into the `serviceRequests` `TMVar`; a reply with no pending request (e.g. post-restart) is `ERR (A_SERVICE ASENoPendingRequest)`.
## Rejection
A rejection is `AgentRejection reason` — the same single confirming message on Q_A as a response.
- **Kind guard.** `rejectContact` only on a contact invitation, `rejectServiceRequest`/`sendServiceReply` only on a request; wrong kind is `CMD PROHIBITED`. `rejectRequest_` enforces the kind **even on a `Nothing` (silent-drop) reject** — it fetches the invitation and checks before deleting, so `rejectContact … Nothing` cannot delete a service request (or vice versa).
- `reject*` take `Maybe ByteString`: `Nothing` → delete the invitation, send nothing (the requester times out); `Just reason` → the reply path with `AgentRejection`.
- Requester side: `AgentRejection` on a contact reply queue → `RJCT`; on an RPC reply queue → a thrown `A_SERVICE (ASERejected reason)`.
## Reply connections and cleanup
No reply-queue table and no new connection type.
- **Requester reply queue** (`RcvConnection` on Q_A): `connections.service_request_expires_at` is non-null only here; it is the persisted request deadline, used both to gate CONF dispatch and to reap the connection. In-memory routing is `serviceRequests :: TMap ConnId (TMVar (Either AgentErrorType MsgBody))`.
- **Timeout race.** The async `JOIN` worker holds `withConnLock c connId` around `joinConnSrv'`, and `serviceRequest_`'s cleanup holds the same lock around `TM.delete` + `deleteConnectionAsync'`. This serializes the send with the timeout teardown, so a timing-out call cannot delete the connection mid-send; after cleanup the worker's re-check of `serviceRequests` finds nothing and skips.
- **Service reply connection** (`SndConnection` to Q_A): ephemeral — created, sends the one reply, deleted with wait-for-delivery in the same operation.
- **Cleanup** (`cleanupManager`, `deleteExpiredServiceReqs`): `deleteExpiredServiceRequests` reaps unanswered `conn_invitations` (service side) older than `serviceResponseTimeout`; `getExpiredServiceConns` (`service_request_expires_at < now`) → `deleteConnectionsAsync'` reaps orphaned requester reply queues.
## Database schema
`M20260712_address_dr_rpc` (SQLite + PostgreSQL) creates `address_ratchet_keys` (address-DR) and adds:
```sql
ALTER TABLE conn_invitations ADD COLUMN service_request INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- service side: 1 = RPC request
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN service_request_expires_at TEXT; -- client side: request deadline; gating + cleanup (nullable)
```
The down migration drops the columns then the table/index. Schema dump tests pass (up, down, STRICT).
## Agent API — `Simplex.Messaging.Agent`
```haskell
-- service: send the one response, return the reply ConnId, then tear the reply connection down.
sendServiceReply :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> InvitationId -> MsgBody -> AE ConnId
sendServiceReplyAsync :: AgentClient -> ACorrId -> UserId -> InvitationId -> MsgBody -> AE ConnId
-- refuse a request (Just reason = AgentRejection; Nothing = silent drop). PROHIBITED on wrong kind.
rejectServiceRequest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> InvitationId -> Maybe ByteString -> AE ()
rejectServiceRequestAsync :: AgentClient -> ACorrId -> UserId -> InvitationId -> Maybe ByteString -> AE ()
rejectContact :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> ConfirmationId -> Maybe ByteString -> AE ()
rejectContactAsync :: AgentClient -> ACorrId -> UserId -> ConfirmationId -> Maybe ByteString -> AE ()
-- client: establish the ratchet from the address, send the request, block on the reply TMVar up to the timeout
-- (Nothing = serviceRequestTimeout; Just t overrides per request), returning the payload. Sync fails fast if the
-- server is down; async enqueues a retried JOIN command that survives an outage.
sendServiceRequest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> Maybe NominalDiffTime -> MsgBody -> AE MsgBody
sendServiceRequestAsync :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> Maybe NominalDiffTime -> MsgBody -> AE MsgBody
```
Both client calls share `serviceRequest_`; the async `JOIN` worker branches on the `JRServiceReq` command to send `AgentServiceRequest`. The call blocks on the `TMVar` and returns synchronously — no events, no correlation for the app.
Events (`AEvent`, entity is the address connection):
```haskell
SREQ :: InvitationId -> MsgBody -> AEvent AEConn -- payload = the request; mirrors REQ.
RJCT :: ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn -- contact-request rejection reason.
```
Errors (`SMPAgentError`):
```haskell
| A_SERVICE {serviceError :: AgentServiceError}
data AgentServiceError
= ASERejected {rejectReason :: Text} -- service refused (Text: JSON-serializable, UTF-8-decoded from the reason bytes)
| ASETimeout -- no reply within the timeout
| ASENoPendingRequest -- a reply arrived with no pending request (e.g. post-restart)
| ASENotDRAddress -- the target address advertises no ratchet keys (fail fast, no send)
```
Config (`AgentConfig`): `serviceRequestTimeout` (30 s, client wait, overridable per request) and `serviceResponseTimeout` (180 s, service reply window and cleanup TTL; must exceed `serviceRequestTimeout`).
## Idempotency (deferred)
Not built. When built, the service will key a request by hash and cache the one response for a retention period, answering a repeat from storage without reaching the bot — single execution over at-least-once delivery, with its own tables.
## Tests
In `FunctionalAPITests` (plus the encoding roundtrip in `ConnectionRequestTests`), passing with `-O0`:
- Request → one response, sync (`sendServiceReply`) and async (`sendServiceReplyAsync`).
- Request → rejection (`rejectServiceRequest (Just reason)` → thrown `A_SERVICE (ASERejected …)`).
- Resilience: `server down → send → up → receive → down → reply → up → receive response`.
- No regression: the contact rejection and DR-join suites still pass.
The `simplex-chat` end-to-end tests (happy path, drop-when-off, non-DR fail-fast) live in that repo.
@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
# Establishing the double ratchet from address data - implementation plan
RFC: [../rfcs/2026-07-12-address-pqdr-keys.md](../rfcs/2026-07-12-address-pqdr-keys.md)
All references are to the current tree. Names of new constructors, fields, tables and functions are provisional.
Goal: a contact address advertises the owner's X3DH parameters in link data; a requester establishes the double ratchet in its first message, so that message and the profile in it are under the ratchet with post-quantum protection. The change reuses the invitation/confirmation machinery, with the requester in the joiner role and the owner in the initiator role - opposite to today's contact flow, but every message and code path below is reused.
Version: `addressDRVersion = VersionSMPA 8`, a plain agent-layer bump; `currentSMPAgentVersion` goes 7 → 8 (Agent/Protocol.hs:317-324). It gates the `AgentConfirmation.ratchetKeyId` field and the DR-from-address behavior. The receive-at-address path relies on ratchet-on-confirmation, already present since `ratchetOnConfSMPAgentVersion = 7` (Agent/Protocol.hs:317), so there is no cross-layer version dependency; the SMP and e2e-encryption versions are unchanged.
Scope of this change: the **synchronous** DR handshake in join, gated on the address advertising `ratchetKeys`. `joinConnection`/`joinConn`/`joinConnSrv` gain an optional `Maybe AddressRatchetKeys` (the advertised `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri` + `ratchetKeyId`), passed in from the link data the caller fetched at plan time (`LGET`); present → DR path (R2'/R3'), absent → the classic `AgentInvitation`. Chat wires that argument later (a chat change); the agent supports it now and tests pass it directly. Making the send **async** (worker retry, a "connecting" UX, the `CreatedConnLink` LGET-gate) is **deferred** - kept below under "Deferred" as future work, not part of this change.
### Implementation status (as built; `lib:simplexmq` compiles)
**Done** (compiles): version bump; `RatchetKeyId`/`AddressRatchetKeys` types + `Encoding`, `UserContactData.ratchetKeys` (appended, backward-compatible); `AgentConfirmation.ratchetKeyId` (version-gated encode/decode); `ContactRequest`/`DRRequest` sum with tagged `Encoding` + `cr_invitation` `ToField`/`FromField` (legacy-URI fallback); `address_ratchet_keys` table + `createAddressRatchetKeys`/`getAddressRatchetKeys` (SQLite + Postgres migrations `M20260712_address_dr`); join threading (`Maybe AddressRatchetKeys`); requester R2'/R3' (`joinAddressDR` + `sendConfirmationToAddress`); owner O1' dispatch, O2' `smpAddressConfirmation`, O3' (`acceptContact'` continue-ratchet branch), all three `connReq` readers (`acceptContact'`, `acceptContactAsync'` → `CMD PROHIBITED` for DR, `newConnToAccept` → shell from `drAgentVersion`/`drPQSupport`); requester R5' (`smpConfirmation` `RcvConnection … Nothing` branch, guarded on a ratchet existing); address-creation bundle generation (`mkAddressRatchetKeys`) wired into `createConnectionForLink'` (`IKUsePQ`-for-`SCMContact` prohibition lifted there).
**Deltas from the plan discovered while building:**
- **R5' emits `CONF` and reuses the allow step** (not auto-complete). The DR requester is a `RcvConnection` receiving the owner's reply - the same position as the classic contact requester, which goes `CONF` → `allowConnection'` → `connectReplyQueues` (msg 3). R5' mirrors that (differing only in that the ratchet already exists, so it `getRatchet` + `rcDecrypt` instead of building it), so the app supplies `ownConnInfo` for msg 3 at allow, exactly as today. No new storage.
- **`DRRequest` carries `drAgentVersion` + `drPQSupport`** (Part 3): the sync accept creates the connection shell via `newConnToAccept`→`newConnToJoin` before O3', and there is no URI to derive the version/PQ from.
- `cr_invitation` serialization is downgrade-safe: `CRInvitation` keeps the legacy URI (`strEncode`, byte-identical to before), so an older agent still reads classic invitations; `CRConfirmation` is JSON (`DRRequest` has manual `ToJSON`/`FromJSON`), told apart on read by the leading `{` (a URI never starts with it). JSON keeps `DRRequest` extensible. `SMPQueueInfo` gained a base64 `StrEncoding` + JSON (it only had `Encoding`) so it can sit in the JSON.
- **DR is opt-in per address**: `createConnectionForLink'`/`createConnectionForLink` gain a `Maybe InitialKeys` DR parameter (separate from the existing connection-PQ `InitialKeys`) - `Nothing` = no DR (old behavior, existing callers), `Just ik` = advertise the bundle with `ik`. The `IKUsePQ`-for-`SCMContact` prohibition stays on the connection-PQ parameter and is lifted only for the DR bundle.
**Test-matrix consequence of the version bump:** `currentSMPAgentVersion` 7 → 8 moves the version-matrix "prev" (`current − 1`) from v6 to v7. v7 ≥ `ratchetOnConfSMPAgentVersion (7)`, so a joiner/acceptor at "prev" now secures the send queue on confirmation - the `sqSecured` expectation for the prev variants in `testMatrix2`/`testMatrix2Stress`/`testBasicMatrix2` flips `False → True`. (Standard version-bump maintenance; the pre-`ratchetOnConf` unsecured path is now two versions back and no longer exercised by these matrices.)
**Not yet done:** rotation (`rotateRatchetKeys`, Part 4), cleanup step (Part 4), the app-driven `LSET` upgrade API (Part 5), wiring the DR parameter into the non-prepared-link `newRcvConnSrv` path, DR-specific tests (Part 6), regenerating `agent_schema.sql` if a schema-consistency test requires it, and chat wiring (deferred by design).
## Part 1 - the current contact-address handshake, step by step
Requester Alice connects to owner Bob's contact address. Q_A is Alice's receive queue (Bob to Alice), Q_B is Bob's receive queue (Alice to Bob).
Requester side, in `joinConnSrv … CRContactUri` (Agent.hs:1398-1428):
- R1. `compatibleContactUri` (Agent.hs:1370) - version check, yields the address queue `SMPQueueInfo`.
- R2. `mkJoinInvitation` (Agent.hs:1411): creates or reuses the receive queue Q_A; `getRatchetX3dhKeys` or `generateRcvE2EParams` produces Alice's Rcv X3DH parameters, stored by `createRatchetX3dhKeys` (Agent.hs:1424); builds `cReq = CRInvitationUri crData aliceRcvParams` (Agent.hs:1426).
- R3. `sendInvitation` (Agent.hs:1408; Agent/Client.hs:1924-1934): sends `AgentInvitation {connReq = cReq, connInfo = aliceProfile}` to the address queue, per-queue encrypted with a fresh ephemeral key by `agentCbEncryptOnce` (Agent/Client.hs:1929-1934), unauthenticated. **`connInfo` (Alice's profile) is under the per-queue X25519 layer only - the gap this plan closes.**
Owner side, receiving on the contact address:
- O1. `processClientMsg` dispatch (Agent.hs:3185): state `(Nothing, Just e2ePubKey)`, `(PHEmpty, AgentInvitation {connReq, connInfo})` -> `smpInvitation` (Agent.hs:3186).
- O2. `smpInvitation` (Agent.hs:3610): stores an `Invitation`, emits `REQ` with Alice's `connInfo`.
- O3. `acceptContact'` (Agent.hs:1477): `getInvitation`, then `joinConn` with Alice's `connReq` (Agent.hs:1480).
- O4. `joinConnSrv … CRInvitationUri` (Agent.hs:1383) -> `startJoinInvitation` (Agent.hs:1395).
- O5. `startJoinInvitation` (Agent.hs:1310-1350): creates Bob's send queue to Q_A (`newSndQueue`, Agent.hs:1335); `createRatchet_` (Agent.hs:1343-1350) runs `generateSndE2EParams`, `pqX3dhSnd` against Alice's Rcv parameters, `initSndRatchet`, `createSndRatchet`.
- O6. `secureConfirmQueue` (Agent.hs:1396, 3747-3765): `agentSecureSndQueue` secures Q_A with `SKEY` (Agent.hs:3749); `mkAgentConfirmation` (Agent.hs:3780-3785) calls `createReplyQueue` to create Bob's receive queue Q_B and returns `AgentConnInfoReply (Q_B :| []) bobInfo`; `mkConfirmation` ratchet-encrypts it and wraps `AgentConfirmation {e2eEncryption_ = Just bobSndParams, encConnInfo}`; `sendConfirmation` sends it to Q_A. This is confirmation #1.
Requester side, receiving confirmation #1 on Q_A:
- R4. dispatch (Agent.hs:3181-3183): state `(Nothing, Just e2ePubKey)`, `AgentConfirmation` -> `smpConfirmation`.
- R5. `smpConfirmation`, initiating-party branch `RcvConnection … Just e2eEncryption` (Agent.hs:3405-3444): `getRatchetX3dhKeys`, `pqX3dhRcv` (Agent.hs:3408), `initRcvRatchet` (Agent.hs:3411), `createRatchet` (Agent.hs:3436), `setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E` (Agent.hs:3440); decrypts `AgentConnInfoReply` (Agent.hs:3420); `processConf` emits `CONF` (Agent.hs:3444).
- R6. `allowConnection'` (Agent.hs:1467-1474): `acceptConfirmation`, then `ICAllowSecure` secures Q_A with Bob's sender key.
- R7. `connectReplyQueues` (Agent.hs:3724-3737): `upgradeConn` creates Alice's send queue to Q_B; `agentSecureSndQueue` secures Q_B; `enqueueConfirmation … Nothing` (Agent.hs:3733) stores `AgentConnInfo aliceInfo` and sends `AgentConfirmation {e2eEncryption_ = Nothing, encConnInfo}` to Q_B. This is confirmation #2.
Owner side, receiving confirmation #2 on Q_B:
- O7. dispatch (Agent.hs:3182): `AgentConfirmation` -> `smpConfirmation`.
- O8. `smpConfirmation`, accepting-party branch `DuplexConnection … Nothing` (Agent.hs:3447-3462): `agentRatchetDecrypt` with the established ratchet; `AgentConnInfo` -> `INFO` (Agent.hs:3452); `ICDuplexSecure` or `CON`.
Completion is direct `CON` on `senderCanSecure` (SKEY) messaging-mode queues (the sender on `AgentConnInfo`, Agent.hs:2252; the receiver with no `senderKey`, Agent.hs:3459-3461); the separate `HELLO` via `helloMsg` (Agent.hs:3466) is the older non-`senderCanSecure` (duplexHandshake v2, in-band-securing) path.
## Part 2 - the DR-from-address handshake, mapped to Part 1
The address advertises Bob's Rcv X3DH parameters in link data (Part 3). Alice, when the address advertises them and versions are compatible, takes the joiner role; Bob takes the initiator role.
Requester side - a new branch in `joinConnSrv … CRContactUri`, taken when the passed `Maybe AddressRatchetKeys` is present (the caller's plan-time `LGET`):
- R2'. Replaces R2/R3. Read the passed bundle - `ratchetKeyId` and `e2eParams :: RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448` - and negotiate the concrete version with `compatibleVersion` against the client e2e range, as `compatibleInvitationUri` does (Agent.hs:1362-1368). Create the receive queue Q_A subscribed (`newRcvQueue` with `subMode`), messaging mode so Bob can secure it. Choose the requester's KEM with `replyKEM_ v ownerKem_ pqSup` (Ratchet.hs:839): if the bundle advertises a KEM (owner `IKUsePQ`) the requester `AcceptKEM` - a **double KEM**: it both encapsulates to the address KEM (ciphertext) and includes its own new KEM public key (`generateSndE2EParams` → `sntrup761Enc` + a fresh keypair, Ratchet.hs:433-435), so PQ is bidirectional from message 1; if the bundle has no KEM and the requester wants PQ, it `ProposeKEM` (its own key only, PQ from message 2 if the owner supports it). Run `generateSndE2EParams g v (replyKEM_ …)`, `pqX3dhSnd` against the negotiated parameters, `initSndRatchet`, `createSndRatchet` - the body of `createRatchet_` (Agent.hs:1343-1350), with parameters from the passed bundle rather than a received invitation.
- R3'. Build `AgentConfirmation {e2eEncryption_ = Just aliceSndParams, ratchetKeyId = Just ratchetKeyId, encConnInfo = ratchetEncrypt(AgentConnInfoReply (Q_A :| []) aliceProfile)}` - the `mkAgentConfirmation`/`mkConfirmation` bodies (Agent.hs:3780-3765) with the reply queue being Alice's own Q_A. Send it to the address queue unauthenticated with `agentCbEncryptOnce`, one-shot (as `sendInvitation` sends, Agent/Client.hs:1929-1934) - **synchronous**, with the same send-failure UX as today's classic contact join. Nothing is stored: a retry (chat re-invokes the join → `mkJoinInvitation` reuses Q_A + keys, 1418) re-builds the confirmation, advancing the send ratchet, and the owner absorbs the advance - a **failed send** is skipped when the owner establishes the ratchet (`maxSkip = 512`, Ratchet.hs:988), and a **lost reply** carries the current content and updates the owner's request by `XContactId` (ContactRequest.hs:99-101, 269); both testable. The requester does **not** SKEY the address (`QMContact`, not `senderCanSecure`); rotation is handled because the passed params are the current advertised keys. **Alice's profile is now inside `encConnInfo`, under the ratchet.** Alice's connection is `RcvConnection` (Q_A) with a send ratchet, until she receives Q_B. This "New `RcvConnection` + `ratchets` row" is a new state (today a New `RcvConnection` holds x3dh keys but no ratchet - the classic initiator builds the ratchet only at R5, `createRatchet` Agent.hs:3436), and it composes: connection type is derived from queue rows alone while the `ratchets` table is keyed independently by `conn_id`, so subscription (Agent.hs:1551), `connectionStats` (2658), and `allowConnectionAsync'` (888) never read the ratchet for a `RcvConnection`; the only handshake reader on it is `smpConfirmation` (R5').
### Deferred (future work): async delivery + connect UX
The synchronous send above fails in the user's face on a lost reply (the same wart as today's classic contact join), even though the request may have been delivered. Making it async is a separate, later change, not part of this DR work:
- Delivery cannot use the message-delivery worker: a `SndQueue` is unique per `(host, port, snd_id)` and belongs to one connection (schema PK), while a contact address is one queue that many connections send to, so no per-connection SndQueue to it can exist. It would go through the **async command worker**, keyed by `(connId, server)` (`getAsyncCmdWorker`, Agent.hs:1856-1858), which already retries the `JOIN` command (`tryMoveableCommand` → `retrySndOp`, 2016-2024); each retry re-runs `joinConnSrv` (re-build + ratchet advance, which the owner absorbs - above), so nothing is stored. (`joinConnSrvAsync` for `CRContactUri` is `CMD PROHIBITED` today, Agent.hs:1452, and the `JOIN` handler falls back to sync `joinConnSrv`, 1899-1902; the `TBC` at Agent.hs:1897 is about async *receive*-queue creation - Q_A - and is orthogonal.)
- The async join returns "connecting" early and completes via the events chat already handles (`joinContact` sets `ConnJoined`; the DR requester emits `CONF` in R5' and the chat allows it, exactly as the classic contact requester, driving msg 3 → `CON`; a permanent send failure still surfaces as `ERR → ConnFailed`).
- This needs a chat change: the join API takes a `CreatedConnLink` (full + short link), not the bare `ConnectionRequestUri` it takes today, so the agent can LGET-gate on the owner's server (a real reachability check) and verify the fetched `linkConnReq` equals the passed full link before reporting success. Used only for DR addresses (link data advertises `ratchetKeys`); old / non-DR addresses stay on the current sync path.
Owner side - a new dispatch branch and a new receive handler:
- O1'. In `processClientMsg` (Agent.hs:3176-3187), add a branch in state `(Nothing, Just e2ePubKey)`: an `AgentConfirmation` with `ratchetKeyId = Just _` **and** `e2eEncryption_ = Just _` on a `ContactConnection` -> `smpAddressConfirmation` (new). A `ratchetKeyId` without `e2eEncryption_` is ignored (it does not match this branch and falls through as a non-DR confirmation). It must be placed **before** the existing `(PHEmpty, AgentConfirmation) | senderCanSecure queueMode` case (Agent.hs:3182-3184), because a contact-address queue is `QMContact` (not `senderCanSecure`) and would otherwise fall into `prohibited "handshake: missing sender key"` (Agent.hs:3184). The address queue's `e2eDhSecret` stays `Nothing` (it is never set for a contact address - `smpInvitation` does not set it, Agent.hs:3609-3622), so every request is decrypted with its own ephemeral key via this `(Nothing, Just e2ePubKey)` path.
- O2'. `smpAddressConfirmation` (new, modeled on `smpConfirmation` initiating branch, Agent.hs:3405-3444): select the private triple `(pk1, pk2, pKem)` by `ratchetKeyId` from `address_ratchet_keys`; `pqX3dhRcv pk1 pk2 pKem aliceSndParams`; `initRcvRatchet` with the address connection's stored `PQSupport` (`connPQEncryption` of the address `InitialKeys` - `On` for `IKUsePQ` and `IKPQOn`, `Off` for `IKPQOff`; this is what lets `IKPQOn` accept the requester's proposed KEM), combined with version compatibility as `smpConfirmation` derives `pqSupport'` (Agent.hs:3410); `rcDecrypt` of `encConnInfo` performs the first ratchet step, giving the ratchet its send side too (as it does for the initiator today), so the owner can later reply. Parse `AgentConnInfoReply (Q_A :| []) aliceProfile`. Store the request with `createInvitation` on the address connection (`contact_conn_id`), exactly as a classic invitation - except the request value is the `CRConfirmation` variant (Part 3) carrying the post-decrypt ratchet state and Q_A, and `recipient_conn_info` is `aliceProfile` - so **no connection or `ratchets` row is created at receive**, as with a classic invitation. Emit `REQ` with the `invitation_id`. A resend is not deduplicated: like a resent classic invitation it produces another `REQ` (the connect-UX fix for that is separate chat work). An unknown or expired `ratchetKeyId`, or a decryption failure: discard and acknowledge, as an undecryptable message is dropped today. This establishes ratchet state on unauthenticated input before the user accepts - see "Receive-time establishment, state, and abuse".
- O3'. `acceptContact'` for a DR request - a new branch that continues the ratchet instead of `joinConn`. `getInvitation` returns the request; its `CRConfirmation` variant gives the stored ratchet state and Q_A. Create the connection now (as `joinConn` does for a classic invitation) and `createRatchet` (AgentStore.hs:1419) from the stored ratchet state. Reuse `mkAgentConfirmation` (Agent.hs:3780-3785) to create Bob's receive queue Q_B and return `AgentConnInfoReply (Q_B :| []) bobInfo`; create Bob's send queue to Q_A (`newSndQueue`, generating Bob's own sender key) and secure Q_A with `SKEY` using that key (`agentSecureSndQueue`, valid because Q_A is messaging mode) - the securing key is Bob's own, not taken from Alice's message; send the response to Q_A as `AgentConfirmation {e2eEncryption_ = Nothing, ratchetKeyId = Nothing, encConnInfo = ratchetEncrypt(AgentConnInfoReply (Q_B :| []) bobInfo)}` via `sendConfirmation` (`agentCbEncrypt` over Bob's send queue to Q_A, `PHEmpty` because Q_A is `senderCanSecure`) - exactly the current contact msg 2 path (Client.hs:1916), not `agentCbEncryptOnce`. The reply content is `AgentConnInfoReply`, not `AgentConnInfo`: it takes the `mkAgentConfirmation` path with `e2eEncryption_ = Nothing`, not the `enqueueConfirmation` path (which produces `AgentConnInfo`, Agent.hs:3789). `rejectContact'` deletes the `conn_invitations` row (the current behaviour), discarding the inline ratchet; no connection was created, so there is nothing else to clean up.
Requester side, receiving the response on Q_A:
- R5'. `smpConfirmation` needs a new branch `RcvConnection … Nothing` (today only `RcvConnection … Just` and `DuplexConnection … Nothing` exist, Agent.hs:3403-3447). It looks up the ratchet first (`getRatchet`) and, if there is none, falls through to `prohibited "conf: incorrect state"` - so a classic initiator (a New `RcvConnection` with x3dh keys but no ratchet) that receives a stray `Nothing`-confirmation keeps today's exact outcome; only a DR requester, which holds a send ratchet, takes the new path. Alice already holds the send ratchet, so `rcDecrypt` advances it and creates the receive side; parse `AgentConnInfoReply (Q_B :| []) bobInfo`. **This mirrors the classic contact requester exactly**: `setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E` on Q_A, `createRatchet` the advanced ratchet, store the reply as a `NewConfirmation`, and emit **`CONF`** - the app then calls `allowConnection'` (supplying `ownConnInfo` for msg 3), which drives `connectReplyQueues` (create Alice's send queue to Q_B, `SKEY`, upgrade to `DuplexConnection`, `enqueueConfirmation` the `AgentConnInfo` msg 3). Because Q_B is sender-securable, sending `AgentConnInfo` completes Alice with `CON` (Agent.hs:2252) - no `HELLO`. The only difference from the classic requester is that the ratchet is pre-built (from R2') rather than built from Bob's Snd params here, so there is no `CONF`-less auto-completion and no separate storage of Alice's own info.
- R6'/completion. Unchanged from the current contact handshake, and modern (no `HELLO`). The exchange is three agent↔agent wire messages - Alice → address queue (msg 1), Bob → Q_A (msg 2, an `AgentConfirmation` carrying `AgentConnInfoReply` with Q_B), Alice → Q_B (msg 3, an `AgentConfirmation` carrying `AgentConnInfo`) - the same shape as the current contact flow, where msg 1 was `AgentInvitation`; here it is the ratchet-establishing `AgentConfirmation`. (`CON` is not a wire message - it is the agent→app event; `HELLO` and `AgentConnInfo` are the wire messages.) `HELLO` belongs to the older non-`senderCanSecure` path (duplexHandshake v2, before SKEY): there the confirmation secures the queue in-band (`PHConfirmation` carries the sender key, Client.hs:1918) and the receiver replies with `HELLO` (`ICDuplexSecure` → `enqueueDuplexHello`, Agent.hs:3457-3458). Both Q_A and Q_B here are messaging-mode - Q_A by R2', Q_B via `createReplyQueue` → `SCMInvitation` → `QMMessaging` (Agent.hs:1233,1458,3783) - so the sender secures with SKEY and sends `PHEmpty` (Client.hs:1918), the dispatch takes the `senderCanSecure` branch (Agent.hs:3182-3184), and each agent raises the `CON` app event locally off msg 3 - Bob on receiving it (`senderKey = Nothing`, Agent.hs:3459-3461), Alice on sending it (Agent.hs:2252) - with no separate `HELLO` wire message. (msg 2's `AgentConnInfoReply` only sets Q_A `Confirmed`, Agent.hs:2254.) Invitations are two messages because the initiator's queue is already in the link; a contact address needs three because Bob's receive queue Q_B is only delivered in msg 2. The third message no longer has a ratchet role: Bob's X3DH params are pre-published, so the agreement is complete once Bob receives msg 1 (in the current flow Bob's Snd params instead arrive in msg 2). msg 2 and msg 3 are queue setup - msg 2 delivers Q_B, msg 3 secures Q_B so Alice can send to Bob and signals Bob's `CON`; neither negotiates the ratchet. A one-directional exchange (the RPC) needs no Q_B and is two messages.
Net code touch points: `joinConnSrv` (new requester branch), `processClientMsg` (new owner dispatch), `smpConfirmation` (new `RcvConnection … Nothing` branch and `AgentConnInfoReply` acceptance), `acceptContact'` (new continue-ratchet branch), a new `smpAddressConfirmation` reusing `createInvitation`/`getInvitation` with the sum request value, and the link data and storage of Part 3-4. `rejectContact'` is unchanged (it deletes the `conn_invitations` row either way).
### Receive-time establishment, state, and abuse
This is the substantive departure from the current flow. Today `smpInvitation` creates only a lightweight `NewInvitation` and emits `REQ` (Agent.hs:3618-3621); no connection or ratchet exists until the user accepts. For DR the request is under the ratchet, so to show the requester's profile in `REQ` the owner must decrypt it, which means establishing the ratchet at **receive**, before accept.
Design decision (Q1): decrypt at receive. Both use cases need the request content at `REQ` - a person decides to accept from the profile, and a service bot needs the request payload to act. Deferring decryption to accept would make `REQ` contentless and does not fit the service case, so it is not done.
Consequences:
- No connection is created at receive, exactly as for a classic invitation. O2' stores the request with `createInvitation` on the address connection; the post-decrypt ratchet state and Q_A live inline in the `CRConfirmation` request value (`cr_invitation`). O3' (accept) creates the connection, `createRatchet` from the stored state, and adds Bob's queues, becoming a `DuplexConnection`; `rejectContact'` deletes the `conn_invitations` row.
- Per incoming `AgentConfirmation` the owner does one `pqX3dhRcv` (three DH plus, with PQ, one `sntrup761` decapsulation) and one `rcDecrypt`, on unauthenticated input, and writes one `conn_invitations` row - more CPU than the current `NewInvitation`, the same order of state (no connection, no `ratchets` row until accept).
Abuse (Q2): a contact address already accepts and processes unauthenticated invitations today, so this is a degree-worse version of an existing surface, not a new class. It is bounded by the address queue quota (an attacker fills it, the owner drains and acknowledges) and, optionally, by basic auth on the address (already supported for contact addresses, `optBasicAuth`). The per-request state is a single `conn_invitations` row - the same class as a classic contact request - so it is subject to the same limits and lifecycle, with no DR-specific dedup or TTL. Proof-of-work or a stricter gate can be added later; it is out of scope here and noted as a follow-up.
`acceptContact'`/`rejectContact'` keep taking the `invitation_id` from `REQ` unchanged; the only difference is that `getInvitation` returns a request that is either a `CRInvitation` URI (current `joinConn` path, O3-O6) or a `CRConfirmation` (continue-ratchet path, O3'). Nothing in the `REQ`/accept/reject flow or the chat client changes - the change is contained in the agent.
### The four communication layers, per message (verified against code)
Layers, outermost (server-visible) first:
- **L1 `ClientMsgEnvelope`** (Protocol.hs:1089), `PubHeader {phVersion, phE2ePubDhKey :: Maybe PublicKeyX25519}` (1096) - **this is where per-queue encryption is agreed** (not L2). `phE2ePubDhKey` is the sender's e2e DH public key; the recipient combines it with the queue's e2e private key: `(e2eDhSecret, e2ePubKey_) -> (Nothing, Just e2ePubKey) -> e2eDh = dh' e2ePubKey e2ePrivKey` (Agent.hs:3172-3178). `agentCbEncryptOnce` (Client.hs:2214) puts a **fresh ephemeral** pubkey (generated 2217, set 2223) - used when the sender has no send queue (the address queue), whose `e2eDhSecret` stays `Nothing`, so it decrypts every message with the per-message ephemeral. `agentCbEncrypt` (Client.hs:2203) puts the **send queue's persistent** e2e pubkey (`Just` on a confirmation, 2210); the recipient stores the secret via `setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E`, and *later* messages send `phE2ePubDhKey = Nothing` (`sendAgentMessage`, 2080).
- **L2 `ClientMessage PrivHeader`** (Protocol.hs:1113), `PrivHeader = PHConfirmation APublicAuthKey | PHEmpty` (1115) - **queue securing / authorization, not encryption**. `PHConfirmation` carries the sender's AUTH key for in-band securing (v2, non-`senderCanSecure`); `PHEmpty` when the sender secured the queue with SKEY out-of-band. `PHEmpty` on every message here is about securing, and says nothing about encryption (that is L1). Set in `sendConfirmation` (Client.hs:1918), `sendInvitation` (1934), `sendAgentMessage` (2079).
- **L3 `AgentMsgEnvelope`** (Agent/Protocol.hs:829, encoding 851) - outside the ratchet. `AgentConfirmation` ('C') carries `e2eEncryption_` (Snd X3DH params, agrees DR) + `encConnInfo`; `AgentInvitation` ('I') carries `connReq` (Rcv X3DH params) + plaintext `connInfo` (no DR); `AgentMsgEnvelope` ('M') carries `encAgentMessage`.
- **L4 `AgentMessage`** (Agent/Protocol.hs:883, encoding 893) - inside the ratchet. `AgentConnInfo` ('I'), `AgentConnInfoReply` ('D', reply queues + info), `AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage` ('M'; `AMessage` includes `HELLO`, Agent/Protocol.hs:1018-1020). **Absent when L3 is `AgentInvitation`** (that profile is per-queue-only - the gap this plan closes).
Send routing: msg 1 (to address) → `sendInvitation` today / a new `agentCbEncryptOnce` confirmation send for DR; msg 2 → `secureConfirmQueue` → `sendConfirmation` (Agent.hs:3747); msg 3 → `connectReplyQueues` → `enqueueConfirmation` → delivery worker `AM_CONN_INFO` → `sendConfirmation` (Agent.hs:3733,3789,2183). `AM_CONN_INFO`/`AM_CONN_INFO_REPLY` both go through `sendConfirmation` (2183-2184); other `AMessage`s go through `sendAgentMessage` wrapping `AgentMsgEnvelope` 'M' (2192-2193).
Current contact handshake (address does **not** advertise DR):
| msg | L1 `PubHeader.phE2ePubDhKey` (per-queue enc) | L2 `PrivHeader` (securing) | L3 `AgentMsgEnvelope` | L4 `AgentMessage` |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Alice→addr | `Just` fresh ephemeral, `agentCbEncryptOnce` (Client.hs:1933,2223) | `PHEmpty` (1934) | `AgentInvitation` {connReq = Alice Rcv params, connInfo = profile} (Client.hs:1932) | — none (profile per-queue only) |
| 2 Bob→Q_A | `Just` Bob's send-queue e2e pubkey, `agentCbEncrypt` (1920,2210) | `PHEmpty` [`senderCanSecure`] (1918) | `AgentConfirmation` {e2eEncryption_ = **Just Bob Snd params**, encConnInfo} (Agent.hs:3765) | `AgentConnInfoReply` (Q_B) bobInfo, DR-enc (Agent.hs:3785) |
| 3 Alice→Q_B | `Just` Alice's send-queue e2e pubkey, `agentCbEncrypt` (1920,2210) | `PHEmpty` [`senderCanSecure`] (1918) | `AgentConfirmation` {e2eEncryption_ = **Nothing**, encConnInfo} (Agent.hs:3802) | `AgentConnInfo` aliceInfo, DR-enc (Agent.hs:3789) |
New DR handshake (address advertises DR):
| msg | L1 `PubHeader.phE2ePubDhKey` (per-queue enc) | L2 `PrivHeader` (securing) | L3 `AgentMsgEnvelope` | L4 `AgentMessage` |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Alice→addr | `Just` fresh ephemeral, `agentCbEncryptOnce` [same] | `PHEmpty` [same] | **`AgentConfirmation`** {e2eEncryption_ = **Just Alice Snd params**, **ratchetKeyId = Just**, encConnInfo} [was `AgentInvitation`] | **`AgentConnInfoReply`** (Q_A) aliceProfile, **DR-enc** [was plaintext connInfo] |
| 2 Bob→Q_A | `Just` Bob's send-queue e2e pubkey, `agentCbEncrypt` [same] | `PHEmpty` [same] | `AgentConfirmation` {e2eEncryption_ = **Nothing**, ratchetKeyId = Nothing, encConnInfo} [was Just Bob Snd params] | `AgentConnInfoReply` (Q_B) bobInfo, DR-enc [same] |
| 3 Alice→Q_B | `Just` Alice's send-queue e2e pubkey, `agentCbEncrypt` [same] | `PHEmpty` [same] | `AgentConfirmation` {e2eEncryption_ = Nothing, encConnInfo} [same] | `AgentConnInfo` aliceInfo, DR-enc [same] |
Net difference: **only msg 1 and msg 2's L3/L4 change.** msg 1's L3 becomes `AgentConfirmation` (was `AgentInvitation`) carrying Alice's Snd params + `ratchetKeyId`, and the profile moves from plaintext L3 to DR-encrypted L4 (`AgentConnInfoReply`) - the whole point of the change. msg 2 drops `e2eEncryption_` (Bob no longer sends Snd params - the ratchet is agreed from msg 1). msg 3 is unchanged. L1 (per-queue encryption - each queue agrees its own secret via the sender's e2e pubkey in the `PubHeader` on the first message to it) and L2 (securing, `PHEmpty` because SKEY is used) are unchanged throughout; the DR change is entirely at L3/L4. The only new send code is msg 1 (an `AgentConfirmation` fired to the address with `agentCbEncryptOnce`, like `sendInvitation` but with a confirmation envelope).
## Part 3 - types and link data
### Fixed data - unchanged
`FixedLinkData` (Protocol.hs:1824) is not touched. The double-ratchet keys go entirely in mutable data, so an existing address advertises them without a new link (the fixed data is hash-committed and cannot change). Fixed data keeps only `agentVRange`, `rootKey`, `linkConnReq`, `linkEntityId`.
### Mutable data - ratchet keys bundle
Appended to `UserContactData` (Protocol.hs:1840); the encoding stops at a trailing tail (Protocol.hs:1981), so earlier versions ignore it:
```haskell
newtype RatchetKeyId = RatchetKeyId ByteString -- opaque short id; one Encoding instance, shared below
data AddressRatchetKeys = AddressRatchetKeys
{ ratchetKeyId :: RatchetKeyId, -- identifies this bundle; changes on rotation, echoed in the request
e2eParams :: CR.RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448 -- version range + both X3DH keys + optional KEM
}
instance Encoding AddressRatchetKeys where ... -- the key-bundle instance; both fields required
data UserContactData = UserContactData
{ direct :: Bool, owners :: [OwnerAuth], relays :: [ConnShortLink 'CMContact],
userData :: UserLinkData,
ratchetKeys :: Maybe AddressRatchetKeys -- whole bundle optional, one Encoding instance
}
```
`e2eParams` is the existing `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448` (`E2ERatchetParamsUri VersionRangeE2E k1 k2 (Maybe (RKEMParams s))`, Ratchet.hs:282-286) - the same type a `CRInvitationUri` advertises - with `StrEncoding`/`Encoding` already defined (Ratchet.hs:302-374). There is no bespoke key type and no reconstruction: the requester negotiates the concrete version with `compatibleVersion` against its own e2e range, exactly as `compatibleInvitationUri` does for an invitation (Agent.hs:1362-1368), giving `RcvE2ERatchetParams` for `pqX3dhSnd`. The KEM is optional: `Nothing` gives an X448-only ratchet (as when `PQSupport` is off), `Just` a hybrid one, matching `generateRcvE2EParams`'s `PQSupport` gate (Ratchet.hs:439-445).
The address-creation parameter is `InitialKeys` (Ratchet.hs:864) - the same 3-way choice as invitations, not a bare `PQSupport`. Currently `IKUsePQ` is prohibited for `SCMContact` (Agent.hs:990,1198) because a contact address carries no owner keys; this change lifts that prohibition. The bundle plays the published-contact-request role, so its KEM follows `initialPQEncryption False pqInitKeys` (Ratchet.hs:882) - exactly as the requester's contact request does today (Agent.hs:1422):
- `IKUsePQ` - the bundle advertises the KEM; the requester encapsulates to it, so PQ from message 1.
- `IKPQOn` (`IKLinkPQ PQSupportOn`) - the bundle is X448-only (no KEM advertised), but the owner's ratchet supports PQ (`connPQEncryption` = On, Ratchet.hs:888); the requester proposes its own KEM (R2'), so PQ from message 2.
- `IKPQOff` (`IKLinkPQ PQSupportOff`) - X448-only, and the owner's ratchet does not support PQ even if the requester proposes it.
Advertising the KEM adds ~1158 B to the rotated, widely-fetched link data, which is why `IKPQOn` exists (PQ one round later, without the size cost). The owner generates the bundle with `generateRcvE2EParams g v (initialPQEncryption False pqInitKeys)` (Ratchet.hs:439), stores the private triple `(pk1, pk2, pKem)` (Part 4), and advertises `e2eParams` by wrapping the public `E2ERatchetParams` in the address's e2e version range (`toVersionRangeT`; or `mkRcvE2ERatchetParams` from the stored privates, Ratchet.hs:412) - the same private-key shape `createRatchetX3dhKeys`/`getRatchetX3dhKeys` already store (AgentStore.hs:1362-1367). `ratchetKeys` is set by the agent when it signs mutable link data (`Crypto.ShortLink.encodeSignUserData`), not by the application.
### Authentication of the advertised keys
No signature is added on the keys: the mutable link data already signs them. `decryptLinkData` (Crypto/ShortLink.hs:106-114) verifies `sig2` over the mutable `UserContactData` by `rootKey`, so `ratchetKeys` is root-signed. This is the X3DH anti-substitution property: an SMP server cannot substitute the keys without forging the root signature. The signer is the root Ed25519 key (the address's signing identity); the X3DH keys are separate DH keys (X448, which cannot sign). A single owner signs address data ("we don't use multiple owners"), so the root signature alone is sufficient - no per-key signature. A malicious server can still serve an older but validly-signed `UserContactData` (rollback to a retired bundle); this is bounded by the retention window and by the ratchet advancing after the first message, and a signature does not prevent it. Inline ratchet params in a `CRInvitationUri` contact request are not in signed link data and remain unsigned - a separate change, out of scope here.
### Request envelope
`AgentConfirmation` (Protocol.hs:830-834) gains an optional `ratchetKeyId` - the `ratchetKeyId` of the `AddressRatchetKeys` bundle the requester used, so the owner selects the matching private keys:
```haskell
AgentConfirmation
{ agentVersion :: VersionSMPA,
e2eEncryption_ :: Maybe (SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448), -- reused: Alice's Snd params in DR msg 1
ratchetKeyId :: Maybe RatchetKeyId, -- selects the owner's key generation
encConnInfo :: ByteString
}
```
`ratchetKeyId` is a separate optional selector (the shared `RatchetKeyId` newtype), not the bundle - the owner already holds the published public bundle and looks up its private keys by this id. It reuses the existing `e2eEncryption_` for Alice's Snd params rather than a new combined bundle; the minor cost is two correlated `Maybe`s (`ratchetKeyId = Just` is only meaningful with `e2eEncryption_ = Just`). **A `ratchetKeyId` with `e2eEncryption_ = Nothing` is ignored** - O2' requires both (there are no Snd params to run `pqX3dhRcv`), so such a message falls through to the current dispatch as if it had no `ratchetKeyId`.
Encoding (extends Protocol.hs:853-866): from `addressDRVersion`, `smpEncode (agentVersion, 'C', e2eEncryption_, ratchetKeyId, Tail encConnInfo)`; `ratchetKeyId` is `Just` for an address-DR confirmation and `Nothing` for the current joiner-to-initiator and initiator-to-joiner confirmations; earlier versions omit the field entirely and use `smpEncode (agentVersion, 'C', e2eEncryption_, Tail encConnInfo)`. Parsing gates the field on `agentVersion`. `CRInvitationUri` is unchanged - a connection request URI holds Rcv parameters and must not hold Snd parameters.
### Stored request - the invitation record
The `conn_invitations` record stays; only the type of the stored request widens. From chat's point of view a DR request is still an invitation - it "contains a confirmation" instead of an invitation URI - so `REQ`, `acceptContact'`/`rejectContact'`, and the chat side are unchanged; the change is contained in the agent. The `NewInvitation`/`Invitation` request field (`cr_invitation`, stays `NOT NULL`) becomes a sum:
```haskell
data ContactRequest
= CRInvitation (ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation) -- classic: joinConn on accept (O3-O6)
| CRConfirmation DRRequest -- DR: continue the ratchet on accept (O3')
data DRRequest = DRRequest
{ drRatchet :: RatchetX448, -- post-decrypt receiving ratchet (with send side), stored inline
drReplyQueue :: SMPQueueInfo, -- Q_A, where the owner replies
drAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA, -- negotiated at receive; needed to build the connection shell at accept
drPQSupport :: PQSupport -- the address's PQ setting for this connection
}
```
`recipient_conn_info` holds the profile in both cases. `getInvitation`/`createInvitation` carry `ContactRequest`; `acceptContact'` branches on the constructor. There is no dedup column: a resent request produces another `REQ`, exactly as a resent classic invitation does.
`drAgentVersion`/`drPQSupport` are stored because the accept flow creates the connection **shell** through `newConnToAccept` → `newConnToJoin` (via `prepareConnectionToAccept`, called by chat's sync accept before `acceptContact'`, Internal.hs:914,925) and `newConnToJoin` today derives `connAgentVersion`/`pqSupport` from the `ConnectionRequestUri` (Agent.hs:1277-1293); a `CRConfirmation` has no URI, so the values negotiated at receive (O2') are stored and used to build the shell.
Three readers of the widened `connReq` field (all via `getInvitation`) branch on the constructor:
- `acceptContact'` (Agent.hs:1479, sync): `CRInvitation cr` → `joinConn … cr` (classic, unchanged); `CRConfirmation dr` → the O3' continue-ratchet path.
- `newConnToAccept` (Agent.hs:1296, via `prepareConnectionToAccept`): `CRInvitation cr` → `newConnToJoin … cr` (unchanged); `CRConfirmation dr` → create the `NewConnection` shell from `drAgentVersion`/`drPQSupport` (`createNewConn`, generating the connId).
- `acceptContactAsync'` (Agent.hs:900): `CRInvitation cr` → `joinConnAsync … cr` (unchanged); `CRConfirmation _` → `throwE $ CMD PROHIBITED` (async DR accept is deferred; DR requests accept synchronously). Chat's REQ/accept is unaffected either way - it only ever passes `invId`, never the `ContactRequest`, which stays internal to the agent.
Storage: `cr_invitation`'s `ToField`/`FromField` encode `CRInvitation` as the legacy `strEncode` URI (unchanged from before, so the format is downgrade-safe) and `CRConfirmation` as JSON (`J.encode` of `DRRequest`). `FromField` peeks the first byte: `{` → JSON `CRConfirmation`, else `strDecode` → `CRInvitation` (a URI never starts with `{`). `DRRequest` uses manual `ToJSON`/`FromJSON` (extensible), and `SMPQueueInfo` gets a base64 `StrEncoding` + JSON to sit inside it. `smpInvitation` (Agent.hs:3618) wraps its `connReq` in `CRInvitation`; `smpAddressConfirmation` (O2') writes `CRConfirmation`.
## Part 4 - key rotation (client-driven)
Rotation is independent of the handshake above and is driven by the client app, not the agent. The agent never rotates on its own - it lacks the app's intent and the mutable link data (profile/badge and other short-link data). The app rotates by calling `setConnShortLink` with the rotate flag; the whole ratchet-keys bundle - both X448 keys and the KEM - is generated fresh each time.
### Schema
```sql
-- one row per ratchet-keys generation for an address; the current generation plus the most recent retained ones.
-- private side of the advertised RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri - same shape as the ratchets x3dh
-- columns and createRatchetX3dhKeys (AgentStore.hs).
CREATE TABLE address_ratchet_keys(
address_ratchet_key_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
ratchet_key_id BLOB NOT NULL, -- the published id echoed by requests
x3dh_priv_key_1 BLOB NOT NULL, -- X448
x3dh_priv_key_2 BLOB NOT NULL, -- X448
pq_priv_kem BLOB, -- RcvPrivRKEMParams (sntrup761 keypair); NULL when PQ is off for this address
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now'))
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_address_ratchet_keys ON address_ratchet_keys(conn_id, ratchet_key_id);
-- a DR request stays in conn_invitations with NO schema change: cr_invitation now holds a ContactRequest
-- sum (an invitation URI or a confirmation carrying the post-decrypt ratchet + reply queue), so it stays
-- NOT NULL - no nullable change, no new column on conn_invitations, no new table for the request.
```
`cr_invitation` stays `NOT NULL` - only its decoded value gains a variant (Part 3), so the invitations flow, `REQ`, and chat are unchanged; the only new storage is the `address_ratchet_keys` table. The link signing key is already on the address queue (`rcv_queues.link_priv_sig_key`, M20250322), so nothing is added there - rotation and retrofit re-sign mutable data with it. PostgreSQL mirrors this. Migration `M20260712_address_dr`.
### Rotation logic
The app rotates by calling `setConnShortLink` with the rotate flag; there is no automatic, agent-driven rotation. On rotation:
1. `generateRcvE2EParams` for a fresh generation - two X448 keys, and an sntrup761 keypair only if PQ is on for this address - with a fresh `ratchetKeyId`.
2. Recompute mutable link data with the new `AddressRatchetKeys` (the public `e2eParams`), re-sign with the root key (`encodeSignUserData`, key from `rcv_queues.link_priv_sig_key`), and `LSET` it to the address queue (`setConnShortLink` path).
3. Insert the new `address_ratchet_keys` row (`x3dh_priv_key_1`, `x3dh_priv_key_2`, `pq_priv_kem`).
### Retention
Retention is count-based, not time-based: on each rotation `deleteOldAddressRatchetKeys` keeps the newest `keepAddressKeys` generations per address (default 3, ordered by `address_ratchet_key_id`) and deletes older ones. There is no `retired_at` column, no time window, and no `cleanupManager` step. A request that used a recently-retired bundle still decrypts while that generation is retained; how long a recorded first message stays decryptable after a compromise of the current private keys is therefore bounded by the retained-generation count and the app's rotation cadence (both app-controlled). Unaccepted DR request rows in `conn_invitations` are handled exactly like unaccepted classic invitation requests - no DR-specific cleanup (a DR request is one `conn_invitations` row, the same class of state as a classic contact request).
## Part 5 - backward compatibility
- A requester older than `addressDRVersion`, or an address without `ratchetKeys`, uses R2/R3 (`AgentInvitation`); the owner uses O1-O8. Unchanged.
- The owner dispatches on the envelope: `AgentInvitation` -> `smpInvitation` (current); `AgentConfirmation` with `ratchetKeyId` on a `ContactConnection` -> `smpAddressConfirmation` (new). Both coexist.
- `AgentConfirmation` without `ratchetKeyId` remains the current confirmation on established connections.
- An existing address gains `ratchetKeys` via a new agent API (e.g. `updateContactAddressLink`) that the app calls with the mutable link data (profile/badge and any other short-link data): the agent generates the DR bundle if absent (the first `address_ratchet_keys` row and its stored private keys), adds `ratchetKeys` to `UserContactData`, re-signs with `rcv_queues.link_priv_sig_key`, and `LSET`s it. **Only mutable data changes - the address (link) is unchanged**, because the keys are in mutable, not fixed, data. Requesters that fetch the updated data use DR; older ones still use `AgentInvitation`. The agent does not do this on its own (it lacks the profile and the user's intent); the app drives it, combined with the full→short address migration.
## Part 6 - tests
- Encoding roundtrips: `UserContactData` with and without `ratchetKeys`, and with the KEM present and absent; `AgentConfirmation` with and without `ratchetKeyId`, across versions.
- Address creation advertises `ratchetKeys` (the `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri`); `decryptLinkData` (Crypto/ShortLink.hs:100) verifies signatures and the requester negotiates the advertised params to a concrete version, with and without the KEM.
- Both PQ modes: an address whose bundle carries a KEM gives a hybrid ratchet (`pqEncryption` on); one without gives an X448-only ratchet.
- End to end: a DR-advertising address; a new requester establishes the ratchet, sends its profile under it, owner emits `REQ`, accepts, both reach `CON`; assert the profile never travels under per-queue-only encryption; assert `pqEncryption` on.
- Rotation and retrofit: request against the current bundle; against a just-retired bundle within the window still decrypts; against a bundle past the window is discarded and the requester times out; an address that adds `ratchetKeys` via `LSET` is then reached by DR while an old requester still uses `AgentInvitation`.
- Backward compatibility: old requester against a DR address connects via `AgentInvitation`; new requester against a non-DR address falls back to `AgentInvitation`.
## Part 7 - phases
1. Link data: `AddressRatchetKeys` in `UserContactData` (reusing `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri`), encoding, `encodeSignUserData`; `AgentConfirmation.ratchetKeyId`; address creation taking `InitialKeys` (lifting the `IKUsePQ`-for-`SCMContact` prohibition), generating (`generateRcvE2EParams`, KEM per `initialPQEncryption False`) and storing the first `address_ratchet_keys` row.
2. Handshake: thread the optional `Maybe AddressRatchetKeys` through `joinConnection`/`joinConn`/`joinConnSrv` (present → DR branch, absent → classic); requester R2'/R3' (synchronous one-shot send); owner O1'/O2'/O3' storing the DR request as a `conn_invitations` row whose request value is the `CRConfirmation` variant; `smpConfirmation` `RcvConnection … Nothing` branch and `AgentConnInfoReply` acceptance; end-to-end connection with the profile under the ratchet. Tests pass `AddressRatchetKeys` directly (chat wiring is later work).
3. Rotation and retrofit: schema migration, `rotateRatchetKeys`, retention window, cleanup step, app-driven `LSET` retrofit (with the full→short address migration), rotation/retrofit tests.
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
# Signed service requests
Optional Ed25519 signature on service RPC requests, constructed and verified in the agent (not the bot), bound to the request's double ratchet. Requests only — responses stay authenticated by the address/ratchet. Signing is optional; a bot decides whether to require it. The agent is stateless: the meaning of a signer key (identity, resource) is the bot's concern.
## Wire — `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol`
Extend the existing `'A'` inner message; `Maybe` absent = unsigned, so the unsigned path is unchanged:
```haskell
AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) (Maybe RequestSignature) MsgBody
data RequestSignature = RequestSignature C.PublicKeyEd25519 (C.Signature 'C.Ed25519)
```
## Binding
```
binding = sha3-256("SimpleXService" <> rcAD)
sig = Ed25519.sign(sk, binding <> payload)
```
The service recomputes `binding` from its own `rcAD` and verifies.
- `rcAD` = the ratchet associated data (`Ratchet.rcAD`) — the shared connection security code: identical on both ratchets by construction (`pubKey(requester ephemeral) <> pubKey(service key)`), stable, and unique per request (fresh requester ephemeral). Already on the ratchet; nothing derived or stored.
- sha3-256 here is not for uniformity or secrecy (both moot: the value is signed, not keyed, and only a ratchet holder can craft a valid request). It gives a canonical fixed-length, domain-tagged binding; the 32-byte fixed prefix also makes `binding <> payload` unambiguous.
- Domain string `"SimpleXService"`: separates this signature from other uses of the signing key.
- Not covered: reply queues (the AEAD protects them in transit; addresses may use redundant queues).
- Anti-relay: a signature bound to one session's rcAD does not verify under another's (both parties' keys differ). Replay of the encrypted blob is handled separately by transport dedup.
## Sign (requester) — `Simplex.Messaging.Agent`
- `sendServiceRequest` / `sendServiceRequestAsync` gain a `Maybe` Ed25519 signing key.
- `joinConnSrv'` DR path takes the ratchet straight from the `createRatchet_`/`getSndRatchet` line (both now yield `(RatchetX448, params)`) and computes `serviceReqBinding` from its `rcAD`; the `mkInner :: SMPQueueInfo -> ByteString -> AgentMessage` closure calls `signServiceReq signKey_ binding payload` — `RequestSignature pub (sign' pk (binding <> payload))` when a key is given, `Nothing` otherwise.
- Async carries the key in `JRServiceReq {requestKey :: Maybe C.PrivateKeyEd25519}` (enabled `StrEncoding (PrivateKey Ed25519)`); the JOIN worker deserializes it and signs after building the ratchet.
**Status:** implemented and tested in simplexmq-3 (sync + async); invalid signature → `A_SERVICE ASEBadSignature` (logs + `ERR` event), no invitation.
## Verify (service) — `smpContactRequest`
After `initRcvRatchet_` + decrypt, on `AgentServiceRequest (replyQueue :| _) sig_ payload`, one helper does the check:
`verifyServiceReq rc payload sig_ :: Either String (Maybe C.PublicKeyEd25519)`
- `Nothing` → `Right Nothing` (unsigned).
- `Just (RequestSignature key sig)` → recompute `serviceReqBinding rc` and `C.verify' key sig (binding <> payload)`; `Right (Just key)` if valid, else `Left err`.
Then:
- `Right key_` → `storeInvitation … True` + `notify $ SREQ invId key_ payload`.
- `Left err` → `logError` + `notify (ERR (AGENT (A_SERVICE ASEBadSignature)))`, no invitation.
Dedup unchanged.
## Event / API
- `SREQ :: InvitationId -> Maybe C.PublicKeyEd25519 -> MsgBody -> AEvent AEConn`.
- `StrEncoding (PrivateKey Ed25519)` enabled so a caller (e.g. via `JRServiceReq`) can carry the signing key.
## Tests
- `testSignedServiceRequest` (sync) + `testSignedServiceRequestAsync` — signed round-trip delivers the exact signer key on `SREQ` (`sigKey_ == Just signPub`).
- Unsigned path unchanged (existing service tests carry `Nothing` for the new field).
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
## Root cause: PRXY errors are attributed to the forwarding server instead of the destination relay
When private routing is enabled and the destination relay is unreachable, the client reports
**"Error connecting to forwarding server smp5.simplex.im"** — naming a preset server that the client
connected to successfully. Retrying rotates to the next proxy (`getNextServer`, `Agent/Client.hs:689`)
and produces the same message with a different preset server, so the destination server is never named
and the failure looks like an outage of our own infrastructure.
### Reproduction
Connecting to a contact address on an unresolvable host (`simplex.server.home`, no DNS record):
```
-- private routing off (correct)
BROKER {brokerAddress = "smp://VvXX…@simplex.server.home:5223",
brokerErr = NETWORK {networkError = NEConnectError {connectError = "…does not exist (Name or service not known)"}}}
-- private routing on (misattributed)
SMP {serverAddress = "smp://…@smp5.simplex.im,…onion",
smpErr = PROXY {proxyErr = BROKER {brokerErr = NETWORK {networkError = NEFailedError}}}}
```
### The asymmetry between the two proxied paths
A server returns `PROXY (BROKER …)` only from `smpProxyError` (`Client.hs:804-815`), which is called
exclusively where the proxy failed to reach the relay — `PRXY` (`Server.hs:1444`) and `PFWD`
(`Server.hs:1466`). The error therefore *always* describes the proxy→relay hop. The two paths then
diverge in how the agent wraps it:
**PFWD — keeps both addresses** (`Agent/Client.hs:1183-1189`): the proxy's error arrives as
`Left ProxyClientError` and is thrown as `PROXY {proxyServer, relayServer, proxyErr}`.
**PRXY — drops the relay** (`Agent/Client.hs:713`): `connectSMPProxiedRelay` has no `Either` layer, so
the error arrives as `PCEProtocolError` and `liftClient SMP` maps it to `SMP <proxyAddr> (PROXY …)`
(`Agent/Client.hs:1244`). The destination address is discarded.
Both clients read the second shape as a client→proxy failure and word it accordingly
(`SimpleXAPI.kt:2692`, `ErrorAlert.swift:117`), which is never what it means.
### Fix
In `newProxiedRelay`, map proxy-reported `PROXY (BROKER …)` errors to the same shape `PFWD` already
produces:
```haskell
proxyRelayError :: HostName -> ErrorType -> AgentErrorType
proxyRelayError proxyHost = \case
e@(SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER _)) -> PROXY {proxyServer = protocolClientServer smp, relayServer = …destSrv, proxyErr = ProxyProtocolError e}
e -> SMP proxyHost e
```
`liftClient` applies this only to `PCEProtocolError`, so genuine client↔proxy failures (response
timeout, network error, proxy transport version) still map to `BROKER <proxy> …` and remain attributed
to the proxy. Both apps already render the resulting shape correctly, with no client change:
*"Forwarding server smp5.simplex.im failed to connect to destination server simplex.server.home."*
The guard is `BROKER` rather than every `ProxyError`, so the remap covers exactly the misattributed
class and nothing else. `BASIC_AUTH` is deliberately excluded — the proxy returns it when proxying is
disabled or the basic auth does not match (`Server.hs:1416-1420`), which is a client↔proxy fact and is
correctly attributed today. `NO_SESSION` is returned only for `PFWD`. `PROTOCOL` describes the relay
but is not rendered as a proxy-connection error by either client, so leaving it unchanged keeps the
diff to the errors that actually produce a wrong message.
### Blast radius
- `temporaryAgentError` (`Agent/Client.hs:1572-1580`) and `serverHostError` (`:1594-1596`) already match
both shapes with the same helpers — retry and proxy-fallback behaviour is unchanged.
- `clientServiceError` (`:1268-1273`) has no `PROXY`-shape twin for `BROKER NO_SERVICE`, but both ends
document that case as unreachable (`Client.hs:812`); left as is.
- simplex-chat `Subscriber.hs:1819-1820` handles both shapes; send failures move from `SndErrProxy` to
`SndErrProxyRelay`, i.e. "Destination server error" rather than "Error" — also more accurate.
- `SMP _ (PROXY _)` becomes unreachable, making `smpProxyErrorAlert` in both clients dead code. Removing
it is a follow-up in simplex-chat, not required by this change.
### Verification
- Reproduced before/after with a CLI built against this branch: the error now carries
`relayServer = "smp://VvXX…@simplex.server.home:5223"`, and the direct (non-proxied) path is
byte-identical to before.
- `SMPProxyTests`: 45 examples, 0 failures — including `fails when fallback is prohibited` and both
retry tests, which exercise `newProxiedRelay` and the error classification.
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
# Fast queue rotation — implementation plan
Branch: ep/drop-agent-versions. RFC: ../rfcs/2026-08-09-fast-queue-rotation.md.
Model: redundant delivery, no flip. `QADD` adds the new receive queue R'. From `QADD` until R' is
secured the sender writes every message to both old and R' (double delivery, not a move); once R' is
secured the sender writes new messages to R' only, while old delivers its already-scheduled tail and
the `QEND` appended to it. `QEND` removes a named queue. The recipient drops duplicates (double
ratchet), so the order and which queue delivers do not matter, as long as every message arrives on at
least one queue. Rotation away from a dead server works because every message up to securing is
scheduled on R' too.
Roles: A initiates (its receive queue rotates; A receives on R'). B sends to A and secures R'.
## Why redundant delivery removes the hard parts
- No boundary, no drain, no last-message id. A never decides how much of old to read.
- A dead old server loses nothing B still holds: every undelivered message is scheduled on R' as well.
- A dead new server does not suspend delivery: old keeps delivering until R' is secured.
- The double ratchet already drops duplicates (`AGENT A_DUPLICATE`) and tolerates bounded reordering,
and the delivery schema already writes one message to several send queues (`enqueueMessageB` +
`enqueueSavedMessageB`).
## The one ordering constraint
A must hold R''s secret before it reads any R' data message. A data message reaching R' before the
confirmation is dropped as "no keys" (`processClientMsg`, `(Nothing, Nothing)` arm, line 3611), which
loses it when old is dead. So the confirmation is the first message B sends on R'. R''s delivery
worker does not start while R' is securing, so its accumulated rows cannot outrun the confirmation.
`ICQSndSecure` sends the confirmation and only then starts the worker. This holds on restart too (see
Worker gate).
## New definitions
Agent/Protocol.hs
- Condition fast rotation on the existing `rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion` (v8, `Protocol.hs:322`).
- New `AMessage` constructor `QEND SndQAddr` (tag `QE`), the address of the queue to remove. v8-only,
and only sent during fast rotation, so peers below v8 never parse it.
- `SndSwitchStatus` constructors `SSSecuringQueue` (old, while R' secures) and `SSSendingQEND` (old,
after R' is secured — it drains its tail and `QEND` but takes no new messages).
- `InternalCommand` constructor `ICQSndSecure SMP.SenderId`.
No receive-side switch status, no boundary, no drain state.
## Schema
None. `SSSecuringQueue` uses `snd_queues.switch_status`; R' is secured into `rcv_queues.e2e_dh_secret`.
No new columns, no migration.
## Sender B
### Dual scheduling from QADD
`enqueueMessageB` writes a delivery row for the head send queue and for each `filter isActiveSndQ`
tail queue (`Agent.hs:2345`). Adjust the selection two ways: additionally include a securing
replacement queue on a v8 connection (`connAgentVersion cData >= rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion && status == New && isJust dbReplaceQueueId`),
and exclude a terminating queue (`sndSwchStatus == Just SSSendingQEND`). The version guard keeps the
slow path unchanged — there R' is also `New` with a replace reference during `QKEY`/`QUSE`, but it must
not be dual-scheduled. `SSSendingQEND` is a fast-path-only status, so the exclusion never affects the
slow path. The gate below is inert for the slow path anyway, since it never starts R''s worker while
`New`.
- `QADD` until R' secured: old is the head (active) and R' is the securing replacement, so every `SEND`
writes both rows. old delivers at once; R''s rows accumulate behind its gate.
- R' secured: R' is the head (primary) and old is `SSSendingQEND` (excluded), so a `SEND` writes R'
only. old keeps its worker and delivers whatever was already scheduled on it, plus `QEND`.
### Worker gate
`submitPendingMsg` (`Agent.hs:2437`) and `resumeMsgDelivery` (`2421`) — the two `getDeliveryWorker`
callers that start delivery — skip a queue with `status == New && isJust dbReplaceQueueId`, so neither
a `SEND` nor startup starts R''s worker while it secures. Startup resumes delivery through
`resumeMsgDelivery` (`resumeDelivery` line 1848, and `getAllSndQueuesForDelivery` line 1943), so R' is
skipped there; `resumeAllCommands` (1883) resumes R''s `ICQSndSecure`, which secures R' and only then
starts its worker.
### Steps
`qAddMsg` (fast branch, under the connection lock, `Agent.hs:3855`):
- Add R' as the slow path does (line 3870): `addConnSndQueue (sq_) {primary = True, dbReplaceQueueId = Just old}`, `New`.
- Duplicate **every** undelivered message on old to R': for each pending row on old
(`SELECT internal_id FROM snd_message_deliveries WHERE conn_id = ? AND snd_queue_id = old AND failed = 0`),
`createSndMsgDelivery db R' internalId`. This is the loss-prevention step: old's not-yet-sent
messages are duplicated onto R', so if old later fails they are already on R'. If old is already
down, nothing was sent and the whole backlog is duplicated.
- `enqueueCommand (Just newSrv) (ICQSndSecure sndId)`; `setSndSwitchStatus SSSecuringQueue` on old
(where the slow path sets `SSSendingQKEY`, line 3874); notify `SWITCH QDSnd SPStarted`. old keeps
delivering; R''s worker is gated.
`ICQSndSecure sId` (retryable, under `tryWithLock`):
1. If old is already gone, a prior attempt finished; return. Otherwise find R' by `sId`.
2. `secureSndQueue` (SKEY) R' — idempotent, since `sndPrivateKey` was persisted by `qAddMsg`
(`QueueStore/STM.hs:213`: same key → `Right ()`, different key → `AUTH`).
3. Send the confirmation on R' (`sendConfirmation`; empty body, both peers already know each other;
`e2eEncryption_ = Nothing`, no ratchet step). It is the first message on R'.
4. On success, in one transaction: `setSndQueueStatus R' Active` (the gate lifts), `setSndQueuePrimary R'`
(R' becomes the head; its replace reference is cleared), and `setSndSwitchStatus old (Just SSSendingQEND)`
(old takes no new messages but keeps its worker). Then `submitPendingMsg c R'` (the worker starts and
flushes the accumulated rows after the confirmation), `enqueueMessages [old, R'] (QEND oldAddr)`
(appended after old's tail, delivered on both), and notify `SWITCH QDSnd SPSecured`. From here a
`SEND` goes to R' only; old delivers its tail then `QEND` and is removed when `QEND` is sent.
A temporary error retries from step 1; nothing is torn down. A permanent `AUTH` (should not occur, R'
was secured with B's own key) leaves both queues and surfaces `A_QUEUE`.
`QEND` sent — new `AM_QEND_` arm in `runSmpQueueMsgDelivery`, modelled on `AM_QTEST_` (`Agent.hs:2567`):
on a successful send of `QEND addr`, remove the named send queue (`TM.delete` its worker,
`deleteConnSndQueue addr`), make the remaining queue the sole primary (`setSndQueuePrimary`, which
clears its `replace_snd_queue_id`), and notify `SWITCH QDSnd SPCompleted` (as `AM_QTEST_` does, line
2591). This re-primary is a no-op on the send side — step 4 already made R' primary before `QEND` was
enqueued. The handler is idempotent — a second `QEND` send finds the named queue already gone and does
nothing. `QEND` is sent on both queues; removing old's send queue also drops any `QEND` still pending
on old. The R' copy reliably removes old
and reaches A even when old is dead; the old copy is best effort. Once old's send queue is gone, `SEND`
schedules to R' only.
## Recipient A
A is subscribed to old (primary, `RSSendingQADD`) and R' (created at rotation start,
`dbReplaceQueueId = old`).
- **Confirmation on R'.** In `processClientMsg`, `(Nothing, Just e2ePubKey)` case, add an arm before the
`senderCanSecure` arm (`Agent.hs:3476`), guarded by `isJust (dbReplaceQueueId rq)`. In one
transaction: `setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E rq (C.dh' e2ePubKey e2ePrivKey) (min v phVer)` (secures R') and
`setRcvQueuePrimary R'` (clears R''s replace reference). Then `ack`, and notify `SWITCH QDRcv SPConfirmed`.
No conn-info processing, no ratchet step, no deferral. Redelivery is idempotent: R' now has `e2e_dh_secret`, so a re-sent
confirmation reaches the `(Just e2eDh, Just _)` arm (line 3608) and is acked — correct here, since
there is no backlog to hold.
- **Data on R'.** With R''s replace reference cleared, a data message on R' takes the ordinary path
(`(_, dbReplaceQueueId=Nothing)`, line 3503) — no old-deletion, no `RSSendingQUSE` check. A copy
already read on old is dropped as `A_DUPLICATE`; a copy read first on R' advances the ratchet and
old's copy is then the duplicate.
- **`QEND oldAddr` on either queue.** New `AMessage` handler (`qEndMsg`, a `qDuplex` handler like
`qAddMsg`): `findRQ oldAddr` the receive queue to remove. Mark it deleted (`setRcvQueueDeleted`, so
`getRcvQueuesByConnId_`'s `deleted = 0` filter excludes it at once and a restart does not resurrect
it) and `enqueueCommand (Just oldServer) (ICDeleteRcvQueue oldRcvId)` for the server `DEL` and record
removal — the async, crash-safe path `abortConnectionSwitch` uses, which resumes on restart and does
not block `QEND`, **not** the synchronous `deleteQueue` of `finalizeSwitch`, which would stall if old
is unreachable. `ICDeleteRcvQueue` (`Agent.hs:2224`) currently retries a temporary error forever;
bound it with the same persisted `rcv_queues.delete_errors`/`deleteErrorCount` mechanism `deleteQueueRec`
uses (2884): on a temporary error `incRcvDeleteErrors`, and at the limit `deleteConnRcvQueue` and
stop. The count is in the database, so the bound survives restarts, and its only other caller
(`abortConnectionSwitch'`, 2739) deletes an alive queue that succeeds well before the limit. `qEndMsg`
does **not** re-primary R' — the confirmation arm (above) owns R''s primary flag and replace
reference. `QEND` on old and the confirmation on R' travel on different queues with no order between
them, so `QEND` on old can be processed first (it sits only behind old's tail); re-primarying then
would clear R''s `dbReplaceQueueId` and the later confirmation would miss the rotation arm and never
secure R'. So `qEndMsg` only removes the named queue. Re-create the notification subscription
(`when enableNtfs $ sendNtfSubCommand ns (NSCCreate, [connId])`); notify
`SWITCH QDRcv SPCompleted`; `ackDel` the `QEND`. Received on both queues, the second finds it already
marked deleted and is a no-op.
No drain, no boundary, no finalize command. Old is removed when `QEND` arrives, not by counting.
## Abort / version
- Fast rotation runs only when `connAgentVersion >= v8`; otherwise the `QKEY`/`QUSE` slow path runs
unchanged.
- `canAbortRcvSwitch` (`Agent/Store.hs:210`) returns false for `RSSendingQADD` when `connAgentVersion >= v8`
(at v8 B always chooses fast, so A treats a sent `QADD` as committed). Its signature gains
`connAgentVersion`; both callers pass it from `cData` — `abortConnectionSwitch'` (2730) and
`rcvQueueInfo` in `connectionStats` (2976).
## Losses and duplication
- No boundary loss: the `QADD` step **duplicates** old's entire undelivered backlog onto R', and every
later message up to securing is scheduled on both queues, so if old fails it loses nothing B still
holds. The only messages old can strand are those its server already accepted but had not handed to
A — the ordinary store-and-forward risk, present whenever a server fails with unread messages, and
empty if old was already down (a down server accepted nothing).
- Duplicates: the double ratchet drops them (`A_DUPLICATE`); `checkMsgIntegrity`'s `MsgDuplicate` is
only a flag, not the mechanism.
- The 512 skip bound (`Crypto/Ratchet.hs:953`) does not bite on the rotation: each queue delivers in
order and every message B still holds is on R', so A reads a contiguous stream with only small
cross-queue reordering. A store-and-forward residual (above) is an ordinary loss, not introduced here.
## Tests
- new/new, old stopped right after `QADD`: rotation completes; all messages delivered on R'; old
removed by `QEND` on R'.
- new/new, both alive: messages delivered on both, deduped; old removed by `QEND`.
- new/old and old/new: fall back to the `QKEY`/`QUSE` path.
- crash during securing: restart does not start R''s worker; `ICQSndSecure` resumes, secures R',
starts the worker, sends `QEND`.
- `QEND` received on both queues: old removed once, the second receipt is a no-op.
- `QEND` on old processed before the confirmation on R': R' still secures, because `qEndMsg` does not
clear R''s replace reference; rotation completes.
-168
View File
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
# Implementation plan: XFTP variable file storage time
Proposal: `../rfcs/2026-08-22-xftp-file-storage-time.md`.
## simplexmq: entitlement crypto
New module `Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement`, over `Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS`:
Types:
```
newtype MasterKey = MasterKey ByteString
data Entitlement = Entitlement
{ expiresAt :: UTCTime,
entitlementName :: Text,
extraInfo :: Text
}
data EntitlementCredential = EntitlementCredential
{ issuerKeyIdx :: Word16,
masterKey :: MasterKey,
entitlement :: Entitlement,
issuerSignature :: BBSSignature
}
data EntitlementProof = EntitlementProof
{ issuerKeyIdx :: Word16,
entitlement :: Entitlement,
entProof :: BBSProof
}
```
Functions and constants:
- the disclosed-message encoding: the master key is message 0 and stays undisclosed; `expiresAt`, `entitlementName`, and `extraInfo` are messages 1 to 3 and are disclosed. The protocol encoding of `Entitlement` and its field order follow the same order
- the BBS header string `"SimpleX badges v1"` (shared with chat's badges, which sign under it), the message count, and the disclosed indexes
- `generateEntitlementProof :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey -> EntitlementCredential -> BBSPresHeader -> IO (Either String EntitlementProof)` (the issuer key is looked up by the credential's index; an absent index is `Left`)
- `verifyEntitlement :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey -> BBSPresHeader -> EntitlementProof -> IO EntitlementVerification`, where `data EntitlementVerification = EVValid | EVInvalid | EVUnknownIssuer` (the caller supplies the presentation header; the server reconstructs it, the proof never includes it)
- the issuer public keys constant `Map Word16 BBSPublicKey`
## simplexmq: protocol, new XFTP version
In `Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport`:
- add the next `VersionXFTP` and set `currentXFTPVersion` to 4
- add `entitlementProof :: Maybe EntitlementProof` to `XFTPClientHandshake`, encoded before the `Tail` and only from this version
- the presentation header is the session id alone
In `Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol`:
- add `GrantedStorageTime` and its encoding; retain the one-character sum prefix for future variants:
```
data GrantedStorageTime = GSTExpires {epochSeconds :: Int64}
```
- add the storage time (`Maybe Word32`: `Nothing` and `Just 0` request the server maximum, a value above zero requests that number of hours) to `FNEW`
- add the granted storage to `FRSndIds` as `Maybe GrantedStorageTime` (`Nothing` when decoding a response from a server below this version)
## simplexmq: server configuration
In `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env` and `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main`:
- make `fileExpiration` non-optional (`ExpirationConfig`, no longer `Maybe`); the server always expires files, so the server maximum is always a concrete number of seconds
- read a maximum storage time (a number of hours) for each entitlement name from the `[STORE_LOG]` INI section, from the keys `expire_files_hours_for_supporter` and `expire_files_hours_for_legend`, into `fileStorageEntitlements :: Map Text EntitlementConfig`, where `newtype EntitlementConfig = EntitlementConfig {storageTime :: Int64}` holds seconds; an absent key is skipped (that name gets the default), a present but malformed value fails startup
- exit at startup if any name's maximum is below the default file expiration
- add `entitlementKeys :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey` to the server config (default = the shared constant, set from `Main`); the handshake verifies the proof against it, so the trusted keys never come from the sender
## simplexmq: server session
In `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server`:
- `processClientHandshake` verifies the proof from the handshake, once per session, and resolves the maximum storage time for the entitlement name. `HandshakeSent` carries `EntitlementChecked`, so the first handshake verifies and every later one on that connection reuses the result, including after `processHello` returns the session to `HandshakeSent`
- verify only when the answer can change: the name is configured (startup rejects a maximum below the default), and the entitlement expired less than 24 hours ago. A proof that fails these checks gets no verification; a proof that fails to verify is logged. In both cases the session gets the default maximum
- a verified proof becomes `peerEntitlement :: Maybe SessionEntitlement` in `THAuthServer`, where `data SessionEntitlement = SessionEntitlement {expiresAt :: SystemSeconds, entConfig :: EntitlementConfig}`; `processXFTPRequest` takes it from there, so no proof is verified while a command is processed
- `createFile` caps the requested storage time by the session maximum, which is the entitlement's storage time when the entitlement is still valid, and the default otherwise
## simplexmq: server store and expiration
The `files` table gets a nullable `expires_at`. Every new file stores a concrete `expires_at`. It is NULL only for pre-feature rows, which the migration must not re-date (it has no access to the operator's configured TTL); those are expired at query time as `created_at + ttl`.
Common to both stores, in `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store`:
- add `expiresAt :: Maybe RoundedFileTime` to `FileRec`
- in `createFile`, cap the requested hours at the session maximum, round the expiry up to the hour, store it, and return that same value as the granted storage
- `expiredFiles` receives `now` and `old` (= `now - ttl`). A stored expiry is deleted when `expires_at < now` (no grace — it is already rounded up); a legacy row (no `expires_at`) is deleted when `created_at + fileTimePrecision < old` (the grace covers `created_at` being floored to the hour)
- retain `created_at` for statistics, export, and the legacy fallback
STM store:
- in `expiredFiles`, expire a new file when `roundedSeconds expiresAt < now`, and a legacy file (no `expiresAt`) when `created_at + fileTimePrecision < old`
PostgreSQL store, in `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres` and its migrations:
- add the nullable column `expires_at BIGINT` (no backfill)
- add one composite index `idx_files_expiry ON files (expires_at, created_at)`
- `expiredFiles` query: `(SELECT ... WHERE expires_at < ? LIMIT ?) UNION ALL (SELECT ... WHERE expires_at IS NULL AND created_at < ? LIMIT ?)` with `(now, limit, old - fileTimePrecision, limit)`. The first arm deletes stored (already rounded-up) expiries; the second drains legacy rows, with the grace folded into `old - fileTimePrecision` so the columns stay bare and sargable. Each arm is one range over the composite index and stops at its own limit; a single `OR` predicate builds a bitmap of every match before the limit applies. A `COALESCE(expires_at, created_at + ttl)` predicate is avoided (not sargable, would force a sequential scan). No `ORDER BY` — the batch loop deletes all expired rows regardless of order. New files always store an expiry, so the second arm drains permanently once the legacy rows expire, and is then removed.
Store log, in `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog`:
- add the optional expiration to the `AddFile` record; a record without it parses to `Nothing` (the configured default), never a hardcoded value
## simplexmq: agent
The credential belongs to the user, so the agent holds it the way it holds the user's servers: in memory, supplied when the agent is created and replaced through an API. It is not stored by the agent.
Per-user state in `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite` and `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client`:
- add `entitlements :: Map UserId EntitlementCredential` to `InitialAgentServers`, beside the servers
- add `userEntitlements :: TMap UserId EntitlementCredential` to `AgentClient`, filled from it by `newAgentClient`
- add `entitlementKeys :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey` to `AgentConfig` (default = the shared constant), for the issuer key that proof generation needs
Public API in `Simplex.Messaging.Agent`:
- add storage time (`Maybe Word32` hours) to `xftpSendFile`
- add `setUserEntitlement :: AgentClient -> UserId -> Maybe EntitlementCredential -> IO ()`, in the shape of `setProtocolServers`: it replaces the entry, and when the credential changed it closes that user's XFTP clients, so the next upload presents the new credential
Store, in both the SQLite and PostgreSQL agent stores:
- add a nullable storage time column (integer hours; NULL means the server maximum) to `snd_files`
- add the migration to both stores
- in `createSndFile`, store the storage time
Upload, in `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client` and `Simplex.FileTransfer.Client`:
- `getXFTPClient` takes a proof for the session as a parameter, `SessionId -> IO (Maybe EntitlementProof)`, beside the callback it already takes for a closed client. The client config holds no credential and no keys
- `getXFTPServerClient` passes a function that generates the proof over the session id from the configured issuer keys, and only for a server of this user, matched by the key hash that TLS pins, so a file description of the sender cannot direct the entitlement to another server. A server that is not the user's, a missing credential, or a failure to generate gives `Nothing`, with the failure logged
- `xftpClientHandshakeV1` calls it with the session id from the connection, and sends the result in the handshake
- `agentXFTPNewChunk` reads the storage time from the send record and sends FNEW with it
- `createXFTPChunk` returns the granted expiry (epoch seconds); `agentXFTPNewChunk` stores it on `NewSndChunkReplica`
Completion:
- `createXFTPChunk` returns the granted expiry as `Maybe GrantedStorageTime`; `SndFileChunkReplica` and `NewSndChunkReplica` carry `expiresAt :: Maybe GrantedStorageTime`
- persist it in a nullable `replica_expires_at` column on `snd_file_chunk_replicas` (added to the entitlement migration): `createSndFileReplica` stores `epochSeconds`, `getSndFile` and `getNextSndChunkToUpload` read it back into `GSTExpires`
- on `SFDONE`, report the file expiry: a chunk expires when its last replica expires (`max` over replicas, absent replicas ignored, `Nothing` only if none report); the file expires when its first chunk expires (`min` over chunks, `Nothing` if any chunk is unknown). `GrantedStorageTime` derives `Ord`
- `SFDONE` gains a trailing `Maybe GrantedStorageTime` (not str-encoded); chat consumes it (wired later)
Testing:
- e2e test in `tests/XFTPAgent.hs`: generate a BBS keypair, sign a supporter credential (issuer key index 1), run the server with `entitlementKeys = {1: testPk}` and a supporter maximum above the default, run the sender agent with the same `entitlementKeys` and the credential for the user, send a file requesting a number of hours above the default and below that maximum, and assert `SFDONE`'s granted expiry rounds up `now + requested` (proof of the entitlement raising the max above the default)
- the same upload without the credential is capped at the default maximum
- the expiry is written before the status, because `BlockingInfo`'s notice parser is terminal (`A.takeByteString`), so any field after the blocking info makes the record unparseable and the file is dropped on restart. Every field added to `AddFile` must go before the status
- store log round trip in `tests/CoreTests/StoreLogTests.hs`, in the shape of the SMP store log test: a file record survives a write, a read into the store, and compaction, with and without the expiry, including a file blocked with a notice in both cases
## simplex-chat
- remove lifetime badges: make `badgeExpiry` a `UTCTime`, drop the `"lifetime"` encoding, and remove the lifetime option from the UI and the CLI
- map `BadgeInfo` to `Entitlement` (`entitlementName = textEncode badgeType`, `expiresAt = badgeExpiry`, `extraInfo = badgeExtra`) when calling the agent
- pass the user's credential to the agent when it is created, and through `setUserEntitlement` when the badge changes, in the same places that pass and update the user's servers
- pass the storage time to `xftpSendFile`
- retain the `maxXFTPFileSize` size limit
- reuse `verifyEntitlement` for peer-badge verification
- import the issuer public keys from the shared simplexmq constant
## State
Steps 2 to 5 are implemented in simplexmq. Step 1 and step 6 belong to the chat branch that carries badges.
## Order
1. Add the entitlement crypto module; move chat's badge verification onto it and remove lifetime badges.
2. Add the new XFTP version, the FNEW storage time, and the response.
3. Change the server configuration, store, expiration, and store log.
4. Move the proof to the handshake: the handshake field, the session state on the server, and the proof for the session on the client.
5. Hold the credential per user in the agent, and add the API to replace it.
6. Wire chat to pass the credential and the storage time.
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
## Root cause: every subscription batch rebuilds the set of subscribed connections
Resubscribing a session allocates and discards a fresh `Set ConnId` covering *all* of that
session's active subscriptions, once per batch. On clients with many queues per session this
dominates both the CPU and the allocation of a reconnection, and it happens again on every
network change.
`subscribeSessQueues_` (`Agent/Client.hs`) needs to know which connections were already
subscribed, so that only newly subscribed ones are reported `UP`. It obtained that by folding
the session's whole subscription map:
```haskell
Just . S.fromList . map qConnId . M.elems <$> atomically (SS.getActiveSubs tSess $ currentSubs c)
```
`activeSubs` is keyed by `RecipientId` and holds every subscribed queue of the session, so this
walks all of them and builds a set of the same size — to answer a membership question about at
most `subsBatchSize` connections.
### Cost
`subscribeQueues` chunks the queues into batches of `subsBatchSize` (1350 by default) and calls
`subscribeSessQueues_` per batch. `activeSubs` grows as the resubscription proceeds, so batch *k*
folds roughly *k* × 1350 entries: resubscribing *N* queues in one session costs on the order of
*N²* / 2700 entry traversals, and allocates a `Set` of up to *N* elements per batch.
For a session holding 50k queues that is ~0.9M traversals per resubscription and ~37 sets of up
to 50k elements — tens of MB of short-lived allocation, repeated for each session. Under the
non-moving collector this allocation is also promotion pressure, which is what makes a
reconnection storm visible as resident memory rather than only as CPU.
Sessions are keyed `(userId, server, Nothing)` in `TSMSession` mode, so a client with many
connections concentrates its queues into few sessions and hits the worst case rather than
avoiding it.
## Fix
Maintain the connection index incrementally instead of deriving it per batch.
`SessSubs` gains `activeConns :: TMap ConnId Int` alongside `activeSubs`, and `getActiveConns`
reads it directly. `subscribeSessQueues_` then tests membership against that map.
A connection can hold more than one subscribed queue, so the index counts them rather than
storing a set: `incActiveConn` on a queue becoming active, `decActiveConn` when it stops, and the
entry is removed when its count reaches zero. That keeps "connection has at least one active
subscription" exact under partial subscription and partial failure.
It is maintained at every site that mutates `activeSubs`, and nowhere else:
| site | change |
|---|---|
| `addActiveSub'` | increments, but only when the queue was not already active |
| `batchAddActiveSubs` | increments for the queues actually added (`M.difference` against the previous map) |
| `deleteSub` | decrements for the queue if it was active |
| `batchDeleteSubs` | decrements for the removed queues that were active (`M.restrictKeys`) |
| `setSubsPending_` | clears the index with `activeSubs`, since all subscriptions become pending |
The guards matter: re-adding an already-active queue, or deleting one that was only pending,
must not move the count, otherwise the index drifts from `activeSubs` and connections are
reported `UP` twice or not at all.
## Behaviour
Unchanged. The same connections are reported `UP`, and the session-closing condition that
previously tested `S.null cs` now tests `M.null cs` over the same information.
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
# Server: batched SUB command processing
Implementation plan for Part 1 of [RFC 2026-03-28-subscription-performance](../rfcs/2026-03-28-subscription-performance.md).
## Current state
When a batch of ~135 SUB commands arrives, the server already batches:
- Queue record lookups (`getQueueRecs` in `receive`, Server.hs:1151)
- Command verification (`verifyLoadedQueue`, Server.hs:1152)
But command processing is per-command (`foldrM process` in `client`, Server.hs:1372-1375). Each SUB calls `subscribeQueueAndDeliver` which calls `tryPeekMsg` - one DB query per queue. For Postgres, that's ~135 individual `SELECT ... FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = ? ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1` queries per batch.
## Goal
Replace ~135 individual message peek queries with 1 batched query per batch. No protocol changes.
## Implementation
### Step 1: Add `tryPeekMsgs` to MsgStoreClass
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Types.hs`
Add to `MsgStoreClass`:
```haskell
tryPeekMsgs :: s -> [StoreQueue s] -> ExceptT ErrorType IO (Map RecipientId Message)
```
Returns a map from recipient ID to earliest pending message for each queue that has one. Queues with no messages are absent from the map.
### Step 2: Parameterize `deliver` to accept pre-fetched message
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs`
Currently `deliver` (inside `subscribeQueueAndDeliver`, line 1641) calls `tryPeekMsg ms q`. Add a parameter for an optional pre-fetched message:
```haskell
deliver :: Maybe Message -> (Bool, Maybe Sub) -> M s ResponseAndMessage
deliver prefetchedMsg (hasSub, sub_) = do
stats <- asks serverStats
fmap (either ((,Nothing) . err) id) $ liftIO $ runExceptT $ do
msg_ <- maybe (tryPeekMsg ms q) (pure . Just) prefetchedMsg
...
```
When `Nothing` is passed, falls back to individual `tryPeekMsg` (existing behavior). When `Just msg` is passed, uses it directly (batched path).
### Step 3: Pre-fetch messages before the processing loop
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs`
Currently (lines 1372-1375):
```haskell
forever $
atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
>>= foldrM process ([], [])
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> ...
```
Add a pre-fetch step before the existing loop:
```haskell
forever $ do
batch <- atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
msgMap <- prefetchMsgs batch
foldrM (process msgMap) ([], []) batch
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> ...
```
`prefetchMsgs` scans the batch, collects queues from SUB commands that have a verified queue (`q_ = Just (q, _)`), calls `tryPeekMsgs` once, returns the map. For batches with no SUBs it returns an empty map (no DB call).
`process` passes the looked-up message (or Nothing) through to `processCommand` and down to `deliver`.
The `foldrM process` loop, `processCommand`, `subscribeQueueAndDeliver`, and all other command handlers stay structurally the same. Only `deliver` gains one parameter, and the `client` loop gains one pre-fetch call.
### Step 4: Review
Review the typeclass signature and server usage. Confirm the interface has the right shape before implementing store backends.
### Step 5: Implement for each store backend
#### Postgres
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Postgres.hs`
Single query using `DISTINCT ON`:
```sql
SELECT DISTINCT ON (recipient_id)
recipient_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id IN ?
ORDER BY recipient_id, message_id ASC
```
Build `Map RecipientId Message` from results.
#### STM
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/STM.hs`
Loop over queues, call `tryPeekMsg` for each, collect into map.
#### Journal
File: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Journal.hs`
Loop over queues, call `tryPeekMsg` for each, collect into map.
### Step 6: Handle edge cases
1. **Mixed batches**: `prefetchMsgs` collects only SUB queues. Non-SUB commands get Nothing for the pre-fetched message and process unchanged.
2. **Already-subscribed queues**: Include in pre-fetch - `deliver` is called for re-SUBs too (delivers pending message).
3. **Service subscriptions**: The pre-fetch doesn't care about service state. `sharedSubscribeQueue` handles service association in STM; message peek is the same.
4. **Error queues**: Verification errors from `receive` are Left values in the batch. `prefetchMsgs` only looks at Right values with SUB commands.
5. **Empty pre-fetch**: If batch has no SUBs (e.g., all ACKs), `prefetchMsgs` returns empty map, no DB call made.
### Step 7: Batch other commands (future, not in scope)
The same pattern (pre-fetch before loop, parameterize handler) can extend to:
- `ACK` with `tryDelPeekMsg` - batch delete+peek
- `GET` with `tryPeekMsg` - same map lookup
Lower priority since these don't have the N-at-once pattern of subscriptions.
## File changes summary
| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Types.hs` | Add `tryPeekMsgs` to typeclass |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Postgres.hs` | Implement `tryPeekMsgs` with batch SQL |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/STM.hs` | Implement `tryPeekMsgs` as loop |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Journal.hs` | Implement `tryPeekMsgs` as loop |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs` | Add `prefetchMsgs`, parameterize `deliver` |
## Testing
1. Existing server tests must pass unchanged (correctness preserved).
2. Add a test that subscribes a batch of queues (some with pending messages, some without) and verifies all get correct SOK + MSG responses.
3. Prometheus metrics: existing `qSub` stat should still increment correctly.
## Performance expectation
For 300K queues across ~2200 batches:
- Before: ~300K individual DB queries
- After: ~2200 batched DB queries (one per batch of ~135)
- ~136x reduction in DB round-trips
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
# Server: batch queue service associations
When a batch of SUB or NSUB commands arrives from a service client, each command that needs a new or removed service association calls `setQueueService` individually - one DB write per command. For 135 commands per batch, that's 135 individual `UPDATE msg_queues` queries.
## Goal
Reduce to at most 2 DB queries per batch (one for rcv associations, one for ntf associations), using `UPDATE ... RETURNING recipient_id` to identify which queues were actually updated.
Also fuse message pre-fetch and association batching into a single batch preparation step with a clean contract.
## Contract
```haskell
prepareBatch :: Maybe ServiceId -> NonEmpty (VerifiedTransmission s) -> M s (Either ErrorType (Map RecipientId (Maybe Message, Maybe (Either ErrorType ()))))
```
`Left e` = batch-level failure (message pre-fetch or association query failed entirely). All SUBs/NSUBs in the batch get this error.
`Right map` = per-queue results as a tuple:
- `Maybe Message` - pre-fetched message for SUB queues, `Nothing` for NSUB or no message
- `Maybe (Either ErrorType ())` - association result. `Nothing` = no update needed. `Just (Right ())` = update succeeded. `Just (Left e)` = update failed for this queue.
One map, one lookup per queue. `processCommand` passes both values to `subscribeQueueAndDeliver` / `subscribeNotifications` -> `sharedSubscribeQueue`.
Queues not in the map (non-SUB/NSUB commands, failed verification) are not affected.
## prepareBatch implementation
One accumulating fold over the batch, collecting three lists:
- `subMsgQs :: [StoreQueue s]` - SUB queues for message pre-fetch
- `rcvAssocQs :: [StoreQueue s]` - SUB queues needing `rcv_service_id` update (`clntServiceId /= rcvServiceId qr`)
- `ntfAssocQs :: [StoreQueue s]` - NSUB queues needing `ntf_service_id` update (`clntServiceId /= ntfServiceId` from `NtfCreds`)
Classification reads from the already-loaded `QueueRec` in `VerifiedTransmission` - no extra DB query.
Then three store calls (each skipped if its list is empty):
1. `tryPeekMsgs ms subMsgQs` -> `Map RecipientId Message`
2. `setRcvQueueServices (queueStore ms) clntServiceId rcvAssocQs` -> `Set RecipientId`
3. `setNtfQueueServices (queueStore ms) clntServiceId ntfAssocQs` -> `Set RecipientId`
Then one pass to merge results into `Map RecipientId (Maybe Message, Maybe (Either ErrorType ()))`:
- For each SUB queue: `(M.lookup rId msgMap, assocResult rId rcvUpdated rcvAssocQs)`
- For each NSUB queue: `(Nothing, assocResult rId ntfUpdated ntfAssocQs)`
Where `assocResult rId updated assocQs` = if the queue was in `assocQs` (needed update), then `Just (Right ())` if `rId` is in `updated`, else `Just (Left AUTH)`. If not in `assocQs` (no update needed), `Nothing`.
If any of the three calls fails entirely, return `Left e`.
## Store interface
Replace the polymorphic `setQueueServices` with two plain functions in `QueueStoreClass`:
```haskell
setRcvQueueServices :: s -> Maybe ServiceId -> [q] -> IO (Set RecipientId)
setNtfQueueServices :: s -> Maybe ServiceId -> [q] -> IO (Set RecipientId)
```
No `SParty p` polymorphism. Each function knows its column.
### Postgres implementation
`setRcvQueueServices`:
```sql
UPDATE msg_queues SET rcv_service_id = ?
WHERE recipient_id IN ? AND deleted_at IS NULL
RETURNING recipient_id
```
`setNtfQueueServices`:
```sql
UPDATE msg_queues SET ntf_service_id = ?
WHERE recipient_id IN ? AND notifier_id IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at IS NULL
RETURNING recipient_id
```
After each batch query, for each queue in the returned set:
1. Read QueueRec TVar, update with new serviceId
2. Write store log entry
### STM implementation
Loop over queues, call existing per-item logic, collect succeeded `RecipientId`s into a Set.
## Downstream changes in Server.hs
### processCommand
Gains one parameter: `Map RecipientId (Maybe Message, Maybe (Either ErrorType ()))`.
SUB case: `M.lookup entId prepared` gives `Just (msg_, assocResult)` or `Nothing`. Pass both to `subscribeQueueAndDeliver`.
NSUB case: `M.lookup entId prepared` gives `Just (Nothing, assocResult)` or `Nothing`. Pass `assocResult` to `subscribeNotifications`.
Forwarded commands: pass `M.empty`.
### subscribeQueueAndDeliver
Takes `Maybe Message` and `Maybe (Either ErrorType ())` as before. No change in how it uses them.
### sharedSubscribeQueue
Takes `Maybe (Either ErrorType ())`. On paths needing association update:
- `Just (Left e)` -> return error
- `Just (Right ())` -> skip `setQueueService`, proceed with STM work
- `Nothing` -> no update needed, proceed with existing logic
## Implementation order (top-down)
1. Define the `prepareBatch` contract and thread one map through `processCommand` -> `subscribeQueueAndDeliver` / `subscribeNotifications` -> `sharedSubscribeQueue` (Server.hs)
2. Implement `prepareBatch` with the fold, three calls, and merge (Server.hs)
3. Add `setRcvQueueServices` and `setNtfQueueServices` to `QueueStoreClass` (Types.hs)
4. Implement for Postgres with batch `UPDATE ... RETURNING` (Postgres.hs)
5. Implement for STM as loop (STM.hs)
6. Implement for Journal as delegation (Journal.hs)
At step 2, store functions can initially be stubs returning empty sets. Steps 3-6 fill in the real implementations.
## Files changed
| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs` | `prepareBatch` with fold + merge; one map parameter through `processCommand` -> `subscribeQueueAndDeliver` / `subscribeNotifications` -> `sharedSubscribeQueue` |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/Types.hs` | Add `setRcvQueueServices`, `setNtfQueueServices` to `QueueStoreClass` |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/Postgres.hs` | Implement with batch `UPDATE ... RETURNING` + per-item TVar/log updates |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/STM.hs` | Implement as loop |
| `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/MsgStore/Journal.hs` | Delegate to underlying store |
-455
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@@ -1,455 +0,0 @@
# Server: SMP support for public namespaces
> **⚠ Implementation diverged from this plan.** Six audit rounds reshaped the
> original design. **The shipped code differs in several load-bearing ways:**
>
> - **Wire format**: `NameRecord` is now JSON (aeson), not the custom binary
> ABNF this plan documents. See `protocol/simplex-messaging.md` §Resolver
> commands and `src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs` ToJSON/FromJSON instances.
> - **No cache**: the TTL + FIFO + byte-cap cache, in-flight coalescing,
> `psqueues` dep, and `cache_*` INI keys are all gone. Every RSLV becomes
> one `eth_call` bounded by `rpcMaxConcurrency` + `rpcTimeoutMs`. See
> `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names.hs`.
> - **No `allow_dangerous_colocation` flag**: the proxy co-location guard
> was demoted to a startup `logWarn` (the flag was always-on because
> `[PROXY]` has no enable toggle).
> - **Module shape**: `Names/Resolver.hs` was merged into `Names.hs`; only
> `Names/Eth/RPC.hs` and `Names/Eth/SNRC.hs` remain as separate modules.
> - **Test list**: of the 15 specs listed below, ~7 shipped; the rest were
> either superseded by the cache removal (CacheSpec) or deferred
> (ForwardedRslvSpec, MockRpcSpec, StartupGuardSpec, UrlValidationSpec,
> EipChecksumSpec).
>
> Sources of truth: `CHANGELOG.md` (release notes),
> `protocol/simplex-messaging.md` §Resolver commands (wire format),
> `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names*.hs` (implementation). This file is
> retained as historical context; do not treat it as a specification.
Implementation plan for Part 2 of [RFC 2026-05-21-public-namespaces](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/ep/namespace/docs/rfcs/2026-05-21-public-namespaces.md). Adds a forwarded-only `RSLV <lookup_key>` SMP command that returns `NAME <NameRecord>` read from the SNRC contract via a Reth+Nimbus JSON-RPC endpoint. Smp-server becomes name-capable by `[NAMES] enable: on`.
Out of scope: `Simplex.Messaging.Client` API, agent-side resolution flow, `ServerRoles.names` in the agent, default-router list, reverse resolution, multicoin/text records, state proofs.
## Architecture
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant C as Client
participant P as Proxy (storage role)
participant N as Name server (names role)
participant E as Ethereum endpoint<br/>(Reth+Nimbus)
C ->> P: PFWD(enc(RSLV key))
P ->> N: RFWD(enc(RSLV key))
note over N: verifyTransmission True →<br/>vc SResolver (RSLV _) → VRVerified
N ->> N: cache lookup
alt cache miss
N ->> E: eth_call(SNRC, namehash(key))
E -->> N: ABI bytes
note over N: ABI decode + zero-owner check + cache insert
end
N -->> P: RFWD(enc(NAME rec | ERR AUTH))
P -->> C: PRES(enc(NAME rec | ERR AUTH))
```
RSLV is **forwarded-only** — direct RSLV is rejected `CMD PROHIBITED`. This preserves the RFC's two-server resolution: the name server sees the lookup key but never the client's IP, session, or identity.
## Protocol
Shared library: `src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs` and `src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs`.
**Version.** `Transport.hs:226`: `namesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 20`. Bump `currentClientSMPRelayVersion`, `currentServerSMPRelayVersion`, `proxiedSMPRelayVersion` to 20. Pre-v20 binaries lack the `RSLV_` tag; v20 binaries with sessions negotiated at v < 20 reject `RSLV_` at the parameter parser. The proxied-version bump 18 → 20 is safe (v19's `RecipientService`/`NotifierService` aren't in the forwarded whitelist; v18's `BLOCKED info` is already version-branched at `Protocol.hs:1943`).
**Party kind.** Append `Resolver` to `Party` (line 335); add `SResolver` (line 349), `TestEquality` clause (line 361), `PartyI Resolver` (line 394). `queueParty SResolver = Nothing` (falls through line 412). `partyClientRole SResolver = Nothing`.
**`RSLV` command.**
```haskell
RSLV :: LookupKey -> Command Resolver
newtype LookupKey = LookupKey ByteString
instance Encoding LookupKey where
smpEncode (LookupKey s) = smpEncode s
smpP = do
n <- lenP
when (n > 64) $ fail "LookupKey too large"
LookupKey <$> A.take n
```
Name-syntax validation is client-side per RFC; the server treats the key as opaque bytes. Tag `"RSLV"`, version guard inside `protocolP v (CT SResolver RSLV_)`: `| v >= namesSMPVersion -> Cmd SResolver . RSLV <$> _smpP`.
**Testnet/mainnet selector**: how the `#testnet:name` namespace appears in `LookupKey` bytes is determined by the SNRC contract (Part 1) — confirm with Part 1 before merging.
**`NAME` response.**
```haskell
NAME :: NameRecord -> BrokerMsg
```
Tag `"NAME"`. Symmetric version guards on encode (in `encodeProtocol v`) and decode (in `protocolP v NAME_`): `| v >= namesSMPVersion -> ...`. `NameRecord` has **no `Encoding` typeclass instance** — the typeclass cannot version-branch. Use top-level helpers `nameRecBytes :: VersionSMP -> NameRecord -> ByteString` and `parseNameRec :: VersionSMP -> Parser NameRecord`, mirroring the `IDS QIK` precedent at `Protocol.hs:1912–1979`.
**`NameRecord` schema and wire layout.**
```haskell
data NameRecord = NameRecord
{ nrDisplayName :: Text -- ≤255 bytes UTF-8
, nrOwner :: NameOwner -- 20 raw bytes
, nrChannelLinks :: [NameLink]
, nrContactLinks :: [NameLink]
, nrAdminAddress :: Maybe Text
, nrAdminEmail :: Maybe Text
, nrExpiry :: Int64 -- Unix seconds, ≥ 0
, nrIsTest :: Bool
}
newtype NameOwner = NameOwner ByteString -- bare ctor NOT exported; smart ctor enforces length 20
newtype NameLink = NameLink Text -- bare ctor NOT exported; smart ctor enforces ≤1024 bytes
unNameOwner :: NameOwner -> ByteString
unNameOwner (NameOwner bs) = bs
unNameLink :: NameLink -> Text
unNameLink (NameLink t) = t
```
Field additions are gated by future SMP version bumps (matching the `IDS QIK` precedent at `Protocol.hs:1912–1979`) — no separate record-version field.
| Field | Encoding | Max bytes |
|---|---|---|
| `nrDisplayName` | 1-byte length prefix + UTF-8 | 1 + 255 |
| `nrOwner` | 20 raw bytes, no prefix | 20 |
| `nrChannelLinks`, `nrContactLinks` | 1-byte count + per-element (Word16 BE len + UTF-8); combined cap **8 entries** across both lists | 1 + Σ(2 + ≤1024) |
| `nrAdminAddress`, `nrAdminEmail` | `'0'` or `'1'` + (1-byte length + UTF-8 if `'1'`) | 1 + 1 + 255 |
| `nrExpiry` | two big-endian `Word32` | 8 |
| `nrIsTest` | `'T'` or `'F'` | 1 |
`Encoding NameLink` reads the Word16 length **before** `A.take` allocates — going through the existing `Large` wrapper allows up to 65 535 bytes per element. There is no `Encoding [a]` instance — use `smpEncodeList` / `smpListP` / a bounded variant:
```haskell
smpListPUpTo :: Encoding a => Int -> Parser [a]
smpListPUpTo cap = do
n <- lenP
when (n > cap) $ fail "list too long"
A.count n smpP
parseNameRec _v = do
nrDisplayName <- smpP
nrOwner <- smpP
nrChannelLinks <- smpListPUpTo 8
nrContactLinks <- smpListPUpTo (8 - length nrChannelLinks)
nrAdminAddress <- smpP
nrAdminEmail <- smpP
nrExpiry <- smpP
when (nrExpiry < 0) $ fail "expiry must be non-negative"
nrIsTest <- smpP
pure NameRecord{..}
```
Both list parsers fail at the count step before allocating; the second inherits the residual budget. Canonical encoding by construction: every primitive has exactly one valid byte form — two name servers reading the same SNRC state produce byte-identical responses.
**Wire-size budget.** `paddedProxiedTLength = 16226` is the plaintext input to `cbEncrypt` (`Server.hs:2117`); `pad` reserves 2 bytes → framed transmission ≤ 16 224 bytes. Combined-link cap 8 yields max payload ≈ 9 050 bytes — generous margin.
**Error semantics.** A single wire code: `ERR AUTH`. Per RFC, this collapses every failure (name not found, malformed key, names disabled, RPC unreachable, decode error, timeout). Resolver internally distinguishes the cause for stats only.
**Forwarded-only access.** Direct RSLV is rejected with `CMD PROHIBITED`. The shape of `THAuthServer` alone cannot discriminate direct from forwarded (`Transport.hs:852` sets `sessSecret' = Just _` for every v6+ direct client too). An explicit `forwarded :: Bool` flag is threaded through `verifyTransmission` (see below).
## Server changes
All edits in `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs`.
**`forwarded :: Bool` plumbing.** Three signatures change:
- `verifyTransmission :: Bool -> ...` (line 1233) — direct path passes `False` (lines 1152–1153), forwarded path passes `True` (line 2129).
- `verifyLoadedQueue :: Bool -> ...` (line 1238) — receives the flag from `verifyTransmission` (lines 1235, 1240).
- `verifyQueueTransmission :: Bool -> ...` (line 1244) — receives and uses the flag.
New `vc` clauses inside `verifyQueueTransmission`:
```haskell
vc SResolver (RSLV _) | forwarded = VRVerified Nothing
| otherwise = VRFailed (CMD PROHIBITED)
vc SResolver _ = VRFailed (CMD PROHIBITED) -- defensive catch-all
```
**Forwarded whitelist** (`Server.hs:2132`):
```haskell
Cmd SResolver (RSLV _) -> True
```
**`processCommand` branch** (alongside line 1481):
```haskell
Cmd SResolver (RSLV (LookupKey key)) -> do
st <- asks (rslvStats . serverStats)
incStat (rslvReqs st)
asks namesEnv >>= \case
Nothing -> incStat (rslvDisabled st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
Just nenv -> liftIO (resolveName nenv key) >>= \case
Right rec -> incStat (rslvSucc st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, NAME rec)
Left NotFound -> incStat (rslvNotFound st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
Left _ -> incStat (rslvEthErrs st) $> response (corrId, NoEntity, ERR AUTH)
```
**Shutdown.** Add `closeNamesEnv :: NamesEnv -> IO ()` calling `closeManager`. Wire into `closeServer` (`Server.hs:247`):
```haskell
closeServer = do
asks (smpAgent . proxyAgent) >>= liftIO . closeSMPClientAgent
asks namesEnv >>= liftIO . mapM_ closeNamesEnv
```
In-flight `resolveName` calls during shutdown receive `ConnectionClosed` → `EthHttpErr` → masked-leader cleanup runs → waiters unblock with `ERR AUTH`.
**`incStat` relocation.** Defined at `Server.hs:2220`, currently unexported. Move to `Server/Stats.hs` (one-line transplant + export) so `Resolver.hs` can use it.
**Co-located proxy warning.** `newEnv` logs a startup warning whenever `allowSMPProxy = True` and `namesConfig = Just _`. RSLV is the first slow forwarded command; on a proxy host it can serialise other forwarded commands on the same proxy-relay session up to `rpcTimeoutMs` per cache miss. The warning is not a hard refusal because `[PROXY]` has no `enable: on/off` toggle — proxy is always on for every smp-server. `forkForwardedCmd` async dispatch is the longer-term fix, tracked as a follow-up; once the proxy role is gateable per-server, the warning can be tightened back to a refusal.
## Resolver subtree
New module tree at `src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Names/`:
| Module | Contents |
|---|---|
| `Names.hs` | Façade — re-exports `NamesConfig`, `NamesEnv`, `ResolveError`, `resolveName`, `newNamesEnv`, `closeNamesEnv`. |
| `Names/Resolver.hs` | All types + cache + in-flight + `resolveName`. Helpers exported directly (no `.Internal` per codebase convention). **Test seam**: `NamesEnv` holds `ethCall` as a function value, so tests construct stubs via `newNamesEnvWith`. |
| `Names/Eth/RPC.hs` | `EthRpcEnv`; `ethCallReal` via `http-client` + `withResponse` + `brReadSome rpcMaxResponseBytes`. JSON-RPC error / HTTP error split. `rpcMaxConcurrency` semaphore. `Authorization` header from `rpcAuth`. |
| `Names/Eth/SNRC.hs` | `EthAddress`, Keccak-256 namehash via `crypton`'s `Crypto.Hash.Algorithms.Keccak_256` (mirroring `Crypto.hs:1023–1025` for SHA3), hand-rolled bounded Solidity ABI codec, `getRecord` with zero-owner detection. **Ethereum's Keccak ≠ NIST SHA3-256.** |
**ABI codec invariants**, enforced before any allocation: `offset + 32 ≤ buf.length`; `offset + 32 + length ≤ buf.length`; `offset ≥ headEnd` (no backward jumps); every length ≤ per-field cap; `string[]` outer length × 32 ≤ buf.length; recursion depth ≤ 2; `uint256 → Int64` rejects if any high 24 bytes non-zero; UTF-8 via `decodeUtf8'` returns `EthDecodeErr`.
**Zero-owner → `NotFound`**: ENS-style resolvers return zeroed records for non-existent names. After ABI decode, if `nrOwner == NameOwner (B.replicate 20 0)` return `Left NotFound`.
**Errors.**
```haskell
data ResolveError = NotFound | EthHttpErr | EthRpcErr { rpcCode :: Int, rpcMessage :: Text }
| EthDecodeErr | TimedOut
```
All collapse to `ERR AUTH`. `EthRpcErr` carries JSON-RPC `error` object — method-not-found (SNRC not deployed at `snrc_address`) is logged immediately on the first error after a recent success: `logError "NAMES: JSON-RPC error from endpoint — check snrc_address: <code> <message>"`. No automatic retry.
**Cache.** TTL + FIFO eviction. `TVar (OrdPSQ LookupKey Word64 NameRecord, Int)` — priority = monotonic-ns at insert; the `Int` is running byte count. `cacheLookup` is one STM transaction (read, expiry-check, expired-delete-with-byte-decrement). `cacheInsert` is one STM transaction: while `size > cacheMaxEntries` OR `bytes + sizeOf(rec) > cacheMaxBytes`, `minView` to drop oldest, then `insert`. Byte counter prevents `100 000 × 9 KB ≈ 900 MB` worst-case blow-up.
**Request coalescing** (async-exception safe via `E.mask`):
```haskell
resolveName env bs = do
let k = LookupKey bs
now <- getMonotonicTimeNSec
atomically (cacheLookup env k now) >>= \case
Just rec -> incStat (rslvCacheHits ...) $> Right rec
Nothing -> do
incStat (rslvCacheMiss ...)
ticket <- atomically $ TM.lookup k (inflight env) >>= \case
Just mv -> pure (Waiter mv)
Nothing -> newEmptyTMVar >>= \mv -> TM.insert k mv (inflight env) $> Leader mv
case ticket of
Waiter mv -> atomically (readTMVar mv)
Leader mv -> E.mask $ \restore -> do
r <- restore (fetchOnceTimed env bs)
`E.catch` \(e :: E.SomeException) -> pure (Left (mapEthErr e))
atomically $ putTMVar mv r >> TM.delete k (inflight env)
case r of Right rec -> atomically (cacheInsert env k now rec); Left _ -> pure ()
pure r
fetchOnceTimed env bs =
System.Timeout.timeout (rpcTimeoutMs (config env) * 1000) (fetchOnce env bs) >>= \case
Just r -> pure r
Nothing -> pure (Left TimedOut)
```
`E.mask` ensures `putTMVar + TM.delete` runs even on async exception; `fetchOnceTimed` runs under `restore` so it remains interruptible. Waiters always see a value; the in-flight TMap entry is always removed.
`fetchOnce`, `mapEthErr`, `scrubUrl`, `cacheLookup`, `cacheInsert` are internal to `Resolver.hs`. `getMonotonicTimeNSec` from `GHC.Clock` — first monotonic-clock use in the codebase; clock-jump safe.
**STM contention.** Cache hits are read-only `readTVar` — STM scales. Cache writes under sustained miss traffic can retry; `CacheSpec` asserts < 5% retry at 4 readers + 1 writer @ 1k RPS. If observed higher, swap `TVar` for `IORef` + `atomicModifyIORef'`.
**Multicoin and text records** are not in `NameRecord`. If Part 1 contract returns them from `getRecord`, extend `NameRecord` and the wire-size budget. **Confirm with Part 1 author before implementing `Eth/SNRC.hs`.**
## Configuration
`ServerConfig` (`Env/STM.hs:142`) gains one field `namesConfig :: Maybe NamesConfig`. `Env` (`Env/STM.hs:261`) gains `namesEnv :: Maybe NamesEnv`. `newEnv` constructs it after `proxyAgent` (line 605) with the co-location guard.
```haskell
data NamesConfig = NamesConfig
{ ethereumEndpoint :: Text -- http(s), no userinfo, explicit port required
, snrcAddress :: NameOwner -- 20 bytes
, rpcAuth :: Maybe RpcAuth -- required when https & non-loopback host
, cacheSeconds :: Int -- 300
, cacheMaxEntries :: Int -- 100000
, cacheMaxBytes :: Int -- 67108864 (64 MB)
, rpcTimeoutMs :: Int -- 3000
, rpcMaxResponseBytes :: Int -- 262144 (256 KB)
, rpcMaxConcurrency :: Int -- 8
}
data RpcAuth = AuthBearer Text | AuthBasic Text Text
```
INI parsing in `Server/Main.hs`:
- `validateUrl` (using new `network-uri` dep): accepts only http(s), non-empty host, **explicit port** (rejects `http://localhost` defaulting to 80 while Reth is on 8545), no userinfo, no query/fragment. Rejects `https://...` without `rpc_auth` when host is non-loopback. On rejection: `logError` + `exitFailure`.
- `parseEthAddr`: accepts `0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}` and the same without `0x`. Mixed-case → verify EIP-55 checksum and reject mismatch (catches typos).
- `parseRpcAuth`: reads optional `rpc_auth` key; format `bearer <token>` or `basic <user>:<pass>`.
- `scrubUrl`: strips userinfo from all log lines mentioning the endpoint, including inside `mapEthErr`.
- Transition-aware error logging: log immediately on first error after a recent success, then at most hourly while persisting + summary at every stats reset.
Default INI template (`Server/Main/Init.hs`, after `[PROXY]`):
```
[NAMES]
# Public-namespace resolution (SNRC on Ethereum).
# Requires an Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoint (Reth+Nimbus). See deployment guide.
# Cannot be combined with [PROXY] enable: on by default — see allow_dangerous_colocation.
# Restart required to change settings.
enable: off
# Same-host:
# ethereum_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8545
# Central Reth via Caddy:
# ethereum_endpoint: https://eth.simplex.chat:443
# rpc_auth: basic <username>:<password>
# snrc_address: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
# cache_seconds: 300
# cache_max_entries: 100000
# cache_max_bytes: 67108864
# rpc_timeout_ms: 3000
# rpc_max_response_bytes: 262144
# rpc_max_concurrency: 8
# allow_dangerous_colocation: off
```
Upgrade from a pre-v6.6 INI: missing `[NAMES]` section → disabled. No operator action required.
## Operator deployment
Two supported topologies. smp-server is agnostic — only `ethereum_endpoint` changes.
**Topology A (same-host)**: smp-server, Caddy (optional), Reth, Nimbus all on one box. `ethereum_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8545`.
**Topology B (central Reth, N smp-server hosts — recommended for fleets)**: one operator runs one eth host with Reth+Nimbus behind Caddy on public HTTPS. Each smp-server has its own credential.
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph eth-host
Caddy["Caddy<br/>(public :443, basic auth)"]
Reth["Reth<br/>(127.0.0.1:8545)"]
Nimbus["Nimbus"]
Caddy --> Reth
Nimbus -- Engine API (jwt.hex) --> Reth
end
subgraph smp-host-1
S1["smp-server #1"]
end
subgraph smp-host-N
SN["smp-server #N"]
end
S1 -- HTTPS + Authorization --> Caddy
SN -- HTTPS + Authorization --> Caddy
Reth <-- Ethereum p2p --> internet
Nimbus <-- beacon sync --> internet
```
Sharing one Reth across **multiple operators** is **not** supported — collapses the RFC's two-server resolution privacy.
**Reth + Nimbus**: Reth (execution layer) holds Ethereum state on ~260 GB pruned NVMe; Nimbus (consensus light client) follows beacon-chain headers. Paired via Engine API on `127.0.0.1:8551` with a shared `jwt.hex`. Recommended Reth flags:
```bash
reth node \
--http.addr 127.0.0.1 \
--http.api eth \ # only eth namespace
--rpc.gascap 50000000 \ # cap gas per eth_call
--rpc.max-response-size 5242880 \ # 5 MB
--http.corsdomain none \
--authrpc.jwtsecret /opt/eth/jwt.hex \
--authrpc.addr 127.0.0.1 --authrpc.port 8551
```
**Caddy + Let's Encrypt + Basic auth** (Topology B):
```caddy
eth.simplex.chat {
basicauth {
smp-server-1 $2a$14$<bcrypt-hash-1>
smp-server-2 $2a$14$<bcrypt-hash-2>
}
log { format filter { wrap json; fields { request>headers>Authorization delete } } }
reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8545
}
```
Caddy auto-fetches Let's Encrypt cert. Each smp-server has its own credential; revoking one = delete the line. `Authorization` stripped from access logs. Port 80 needed for the ACME HTTP-01 challenge (use TLS-ALPN-01 or DNS-01 to drop it). The threat being defended against is DoS (SNRC state is public); mTLS would be overkill. WireGuard/Tailscale are alternative network-layer approaches — both compatible with the plan.
**Capacity.** One Reth+Nimbus box handles a realistic operator fleet by 10–1000× margin. Per-smp-server peak RSLV ≈ 1700 RPS (pessimistic); cache hit rate ≥ 95% → ~85 RPS cache miss per smp-server; 10 smp-servers → ~850 RPS aggregate cache miss reaching Reth; Reth `eth_call` throughput on warm NVMe ≈ 1k–10k RPS. Sizing: 8 vCPU, 32 GB RAM, 1 TB NVMe is comfortable. Scale-out path: more Reth+Nimbus pairs, smp-servers round-robin or shard.
## Implementation
**Order**:
1. Protocol: party/SParty/PartyI, RSLV+tag, NAME+tag, NameRecord + helpers, version constants in `Transport.hs`.
2. `verifyTransmission`/`verifyLoadedQueue`/`verifyQueueTransmission` `forwarded :: Bool` flag + `vc SResolver` clauses.
3. Forwarded whitelist + `processCommand` branch + `incStat` move to `Stats.hs`.
4. Env plumbing: `Server/Env/STM.hs`, `Server/Main.hs` INI parse, `Server/Main/Init.hs` template.
5. Resolver subtree: `Eth/SNRC.hs` → `Eth/RPC.hs` → `Resolver.hs`.
6. `NameResolverStats` sub-record + CSV log + Prometheus `names =` block.
7. Replace stub in (3) with real `resolveName`.
8. Tests.
9. `protocol/simplex-messaging.md`: header version line 1 (`19 → 20`), sentence at line 86, version-history list (lines 93–105) v20 entry, TOC (lines 25–68) "Resolver commands" subsection, new section with ABNF + byte layout + error semantics, "Router security requirements" paragraph about names-role outbound HTTP, cross-ref `Transport.hs:226`.
10. `CHANGELOG.md`: v6.6 entry.
**Cabal** (`simplexmq.cabal`): bump `version: 6.6.0.0`. Add to `if !flag(client_library)` block: `http-client >=0.7 && <0.8`, `http-client-tls >=0.3 && <0.4`, `network-uri >=2.6 && <2.7`, `psqueues >=0.2.7 && <0.3`. Expose 4 new `Server.Names.*` modules in the same block. `crypton` already provides `Keccak_256`.
**Files changed**:
| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `Protocol.hs` | Resolver party + RSLV/NAME tags + version guards; `NameRecord` + newtypes + smart ctors; `nameRecBytes`/`parseNameRec`/`smpListPUpTo` helpers (no Encoding NameRecord instance); `LookupKey` parser-side cap |
| `Transport.hs` | `namesSMPVersion = 20`; bump current/proxied SMP versions |
| `Server.hs` | Thread `forwarded :: Bool`; `vc SResolver` clauses; whitelist (2132); Resolver branch in `processCommand` (1481); `closeServer` calls `closeNamesEnv`; CSV log (579–618); **remove** local `incStat` |
| `Server/Env/STM.hs` | `namesConfig` field; `namesEnv` field; `newEnv` constructs `NamesEnv` with co-location guard |
| `Server/Main.hs` | `[NAMES]` parse: `validateUrl`/`parseEthAddr`/`parseRpcAuth`; `scrubUrl` in logs |
| `Server/Main/Init.hs` | `[NAMES]` block in default INI |
| `Server/Stats.hs` | `incStat` moved here + exported; `NameResolverStats` sub-record + helpers; `rslvStats` field |
| `Server/Prometheus.hs` | `names =` metric block |
| `Server/Names.hs` (new) | Façade re-exports |
| `Server/Names/Resolver.hs` (new) | All resolver types + cache + coalescing + `fetchOnceTimed` + `newNamesEnv[With]` + `closeNamesEnv` |
| `Server/Names/Eth/RPC.hs` (new) | `EthRpcEnv`, `ethCallReal` with bounded body + concurrency semaphore + `Authorization` header |
| `Server/Names/Eth/SNRC.hs` (new) | `EthAddress`, Keccak namehash, bounded ABI (8 invariants), `getRecord` with zero-owner detection |
| `simplexmq.cabal` | Bump `6.6.0.0`; 4 new deps + 4 new modules in `if !flag(client_library)` block |
| `protocol/simplex-messaging.md` | Header version, version-history v20 entry, new "Resolver commands" section |
| `CHANGELOG.md` | v6.6 entry |
## Testing
`tests/SMPNamesTests/` registered in `tests/Test.hs:112–151`. Build only when `client_library = False`.
1. **ProtocolEncodingSpec** — `nameRecBytes` ↔ `parseNameRec` round-trip; oversized fields rejected at parse; combined-list cap 8 enforced; negative `nrExpiry` rejected; canonical encoding byte-stable.
2. **MaxSizeSpec** — max `NameRecord` encodes ≤ ~9 KB; `encodeTransmission v ≤ paddedProxiedTLength - 2`; `cbEncrypt` succeeds.
3. **CommandTagSpec** — `"RSLV"`/`"NAME"` parse; v < 20 sessions reject `RSLV_` at parameter parser.
4. **ForwardedGateSpec** — direct RSLV → `CMD PROHIBITED`; forwarded RSLV reaches handler.
5. **ForwardedRslvSpec** — RSLV wrapped in PFWD reaches the handler end-to-end. **Test infra cost**: first protocol-level PFWD test; budget for `runProxiedSmpCommand` helper performing `PRXY`/`PKEY`/`PFWD` manually.
6. **CacheSpec** — hit avoids RPC; TTL expiry forces re-fetch; bytes cap evicts before entries cap on large records; concurrent same-key callers issue one RPC; leader exception → all waiters get `Left _`, TMap entry removed; leader async-cancel → cleanup STM still runs.
7. **AbiSpec** — encode/decode against pinned fixtures (`tests/fixtures/snrc/`); QuickCheck fuzz on random buffers ≤ `rpcMaxResponseBytes` must never crash.
8. **NamehashSpec** — Keccak-256 reference vectors; assert Keccak ≠ SHA3-256.
9. **MockRpcSpec** — fake HTTP server; missing → `EthHttpErr`; slow → `TimedOut`; multi-GB body truncated → `EthDecodeErr`. `rpcAuth = AuthBasic` sends correct header.
10. **Uint256OverflowSpec** — `expiry > Int64.maxBound` → `EthDecodeErr`.
11. **ZeroOwnerSpec** — `owner = 0x000...000` → `NotFound`.
12. **StartupGuardSpec** — `allowSMPProxy + names.enable` aborts; `allow_dangerous_colocation = on` starts with warning.
13. **UrlValidationSpec** — userinfo/scheme/host/port edge cases; rejects `https://` without `rpc_auth` for non-loopback.
14. **EipChecksumSpec** — `parseEthAddr` accepts lower/upper; verifies mixed-case checksum; rejects typos.
15. **AbiBoundsSpec** — each of 8 ABI invariants triggers `EthDecodeErr` without crash/allocation blow-up.
Integration against real Reth+Nimbus mainnet deferred to ops.
## Threat model, scope, coordination
| Actor | Can | Cannot |
|---|---|---|
| Name server | See lookup-key bytes; see query timing; see Eth endpoint URL (operator-self) | See client IP/session; correlate clients across queries |
| Compromised Eth endpoint | Poison this server's cache for one TTL window; see every lookup key the server queries | Bypass two-server agreement (client-side, out of scope) |
| Adversarial client (high-rate unique keys) | Cache-thrash DoS; fill `Manager` connection pool up to `managerConnCount = 8` | Bypass `rpcMaxResponseBytes` or `fetchOnceTimed` |
| Adversarial proxy (slow inner RSLVs) | Block other forwarded commands on that proxy connection up to `rpcTimeoutMs` per miss | Affect other proxy connections |
| Operator with footgun config (https no auth, public Eth RPC) | (rejected at startup, or operator-acknowledged data leak) | — |
Mitigations: caching + coalescing + `rpcTimeoutMs` + `rpcMaxResponseBytes` + `rpcMaxConcurrency`; co-location refused at startup; URL validation; Caddy + auth in front of Reth; Reth's own gas/size caps. Timing side-channels (cache-hit vs miss latency) not mitigated — flagged for post-MVP. State proofs deferred to post-MVP per RFC.
**Cross-repo coordination.** The `simplex-chat` `ep/namespace` branch currently contains only the RFC commit — no agent-side wire-format code yet. This plan's wire format is validated only by simplexmq's own tests until a matching agent PR lands (structurally weak — encoder/decoder bugs are mutually consistent with themselves). Coordinate with the agent-side implementer **before merging** on: exact `NameRecord` field order and types; `LookupKey` namespace-prefix convention; error-code semantics; Part 1 SNRC contract `getRecord` ABI surface.
@@ -5,18 +5,13 @@ sequenceDiagram
participant S as Server<br>that has A's send queue<br>(B's receive queue)
participant B as Bob
A ->> R': NEW: create new queue (SKEY allowed)
A ->> S: SEND: QADD (R')
A ->> R': NEW: create new queue<br>(allow SKEY)
A ->> S: SEND: QADD (R'): send address<br>of the new queue(s)
S ->> B: MSG: QADD (R')
B ->> R: SEND: messages (also scheduled on R')
R ->> A: MSG: messages
B ->> R': SKEY: authorize B as sender
B ->> R': SEND: confirmation (establishes R' secret)
R' ->> A: MSG: confirmation (A secures R')
B ->> R': SEND: held copies (deduped), then new messages
R' ->> A: MSG: messages
B ->> R: SEND: remaining tail, then QEND
R ->> A: MSG: QEND
B ->> R': SEND: QEND
R' ->> A: MSG: QEND
A ->> R: DEL: delete the current queue
B ->> R': SKEY: secure new queue
B ->> R': SEND: QTEST
R' ->> A: MSG: QTEST
A ->> R: DEL: delete the old queue
B ->> R': SEND: send messages to the new queue
R' ->> A: MSG: receive messages from the new queue
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@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ note over CC, HC: TLS handshake
par
note over CC: validate client X509 credentials
CC->>CI: session code from tlsUnique
CI-->>CC: user confirmation (optional if known)
CI-->>CC: user confirmation
and
note over HC: validate server X509 credentials
HC->>HI: session code from tlsUnique
HI-->>HC: user confirmation (optional if known)
HI-->>HC: user confirmation
end
note over CI, HI: 3. Session verification and protocol negotiation
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@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ For encryption primitives, threat model, and detailed security analysis, see [Se
SimpleX provides these security properties:
- **End-to-end encryption** using Double Ratchet algorithm with forward secrecy and post-quantum cryptography.
- **End-to-end encryption** with forward secrecy via double ratchet protocol, with optional post-quantum protection.
- **No shared identifiers** across connections — contacts cannot prove they communicate with the same user.
- **Sender deniability** — neither routers nor recipients can cryptographically prove message origin.
- **Transport metadata protection** — fixed-size blocks, 2-hop onion routing, and optional connection isolation frustrate traffic correlation.
- **Transport metadata protection** — fixed-size blocks, 2-hop onion routing, and connection isolation frustrate traffic correlation.
- **Out-of-band key exchange** — connection requests passed outside the network protect against MITM attacks.
+1 -1
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@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
*cannot:*
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen, unless the database contains a new rotation queue that is not secured yet. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- undetectably communicate at the same time as Alice with her contacts. Doing so would result in the contact getting different messages with repeated IDs.
+2 -205
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Version 21, 2026-07-05
Version 19, 2025-01-24
# Simplex Messaging Protocol (SMP)
@@ -67,9 +67,6 @@ Version 21, 2026-07-05
- [Queue deleted notification](#queue-deleted-notification)
- [Error responses](#error-responses)
- [OK response](#ok-response)
- [Resolver commands](#resolver-commands)
- [Resolve name command](#resolve-name-command)
- [Name record response](#name-record-response)
- [Transport connection with the SMP router](#transport-connection-with-the-SMP-router)
- [General transport protocol considerations](#general-transport-protocol-considerations)
- [TLS transport encryption](#tls-transport-encryption)
@@ -86,7 +83,7 @@ It's designed with the focus on communication security and integrity, under the
It is designed as a low level protocol for other application protocols to solve the problem of secure and private message transmission, making [MITM attack][1] very difficult at any part of the message transmission system.
This document describes SMP protocol version 22. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
This document describes SMP protocol version 19. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
- v1: binary protocol encoding
- v2: message flags (used to control notifications)
@@ -106,9 +103,6 @@ This document describes SMP protocol version 22. Versions 1-5 are discontinued.
- v17: create notification credentials with NEW command
- v18: support client notices in BLOCKED error
- v19: service subscriptions to messages (SUBS, NSUBS, SOKS, ENDS, ALLS commands)
- v20: public namespaces resolver (RSLV command, RNAME response) — direct or forwarded via PFWD
- v21: server public information in handshake
- v22: `RNAME` says whether a name can be registered, not only what it resolves to
## Introduction
@@ -430,8 +424,6 @@ Simplex messaging router implementations MUST NOT create, store or send to any o
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging routers (the routers cannot compromise forward secrecy of any application layer protocol, such as double ratchet).
Routers with the names role make outbound HTTP calls to a backing resolver service (the reference implementation is `scripts/resolver/snrc-resolve.py`, which in turn makes JSON-RPC calls to an Ethereum endpoint) to read `NameRecord` data; the lookup key reaches that resolver and its upstream RPC endpoint. Operators MUST run both the resolver process and its upstream RPC endpoint themselves (loopback Reth + Nimbus, or a self-hosted central deployment) — sharing them across multiple operators collapses the two-server privacy property because the resolver / RPC operator would see every lookup key across all of them. The names role and the SMP-proxy role MUST NOT be enabled on the same router by default: a client forwarding `RSLV` through a proxy that is also the names router would expose both its connection and the lookup key to one operator, collapsing the two-server privacy property. (Resolution itself runs on a forked thread, so a slow `RSLV` does not serialise other forwarded commands on the session.)
## Message delivery notifications
Supporting message delivery while the client mobile app is not running requires sending push notifications with the device token. All alternative mechanisms for background message delivery are unreliable, particularly on iOS platform.
@@ -1120,8 +1112,6 @@ When the client receives PKEY response it MUST validate that:
- the fingerprint of the received certificate matches fingerprint in the router address - it mitigates MITM attack by proxy.
- the router session key is correctly signed with the received certificate.
`smpVersionRange` in `PKEY` is not signed.
The proxy router may respond with error response in case the destination router is not available or in case it has an earlier version that does not support proxied commands.
#### Send command via proxy
@@ -1432,199 +1422,6 @@ When the command is successfully executed by the router, it should respond with
ok = %s"OK"
```
### Resolver commands
Resolver commands implement public-namespace name resolution on the names-role
router. A names router translates an opaque lookup key (such as `alice` or
`alice.simplex.eth`) into a `NameRecord` carrying the channel and contact links
the named party publishes.
**Direct or forwarded.** RSLV is an unauthenticated command accepted both
directly from a transport client and inside a `PFWD` block via the SMP proxy;
the client chooses. Forwarded delivery preserves the two-server privacy property
of the resolver design: the names router sees the lookup key but never the
client IP, session, or identity, while the proxy router sees the client
connection but cannot read the encrypted lookup key inside the forwarded
transmission. Direct delivery is simpler but exposes the client's connection to
the names router, so clients SHOULD prefer the forwarded path when proxying is
available.
**Backing store.** This protocol does not prescribe where the names router
reads `NameRecord` from. The reference implementation forwards each RSLV to a
companion REST resolver process (`scripts/resolver/snrc-resolve.py`) that
queries the SNRC contract on Ethereum; alternative backings (different chains,
DHT, etc.) are valid as long as they expose the documented HTTP shape (`GET
/v2/resolve/<query>` returning a `NameRegistration` on 200 for every
registration shape, 400 for unknown TLDs, 502 for upstream failures) or
substitute a different transport returning the same JSON. The resolver API is
versioned separately from this protocol: `/v1/resolve/<name>` returns a bare
`NameRecord` and is what relays before v22 call as `/resolve/<name>`.
#### Resolve name command
The `RSLV` command carries the query as text, not JSON. A client sends the
hashed form only from v22, and the name itself below it:
```abnf
rslv = %s"RSLV" SP query
query = domain / hashed ; hashed only from v22
domain = 1*253 OCTET ; the name as text
hashed = "[" 64HEXDIG "]" tld ; keccak-256 of the second-level label
tld = %s".simplex" / %s".testing"
```
`domain` is the UTF-8 canonical fully-qualified name with the TLD always
explicit (e.g. `privacy.simplex`, `test.testing`, `example.com`), bounded to
253 bytes.
**Hashed labels.** The query is a name, or the keccak-256 of a second-level
label in ENS's bracketed form. A label can only be letters, digits and hyphens,
so `[` tells the two apart and no tag is needed.
Only a second-level name may be hashed. A name with subnames is sent as text: it
is resolved rather than priced, and its record names it anyway. A web TLD has no
registry to key a hash on.
From v22 a client MUST send the hash. Older routers can only read the name, so a
client on an older session sends the name. A router answering a hashed query
does not know the label's length, so it cannot check a minimum-length policy
either: the client does that, from the pricing it is sent.
The same form reaches the backing resolver, which is what its HTTP API takes, so
the query is one string end to end.
A hashed query still answers with the name. The registrar records the plaintext
label when a name is registered, keyed by the hash of that label, so a router can
look up what the hash stands for without ever being told. The router is not
trusted for it: a client MUST check that the record names the name it asked
about, and reject the answer otherwise. A registry that does not record the
label cannot answer a hashed query at all, and the router answers `ERR NAME
RESOLVER` rather than a record it knows the client will reject. An unregistered
name has no recorded label, so it cannot be looked up either.
**Server-side validation.** The names router parses `domain` as a
fully-qualified name (TLD required — bare labels are rejected) and forwards it
to the configured backing resolver, which is the source of truth for which
on-chain registry maps to each TLD.
The names router responds with either an `RNAME` response saying what it knows
about the name, or an `ERR NAME` error whose subcode a client iterating across
several configured servers can act on distinctly:
| Response | Condition | Client action |
|---|---|---|
| `RNAME` | the router read the registry | use it |
| `ERR NAME NOT_FOUND` | below v22 only: every name that does not resolve. From v22 a router never sends it | stop, and do not read it as registrable |
| `ERR NAME NO_RESOLVER` | this router has no resolver (names role not enabled) | skip this server, try the next |
| `ERR NAME RESOLVER <detail>` | the router cannot state an answer completely: no registrar or price oracle for the TLD, an unreachable chain, a transport failure, a timeout, a registration it could not date or resolve | surface `<detail>`; retry only if it reads as transient |
A client SHOULD NOT broadcast a `name` to further servers after a name-capable
router has answered (`NOT_FOUND` or `RESOLVER`), since that router has already
seen the lookup key; `NO_RESOLVER` discloses nothing about the name beyond the
fact that this router cannot resolve, so iterating past it is safe.
#### Name response
`RNAME` answers both what a name resolves to and whether it can be registered.
```abnf
rname = %s"RNAME" SP nameResponse
```
`nameResponse` is a UTF-8 JSON object consuming the remainder of the
transmission: the `registration` below, and `lastBlockTs`, the block timestamp the
registry was read at. Money is US cents, times are seconds since the Unix epoch, and lengths are
characters.
| Field | JSON type | Constraints |
|---|---|---|
| `lastBlockTs` | number | block timestamp the answer was read at. Absent only from a v20/v21 router, which sent the record alone |
| `registration` | object | below |
A router reads the registry through a node of its own, which can lag. A name
registered or changed after `lastBlockTs` still reads as it did before, so a client
MUST NOT treat an answer as current without checking it.
`registration`'s `type` selects which of the three answers it is.
| `type` | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `registered` | held by someone until `expires`, renewable by its owner alone until `graceUntil`. It always carries `nameRecord`: where the owner set none, every field is unset and the resolver address is zero |
| `available` | held by nobody and registrable now, at `pricing` |
| `reserved` | held back by the registry and not registered. It carries no price, and a router MUST NOT quote one |
| Field | On | JSON type | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|
| `expires` | `registered` | number | absent only from a v20/v21 router, which sent the record alone |
| `graceUntil` | `registered` | number | after `expires`; until here only the owner may renew. Absent on the same condition as `expires` |
| `reservedReason_` | `registered` | string | a reason word, present only when the name is held back as well |
| `nameRecord` | `registered` | object | the record, schema below |
| `pricing` | `available` | object | `registrationPrices`, `basePrice` and `minLabelLength`, below |
| `reservedReason` | `reserved` | string | a reason word |
| `pricing` field | JSON type | Constraints |
|---|---|---|
| `registrationPrices` | object | label length, as a decimal string, to US cents per year, for the lengths the registry prices specially |
| `basePrice` | number | US cents per year for every other length |
| `minLabelLength` | number | characters; the registry refuses shorter labels |
A reason word is `internal`, `trademark`, `community`, or a word a later version
reserves under, at most 32 printable ASCII characters. A router truncates an
unknown word to that and otherwise passes it through unchanged. A client MUST
read a word it does not know as unknown and still treat the name as reserved.
**Computing the price.** In US cents, for a duration in seconds:
```
price len duration = tier len * duration / 31536000
tier len = the entry for len in registrationPrices, or basePrice when there is none
```
The registry's minimum registration is 730 days, a contract constant, so it is
specified here rather than sent. `registrationPrices` omits any length below
`minLabelLength`. A client MUST NOT show a quote for a label the registry
refuses: a hashed query carries no length, so only the client can check it.
Below v22, `RNAME` carries the bare record and nothing else, and every answer
without one is `ERR NAME NOT_FOUND`. A v22 client reads such an answer as
`registered` with no expiry, grace or reservation.
From v22 a client MUST NOT read `ERR NAME NOT_FOUND` as "registrable": only
`available` says that.
A router that cannot state an answer completely MUST send `ERR NAME RESOLVER
<detail>` rather than answer partially or guess. That covers a TLD with no
registrar or price oracle, an unreachable chain, a timeout, a registration it
could not date or resolve, and any status word it does not recognise.
`nameRecord` MUST be a UTF-8 JSON object with the following schema:
| Field | JSON type | Constraints |
|---|---|---|
| `name` | string | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8 |
| `nickname` | string | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; senders MUST emit the empty string `""` when unset |
| `website` | string | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; same empty-string-when-unset rule |
| `location` | string | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; same empty-string-when-unset rule |
| `simplexContact` | array of strings | each a SimpleX contact link (primary first); empty array `[]` when unset |
| `simplexChannel` | array of strings | each a SimpleX channel link (primary first); empty array `[]` when unset |
| `eth` | string or null | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; senders MUST emit `null` when unset; receivers MUST also accept absent keys as unset |
| `btc` | string or null | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; same null / absent rules |
| `xmr` | string or null | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; same null / absent rules |
| `dot` | string or null | ≤ 255 bytes UTF-8; same null / absent rules |
| `owner` | string | `"0x"` followed by 40 lowercase hex characters (20 raw bytes) |
| `resolver` | string | `"0x"` followed by 40 lowercase hex characters; the resolver contract address that produced the record |
Testnet-vs-mainnet status is derived from the queried TLD, not from the record.
Receivers MUST tolerate extra unknown fields; adding a required field is a
breaking change requiring an SMP version bump. Receivers parse by key name, so
peers MUST NOT rely on a byte-canonical form.
The names router caps the resolver response it will accept
(`resolver_max_response_bytes`, at most 16000 bytes) so the re-encoded `RNAME`
stays within the SMP proxied transmission budget of 16224 bytes; a response over
the cap is `ERR NAME RESOLVER`.
## Transport connection with the SMP router
### General transport protocol considerations
+6 -27
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
Version 4, 2026-08-08
Version 3, 2025-01-24
# SimpleX File Transfer Protocol
@@ -50,12 +50,11 @@ The objective of SimpleX File Transfer Protocol (XFTP) is to facilitate the secu
XFTP is implemented as an application level protocol on top of HTTP2 and TLS.
This document describes XFTP protocol version 4. The version history:
This document describes XFTP protocol version 3. The version history:
- v1: initial version
- v2: authenticated commands - added basic auth support for commands
- v3: blocked files - added BLOCKED error type for policy violations
- v4: server public information and entitlement proof in handshake, file storage time in FNEW and SIDS
The protocol describes the set of commands that senders and recipients can send to XFTP routers to create, upload, download and delete data packets of several pre-defined sizes. XFTP routers SHOULD support packets of 4 sizes: 64KB, 256KB, 1MB and 4MB (1KB = 1024 bytes, 1MB = 1024KB).
@@ -330,7 +329,7 @@ Once TLS handshake is complete, client and router will exchange blocks of fixed
```abnf
paddedRouterHello = <padded(routerHello, 16384)>
routerHello = xftpVersionRange sessionIdentifier routerCerts signedRouterKey webIdentityProof serverInfo ignoredPart
routerHello = xftpVersionRange sessionIdentifier routerCerts signedRouterKey ignoredPart
xftpVersionRange = minXftpVersion maxXftpVersion
minXftpVersion = xftpVersion
maxXftpVersion = xftpVersion
@@ -339,27 +338,15 @@ sessionIdentifier = shortString
routerCerts = length 1*routerCert ; NonEmpty list of certificates in chain
routerCert = originalLength <x509encoded>
signedRouterKey = originalLength <x509encoded> ; signed by router certificate
webIdentityProof = shortString ; signature over the web client challenge and sessionIdentifier, empty when the client sent no challenge
serverInfo = %s"0" / (%s"1" largeString) ; JSON server public information, sent when maxXftpVersion is 4 or above
paddedClientHello = <padded(clientHello, 16384)>
clientHello = xftpVersion keyHash entitlementProof ignoredPart
clientHello = xftpVersion keyHash ignoredPart
; chosen XFTP protocol version - must be the maximum supported version
; within the range offered by the router
entitlementProof = %s"0" / (%s"1" issuerKeyIndex bbsProof entitlement)
; proof of the user entitlement, encoded from v4, bound to sessionIdentifier
issuerKeyIndex = 2*2OCTET ; Word16 index of the issuer public key
bbsProof = largeString
entitlement = entExpires entName entExtra
entExpires = shortString ; expiration as an ISO8601 UTC timestamp
entName = shortString ; e.g. "supporter", "legend"
entExtra = largeString ; opaque to the router
xftpVersion = 2*2OCTET ; Word16 version number
keyHash = shortString
shortString = length length*OCTET
largeString = originalLength *OCTET
length = 1*1OCTET
originalLength = 2*2OCTET
ignoredPart = *OCTET
@@ -445,7 +432,7 @@ Routers SHOULD support basic auth with this command, to allow only router owners
The syntax is:
```abnf
register = %s"FNEW " fileInfo rcvPublicAuthKeys basicAuth fileStorageTime
register = %s"FNEW " fileInfo rcvPublicAuthKeys basicAuth
fileInfo = sndKey size digest
sndKey = length x509encoded
size = 4*4 OCTET ; Word32 big-endian
@@ -453,27 +440,19 @@ digest = length *OCTET
rcvPublicAuthKeys = length 1*rcvPublicAuthKey
rcvPublicAuthKey = length x509encoded
basicAuth = "0" / "1" length *OCTET
fileStorageTime = %s"0" / (%s"1" storageHours)
; encoded from v4; absent or zero requests the maximum the router allows
storageHours = 4*4 OCTET ; Word32 big-endian
x509encoded = <binary X509 key encoding>
length = 1*1 OCTET
```
`fileStorageTime` requests how long the router stores the data packet. The router grants the smaller of the request and the maximum it allows for the entitlement presented in the handshake, and returns the granted expiration in `sndIds`.
If the data packet is registered successfully, the router must send `sndIds` response with the sender's and recipients' data packet IDs:
```abnf
sndIds = %s"SIDS " senderId recipientIds grantedStorageTime
sndIds = %s"SIDS " senderId recipientIds
senderId = length *OCTET
recipientIds = length 1*recipientId
recipientId = length *OCTET
grantedStorageTime = %s"0" / (%s"1" grantedExpires) ; encoded from v4
grantedExpires = %s"T" expiresAt
expiresAt = 8*8 OCTET ; Int64 big-endian, seconds since epoch
```
#### Add data packet recipients
+3 -18
View File
@@ -121,15 +121,9 @@ During TLS handshake, parties validate certificate chains against previously kno
### Session verification and protocol negotiation
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user who must match them (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirm on the host device. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
To verify the session, the user matches the codes (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirms the session on the host device.
The user MUST verify the first session with a new controller. The host stores the long-term identity of the controller (CA fingerprint and Ed25519 public key) only after this session is verified. A controller with the stored long-term identity is a known controller.
The user MAY verify the subsequent sessions with a known controller. In a session that the host confirms without user action, the controller is authenticated only by its long-term identity stored in the first session (see [Threat model](#threat-model)). SimpleX Chat mobile apps require user verification of sessions with known controllers only when the user enables the "Verify connections" option.
Once the session is confirmed, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
Once the session is confirmed by the user, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
XRCP blocks inside TLS are padded to 16384 bytes.
@@ -311,7 +305,7 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
- prevent host and controller devices from establishing the session
*cannot:*
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band in the first session with the controller.
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network:
@@ -330,15 +324,6 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
*cannot:*
- connect to the host or make host connect to itself.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network who also obtained the long-term private keys of a known controller (e.g., from the controller device):
*can:*
- make host connect to itself instead of the controller.
- access any data of the controlled host application, within the capabilities of the provided API, if the host confirms the session without user action.
*cannot:*
- access host application data, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
#### Compromised controller device:
*can:*
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
# Subscription performance
No protocol changes. This is an implementation RFC addressing subscription performance bottlenecks in both the SMP router and the agent.
## Problem
Subscribing large numbers of queues is slow. A messaging client with ~300K queues per router across 3 routers takes over 1 hour to subscribe. For comparison, the NTF server with ~1M queues per router across 12 routers took 20-30 minutes (prior to NTF client services, now in master).
Even on fast networks (cloud VMs), a client with 1.1M active subscriptions needed ~1.5M attempts (commands sent) to fully subscribe - ~36% retry rate caused by the timeout cascade described below.
### Root causes
#### 1. Router: per-command processing in batches
Batch verification and queue lookups are already done efficiently for the whole batch in `Server.hs`. But `processCommand` is called per-command in a loop - each SUB does its own individual DB query for message peek/delivery. With ~135 SUBs per batch (current SMP version), that's 135 individual DB queries per batch instead of 1 batched query.
For 300K queues, that's ~2200 batches x 135 queries = ~300K individual DB queries on the router, which is the dominant bottleneck when using PostgreSQL storage.
NSUB is cheaper because it just registers for notifications without message delivery - no per-queue DB query.
#### 2. Agent: all queues read and sent at once
`getUserServerRcvQueueSubs` reads all queues for a `(userId, server)` pair in one query with no LIMIT. For 300K queues, the entire result set is loaded into memory, then all ~2200 batches are queued to send without waiting for responses.
The NTF server agent uses cursor-style reading with configurable batch sizes (900 subs per chunk, 90K per DB fetch) and waits for each chunk to be processed before fetching the next.
#### 3. No backpressure on sends
`nonBlockingWriteTBQueue` bypasses the `sndQ` bound by forking a thread when the queue is full. All batches are queued immediately, and all their response timers start simultaneously. A 30-second per-response timeout means later batches time out not because the router is slow to respond to them specifically, but because they're waiting in the router's receive queue behind thousands of earlier commands.
This causes cascading timeouts: timed-out responses trigger `resubscribeSMPSession`, which retries all pending subs. Three consecutive timeouts can trigger connection drop via the monitor thread, causing a full reconnection and retry of everything.
## Solution
### Part 1: Router - batched command processing
Move the per-command processing loop inside command handlers so that commands of the same type within a batch can be processed together.
Current flow:
```
receive batch -> verify all -> lookup queues all -> for each command: processCommand (individual DB query)
```
Proposed flow:
```
receive batch -> verify all -> lookup queues all -> group by command type -> process group:
SUB group: one batched message peek query for all queues
NSUB group: batch registration (already cheap, but can batch DB writes)
other commands: process individually as before
```
For SUB, the batched processing would:
1. Collect all queue IDs from the SUB group
2. Perform a single DB query to peek messages for all queues
3. Distribute results back to individual responses
This reduces ~135 DB queries per batch to 1, cutting router-side DB load by ~100x for subscriptions.
Commands where batching doesn't matter (SEND, ACK, KEY, etc.) continue to be processed individually.
### Part 2: Agent - cursor-based subscription with backpressure
Replace the all-at-once fetch-and-send pattern with cursor-style batching, similar to what the NTF server agent does.
Changes to `subscribeUserServer`:
1. Fetch queues in fixed-size batches (e.g., configurable, default ~1000) using LIMIT/OFFSET or cursor-based pagination.
2. Send each batch and wait for responses before sending the next.
3. Remove the use of `nonBlockingWriteTBQueue` for subscription batches - use blocking writes or structured backpressure so response timers don't start until the batch is actually sent.
This ensures:
- Memory usage is bounded (not 300K queue records in memory at once)
- Response timeouts are meaningful (timer starts when the router receives the batch, not when it's queued locally)
- Retries are scoped to the failed batch, not all pending subs
- Works on slow/lossy networks by naturally pacing sends
### Part 3: Response timeout for batches
The current per-response 30-second timeout doesn't account for batch processing time. Options:
1. **Stagger deadlines**: later responses in a batch get proportionally more time. The `rcvConcurrency` field was designed for this but is never used.
2. **Per-batch timeout**: instead of timing individual responses, timeout the entire batch with a budget proportional to batch size.
3. **No timeout for subscription responses**: since subscriptions are sent as batches with backpressure (Part 2), and the connection is monitored by pings, individual response timeouts may not be needed. A subscription that doesn't get a response will be retried on reconnect.
## Priority and ordering
Part 1 (router batching) gives the biggest improvement and is independent of Parts 2/3.
Part 2 (agent cursor + backpressure) eliminates the retry cascade and is critical for slow networks.
Part 3 (timeout handling) is a refinement that can be addressed after Parts 1 and 2.
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---
Proposed: 2026-07-11
Protocol: agent-protocol (new version)
Depends on: 2026-07-12-address-pqdr-keys
---
# One-off requests to service addresses
Implementation plan: to follow, after this and the address-DR RFC are reviewed.
## Problem
Client applications need to interact with services, for example: badge issuance, directory requests, telemetry submissions, blockchain reads and writes, LLM calls. The only communication primitive available today is a duplex connection, so each of these interactions requires the full connection procedure - creating queues, key agreement, double ratchet initialization - and leaves persistent state on both sides: queues, ratchet state, connection records, message history.
This is the wrong primitive for most service interactions:
1. Cost. To send the first request to a not yet connected service, the client and the service exchange multiple commands across two servers. For "search the directory" all of it is overhead. The setup cost also creates an incentive to keep connections open, and a service with N users who used it once permanently holds N sets of queues and ratchet states.
2. Privacy. A connection is a stable pairwise pseudonym. If a service were to use a duplex connection, it could link all requests made over it into a profile: search history in the directory, blockchain operations linked even when different on-chain keys are used, telemetry that becomes longitudinal tracking. The client also accumulates history that can be recovered from the device. Where continuity is needed, it can be provided in the application protocol (e.g., a token included in requests), without a transport-level identity.
3. Encryption. Messages sent to contact addresses outside an established connection have a single layer of X25519 encryption, with no post-quantum protection and no forward secrecy. This is not acceptable for service requests.
In-app service addresses should be stored as names resolving to links via the existing addressing layer (server host in the link authority, current link data retrieved with `LGET`), so that service links can be changed without redeploying the apps. Name resolution is already supported, and out of scope.
## Security objectives
1. Requests from the same client must not be linkable to each other by the service or by servers, and no long term state is created on either side in the transport layer.
2. Post-quantum resistant end-to-end encryption of requests and replies.
3. Reply authenticity must be verifiable against the link; substitution, replay, dropping or reordering of replies by servers must be detectable.
4. A repeated request for the same operation must not be executed twice.
## Solution
A service address is an ordinary short-link contact address. The client sends one request to the address queue and receives replies in a reply queue it creates for the request. The double ratchet is established from the address's published keys (see the address-DR RFC): the request is the first ratchet message, and replies are subsequent ratchet messages. So a request-response exchange is a short-lived one-directional double ratchet connection, established from the first message and removed after the last.
The exchange:
1. Retrieve the address link data (`LGET`, via proxy when IP protection is needed): the root key, the identity key, the prekey with its id, and the KEM key.
2. Create a reply queue (`NEW`, subscribed).
3. Establish the sending ratchet from the published keys (`pqX3dhSnd`, `initSndRatchet`). Build the request: the reply queue, the requester's X3DH parameters, and the payload encrypted under the ratchet. Encrypt the whole request to the address queue and send it once (unauthenticated `SEND`, via proxy when IP protection is needed). There is no transport retry; a reply is the success signal, and a hard error fails the request.
4. The service establishes the receiving ratchet from its private keys and the request's X3DH parameters (`pqX3dhRcv`, `initRcvRatchet`), decrypts the payload, and delivers it to the service application. To reply it creates a send connection with the ratchet and sends reply messages to the reply queue, each encrypted under the ratchet.
5. The client decrypts and delivers each reply message to the application. The first reply message returns from the request; later reply messages are delivered through a callback the application registered. The exchange ends on a reply marked final. The client deletes the reply queue and the ratchet on the final message, the deadline, or when the application cancels.
How this meets the objectives:
1. Unlinkability: fresh X3DH keys and a fresh reply queue per request; the sender's IP address and session are protected by existing private routing; the reply queue and both ratchets are removed after the exchange; nothing is shared between two requests.
2. Encryption: the double ratchet with its sntrup761 KEM, from the first message.
3. Authenticity: the ratchet is established against the identity key committed by the link hash, so a decryptable reply proves it came from the address owner; the ratchet message numbering detects dropped and reordered replies. No separate signature is needed.
4. Single execution: the service identifies a request by the hash of its decrypted payload and, within a fixed retention period, re-sends the stored replies for a repeated request without running the operation again.
## Design
Syntax uses [ABNF][1] with [case-sensitive strings extension][2]. `SMPQueueInfo`, `agentVersion`, and the X3DH and ratchet types are as in the [agent protocol](../protocol/agent-protocol.md) and `Crypto.Ratchet`.
### Correlation and chat
A reply is connected to its request by the reply queue: each request has its own reply queue, and every message in that queue is a reply to that request. The request hash (of the decrypted payload) is used only for idempotency. The application sets an id inside the payload to make two requests the same operation or different ones; the agent does not read it.
Both ends are chat bots on the chat library over the agent. The chat library serializes a service command into the request payload and deserializes the responses; the agent transports them, establishes and removes the ratchet, and correlates by reply queue.
### Request
A new agent envelope, shaped like `AgentConfirmation` (X3DH parameters to establish the ratchet, plus a body encrypted under it):
```abnf
agentRequest = agentVersion %s"Q" replyQueues prekeyId sndE2EParams encRequest
replyQueues = length 1*SMPQueueInfo ; the first is used; more are for redundancy
prekeyId = shortString ; the published prekey used, from link data
sndE2EParams = <requester Snd X3DH parameters, see address-DR RFC>
encRequest = <ratchet-encrypted request payload>
```
The whole `agentRequest` is encrypted to the address queue with the per-queue layer and sent with `SEND`, as an invitation is today. The reply queue keys and the X3DH parameters are not visible to servers. A request must fit one message; a larger payload is an XFTP file description in the payload.
The request hash is the SHA3-256 of the decrypted payload - the same bytes on both sides. There is no transport retry; a hard error (`AUTH`, `QUOTA`) fails the request, and the application decides whether to send a new one.
### Replies
The service creates a send connection with the ratchet and sends reply messages to the reply queue, each encrypted under the ratchet. A reply message uses a new agent envelope:
```abnf
agentResponse = agentVersion %s"P" final responses
final = %s"T" / %s"F" ; T - no more reply messages follow
responses = length 1*responseItem ; non-empty list of application responses
responseItem = largeString ; opaque application response
```
Each message includes a list of responses, so responses known together are sent in one message and responses that become known over time are sent in separate messages. The message is encrypted and numbered by the ratchet, which authenticates it against the committed identity key and detects dropped or reordered messages; no separate signature is used.
The first reply message returns from the request. Later reply messages are delivered through the callback the application registered with the request, while the process runs. The exchange ends on a message with `final = T`. The client deletes the reply queue and the ratchet on that message, on the deadline, or when the application cancels. Deleting the reply queue stops further replies. The transport keeps no exchange across a client restart; the application keeps its own state and sends a new request when it needs to.
### Rejection
The service refuses a request with the `AgentRejection` envelope from the [communicating rejection RFC](../../simplex-chat/docs/rfcs/2024-03-22-communicating-reject.md), sent to the reply queue under the ratchet, with an opaque application reason. The same envelope communicates refusal of a connection request, where today it is dropped silently. A rejection ends the exchange like a final reply.
### Idempotency
The service keeps, for a fixed retention period it chooses (1 to 24 hours, in service configuration, not in link data), the request hash, the ordered response messages it produced, and the reply queues and ratchets subscribed under that hash. A repeat request with the same hash does not reach the service application:
- while the first request is being answered, the repeat establishes its own ratchet and reply queue, is added to the record, receives the responses already produced, and receives each later response too.
- after the operation completed, the repeat receives the whole stored sequence of responses, re-encrypted under its own ratchet.
The stored responses are the application response bytes, not the ratchet ciphertext, because a repeat establishes a new ratchet and the responses are re-encrypted for it. This gives single execution over at-least-once delivery. After the retention period a request with the same hash is a new operation and runs again.
### Out of scope
- Recovery across restart: the transport keeps no exchange across a client restart; the application persists its own state and sends a new request when it needs to.
- Service-initiated messages: there is no standing channel; use a connection where the service must reach the client without a request.
- Abuse protection beyond existing queue quotas: services can require application-level credentials (e.g., a badge) in the request payload; rate limiting is a separate discussion.
- Scaling request reception: a single address queue bounds service throughput; distributing reception across multiple queues or relays (the existing `relays` field in contact link data) is a separate question, but it would fit well with name resolving to multiple addresses, both for redundancy, reliability and higher throughput.
- Name resolution: existing addressing layer.
[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234
[2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7405
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---
Proposed: 2026-07-12
Protocol: agent-protocol (new version)
---
# Establishing the double ratchet from address data
## Problem
A contact address receives a connection request as an `AgentInvitation` message, encrypted only with the per-queue X25519 layer. The double ratchet is established later: the address owner joins the requester's connection request, generates its X3DH keys, and sends them in the confirmation. So the first message to an address - the invitation and the profile in it - is not under the double ratchet, and has no post-quantum protection.
The cause is that the address owner's X3DH contribution is generated per request and sent in the confirmation, so it cannot exist before the requester's first message.
## Solution
Publish the address owner's X3DH contribution in the address link data, so a requester can establish the double ratchet in its first message. The requester runs the existing `pqX3dhSnd` against the published keys, initializes a sending ratchet, and encrypts its first message under it. The owner runs the existing `pqX3dhRcv` against its stored private keys and the requester's X3DH keys from the message, initializes a receiving ratchet, and decrypts it.
Publish the owner's X3DH contribution - two X448 keys and an optional sntrup761 KEM key, with the e2e version range - as one bundle in the mutable contact user data, signed by the root key. The bundle is the existing `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri` type that a one-time invitation already advertises, with an id for rotation.
This is backward compatible. A requester that does not use the published bundle sends a current `AgentInvitation` with its own X3DH keys, and the owner does what it does today: generates fresh X3DH keys and sends them in the confirmation. The owner branches on whether the incoming message uses the published bundle.
Three properties follow. The first message, including the profile, is under the double ratchet, which closes the profile gap and gives it post-quantum protection through the ratchet's sntrup761 KEM. A decryptable message proves the sender established X3DH against the root-signed keys, so it authenticates the address owner without a separate signature. And because the bundle is in mutable data, an existing address can advertise the double ratchet by updating its mutable data - no new link.
## Design
Syntax uses [ABNF][1] with [case-sensitive strings extension][2]. Key and ratchet types are as in `Crypto.Ratchet` and the [agent protocol](../protocol/agent-protocol.md); all DH keys are X448, the KEM is sntrup761.
### Published keys in link data
The owner's X3DH contribution is a ratchet-keys bundle appended to the mutable contact user data, signed by the root key. Nothing is added to the immutable fixed link data:
```abnf
userContactData =/ ratchetKeys ; appended, ignored by earlier versions
ratchetKeys = %s"0" / (%s"1" ratchetKeyId e2eParams)
ratchetKeyId = shortString ; identifies this bundle, changes on rotation, echoed in the request
e2eParams = <RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri: e2e version range, two X448 keys, optional sntrup761 key>
```
`e2eParams` is the existing `RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri` - the same type a one-time invitation advertises - so a requester reads it, negotiates the concrete e2e version against its own range, and runs `pqX3dhSnd` against it, exactly as it does for an invitation. The KEM key is optional (the params' KEM field is a `Maybe`), controlled by the address's initial-keys mode, the same 3-way choice as invitations: advertise the KEM (post-quantum from the first message), advertise X448-only but still support post-quantum if the requester proposes its own KEM (one message later, avoiding the ~1158-byte key in link data), or no post-quantum.
The owner keeps the private side of each bundle - the two X448 private keys and, when PQ is on, the KEM keypair - indexed by `ratchetKeyId`. On rotation with `LSET` it publishes a new bundle with a new `ratchetKeyId` and keeps the previous private keys for a window covering queue message retention, so a request that used a just-rotated bundle still decrypts. Because the bundle is in mutable data, an existing address advertises the double ratchet by updating its mutable data - no new link, no re-creation.
### Request confirmation
A requester that uses the published keys establishes the sending ratchet before its first message, so it sends that message as a confirmation, not an invitation - the same envelope a joining party sends in a connection. The confirmation gains an optional `ratchetKeyId` naming the bundle the requester used, so the owner selects the matching private keys:
```abnf
agentConfirmation =/ ratchetKeyId ; the bundle the requester used, echoed; absent on other confirmations
```
The confirmation holds the requester's Snd X3DH parameters (so the owner runs `pqX3dhRcv`) and, encrypted under the ratchet, the first message. A confirmation with `ratchetKeyId` on a contact address takes the published-key path; an `AgentInvitation`, as today, takes the current path where the owner generates fresh X3DH keys and returns them in its own confirmation. A connection-request URI is unchanged: it advertises the requester's Rcv parameters and must not include Snd parameters.
### Establishing the ratchet
Requester:
1. Retrieve link data (`LGET`), read the bundle - its `ratchetKeyId` and `e2eParams` (`RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri`) - and negotiate the concrete e2e version against its own range.
2. `generateSndE2EParams` for its own X3DH contribution - encapsulating to the bundle's KEM if it advertises one, or proposing its own KEM if the requester wants post-quantum and the bundle is X448-only.
3. `pqX3dhSnd` against the bundle's parameters, then `initSndRatchet` - the sending ratchet.
4. Encrypt the first message under the ratchet, and send a confirmation with its Snd parameters and `ratchetKeyId`.
Owner:
1. On a confirmation with `ratchetKeyId` on a contact address, select the private X3DH keys and, if any, KEM keypair by `ratchetKeyId` (current or a retained previous generation).
2. `pqX3dhRcv` against the requester's Snd parameters with those private keys, then `initRcvRatchet` - the receiving ratchet. Decrypting the first message advances the ratchet and gives it a send side, so the owner can reply.
3. Decrypt, and reply under the ratchet.
A request whose `ratchetKeyId` is no longer retained cannot be decrypted; the owner does not learn the requester or its reply address, and the requester's attempt fails at its own timeout.
### Authentication
The ratchet-keys bundle is in the mutable link data, signed by the root key. A decryptable message proves the sender established X3DH against those root-signed keys: an SMP server cannot substitute them without forging the root signature (`decryptLinkData` verifies it), which is the X3DH anti-substitution property. Where a message today relies on a separate signature over its content for authenticity, this establishment provides it, and the signature is not needed. The root Ed25519 key is the address's signing identity; the X3DH keys are separate DH keys (X448), and X3DH is over crypto_box, so deniability is preserved. A malicious server can still serve an older but validly-signed bundle (rollback to a retired generation); this is bounded by the retention window and by the ratchet advancing after the first message, and a per-key signature would not prevent it. Reusing a bundle across requesters is consistent with the address already being a shared identifier.
## Uses
- Invitations to an address, and the profile in them, are under the double ratchet from the first message.
- An existing address gains the double ratchet when the app updates its mutable link data (`LSET`, with the user's confirmation and current profile, combined with the full→short address migration); no new link is issued.
- The service RPC (see the RPC RFC) establishes the ratchet this way to send the request as the first ratchet message.
This RFC depends on nothing else here. It replaces the need for the PQ-queue RFC in the address case, because the ratchet provides post-quantum protection for the first message; the PQ-queue RFC remains for first messages that do not establish a ratchet.
[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234
[2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7405
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---
Proposed: 2026-07-12
Protocol: smp-client (new version)
---
# Post-quantum encryption of the SMP queue layer
## Problem
A message sent to a queue outside an established double ratchet has one layer of end-to-end encryption: NaCl crypto_box over an X25519 DH secret. The sender generates an ephemeral X25519 key, computes the secret with the recipient's per-queue DH key, and puts its ephemeral key in the message public header (`agentCbEncryptOnce`). This layer protects invitations, confirmations, and the profile sent with them.
It is not post-quantum. An adversary that records this traffic and later has a quantum computer can recover the X25519 secret and decrypt it. The double ratchet adds a post-quantum KEM once it is established, but the first message to a queue, before the ratchet, has only X25519.
This RFC adds post-quantum protection to the single-shot queue encryption itself, for cases that do not establish a double ratchet from the first message. Where a double ratchet is established from the first message (see the address-DR RFC), the ratchet provides post-quantum protection and this layer is not needed.
## Solution
Extend the single-shot queue encryption to a hybrid X25519 + sntrup761 scheme, in a new SMP client version. The recipient publishes a KEM encapsulation key alongside its per-queue DH key. The sender encapsulates to it, combines the KEM shared secret with the X25519 DH secret, and encrypts the body with the combined secret. The KEM ciphertext travels in the message public header next to the ephemeral X25519 key.
Recording the traffic and breaking X25519 later is not sufficient: without breaking sntrup761 as well, the combined secret is not recoverable.
## Design
The message public header (`PubHeader`) gains a hybrid variant, selected by a version and a tag, so older senders and the empty-header case are unchanged:
```abnf
smpPubHeaderHybrid = smpClientVersion %s"2" senderPublicDhKey kemCiphertext
senderPublicDhKey = length x509encoded ; sender ephemeral X25519 key
kemCiphertext = largeString ; sntrup761 ciphertext, 1039 bytes
```
The secret combines both shared secrets, and the body is encrypted with NaCl secret_box (the DH-only path uses crypto_box today; the combined secret is no longer a plain DH result, so it is used as a secret_box key), padded to the same lengths:
```
secret = HKDF(dh(recipient key, sender ephemeral key) || KEM shared secret)
```
The recipient's KEM encapsulation key is distributed the same way its per-queue DH key is today - in the queue address for a connection request, and in link data for a short link. The KEM ciphertext is stored the same way the ephemeral DH key is: in the public header, readable by the destination server (and not by the proxy with proxied sending), which cannot derive the secret without the recipient's KEM private key.
The recipient stores the computed secret the way the per-queue DH secret is stored on receiving the first message (`setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E`), and reuses it for later messages on the queue.
Sizes: the KEM ciphertext is 1039 bytes and the encapsulation key 1158 bytes. Link data user data is padded to 13784 bytes, so the key fits with application data. This RFC is independent of the RPC, SSND, and address-DR RFCs.
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---
Proposed: 2026-07-12
Protocol: smp (new version)
---
# SSND: combined secure-and-send command
## Problem
Two SMP flows secure a messaging queue and then immediately send the first message to it, as two commands and two round trips:
- The fast connection handshake: the joining party secures the queue with `SKEY`, then sends the confirmation with `SEND`.
- Any first send to a sender-securable queue where the sender both secures it and delivers the first message.
The two commands express one intent - "this is my key, and here is my first message" - so they can be one command and one round trip. The combination must be idempotent, because the first send is retried on network failure and a queue is often secured before the response is known. `SKEY` is already idempotent (a repeat with the same key succeeds). `SEND` is not, so a naive combination would deliver a duplicate message on retry.
## Solution
A new command `SSND` combines `SKEY` and `SEND` in one transmission, idempotent in both parts:
- Key part: as `SKEY` - a repeat with the same key succeeds, a different key fails with `AUTH`.
- Send part: the server keeps the hash of the message until it is acknowledged, and reports a repeat of the same message as delivered without delivering it again.
The server-side hash covers the common case, when the retry arrives before the message is acknowledged. A retry that arrives after the acknowledgement is delivered as a duplicate and discarded by the receiving agent by message hash, as duplicate messages are discarded today.
## Design
Syntax uses [ABNF][1] with [case-sensitive strings extension][2]. `senderAuthPublicKey`, `msgFlags` and `smpEncMessage` are as in the [SMP protocol](../protocol/simplex-messaging.md).
```abnf
secureSend = %s"SSND " senderAuthPublicKey SP msgFlags SP smpEncMessage
senderAuthPublicKey = length x509encoded
```
`SSND` is a sender command, authorized with the key it sets, and accepted only on messaging-mode queues (`QMMessaging`), where the sender can secure the queue. The server responds `OK` or `ERR`.
Server processing:
1. Secure the queue with the key, as `SKEY`. A repeat with the same key succeeds; a different key returns `AUTH`.
2. If the queue holds an unacknowledged message whose stored hash equals the hash of this message, respond `OK` without storing it again.
3. Otherwise store the message, keep its hash with the queue until the message is acknowledged, and deliver it.
The stored hash is one value per not-yet-acknowledged queue message. It is removed when the message is acknowledged. All queue store backends (in-memory, journal, PostgreSQL) keep it.
`SSND` composes with the proxy protocol without change: `proxySMPCommand` forwards any sender command through `PFWD`/`RFWD`, so `SSND` is proxied as `SEND` and `SKEY` are today.
## Uses
- The fast connection handshake replaces `SKEY` then the `SEND` confirmation with one `SSND`.
- The service RPC response (see the RPC RFC) secures the reply queue and sends the first reply with one `SSND`.
This RFC is independent of the RPC, PQ-queue, and address-DR RFCs and can be implemented on its own.
[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234
[2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7405
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---
Proposed: 2026-08-09
Protocol: agent-protocol v8
Diagram: ../protocol/diagrams/duplex-messaging/queue-rotation-fast.svg
---
# Fast queue rotation
## Problem
In the current rotation the peer returns `QKEY` to the initiator over the initiator's current
receiving queue. When that queue's server is unavailable the rotation cannot complete, so a client
cannot move away from a failed server.
## Solution
Both the current rotation and v8 add a queue, deliver to both queues while the rotation is in
progress, and remove the old queue; the recipient drops duplicates in both. The main difference is where
the new queue's secret is established. In the current rotation it is established over the current
queue, by `QKEY`, so it cannot complete when the current server is down. In v8 the peer establishes the
new queue's secret over the new queue itself — a confirmation it sends on R' — so establishing the
secret no longer depends on the current queue, and the rotation completes even when the current server
is down.
v8 also starts writing to both queues earlier: from the moment the queue is added, including the
current queue's not-yet-delivered backlog. So the initiator adds the new queue with `QADD`; from that
point the peer writes every message to both the current queue and R'. Once R' is secured the peer
writes new messages to it alone, while the current queue delivers whatever was already scheduled on it
and a final `QEND`, and is then removed. Because the recipient drops duplicates, neither the order of
arrival nor which queue carries a message matters, provided each message arrives on at least one queue
— with one exception, the confirmation, which is always the first message on R'. A dead new queue does
not stop delivery either, because the current queue keeps delivering until R' is secured.
Roles: A initiates (its receiving queue rotates; A receives on the new queue R'). B is the peer (B
holds the sending queue to A, secures R', and delivers to both).
Sequence:
A -> R' : create new queue (messaging mode, SKEY allowed)
A -> S -> B : QADD(R') (over A's sending queue; A's current server untouched)
B : from QADD, schedule every message and the current backlog on both queues
B -> current : deliver the scheduled messages (R' holds its copies while securing)
B -> R' : SKEY (authorize B as sender)
B -> R' : confirmation (empty; establishes R' secret; first message on R')
B -> R' : deliver R''s held copies (A dedups), then new messages to R' only
B -> current : deliver the remaining tail, then QEND(current)
B -> R' : QEND(current)
A : on QEND, delete the current queue; keep receiving on R'
## Confirmation
The confirmation is the only message a recipient can read on a queue that is not yet secured, and it
establishes the queue's shared secret without depending on the current queue. Because a data message
that reached R' before the confirmation could not be read, the confirmation is the first message the
peer sends on R', and the peer does not start ordinary delivery on R' until the confirmation has been
sent.
The confirmation body is empty: both parties already know each other, so no profile or reply queue is
sent. It is sealed by the queue's box (keyed by the shared secret being established) and is not
additionally encrypted with the double ratchet, so rotation does not advance the message ratchet.
## Termination
`QEND` names a queue to remove and is delivered on both queues. On receipt the recipient deletes the
named queue; on send the peer removes its sending queue of that address. `QEND` is a general
queue-removal message — the peer can remove either queue with it — so on the wire a rotation is the
addition of a queue (`QADD`) and the later removal of the replaced one (`QEND`), each an ordinary
operation on the queue set rather than a `QTEST`-style completion. Delivering `QEND` on the removed
queue is best effort; the copy on the surviving queue removes it and reaches the recipient even when
the removed server is dead.
## Per-queue secret
R' secret is a fresh Diffie-Hellman between the peer's queue key, sent in the confirmation header, and
the initiator's R' key. It does not depend on any current queue, so redundancy of current queues is
unaffected.
## Compatibility
Fast rotation runs only when the connection's agreed agent protocol version is 8 or higher; the peer
chooses it. Otherwise the `QKEY`/`QUSE` exchange is used. `QEND` is defined at version 8 and is only
sent during fast rotation, so peers below version 8 never receive it.
new A / new B : fast (QADD, confirmation on R', QEND)
new A / old B : slow (old B returns QKEY; new A keeps the QKEY/QUSE handling)
old A / new B : slow (agreed version below 8; new B returns QKEY)
old A / old B : slow
The recipient does not choose by version; it reacts to whichever message arrives — `QKEY`, or a
confirmation on R' followed later by `QEND`.
## Dead current server
The initiator keeps reading messages on the new queue and removes the current queue when `QEND`
arrives there, without waiting for the current server. Nothing is lost, because every message is
scheduled on the new queue; the only cleanup that a dead current server delays is the deletion
of its queue, which is retried a bounded number of times and then abandoned.
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
# XFTP variable file storage time
## Summary
The server stores a storage time for each file. The sender sets it in the FNEW command. The client may present a proof of an entitlement in the handshake to raise the maximum storage time the server allows. The proof is bound to the TLS session, so it cannot be reused for another session.
An entitlement belongs to the user, not to a file: the client presents it once per connection, and the server applies it to everything the client does in that session. The server can also vary other limits, such as throttling, by the entitlement.
## Entitlement
An entitlement is a name, an expiration, and an extra string. It is the disclosed content of a BBS proof: the holder's secret remains undisclosed, and the three fields are revealed. The server reads `entName` to select a maximum storage time, checks `entExpires`, and ignores `entExtra`; the interpretation of `entExtra` is out of scope here. The protocol references only the entitlement, never a badge; chat maps its own badge to an entitlement before it asks the agent to send.
The proof discloses the entitlement and includes the issuer key index and the BBS proof. The holder's secret and the BBS signature remain with the sender and are never transmitted. The origin of the sender's signed entitlement, from the entitlement service, is out of scope here.
```
entitlement = entExpires entName entExtra
entExpires = shortString ; expiration as a UTCTime ISO8601 string
entName = shortString ; e.g. "supporter", "legend"
entExtra = largeString ; opaque, interpretation out of scope
entitlementProof = issuerKeyIndex bbsProof entitlement
issuerKeyIndex = 2*2 OCTET ; Word16, network byte order
bbsProof = largeString ; BBS proof bytes
```
The presentation header that the BBS proof is generated over is not transmitted; the server takes it from the session (see [Binding](#binding)), which is what binds the proof.
### Issuer keys
Client apps and servers share one list of issuer public keys, indexed by `issuerKeyIndex`. The secret key for the current index is held by the service that issues entitlements, on conditions that are out of scope here, such as payment.
The list holds eight keys so that the issuing service can rotate its current key without an app or server release: the next index is already known to every app and server. Each rotation consumes one index, so a new key has to be added to client apps and servers eventually, and released before the list is exhausted.
## Storage time
```
fileStorageTime = %s"0" / (%s"1" storageHours)
storageHours = 4*4 OCTET ; Word32, network byte order
```
The storage time is an optional number of hours. Absent (`%s"0"`), or present as zero hours, requests the maximum the server allows for the presented entitlement, or the default maximum when no proof is present. A value above zero requests that number of hours, and the server grants the smaller of it and the maximum.
## Handshake, new XFTP version
The client handshake carries the entitlement proof.
```
clientHandshake = xftpVersion keyHash optEntitlementProof
optEntitlementProof = %s"0" / (%s"1" entitlementProof)
```
`xftpVersion` and `keyHash` are defined by the current XFTP protocol. Version 3 and earlier encode no proof.
The server verifies the proof when it accepts the handshake and keeps the result for the session; further handshakes on the same connection keep that result and verify nothing, so a session costs one verification however many handshakes it makes. A proof that names an entitlement the server does not configure, or one whose expiration passed 24 hours ago or more, is ignored without verification; a proof that fails to verify is logged. In each case the session gets the default maximum. The response is the same in every case, but only a configured, unlapsed name costs a verification, so the handshake latency tells the client which names the server configures.
## Commands
The new protocol version extends FNEW with the storage time.
```
fnew = %s"FNEW " fileInfo rcvKeys optBasicAuth fileStorageTime
```
`fileInfo`, `rcvKeys`, and `optBasicAuth` are defined by the current XFTP protocol. Version 3 and earlier encode no `fileStorageTime`, and the server applies the default storage time.
## Responses
FNEW extends the SIDS response with the granted storage.
```
sndIds = %s"SIDS " senderId rcvIds optGrantedStorageTime
optGrantedStorageTime = %s"0" / (%s"1" grantedStorageTime)
grantedStorageTime = grantedExpires
grantedExpires = %s"T" expiresAt
expiresAt = 8*8 OCTET ; Int64, seconds since epoch (absolute UTC instant), network byte order
```
`grantedExpires` returns the absolute expiration — the same value stored for the file. The sum encoding retains a one-character prefix so further variants can be added. Version 3 and earlier omit `optGrantedStorageTime` entirely; a client decoding such a response reads it as absent. `senderId` and `rcvIds` are defined by the current XFTP protocol.
## Binding
The presentation header binds the proof to the TLS session, so a proof presented on any other session fails to verify.
```
presHeader = sessionId
```
`sessionId` is the TLS session identifier, the TLS unique channel binding. Both sides take it from the connection: the client has it once TLS is established, and the client checks that the identifier the server sends in its handshake matches.
Binding to the session is what stops a proof being replayed by another client. A proof is not bound to a file, because the entitlement belongs to the user and authorises everything the client does in that session.
BBS proofs of one credential are unlinkable, but every proof discloses the same `entExpires`, `entName` and `entExtra`, so a server can link the sessions of one holder by that triple, and two servers can correlate them. The issuing service decides how identifying it is: `entExpires` set to the same instant for everyone who buys in the same period, and an `entExtra` that carries nothing per-holder, make the holders of that period indistinguishable.
## Maximum storage time
The server configures a maximum storage time for each entitlement name, and a default maximum for requests with no proof. Each maximum is a number of hours. The server exits at startup if any name's maximum is below the default, so a proof never reduces the allowed time. The server honours an entitlement for 24 hours after its expiration; past that grace it is treated as no proof.
If the requested time exceeds the maximum, the server stores the file for the maximum and does not reject the request. The expiration is rounded up to the hour, stored, and returned as `grantedExpires`.
## Encoding primitives
```
shortString = length *OCTET ; 0-255 bytes
largeString = length2 *OCTET
length = 1*1 OCTET
length2 = 2*2 OCTET ; Word16, network byte order
```
`senderId`, `rcvIds`, `fileInfo`, `sndKey`, `digest`, `rcvKeys`, `optBasicAuth`, and `sessionId` are defined by the current XFTP and SMP protocols.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ if [ ! -f "${confd}/smp-server.ini" ]; then
# Fix path to certificates
if [ -n "${WEB_MANUAL}" ]; then
sed -i -e 's|^[^#]*https = |#&|' \
-e 's|^[^#]*cert = |#&|' \
-e 's|^[^#]*key = |#&|' \
-e 's|^port = .*|port = 5223|' \
sed -i -e 's|^[^#]*https: |#&|' \
-e 's|^[^#]*cert: |#&|' \
-e 's|^[^#]*key: |#&|' \
-e 's|^port:.*|port: 5223|' \
"${confd}/smp-server.ini"
else
sed -i -e "s|cert = /etc/opt/simplex/web.crt|cert = $cert_path/$ADDR.crt|" \
-e "s|key = /etc/opt/simplex/web.key|key = $cert_path/$ADDR.key|" \
sed -i -e "s|cert: /etc/opt/simplex/web.crt|cert: $cert_path/$ADDR.crt|" \
-e "s|key: /etc/opt/simplex/web.key|key: $cert_path/$ADDR.key|" \
"${confd}/smp-server.ini"
fi
fi
+1 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if [ ! -f "${confd}/file-server.ini" ]; then
# Optionally, set password
if [ -n "${PASS}" ]; then
sed -i -e "/^# create_password =/a create_password = $PASS" \
sed -i -e "/^# create_password:/a create_password: $PASS" \
"${confd}/file-server.ini"
fi
fi
+2 -2
View File
@@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ checks() {
exit 1
fi
mkdir -p "$path_conf_info" "$path_tmp_bin"
check_versions
check_distro
mkdir -p $path_conf_info $path_tmp_bin
return 0
}
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# ============================================================================
# Required settings — the stack will not start without these.
# ============================================================================
# Ethereum network: mainnet (the SNRC `.testing` contracts live on mainnet)
# or holesky (test). Mainnet full sync needs ~1 day and ~1.2 TB NVMe.
NETWORK=mainnet
# Beacon checkpoint-sync URL — used ONCE on first sync. Must expose the heavy
# /eth/v2/debug/beacon/states/finalized endpoint (generic beacon APIs do not;
# use a dedicated checkpoint provider). List: https://eth-clients.github.io/checkpoint-sync-endpoints/
# mainnet: https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io (also beaconstate.info, sync-mainnet.beaconcha.in)
# holesky: https://checkpoint-sync.holesky.ethpandaops.io
TRUSTED_NODE_URL=https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io
# ============================================================================
# Optional overrides — sensible defaults are baked into docker-compose.yml,
# so leave these commented unless you need to change them.
# ============================================================================
# Nimbus NAT (default: any). For a stable public node set an explicit IP:
# NAT=extip:1.2.3.4 # your public IPv4: curl -s ifconfig.me
-376
View File
@@ -1,376 +0,0 @@
# Self-hosted SNRC stack
One `docker compose up` runs the self-hosted SimpleX Namespace (SNRC) backend
against **Ethereum mainnet** (where the `.testing` contracts live):
| # | Component | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | **reth + nimbus** | self-hosted Ethereum node (`--minimal` — enough for the resolver's `eth_call` at chain head) |
| 2 | **resolver** | the REST resolver the smp-server's `[NAMES]` role queries (`snrc-resolve.py`) |
## Requirements
- **Docker** + Compose v2.
- **≥ 300 GB NVMe SSD** for `reth --minimal` (~260 GB on mainnet; TLC, not QLC
— QLC stalls during sync) + **32 GB RAM**, fast multi-core CPU.
- **~1 day** for the initial reth sync. The resolver returns errors until reth
has caught up — that's expected.
- Firewall: open p2p ports `30303` (tcp/udp) and `9000` (tcp/udp).
## 1. Configure
Edit `.env` — the defaults work as-is; override only if needed:
```sh
NETWORK=mainnet # default
TRUSTED_NODE_URL=https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io # default
```
Everything else (NAT) has a working default baked into `docker-compose.yml`;
uncomment the hints in `.env` only to override.
## 2. Run
```sh
cd scripts/resolver
docker compose up -d
docker compose logs -f reth resolver
```
`depends_on` handles ordering automatically (start node → start resolver).
## 3. Wait for the node to sync
```sh
docker compose logs --tail=20 reth
```
This is the long pole (~1 day on mainnet). Until reth is synced the resolver
returns `502`.
## Verify
Run these once the stack is up (the node-dependent ones pass after sync):
**1. reth is reachable and reporting a block:**
```sh
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8545 \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_blockNumber","params":[],"id":1}' | jq
```
**2. resolver is healthy:**
```sh
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/health | jq
# → {"ok": true, "rpc": "http://reth:8545", "registries": {"testing": "0x…", "simplex": ""},
# "blockNumber": 23400000, "chainLagSeconds": 12}
```
`chainLagSeconds` is how far the node is behind the wall clock. A resolver that
is reachable and answering can still be hours behind, and every name it reports
is that stale. `null` means the node could not be reached.
**3. resolver resolves a live name** (`foobar.testing` is a populated test name):
```sh
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/resolve/foobar.testing | jq
# → {"name":"foobar.testing","nickname":"Foo","simplexContact":["https://smp16.simplex.im/a#…"], … }
```
**4. the route your router will call** (check 3 passes on an older resolver too):
```sh
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/v2/resolve/foobar.testing | jq
# → {"type":"registered","expires":1780000000,"graceUntil":…,"nameRecord":{…}}
```
**Wire your smp-server:** in its `[NAMES]` section set
`resolver_endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8000` (no auth needed for loopback).
## Ports (all loopback unless noted)
| Service | Host | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| reth JSON-RPC | `127.0.0.1:8545` | smp-server RPC |
| reth p2p | `:30303` tcp/udp | Ethereum sync (open on firewall) |
| nimbus p2p | `:9000` tcp/udp | beacon sync (open on firewall) |
| nimbus REST | `127.0.0.1:5052` | beacon API |
| **resolver** | `127.0.0.1:8000` | SNRC REST (`/v2/resolve`, `/resolve`, `/health`) |
## Caveats
- **All images track `:latest`** (reth, nimbus) — you get upstream fixes on each
`docker compose pull`; re-run the verify checks after pulling.
- All ports bind to loopback; expose only what you put behind a TLS reverse proxy.
## Teardown
```sh
docker compose down # stop, keep all state
docker compose down -v # also wipe volumes → full re-sync
```
`down -v` wipes the chain data (full re-sync on the next `up`).
---
## Resolver API reference
The resolver (`snrc-resolve.py`, host `127.0.0.1:8000`) is also runnable
standalone for local dev (no Docker), via [`uv`](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/):
```sh
uv run scripts/resolver/service/snrc-resolve.py # defaults to local reth + mainnet .testing
```
Three routes, versioned separately from the protocol so each only changes when
its own shape does:
| Route | Called by | Answers |
|---|---|---|
| `/v2/resolve/<query>` | routers from SMP v22 | a `NameRegistration` |
| `/resolve/<name>` | routers before SMP v22 | a name record, flat |
| `/health` | anyone | readiness |
`/v1/resolve/<name>` is an alias for `/resolve/<name>`.
### v2: `/v2/resolve/<query>`
The body is the SMP protocol's `NameResponse`, which the router decodes as is
and forwards; translating the registry's model to it is this resolver's job. It
is the registration below, plus `lastBlockTs`, the timestamp of the block it was read
at: a node that lags answers with names it has not seen registered yet.
Its `type` is `registered`, `available` or `reserved`, and the fields each one
carries are specified once, in the **Name response** section of
[`protocol/simplex-messaging.md`](../../protocol/simplex-messaging.md). It is
the wire format, so it is documented with the wire.
Two things follow from that and are worth stating here. Expiry and grace belong
to the registration, not to the record: `expires` and `graceUntil` sit beside
`nameRecord`, not inside it. And a name nobody holds is not an error: it
answers 200 with `type: available` and its price, so no status code from this
route means "not registered".
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 200 | a registration: `registered`, `available` or `reserved` |
| 400 | `tldNotConfigured`, `notFullyQualified` |
| 502 | `noPriceOracle`, `labelNotRecorded`, an unreadable status, or `upstreamError` |
Error bodies carry `name` and a fixed `error` code to branch on. Only
`upstreamError` adds a `message`; the v1 route always adds one.
`labelNotRecorded` means the registrar holds the name but never recorded its
label, so a hashed query cannot be answered with a name. See
[Querying by labelhash](#querying-by-labelhash).
A subname reports the expiry and grace of the 2LD above it, since that is what
bounds its lifetime. A subname nobody created reports as not registered.
### v1: `/resolve/<name>`
What routers before SMP v22 call. Its shape is unrelated to v2's: the record is
flat, and `status`, `expires`, `graceEnds`, `reasonCode` and `reason` sit
alongside its fields.
#### v1 response shape
```jsonc
{
"name": "foobar.testing",
"nickname": "Foo", "website": "https://foo.bar", "location": "",
"simplexContact": ["https://smp16.simplex.im/a#…", "https://smp11…"], // primary first, fallbacks after
"simplexChannel": [],
"eth": null, "btc": "bc1q…", "xmr": "4ANz…", "dot": "139G…",
"owner": "0xd83b…", "resolver": "0x80fa…",
"status": "registered", // registered | grace | expired | unregistered | unknown
"expires": 1780000000, // Unix seconds; when the registration ends
"graceEnds": 1787776000, // expires + GRACE_PERIOD; last moment the owner can renew
"reasonCode": null, // set when the name is held back as well
"reason": null // set when the name is held back as well
}
```
`simplexContact`/`simplexChannel` are arrays (a name can advertise multiple SMP
servers; clients try them in order). On-chain they're a single `;`-separated
text record; the resolver splits/trims/drops-empties. Address encodings are
canonical per chain (EIP-55 / bech32 / SS58 / Monero-base58). Subnames work
identically (`bar.foobar.testing`).
#### v1 registration status and expiry
A response carries `status`, `expires` and `graceEnds` whenever the resolver
read them, a successful resolve included, so a client that has just resolved a
name already knows when it expires. Both timestamps are Unix seconds, and
`null` when they could not be read.
| `status` | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `registered` | live; `expires` is when that ends |
| `grace` | lapsed, but only the previous owner may renew it, until `graceEnds` |
| `expired` | lapsed and past grace; anyone may register it |
| `unregistered` | never registered, and free to take |
| `unknown` | no `SNRC_REGISTRAR_<TLD>` configured, so status could not be read |
A reservation is orthogonal to the status: a name held back by the registry
carries `reasonCode` and `reason` whether or not it is registered.
`grace` and `expired` are told apart by the registrar's own `available(id)`
rule, `expires + GRACE_PERIOD < now`. `GRACE_PERIOD` is read from the contract
rather than assumed, and `now` is the latest block's timestamp rather than the
host clock, which the registrar compares against too, so a machine with a wrong
clock cannot misreport a registration. That rule alone is not enough: it also
holds for a name nobody ever registered (`0 + GRACE_PERIOD < now`), so a zero
expiry is what separates *never registered* from *registered and since
released*.
A subname reports the status of the 2LD above it, which is only as good as the
name it sits under. A subname nobody created answers 404 `unregistered`.
#### v1 errors
Every non-2xx body carries two fields: `error` is a fixed code to branch on,
and `message` is a sentence for a human. Match on `error`, never on `message`,
which is free to change.
```jsonc
{"name": "nope.testing", "error": "unregistered",
"message": "this name has never been registered",
"status": "unregistered", "expires": null, "graceEnds": null}
```
The codes are `tldNotConfigured`, `notFullyQualified`, `unregistered`,
`expired`, `noSuchRoute` and `upstreamError`. When the registration is what went
wrong, `error` and `status` hold the same value, so one field is enough to read.
`upstreamError` says only which exception type the RPC call raised. The text
goes to the resolver's log instead, because `SNRC_RPC` can carry a provider key
and urlopen puts the URL it failed on into the message. It is also the answer
when a registrar, controller or oracle address has no contract behind it: the
empty reply is refused rather than read as zero, which would make every name
look free.
#### v1 status codes
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 200 | resolved (`status` is `registered` or `grace`, or `unknown` when no registrar is configured) |
| 400 | TLD not configured, or not a fully-qualified name |
| 404 | `unregistered` |
| 410 | `expired`: lapsed and past grace, so anyone may take it |
| 502 | upstream RPC error / reth not synced |
### Querying by labelhash
A client asking whether a name is free is usually about to register it, and
whoever runs the resolver could register it first. To avoid that, send the
keccak hash of the label in ENS's `[<64 hex>]` form instead of the label:
```sh
# instead of /resolve/acme.testing
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/resolve/[$(printf acme | keccak-256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)].testing"
```
namehash is `keccak(parent || keccak(label))`, so this reaches the same node and
returns the same record. The registrar keys `nameExpires` and `reservedNames` on
the labelhash too, so the status fields do not need the label either. The
resolver learns the name only by guessing the label and hashing it.
Only the second-level label is a registry key, and `status` decodes a bracket
there at any depth. The record does not: a bracket is decoded only in a
two-label name, so `sub.[<hash>].testing` is not a supported query. Subname
labels stay text; a bracket label left of the 2LD is an ordinary label. Routers
from v22 send every 2LD this way, so a registrable name normally never reaches
this service.
On v2, read `type`: only `available` means the name is free. On v1, read
`status`: a name is free on `unregistered` (404) and on `expired` (410), every
other status means somebody holds it, and a `reasonCode` means the registry will
refuse it whatever the status says.
The hash must be keccak-256. `openssl dgst -sha3-256` and `sha3sum` compute
SHA3-256, a different function that returns 64 valid-looking hex characters
pointing at the wrong node.
The resolver lowercases the query before matching, so uppercase hex works too.
Clients that refuse raw brackets in a path can percent-encode them as `%5B` and
`%5D`.
Brackets cannot collide with a real name: they are invalid in a normalised ENS
name, and a `[<64 hex>]` label is 66 bytes against the registrar's
`maxLabelLength` of 63. A plain `0x…` label is not treated as a hash, since that
is an ordinary, registrable name.
Only 2LDs can be queried this way, as only a 2LD can be raced for: subnames are
created by the 2LD's owner. A bracket label in a subname is hashed as written,
so it points at a node nobody can own. ENS tooling accepts the bracketed form at
any depth; this resolver does not, on purpose.
This hides interest in a name and nothing else: the registration itself is
public, and commit-reveal covers that step. A short or well-known label is easy
to guess by hashing candidates, and the reveal publishes the labelhash, so an
operator who logged the query can match it to the name afterwards.
### What a name costs
The controller's `prices()` names the price oracle, so no extra configuration is
needed beyond `SNRC_CONTROLLER_<TLD>`. A `SimplexPriceOracle` exposes its curve
through `prices()`, in US cents per year, which is the unit this API carries.
An ENS-shaped oracle exposes only `price1Letter()`..`price6Letter()`, in attoUSD
per second, and charges a premium on a lapsed name that it does not expose. A
quote from one is therefore only safe for a name that was never registered: an
`expired` name gets no price rather than one below what the registrar charges.
**Set `SNRC_CONTROLLER_<TLD>` wherever `SNRC_REGISTRAR_<TLD>` is.** Without a
controller there is no oracle, so no name can be priced.
**Upgrade this service before the routers that query it.** Routers from SMP v22
call `/v2/resolve`, which an older resolver does not serve. Every name then
answers `ERR NAME RESOLVER "HTTP 404"` until this service is upgraded, while
`/health` still reports it as ready.
### Why a name is reserved
v2 carries the controller's reason as `reservedReason`. v1 carries the same word
as `reasonCode`, plus `reason`, an English sentence for a human reading this API.
Clients should branch on the word and phrase it themselves, in the user's
language.
| `reasonCode` | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `internal` | reserved for SimpleX |
| `trademark` | reserved to protect a trademark |
| `community` | reserved for the community |
| `unknown` | a reason added to the contract after this resolver; still reserved |
These are `SimplexController.Reason`, where 0 means not reserved. A controller
from before the enum stores a boolean, whose `true` decodes as 1, which is why
1 reads as `internal`, so nothing needs migrating.
### Configuring addresses
The resolver reads three contracts, each configured per TLD.
The **registry** answers who owns a node, and `/resolve` reads the records from
it. The **registrar** (ERC-721) holds `nameExpires` and `GRACE_PERIOD`, which
is where every expiry field comes from, and `labelOf`, which is how a hashed
query is answered with a name. A name registered without recording its label
cannot answer one, and `/v2/resolve` refuses it rather than answer with a name
the client will reject. With no registrar for a TLD, `/resolve` still works and
reports `"status": "unknown"`. The **controller** holds
`reservedNames`, which is where `reasonCode` comes from. With no controller a
held-back name reads as not reserved, and no name can be priced.
All three default to the mainnet `.testing` deployment. `.simplex` is unset
until it is deployed.
The controller default is the **proxy**, not `SimplexControllerImpl`. Storage
lives in the proxy, so the implementation address answers nothing. The two
deployment files use different names for that proxy:
`deployments.mainnet.testing.json` records it under the ENS role name
`ETHRegistrarController`, and `verification.mainnet.testing.json` calls it
`SimplexControllerProxy`. Both are the same address, and it is the one used
here.
To override any of them, set `SNRC_REGISTRY_<TLD>`, `SNRC_REGISTRAR_<TLD>` or
`SNRC_CONTROLLER_<TLD>` on the `resolver` service in `docker-compose.yml`, or
as env vars when you run the script directly.
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
services:
# One-shot setup (runs as root): generates /jwt/jwt.hex and chowns the
# nimbus-data volume to UID 1000 (the user Nimbus runs as inside its image).
# Without this chown Nimbus gets "Permission denied" on its data dir
# because docker creates fresh named volumes owned by root.
init:
image: alpine:latest
volumes:
- jwt:/jwt
- nimbus-data:/nimbus-data
command: >
sh -c '
set -e;
if [ ! -f /jwt/jwt.hex ]; then
apk add --no-cache openssl >/dev/null;
openssl rand -hex 32 | tr -d "\n" > /jwt/jwt.hex;
chmod 644 /jwt/jwt.hex;
echo "Generated /jwt/jwt.hex";
else
echo "jwt.hex already exists";
fi;
chown 1000:1000 /nimbus-data;
echo "Chowned /nimbus-data to 1000:1000";
'
restart: "no"
# One-shot: fetches a recent finalised checkpoint into the Nimbus data dir
# using the trustedNodeSync subcommand. Skipped if the data dir is already
# initialised, so subsequent compose-ups are no-ops.
nimbus-checkpoint-sync:
image: statusim/nimbus-eth2:multiarch-latest
depends_on:
init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
volumes:
- nimbus-data:/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data
entrypoint:
- sh
- -c
- |
if [ -d /home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK}/db ]; then
echo "Nimbus data dir already initialised — skipping checkpoint sync";
exit 0;
fi;
/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/nimbus_beacon_node trustedNodeSync \
--network=${NETWORK} \
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK} \
--trusted-node-url=${TRUSTED_NODE_URL} \
--backfill=false
restart: "no"
# One-shot: downloads a pre-synced snapshot from snapshots.reth.rs into the
# Reth data dir. Turns a multi-day from-scratch sync into a ~hour download.
# Skipped if the data dir is already initialised — re-runs are no-ops.
# Privacy note: snapshots.reth.rs sees this download (operator existence).
# Subsequent eth_call traffic stays local.
reth-snapshot-init:
image: ghcr.io/paradigmxyz/reth:latest
depends_on:
init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
volumes:
- reth-data:/data
entrypoint:
- sh
- -c
- |
if [ -f /data/.snapshot-done ] || [ -d /data/db ]; then
echo "Reth data already initialised — skipping snapshot download";
exit 0;
fi;
echo "Downloading Reth ${NETWORK} --minimal snapshot...";
reth download --datadir /data --chain ${NETWORK} --minimal && \
touch /data/.snapshot-done && \
echo "Snapshot download complete"
restart: "no"
reth:
image: ghcr.io/paradigmxyz/reth:latest
depends_on:
reth-snapshot-init:
condition: service_completed_successfully
volumes:
- reth-data:/data
- jwt:/jwt:ro
ports:
# JSON-RPC for smp-server. Bound to loopback — put Caddy in front for remote access.
- "127.0.0.1:8545:8545"
# p2p (Ethereum network). Open these on your firewall for sync.
- "30303:30303/tcp"
- "30303:30303/udp"
command: >
node
--datadir /data
--chain ${NETWORK}
--minimal
--authrpc.jwtsecret /jwt/jwt.hex
--authrpc.addr 0.0.0.0 --authrpc.port 8551
--http
--http.addr 0.0.0.0 --http.port 8545
--http.api eth,net
--rpc.gascap 50000000
--port 30303
--discovery.port 30303
restart: unless-stopped
nimbus:
image: statusim/nimbus-eth2:multiarch-latest
depends_on:
nimbus-checkpoint-sync:
condition: service_completed_successfully
volumes:
- nimbus-data:/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data
- jwt:/jwt:ro
ports:
- "9000:9000/tcp"
- "9000:9000/udp"
- "127.0.0.1:5052:5052"
command: >
--network=${NETWORK}
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK}
--el=http://reth:8551
--jwt-secret=/jwt/jwt.hex
--non-interactive
--rest --rest-address=0.0.0.0 --rest-port=5052
--nat=${NAT:-any}
restart: unless-stopped
# SNRC REST resolver. Talks to reth on the compose-internal network,
# exposes /resolve and /health on 127.0.0.1:8000 by default. The
# smp-server points its [NAMES] resolver_endpoint at this URL.
# To change the host port, edit the LEFT side of the port mapping below.
resolver:
build:
context: ./service
dockerfile: Dockerfile
depends_on:
# reth's `service_started` is sufficient — the resolver tolerates
# eth_call failures gracefully (returns 502 with the error body), so
# starting before reth has finished snapshot replay just yields a few
# 502s until the chain is queryable. The upstream reth image doesn't
# ship a HEALTHCHECK, so we can't gate on healthy.
reth:
condition: service_started
environment:
SNRC_RPC: http://reth:8545
SNRC_BIND: 0.0.0.0
# Registry addresses cascade through the script's own defaults
# (mainnet `.testing`; `.simplex` unconfigured). Set explicitly here
# only if you're deploying against a different network or contract.
# SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING: 0x...
# SNRC_REGISTRY_SIMPLEX: 0x...
# Registrar and controller, same cascade. Without the registrar `status`
# is "unknown"; without the controller a reserved name is "unregistered".
# SNRC_REGISTRAR_TESTING: 0x...
# SNRC_REGISTRAR_SIMPLEX: 0x...
# SNRC_CONTROLLER_TESTING: 0x...
# SNRC_CONTROLLER_SIMPLEX: 0x...
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
reth-data:
nimbus-data:
jwt:
-48
View File
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
# ---------- builder ----------
# Use the official uv image (Astral) on top of a slim Python base.
# uv resolves and installs the lockfile-free pyproject.toml in seconds and
# produces a portable .venv we can copy into the runtime stage.
FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:python3.13-bookworm-slim AS builder
ENV UV_LINK_MODE=copy \
UV_COMPILE_BYTECODE=1 \
UV_PYTHON_DOWNLOADS=never \
UV_NO_PROGRESS=1
WORKDIR /app
# Install deps first (separate layer) — script edits won't bust this cache.
COPY pyproject.toml ./
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \
uv sync --no-dev --no-install-project
# Script is added after the dep layer for cache friendliness.
COPY snrc-resolve.py ./
# ---------- runtime ----------
# Slim runtime — only the venv + script. No uv, no apt.
FROM python:3.13-slim AS runtime
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH"
# Non-root user (matches resolver privacy posture: it has no need for root).
RUN groupadd --system --gid 10001 snrc && \
useradd --system --uid 10001 --gid snrc --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin snrc
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=snrc:snrc /app /app
USER snrc:snrc
EXPOSE 8000
# Liveness check hits the script's own /health route. ThreadingHTTPServer is
# fast enough that 3s is generous for a localhost probe; restart if it stops
# responding entirely.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
CMD ["python", "-c", "import urllib.request, sys; sys.exit(0 if urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8000/health', timeout=3).status == 200 else 1)"]
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "snrc-resolve.py"]
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
[project]
name = "snrc-resolve"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "SimpleX Namespace (SNRC) resolver — REST API over ENS-shaped Ethereum registries"
readme = "README.md"
requires-python = ">=3.11"
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
dependencies = [
"eth-hash[pycryptodome]>=0.7",
]
[tool.uv]
package = false
-964
View File
@@ -1,964 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# /// script
# requires-python = ">=3.11"
# dependencies = [
# "eth-hash[pycryptodome]>=0.7",
# ]
# ///
"""SimpleX Namespace (SNRC) resolver — REST API.
Resolves names like `alice.testing` / `bob.simplex` against the SNRC
deployment on Ethereum mainnet (or any compatible ENS-shaped registry)
and returns a flat JSON document with these fields:
name, nickname, website, location,
simplexContact, simplexChannel, -- list[str], primary first
eth, btc, xmr, dot,
owner, resolver
`simplexContact` and `simplexChannel` are arrays so a name can advertise
multiple SMP servers for redundancy. Clients SHOULD try the URLs in the
order returned. The on-chain text record stores them as a single
`LINK_SEPARATOR` (`;`)-joined string; this resolver splits and trims into a list.
All keys are valid Haskell record-field identifiers (lowercase initial,
no dots), so consumers can derive aeson FromJSON instances directly
without a key-rewriting layer.
Usage:
./snrc-resolve.py # serve on :8000
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/resolve/foobar.testing | jq .
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/resolve/[<64-hex labelhash>].testing' | jq .
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/health
Environment:
SNRC_RPC JSON-RPC endpoint (default: http://127.0.0.1:8545)
SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING ENSRegistry for the .testing deployment
(default: mainnet,
0x58fc46996d975c57883564648bda5206d1a0102b)
SNRC_REGISTRY_SIMPLEX ENSRegistry for the .simplex deployment
(default: empty — TLD not yet deployed)
SNRC_REGISTRAR_<TLD> BaseRegistrar (ERC-721) for the TLD; expiry and status
(default: mainnet for .testing, empty for .simplex)
SNRC_CONTROLLER_<TLD> SimplexController (proxy) for the TLD; reservations,
and through its `prices()` oracle what registering costs
(default: mainnet for .testing, empty for .simplex)
SNRC_PORT Listen port (default: 8000)
SNRC_BIND Bind address (default: 0.0.0.0)
Each TLD is a separate SNRC deployment with its own ENSRegistry; the
resolver dispatches by the queried name's rightmost label.
Dependencies are declared inline (PEP 723) at the top of this file. Run with:
uv run snrc-resolve.py # uv resolves & caches deps; one-line setup
python snrc-resolve.py # if eth-hash[pycryptodome] is already installed
Addresses are returned in each chain's canonical presentation:
eth EIP-55 mixed-case checksummed hex (e.g. 0xEa65A0…1572)
btc bech32(m) for segwit/taproot, base58check for P2PKH/P2SH
(e.g. bc1q… / 1A1zP1…)
dot SS58 with Polkadot network prefix 0 (e.g. 15oF4u…)
xmr Monero base58 (e.g. 4Aux5y…)
Unrecognised payloads fall back to `0x`-prefixed raw hex.
"""
import hashlib
import json
import os
import sys
import time
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from eth_hash.auto import keccak
RPC = os.environ.get("SNRC_RPC", "http://127.0.0.1:8545")
BIND = os.environ.get("SNRC_BIND", "0.0.0.0")
PORT = int(os.environ.get("SNRC_PORT", "8000"))
# Each TLD is its own SNRC deployment with its own ENSRegistry. Dispatch
# happens on the rightmost label of the queried name. Empty / unset means
# "not deployed" — requests for that TLD return 400 with a clear error.
# `... or "..."` makes the script's defaults the single source of truth:
# unset AND empty-string both fall through to the literal. docker-compose
# can therefore pass `SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING=${SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING:-}`
# without duplicating the registry address.
REGISTRIES = {
"testing": os.environ.get("SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING", "")
or "0x58fc46996d975c57883564648bda5206d1a0102b", # mainnet .testing
"simplex": os.environ.get("SNRC_REGISTRY_SIMPLEX", ""), # not deployed yet
}
REGISTRARS = {
"testing": os.environ.get("SNRC_REGISTRAR_TESTING", "")
or "0xef47eb4384b46c89e4482a677c2cbcbd2a6fd85a", # mainnet .testing
"simplex": os.environ.get("SNRC_REGISTRAR_SIMPLEX", ""), # not deployed yet
}
CONTROLLERS = {
"testing": os.environ.get("SNRC_CONTROLLER_TESTING", "")
# Proxy address, not SimplexControllerImpl: storage is held by the proxy.
# Recorded in deployments.json as ETHRegistrarController.
or "0xeeb9b6bf5fb68fb726005f7ba549c2f4b32f2dad", # mainnet .testing
"simplex": os.environ.get("SNRC_CONTROLLER_SIMPLEX", ""), # not deployed yet
}
# `reservedNames` holds a SimplexController.Reason; 0 means not reserved. A
# controller from before the enum stores a bool, whose `true` decodes as 1,
# which is why 1 reads as "internal".
RESERVED_REASONS = {
1: ("internal", "reserved for SimpleX"),
2: ("trademark", "reserved to protect a trademark"),
3: ("community", "reserved for the community"),
}
# a Reason added to the contract after this resolver: still reserved, unworded
UNKNOWN_REASON = ("unknown", "reserved")
# SLIP-44 coin types (https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0044.md)
COIN_ETH = 60
COIN_BTC = 0
COIN_XMR = 128
COIN_DOT = 354
ZERO_ADDR = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
# The registry prices in attoUSD (1e-18 USD); the protocol carries US cents.
# ---------- RPC + ABI helpers (mirrors ens-lookup.py shape) ----------
def rpc(method, params):
body = json.dumps(
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params, "id": 1}
).encode()
# Set a non-default User-Agent; Cloudflare-fronted public RPCs (drpc,
# publicnode, etc.) reject `Python-urllib/3.x` with 403.
req = Request(
RPC,
data=body,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "snrc-resolve/1.0",
},
)
res = json.loads(urlopen(req, timeout=15).read())
if "error" in res:
raise RuntimeError(res["error"])
return res["result"]
def namehash(name: str) -> bytes:
node = b"\x00" * 32
if name:
for label in reversed(name.split(".")):
node = keccak(node + keccak(label.encode()))
return node
# ENS's encoding for a label whose preimage is unknown. Brackets are outside
# the normalised character set, so it cannot collide with a registrable name.
ENCODED_LABELHASH_LEN = 66 # "[" + 64 hex + "]"
def is_encoded_labelhash(label: str) -> bool:
return (
len(label) == ENCODED_LABELHASH_LEN
and label.startswith("[")
and label.endswith("]")
and all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in label[1:-1])
)
def node_of(name: str) -> bytes:
"""namehash, decoding a second-level labelhash so `[hash].tld` reaches the
node its name does. Only a second-level name is ever hashed; a bracket
anywhere else is hashed as written."""
labels = name.split(".")
if len(labels) != 2 or not is_encoded_labelhash(labels[0]):
return namehash(name)
return keccak(namehash(labels[1]) + bytes.fromhex(labels[0][1:-1]))
# ---------- Registration status ----------
def head_block():
"""How far behind the node is. Unlike expiry, this is the one thing that has
to be measured against the host clock: a node that stops still has a block."""
try:
block = rpc("eth_getBlockByNumber", ["latest", False])
return {
"blockNumber": decode_uint(block["number"]),
"chainLagSeconds": int(time.time()) - decode_uint(block["timestamp"]),
}
except Exception:
return {"blockNumber": None, "chainLagSeconds": None}
def chain_now() -> int:
"""Expiry is compared against the block timestamp, never the host clock."""
block = rpc("eth_getBlockByNumber", ["latest", False])
return decode_uint(block["timestamp"])
def grace_period(registrar: str) -> int:
"""A deployment can configure a different window, so it is read on chain."""
return decode_uint(eth_call(registrar, selector("GRACE_PERIOD()")))
def expiry_status(expires: int, grace: int, now: int) -> str:
"""The registrar's `available(id)` is not enough on its own: it is also
true for a name nobody registered, since 0 + GRACE_PERIOD < now."""
if expires == 0:
return "unregistered"
if expires > now:
return "registered"
if expires + grace >= now:
return "grace"
return "expired"
def reservation_reason(tld: str, token: int) -> int:
"""The SimplexController.Reason held for the name, 0 when not reserved."""
controller = CONTROLLERS.get(tld)
if not controller:
return 0
raw = eth_call(controller, selector("reservedNames(bytes32)") + encode_uint(token))
return decode_uint(raw)
def pricing_params(tld: str):
"""What it costs to register a name under this TLD, in US cents, or None
when no controller or price oracle is configured."""
controller = CONTROLLERS.get(tld)
if not controller:
return None
oracle = decode_address(eth_call(controller, selector("prices()")))
if oracle == ZERO_ADDR:
return None
try:
return read_oracle_prices(controller, oracle)
except RuntimeError:
# An oracle that does not expose its curve cannot be quoted from. The
# name is still registrable; the price is simply not ours to state.
return None
SECONDS_PER_YEAR = 31536000
ATTO_PER_CENT = 10**16
def read_oracle_prices(controller: str, oracle: str):
"""SimplexPriceOracle keeps the curve in US cents per year, the unit the SMP
protocol carries. An ENS-shaped oracle prices in attoUSD per second and
charges a premium on lapsed names that it does not expose, so a quote from
it is only safe for a name that was never registered."""
try:
base, tiers = decode_prices(eth_call(oracle, selector("prices()")))
premium_unknown = False
except RuntimeError:
base, tiers = decode_letter_prices(oracle)
premium_unknown = True
min_len = decode_uint(eth_call(controller, selector("minCharLength()")))
return {
# lengths the registry refuses are left out rather than priced at zero
"registrationPrices": {n: c for n, c in tiers.items() if n >= min_len},
"basePrice": base,
"minLabelLength": min_len,
"_premiumUnknown": premium_unknown,
}
def decode_letter_prices(oracle: str):
"""`price1Letter()`..`price6Letter()`, in attoUSD per second. Quotes round
up, so one is never below what the registry charges. An oracle built before
the six-letter tier stops at five, and charges its highest tier for anything
longer, which is what basePrice means here."""
tiers = {}
for n in range(1, 7):
try:
rate = decode_uint(eth_call(oracle, selector(f"price{n}Letter()")))
except RuntimeError:
if n <= 5:
raise
break
tiers[n] = ceil_div(rate * SECONDS_PER_YEAR, ATTO_PER_CENT)
return tiers.pop(max(tiers)), tiers
def ceil_div(a: int, b: int) -> int:
return -(-a // b)
def decode_prices(hex_data: str):
"""`prices()` returns the base price and the lengths priced differently."""
raw = bytes.fromhex(hex_data[2:] if hex_data.startswith("0x") else hex_data)
# a short answer is not a curve: decoding it would quote every name as free
if len(raw) < 96:
raise RuntimeError("prices(): short response")
base = int.from_bytes(raw[:32], "big")
at = int.from_bytes(raw[32:64], "big")
count = int.from_bytes(raw[at:at + 32], "big")
tiers = {}
for i in range(count):
item = at + 32 + i * 64
length = int.from_bytes(raw[item:item + 32], "big")
tiers[length] = int.from_bytes(raw[item + 32:item + 64], "big")
return base, tiers
def name_status(name: str):
labels = name.split(".")
tld = labels[-1]
registrar = REGISTRARS.get(tld)
if not registrar or len(labels) < 2:
return {
"status": "unknown",
# nothing was read, so there is no block to report
"lastBlockTs": None,
"expires": None,
"graceEnds": None,
"reasonCode": None,
"reason": None,
}
# nameExpires and reservedNames are keyed on uint256(keccak(label)).
# The 2LD's label is that key at any depth. node_of decodes a bracket only
# in a two-label name, so a bracket subname gets a status but no record.
token = label_token(labels[-2])
expires = decode_uint(
eth_call(registrar, selector("nameExpires(uint256)") + encode_uint(token))
)
grace = grace_period(registrar) if expires else 0
now = chain_now()
status = expiry_status(expires, grace, now)
# A reservation is orthogonal to the registration: a registered name can be
# held back too.
code = reservation_reason(tld, token)
reason = RESERVED_REASONS.get(code, UNKNOWN_REASON) if code else None
out = {
"status": status,
# the block this was read at
"lastBlockTs": now,
"expires": expires or None,
"graceEnds": (expires + grace) if expires else None,
"reasonCode": reason[0] if reason else None,
"reason": reason[1] if reason else None,
}
if status in ("unregistered", "expired"):
pricing = pricing_params(tld)
# a lapsed name may carry a premium this resolver cannot read, and a
# quote without it would be below what the registry charges
if pricing and not (status == "expired" and pricing["_premiumUnknown"]):
out.update({k: v for k, v in pricing.items() if not k.startswith("_")})
return out
def selector(signature: str) -> str:
return "0x" + keccak(signature.encode())[:4].hex()
def eth_call(to: str, data: str) -> str:
result = rpc("eth_call", [{"to": to, "data": data}, "latest"])
if result == "0x":
raise RuntimeError(f"empty return from {to}: no contract at that address?")
return result
def decode_address(hex_data: str) -> str:
return "0x" + hex_data[-40:]
def decode_bytes(hex_data: str) -> bytes:
raw = bytes.fromhex(hex_data[2:] if hex_data.startswith("0x") else hex_data)
if len(raw) < 64:
return b""
length = int.from_bytes(raw[32:64], "big")
return raw[64:64 + length]
def registered_label(registrar: str, token: int):
"""The plaintext label the registrar recorded at registration, keyed by the
hash of that label. None when the name was registered without
registerWithLabel, so the registrar cannot name it."""
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(registrar, selector("labelOf(uint256)") + encode_uint(token)))
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if raw else None
def canonical_name(name: str):
"""The name to answer with: a hashed query does not carry one, so the
registrar's record of the label fills it in. None when it recorded none."""
labels = name.split(".")
registrar = REGISTRARS.get(labels[-1])
if not registrar or len(labels) != 2 or not is_encoded_labelhash(labels[0]):
return name
label = registered_label(registrar, label_token(labels[0]))
return label + "." + labels[1] if label else None
def label_token(label: str) -> int:
"""The registry key for a second-level label, whether it arrived as text or
already hashed."""
if is_encoded_labelhash(label):
return int(label[1:-1], 16)
return int.from_bytes(keccak(label.encode()), "big")
def decode_uint(hex_data: str) -> int:
raw = hex_data[2:] if hex_data.startswith("0x") else hex_data
return int(raw[-64:], 16) if raw else 0
def encode_uint(value: int) -> str:
return value.to_bytes(32, "big").hex()
def encode_text_call(node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
sel = selector("text(bytes32,string)")
head = node.hex() + (0x40).to_bytes(32, "big").hex()
key_bytes = key.encode()
body = len(key_bytes).to_bytes(32, "big").hex() + key_bytes.hex()
body += "00" * ((-len(key_bytes)) % 32)
return sel + head + body
def text(resolver: str, node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, encode_text_call(node, key)))
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if raw else ""
def encode_addr_multicoin_call(node: bytes, coin_type: int) -> str:
"""ENSIP-9 addr(bytes32 node, uint256 coinType) — both static, no offsets."""
return (
selector("addr(bytes32,uint256)")
+ node.hex()
+ coin_type.to_bytes(32, "big").hex()
)
def addr_multicoin(resolver: str, node: bytes, coin_type: int):
"""Read ENSIP-9 raw bytes for `coinType`, then encode to that chain's
canonical presentation form. Falls back to `0x`-prefixed hex if the
payload doesn't match any recognised on-chain shape. Returns None when
the record is unset."""
try:
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, encode_addr_multicoin_call(node, coin_type)))
except RuntimeError:
return None
if not raw:
return None
# An all-zero payload is the ENS convention for "unset" — many tools
# write 20 zero bytes for coinType=60 instead of clearing the slot.
# Treat it as null so the response doesn't surface a zero address.
if raw == b"\x00" * len(raw):
return None
encoder = COIN_ENCODERS.get(coin_type)
if encoder is None:
return "0x" + raw.hex()
try:
return encoder(raw) or ("0x" + raw.hex())
except Exception:
return "0x" + raw.hex()
# ---------- Coin-specific address encoders ----------
# Each takes raw bytes as stored under ENSIP-9 and returns the canonical
# user-facing string for that chain (EIP-55 for ETH, bech32/base58check
# for BTC, SS58 for DOT, Monero-base58 for XMR). All stdlib + eth_hash.
B58_ALPHA = "123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz"
def _b58_encode(b: bytes) -> str:
n = int.from_bytes(b, "big")
out = ""
while n:
n, r = divmod(n, 58)
out = B58_ALPHA[r] + out
# leading zero bytes → leading '1's
pad = len(b) - len(b.lstrip(b"\x00"))
return "1" * pad + out
def _b58check_encode(payload: bytes) -> str:
"""Base58Check used by BTC legacy/P2SH: payload + dSHA256(payload)[:4]."""
chk = hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(payload).digest()).digest()[:4]
return _b58_encode(payload + chk)
# ---- Bech32 / Bech32m (BIP-173 / BIP-350) ----
_BECH32_CHARSET = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
_BECH32_GEN = [0x3B6A57B2, 0x26508E6D, 0x1EA119FA, 0x3D4233DD, 0x2A1462B3]
def _bech32_polymod(values):
chk = 1
for v in values:
b = chk >> 25
chk = ((chk & 0x1FFFFFF) << 5) ^ v
for i in range(5):
if (b >> i) & 1:
chk ^= _BECH32_GEN[i]
return chk
def _bech32_hrp_expand(hrp):
return [ord(c) >> 5 for c in hrp] + [0] + [ord(c) & 31 for c in hrp]
def _bech32_create_checksum(hrp, data, spec):
const = 1 if spec == "bech32" else 0x2BC830A3 # bech32m
values = _bech32_hrp_expand(hrp) + data + [0] * 6
polymod = _bech32_polymod(values) ^ const
return [(polymod >> 5 * (5 - i)) & 31 for i in range(6)]
def _bech32_encode(hrp, data, spec):
combined = data + _bech32_create_checksum(hrp, data, spec)
return hrp + "1" + "".join(_BECH32_CHARSET[d] for d in combined)
def _convertbits(data, frombits, tobits, pad=True):
acc = 0
bits = 0
ret = []
maxv = (1 << tobits) - 1
max_acc = (1 << (frombits + tobits - 1)) - 1
for value in data:
if value < 0 or (value >> frombits):
return None
acc = ((acc << frombits) | value) & max_acc
bits += frombits
while bits >= tobits:
bits -= tobits
ret.append((acc >> bits) & maxv)
if pad and bits:
ret.append((acc << (tobits - bits)) & maxv)
elif not pad and (bits >= frombits or ((acc << (tobits - bits)) & maxv)):
return None
return ret
def _segwit_encode(hrp: str, witver: int, witprog: bytes) -> str:
spec = "bech32" if witver == 0 else "bech32m"
data = [witver] + _convertbits(list(witprog), 8, 5)
return _bech32_encode(hrp, data, spec)
# ---- BTC scriptPubKey → address ----
# ENSIP-9 stores the raw output script. Dispatch by length + opcode prefix.
def _btc_encode(raw: bytes) -> str | None:
hrp = "bc" # mainnet
if len(raw) == 25 and raw[:3] == b"\x76\xa9\x14" and raw[23:25] == b"\x88\xac":
return _b58check_encode(b"\x00" + raw[3:23]) # P2PKH
if len(raw) == 23 and raw[:2] == b"\xa9\x14" and raw[22:23] == b"\x87":
return _b58check_encode(b"\x05" + raw[2:22]) # P2SH
if len(raw) == 22 and raw[:2] == b"\x00\x14":
return _segwit_encode(hrp, 0, raw[2:22]) # P2WPKH
if len(raw) == 34 and raw[:2] == b"\x00\x20":
return _segwit_encode(hrp, 0, raw[2:34]) # P2WSH
if len(raw) == 34 and raw[:2] == b"\x51\x20":
return _segwit_encode(hrp, 1, raw[2:34]) # P2TR
return None
# ---- Polkadot SS58 ----
# Per SS58 spec: base58( prefix_byte + pubkey + blake2b-512("SS58PRE" + body)[:2] )
# Polkadot mainnet uses network prefix 0 (single byte); Kusama uses 2.
_SS58_PRE = b"SS58PRE"
def _ss58_encode(pubkey: bytes, network_prefix: int = 0) -> str:
if len(pubkey) != 32:
return None
body = bytes([network_prefix]) + pubkey
checksum = hashlib.blake2b(_SS58_PRE + body, digest_size=64).digest()[:2]
return _b58_encode(body + checksum)
def _dot_encode(raw: bytes) -> str | None:
return _ss58_encode(raw, network_prefix=0)
# ---- Monero base58 ----
# Monero base58 encodes in 8-byte blocks; each full block → 11 chars, partial
# block sizes per fixed table. Alphabet is identical to Bitcoin's.
_XMR_BLOCK_SIZES = [0, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11]
def _xmr_encode(raw: bytes) -> str:
out = []
for i in range(0, len(raw), 8):
chunk = raw[i:i + 8]
n = int.from_bytes(chunk, "big")
width = 11 if len(chunk) == 8 else _XMR_BLOCK_SIZES[len(chunk)]
block = []
for _ in range(width):
n, r = divmod(n, 58)
block.append(B58_ALPHA[r])
out.append("".join(reversed(block)))
return "".join(out)
# ---- ETH EIP-55 mixed-case checksum ----
def _eth_encode(raw: bytes) -> str | None:
if len(raw) != 20:
return None
hex_addr = raw.hex()
hash_hex = keccak(hex_addr.encode()).hex()
return "0x" + "".join(
c.upper() if c.isalpha() and int(hash_hex[i], 16) >= 8 else c
for i, c in enumerate(hex_addr)
)
COIN_ENCODERS = {
COIN_ETH: _eth_encode,
COIN_BTC: _btc_encode,
COIN_XMR: _xmr_encode,
COIN_DOT: _dot_encode,
}
# ---------- Resolution logic ----------
# Text-record keys we read from the resolver. Surfaced under the response
# field names listed in the docstring above. `name` and `description` are
# common ENS fallbacks for a human-readable nickname.
TEXT_KEYS = [
"name",
"nickname",
"description",
"url",
"location",
"simplex.contact",
"simplex.channel",
]
# Separator that joins the SMP-server URL list inside a simplex.contact /
# simplex.channel text record. MUST match SIMPLEX_LINK_SEPARATOR in the dApp
# (ens-app-v3 src/constants/simplex.ts) — the two sides decode the same record.
LINK_SEPARATOR = ";"
def split_links(value: str) -> list:
"""Split a separator-joined text record into an ordered list of entries.
Trims whitespace around each element and drops empties so trailing
separators, doubled separators, and all-whitespace inputs all yield clean
output. Single-value records yield a 1-element list; empty inputs
yield `[]`. Used for `simplex.contact` / `simplex.channel`, which
store one-or-more SMP-server URLs as a single `LINK_SEPARATOR`-joined string.
"""
return [item.strip() for item in value.split(LINK_SEPARATOR) if item.strip()]
def upstream_error(subject: dict, e: Exception) -> dict:
"""urlopen puts the failing URL into its message and SNRC_RPC can carry a
provider key, so the text goes to the log and only the type to the caller."""
print(f"upstream error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return {
**subject,
"error": "upstreamError",
"message": f"upstream RPC failed ({type(e).__name__})",
}
def name_record(name: str):
"""The NameRecord for a registered name. A name with no resolver set still
has one, with every field unset."""
registry = REGISTRIES[name.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]]
node = node_of(name)
node_hex = node.hex()
resolver_addr = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node_hex))
owner = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex))
rec = {
"name": canonical_name(name),
"nickname": "",
"website": "",
"location": "",
"simplexContact": [],
"simplexChannel": [],
"eth": None,
"btc": None,
"xmr": None,
"dot": None,
"owner": owner,
"resolver": resolver_addr,
}
if resolver_addr == ZERO_ADDR:
return rec
texts = {}
for k in TEXT_KEYS:
try:
v = text(resolver_addr, node, k)
except RuntimeError:
v = ""
if v:
texts[k] = v
rec.update(
{
"nickname": texts.get("nickname") or texts.get("name") or texts.get("description") or "",
"website": texts.get("url", ""),
"location": texts.get("location", ""),
"simplexContact": split_links(texts.get("simplex.contact", "")),
"simplexChannel": split_links(texts.get("simplex.channel", "")),
"eth": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_ETH),
"btc": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_BTC),
"xmr": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_XMR),
"dot": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_DOT),
}
)
return rec
def name_response(reg, registration_body):
"""The SMP protocol's NameResponse: the registration and the block read at."""
return 200, {"lastBlockTs": reg["lastBlockTs"], "registration": registration_body}
def registration(name: str):
"""The SMP protocol's NameRegistration, which the relay decodes as is.
Translating the contract's model to it is this resolver's job."""
tld = name.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]
if not REGISTRIES.get(tld):
return 400, {"name": name, "error": "tldNotConfigured"}
reg = name_status(name)
status = reg["status"]
if status in ("registered", "grace"):
rec = name_record(name)
# the client checks that the record names what it asked about, so a
# hashed query the registrar cannot name is refused rather than answered
if rec["name"] is None:
return 502, {"name": name, "error": "labelNotRecorded"}
# a subname inherits the 2LD's status, so only its node's owner says
# whether anyone created it
if len(name.split(".")) > 2 and rec["owner"] == ZERO_ADDR:
# name_status reads pricing only when the name was already
# unregistered, so read it here
status = "unregistered"
pricing = pricing_params(tld)
if pricing:
reg.update({k: v for k, v in pricing.items() if not k.startswith("_")})
else:
return name_response(reg, {
"type": "registered",
"expires": reg["expires"],
"graceUntil": reg["graceEnds"],
"reservedReason_": reg["reasonCode"],
"nameRecord": rec,
})
if reg["reasonCode"]:
return name_response(reg, {"type": "reserved", "reservedReason": reg["reasonCode"]})
if status in ("unregistered", "expired"):
if "basePrice" not in reg:
return 502, {"name": name, "error": "noPriceOracle"}
return name_response(reg, {
"type": "available",
"pricing": {
"registrationPrices": reg["registrationPrices"],
"basePrice": reg["basePrice"],
"minLabelLength": reg["minLabelLength"],
},
})
return 502, {"name": name, "error": status}
def resolve(name: str):
tld = name.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]
registry = REGISTRIES.get(tld)
if not registry:
configured = [k for k, v in REGISTRIES.items() if v]
return 400, {
"name": name,
"error": "tldNotConfigured",
"message": f"TLD '{tld}' is not configured on this resolver",
"configuredTlds": configured,
}
node = node_of(name)
node_hex = node.hex()
# Before the resolver lookup, so a lapsed name is not reported as noResolver.
reg = name_status(name)
if reg["status"] in ("unregistered", "expired"):
# A name in grace is not here: its record still resolves.
body = {
"name": name,
**reg,
"error": reg["status"],
"message": (
"this name has never been registered"
if reg["status"] == "unregistered"
else "this registration expired and is open to anyone"
),
}
return (404 if reg["status"] == "unregistered" else 410), body
resolver_raw = eth_call(registry, selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node_hex)
resolver_addr = decode_address(resolver_raw)
if resolver_addr == ZERO_ADDR:
# A registered name always resolves: with no resolver set the record is
# still returned with every field unset, so "taken until <date>" stays
# answerable. For a subname, no owner means nobody created it.
owner = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex))
if len(name.split(".")) > 2 and owner == ZERO_ADDR:
return 404, {
"name": name,
**reg,
"status": "unregistered",
"error": "unregistered",
"message": "this subname has never been created",
}
return 200, {
"name": canonical_name(name) or name,
"nickname": "",
"website": "",
"location": "",
"simplexContact": [],
"simplexChannel": [],
"eth": None,
"btc": None,
"xmr": None,
"dot": None,
"owner": owner,
"resolver": ZERO_ADDR,
**reg,
}
owner_raw = eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex)
owner = decode_address(owner_raw)
texts = {}
for k in TEXT_KEYS:
try:
v = text(resolver_addr, node, k)
except RuntimeError:
v = ""
if v:
texts[k] = v
# The user-facing "nickname" prefers an explicit `nickname` record,
# falls back to `name`, then `description` (ENSIP-5 convention).
nickname = texts.get("nickname") or texts.get("name") or texts.get("description") or ""
# Keys chosen to be valid Haskell record-field identifiers (lowercase
# initial, no dots) so consumers can derive aeson FromJSON instances
# without a key-rewriting layer. On-chain text-record names still
# use the ENSIP-5 dot convention (e.g. "simplex.contact") — only the
# resolver's JSON surface camelCases them.
return 200, {
"name": canonical_name(name) or name,
"nickname": nickname,
"website": texts.get("url", ""),
"location": texts.get("location", ""),
"simplexContact": split_links(texts.get("simplex.contact", "")),
"simplexChannel": split_links(texts.get("simplex.channel", "")),
"eth": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_ETH),
"btc": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_BTC),
"xmr": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_XMR),
"dot": addr_multicoin(resolver_addr, node, COIN_DOT),
"owner": owner,
"resolver": resolver_addr,
**reg,
}
# ---------- HTTP layer ----------
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self): # noqa: N802 - http.server contract
path = urlparse(self.path).path
parts = [unquote(p) for p in path.split("/") if p]
if parts == ["health"]:
self._respond(200, {"ok": True, "rpc": RPC, "registries": REGISTRIES, **head_block()})
return
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "v2" and parts[1] == "resolve":
name = parts[2].strip().lower()
if not name or "." not in name:
self._respond(400, {"name": name, "error": "notFullyQualified"})
return
try:
status, body = registration(name)
except Exception as e: # surface upstream errors as 502
status, body = 502, upstream_error({"name": name}, e)
self._respond(status, body)
return
# /v1/resolve is an alias: relays before SMP v22 call /resolve
if parts[:2] == ["v1", "resolve"] and len(parts) == 3:
parts = ["resolve", parts[2]]
if len(parts) == 2 and parts[0] == "resolve":
name = parts[1].strip().lower()
if not name or "." not in name:
self._respond(
400,
{
"name": name,
"error": "notFullyQualified",
"message": "expected a fully-qualified name, e.g. alice.testing",
},
)
return
try:
status, body = resolve(name)
except Exception as e: # surface upstream errors as 502
status, body = 502, upstream_error({"name": name}, e)
self._respond(status, body)
return
self._respond(
404,
{
"error": "noSuchRoute",
"message": "not found",
"routes": ["/health", "/v2/resolve/<query>", "/v1/resolve/<name>", "/resolve/<name>"],
},
)
def _respond(self, status: int, body: dict):
data = json.dumps(body, indent=2).encode()
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
# Quiet the default per-request access log; route to stderr in one line.
sys.stderr.write(f"{self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}\n")
def main():
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((BIND, PORT), Handler)
sys.stderr.write(
f"snrc-resolve listening on {BIND}:{PORT}\n"
f" RPC = {RPC}\n"
f" Registries:\n"
)
for tld, addr in REGISTRIES.items():
sys.stderr.write(f" .{tld:<8s} = {addr or '(not configured)'}\n")
sys.stderr.write(" GET /v2/resolve/<name> GET /v1/resolve/<name> GET /health\n")
try:
server.serve_forever()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
sys.stderr.write("\nshutting down\n")
server.server_close()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Resolve an ENS name via local Reth (the same shape SNRC will use).
Usage:
./ens-lookup.py # defaults to simplexchat.eth
./ens-lookup.py vitalik.eth
./ens-lookup.py corevo.eth
Requires: pip install --break-system-packages 'eth-hash[pycryptodome]'
"""
import base64
import json
import sys
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from eth_hash.auto import keccak
RPC = "http://127.0.0.1:8545"
# ENS Registry (current, post-2020 migration)
ENS_REGISTRY = "0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e"
def rpc(method, params):
body = json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params, "id": 1}).encode()
req = Request(RPC, data=body, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
res = json.loads(urlopen(req, timeout=15).read())
if "error" in res:
raise RuntimeError(res["error"])
return res["result"]
def namehash(name: str) -> bytes:
"""ENS namehash — recursive keccak256 over reversed labels."""
node = b"\x00" * 32
if name:
for label in reversed(name.split(".")):
node = keccak(node + keccak(label.encode()))
return node
def selector(signature: str) -> str:
return "0x" + keccak(signature.encode())[:4].hex()
def eth_call(to: str, data: str) -> str:
return rpc("eth_call", [{"to": to, "data": data}, "latest"])
def decode_address(hex_data: str) -> str:
return "0x" + hex_data[-40:]
def decode_bytes(hex_data: str) -> bytes:
raw = bytes.fromhex(hex_data[2:] if hex_data.startswith("0x") else hex_data)
if len(raw) < 64:
return b""
length = int.from_bytes(raw[32:64], "big")
return raw[64:64 + length]
def encode_text_call(node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
"""ABI-encode text(bytes32 node, string key). String arg is dynamic:
offset (=0x40) + length + right-padded data."""
sel = selector("text(bytes32,string)")
head = node.hex() + (0x40).to_bytes(32, "big").hex()
key_bytes = key.encode()
body = len(key_bytes).to_bytes(32, "big").hex() + key_bytes.hex()
# right-pad to 32-byte boundary
pad = (-len(key_bytes)) % 32
body += "00" * pad
return sel + head + body
def text(resolver: str, node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, encode_text_call(node, key)))
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if raw else ""
# Common ENS text keys (ENSIP-5). Resolvers may return empty for any of these.
TEXT_KEYS = [
"url",
"avatar",
"description",
"email",
"notice",
"keywords",
"com.twitter",
"com.github",
"com.discord",
"org.telegram",
"io.keybase",
"xyz.farcaster",
]
def decode_contenthash(raw: bytes) -> str:
"""ENS contenthash → human-readable URI (best-effort)."""
if not raw:
return "(empty)"
# Multicodec prefixes:
# 0xe301 = ipfs-ns + dag-pb (CIDv0/v1)
# 0xe501 = ipns-ns
# 0xe40101701b... = swarm
if raw[:2] == b"\xe3\x01":
cid_bytes = raw[2:]
# Base32 lowercase + 'b' prefix per CIDv1 spec
b32 = base64.b32encode(cid_bytes).decode().lower().rstrip("=")
return f"ipfs://b{b32}"
if raw[:2] == b"\xe5\x01":
cid_bytes = raw[2:]
b32 = base64.b32encode(cid_bytes).decode().lower().rstrip("=")
return f"ipns://b{b32}"
return "0x" + raw.hex()
def main():
name = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "simplexchat.eth"
print(f" name: {name}")
node = namehash(name)
print(f" namehash: 0x{node.hex()}")
# 1. Ask the registry which resolver is responsible for this name
resolver_data = selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node.hex()
resolver_raw = eth_call(ENS_REGISTRY, resolver_data)
resolver = decode_address(resolver_raw)
print(f" resolver: {resolver}")
if resolver == "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000":
print(" → no resolver set for this name")
return
node_hex = node.hex()
# 2. Ask the resolver for the address
try:
addr = decode_address(eth_call(resolver, selector("addr(bytes32)") + node_hex))
print(f" address: {addr}")
except Exception as e:
print(f" address: (error: {e})")
# 3. Ask the resolver for the content hash (IPFS pointer)
try:
ch = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, selector("contenthash(bytes32)") + node_hex))
print(f" contenthash: {decode_contenthash(ch)}")
except Exception as e:
print(f" contenthash: (not supported: {e})")
# 4. Owner from the registry
try:
owner = decode_address(eth_call(ENS_REGISTRY, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex))
print(f" owner: {owner}")
except Exception as e:
print(f" owner: (error: {e})")
# 5. Text records (EIP-634). Print only the non-empty ones.
print(" text records:")
for key in TEXT_KEYS:
try:
v = text(resolver, node, key)
if v:
print(f" {key:<16s} {v}")
except Exception as e:
print(f" {key:<16s} (error: {e})")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sync progress for the Reth + Nimbus stack.
Usage:
./progress.py # continuous (Ctrl-C to exit, auto-exits when synced)
./progress.py --once # single snapshot
Requires Nimbus REST port exposed at 127.0.0.1:5052 (add --rest flag in compose).
"""
import json
import sys
import time
from collections import deque
from datetime import timedelta
from urllib.error import URLError
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
RETH = "http://127.0.0.1:8545"
NIMBUS = "http://127.0.0.1:5052"
INTERVAL = 5
WINDOW = 60
BAR_W = 40
# ANSI helpers
def c(s, code): return f"\033[{code}m{s}\033[0m"
GREEN, YELLOW, RED, DIM, BOLD = "32", "33", "31", "2;37", "1"
def rpc(method):
body = json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": [], "id": 1}).encode()
req = Request(RETH, data=body, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
return json.loads(urlopen(req, timeout=5).read())["result"]
def get_reth():
try:
r = rpc("eth_syncing")
try:
peers = int(rpc("net_peerCount"), 16)
except Exception:
peers = -1 # net namespace not exposed
if r is False:
head = int(rpc("eth_blockNumber"), 16)
return {"state": "synced", "current": head, "target": head, "peers": peers,
"stage": None, "stages": {}, "err": None}
current = int(r["currentBlock"], 16)
highest = int(r["highestBlock"], 16)
# Build stage map (name -> block).
stages = {s["name"]: int(s["block"], 16) for s in r.get("stages", [])}
active_stages = {k: v for k, v in stages.items() if v > 0}
# Headers download phase: nothing has progressed yet.
if current == 0 and highest == 0 and not active_stages:
return {"state": "headers", "current": 0, "target": 0, "peers": peers,
"stage": "Headers", "stages": stages, "err": None}
# Derive progress from the stages pipeline.
# Bottleneck (rate-limiting stage) = stage with lowest non-zero block.
# Target = leading stage block (typically Headers = chain tip).
# Reth's top-level currentBlock/highestBlock are unreliable during initial
# sync (often 0 until execution stage runs), so prefer stages-derived values.
if active_stages:
bottleneck = min(active_stages, key=active_stages.get)
stage_current = active_stages[bottleneck]
stage_target = max(stages.values()) if stages else 0
# Trust the stages-derived values if highest is unset or stages tip is higher.
if highest <= 0 or stage_target > highest:
current = stage_current
highest = stage_target
elif current <= 0:
current = stage_current
else:
bottleneck = None
return {"state": "syncing", "current": current, "target": highest,
"peers": peers, "stage": bottleneck, "stages": stages, "err": None}
except URLError as e:
return {"state": "down", "current": 0, "target": 0, "peers": 0,
"stage": None, "stages": {}, "err": str(e.reason)}
except Exception as e:
return {"state": "error", "current": 0, "target": 0, "peers": 0,
"stage": None, "stages": {}, "err": str(e)}
def get_nimbus():
try:
d = json.loads(urlopen(f"{NIMBUS}/eth/v1/node/syncing", timeout=5).read())["data"]
peers_d = json.loads(urlopen(f"{NIMBUS}/eth/v1/node/peer_count", timeout=5).read())["data"]
head = int(d["head_slot"])
dist = int(d["sync_distance"])
peers = int(peers_d.get("connected", "0"))
return {"state": "synced" if not d["is_syncing"] else "syncing",
"current": head, "target": head + dist, "peers": peers,
"optimistic": bool(d.get("is_optimistic", False)),
"el_offline": bool(d.get("el_offline", False)),
"err": None}
except URLError as e:
return {"state": "down", "current": 0, "target": 0, "peers": 0,
"optimistic": False, "el_offline": False, "err": str(e.reason)}
except Exception as e:
return {"state": "error", "current": 0, "target": 0, "peers": 0,
"optimistic": False, "el_offline": False, "err": str(e)}
def format_num(n): return f"{n:,}"
def format_eta(seconds):
if seconds is None: return "?"
if seconds < 0: return "?"
if seconds < 60: return f"{int(seconds)}s"
if seconds < 3600:
return f"{int(seconds // 60)}m {int(seconds % 60)}s"
if seconds < 86400:
return f"{int(seconds // 3600)}h {int((seconds % 3600) // 60)}m"
return f"{int(seconds // 86400)}d {int((seconds % 86400) // 3600)}h"
def rate_per_sec(history):
if len(history) < 2: return None
t0, c0 = history[0]
t1, c1 = history[-1]
if t1 <= t0: return None
return (c1 - c0) / (t1 - t0)
def eta_seconds(history, target):
r = rate_per_sec(history)
if r is None or r <= 0: return None
remaining = target - history[-1][1]
if remaining <= 0: return 0
return remaining / r
def progress_bar(pct):
pct = max(0.0, min(100.0, pct))
filled = int(pct / 100 * BAR_W)
return c("█" * filled, GREEN) + c("░" * (BAR_W - filled), DIM)
def peers_label(peers):
if peers < 0:
return c("· peers unknown (enable net namespace)", DIM)
return c(f"· {peers} peers", DIM)
def stages_summary(stages):
"""One-line view: stages that have progressed, with their block numbers."""
if not stages:
return ""
advanced = [(n, b) for n, b in stages.items() if b > 0]
if not advanced:
return c(" stages: all 0 (headers downloading)", DIM)
advanced.sort(key=lambda kv: kv[1], reverse=True)
parts = [f"{n}={format_num(b)}" for n, b in advanced[:4]]
return c(" stages: " + ", ".join(parts), DIM)
def render_one(name, x, hist):
state = x["state"]
peers = x.get("peers", 0)
extras = []
if name == "Nimbus":
if x.get("optimistic"):
extras.append(c("(optimistic head — Reth not yet verifying)", YELLOW))
if x.get("el_offline"):
extras.append(c("⚠ EL OFFLINE", RED))
if state == "synced":
out = [f" {c(name, BOLD):<14s} {c('✓ synced', GREEN)} {c(format_num(x['current']), BOLD)} {peers_label(peers)}"]
elif state == "headers":
out = [
f" {c(name, BOLD):<14s} {c('⧗ headers', YELLOW)} {c('downloading initial chain', DIM)} {peers_label(peers)}",
f" {c('(per-block progress unavailable until headers validated — see docker logs)', DIM)}",
]
elif state == "syncing" and x["target"] <= 0:
out = [f" {c(name, BOLD):<14s} {c('⧗ syncing', YELLOW)} {c('waiting for fork-choice', DIM)} {peers_label(peers)}"]
elif state == "syncing":
pct = x["current"] / x["target"] * 100
r = rate_per_sec(hist)
eta = eta_seconds(hist, x["target"])
rate_s = f"{format_num(int(r))} /s" if r and r > 0 else c("stalled", RED)
eta_s = format_eta(eta) if eta is not None else "?"
stage = x.get("stage")
stage_s = c(f"[{stage}]", DIM) if stage else ""
out = [
f" {c(name, BOLD):<14s} {c('⧗ syncing', YELLOW)} {format_num(x['current'])} / {format_num(x['target'])} {stage_s} {peers_label(peers)}",
f" {progress_bar(pct)} {c(f'{pct:6.2f}%', BOLD)}",
f" {c(rate_s, DIM)} ETA {c(eta_s, BOLD)}",
]
else:
out = [
f" {c(name, BOLD):<14s} {c('✗ ' + state, RED)}",
f" {c(x.get('err') or '', DIM)}",
]
# Reth-only: stages summary
if name == "Reth" and x.get("stages"):
out.append(f" {stages_summary(x['stages'])}")
for e in extras:
out.append(f" {e}")
return out
def render(reth, nimbus, reth_hist, nim_hist):
print("\033[2J\033[H", end="")
width = 64
title = f"Reth + Nimbus sync"
ts = time.strftime("%H:%M:%S")
print()
print(f" {c(title, BOLD)} {c(ts, DIM)}")
print(f" {c('─' * width, DIM)}")
print()
for line in render_one("Reth", reth, reth_hist):
print(line)
print()
for line in render_one("Nimbus", nimbus, nim_hist):
print(line)
print()
win_s = (len(reth_hist) - 1) * INTERVAL if len(reth_hist) > 1 else 0
print(f" {c(f'window {win_s}s · refresh {INTERVAL}s · Ctrl-C to exit', DIM)}")
print()
def main():
once = "--once" in sys.argv
reth_hist = deque(maxlen=WINDOW)
nim_hist = deque(maxlen=WINDOW)
try:
while True:
r = get_reth()
n = get_nimbus()
now = time.time()
if r["target"] > 0 or r["state"] == "syncing":
reth_hist.append((now, r["current"]))
if n["target"] > 0 or n["state"] == "syncing":
nim_hist.append((now, n["current"]))
render(r, n, reth_hist, nim_hist)
if once:
break
if r["state"] == "synced" and n["state"] == "synced":
print(f" {c('✓ all synced.', GREEN)}\n")
break
time.sleep(INTERVAL)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ smp-server --version
# Initialize server
ip_address=$(curl ifconfig.me)
smp-server init -l --disable-web --ip $ip_address
smp-server init -l --ip $ip_address
# Server fingerprint
fingerprint=$(cat /etc/opt/simplex/fingerprint)
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@ Check SMP server status with: systemctl status smp-server
To keep this server secure, the UFW firewall is enabled.
All ports are BLOCKED except 22 (SSH), 443 (HTTPS), 5223 (SMP server).
Embedded HTTPS web is disabled because this image does not provision
/etc/opt/simplex/web.crt or /etc/opt/simplex/web.key. To enable it, provision
those files, uncomment WEB https/cert/key in /etc/opt/simplex/smp-server.ini,
and restart smp-server.
********************************************************************************
To stop seeing this message delete line - bash /opt/simplex/on_login.sh - from /root/.bashrc
EOF
-8
View File
@@ -75,9 +75,6 @@ init_opts=()
[[ $ENABLE_STORE_LOG == "on" ]] && init_opts+=(-l)
# This script does not provision /etc/opt/simplex/web.crt or web.key.
init_opts+=(--disable-web)
ip_address=$(curl ifconfig.me)
init_opts+=(--ip $ip_address)
@@ -114,11 +111,6 @@ Check SMP server status with: systemctl status smp-server
To keep this server secure, the UFW firewall is enabled.
All ports are BLOCKED except 22 (SSH), 443 (HTTPS), 5223 (SMP server).
Embedded HTTPS web is disabled because this script does not provision
/etc/opt/simplex/web.crt or /etc/opt/simplex/web.key. To enable it, provision
those files, uncomment WEB https/cert/key in /etc/opt/simplex/smp-server.ini,
and restart smp-server.
********************************************************************************
To stop seeing this message delete line - bash /opt/simplex/on_login.sh - from /root/.bashrc
EOF2
+36 -67
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
cabal-version: 3.0
cabal-version: 1.12
name: simplexmq
version: 7.1.0.10
version: 6.5.0.11
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ homepage: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq#readme
author: simplex.chat
maintainer: [email protected]
copyright: 2020-2022 simplex.chat
license: AGPL-3.0-only
license: AGPL-3
license-file: LICENSE
build-type: Simple
extra-source-files:
@@ -24,13 +24,6 @@ extra-source-files:
CHANGELOG.md
cbits/sha512.h
cbits/sntrup761.h
cbits/blst/**/*.c
cbits/blst/**/*.h
cbits/blst/**/*.s
cbits/blst/**/*.S
cbits/blst/**/*.asm
cbits/libbbs/**/*.c
cbits/libbbs/**/*.h
apps/common/Web/static/index.html
apps/common/Web/static/link.html
apps/common/Web/static/media/apk_icon.png
@@ -89,11 +82,6 @@ flag server_postgres
manual: True
default: False
flag commoncrypto
description: On Apple platforms, use SecRandomCopyBytes (Security.framework) for libbbs randomness. getentropy is a non-public symbol on iOS and triggers App Store rejection (ITMS-90338).
manual: True
default: False
library
exposed-modules:
Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
@@ -134,8 +122,6 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
@@ -144,7 +130,6 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.ShortLink
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
Simplex.Messaging.Names.Record
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport
@@ -153,11 +138,9 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Protocol.Types
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Config
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.QueueInfo
Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
Simplex.Messaging.SimplexName
Simplex.Messaging.Session
Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
Simplex.Messaging.TMap
@@ -190,11 +173,7 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251009_queue_to_subscribe
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251010_client_notices
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251230_strict_tables
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260115_service_certs
else
exposed-modules:
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
@@ -245,11 +224,7 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251009_queue_to_subscribe
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251010_client_notices
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251230_strict_tables
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260115_service_certs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Util
if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
exposed-modules:
@@ -274,6 +249,7 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main.GitCommit
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main.Init
@@ -283,8 +259,6 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal.SharedLock
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Names.HttpResolver
Simplex.Messaging.Server.NtfStore
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Prometheus
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
@@ -309,9 +283,6 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store.Migrations
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store.Postgres
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store.Types
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Postgres
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Migrations
@@ -324,33 +295,11 @@ library
ghc-options: -Weverything -Wno-missing-exported-signatures -Wno-missing-import-lists -Wno-missed-specialisations -Wno-all-missed-specialisations -Wno-unsafe -Wno-safe -Wno-missing-local-signatures -Wno-missing-kind-signatures -Wno-missing-deriving-strategies -Wno-monomorphism-restriction -Wno-prepositive-qualified-module -Wno-implicit-prelude -Wno-missing-safe-haskell-mode -Wno-missing-export-lists -Wno-partial-fields -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-record-updates -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Werror=incomplete-uni-patterns -Werror=missing-home-modules -Werror=missing-methods -Werror=tabs -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wunused-type-patterns -O2
include-dirs:
cbits
cbits/blst/bindings
cbits/blst/src
cbits/libbbs/include
cbits/libbbs/src
cc-options: -D__BLST_PORTABLE__
if flag(commoncrypto)
cc-options: -DBBS_CRYPTO_CC
frameworks: Security
c-sources:
cbits/sha512.c
cbits/sntrup761.c
cbits/blst/src/server.c
cbits/libbbs/src/bbs.c
cbits/libbbs/src/bbs_ciphersuites.c
cbits/libbbs/src/bbs_util.c
cbits/libbbs/src/compat-string.c
cbits/libbbs/src/sha256.c
cbits/libbbs/src/shake256.c
asm-sources:
cbits/blst/build/assembly.S
extra-libraries:
crypto
if os(windows)
c-sources:
cbits/getentropy_win.c
extra-libraries:
bcrypt
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
@@ -401,10 +350,7 @@ library
build-depends:
case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, hashable ==1.4.*
, http-client >=0.7 && <0.8
, http-client-tls >=0.3 && <0.4
, ini ==0.4.1
, network-uri >=2.6 && <2.7
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
@@ -486,6 +432,36 @@ executable smp-server
, text
default-language: Haskell2010
executable smp-server-bench
if flag(client_library)
buildable: False
if flag(server_postgres)
cpp-options: -DdbServerPostgres
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
ClientSim
Report
hs-source-dirs:
bench
default-extensions:
StrictData
ghc-options: -O2 -threaded -rtsopts
build-depends:
base
, async
, bytestring
, containers
, crypton
, mtl
, network
, simple-logger
, simplexmq
, stm
, text
, time
, unliftio
default-language: Haskell2010
executable xftp
if flag(client_library)
buildable: False
@@ -538,7 +514,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
AgentTests.EqInstances
AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
AgentTests.MigrationTests
AgentTests.ResolveNameTests
AgentTests.ServerChoice
AgentTests.ShortLinkTests
CLITests
@@ -555,12 +530,9 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
CoreTests.VersionRangeTests
FileDescriptionTests
RemoteControl
NamesResolverServer
RSLVTests
ServerTests
SMPAgentClient
SMPClient
SMPNamesTests
SMPProxyTests
Util
XFTPAgent
@@ -583,7 +555,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
if flag(server_postgres)
other-modules:
AgentTests.NotificationTests
CoreTests.XFTPStoreTests
NtfClient
NtfServerTests
if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
@@ -641,8 +612,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
, unliftio
, unliftio-core
, unordered-containers
, wai
, warp
, yaml
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(server_postgres)
+19 -48
View File
@@ -17,16 +17,11 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
toFSFilePath,
-- Receiving files
xftpReceiveFile',
xftpPrepareReceiveFile',
xftpStartReceiveFile',
xftpDeleteRcvFile',
xftpDeleteRcvFiles',
-- Sending files
xftpSendFile',
xftpSendDescription',
xftpPrepareSendFile',
xftpPrepareSendDescription',
xftpStartSendFile',
deleteSndFileInternal,
deleteSndFilesInternal,
deleteSndFileRemote,
@@ -55,12 +50,11 @@ import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.Text (Text, pack)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Format (defaultTimeLocale, formatTime)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks (toKB)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..), getChunkDigest, prepareChunkSizes, prepareChunkSpecs, singleChunkSize)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), GrantedStorageTime, SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..))
import qualified Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport as XFTP
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
@@ -132,12 +126,7 @@ closeXFTPAgent a = do
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
xftpReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> Bool -> AM RcvFileId
xftpReceiveFile' c userId vfd cfArgs approvedRelays = do
fId <- xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId vfd cfArgs approvedRelays
fId <$ xftpStartReceiveFile' c fId
xftpPrepareReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> Bool -> AM RcvFileId
xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {redirect}) cfArgs approvedRelays = do
xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks, redirect}) cfArgs approvedRelays = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "rcv.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -147,7 +136,7 @@ xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {redir
lift $ createDirectory =<< toFSFilePath relTmpPath
lift $ createEmptyFile =<< toFSFilePath relSavePath
let saveFile = CryptoFile relSavePath cfArgs
case redirect of
fId <- case redirect of
Nothing -> withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFile db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPath saveFile approvedRelays
Just _ -> do
-- prepare description paths
@@ -159,11 +148,8 @@ xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {redir
let saveFileRedirect = CryptoFile relSavePathRedirect $ Just cfArgsRedirect
-- create download tasks
withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFileRedirect db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPathRedirect saveFileRedirect relTmpPath saveFile approvedRelays
xftpStartReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> RcvFileId -> AM ()
xftpStartReceiveFile' c rcvFileEntityId = do
srvs <- withStore c (`startPreparedRcvFile` rcvFileEntityId)
lift $ forM_ srvs $ void . getXFTPRcvWorker True c . Just
forM_ chunks (downloadChunk c)
pure fId
downloadChunk :: AgentClient -> FileChunk -> AM ()
downloadChunk c FileChunk {replicas = (FileChunkReplica {server} : _)} = do
@@ -364,13 +350,8 @@ xftpDeleteRcvFiles' c rcvFileEntityIds = do
notify :: forall m e. (MonadIO m, AEntityI e) => AgentClient -> AEntityId -> AEvent e -> m ()
notify c entId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", entId, AEvt (sAEntity @e) cmd)
xftpSendFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> Maybe Word32 -> AM SndFileId
xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
fId <- xftpPrepareSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours
fId <$ xftpStartSendFile' c fId
xftpPrepareSendFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> Maybe Word32 -> AM SndFileId
xftpPrepareSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
xftpSendFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> AM SndFileId
xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -378,15 +359,12 @@ xftpPrepareSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-- saving absolute filePath will not allow to restore file encryption after app update, but it's a short window
withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce Nothing storageHours
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce Nothing
lift . void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
pure fId
xftpSendDescription' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Int -> AM SndFileId
xftpSendDescription' c userId vfd numRecipients = do
fId <- xftpPrepareSendDescription' c userId vfd numRecipients
fId <$ xftpStartSendFile' c fId
xftpPrepareSendDescription' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Int -> AM SndFileId
xftpPrepareSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {size, digest}) numRecipients = do
xftpSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {size, digest}) numRecipients = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -397,12 +375,9 @@ xftpPrepareSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescript
liftError (FILE . FILE_IO . show) $ CF.writeFile file (LB.fromStrict $ strEncode fdDirect)
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce (Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}) Nothing
xftpStartSendFile' :: AgentClient -> SndFileId -> AM ()
xftpStartSendFile' c sndFileEntityId = do
withStore c (`startPreparedSndFile` sndFileEntityId)
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce $ Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}
lift . void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
pure fId
resumeXFTPSndWork :: AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> AM' ()
resumeXFTPSndWork = void .: getXFTPSndWorker False
@@ -430,7 +405,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
prepareFile _ SndFile {prefixPath = Nothing} =
throwE $ INTERNAL "no prefix path"
prepareFile cfg sndFile@SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, userId, prefixPath = Just ppath, status} = do
SndFile {numRecipients, chunks, storageHours} <-
SndFile {numRecipients, chunks} <-
if status /= SFSEncrypted -- status is SFSNew or SFSEncrypting
then do
fsEncPath <- lift . toFSFilePath $ sndFileEncPath ppath
@@ -449,7 +424,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
let (pendingChunks, preparedSrvs) = partitionEithers $ map srvOrPendingChunk chunks
-- concurrently?
-- separate worker to create chunks? record retries and delay on snd_file_chunks?
srvs <- forM pendingChunks $ createChunk numRecipients' storageHours
srvs <- forM pendingChunks $ createChunk numRecipients'
let allSrvs = S.fromList $ preparedSrvs <> srvs
lift $ forM_ allSrvs $ \srv -> getXFTPSndWorker True c (Just srv)
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSUploading
@@ -479,8 +454,8 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
srvOrPendingChunk ch@SndFileChunk {replicas} = case replicas of
[] -> Left ch
SndFileChunkReplica {server} : _ -> Right server
createChunk :: Int -> Maybe Word32 -> SndFileChunk -> AM (ProtocolServer 'PXFTP)
createChunk numRecipients' storageHours ch = do
createChunk :: Int -> SndFileChunk -> AM (ProtocolServer 'PXFTP)
createChunk numRecipients' ch = do
liftIO $ assertAgentForeground c
(replica, ProtoServerWithAuth srv _) <- tryCreate
withStore' c $ \db -> createSndFileReplica db ch replica
@@ -507,7 +482,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
deleted <- withStore' c $ \db -> getSndFileDeleted db sndFileId
when deleted $ throwE $ FILE NO_FILE
withNextSrv c userId storageSrvs triedHosts [] $ \srvAuth -> do
replica <- agentXFTPNewChunk c ch numRecipients' srvAuth storageHours
replica <- agentXFTPNewChunk c ch numRecipients' srvAuth
pure (replica, srvAuth)
sndWorkerInternalError :: AgentClient -> DBSndFileId -> SndFileId -> Maybe FilePath -> AgentErrorType -> AM ()
@@ -568,7 +543,7 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFPROG uploaded total
when complete $ do
(sndDescr, rcvDescrs) <- sndFileToDescrs sf
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs (sndFileExpiresAt chunks)
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs
lift . forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
where
@@ -602,10 +577,6 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
let chunkSize = FileSize $ sndChunkSize ch
replicas = [FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}]
pure FileChunk {chunkNo, digest = chDigest, chunkSize, replicas}
sndFileExpiresAt :: [SndFileChunk] -> Maybe GrantedStorageTime
sndFileExpiresAt chunks' = fmap minimum $ L.nonEmpty =<< mapM chunkExpiresAt chunks'
where
chunkExpiresAt SndFileChunk {replicas} = maximum <$> L.nonEmpty (mapMaybe (\SndFileChunkReplica {expiresAt} -> expiresAt) replicas)
createRcvFileDescriptions :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> [SndFileChunk] -> [FileDescription 'FRecipient]
createRcvFileDescriptions fd sndChunks = map (\chunks -> (fd :: (FileDescription 'FRecipient)) {chunks}) rcvChunks
where
+20 -20
View File
@@ -36,10 +36,8 @@ import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
@@ -59,7 +57,6 @@ import Network.Socket (HostName)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (EntitlementProof)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
( NetworkConfig (..),
NetworkRequestMode (..),
@@ -87,7 +84,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
SenderId,
pattern NoEntity,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, CertChainPubKey (..), HandshakeError (..), SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, CertChainPubKey (..), HandshakeError (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
@@ -112,6 +109,12 @@ data XFTPClientConfig = XFTPClientConfig
clientALPN :: Maybe [ALPN]
}
data XFTPChunkBody = XFTPChunkBody
{ chunkSize :: Int,
chunkPart :: Int -> IO ByteString,
http2Body :: HTTP2Body
}
data XFTPChunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec
{ filePath :: FilePath,
chunkOffset :: Int64,
@@ -129,8 +132,8 @@ defaultXFTPClientConfig =
clientALPN = Just alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes
}
getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> [HostName] -> UTCTime -> (SessionId -> IO (Maybe EntitlementProof)) -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} presetDomains proxySessTs mkEntitlementProof disconnected = runExceptT $ do
getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> [HostName] -> UTCTime -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} presetDomains proxySessTs disconnected = runExceptT $ do
let socksCreds = clientSocksCredentials xftpNetworkConfig proxySessTs transportSession
ProtocolServer _ host port keyHash = srv
useALPN = if useWebPort xftpNetworkConfig presetDomains srv then Just [httpALPN11] else clientALPN
@@ -144,28 +147,26 @@ getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN,
let HTTP2Client {sessionId, sessionALPN} = http2Client
v = VersionXFTP 1
thServerVRange = versionToRange v
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, serviceAuth = False, serverInfo = Nothing}
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True, serviceAuth = False}
logDebug $ "Client negotiated handshake protocol: " <> tshow sessionALPN
thParams@THandleParams {thVersion} <- case sessionALPN of
Just alpn
| alpn == xftpALPNv1 || alpn == httpALPN11 ->
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client mkEntitlementProof thParams0
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
_ -> pure thParams0
logDebug $ "Client negotiated protocol: " <> tshow thVersion
let c = XFTPClient {http2Client, thParams, transportSession, config}
atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
pure c
xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> (SessionId -> IO (Maybe EntitlementProof)) -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} mkEntitlementProof thParams0 = do
shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck, serverInfoBytes} <- getServerHandshake
xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck} <- getServerHandshake
(vr, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
let v = maxVersion vr
ep <- if v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion then liftIO (mkEntitlementProof sessionId) else pure Nothing
sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, entitlementProof = ep}
sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash}
let thAuth = Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = sk, peerServerCertKey = ck, clientService = Nothing, sessSecret = Nothing}
serverInfo = J.eitherDecodeStrict' <$> serverInfoBytes
pure thParams0 {thAuth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr, serverInfo}
pure thParams0 {thAuth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
where
getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
getServerHandshake = do
@@ -258,11 +259,10 @@ createXFTPChunk ::
FileInfo ->
NonEmpty C.APublicAuthKey ->
Maybe BasicAuth ->
Maybe Word32 ->
ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (SenderId, NonEmpty RecipientId, Maybe GrantedStorageTime)
createXFTPChunk c spKey file rcps auth_ storageHours =
sendXFTPCommand c spKey NoEntity (FNEW file rcps auth_ storageHours) Nothing >>= \case
(FRSndIds sId rIds gs, body) -> noFile body (sId, rIds, gs)
ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (SenderId, NonEmpty RecipientId)
createXFTPChunk c spKey file rcps auth_ =
sendXFTPCommand c spKey NoEntity (FNEW file rcps auth_) Nothing >>= \case
(FRSndIds sId rIds, body) -> noFile body (sId, rIds)
(r, _) -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
addXFTPRecipients :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty C.APublicAuthKey -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (NonEmpty RecipientId)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, startedAt, config} srv = do
connectClient =
ExceptT $
first (XFTPClientAgentError srv)
<$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) [] startedAt (\_ -> pure Nothing) clientDisconnected
<$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) [] startedAt clientDisconnected
clientDisconnected :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
clientDisconnected _ = do
+11 -14
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
( SendOptions (..),
CLIError (..),
xftpClientCLI,
xftpClientDeprecationNotice,
cliSendFile,
cliSendFileOpts,
encodeWebURI,
@@ -70,6 +69,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), ProtocolServer (..), SenderId, SndPrivateAuthKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getCliCommand')
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (groupAllOn, ifM, tshow, whenM)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath (splitFileName, (</>))
@@ -81,10 +81,6 @@ import UnliftIO.Directory
xftpClientVersion :: String
xftpClientVersion = "1.0.1"
xftpClientDeprecationNotice :: String
xftpClientDeprecationNotice =
"WARNING: the standalone xftp CLI is experimental and deprecated."
newtype CLIError = CLIError String
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
@@ -227,13 +223,7 @@ logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
xftpClientCLI :: IO ()
xftpClientCLI =
customExecParser
(prefs showHelpOnEmpty)
( info
(helper <*> versionOption <*> cliCommandP)
(header (clientVersion <> "\n" <> xftpClientDeprecationNotice) <> fullDesc)
)
>>= \case
getCliCommand' cliCommandP clientVersion >>= \case
SendFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliSendFile opts
ReceiveFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliReceiveFile opts
DeleteFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliDeleteFile opts
@@ -241,7 +231,6 @@ xftpClientCLI =
RandomFile opts -> cliRandomFile opts
where
clientVersion = "SimpleX XFTP client v" <> xftpClientVersion
versionOption = infoOption clientVersion (long "version" <> short 'v' <> help "Show version")
runLogE :: HasField "verbose" a Bool => a -> ExceptT CLIError IO () -> IO ()
runLogE opts a
@@ -328,7 +317,7 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
digest <- liftIO $ getChunkDigest chunkSpec
let ch = FileInfo {sndKey, size = chunkSize, digest}
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a xftpServer
(sndId, rIds, _) <- withRetry retryCount $ createXFTPChunk c spKey ch (L.map fst rKeys) auth Nothing
(sndId, rIds) <- withRetry retryCount $ createXFTPChunk c spKey ch (L.map fst rKeys) auth
withReconnect a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
logDebug $ "uploaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo
uploaded <- atomically . stateTVar uploadedChunks $ \cs ->
@@ -441,6 +430,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
| depth > 0 -> do
CryptoFile tmpFile _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ \_ ->
fmap CF.plain $ uniqueCombine encPath "redirect.yaml"
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
yaml <- liftIO $ B.readFile tmpFile
whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
innerVfd <- either (throwE . CLIError . ("Redirect: invalid file description: " <>)) pure $ strDecode yaml
@@ -449,6 +439,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
Nothing -> do
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
liftIO $ do
printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
@@ -477,6 +468,12 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
_ -> (`uniqueCombine` name') . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
where
name' = T.unpack name
acknowledgeFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
acknowledgeFileChunk a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a server
withRetry retryCount $ ackXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ = throwE $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
printProgress :: String -> Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()
printProgress s part total = printNoNewLine $ s <> " " <> show ((part * 100) `div` total) <> "%"
-9
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
YAMLFileDescription (..), -- for tests
YAMLServerReplicas (..), -- for tests
validateFileDescription,
sharedDescriptionHash,
groupReplicasByServer,
fdSeparator,
kb,
@@ -73,7 +72,6 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
@@ -229,13 +227,6 @@ validateFileDescription fd@FileDescription {size, chunks}
chunkNos = map (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo) chunks
chunksSize = foldl' (\(s :: Int64) FileChunk {chunkSize} -> s + fromIntegral (unFileSize chunkSize)) 0
sharedDescriptionHash :: FileDescription p -> ByteString
sharedDescriptionHash FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks} =
C.sha512Hash $ smpEncode (unFileSize size, unFileDigest digest, C.unSbKey key, nonce, unFileSize chunkSize) <> foldMap chunkFields chunks
where
chunkFields FileChunk {chunkNo, chunkSize = cSize, digest = cDigest} =
smpEncode (fromIntegral chunkNo :: Int64, unFileSize cSize, unFileDigest cDigest)
encodeFileDescription :: FileDescription p -> YAMLFileDescription
encodeFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks, redirect} =
YAMLFileDescription
+10 -35
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
FileCommand (..),
FileCmd (..),
FileInfo (..),
GrantedStorageTime (..),
XFTPFileId,
FileResponse (..),
xftpBlockSize,
@@ -39,13 +38,12 @@ import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..), XFTPVersion, blockedFilesXFTPVersion, fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion, xftpClientHandshakeStub)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..), XFTPVersion, blockedFilesXFTPVersion, xftpClientHandshakeStub)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (authTransmission)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ instance Protocol XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
{-# INLINE protocolError #-}
data FileCommand (p :: FileParty) where
FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Maybe Word32 -> FileCommand FSender
FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> FileCommand FSender
FADD :: NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> FileCommand FSender
FPUT :: FileCommand FSender
FDEL :: FileCommand FSender
@@ -198,27 +196,12 @@ data FileInfo = FileInfo
}
deriving (Show)
data GrantedStorageTime = GSTExpires {epochSeconds :: Int64}
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
instance Encoding GrantedStorageTime where
smpEncode = \case
GSTExpires t -> smpEncode ('T', t)
smpP =
smpP >>= \case
'T' -> GSTExpires <$> smpP
_ -> fail "bad GrantedStorageTime"
type XFTPFileId = EntityId
instance FilePartyI p => ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType (FileCommand p) where
type Tag (FileCommand p) = FileCommandTag p
encodeProtocol v = \case
FNEW file rKeys auth_ st
| v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion -> fnew <> e st
| otherwise -> fnew
where
fnew = e (FNEW_, ' ', file, rKeys, auth_)
encodeProtocol _v = \case
FNEW file rKeys auth_ -> e (FNEW_, ' ', file, rKeys, auth_)
FADD rKeys -> e (FADD_, ' ', rKeys)
FPUT -> e FPUT_
FDEL -> e FDEL_
@@ -252,14 +235,10 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileCmd where
type Tag FileCmd = FileCmdTag
encodeProtocol _v (FileCmd _ c) = encodeProtocol _v c
protocolP v = \case
protocolP _v = \case
FCT SFSender tag ->
FileCmd SFSender <$> case tag of
FNEW_
| v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion -> fnewP smpP
| otherwise -> fnewP (pure Nothing)
where
fnewP stP = FNEW <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> stP
FNEW_ -> FNEW <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
FADD_ -> FADD <$> _smpP
FPUT_ -> pure FPUT
FDEL_ -> pure FDEL
@@ -313,7 +292,7 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag FileResponseTag where
_ -> Nothing
data FileResponse
= FRSndIds SenderId (NonEmpty RecipientId) (Maybe GrantedStorageTime)
= FRSndIds SenderId (NonEmpty RecipientId)
| FRRcvIds (NonEmpty RecipientId)
| FRFile RcvPublicDhKey C.CbNonce
| FROk
@@ -324,9 +303,7 @@ data FileResponse
instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
type Tag FileResponse = FileResponseTag
encodeProtocol v = \case
FRSndIds fId rIds gs
| v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion -> e (FRSndIds_, ' ', fId, rIds, gs)
| otherwise -> e (FRSndIds_, ' ', fId, rIds)
FRSndIds fId rIds -> e (FRSndIds_, ' ', fId, rIds)
FRRcvIds rIds -> e (FRRcvIds_, ' ', rIds)
FRFile rDhKey nonce -> e (FRFile_, ' ', rDhKey, nonce)
FROk -> e FROk_
@@ -338,10 +315,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
e = smpEncode
protocolP v = \case
FRSndIds_
| v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion -> FRSndIds <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
| otherwise -> FRSndIds <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> pure Nothing
protocolP _v = \case
FRSndIds_ -> FRSndIds <$> _smpP <*> smpP
FRRcvIds_ -> FRRcvIds <$> _smpP
FRFile_ -> FRFile <$> _smpP <*> smpP
FROk_ -> pure FROk
+126 -179
View File
@@ -23,12 +23,11 @@ import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
@@ -37,7 +36,6 @@ import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import qualified Data.Text.IO as T
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffTimeToPicoseconds, getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (systemSeconds, utcToSystemTime)
import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
@@ -57,12 +55,10 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS (BBSPresHeader (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (Entitlement (..), EntitlementProof (..), EntitlementVerification (..), verifyEntitlement)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, CommandError (..), EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RcvPublicDhKey, RecipientId, SignedTransmission, pattern NoEntity)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RcvPublicDhKey, RecipientId, SignedTransmission, pattern NoEntity)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (controlPortAuth, dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdAuthorization)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control (CPClientRole (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
@@ -71,7 +67,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (CertChainPubKey (..), EntitlementConfig (..), SessionEntitlement (..), SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams, defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (CertChainPubKey (..), SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams, defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File (fileBlockSize)
@@ -92,7 +88,7 @@ import UnliftIO.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import UnliftIO.Directory (canonicalizePath, doesFileExist, removeFile, renameFile)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
type M s a = ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO a
type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a
data XFTPTransportRequest = XFTPTransportRequest
{ thParams :: THandleParamsXFTP 'TServer,
@@ -116,35 +112,32 @@ corsPreflightHeaders =
("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
]
runXFTPServer :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> IO ()
runXFTPServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
runXFTPServer cfg = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg
runXFTPServerBlocking :: FileStoreClass s => TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig s -> IO ()
runXFTPServerBlocking :: TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpServer cfg started)
data Handshake
= HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519 EntitlementChecked
= HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519
| HandshakeAccepted (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer)
-- | the entitlement of the session is resolved once, however many handshakes it has
data EntitlementChecked = EntNotChecked | EntChecked (Maybe SessionEntitlement)
xftpServer :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> TMVar Bool -> M s ()
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration, xftpServerVRange, information} started = do
expireServerFiles Nothing fileExpiration
xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> M ()
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration, xftpServerVRange} started = do
mapM_ (expireServerFiles Nothing) fileExpiration
restoreServerStats
raceAny_
( runServer
: expireFiles fileExpiration
: serverStatsThread_ cfg
: expireFilesThread_ cfg
<> serverStatsThread_ cfg
<> prometheusMetricsThread_ cfg
<> controlPortThread_ cfg
)
`finally` stopServer
where
runServer :: M s ()
runServer :: M ()
runServer = do
srvCreds@(chain, pk) <- asks tlsServerCreds
httpCreds_ <- asks httpServerCreds
@@ -165,7 +158,7 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
let v = VersionXFTP 1
thServerVRange = versionToRange v
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, serviceAuth = False, serverInfo = Nothing}
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True, serviceAuth = False}
req0 = XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS = addCORS'}
flip runReaderT env $ case sessionALPN of
Nothing -> processRequest req0
@@ -175,19 +168,19 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
Nothing -> pure ()
Just thParams -> processRequest req0 {thParams}
| otherwise -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS')
xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M s (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, request, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS} = do
s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
r <- runExceptT $ case s of
Nothing
| sniUsed && not webHello -> throwE SESSION
| otherwise -> processHello Nothing
Just (HandshakeSent pk ent_)
Just (HandshakeSent pk)
| webHello -> processHello (Just pk)
| otherwise -> processClientHandshake pk ent_
| otherwise -> processClientHandshake pk
Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams)
| webHello -> processHello (serverPrivKey <$> thAuth thParams)
| webHandshake, Just auth <- thAuth thParams -> processClientHandshake (serverPrivKey auth) (EntChecked $ peerEntitlement auth)
| webHandshake, Just auth <- thAuth thParams -> processClientHandshake (serverPrivKey auth)
| otherwise -> pure $ Just thParams
either sendError pure r
where
@@ -204,35 +197,28 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
| otherwise -> throwE HANDSHAKE
rng <- asks random
k <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions >>= \case
Just (HandshakeSent pk' _) -> pure $ C.publicKey pk'
s' -> do
Just (HandshakeSent pk') -> pure $ C.publicKey pk'
_ -> do
kp <- maybe (C.generateKeyPair rng) (\p -> pure (C.publicKey p, p)) pk_
let ent_ = case s' of
Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams) -> EntChecked $ peerEntitlement =<< thAuth thParams
_ -> EntNotChecked
fst kp <$ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent (snd kp) ent_) sessions
fst kp <$ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent $ snd kp) sessions
let authPubKey = CertChainPubKey chain (C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k)
webIdentityProof = C.sign serverSignKey . (<> sessionId) <$> challenge_
serverInfoBytes = LB.toStrict . J.encode <$> information
let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = xftpServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof, serverInfoBytes}
let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = xftpServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof}
shs <- encodeXftp hs
#ifdef slow_servers
lift randomDelay
#endif
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS) shs
pure Nothing
processClientHandshake pk ent_ = do
processClientHandshake pk = do
unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwE HANDSHAKE
body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, entitlementProof} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
kh <- asks serverIdentity
unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwE HANDSHAKE
case compatibleVRange' xftpServerVRange v of
Just (Compatible vr) -> do
ent <- case ent_ of
EntChecked ent -> pure ent
EntNotChecked -> lift $ verifiedEntitlement entitlementProof
let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, peerClientService = Nothing, peerEntitlement = ent, sessSecret' = Nothing}
let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, peerClientService = Nothing, sessSecret' = Nothing}
thParams = thParams0 {thAuth = Just auth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted thParams) sessions
#ifdef slow_servers
@@ -241,49 +227,39 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS)
pure Nothing
Nothing -> throwE HANDSHAKE
verifiedEntitlement :: Maybe EntitlementProof -> M s (Maybe SessionEntitlement)
verifiedEntitlement ep =
pure ep $>>= \proof@EntitlementProof {entitlement = Entitlement {entitlementName, expiresAt = expiresAtTs}} -> do
entCfg <- asks $ M.lookup entitlementName . fileStorageEntitlements . config
now <- liftIO getSystemSeconds
let expiresAt = RoundedSystemTime $ systemSeconds $ utcToSystemTime expiresAtTs
case entCfg of
Just cfg | entitlementValid now expiresAt -> do
keys <- asks $ entitlementKeys . config
liftIO (verifyEntitlement keys (BBSPresHeader sessionId) proof) >>= \case
EVValid -> pure $ Just SessionEntitlement {expiresAt, entConfig = cfg}
r -> Nothing <$ logError ("entitlement not verified: " <> tshow r)
_ -> pure Nothing
sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M s (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
sendError err = do
runExceptT (encodeXftp err) >>= \case
Right bs -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS) bs
Left _ -> logError $ "Error encoding handshake error: " <> tshow err
pure Nothing
encodeXftp :: Encoding a => a -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType (ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO) Builder
encodeXftp :: Encoding a => a -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) Builder
encodeXftp a = byteString <$> liftHS (C.pad (smpEncode a) xftpBlockSize)
liftHS = liftEitherWith (const HANDSHAKE)
stopServer :: M s ()
stopServer :: M ()
stopServer = do
st <- asks fileStore
liftIO $ closeFileStore st
withFileLog closeStoreLog
saveServerStats
logNote "Server stopped"
expireFiles :: ExpirationConfig -> M s ()
expireFilesThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
expireFilesThread_ XFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration = Just fileExp} = [expireFiles fileExp]
expireFilesThread_ _ = []
expireFiles :: ExpirationConfig -> M ()
expireFiles expCfg = do
let interval = checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
forever $ do
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
expireServerFiles (Just 100000) expCfg
serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
serverStatsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {logStatsInterval = Just interval, logStatsStartTime, serverStatsLogFile} =
[logServerStats logStatsStartTime interval serverStatsLogFile]
serverStatsThread_ _ = []
logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M s ()
logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M ()
logServerStats startAt logInterval statsFilePath = do
initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
@@ -324,12 +300,12 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
]
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
prometheusMetricsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
prometheusMetricsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
prometheusMetricsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {prometheusInterval = Just interval, prometheusMetricsFile} =
[savePrometheusMetrics interval prometheusMetricsFile]
prometheusMetricsThread_ _ = []
savePrometheusMetrics :: Int -> FilePath -> M s ()
savePrometheusMetrics :: Int -> FilePath -> M ()
savePrometheusMetrics saveInterval metricsFile = do
labelMyThread "savePrometheusMetrics"
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "Prometheus metrics saved every " <> show saveInterval <> " seconds to " <> metricsFile
@@ -348,11 +324,11 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
let fd = periodStatDataCounts $ _filesDownloaded d
pure FileServerMetrics {statsData = d, filesDownloadedPeriods = fd, rtsOptions}
controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
controlPortThread_ XFTPServerConfig {controlPort = Just port} = [runCPServer port]
controlPortThread_ _ = []
runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M s ()
runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M ()
runCPServer port = do
cpStarted <- newEmptyTMVarIO
u <- askUnliftIO
@@ -360,7 +336,7 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
labelMyThread "control port server"
runLocalTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u
where
runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
runCPClient u sock = do
labelMyThread "control port client"
h <- socketToHandle sock ReadWriteMode
@@ -390,15 +366,15 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
XFTPServerConfig {controlPortUserAuth = user, controlPortAdminAuth = admin} = cfg
CPStatsRTS -> E.tryAny getRTSStats >>= either (hPrint h) (hPrint h)
CPDelete fileId -> withUserRole $ unliftIO u $ do
fs <- asks fileStore
fs <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
(fr, _) <- ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
(fr, _) <- ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
ExceptT $ deleteServerFile_ fr
liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
CPBlock fileId info -> withUserRole $ unliftIO u $ do
fs <- asks fileStore
fs <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
(fr, _) <- ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
(fr, _) <- ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
ExceptT $ blockServerFile fr info
liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats-rts, delete, help, quit"
@@ -419,16 +395,15 @@ data ServerFile = ServerFile
sbState :: LC.SbState
}
processRequest :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPTransportRequest -> M s ()
processRequest :: XFTPTransportRequest -> M ()
processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, addCORS}
| B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize = sendXFTPResponse ("", NoEntity, FRErr BLOCK) Nothing
| otherwise =
case xftpDecodeTServer thParams bodyHead of
Right (Right t@(_, _, (corrId, fId, _))) -> do
let THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams
ent = peerEntitlement =<< thAuth
verifyXFTPTransmission thAuth t >>= \case
VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest ent body req
VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
VRFailed e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
where
send resp = sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp)
@@ -455,7 +430,7 @@ processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHea
done
#ifdef slow_servers
randomDelay :: M s ()
randomDelay :: M ()
randomDelay = do
d <- asks $ responseDelay . config
when (d > 0) $ do
@@ -465,20 +440,20 @@ randomDelay = do
data VerificationResult = VRVerified XFTPRequest | VRFailed XFTPErrorType
verifyXFTPTransmission :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission FileCmd -> M s VerificationResult
verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
verifyXFTPTransmission thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, fId, cmd)) =
case cmd of
FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth' st) -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth' st `verifyWith` sndKey file
FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth') -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth' `verifyWith` sndKey file
FileCmd SFRecipient PING -> pure $ VRVerified XFTPReqPing
FileCmd party _ -> verifyCmd party
where
verifyCmd :: SFileParty p -> M s VerificationResult
verifyCmd :: SFileParty p -> M VerificationResult
verifyCmd party = do
st <- asks fileStore
liftIO $ verify =<< getFile st party fId
st <- asks store
atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId
where
verify = \case
Right (fr, k) -> result <$> readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)
Right (fr, k) -> result <$> readTVar (fileStatus fr)
where
result = \case
EntityActive -> XFTPReqCmd fId fr cmd `verifyWith` k
@@ -489,9 +464,9 @@ verifyXFTPTransmission thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, fId, cmd)) =
-- TODO verify with DH authorization
req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId k then VRVerified req else VRFailed AUTH
processXFTPRequest :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => Maybe SessionEntitlement -> HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M s (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
XFTPReqNew file rks auth storageHours -> noFile =<< ifM allowNew (createFile file rks storageHours) (pure $ FRErr AUTH)
processXFTPRequest :: HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
XFTPReqNew file rks auth -> noFile =<< ifM allowNew (createFile file rks) (pure $ FRErr AUTH)
where
allowNew = do
XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth} <- asks config
@@ -508,59 +483,46 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
XFTPReqPing -> noFile FRPong
where
noFile resp = pure (resp, Nothing)
createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> Maybe Word32 -> M s FileResponse
createFile file rks storageHours = do
st <- asks fileStore
createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
createFile file rks = do
st <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
sizes <- asks $ allowedChunkSizes . config
unless (size file `elem` sizes) $ throwE SIZE
now <- liftIO getSystemSeconds
maxSeconds <- lift $ storageMaxSeconds now
let nowSeconds = roundedSeconds now
ts = RoundedSystemTime $ (nowSeconds `div` fileTimePrecision) * fileTimePrecision
secs = case storageHours of
Just hours | hours > 0 -> min maxSeconds (fromIntegral hours * 3600)
_ -> maxSeconds
fileExpiresAt = RoundedSystemTime $ ((nowSeconds + secs + fileTimePrecision - 1) `div` fileTimePrecision) * fileTimePrecision
ts <- liftIO getFileTime
-- TODO validate body empty
sId <- ExceptT $ addFileRetry st file 3 ts (Just fileExpiresAt)
sId <- ExceptT $ addFileRetry st file 3 ts
rcps <- mapM (ExceptT . addRecipientRetry st 3 sId) rks
lift $ withFileLog $ \sl -> do
logAddFile sl sId file ts (Just fileExpiresAt) EntityActive
logAddFile sl sId file ts EntityActive
logAddRecipients sl sId rcps
stats <- asks serverStats
lift $ incFileStat filesCreated
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (fileRecipients stats) (+ length rks)
let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
pure $ FRSndIds sId rIds (Just (GSTExpires (roundedSeconds fileExpiresAt)))
pure $ FRSndIds sId rIds
pure $ either FRErr id r
storageMaxSeconds :: SystemSeconds -> M s Int64
storageMaxSeconds now = do
defaultMax <- asks $ ttl . fileExpiration . config
pure $ case ent of
Just SessionEntitlement {expiresAt, entConfig} | entitlementValid now expiresAt -> max (storageTime entConfig) defaultMax
_ -> defaultMax
addFileRetry :: s -> FileInfo -> Int -> RoundedFileTime -> Maybe RoundedFileTime -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType XFTPFileId)
addFileRetry st file n ts expiresAt =
addFileRetry :: FileStore -> FileInfo -> Int -> RoundedFileTime -> M (Either XFTPErrorType XFTPFileId)
addFileRetry st file n ts =
retryAdd n $ \sId -> runExceptT $ do
ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts expiresAt EntityActive
ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts EntityActive
pure sId
addRecipientRetry :: s -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
addRecipientRetry :: FileStore -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> M (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
addRecipientRetry st n sId rpk =
retryAdd n $ \rId -> runExceptT $ do
let rcp = FileRecipient rId rpk
ExceptT $ addRecipient st sId rcp
pure rcp
retryAdd :: Int -> (XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType a)
retryAdd :: Int -> (XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> M (Either XFTPErrorType a)
retryAdd 0 _ = pure $ Left INTERNAL
retryAdd n add = do
fId <- getFileId
liftIO (add fId) >>= \case
atomically (add fId) >>= \case
Left DUPLICATE_ -> retryAdd (n - 1) add
r -> pure r
addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M s FileResponse
addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
addRecipients sId rks = do
st <- asks fileStore
st <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
rcps <- mapM (ExceptT . addRecipientRetry st 3 sId) rks
lift $ withFileLog $ \sl -> logAddRecipients sl sId rcps
@@ -569,7 +531,7 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
pure $ FRRcvIds rIds
pure $ either FRErr id r
receiveServerFile :: FileRec -> M s FileResponse
receiveServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
receiveServerFile FileRec {senderId, fileInfo = FileInfo {size, digest}, filePath} = case bodyPart of
Nothing -> pure $ FRErr SIZE
-- TODO validate body size from request before downloading, once it's populated
@@ -587,38 +549,31 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
| bs == 0 || bs > s -> pure $ FRErr SIZE
| otherwise -> drain (s - bs)
reserve = do
us <- asks usedStorage
us <- asks $ usedStorage . store
quota <- asks $ fromMaybe maxBound . fileSizeQuota . config
atomically . stateTVar us $
\used -> let used' = used + fromIntegral size in if used' <= quota then (True, used') else (False, used)
receive = do
path <- asks $ filesPath . config
let fPath = path </> serverFileName senderId
let fPath = path </> B.unpack (B64.encode $ unEntityId senderId)
receiveChunk (XFTPRcvChunkSpec fPath size digest) >>= \case
Right () -> do
stats <- asks serverStats
st <- asks fileStore
liftIO (setFilePath st senderId fPath) >>= \case
Right () -> do
withFileLog $ \sl -> logPutFile sl senderId fPath
incFileStat filesUploaded
incFileStat filesCount
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (+ fromIntegral size)
pure FROk
Left _e -> do
us <- asks usedStorage
atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral size)
liftIO $ whenM (doesFileExist fPath) (removeFile fPath) `catch` logFileError
pure $ FRErr AUTH
withFileLog $ \sl -> logPutFile sl senderId fPath
atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
incFileStat filesUploaded
incFileStat filesCount
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (+ fromIntegral size)
pure FROk
Left e -> do
us <- asks usedStorage
us <- asks $ usedStorage . store
atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral size)
liftIO $ whenM (doesFileExist fPath) (removeFile fPath) `catch` logFileError
pure $ FRErr e
receiveChunk spec = do
t <- asks $ fileTimeout . config
liftIO $ fromMaybe (Left TIMEOUT) <$> timeout t (runExceptT $ receiveFile getBody spec)
sendServerFile :: FileRec -> RcvPublicDhKey -> M s (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
sendServerFile :: FileRec -> RcvPublicDhKey -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
sendServerFile FileRec {senderId, filePath, fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} rDhKey = do
readTVarIO filePath >>= \case
Just path -> ifM (doesFileExist path) sendFile (pure (FRErr AUTH, Nothing))
@@ -637,96 +592,88 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
_ -> pure (FRErr INTERNAL, Nothing)
_ -> pure (FRErr NO_FILE, Nothing)
deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M s FileResponse
deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
deleteServerFile fr = either FRErr (\() -> FROk) <$> deleteServerFile_ fr
logFileError :: SomeException -> IO ()
logFileError e = logError $ "Error deleting file: " <> tshow e
ackFileReception :: RecipientId -> FileRec -> M s FileResponse
ackFileReception :: RecipientId -> FileRec -> M FileResponse
ackFileReception rId fr = do
pure $ FRErr $ CMD PROHIBITED
-- withFileLog (`logAckFile` rId)
-- st <- asks fileStore
-- liftIO $ deleteRecipient st rId fr
-- incFileStat fileDownloadAcks
-- pure FROk
withFileLog (`logAckFile` rId)
st <- asks store
atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr
incFileStat fileDownloadAcks
pure FROk
deleteServerFile_ :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteServerFile_ :: FileRec -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteServerFile_ fr@FileRec {senderId} = do
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` senderId)
deleteOrBlockServerFile_ fr filesDeleted (`deleteFile` senderId)
-- this also deletes the file from storage, but doesn't include it in delete statistics
blockServerFile :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> BlockingInfo -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
blockServerFile :: FileRec -> BlockingInfo -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
blockServerFile fr@FileRec {senderId} info = do
withFileLog $ \sl -> logBlockFile sl senderId info
deleteOrBlockServerFile_ fr filesBlocked $ \st -> blockFile st senderId info True
deleteOrBlockServerFile_ :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> (s -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteOrBlockServerFile_ :: FileRec -> (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> (FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteOrBlockServerFile_ FileRec {filePath, fileInfo} stat storeAction = runExceptT $ do
path <- readTVarIO filePath
stats <- asks serverStats
ExceptT $ first (\(_ :: SomeException) -> FILE_IO) <$> try (forM_ path $ \p -> whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p >> deletedStats stats))
st <- asks fileStore
ExceptT $ liftIO $ storeAction st
forM_ path $ \_ -> do
us <- asks usedStorage
atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
st <- asks store
void $ atomically $ storeAction st
lift $ incFileStat stat
where
deletedStats stats = do
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesCount stats) (subtract 1)
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (subtract $ fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
entitlementValid :: SystemSeconds -> SystemSeconds -> Bool
entitlementValid now expiresAt = roundedSeconds expiresAt + 86400 > roundedSeconds now
getFileTime :: IO RoundedFileTime
getFileTime = getRoundedSystemTime
expireServerFiles :: FileStoreClass s => Maybe Int -> ExpirationConfig -> M s ()
expireServerFiles :: Maybe Int -> ExpirationConfig -> M ()
expireServerFiles itemDelay expCfg = do
st <- asks fileStore
us <- asks usedStorage
usedStart <- readTVarIO us
now <- liftIO getSystemSeconds
st <- asks store
usedStart <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st
old <- liftIO $ expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st
logNote $ "Expiration check: " <> tshow filesCount <> " files"
expireLoop st us now old
usedEnd <- readTVarIO us
files' <- readTVarIO (files st)
logNote $ "Expiration check: " <> tshow (M.size files') <> " files"
forM_ (M.keys files') $ \sId -> do
mapM_ threadDelay itemDelay
atomically (expiredFilePath st sId old)
>>= mapM_ (maybeRemove $ delete st sId)
usedEnd <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st
logNote $ "Used " <> mbs usedStart <> " -> " <> mbs usedEnd <> ", " <> mbs (usedStart - usedEnd) <> " reclaimed."
where
mbs bs = tshow (bs `div` 1048576) <> "mb"
expireLoop st us now old = do
expired <- liftIO $ expiredFiles st now old 10000
forM_ expired $ \(sId, filePath_, fileSize) -> do
mapM_ threadDelay itemDelay
forM_ filePath_ $ \fp ->
whenM (doesFileExist fp) $
removeFile fp `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow fp <> ": " <> tshow e
forM_ filePath_ $ \_ ->
atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral fileSize)
incFileStat filesExpired
let sIds = map (\(sId, _, _) -> sId) expired
unless (null sIds) $ do
withFileLog $ \sl -> mapM_ (logDeleteFile sl) sIds
liftIO $ deleteFiles st sIds
expireLoop st us now old
maybeRemove del = maybe del (remove del)
remove del filePath =
ifM
(doesFileExist filePath)
((removeFile filePath >> del) `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow filePath <> ": " <> tshow e)
del
delete st sId = do
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` sId)
void . atomically $ deleteFile st sId -- will not update usedStorage if sId isn't in store
incFileStat filesExpired
randomId :: Int -> M s ByteString
randomId :: Int -> M ByteString
randomId n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
getFileId :: M s XFTPFileId
getFileId :: M XFTPFileId
getFileId = fmap EntityId . randomId =<< asks (fileIdSize . config)
withFileLog :: (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> M s ()
withFileLog :: (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> M ()
withFileLog action = liftIO . mapM_ action =<< asks storeLog
incFileStat :: (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> M s ()
incFileStat :: (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> M ()
incFileStat statSel = do
stats <- asks serverStats
liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (statSel stats) (+ 1)
saveServerStats :: M s ()
saveServerStats :: M ()
saveServerStats =
asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config)
>>= mapM_ (\f -> asks serverStats >>= liftIO . getFileServerStatsData >>= liftIO . saveStats f)
@@ -736,7 +683,7 @@ saveServerStats =
B.writeFile f $ strEncode stats
logNote "server stats saved"
restoreServerStats :: FileStoreClass s => M s ()
restoreServerStats :: M ()
restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStats
where
restoreStats f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
@@ -744,9 +691,9 @@ restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStat
liftIO (strDecode <$> B.readFile f) >>= \case
Right d@FileServerStatsData {_filesCount = statsFilesCount, _filesSize = statsFilesSize} -> do
s <- asks serverStats
st <- asks fileStore
_filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st
_filesSize <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage
FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store
_filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files
_filesSize <- readTVarIO usedStorage
liftIO $ setFileServerStats s d {_filesCount, _filesSize}
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
logNote "server stats restored"
+18 -169
View File
@@ -1,35 +1,21 @@
{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
( XFTPServerConfig (..),
XFTPStoreConfig (..),
XFTPEnv (..),
XFTPRequest (..),
XFTPStoreType,
FileStore (..),
AFStoreType (..),
fileStore,
fromFileStore,
defaultInactiveClientExpiration,
defFileExpirationHours,
defaultFileExpiration,
newXFTPServerEnv,
readFileStoreType,
runWithStoreConfig,
checkFileStoreMode,
importToDatabase,
exportFromDatabase,
countUsedStorage,
) where
import Control.Logger.Simple
@@ -37,49 +23,29 @@ import Control.Monad
import Crypto.Random
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Data.Word (Word16, Word32)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..))
import Network.Socket
import qualified Network.TLS as T
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileCmd, FileInfo (..), XFTPFileId)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
import Data.Either (fromRight)
import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (settingIsOn)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore, importFileStore, exportFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config (PostgresFileStoreCfg (..), defaultXFTPDBOpts)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (iniDBOptions)
import System.Directory (doesFileExist)
#endif
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (VersionRangeXFTP)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS (BBSPublicKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth, RcvPublicAuthKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (EntitlementConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (ServerCredentials (..), TransportServerConfig (..), loadFingerprint, loadServerCredential)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
import UnliftIO.STM
data XFTPServerConfig s = XFTPServerConfig
data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
{ xftpPort :: ServiceName,
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
fileIdSize :: Int,
serverStoreCfg :: XFTPStoreConfig s,
storeLogFile :: Maybe FilePath,
filesPath :: FilePath,
-- | server storage quota
@@ -94,10 +60,7 @@ data XFTPServerConfig s = XFTPServerConfig
controlPortUserAuth :: Maybe BasicAuth,
controlPortAdminAuth :: Maybe BasicAuth,
-- | time after which the files can be removed and check interval, seconds
fileExpiration :: ExpirationConfig,
-- | what each entitlement name grants
fileStorageEntitlements :: Map Text EntitlementConfig,
entitlementKeys :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey,
fileExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
-- | timeout to receive file
fileTimeout :: Int,
-- | time after which inactive clients can be disconnected and check interval, seconds
@@ -106,8 +69,6 @@ data XFTPServerConfig s = XFTPServerConfig
httpCredentials :: Maybe ServerCredentials,
-- | XFTP client-server protocol version range
xftpServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP,
-- | server public information sent in handshake and used to generate static mini-site
information :: Maybe ServerPublicInfo,
-- stats config - see SMP server config
logStatsInterval :: Maybe Int64,
logStatsStartTime :: Int64,
@@ -127,10 +88,9 @@ defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hours
}
data XFTPEnv s = XFTPEnv
{ config :: XFTPServerConfig s,
store :: FileStore s,
usedStorage :: TVar Int64,
data XFTPEnv = XFTPEnv
{ config :: XFTPServerConfig,
store :: FileStore,
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
serverIdentity :: C.KeyHash,
@@ -139,38 +99,6 @@ data XFTPEnv s = XFTPEnv
serverStats :: FileServerStats
}
fileStore :: XFTPEnv s -> s
fileStore = fromFileStore . store
{-# INLINE fileStore #-}
data XFTPStoreConfig s where
XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
#endif
type family XFTPStoreType (fs :: FSType) where
XFTPStoreType 'FSMemory = STMFileStore
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
XFTPStoreType 'FSPostgres = PostgresFileStore
#endif
data FileStore s where
StoreMemory :: STMFileStore -> FileStore STMFileStore
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
StoreDatabase :: PostgresFileStore -> FileStore PostgresFileStore
#endif
data AFStoreType = forall fs. AFSType (SFSType fs)
fromFileStore :: FileStore s -> s
fromFileStore = \case
StoreMemory s -> s
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
StoreDatabase s -> s
#endif
{-# INLINE fromFileStore #-}
defFileExpirationHours :: Int64
defFileExpirationHours = 48
@@ -181,28 +109,13 @@ defaultFileExpiration =
checkInterval = 2 * 3600 -- seconds, 2 hours
}
newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> IO (XFTPEnv s)
newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {serverStoreCfg, fileSizeQuota, fileExpiration, fileStorageEntitlements, xftpCredentials, httpCredentials} = do
let defaultMax = ttl fileExpiration
belowDefault = M.filter ((< defaultMax) . storageTime) fileStorageEntitlements
unless (M.null belowDefault) $ do
forM_ (M.assocs belowDefault) $ \(name, EntitlementConfig {storageTime}) ->
logError $ "expire_files_hours_for_" <> name <> " is " <> tshow (storageTime `div` 3600) <> " hours, below expire_files_hours " <> tshow (defaultMax `div` 3600) <> " hours, server not started"
exitFailure
newXFTPServerEnv :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO XFTPEnv
newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {storeLogFile, fileSizeQuota, xftpCredentials, httpCredentials} = do
random <- C.newRandom
(store, storeLog) <- case serverStoreCfg of
XSCMemory storeLogPath -> do
st <- newFileStore ()
sl <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath
atomically $ writeTVar (stmStoreLog st) sl
pure (StoreMemory st, sl)
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
XSCDatabase dbCfg -> do
st <- newFileStore dbCfg
pure (StoreDatabase st, Nothing)
#endif
used <- getUsedStorage (fromFileStore store)
usedStorage <- newTVarIO used
store <- newFileStore
storeLog <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` store) storeLogFile
used <- countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
atomically $ writeTVar (usedStorage store) used
forM_ fileSizeQuota $ \quota -> do
logNote $ "Total / available storage: " <> tshow quota <> " / " <> tshow (quota - used)
when (quota < used) $ logWarn "WARNING: storage quota is less than used storage, no files can be uploaded!"
@@ -210,76 +123,12 @@ newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {serverStoreCfg, fileSizeQuota, fileExp
httpServerCreds <- mapM loadServerCredential httpCredentials
Fingerprint fp <- loadFingerprint xftpCredentials
serverStats <- newFileServerStats =<< getCurrentTime
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, usedStorage, storeLog, random, tlsServerCreds, httpServerCreds, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, storeLog, random, tlsServerCreds, httpServerCreds, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
countUsedStorage :: M.Map k FileRec -> Int64
countUsedStorage = M.foldl' (\acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} -> acc + fromIntegral size) 0
data XFTPRequest
= XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey) (Maybe BasicAuth) (Maybe Word32)
= XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey) (Maybe BasicAuth)
| XFTPReqCmd XFTPFileId FileRec FileCmd
| XFTPReqPing
readFileStoreType :: Ini -> Either String AFStoreType
readFileStoreType ini = case fromRight "memory" $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini of
"memory" -> Right $ AFSType SFSMemory
"database" -> Right $ AFSType SFSPostgres
other -> Left $ "Invalid store_files value: " <> other
-- | Dispatch store config from AFStoreType singleton and run the callback.
-- CPP guards for Postgres are handled here so Main.hs stays CPP-free.
runWithStoreConfig ::
AFStoreType ->
Ini ->
FilePath ->
MigrationConfirmation ->
(forall s. FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()) ->
IO ()
runWithStoreConfig (AFSType SFSMemory) ini storeLogFilePath _confirmMigrations run =
run $ XSCMemory (enableStoreLog' $> storeLogFilePath)
where
enableStoreLog' = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
runWithStoreConfig (AFSType SFSPostgres) ini storeLogFilePath confirmMigrations run =
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
run $ XSCDatabase dbCfg
where
enableDbStoreLog' = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log" ini
dbStoreLogPath = enableDbStoreLog' $> storeLogFilePath
dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath, confirmMigrations}
#else
error "server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database"
#endif
-- | Validate startup config when store_files=database.
checkFileStoreMode :: Ini -> AFStoreType -> FilePath -> IO ()
checkFileStoreMode ini (AFSType SFSPostgres) storeLogFilePath = do
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
let dbStoreLogOn = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log" ini
when (storeLogExists && isNothing dbStoreLogOn) $ do
putStrLn $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " exists but store_files is `database`."
putStrLn "Use `file-server database import` to migrate, or set `db_store_log: on`."
exitFailure
#else
putStrLn "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database."
putStrLn "Please re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
exitFailure
#endif
checkFileStoreMode _ (AFSType SFSMemory) _ = pure ()
-- | Import StoreLog to PostgreSQL database.
importToDatabase :: FilePath -> Ini -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO ()
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
importToDatabase storeLogFilePath ini _confirmMigrations = do
let dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath = Nothing, confirmMigrations = _confirmMigrations}
importFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg
#else
importToDatabase _ _ _ = error "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database.\nPlease re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
#endif
-- | Export PostgreSQL database to StoreLog.
exportFromDatabase :: FilePath -> Ini -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO ()
#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
exportFromDatabase storeLogFilePath ini _confirmMigrations = do
let dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath = Nothing, confirmMigrations = _confirmMigrations}
exportFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg
#else
exportFromDatabase _ _ _ = error "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database.\nPlease re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
#endif
+65 -147
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
@@ -14,16 +12,14 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
xftpServerCLI_,
) where
import Control.Monad (forM_, unless, when)
import Control.Monad (when)
import Data.Either (fromRight)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (find)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust, mapMaybe)
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import qualified Data.Text.IO as T
@@ -32,19 +28,16 @@ import Options.Applicative
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), XFTPStoreConfig, AFStoreType (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, readFileStoreType, runWithStoreConfig, checkFileStoreMode, importToDatabase, exportFromDatabase)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes, supportedFileServerVRange)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (entitlementIssuerKeys)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (serverPublicInfo, printSourceCode)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (EmbeddedWebParams (..), WebHttpsParams (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (EntitlementConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2 (httpALPN)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (ServerCredentials (..), TransportServerConfig (..), mkTransportServerConfig)
@@ -58,7 +51,7 @@ xftpServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
xftpServerCLI = xftpServerCLI_ (\_ _ _ _ -> pure ()) (\_ -> pure ())
xftpServerCLI_ ::
(forall s. XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()) ->
(XFTPServerConfig -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()) ->
(EmbeddedWebParams -> IO ()) ->
FilePath ->
FilePath ->
@@ -73,13 +66,9 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> genOnline cfgPath certOpts
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
Start opts ->
Start ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError (runServer opts)
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
Database cmd ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError (runDatabaseCmd cmd)
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError runServer
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
Delete -> do
confirmOrExit
@@ -95,21 +84,6 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
executableName = "file-server"
storeLogFilePath = combine logPath "file-server-store.log"
defaultStaticPath = combine logPath "www"
runDatabaseCmd cmd ini = case cmd of
SCImport -> do
storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
unless storeLogExists $ exitError $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " does not exist."
confirmOrExit
("Import store log " <> storeLogFilePath <> " to PostgreSQL database?")
"Import cancelled."
importToDatabase storeLogFilePath ini MCYesUp
SCExport -> do
storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
when storeLogExists $ exitError $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " already exists."
confirmOrExit
("Export PostgreSQL database to store log " <> storeLogFilePath <> "?")
"Export cancelled."
exportFromDatabase storeLogFilePath ini MCConsole
initializeServer InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota, webStaticPath = webStaticPath_} = do
clearDirIfExists cfgPath
clearDirIfExists logPath
@@ -130,20 +104,20 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
\# available to the end users of the server.\n\
\# LICENSE: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/LICENSE\n\
\# Include correct source code URI in case the server source code is modified in any way.\n\
\# source_code = https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq\n\
\# source_code: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq\n\
\\n\
\# Declaring all below information is optional, any of these fields can be omitted.\n\
\# server_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# operator = entity (organization or person name)\n\
\# operator_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# website =\n\
\# admin_simplex = SimpleX address\n\
\# admin_email =\n\
\# complaints_simplex = SimpleX address\n\
\# complaints_email =\n\
\# hosting = entity (organization or person name)\n\
\# hosting_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# hosting_type = virtual\n\
\# server_country: ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# operator: entity (organization or person name)\n\
\# operator_country: ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# website:\n\
\# admin_simplex: SimpleX address\n\
\# admin_email:\n\
\# complaints_simplex: SimpleX address\n\
\# complaints_email:\n\
\# hosting: entity (organization or person name)\n\
\# hosting_country: ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
\# hosting_type: virtual\n\
\\n\
\[STORE_LOG]\n\
\# The server uses STM memory for persistence,\n\
@@ -151,69 +125,55 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
\# This option enables saving memory to append only log,\n\
\# and restoring it when the server is started.\n\
\# Log is compacted on start (deleted objects are removed).\n"
<> ("enable = " <> onOff enableStoreLog <> "\n\n")
<> "# File storage mode: `memory` or `database` (PostgreSQL).\n\
\store_files = memory\n\n\
\# Database connection settings for PostgreSQL database (`store_files = database`).\n\
\# db_connection = postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store\n\
\# db_schema = xftp_server\n\
\# db_pool_size = 10\n\n\
\# Write database changes to store log file\n\
\# db_store_log = off\n\n"
<> "# Expire files after the specified number of hours.\n\
\# The change only affects new files.\n"
<> ("expire_files_hours = " <> tshow defFileExpirationHours <> "\n\n")
<> "# Expire files after the specified number of hours for the senders that present\n\
\# a proof of the entitlement. Must not be below expire_files_hours.\n\
\# The change only affects new files.\n\
\# expire_files_hours_for_supporter = 168\n\
\# expire_files_hours_for_legend = 504\n\n"
<> "log_stats = off\n\
<> ("enable: " <> onOff enableStoreLog <> "\n\n")
<> "# Expire files after the specified number of hours.\n"
<> ("expire_files_hours: " <> tshow defFileExpirationHours <> "\n\n")
<> "log_stats: off\n\
\\n\
\# Log interval for real-time Prometheus metrics\n\
\# prometheus_interval = 60\n\
\# prometheus_interval: 60\n\
\\n\
\[AUTH]\n\
\# Set new_files option to off to completely prohibit uploading new files.\n\
\# This can be useful when you want to decommission the server, but still allow downloading the existing files.\n\
\new_files = on\n\
\new_files: on\n\
\\n\
\# Use create_password option to enable basic auth to upload new files.\n\
\# The password should be used as part of server address in client configuration:\n\
\# xftp://fingerprint:password@host1,host2\n\
\# The password will not be shared with file recipients, you must share it only\n\
\# with the users who you want to allow uploading files to your server.\n\
\# create_password = password to upload files (any printable ASCII characters without whitespace, '@', ':' and '/')\n\
\# create_password: password to upload files (any printable ASCII characters without whitespace, '@', ':' and '/')\n\
\\n\
\# control_port_admin_password =\n\
\# control_port_user_password =\n\
\# control_port_admin_password:\n\
\# control_port_user_password:\n\
\\n\
\[TRANSPORT]\n\
\# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
<> ("host = " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
<> ("port = " <> T.pack defaultServerPort <> "\n")
<> "log_tls_errors = off\n\
\# control_port = 5226\n\
<> ("host: " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
<> ("port: " <> T.pack defaultServerPort <> "\n")
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
\# control_port: 5226\n\
\\n\
\[FILES]\n"
<> ("path = " <> T.pack filesPath <> "\n")
<> ("storage_quota = " <> safeDecodeUtf8 (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
<> ("path: " <> T.pack filesPath <> "\n")
<> ("storage_quota: " <> safeDecodeUtf8 (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
<> "\n\
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
\disconnect = off\n"
<> ("# ttl = " <> tshow (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
<> ("# check_interval = " <> tshow (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
\disconnect: off\n"
<> ("# ttl: " <> tshow (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
<> ("# check_interval: " <> tshow (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
<> "\n\
\[WEB]\n\
\# Set path to generate static mini-site for server information\n"
<> ("static_path = " <> T.pack (fromMaybe defaultStaticPath webStaticPath_) <> "\n\n")
<> ("static_path: " <> T.pack (fromMaybe defaultStaticPath webStaticPath_) <> "\n\n")
<> "# Run an embedded HTTP server on this port.\n\
\# http = 8000\n\n\
\# http: 8000\n\n\
\# TLS credentials for HTTPS web server on the same port as XFTP.\n\
\# cert = " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.crt") <> "\n\
\# key = " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.key") <> "\n"
runServer StartOptions {confirmMigrations} ini = do
\# cert: " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.crt") <> "\n\
\# key: " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.key") <> "\n"
runServer ini = do
hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
fp <- checkSavedFingerprint cfgPath defaultX509Config
@@ -223,36 +183,30 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
printServiceInfo serverVersion srv
let information = serverPublicInfo ini
printSourceCode (sourceCode <$> information)
case readFileStoreType ini of
Left err -> error err
Right fsType -> do
checkFileStoreMode ini fsType storeLogFilePath
runWithStoreConfig fsType ini storeLogFilePath confirmMigrations $ \storeCfg -> do
let cfg = serverConfig storeCfg
printXFTPConfig cfg
case webStaticPath' of
Just path -> do
let onionHost =
either (const Nothing) (find isOnion) $
strDecode @(L.NonEmpty TransportHost) . encodeUtf8 =<< lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
webHttpPort = eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "WEB" "http" ini) >>= readMaybe . T.unpack
generateSite cfg information onionHost path
when (isJust webHttpPort || isJust webHttpsParams') $
serveStaticFiles EmbeddedWebParams {webStaticPath = path, webHttpPort, webHttpsParams = webHttpsParams'}
Nothing -> pure ()
runXFTPServer cfg
printXFTPConfig serverConfig
case webStaticPath' of
Just path -> do
let onionHost =
either (const Nothing) (find isOnion) $
strDecode @(L.NonEmpty TransportHost) . encodeUtf8 =<< lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
webHttpPort = eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "WEB" "http" ini) >>= readMaybe . T.unpack
generateSite serverConfig information onionHost path
when (isJust webHttpPort || isJust webHttpsParams') $
serveStaticFiles EmbeddedWebParams {webStaticPath = path, webHttpPort, webHttpsParams = webHttpsParams'}
Nothing -> pure ()
runXFTPServer serverConfig
where
isOnion = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
printXFTPConfig XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth, xftpPort, storeLogFile, fileExpiration, fileStorageEntitlements, inactiveClientExpiration} = do
printXFTPConfig XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth, xftpPort, storeLogFile, fileExpiration, inactiveClientExpiration} = do
putStrLn $ case storeLogFile of
Just f -> "Store log: " <> f
_ -> "Store log disabled."
putStrLn $ "expiring files after " <> showTTL (ttl fileExpiration)
forM_ (M.assocs fileStorageEntitlements) $ \(name, EntitlementConfig {storageTime}) ->
putStrLn $ "expiring files of " <> T.unpack name <> " after " <> showTTL storageTime
putStrLn $ case fileExpiration of
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl} -> "expiring files after " <> showTTL ttl
_ -> "not expiring files"
putStrLn $ case inactiveClientExpiration of
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl, checkInterval} -> "expiring clients inactive for " <> show ttl <> " seconds every " <> show checkInterval <> " seconds"
_ -> "not expiring inactive clients"
@@ -282,13 +236,11 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
webStaticPath' = eitherToMaybe $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "static_path" ini
serverConfig :: XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig s
serverConfig serverStoreCfg =
serverConfig =
XFTPServerConfig
{ xftpPort = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini,
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
fileIdSize = 16,
serverStoreCfg,
storeLogFile = enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath,
filesPath = T.unpack $ strictIni "FILES" "path" ini,
fileSizeQuota = either error unFileSize <$> strDecodeIni "FILES" "storage_quota" ini,
@@ -298,11 +250,10 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
controlPortAdminAuth = either error id <$> strDecodeIni "AUTH" "control_port_admin_password" ini,
controlPortUserAuth = either error id <$> strDecodeIni "AUTH" "control_port_user_password" ini,
fileExpiration =
defaultFileExpiration
{ ttl = 3600 * readIniDefault defFileExpirationHours "STORE_LOG" "expire_files_hours" ini
},
fileStorageEntitlements = iniEntitlements ini,
entitlementKeys = entitlementIssuerKeys,
Just
defaultFileExpiration
{ ttl = 3600 * readIniDefault defFileExpirationHours "STORE_LOG" "expire_files_hours" ini
},
fileTimeout = 5 * 60 * 1000000, -- 5 mins to send 4mb chunk
inactiveClientExpiration =
settingIsOn "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "disconnect" ini
@@ -318,7 +269,6 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
},
httpCredentials = httpCredentials_,
xftpServerVRange = supportedFileServerVRange,
information = serverPublicInfo ini,
logStatsInterval = logStats $> 86400, -- seconds
logStatsStartTime = 0, -- seconds from 00:00 UTC
serverStatsLogFile = combine logPath "file-server-stats.daily.log",
@@ -339,16 +289,9 @@ xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
data CliCommand
= Init InitOptions
| OnlineCert CertOptions
| Start StartOptions
| Database StoreCmd
| Start
| Delete
data StoreCmd = SCImport | SCExport
newtype StartOptions = StartOptions
{ confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
}
data InitOptions = InitOptions
{ enableStoreLog :: Bool,
signAlgorithm :: SignAlgorithm,
@@ -365,8 +308,7 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
hsubparser
( command "init" (info (Init <$> initP) (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgPath <> " and " <> logPath <> " directories and configuration files"))
<> command "cert" (info (OnlineCert <$> certOptionsP) (progDesc $ "Generate new online TLS server credentials (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
<> command "start" (info (Start <$> startOptsP) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
<> command "database" (info (Database <$> storeCmdP) (progDesc "Import/export file store to/from PostgreSQL database"))
<> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
<> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
)
where
@@ -433,27 +375,3 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
<> metavar "PATH"
)
pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota, webStaticPath}
startOptsP :: Parser StartOptions
startOptsP = do
confirmMigrations <-
option
parseConfirmMigrations
( long "confirm-migrations"
<> metavar "CONFIRM_MIGRATIONS"
<> help "Confirm PostgreSQL database migration: up, down (default is manual confirmation)"
<> value MCConsole
)
pure StartOptions {confirmMigrations}
storeCmdP :: Parser StoreCmd
storeCmdP =
hsubparser
( command "import" (info (pure SCImport) (progDesc "Import store log file into PostgreSQL database"))
<> command "export" (info (pure SCExport) (progDesc "Export PostgreSQL database to store log file"))
)
iniEntitlements :: Ini -> Map T.Text EntitlementConfig
iniEntitlements ini =
M.fromList $ mapMaybe readEntitlement [("supporter", "expire_files_hours_for_supporter"), ("legend", "expire_files_hours_for_legend")]
where
readEntitlement (name, key) = (name,) . EntitlementConfig . parseHours key <$> eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "STORE_LOG" key ini)
parseHours key t = maybe (error $ "Error: invalid " <> T.unpack key <> " value: " <> T.unpack t) (3600 *) (readMaybe (T.unpack (T.strip t)) :: Maybe Int64)
+103 -142
View File
@@ -1,53 +1,51 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
( FSType (..),
SFSType (..),
FileStoreClass (..),
( FileStore (..),
FileRec (..),
FileRecipient (..),
STMFileStore (..),
RoundedFileTime,
newFileStore,
addFile,
setFilePath,
addRecipient,
deleteFile,
blockFile,
deleteRecipient,
expiredFilePath,
getFile,
ackFile,
fileTimePrecision,
)
where
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Int (Int64)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (catMaybes, isJust)
import Data.Set (Set)
import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..), XFTPFileId)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLog, closeStoreLog)
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))
data FSType = FSMemory | FSPostgres
data SFSType :: FSType -> Type where
SFSMemory :: SFSType 'FSMemory
SFSPostgres :: SFSType 'FSPostgres
data FileStore = FileStore
{ files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey),
usedStorage :: TVar Int64
}
data FileRec = FileRec
{ senderId :: SenderId,
@@ -55,148 +53,111 @@ data FileRec = FileRec
filePath :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
recipientIds :: TVar (Set RecipientId),
createdAt :: RoundedFileTime,
expiresAt :: Maybe RoundedFileTime,
fileStatus :: TVar ServerEntityStatus
}
type RoundedFileTime = RoundedSystemTime 3600
fileTimePrecision :: Int64
fileTimePrecision = 3600
fileTimePrecision = 3600 -- truncate creation time to 1 hour
data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId C.APublicAuthKey
data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId RcvPublicAuthKey
deriving (Show)
instance StrEncoding FileRecipient where
strEncode (FileRecipient rId rKey) = strEncode rId <> ":" <> strEncode rKey
strP = FileRecipient <$> strP <* A.char ':' <*> strP
class FileStoreClass s where
type FileStoreConfig s
newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> Maybe RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteFiles :: s -> [SenderId] -> IO ()
deleteFiles s = mapM_ (void . deleteFile s)
blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
expiredFiles :: s -> SystemSeconds -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
newFileStore :: IO FileStore
newFileStore = do
files <- TM.emptyIO
recipients <- TM.emptyIO
usedStorage <- newTVarIO 0
pure FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage}
-- STM in-memory store
addFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addFile FileStore {files} sId fileInfo createdAt status =
ifM (TM.member sId files) (pure $ Left DUPLICATE_) $ do
f <- newFileRec sId fileInfo createdAt status
TM.insert sId f files
pure $ Right ()
data STMFileStore = STMFileStore
{ files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey),
stmStoreLog :: TVar (Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode))
}
instance FileStoreClass STMFileStore where
type FileStoreConfig STMFileStore = ()
newFileStore () = do
files <- TM.emptyIO
recipients <- TM.emptyIO
stmStoreLog <- newTVarIO Nothing
pure STMFileStore {files, recipients, stmStoreLog}
closeFileStore STMFileStore {stmStoreLog} = readTVarIO stmStoreLog >>= mapM_ closeStoreLog
addFile STMFileStore {files} sId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status = atomically $
ifM (TM.member sId files) (pure $ Left DUPLICATE_) $ do
f <- newFileRec sId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status
TM.insert sId f files
pure $ Right ()
setFilePath st sId fPath = atomically $
withFile st sId $ \FileRec {filePath, fileStatus} -> do
readTVar filePath >>= \case
Just _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
Nothing ->
readTVar fileStatus >>= \case
EntityActive -> do
writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
addRecipient st@STMFileStore {recipients} senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) = atomically $
withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
rIds <- readTVar recipientIds
mem <- TM.member rId recipients
if rId `S.member` rIds || mem
then pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
else do
writeTVar recipientIds $! S.insert rId rIds
TM.insert rId (senderId, rKey) recipients
pure $ Right ()
deleteFile STMFileStore {files, recipients} senderId = atomically $ do
TM.lookupDelete senderId files >>= \case
Just FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
readTVar recipientIds >>= mapM_ (`TM.delete` recipients)
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
blockFile st senderId info _deleted = atomically $
withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {fileStatus} -> do
writeTVar fileStatus $! EntityBlocked info
pure $ Right ()
deleteRecipient STMFileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = atomically $ do
TM.delete rId recipients
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
getFile st party fId = atomically $ case party of
SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
SFRecipient ->
TM.lookup fId (recipients st) >>= \case
Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
ackFile st@STMFileStore {recipients} recipientId = atomically $ do
TM.lookupDelete recipientId recipients >>= \case
Just (sId, _) ->
withFile st sId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete recipientId
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
expiredFiles STMFileStore {files} now old _limit = do
fs <- readTVarIO files
fmap catMaybes . forM (M.toList fs) $ \(sId, FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}, filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt, expiresAt}) ->
let expired = case expiresAt of
Just e -> roundedSeconds e < roundedSeconds now
Nothing -> createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
in if expired
then do
path <- readTVarIO filePath
pure $ Just (sId, path, size)
else pure Nothing
getUsedStorage STMFileStore {files} = foldM addSize 0 =<< readTVarIO files
where
addSize acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}, filePath} =
ifM (isJust <$> readTVarIO filePath) (pure $! acc + fromIntegral size) (pure acc)
getFileCount STMFileStore {files} = M.size <$> readTVarIO files
-- Internal STM helpers
newFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> Maybe RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM FileRec
newFileRec senderId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status = do
newFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM FileRec
newFileRec senderId fileInfo createdAt status = do
recipientIds <- newTVar S.empty
filePath <- newTVar Nothing
fileStatus <- newTVar status
pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, expiresAt, fileStatus}
pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, fileStatus}
withFile :: STMFileStore -> SenderId -> (FileRec -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)
withFile STMFileStore {files} sId a =
setFilePath :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FilePath -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
setFilePath st sId fPath =
withFile st sId $ \FileRec {fileInfo, filePath} -> do
writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
modifyTVar' (usedStorage st) (+ fromIntegral (size fileInfo))
pure $ Right ()
addRecipient :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addRecipient st@FileStore {recipients} senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) =
withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
rIds <- readTVar recipientIds
mem <- TM.member rId recipients
if rId `S.member` rIds || mem
then pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
else do
writeTVar recipientIds $! S.insert rId rIds
TM.insert rId (senderId, rKey) recipients
pure $ Right ()
-- this function must be called after the file is deleted from the file system
deleteFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteFile FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage} senderId = do
TM.lookupDelete senderId files >>= \case
Just FileRec {fileInfo, recipientIds} -> do
readTVar recipientIds >>= mapM_ (`TM.delete` recipients)
modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
-- this function must be called after the file is deleted from the file system
blockFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
blockFile st@FileStore {usedStorage} senderId info deleted =
withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {fileInfo, fileStatus} -> do
when deleted $ modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
writeTVar fileStatus $! EntityBlocked info
pure $ Right ()
deleteRecipient :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> STM ()
deleteRecipient FileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = do
TM.delete rId recipients
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
getFile :: FileStore -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
getFile st party fId = case party of
SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
SFRecipient ->
TM.lookup fId (recipients st) >>= \case
Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
expiredFilePath :: FileStore -> XFTPFileId -> Int64 -> STM (Maybe (Maybe FilePath))
expiredFilePath FileStore {files} sId old =
TM.lookup sId files
$>>= \FileRec {filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt} ->
if createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
then Just <$> readTVar filePath
else pure Nothing
ackFile :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
ackFile st@FileStore {recipients} recipientId = do
TM.lookupDelete recipientId recipients >>= \case
Just (sId, _) ->
withFile st sId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete recipientId
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
withFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> (FileRec -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)
withFile FileStore {files} sId a =
TM.lookup sId files >>= \case
Just f -> a f
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
( PostgresFileStore (..),
importFileStore,
exportFileStore,
)
where
import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Builder as BB
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int32, Int64)
import Data.List (intersperse)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple (Binary (..), In (..), Only (..), SqlError, (:.) (..))
import qualified Database.PostgreSQL.Simple as DB
import qualified Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.Copy as DB
import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.Errors (ConstraintViolation (..), constraintViolation)
import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.ToField (Action (..), ToField (..))
import GHC.IO (catchAny)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations (xftpServerMigrations)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres (closeDBStore, createDBStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Common (DBStore, withTransaction)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfig (..), MigrationConfirmation (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (EntityId (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres ()
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (openWriteStoreLog)
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime (roundedSeconds)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (firstRow, tshow)
import System.Directory (renameFile)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.IO (IOMode (..), hFlush, stdout)
import UnliftIO.STM
data PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStore
{ dbStore :: DBStore,
dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
}
instance FileStoreClass PostgresFileStore where
type FileStoreConfig PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStoreCfg
newFileStore PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts, dbStoreLogPath, confirmMigrations} = do
dbStore <- either err pure =<< createDBStore dbOpts xftpServerMigrations (MigrationConfig confirmMigrations Nothing)
dbStoreLog <- mapM (openWriteStoreLog True) dbStoreLogPath
pure PostgresFileStore {dbStore, dbStoreLog}
where
err e = do
logError $ "STORE: newFileStore, error opening PostgreSQL database, " <> tshow e
exitFailure
closeFileStore PostgresFileStore {dbStore, dbStoreLog} = do
closeDBStore dbStore
mapM_ closeStoreLog dbStoreLog
addFile st sId fileInfo@FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest} createdAt expiresAt status =
E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
void $ withDB "addFile" st $ \db ->
E.try
( DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, created_at, expires_at, status) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
(sId, (fromIntegral size :: Int32), Binary digest, Binary (C.encodePubKey sndKey), createdAt, expiresAt, status)
)
>>= either handleDuplicate (pure . Right)
withLog "addFile" st $ \s -> logAddFile s sId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status
setFilePath st sId fPath = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
assertUpdated $ withDB' "setFilePath" st $ \db ->
DB.execute db "UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL AND status = 'active'" (fPath, sId)
withLog "setFilePath" st $ \s -> logPutFile s sId fPath
addRecipient st senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
void $ withDB "addRecipient" st $ \db ->
E.try
( DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) VALUES (?,?,?)"
(rId, senderId, Binary (C.encodePubKey rKey))
)
>>= either handleDuplicate (pure . Right)
withLog "addRecipient" st $ \s -> logAddRecipients s senderId (pure $ FileRecipient rId rKey)
deleteFile st sId = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
assertUpdated $ withDB' "deleteFile" st $ \db ->
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?" (Only sId)
withLog "deleteFile" st $ \s -> logDeleteFile s sId
deleteFiles st sIds = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ do
withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db ->
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id IN ?" (Only (In sIds))
withLog "deleteFiles" st $ \s -> mapM_ (logDeleteFile s) sIds
blockFile st sId info _deleted = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
assertUpdated $ withDB' "blockFile" st $ \db ->
DB.execute db "UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?" (EntityBlocked info, sId)
withLog "blockFile" st $ \s -> logBlockFile s sId info
deleteRecipient st rId _fr =
void $ runExceptT $ withDB' "deleteRecipient" st $ \db ->
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only rId)
getFile st party fId = runExceptT $ case party of
SFSender -> do
row <- loadFileRow "SELECT sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, expires_at, status FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?"
fr <- ExceptT $ rowToFileRec row
pure (fr, sndKey (fileInfo fr))
SFRecipient -> do
row :. Only rcpKeyBs <-
loadFileRow
"SELECT f.sender_id, f.file_size, f.file_digest, f.sender_key, f.file_path, f.created_at, f.expires_at, f.status, r.recipient_key FROM files f JOIN recipients r ON r.sender_id = f.sender_id WHERE r.recipient_id = ?"
fr <- ExceptT $ rowToFileRec row
rcpKey <- either (const $ throwE INTERNAL) pure $ C.decodePubKey rcpKeyBs
pure (fr, rcpKey)
where
loadFileRow :: DB.FromRow r => DB.Query -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO r
loadFileRow q =
withDB "getFile" st $ \db ->
firstRow id AUTH $ DB.query db q (Only fId)
ackFile st rId = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
assertUpdated $ withDB' "ackFile" st $ \db ->
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only rId)
withLog "ackFile" st $ \s -> logAckFile s rId
expiredFiles st now old limit =
fmap toResult $ withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db ->
DB.query
db
"(SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE expires_at < ? LIMIT ?) UNION ALL (SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE expires_at IS NULL AND created_at < ? LIMIT ?)"
(roundedSeconds now, limit, old - fileTimePrecision, limit)
where
toResult :: [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Int32)] -> [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
toResult = map (\(sId, path, size) -> (sId, path, fromIntegral size))
getUsedStorage st =
withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db -> do
[Only total] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size::BIGINT), 0)::BIGINT FROM files WHERE file_path IS NOT NULL"
pure total
getFileCount st =
withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db -> do
[Only count] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files"
pure (fromIntegral (count :: Int64))
-- Internal helpers
mkFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> Maybe FilePath -> RoundedFileTime -> Maybe RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO FileRec
mkFileRec senderId fileInfo path createdAt expiresAt status = do
filePath <- newTVarIO path
recipientIds <- newTVarIO S.empty
fileStatus <- newTVarIO status
pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, expiresAt, fileStatus}
type FileRecRow = (SenderId, Int32, ByteString, ByteString, Maybe FilePath, RoundedFileTime, Maybe RoundedFileTime, ServerEntityStatus)
rowToFileRec :: FileRecRow -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType FileRec)
rowToFileRec (sId, size, digest, sndKeyBs, path, createdAt, expiresAt, status) =
case C.decodePubKey sndKeyBs of
Right sndKey -> do
let fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral size, digest}
Right <$> mkFileRec sId fileInfo path createdAt expiresAt status
Left _ -> pure $ Left INTERNAL
-- DB helpers
withDB :: forall a. Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
withDB op st action =
ExceptT $ E.try (withTransaction (dbStore st) action) >>= either logErr pure
where
logErr :: E.SomeException -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
logErr e = logError ("STORE: " <> err) $> Left INTERNAL
where
err = op <> ", withDB, " <> tshow e
withDB' :: Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
withDB' op st action = withDB op st $ fmap Right . action
assertUpdated :: ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO Int64 -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
assertUpdated = (>>= \n -> when (n == 0) (throwE AUTH))
handleDuplicate :: SqlError -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
handleDuplicate e = case constraintViolation e of
Just (UniqueViolation _) -> pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
Just (ForeignKeyViolation _ _) -> pure $ Left AUTH
_ -> E.throwIO e
withLog :: MonadIO m => Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO ()) -> m ()
withLog op PostgresFileStore {dbStoreLog} action =
forM_ dbStoreLog $ \sl -> liftIO $ action sl `catchAny` \e ->
logWarn $ "STORE: " <> op <> ", withLog, " <> tshow e
-- Import: StoreLog -> PostgreSQL
importFileStore :: FilePath -> PostgresFileStoreCfg -> IO ()
importFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg = do
putStrLn $ "Reading store log: " <> storeLogFilePath
stmStore <- newFileStore () :: IO STMFileStore
sl <- readWriteFileStore storeLogFilePath stmStore
closeStoreLog sl
allFiles <- readTVarIO (files stmStore)
allRcps <- readTVarIO (recipients stmStore)
let fileCount = M.size allFiles
rcpCount = M.size allRcps
putStrLn $ "Loaded " <> show fileCount <> " files, " <> show rcpCount <> " recipients."
let dbCfg' = dbCfg {dbOpts = (dbOpts dbCfg) {createSchema = True}, confirmMigrations = MCYesUp}
pgStore <- newFileStore dbCfg' :: IO PostgresFileStore
existingCount <- getFileCount pgStore
when (existingCount > 0) $ do
putStrLn $ "WARNING: database already contains " <> show existingCount <> " files. Import will fail on duplicate keys."
putStrLn "Drop the existing schema first or use a fresh database."
exitFailure
putStrLn "Importing files..."
fCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db -> do
DB.copy_
db
"COPY files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, expires_at, status) FROM STDIN WITH (FORMAT csv)"
iforM_ (M.toList allFiles) $ \i (sId, fr) -> do
DB.putCopyData db =<< fileRecToCSV sId fr
when (i > 0 && i `mod` 10000 == 0) $ putStr (" " <> show i <> " files\r") >> hFlush stdout
DB.putCopyEnd db
[Only cnt] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files"
pure (cnt :: Int64)
putStrLn $ "Imported " <> show fCnt <> " files."
putStrLn "Importing recipients..."
rCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db -> do
DB.copy_
db
"COPY recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) FROM STDIN WITH (FORMAT csv)"
iforM_ (M.toList allRcps) $ \i (rId, (sId, rKey)) -> do
DB.putCopyData db $ recipientToCSV rId sId rKey
when (i > 0 && i `mod` 10000 == 0) $ putStr (" " <> show i <> " recipients\r") >> hFlush stdout
DB.putCopyEnd db
[Only cnt] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM recipients"
pure (cnt :: Int64)
putStrLn $ "Imported " <> show rCnt <> " recipients."
when (fromIntegral fileCount /= fCnt) $
putStrLn $ "WARNING: expected " <> show fileCount <> " files, got " <> show fCnt
when (fromIntegral rcpCount /= rCnt) $
putStrLn $ "WARNING: expected " <> show rcpCount <> " recipients, got " <> show rCnt
closeFileStore pgStore
renameFile storeLogFilePath (storeLogFilePath <> ".bak")
putStrLn $ "Store log renamed to " <> storeLogFilePath <> ".bak"
-- Export: PostgreSQL -> StoreLog
exportFileStore :: FilePath -> PostgresFileStoreCfg -> IO ()
exportFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg = do
pgStore <- newFileStore dbCfg :: IO PostgresFileStore
sl <- openWriteStoreLog False storeLogFilePath
-- Fold 1: stream files, write FNEW + FPUT per file
putStrLn "Exporting files..."
!fCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db ->
DB.fold_
db
"SELECT sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, expires_at, status FROM files ORDER BY created_at"
(0 :: Int)
( \(!fc) (sId, size :: Int32, digest :: ByteString, sndKeyBs :: ByteString, path :: Maybe String, createdAt, expiresAt, status) ->
case C.decodePubKey sndKeyBs of
Right sndKey -> do
let fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral size, digest}
logAddFile sl sId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status
forM_ path $ logPutFile sl sId
pure (fc + 1)
Left _ -> do
putStrLn $ "WARNING: invalid sender key for " <> show sId
pure fc
)
-- Fold 2: stream recipients ordered by sender_id, flush FADD on sender change
putStrLn "Exporting recipients..."
!rCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db ->
DB.fold_
db
"SELECT sender_id, recipient_id, recipient_key FROM recipients ORDER BY sender_id"
(Nothing :: Maybe SenderId, [] :: [FileRecipient], 0 :: Int)
( \(!prevSId, !buf, !rc) (sId, rId, rKeyBs :: ByteString) ->
case C.decodePubKey rKeyBs of
Right rKey -> do
let rcp = FileRecipient rId rKey
case prevSId of
Just prev | prev /= sId -> do
forM_ (L.nonEmpty buf) $ logAddRecipients sl prev
pure (Just sId, [rcp], rc + length buf)
_ -> pure (Just sId, rcp : buf, rc)
Left _ -> putStrLn ("WARNING: invalid recipient key for " <> show rId) $> (prevSId, buf, rc)
)
>>= \(lastSId, buf, rc) -> do
forM_ lastSId $ \sId -> forM_ (L.nonEmpty buf) $ logAddRecipients sl sId
pure (rc + length buf)
closeStoreLog sl
closeFileStore pgStore
putStrLn $ "Exported " <> show fCnt <> " files, " <> show rCnt <> " recipients to " <> storeLogFilePath
-- CSV helpers for COPY protocol
iforM_ :: Monad m => [a] -> (Int -> a -> m ()) -> m ()
iforM_ xs f = zipWithM_ f [0 ..] xs
fileRecToCSV :: SenderId -> FileRec -> IO ByteString
fileRecToCSV sId FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest}, filePath, createdAt, expiresAt, fileStatus} = do
path <- readTVarIO filePath
status <- readTVarIO fileStatus
pure $ LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString $ mconcat (BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields path status) <> BB.char7 '\n'
where
fields path status =
[ renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId sId))),
renderField (toField (fromIntegral size :: Int32)),
renderField (toField (Binary digest)),
renderField (toField (Binary (C.encodePubKey sndKey))),
nullable (toField <$> path),
renderField (toField createdAt),
nullable (toField <$> expiresAt),
quotedField (toField status)
]
recipientToCSV :: RecipientId -> SenderId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> ByteString
recipientToCSV rId sId rKey =
LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString $ mconcat (BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields) <> BB.char7 '\n'
where
fields =
[ renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId rId))),
renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId sId))),
renderField (toField (Binary (C.encodePubKey rKey)))
]
renderField :: Action -> Builder
renderField = \case
Plain bld -> bld
Escape s -> BB.byteString s
EscapeByteA s -> BB.string7 "\\x" <> BB.byteStringHex s
EscapeIdentifier s -> BB.byteString s
Many as -> mconcat (map renderField as)
nullable :: Maybe Action -> Builder
nullable = maybe mempty renderField
quotedField :: Action -> Builder
quotedField a = BB.char7 '"' <> escapeQuotes (renderField a) <> BB.char7 '"'
where
escapeQuotes bld =
let bs = LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString bld
in BB.byteString $ B.concatMap (\c -> if c == '"' then "\"\"" else B.singleton c) bs
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
( PostgresFileStoreCfg (..),
defaultXFTPDBOpts,
)
where
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
{ dbOpts :: DBOpts,
dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
}
defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
defaultXFTPDBOpts =
DBOpts
{ connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
schema = "xftp_server",
poolSize = 10,
createSchema = False
}
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
( xftpServerMigrations,
)
where
import Data.List (sortOn)
import Data.Text (Text)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
xftpSchemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
xftpSchemaMigrations =
[ ("20260325_initial", m20260325_initial, Nothing),
("20260823_file_expiration", m20260823_file_expiration, Just down_m20260823_file_expiration)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]
xftpServerMigrations = sortOn name $ map migration xftpSchemaMigrations
where
migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up, down = down}
m20260325_initial :: Text
m20260325_initial =
[r|
CREATE TABLE files (
sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
file_size INTEGER NOT NULL,
file_digest BYTEA NOT NULL,
sender_key BYTEA NOT NULL,
file_path TEXT,
created_at BIGINT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active'
);
CREATE TABLE recipients (
recipient_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL REFERENCES files ON DELETE CASCADE,
recipient_key BYTEA NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX idx_recipients_sender_id ON recipients (sender_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_files_created_at ON files (created_at);
|]
m20260823_file_expiration :: Text
m20260823_file_expiration =
[r|
ALTER TABLE files ADD COLUMN expires_at BIGINT;
CREATE INDEX idx_files_expiry ON files (expires_at, created_at);
|]
down_m20260823_file_expiration :: Text
down_m20260823_file_expiration =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_files_expiry;
ALTER TABLE files DROP COLUMN expires_at;
|]
+17 -39
View File
@@ -10,42 +10,37 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
FileStoreLogRecord (..),
closeStoreLog,
readWriteFileStore,
writeFileStore,
logAddFile,
logPutFile,
logAddRecipients,
logDeleteFile,
logBlockFile,
logAckFile,
serverFileName,
)
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.::.))
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.::))
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import System.FilePath (takeFileName)
import System.IO
data FileStoreLogRecord
= AddFile SenderId FileInfo RoundedFileTime (Maybe RoundedFileTime) ServerEntityStatus
= AddFile SenderId FileInfo RoundedFileTime ServerEntityStatus
| PutFile SenderId FilePath
| AddRecipients SenderId (NonEmpty FileRecipient)
| DeleteFile SenderId
@@ -55,37 +50,27 @@ data FileStoreLogRecord
instance StrEncoding FileStoreLogRecord where
strEncode = \case
AddFile sId file createdAt expiresAt status -> B.concat [strEncode (Str "FNEW", sId, file, createdAt), expE expiresAt, " ", strEncode status]
AddFile sId file createdAt status -> strEncode (Str "FNEW", sId, file, createdAt, status)
PutFile sId path -> strEncode (Str "FPUT", sId, path)
AddRecipients sId rcps -> strEncode (Str "FADD", sId, rcps)
DeleteFile sId -> strEncode (Str "FDEL", sId)
BlockFile sId info -> strEncode (Str "FBLK", sId, info)
AckFile rId -> strEncode (Str "FACK", rId)
where
expE = maybe "" ((" " <>) . strEncode)
strP =
A.choice
[ "FNEW " *> addFileP,
[ "FNEW " *> (AddFile <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP <*> (_strP <|> pure EntityActive)),
"FPUT " *> (PutFile <$> strP_ <*> strP),
"FADD " *> (AddRecipients <$> strP_ <*> strP),
"FDEL " *> (DeleteFile <$> strP),
"FBLK " *> (BlockFile <$> strP_ <*> strP),
"FACK " *> (AckFile <$> strP)
]
where
addFileP = do
sId <- strP_
file <- strP_
createdAt <- strP
expiresAt <- optional _strP
status <- _strP <|> pure EntityActive
pure $ AddFile sId file createdAt expiresAt status
logFileStoreRecord :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> FileStoreLogRecord -> IO ()
logFileStoreRecord = writeStoreLogRecord
logAddFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> Maybe RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO ()
logAddFile s = logFileStoreRecord s .::. AddFile
logAddFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO ()
logAddFile s = logFileStoreRecord s .:: AddFile
logPutFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO ()
logPutFile s = logFileStoreRecord s .: PutFile
@@ -102,43 +87,36 @@ logBlockFile s fId = logFileStoreRecord s . BlockFile fId
logAckFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> RecipientId -> IO ()
logAckFile s = logFileStoreRecord s . AckFile
serverFileName :: SenderId -> FilePath
serverFileName = B.unpack . B64.encode . unEntityId
readWriteFileStore :: FilePath -> STMFileStore -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteFileStore :: FilePath -> FileStore -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteFileStore = readWriteStoreLog readFileStore writeFileStore
readFileStore :: FilePath -> STMFileStore -> IO ()
readFileStore :: FilePath -> FileStore -> IO ()
readFileStore f st = mapM_ (addFileLogRecord . LB.toStrict) . LB.lines =<< LB.readFile f
where
addFileLogRecord s = case strDecode s of
Left e -> B.putStrLn $ "Log parsing error (" <> B.pack e <> "): " <> B.take 100 s
Right lr ->
addToStore lr >>= \case
atomically (addToStore lr) >>= \case
Left e -> B.putStrLn $ "Log processing error (" <> bshow e <> "): " <> B.take 100 s
_ -> pure ()
addToStore = \case
AddFile sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| size file > 0 -> addFile st sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| otherwise -> pure $ Left SIZE
PutFile qId path
| takeFileName path == serverFileName qId -> setFilePath st qId path
| otherwise -> pure $ Left AUTH
AddFile sId file createdAt status -> addFile st sId file createdAt status
PutFile qId path -> setFilePath st qId path
AddRecipients sId rcps -> runExceptT $ addRecipients sId rcps
DeleteFile sId -> deleteFile st sId
BlockFile sId info -> blockFile st sId info True
AckFile rId -> ackFile st rId
addRecipients sId rcps = mapM_ (ExceptT . addRecipient st sId) rcps
writeFileStore :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> STMFileStore -> IO ()
writeFileStore s STMFileStore {files, recipients} = do
writeFileStore :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> FileStore -> IO ()
writeFileStore s FileStore {files, recipients} = do
allRcps <- readTVarIO recipients
readTVarIO files >>= mapM_ (logFile allRcps)
where
logFile :: Map RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey) -> FileRec -> IO ()
logFile allRcps FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, expiresAt, fileStatus} = do
logFile allRcps FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, fileStatus} = do
status <- readTVarIO fileStatus
logAddFile s senderId fileInfo createdAt expiresAt status
logAddFile s senderId fileInfo createdAt status
(rcpErrs, rcps) <- M.mapEither getRcp . M.fromSet id <$> readTVarIO recipientIds
mapM_ (logAddRecipients s senderId) $ L.nonEmpty $ M.elems rcps
mapM_ (B.putStrLn . ("Error storing log: " <>)) rcpErrs
+13 -33
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
( supportedFileServerVRange,
authCmdsXFTPVersion,
blockedFilesXFTPVersion,
fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion,
xftpClientHandshakeStub,
alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes,
xftpALPNv1,
@@ -37,6 +36,7 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
)
where
import Control.Applicative (optional)
import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad
@@ -56,14 +56,13 @@ import Data.Word (Word16, Word32)
import Network.HTTP2.Client (HTTP2Error)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (EntitlementProof)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, CommandError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, CertChainPubKey, ServiceCredentials, SessionId, THandle (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, tshow, (<$?>), (<$$>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, tshow, (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
import System.IO (Handle, IOMode (..), withFile)
@@ -98,11 +97,8 @@ authCmdsXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 2
blockedFilesXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
blockedFilesXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 3
fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 4
currentXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
currentXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 4
currentXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 3
supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP
supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange initialXFTPVersion currentXFTPVersion
@@ -128,18 +124,14 @@ data XFTPServerHandshake = XFTPServerHandshake
-- | pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
authPubKey :: CertChainPubKey,
-- | signed identity challenge from XFTPClientHello
webIdentityProof :: Maybe C.ASignature,
-- | optional server public information (JSON-encoded ServerPublicInfo), sent when version >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion
serverInfoBytes :: Maybe ByteString
webIdentityProof :: Maybe C.ASignature
}
data XFTPClientHandshake = XFTPClientHandshake
{ -- | agreed XFTP server protocol version
xftpVersion :: VersionXFTP,
-- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
-- | proof of the user entitlement bound to the session
entitlementProof :: Maybe EntitlementProof
keyHash :: C.KeyHash
}
instance Encoding XFTPClientHello where
@@ -151,33 +143,21 @@ instance Encoding XFTPClientHello where
pure XFTPClientHello {webChallenge}
instance Encoding XFTPClientHandshake where
smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, entitlementProof} =
smpEncode (v, keyHash) <> ifHasEntitlement v (smpEncode entitlementProof) ""
smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} =
smpEncode (xftpVersion, keyHash)
smpP = do
(v, keyHash) <- smpP
entitlementProof <- ifHasEntitlement v smpP (pure Nothing)
(xftpVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
Tail _compat <- smpP
pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, entitlementProof}
ifHasEntitlement :: VersionXFTP -> a -> a -> a
ifHasEntitlement v a b = if v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion then a else b
pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash}
instance Encoding XFTPServerHandshake where
smpEncode XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof, serverInfoBytes} =
smpEncode (xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, C.signatureBytes webIdentityProof) <> info
where
info = ifHasServerInfo (maxVersion xftpVersionRange) (smpEncode (Large <$> serverInfoBytes)) ""
smpEncode XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof} =
smpEncode (xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, C.signatureBytes webIdentityProof)
smpP = do
(xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey) <- smpP
-- decode the (length-prefixed) signature bytes deterministically: empty bytes decode to Nothing.
-- (Must not use `optional`, which would backtrack and leave the bytes for the parsers that follow.)
webIdentityProof <- C.decodeSignature <$?> smpP
serverInfoBytes <- ifHasServerInfo (maxVersion xftpVersionRange) (unLarge <$$> smpP) (pure Nothing)
webIdentityProof <- optional $ C.decodeSignature <$?> smpP
Tail _compat <- smpP
pure XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof, serverInfoBytes}
ifHasServerInfo :: VersionXFTP -> a -> a -> a
ifHasServerInfo v a b = if v >= fileStorageTimeXFTPVersion then a else b
pure XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof}
sendEncFile :: Handle -> (Builder -> IO ()) -> LC.SbState -> Word32 -> IO ()
sendEncFile h send = go
+6 -18
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (GrantedStorageTime (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (FromField (..), ToField (..), fromTextField_)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..))
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8, (<$$>))
import System.FilePath ((</>))
type RcvFileId = ByteString -- Agent entity ID
@@ -67,8 +65,7 @@ data FileHeader = FileHeader
instance Encoding FileHeader where
smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra} = smpEncode (fileName, fileExtra)
smpP = do
fileName <- safeDecodeUtf8 <$> smpP
fileExtra <- safeDecodeUtf8 <$$> smpP
(fileName, fileExtra) <- smpP
pure FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra}
type DBRcvFileId = Int64
@@ -93,8 +90,7 @@ data RcvFile = RcvFile
deriving (Show)
data RcvFileStatus
= RFSPrepared
| RFSReceiving
= RFSReceiving
| RFSReceived
| RFSDecrypting
| RFSComplete
@@ -107,7 +103,6 @@ instance ToField RcvFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding RcvFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"prepared" -> Just RFSPrepared
"receiving" -> Just RFSReceiving
"received" -> Just RFSReceived
"decrypting" -> Just RFSDecrypting
@@ -115,7 +110,6 @@ instance TextEncoding RcvFileStatus where
"error" -> Just RFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
RFSPrepared -> "prepared"
RFSReceiving -> "receiving"
RFSReceived -> "received"
RFSDecrypting -> "decrypting"
@@ -171,8 +165,7 @@ data SndFile = SndFile
prefixPath :: Maybe FilePath,
status :: SndFileStatus,
deleted :: Bool,
redirect :: Maybe RedirectFileInfo,
storageHours :: Maybe Word32
redirect :: Maybe RedirectFileInfo
}
deriving (Show)
@@ -180,8 +173,7 @@ sndFileEncPath :: FilePath -> FilePath
sndFileEncPath prefixPath = prefixPath </> "xftp.encrypted"
data SndFileStatus
= SFSPrepared
| SFSNew -- db record created
= SFSNew -- db record created
| SFSEncrypting -- encryption started
| SFSEncrypted -- encryption complete
| SFSUploading -- all chunk replicas are created on servers
@@ -195,7 +187,6 @@ instance ToField SndFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding SndFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"prepared" -> Just SFSPrepared
"new" -> Just SFSNew
"encrypting" -> Just SFSEncrypting
"encrypted" -> Just SFSEncrypted
@@ -204,7 +195,6 @@ instance TextEncoding SndFileStatus where
"error" -> Just SFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
SFSPrepared -> "prepared"
SFSNew -> "new"
SFSEncrypting -> "encrypting"
SFSEncrypted -> "encrypted"
@@ -233,8 +223,7 @@ data NewSndChunkReplica = NewSndChunkReplica
{ server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)],
expiresAt :: Maybe GrantedStorageTime
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)]
}
deriving (Show)
@@ -246,8 +235,7 @@ data SndFileChunkReplica = SndFileChunkReplica
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)],
replicaStatus :: SndFileReplicaStatus,
delay :: Maybe Int64,
retries :: Int,
expiresAt :: Maybe GrantedStorageTime
retries :: Int
}
deriving (Show)
+2 -9
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,19 @@
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Util
( uniqueCombine,
safeFileNameStr,
removePath,
)
where
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, whenM)
import System.FilePath (makeValid, splitExtensions, takeFileName, (</>))
import System.FilePath (splitExtensions, (</>))
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
safeFileNameStr :: String -> String
safeFileNameStr = notDots . makeValid . takeFileName
where
notDots n = if n == "." || n == ".." then "_" else n
-- | The file name is sanitized, so the combined path cannot escape the folder.
uniqueCombine :: MonadIO m => FilePath -> String -> m FilePath
uniqueCombine filePath fileName = tryCombine (0 :: Int)
where
tryCombine n =
let (name, ext) = splitExtensions $ safeFileNameStr fileName
let (name, ext) = splitExtensions fileName
suffix = if n == 0 then "" else "_" <> show n
f = filePath </> (name <> suffix <> ext)
in ifM (doesPathExist f) (tryCombine $ n + 1) (pure f)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+74 -133
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
reconnectServerClients,
reconnectSMPServer,
closeXFTPServerClient,
closeUserXFTPClients,
runSMPServerTest,
runXFTPServerTest,
runNTFServerTest,
@@ -69,8 +68,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
deleteQueueLink,
secureGetQueueLink,
getQueueLink,
resolveName,
getNextNameServer,
enableQueueNotifications,
EnableQueueNtfReq (..),
enableQueuesNtfs,
@@ -228,7 +225,7 @@ import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Text.Encoding
import Data.Time (UTCTime, addUTCTime, defaultTimeLocale, formatTime, getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (getSystemTime)
import Data.Word (Word16, Word32)
import Data.Word (Word16)
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import Network.Socket (HostName)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..), XFTPClient, XFTPClientConfig (..), XFTPClientError)
@@ -254,8 +251,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TSessionSubs (TSessionSubs)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TSessionSubs as SS
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS (BBSPresHeader (..), BBSPublicKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (EntitlementCredential, EntitlementProof, generateEntitlementProof)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client
@@ -272,7 +267,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
NetworkError (..),
MsgFlags (..),
MsgId,
NameResponse,
NtfServer,
NtfServerWithAuth,
ProtoServer,
@@ -307,12 +301,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.QueueInfo
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo)
import Simplex.Messaging.Session
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion, serverInfo), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), shortLinksSMPVersion, newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), sndAuthKeySMPVersion, shortLinksSMPVersion, newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
@@ -357,7 +350,6 @@ data AgentClient = AgentClient
ntfClients :: TMap NtfTransportSession NtfClientVar,
xftpServers :: TMap UserId (UserServers 'PXFTP),
xftpClients :: TMap XFTPTransportSession XFTPClientVar,
userEntitlements :: TMap UserId EntitlementCredential,
useNetworkConfig :: TVar (NetworkConfig, NetworkConfig), -- (slow, fast) networks
presetDomains :: [HostName],
presetServers :: [SMPServer],
@@ -389,7 +381,6 @@ data AgentClient = AgentClient
clientId :: Int,
agentEnv :: Env,
proxySessTs :: TVar UTCTime,
serviceRequests :: TMap ConnId (TMVar (Either AgentErrorType SMP.MsgBody)),
smpServersStats :: TMap (UserId, SMPServer) AgentSMPServerStats,
xftpServersStats :: TMap (UserId, XFTPServer) AgentXFTPServerStats,
ntfServersStats :: TMap (UserId, NtfServer) AgentNtfServerStats,
@@ -515,7 +506,7 @@ data UserNetworkType = UNNone | UNCellular | UNWifi | UNEthernet | UNOther
-- | Creates an SMP agent client instance that receives commands and sends responses via 'TBQueue's.
newAgentClient :: Int -> InitialAgentServers -> UTCTime -> Map (Maybe SMPServer) (Maybe SystemSeconds) -> Env -> IO AgentClient
newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, entitlements, netCfg, useServices, presetDomains, presetServers} currentTs notices agentEnv = do
newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, netCfg, useServices, presetDomains, presetServers} currentTs notices agentEnv = do
let cfg = config agentEnv
qSize = tbqSize cfg
proxySessTs <- newTVarIO =<< getCurrentTime
@@ -531,7 +522,6 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, entitlements, netCf
ntfClients <- TM.emptyIO
xftpServers <- newTVarIO $ M.map mkUserServers xftp
xftpClients <- TM.emptyIO
userEntitlements <- newTVarIO entitlements
useNetworkConfig <- newTVarIO (slowNetworkConfig netCfg, netCfg)
userNetworkInfo <- newTVarIO $ UserNetworkInfo UNOther True
userNetworkUpdated <- newTVarIO Nothing
@@ -554,7 +544,6 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, entitlements, netCf
invLocks <- TM.emptyIO
deleteLock <- createLockIO
smpSubWorkers <- TM.emptyIO
serviceRequests <- TM.emptyIO
smpServersStats <- TM.emptyIO
xftpServersStats <- TM.emptyIO
ntfServersStats <- TM.emptyIO
@@ -573,7 +562,6 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, entitlements, netCf
ntfClients,
xftpServers,
xftpClients,
userEntitlements,
useNetworkConfig,
presetDomains,
presetServers,
@@ -601,7 +589,6 @@ newAgentClient clientId InitialAgentServers {smp, ntf, xftp, entitlements, netCf
clientId,
agentEnv,
proxySessTs,
serviceRequests,
smpServersStats,
xftpServersStats,
ntfServersStats,
@@ -638,7 +625,9 @@ getServiceCredentials c userId srv =
Just service -> pure service
Nothing -> do
cred <- genCredentials g Nothing (25, 24 * 999999) "simplex"
createClientService db userId srv $ tlsCredentials [cred]
let tlsCreds = tlsCredentials [cred]
createClientService db userId srv tlsCreds
pure (tlsCreds, Nothing)
serviceSignKey <- liftEitherWith INTERNAL $ C.x509ToPrivate' $ snd serviceCreds
let creds = ServiceCredentials {serviceRole = SRMessaging, serviceCreds, serviceCertHash = XV.Fingerprint kh, serviceSignKey}
pure (creds, serviceId_)
@@ -687,7 +676,8 @@ getSMPServerClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> SMPTransportSession -
getSMPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, workerSeq} nm tSess = do
unlessM (readTVarIO active) $ throwE INACTIVE
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
withGetSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients ts newClient (waitForProtocolClient c nm tSess smpClients)
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients ts)
>>= either newClient (waitForProtocolClient c nm tSess smpClients)
where
newClient v = do
prs <- liftIO TM.emptyIO
@@ -698,29 +688,33 @@ getSMPProxyClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, smpProxiedRelays, workerSeq
unlessM (readTVarIO active) $ throwE INACTIVE
proxySrv <- maybe (getNextServer c userId proxySrvs [destSrv]) pure proxySrv_
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
(tSess, auth) <- atomically $ proxiedTransportSession proxySrv
withGetSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients ts (newProxyClient tSess auth ts) (waitForProxyClient tSess auth)
atomically (getClientVar proxySrv ts) >>= \(tSess, auth, v) ->
either (newProxyClient tSess auth ts) (waitForProxyClient tSess auth) v
where
proxiedTransportSession :: SMPServerWithAuth -> STM (SMPTransportSession, Maybe SMP.BasicAuth)
proxiedTransportSession proxySrv = do
getClientVar :: SMPServerWithAuth -> UTCTime -> STM (SMPTransportSession, Maybe SMP.BasicAuth, Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
getClientVar proxySrv ts = do
ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth <- TM.lookup destSess smpProxiedRelays >>= maybe (TM.insert destSess proxySrv smpProxiedRelays $> proxySrv) pure
pure ((userId, srv, qId), auth)
let tSess = (userId, srv, qId)
(tSess,auth,) <$> getSessVar workerSeq tSess smpClients ts
newProxyClient :: SMPTransportSession -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> UTCTime -> SMPClientVar -> AM (SMPConnectedClient, Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
newProxyClient tSess auth ts v = do
prs <- liftIO TM.emptyIO
-- we do not need to check if it is a new proxied relay session,
-- as the client is just created and there are no sessions yet
rv <- atomically $ either id id <$> getSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs ts
clnt <- smpConnectClient c nm tSess prs v
-- the relay var is always new (the client is just created and has no sessions yet)
sess <- withGetSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs ts (newProxiedRelay clnt auth) (waitForProxiedRelay tSess)
pure (clnt, sess)
(clnt,) <$> newProxiedRelay clnt auth rv
waitForProxyClient :: SMPTransportSession -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> SMPClientVar -> AM (SMPConnectedClient, Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
waitForProxyClient tSess auth v = do
clnt@(SMPConnectedClient _ prs) <- waitForProtocolClient c nm tSess smpClients v
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
sess <- withGetSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs ts (newProxiedRelay clnt auth) (waitForProxiedRelay tSess)
sess <-
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq destSrv prs ts)
>>= either (newProxiedRelay clnt auth) (waitForProxiedRelay tSess)
pure (clnt, sess)
newProxiedRelay :: SMPConnectedClient -> Maybe SMP.BasicAuth -> ProxiedRelayVar -> AM (Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
newProxiedRelay (SMPConnectedClient smp prs) proxyAuth rv =
tryAllErrors (liftClient proxyRelayError (clientServer smp) $ connectSMPProxiedRelay smp nm destSrv proxyAuth) >>= \case
tryAllErrors (liftClient SMP (clientServer smp) $ connectSMPProxiedRelay smp nm destSrv proxyAuth) >>= \case
Right sess -> do
atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar rv) (Right sess)
pure $ Right sess
@@ -731,18 +725,6 @@ getSMPProxyClient c@AgentClient {active, smpClients, smpProxiedRelays, workerSeq
TM.delete destSess smpProxiedRelays
putTMVar (sessionVar rv) (Left e)
pure $ Left e
where
-- proxy reports BROKER errors about the relay, not about its own connection,
-- so they include both addresses, same as PFWD errors.
proxyRelayError :: HostName -> ErrorType -> AgentErrorType
proxyRelayError proxyHost = \case
e@(SMP.PROXY (SMP.BROKER _)) ->
PROXY
{ proxyServer = protocolClientServer smp,
relayServer = B.unpack $ strEncode destSrv,
proxyErr = ProxyProtocolError e
}
e -> SMP proxyHost e
waitForProxiedRelay :: SMPTransportSession -> ProxiedRelayVar -> AM (Either AgentErrorType ProxiedRelay)
waitForProxiedRelay (_, srv, _) rv = do
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} <- getNetworkConfig c
@@ -828,17 +810,13 @@ resubscribeSMPSession c@AgentClient {smpSubWorkers, workerSeq} tSess = do
(pure Nothing) -- prevent race with cleanup and adding pending queues in another call
(Just <$> getSessVar workerSeq tSess smpSubWorkers ts)
newSubWorker v = do
a <- async $ void $ E.tryAny $ runSubWorker v
a <- async $ void (E.tryAny runSubWorker) >> atomically (cleanup v)
atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar v) a
runSubWorker v = do
runSubWorker = do
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
withRetryForeground ri isForeground (isNetworkOnline c) $ \_ loop -> do
pending_ <- atomically $ do
pending@(pendingSubs, pendingSS) <- SS.getPendingSubs tSess $ currentSubs c
if M.null pendingSubs && isNothing pendingSS
then cleanup v $> Nothing
else pure $ Just pending
forM_ pending_ $ \(pendingSubs, pendingSS) -> do
(pendingSubs, pendingSS) <- atomically $ SS.getPendingSubs tSess $ currentSubs c
unless (M.null pendingSubs && isNothing pendingSS) $ do
liftIO $ waitUntilForeground c
liftIO $ waitForUserNetwork c
mapM_ (handleNotify . void . runExceptT . resubscribeClientService c tSess) pendingSS
@@ -866,7 +844,10 @@ getNtfServerClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> NtfTransportSession -
getNtfServerClient c@AgentClient {active, ntfClients, workerSeq, proxySessTs, presetDomains} nm tSess@(_, srv, _) = do
unlessM (readTVarIO active) $ throwE INACTIVE
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
withGetSessVar workerSeq tSess ntfClients ts (newProtocolClient c tSess ntfClients connectClient) (waitForProtocolClient c nm tSess ntfClients)
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq tSess ntfClients ts)
>>= either
(newProtocolClient c tSess ntfClients connectClient)
(waitForProtocolClient c nm tSess ntfClients)
where
connectClient :: NtfClientVar -> AM NtfClient
connectClient v = do
@@ -884,36 +865,23 @@ getNtfServerClient c@AgentClient {active, ntfClients, workerSeq, proxySessTs, pr
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
getXFTPServerClient :: AgentClient -> XFTPTransportSession -> AM XFTPClient
getXFTPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, xftpClients, userEntitlements, workerSeq, proxySessTs, presetDomains} tSess@(userId, srv, _) = do
getXFTPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, xftpClients, workerSeq, proxySessTs, presetDomains} tSess@(_, srv, _) = do
unlessM (readTVarIO active) $ throwE INACTIVE
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
withGetSessVar workerSeq tSess xftpClients ts (newProtocolClient c tSess xftpClients connectClient) (waitForProtocolClient c NRMBackground tSess xftpClients)
atomically (getSessVar workerSeq tSess xftpClients ts)
>>= either
(newProtocolClient c tSess xftpClients connectClient)
(waitForProtocolClient c NRMBackground tSess xftpClients)
where
connectClient :: XFTPClientVar -> AM XFTPClient
connectClient v = do
cfg <- asks $ xftpCfg . config
keys <- asks $ entitlementKeys . config
xftpNetworkConfig <- getNetworkConfig c
ts <- readTVarIO proxySessTs
liftError' (protocolClientError XFTP $ B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} presetDomains ts (mkEntitlementProof keys) $
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} presetDomains ts $
clientDisconnected v
mkEntitlementProof :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey -> SessionId -> IO (Maybe EntitlementProof)
mkEntitlementProof keys sessId =
ifM knownServer proof (pure Nothing)
where
-- the entitlement is presented only to the servers of this user, matched by key hash that TLS pins,
-- so a file description of the sender cannot direct it to another server
knownServer = maybe False (any (sameKeyHash . snd) . storageSrvs) <$> TM.lookupIO userId (xftpServers c)
sameKeyHash (ProtoServerWithAuth srv' _) = srvKeyHash srv' == srvKeyHash srv
srvKeyHash (ProtocolServer _ _ _ kh) = kh
proof =
TM.lookupIO userId userEntitlements $>>= \cred ->
generateEntitlementProof keys cred (BBSPresHeader sessId) >>= \case
Right p -> pure $ Just p
Left e -> Nothing <$ logError ("entitlement proof error: " <> tshow e)
clientDisconnected :: XFTPClientVar -> XFTPClient -> IO ()
clientDisconnected v client = do
atomically $ removeSessVar v tSess xftpClients
@@ -1059,13 +1027,6 @@ reconnectSMPServer c userId srv = do
| userId == userId' && srv == srv' = (v :)
| otherwise = id
closeUserXFTPClients :: AgentClient -> UserId -> IO ()
closeUserXFTPClients c userId = do
vs <- atomically $ stateTVar (xftpClients c) $ \cs ->
let (userCs, cs') = M.partitionWithKey (\(userId', _, _) _ -> userId == userId') cs
in (M.elems userCs, cs')
mapM_ (forkIO . closeClient_ c) vs
closeClient :: ProtocolServerClient v err msg => AgentClient -> (AgentClient -> TMap (TransportSession msg) (ClientVar msg)) -> TransportSession msg -> IO ()
closeClient c clientSel tSess =
atomically (TM.lookupDelete tSess $ clientSel c) >>= mapM_ (closeClient_ c)
@@ -1326,7 +1287,7 @@ data ProtocolTestFailure = ProtocolTestFailure
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
runSMPServerTest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> SMPServerWithAuth -> AM' (Either ProtocolTestFailure (Maybe (Either String ServerPublicInfo)))
runSMPServerTest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> SMPServerWithAuth -> AM' (Maybe ProtocolTestFailure)
runSMPServerTest c@AgentClient {presetDomains} nm userId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
cfg <- getClientConfig c smpCfg
C.AuthAlg ra <- asks $ rcvAuthAlg . config
@@ -1348,14 +1309,14 @@ runSMPServerTest c@AgentClient {presetDomains} nm userId (ProtoServerWithAuth sr
_ -> secureSMPQueue smp nm rpKey rcvId sKey
liftError (testErr TSDeleteQueue) $ deleteSMPQueue smp nm rpKey rcvId
ok <- netTimeoutInt (tcpTimeout $ networkConfig cfg) nm `timeout` closeProtocolClient smp
pure $ r >> maybe (Left (ProtocolTestFailure TSDisconnect $ BROKER addr TIMEOUT)) (const $ Right $ serverInfo (thParams smp)) ok
Left e -> pure $ Left (testErr TSConnect e)
pure $ either Just (const Nothing) r <|> maybe (Just (ProtocolTestFailure TSDisconnect $ BROKER addr TIMEOUT)) (const Nothing) ok
Left e -> pure (Just $ testErr TSConnect e)
where
addr = B.unpack $ strEncode srv
testErr :: ProtocolTestStep -> SMPClientError -> ProtocolTestFailure
testErr step = ProtocolTestFailure step . protocolClientError SMP addr
runXFTPServerTest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> XFTPServerWithAuth -> AM' (Either ProtocolTestFailure (Maybe (Either String ServerPublicInfo)))
runXFTPServerTest :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> XFTPServerWithAuth -> AM' (Maybe ProtocolTestFailure)
runXFTPServerTest c@AgentClient {presetDomains} nm userId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
cfg <- asks $ xftpCfg . config
g <- asks random
@@ -1366,7 +1327,7 @@ runXFTPServerTest c@AgentClient {presetDomains} nm userId (ProtoServerWithAuth s
liftIO $ do
let tSess = (userId, srv, Nothing)
ts <- readTVarIO $ proxySessTs c
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} presetDomains ts (\_ -> pure Nothing) (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} presetDomains ts (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
Right xftp -> withTestChunk filePath $ do
(sndKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
(rcvKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
@@ -1374,15 +1335,15 @@ runXFTPServerTest c@AgentClient {presetDomains} nm userId (ProtoServerWithAuth s
let file = FileInfo {sndKey, size = chSize, digest}
chunkSpec = X.XFTPChunkSpec {filePath, chunkOffset = 0, chunkSize = chSize}
r <- runExceptT $ do
(sId, [rId], _) <- liftError (testErr TSCreateFile) $ X.createXFTPChunk xftp spKey file [rcvKey] auth Nothing
(sId, [rId]) <- liftError (testErr TSCreateFile) $ X.createXFTPChunk xftp spKey file [rcvKey] auth
liftError (testErr TSUploadFile) $ X.uploadXFTPChunk xftp spKey sId chunkSpec
liftError (testErr TSDownloadFile) $ X.downloadXFTPChunk g xftp rpKey rId $ XFTPRcvChunkSpec rcvPath chSize digest
rcvDigest <- liftIO $ C.sha256Hash <$> B.readFile rcvPath
unless (digest == rcvDigest) $ throwE $ ProtocolTestFailure TSCompareFile $ XFTP (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) DIGEST
liftError (testErr TSDeleteFile) $ X.deleteXFTPChunk xftp spKey sId
ok <- netTimeoutInt (tcpTimeout xftpNetworkConfig) nm `timeout` X.closeXFTPClient xftp
pure $ r >> maybe (Left (ProtocolTestFailure TSDisconnect $ BROKER addr TIMEOUT)) (const $ Right $ serverInfo (X.thParams xftp)) ok
Left e -> pure $ Left (testErr TSConnect e)
pure $ either Just (const Nothing) r <|> maybe (Just (ProtocolTestFailure TSDisconnect $ BROKER addr TIMEOUT)) (const Nothing) ok
Left e -> pure (Just $ testErr TSConnect e)
where
addr = B.unpack $ strEncode srv
testErr :: ProtocolTestStep -> XFTPClientError -> ProtocolTestFailure
@@ -1549,7 +1510,9 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
if sndId == sndId' && lnkId == lnkId'
then pure $ Just $ ShortLinkCreds lnkId linkKey privSigKey Nothing (fst d)
else newErr "different sender or link IDs"
(_, Nothing) -> newErr "unexpected link ID"
(_, Nothing) -> case linkId of
Nothing | v < sndAuthKeySMPVersion -> pure Nothing
_ -> newErr "unexpected link ID"
_ -> newErr "unexpected queue mode"
where
v = thVersion thParams'
@@ -1696,15 +1659,9 @@ checkQueues c = fmap partitionEithers . mapM checkQueue
resubscribeSessQueues :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> [RcvQueueSub] -> AM' ()
resubscribeSessQueues _ _ [] = pure ()
resubscribeSessQueues c tSess qs = do
batchSize <- asks $ subsBatchSize . config
(errs, qs_) <- checkQueues c qs
subscribeChunks $ toChunks batchSize qs_
forM_ (L.nonEmpty qs_) $ \qs' -> void $ subscribeSessQueues_ c True (tSess, qs')
forM_ (L.nonEmpty errs) $ notifySub c . ERRS . L.map (first qConnId)
where
subscribeChunks [] = pure ()
subscribeChunks (qs' : rest) = do
(_, active) <- subscribeSessQueues_ c True (tSess, qs')
when active $ subscribeChunks rest
subscribeSessQueues_ :: AgentClient -> Bool -> (SMPTransportSession, NonEmpty RcvQueueSub) -> AM' (BatchResponses RcvQueueSub AgentErrorType (Maybe ServiceId), Bool)
subscribeSessQueues_ c withEvents qs = sendClientBatch_ "SUB" False subscribe_ c NRMBackground qs
@@ -1716,7 +1673,7 @@ subscribeSessQueues_ c withEvents qs = sendClientBatch_ "SUB" False subscribe_ c
rs <- sendBatch (\smp' _ -> subscribeSMPQueues smp') smp NRMBackground qs'
cs_ <-
if withEvents
then Just <$> atomically (SS.getActiveConns tSess $ currentSubs c)
then Just . S.fromList . map qConnId . M.elems <$> atomically (SS.getActiveSubs tSess $ currentSubs c)
else pure Nothing
active <- E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ do
(active, (serviceQs, notices)) <- atomically $ do
@@ -1727,20 +1684,20 @@ subscribeSessQueues_ c withEvents qs = sendClientBatch_ "SUB" False subscribe_ c
unless (null notices) $ takeTMVar $ clientNoticesLock c
pure r
unless (null serviceQs) $ void $
processRcvServiceAssocs c srv serviceQs `runReaderT` agentEnv c
processRcvServiceAssocs c serviceQs `runReaderT` agentEnv c
unless (null notices) $ void $
(processClientNotices c tSess notices `runReaderT` agentEnv c)
`E.finally` atomically (putTMVar (clientNoticesLock c) ())
pure active
forM_ cs_ $ \cs -> do
let (errs, okConns) = partitionEithers $ map (\(RcvQueueSub {connId}, r) -> bimap (connId,) (const connId) r) $ L.toList rs
conns = filter (`M.notMember` cs) okConns
conns = filter (`S.notMember` cs) okConns
unless (null conns) $ notifySub c $ UP srv conns
forM_ (L.nonEmpty errs) $ \errs' -> do
let noFinalErrs = all (temporaryClientError . snd) errs'
addr = B.unpack $ strEncode srv
notifySub c $ ERRS $ L.map (second $ protocolClientError SMP addr) errs'
when (null okConns && M.null cs && noFinalErrs && active) $ liftIO $ do
when (null okConns && S.null cs && noFinalErrs && active) $ liftIO $ do
-- We only close the client session that was used to subscribe.
v_ <- atomically $ ifM (activeClientSession c tSess sessId) (TM.lookupDelete tSess $ smpClients c) (pure Nothing)
mapM_ (closeClient_ c) v_
@@ -1749,11 +1706,11 @@ subscribeSessQueues_ c withEvents qs = sendClientBatch_ "SUB" False subscribe_ c
tSess = transportSession' smp
sessId = sessionId $ thParams smp
processRcvServiceAssocs :: SMPQueue q => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> [q] -> AM' ()
processRcvServiceAssocs _ _ [] = pure ()
processRcvServiceAssocs c srv serviceQs =
withStore' c (\db -> setRcvServiceAssocs db srv serviceQs) `catchAllErrors'` \e -> do
logError $ "processRcvServiceAssocs error: " <> tshow e
processRcvServiceAssocs :: SMPQueue q => AgentClient -> [q] -> AM' ()
processRcvServiceAssocs _ [] = pure ()
processRcvServiceAssocs c serviceQs =
withStore' c (`setRcvServiceAssocs` serviceQs) `catchAllErrors'` \e -> do
logError $ "processClientNotices error: " <> tshow e
notifySub' c "" $ ERR e
processClientNotices :: AgentClient -> SMPTransportSession -> [(RcvQueueSub, Maybe ClientNotice)] -> AM' ()
@@ -1956,10 +1913,17 @@ sendConfirmation c nm sq@SndQueue {userId, server, connId, sndId, queueMode, snd
sendOrProxySMPMessage c nm userId server connId "<CONF>" spKey sndId (MsgFlags {notification = True}) msg
sendConfirmation _ _ _ _ = throwE $ INTERNAL "sendConfirmation called without snd_queue public key(s) in the database"
sendInvitation :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> ConnId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> AgentMsgEnvelope -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendInvitation c nm userId connId (Compatible (SMPQueueInfo v SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey})) agentEnvelope = do
msg <- agentCbEncryptOnce v dhPublicKey . smpEncode $ SMP.ClientMessage SMP.PHEmpty (smpEncode agentEnvelope)
sendInvitation :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> ConnId -> Compatible SMPQueueInfo -> Compatible VersionSMPA -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> AM (Maybe SMPServer)
sendInvitation c nm userId connId (Compatible (SMPQueueInfo v SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey})) (Compatible agentVersion) connReq connInfo = do
msg <- mkInvitation
sendOrProxySMPMessage c nm userId smpServer connId "<INV>" Nothing senderId (MsgFlags {notification = True}) msg
where
mkInvitation :: AM ByteString
-- this is only encrypted with per-queue E2E, not with double ratchet
mkInvitation = do
let agentEnvelope = AgentInvitation {agentVersion, connReq, connInfo}
agentCbEncryptOnce v dhPublicKey . smpEncode $
SMP.ClientMessage SMP.PHEmpty (smpEncode agentEnvelope)
getQueueMessage :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> AM (Maybe SMPMsgMeta)
getQueueMessage c rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} = do
@@ -1979,7 +1943,7 @@ getQueueMessage c rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} = do
decryptSMPMessage :: RcvQueue -> SMP.RcvMessage -> AM SMP.ClientRcvMsgBody
decryptSMPMessage rq SMP.RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = SMP.EncRcvMsgBody body} =
liftEither $ parse SMP.clientRcvMsgBodyP (AGENT $ A_MESSAGE "decrypt message") =<< decrypt body
liftEither $ parse SMP.clientRcvMsgBodyP (AGENT A_MESSAGE) =<< decrypt body
where
decrypt = agentCbDecrypt (rcvDhSecret rq) (C.cbNonce msgId)
@@ -2018,28 +1982,6 @@ getQueueLink c nm userId server lnkId =
getViaProxy smp proxySess = proxyGetSMPQueueLink smp nm proxySess lnkId
getDirectly smp = getSMPQueueLink smp nm lnkId
-- | Resolve a public-namespace name. Prefers PFWD (hides client IP from the
-- resolver) and falls back to a direct send when the proxy is unavailable
-- (faster but exposes the client IP). Mode selection is delegated to
-- `sendOrProxySMPCommand`, which honours the network config (SPMNever etc.).
resolveName :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> UserId -> SMPServer -> SimplexDomain -> AM NameResponse
resolveName c nm userId server domain =
snd <$> sendOrProxySMPCommand c nm userId server "" "RSLV" NoEntity resolveViaProxy resolveDirectly
where
resolveViaProxy smp proxySess = proxyResolveName smp nm proxySess domain
resolveDirectly smp = directResolveName smp nm domain
-- | Pick a names-capable server for the user (the agent owns server selection,
-- accounting for the names role). nameSrvs is opt-in (a plain list); empty means
-- no server resolves names - a declared agent error, never a fallback.
getNextNameServer :: AgentClient -> UserId -> AM SMPServer
getNextNameServer c userId =
liftIO (TM.lookupIO userId (userServers c :: TMap UserId (UserServers 'PSMP))) >>= \case
Just UserServers {nameSrvs} -> case L.nonEmpty nameSrvs of
Just srvs -> protoServer <$> pickServer srvs
Nothing -> throwE NO_NAME_SERVERS
Nothing -> throwE $ INTERNAL "unknown userId - no user servers"
enableQueueNotifications :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> SMP.NtfPublicAuthKey -> SMP.RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> AM (SMP.NotifierId, SMP.RcvNtfPublicDhKey)
enableQueueNotifications c rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} notifierKey rcvNtfPublicDhKey =
withSMPClient c NRMBackground rq "NKEY <nkey>" $ \smp ->
@@ -2215,17 +2157,16 @@ agentXFTPDownloadChunk c userId (FileDigest chunkDigest) RcvFileChunkReplica {se
g <- asks random
withXFTPClient c (userId, server, chunkDigest) "FGET" $ \xftp -> X.downloadXFTPChunk g xftp replicaKey fId chunkSpec
agentXFTPNewChunk :: AgentClient -> SndFileChunk -> Int -> XFTPServerWithAuth -> Maybe Word32 -> AM NewSndChunkReplica
agentXFTPNewChunk c SndFileChunk {userId, chunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}, digest = FileDigest chunkDigest} n (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) storageHours = do
agentXFTPNewChunk :: AgentClient -> SndFileChunk -> Int -> XFTPServerWithAuth -> AM NewSndChunkReplica
agentXFTPNewChunk c SndFileChunk {userId, chunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}, digest = FileDigest chunkDigest} n (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
rKeys <- xftpRcvKeys n
(sndKey, replicaKey) <- atomically . C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 =<< asks random
let fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size = chunkSize, digest = chunkDigest}
logServer "-->" c srv NoEntity "FNEW"
tSess <- mkTransportSession c userId srv chunkDigest
(sndId, rIds, expiresAt) <- withClient c NRMBackground tSess $ \xftp ->
X.createXFTPChunk xftp replicaKey fileInfo (L.map fst rKeys) auth storageHours
(sndId, rIds) <- withClient c NRMBackground tSess $ \xftp -> X.createXFTPChunk xftp replicaKey fileInfo (L.map fst rKeys) auth
logServer "<--" c srv NoEntity $ B.unwords ["SIDS", logSecret sndId]
pure NewSndChunkReplica {server = srv, replicaId = ChunkReplicaId sndId, replicaKey, rcvIdsKeys = L.toList $ xftpRcvIdsKeys rIds rKeys, expiresAt}
pure NewSndChunkReplica {server = srv, replicaId = ChunkReplicaId sndId, replicaKey, rcvIdsKeys = L.toList $ xftpRcvIdsKeys rIds rKeys}
agentXFTPUploadChunk :: AgentClient -> UserId -> FileDigest -> SndFileChunkReplica -> XFTPChunkSpec -> AM ()
agentXFTPUploadChunk c userId (FileDigest chunkDigest) SndFileChunkReplica {server, replicaId = ChunkReplicaId fId, replicaKey} chunkSpec =
@@ -2284,8 +2225,8 @@ agentCbDecrypt dhSecret nonce msg =
cryptoError :: C.CryptoError -> AgentErrorType
cryptoError = \case
C.CryptoLargeMsgError -> CMD LARGE "CryptoLargeMsgError"
C.CryptoHeaderError e -> AGENT $ A_MESSAGE $ "parse msg header " <> e
C.CERatchetDuplicateMessage -> AGENT $ A_DUPLICATE Nothing
C.CryptoHeaderError _ -> AGENT A_MESSAGE -- parsing error
C.CERatchetDuplicateMessage -> AGENT A_DUPLICATE
C.AESDecryptError -> c DECRYPT_AES
C.CBDecryptError -> c DECRYPT_CB
C.CERatchetHeader -> c RATCHET_HEADER
+5 -27
View File
@@ -67,8 +67,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Interface (DBOpts)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfig (..), MigrationError (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS (BBSPublicKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement (EntitlementCredential, entitlementIssuerKeys)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (VersionRangeE2E, supportedE2EEncryptVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (NTFVersion)
@@ -91,7 +89,6 @@ data InitialAgentServers = InitialAgentServers
{ smp :: Map UserId (NonEmpty (ServerCfg 'PSMP)),
ntf :: [NtfServer],
xftp :: Map UserId (NonEmpty (ServerCfg 'PXFTP)),
entitlements :: Map UserId EntitlementCredential,
netCfg :: NetworkConfig,
useServices :: Map UserId Bool,
presetDomains :: [HostName],
@@ -108,13 +105,12 @@ data ServerCfg p = ServerCfg
data ServerRoles = ServerRoles
{ storage :: Bool,
proxy :: Bool,
names :: Bool
proxy :: Bool
}
deriving (Show)
allRoles :: ServerRoles
allRoles = ServerRoles True True True
allRoles = ServerRoles True True
presetServerCfg :: Bool -> ServerRoles -> Maybe OperatorId -> ProtoServerWithAuth p -> ServerCfg p
presetServerCfg enabled roles operator server =
@@ -123,9 +119,6 @@ presetServerCfg enabled roles operator server =
data UserServers p = UserServers
{ storageSrvs :: NonEmpty (Maybe OperatorId, ProtoServerWithAuth p),
proxySrvs :: NonEmpty (Maybe OperatorId, ProtoServerWithAuth p),
-- name resolution is opt-in: a plain list (NOT NonEmpty, no fallback-to-all).
-- Empty = no servers resolve names = a clean agent error, never falls back.
nameSrvs :: [(Maybe OperatorId, ProtoServerWithAuth p)],
knownHosts :: Set TransportHost
}
@@ -133,10 +126,9 @@ type OperatorId = Int64
-- This function sets all servers as enabled in case all passed servers are disabled.
mkUserServers :: NonEmpty (ServerCfg p) -> UserServers p
mkUserServers srvs = UserServers {storageSrvs = filterSrvs storage, proxySrvs = filterSrvs proxy, nameSrvs, knownHosts}
mkUserServers srvs = UserServers {storageSrvs = filterSrvs storage, proxySrvs = filterSrvs proxy, knownHosts}
where
filterSrvs role = L.map (\ServerCfg {operator, server} -> (operator, server)) $ fromMaybe srvs $ L.nonEmpty $ L.filter (\ServerCfg {enabled, roles} -> enabled && role roles) srvs
nameSrvs = map (\ServerCfg {operator, server} -> (operator, server)) $ L.filter (\ServerCfg {enabled, roles} -> enabled && names roles) srvs
knownHosts = S.unions $ L.map (\ServerCfg {server = ProtoServerWithAuth srv _} -> serverHosts srv) srvs
serverHosts :: ProtocolServer p -> Set TransportHost
@@ -151,18 +143,14 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
smpCfg :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion,
ntfCfg :: ProtocolClientConfig NTFVersion,
xftpCfg :: XFTPClientConfig,
entitlementKeys :: Map Word16 BBSPublicKey,
reconnectInterval :: RetryInterval,
messageRetryInterval :: RetryInterval2,
userNetworkInterval :: Int,
userOfflineDelay :: NominalDiffTime,
messageTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
serviceRequestTimeout :: NominalDiffTime, -- client side: default time the client waits for a service response (overridable per request)
serviceResponseTimeout :: NominalDiffTime, -- service side: time a received service request is valid to respond to
connDeleteDeliveryTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
helloTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
quotaExceededTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
commandQuotaRetryInterval :: RetryInterval,
persistErrorInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
initialCleanupDelay :: Int64,
cleanupInterval :: Int64,
@@ -177,17 +165,14 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
xftpConsecutiveRetries :: Int,
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest :: Int,
deleteErrorCount :: Int,
keepAddressKeys :: Int,
ntfCron :: Word16,
ntfBatchSize :: Int,
ntfSubFirstCheckInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
ntfSubCheckInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
subsBatchSize :: Int,
maxPendingSubscriptions :: Int,
caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
certificateFile :: FilePath,
rcvExpireCount :: Int,
rcvExpireInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
e2eEncryptVRange :: VersionRangeE2E,
smpAgentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA,
smpClientVRange :: VersionRangeSMPC
@@ -231,18 +216,14 @@ defaultAgentConfig =
smpCfg = defaultSMPClientConfig,
ntfCfg = defaultNTFClientConfig,
xftpCfg = defaultXFTPClientConfig,
entitlementKeys = entitlementIssuerKeys,
reconnectInterval = defaultReconnectInterval,
messageRetryInterval = defaultMessageRetryInterval,
userNetworkInterval = 1800_000000, -- 30 minutes, should be less than Int32 max value
userOfflineDelay = 2, -- if network offline event happens in less than 2 seconds after it was set online, it is ignored
messageTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
serviceRequestTimeout = 30,
serviceResponseTimeout = 180,
connDeleteDeliveryTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
helloTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
quotaExceededTimeout = 7 * nominalDay,
commandQuotaRetryInterval = RetryInterval {initialInterval = 30_000000, increaseAfter = 0, maxInterval = 3600_000000},
persistErrorInterval = 3, -- seconds
initialCleanupDelay = 30 * 1000000, -- 30 seconds
cleanupInterval = 5 * 60 * 1000000, -- 5 minutes
@@ -257,19 +238,16 @@ defaultAgentConfig =
xftpConsecutiveRetries = 3,
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = 200,
deleteErrorCount = 10,
keepAddressKeys = 3,
ntfCron = 20, -- minutes
ntfBatchSize = 150,
ntfSubFirstCheckInterval = nominalDay,
ntfSubCheckInterval = 3 * nominalDay,
subsBatchSize = 1350,
maxPendingSubscriptions = 35000,
-- CA certificate private key is not needed for initialization
-- ! we do not generate these
caCertificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/ca.crt",
privateKeyFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.key",
certificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.crt",
rcvExpireCount = 8,
rcvExpireInterval = nominalDay,
e2eEncryptVRange = supportedE2EEncryptVRange,
smpAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange,
smpClientVRange = supportedSMPClientVRange
+77 -274
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DerivingStrategies #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DerivingVia #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
@@ -41,8 +40,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
VersionSMPA,
VersionRangeSMPA,
pattern VersionSMPA,
duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion,
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion,
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion,
pqdrSMPAgentVersion,
sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion,
ratchetOnConfSMPAgentVersion,
rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion,
currentSMPAgentVersion,
supportedSMPAgentVRange,
e2eEncConnInfoLength,
@@ -51,10 +54,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
-- * SMP agent protocol types
ConnInfo,
SndQueueSecured,
UseRatchetKeys,
AEntityId,
ACommand (..),
JoinRequest (..),
AEvent (..),
AEvt (..),
ACommandTag (..),
@@ -79,7 +80,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
SMPConfirmation (..),
AgentMsgEnvelope (..),
AgentMessage (..),
RequestSignature (..),
AgentMessageType (..),
APrivHeader (..),
AMessage (..),
@@ -107,9 +107,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
ConnectionModeI (..),
ConnectionRequestUri (..),
AConnectionRequestUri (..),
BinaryConnectionRequestUri (..),
ABinaryConnectionRequestUri (..),
binaryConnReq,
ShortLinkCreds (..),
ConnReqUriData (..),
CRClientData,
@@ -121,18 +118,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
UserConnLinkData (..),
UserContactData (..),
UserLinkData (..),
AddressRatchetKeys,
NewRatchetKeys,
DRInvitation (..),
RatchetKeyId (..),
OwnerAuth (..),
OwnerId,
ConnectionLink (..),
AConnectionLink (..),
SimplexNameInfo (..),
SimplexDomain (..),
SimplexTLD (..),
SimplexNameType (..),
ConnShortLink (..),
AConnShortLink (..),
CreatedConnLink (..),
@@ -144,30 +133,22 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
validateOwners,
validateLinkOwners,
sameConnReqContact,
sameConnShortLink,
sameShortLinkContact,
sameShortLinkInv,
simplexChat,
connReqUriP',
simplexConnReqUri,
simplexShortLink,
fullDomainName,
shortNameInfoStr,
AgentErrorType (..),
CommandErrorType (..),
ConnectionErrorType (..),
BrokerErrorType (..),
SMPAgentError (..),
AgentServiceError (..),
DroppedMsg (..),
AgentCryptoError (..),
cryptoErrToSyncState,
ATransmission,
ConnId,
ConfirmationId,
InvitationId,
ConnVerifyCodes (..),
ContactRequestBinding (..),
MsgIntegrity (..),
MsgErrorType (..),
QueueStatus (..),
@@ -210,7 +191,6 @@ import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
import Data.Char (toLower, toUpper)
import Data.Foldable (find)
import Data.Functor (($>))
@@ -230,7 +210,7 @@ import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Typeable (Typeable)
import Data.Word (Word16, Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), GrantedStorageTime)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types (FileErrorType)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
@@ -241,17 +221,14 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
( InitialKeys (..),
PQEncryption (..),
PQSupport,
RatchetX448,
RcvE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri,
SndE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams,
pattern PQSupportOff,
pattern PQSupportOn,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.SimplexName (SimplexDomain (..), SimplexNameInfo (..), SimplexNameType (..), SimplexTLD (..), fullDomainName, shortNameInfoStr)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( AProtocolType,
@@ -302,7 +279,6 @@ import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
-- 5 - post-quantum double ratchet (3/14/2024)
-- 6 - secure reply queues with provided keys (6/14/2024)
-- 7 - initialize ratchet on processing confirmation (7/18/2024)
-- 8 - agent RPC and double ratchet PQ encryption from first message to contact address (8/01/2026)
data SMPAgentVersion
@@ -315,20 +291,29 @@ type VersionRangeSMPA = VersionRange SMPAgentVersion
pattern VersionSMPA :: Word16 -> VersionSMPA
pattern VersionSMPA v = Version v
_sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
_sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 6
duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 2
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 3
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 4
pqdrSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
pqdrSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 5
sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 6
ratchetOnConfSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
ratchetOnConfSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 7
rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 8
minSupportedSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
minSupportedSMPAgentVersion = _sndAuthKeySMPAgentVersion
minSupportedSMPAgentVersion = duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion
currentSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
currentSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 8
currentSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 7
supportedSMPAgentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA
supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange minSupportedSMPAgentVersion currentSMPAgentVersion
@@ -336,17 +321,17 @@ supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange minSupportedSMPAgentVersion currentSMPA
-- it is shorter to allow all handshake headers,
-- including E2E (double-ratchet) parameters and
-- signing key of the sender for the server
e2eEncConnInfoLength :: PQSupport -> Int
e2eEncConnInfoLength = \case
e2eEncConnInfoLength :: VersionSMPA -> PQSupport -> Int
e2eEncConnInfoLength v = \case
-- reduced by 3726 (roughly the increase of message ratchet header size + key and ciphertext in reply link)
PQSupportOn -> 11106
PQSupportOff -> 14832
PQSupportOn | v >= pqdrSMPAgentVersion -> 11106
_ -> 14832
e2eEncAgentMsgLength :: PQSupport -> Int
e2eEncAgentMsgLength = \case
e2eEncAgentMsgLength :: VersionSMPA -> PQSupport -> Int
e2eEncAgentMsgLength v = \case
-- reduced by 2222 (the increase of message ratchet header size)
PQSupportOn -> 13618
PQSupportOff -> 15840
PQSupportOn | v >= pqdrSMPAgentVersion -> 13618
_ -> 15840
-- | SMP agent event
type ATransmission = (ACorrId, AEntityId, AEvt)
@@ -398,18 +383,13 @@ type ConnInfo = ByteString
type SndQueueSecured = Bool
type UseRatchetKeys = Bool
-- | Parameterized type for SMP agent events
data AEvent (e :: AEntity) where
INV :: AConnectionRequestUri -> AEvent AEConn
LINK :: ConnShortLink 'CMContact -> UserConnLinkData 'CMContact -> AEvent AEConn
LDATA :: FixedLinkData 'CMContact -> ConnLinkData 'CMContact -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> AEvent AEConn
LDATA :: FixedLinkData 'CMContact -> ConnLinkData 'CMContact -> AEvent AEConn
CONF :: ConfirmationId -> PQSupport -> [SMPServer] -> ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender, [SMPServer] will be empty only in v1 handshake
REQ :: InvitationId -> PQSupport -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> ContactRequestBinding -> Bool -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender; Bool - rejection reason can be sent
SREQ :: InvitationId -> Maybe C.PublicKeyEd25519 -> MsgBody -> AEvent AEConn
SSENT :: AgentMsgId -> Maybe SMPServer -> AEvent AEConn
RJCT :: ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn
REQ :: InvitationId -> PQSupport -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender
INFO :: PQSupport -> ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn
CON :: PQEncryption -> AEvent AEConn -- notification that connection is established
END :: AEvent AEConn
@@ -446,7 +426,7 @@ data AEvent (e :: AEntity) where
RFERR :: AgentErrorType -> AEvent AERcvFile
RFWARN :: AgentErrorType -> AEvent AERcvFile
SFPROG :: Int64 -> Int64 -> AEvent AESndFile
SFDONE :: ValidFileDescription 'FSender -> [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient] -> Maybe GrantedStorageTime -> AEvent AESndFile
SFDONE :: ValidFileDescription 'FSender -> [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient] -> AEvent AESndFile
SFERR :: AgentErrorType -> AEvent AESndFile
SFWARN :: AgentErrorType -> AEvent AESndFile
@@ -464,15 +444,15 @@ instance Eq AEvtTag where
deriving instance Show AEvtTag
data ACommand
= NEW Bool AConnectionMode InitialKeys SubscriptionMode UseRatchetKeys -- response INV
= NEW Bool AConnectionMode InitialKeys SubscriptionMode -- response INV
| LSET (UserConnLinkData 'CMContact) (Maybe CRClientData) -- response LINK
| LGET (ConnShortLink 'CMContact) -- response LDATA
| JOIN JoinRequest SubscriptionMode ConnInfo
| JOIN Bool AConnectionRequestUri PQSupport SubscriptionMode ConnInfo
| LET ConfirmationId ConnInfo -- ConnInfo is from client
| ACK AgentMsgId (Maybe MsgReceiptInfo)
| SWCH
| DEL
deriving (Show)
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ACommandTag
= NEW_
@@ -491,9 +471,6 @@ data AEventTag (e :: AEntity) where
LDATA_ :: AEventTag AEConn
CONF_ :: AEventTag AEConn
REQ_ :: AEventTag AEConn
SREQ_ :: AEventTag AEConn
SSENT_ :: AEventTag AEConn
RJCT_ :: AEventTag AEConn
INFO_ :: AEventTag AEConn
CON_ :: AEventTag AEConn
END_ :: AEventTag AEConn
@@ -557,9 +534,6 @@ aEventTag = \case
LDATA {} -> LDATA_
CONF {} -> CONF_
REQ {} -> REQ_
SREQ {} -> SREQ_
SSENT {} -> SSENT_
RJCT {} -> RJCT_
INFO {} -> INFO_
CON _ -> CON_
END -> END_
@@ -641,22 +615,16 @@ instance FromJSON RcvSwitchStatus where
data SndSwitchStatus
= SSSendingQKEY
| SSSendingQTEST
| SSSecuringQueue
| SSSendingQEND
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding SndSwitchStatus where
strEncode = \case
SSSendingQKEY -> "sending_qkey"
SSSendingQTEST -> "sending_qtest"
SSSecuringQueue -> "securing_queue"
SSSendingQEND -> "sending_qend"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"sending_qkey" -> pure SSSendingQKEY
"sending_qtest" -> pure SSSendingQTEST
"securing_queue" -> pure SSSecuringQueue
"sending_qend" -> pure SSSendingQEND
_ -> fail "bad SndSwitchStatus"
instance ToField SndSwitchStatus where toField = toField . decodeLatin1 . strEncode
@@ -830,12 +798,6 @@ data MsgMeta = MsgMeta
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data DroppedMsg = DroppedMsg
{ brokerTs :: UTCTime,
attempts :: Int
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SMPConfirmation = SMPConfirmation
{ -- | sender's public key to use for authentication of sender's commands at the recepient's server
senderKey :: Maybe SndPublicAuthKey,
@@ -865,12 +827,6 @@ data AgentMsgEnvelope
connReq :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation,
connInfo :: ByteString -- this message is only encrypted with per-queue E2E, not with double ratchet,
}
| AgentContactRequest -- DR request to a contact address that published DR keys: a contact invitation or a service (RPC) request
{ agentVersion :: VersionSMPA,
e2eSndParams :: SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448,
ratchetKeyId :: RatchetKeyId,
encConnInfo :: ByteString
}
| AgentRatchetKey
{ agentVersion :: VersionSMPA,
e2eEncryption :: RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448,
@@ -886,8 +842,6 @@ instance Encoding AgentMsgEnvelope where
smpEncode (agentVersion, 'M', Tail encAgentMessage)
AgentInvitation {agentVersion, connReq, connInfo} ->
smpEncode (agentVersion, 'I', Large $ strEncode connReq, Tail connInfo)
AgentContactRequest {agentVersion, e2eSndParams, ratchetKeyId, encConnInfo} ->
smpEncode (agentVersion, 'A', e2eSndParams, ratchetKeyId, Tail encConnInfo)
AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info} ->
smpEncode (agentVersion, 'R', e2eEncryption, Tail info)
smpP = do
@@ -903,22 +857,12 @@ instance Encoding AgentMsgEnvelope where
connReq <- strDecode . unLarge <$?> smpP
Tail connInfo <- smpP
pure AgentInvitation {agentVersion, connReq, connInfo}
'A' -> do
(e2eSndParams, ratchetKeyId, Tail encConnInfo) <- smpP
pure AgentContactRequest {agentVersion, e2eSndParams, ratchetKeyId, encConnInfo}
'R' -> do
e2eEncryption <- smpP
Tail info <- smpP
pure AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion, e2eEncryption, info}
_ -> fail "bad AgentMsgEnvelope"
data RequestSignature = RequestSignature C.PublicKeyEd25519 (C.Signature 'C.Ed25519)
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Encoding RequestSignature where
smpEncode (RequestSignature k sig) = smpEncode (k, sig)
smpP = RequestSignature <$> smpP <*> smpP
-- SMP agent message formats (after double ratchet decryption,
-- or in case of AgentInvitation - in plain text body)
-- AgentRatchetInfo is not encrypted with double ratchet, but with per-queue E2E encryption
@@ -930,9 +874,6 @@ data AgentMessage
AgentConnInfoReply (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) ConnInfo
| AgentRatchetInfo ByteString
| AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage
| AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) (Maybe RequestSignature) MsgBody
| AgentServiceResponse MsgBody
| AgentRejection ByteString
deriving (Show)
instance Encoding AgentMessage where
@@ -941,18 +882,12 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
AgentConnInfoReply smpQueues cInfo -> smpEncode ('D', smpQueues, Tail cInfo) -- 'D' stands for "duplex"
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', Tail info)
AgentMessage hdr aMsg -> smpEncode ('M', hdr, aMsg)
AgentServiceRequest qs sig_ body -> smpEncode ('A', qs, sig_, Tail body)
AgentServiceResponse body -> smpEncode ('P', Tail body)
AgentRejection reason -> smpEncode ('J', Tail reason)
smpP =
smpP >>= \case
'I' -> AgentConnInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'D' -> AgentConnInfoReply <$> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'M' -> AgentMessage <$> smpP <*> smpP
'A' -> AgentServiceRequest <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'P' -> AgentServiceResponse . unTail <$> smpP
'J' -> AgentRejection . unTail <$> smpP
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessage"
-- internal type for storing message type in the database
@@ -968,11 +903,7 @@ data AgentMessageType
| AM_QKEY_
| AM_QUSE_
| AM_QTEST_
| AM_QEND_
| AM_EREADY_
| AM_SRV_REQ
| AM_SRV_RESP
| AM_RJCT
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Encoding AgentMessageType where
@@ -988,11 +919,7 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessageType where
AM_QKEY_ -> "QK"
AM_QUSE_ -> "QU"
AM_QTEST_ -> "QT"
AM_QEND_ -> "QE"
AM_EREADY_ -> "E"
AM_SRV_REQ -> "A"
AM_SRV_RESP -> "P"
AM_RJCT -> "J"
smpP =
A.anyChar >>= \case
'C' -> pure AM_CONN_INFO
@@ -1008,12 +935,8 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessageType where
'K' -> pure AM_QKEY_
'U' -> pure AM_QUSE_
'T' -> pure AM_QTEST_
'E' -> pure AM_QEND_
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessageType"
'E' -> pure AM_EREADY_
'A' -> pure AM_SRV_REQ
'P' -> pure AM_SRV_RESP
'J' -> pure AM_RJCT
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessageType"
agentMessageType :: AgentMessage -> AgentMessageType
@@ -1022,9 +945,6 @@ agentMessageType = \case
AgentConnInfoReply {} -> AM_CONN_INFO_REPLY
AgentRatchetInfo _ -> AM_RATCHET_INFO
AgentMessage _ aMsg -> aMessageType aMsg
AgentServiceRequest {} -> AM_SRV_REQ
AgentServiceResponse {} -> AM_SRV_RESP
AgentRejection {} -> AM_RJCT
data APrivHeader = APrivHeader
{ -- | sequential ID assigned by the sending agent
@@ -1048,7 +968,6 @@ data AMsgType
| QKEY_
| QUSE_
| QTEST_
| QEND_
| EREADY_
deriving (Eq)
@@ -1062,7 +981,6 @@ instance Encoding AMsgType where
QKEY_ -> "QK"
QUSE_ -> "QU"
QTEST_ -> "QT"
QEND_ -> "QE"
EREADY_ -> "E"
smpP =
A.anyChar >>= \case
@@ -1076,7 +994,6 @@ instance Encoding AMsgType where
'K' -> pure QKEY_
'U' -> pure QUSE_
'T' -> pure QTEST_
'E' -> pure QEND_
_ -> fail "bad AMsgType"
'E' -> pure EREADY_
_ -> fail "bad AMsgType"
@@ -1101,8 +1018,6 @@ data AMessage
QUSE (NonEmpty (SndQAddr, Bool))
| -- sent by the sender to test new queues and to complete switching
QTEST (NonEmpty SndQAddr)
| -- sent by the sender to remove queues from the connection (fast rotation, v8)
QEND (NonEmpty SndQAddr)
| -- ratchet re-synchronization is complete, with last decrypted sender message id (recipient's `last_external_snd_msg_id`)
EREADY AgentMsgId
deriving (Show)
@@ -1121,7 +1036,6 @@ aMessageType = \case
QKEY _ -> AM_QKEY_
QUSE _ -> AM_QUSE_
QTEST _ -> AM_QTEST_
QEND _ -> AM_QEND_
EREADY _ -> AM_EREADY_
-- | this type is used to send as part of the protocol between different clients
@@ -1174,7 +1088,6 @@ instance Encoding AMessage where
QKEY qs -> smpEncode (QKEY_, qs)
QUSE qs -> smpEncode (QUSE_, qs)
QTEST qs -> smpEncode (QTEST_, qs)
QEND qs -> smpEncode (QEND_, qs)
EREADY lastDecryptedMsgId -> smpEncode (EREADY_, lastDecryptedMsgId)
smpP =
smpP
@@ -1187,7 +1100,6 @@ instance Encoding AMessage where
QKEY_ -> QKEY <$> smpP
QUSE_ -> QUSE <$> smpP
QTEST_ -> QTEST <$> smpP
QEND_ -> QEND <$> smpP
EREADY_ -> EREADY <$> smpP
instance ToField AMessage where toField = toField . Binary . smpEncode
@@ -1203,13 +1115,11 @@ instance Encoding AMessageReceipt where
instance ConnectionModeI m => StrEncoding (ConnectionRequestUri m) where
strEncode = \case
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> crEncode "invitation" crData (Just e2eParams, Nothing)
CRContactUri crData rks -> crEncode "contact" crData $ case rks of
Just (ratchetKeyId, e2eRcvParams) -> (Just e2eRcvParams, Just ratchetKeyId)
Nothing -> (Nothing, Nothing)
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> crEncode "invitation" crData (Just e2eParams)
CRContactUri crData -> crEncode "contact" crData Nothing
where
crEncode :: ByteString -> ConnReqUriData -> (Maybe (RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448), Maybe RatchetKeyId) -> ByteString
crEncode crMode ConnReqUriData {crScheme, crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData} (e2eParams, rk) =
crEncode :: ByteString -> ConnReqUriData -> Maybe (RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448) -> ByteString
crEncode crMode ConnReqUriData {crScheme, crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData} e2eParams =
strEncode crScheme <> "/" <> crMode <> "#/?" <> queryStr
where
queryStr =
@@ -1217,24 +1127,23 @@ instance ConnectionModeI m => StrEncoding (ConnectionRequestUri m) where
-- semicolon is used to separate SMP queues because comma is used to separate server address hostnames
[("v", strEncode crAgentVRange), ("smp", B.intercalate ";" $ map strEncode $ L.toList crSmpQueues)]
<> maybe [] (\e2e -> [("e2e", strEncode e2e)]) e2eParams
<> maybe [] (\k -> [("rk", strEncode k)]) rk
<> maybe [] (\cd -> [("data", encodeUtf8 cd)]) crClientData
strP = connReqUriP' (Just SSSimplex)
instance ConnectionModeI m => Encoding (BinaryConnectionRequestUri m) where
instance ConnectionModeI m => Encoding (ConnectionRequestUri m) where
smpEncode = \case
BCRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> smpEncode (CMInvitation, crData, e2eParams)
BCRContactUri crData -> smpEncode (CMContact, crData)
smpP = (\(ABCR _ cr) -> checkConnMode cr) <$?> smpP
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> smpEncode (CMInvitation, crData, e2eParams)
CRContactUri crData -> smpEncode (CMContact, crData)
smpP = (\(ACR _ cr) -> checkConnMode cr) <$?> smpP
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
instance Encoding ABinaryConnectionRequestUri where
smpEncode (ABCR _ cr) = smpEncode cr
instance Encoding AConnectionRequestUri where
smpEncode (ACR _ cr) = smpEncode cr
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
smpP =
smpP >>= \case
CMInvitation -> ABCR SCMInvitation <$> (BCRInvitationUri <$> smpP <*> smpP)
CMContact -> ABCR SCMContact . BCRContactUri <$> smpP
CMInvitation -> ACR SCMInvitation <$> (CRInvitationUri <$> smpP <*> smpP)
CMContact -> ACR SCMContact . CRContactUri <$> smpP
instance Encoding ConnReqUriData where
smpEncode ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData} =
@@ -1277,10 +1186,7 @@ connReqUriP overrideScheme = do
pure . ACR SCMInvitation $ CRInvitationUri crData crE2eParams
-- contact links are adjusted to the minimum version supported by the agent
-- to preserve compatibility with the old links published online
CMContact -> do
e2e_ <- queryParam_ "e2e" query
rk_ <- queryParam_ "rk" query
pure . ACR SCMContact $ CRContactUri crData {crAgentVRange = adjustAgentVRange aVRange} ((,) <$> rk_ <*> e2e_)
CMContact -> pure . ACR SCMContact $ CRContactUri crData {crAgentVRange = adjustAgentVRange aVRange}
where
crModeP = "invitation" $> CMInvitation <|> "contact" $> CMContact
-- semicolon is used to separate SMP queues because comma is used to separate server address hostnames
@@ -1374,15 +1280,6 @@ type ConfirmationId = ByteString
type InvitationId = ByteString
data ConnVerifyCodes = ConnVerifyCodes
{ codeAD :: ByteString,
codePQ :: Maybe ByteString
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ContactRequestBinding = CRBRatchet ConnVerifyCodes | CRBRequest ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
extraSMPServerHosts :: Map TransportHost TransportHost
extraSMPServerHosts =
M.fromList
@@ -1415,7 +1312,6 @@ sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
data SMPQueueInfo = SMPQueueInfo {clientVersion :: VersionSMPC, queueAddress :: SMPQueueAddress}
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving (ToJSON, FromJSON) via (StrJSON "SMPQueueInfo" SMPQueueInfo)
instance Encoding SMPQueueInfo where
smpEncode (SMPQueueInfo clientVersion SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey, queueMode})
@@ -1521,10 +1417,6 @@ instance StrEncoding SMPQueueUri where
_ -> Nothing
pure (vr, maybe [] thList_ hs_, dhKey, queueMode)
instance StrEncoding SMPQueueInfo where
strEncode (SMPQueueInfo v addr) = strEncode (SMPQueueUri (versionToRange v) addr)
strP = (\(SMPQueueUri vr addr) -> SMPQueueInfo (maxVersion vr) addr) <$> strP
instance Encoding SMPQueueUri where
smpEncode (SMPQueueUri clientVRange@(VersionRange minV maxV) SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey, queueMode})
-- The condition is for minVersion as earlier clients won't be able to support it.
@@ -1544,30 +1436,16 @@ instance Encoding SMPQueueUri where
queueModeP :: Parser (Maybe QueueMode)
queueModeP = Just <$> smpP <|> optional ((\case True -> QMMessaging; _ -> QMContact) <$> smpP)
data BinaryConnectionRequestUri (m :: ConnectionMode) where
BCRInvitationUri :: ConnReqUriData -> RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448 -> BinaryConnectionRequestUri CMInvitation
BCRContactUri :: ConnReqUriData -> BinaryConnectionRequestUri CMContact
deriving instance Eq (BinaryConnectionRequestUri m)
deriving instance Show (BinaryConnectionRequestUri m)
data ABinaryConnectionRequestUri = forall m. ConnectionModeI m => ABCR (SConnectionMode m) (BinaryConnectionRequestUri m)
data ConnectionRequestUri (m :: ConnectionMode) where
CRInvitationUri :: ConnReqUriData -> RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448 -> ConnectionRequestUri CMInvitation
-- optional contact address DR keys for double ratchet e2e from message 1
CRContactUri :: ConnReqUriData -> Maybe AddressRatchetKeys -> ConnectionRequestUri CMContact
-- contact connection request does NOT contain E2E encryption parameters for double ratchet -
-- they are passed in AgentInvitation message
CRContactUri :: ConnReqUriData -> ConnectionRequestUri CMContact
simplexConnReqUri :: ConnectionRequestUri m -> ConnectionRequestUri m
simplexConnReqUri = \case
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> CRInvitationUri crData {crScheme = SSSimplex} e2eParams
CRContactUri crData rk -> CRContactUri crData {crScheme = SSSimplex} rk
binaryConnReq :: ConnectionRequestUri m -> BinaryConnectionRequestUri m
binaryConnReq = \case
CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> BCRInvitationUri crData e2eParams
CRContactUri crData _ -> BCRContactUri crData
CRContactUri crData -> CRContactUri crData {crScheme = SSSimplex}
deriving instance Eq (ConnectionRequestUri m)
@@ -1625,12 +1503,9 @@ data PreparedLinkParams = PreparedLinkParams
-- | smpEncode of FixedLinkData (includes linkEntityId)
plpSignedFixedData :: ByteString,
-- | Server with basic auth (not stored in link)
plpSrvWithAuth :: SMPServerWithAuth,
-- | Initial PQ keys
plpInitKeys :: InitialKeys,
-- | Contact address double ratchet keys
plpAddressKeys :: Maybe (RatchetKeyId, RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448)
plpSrvWithAuth :: SMPServerWithAuth
}
deriving (Show)
instance ConnectionModeI c => ToField (ConnectionLink c) where toField = toField . Binary . strEncode
@@ -1800,10 +1675,6 @@ ctTypeChar = \case
CCTRelay -> 'R'
{-# INLINE ctTypeChar #-}
instance StrEncoding ContactConnType where
strEncode = B.singleton . ctTypeChar
strP = A.anyChar >>= ctTypeP
-- the servers passed to this function should be all preset servers, not servers configured by the user.
shortenShortLink :: NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnShortLink m -> ConnShortLink m
shortenShortLink presetSrvs = \case
@@ -1842,26 +1713,15 @@ findPresetServer ProtocolServer {host = h :| _} = find (\ProtocolServer {host =
{-# INLINE findPresetServer #-}
sameConnReqContact :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> Bool
sameConnReqContact (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = qs} _) (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = qs'} _) =
sameConnReqContact (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = qs}) (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crSmpQueues = qs'}) =
L.length qs == L.length qs' && all same (L.zip qs qs')
where
same (q, q') = sameQAddress (qAddress q) (qAddress q')
sameConnShortLink :: AConnShortLink -> AConnShortLink -> Bool
sameConnShortLink (ACSL m sl) (ACSL m' sl') = case testEquality m m' of
Just Refl -> case sl of
CSLContact {} -> sameShortLinkContact sl sl'
CSLInvitation {} -> sameShortLinkInv sl sl'
Nothing -> False
sameShortLinkContact :: ConnShortLink 'CMContact -> ConnShortLink 'CMContact -> Bool
sameShortLinkContact (CSLContact _ ct srv k) (CSLContact _ ct' srv' k') =
ct == ct' && sameSrvAddr srv srv' && k == k'
sameShortLinkInv :: ConnShortLink 'CMInvitation -> ConnShortLink 'CMInvitation -> Bool
sameShortLinkInv (CSLInvitation _ srv lnkId k) (CSLInvitation _ srv' lnkId' k') =
sameSrvAddr srv srv' && lnkId == lnkId' && k == k'
checkConnMode :: forall t m m'. (ConnectionModeI m, ConnectionModeI m') => t m' -> Either String (t m)
checkConnMode c = case testEquality (sConnectionMode @m) (sConnectionMode @m') of
Just Refl -> Right c
@@ -1881,7 +1741,7 @@ type CRClientData = Text
data FixedLinkData c = FixedLinkData
{ agentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA,
rootKey :: C.PublicKeyEd25519,
linkConnReq :: BinaryConnectionRequestUri c,
linkConnReq :: ConnectionRequestUri c,
linkEntityId :: Maybe ByteString
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -1894,31 +1754,6 @@ deriving instance Eq (ConnLinkData c)
deriving instance Show (ConnLinkData c)
newtype RatchetKeyId = RatchetKeyId ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving newtype (Encoding, StrEncoding)
-- | double ratchet keys in contact address
type AddressRatchetKeys = (RatchetKeyId, RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448)
-- | Whether to rotate double ratchet keys in contact address
type NewRatchetKeys = Bool
-- | stored invitation with double ratchet keys
data DRInvitation = DRInvitation
{ ratchetState :: RatchetX448,
replyQueue :: SMPQueueInfo,
agentVersion :: VersionSMPA,
pqSupport :: PQSupport
}
deriving (Show)
data JoinRequest
= JRConnReq {enableNtfs :: Bool, joinConnReq :: AConnectionRequestUri, joinPQSupport :: PQSupport}
| JRServiceReq {contactReq :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact, joinPQSupport :: PQSupport, requestKey :: Maybe (C.StoredPrivateKey C.Ed25519)}
| JRInvitationDR DRInvitation
deriving (Show)
data UserContactData = UserContactData
{ -- direct connection via connReq in fixed data is allowed.
direct :: Bool,
@@ -1926,8 +1761,7 @@ data UserContactData = UserContactData
owners :: [OwnerAuth],
-- alternative addresses of chat relays that receive requests for this contact address.
relays :: [ConnShortLink 'CMContact],
userData :: UserLinkData,
ratchetKeys :: Maybe AddressRatchetKeys
userData :: UserLinkData
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -2005,12 +1839,10 @@ validateLinkOwners rootKey = go []
instance ConnectionModeI c => Encoding (FixedLinkData c) where
smpEncode FixedLinkData {agentVRange, rootKey, linkConnReq, linkEntityId} =
-- TODO this encoding is not extensible, replace with smpEncode (fromMaybe "" linkEntityId) - safe to do it in 2027
smpEncode (agentVRange, rootKey, linkConnReq) <> maybe "" smpEncode linkEntityId
smpP = do
(agentVRange, rootKey, linkConnReq) <- smpP
linkEntityId <- ((\s -> if B.null s then Nothing else Just s) =<<) <$> optional smpP
_ <- A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding (added in January 2026)
linkEntityId <- optional smpP <* A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding
pure FixedLinkData {agentVRange, rootKey, linkConnReq, linkEntityId}
instance ConnectionModeI c => Encoding (ConnLinkData c) where
@@ -2057,13 +1889,14 @@ instance ConnectionModeI c => StrEncoding (UserConnLinkData c) where
{-# INLINE strP #-}
instance Encoding UserContactData where
smpEncode UserContactData {direct, owners, relays, userData, ratchetKeys} =
smpEncode (direct, EncList owners, EncList relays, userData, ratchetKeys)
smpEncode UserContactData {direct, owners, relays, userData} =
B.concat [smpEncode direct, smpEncodeList owners, smpEncodeList relays, smpEncode userData]
smpP = do
(direct, EncList owners, EncList relays, userData) <- smpP
ratchetKeys <- smpP <|> pure Nothing
_ <- A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding
pure UserContactData {direct, owners, relays, userData, ratchetKeys}
direct <- smpP
owners <- smpListP
relays <- smpListP
userData <- smpP <* A.takeByteString -- ignoring tail for forward compatibility with the future link data encoding
pure UserContactData {direct, owners, relays, userData}
instance Encoding UserLinkData where
smpEncode (UserLinkData s) = if B.length s <= 254 then smpEncode s else smpEncode ('\255', Large s)
@@ -2151,9 +1984,6 @@ data AgentErrorType
XFTP {serverAddress :: String, xftpErr :: XFTPErrorType}
| -- | XFTP agent errors
FILE {fileErr :: FileErrorType}
| -- | no name-resolving servers configured for the user (agent-origin).
-- Server-origin name errors arrive forwarded as SMP _ (NAME ...) instead.
NO_NAME_SERVERS
| -- | SMP proxy errors
PROXY {proxyServer :: String, relayServer :: String, proxyErr :: ProxyClientError}
| -- | XRCP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
@@ -2211,7 +2041,7 @@ data ConnectionErrorType
-- | Errors of another SMP agent.
data SMPAgentError
= -- | client or agent message that failed to parse
A_MESSAGE {messageErr :: String}
A_MESSAGE
| -- | prohibited SMP/agent message
A_PROHIBITED {prohibitedErr :: String}
| -- | incompatible version of SMP client, agent or encryption protocols
@@ -2220,22 +2050,12 @@ data SMPAgentError
A_LINK {linkErr :: String}
| -- | cannot decrypt message
A_CRYPTO {cryptoErr :: AgentCryptoError}
| -- | duplicate message - this error is detected by ratchet decryption - this message will be ignored and not shown.
-- it may also indicate a loss of ratchet synchronization (when only one message is sent via copied ratchet).
-- when message is dropped after too many reception attempts, DroppedMsg is included.
A_DUPLICATE {droppedMsg_ :: Maybe DroppedMsg}
| -- | duplicate message - this error is detected by ratchet decryption - this message will be ignored and not shown
-- it may also indicate a loss of ratchet synchronization (when only one message is sent via copied ratchet)
A_DUPLICATE
| -- | error in the message to add/delete/etc queue in connection
A_QUEUE {queueErr :: String}
| A_SERVICE {serviceError :: AgentServiceError}
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
data AgentServiceError
= ASERejected {rejectReason :: Text}
| ASETimeout
| ASENoPendingRequest
| ASENotDRAddress
| ASEBadSignature
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
data AgentCryptoError
= -- | AES decryption error
@@ -2261,19 +2081,6 @@ cryptoErrToSyncState = \case
RATCHET_SKIPPED _ -> RSRequired
RATCHET_SYNC -> RSRequired
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''DRInvitation)
-- JRConnReq is identical to JOIN before DR support for old/new client compatibility
instance StrEncoding JoinRequest where
strEncode = \case
JRConnReq ntfs cReq pqSup -> strEncode (ntfs, cReq, pqSup)
JRServiceReq cReq pqSup signKey -> strEncode ('S', cReq, pqSup, signKey)
JRInvitationDR dr -> serializeBinary $ LB.toStrict (J'.encode dr)
strP =
(A.char 'S' *> (JRServiceReq <$> _strP <*> _strP <*> _strP))
<|> (JRConnReq <$> strP <*> _strP <*> (_strP <|> pure PQSupportOff))
<|> (JRInvitationDR <$> (J'.eitherDecodeStrict' <$?> (A.take =<< (A.decimal <* "\n"))))
-- | SMP agent command and response parser for commands stored in db (fully parses binary bodies)
dbCommandP :: Parser ACommand
dbCommandP = commandP $ A.take =<< (A.decimal <* "\n")
@@ -2304,11 +2111,10 @@ commandP :: Parser ByteString -> Parser ACommand
commandP binaryP =
strP
>>= \case
-- useDR is a trailing field defaulting to False, so NEW persisted before it was added still parses
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> pqIKP <*> (strP <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> (_strP <|> pure False))
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> pqIKP <*> (strP <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe))
LSET_ -> s (LSET <$> strP <*> optional (A.space *> strP))
LGET_ -> s (LGET <$> strP)
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> (strP_ <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> binaryP)
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> pqSupP <*> (strP_ <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> binaryP)
LET_ -> s (LET <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> binaryP)
ACK_ -> s (ACK <$> A.decimal <*> optional (A.space *> binaryP))
SWCH_ -> pure SWCH
@@ -2318,14 +2124,16 @@ commandP binaryP =
s p = A.space *> p
pqIKP :: Parser InitialKeys
pqIKP = strP_ <|> pure (IKLinkPQ PQSupportOff)
pqSupP :: Parser PQSupport
pqSupP = strP_ <|> pure PQSupportOff
-- | Serialize SMP agent command.
serializeCommand :: ACommand -> ByteString
serializeCommand = \case
NEW ntfs cMode pqIK subMode useDR -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode, pqIK, subMode, useDR)
NEW ntfs cMode pqIK subMode -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode, pqIK, subMode)
LSET uld cd_ -> s (LSET_, uld) <> maybe "" (B.cons ' ' . s) cd_
LGET sl -> s (LGET_, sl)
JOIN joinReq subMode cInfo -> s (JOIN_, joinReq, subMode, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
JOIN ntfs cReq pqSup subMode cInfo -> s (JOIN_, ntfs, cReq, pqSup, subMode, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
LET confId cInfo -> B.unwords [s LET_, confId, serializeBinary cInfo]
ACK mId rcptInfo_ -> s (ACK_, mId) <> maybe "" (B.cons ' ' . serializeBinary) rcptInfo_
SWCH -> s SWCH_
@@ -2357,10 +2165,6 @@ $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ConnectionErrorType)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''AgentCryptoError)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "ASE") ''AgentServiceError)
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''DroppedMsg)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''SMPAgentError)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''AgentErrorType)
@@ -2387,4 +2191,3 @@ instance FromJSON ACreatedConnLink where
instance ToJSON ACreatedConnLink where
toEncoding (ACCL _ ccLink) = toEncoding ccLink
toJSON (ACCL _ ccLink) = toJSON ccLink
+9 -17
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
withRetryInterval,
withRetryIntervalCount,
withRetryForeground,
withRetryInterval2,
withRetryLock2,
updateRetryInterval2,
nextRetryDelay,
@@ -87,24 +86,9 @@ withRetryForeground ri isForeground isOnline action = callAction 0 $ initialInte
| otherwise = (elapsed + delay, nextRetryDelay elapsed' delay ri)
callAction elapsed' delay'
withRetryInterval2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryInterval2 = withRetryWait2 $ liftIO . threadDelay'
-- This function allows action to toggle between slow and fast retry intervals.
withRetryLock2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> TMVar () -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryLock2 ri lock = withRetryWait2 wait ri
where
wait delay = do
waiting <- newTVarIO True
_ <- liftIO . forkIO $ do
threadDelay' delay
atomically $ whenM (readTVar waiting) $ void $ tryPutTMVar lock ()
atomically $ do
takeTMVar lock
writeTVar waiting False
withRetryWait2 :: forall m. Monad m => (Int64 -> m ()) -> RetryInterval2 -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryWait2 wait RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} action =
withRetryLock2 RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} lock action =
callAction (0, initialInterval riSlow) (0, initialInterval riFast)
where
callAction :: (Int64, Int64) -> (Int64, Int64) -> m ()
@@ -118,6 +102,14 @@ withRetryWait2 wait RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} action =
let elapsed' = elapsed + delay
delay' = nextRetryDelay elapsed' delay ri
call (elapsed', delay')
wait delay = do
waiting <- newTVarIO True
_ <- liftIO . forkIO $ do
threadDelay' delay
atomically $ whenM (readTVar waiting) $ void $ tryPutTMVar lock ()
atomically $ do
takeTMVar lock
writeTVar waiting False
nextRetryDelay :: Int64 -> Int64 -> RetryInterval -> Int64
nextRetryDelay elapsed delay RetryInterval {increaseAfter, maxInterval} =
+11 -40
View File
@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
AcceptedConfirmation (..),
NewInvitation (..),
Invitation (..),
ContactRequest (..),
DRInvitation (..),
PrevExternalSndId,
PrevRcvMsgHash,
PrevSndMsgHash,
@@ -207,13 +205,12 @@ rcvSMPQueueAddress :: RcvQueue -> SMPQueueAddress
rcvSMPQueueAddress RcvQueue {server, sndId, e2ePrivKey, queueMode} =
SMPQueueAddress server sndId (C.publicKey e2ePrivKey) queueMode
canAbortRcvSwitch :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Bool
canAbortRcvSwitch ConnData {connAgentVersion} = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchStatus
canAbortRcvSwitch :: RcvQueue -> Bool
canAbortRcvSwitch = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchStatus
where
canAbort = \case
RSSwitchStarted -> True
-- at agent version 8 and above the peer always chooses fast rotation, so a sent QADD is committed
RSSendingQADD -> connAgentVersion < rpcAddressSMPAgentVersion
RSSendingQADD -> True
-- if switch is in RSSendingQUSE, a race condition with sender deleting the original queue is possible
RSSendingQUSE -> False
-- if switch is in RSReceivedMessage status, aborting switch (deleting new queue)
@@ -466,9 +463,7 @@ data ConnData = ConnData
lastExternalSndId :: PrevExternalSndId,
deleted :: Bool,
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState,
pqSupport :: PQSupport,
-- client side: set on the requester's connection for a service request; Nothing otherwise. The time the client stops waiting for the response (created + serviceRequestTimeout or per-call override).
serviceRequestExpiresAt :: Maybe UTCTime
pqSupport :: PQSupport
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -476,8 +471,8 @@ type NoticeId = Int64
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
ratchetSyncAllowed :: ConnData -> Bool
ratchetSyncAllowed ConnData {ratchetSyncState} =
ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState])
ratchetSyncAllowed ConnData {ratchetSyncState, connAgentVersion} =
connAgentVersion >= ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion && (ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState]))
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
ratchetSyncSendProhibited :: ConnData -> Bool
@@ -489,8 +484,7 @@ data PendingCommand = PendingCommand
corrId :: ACorrId,
userId :: UserId,
connId :: ConnId,
command :: AgentCommand,
createdAt :: UTCTime
command :: AgentCommand
}
data AgentCmdType = ACClient | ACInternal
@@ -540,9 +534,7 @@ data InternalCommand
| ICDeleteConn
| ICDeleteRcvQueue SMP.RecipientId
| ICQSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicAuthKey
| ICQSndSecure SMP.SenderId
| ICQDelete SMP.RecipientId
| ICReplyDel
data InternalCommandTag
= ICAck_
@@ -552,9 +544,7 @@ data InternalCommandTag
| ICDeleteConn_
| ICDeleteRcvQueue_
| ICQSecure_
| ICQSndSecure_
| ICQDelete_
| ICReplyDel_
deriving (Show)
instance StrEncoding InternalCommand where
@@ -566,9 +556,7 @@ instance StrEncoding InternalCommand where
ICDeleteConn -> strEncode ICDeleteConn_
ICDeleteRcvQueue rId -> strEncode (ICDeleteRcvQueue_, rId)
ICQSecure rId senderKey -> strEncode (ICQSecure_, rId, senderKey)
ICQSndSecure sId -> strEncode (ICQSndSecure_, sId)
ICQDelete rId -> strEncode (ICQDelete_, rId)
ICReplyDel -> strEncode ICReplyDel_
strP =
strP >>= \case
ICAck_ -> ICAck <$> _strP <*> _strP
@@ -578,9 +566,7 @@ instance StrEncoding InternalCommand where
ICDeleteConn_ -> pure ICDeleteConn
ICDeleteRcvQueue_ -> ICDeleteRcvQueue <$> _strP
ICQSecure_ -> ICQSecure <$> _strP <*> _strP
ICQSndSecure_ -> ICQSndSecure <$> _strP
ICQDelete_ -> ICQDelete <$> _strP
ICReplyDel_ -> pure ICReplyDel
instance StrEncoding InternalCommandTag where
strEncode = \case
@@ -591,9 +577,7 @@ instance StrEncoding InternalCommandTag where
ICDeleteConn_ -> "DELETE_CONN"
ICDeleteRcvQueue_ -> "DELETE_RCV_QUEUE"
ICQSecure_ -> "QSECURE"
ICQSndSecure_ -> "QSND_SECURE"
ICQDelete_ -> "QDELETE"
ICReplyDel_ -> "REPLY_DEL"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"ACK" -> pure ICAck_
@@ -603,9 +587,7 @@ instance StrEncoding InternalCommandTag where
"DELETE_CONN" -> pure ICDeleteConn_
"DELETE_RCV_QUEUE" -> pure ICDeleteRcvQueue_
"QSECURE" -> pure ICQSecure_
"QSND_SECURE" -> pure ICQSndSecure_
"QDELETE" -> pure ICQDelete_
"REPLY_DEL" -> pure ICReplyDel_
_ -> fail "bad InternalCommandTag"
agentCommandTag :: AgentCommand -> AgentCommandTag
@@ -622,9 +604,7 @@ internalCmdTag = \case
ICDeleteConn -> ICDeleteConn_
ICDeleteRcvQueue {} -> ICDeleteRcvQueue_
ICQSecure {} -> ICQSecure_
ICQSndSecure {} -> ICQSndSecure_
ICQDelete _ -> ICQDelete_
ICReplyDel -> ICReplyDel_
-- * Confirmation types
@@ -646,28 +626,19 @@ data AcceptedConfirmation = AcceptedConfirmation
data NewInvitation = NewInvitation
{ contactConnId :: ConnId,
connReq :: ContactRequest,
recipientConnInfo :: ConnInfo,
-- service side: the received request is a service request (SREQ) not a contact request (REQ)
serviceRequest :: Bool
connReq :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation,
recipientConnInfo :: ConnInfo
}
data Invitation = Invitation
{ invitationId :: InvitationId,
contactConnId_ :: Maybe ConnId,
connReq :: ContactRequest,
connReq :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation,
recipientConnInfo :: ConnInfo,
ownConnInfo :: Maybe ConnInfo,
accepted :: Bool,
-- service side: the received request is a service request (SREQ) not a contact request (REQ)
serviceRequest :: Bool,
createdAt :: UTCTime
accepted :: Bool
}
data ContactRequest
= CRInvitation (ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation)
| CRInvitationDR DRInvitation
-- * Message integrity validation types
-- | Corresponds to `last_external_snd_msg_id` in `connections` table
+84 -309
View File
@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
setConnPQSupport,
updateNewConnJoin,
getDeletedConnIds,
getExpiredServiceConns,
deleteExpiredServiceRequests,
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds,
setConnRatchetSync,
addProcessedRatchetKeyHash,
@@ -131,8 +129,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
createSndMsg,
updateSndMsgHash,
createSndMsgDelivery,
copyPendingSndDeliveries,
countSndQueueDeliveries,
getSndMsgViaRcpt,
updateSndMsgRcpt,
getPendingQueueMsg,
@@ -144,7 +140,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
setMsgUserAck,
getRcvMsg,
getLastMsg,
incMsgRcvAttempts,
checkRcvMsgHashExists,
getRcvMsgBrokerTs,
deleteMsg,
@@ -156,17 +151,11 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
createRatchetX3dhKeys,
getRatchetX3dhKeys,
setRatchetX3dhKeys,
createAddressRatchetKeys,
getCurrentAddressRatchetKeys,
getAddressRatchetKeys,
deleteOldAddressRatchetKeys,
createSndRatchet,
getSndRatchet,
createRatchet,
deleteRatchet,
getRatchet,
getRatchetVerifyCodes,
ratchetVerifyCodes,
getRatchetForUpdate,
getSkippedMsgKeys,
updateRatchet,
@@ -215,7 +204,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
-- Rcv files
createRcvFile,
createRcvFileRedirect,
startPreparedRcvFile,
lockRcvFileForUpdate,
getRcvFile,
getRcvFileByEntityId,
@@ -237,7 +225,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
getRcvFilesExpired,
-- Snd files
createSndFile,
startPreparedSndFile,
lockSndFileForUpdate,
getSndFile,
getSndFileByEntityId,
@@ -290,12 +277,9 @@ import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
import Data.Either (partitionEithers)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (foldl', sortBy)
@@ -314,7 +298,7 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Network.TLS as TLS
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), GrantedStorageTime (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval (RI2State (..))
@@ -426,23 +410,23 @@ deleteUsersWithoutConns db = do
forM_ userIds $ DB.execute db "DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id = ?" . Only
pure userIds
createClientService :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> (C.KeyHash, TLS.Credential) -> IO ((C.KeyHash, TLS.Credential), Maybe ServiceId)
createClientService db userId srv tlsCreds@(kh, (cert, pk)) = do
createClientService :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> (C.KeyHash, TLS.Credential) -> IO ()
createClientService db userId srv (kh, (cert, pk)) = do
serverKeyHash_ <- createServer db srv
(rs :: [Only Int]) <-
DB.query
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO client_services
(user_id, host, port, server_key_hash, service_cert_hash, service_cert, service_priv_key)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, host, port, server_key_hash) DO NOTHING
RETURNING 1
|]
(userId, host srv, port srv, serverKeyHash_, kh, cert, pk)
if null rs
then fromMaybe (tlsCreds, Nothing) <$> getClientServiceCredentials db userId srv
else pure (tlsCreds, Nothing)
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO client_services
(user_id, host, port, server_key_hash, service_cert_hash, service_cert, service_priv_key)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, host, port, server_key_hash)
DO UPDATE SET
service_cert_hash = EXCLUDED.service_cert_hash,
service_cert = EXCLUDED.service_cert,
service_priv_key = EXCLUDED.service_priv_key,
service_id = NULL
|]
(userId, host srv, port srv, serverKeyHash_, kh, cert, pk)
getClientServiceCredentials :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> IO (Maybe ((C.KeyHash, TLS.Credential), Maybe ServiceId))
getClientServiceCredentials db userId srv =
@@ -573,16 +557,14 @@ createSndConn db gVar cData q@SndQueue {server} =
insertSndQueue_ db connId q serverKeyHash_
createConnRecord :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ConnData -> SConnectionMode c -> IO ()
createConnRecord db connId ConnData {userId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, pqSupport, serviceRequestExpiresAt} cMode = do
createdAt <- getCurrentTime
createConnRecord db connId ConnData {userId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, pqSupport} cMode =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO connections
(user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs, pq_support, service_request_expires_at, duplex_handshake, created_at)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
(user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs, pq_support, duplex_handshake) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
|]
(userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, BI enableNtfs, pqSupport, serviceRequestExpiresAt, BI True, createdAt)
(userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, BI enableNtfs, pqSupport, BI True)
deleteConnRecord :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO ()
deleteConnRecord db connId = DB.execute db "DELETE FROM connections WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
@@ -885,15 +867,15 @@ removeConfirmations db connId =
(Only connId)
createInvitation :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> NewInvitation -> IO (Either StoreError InvitationId)
createInvitation db gVar NewInvitation {contactConnId, connReq, recipientConnInfo, serviceRequest} =
createInvitation db gVar NewInvitation {contactConnId, connReq, recipientConnInfo} =
createWithRandomId db gVar $ \invitationId ->
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO conn_invitations
(invitation_id, contact_conn_id, cr_invitation, recipient_conn_info, accepted, service_request) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?);
(invitation_id, contact_conn_id, cr_invitation, recipient_conn_info, accepted) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 0);
|]
(Binary invitationId, contactConnId, connReq, Binary recipientConnInfo, BI serviceRequest)
(Binary invitationId, contactConnId, connReq, Binary recipientConnInfo)
getInvitation :: DB.Connection -> String -> InvitationId -> IO (Either StoreError Invitation)
getInvitation db cxt invitationId =
@@ -901,15 +883,15 @@ getInvitation db cxt invitationId =
DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT contact_conn_id, cr_invitation, recipient_conn_info, own_conn_info, accepted, service_request, created_at
SELECT contact_conn_id, cr_invitation, recipient_conn_info, own_conn_info, accepted
FROM conn_invitations
WHERE invitation_id = ?
AND accepted = 0
|]
(Only (Binary invitationId))
where
invitation (contactConnId_, connReq, recipientConnInfo, ownConnInfo, BI accepted, BI serviceRequest, createdAt) =
Invitation {invitationId, contactConnId_, connReq, recipientConnInfo, ownConnInfo, accepted, serviceRequest, createdAt}
invitation (contactConnId_, connReq, recipientConnInfo, ownConnInfo, BI accepted) =
Invitation {invitationId, contactConnId_, connReq, recipientConnInfo, ownConnInfo, accepted}
acceptInvitation :: DB.Connection -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> IO ()
acceptInvitation db invitationId ownConnInfo =
@@ -1048,24 +1030,6 @@ createSndMsgDelivery :: DB.Connection -> SndQueue -> InternalId -> IO ()
createSndMsgDelivery db SndQueue {connId, dbQueueId} msgId =
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO snd_message_deliveries (conn_id, snd_queue_id, internal_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?)" (connId, dbQueueId, msgId)
-- copies every undelivered (failed = 0) delivery from one snd queue to another, for redundant delivery during fast rotation
copyPendingSndDeliveries :: DB.Connection -> SndQueue -> SndQueue -> IO ()
copyPendingSndDeliveries db SndQueue {connId, dbQueueId = fromQueueId} SndQueue {dbQueueId = toQueueId} =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO snd_message_deliveries (conn_id, snd_queue_id, internal_id)
SELECT conn_id, ?, internal_id
FROM snd_message_deliveries
WHERE conn_id = ? AND snd_queue_id = ? AND failed = 0
|]
(toQueueId, connId, fromQueueId)
countSndQueueDeliveries :: DB.Connection -> SndQueue -> IO Int
countSndQueueDeliveries db SndQueue {connId, dbQueueId} =
maybeFirstRow' 0 fromOnly $
DB.query db "SELECT count(1) FROM snd_message_deliveries WHERE conn_id = ? AND snd_queue_id = ? AND failed = 0" (connId, dbQueueId)
getSndMsgViaRcpt :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> InternalSndId -> IO (Either StoreError SndMsg)
getSndMsgViaRcpt db connId sndMsgId =
firstRow toSndMsg (SEMsgNotFound "getSndMsgViaRcpt") $
@@ -1262,19 +1226,6 @@ toRcvMsg ((agentMsgId, internalTs, brokerId, brokerTs) :. (sndMsgId, integrity,
msgReceipt = MsgReceipt <$> rcptInternalId_ <*> rcptStatus_
in RcvMsg {internalId = InternalId agentMsgId, msgMeta, msgType, msgBody, internalHash, msgReceipt, userAck}
incMsgRcvAttempts :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> InternalId -> IO Int
incMsgRcvAttempts db connId (InternalId msgId) =
fromOnly . head
<$> DB.query
db
[sql|
UPDATE rcv_messages
SET receive_attempts = receive_attempts + 1
WHERE conn_id = ? AND internal_id = ?
RETURNING receive_attempts
|]
(connId, msgId)
checkRcvMsgHashExists :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> ByteString -> IO Bool
checkRcvMsgHashExists db connId hash =
maybeFirstRow' False fromOnlyBI $
@@ -1394,11 +1345,11 @@ deleteSndMsgsExpired db ttl limit = do
|]
(cutoffTs, limit)
createRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448 -> IO ()
createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId (x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem) =
createRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams -> IO ()
createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 pqPrivKem =
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)" (connId, x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem)
getRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError (CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448))
getRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448, Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams))
getRatchetX3dhKeys db connId =
firstRow' keys SEX3dhKeysNotFound $
DB.query db "SELECT x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem FROM ratchets WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
@@ -1408,8 +1359,8 @@ getRatchetX3dhKeys db connId =
_ -> Left SEX3dhKeysNotFound
-- used to remember new keys when starting ratchet re-synchronization
setRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448 -> IO ()
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId (x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem) =
setRatchetX3dhKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> Maybe CR.RcvPrivRKEMParams -> IO ()
setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId x3dhPrivKey1 x3dhPrivKey2 pqPrivKem =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
@@ -1419,71 +1370,15 @@ setRatchetX3dhKeys db connId (x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem) =
|]
(x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem, connId)
createAddressRatchetKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> (RatchetKeyId, CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448) -> IO ()
createAddressRatchetKeys db connId (ratchetKeyId, (x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem)) =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO address_ratchet_keys
(conn_id, ratchet_key_id, x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|]
(connId, ratchetKeyId, x3dhPrivKey1, x3dhPrivKey2, pqPrivKem)
getCurrentAddressRatchetKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError (RatchetKeyId, CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448))
getCurrentAddressRatchetKeys db connId =
firstRow (\(Only rkId :. pks) -> (rkId, pks)) SEX3dhKeysNotFound $
DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT ratchet_key_id, x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem
FROM address_ratchet_keys
WHERE conn_id = ?
ORDER BY address_ratchet_key_id DESC
LIMIT 1
|]
(Only connId)
getAddressRatchetKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetKeyId -> IO (Either StoreError (CR.RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448))
getAddressRatchetKeys db connId ratchetKeyId =
firstRow id SEX3dhKeysNotFound $
DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT x3dh_priv_key_1, x3dh_priv_key_2, pq_priv_kem
FROM address_ratchet_keys
WHERE conn_id = ? AND ratchet_key_id = ?
|]
(connId, ratchetKeyId)
deleteOldAddressRatchetKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int -> IO ()
deleteOldAddressRatchetKeys db connId keep =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
DELETE FROM address_ratchet_keys
WHERE conn_id = ?
AND address_ratchet_key_id NOT IN (
SELECT address_ratchet_key_id
FROM address_ratchet_keys
WHERE conn_id = ?
ORDER BY address_ratchet_key_id DESC
LIMIT ?
)
|]
(connId, connId, keep)
createSndRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetX448 -> CR.AE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> IO ()
createSndRatchet db connId ratchetState (CR.AE2ERatchetParams s (CR.E2ERatchetParams _ x3dhPubKey1 x3dhPubKey2 pqPubKem)) =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO ratchets
(conn_id, ratchet_state, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, x3dh_pub_key_1, x3dh_pub_key_2, pq_pub_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
(conn_id, ratchet_state, x3dh_pub_key_1, x3dh_pub_key_2, pq_pub_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (conn_id) DO UPDATE SET
ratchet_state = EXCLUDED.ratchet_state,
rc_verify_code_ad = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_ad,
rc_verify_code_pq = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_pq,
x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL,
x3dh_pub_key_1 = EXCLUDED.x3dh_pub_key_1,
@@ -1491,13 +1386,7 @@ createSndRatchet db connId ratchetState (CR.AE2ERatchetParams s (CR.E2ERatchetPa
pq_priv_kem = NULL,
pq_pub_kem = EXCLUDED.pq_pub_kem
|]
((connId, ratchetState) :. verifyCodesRow (ratchetVerifyCodes ratchetState) :. (x3dhPubKey1, x3dhPubKey2, CR.ARKP s <$> pqPubKem))
ratchetVerifyCodes :: RatchetX448 -> ConnVerifyCodes
ratchetVerifyCodes CR.Ratchet {rcAD, rcVCPQ} = ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD = C.sha256Hash $ unStr rcAD, codePQ = unStr <$> rcVCPQ}
verifyCodesRow :: ConnVerifyCodes -> (Binary ByteString, Maybe (Binary ByteString))
verifyCodesRow ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD, codePQ} = (Binary codeAD, Binary <$> codePQ)
(connId, ratchetState, x3dhPubKey1, x3dhPubKey2, CR.ARKP s <$> pqPubKem)
getSndRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.VersionE2E -> IO (Either StoreError (RatchetX448, CR.AE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448))
getSndRatchet db connId v =
@@ -1518,12 +1407,10 @@ createRatchet db connId rc =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, ratchet_state, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, ratchet_state)
VALUES (?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (conn_id) DO UPDATE SET
ratchet_state = EXCLUDED.ratchet_state,
rc_verify_code_ad = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_ad,
rc_verify_code_pq = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_pq,
ratchet_state = ?,
x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL,
x3dh_pub_key_1 = NULL,
@@ -1531,42 +1418,7 @@ createRatchet db connId rc =
pq_priv_kem = NULL,
pq_pub_kem = NULL
|]
((connId, rc) :. verifyCodesRow (ratchetVerifyCodes rc))
getRatchetVerifyCodes :: DB.Connection -> [ConnId] -> IO (Map ConnId ConnVerifyCodes)
getRatchetVerifyCodes db connIds = do
(saved, computed) <- partitionEithers . mapMaybe rowCodes <$> selectCodes
stored <- saveCodes computed
pure $ M.fromList $ saved <> stored
where
rowCodes (connId, codeAD_, codePQ_, rc_) = case codeAD_ of
Just codeAD -> Just $ Left $ toCodes (connId, codeAD, codePQ_)
Nothing -> Right . (connId,) . ratchetVerifyCodes <$> rc_
toCodes (connId, Binary codeAD, codePQ_) = (connId, ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD, codePQ = fromBinary <$> codePQ_})
codesRow (connId, cs) = verifyCodesRow cs :. Only connId
codesQuery :: Query
codesQuery = "SELECT conn_id, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, CASE WHEN rc_verify_code_ad IS NULL THEN ratchet_state END FROM ratchets"
selectCodes :: IO [(ConnId, Maybe (Binary ByteString), Maybe (Binary ByteString), Maybe RatchetX448)]
saveCodes :: [(ConnId, ConnVerifyCodes)] -> IO [(ConnId, ConnVerifyCodes)]
#if defined(dbPostgres)
selectCodes = DB.query db (codesQuery <> " WHERE conn_id IN ?") (Only (In connIds))
saveCodes cs =
map toCodes
<$> DB.returning
db
[sql|
UPDATE ratchets r
SET rc_verify_code_ad = COALESCE(r.rc_verify_code_ad, (upd.rc_verify_code_ad :: BYTEA)),
rc_verify_code_pq = CASE WHEN r.rc_verify_code_ad IS NULL THEN (upd.rc_verify_code_pq :: BYTEA) ELSE r.rc_verify_code_pq END
FROM (VALUES(?, ?, ?)) AS upd(rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, conn_id)
WHERE r.conn_id = (upd.conn_id :: BYTEA)
RETURNING r.conn_id, r.rc_verify_code_ad, r.rc_verify_code_pq
|]
(map codesRow cs)
#else
selectCodes = concat <$> mapM (DB.query db (codesQuery <> " WHERE conn_id = ?") . Only) connIds
saveCodes cs = cs <$ unless (null cs) (DB.executeMany db "UPDATE ratchets SET rc_verify_code_ad = ?, rc_verify_code_pq = ? WHERE conn_id = ?" $ map codesRow cs)
#endif
(connId, rc, rc)
deleteRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO ()
deleteRatchet db connId =
@@ -1718,7 +1570,7 @@ getPendingServerCommand db connId srv_ = getWorkItem "command" getCmdId getComma
DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT c.corr_id, cs.user_id, c.command, c.created_at
SELECT c.corr_id, cs.user_id, c.command
FROM commands c
JOIN connections cs USING (conn_id)
WHERE c.command_id = ?
@@ -1726,7 +1578,7 @@ getPendingServerCommand db connId srv_ = getWorkItem "command" getCmdId getComma
(Only cmdId)
where
err = SEInternal $ "command " <> bshow cmdId <> " returned []"
pendingCommand (corrId, userId, command, createdAt) = PendingCommand {cmdId, corrId, userId, connId, command, createdAt}
pendingCommand (corrId, userId, command) = PendingCommand {cmdId, corrId, userId, connId, command}
markCommandFailed cmdId = DB.execute db "UPDATE commands SET failed = 1 WHERE command_id = ?" (Only cmdId)
updateCommandServer :: DB.Connection -> AsyncCmdId -> SMPServer -> IO (Either StoreError ())
@@ -2209,21 +2061,6 @@ instance ConnectionModeI c => ToField (ConnectionRequestUri c) where toField = t
instance (E.Typeable c, ConnectionModeI c) => FromField (ConnectionRequestUri c) where fromField = blobFieldDecoder strDecode
instance ToField RatchetKeyId where toField (RatchetKeyId s) = toField $ Binary s
instance FromField RatchetKeyId where fromField = blobFieldDecoder $ Right . RatchetKeyId
instance ToField ContactRequest where
toField = toField . Binary . \case
CRInvitation cr -> strEncode cr
CRInvitationDR dr -> LB.toStrict $ J.encode dr
instance FromField ContactRequest where
fromField = blobFieldDecoder $ \bs ->
if "{" `B.isPrefixOf` bs
then CRInvitationDR <$> J.eitherDecodeStrict' bs
else CRInvitation <$> strDecode bs
instance ToField ConnectionMode where toField = toField . decodeLatin1 . strEncode
instance FromField ConnectionMode where fromField = fromTextField_ connModeT
@@ -2499,14 +2336,14 @@ getSubscriptionServers db onlyNeeded =
toUserServer (userId, host, port, keyHash) = (userId, SMPServer host port keyHash)
-- TODO [certs rcv] check index for getting queues with service present
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> Bool -> ServiceAssoc -> Int -> Maybe SMP.RecipientId -> IO [RcvQueueSub]
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) onlyNeeded hasService limit cursor_ =
map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv) <$> case cursor_ of
Nothing -> DB.query db (q <> orderLimit) (userId, h, p, kh, limit)
Just cursor -> DB.query db (q <> " AND q.rcv_id > ? " <> orderLimit) (userId, h, p, kh, cursor, limit)
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> Bool -> ServiceAssoc -> IO [RcvQueueSub]
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId (SMPServer h p kh) onlyNeeded hasService =
map toRcvQueueSub
<$> DB.query
db
(rcvQueueSubQuery <> toSubscribe <> " c.deleted = 0 AND q.deleted = 0 AND c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ?" <> serviceCond)
(userId, h, p, kh)
where
q = serverRcvQueueSubQuery <> toSubscribe <> " c.deleted = 0 AND q.deleted = 0 AND c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ?" <> serviceCond
orderLimit = " ORDER BY q.rcv_id LIMIT ?"
toSubscribe
| onlyNeeded = " WHERE q.to_subscribe = 1 AND "
| otherwise = " WHERE "
@@ -2518,7 +2355,7 @@ unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> IO [Rcv
unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) = do
deleteClientService db userId srv
#if defined(dbPostgres)
map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv)
map toRcvQueueSub
<$> DB.query
db
(removeRcvAssocsQuery <> " " <> returningColumns)
@@ -2526,15 +2363,15 @@ unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) = do
where
returningColumns =
[sql|
RETURNING c.user_id, rcv_queues.conn_id,
RETURNING c.user_id, rcv_queues.conn_id, rcv_queues.host, rcv_queues.port, COALESCE(rcv_queues.server_key_hash, s.key_hash),
rcv_queues.rcv_id, rcv_queues.rcv_private_key, rcv_queues.status, c.enable_ntfs, rcv_queues.client_notice_id,
rcv_queues.rcv_queue_id, rcv_queues.rcv_primary, rcv_queues.replace_rcv_queue_id
|]
#else
qs <- map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv)
qs <- map toRcvQueueSub
<$> DB.query
db
(serverRcvQueueSubQuery <> " WHERE c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ? AND q.rcv_service_assoc = 1")
(rcvQueueSubQuery <> " WHERE c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ? AND q.rcv_service_assoc = 1")
(userId, h, p, kh)
DB.execute db removeRcvAssocsQuery (h, p, userId, kh)
pure qs
@@ -2548,18 +2385,12 @@ unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs' db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) = do
unsetQueuesToSubscribe :: DB.Connection -> IO ()
unsetQueuesToSubscribe db = DB.execute_ db "UPDATE rcv_queues SET to_subscribe = 0 WHERE to_subscribe = 1"
setRcvServiceAssocs :: SMPQueue q => DB.Connection -> SMPServer -> [q] -> IO ()
setRcvServiceAssocs db ProtocolServer {host, port} rqs =
setRcvServiceAssocs :: SMPQueue q => DB.Connection -> [q] -> IO ()
setRcvServiceAssocs db rqs = do
#if defined(dbPostgres)
DB.execute
db
"UPDATE rcv_queues SET rcv_service_assoc = 1 WHERE host = ? AND port = ? AND rcv_id IN ?"
(host, port, In (map queueId rqs))
DB.execute db "UPDATE rcv_queues SET rcv_service_assoc = 1 WHERE rcv_id IN ?" $ Only $ In (map queueId rqs)
#else
DB.executeMany
db
"UPDATE rcv_queues SET rcv_service_assoc = 1 WHERE host = ? AND port = ? AND rcv_id = ?"
(map (\q -> (host, port, queueId q)) rqs)
DB.executeMany db "UPDATE rcv_queues SET rcv_service_assoc = 1 WHERE rcv_id = ?" $ map (Only . queueId) rqs
#endif
removeRcvServiceAssocs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> IO ()
@@ -2698,7 +2529,7 @@ getConnsData_ deleted' db connIds =
db
[sql|
SELECT user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs,
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state, pq_support, service_request_expires_at
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state, pq_support
FROM connections
WHERE conn_id IN ? AND deleted = ?
|]
@@ -2733,7 +2564,7 @@ getConnData deleted' forUpdate db connId' =
db
( [sql|
SELECT user_id, conn_id, conn_mode, smp_agent_version, enable_ntfs,
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state, pq_support, service_request_expires_at
last_external_snd_msg_id, deleted, ratchet_sync_state, pq_support
FROM connections
WHERE conn_id = ? AND deleted = ?
|]
@@ -2750,9 +2581,9 @@ lockConnForUpdate db connId = do
#endif
pure ()
rowToConnData :: (UserId, ConnId, ConnectionMode, VersionSMPA, Maybe BoolInt, PrevExternalSndId, BoolInt, RatchetSyncState, PQSupport, Maybe UTCTime) -> (ConnData, ConnectionMode)
rowToConnData (userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, BI deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqSupport, serviceRequestExpiresAt) =
(ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs = maybe True unBI enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqSupport, serviceRequestExpiresAt}, cMode)
rowToConnData :: (UserId, ConnId, ConnectionMode, VersionSMPA, Maybe BoolInt, PrevExternalSndId, BoolInt, RatchetSyncState, PQSupport) -> (ConnData, ConnectionMode)
rowToConnData (userId, connId, cMode, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, BI deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqSupport) =
(ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs = maybe True unBI enableNtfs_, lastExternalSndId, deleted, ratchetSyncState, pqSupport}, cMode)
setConnDeleted :: DB.Connection -> Bool -> ConnId -> IO ()
setConnDeleted db waitDelivery connId
@@ -2781,14 +2612,6 @@ updateNewConnJoin db connId aVersion pqSupport enableNtfs =
getDeletedConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getDeletedConnIds db = map fromOnly <$> DB.query db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE deleted = ?" (Only (BI True))
getExpiredServiceConns :: DB.Connection -> UTCTime -> IO [ConnId]
getExpiredServiceConns db now =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE service_request_expires_at < ? AND deleted = 0 AND deleted_at_wait_delivery IS NULL" (Only now)
deleteExpiredServiceRequests :: DB.Connection -> UTCTime -> IO ()
deleteExpiredServiceRequests db expireTs =
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM conn_invitations WHERE service_request = 1 AND created_at < ?" (Only expireTs)
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds db =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE deleted_at_wait_delivery IS NOT NULL"
@@ -2885,32 +2708,17 @@ getRcvQueueSubsByConnId_ db connId =
rcvQueueSubQuery :: Query
rcvQueueSubQuery =
[sql|
SELECT q.host, q.port, COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash), c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
SELECT c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.host, q.port, COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash), q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
q.rcv_queue_id, q.rcv_primary, q.replace_rcv_queue_id
FROM rcv_queues q
JOIN servers s ON q.host = s.host AND q.port = s.port
JOIN connections c ON q.conn_id = c.conn_id
|]
serverRcvQueueSubQuery :: Query
serverRcvQueueSubQuery =
[sql|
SELECT c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
q.rcv_queue_id, q.rcv_primary, q.replace_rcv_queue_id
FROM rcv_queues q
JOIN servers s ON q.host = s.host AND q.port = s.port
JOIN connections c ON q.conn_id = c.conn_id
|]
type RcvQueueSubRow = (UserId, ConnId, SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey) :. (QueueStatus, Maybe BoolInt, Maybe NoticeId, Int64, BoolInt, Maybe Int64)
toRcvQueueSub :: (NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash) :. RcvQueueSubRow -> RcvQueueSub
toRcvQueueSub ((host, port, keyHash) :. r) = toServerRcvQueueSub (SMPServer host port keyHash) r
toServerRcvQueueSub :: SMPServer -> RcvQueueSubRow -> RcvQueueSub
toServerRcvQueueSub server ((userId, connId, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey) :. (status, enableNtfs_, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, BI primary, dbReplaceQueueId)) =
toRcvQueueSub :: (UserId, ConnId, NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash, SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey) :. (QueueStatus, Maybe BoolInt, Maybe NoticeId, Int64, BoolInt, Maybe Int64) -> RcvQueueSub
toRcvQueueSub ((userId, connId, host, port, keyHash, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey) :. (status, enableNtfs_, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, BI primary, dbReplaceQueueId)) =
let enableNtfs = maybe True unBI enableNtfs_
in RcvQueueSub {userId, connId, server, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey, status, enableNtfs, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, primary, dbReplaceQueueId}
in RcvQueueSub {userId, connId, server = SMPServer host port keyHash, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey, status, enableNtfs, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, primary, dbReplaceQueueId}
getRcvQueueById :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int64 -> IO (Either StoreError RcvQueue)
getRcvQueueById db connId dbRcvId =
@@ -3180,29 +2988,6 @@ createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redire
chunks = []
}
startPreparedRcvFile :: DB.Connection -> RcvFileId -> IO (Either StoreError [XFTPServer])
startPreparedRcvFile db rcvFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
rcvFileId <- ExceptT $ getRcvFileIdByEntityId_ db rcvFileEntityId
liftIO $ do
updatedAt <- getCurrentTime
DB.execute
db
"UPDATE rcv_files SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE (rcv_file_id = ? OR redirect_id = ?) AND status = ?"
(RFSReceiving, updatedAt, rcvFileId, rcvFileId, RFSPrepared)
map toXFTPServer
<$> DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT DISTINCT
s.xftp_host, s.xftp_port, s.xftp_key_hash
FROM rcv_file_chunk_replicas r
JOIN xftp_servers s ON s.xftp_server_id = r.xftp_server_id
JOIN rcv_file_chunks c ON c.rcv_file_chunk_id = r.rcv_file_chunk_id
JOIN rcv_files f ON f.rcv_file_id = c.rcv_file_id
WHERE (f.rcv_file_id = ? OR f.redirect_id = ?) AND r.replica_number = 1
|]
(rcvFileId, rcvFileId)
insertRcvFile :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> FileDescription 'FRecipient -> FilePath -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> Maybe DBRcvFileId -> Maybe RcvFileId -> Bool -> IO (Either StoreError (RcvFileId, DBRcvFileId))
insertRcvFile db gVar userId FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, redirect} prefixPath tmpPath (CryptoFile savePath cfArgs) redirectId_ redirectEntityId_ approvedRelays = runExceptT $ do
let (redirectDigest_, redirectSize_) = case redirect of
@@ -3213,7 +2998,7 @@ insertRcvFile db gVar userId FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSiz
DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO rcv_files (rcv_file_entity_id, user_id, size, digest, key, nonce, chunk_size, prefix_path, tmp_path, save_path, save_file_key, save_file_nonce, status, redirect_id, redirect_entity_id, redirect_digest, redirect_size, approved_relays) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
((Binary rcvFileEntityId, userId, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, prefixPath, tmpPath) :. (savePath, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, RFSPrepared, redirectId_, Binary <$> redirectEntityId_, redirectDigest_, redirectSize_, BI approvedRelays))
((Binary rcvFileEntityId, userId, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, prefixPath, tmpPath) :. (savePath, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, RFSReceiving, redirectId_, Binary <$> redirectEntityId_, redirectDigest_, redirectSize_, BI approvedRelays))
rcvFileId <- liftIO $ insertedRowId db
pure (rcvFileEntityId, rcvFileId)
@@ -3512,29 +3297,19 @@ getRcvFilesExpired db ttl = do
|]
(Only cutoffTs)
createSndFile :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> FilePath -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> Maybe RedirectFileInfo -> Maybe Word32 -> IO (Either StoreError SndFileId)
createSndFile db gVar userId (CryptoFile path cfArgs) numRecipients prefixPath key nonce redirect_ storageHours =
createSndFile :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> FilePath -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> Maybe RedirectFileInfo -> IO (Either StoreError SndFileId)
createSndFile db gVar userId (CryptoFile path cfArgs) numRecipients prefixPath key nonce redirect_ =
createWithRandomId db gVar $ \sndFileEntityId ->
DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO snd_files (snd_file_entity_id, user_id, path, src_file_key, src_file_nonce, num_recipients, prefix_path, key, nonce, status, redirect_size, redirect_digest, storage_time) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
((Binary sndFileEntityId, userId, path, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, numRecipients) :. (prefixPath, key, nonce, SFSPrepared, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_, storageHours))
"INSERT INTO snd_files (snd_file_entity_id, user_id, path, src_file_key, src_file_nonce, num_recipients, prefix_path, key, nonce, status, redirect_size, redirect_digest) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
((Binary sndFileEntityId, userId, path, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, numRecipients) :. (prefixPath, key, nonce, SFSNew, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_))
where
(redirectSize_, redirectDigest_) =
case redirect_ of
Nothing -> (Nothing, Nothing)
Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest} -> (Just size, Just digest)
startPreparedSndFile :: DB.Connection -> SndFileId -> IO (Either StoreError ())
startPreparedSndFile db sndFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
sndFileId <- ExceptT $ getSndFileIdByEntityId_ db sndFileEntityId
liftIO $ do
updatedAt <- getCurrentTime
DB.execute
db
"UPDATE snd_files SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE snd_file_id = ? AND status = ?"
(SFSNew, updatedAt, sndFileId, SFSPrepared)
getSndFileByEntityId :: DB.Connection -> SndFileId -> IO (Either StoreError SndFile)
getSndFileByEntityId db sndFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
sndFileId <- ExceptT $ getSndFileIdByEntityId_ db sndFileEntityId
@@ -3564,7 +3339,7 @@ getSndFile db sndFileId = runExceptT $ do
DB.query
db
( [sql|
SELECT snd_file_entity_id, user_id, path, src_file_key, src_file_nonce, num_recipients, digest, prefix_path, key, nonce, status, deleted, redirect_size, redirect_digest, storage_time
SELECT snd_file_entity_id, user_id, path, src_file_key, src_file_nonce, num_recipients, digest, prefix_path, key, nonce, status, deleted, redirect_size, redirect_digest
FROM snd_files
WHERE snd_file_id = ?
|]
@@ -3574,12 +3349,12 @@ getSndFile db sndFileId = runExceptT $ do
)
(Only sndFileId)
where
toFile :: (SndFileId, UserId, FilePath, Maybe C.SbKey, Maybe C.CbNonce, Int, Maybe FileDigest, Maybe FilePath, C.SbKey, C.CbNonce) :. (SndFileStatus, BoolInt, Maybe (FileSize Int64), Maybe FileDigest, Maybe Word32) -> SndFile
toFile ((sndFileEntityId, userId, srcPath, srcKey_, srcNonce_, numRecipients, digest, prefixPath, key, nonce) :. (status, BI deleted, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_, storageHours)) =
toFile :: (SndFileId, UserId, FilePath, Maybe C.SbKey, Maybe C.CbNonce, Int, Maybe FileDigest, Maybe FilePath, C.SbKey, C.CbNonce) :. (SndFileStatus, BoolInt, Maybe (FileSize Int64), Maybe FileDigest) -> SndFile
toFile ((sndFileEntityId, userId, srcPath, srcKey_, srcNonce_, numRecipients, digest, prefixPath, key, nonce) :. (status, BI deleted, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_)) =
let cfArgs = CFArgs <$> srcKey_ <*> srcNonce_
srcFile = CryptoFile srcPath cfArgs
redirect = RedirectFileInfo <$> redirectSize_ <*> redirectDigest_
in SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, userId, srcFile, numRecipients, digest, prefixPath, key, nonce, status, deleted, redirect, storageHours, chunks = []}
in SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, userId, srcFile, numRecipients, digest, prefixPath, key, nonce, status, deleted, redirect, chunks = []}
getChunks :: SndFileId -> UserId -> Int -> FilePath -> IO [SndFileChunk]
getChunks sndFileEntityId userId numRecipients filePrefixPath = do
chunks <-
@@ -3608,7 +3383,7 @@ getSndFile db sndFileId = runExceptT $ do
db
[sql|
SELECT
r.snd_file_chunk_replica_id, r.replica_id, r.replica_key, r.replica_status, r.delay, r.retries, r.replica_expires_at,
r.snd_file_chunk_replica_id, r.replica_id, r.replica_key, r.replica_status, r.delay, r.retries,
s.xftp_host, s.xftp_port, s.xftp_key_hash
FROM snd_file_chunk_replicas r
JOIN xftp_servers s ON s.xftp_server_id = r.xftp_server_id
@@ -3619,10 +3394,10 @@ getSndFile db sndFileId = runExceptT $ do
rcvIdsKeys <- getChunkReplicaRecipients_ db sndChunkReplicaId
pure (replica :: SndFileChunkReplica) {rcvIdsKeys}
where
toReplica :: (Int64, ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey, SndFileReplicaStatus, Maybe Int64, Int, Maybe Int64, NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash) -> SndFileChunkReplica
toReplica (sndChunkReplicaId, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, expiresAtSec, host, port, keyHash) =
toReplica :: (Int64, ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey, SndFileReplicaStatus, Maybe Int64, Int, NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash) -> SndFileChunkReplica
toReplica (sndChunkReplicaId, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, host, port, keyHash) =
let server = XFTPServer host port keyHash
in SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, expiresAt = GSTExpires <$> expiresAtSec, rcvIdsKeys = []}
in SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, rcvIdsKeys = []}
getChunkReplicaRecipients_ :: DB.Connection -> Int64 -> IO [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)]
getChunkReplicaRecipients_ db replicaId =
@@ -3703,16 +3478,16 @@ createSndFileReplica :: DB.Connection -> SndFileChunk -> NewSndChunkReplica -> I
createSndFileReplica db SndFileChunk {sndChunkId} = createSndFileReplica_ db sndChunkId
createSndFileReplica_ :: DB.Connection -> Int64 -> NewSndChunkReplica -> IO ()
createSndFileReplica_ db sndChunkId NewSndChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey, rcvIdsKeys, expiresAt} = do
createSndFileReplica_ db sndChunkId NewSndChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey, rcvIdsKeys} = do
srvId <- createXFTPServer_ db server
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO snd_file_chunk_replicas
(snd_file_chunk_id, replica_number, xftp_server_id, replica_id, replica_key, replica_status, replica_expires_at)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
(snd_file_chunk_id, replica_number, xftp_server_id, replica_id, replica_key, replica_status)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)
|]
(sndChunkId, 1 :: Int, srvId, replicaId, replicaKey, SFRSCreated, epochSeconds <$> expiresAt)
(sndChunkId, 1 :: Int, srvId, replicaId, replicaKey, SFRSCreated)
rId <- insertedRowId db
forM_ rcvIdsKeys $ \(rcvId, rcvKey) -> do
DB.execute
@@ -3758,7 +3533,7 @@ getNextSndChunkToUpload db server@ProtocolServer {host, port, keyHash} ttl = do
SELECT
f.snd_file_id, f.snd_file_entity_id, f.user_id, f.num_recipients, f.prefix_path,
c.snd_file_chunk_id, c.chunk_no, c.chunk_offset, c.chunk_size, c.digest,
r.snd_file_chunk_replica_id, r.replica_id, r.replica_key, r.replica_status, r.delay, r.retries, r.replica_expires_at
r.snd_file_chunk_replica_id, r.replica_id, r.replica_key, r.replica_status, r.delay, r.retries
FROM snd_file_chunk_replicas r
JOIN xftp_servers s ON s.xftp_server_id = r.xftp_server_id
JOIN snd_file_chunks c ON c.snd_file_chunk_id = r.snd_file_chunk_id
@@ -3772,8 +3547,8 @@ getNextSndChunkToUpload db server@ProtocolServer {host, port, keyHash} ttl = do
pure (replica :: SndFileChunkReplica) {rcvIdsKeys}
pure (chunk {replicas = replicas'} :: SndFileChunk)
where
toChunk :: ((DBSndFileId, SndFileId, UserId, Int, FilePath) :. (Int64, Int, Int64, Word32, FileDigest) :. (Int64, ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey, SndFileReplicaStatus, Maybe Int64, Int, Maybe Int64)) -> SndFileChunk
toChunk ((sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, userId, numRecipients, filePrefixPath) :. (sndChunkId, chunkNo, chunkOffset, chunkSize, digest) :. (sndChunkReplicaId, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, expiresAtSec)) =
toChunk :: ((DBSndFileId, SndFileId, UserId, Int, FilePath) :. (Int64, Int, Int64, Word32, FileDigest) :. (Int64, ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey, SndFileReplicaStatus, Maybe Int64, Int)) -> SndFileChunk
toChunk ((sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, userId, numRecipients, filePrefixPath) :. (sndChunkId, chunkNo, chunkOffset, chunkSize, digest) :. (sndChunkReplicaId, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries)) =
let chunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec {filePath = sndFileEncPath filePrefixPath, chunkOffset, chunkSize}
in SndFileChunk
{ sndFileId,
@@ -3785,7 +3560,7 @@ getNextSndChunkToUpload db server@ProtocolServer {host, port, keyHash} ttl = do
chunkSpec,
digest,
filePrefixPath,
replicas = [SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, expiresAt = GSTExpires <$> expiresAtSec, rcvIdsKeys = []}]
replicas = [SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, replicaId, replicaKey, replicaStatus, delay, retries, rcvIdsKeys = []}]
}
updateSndChunkReplicaDelay :: DB.Connection -> Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.DB
execute,
execute_,
executeMany,
returning,
query,
query_,
blobFieldDecoder,
@@ -61,10 +60,6 @@ executeMany :: ToRow q => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO ()
executeMany db q qs = void $ PSQL.executeMany db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE executeMany #-}
returning :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO [r]
returning db q qs = PSQL.returning db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE returning #-}
query :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> q -> IO [r]
query db q qs = PSQL.query db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE query #-}
@@ -11,11 +11,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20250702_conn_invitati
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251009_queue_to_subscribe
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251010_client_notices
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251230_strict_tables
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260115_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
@@ -27,11 +23,7 @@ schemaMigrations =
("20251009_queue_to_subscribe", m20251009_queue_to_subscribe, Just down_m20251009_queue_to_subscribe),
("20251010_client_notices", m20251010_client_notices, Just down_m20251010_client_notices),
("20251230_strict_tables", m20251230_strict_tables, Just down_m20251230_strict_tables),
("20260410_receive_attempts", m20260410_receive_attempts, Just down_m20260410_receive_attempts),
("20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
("20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
("20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes)
("20260115_service_certs", m20260115_service_certs, Just down_m20260115_service_certs)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs where
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260115_service_certs where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.Util
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260411_service_certs :: Text
m20260411_service_certs =
m20260115_service_certs :: Text
m20260115_service_certs =
createXorHashFuncs <> [r|
CREATE TABLE client_services(
user_id BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES users ON UPDATE RESTRICT ON DELETE CASCADE,
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ AFTER UPDATE ON rcv_queues
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE on_rcv_queue_update();
|]
down_m20260411_service_certs :: Text
down_m20260411_service_certs =
down_m20260115_service_certs :: Text
down_m20260115_service_certs =
[r|
DROP TRIGGER tr_rcv_queue_insert ON rcv_queues;
DROP TRIGGER tr_rcv_queue_delete ON rcv_queues;
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260410_receive_attempts :: Text
m20260410_receive_attempts =
[r|
ALTER TABLE rcv_messages ADD COLUMN receive_attempts SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
|]
down_m20260410_receive_attempts :: Text
down_m20260410_receive_attempts =
[r|
ALTER TABLE rcv_messages DROP COLUMN receive_attempts;
|]
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260712_address_dr_rpc :: Text
m20260712_address_dr_rpc =
[r|
CREATE TABLE address_ratchet_keys(
address_ratchet_key_id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
conn_id BYTEA NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
ratchet_key_id BYTEA NOT NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_1 BYTEA NOT NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_2 BYTEA NOT NULL,
pq_priv_kem BYTEA,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT (now())
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_address_ratchet_keys ON address_ratchet_keys(conn_id, ratchet_key_id);
ALTER TABLE conn_invitations ADD COLUMN service_request SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- service side: received request is a service request (SREQ) not a contact request (REQ)
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN service_request_expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ; -- client side: requester's outstanding service request; the time the client stops waiting for the response
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_deleted ON connections(deleted);
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_service_request_expires_at ON connections(service_request_expires_at);
|]
down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc :: Text
down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_connections_service_request_expires_at;
DROP INDEX idx_connections_deleted;
ALTER TABLE connections DROP COLUMN service_request_expires_at;
ALTER TABLE connections DROP COLUMN created_at;
ALTER TABLE conn_invitations DROP COLUMN service_request;
DROP INDEX idx_address_ratchet_keys;
DROP TABLE address_ratchet_keys;
|]
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260823_snd_files_entitlement :: Text
m20260823_snd_files_entitlement =
[r|
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN storage_time BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE snd_file_chunk_replicas ADD COLUMN replica_expires_at BIGINT;
|]
down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement :: Text
down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement =
[r|
ALTER TABLE snd_file_chunk_replicas DROP COLUMN replica_expires_at;
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN storage_time;
|]

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