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40 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Evgeny Poberezkin cba1382356 7.1.0.11 2026-10-11 22:33:06 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat b5e8a4b8cc fix tests on ghc 8.10.7 (#1939)
* fix tests on ghc 8.10.7

* fix test

* fix schema dump test

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-11 20:36:51 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 3db4029bb9 ci: build cache (#1938)
* ci: build cache

* update build job

* rename steps, cache all builds, patch timestamps for ghc 8.10.7

* refactor, save O0 caches in master and stable builds

* update build to include toolchain fingerprint

* do not save cache on exact match

* remove caching docker from prs

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-11 11:52:24 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 8a80727fa5 smp server: delayed AUTH responses (#1937)
* smp server: delayed AUTH responses

* plan

* update

* simplify

* simplify

* stat when sent without delay

* update schema

* round up response time to the nearest delay multiple

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-11 07:37:33 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat a2f985dc68 agent: prepare invitation link, create ratchet when connection is prepared (#1880)
* agent: prepare invitation link

* simplify

* refactor

* fix

* change min SMP version to 15

* remove dead code for SMP version <= 15

* update

* diff

* create ratchet when connection is prepared

* createRatchetIfNotExists

* clean up, only check client notices for contacts, fix orphan record

* simplify

* refactor

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-10 23:15:19 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat c18e0297c4 agent: migration to add index to read queues (#1934)
* agent: migration to add index to read queues

* update postgres schema

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-08 17:07:55 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat e24d537eaa agent: fix race when switching reception to the new queue (#1933)
* agent: fix race when switching reception to the new queue

* return bool

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-08 16:03:06 +01:00
sh 7754f8624e smp-server: copy entity IDs out of received block (#1906) 2026-10-08 15:28:38 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 8d81f775b1 smp protocol: require fixed size corr ID when used as nonce, and min size msg ID to use as nonce (#1925)
* smp protocol: require fixed size corr ID when used as nonce, and min size msg ID to use as nonce

* simpler

* fixes

* randomMsgId

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-08 09:32:11 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat c0a1b7bd2d agent: fail database transaction instantly when database is closed, prevent race conditions in command processing, fix race when uploading files (#1885)
* agent: fail database transaction instantly when database is closed

* update direct-sqlcipher

* update direct-sqlcipher, fixes

* autoincrement command ID

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-06 13:01:55 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 4ab5376a6e smp: reduce min supported version to 15 (short links support, 3/30/2025) (#1931)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-05 11:31:57 +01:00
Evgeny aaffb5b07d Merge pull request #1922 from simplex-chat/ratchet
Improve double ratchet
2026-10-05 08:07:04 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 65893a359a agent: resolve potential race conditions in double ratchet (#1923)
* agent: resolve potential race conditions in double ratchet

* update

* improve

* diff

* diff

* diff

* simpler

* more races

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-04 22:28:50 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat fcc5670ae2 agent: keep ratchet hashes for connection lifetime, up to some cap, to prevent replay of expired ratchets (#1893)
* agent: keep ratchet hashes for connection lifetime, to prevent replay of expired ratchets

* cap

* simpler

* simpler2

* split

* one query

* simplify

* performance

* migration

* fix schema

* comment

* improve

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-04 14:43:21 +01:00
Evgenyandshum 18440c0d17 smp-server: check queue is not secured in link store (#1917)
Co-authored-by: shum <[email protected]>
2026-10-04 13:41:48 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 64c5d19fc4 agent: aggregate cap on skipped message keys (#1903)
* agent: aggregate cap on skipped message keys

* migration

* update migration

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-04 10:18:41 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat e11dfb985d consider IP address protected only if it is used for the chosen host (#1895)
* consider IP address protected only if it is used for the chosen host

* simplify

* simplify

* simplify

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-03 22:45:44 +01:00
Evgenyandshum 76248dd767 sntrup761: bound KeyGen retries on R3 inversion (#1918)
Co-authored-by: shum <[email protected]>
2026-10-03 17:01:36 +01:00
brenzi 9c641fed91 reject e2e params with kem_ct and without kem_key (#1901) 2026-10-03 15:10:42 +01:00
sh 91e070cb5e crypto: document 16-byte GCM IV in double ratchet (#1914) 2026-10-03 15:00:18 +01:00
sh 9fe3745401 docs: use role names for key exchange parties (#1912) 2026-10-03 14:59:22 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 24036368f8 xrcp: limit multicast validity time window (#1899)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-03 14:51:48 +01:00
sh acd5c0f530 docs: add cryptographic primitive registry (#1913) 2026-10-03 14:21:21 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat ead8f10f26 smp protocol: bind agreed version of forwarded command (#1915)
* smp protocol: bind agreed version of forwarded command

* refactor

* pass proxied relay version range via config

* simplify

* refactor

* packZipWith

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-10-03 08:56:19 +01:00
sh 053e83b704 resolver: multicall reads, keep-alive, workers and structured logs (#1883)
* resolver: queue up to 128 pending connections

* resolver: reuse connections to the node

* resolver: read each round in one multicall

* resolver: run worker processes, log durations

* resolver: keep smp-server connections alive

* resolver: test with pytest, lock dependencies

* resolver: structured logs and real client addresses

* resolver: refuse requests with a body

* resolver: harden pool, health and odd answers

* resolver: pin images, rotate logs

* resolver: stricter body check, redact RPC URL

* resolver: ship .env as .env.example

* resolver: pass settings from .env

* resolver: name the image snrc-resolve:local
2026-10-01 09:10:42 +01:00
sh 234b5cd856 smp-server: rework message expiration (#1873)
* smp server: rework message expiration

* smp server: paginate message expiration sweep
2026-10-01 09:08:16 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 38fdc0c544 7.1.0.10 2026-09-30 13:03:16 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat b4c288c597 docs: clarify security model (#1902)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 10:18:52 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 0e1ecdcff6 xftp server: validate paths in store log (#1894)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 09:36:45 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat c1776dc5a4 server: improve control port auth (#1898)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 09:04:28 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat e2df2e1b7c docs: update SMP protocol (#1900)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-30 08:10:35 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 267e2e0727 agent: fix ratchet - dont save if body auth failed (#1892)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 21:32:21 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 551a79d99b smp server: validate client version in forwarded command (#1890)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 19:52:15 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 972e50e768 docs: update XRCP doc to make code verification optional for known connections (#1891)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-29 18:08:54 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 5eecd99bc2 7.1.0.9 2026-09-26 12:52:57 +01:00
69eb28b3ab agent: share server value across subscription rows of server-keyed queries (#1877)
* agent: share server value across subscription rows of server-keyed queries

* reduce fields in query

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-26 12:05:20 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 875ba7d53f agent: make QUOTA error temporary for async commands (#1881)
* agent: make QUOTA error temporary for async commands

* retry commands on quota

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-25 18:13:49 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 35f1b145a7 xftp: fix race when sending the file (#1879)
* xftp: fix race when sending the file

* simpler test

* fix tests

* test

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-25 11:59:06 +01:00
sh c7163afa3a ci: cancel stale runs (#1878) 2026-09-24 15:33:22 +01:00
EvgenyandEvgeny @ SimpleX Chat 5294b7d8b7 agent: PQ rachet security code, store AD and pqAD in database, bulk reading (#1874)
* agent: PQ rachet security code, store AD and pqAD in database, bulk reading

* rename to verify code

* diff

* refactor

* query

* reduce transactions

* request binding

* simplify

* fix query and security code derivation

---------

Co-authored-by: Evgeny @ SimpleX Chat <[email protected]>
2026-09-23 21:21:09 +01:00
101 changed files with 5249 additions and 1032 deletions
+167 -28
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ on:
- "v*"
pull_request:
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
jobs:
# =============================
@@ -62,8 +66,19 @@ jobs:
build:
name: "ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}, GHC: ${{ matrix.ghc }}"
needs: maybe-release
permissions:
contents: write
packages: write
env:
apps: "smp-server xftp-server ntf-server xftp"
opt: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && 'O0' || 'O2' }}
ghc_options: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' && '--ghc-options=-O0' || '' }}
release: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
postgres_dist: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && 'dist-newstyle' || 'dist-postgres' }}
branch: ${{ github.base_ref || github.ref_name }}
cache_o0: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && (github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' || github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable') }}
image_cache: ghcr.io/simplex-chat/simplexmq-build-cache:${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}-ghc${{ matrix.ghc }}
source_hashes: dist-newstyle/sources.sha256
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
services:
postgres:
@@ -142,6 +157,18 @@ jobs:
sudo apt update
sudo apt -y install postgresql-client-15
- name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
shell: bash
env:
GHCR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: echo "$GHCR_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "${{ github.actor }}" --password-stdin
- name: Compute image cache week
id: week
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
run: echo "week=$(date -u +%G-W%V)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build and cache Docker image
if: matrix.should_run == true
uses: simplex-chat/docker-build-push-action@v6
@@ -153,20 +180,14 @@ jobs:
build-args: |
TAG=${{ matrix.os }}
GHC=${{ matrix.ghc }}
- name: Cache dependencies
if: matrix.should_run == true
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cabal/store
dist-newstyle
key: ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}-ghc${{ matrix.ghc }}-${{ hashFiles('cabal.project', 'simplexmq.cabal') }}
cache-from: ${{ env.release != 'true' && format('type=registry,ref={0}-{1}', env.image_cache, steps.week.outputs.week) || '' }}
cache-to: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/master' && format('type=registry,ref={0}-{1},mode=max,ignore-error=true', env.image_cache, steps.week.outputs.week) || '' }}
- name: Start container
if: matrix.should_run == true
shell: bash
run: |
mkdir -p ~/.cabal
docker run -t -d \
--device /dev/fuse \
--cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
@@ -177,21 +198,66 @@ jobs:
-v ${{ github.workspace }}:/project \
build/${{ matrix.os }}:latest
- name: Compute cache key prefixes
id: keys
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
run: |
toolchain=$(docker exec builder dpkg-query -W -f '${db:Status-Status} ${binary:Package} ${Version}\n' 'binutils*' 'cpp*' 'gcc*' '*-dev' | grep '^installed ' | sha256sum | cut -c1-16)
target=${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}-ghc${{ matrix.ghc }}-$toolchain
echo "deps=deps-$target" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "dist=dist-$target" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Restore dependencies from cache
id: restore-deps
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
with:
path: ~/.cabal/store
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.deps }}-${{ env.branch }}-${{ github.sha }}
restore-keys: |
${{ steps.keys.outputs.deps }}-${{ env.branch }}-
${{ steps.keys.outputs.deps }}-
- name: Warn if dependencies not in cache
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true' && steps.restore-deps.outputs.cache-matched-key == ''
run: echo "::warning title=Cache miss::${{ steps.keys.outputs.deps }}-${{ env.branch }}"
- name: Restore build directories from cache
id: restore-build
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
with:
path: |
dist-newstyle
dist-postgres
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-${{ env.opt }}-${{ env.branch }}-${{ github.sha }}
restore-keys: |
${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-${{ env.opt }}-${{ env.branch }}-
${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-${{ env.opt }}-
- name: Warn if build directories not in cache
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true' && steps.restore-build.outputs.cache-matched-key == ''
run: echo "::warning title=Cache miss::${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-${{ env.opt }}-${{ env.branch }}"
- name: Set old timestamps on unchanged sources (GHC 8.10.7)
if: matrix.ghc == '8.10.7' && steps.restore-build.outputs.cache-matched-key != '' && hashFiles(env.source_hashes) != ''
run: scripts/ci/source-timestamps.sh restore ${{ env.source_hashes }}
- name: Build smp-server, xftp-server (postgresql) and tests
if: matrix.should_run == true
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: |
chmod -fR 777 ~/.cabal ./dist-newstyle || :; git config --global --add safe.directory '*'
cabal clean
chmod -fR 777 ~/.cabal ./dist-newstyle ./dist-postgres || :; git config --global --add safe.directory '*'
scripts/ci/prune-old-builds.sh dist-newstyle dist-postgres
cabal update
cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres
cabal build --builddir=${{ env.postgres_dist }} --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres ${{ env.ghc_options }}
mkdir -p /out
for i in smp-server xftp-server simplexmq-test; do
bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable)
for i in smp-server xftp-server ntf-server simplexmq-test; do
bin=$(find /project/${{ env.postgres_dist }} -name "$i" -type f -executable)
chmod +x "$bin"
mv "$bin" /out/
cp "$bin" /out/
done
strip /out/smp-server /out/xftp-server
strip /out/smp-server /out/xftp-server /out/ntf-server
- name: Copy simplexmq-test from container
if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -224,16 +290,17 @@ jobs:
cat hashes.output >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Build everything else (standard)
id: build-standard
if: matrix.should_run == true
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: |
cabal build --jobs=$(nproc)
cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) ${{ env.ghc_options }}
mkdir -p /out
for i in ${{ env.apps }}; do
for i in smp-server xftp-server xftp; do
bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable)
strip "$bin"
chmod +x "$bin"
mv "$bin" /out/
cp "$bin" /out/
done
- name: Copy binaries from container and prepare them
@@ -278,6 +345,33 @@ jobs:
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Record source hashes (GHC 8.10.7)
if: matrix.should_run == true && matrix.ghc == '8.10.7'
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: scripts/ci/source-timestamps.sh record ${{ env.source_hashes }}
- name: Compute dependency cache key
id: hash-deps
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true'
shell: bash
run: echo "hash=$(ls ~/.cabal/store/ghc-*/ | sha256sum | cut -c1-16)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Save dependencies to cache
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true' && steps.restore-deps.outputs.cache-matched-key != format('{0}-{1}-{2}', steps.keys.outputs.deps, env.branch, steps.hash-deps.outputs.hash)
uses: actions/cache/save@v4
with:
path: ~/.cabal/store
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.deps }}-${{ env.branch }}-${{ steps.hash-deps.outputs.hash }}
- name: Save build directories to cache
if: matrix.should_run == true && env.release != 'true' && steps.restore-build.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
uses: actions/cache/save@v4
with:
path: |
dist-newstyle
dist-postgres
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-${{ env.opt }}-${{ env.branch }}-${{ github.sha }}
- name: Test
if: matrix.should_run == true && matrix.arch == 'x86-64'
timeout-minutes: 120
@@ -302,6 +396,52 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
- name: Remove -O2 build directories
id: remove-o2
if: env.cache_o0 == 'true' && !cancelled() && steps.build-standard.outcome == 'success'
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: rm -rf dist-newstyle dist-postgres
- name: Restore -O0 build directories from cache
id: restore-build-o0
if: ${{ !cancelled() && steps.remove-o2.outcome == 'success' }}
uses: actions/cache/restore@v4
with:
path: |
dist-newstyle
dist-postgres
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-O0-${{ env.branch }}-${{ github.sha }}
restore-keys: |
${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-O0-${{ env.branch }}-
${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-O0-
- name: Set old timestamps on unchanged sources for -O0 build (GHC 8.10.7)
if: ${{ !cancelled() && matrix.ghc == '8.10.7' && steps.restore-build-o0.outputs.cache-matched-key != '' && hashFiles(env.source_hashes) != '' }}
run: scripts/ci/source-timestamps.sh restore ${{ env.source_hashes }}
- name: Build at -O0 for pull request caches
id: build-o0
if: ${{ !cancelled() && steps.remove-o2.outcome == 'success' }}
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: |
scripts/ci/prune-old-builds.sh dist-newstyle dist-postgres
cabal build --builddir=dist-postgres --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres --ghc-options=-O0
cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --ghc-options=-O0
- name: Record source hashes for -O0 build (GHC 8.10.7)
if: ${{ !cancelled() && matrix.ghc == '8.10.7' && steps.build-o0.outcome == 'success' }}
shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
run: scripts/ci/source-timestamps.sh record ${{ env.source_hashes }}
- name: Save -O0 build directories to cache
if: ${{ !cancelled() && steps.build-o0.outcome == 'success' && steps.restore-build-o0.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' }}
uses: actions/cache/save@v4
with:
path: |
dist-newstyle
dist-postgres
key: ${{ steps.keys.outputs.dist }}-O0-${{ env.branch }}-${{ github.sha }}
# =============================
# Resolver test job
# =============================
@@ -316,15 +456,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Python
# Matches the runtime stage of scripts/resolver/service/Dockerfile.
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.13"
- name: Set up uv
# uv takes Python from .python-version, the version of the Dockerfile's runtime stage.
uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@c18668ad3cf93ea998bef934396af7bb5c839dc7 # v10.2.0
- name: Install resolver dependencies
# Must match scripts/resolver/service/pyproject.toml.
run: python -m pip install "eth-hash[pycryptodome]>=0.7"
- name: Lint
working-directory: scripts/resolver/service
run: uv run --frozen ruff check .
- name: Test
run: python -m unittest discover -s scripts/resolver/service -v
working-directory: scripts/resolver/service
run: uv run --frozen pytest -v
+4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
*.lock
# the resolver's Docker image and CI install exactly these
!/scripts/resolver/service/uv.lock
# local overrides of scripts/resolver/.env.example
/scripts/resolver/.env
*.db
*.db.bak
*.session.sql
+1 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ source-repository-package
source-repository-package
type: git
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/direct-sqlcipher.git
tag: f814ee68b16a9447fbb467ccc8f29bdd3546bfd9
tag: 2330df3dc8c4b660674d3c02d76bb86f66c2abee
source-repository-package
type: git
+20 -6
View File
@@ -719,23 +719,32 @@ Small_random (small * out, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func * random)
/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime Core */
/* x^p-x-1 has a degree-19 factor mod 3, so a random g is not invertible in R3
with probability about 3^-19; KeyGen_attempts failures in a row mean a broken RNG */
#define KeyGen_attempts 10
/* h,(f,ginv) = KeyGen() */
static void
/* returns 0 if KeyGen succeeded; else -1 */
static int
KeyGen (Fq * h, small * f, small * ginv, void *random_ctx,
sntrup761_random_func * random)
{
small g[p];
Fq finv[p];
int i;
for (;;)
for (i = 0; i < KeyGen_attempts; ++i)
{
Small_random (g, random_ctx, random);
if (R3_recip (ginv, g) == 0)
break;
}
if (i == KeyGen_attempts)
return -1;
Short_random (f, random_ctx, random);
Rq_recip3 (finv, f); /* always works */
Rq_mult_small (h, finv, g);
return 0;
}
/* c = Encrypt(r,h) */
@@ -884,18 +893,21 @@ typedef small Inputs[p]; /* passed by reference */
#define PublicKeys_bytes Rq_bytes
/* pk,sk = ZKeyGen() */
static void
/* returns 0 if KeyGen succeeded; else -1 */
static int
ZKeyGen (unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, void *random_ctx,
sntrup761_random_func * random)
{
Fq h[p];
small f[p], v[p];
KeyGen (h, f, v, random_ctx, random);
if (KeyGen (h, f, v, random_ctx, random) != 0)
return -1;
Rq_encode (pk, h);
Small_encode (sk, f);
sk += Small_bytes;
Small_encode (sk, v);
return 0;
}
/* C = ZEncrypt(r,pk) */
@@ -960,19 +972,21 @@ HashSession (unsigned char *k, int b, const unsigned char *y,
/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime */
/* pk,sk = KEM_KeyGen() */
void
int
sntrup761_keypair (unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, void *random_ctx,
sntrup761_random_func * random)
{
int i;
ZKeyGen (pk, sk, random_ctx, random);
if (ZKeyGen (pk, sk, random_ctx, random) != 0)
return -1;
sk += SecretKeys_bytes;
for (i = 0; i < PublicKeys_bytes; ++i)
*sk++ = pk[i];
random (random_ctx, Inputs_bytes, sk);
sk += Inputs_bytes;
Hash_prefix (sk, 4, pk, PublicKeys_bytes);
return 0;
}
/* c,r_enc = Hide(r,pk,cache); cache is Hash4(pk) */
+2 -1
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@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
typedef void sntrup761_random_func (void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *dst);
void
/* returns 0 on success, -1 if the RNG never produced an invertible polynomial */
int
sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk,
void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
+1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ This file provides guidance on coding style and approaches and on building the c
When designing code and planning implementations:
- Apply adversarial thinking, and consider what may happen if one of the communicating parties is malicious.
- Formulate an explicit threat model for each change - who can do which undesirable things and under which circumstances.
- Use the default cryptographic primitive for each purpose from the [primitive registry](../protocol/crypto-registry.md); any exception requires review, and the registry must be updated with every new primitive use or domain-separation string.
## Code Quality Standards
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
# Fast rotation: draining the old receive queue
Recipient only. The sender is unchanged.
## Decisions
- New `RcvSwitchStatus` value:
| constructor | encoding |
|------------------|-----------------|
| `RSReceivedQEND` | `received_qend` |
- Stored in `rcv_queues.switch_status`.
- `canAbortRcvSwitch` returns `False` for it.
- `qEndMsg`, by the queue that delivered `QEND`:
- the queue named in `QEND`: the named queue is marked deleted, `ICDeleteRcvQueue` is enqueued.
- the new queue: the named queue is set to `RSReceivedQEND` and stays subscribed.
- `NSCCreate` and `SWITCH QDRcv SPCompleted`: sent when the named queue had no `RSReceivedQEND`.
- Deletion of an `RSReceivedQEND` queue:
- trigger: `OK` response to an `ACK` on that queue, without a `GET` lock on it.
- action: the queue is marked deleted, `ICDeleteRcvQueue` is enqueued.
- Bound, a `cleanupManager` step, for each connection with an `RSReceivedQEND` queue:
- condition: another receive queue of the connection has an active subscription.
- `delete_errors + 1 < deleteErrorCount`: `delete_errors` is incremented.
- otherwise: the queue is deleted as above; the first `DEL` error of `ICDeleteRcvQueue` removes it locally.
- `ackSMPMessage` result, `type QueueDrained = Bool`:
- `OK`: `True`.
- `MSG`: `False`; the message is written to `msgQ`.
- Apps: `received_qend` is added to `RcvSwitchStatus`.
- Migration `20261008_rcv_switch_status`, SQLite and Postgres:
- up: index `idx_rcv_queues_switch_status` on `rcv_queues(switch_status)`.
- down: `received_qend` is set to `NULL`, the index is dropped.
## Mechanics
- `Agent/Protocol.hs`: `RSReceivedQEND`.
- `Agent/Store.hs`: `canAbortRcvSwitch`.
- `Client.hs`: `QueueDrained`; `ackSMPMessage` returns it.
- `Agent/Client.hs`: `sendAck` returns `QueueDrained`.
- `Agent/Store/AgentStore.hs`: `getEndedRcvQueueConnIds`:
```sql
SELECT conn_id FROM rcv_queues WHERE switch_status = ? AND deleted = 0
```
- `Agent.hs`:
- `deleteRcvQueueAsync`: `setRcvQueueDeleted`, then `ICDeleteRcvQueue`.
- `qEndMsg`.
- `ackQueueMessage`.
- `cleanupManager`: `expireEndedRcvQueues`.
- Apps:
- `apps/ios/SimpleXChat/APITypes.swift`
- `apps/multiplatform/common/src/commonMain/kotlin/chat/simplex/common/model/SimpleXAPI.kt`
## Tests
- `QEND` on the new queue while a message waits on the old queue:
- the message is delivered;
- the old queue is deleted after the `ACK` that returns `OK`.
- The same with a recipient restart before the `ACK`.
- Old server stopped: the old queue is deleted by the bound.
- Downgrade: `received_qend` is cleared, other switch statuses are kept.
+52
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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# Delayed AUTH error responses
## Decisions
- Responses that include `ERR AUTH` are sent at the next multiple of the delay after the start time.
- Delayed response sets:
| Source | Responses sent together | Start time |
|---|---|---|
| `receive`, failed verification | verification and parsing errors of one received block | block receipt |
| `client`, command processing | responses and messages of one batch | batch read from `rcvQ` |
| `RFWD`, forwarded command | the `RRES` of that command | start of forwarded command processing |
- A thread created by `forkClient` writes the responses to the send queue.
- Delay 0: the responses are written to the send queue directly.
- `authDelayExceeded`: incremented when processing took longer than the delay.
- Prometheus counter `simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded`.
- Not saved in the stats backup.
- Not in the daily stats log.
- Configuration:
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| INI section | `TRANSPORT` |
| INI key | `auth_error_delay_ms` |
| default | 50 |
| `ServerConfig` field | `authErrorDelay`, microseconds |
| test servers | 20 ms |
- AUTH timing test: elapsed time of 5 requests, test servers' delay.
- Out of scope: NTF and XFTP servers.
## Mechanics
- `Server.hs`:
- `isAuthError`: response is `ERR AUTH`.
- `sendResponses`: responses with `ERR AUTH` to `sendAfterDelay`, others to the send queue.
- `sendAfterDelay`: writes responses to the send queue at the next multiple of the delay.
- `receive`: block receipt time from the `rcvActiveAt` reading.
- `client`: batch time.
- `processForwardedCommand`: start time.
- `Server/Env/STM.hs`: `authErrorDelay` field, `defaultAuthErrorDelayMs`.
- `Server/Stats.hs`: `authDelayExceeded` in `ServerStats` and `ServerStatsData`.
- `Server/Prometheus.hs`: `simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded`.
- `Server/Main.hs`: INI value.
- `Server/Main/Init.hs`: INI template line.
- `simplexmq.cabal`: `timeit` removed from the test suite.
- `tests/SMPClient.hs`: `authErrorDelay = 20000`.
- `tests/ServerTests.hs`:
- delayed AUTH for wrong key, absent queue, absent link and suspended queue; immediate `SOK`.
- AUTH timing test measures elapsed time.
- `tests/SMPProxyTests.hs`: delayed AUTH to forwarded `SEND` and `LGET`.
+4 -3
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@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ SMP agent protocol has 2 main parts:
![Duplex connection procedure](./diagrams/duplex-messaging/duplex-creating.svg)
The procedure of establishing a duplex connection is explained on the example of Alice and Bob creating a bi-directional connection consisting of two unidirectional (simplex) queues, using SMP agents (A and B) to facilitate it, and two different SMP routers (which could be the same router). It is shown on the diagram above and has these steps:
The procedure of establishing a duplex connection is explained on the example of Alice (the initiating party) and Bob (the joining party) creating a bi-directional connection consisting of two unidirectional (simplex) queues, using SMP agents (A and B) to facilitate it, and two different SMP routers (which could be the same router). It is shown on the diagram above and has these steps:
1. Alice requests the new connection from the SMP agent A using agent `createConnection` api function.
2. Agent A creates an SMP queue on the router (using [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md) `NEW` command) and responds to Alice with the invitation that contains queue information and the encryption keys Bob's agent B should use. The invitation format is described in [Connection link](connection-link-1-time-invitation-and-contact-address).
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ This syntax of decrypted SMP client message body is defined by `decryptedAgentMe
Decrypted SMP message client body can be one of 4 types:
- `agentConnInfo` - used by the initiating party when confirming reply queue - sent in `agentConfirmation` envelope.
- `agentConnInfoReply` - used by accepting party, includes reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation - sent in `agentConfirmation` envelope.
- `agentRatchetInfo` - used to pass additional information when renegotiating double ratchet encryption - sent in `agentRatchetKey` envelope.
- `agentRatchetInfo` - used to pass additional information when renegotiating double ratchet encryption - sent in `agentRatchetKey` envelope. A key sent in reply to another key includes the hash of that key; agents do not reply to such keys.
- `agentMessage` - all other agent messages.
`agentMessage` contains these parts:
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ connInfo = *OCTET
agentConnInfoReply = %s"D" smpQueues connInfo
smpQueues = length 1*newQueueInfo ; NonEmpty list of reply queues
agentRatchetInfo = %s"R" ratchetInfo
ratchetInfo = *OCTET
ratchetInfo = [answeredKeyHash *OCTET] ; bytes after answeredKeyHash are ignored
answeredKeyHash = %s"0" / (%s"1" shortString) ; "0" in a key that starts renegotiation, otherwise SHA-256 of the two raw public keys of the answered key
agentMessage = %s"M" agentMsgHeader aMessage
agentMsgHeader = agentMsgId prevMsgHash
+189
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@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
Revision 1, 2026-10-01
# SimpleX Network: cryptographic primitive registry
The cryptographic primitives, constructions and domain-separation strings used by this repository, and which of them new code may use. For the threat model see [Security](./security.md).
Module aliases follow the codebase: `C` = [Simplex.Messaging.Crypto](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto.hs), `LC` = [Crypto.Lazy](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/Lazy.hs), `CR` = [Crypto.Ratchet](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/Ratchet.hs), `SL` = [Crypto.ShortLink](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/ShortLink.hs), `KEM` = [Crypto.SNTRUP761](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/SNTRUP761.hs) and [its bindings](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/SNTRUP761/Bindings.hs), `BBS` = [Crypto.BBS](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/BBS.hs). Lengths are in bytes.
## Table of contents
- [Policy](#policy)
- [Defaults for new code](#defaults-for-new-code)
- [Primitives](#primitives)
- [SimpleX box constructions](#simplex-box-constructions)
- [Domain separation and KDF inputs](#domain-separation-and-kdf-inputs)
- [Nonces and IVs](#nonces-and-ivs)
- [Implementation sources](#implementation-sources)
- [xftp-web (TypeScript)](#xftp-web-typescript)
- [Tests](#tests)
## Policy
- New code uses the default primitive for its purpose from [Defaults for new code](#defaults-for-new-code).
- Using any other primitive, or a primitive marked *restricted* outside its listed purpose, requires a written justification in the pull request and review by a maintainer responsible for cryptography.
- *Legacy-only* primitives stay only for the existing wire formats and stored data listed below. Do not add call sites.
- Every new HKDF info string or hash prefix must be unique, start with `SimpleX`, and be added to [Domain separation and KDF inputs](#domain-separation-and-kdf-inputs).
- Changing a primitive, key length, KDF input, info string or nonce construction changes the wire format. It requires a protocol version and an update of this registry and of the affected `protocol/` specification.
Status values used below:
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Default | Approved and preferred for new code for this purpose |
| Approved | Approved for new code for this purpose when the default does not fit |
| Restricted | Approved only for the listed purpose (external interoperability or a single protocol) |
| Legacy-only | Kept for existing wire formats or stored data; no new call sites |
## Defaults for new code
| Purpose | Default | Functions |
|---|---|---|
| Signature | Ed25519 | `C.sign'`, `C.verify'` with `C.SEd25519` |
| Key agreement | X25519 | `C.generateKeyPair`, `C.dh'` |
| Post-quantum KEM | sntrup761 | `KEM.sntrup761Keypair`, `sntrup761Enc`, `sntrup761Dec` |
| Hybrid DH + KEM secret | HKDF-SHA512 over `dh \|\| kemSecret` with a new info string, as in `CR.rootKdf` | `C.hkdf` |
| Authenticated encryption | XSalsa20-Poly1305 [SimpleX secretbox](#simplex-box-constructions) | `C.sbEncrypt`/`C.sbDecrypt`, `LC.sbEncryptTailTag` for streams |
| Authenticated encryption with a DH secret | XSalsa20-Poly1305 [SimpleX crypto_box](#simplex-box-constructions) | `C.cbEncrypt`/`C.cbDecrypt` |
| Forward-secret symmetric session | HKDF-SHA512 key chain | `C.sbcInit`, `C.sbcHkdf` |
| KDF | HKDF-SHA512 | `C.hkdf` |
| Hash commitment, derived identifier | SHA3-256 | `C.sha3_256` |
| Certificate fingerprint | SHA-256 X.509 fingerprint | `C.signedFingerprint`, `C.certificateFingerprint` |
| Randomness | ChaChaDRG seeded from system entropy | `C.newRandom`, `C.randomBytes` and the `random*` helpers |
## Primitives
| Primitive | Status | Purpose and protocol | Implementation | Lengths |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 | Default | SMP/NTF/XFTP queue and file keys (agent default `rcvAuthAlg`, `sndAuthAlg` in [Agent/Env/SQLite.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Env/SQLite.hs)), short-link signatures and owner auth (`SL.encodeSign`, `SL.newOwnerAuth`), XRCP identity and session keys ([RemoteControl/Invitation.hs](../src/Simplex/RemoteControl/Invitation.hs)), agent service request signatures, client/service TLS certificates ([Transport/Credentials.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport/Credentials.hs)) | crypton `Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519` via `C.sign'`/`C.verify'` | pub 32, priv 32, sig 64; X.509 SPKI 44 |
| Ed448 | Approved | Server CA and online certificates (default `signAlgorithm = ED448` in [Server/CLI.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/CLI.hs)); accepted for SMP command signatures and TLS | crypton `Crypto.PubKey.Ed448`; server key generation by the `openssl genpkey` CLI | pub 57, priv 57, sig 114; SPKI 69 |
| X25519 | Default | Per-queue e2e and server-to-recipient `crypto_box` keys, SMP session DH, command authenticator (SMP v7+), proxy (PRXY/PFWD), notification tokens, XFTP chunk transport, XRCP hello and announcements | crypton `Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519` via `C.dh'` | pub 32, priv 32, secret 32; SPKI 44 |
| X448 | Restricted | E2E double ratchet only: X3DH and DH ratchet (`CR.RatchetX448`, E2E v3) | crypton `Crypto.PubKey.Curve448` | pub 56, priv 56, secret 56 |
| sntrup761 | Default | PQ KEM in double ratchet (E2E v3, agent v5+) and XRCP v1 hello | Vendored C [cbits/sntrup761.c](../cbits/sntrup761.c) via FFI; randomness from ChaChaDRG through `haskell_rng_func` ([Bindings/RNG.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/SNTRUP761/Bindings/RNG.hs)) | pk 1158, sk 1763, ct 1039, shared 32 |
| XSalsa20-Poly1305, SimpleX crypto_box | Default | SMP message bodies (server to recipient), per-queue e2e envelope, confirmations, proxy forwarding, notifications, XRCP hello, XFTP chunk transport | crypton `Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa`, `Crypto.MAC.Poly1305`; `C.cryptoBox`, `LC.cbInit` | key 32 (DH secret), nonce 24, tag 16 |
| XSalsa20-Poly1305, SimpleX secretbox | Default | SMP transport block encryption (SMP v11+), short-link data (SMP v15+), XFTP file encryption, local file encryption ([Crypto/File.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/File.hs)), XRCP session | same; `C.sbEncrypt`, `LC.sbEncryptTailTag`, `LC.sbInit` | key 32, nonce 24, tag 16 |
| crypto_box authenticator | Approved | Deniable sender command authorization with X25519 queue keys (SMP v7+); agent currently creates Ed25519 keys | `C.cbAuthenticate`, `C.cbVerify`: `crypto_box(sha512(msg))` | 80 = 64 + 16 |
| AES-256-GCM, 16-byte IV | Legacy-only | Double ratchet header and body (E2E v3, [pqdr.md](./pqdr.md)) | crypton `Crypto.Cipher.AES`, `Crypto.Cipher.Types`; `C.encryptAEAD`, `C.decryptAEAD`, `C.initAEAD`; J0 = GHASH(IV) as NIST SP 800-38D defines for non-96-bit IVs | key 32, IV 16, tag 16; padded header 88 (PQ off) or 2310 (PQ on), `CR.paddedHeaderLen` |
| AES-256-GCM, 12-byte IV | Restricted | WebRTC frame encryption in simplex-chat (`Simplex.Chat.Mobile.WebRTC`), for WebCrypto interoperability | `C.encryptAESNoPad`, `C.decryptAESNoPad`, `C.initAEADGCM`, `C.GCMIV` | key 32, IV 12, tag 16 |
| HKDF-SHA512 | Default | All KDFs listed in [Domain separation](#domain-separation-and-kdf-inputs) | crypton `Crypto.KDF.HKDF` with `SHA512`; `C.hkdf` (extract + expand) | output per use, at most 255 * 64 |
| SHA-256 | Default for X.509 fingerprints, otherwise Restricted | X.509 fingerprints (`C.KeyHash`, server identity, XRCP CA, service certificate hash, SMP v16+), XFTP chunk digests, agent message hashes, `requestCode`, ratchet key dedup hash, security code `codeAD = sha256(rcAD)` | crypton; `C.sha256Hash`, `LC.sha256Hash`, `getFingerprint ... HashSHA256` | 32 |
| SHA-512 | Restricted | XFTP file digests and file description hash, input of the crypto_box authenticator | crypton; `C.sha512Hash`, `LC.sha512Hash` | 64 |
| SHA-512 (inside sntrup761) | Restricted | sntrup761 internal hash | [cbits/sha512.c](../cbits/sha512.c) calls OpenSSL `SHA512()` from the system `libcrypto` (`extra-libraries: crypto`) | 64 |
| SHA3-256 | Default | Short-link key `sha3_256(fixedData)` (SMP v15+), XRCP hybrid secret, service request binding (agent v8) | crypton; `C.sha3_256`, `KEM.kemHybridSecret` | 32 |
| SHA3-384 | Restricted | Client-supplied sender ID: first 24 bytes of `sha3_384(corrId)`, computed by the agent (`prepareConnectionLink'`, `newRcvConnSrv`) and the server (`createQueue`) | crypton; `C.sha3_384` | 48, truncated to 24 |
| Keccak-256 | Restricted | Label hash for SMP name queries (`NameQuery NQHash`), must match the on-chain registry | crypton `Keccak_256`; `labelHash` in [SimplexName.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/SimplexName.hs) | 32 |
| MD5 | Legacy-only, non-security | XOR-aggregated queue ID hash `IdsHash` for service subscription reconciliation (SUBS, NSUBS, SOKS, ENDS) | crypton (`C.md5Hash`, `Protocol.queueIdHash`); SQLite UDF `simplex_xor_md5_combine` ([Agent/Store/SQLite.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/SQLite.hs)); PostgreSQL pgcrypto `digest(..., 'md5')` in server and NTF schemas | 16 |
| ChaChaDRG | Default | Keys, nonces, correlation IDs, random IDs, sntrup761 randomness | crypton `Crypto.Random`; `C.newRandom` seeds with `drgNew` from system entropy | n/a |
| BBS+ over BLS12-381, SHA-256 suite | Restricted | Badge entitlement credentials and proofs ([Crypto/Entitlement.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/Entitlement.hs)), XFTP storage-time extension | Vendored submodules libbbs and blst (C and assembly) via FFI; randomness from libbbs `getentropy`, `SecRandomCopyBytes` with the `commoncrypto` flag, `BCryptGenRandom` on Windows ([cbits/getentropy_win.c](../cbits/getentropy_win.c)) | sk 32, pk 96, sig 80, proof 272 + 32 per undisclosed message |
| ECDSA with SHA-256 (ES256) | Restricted | APNS provider JWT ([Push/APNS.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Server/Push/APNS.hs)) | crypton `Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA.sign`; key read by cryptostore `Crypto.Store.PKCS8`; curve taken from the key file | signature DER `SEQUENCE {r, s}`, base64url |
| TLS 1.3 / 1.2 | Restricted | SMP, XFTP, NTF, XRCP transport: `TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256` (1.3), `ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256` (1.2), groups X448 and X25519, Ed448 and Ed25519 signatures (`defaultSupportedParams`) | `tls` 1.9 | n/a |
| TLS for browsers | Restricted | XFTP server with HTTPS credentials (`defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS`: `ciphersuite_strong`, FFDHE, P-521, ECDSA and RSA signatures); SMP server HTTPS requires RSA-4096 (`checkHTTPSCredentials`) | `tls`, `warp-tls` | n/a |
| X.509 | Restricted | Certificate chains, fingerprints, signed session keys (`C.signX509`, `C.verifyX509`) | `crypton-x509`, `crypton-x509-validation`, `cryptostore` | n/a |
| SQLCipher | Restricted | Agent SQLite database at rest (`PRAGMA key`); cipher parameters are SQLCipher defaults, not set in this repository | `direct-sqlcipher` (git dependency, [cabal.project](../cabal.project)) | n/a |
## SimpleX box constructions
`C.cryptoBox` and `LC.sbInit_` compute, for a 32-byte key `k` and 24-byte nonce `n`:
```
k1 = HSalsa20(k, 0^16)
subkey = HSalsa20(k1, n[0..16])
stream = Salsa20(subkey, n[16..24])
polyKey = stream[0..32]
ct = msg XOR stream[32..]
tag = Poly1305(polyKey, ct)
```
| Construction | Key `k` | Equivalent libsodium call | Layout |
|---|---|---|---|
| SimpleX crypto_box (`C.cbEncrypt`, `LC.cbInit`) | X25519 shared secret | `crypto_box_easy` (`crypto_box_beforenm` is `HSalsa20(dh, 0^16)`) | strict: `tag \|\| ct`; lazy tail-tag: `ct \|\| tag` |
| SimpleX secretbox (`C.sbEncrypt`, `LC.sbInit`, `KEM.kcb*`) | 32-byte symmetric key | `crypto_secretbox_easy` with key `crypto_core_hsalsa20(0^16, k)`, not with `k` | same |
Padding before encryption: `C.pad` prefixes a 2-byte big-endian length and fills with `#` (message at most 65533 bytes); `LC.pad` prefixes an 8-byte length. `*NoPad` variants skip padding.
## Domain separation and KDF inputs
HKDF is `C.hkdf salt ikm info len` (HKDF-SHA512).
| Info string | Salt | IKM | Output (split) | Function | Use |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `"SimpleXX3DH"` | 64 zero bytes | `dh1 \|\| dh2 \|\| dh3 [\|\| kemShared]` | 96: `hk`, `nhk`, root key (32 each) | `CR.pqX3dh` | Ratchet initialization, added in E2E v2; KEM secret from E2E v3 (current minimum) |
| `"SimpleXVerifyCode"` | 64 zero bytes | same as `SimpleXX3DH` | 32: `rcVCPQ` | `CR.pqX3dh` | Verification code covering all handshake keys, new ratchets |
| `"SimpleXRootRatchet"` | root key | `dh [\|\| kemShared]` | 96: root key, chain key, next header key | `CR.rootKdf` | DH/PQ ratchet step |
| `"SimpleXChainRatchet"` | empty | chain key | 96: chain key, message key (32 each), message IV (16), header IV (16) | `CR.chainKdf` | Per-message keys |
| `"SimpleXSbChainInit"` | SMP session ID | X25519 session secret | 64: two 32-byte chain keys | `C.sbcInit` from `Transport.blockEncryption` | SMP transport block encryption, SMP v11+ |
| `"SimpleXSbChainInit"` | empty | XRCP hybrid secret (below) | 64: two 32-byte chain keys | `C.sbcInit` in [RemoteControl/Client.hs](../src/Simplex/RemoteControl/Client.hs) | XRCP v1 session |
| `"SimpleXSbChain"` | empty | chain key | 88: chain key (32), secretbox key (32), nonce (24) | `C.sbcHkdf` | Each SMP block and XRCP message |
| `"SimpleXContactLink"` | empty | link key (32) | 56: link ID (24), secretbox key (32) | `SL.contactShortLinkKdf` | Contact short links, SMP v15+ |
| `"SimpleXInvLink"` | empty | link key (32) | 32: secretbox key | `SL.invShortLinkKdf` | Invitation short links, SMP v15+ |
Other derivations:
| Value | Construction | Function | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| Service request binding | `sha3_256("SimpleXService" \|\| rcAD)` | `serviceReqBinding` in [Agent.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs) | Agent RPC, agent v8 |
| BBS header | `"SimpleX badges v1"` | `entitlementBBSHeader` | Badge credentials |
| XRCP hybrid secret | `sha3_256(x25519Dh \|\| kemShared)` | `KEM.kemHybridSecret` | XRCP v1 |
| Short-link key | `sha3_256(smpEncode FixedLinkData)` | `SL.encodeSignFixedData`, checked in `SL.decryptLinkData` | SMP v15+ |
| Sender ID | `take 24 (sha3_384 corrId)` | `prepareConnectionLink'`, `newRcvConnSrv` in Agent.hs; `createQueue` in [Server.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs) | Client-supplied sender ID with link data, SMP v15+; the server rejects a mismatch to prevent an ID oracle |
| Ratchet associated data | `pubKeyBytes sk1 \|\| pubKeyBytes rk1` (raw X448, 112) | `CR.pqX3dh` | AD of every ratchet AEAD |
| Security code | `sha256(rcAD)` | `ratchetVerifyCodes` in [AgentStore.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/AgentStore.hs) | Connection verification |
| Contact request code | `sha256(smpEncode (k1, k2, kem, sndId))` | `requestCode` in Agent.hs | Contact request binding |
| Command authenticator | `crypto_box(sha512(authorized))` | `C.cbAuthenticate` | SMP v7+ |
| Queue IDs hash | `xor` of `md5(queueId)` | `Protocol.queueIdsHash` | Service subscriptions |
`"SimpleXSbChainInit"` and `"SimpleXSbChain"` are shared by SMP block encryption and XRCP. Their outputs are separated only by the IKM (and the salt for `sbcInit`).
## Nonces and IVs
| Use | Construction |
|---|---|
| SMP command authenticator, proxied command | `C.cbNonce corrId`, where `corrId` is a random 24-byte nonce (`C.randomCbNonce`) |
| SMP proxied responses | `C.reverseNonce` of the request nonce |
| Server-to-recipient message body | `C.cbNonce msgId`; `msgIdBytes = 24` in [Server/Main.hs](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs) |
| Per-queue e2e envelope, short-link data, notifications, XRCP hello, XFTP chunk download | Random 24-byte nonce, sent with the ciphertext |
| XFTP file, local encrypted file | Random key and nonce per file (`C.randomSbKey`, `C.randomCbNonce`) |
| SMP block, XRCP session messages | Key and nonce from `C.sbcHkdf`, one per block |
| Ratchet header, body | 16-byte IVs from `CR.chainKdf`; header IV is sent, body IV is not |
| WebRTC frames | 12-byte `C.GCMIV` supplied by the caller in simplex-chat |
## Implementation sources
| Source | Version or pin | Provides |
|---|---|---|
| crypton | 0.34 | Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, X448, XSalsa20, Poly1305, AES-GCM, HKDF, SHA-2, SHA-3, Keccak, MD5, ChaChaDRG, ECDSA |
| tls, crypton-x509, crypton-x509-validation, cryptostore | 1.9.0, 1.7.6, 1.6.12, 0.3.0.1 | TLS, X.509, PKCS#8 |
| [cbits/sntrup761.c](../cbits/sntrup761.c) | Copy of draft-josefsson-ntruprime-streamlined-00 ([cbits/README.md](../cbits/README.md)) | sntrup761 |
| [cbits/sha512.c](../cbits/sha512.c) and system OpenSSL `libcrypto` | system | SHA-512 for sntrup761 |
| `cbits/libbbs` submodule ([simplex-chat/libbbs](https://github.com/simplex-chat/libbbs)) | `59a0f4bf` | BBS+ (`bbs_sha256_ciphersuite`), SHA-256, SHAKE256 |
| `cbits/blst` submodule ([supranational/blst](https://github.com/supranational/blst)) | `db3defd0` | BLS12-381 (C and `build/assembly.S`, `-D__BLST_PORTABLE__`) |
| direct-sqlcipher | git `f814ee68` | SQLCipher |
| `openssl` CLI | system | Server CA and certificate key generation (`createServerX509_`) |
## xftp-web (TypeScript)
[xftp-web](../xftp-web/) reimplements a subset for the browser XFTP client. It has no AES-GCM, HKDF, SHA-3, MD5, X448 or sntrup761 code.
| Primitive | Implementation | Haskell counterpart |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 sign, verify, keys | libsodium-wrappers-sumo (`crypto_sign_*`), [src/crypto/keys.ts](../xftp-web/src/crypto/keys.ts) | `C.sign'`, `C.verify'` |
| Ed448 verify | `@noble/curves/ed448`, keys.ts `verifyEd448` | `C.verify'` |
| X25519 | libsodium `crypto_scalarmult`, `crypto_box_keypair` | `C.dh'` |
| SimpleX crypto_box, secretbox, tail-tag streaming | Salsa20 block function written in TypeScript, libsodium `crypto_core_hsalsa20` and `crypto_onetimeauth_*`, [src/crypto/secretbox.ts](../xftp-web/src/crypto/secretbox.ts) | `C.cryptoBox`, `LC.sbInit_` |
| crypto_box authenticator | [src/protocol/client.ts](../xftp-web/src/protocol/client.ts) `cbAuthenticate`, `cbVerify` | `C.cbAuthenticate`, `C.cbVerify` |
| SHA-256, SHA-512 | libsodium `crypto_hash_sha256`, `crypto_hash_sha512*`, [src/crypto/digest.ts](../xftp-web/src/crypto/digest.ts) | `C.sha256Hash`, `C.sha512Hash` |
| Random | WebCrypto `crypto.getRandomValues`; libsodium for key generation | `C.randomBytes` |
## Tests
None of the tests below compares against published reference vectors (NIST, RFC 8032, RFC 7748, RFC 5869, NaCl, the sntrup761 draft or the BBS draft). Interoperability is tested between this repository's own implementations.
| Area | Test module (hspec group) | Kind |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519, Ed448, X25519 crypto_box, secretbox, lazy and tail-tag secretbox, AES-GCM 12-byte IV, X.509 key encoding, X.509 chains, sntrup761, BBS+, entitlements, padding | [tests/CoreTests/CryptoTests.hs](../tests/CoreTests/CryptoTests.hs) | Round-trip; fixed lengths for BBS+; fixed bytes for padding |
| Double ratchet (X25519 and X448), PQ KEM agreement, AES-GCM 16-byte IV | [tests/AgentTests/DoubleRatchetTests.hs](../tests/AgentTests/DoubleRatchetTests.hs) | Round-trip; decoding of a stored v2 ratchet JSON |
| Short links (HKDF info strings, SHA3-256 link key) | [tests/AgentTests/ShortLinkTests.hs](../tests/AgentTests/ShortLinkTests.hs) | Round-trip, tamper rejection |
| File encryption | [tests/CoreTests/CryptoFileTests.hs](../tests/CoreTests/CryptoFileTests.hs) | Round-trip |
| XRCP session (SHA3-256 hybrid, sb chain) | [tests/RemoteControl.hs](../tests/RemoteControl.hs) | End-to-end |
| SMP authenticators, block encryption, `IdsHash` (MD5) | [tests/ServerTests.hs](../tests/ServerTests.hs) | End-to-end; with the PostgreSQL queue store this checks Haskell MD5 against pgcrypto |
| Haskell and xftp-web: SHA-256/512, Ed25519, Ed448 identity proof, X25519, DER keys, crypto_box, secretbox, tail-tag, authenticator, file encryption | [tests/XFTPWebTests.hs](../tests/XFTPWebTests.hs) (`XFTP Web Client`) | Byte-identical cross-language output |
+2 -2
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@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ note over CC, HC: TLS handshake
par
note over CC: validate client X509 credentials
CC->>CI: session code from tlsUnique
CI-->>CC: user confirmation
CI-->>CC: user confirmation (optional if known)
and
note over HC: validate server X509 credentials
HC->>HI: session code from tlsUnique
HI-->>HC: user confirmation
HI-->>HC: user confirmation (optional if known)
end
note over CI, HI: 3. Session verification and protocol negotiation
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@@ -62,14 +62,16 @@ It is possible to reduce size overhead by using only one KEM agreement and makin
## Double ratchet with encrypted headers augmented with double PQ KEM
Algorithm below assumes that in addition to shared secret from the initial key agreement, there will be an encapsulation key available from the party that published its keys (Bob).
Algorithm below assumes that in addition to shared secret from the initial key agreement, there will be an encapsulation key available from the initiating party, that sent its keys in the connection invitation to the joining party (see [agent protocol](./agent-protocol.md)). Following the double ratchet specification, the pseudo-code below names the joining party Alice and the initiating party Bob.
Unlike X3DH prekey bundles, these keys are not reusable keys published for any party to use. The initiating party generates two X448 key pairs and, optionally, a sntrup761 KEM key pair for each connection, sends the public keys in the invitation, and deletes the stored private keys once the ratchet is initialized; only the second X448 private key and the agreed KEM key pair remain in the ratchet state as its initial ratchet keys. The joining party generates its keys when joining and keeps only its KEM key pair, in the ratchet state. The exception is a contact address that publishes ratchet keys in its link data: all requesters use these keys until the address owner rotates them, and the owner keeps the private keys of a few recent generations.
### Initialization
The double ratchet initialization is defined in pseudo-code. This pseudo-code is identical to Signal algorithm specification except for that parts that add post-quantum key agreement.
```
// Alice obtained Bob's keys and initializes ratchet first
// Alice (joining party) received Bob's keys in the invitation and initializes ratchet first
def RatchetInitAlicePQ2HE(state, SK, bob_dh_public_key, shared_hka, shared_nhkb, bob_pq_kem_encapsulation_key):
state.DHRs = GENERATE_DH()
state.DHRr = bob_dh_public_key
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ def RatchetInitAlicePQ2HE(state, SK, bob_dh_public_key, shared_hka, shared_nhkb,
state.HKr = None
state.NHKr = shared_nhkb
// Bob initializes ratchet second, having received Alice's connection request
// Bob (initiating party) initializes ratchet second, having received Alice's first message
def RatchetInitBobPQ2HE(state, SK, bob_dh_key_pair, shared_hka, shared_nhkb, bob_pq_kem_key_pair):
state.DHRs = bob_dh_key_pair
state.DHRr = None
@@ -210,6 +212,8 @@ The outer envelope contains the encrypted header (used as associated data for bo
The message body is encrypted with AES-256-GCM using the message key derived from the sending chain key (`KDF_CK`). The associated data for body encryption is the concatenation of the ratchet associated data and the encoded encrypted header.
`KDF_CK(CK)` is HKDF-SHA512 with empty salt, `CK` as input key material and info `"SimpleXChainRatchet"`, producing 96 bytes split into the next chain key (32 bytes), the message key (32 bytes), the message body IV (16 bytes, not transmitted) and `headerIV` (16 bytes). Both IVs are used as 16-byte AES-256-GCM IVs, not the 12-byte IVs recommended by NIST SP 800-38D, so the initial counter block is J0 = GHASH(IV || 0^64 || [128]_64) as defined there for non-96-bit IVs. WebCrypto and other conforming implementations compute it when given the full 16-byte IV; truncating the IV to 12 bytes produces different ciphertext.
```abnf
encRatchetMessage = versionedLength encMessageHeader msgAuthTag encMsgBody
; encMessageHeader is used as associated data for body decryption: AD = rcAD || encMessageHeader
@@ -274,7 +278,7 @@ As SimpleX Messaging Protocol pads messages to a fixed size, using 16kb transpor
Sharing the initial keys in case of SimpleX Chat it is equivalent to sharing the invitation link. As encapsulation key is large, it may be inconvenient to share it in the link in some contexts, e.g. when QR codes are used.
It is possible to postpone sharing the encapsulation key until the first message from Alice (confirmation message in SMP protocol), the party sending connection request. The upside here is that the invitation link size would not increase. The downside is that the user profile shared in this confirmation will not be encrypted with PQ-resistant algorithm.
It is possible to postpone sharing the encapsulation key until the first message from the joining party (confirmation message in SMP protocol). The upside here is that the invitation link size would not increase. The downside is that the user profile shared in this confirmation will not be encrypted with PQ-resistant algorithm.
Another consideration is pairwise ratchets in groups. Key generation in sntrup761 is quite slow - on slow devices it can be as slow as 10-20 keys per second, so using this primitive in groups larger than 10-20 members would result in slow performance.
+7 -5
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
- [SimpleX Messaging Protocol router that proxies the messages to another SMP router](#simplex-messaging-protocol-router-that-proxies-the-messages-to-another-smp-router)
- [An attacker who obtained Alice's (decrypted) chat database](#an-attacker-who-obtained-alices-decrypted-chat-database)
- [A user's contact](#a-users-contact)
- [An attacker who observes Alice showing an introduction message to Bob](#an-attacker-who-observes-alice-showing-an-introduction-message-to-bob)
- [An attacker who observes the initiating party showing an introduction message to the joining party](#an-attacker-who-observes-the-initiating-party-showing-an-introduction-message-to-the-joining-party)
- [An attacker with Internet access](#an-attacker-with-internet-access)
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
- AES-GCM AEAD cipher,
- SHA512-based HKDF for key derivation.
All primitives in use, their lengths, domain-separation strings and the policy for new code are listed in the [cryptographic primitive registry](./crypto-registry.md).
## Threat Model
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
*cannot:*
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen, unless the database contains a new rotation queue that is not secured yet. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
- undetectably communicate at the same time as Alice with her contacts. Doing so would result in the contact getting different messages with repeated IDs.
@@ -190,15 +192,15 @@ This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the Si
- cannot collaborate with another of the user's contacts to confirm they are communicating with the same user.
### An attacker who observes Alice showing an introduction message to Bob
### An attacker who observes the initiating party showing an introduction message to the joining party
*can:*
- Impersonate Bob to Alice.
- Impersonate the joining party to the initiating party.
*cannot:*
- Impersonate Alice to Bob.
- Impersonate the initiating party to the joining party.
### An attacker with Internet access
+9 -5
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ It's designed with the focus on communication security and integrity, under the
It is designed as a low level protocol for other application protocols to solve the problem of secure and private message transmission, making [MITM attack][1] very difficult at any part of the message transmission system.
This document describes SMP protocol version 22. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
This document describes SMP protocol version 23. Versions 1-5 are discontinued. The version history:
- v1: binary protocol encoding
- v2: message flags (used to control notifications)
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ This document describes SMP protocol version 22. Versions 1-5 are discontinued.
- v20: public namespaces resolver (RSLV command, RNAME response) — direct or forwarded via PFWD
- v21: server public information in handshake
- v22: `RNAME` says whether a name can be registered, not only what it resolves to
- v23: version in nonces of forwarded commands, random nonces for forwarded responses
## Introduction
@@ -1120,13 +1121,15 @@ When the client receives PKEY response it MUST validate that:
- the fingerprint of the received certificate matches fingerprint in the router address - it mitigates MITM attack by proxy.
- the router session key is correctly signed with the received certificate.
`smpVersionRange` in `PKEY` is not signed.
The proxy router may respond with error response in case the destination router is not available or in case it has an earlier version that does not support proxied commands.
#### Send command via proxy
Sender can send `SKEY` and `SEND` commands via proxy after obtaining the session ID with `PRXY` command (see [Request proxied session](#request-proxied-session)).
Transmission sent to proxy router should use session ID as entity ID and use a random correlation ID of 24 bytes as a nonce for crypto_box encryption of transmission to the destination router. The random ephemeral X25519 key to encrypt transmission should be unique per command, and it should be combined with the key sent by the router in the handshake header to proxy and to the client in `PKEY` command.
Transmission sent to proxy router should use session ID as entity ID and use a random correlation ID of 24 bytes as a nonce for crypto_box encryption of transmission to the destination router. When `smpVersion` in `PFWD` is 23 or higher, the first 2 bytes of this nonce are XOR-ed with `smpVersion`. The random ephemeral X25519 key to encrypt transmission should be unique per command, and it should be combined with the key sent by the router in the handshake header to proxy and to the client in `PKEY` command.
Encrypted transmission should use the received session ID from the connection between proxy router and destination router in the authorized body.
@@ -1138,10 +1141,11 @@ commandKey = length x509encoded
The proxy router will forward the encrypted transmission in `RFWD` command (see below).
Having received the `RRES` response from the destination router, proxy router will forward `PRES` response to the client. `PRES` response should use the same correlation ID as `PFWD` command. The destination router will use this correlation ID increased by 1 as a nonce for encryption of the response.
Having received the `RRES` response from the destination router, proxy router will forward `PRES` response to the client. `PRES` response should use the same correlation ID as `PFWD` command. The destination router will use this correlation ID increased by 1 as a nonce for encryption of the response. When `smpVersion` in `PFWD` is 23 or higher, the destination router uses a random nonce instead, and sends it before the encrypted response.
```abnf
proxyResponse = %s"PRES" SP <encrypted padded(forwardedResponse, 16226)>
proxyResponse = %s"PRES" SP [responseNonce] <encrypted padded(forwardedResponse, 16226)>
responseNonce = %s"0" / (%s"1" 24*24 OCTET) ; from v23
forwardedResponse = *OCTET ; client-encrypted SMP response, decrypted by client using per-command DH secret
```
@@ -1168,7 +1172,7 @@ The shared secret for encrypting transmission bodies between proxy router and de
```abnf
relayResponse = %s"RRES" SP <encrypted(responseTransmission)>
relayResponse = %s"RRES" SP [responseNonce] <encrypted(responseTransmission)>
responseTransmission = fwdCorrId forwardedResponse
; fwdCorrId and forwardedResponse defined above in RFWD section
```
+19 -4
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The session invitation contains this data:
Host application decrypts (except the first session) and validates the invitation:
- Session signature is valid.
- Timestamp is within some window from the current time.
- Timestamp of a multicast announcement is not earlier than 3660 seconds before and not later than 3600 seconds after the current time of the host. The host ignores announcements outside of this interval and continues listening.
- Long-term key signature is valid.
- Long-term CA and signature key are the same as in the first session.
- Some version in the offered range is supported.
@@ -121,9 +121,15 @@ During TLS handshake, parties validate certificate chains against previously kno
### Session verification and protocol negotiation
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user who must match them (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirm on the host device. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller devices present a "session security code" to the user. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once the session is confirmed by the user, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
To verify the session, the user matches the codes (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirms the session on the host device.
The user MUST verify the first session with a new controller. The host stores the long-term identity of the controller (CA fingerprint and Ed25519 public key) only after this session is verified. A controller with the stored long-term identity is a known controller.
The user MAY verify the subsequent sessions with a known controller. In a session that the host confirms without user action, the controller is authenticated only by its long-term identity stored in the first session (see [Threat model](#threat-model)). SimpleX Chat mobile apps require user verification of sessions with known controllers only when the user enables the "Verify connections" option.
Once the session is confirmed, the host sends HELLO block to the controller.
XRCP blocks inside TLS are padded to 16384 bytes.
@@ -305,7 +311,7 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
- prevent host and controller devices from establishing the session
*cannot:*
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band in the first session with the controller.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network:
@@ -324,6 +330,15 @@ to receive: (rcvKey', sk, nonce) = HKDF(rcvKey, "SimpleXSbChain", 88)
*cannot:*
- connect to the host or make host connect to itself.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network who also obtained the long-term private keys of a known controller (e.g., from the controller device):
*can:*
- make host connect to itself instead of the controller.
- access any data of the controlled host application, within the capabilities of the provided API, if the host confirms the session without user action.
*cannot:*
- access host application data, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
#### Compromised controller device:
*can:*
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
version=$(awk '/^version:/ {print $2}' simplexmq.cabal)
for dir in "$@"; do
if [ -d "$dir/build" ]; then
find "$dir/build" -mindepth 3 -maxdepth 3 -type d -name 'simplexmq-*' ! -name "simplexmq-$version" -exec rm -rf {} +
fi
done
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
command=$1
hashes=$2
sources() {
git ls-files -z '*.hs' '*.hsc'
}
case "$command" in
record)
sources | xargs -0 sha256sum > "$hashes"
;;
restore)
sources | xargs -0 touch
while read -r hash file; do
if [ -f "$file" ] && [ "$(sha256sum "$file" | cut -d' ' -f1)" = "$hash" ]; then
touch -d 2000-01-01 "$file"
fi
done < "$hashes"
;;
*)
echo "usage: $0 record|restore <hashes file>" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
# Copy to .env (next to docker-compose.yml) only to change a setting; without it
# docker-compose.yml uses the values shown here.
# ============================================================================
# Required settings — the stack will not start without these.
# Chain settings.
# ============================================================================
# Ethereum network: mainnet (the SNRC `.testing` contracts live on mainnet)
@@ -14,9 +17,16 @@ NETWORK=mainnet
TRUSTED_NODE_URL=https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io
# ============================================================================
# Optional overrides — sensible defaults are baked into docker-compose.yml,
# so leave these commented unless you need to change them.
# Optional overrides — leave commented unless you need to change them.
# ============================================================================
# Nimbus NAT (default: any). For a stable public node set an explicit IP:
# NAT=extip:1.2.3.4 # your public IPv4: curl -s ifconfig.me
# Resolver (defaults in the README's "Load and scaling" and "Logs" sections)
# SNRC_WORKERS=4 # worker processes; default CPU count, at most 4
# SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT=5 # seconds per request to reth
# SNRC_LOG_FORMAT=json # default text (key=value)
# SNRC_LOG_COLOR=always # coloured `docker compose logs`
# SNRC_LOG_LEVEL=debug # also log health checks and idle connections
# SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES=172.16.0.0/12 # behind a reverse proxy on the host; see README
+97 -4
View File
@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@ against **Ethereum mainnet** (where the `.testing` contracts live):
## 1. Configure
Edit `.env` — the defaults work as-is; override only if needed:
The defaults in `docker-compose.yml` work as-is:
```sh
NETWORK=mainnet # default
TRUSTED_NODE_URL=https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io # default
```
Everything else (NAT) has a working default baked into `docker-compose.yml`;
uncomment the hints in `.env` only to override.
To override these or NAT, copy `.env.example` to `.env` and edit it; `.env` is
not committed.
## 2. Run
@@ -121,6 +121,15 @@ standalone for local dev (no Docker), via [`uv`](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/):
uv run scripts/resolver/service/snrc-resolve.py # defaults to local reth + mainnet .testing
```
Tests and lint run from `scripts/resolver/service`:
```sh
uv run pytest
uv run ruff check .
```
Dependencies are locked in `uv.lock`; the Docker image installs exactly those.
Three routes, versioned separately from the protocol so each only changes when
its own shape does:
@@ -243,7 +252,7 @@ wrong, `error` and `status` hold the same value, so one field is enough to read.
`upstreamError` says only which exception type the RPC call raised. The text
goes to the resolver's log instead, because `SNRC_RPC` can carry a provider key
and urlopen puts the URL it failed on into the message. It is also the answer
and the exception can carry the URL it failed on. It is also the answer
when a registrar, controller or oracle address has no contract behind it: the
empty reply is refused rather than read as zero, which would make every name
look free.
@@ -374,3 +383,87 @@ here.
To override any of them, set `SNRC_REGISTRY_<TLD>`, `SNRC_REGISTRAR_<TLD>` or
`SNRC_CONTROLLER_<TLD>` on the `resolver` service in `docker-compose.yml`, or
as env vars when you run the script directly.
### Load and scaling
A lookup reads the chain in at most three rounds: the name's status and
registry entries, then its record from its resolver, then prices for a name
that is free. The node runs the calls of a JSON-RPC batch one after another,
so the contract reads of a round go to the chain as one `eth_call` to
[Multicall3](https://github.com/mds1/multicall). A node that is slow for a
moment therefore delays a lookup a few times, not once per read. Connections to
the node are kept open and reused.
The resolver answers HTTP/1.1, so each smp-server keeps its connections to it
open instead of connecting for every lookup. An idle connection is closed after
60 s; the smp-server drops its own idle ones after 30 s, so it closes them first.
Each access log line ends with how long the request took, so slow requests
show up in `docker compose logs resolver`.
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `SNRC_WORKERS` | CPU count, at most 4 | processes sharing the port. If one exits, the others stop, so the container restarts |
| `SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT` | `5` | seconds to wait for each request to the node; the smp-server gives up after 3 |
| `SNRC_MULTICALL` | `0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11` | Multicall3 address. If it does not answer, each round is sent as a plain batch and the log says so once |
### Logs
Each event is one line: UTC time, level, event name, then `key=value` fields.
```
2026-09-26T08:06:19.992Z INFO request client=203.0.113.7 worker=12 method=GET path=/v2/resolve/[4fdd…].testing status=200 bytes=701 ms=35
2026-09-26T08:06:20.051Z WARN upstream_error name=foobar.testing error=ConnectionRefusedError message="[Errno 111] Connection refused"
```
| Event | Level | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `listening` | info | started: address, workers, RPC endpoint, registries, trusted proxies |
| `request` | info | one answered request; `/health` only at debug |
| `upstream_error` | warn | a read from the node failed; the caller got 502 |
| `multicall_unavailable` | warn | Multicall3 did not answer; rounds are sent as plain batches |
| `client_gone` | warn | the caller hung up before the answer, usually an smp-server past its timeout |
| `http_error` | warn | a malformed request; idle keep-alive timeouts only at debug |
| `request_failed` | error | a request failed unexpectedly, with its traceback |
| `worker_exited`, `worker_failed` | error | a worker stopped; the others stop too, so the container restarts |
| `stopping` | info | stopped by a signal |
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `SNRC_LOG_FORMAT` | `text` | `text` (`key=value`) or `json`, one object per line |
| `SNRC_LOG_COLOR` | `auto` | `auto` colours only a terminal, `always`, `never`. Docker output is no terminal, so set `always` for coloured `docker compose logs` |
| `SNRC_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | `debug` also logs health checks and idle connections closing |
| `SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | none | addresses or CIDRs of reverse proxies whose `X-Forwarded-For` names the client |
With docker compose, set these, and those in "Load and scaling", in `.env`
(`.env.example` lists them).
Behind a reverse proxy such as Caddy on the host, the resolver sees the Docker
network's gateway rather than the client. Trust that gateway, and the logged
client is the last `X-Forwarded-For` address no trusted proxy added, so a caller
through the proxy cannot claim another address. Everything else on the host that
connects to `127.0.0.1:8000`, the smp-servers included, arrives through the same
gateway and could set the logged address too; run the proxy in the compose network
and trust only its address to avoid that.
The gateway is
`docker network inspect resolver_default --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}'`,
with the network named after the compose project. It changes when the network is
recreated, as `docker compose down` does, so trust one of, in `.env`:
- `SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES=172.16.0.0/12`: Docker's default pools for compose
networks, whatever subnet it picks. This also trusts every other container on the
host. Add the gateway too if Docker ever gives the network a `192.168.x.x` one.
- a pinned subnet, so the gateway stays fixed, and only that gateway:
```yaml
networks:
default:
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.30.0.0/24
gateway: 172.30.0.1
```
in `docker-compose.yml`, with `SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES=172.30.0.1`, on a subnet no
other network on the host uses.
+20 -9
View File
@@ -38,14 +38,14 @@ services:
- sh
- -c
- |
if [ -d /home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK}/db ]; then
if [ -d /home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK:-mainnet}/db ]; then
echo "Nimbus data dir already initialised — skipping checkpoint sync";
exit 0;
fi;
/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/nimbus_beacon_node trustedNodeSync \
--network=${NETWORK} \
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK} \
--trusted-node-url=${TRUSTED_NODE_URL} \
--network=${NETWORK:-mainnet} \
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK:-mainnet} \
--trusted-node-url=${TRUSTED_NODE_URL:-https://mainnet-checkpoint-sync.attestant.io} \
--backfill=false
restart: "no"
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ services:
echo "Reth data already initialised — skipping snapshot download";
exit 0;
fi;
echo "Downloading Reth ${NETWORK} --minimal snapshot...";
reth download --datadir /data --chain ${NETWORK} --minimal && \
echo "Downloading Reth ${NETWORK:-mainnet} --minimal snapshot...";
reth download --datadir /data --chain ${NETWORK:-mainnet} --minimal && \
touch /data/.snapshot-done && \
echo "Snapshot download complete"
restart: "no"
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ services:
command: >
node
--datadir /data
--chain ${NETWORK}
--chain ${NETWORK:-mainnet}
--minimal
--authrpc.jwtsecret /jwt/jwt.hex
--authrpc.addr 0.0.0.0 --authrpc.port 8551
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ services:
- "9000:9000/udp"
- "127.0.0.1:5052:5052"
command: >
--network=${NETWORK}
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK}
--network=${NETWORK:-mainnet}
--data-dir=/home/user/nimbus-eth2/build/data/${NETWORK:-mainnet}
--el=http://reth:8551
--jwt-secret=/jwt/jwt.hex
--non-interactive
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ services:
# smp-server points its [NAMES] resolver_endpoint at this URL.
# To change the host port, edit the LEFT side of the port mapping below.
resolver:
image: snrc-resolve:local
build:
context: ./service
dockerfile: Dockerfile
@@ -156,8 +157,18 @@ services:
# SNRC_REGISTRAR_SIMPLEX: 0x...
# SNRC_CONTROLLER_TESTING: 0x...
# SNRC_CONTROLLER_SIMPLEX: 0x...
# Set in .env (see .env.example); unset or empty means the resolver's default.
SNRC_WORKERS: ${SNRC_WORKERS:-}
SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT: ${SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT:-}
SNRC_LOG_FORMAT: ${SNRC_LOG_FORMAT:-}
SNRC_LOG_COLOR: ${SNRC_LOG_COLOR:-}
SNRC_LOG_LEVEL: ${SNRC_LOG_LEVEL:-}
SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES: ${SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES:-}
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"
# a line per lookup; the local driver keeps 5 rotated files of 20 MB
logging:
driver: local
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
.venv
**/__pycache__
.pytest_cache
.ruff_cache
test_snrc_resolve.py
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
3.13
+13 -12
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
# ---------- builder ----------
# Use the official uv image (Astral) on top of a slim Python base.
# uv resolves and installs the lockfile-free pyproject.toml in seconds and
# produces a portable .venv we can copy into the runtime stage.
FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:python3.13-bookworm-slim AS builder
# The official uv image (Astral) on top of a slim Python base installs the
# locked dependencies into a portable .venv for the runtime stage.
# Pinned to the uv that wrote uv.lock (its bookworm images stopped at 0.9.30), on the
# runtime's Debian release, so the .venv's Python path exists there.
FROM ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.12.16-python3.13-trixie-slim AS builder
ENV UV_LINK_MODE=copy \
UV_COMPILE_BYTECODE=1 \
@@ -12,17 +13,17 @@ ENV UV_LINK_MODE=copy \
WORKDIR /app
# Install deps first (separate layer) — script edits won't bust this cache.
COPY pyproject.toml ./
# Dependencies first (separate layer), exactly as locked: script edits don't bust this cache.
COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock .python-version ./
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \
uv sync --no-dev --no-install-project
uv sync --frozen --no-dev --no-install-project
# Script is added after the dep layer for cache friendliness.
COPY snrc-resolve.py ./
# ---------- runtime ----------
# Slim runtime — only the venv + script. No uv, no apt.
FROM python:3.13-slim AS runtime
FROM python:3.13-slim-trixie AS runtime
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
@@ -33,15 +34,15 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 10001 snrc && \
useradd --system --uid 10001 --gid snrc --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin snrc
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=snrc:snrc /app /app
# owned by root, so the service cannot rewrite its own code
COPY --from=builder /app /app
USER snrc:snrc
EXPOSE 8000
# Liveness check hits the script's own /health route. ThreadingHTTPServer is
# fast enough that 3s is generous for a localhost probe; restart if it stops
# responding entirely.
# Liveness check hits the script's own /health route. Three failures mark the
# container unhealthy; compose does not restart it for that, but `docker ps` shows it.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
CMD ["python", "-c", "import urllib.request, sys; sys.exit(0 if urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8000/health', timeout=3).status == 200 else 1)"]
+9
View File
@@ -9,5 +9,14 @@ dependencies = [
"eth-hash[pycryptodome]>=0.7",
]
[dependency-groups]
dev = [
"pytest>=8",
"ruff>=0.6",
]
[tool.uv]
package = false
[tool.ruff.lint]
select = ["E9", "F", "B"]
+609 -63
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,15 @@ Environment:
(default: mainnet for .testing, empty for .simplex)
SNRC_PORT Listen port (default: 8000)
SNRC_BIND Bind address (default: 0.0.0.0)
SNRC_WORKERS Worker processes sharing the port (default: CPU count, at most 4)
SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT Seconds to wait for each RPC request (default: 5)
SNRC_MULTICALL Multicall3 contract that runs a round of reads as one call
(default: 0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11)
SNRC_LOG_FORMAT text (key=value) or json (default: text)
SNRC_LOG_COLOR auto (on a terminal), always or never (default: auto)
SNRC_LOG_LEVEL debug, info, warning or error (default: info)
SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES Comma-separated addresses or CIDRs of reverse proxies whose
X-Forwarded-For names the client (default: none)
Each TLD is a separate SNRC deployment with its own ENSRegistry; the
resolver dispatches by the queried name's rightmost label.
@@ -64,19 +73,45 @@ Unrecognised payloads fall back to `0x`-prefixed raw hex.
"""
import hashlib
import ipaddress
import json
import logging
import os
import queue
import signal
import socket
import sys
import threading
import time
from contextlib import contextmanager
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from functools import lru_cache
from http.client import BadStatusLine, HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from urllib.error import HTTPError
from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from eth_hash.auto import keccak
RPC = os.environ.get("SNRC_RPC", "http://127.0.0.1:8545")
BIND = os.environ.get("SNRC_BIND", "0.0.0.0")
PORT = int(os.environ.get("SNRC_PORT", "8000"))
# The smp-server gives up after 3 s, so a slower call only holds a thread.
RPC_TIMEOUT_S = float(os.environ.get("SNRC_RPC_TIMEOUT", "") or 5)
# The node and the beacon client usually share the host, so not every core.
MAX_DEFAULT_WORKERS = 4
WORKERS = int(os.environ.get("SNRC_WORKERS", "") or min(MAX_DEFAULT_WORKERS, os.cpu_count() or 1))
# Multicall3, at this address on mainnet and most chains. A node runs a JSON-RPC
# batch one call after another, so a round of reads is sent as one eth_call.
MULTICALL = os.environ.get("SNRC_MULTICALL", "") or "0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11"
LOG_FORMAT = os.environ.get("SNRC_LOG_FORMAT", "") or "text"
LOG_COLOR = os.environ.get("SNRC_LOG_COLOR", "") or "auto"
LOG_LEVEL = os.environ.get("SNRC_LOG_LEVEL", "") or "info"
# Peers whose X-Forwarded-For is believed, such as the Docker gateway a reverse proxy on the host
# connects through. Anyone else could put any address there.
TRUSTED_PROXIES = tuple(
ipaddress.ip_network(p.strip(), strict=False) for p in os.environ.get("SNRC_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "").split(",") if p.strip()
)
# Each TLD is its own SNRC deployment with its own ENSRegistry. Dispatch
# happens on the rightmost label of the queried name. Empty / unset means
@@ -121,34 +156,291 @@ COIN_ETH = 60
COIN_BTC = 0
COIN_XMR = 128
COIN_DOT = 354
RECORD_COINS = (COIN_ETH, COIN_BTC, COIN_XMR, COIN_DOT)
ZERO_ADDR = "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
# The registry prices in attoUSD (1e-18 USD); the protocol carries US cents.
# ---------- Logging ----------
LOGGER = logging.getLogger("snrc_resolve")
LEVEL_NAMES = {logging.DEBUG: "DEBUG", logging.INFO: "INFO", logging.WARNING: "WARN", logging.ERROR: "ERROR"}
# ANSI SGR codes
DIM, BOLD, GREEN, YELLOW, RED = "2", "1", "32", "33", "31"
LEVEL_COLORS = {"DEBUG": DIM, "INFO": GREEN, "WARN": YELLOW, "ERROR": RED}
STATUS_COLORS = {2: GREEN, 3: GREEN, 4: YELLOW, 5: RED}
def log_event(level: int, name: str, /, exc_info=None, **fields):
LOGGER.log(level, name, exc_info=exc_info, extra={"fields": fields})
def _log_time(record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
return datetime.fromtimestamp(record.created, timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="milliseconds").replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _log_value(value) -> str:
"""A logfmt value: bare when it cannot be misread, JSON-quoted otherwise."""
if value is None:
return "-"
s = str(value)
if not s or any(c in s for c in ' ="\\') or not s.isprintable():
return json.dumps(s)
return s
class TextFormatter(logging.Formatter):
def __init__(self, color: bool):
super().__init__()
self.color = color
def _paint(self, code: str, text: str) -> str:
return f"\033[{code}m{text}\033[0m" if self.color and code else text
def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
level = LEVEL_NAMES.get(record.levelno, record.levelname)
fields = " ".join(
self._paint(DIM, f"{k}=") + self._paint(STATUS_COLORS.get(v // 100, "") if k == "status" and isinstance(v, int) else "", _log_value(v))
for k, v in getattr(record, "fields", {}).items()
)
line = f"{self._paint(DIM, _log_time(record))} {self._paint(LEVEL_COLORS.get(level, ''), f'{level:<5}')} {self._paint(BOLD, record.getMessage())}"
if fields:
line += " " + fields
if record.exc_info:
line += "\n" + self.formatException(record.exc_info)
return line
class JsonFormatter(logging.Formatter):
def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
out = {
"time": _log_time(record),
"level": LEVEL_NAMES.get(record.levelno, record.levelname).lower(),
"event": record.getMessage(),
**getattr(record, "fields", {}),
}
if record.exc_info:
out["exception"] = self.formatException(record.exc_info)
return json.dumps(out, default=str)
def setup_logging(stream=None):
"""Sends the resolver's events to stderr in the configured format."""
stream = stream or sys.stderr
if LOG_FORMAT not in ("text", "json"):
raise ValueError(f"SNRC_LOG_FORMAT must be text or json, not {LOG_FORMAT!r}")
if LOG_COLOR not in ("auto", "always", "never"):
raise ValueError(f"SNRC_LOG_COLOR must be auto, always or never, not {LOG_COLOR!r}")
level = logging.getLevelName(LOG_LEVEL.upper())
if not isinstance(level, int):
raise ValueError(f"SNRC_LOG_LEVEL must be debug, info, warning or error, not {LOG_LEVEL!r}")
color = LOG_COLOR == "always" or (LOG_COLOR == "auto" and stream.isatty())
handler = logging.StreamHandler(stream)
handler.setFormatter(JsonFormatter() if LOG_FORMAT == "json" else TextFormatter(color))
LOGGER.handlers[:] = [handler]
LOGGER.setLevel(level)
LOGGER.propagate = False
# ---------- RPC + ABI helpers (mirrors ens-lookup.py shape) ----------
RPC_URL = urlparse(RPC)
# Set a non-default User-Agent; Cloudflare-fronted public RPCs (drpc,
# publicnode, etc.) reject `Python-urllib/3.x` with 403.
RPC_HEADERS = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "snrc-resolve/1.0"}
# Idle keep-alive connections to SNRC_RPC. A connection per call costs most of
# a lookup's CPU and leaves a TIME_WAIT socket per call, which exhausts local
# ports at a few dozen lookups per second.
# Idle connections kept per worker; more are closed after use. 4 workers stay well
# under reth's default limit of 500 connections.
RPC_POOL_SIZE = 32
_rpc_pool = queue.LifoQueue(maxsize=RPC_POOL_SIZE)
def _new_rpc_connection():
conn_class = HTTPSConnection if RPC_URL.scheme == "https" else HTTPConnection
return conn_class(RPC_URL.hostname, RPC_URL.port, timeout=RPC_TIMEOUT_S)
def _post_rpc(conn, body: bytes) -> bytes:
path = (RPC_URL.path or "/") + (f"?{RPC_URL.query}" if RPC_URL.query else "")
conn.request("POST", path, body, RPC_HEADERS)
res = conn.getresponse()
data = res.read()
# HTTPError, as urlopen raised: RuntimeError means the call itself failed
if not 200 <= res.status < 300:
raise HTTPError(RPC, res.status, res.reason, res.headers, None)
return data
def _post_pooled(conn, body: bytes) -> bytes:
try:
data = _post_rpc(conn, body)
except BaseException:
conn.close()
raise
try:
_rpc_pool.put_nowait(conn)
except queue.Full:
conn.close()
return data
def _send_rpc(payload) -> object:
body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
try:
idle = _rpc_pool.get_nowait()
except queue.Empty:
return json.loads(_post_pooled(_new_rpc_connection(), body))
try:
return json.loads(_post_pooled(idle, body))
except (ConnectionError, BadStatusLine):
# the node closed the idle connection; every call is a read, so resending is safe
return json.loads(_post_pooled(_new_rpc_connection(), body))
# Reads prefetched for the request being answered, keyed by _read_key. Only set
# inside request_reads(), so code called outside a request reads one call at a time.
_request = threading.local()
_UNREAD = object()
def _read_key(method, params) -> str:
return method + json.dumps(params, sort_keys=True)
@contextmanager
def request_reads():
_request.reads = {}
try:
yield
finally:
del _request.reads
def rpc(method, params):
body = json.dumps(
{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params, "id": 1}
).encode()
# Set a non-default User-Agent; Cloudflare-fronted public RPCs (drpc,
# publicnode, etc.) reject `Python-urllib/3.x` with 403.
req = Request(
RPC,
data=body,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "snrc-resolve/1.0",
},
)
res = json.loads(urlopen(req, timeout=15).read())
reads = getattr(_request, "reads", None)
if reads is not None:
read = reads.get(_read_key(method, params), _UNREAD)
if isinstance(read, RuntimeError):
raise read
if read is not _UNREAD:
return read
res = _send_rpc({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method, "params": params, "id": 1})
if "error" in res:
raise RuntimeError(res["error"])
return res["result"]
def _send_batch(requests):
"""Answers of a JSON-RPC batch in request order, None for a request left
unanswered; all None when the node does not batch."""
res = _send_rpc([{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": i, "method": m, "params": p} for i, (m, p) in enumerate(requests)])
# a node that does not batch answers with a single error object
by_id = {r.get("id"): r for r in res if isinstance(r, dict)} if isinstance(res, list) else {}
return [by_id.get(i) for i in range(len(requests))]
def _is_latest_call(method, params) -> bool:
return method == "eth_call" and params[1] == "latest"
_multicall_failed_logged = False
def _remember(reads, requests, answers):
for (m, p), r in zip(requests, answers, strict=True):
if r is not None and ("result" in r or "error" in r):
reads[_read_key(m, p)] = RuntimeError(r["error"]) if "error" in r else r["result"]
def prefetch(requests):
"""Sends reads the request will make in one round trip, with its contract
reads as one multicall. A read left unanswered is made on its own when the
code gets to it."""
global _multicall_failed_logged
reads = getattr(_request, "reads", None)
if reads is None:
return
todo = [(m, p) for m, p in requests if _read_key(m, p) not in reads]
if len(todo) < 2:
return
calls = [(m, p) for m, p in todo if _is_latest_call(m, p)]
if len(calls) < 2:
_remember(reads, todo, _send_batch(todo))
return
others = [(m, p) for m, p in todo if not _is_latest_call(m, p)]
multicall = eth_call_read(MULTICALL, encode_aggregate3([(p[0]["to"], p[0]["data"]) for _, p in calls]))
answers = _send_batch(others + [multicall])
if all(r is None for r in answers):
return
_remember(reads, others, answers[:-1])
try:
result = (answers[-1] or {}).get("result")
if not isinstance(result, str):
raise ValueError(f"multicall answered {answers[-1]!r}")
results = decode_aggregate3(result)
if len(results) != len(calls):
raise ValueError("multicall answered a different number of calls")
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as e:
if not _multicall_failed_logged:
_multicall_failed_logged = True
log_event(logging.WARNING, "multicall_unavailable", multicall=MULTICALL, error=repr(e), fallback="batch")
_remember(reads, calls, _send_batch(calls))
return
for (m, p), (success, data) in zip(calls, results, strict=True):
reads[_read_key(m, p)] = "0x" + data.hex() if success else RuntimeError("execution reverted")
AGGREGATE3 = "0x82ad56cb" # aggregate3((address,bool,bytes)[])
def encode_aggregate3(calls) -> str:
"""Calldata for Multicall3.aggregate3 with every call allowed to fail."""
tuples = []
for to, data in calls:
b = bytes.fromhex(data[2:])
tuples.append(
int(to, 16).to_bytes(32, "big")
+ (1).to_bytes(32, "big")
+ (0x60).to_bytes(32, "big")
+ len(b).to_bytes(32, "big")
+ b
+ b"\x00" * ((-len(b)) % 32)
)
offsets, at = [], 32 * len(tuples)
for t in tuples:
offsets.append(at.to_bytes(32, "big"))
at += len(t)
body = (0x20).to_bytes(32, "big") + len(tuples).to_bytes(32, "big") + b"".join(offsets) + b"".join(tuples)
return AGGREGATE3 + body.hex()
def decode_aggregate3(hex_data: str):
"""Multicall3.aggregate3's (bool success, bytes returnData)[]."""
raw = bytes.fromhex(hex_data[2:] if hex_data.startswith("0x") else hex_data)
def word(at: int) -> int:
if at + 32 > len(raw):
raise ValueError("multicall answer is truncated")
return int.from_bytes(raw[at:at + 32], "big")
array = word(0)
base = array + 32
out = []
for i in range(word(array)):
item = base + word(base + 32 * i)
data = item + word(item + 32)
length = word(data)
if data + 32 + length > len(raw):
raise ValueError("multicall answer is truncated")
out.append((word(item) != 0, raw[data + 32:data + 32 + length]))
return out
def namehash(name: str) -> bytes:
node = b"\x00" * 32
if name:
@@ -184,11 +476,14 @@ def node_of(name: str) -> bytes:
# ---------- Registration status ----------
BLOCK_READ = ("eth_getBlockByNumber", ["latest", False])
def head_block():
"""How far behind the node is. Unlike expiry, this is the one thing that has
to be measured against the host clock: a node that stops still has a block."""
try:
block = rpc("eth_getBlockByNumber", ["latest", False])
block = rpc(*BLOCK_READ)
return {
"blockNumber": decode_uint(block["number"]),
"chainLagSeconds": int(time.time()) - decode_uint(block["timestamp"]),
@@ -199,13 +494,13 @@ def head_block():
def chain_now() -> int:
"""Expiry is compared against the block timestamp, never the host clock."""
block = rpc("eth_getBlockByNumber", ["latest", False])
block = rpc(*BLOCK_READ)
return decode_uint(block["timestamp"])
def grace_period(registrar: str) -> int:
"""A deployment can configure a different window, so it is read on chain."""
return decode_uint(eth_call(registrar, selector("GRACE_PERIOD()")))
return decode_uint(eth_call(*grace_call(registrar)))
def expiry_status(expires: int, grace: int, now: int) -> str:
@@ -225,8 +520,7 @@ def reservation_reason(tld: str, token: int) -> int:
controller = CONTROLLERS.get(tld)
if not controller:
return 0
raw = eth_call(controller, selector("reservedNames(bytes32)") + encode_uint(token))
return decode_uint(raw)
return decode_uint(eth_call(*reserved_call(controller, token)))
def pricing_params(tld: str):
@@ -235,7 +529,8 @@ def pricing_params(tld: str):
controller = CONTROLLERS.get(tld)
if not controller:
return None
oracle = decode_address(eth_call(controller, selector("prices()")))
prefetch([eth_call_read(*prices_call(controller)), eth_call_read(*min_length_call(controller))])
oracle = decode_address(eth_call(*prices_call(controller)))
if oracle == ZERO_ADDR:
return None
try:
@@ -247,6 +542,8 @@ def pricing_params(tld: str):
SECONDS_PER_YEAR = 31536000
# an ENS-shaped oracle prices names by length up to six letters
LETTER_TIERS = range(1, 7)
ATTO_PER_CENT = 10**16
@@ -255,13 +552,15 @@ def read_oracle_prices(controller: str, oracle: str):
protocol carries. An ENS-shaped oracle prices in attoUSD per second and
charges a premium on lapsed names that it does not expose, so a quote from
it is only safe for a name that was never registered."""
# either oracle shape is answered in the same round trip
prefetch([eth_call_read(*prices_call(oracle))] + [eth_call_read(*letter_price_call(oracle, n)) for n in LETTER_TIERS])
try:
base, tiers = decode_prices(eth_call(oracle, selector("prices()")))
base, tiers = decode_prices(eth_call(*prices_call(oracle)))
premium_unknown = False
except RuntimeError:
base, tiers = decode_letter_prices(oracle)
premium_unknown = True
min_len = decode_uint(eth_call(controller, selector("minCharLength()")))
min_len = decode_uint(eth_call(*min_length_call(controller)))
return {
# lengths the registry refuses are left out rather than priced at zero
"registrationPrices": {n: c for n, c in tiers.items() if n >= min_len},
@@ -277,9 +576,9 @@ def decode_letter_prices(oracle: str):
the six-letter tier stops at five, and charges its highest tier for anything
longer, which is what basePrice means here."""
tiers = {}
for n in range(1, 7):
for n in LETTER_TIERS:
try:
rate = decode_uint(eth_call(oracle, selector(f"price{n}Letter()")))
rate = decode_uint(eth_call(*letter_price_call(oracle, n)))
except RuntimeError:
if n <= 5:
raise
@@ -301,6 +600,9 @@ def decode_prices(hex_data: str):
base = int.from_bytes(raw[:32], "big")
at = int.from_bytes(raw[32:64], "big")
count = int.from_bytes(raw[at:at + 32], "big")
# the count comes from the answer, so it is checked against the answer's length
if at + 32 + count * 64 > len(raw):
raise RuntimeError("prices(): short response")
tiers = {}
for i in range(count):
item = at + 32 + i * 64
@@ -328,9 +630,7 @@ def name_status(name: str):
# The 2LD's label is that key at any depth. node_of decodes a bracket only
# in a two-label name, so a bracket subname gets a status but no record.
token = label_token(labels[-2])
expires = decode_uint(
eth_call(registrar, selector("nameExpires(uint256)") + encode_uint(token))
)
expires = decode_uint(eth_call(*expires_call(registrar, token)))
grace = grace_period(registrar) if expires else 0
now = chain_now()
status = expiry_status(expires, grace, now)
@@ -358,12 +658,17 @@ def name_status(name: str):
return out
@lru_cache(maxsize=None)
def selector(signature: str) -> str:
return "0x" + keccak(signature.encode())[:4].hex()
def eth_call_read(to: str, data: str):
return "eth_call", [{"to": to, "data": data}, "latest"]
def eth_call(to: str, data: str) -> str:
result = rpc("eth_call", [{"to": to, "data": data}, "latest"])
result = rpc(*eth_call_read(to, data))
if result == "0x":
raise RuntimeError(f"empty return from {to}: no contract at that address?")
return result
@@ -385,7 +690,7 @@ def registered_label(registrar: str, token: int):
"""The plaintext label the registrar recorded at registration, keyed by the
hash of that label. None when the name was registered without
registerWithLabel, so the registrar cannot name it."""
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(registrar, selector("labelOf(uint256)") + encode_uint(token)))
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(*label_call(registrar, token)))
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if raw else None
@@ -427,7 +732,7 @@ def encode_text_call(node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
def text(resolver: str, node: bytes, key: str) -> str:
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, encode_text_call(node, key)))
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(*text_call(resolver, node, key)))
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") if raw else ""
@@ -446,7 +751,7 @@ def addr_multicoin(resolver: str, node: bytes, coin_type: int):
payload doesn't match any recognised on-chain shape. Returns None when
the record is unset."""
try:
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(resolver, encode_addr_multicoin_call(node, coin_type)))
raw = decode_bytes(eth_call(*addr_call(resolver, node, coin_type)))
except RuntimeError:
return None
if not raw:
@@ -465,6 +770,81 @@ def addr_multicoin(resolver: str, node: bytes, coin_type: int):
return "0x" + raw.hex()
# ---------- Contract calls, as (to, data) ----------
# Shared by the reads and prefetch, so a prefetched read is found by the code that makes it.
def expires_call(registrar: str, token: int):
return registrar, selector("nameExpires(uint256)") + encode_uint(token)
def grace_call(registrar: str):
return registrar, selector("GRACE_PERIOD()")
def label_call(registrar: str, token: int):
return registrar, selector("labelOf(uint256)") + encode_uint(token)
def reserved_call(controller: str, token: int):
return controller, selector("reservedNames(bytes32)") + encode_uint(token)
def prices_call(contract: str):
return contract, selector("prices()")
def letter_price_call(oracle: str, letters: int):
return oracle, selector(f"price{letters}Letter()")
def min_length_call(controller: str):
return controller, selector("minCharLength()")
def resolver_call(registry: str, node: bytes):
return registry, selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node.hex()
def owner_call(registry: str, node: bytes):
return registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node.hex()
def text_call(resolver: str, node: bytes, key: str):
return resolver, encode_text_call(node, key)
def addr_call(resolver: str, node: bytes, coin_type: int):
return resolver, encode_addr_multicoin_call(node, coin_type)
def lookup_reads(name: str):
"""The reads a lookup makes before it knows the name's resolver."""
labels = name.split(".")
tld = labels[-1]
reads = []
registrar = REGISTRARS.get(tld)
if registrar and len(labels) >= 2:
token = label_token(labels[-2])
reads += [BLOCK_READ, eth_call_read(*expires_call(registrar, token)), eth_call_read(*grace_call(registrar))]
if len(labels) == 2 and is_encoded_labelhash(labels[0]):
reads.append(eth_call_read(*label_call(registrar, token)))
if CONTROLLERS.get(tld):
reads.append(eth_call_read(*reserved_call(CONTROLLERS[tld], token)))
registry = REGISTRIES.get(tld)
if registry:
node = node_of(name)
reads += [eth_call_read(*resolver_call(registry, node)), eth_call_read(*owner_call(registry, node))]
return reads
def record_reads(resolver: str, node: bytes):
"""The reads of a name's record from its resolver."""
return [eth_call_read(*text_call(resolver, node, k)) for k in TEXT_KEYS] + [
eth_call_read(*addr_call(resolver, node, coin)) for coin in RECORD_COINS
]
# ---------- Coin-specific address encoders ----------
# Each takes raw bytes as stored under ENSIP-9 and returns the canonical
# user-facing string for that chain (EIP-55 for ETH, bech32/base58check
@@ -665,9 +1045,9 @@ def split_links(value: str) -> list:
def upstream_error(subject: dict, e: Exception) -> dict:
"""urlopen puts the failing URL into its message and SNRC_RPC can carry a
provider key, so the text goes to the log and only the type to the caller."""
print(f"upstream error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
"""The exception can carry the failing URL and SNRC_RPC can carry a provider
key, so the text goes to the log and only the type to the caller."""
log_event(logging.WARNING, "upstream_error", **subject, error=type(e).__name__, message=str(e))
return {
**subject,
"error": "upstreamError",
@@ -680,9 +1060,8 @@ def name_record(name: str):
has one, with every field unset."""
registry = REGISTRIES[name.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]]
node = node_of(name)
node_hex = node.hex()
resolver_addr = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node_hex))
owner = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex))
resolver_addr = decode_address(eth_call(*resolver_call(registry, node)))
owner = decode_address(eth_call(*owner_call(registry, node)))
rec = {
"name": canonical_name(name),
"nickname": "",
@@ -699,6 +1078,7 @@ def name_record(name: str):
}
if resolver_addr == ZERO_ADDR:
return rec
prefetch(record_reads(resolver_addr, node))
texts = {}
for k in TEXT_KEYS:
try:
@@ -734,6 +1114,7 @@ def registration(name: str):
tld = name.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]
if not REGISTRIES.get(tld):
return 400, {"name": name, "error": "tldNotConfigured"}
prefetch(lookup_reads(name))
reg = name_status(name)
status = reg["status"]
if status in ("registered", "grace"):
@@ -788,7 +1169,7 @@ def resolve(name: str):
}
node = node_of(name)
node_hex = node.hex()
prefetch(lookup_reads(name))
# Before the resolver lookup, so a lapsed name is not reported as noResolver.
reg = name_status(name)
@@ -806,13 +1187,12 @@ def resolve(name: str):
}
return (404 if reg["status"] == "unregistered" else 410), body
resolver_raw = eth_call(registry, selector("resolver(bytes32)") + node_hex)
resolver_addr = decode_address(resolver_raw)
resolver_addr = decode_address(eth_call(*resolver_call(registry, node)))
if resolver_addr == ZERO_ADDR:
# A registered name always resolves: with no resolver set the record is
# still returned with every field unset, so "taken until <date>" stays
# answerable. For a subname, no owner means nobody created it.
owner = decode_address(eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex))
owner = decode_address(eth_call(*owner_call(registry, node)))
if len(name.split(".")) > 2 and owner == ZERO_ADDR:
return 404, {
"name": name,
@@ -837,9 +1217,9 @@ def resolve(name: str):
**reg,
}
owner_raw = eth_call(registry, selector("owner(bytes32)") + node_hex)
owner = decode_address(owner_raw)
owner = decode_address(eth_call(*owner_call(registry, node)))
prefetch(record_reads(resolver_addr, node))
texts = {}
for k in TEXT_KEYS:
try:
@@ -878,12 +1258,34 @@ def resolve(name: str):
# ---------- HTTP layer ----------
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
# the smp-server reuses a connection only after an HTTP/1.1 response
protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
# idle seconds before a kept-alive connection is closed; the smp-server closes
# its idle ones after 30-35 s, so it is the one to close them
timeout = 60
def setup(self):
super().setup()
# headers and body go out in separate writes, which Nagle holds for the client's delayed ACK
self.request.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
def handle_one_request(self):
# on a kept-alive connection these still hold the previous request's values
self._started = self._sent = self.path = self.headers = None
super().handle_one_request()
def do_GET(self): # noqa: N802 - http.server contract
self._started = time.monotonic()
if self._has_body():
# an unread body would be taken for the next request on this connection, which a
# reverse proxy reusing it would pass to another client (request smuggling)
self._respond(400, {"error": "unexpectedBody"}, close=True)
return
path = urlparse(self.path).path
parts = [unquote(p) for p in path.split("/") if p]
if parts == ["health"]:
self._respond(200, {"ok": True, "rpc": RPC, "registries": REGISTRIES, **head_block()})
self._respond(200, {"ok": True, "rpc": public_endpoint(RPC), "registries": REGISTRIES, **head_block()})
return
if len(parts) == 3 and parts[0] == "v2" and parts[1] == "resolve":
@@ -892,7 +1294,8 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
self._respond(400, {"name": name, "error": "notFullyQualified"})
return
try:
status, body = registration(name)
with request_reads():
status, body = registration(name)
except Exception as e: # surface upstream errors as 502
status, body = 502, upstream_error({"name": name}, e)
self._respond(status, body)
@@ -915,7 +1318,8 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
)
return
try:
status, body = resolve(name)
with request_reads():
status, body = resolve(name)
except Exception as e: # surface upstream errors as 502
status, body = 502, upstream_error({"name": name}, e)
self._respond(status, body)
@@ -930,34 +1334,176 @@ class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
},
)
def _respond(self, status: int, body: dict):
def _has_body(self) -> bool:
# a malformed header line ends parsing, leaving the rest, Content-Length included, as payload
if self.headers.defects or self.headers.get_payload():
return True
if self.headers.get_all("Transfer-Encoding"):
return True
return any(length.strip() != "0" for length in self.headers.get_all("Content-Length") or [])
def _respond(self, status: int, body: dict, close: bool = False):
data = json.dumps(body, indent=2).encode()
# send_response logs the request, so the size is known before it
self._sent = len(data)
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
if close:
# also sets close_connection, so the server closes it after this response
self.send_header("Connection", "close")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def address_string(self) -> str:
forwarded = self.headers.get_all("X-Forwarded-For") if self.headers else None
return client_address(self.client_address[0], ",".join(forwarded) if forwarded else None)
def log_request(self, code="-", size="-"):
started = self._started
path = urlparse(self.path).path if self.path else None
log_event(
# the container's health check runs every 30 s
logging.DEBUG if path == "/health" else logging.INFO,
"request",
client=self.address_string(),
worker=os.getpid(),
method=getattr(self, "command", None),
path=unquote(self.path) if self.path else None,
status=getattr(code, "value", code),
bytes=self._sent,
ms=round((time.monotonic() - started) * 1000) if started else None,
)
def log_error(self, fmt, *args):
message = fmt % args
# a kept-alive connection left idle is closed on purpose
level = logging.DEBUG if message.startswith("Request timed out") else logging.WARNING
log_event(level, "http_error", client=self.address_string(), worker=os.getpid(), message=message)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
# Quiet the default per-request access log; route to stderr in one line.
sys.stderr.write(f"{self.address_string()} - {fmt % args}\n")
log_event(logging.INFO, "http", client=self.address_string(), message=fmt % args)
class ResolverServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
# socketserver's default of 5 drops simultaneous connections, each retried by
# TCP after 1 s, and the smp-server gives up after 3 s. The kernel caps it at somaxconn.
request_queue_size = 128
def handle_error(self, request, client_address):
error = sys.exc_info()[1]
if isinstance(error, ConnectionError):
# the smp-server hung up, usually after its own timeout
log_event(logging.WARNING, "client_gone", client=client_address[0], worker=os.getpid(), error=type(error).__name__)
else:
log_event(logging.ERROR, "request_failed", client=client_address[0], worker=os.getpid(), exc_info=True)
def public_endpoint(url: str) -> str:
"""The RPC endpoint without credentials, path or query, where a provider key would be."""
parsed = urlparse(url)
return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc.rpartition('@')[2]}"
def client_address(peer: str, forwarded_for: str | None) -> str:
"""The peer, or behind trusted proxies the last X-Forwarded-For address none of them added."""
if not forwarded_for or not _trusted(peer):
return peer
hops = [hop.strip() for hop in forwarded_for.split(",")]
for hop in reversed(hops):
# an address it cannot read, and anything claimed before it, is not believed
if _address(hop) is None:
return peer
if not _trusted(hop):
return hop
return hops[0]
def _address(text: str):
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(text)
except ValueError:
return None
return ip.ipv4_mapped or ip if ip.version == 6 else ip
def _trusted(text: str) -> bool:
ip = _address(text)
return ip is not None and any(ip in net for net in TRUSTED_PROXIES)
def serve(reuse_port: bool):
server = ResolverServer((BIND, PORT), Handler, bind_and_activate=False)
server.allow_reuse_port = reuse_port
try:
server.server_bind()
server.server_activate()
server.serve_forever()
finally:
server.server_close()
def stop_on(signum, _frame):
log_event(logging.INFO, "stopping", signal=signal.Signals(signum).name)
sys.exit(0)
def supervise(workers: int):
"""Runs the workers, each with its own socket on the shared port. One worker
exiting stops the others, so the container restarts instead of running short."""
children = []
def stop(*_):
for pid in children:
try:
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
def stop_and_exit(signum, frame):
stop()
stop_on(signum, frame)
# before forking, so a signal during startup cannot orphan the workers
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, stop_and_exit)
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, stop_and_exit)
for _ in range(workers):
pid = os.fork()
if pid == 0:
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIG_DFL)
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal.SIG_DFL)
code = 0
try:
serve(reuse_port=True)
except BaseException:
log_event(logging.ERROR, "worker_failed", worker=os.getpid(), exc_info=True)
code = 1
os._exit(code)
children.append(pid)
pid, status = os.wait()
log_event(logging.ERROR, "worker_exited", worker=pid, status=status, action="stopping")
stop()
sys.exit(1)
def main():
server = ThreadingHTTPServer((BIND, PORT), Handler)
sys.stderr.write(
f"snrc-resolve listening on {BIND}:{PORT}\n"
f" RPC = {RPC}\n"
f" Registries:\n"
setup_logging()
log_event(
logging.INFO,
"listening",
bind=BIND,
port=PORT,
workers=WORKERS,
rpc=public_endpoint(RPC),
registries=",".join(f"{tld}={addr or '-'}" for tld, addr in REGISTRIES.items()),
trusted_proxies=",".join(map(str, TRUSTED_PROXIES)) or None,
)
for tld, addr in REGISTRIES.items():
sys.stderr.write(f" .{tld:<8s} = {addr or '(not configured)'}\n")
sys.stderr.write(" GET /v2/resolve/<name> GET /v1/resolve/<name> GET /health\n")
try:
server.serve_forever()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
sys.stderr.write("\nshutting down\n")
server.server_close()
if WORKERS > 1:
supervise(WORKERS)
else:
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, stop_on)
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, stop_on)
serve(reuse_port=False)
if __name__ == "__main__":
+835 -5
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,30 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unit tests for snrc-resolve helpers.
Run with `python3 -m unittest scripts/resolver/service/test_snrc_resolve.py`.
Run with `uv run pytest` from scripts/resolver/service.
"""
import contextlib
import http.client
import importlib.util
import io
import ipaddress
import json
import logging
import os
import queue
import re
import signal
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
import unittest
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from urllib.error import HTTPError
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
# snrc-resolve.py has a hyphen, so import it via importlib instead of `import`.
_HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
@@ -636,6 +651,25 @@ class PricingTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(body["basePrice"], self.BASE)
class DecodePricesTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_a_count_longer_than_the_answer_is_refused(self):
"""The count comes from the oracle; decoding it unchecked could loop for ever."""
huge = "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(200) + snrc.encode_uint(0x40) + snrc.encode_uint(2**64)
outcome = []
def decode():
try:
snrc.decode_prices(huge)
except RuntimeError as e:
outcome.append(e)
worker = threading.Thread(target=decode, daemon=True)
worker.start()
worker.join(5)
self.assertFalse(worker.is_alive(), "decoding did not stop")
self.assertRegex(str(outcome[0]), "short response")
class EnsOracleTests(unittest.TestCase):
""".testing runs an ENS-shaped oracle: it prices in attoUSD per second and
charges a premium on lapsed names that it does not expose."""
@@ -777,13 +811,17 @@ class ErrorCodeTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotEqual(body["error"], body["message"])
def test_an_upstream_failure_does_not_echo_the_exception(self):
with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()) as log:
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "WARNING") as logs:
body = snrc.upstream_error(
{"name": "alice.testing"},
RuntimeError("http://user:[email protected]/kEy8 refused"),
)
# the operator still sees the detail in the log
self.assertIn("secret", log.getvalue())
[record] = logs.records
self.assertEqual(record.getMessage(), "upstream_error")
self.assertEqual(record.fields["name"], "alice.testing")
self.assertEqual(record.fields["error"], "RuntimeError")
self.assertIn("secret", record.fields["message"])
self.assertEqual(body["error"], "upstreamError")
self.assertIn("RuntimeError", body["message"])
self.assertNotIn("secret", body["message"])
@@ -1035,5 +1073,797 @@ class RegistrationV2Tests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(res["lastBlockTs"], self.now)
self.assertEqual(res["registration"]["type"], "available")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@unittest.skipUnless(sys.platform.startswith("linux"), "Linux drops SYNs on a full accept queue")
class ListenBacklogTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""The smp-server opens a connection per lookup and gives up after 3 s, so a
burst the accept queue cannot hold fails: TCP retries a dropped SYN after 1 s."""
BURST = 50
def test_a_burst_of_connections_is_queued_while_the_server_is_busy(self):
# never accepts, so every connection must wait in the queue
server = snrc.ResolverServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), snrc.Handler)
clients = []
try:
for i in range(self.BURST):
c = socket.socket()
clients.append(c)
c.settimeout(0.5)
try:
c.connect(server.server_address)
except TimeoutError:
self.fail(f"connection {i + 1} of {self.BURST} was not queued")
finally:
for c in clients:
c.close()
server.server_close()
def _word(value: int) -> bytes:
return value.to_bytes(32, "big")
def _decode_aggregate3_calls(data: str):
"""Multicall3.aggregate3 calldata back to (to, data) pairs, written apart
from the resolver's encoder so the two check each other."""
raw = bytes.fromhex(data[len(snrc.AGGREGATE3):])
def word(at):
return int.from_bytes(raw[at:at + 32], "big")
array = word(0)
base = array + 32
calls = []
for i in range(word(array)):
item = base + word(base + 32 * i)
call = item + word(item + 64)
calls.append(("0x" + raw[item + 12:item + 32].hex(), "0x" + raw[call + 32:call + 32 + word(call)].hex()))
return calls
def _encode_aggregate3_results(results) -> str:
tuples = [
_word(int(ok)) + _word(0x40) + _word(len(data)) + data + b"\x00" * ((-len(data)) % 32)
for ok, data in results
]
offsets, at = b"", 32 * len(tuples)
for t in tuples:
offsets += _word(at)
at += len(t)
return "0x" + (_word(0x20) + _word(len(tuples)) + offsets + b"".join(tuples)).hex()
class FakeChain:
"""Contract state for one registered name and one free name. Any other
call reverts, as a view function asked for something unset does."""
REGISTRY = "0x58fc46996d975c57883564648bda5206d1a0102b"
REGISTRAR = "0xef47eb4384b46c89e4482a677c2cbcbd2a6fd85a"
CONTROLLER = "0x281ca41311c2aa808c917c4674639d7567b75714"
ORACLE = "0x1e0c9a2b9d1a4c8f7b3e5d6a9c2f4b8e1d7a3c50"
OWNER = "0xd83bd7e0e6b8a4c1f2593a7b0c4e8d1a6f9b2c37"
RESOLVER = "0x80fa2b1c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f9012345"
GRACE = 90 * 86400
TEXTS = {"nickname": "Acme", "url": "https://acme.example", "simplex.channel": "https://a.example/c#1;https://b.example/c#2"}
def __init__(self):
self.now = int(time.time())
acme, free = snrc.label_token("acme"), snrc.label_token("free")
node = snrc.node_of("acme.testing")
abi_bytes = RegistrationV2Tests._abi_bytes
prices = RegistrationV2Tests._prices_return(RegistrationV2Tests())
self.answers = {
snrc.expires_call(self.REGISTRAR, acme): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(self.now + 3600),
snrc.expires_call(self.REGISTRAR, free): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(0),
snrc.grace_call(self.REGISTRAR): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(self.GRACE),
snrc.label_call(self.REGISTRAR, acme): abi_bytes(b"acme"),
snrc.reserved_call(self.CONTROLLER, acme): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(0),
snrc.reserved_call(self.CONTROLLER, free): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(0),
snrc.resolver_call(self.REGISTRY, node): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(int(self.RESOLVER, 16)),
snrc.owner_call(self.REGISTRY, node): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(int(self.OWNER, 16)),
snrc.addr_call(self.RESOLVER, node, snrc.COIN_ETH): abi_bytes(bytes.fromhex(self.OWNER[2:])),
snrc.prices_call(self.CONTROLLER): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(int(self.ORACLE, 16)),
snrc.prices_call(self.ORACLE): prices,
snrc.min_length_call(self.CONTROLLER): "0x" + snrc.encode_uint(3),
}
for key, value in self.TEXTS.items():
self.answers[snrc.text_call(self.RESOLVER, node, key)] = abi_bytes(value.encode())
def call(self, to, data):
answer = self.answers.get((to.lower(), data))
if answer is None:
raise RuntimeError("execution reverted")
return answer
class FakeNode(ThreadingHTTPServer):
"""A JSON-RPC node over HTTP/1.1 keep-alive, serving FakeChain, with
batches and Multicall3, each of which a test can take away."""
daemon_threads = True
def __init__(self):
super().__init__(("127.0.0.1", 0), _FakeNodeHandler)
self.chain = FakeChain()
self.block = 100
self.requests = 0
self.connections = 0
self.batch = True
self.multicall = True
self.multicall_null = False
self.status = 200
self.hang_up = False
self.drop_after_reply = False
threading.Thread(target=self.serve_forever, args=(0.05,), daemon=True).start()
@property
def url(self):
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server_address[1]}/"
def stop(self):
self.shutdown()
self.server_close()
def answer(self, req):
out = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": req.get("id")}
method, params = req["method"], req["params"]
if method == "eth_blockNumber":
out["result"] = hex(self.block)
elif method == "eth_getBlockByNumber":
out["result"] = {"number": hex(self.block), "timestamp": hex(self.chain.now)}
elif method == "eth_call" and params[0]["to"].lower() == snrc.MULTICALL.lower():
if not self.multicall:
out["error"] = {"code": -32000, "message": "no contract code"}
elif self.multicall_null:
out["result"] = None
else:
results = []
for to, data in _decode_aggregate3_calls(params[0]["data"]):
try:
results.append((True, bytes.fromhex(self.chain.call(to, data)[2:])))
except RuntimeError:
results.append((False, b""))
out["result"] = _encode_aggregate3_results(results)
elif method == "eth_call":
try:
out["result"] = self.chain.call(params[0]["to"], params[0]["data"])
except RuntimeError:
out["error"] = {"code": 3, "message": "execution reverted"}
else:
out["error"] = {"code": -32601, "message": "method not found"}
return out
class _FakeNodeHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
def setup(self):
super().setup()
# headers and body go out in separate writes, which Nagle holds for the client's delayed ACK
self.request.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
self.server.connections += 1
def do_POST(self): # noqa: N802 - http.server contract
request = json.loads(self.rfile.read(int(self.headers["Content-Length"])))
node = self.server
node.requests += 1
if node.hang_up:
self.close_connection = True
return
if node.status != 200:
reply = {"error": "unavailable"}
elif isinstance(request, list):
reply = [node.answer(r) for r in request] if node.batch else {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": None, "error": {"code": -32600, "message": "batch not supported"}}
else:
reply = node.answer(request)
data = json.dumps(reply).encode()
self.send_response(node.status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
# closes without `Connection: close`, as a node dropping an idle connection does
self.close_connection = node.drop_after_reply
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
pass
class FakeNodeTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
"""Points the resolver at a FakeNode and at FakeChain's contracts."""
def setUp(self):
self.node = FakeNode()
self._saved = (snrc.RPC, snrc.RPC_URL, snrc.REGISTRIES, snrc.REGISTRARS, snrc.CONTROLLERS)
snrc.RPC = self.node.url
snrc.RPC_URL = urlparse(snrc.RPC)
snrc.REGISTRIES = {"testing": FakeChain.REGISTRY, "simplex": ""}
snrc.REGISTRARS = {"testing": FakeChain.REGISTRAR}
snrc.CONTROLLERS = {"testing": FakeChain.CONTROLLER}
snrc._multicall_failed_logged = False
self._drain_pool()
def tearDown(self):
self._drain_pool()
snrc.RPC, snrc.RPC_URL, snrc.REGISTRIES, snrc.REGISTRARS, snrc.CONTROLLERS = self._saved
self.node.stop()
def _drain_pool(self):
while not snrc._rpc_pool.empty():
snrc._rpc_pool.get_nowait().close()
def requests_made(self, action):
before = self.node.requests
result = action()
return result, self.node.requests - before
class RpcTransportTests(FakeNodeTestCase):
"""A lookup makes several reads, and a new connection per read costs CPU
and leaves a TIME_WAIT socket each, which exhausts local ports under load."""
def test_reads_share_one_connection(self):
for _ in range(18):
self.assertEqual(snrc.rpc("eth_blockNumber", []), hex(self.node.block))
self.assertEqual(self.node.connections, 1)
def test_a_connection_the_node_closed_is_replaced(self):
self.node.drop_after_reply = True
for _ in range(3):
self.assertEqual(snrc.rpc("eth_blockNumber", []), hex(self.node.block))
self.assertEqual(self.node.connections, 3)
def test_a_fresh_connection_that_fails_is_not_retried(self):
"""Only a pooled connection can be stale; a new one failing means the
node is down, and resending would only double the wait."""
self.node.hang_up = True
with self.assertRaises(ConnectionError):
snrc.rpc("eth_blockNumber", [])
self.assertEqual(self.node.requests, 1)
def test_a_node_failure_is_not_a_reverted_call(self):
"""Callers read RuntimeError as the call reverting and fall back to an
empty value, so a node failure must not look like one."""
self.node.status = 502
with self.assertRaises(HTTPError) as cm:
snrc.rpc("eth_blockNumber", [])
self.assertNotIsInstance(cm.exception, RuntimeError)
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.code, 502)
def test_a_reverted_call_is_a_runtime_error_and_keeps_the_connection(self):
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
snrc.eth_call("0x" + "11" * 20, "0xdeadbeef")
snrc.rpc("eth_blockNumber", [])
self.assertEqual(self.node.connections, 1)
class RpcPoolTests(FakeNodeTestCase):
def test_connections_beyond_the_pool_are_closed_after_use(self):
"""Every worker would otherwise keep its peak concurrency open to the node."""
saved, snrc._rpc_pool = snrc._rpc_pool, queue.LifoQueue(maxsize=1)
try:
body = json.dumps({"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "eth_blockNumber", "params": []}).encode()
kept, extra = snrc._new_rpc_connection(), snrc._new_rpc_connection()
snrc._post_pooled(kept, body)
# returning a connection to a full pool must not wait for a free slot
done = threading.Thread(target=snrc._post_pooled, args=(extra, body), daemon=True)
done.start()
done.join(5)
self.assertFalse(done.is_alive(), "returning a connection to a full pool blocked")
self.assertEqual(snrc._rpc_pool.qsize(), 1)
self.assertIsNotNone(kept.sock)
self.assertIsNone(extra.sock)
finally:
while not snrc._rpc_pool.empty():
snrc._rpc_pool.get_nowait().close()
snrc._rpc_pool = saved
class BatchedReadsTests(FakeNodeTestCase):
"""Inside a request a round of reads is one round trip, and its contract
reads one multicall, because a node runs the calls of a JSON-RPC batch one
after another. Answers must be exactly those of reading one call at a time."""
def batched(self, answer, name):
def action():
with snrc.request_reads():
return answer(name)
return self.requests_made(action)
def assert_same_answer(self, answer, name, round_trips):
one_by_one, one_by_one_trips = self.requests_made(lambda: answer(name))
batched, batched_trips = self.batched(answer, name)
self.assertEqual(batched, one_by_one)
self.assertEqual(batched_trips, round_trips)
self.assertGreater(one_by_one_trips, round_trips)
return batched
def test_a_registered_name_takes_two_round_trips(self):
status, body = self.assert_same_answer(snrc.registration, "acme.testing", 2)
record = body["registration"]["nameRecord"]
self.assertEqual(record["nickname"], "Acme")
self.assertEqual(record["simplexChannel"], ["https://a.example/c#1", "https://b.example/c#2"])
self.assertIsNone(record["btc"])
def test_a_hashed_query_is_named_from_the_same_round_trip(self):
hashed = "[" + snrc.keccak(b"acme").hex() + "].testing"
status, body = self.assert_same_answer(snrc.registration, hashed, 2)
self.assertEqual(body["registration"]["nameRecord"]["name"], "acme.testing")
def test_an_available_name_is_priced_in_three_round_trips(self):
status, body = self.assert_same_answer(snrc.registration, "free.testing", 3)
self.assertEqual(body["registration"]["type"], "available")
def test_v1_answers_the_same(self):
self.assert_same_answer(snrc.resolve, "acme.testing", 2)
def test_without_multicall_a_round_is_still_one_batch(self):
self.node.multicall = False
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "WARNING") as logs:
self.assert_same_answer(snrc.registration, "acme.testing", 4)
[record] = logs.records
self.assertEqual((record.getMessage(), record.fields["fallback"]), ("multicall_unavailable", "batch"))
def test_a_multicall_without_a_result_falls_back_to_a_batch(self):
self.node.multicall_null = True
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "WARNING") as logs:
self.assert_same_answer(snrc.registration, "acme.testing", 4)
self.assertEqual([r.getMessage() for r in logs.records], ["multicall_unavailable"])
def test_an_answer_with_neither_result_nor_error_is_not_taken_as_one(self):
reads = {}
snrc._remember(reads, [("eth_blockNumber", [])], [{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 0}])
self.assertEqual(reads, {})
def test_a_node_that_does_not_batch_is_read_one_call_at_a_time(self):
self.node.batch = False
one_by_one, one_by_one_trips = self.requests_made(lambda: snrc.registration("acme.testing"))
with self.assertNoLogs("snrc_resolve"):
batched, batched_trips = self.batched(snrc.registration, "acme.testing")
self.assertEqual(batched, one_by_one)
# one refused batch per round, then the reads the batch would have made
self.assertEqual(batched_trips, one_by_one_trips + 2)
def test_a_read_reverted_in_the_multicall_is_a_reverted_call(self):
with snrc.request_reads():
snrc.prefetch([snrc.eth_call_read(*snrc.grace_call(FakeChain.REGISTRAR)), snrc.eth_call_read(FakeChain.REGISTRY, "0xdeadbeef")])
_, trips = self.requests_made(lambda: self.assertRaises(RuntimeError, snrc.eth_call, FakeChain.REGISTRY, "0xdeadbeef"))
self.assertEqual(trips, 0)
def test_outside_a_request_nothing_is_prefetched(self):
_, trips = self.requests_made(lambda: snrc.prefetch(snrc.lookup_reads("acme.testing")))
self.assertEqual(trips, 0)
class Aggregate3Tests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_calls_are_encoded_as_multicall3_reads_them(self):
calls = [(FakeChain.REGISTRY, "0x0178b8bf" + "11" * 32), (FakeChain.RESOLVER, "0x59d1d43c" + "22" * 100)]
data = snrc.encode_aggregate3(calls)
self.assertTrue(data.startswith(snrc.AGGREGATE3))
self.assertEqual(_decode_aggregate3_calls(data), calls)
def test_results_are_decoded_with_their_success_flags(self):
results = [(True, b"\x01" * 40), (False, b""), (True, b"")]
self.assertEqual(snrc.decode_aggregate3(_encode_aggregate3_results(results)), results)
def test_a_truncated_answer_is_refused(self):
whole = _encode_aggregate3_results([(True, b"\x01" * 40)])
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
snrc.decode_aggregate3(whole[:-64])
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
snrc.decode_aggregate3("0x")
class RequestLogTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Each request is one event with the client it came from, behind a reverse
proxy the client the proxy names rather than the proxy itself."""
def setUp(self):
self.server = snrc.ResolverServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), snrc.Handler)
threading.Thread(target=self.server.serve_forever, args=(0.05,), daemon=True).start()
self._saved = snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES
def tearDown(self):
snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES = self._saved
self.server.shutdown()
self.server.server_close()
def request(self, path, headers=None, level="INFO"):
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.server.server_address[1]}{path}"
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", level) as logs:
try:
urlopen(Request(url, headers=headers or {}), timeout=5).read()
except HTTPError:
pass
deadline = time.monotonic() + 2
while not any(r.getMessage() == "request" for r in logs.records) and time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(0.01)
[record] = [r for r in logs.records if r.getMessage() == "request"]
return record
def test_a_request_is_logged_with_its_outcome(self):
record = self.request("/v2/resolve/x.simplex")
fields = record.fields
self.assertEqual(record.levelname, "INFO")
self.assertEqual(
(fields["client"], fields["method"], fields["path"], fields["status"], fields["worker"]),
("127.0.0.1", "GET", "/v2/resolve/x.simplex", 400, os.getpid()),
)
self.assertGreater(fields["bytes"], 0)
self.assertGreaterEqual(fields["ms"], 0)
def test_a_trusted_proxy_names_the_client(self):
snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES = (ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.1/32"),)
record = self.request("/v2/resolve/x.simplex", {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.7"})
self.assertEqual(record.fields["client"], "203.0.113.7")
def test_any_other_peer_cannot_name_itself(self):
record = self.request("/v2/resolve/x.simplex", {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.7"})
self.assertEqual(record.fields["client"], "127.0.0.1")
def test_a_bad_request_is_not_logged_with_the_previous_ones_fields(self):
"""On a kept-alive connection the handler still held the last request's path and size."""
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "INFO") as logs:
with socket.create_connection(self.server.server_address, timeout=5) as sock:
sock.sendall(b"GET /v2/resolve/x.simplex HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n")
sock.recv(65536)
sock.sendall(b"BOGUS\r\n\r\n")
while sock.recv(65536):
pass
first, second = [r for r in logs.records if r.getMessage() == "request"]
self.assertEqual(first.fields["path"], "/v2/resolve/x.simplex")
self.assertEqual((second.fields["status"], second.fields["path"], second.fields["bytes"], second.fields["ms"]), (400, None, None, None))
def test_health_checks_are_logged_only_at_debug(self):
"""The container checks /health every 30 s."""
record = self.request("/health", level="DEBUG")
self.assertEqual(record.levelname, "DEBUG")
class RequestBodyTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Behind a reverse proxy that reuses connections, a body left unread would be
answered as another request, and that answer given to the proxy's next client."""
def setUp(self):
self.server = snrc.ResolverServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), snrc.Handler)
threading.Thread(target=self.server.serve_forever, args=(0.05,), daemon=True).start()
self._log = contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO())
self._log.__enter__()
def tearDown(self):
self._log.__exit__(None, None, None)
self.server.shutdown()
self.server.server_close()
def exchange(self, head: bytes, body: bytes = b"") -> bytes:
with socket.create_connection(self.server.server_address, timeout=5) as sock:
sock.sendall(head + body)
data = b""
while chunk := sock.recv(65536):
data += chunk
if data.count(b"HTTP/1.1 ") > 1:
break
return data
SMUGGLED = b"GET /v2/resolve/y.simplex HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n"
def test_a_body_is_refused_and_the_connection_closed(self):
data = self.exchange(b"GET /v2/resolve/x.simplex HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\n\r\n" % len(self.SMUGGLED), self.SMUGGLED)
self.assertEqual(data.count(b"HTTP/1.1 "), 1)
self.assertIn(b"HTTP/1.1 400 ", data)
self.assertIn(b"Connection: close", data)
self.assertNotIn(b"y.simplex", data)
def test_a_length_after_a_malformed_header_line_is_still_seen(self):
"""Python stops parsing headers at a malformed line and keeps the rest as payload."""
data = self.exchange(b"GET /v2/resolve/x.simplex HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Junk : 1\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\n\r\n" % len(self.SMUGGLED), self.SMUGGLED)
self.assertEqual(data.count(b"HTTP/1.1 "), 1)
self.assertIn(b"unexpectedBody", data)
self.assertNotIn(b"y.simplex", data)
def test_a_chunked_body_is_refused_and_the_connection_closed(self):
chunked = b"%x\r\n" % len(self.SMUGGLED) + self.SMUGGLED + b"\r\n0\r\n\r\n"
data = self.exchange(b"GET /v2/resolve/x.simplex HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n", chunked)
self.assertEqual(data.count(b"HTTP/1.1 "), 1)
self.assertNotIn(b"y.simplex", data)
def test_an_empty_body_keeps_the_connection(self):
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(*self.server.server_address, timeout=5)
answers = []
for _ in range(2):
conn.request("GET", "/v2/resolve/x.simplex", headers={"Content-Length": "0"})
res = conn.getresponse()
answers.append((res.status, json.loads(res.read())["error"], conn.sock))
conn.close()
self.assertEqual([a[:2] for a in answers], [(400, "tldNotConfigured")] * 2)
self.assertIs(answers[0][2], answers[1][2])
class PublicEndpointTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_credentials_path_and_query_are_not_shown(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.public_endpoint("https://user:[email protected]:8443/v2/KEY?apikey=K"), "https://rpc.example:8443")
def test_a_plain_endpoint_is_unchanged(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.public_endpoint("http://reth:8545"), "http://reth:8545")
def test_an_ipv6_host_keeps_its_brackets(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.public_endpoint("http://u:p@[::1]:8545/key"), "http://[::1]:8545")
def test_a_malformed_port_does_not_break_health(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.public_endpoint("http://reth:port"), "http://reth:port")
class ClientAddressTests(unittest.TestCase):
PROXY = "172.18.0.1"
def setUp(self):
self._saved = snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES
snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES = (ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),)
def tearDown(self):
snrc.TRUSTED_PROXIES = self._saved
def test_a_peer_that_is_no_proxy_is_the_client(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address("198.51.100.9", "203.0.113.7"), "198.51.100.9")
def test_without_the_header_the_proxy_is_the_client(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, None), self.PROXY)
def test_the_address_the_proxy_added_is_the_client(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, "203.0.113.7"), "203.0.113.7")
def test_addresses_a_client_sent_itself_are_not_believed(self):
"""A proxy appends the address it saw, so only the last untrusted one is known."""
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, "6.6.6.6, 203.0.113.7"), "203.0.113.7")
def test_trusted_proxies_in_a_chain_are_skipped(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, "203.0.113.7, 172.18.0.5"), "203.0.113.7")
def test_an_address_that_does_not_parse_is_not_believed(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, "203.0.113.7, not-an-ip"), self.PROXY)
def test_an_ipv4_mapped_peer_is_matched_as_ipv4(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address("::ffff:172.18.0.1", "203.0.113.7"), "203.0.113.7")
def test_an_ipv6_client_is_kept(self):
self.assertEqual(snrc.client_address(self.PROXY, "2001:db8::7"), "2001:db8::7")
class RequestErrorTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.server = snrc.ResolverServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), snrc.Handler)
def tearDown(self):
self.server.server_close()
def test_a_client_that_hung_up_is_a_warning_without_a_traceback(self):
"""What an smp-server that gave up after its timeout leaves behind."""
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "WARNING") as logs:
try:
raise BrokenPipeError
except BrokenPipeError:
self.server.handle_error(None, ("198.51.100.9", 4000))
[record] = logs.records
self.assertEqual((record.levelname, record.getMessage(), record.fields["error"]), ("WARNING", "client_gone", "BrokenPipeError"))
self.assertIsNone(record.exc_info)
def test_a_failure_is_an_error_with_its_traceback(self):
with self.assertLogs("snrc_resolve", "ERROR") as logs:
try:
raise KeyError("boom")
except KeyError:
self.server.handle_error(None, ("198.51.100.9", 4000))
[record] = logs.records
self.assertEqual((record.getMessage(), record.fields["client"]), ("request_failed", "198.51.100.9"))
self.assertIsNotNone(record.exc_info)
class KeepAliveTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""The smp-server keeps a resolver connection only after an HTTP/1.1
response, and otherwise connects for every lookup."""
def setUp(self):
self.server = snrc.ResolverServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), snrc.Handler)
threading.Thread(target=self.server.serve_forever, args=(0.05,), daemon=True).start()
self._saved_timeout = snrc.Handler.timeout
self._log = contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO())
self._log.__enter__()
def tearDown(self):
self._log.__exit__(None, None, None)
snrc.Handler.timeout = self._saved_timeout
self.server.shutdown()
self.server.server_close()
def test_requests_share_one_connection_without_delay(self):
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(*self.server.server_address, timeout=5)
start = time.monotonic()
for i in range(20):
conn.request("GET", "/v2/resolve/x.simplex")
res = conn.getresponse()
res.read()
self.assertEqual((res.version, res.status), (11, 400))
if i == 0:
sock = conn.sock
self.assertIs(conn.sock, sock)
conn.close()
# a response held by Nagle for the delayed ACK takes ~40 ms, 20 of them over 0.8 s
self.assertLess(time.monotonic() - start, 0.5)
def test_idle_connections_outlast_the_smp_servers(self):
"""http-client drops a connection idle for 30 s, checked every 5 s. A
resolver that closed sooner would race the client reusing it, and one
that never closed would keep a thread per dead connection."""
self.assertIsNotNone(self._saved_timeout)
self.assertGreater(self._saved_timeout, 35)
def test_an_idle_connection_is_closed(self):
snrc.Handler.timeout = 0.2
with socket.create_connection(self.server.server_address, timeout=5) as sock:
time.sleep(0.5)
self.assertEqual(sock.recv(1), b"")
@unittest.skipUnless(sys.platform.startswith("linux"), "reads worker processes from /proc")
class WorkerProcessesTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Workers share the port, and the service stops as a whole, so the
container restarts rather than serving on fewer workers."""
def setUp(self):
self.node = FakeNode()
with socket.socket() as s:
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
self.port = s.getsockname()[1]
env = dict(os.environ, SNRC_RPC=self.node.url, SNRC_BIND="127.0.0.1", SNRC_PORT=str(self.port), SNRC_WORKERS="2",
SNRC_REGISTRY_TESTING=FakeChain.REGISTRY, SNRC_REGISTRAR_TESTING=FakeChain.REGISTRAR, SNRC_CONTROLLER_TESTING=FakeChain.CONTROLLER)
self.service = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, os.path.join(_HERE, "snrc-resolve.py")], env=env, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)
self.workers = self._wait_for_workers(2)
def tearDown(self):
if self.service.poll() is None:
self.service.kill()
self.service.wait()
self.service.stderr.close()
for pid in self.workers:
with contextlib.suppress(ProcessLookupError):
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGKILL)
self.node.stop()
def _wait_for_workers(self, count):
deadline = time.monotonic() + 10
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
workers = [int(p) for p in os.listdir("/proc") if p.isdigit() and self._parent(p) == self.service.pid]
if len(workers) == count and self._serving():
return workers
time.sleep(0.05)
self.fail("workers did not start")
@staticmethod
def _parent(pid):
try:
with open(f"/proc/{pid}/stat") as f:
return int(f.read().rsplit(")", 1)[1].split()[1])
except (FileNotFoundError, ProcessLookupError):
return None
def _serving(self):
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", self.port), timeout=1):
return True
except OSError:
return False
def _gone(self, pid):
deadline = time.monotonic() + 5
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if self._parent(pid) != self.service.pid:
return True
time.sleep(0.05)
return False
def test_workers_answer_on_the_shared_port(self):
for _ in range(20):
with urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.port}/v2/resolve/acme.testing", timeout=5) as res:
self.assertEqual(json.loads(res.read())["registration"]["type"], "registered")
def test_stopping_the_service_stops_every_worker(self):
self.service.send_signal(signal.SIGTERM)
self.assertEqual(self.service.wait(timeout=5), 0)
self.assertTrue(all(self._gone(pid) for pid in self.workers))
self.assertRegex(self.service.stderr.read(), r"INFO stopping signal=SIGTERM")
def test_a_worker_exiting_stops_the_service(self):
os.kill(self.workers[0], signal.SIGKILL)
self.assertEqual(self.service.wait(timeout=5), 1)
self.assertTrue(self._gone(self.workers[1]))
TIME = r"\d{4}-\d\d-\d\dT\d\d:\d\d:\d\d\.\d{3}Z"
class LogTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self._saved = (snrc.LOG_FORMAT, snrc.LOG_COLOR, snrc.LOG_LEVEL)
snrc.LOG_FORMAT, snrc.LOG_COLOR, snrc.LOG_LEVEL = "text", "never", "info"
self.out = io.StringIO()
def tearDown(self):
snrc.LOG_FORMAT, snrc.LOG_COLOR, snrc.LOG_LEVEL = self._saved
snrc.LOGGER.handlers[:] = []
snrc.LOGGER.setLevel(logging.NOTSET)
snrc.LOGGER.propagate = True
def emit(self, level=logging.INFO, name="request", **fields):
snrc.setup_logging(self.out)
snrc.log_event(level, name, **fields)
return self.out.getvalue()
class TextFormatTests(LogTestCase):
def test_a_line_is_utc_time_level_event_and_fields(self):
line = self.emit(client="203.0.113.7", path="/v2/resolve/[4fdd].testing", status=200, ms=7)
self.assertRegex(line, rf"^{TIME} INFO request client=203\.0\.113\.7 path=/v2/resolve/\[4fdd\]\.testing status=200 ms=7\n$")
def test_values_that_would_be_misread_are_quoted(self):
line = self.emit(message='says "hi" here', empty="", missing=None, eq="a=b")
self.assertIn('message="says \\"hi\\" here" empty="" missing=- eq="a=b"', line)
def test_levels_are_named_in_five_columns(self):
self.assertRegex(self.emit(logging.WARNING, "upstream_error"), rf"^{TIME} WARN upstream_error\n$")
def test_below_the_configured_level_nothing_is_written(self):
self.assertEqual(self.emit(logging.DEBUG), "")
def test_an_exception_follows_its_line(self):
snrc.setup_logging(self.out)
try:
raise KeyError("boom")
except KeyError:
snrc.log_event(logging.ERROR, "request_failed", exc_info=True)
self.assertRegex(self.out.getvalue(), rf"(?s)^{TIME} ERROR request_failed\nTraceback .*KeyError: 'boom'\n$")
class ColorTests(LogTestCase):
def test_colours_mark_the_level_and_the_status_class(self):
snrc.LOG_COLOR = "always"
line = self.emit(status=503)
self.assertIn("\033[32mINFO ", line)
self.assertIn("\033[31m503\033[0m", line)
def test_auto_leaves_output_that_is_no_terminal_plain(self):
snrc.LOG_COLOR = "auto"
self.assertNotIn("\033[", self.emit(status=200))
def test_never_is_plain(self):
self.assertNotIn("\033[", self.emit(status=200))
class JsonFormatTests(LogTestCase):
def test_a_line_is_one_json_object(self):
snrc.LOG_FORMAT = "json"
record = json.loads(self.emit(client="203.0.113.7", status=200, missing=None))
self.assertRegex(record.pop("time"), rf"^{TIME}$")
self.assertEqual(record, {"level": "info", "event": "request", "client": "203.0.113.7", "status": 200, "missing": None})
def test_an_exception_is_a_field(self):
snrc.LOG_FORMAT = "json"
snrc.setup_logging(self.out)
try:
raise KeyError("boom")
except KeyError:
snrc.log_event(logging.ERROR, "request_failed", exc_info=True)
self.assertIn("KeyError: 'boom'", json.loads(self.out.getvalue())["exception"])
class SetupTests(LogTestCase):
def test_unknown_settings_are_refused_at_start(self):
for setting, value in (("LOG_FORMAT", "yaml"), ("LOG_COLOR", "sometimes"), ("LOG_LEVEL", "loud")):
with self.subTest(setting=setting):
saved = getattr(snrc, setting)
setattr(snrc, setting, value)
try:
with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, re.escape(f"SNRC_{setting}")):
snrc.setup_logging(self.out)
finally:
setattr(snrc, setting, saved)
+156
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
version = 1
revision = 3
requires-python = ">=3.11"
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[[package]]
name = "snrc-resolve"
version = "0.1.0"
source = { virtual = "." }
dependencies = [
{ name = "eth-hash", extra = ["pycryptodome"] },
]
[package.dev-dependencies]
dev = [
{ name = "pytest" },
{ name = "ruff" },
]
[package.metadata]
requires-dist = [{ name = "eth-hash", extras = ["pycryptodome"], specifier = ">=0.7" }]
[package.metadata.requires-dev]
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+9 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
cabal-version: 3.0
name: simplexmq
version: 7.1.0.8
version: 7.1.0.11
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
else
exposed-modules:
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
@@ -248,6 +251,10 @@ library
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261005_commands_autoincrement
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Util
if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
exposed-modules:
@@ -595,7 +602,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
default-extensions:
StrictData
-- add -fhpc to ghc-options to run tests with coverage
ghc-options: -Weverything -Wno-missing-exported-signatures -Wno-missing-import-lists -Wno-missed-specialisations -Wno-all-missed-specialisations -Wno-unsafe -Wno-safe -Wno-missing-local-signatures -Wno-missing-kind-signatures -Wno-missing-deriving-strategies -Wno-monomorphism-restriction -Wno-prepositive-qualified-module -Wno-implicit-prelude -Wno-missing-safe-haskell-mode -Wno-missing-export-lists -Wno-partial-fields -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-record-updates -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Werror=incomplete-uni-patterns -Werror=missing-methods -Werror=tabs -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wunused-type-patterns -O2 -threaded -rtsopts -with-rtsopts=-A64M -with-rtsopts=-N1
ghc-options: -Weverything -Wno-missing-exported-signatures -Wno-missing-import-lists -Wno-missed-specialisations -Wno-all-missed-specialisations -Wno-unsafe -Wno-safe -Wno-missing-local-signatures -Wno-missing-kind-signatures -Wno-missing-deriving-strategies -Wno-monomorphism-restriction -Wno-prepositive-qualified-module -Wno-implicit-prelude -Wno-missing-safe-haskell-mode -Wno-missing-export-lists -Wno-partial-fields -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-record-updates -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Werror=incomplete-uni-patterns -Werror=missing-methods -Werror=tabs -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wunused-type-patterns -O2 -threaded -rtsopts "-with-rtsopts=-A64M -N1"
build-depends:
base
, aeson
@@ -633,7 +640,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
, stm
, text
, time
, timeit ==2.0.*
, tls >=1.9.0 && <1.10
, transformers
, unliftio
+37 -12
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,16 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
toFSFilePath,
-- Receiving files
xftpReceiveFile',
xftpPrepareReceiveFile',
xftpStartReceiveFile',
xftpDeleteRcvFile',
xftpDeleteRcvFiles',
-- Sending files
xftpSendFile',
xftpSendDescription',
xftpPrepareSendFile',
xftpPrepareSendDescription',
xftpStartSendFile',
deleteSndFileInternal,
deleteSndFilesInternal,
deleteSndFileRemote,
@@ -127,7 +132,12 @@ closeXFTPAgent a = do
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
xftpReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> Bool -> AM RcvFileId
xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks, redirect}) cfArgs approvedRelays = do
xftpReceiveFile' c userId vfd cfArgs approvedRelays = do
fId <- xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId vfd cfArgs approvedRelays
fId <$ xftpStartReceiveFile' c fId
xftpPrepareReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> Bool -> AM RcvFileId
xftpPrepareReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {redirect}) cfArgs approvedRelays = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "rcv.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -137,7 +147,7 @@ xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks, redi
lift $ createDirectory =<< toFSFilePath relTmpPath
lift $ createEmptyFile =<< toFSFilePath relSavePath
let saveFile = CryptoFile relSavePath cfArgs
fId <- case redirect of
case redirect of
Nothing -> withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFile db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPath saveFile approvedRelays
Just _ -> do
-- prepare description paths
@@ -149,8 +159,11 @@ xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks, redi
let saveFileRedirect = CryptoFile relSavePathRedirect $ Just cfArgsRedirect
-- create download tasks
withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFileRedirect db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPathRedirect saveFileRedirect relTmpPath saveFile approvedRelays
forM_ chunks (downloadChunk c)
pure fId
xftpStartReceiveFile' :: AgentClient -> RcvFileId -> AM ()
xftpStartReceiveFile' c rcvFileEntityId = do
srvs <- withStore c (`startPreparedRcvFile` rcvFileEntityId)
lift $ forM_ srvs $ void . getXFTPRcvWorker True c . Just
downloadChunk :: AgentClient -> FileChunk -> AM ()
downloadChunk c FileChunk {replicas = (FileChunkReplica {server} : _)} = do
@@ -353,6 +366,11 @@ notify c entId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", entId, AEvt (sAEnti
xftpSendFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> Maybe Word32 -> AM SndFileId
xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
fId <- xftpPrepareSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours
fId <$ xftpStartSendFile' c fId
xftpPrepareSendFile' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> Maybe Word32 -> AM SndFileId
xftpPrepareSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -360,12 +378,15 @@ xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients storageHours = do
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-- saving absolute filePath will not allow to restore file encryption after app update, but it's a short window
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce Nothing storageHours
lift . void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
pure fId
withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce Nothing storageHours
xftpSendDescription' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Int -> AM SndFileId
xftpSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {size, digest}) numRecipients = do
xftpSendDescription' c userId vfd numRecipients = do
fId <- xftpPrepareSendDescription' c userId vfd numRecipients
fId <$ xftpStartSendFile' c fId
xftpPrepareSendDescription' :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Int -> AM SndFileId
xftpPrepareSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {size, digest}) numRecipients = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- lift $ getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
@@ -376,9 +397,12 @@ xftpSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {si
liftError (FILE . FILE_IO . show) $ CF.writeFile file (LB.fromStrict $ strEncode fdDirect)
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce (Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}) Nothing
withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce (Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}) Nothing
xftpStartSendFile' :: AgentClient -> SndFileId -> AM ()
xftpStartSendFile' c sndFileEntityId = do
withStore c (`startPreparedSndFile` sndFileEntityId)
lift . void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
pure fId
resumeXFTPSndWork :: AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> AM' ()
resumeXFTPSndWork = void .: getXFTPSndWorker False
@@ -544,9 +568,10 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFPROG uploaded total
when complete $ do
(sndDescr, rcvDescrs) <- sndFileToDescrs sf
flip catchAllErrors (\e -> logError $ "XFTP snd worker error: " <> tshow e) $ do
lift . forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs (sndFileExpiresAt chunks)
lift . forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
where
addRecipients :: SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> AM SndFileChunkReplica
addRecipients ch@SndFileChunk {numRecipients} cr@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, rcvIdsKeys}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
tParse,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe, (<$?>))
xftpBlockSize :: Int
xftpBlockSize = 16384
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey t@(corrId, _, _) = do
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams t
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth False (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth False (Just pKey) (eitherToMaybe $ C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams t = xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams t)
+1 -2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import Control.Monad.Reader
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -594,7 +593,7 @@ processXFTPRequest ent HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
\used -> let used' = used + fromIntegral size in if used' <= quota then (True, used') else (False, used)
receive = do
path <- asks $ filesPath . config
let fPath = path </> B.unpack (B64.encode $ unEntityId senderId)
let fPath = path </> serverFileName senderId
receiveChunk (XFTPRcvChunkSpec fPath size digest) >>= \case
Right () -> do
stats <- asks serverStats
+10 -2
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
logDeleteFile,
logBlockFile,
logAckFile,
serverFileName,
)
where
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.::.))
@@ -35,10 +37,11 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import System.FilePath (takeFileName)
import System.IO
data FileStoreLogRecord
@@ -99,6 +102,9 @@ logBlockFile s fId = logFileStoreRecord s . BlockFile fId
logAckFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> RecipientId -> IO ()
logAckFile s = logFileStoreRecord s . AckFile
serverFileName :: SenderId -> FilePath
serverFileName = B.unpack . B64.encode . unEntityId
readWriteFileStore :: FilePath -> STMFileStore -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteFileStore = readWriteStoreLog readFileStore writeFileStore
@@ -115,7 +121,9 @@ readFileStore f st = mapM_ (addFileLogRecord . LB.toStrict) . LB.lines =<< LB.re
AddFile sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| size file > 0 -> addFile st sId file createdAt expiresAt status
| otherwise -> pure $ Left SIZE
PutFile qId path -> setFilePath st qId path
PutFile qId path
| takeFileName path == serverFileName qId -> setFilePath st qId path
| otherwise -> pure $ Left AUTH
AddRecipients sId rcps -> runExceptT $ addRecipients sId rcps
DeleteFile sId -> deleteFile st sId
BlockFile sId info -> blockFile st sId info True
+8 -2
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ data RcvFile = RcvFile
deriving (Show)
data RcvFileStatus
= RFSReceiving
= RFSPrepared
| RFSReceiving
| RFSReceived
| RFSDecrypting
| RFSComplete
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ instance ToField RcvFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding RcvFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"prepared" -> Just RFSPrepared
"receiving" -> Just RFSReceiving
"received" -> Just RFSReceived
"decrypting" -> Just RFSDecrypting
@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ instance TextEncoding RcvFileStatus where
"error" -> Just RFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
RFSPrepared -> "prepared"
RFSReceiving -> "receiving"
RFSReceived -> "received"
RFSDecrypting -> "decrypting"
@@ -177,7 +180,8 @@ sndFileEncPath :: FilePath -> FilePath
sndFileEncPath prefixPath = prefixPath </> "xftp.encrypted"
data SndFileStatus
= SFSNew -- db record created
= SFSPrepared
| SFSNew -- db record created
| SFSEncrypting -- encryption started
| SFSEncrypted -- encryption complete
| SFSUploading -- all chunk replicas are created on servers
@@ -191,6 +195,7 @@ instance ToField SndFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding SndFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"prepared" -> Just SFSPrepared
"new" -> Just SFSNew
"encrypting" -> Just SFSEncrypting
"encrypted" -> Just SFSEncrypted
@@ -199,6 +204,7 @@ instance TextEncoding SndFileStatus where
"error" -> Just SFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
SFSPrepared -> "prepared"
SFSNew -> "new"
SFSEncrypting -> "encrypting"
SFSEncrypted -> "encrypted"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+13 -12
View File
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Session
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion, serverInfo), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), shortLinksSMPVersion, newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SMPServiceRole (..), SMPVersion, ServiceCredentials (..), SessionId, THClientService' (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (sessionId, thAuth, thVersion, serverInfo), TransportError (..), newNtfCredsSMPVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
@@ -1261,9 +1261,12 @@ sendOrProxySMPCommand c nm userId destSrv@ProtocolServer {host = destHosts} conn
Left e -> throwE e
ipAddressProtected :: NetworkConfig -> ProtocolServer p -> Bool
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _) = do
isJust socksProxy || (hostMode == HMOnion && any isOnionHost hosts)
ipAddressProtected NetworkConfig {socksProxy, socksMode, hostMode} (ProtocolServer _ hosts _ _)
| isJust socksProxy = socksMode == SMAlways || if hostMode == HMPublic then allOnion else anyOnion
| otherwise = hostMode == HMOnion && anyOnion
where
anyOnion = any isOnionHost hosts
allOnion = all isOnionHost hosts
isOnionHost = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
withNtfClient :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> NtfServer -> EntityId -> ByteString -> (NtfClient -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO a) -> AM a
@@ -1496,7 +1499,7 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
let sessServiceId = (\THClientService {serviceId = sId} -> sId) <$> (clientService =<< thAuth thParams')
when (isJust serviceId && serviceId /= sessServiceId) $ logError "incorrect service ID in NEW response"
liftIO . logServer "<--" c srv NoEntity $ B.unwords ["IDS", logSecret rcvId, logSecret sndId]
shortLink <- mkShortLinkCreds thParams' qik
shortLink <- mkShortLinkCreds qik
let rq =
RcvQueue
{ userId,
@@ -1537,8 +1540,8 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
(Just ((ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey), dhpk), Just (ServerNtfCreds notifierId dhk')) ->
Just ClientNtfCreds {ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey, notifierId, rcvNtfDhSecret = C.dh' dhk' dhpk}
_ -> Nothing
mkShortLinkCreds :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient -> QueueIdsKeys -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
mkShortLinkCreds thParams' QIK {sndId, queueMode, linkId} = case (cqrd, queueMode) of
mkShortLinkCreds :: QueueIdsKeys -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
mkShortLinkCreds QIK {sndId, queueMode, linkId} = case (cqrd, queueMode) of
(CQRMessaging ld, Just QMMessaging) ->
withLinkData ld $ \lnkId CQRData {linkKey, privSigKey, srvReq = (sndId', d)} ->
if sndId == sndId'
@@ -1552,11 +1555,9 @@ newRcvQueue_ c nm userId connId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) vRange cqrd enabl
(_, Nothing) -> newErr "unexpected link ID"
_ -> newErr "unexpected queue mode"
where
v = thVersion thParams'
withLinkData :: Maybe d -> (SMP.LinkId -> d -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)) -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
withLinkData ld_ mkLink = case (ld_, linkId) of
(Just ld, Just lnkId) -> mkLink lnkId ld
(Just _, Nothing) | v < shortLinksSMPVersion -> pure Nothing
(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
_ -> newErr "unexpected or absent link ID"
newErr :: String -> AM (Maybe ShortLinkCreds)
@@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ decryptSMPMessage :: RcvQueue -> SMP.RcvMessage -> AM SMP.ClientRcvMsgBody
decryptSMPMessage rq SMP.RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = SMP.EncRcvMsgBody body} =
liftEither $ parse SMP.clientRcvMsgBodyP (AGENT $ A_MESSAGE "decrypt message") =<< decrypt body
where
decrypt = agentCbDecrypt (rcvDhSecret rq) (C.cbNonce msgId)
decrypt = agentCbDecrypt (rcvDhSecret rq) msgId
secureQueue :: AgentClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> RcvQueue -> SndPublicAuthKey -> AM ()
secureQueue c nm rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} senderKey =
@@ -2079,9 +2080,9 @@ disableQueuesNtfs c = sendTSessionBatches "NDEL" (mkSMPTSession . snd) disableQu
queueCreds :: DisableQueueNtfReq -> (SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey)
queueCreds (_, RcvQueue {rcvPrivateKey, rcvId}) = (rcvId, rcvPrivateKey)
sendAck :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> MsgId -> AM ()
sendAck :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> MsgId -> AM QueueDrained
sendAck c rq@RcvQueue {rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} msgId =
withSMPClient c NRMBackground rq ("ACK:" <> logSecret' msgId) $ \smp ->
withSMPClient c NRMBackground rq ("ACK:" <> logSecret' (SMP.unMsgId msgId)) $ \smp ->
ackSMPMessage smp rcvPrivateKey rcvId msgId
hasGetLock :: SomeRcvQueue q => AgentClient -> q -> IO Bool
@@ -2276,7 +2277,7 @@ agentCbEncryptOnce clientVersion dhRcvPubKey msg = do
-- | NaCl crypto-box decrypt - both for messages received from the server
-- and per-queue E2E encrypted messages from the sender that were inside.
agentCbDecrypt :: C.DhSecretX25519 -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ByteString
agentCbDecrypt :: C.CbNonceI n => C.DhSecretX25519 -> n -> ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ByteString
agentCbDecrypt dhSecret nonce msg =
first cryptoError $
C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce msg
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
connDeleteDeliveryTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
helloTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
quotaExceededTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
commandQuotaRetryInterval :: RetryInterval,
persistErrorInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
initialCleanupDelay :: Int64,
cleanupInterval :: Int64,
@@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ defaultAgentConfig =
connDeleteDeliveryTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
helloTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
quotaExceededTimeout = 7 * nominalDay,
commandQuotaRetryInterval = RetryInterval {initialInterval = 30_000000, increaseAfter = 0, maxInterval = 3600_000000},
persistErrorInterval = 3, -- seconds
initialCleanupDelay = 30 * 1000000, -- 30 seconds
cleanupInterval = 5 * 60 * 1000000, -- 5 minutes
+32 -8
View File
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
SMPConfirmation (..),
AgentMsgEnvelope (..),
AgentMessage (..),
RatchetInfo (..),
RequestSignature (..),
AgentMessageType (..),
APrivHeader (..),
@@ -166,6 +167,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
ConnId,
ConfirmationId,
InvitationId,
ConnVerifyCodes (..),
ContactRequestBinding (..),
MsgIntegrity (..),
MsgErrorType (..),
QueueStatus (..),
@@ -243,7 +246,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
RcvE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri,
SndE2ERatchetParams,
RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams,
pattern PQSupportOff,
pattern PQSupportOn,
)
@@ -404,7 +406,7 @@ data AEvent (e :: AEntity) where
LINK :: ConnShortLink 'CMContact -> UserConnLinkData 'CMContact -> AEvent AEConn
LDATA :: FixedLinkData 'CMContact -> ConnLinkData 'CMContact -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> AEvent AEConn
CONF :: ConfirmationId -> PQSupport -> [SMPServer] -> ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender, [SMPServer] will be empty only in v1 handshake
REQ :: InvitationId -> PQSupport -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> Bool -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender; Bool - rejection reason can be sent
REQ :: InvitationId -> PQSupport -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> ContactRequestBinding -> Bool -> AEvent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender; Bool - rejection reason can be sent
SREQ :: InvitationId -> Maybe C.PublicKeyEd25519 -> MsgBody -> AEvent AEConn
SSENT :: AgentMsgId -> Maybe SMPServer -> AEvent AEConn
RJCT :: ConnInfo -> AEvent AEConn
@@ -609,6 +611,7 @@ data RcvSwitchStatus
| RSSendingQADD
| RSSendingQUSE
| RSReceivedMessage
| RSReceivedQEND
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding RcvSwitchStatus where
@@ -617,12 +620,14 @@ instance StrEncoding RcvSwitchStatus where
RSSendingQADD -> "sending_qadd"
RSSendingQUSE -> "sending_quse"
RSReceivedMessage -> "received_message"
RSReceivedQEND -> "received_qend"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"switch_started" -> pure RSSwitchStarted
"sending_qadd" -> pure RSSendingQADD
"sending_quse" -> pure RSSendingQUSE
"received_message" -> pure RSReceivedMessage
"received_qend" -> pure RSReceivedQEND
_ -> fail "bad RcvSwitchStatus"
instance ToField RcvSwitchStatus where toField = toField . decodeLatin1 . strEncode
@@ -926,7 +931,7 @@ data AgentMessage
| -- AgentConnInfoReply is used by accepting party in duplexHandshake mode (v2), allowing to include reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation.
-- It made removed REPLY message unnecessary.
AgentConnInfoReply (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) ConnInfo
| AgentRatchetInfo ByteString
| AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo
| AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage
| AgentServiceRequest (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) (Maybe RequestSignature) MsgBody
| AgentServiceResponse MsgBody
@@ -937,7 +942,7 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
smpEncode = \case
AgentConnInfo cInfo -> smpEncode ('I', Tail cInfo)
AgentConnInfoReply smpQueues cInfo -> smpEncode ('D', smpQueues, Tail cInfo) -- 'D' stands for "duplex"
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', Tail info)
AgentRatchetInfo info -> smpEncode ('R', info)
AgentMessage hdr aMsg -> smpEncode ('M', hdr, aMsg)
AgentServiceRequest qs sig_ body -> smpEncode ('A', qs, sig_, Tail body)
AgentServiceResponse body -> smpEncode ('P', Tail body)
@@ -946,13 +951,23 @@ instance Encoding AgentMessage where
smpP >>= \case
'I' -> AgentConnInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'D' -> AgentConnInfoReply <$> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo . unTail <$> smpP
'R' -> AgentRatchetInfo <$> smpP
'M' -> AgentMessage <$> smpP <*> smpP
'A' -> AgentServiceRequest <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> (unTail <$> smpP)
'P' -> AgentServiceResponse . unTail <$> smpP
'J' -> AgentRejection . unTail <$> smpP
_ -> fail "bad AgentMessage"
data RatchetInfo = RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash :: Maybe ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Encoding RatchetInfo where
smpEncode RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash} = smpEncode answeredKeyHash
smpP = do
answeredKeyHash <- smpP <|> pure Nothing
_ <- A.takeByteString
pure RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash}
-- internal type for storing message type in the database
data AgentMessageType
= AM_CONN_INFO
@@ -1372,6 +1387,15 @@ type ConfirmationId = ByteString
type InvitationId = ByteString
data ConnVerifyCodes = ConnVerifyCodes
{ codeAD :: ByteString,
codePQ :: Maybe ByteString
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ContactRequestBinding = CRBRatchet ConnVerifyCodes | CRBRequest ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
extraSMPServerHosts :: Map TransportHost TransportHost
extraSMPServerHosts =
M.fromList
@@ -1602,7 +1626,7 @@ newtype LinkKey = LinkKey ByteString -- sha3-256(fixed_data)
instance ToField LinkKey where toField (LinkKey s) = toField $ Binary s
-- | Parameters for creating a connection with a prepared link.
data PreparedLinkParams = PreparedLinkParams
data PreparedLinkParams k = PreparedLinkParams
{ -- | Correlation ID / determines sender ID
plpNonce :: C.CbNonce,
-- | Queue E2EE DH key pair
@@ -1617,8 +1641,8 @@ data PreparedLinkParams = PreparedLinkParams
plpSrvWithAuth :: SMPServerWithAuth,
-- | Initial PQ keys
plpInitKeys :: InitialKeys,
-- | Contact address double ratchet keys
plpAddressKeys :: Maybe (RatchetKeyId, RcvE2EPrivRatchetParams 'C.X448)
-- | Contact address double ratchet keys or invitation X3DH keys
plpRatchetKeys :: k
}
instance ConnectionModeI c => ToField (ConnectionLink c) where toField = toField . Binary . strEncode
+17 -9
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
withRetryInterval,
withRetryIntervalCount,
withRetryForeground,
withRetryInterval2,
withRetryLock2,
updateRetryInterval2,
nextRetryDelay,
@@ -86,9 +87,24 @@ withRetryForeground ri isForeground isOnline action = callAction 0 $ initialInte
| otherwise = (elapsed + delay, nextRetryDelay elapsed' delay ri)
callAction elapsed' delay'
withRetryInterval2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryInterval2 = withRetryWait2 $ liftIO . threadDelay'
-- This function allows action to toggle between slow and fast retry intervals.
withRetryLock2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> TMVar () -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryLock2 RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} lock action =
withRetryLock2 ri lock = withRetryWait2 wait ri
where
wait delay = do
waiting <- newTVarIO True
_ <- liftIO . forkIO $ do
threadDelay' delay
atomically $ whenM (readTVar waiting) $ void $ tryPutTMVar lock ()
atomically $ do
takeTMVar lock
writeTVar waiting False
withRetryWait2 :: forall m. Monad m => (Int64 -> m ()) -> RetryInterval2 -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryWait2 wait RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} action =
callAction (0, initialInterval riSlow) (0, initialInterval riFast)
where
callAction :: (Int64, Int64) -> (Int64, Int64) -> m ()
@@ -102,14 +118,6 @@ withRetryLock2 RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} lock action =
let elapsed' = elapsed + delay
delay' = nextRetryDelay elapsed' delay ri
call (elapsed', delay')
wait delay = do
waiting <- newTVarIO True
_ <- liftIO . forkIO $ do
threadDelay' delay
atomically $ whenM (readTVar waiting) $ void $ tryPutTMVar lock ()
atomically $ do
takeTMVar lock
writeTVar waiting False
nextRetryDelay :: Int64 -> Int64 -> RetryInterval -> Int64
nextRetryDelay elapsed delay RetryInterval {increaseAfter, maxInterval} =
+3 -1
View File
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ canAbortRcvSwitch ConnData {connAgentVersion} = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchSt
-- if switch is in RSReceivedMessage status, aborting switch (deleting new queue)
-- will break the connection because the sender would have original queue deleted
RSReceivedMessage -> False
RSReceivedQEND -> False
data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
{ -- | key pair to be used by the notification server to authorize transmissions
@@ -489,7 +490,8 @@ data PendingCommand = PendingCommand
corrId :: ACorrId,
userId :: UserId,
connId :: ConnId,
command :: AgentCommand
command :: AgentCommand,
createdAt :: UTCTime
}
data AgentCmdType = ACClient | ACInternal
+171 -43
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
getExpiredServiceConns,
deleteExpiredServiceRequests,
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds,
getConnRatchetSync,
setConnRatchetSync,
addProcessedRatchetKeyHash,
checkRatchetKeyHashExists,
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
setSndQueuePrimary,
deleteConnRcvQueue,
incRcvDeleteErrors,
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds,
deleteConnSndQueue,
getPrimaryRcvQueue,
getRcvQueue,
@@ -165,6 +167,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
createRatchet,
deleteRatchet,
getRatchet,
getRatchetVerifyCodes,
ratchetVerifyCodes,
getRatchetForUpdate,
getSkippedMsgKeys,
updateRatchet,
@@ -213,6 +217,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
-- Rcv files
createRcvFile,
createRcvFileRedirect,
startPreparedRcvFile,
lockRcvFileForUpdate,
getRcvFile,
getRcvFileByEntityId,
@@ -234,6 +239,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
getRcvFilesExpired,
-- Snd files
createSndFile,
startPreparedSndFile,
lockSndFileForUpdate,
getSndFile,
getSndFileByEntityId,
@@ -291,6 +297,7 @@ import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
import Data.Either (partitionEithers)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (foldl', sortBy)
@@ -757,6 +764,10 @@ incRcvDeleteErrors :: DB.Connection -> RcvQueue -> IO ()
incRcvDeleteErrors db RcvQueue {connId, dbQueueId} =
DB.execute db "UPDATE rcv_queues SET delete_errors = delete_errors + 1 WHERE conn_id = ? AND rcv_queue_id = ?" (connId, dbQueueId)
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getEndedRcvQueueConnIds db =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query db "SELECT conn_id FROM rcv_queues WHERE switch_status = ? AND deleted = 0" (Only RSReceivedQEND)
deleteConnRcvQueue :: DB.Connection -> RcvQueue -> IO ()
deleteConnRcvQueue db RcvQueue {connId, dbQueueId} =
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM rcv_queues WHERE conn_id = ? AND rcv_queue_id = ?" (connId, dbQueueId)
@@ -1249,7 +1260,7 @@ getLastMsg db connId msgId =
LEFT JOIN snd_messages s ON s.conn_id = r.conn_id AND s.rcpt_internal_id = r.internal_id
WHERE r.conn_id = ? AND r.broker_id = ?
|]
(connId, Binary msgId)
(connId, msgId)
toRcvMsg :: (Int64, InternalTs, BrokerId, BrokerTs) :. (AgentMsgId, MsgIntegrity, MsgHash, AgentMessageType, MsgBody, PQEncryption, Maybe AgentMsgId, Maybe MsgReceiptStatus, BoolInt) -> RcvMsg
toRcvMsg ((agentMsgId, internalTs, brokerId, brokerTs) :. (sndMsgId, integrity, internalHash, msgType, msgBody, pqEncryption, rcptInternalId_, rcptStatus_, BI userAck)) =
@@ -1281,7 +1292,7 @@ checkRcvMsgHashExists db connId hash =
getRcvMsgBrokerTs :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> SMP.MsgId -> IO (Either StoreError BrokerTs)
getRcvMsgBrokerTs db connId msgId =
firstRow fromOnly (SEMsgNotFound "getRcvMsgBrokerTs") $
DB.query db "SELECT broker_ts FROM rcv_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND broker_id = ?" (connId, Binary msgId)
DB.query db "SELECT broker_ts FROM rcv_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND broker_id = ?" (connId, msgId)
deleteMsg :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> InternalId -> IO ()
deleteMsg db connId msgId =
@@ -1474,9 +1485,11 @@ createSndRatchet db connId ratchetState (CR.AE2ERatchetParams s (CR.E2ERatchetPa
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO ratchets
(conn_id, ratchet_state, x3dh_pub_key_1, x3dh_pub_key_2, pq_pub_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
(conn_id, ratchet_state, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, x3dh_pub_key_1, x3dh_pub_key_2, pq_pub_kem) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (conn_id) DO UPDATE SET
ratchet_state = EXCLUDED.ratchet_state,
rc_verify_code_ad = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_ad,
rc_verify_code_pq = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_pq,
x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL,
x3dh_pub_key_1 = EXCLUDED.x3dh_pub_key_1,
@@ -1484,7 +1497,13 @@ createSndRatchet db connId ratchetState (CR.AE2ERatchetParams s (CR.E2ERatchetPa
pq_priv_kem = NULL,
pq_pub_kem = EXCLUDED.pq_pub_kem
|]
(connId, ratchetState, x3dhPubKey1, x3dhPubKey2, CR.ARKP s <$> pqPubKem)
((connId, ratchetState) :. verifyCodesRow (ratchetVerifyCodes ratchetState) :. (x3dhPubKey1, x3dhPubKey2, CR.ARKP s <$> pqPubKem))
ratchetVerifyCodes :: RatchetX448 -> ConnVerifyCodes
ratchetVerifyCodes CR.Ratchet {rcAD, rcVCPQ} = ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD = C.sha256Hash $ unStr rcAD, codePQ = unStr <$> rcVCPQ}
verifyCodesRow :: ConnVerifyCodes -> (Binary ByteString, Maybe (Binary ByteString))
verifyCodesRow ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD, codePQ} = (Binary codeAD, Binary <$> codePQ)
getSndRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> CR.VersionE2E -> IO (Either StoreError (RatchetX448, CR.AE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448))
getSndRatchet db connId v =
@@ -1505,10 +1524,12 @@ createRatchet db connId rc =
DB.execute
db
[sql|
INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, ratchet_state)
VALUES (?, ?)
INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id, ratchet_state, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT (conn_id) DO UPDATE SET
ratchet_state = ?,
ratchet_state = EXCLUDED.ratchet_state,
rc_verify_code_ad = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_ad,
rc_verify_code_pq = EXCLUDED.rc_verify_code_pq,
x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL,
x3dh_priv_key_2 = NULL,
x3dh_pub_key_1 = NULL,
@@ -1516,7 +1537,42 @@ createRatchet db connId rc =
pq_priv_kem = NULL,
pq_pub_kem = NULL
|]
(connId, rc, rc)
((connId, rc) :. verifyCodesRow (ratchetVerifyCodes rc))
getRatchetVerifyCodes :: DB.Connection -> [ConnId] -> IO (Map ConnId ConnVerifyCodes)
getRatchetVerifyCodes db connIds = do
(saved, computed) <- partitionEithers . mapMaybe rowCodes <$> selectCodes
stored <- saveCodes computed
pure $ M.fromList $ saved <> stored
where
rowCodes (connId, codeAD_, codePQ_, rc_) = case codeAD_ of
Just codeAD -> Just $ Left $ toCodes (connId, codeAD, codePQ_)
Nothing -> Right . (connId,) . ratchetVerifyCodes <$> rc_
toCodes (connId, Binary codeAD, codePQ_) = (connId, ConnVerifyCodes {codeAD, codePQ = fromBinary <$> codePQ_})
codesRow (connId, cs) = verifyCodesRow cs :. Only connId
codesQuery :: Query
codesQuery = "SELECT conn_id, rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, CASE WHEN rc_verify_code_ad IS NULL THEN ratchet_state END FROM ratchets"
selectCodes :: IO [(ConnId, Maybe (Binary ByteString), Maybe (Binary ByteString), Maybe RatchetX448)]
saveCodes :: [(ConnId, ConnVerifyCodes)] -> IO [(ConnId, ConnVerifyCodes)]
#if defined(dbPostgres)
selectCodes = DB.query db (codesQuery <> " WHERE conn_id IN ?") (Only (In connIds))
saveCodes cs =
map toCodes
<$> DB.returning
db
[sql|
UPDATE ratchets r
SET rc_verify_code_ad = COALESCE(r.rc_verify_code_ad, (upd.rc_verify_code_ad :: BYTEA)),
rc_verify_code_pq = CASE WHEN r.rc_verify_code_ad IS NULL THEN (upd.rc_verify_code_pq :: BYTEA) ELSE r.rc_verify_code_pq END
FROM (VALUES(?, ?, ?)) AS upd(rc_verify_code_ad, rc_verify_code_pq, conn_id)
WHERE r.conn_id = (upd.conn_id :: BYTEA)
RETURNING r.conn_id, r.rc_verify_code_ad, r.rc_verify_code_pq
|]
(map codesRow cs)
#else
selectCodes = concat <$> mapM (DB.query db (codesQuery <> " WHERE conn_id = ?") . Only) connIds
saveCodes cs = cs <$ unless (null cs) (DB.executeMany db "UPDATE ratchets SET rc_verify_code_ad = ?, rc_verify_code_pq = ? WHERE conn_id = ?" $ map codesRow cs)
#endif
deleteRatchet :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO ()
deleteRatchet db connId =
@@ -1544,12 +1600,16 @@ getRatchet_ q db connId =
where
ratchet = maybe (Left SERatchetNotFound) Right . fromOnly
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId =
skipped <$> DB.query db "SELECT header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
getSkippedMsgKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int -> IO SkippedMsgKeys
getSkippedMsgKeys db connId maxKeys = do
(keys, oldKeys) <- splitAt maxKeys <$> DB.query db "SELECT skipped_message_id, header_key, msg_n, msg_key FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? ORDER BY skipped_message_id DESC LIMIT ?" (connId, maxKeys + 1)
case oldKeys of
(skippedMsgId :: Int64, _, _, _) : _ -> DB.execute db "DELETE FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? AND skipped_message_id <= ?" (connId, skippedMsgId)
[] -> pure ()
pure $ skipped keys
where
skipped = foldl' addSkippedKey M.empty
addSkippedKey smks (hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
addSkippedKey smks (_, hk, msgN, mk) = M.alter (Just . addMsgKey) hk smks
where
addMsgKey = maybe (M.singleton msgN mk) (M.insert msgN mk)
@@ -1668,7 +1728,7 @@ getPendingServerCommand db connId srv_ = getWorkItem "command" getCmdId getComma
DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT c.corr_id, cs.user_id, c.command
SELECT c.corr_id, cs.user_id, c.command, c.created_at
FROM commands c
JOIN connections cs USING (conn_id)
WHERE c.command_id = ?
@@ -1676,7 +1736,7 @@ getPendingServerCommand db connId srv_ = getWorkItem "command" getCmdId getComma
(Only cmdId)
where
err = SEInternal $ "command " <> bshow cmdId <> " returned []"
pendingCommand (corrId, userId, command) = PendingCommand {cmdId, corrId, userId, connId, command}
pendingCommand (corrId, userId, command, createdAt) = PendingCommand {cmdId, corrId, userId, connId, command, createdAt}
markCommandFailed cmdId = DB.execute db "UPDATE commands SET failed = 1 WHERE command_id = ?" (Only cmdId)
updateCommandServer :: DB.Connection -> AsyncCmdId -> SMPServer -> IO (Either StoreError ())
@@ -2450,12 +2510,12 @@ getSubscriptionServers db onlyNeeded =
-- TODO [certs rcv] check index for getting queues with service present
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> Bool -> ServiceAssoc -> Int -> Maybe SMP.RecipientId -> IO [RcvQueueSub]
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId (SMPServer h p kh) onlyNeeded hasService limit cursor_ =
map toRcvQueueSub <$> case cursor_ of
getUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) onlyNeeded hasService limit cursor_ =
map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv) <$> case cursor_ of
Nothing -> DB.query db (q <> orderLimit) (userId, h, p, kh, limit)
Just cursor -> DB.query db (q <> " AND q.rcv_id > ? " <> orderLimit) (userId, h, p, kh, cursor, limit)
where
q = rcvQueueSubQuery <> toSubscribe <> " c.deleted = 0 AND q.deleted = 0 AND c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ?" <> serviceCond
q = serverRcvQueueSubQuery <> toSubscribe <> " c.deleted = 0 AND q.deleted = 0 AND c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ?" <> serviceCond
orderLimit = " ORDER BY q.rcv_id LIMIT ?"
toSubscribe
| onlyNeeded = " WHERE q.to_subscribe = 1 AND "
@@ -2468,7 +2528,7 @@ unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs :: DB.Connection -> UserId -> SMPServer -> IO [Rcv
unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) = do
deleteClientService db userId srv
#if defined(dbPostgres)
map toRcvQueueSub
map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv)
<$> DB.query
db
(removeRcvAssocsQuery <> " " <> returningColumns)
@@ -2476,15 +2536,15 @@ unassocUserServerRcvQueueSubs db userId srv@(SMPServer h p kh) = do
where
returningColumns =
[sql|
RETURNING c.user_id, rcv_queues.conn_id, rcv_queues.host, rcv_queues.port, COALESCE(rcv_queues.server_key_hash, s.key_hash),
RETURNING c.user_id, rcv_queues.conn_id,
rcv_queues.rcv_id, rcv_queues.rcv_private_key, rcv_queues.status, c.enable_ntfs, rcv_queues.client_notice_id,
rcv_queues.rcv_queue_id, rcv_queues.rcv_primary, rcv_queues.replace_rcv_queue_id
|]
#else
qs <- map toRcvQueueSub
qs <- map (toServerRcvQueueSub srv)
<$> DB.query
db
(rcvQueueSubQuery <> " WHERE c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ? AND q.rcv_service_assoc = 1")
(serverRcvQueueSubQuery <> " WHERE c.user_id = ? AND q.host = ? AND q.port = ? AND COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash) = ? AND q.rcv_service_assoc = 1")
(userId, h, p, kh)
DB.execute db removeRcvAssocsQuery (h, p, userId, kh)
pure qs
@@ -2743,6 +2803,11 @@ getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds :: DB.Connection -> IO [ConnId]
getDeletedWaitingDeliveryConnIds db =
map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT conn_id FROM connections WHERE deleted_at_wait_delivery IS NOT NULL"
getConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError RatchetSyncState)
getConnRatchetSync db connId =
firstRow fromOnly SEConnNotFound $
DB.query db "SELECT ratchet_sync_state FROM connections WHERE conn_id = ?" (Only connId)
setConnRatchetSync :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> RatchetSyncState -> IO ()
setConnRatchetSync db connId ratchetSyncState =
DB.execute db "UPDATE connections SET ratchet_sync_state = ? WHERE conn_id = ?" (ratchetSyncState, connId)
@@ -2764,21 +2829,35 @@ checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId hash =
(connId, Binary hash)
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired :: DB.Connection -> NominalDiffTime -> Int -> IO ()
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl limit = do
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db ttl maxConnHashes = do
cutoffTs <- addUTCTime (-ttl) <$> getCurrentTime
#if defined(dbPostgres)
DB.execute
db
[sql|
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE processed_ratchet_key_hash_id IN (
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE created_at < ?
ORDER BY created_at ASC
LIMIT ?
)
|]
(cutoffTs, limit)
("DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes h USING (" <> maxExcessIdsQuery <> ") e WHERE h.conn_id = e.conn_id AND h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= e.max_excess_id AND h.created_at < ?")
(maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes, cutoffTs)
#else
maxExcessIds <- DB.query db maxExcessIdsQuery (maxConnHashes, maxConnHashes)
DB.executeMany
db
"DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes WHERE conn_id = ? AND processed_ratchet_key_hash_id <= ? AND created_at < ?"
(map (\(connId :: ConnId, maxExcessId :: Int64) -> (connId, maxExcessId, cutoffTs)) maxExcessIds)
#endif
where
maxExcessIdsQuery :: Query
maxExcessIdsQuery =
[sql|
SELECT conn_id, (
SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes
WHERE conn_id = c.conn_id
ORDER BY processed_ratchet_key_hash_id DESC
LIMIT 1 OFFSET ?
) AS max_excess_id
FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes c
GROUP BY conn_id
HAVING COUNT(*) > ?
|]
-- | returns all connection queues, the first queue is the primary one
getRcvQueuesByConnId_ :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO (Maybe (NonEmpty RcvQueue))
@@ -2835,17 +2914,32 @@ getRcvQueueSubsByConnId_ db connId =
rcvQueueSubQuery :: Query
rcvQueueSubQuery =
[sql|
SELECT c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.host, q.port, COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash), q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
SELECT q.host, q.port, COALESCE(q.server_key_hash, s.key_hash), c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
q.rcv_queue_id, q.rcv_primary, q.replace_rcv_queue_id
FROM rcv_queues q
JOIN servers s ON q.host = s.host AND q.port = s.port
JOIN connections c ON q.conn_id = c.conn_id
|]
toRcvQueueSub :: (UserId, ConnId, NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash, SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey) :. (QueueStatus, Maybe BoolInt, Maybe NoticeId, Int64, BoolInt, Maybe Int64) -> RcvQueueSub
toRcvQueueSub ((userId, connId, host, port, keyHash, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey) :. (status, enableNtfs_, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, BI primary, dbReplaceQueueId)) =
serverRcvQueueSubQuery :: Query
serverRcvQueueSubQuery =
[sql|
SELECT c.user_id, q.conn_id, q.rcv_id, q.rcv_private_key, q.status, c.enable_ntfs, q.client_notice_id,
q.rcv_queue_id, q.rcv_primary, q.replace_rcv_queue_id
FROM rcv_queues q
JOIN servers s ON q.host = s.host AND q.port = s.port
JOIN connections c ON q.conn_id = c.conn_id
|]
type RcvQueueSubRow = (UserId, ConnId, SMP.RecipientId, SMP.RcvPrivateAuthKey) :. (QueueStatus, Maybe BoolInt, Maybe NoticeId, Int64, BoolInt, Maybe Int64)
toRcvQueueSub :: (NonEmpty TransportHost, ServiceName, C.KeyHash) :. RcvQueueSubRow -> RcvQueueSub
toRcvQueueSub ((host, port, keyHash) :. r) = toServerRcvQueueSub (SMPServer host port keyHash) r
toServerRcvQueueSub :: SMPServer -> RcvQueueSubRow -> RcvQueueSub
toServerRcvQueueSub server ((userId, connId, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey) :. (status, enableNtfs_, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, BI primary, dbReplaceQueueId)) =
let enableNtfs = maybe True unBI enableNtfs_
in RcvQueueSub {userId, connId, server = SMPServer host port keyHash, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey, status, enableNtfs, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, primary, dbReplaceQueueId}
in RcvQueueSub {userId, connId, server, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey, status, enableNtfs, clientNoticeId, dbQueueId, primary, dbReplaceQueueId}
getRcvQueueById :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> Int64 -> IO (Either StoreError RcvQueue)
getRcvQueueById db connId dbRcvId =
@@ -2946,7 +3040,7 @@ insertRcvMsgDetails_ db connId RcvQueue {dbQueueId} RcvMsgData {msgMeta, interna
VALUES
(?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)
|]
(connId, dbQueueId, internalRcvId, fst recipient, sndMsgId, Binary (fst broker), snd broker, Binary internalHash, Binary externalPrevSndHash, integrity)
(connId, dbQueueId, internalRcvId, fst recipient, sndMsgId, fst broker, snd broker, Binary internalHash, Binary externalPrevSndHash, integrity)
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO encrypted_rcv_message_hashes (conn_id, hash) VALUES (?,?)" (connId, Binary encryptedMsgHash)
updateRcvMsgHash :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> InternalRcvId -> MsgHash -> IO ()
@@ -3094,7 +3188,8 @@ createRcvFile db gVar userId fd@FileDescription {chunks} prefixPath tmpPath file
createRcvFileRedirect :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> FileDescription 'FRecipient -> FilePath -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> Bool -> IO (Either StoreError RcvFileId)
createRcvFileRedirect _ _ _ FileDescription {redirect = Nothing} _ _ _ _ _ _ = pure $ Left $ SEInternal "createRcvFileRedirect called without redirect"
createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redirectChunks, redirect = Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}} prefixPath redirectPath redirectFile dstPath dstFile approvedRelays = runExceptT $ do
(dstEntityId, dstId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId dummyDst prefixPath dstPath dstFile Nothing Nothing approvedRelays
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce gVar
(dstEntityId, dstId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId (dummyDst nonce) prefixPath dstPath dstFile Nothing Nothing approvedRelays
(_, redirectId) <- ExceptT $ insertRcvFile db gVar userId redirectFd prefixPath redirectPath redirectFile (Just dstId) (Just dstEntityId) approvedRelays
liftIO $
forM_ redirectChunks $ \fc@FileChunk {replicas} -> do
@@ -3102,7 +3197,7 @@ createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redire
forM_ (zip [1 ..] replicas) $ \(rno, replica) -> insertRcvFileChunkReplica db rno replica chunkId
pure dstEntityId
where
dummyDst =
dummyDst nonce =
FileDescription
{ party = SFRecipient,
size,
@@ -3110,11 +3205,34 @@ createRcvFileRedirect db gVar userId redirectFd@FileDescription {chunks = redire
redirect = Nothing,
-- updated later with updateRcvFileRedirect
key = C.unsafeSbKey $ B.replicate 32 '#',
nonce = C.cbNonce "",
nonce,
chunkSize = FileSize 0,
chunks = []
}
startPreparedRcvFile :: DB.Connection -> RcvFileId -> IO (Either StoreError [XFTPServer])
startPreparedRcvFile db rcvFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
rcvFileId <- ExceptT $ getRcvFileIdByEntityId_ db rcvFileEntityId
liftIO $ do
updatedAt <- getCurrentTime
DB.execute
db
"UPDATE rcv_files SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE (rcv_file_id = ? OR redirect_id = ?) AND status = ?"
(RFSReceiving, updatedAt, rcvFileId, rcvFileId, RFSPrepared)
map toXFTPServer
<$> DB.query
db
[sql|
SELECT DISTINCT
s.xftp_host, s.xftp_port, s.xftp_key_hash
FROM rcv_file_chunk_replicas r
JOIN xftp_servers s ON s.xftp_server_id = r.xftp_server_id
JOIN rcv_file_chunks c ON c.rcv_file_chunk_id = r.rcv_file_chunk_id
JOIN rcv_files f ON f.rcv_file_id = c.rcv_file_id
WHERE (f.rcv_file_id = ? OR f.redirect_id = ?) AND r.replica_number = 1
|]
(rcvFileId, rcvFileId)
insertRcvFile :: DB.Connection -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> UserId -> FileDescription 'FRecipient -> FilePath -> FilePath -> CryptoFile -> Maybe DBRcvFileId -> Maybe RcvFileId -> Bool -> IO (Either StoreError (RcvFileId, DBRcvFileId))
insertRcvFile db gVar userId FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, redirect} prefixPath tmpPath (CryptoFile savePath cfArgs) redirectId_ redirectEntityId_ approvedRelays = runExceptT $ do
let (redirectDigest_, redirectSize_) = case redirect of
@@ -3125,7 +3243,7 @@ insertRcvFile db gVar userId FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSiz
DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO rcv_files (rcv_file_entity_id, user_id, size, digest, key, nonce, chunk_size, prefix_path, tmp_path, save_path, save_file_key, save_file_nonce, status, redirect_id, redirect_entity_id, redirect_digest, redirect_size, approved_relays) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
((Binary rcvFileEntityId, userId, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, prefixPath, tmpPath) :. (savePath, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, RFSReceiving, redirectId_, Binary <$> redirectEntityId_, redirectDigest_, redirectSize_, BI approvedRelays))
((Binary rcvFileEntityId, userId, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, prefixPath, tmpPath) :. (savePath, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, RFSPrepared, redirectId_, Binary <$> redirectEntityId_, redirectDigest_, redirectSize_, BI approvedRelays))
rcvFileId <- liftIO $ insertedRowId db
pure (rcvFileEntityId, rcvFileId)
@@ -3430,13 +3548,23 @@ createSndFile db gVar userId (CryptoFile path cfArgs) numRecipients prefixPath k
DB.execute
db
"INSERT INTO snd_files (snd_file_entity_id, user_id, path, src_file_key, src_file_nonce, num_recipients, prefix_path, key, nonce, status, redirect_size, redirect_digest, storage_time) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
((Binary sndFileEntityId, userId, path, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, numRecipients) :. (prefixPath, key, nonce, SFSNew, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_, storageHours))
((Binary sndFileEntityId, userId, path, fileKey <$> cfArgs, fileNonce <$> cfArgs, numRecipients) :. (prefixPath, key, nonce, SFSPrepared, redirectSize_, redirectDigest_, storageHours))
where
(redirectSize_, redirectDigest_) =
case redirect_ of
Nothing -> (Nothing, Nothing)
Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest} -> (Just size, Just digest)
startPreparedSndFile :: DB.Connection -> SndFileId -> IO (Either StoreError ())
startPreparedSndFile db sndFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
sndFileId <- ExceptT $ getSndFileIdByEntityId_ db sndFileEntityId
liftIO $ do
updatedAt <- getCurrentTime
DB.execute
db
"UPDATE snd_files SET status = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE snd_file_id = ? AND status = ?"
(SFSNew, updatedAt, sndFileId, SFSPrepared)
getSndFileByEntityId :: DB.Connection -> SndFileId -> IO (Either StoreError SndFile)
getSndFileByEntityId db sndFileEntityId = runExceptT $ do
sndFileId <- ExceptT $ getSndFileIdByEntityId_ db sndFileEntityId
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.DB
execute,
execute_,
executeMany,
returning,
query,
query_,
blobFieldDecoder,
@@ -60,6 +61,10 @@ executeMany :: ToRow q => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO ()
executeMany db q qs = void $ PSQL.executeMany db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE executeMany #-}
returning :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO [r]
returning db q qs = PSQL.returning db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE returning #-}
query :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => PSQL.Connection -> Query -> q -> IO [r]
query db q qs = PSQL.query db q qs `E.catch` addSql q
{-# INLINE query #-}
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attem
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
@@ -29,7 +32,10 @@ schemaMigrations =
("20260410_receive_attempts", m20260410_receive_attempts, Just down_m20260410_receive_attempts),
("20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
("20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
("20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement)
("20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
("20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
("20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes),
("20261008_rcv_switch_status", m20261008_rcv_switch_status, Just down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes :: Text
m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes =
[r|
ALTER TABLE ratchets ADD COLUMN rc_verify_code_ad BYTEA;
ALTER TABLE ratchets ADD COLUMN rc_verify_code_pq BYTEA;
|]
down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes :: Text
down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes =
[r|
ALTER TABLE ratchets DROP COLUMN rc_verify_code_pq;
ALTER TABLE ratchets DROP COLUMN rc_verify_code_ad;
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id, skipped_message_id);
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
WHERE EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|]
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Text
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[r|
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
DROP INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id;
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON skipped_messages(conn_id);
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Text
m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[r|
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
|]
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Text
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[r|
UPDATE rcv_queues SET switch_status = NULL WHERE switch_status = 'received_qend';
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status;
|]
@@ -448,7 +448,9 @@ CREATE TABLE smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.ratchets (
x3dh_pub_key_1 bytea,
x3dh_pub_key_2 bytea,
pq_priv_kem bytea,
pq_pub_kem bytea
pq_pub_kem bytea,
rc_verify_code_ad bytea,
rc_verify_code_pq bytea
);
@@ -1167,11 +1169,15 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_ntf_tokens_ntf_host_ntf_port ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_created_at ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (created_at);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.processed_ratchet_key_hashes USING btree (conn_id, hash);
@@ -1227,6 +1233,10 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_ntf ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_que
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_queues USING btree (switch_status);
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_to_subscribe ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.rcv_queues USING btree (to_subscribe);
@@ -1239,7 +1249,7 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_server_certs_user_id_host_port ON smp_agent_test_protoco
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id);
CREATE INDEX idx_skipped_messages_conn_id ON smp_agent_test_protocol_schema.skipped_messages USING btree (conn_id, skipped_message_id);
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ withTransaction st = withTransactionPriority st False
{-# INLINE withTransaction #-}
withTransactionPriority :: DBStore -> Bool -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withTransactionPriority st priority action = withConnectionPriority st priority $ dbBusyLoop . transaction
withTransactionPriority st@DBStore {dbClosed} priority action = withConnectionPriority st priority $ \db ->
ifM (readTVarIO dbClosed) (fail "withTransaction: database closed") (dbBusyLoop $ transaction db)
where
transaction db@DB.Connection {conn} = SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempt
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260411_service_certs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260712_address_dr_rpc
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260823_snd_files_entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261005_commands_autoincrement
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..))
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Query, Maybe Query)]
@@ -101,7 +105,11 @@ schemaMigrations =
("m20260410_receive_attempts", m20260410_receive_attempts, Just down_m20260410_receive_attempts),
("m20260411_service_certs", m20260411_service_certs, Just down_m20260411_service_certs),
("m20260712_address_dr_rpc", m20260712_address_dr_rpc, Just down_m20260712_address_dr_rpc),
("m20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement)
("m20260823_snd_files_entitlement", m20260823_snd_files_entitlement, Just down_m20260823_snd_files_entitlement),
("m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes", m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes, Just down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes),
("m20260929_ratchet_indexes", m20260929_ratchet_indexes, Just down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes),
("m20261005_commands_autoincrement", m20261005_commands_autoincrement, Just down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement),
("m20261008_rcv_switch_status", m20261008_rcv_switch_status, Just down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260919_ratchet_verify_codes where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes :: Query
m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE ratchets ADD COLUMN rc_verify_code_ad BLOB;
ALTER TABLE ratchets ADD COLUMN rc_verify_code_pq BLOB;
|]
down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes :: Query
down_m20260919_ratchet_verify_codes =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE ratchets DROP COLUMN rc_verify_code_pq;
ALTER TABLE ratchets DROP COLUMN rc_verify_code_ad;
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260929_ratchet_indexes where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
-- idx_skipped_messages_conn_id is not changed: SQLite index entries include rowid (skipped_message_id)
m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[sql|
DELETE FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes AS h
WHERE EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes d
WHERE d.conn_id = h.conn_id AND d.hash = h.hash AND d.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id < h.processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, processed_ratchet_key_hash_id);
|]
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes :: Query
down_m20260929_ratchet_indexes =
[sql|
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id;
DROP INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash;
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(conn_id, hash);
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261005_commands_autoincrement where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20261005_commands_autoincrement :: Query
m20261005_commands_autoincrement =
[sql|
INSERT INTO sqlite_sequence (name, seq)
SELECT 'commands', MAX(ROWID) FROM commands;
PRAGMA writable_schema=1;
UPDATE sqlite_master SET sql = replace(sql, 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,', 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,')
WHERE name = 'commands' AND type = 'table';
PRAGMA writable_schema=RESET;
|]
down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement :: Query
down_m20261005_commands_autoincrement =
[sql|
DELETE FROM sqlite_sequence WHERE name = 'commands';
PRAGMA writable_schema=1;
UPDATE sqlite_master SET sql = replace(sql, 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,', 'command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,')
WHERE name = 'commands' AND type = 'table';
PRAGMA writable_schema=RESET;
|]
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20261008_rcv_switch_status where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Query
m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[sql|
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
|]
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status :: Query
down_m20261008_rcv_switch_status =
[sql|
UPDATE rcv_queues SET switch_status = NULL WHERE switch_status = 'received_qend';
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status;
|]
@@ -182,7 +182,9 @@ CREATE TABLE ratchets(
x3dh_pub_key_1 BLOB,
x3dh_pub_key_2 BLOB,
pq_priv_kem BLOB,
pq_pub_kem BLOB
pq_pub_kem BLOB,
rc_verify_code_ad BLOB,
rc_verify_code_pq BLOB
) WITHOUT ROWID, STRICT;
CREATE TABLE skipped_messages(
skipped_message_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@ CREATE TABLE ntf_subscriptions(
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID, STRICT;
CREATE TABLE commands(
command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
command_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
host TEXT,
port TEXT,
@@ -259,6 +261,7 @@ CREATE TABLE commands(
FOREIGN KEY(host, port) REFERENCES servers
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) STRICT;
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq);
CREATE TABLE snd_message_deliveries(
snd_message_delivery_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
@@ -267,7 +270,6 @@ CREATE TABLE snd_message_deliveries(
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
FOREIGN KEY(conn_id, internal_id) REFERENCES messages ON DELETE CASCADE DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) STRICT;
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq);
CREATE TABLE users(
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
,
@@ -571,10 +573,6 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes_hash ON encrypted_rcv_message_hash
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_messages_rcpt_internal_id ON snd_messages(
conn_id,
rcpt_internal_id
@@ -639,6 +637,15 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_connections_deleted ON connections(deleted);
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_service_request_expires_at ON connections(
service_request_expires_at
);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
hash
);
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_conn_id ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
conn_id,
processed_ratchet_key_hash_id
);
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_switch_status ON rcv_queues(switch_status);
CREATE TRIGGER tr_rcv_queue_insert
AFTER INSERT ON rcv_queues
FOR EACH ROW
+30 -21
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
enableSMPQueuesNtfs,
disableSMPQueuesNtfs,
sendSMPMessage,
QueueDrained,
ackSMPMessage,
suspendSMPQueue,
deleteSMPQueue,
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
transportHost :: TransportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
tcpTimeout :: NetworkTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
sendPings :: TVar Bool,
lastReceived :: TVar UTCTime,
timeoutErrorCount :: TVar Int,
@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
transportHost = "localhost",
tcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
timeoutErrorCount,
@@ -477,6 +480,7 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
serviceCredentials :: Maybe ServiceCredentials,
-- | client-server protocol version range
serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
proxiedRelayVRange :: VersionRange v,
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy for additional encryption layer)
agreeSecret :: Bool,
-- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server. See comment in ClientHandshake
@@ -495,6 +499,7 @@ defaultClientConfig clientALPN useSNI serverVRange =
clientALPN,
serviceCredentials = Nothing,
serverVRange,
proxiedRelayVRange = serverVRange,
agreeSecret = False,
proxyServer = False,
useSNI
@@ -505,6 +510,7 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion
defaultSMPClientConfig =
(defaultClientConfig (Just alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes) False supportedClientSMPRelayVRange)
{ defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS),
proxiedRelayVRange = supportedClientSMPRelayVRange,
agreeSecret = True
}
{-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
@@ -568,7 +574,7 @@ type SMPTransportSession = TransportSession BrokerMsg
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> NetworkRequestMode -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> [HostName] -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmissionBatch v err msg)) -> UTCTime -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, clientALPN, serviceCredentials, serverVRange, proxiedRelayVRange, agreeSecret, proxyServer, useSNI} presetDomains msgQ proxySessTs disconnected = do
case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
Right useHost ->
(getCurrentTime >>= mkProtocolClient useHost >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
@@ -593,6 +599,7 @@ getProtocolClient g nm transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qS
transportHost,
tcpConnectTimeout,
tcpTimeout,
proxiedRelayVRange,
sendPings,
lastReceived,
timeoutErrorCount,
@@ -1081,15 +1088,17 @@ resolvedNameOrNotFound d NameResponse {registration} = case registration of
NRRegistered {nameRecord} -> T.toLower (nrName nameRecord) == fullDomainName d
_ -> True
type QueueDrained = Bool
-- | Acknowledge message delivery (server deletes the message).
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#acknowledge-message-delivery
-- This command is always sent in background request mode
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO QueueDrained
ackSMPMessage c rpKey rId msgId =
sendSMPCommand c NRMBackground (Just rpKey) rId (ACK msgId) >>= \case
OK -> return ()
cmd@MSG {} -> liftIO $ writeSMPMessage c rId cmd
OK -> pure True
cmd@MSG {} -> liftIO (writeSMPMessage c rId cmd) $> False
r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
-- | Irreversibly suspend SMP queue.
@@ -1115,10 +1124,10 @@ deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
connectSMPProxiedRelay :: SMPClient -> NetworkRequestMode -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ProxiedRelay
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
connectSMPProxiedRelay c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, proxiedRelayVRange}} nm relayServ@ProtocolServer {port = relayPort, keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
sendProtocolCommand_ c nm Nothing tOut Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxiedClient (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth)) >>= \case
PKEY sId vr (CertChainPubKey chain key) ->
case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
case proxiedRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
Nothing -> throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
Just (Compatible v) -> do
relayKey <- liftEitherWith (const $ transportErr $ TEHandshake IDENTITY) =<< liftIO (runExceptT $ validateRelay chain key)
@@ -1169,7 +1178,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ProxyClientError where
-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
-- this method is used in the client
-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-- receives PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-- When client sends message via proxy, there may be one successful scenario and 9 error scenarios
-- as shown below (WTF stands for unexpected response, ??? for response that failed to parse).
@@ -1222,20 +1231,20 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
-- encode
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd (sParty @p) command)
-- serviceAuth is False here – proxied commands are not used with service certificates
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth False spKey nonce tForAuth
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth False spKey (Just nonce) tForAuth
b <- case batchTransmissions serverThParams [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
[] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e
TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedTLength
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret (encTransmissionNonce v nonce) b paddedProxiedTLength
-- proxy interaction errors are wrapped
let tOut = Just $ 2 * netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout nm
tryE (sendProtocolCommand_ c nm (Just nonce) tOut Nothing (EntityId sessionId) (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD v cmdPubKey et))) >>= \case
Right r -> case r of
PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse er) -> do
-- server interaction errors are thrown directly
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce nonce) nonce_) er
case tParse serverThParams t' of
t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeClient serverThParams t'' of
(_, _, cmd) -> case cmd of
@@ -1253,10 +1262,10 @@ proxySMPCommand c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {c
-- this method is used in the proxy
-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
-- receives RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
-- Always uses background timeout mode
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
forwardSMPTransmission :: SMPClient -> C.CorrCbNonce -> VersionSMP -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe C.CbNonce, EncResponse)
forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdVersion fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
-- prepare params
sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
@@ -1268,11 +1277,11 @@ forwardSMPTransmission c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorr
eft = EncFwdTransmission $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT)
-- send
sendProtocolCommand_ c NRMBackground (Just nonce) Nothing Nothing NoEntity (Cmd SProxyService (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
-- unwrap
r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
pure fwdResponse
pure (nonce_, fwdResponse)
r -> throwE $ unexpectedResponse r
-- get queue information - always sent interactively
@@ -1394,7 +1403,7 @@ mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => ProtocolClient v err
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (entityId, pKey_, command) = do
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entityId, command)
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) (useServiceAuth command) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) (useServiceAuth command) pKey_ (Just nonce) tForAuth
r <- mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
where
@@ -1413,14 +1422,14 @@ mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentC
atomically $ TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
pure r
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Bool -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TAuthorizations)
authTransmission thAuth serviceAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Bool -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TAuthorizations)
authTransmission thAuth serviceAuth pKey_ nonce_ t = traverse authenticate pKey_
where
authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TAuthorizations
authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = (,serviceSig) <$> case a of
C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t'
Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
C.SX25519 -> case (thAuth, nonce_) of
(Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k}, Just nonce) -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t'
_ -> Left TENoServerAuth
C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
C.SEd448 -> sign pk
-- When command is signed by both entity key and service key,
+58 -27
View File
@@ -140,8 +140,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
gcmIV,
-- * NaCl crypto_box
CbNonce (unCbNonce),
CbNonceI (..),
CbNonce,
pattern CbNonce,
CorrCbNonce,
cbEncrypt,
cbEncryptNoPad,
cbEncryptMaxLenBS,
@@ -152,8 +154,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
sbEncryptNoPad,
sbDecryptNoPad,
cbNonce,
unsafeCbNonce,
corrCbNonce,
randomCbNonce,
reverseNonce,
xorNonce,
toCbNonce,
-- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
SbKey (unSbKey),
@@ -232,6 +238,7 @@ import Data.ASN1.Types
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
import Data.Bits (xor)
import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (decode)
@@ -254,7 +261,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (.
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll, parseString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (packZipWith, (<$?>))
-- | Cryptographic algorithms.
data Algorithm = Ed25519 | Ed448 | X25519 | X448
@@ -931,6 +938,8 @@ data CryptoError
CERatchetEarlierMessage Word32
| -- | duplicate message number
CERatchetDuplicateMessage
| -- | KEM key generation failed, indicating a broken RNG
CryptoKEMKeyGenError
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
aesKeySize :: Int
@@ -1045,9 +1054,7 @@ md5Hash = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest MD5)
-- | AEAD-GCM encryption with associated data.
--
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
encryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> Int -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AuthTag, ByteString)
encryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes paddedLen ad msg = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -1067,10 +1074,7 @@ encryptAEADNoPad aesKey ivBytes ad msg = do
-- | AEAD-GCM decryption with associated data.
--
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption.
-- This function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- To make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to start using initAEADGCM.
-- Used as part of double ratchet encryption, with a 16-byte IV (see @initAEAD@).
decryptAEAD :: Key -> IV -> ByteString -> ByteString -> AuthTag -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
decryptAEAD aesKey ivBytes ad msg (AuthTag authTag) = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -1148,9 +1152,9 @@ maxLength :: forall i. KnownNat i => Int
maxLength = fromIntegral (natVal $ Proxy @i)
{-# INLINE maxLength #-}
-- this function requires 16 bytes IV, it transforms IV in cryptonite_aes_gcm_init here:
-- https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/blob/master/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c
-- This is used for double ratchet encryption, so to make it compatible with WebCrypto we will need to deprecate it and start using initAEADGCM
-- The 16-byte double ratchet IV is intentionally not the 96-bit IV recommended by NIST SP 800-38D, so GCM derives J0 = GHASH(IV || 0^64 || [128]_64),
-- as in crypton_aes_gcm_init: https://hackage.haskell.org/package/crypton-0.34/src/cbits/crypton_aes.c
-- WebCrypto and other SP 800-38D implementations interoperate only when given all 16 IV bytes.
initAEAD :: forall c. AES.BlockCipher c => Key -> IV -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AES.AEAD c)
initAEAD (Key aesKey) (IV ivBytes) = do
iv <- makeIV @c ivBytes
@@ -1327,8 +1331,8 @@ sbEncryptNoPad (SbKey key) (CbNonce nonce) = cryptoBox key nonce
{-# INLINE sbEncryptNoPad #-}
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
cbEncryptMaxLenBS :: KnownNat i => DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> MaxLenBS i -> ByteString
cbEncryptMaxLenBS (DhSecretX25519 secret) (CbNonce nonce) = cryptoBox secret nonce . unMaxLenBS . padMaxLenBS
cbEncryptMaxLenBS :: (KnownNat i, CbNonceI n) => DhSecret X25519 -> n -> MaxLenBS i -> ByteString
cbEncryptMaxLenBS (DhSecretX25519 secret) nonce = cryptoBox secret (unCbNonce nonce) . unMaxLenBS . padMaxLenBS
{-# INLINE cbEncryptMaxLenBS #-}
cryptoBox :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString
@@ -1338,8 +1342,8 @@ cryptoBox secret nonce s = BA.convert tag <> c
tag = Poly1305.auth rs c
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
cbDecrypt :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
cbDecrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecrypt_ secret
cbDecrypt :: CbNonceI n => DhSecret X25519 -> n -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
cbDecrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecrypt_ secret . toCbNonce
{-# INLINE cbDecrypt #-}
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce (without unpadding).
@@ -1386,9 +1390,16 @@ cbAuthenticate k pk nonce msg = CbAuthenticator $ cbEncryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonc
cbVerify :: PublicKeyX25519 -> PrivateKeyX25519 -> CbNonce -> CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
cbVerify k pk nonce (CbAuthenticator s) authorized = cbDecryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonce s == Right (sha512Hash authorized)
newtype CbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce {unCbNonce :: ByteString}
class CbNonceI n where
unCbNonce :: n -> ByteString
newtype CbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving newtype (FromField)
instance CbNonceI CbNonce where
unCbNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = s
instance FromField CbNonce where fromField = blobFieldDecoder cbNonce
instance ToField CbNonce where toField (CryptoBoxNonce s) = toField $ Binary s
@@ -1399,7 +1410,7 @@ pattern CbNonce s <- CryptoBoxNonce s
instance StrEncoding CbNonce where
strEncode (CbNonce s) = strEncode s
strP = cbNonce <$> strP
strP = cbNonce <$?> strP
instance ToJSON CbNonce where
toJSON = strToJSON
@@ -1408,13 +1419,16 @@ instance ToJSON CbNonce where
instance FromJSON CbNonce where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "CbNonce"
cbNonce :: ByteString -> CbNonce
cbNonce :: ByteString -> Either String CbNonce
cbNonce s
| len == 24 = CryptoBoxNonce s
| len > 24 = CryptoBoxNonce . fst $ B.splitAt 24 s
| otherwise = CryptoBoxNonce $ s <> B.replicate (24 - len) (toEnum 0)
where
len = B.length s
| B.length s == 24 = Right $ CryptoBoxNonce s
| otherwise = Left "CbNonce: invalid length"
unsafeCbNonce :: ByteString -> CbNonce
unsafeCbNonce s = either error id $ cbNonce s
corrCbNonce :: ByteString -> Either String CorrCbNonce
corrCbNonce s = CorrCbNonce . unCbNonce <$> cbNonce s
randomCbNonce :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM CbNonce
randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
@@ -1422,13 +1436,30 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
reverseNonce :: CbNonceI n => n -> CbNonce
reverseNonce = CryptoBoxNonce . B.reverse . unCbNonce
xorNonce :: CbNonceI n => ByteString -> n -> CbNonce
xorNonce s nonce = CryptoBoxNonce $ packZipWith xor s n <> B.drop (B.length s) n
where
n = unCbNonce nonce
toCbNonce :: CbNonceI n => n -> CbNonce
toCbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce . unCbNonce
instance Encoding CbNonce where
smpEncode = unCbNonce
smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24
newtype CorrCbNonce = CorrCbNonce ByteString
instance CbNonceI CorrCbNonce where
unCbNonce (CorrCbNonce s) = s
instance Encoding CorrCbNonce where
smpEncode = smpEncode . unCbNonce
smpP = corrCbNonce <$?> smpP
newtype SbKey = SecretBoxKey {unSbKey :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
deriving newtype (FromField)
+23 -10
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
rcEncryptHeader,
rcEncryptMsg,
rcDecrypt,
maxSkippedMsgKeys,
-- used in tests
MsgHeader (..),
RatchetInitParams (..),
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (($>>=), (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
import UnliftIO.STM
@@ -327,9 +328,13 @@ instance StrEncoding AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri where
Nothing -> pure $ AnyE2ERatchetParamsUri SRKSProposed a $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vr k1 k2 Nothing
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
where
kemP query =
queryParam_ "kem_key" query
$>>= \k -> Just . kemParams k <$> queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
kemP query = do
k_ <- queryParam_ "kem_key" query
ct_ <- queryParam_ "kem_ct" query
case (k_, ct_) of
(Just k, _) -> pure $ Just $ kemParams k ct_
(Nothing, Nothing) -> pure Nothing
(Nothing, Just _) -> fail "bad e2e params: kem_ct without kem_key"
kemParams k = \case
Nothing -> ARKP SRKSProposed $ RKParamsProposed k
Just ct -> ARKP SRKSAccepted $ RKParamsAccepted ct k
@@ -451,6 +456,7 @@ generateSndE2EParams g v = \case
data RatchetInitParams = RatchetInitParams
{ assocData :: Str,
rcVerifyCodePQ :: Str,
ratchetKey :: RatchetKey,
sndHK :: HeaderKey,
rcvNextHK :: HeaderKey,
@@ -493,14 +499,14 @@ pqX3dhRcv (rpk1, rpk2, rpKem_) (E2ERatchetParams _ sk1 sk2 sKem_) = do
pqX3dh :: DhAlgorithm a => (PublicKey a, PublicKey a) -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> Maybe RatchetKEMAccepted -> RatchetInitParams
pqX3dh (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 kemAccepted =
RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey = RatchetKey sk, sndHK = Key hk, rcvNextHK = Key nhk, kemAccepted}
RatchetInitParams {assocData, rcVerifyCodePQ = Str vcPQ, ratchetKey = RatchetKey sk, sndHK = Key hk, rcvNextHK = Key nhk, kemAccepted}
where
assocData = Str $ pubKeyBytes sk1 <> pubKeyBytes rk1
dhs = dhBytes' dh1 <> dhBytes' dh2 <> dhBytes' dh3 <> pq
pq = maybe "" (\RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRss = KEMSharedKey ss} -> BA.convert ss) kemAccepted
(hk, nhk, sk) =
let salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
(hk, nhk, sk) = hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
vcPQ = hkdf salt dhs "SimpleXVerifyCode" 32
type RatchetX448 = Ratchet 'X448
@@ -509,6 +515,8 @@ data Ratchet a = Ratchet
rcVersion :: RatchetVersions,
-- associated data - must be the same in both parties ratchets
rcAD :: Str,
-- verification code covering all handshake keys, absent in the ratchets created before it was added
rcVCPQ :: Maybe Str,
rcDHRs :: PrivateKey a,
rcKEM :: Maybe RatchetKEM,
rcSupportKEM :: PQSupport, -- defines header size, can only be enabled once
@@ -637,13 +645,14 @@ instance FromField MessageKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder smpDecode
-- @
initSndRatchet ::
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => RatchetVersions -> PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair) -> Ratchet a
initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) = do
initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, rcVerifyCodePQ, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) = do
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(SK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr) || state.PQRss)
let (rcRK, rcCKs, rcNHKs) = rootKdf ratchetKey rcDHRr rcDHRs (rcPQRss <$> kemAccepted)
pqOn = isJust rcPQRs_
in Ratchet
{ rcVersion,
rcAD = assocData,
rcVCPQ = Just rcVerifyCodePQ,
rcDHRs,
rcKEM = (`RatchetKEM` kemAccepted) <$> rcPQRs_,
rcSupportKEM = PQSupport pqOn,
@@ -668,10 +677,11 @@ initSndRatchet rcVersion rcDHRr rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey
-- as part of the connection request and random salt was received from the sender.
initRcvRatchet ::
forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => RatchetVersions -> PrivateKey a -> (RatchetInitParams, Maybe KEMKeyPair) -> PQSupport -> Ratchet a
initRcvRatchet rcVersion rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) pqSupport =
initRcvRatchet rcVersion rcDHRs (RatchetInitParams {assocData, rcVerifyCodePQ, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, rcPQRs_) pqSupport =
Ratchet
{ rcVersion,
rcAD = assocData,
rcVCPQ = Just rcVerifyCodePQ,
rcDHRs,
-- rcKEM:
-- state.PQRs = bob_pq_kem_key_pair
@@ -953,6 +963,9 @@ type DecryptResult a = (Either CryptoError ByteString, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgDiff
maxSkip :: Word32
maxSkip = 512
maxSkippedMsgKeys :: Int
maxSkippedMsgKeys = 2000
rcDecrypt ::
forall a.
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
) where
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Exception (throwIO)
import Control.Monad (when)
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap)
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (FromField (..), ToField (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (rngFuncPtr, withDRG)
@@ -55,14 +58,13 @@ pattern KEMSharedKey s <- KEMSharedKey_ s
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
sntrup761Keypair :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO KEMKeyPair
sntrup761Keypair drg =
bimap KEMPublicKey_ KEMSecretKey
<$> BA.allocRet
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE
( \skPtr ->
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
)
sntrup761Keypair drg = do
((r, pk), sk) <-
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE $ \skPtr ->
BA.allocRet c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
withDRG drg $ \cxtPtr -> c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr cxtPtr rngFuncPtr
when (r /= 0) $ throwIO C.CryptoKEMKeyGenError
pure (KEMPublicKey_ pk, KEMSecretKey sk)
sntrup761Enc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> KEMPublicKey -> IO (KEMCiphertext, KEMSharedKey)
sntrup761Enc drg (KEMPublicKey pk) =
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import Foreign
import Foreign.C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGContext, RNGFunc)
-- void sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
-- int sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_keypair"
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO CInt
-- void sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_enc"
+5 -3
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.ShortLink
encodeSignUserData,
newOwnerAuth,
encryptLinkData,
encryptFixedData,
encryptUserData,
decryptLinkData,
)
@@ -84,9 +85,10 @@ newOwnerAuth g ownerId signingKey = do
pure (ownerPrivKey, OwnerAuth {ownerId, ownerKey, authOwnerSig})
encryptLinkData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> (ByteString, ByteString) -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO QueueLinkData
encryptLinkData g k = bimapM (encrypt fixedDataPaddedLength) (encrypt userDataPaddedLength)
where
encrypt len = encryptData g k len
encryptLinkData g k = bimapM (encryptFixedData g k) (encryptUserData g k)
encryptFixedData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> ByteString -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO EncDataBytes
encryptFixedData g k s = encryptData g k fixedDataPaddedLength s
encryptUserData :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.SbKey -> ByteString -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO EncDataBytes
encryptUserData g k s = encryptData g k userDataPaddedLength s
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
SET statement_timeout = 0;
SET lock_timeout = 0;
SET idle_in_transaction_session_timeout = 0;
@@ -312,3 +313,4 @@ ALTER TABLE ONLY ntf_server.subscriptions
+85 -41
View File
@@ -145,7 +145,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
RcvNtfDhSecret,
Message (..),
RcvMessage (..),
MsgId,
MsgId (unMsgId),
mkMsgId,
unsafeMsgId,
randomMsgId,
MsgBody,
IdsHash (..),
ServiceSub (..),
@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
EncFwdTransmission (..),
EncResponse (..),
EncTransmission (..),
encTransmissionNonce,
FwdResponse (..),
FwdTransmission (..),
NameRecord (..),
@@ -232,8 +236,10 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Concurrent.STM (STM, TVar)
import Control.Exception (Exception, SomeException, displayException, fromException)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
@@ -241,6 +247,7 @@ import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser, (<?>))
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
import Data.Bits (xor)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import qualified Data.ByteString as BS
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64 as B64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
@@ -267,7 +274,7 @@ import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Network.TLS as TLS
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB (Binary (..), FromField (..), ToField (..), blobFieldDecoder)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
@@ -701,19 +708,24 @@ instance Encoding NewNtfCreds where
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
encTransmissionNonce :: C.CbNonceI n => VersionSMP -> n -> C.CbNonce
encTransmissionNonce v nonce
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = C.xorNonce (smpEncode v) nonce
| otherwise = C.toCbNonce nonce
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
{ fwdCorrId :: C.CorrCbNonce,
fwdVersion :: VersionSMP,
fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
}
instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
smpEncode (corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t)
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
smpEncode (fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
(fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
deriving (Show)
@@ -736,8 +748,8 @@ data BrokerMsg where
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
-- Should include certificate chain
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> CertChainPubKey -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
RRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
PRES :: Maybe C.CbNonce -> EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
END :: BrokerMsg
ENDS :: Int64 -> IdsHash -> BrokerMsg
DELD :: BrokerMsg
@@ -759,16 +771,16 @@ newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
{ fwdCorrId :: C.CorrCbNonce,
fwdResponse :: EncResponse
}
instance Encoding FwdResponse where
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
smpEncode (fwdCorrId, Tail t)
smpP = do
(corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
(fwdCorrId, Tail t) <- smpP
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
deriving (Eq, Show)
@@ -791,7 +803,7 @@ toMsgInfo = \case
Message {msgId, msgTs} -> msgInfo msgId msgTs MTMessage
MessageQuota {msgId, msgTs} -> msgInfo msgId msgTs MTQuota
where
msgInfo msgId msgTs msgType = MsgInfo {msgId = decodeLatin1 $ B64.encode msgId, msgTs = systemToUTCTime msgTs, msgType}
msgInfo msgId msgTs msgType = MsgInfo {msgId = decodeLatin1 $ B64.encode $ unMsgId msgId, msgTs = systemToUTCTime msgTs, msgType}
messageId :: Message -> MsgId
messageId = \case
@@ -1323,7 +1335,10 @@ instance ProtocolTypeI p => FromJSON (ProtocolServer p) where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "ProtocolServer"
newtype BasicAuth = BasicAuth {unBasicAuth :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
deriving (Ord, Show)
instance Eq BasicAuth where
BasicAuth s == BasicAuth s' = BA.constEq s s'
instance IsString BasicAuth where fromString = BasicAuth . B.pack
@@ -1489,7 +1504,34 @@ type RcvNtfPublicDhKey = C.PublicKeyX25519
type RcvNtfDhSecret = C.DhSecretX25519
-- | SMP message server ID.
type MsgId = ByteString
newtype MsgId = MsgId {unMsgId :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance C.CbNonceI MsgId where
unCbNonce (MsgId s) = B.take 24 s
instance Encoding MsgId where
smpEncode (MsgId s) = smpEncode s
smpP = mkMsgId <$?> smpP
instance StrEncoding MsgId where
strEncode (MsgId s) = strEncode s
strP = mkMsgId <$?> strP
instance FromField MsgId where fromField = blobFieldDecoder mkMsgId
instance ToField MsgId where toField (MsgId s) = toField $ Binary s
mkMsgId :: ByteString -> Either String MsgId
mkMsgId s
| B.length s >= 24 = Right $ MsgId s
| otherwise = Left "MsgId: invalid length"
unsafeMsgId :: ByteString -> MsgId
unsafeMsgId s = either error id $ mkMsgId s
randomMsgId :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM MsgId
randomMsgId n = fmap MsgId . C.randomBytes (max 24 n)
-- | SMP message body.
type MsgBody = ByteString
@@ -1814,8 +1856,7 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
encodeProtocol v = \case
NEW NewQueueReq {rcvAuthKey = rKey, rcvDhKey = dhKey, auth_, subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds}
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds)
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData)
| otherwise -> new <> e (subMode, senderCanSecure (queueReqMode <$> queueReqData))
| otherwise -> new <> e (subMode, queueReqData)
where
new = e (NEW_, ' ', rKey, dhKey, auth_)
SUB -> e SUB_
@@ -1902,20 +1943,18 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
CT SCreator NEW_ -> Cmd SCreator <$> newCmd
where
newCmd
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion = new smpP smpP
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion = new smpP nothing
| otherwise = new (qReq <$> smpP) nothing
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion = new smpP
| otherwise = new nothing
where
nothing = pure Nothing
new p2 p3 = NEW <$> do
new p3 = NEW <$> do
rcvAuthKey <- _smpP
rcvDhKey <- smpP
auth_ <- smpP
subMode <- smpP
queueReqData <- p2
queueReqData <- smpP
ntfCreds <- p3
pure NewQueueReq {rcvAuthKey, rcvDhKey, auth_, subMode, queueReqData, ntfCreds}
qReq sndSecure = Just $ if sndSecure then QRMessaging Nothing else QRContact Nothing
CT SRecipient tag ->
Cmd SRecipient <$> case tag of
SUB_ -> pure SUB
@@ -1966,8 +2005,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
IDS QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh, queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds}
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds)
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId, serviceId)
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId)
| otherwise -> ids <> e (senderCanSecure queueMode)
| otherwise -> ids <> e (queueMode, linkId)
where
ids = e (IDS_, ' ', rcvId, sndId, srvDh)
LNK sId d -> e (LNK_, ' ', sId, d)
@@ -1981,8 +2019,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
PKEY sid vr certKey -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, certKey)
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
RRES nonce_ (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp RRES_ nonce_ encBlock
PRES nonce_ (EncResponse encBlock) -> fwdResp PRES_ nonce_ encBlock
END -> e END_
ENDS n idsHash -> serviceResp ENDS_ n idsHash
DELD -> e DELD_
@@ -2006,6 +2044,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
serviceResp tag n idsHash
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', n, idsHash)
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', n)
fwdResp tag nonce_ encBlock
| v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion = e (tag, ' ', nonce_, Tail encBlock)
| otherwise = e (tag, ' ', Tail encBlock)
protocolP v = \case
MSG_ -> do
@@ -2015,19 +2056,17 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
bodyP = EncRcvMsgBody . unTail <$> smpP
ALLS_ -> pure ALLS
IDS_
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP smpP smpP
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP smpP nothing
| v >= shortLinksSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP nothing nothing
| otherwise -> ids (qm <$> smpP) nothing nothing nothing
| v >= newNtfCredsSMPVersion -> ids smpP smpP
| v >= serviceCertsSMPVersion -> ids smpP nothing
| otherwise -> ids nothing nothing
where
qm sndSecure = Just $ if sndSecure then QMMessaging else QMContact
nothing = pure Nothing
ids p1 p2 p3 p4 = do
ids p3 p4 = do
rcvId <- _smpP
sndId <- smpP
rcvPublicDhKey <- smpP
queueMode <- p1
linkId <- p2
queueMode <- smpP
linkId <- smpP
serviceId <- p3
serverNtfCreds <- p4
pure $ IDS QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey, queueMode, linkId, serviceId, serverNtfCreds}
@@ -2037,8 +2076,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
RRES_ -> fwdRespP RRES EncFwdResponse
PRES_ -> fwdRespP PRES EncResponse
END_ -> pure END
ENDS_ -> serviceRespP ENDS
DELD_ -> pure DELD
@@ -2055,6 +2094,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
serviceRespP resp
| v >= rcvServiceSMPVersion = resp <$> _smpP <*> smpP
| otherwise = resp <$> _smpP <*> pure mempty
fwdRespP :: (Maybe C.CbNonce -> a -> BrokerMsg) -> (ByteString -> a) -> Parser BrokerMsg
fwdRespP resp enc = resp <$> (A.space *> nonceP) <*> (enc <$> A.takeByteString)
nonceP = if v >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion then smpP else pure Nothing
fromProtocolError = \case
PECmdSyntax -> CMD SYNTAX
@@ -2071,7 +2113,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
PONG -> noEntityMsg
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
RRES {} -> noEntityMsg
ALLS -> noEntityMsg
RNAME {} -> noEntityMsg
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
@@ -2407,7 +2449,9 @@ tDecodeServer THandleParams {sessionId, thVersion = v, implySessId} = \case
where
cmdOrErr = parseProtocol @v @err @cmd v command >>= checkCredentials tAuth entityId
t :: a -> (CorrId, EntityId, a)
t = (corrId,entityId,)
-- IDs are slices of the ~16 KB received block and are kept as subscription keys,
-- so without a copy one live key retains the whole block
t = (CorrId $ B.copy $ bs corrId,EntityId $ B.copy $ unEntityId entityId,)
Left _ -> tError corrId PEBlock
| otherwise -> tError corrId PESession
Left _ -> tError "" PEBlock
+57 -24
View File
@@ -1092,6 +1092,7 @@ controlPortAuth h user admin role auth = do
readTVarIO role >>= \case
CPRNone -> do
atomically $ writeTVar role $! newRole
when (newRole == CPRNone) $ logWarn "ControlPort: failed auth"
hPutStrLn h $ currentRole newRole
r -> hPutStrLn h $ currentRole r <> if r == newRole then "" else ", start new session to change."
where
@@ -1144,14 +1145,16 @@ cancelSub s = case subThread s of
type VerifiedTransmissionOrError s = Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (VerifiedTransmission s)
receive :: forall c s. (Transport c, MsgStoreClass s) => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> s -> Client s -> M s ()
receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt} = do
receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms c@Client {rcvQ, rcvActiveAt} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " receive"
sa <- asks serverActive
stats <- asks serverStats
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
liftIO $ forever $ do
ts <- tGetServer h
unlessM (readTVarIO sa) $ throwIO $ userError "server stopped"
atomically . (writeTVar rcvActiveAt $!) =<< getSystemTime
receivedAt <- getSystemTime
atomically $ writeTVar rcvActiveAt $! receivedAt
let (es, ts') = partitionEithers $ L.toList ts
errs = map (second ERR) es
errs' <- case ts' of
@@ -1167,7 +1170,7 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ,
mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ) $ L.nonEmpty cmds
pure $ errs ++ errs'
[] -> pure errs
mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ . (,[])) $ L.nonEmpty errs'
mapM_ (sendResponses c stats authDelay receivedAt . (,[])) $ L.nonEmpty errs'
where
sameParty :: SParty p -> SignedTransmission Cmd -> Bool
sameParty p (_, _, (_, _, Cmd p' _)) = isJust $ testEquality p p'
@@ -1190,6 +1193,27 @@ receive h@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth, sessionId}} ms Client {rcvQ,
GET -> incStat $ msgGetAuth stats
_ -> pure ()
isAuthError :: Transmission BrokerMsg -> Bool
isAuthError (_, _, r) = case r of
ERR AUTH -> True
_ -> False
sendResponses :: Client s -> ServerStats -> Int64 -> SystemTime -> (NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg), [Transmission BrokerMsg]) -> IO ()
sendResponses c@Client {sndQ} stats authDelay since rs@(ts, _)
| any isAuthError ts = sendAfterDelay c stats authDelay since rs
| otherwise = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ rs
sendAfterDelay :: Client s -> ServerStats -> Int64 -> SystemTime -> (NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg), [Transmission BrokerMsg]) -> IO ()
sendAfterDelay c@Client {sndQ, clientTHParams = THandleParams {sessionId}} stats delay since rs
| delay > 0 = do
elapsed <- subtract (microseconds since) . microseconds <$> getSystemTime
when (elapsed >= delay) $ incStat $ authDelayExceeded stats
forkClient c (B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " auth") $ threadDelay' (delay - elapsed `mod` delay) >> write
| otherwise = write
where
write = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ rs
microseconds (MkSystemTime s ns) = s * 1000000 + fromIntegral (ns `div` 1000)
send :: Transport c => MVar (THandleSMP c 'TServer) -> Client s -> IO ()
send th c@Client {sndQ, msgQ, clientTHParams = THandleParams {sessionId}} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " send"
@@ -1318,11 +1342,6 @@ isContactQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> True
Nothing -> isNothing senderKey -- for backward compatibility with pre-SKEY contact addresses
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> False
_ -> isJust senderKey
-- Random correlation ID is used as a nonce in case crypto_box authenticator is used to authorize transmission
verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId key = maybe False (verify key) tAuth
@@ -1338,7 +1357,7 @@ verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId key = maybe False (verify
verifyCmdAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> C.CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Bool
verifyCmdAuth thAuth k authenticator authorized (CorrId corrId) = case thAuth of
Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk} -> C.cbVerify k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) authenticator authorized
Just THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk} -> either (const False) (\nonce -> C.cbVerify k pk nonce authenticator authorized) $ C.cbNonce corrId
Nothing -> False
dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> Maybe TAuthorizations -> ByteString -> CorrId -> Bool
@@ -1378,15 +1397,18 @@ client
ms
clnt@Client {clientId, rcvQ, sndQ, msgQ, clientTHParams = thParams'@THandleParams {sessionId}, procThreads} = do
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
stats <- asks serverStats
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
let clntServiceId = (\THClientService {serviceId} -> serviceId) <$> (peerClientService =<< thAuth thParams')
process batchSubs t acc@(rs, msgs) =
(maybe acc (\(!r, !msg_) -> (r : rs, maybe msgs (: msgs) msg_)))
<$> processCommand clntServiceId batchSubs t
forever $ do
batch <- atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
processedAt <- liftIO getSystemTime
batchSubs <- prepareBatchSubs clntServiceId batch
foldrM (process batchSubs) ([], []) batch
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ . (,msgs)) (L.nonEmpty rs_)
>>= \(rs_, msgs) -> mapM_ (liftIO . sendResponses clnt stats authDelay processedAt . (,msgs)) (L.nonEmpty rs_)
where
prepareBatchSubs ::
Maybe ServiceId ->
@@ -1457,14 +1479,15 @@ client
ServerStats {pMsgFwds, pMsgFwdsOwn} <- asks serverStats
let inc = mkIncProxyStats pMsgFwds pMsgFwdsOwn
liftIO (lookupSMPServerClient a sessId) >>= \case
Just (own, smp) -> do
Just (own, smp) | Right fwdCorrId <- C.corrCbNonce (bs corrId) -> do
inc own pRequests
forkProxiedCmd $ do
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp corrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right r -> PRES r <$ inc own pSuccesses
liftIO (runExceptT (forwardSMPTransmission smp fwdCorrId fwdV pubKey encBlock) `E.catches` clientHandlers) >>= \case
Right (nonce_, r) -> PRES nonce_ r <$ inc own pSuccesses
Left e -> ERR (smpProxyError e) <$ case e of
PCEProtocolError {} -> inc own pSuccesses
_ -> inc own pErrorsOther
Just _ -> pure $ Just $ ERR $ CMD SYNTAX
Nothing -> inc False pRequests >> inc False pErrorsConnect $> Just (ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION)
where
forkProxiedCmd :: M s BrokerMsg -> M s (Maybe BrokerMsg)
@@ -1954,7 +1977,7 @@ client
getDelivered :: Sub -> STM (Maybe (ServerSub, SystemSeconds))
getDelivered Sub {delivered, subThread} = do
readTVar delivered $>>= \(msgId', ts) ->
if msgId == msgId' || B.null msgId
if msgId == msgId'
then writeTVar delivered Nothing $> Just (subThread, ts)
else pure Nothing
updateStats :: ServerStats -> Bool -> SystemSeconds -> Message -> IO ()
@@ -2000,7 +2023,7 @@ client
when (isJust (queueData qr) && isSecuredMsgQueue qr) $ void $ liftIO $
deleteQueueLinkData (queueStore ms) q
ServerConfig {messageExpiration, expireMessagesOnSend, msgIdBytes} <- asks config
msgId <- randomId' msgIdBytes
msgId <- atomically . randomMsgId msgIdBytes =<< asks random
msg_ <- liftIO $ runExceptT $ do
when expireMessagesOnSend $ mapM_ (expireMessages stats) messageExpiration
msg <- liftIO $ mkMessage msgId body
@@ -2113,7 +2136,7 @@ client
liftIO $ storeNtf ns nId ntf
incStat . ntfCount =<< asks serverStats
mkMessageNotification :: ByteString -> SystemTime -> RcvNtfDhSecret -> M s MsgNtf
mkMessageNotification :: MsgId -> SystemTime -> RcvNtfDhSecret -> M s MsgNtf
mkMessageNotification msgId msgTs rcvNtfDhSecret = do
ntfNonce <- atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random
let msgMeta = NMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs}
@@ -2122,14 +2145,16 @@ client
processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M s (Maybe BrokerMsg)
processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either (Just . ERR) id) . runExceptT $ do
startedAt <- liftIO getSystemTime
THAuthServer {serverPrivKey, sessSecret'} <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure (thAuth thParams')
sessSecret <- maybe (throwE $ transportErr TENoServerAuth) pure sessSecret'
let proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
proxyNonce <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
s' <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecryptNoPad sessSecret proxyNonce s
FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdVersion, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith (const $ CMD SYNTAX) $ smpDecode s'
unless (fwdVersion `isCompatible` thServerVRange thParams') $ throwE $ transportErr TEVersion
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
clientNonce = fwdCorrId
b <- liftEitherWith (const CRYPTO) $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret (encTransmissionNonce fwdVersion clientNonce) et
let clntTHParams = smpTHParamsSetVersion fwdVersion thParams'
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
t' <- case tParse clntTHParams b of
@@ -2142,9 +2167,13 @@ client
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE BLOCK
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedTLength
nonce_ <-
if fwdVersion >= fwdNoncesSMPVersion
then Just <$> (atomically . C.randomCbNonce =<< asks random)
else pure Nothing
r2 <- liftEitherWith (const BLOCK) $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (fromMaybe (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) nonce_) r' paddedProxiedTLength
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
pure $ RRES $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
pure $ RRES nonce_ $ EncFwdResponse $ C.cbEncryptNoPad sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr)
-- the inner response, or Nothing if forked (RSLV).
r_ <- lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
-- rejectOrVerify filters allowed commands, no need to repeat it here.
@@ -2160,7 +2189,11 @@ client
_ -> Just . maybe (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) fst <$> lift (processCommand Nothing (Right (M.empty, M.empty, M.empty)) t'')
stats <- asks serverStats
incStat $ pMsgFwdsRecv stats
traverse encodeResp r_
traverse encodeResp r_ >>= \case
Just rres | any isAuthError r_ -> do
authDelay <- asks $ authErrorDelay . config
Nothing <$ liftIO (sendAfterDelay clnt stats authDelay startedAt ([(corrId, NoEntity, rres)], []))
rres_ -> pure rres_
where
rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmissionOrError ErrorType Cmd -> M s (VerifiedTransmissionOrError s)
rejectOrVerify clntThAuth = \case
@@ -2186,7 +2219,7 @@ client
MessageQuota {} -> RcvMsgQuota msgTs'
where
encrypt :: KnownNat i => C.MaxLenBS i -> RcvMessage
encrypt body = RcvMessage msgId' . EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) (C.cbNonce msgId') body
encrypt body = RcvMessage msgId' . EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) msgId' body
msgId' = messageId msg
msgTs' = messageTs msg
@@ -2235,7 +2268,7 @@ client
SubPending -> QSubPending
SubThread _ -> QSubThread
ProhibitSub -> pure QProhibitSub
qDelivered <- decodeLatin1 . encode . fst <$$> readTVarIO delivered
qDelivered <- decodeLatin1 . encode . unMsgId . fst <$$> readTVarIO delivered
pure QSub {qSubThread, qDelivered}
ok :: Transmission BrokerMsg
+9 -1
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
defaultInactiveClientExpiration,
defaultProxyClientConcurrency,
defaultNameResolverConcurrency,
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs,
defaultMaxJournalMsgCount,
defaultMaxJournalStateLines,
defaultIdleQueueInterval,
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ data ServerConfig s = ServerConfig
ntfDeliveryInterval :: Int,
-- | interval between sending pending END events to unsubscribed clients, seconds
pendingENDInterval :: Int,
authErrorDelay :: Int64,
smpCredentials :: ServerCredentials,
httpCredentials :: Maybe ServerCredentials,
-- | SMP client-server protocol version range
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ defaultProxyClientConcurrency = 32
defaultNameResolverConcurrency :: Int
defaultNameResolverConcurrency = 1000
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs :: Int64
defaultAuthErrorDelayMs = 50
journalMsgStoreDepth :: Int
journalMsgStoreDepth = 5
@@ -571,7 +576,10 @@ newProhibitedSub = do
return Sub {subThread = ProhibitSub, delivered}
newEnv :: ServerConfig s -> IO (Env s)
newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines, namesConfig} = do
newEnv config@ServerConfig {smpCredentials, httpCredentials, serverStoreCfg, smpAgentCfg, information, messageExpiration, idleQueueInterval, msgQueueQuota, maxJournalMsgCount, maxJournalStateLines, namesConfig, msgIdBytes} = do
when (msgIdBytes < 24) $ do
logError "Error: msgIdBytes must be at least 24"
exitFailure
serverActive <- newTVarIO True
server <- newServer
msgStore_ <- case serverStoreCfg of
+1
View File
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ smpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath =
prometheusMetricsFile = combine logPath "smp-server-metrics.txt",
pendingENDInterval = 15000000, -- 15 seconds
ntfDeliveryInterval = 1500000, -- 1.5 second
authErrorDelay = 1000 * readIniDefault defaultAuthErrorDelayMs "TRANSPORT" "auth_error_delay_ms" ini,
smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
transportConfig =
mkTransportServerConfig
+3 -1
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,9 @@ iniFileContent cfgPath logPath opts host basicAuth controlPortPwds =
<> ("host = " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
<> ("port = " <> defaultServerPorts <> "\n")
<> "log_tls_errors = off\n\n\
\# Use `websockets = 443` to run websockets server in addition to plain TLS.\n\
\# Minimum time to respond with AUTH error, milliseconds.\n"
<> ("# auth_error_delay_ms = " <> tshow defaultAuthErrorDelayMs <> "\n\n")
<> "# Use `websockets = 443` to run websockets server in addition to plain TLS.\n\
\# This option is deprecated and should be used for testing only.\n\
\# , port 443 should be specified in port above\n\
\websockets = off\n"
@@ -114,7 +114,9 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
where
st = dbStore $ queueStore_ ms
oldMsg = now - ttl
batchSize = 10000 :: Int
-- expired messages read per page in expire_old_messages, and the page is one
-- transaction: queues in it stay row-locked against SEND and ACK until it commits.
batchSize = 100 :: Int
toMessageStats (expiredMsgsCount, storedMsgsCount, storedQueues) =
MessageStats {expiredMsgsCount, storedMsgsCount, storedQueues}
@@ -200,7 +202,7 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
DB.query
db
"SELECT quota_written, was_empty FROM write_message(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)"
(recipientId' q, Binary (messageId msg), systemSeconds (messageTs msg), msgQuota, ntf, Binary body, quota)
(recipientId' q, messageId msg, systemSeconds (messageTs msg), msgQuota, ntf, Binary body, quota)
where
toResult = \case
((msgQuota, wasEmpty) : _) -> if msgQuota then Nothing else Just (msg, wasEmpty)
@@ -269,14 +271,14 @@ instance MsgStoreClass PostgresMsgStore where
uninterruptibleMask_ $
withDB' "tryDelMsg" (queueStore_ ms) $ \db ->
maybeFirstRow toMessage $
DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, Binary msgId)
DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, msgId)
tryDelPeekMsg :: PostgresMsgStore -> PostgresQueue -> MsgId -> ExceptT ErrorType IO (Maybe Message, Maybe Message)
tryDelPeekMsg ms q msgId =
uninterruptibleMask_ $
withDB' "tryDelPeekMsg" (queueStore_ ms) $ \db ->
toResult . map toMessage
<$> DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_peek_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, Binary msgId)
<$> DB.query db "SELECT r_msg_id, r_msg_ts, r_msg_quota, r_msg_ntf_flag, r_msg_body FROM try_del_peek_msg(?, ?)" (recipientId' q, msgId)
where
toResult = \case
[] -> (Nothing, Nothing)
@@ -295,13 +297,13 @@ uninterruptibleMask_ :: ExceptT ErrorType IO a -> ExceptT ErrorType IO a
uninterruptibleMask_ = ExceptT . E.uninterruptibleMask_ . runExceptT
{-# INLINE uninterruptibleMask_ #-}
toMaybeMessage :: (Maybe (Binary MsgId), Maybe Int64, Maybe Bool, Maybe Bool, Maybe (Binary MsgBody)) -> Maybe Message
toMaybeMessage :: (Maybe MsgId, Maybe Int64, Maybe Bool, Maybe Bool, Maybe (Binary MsgBody)) -> Maybe Message
toMaybeMessage = \case
(Just msgId, Just ts, Just msgQuota, Just ntf, Just body) -> Just $ toMessage (msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, body)
_ -> Nothing
toMessage :: (Binary MsgId, Int64, Bool, Bool, Binary MsgBody) -> Message
toMessage (Binary msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, Binary body)
toMessage :: (MsgId, Int64, Bool, Bool, Binary MsgBody) -> Message
toMessage (msgId, ts, msgQuota, ntf, Binary body)
| msgQuota = MessageQuota {msgId, msgTs}
| otherwise = Message {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags = MsgFlags ntf, msgBody = C.unsafeMaxLenBS body} -- TODO [messages] unsafeMaxLenBS?
where
@@ -363,8 +365,8 @@ deleteAllMessages ms =
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE, msg_queue_expire = FALSE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE OR msg_queue_expire = TRUE
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE
|]
updateQueueCounts :: PostgresMsgStore -> IO ()
@@ -384,16 +386,15 @@ updateQueueCounts ms =
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE, msg_queue_expire = FALSE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE OR msg_queue_expire = TRUE
SET msg_queue_size = 0, msg_can_write = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size != 0 OR msg_can_write = FALSE
|]
void $ DB.execute_
db
[sql|
UPDATE msg_queues q
SET msg_queue_size = s.size,
msg_can_write = s.quota_count = 0,
msg_queue_expire = s.size > s.quota_count
msg_can_write = s.quota_count = 0
FROM queue_stats s
WHERE q.recipient_id = s.recipient_id
|]
@@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ messageRecToText rId msg =
tabFields = BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields
fields =
[ renderField (toField rId),
renderField (toField $ Binary (messageId msg)),
renderField (toField $ messageId msg),
renderField (toField $ systemSeconds (messageTs msg)),
renderField (toField msgQuota),
renderField (toField ntf),
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
_authDelayExceeded,
_qCount,
_msgCount,
_ntfCount,
@@ -192,6 +193,10 @@ prometheusMetrics sm rtm ts =
\# HELP simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly Monthly active queues with notifications.\n\
\# TYPE simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly gauge\n\
\simplex_smp_queues_notify_monthly " <> mstr (monthCount psNtf) <> "\n# monthCountNtf\n\
\\n\
\# HELP simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded Responses with AUTH errors sent without delay, as processing took longer than the delay.\n\
\# TYPE simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded counter\n\
\simplex_smp_auth_delay_exceeded " <> mshow _authDelayExceeded <> "\n# authDelayExceeded\n\
\\n"
subscriptions =
"# Subscriptions\n\
@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
ServiceRec (..),
CertFingerprint,
ServerEntityStatus (..),
isSecuredMsgQueue,
) where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -48,6 +50,11 @@ data QueueRec = QueueRec
}
deriving (Show)
isSecuredMsgQueue :: QueueRec -> Bool
isSecuredMsgQueue QueueRec {queueMode, senderKey} = case queueMode of
Just QMContact -> False
_ -> isJust senderKey
data NtfCreds = NtfCreds
{ notifierId :: NotifierId,
notifierKey :: NtfPublicAuthKey,
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
addQueueLinkData st sq lnkId d =
withQueueRec sq "addQueueLinkData" $ \q -> case queueData q of
Nothing ->
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId))
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db qry (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact))
Just (lnkId', _) | lnkId' == lnkId ->
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, fst d))
addLink q $ \db -> DB.execute db (qry <> " AND (fixed_data IS NULL OR fixed_data = ?)") (d :. (lnkId, rId, QMContact, fst d))
_ -> throwE AUTH
where
rId = recipientId sq
@@ -324,7 +324,8 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (PostgresQueueStore q) where
assertUpdated $ withDB' "addQueueLinkData" st update
atomically $ writeTVar (queueRec sq) $ Just q {queueData = Just (lnkId, d)}
withLog "addQueueLinkData" st $ \s -> logCreateLink s rId lnkId d
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL"
-- the sender key condition is checked in SQL because without cache each command reads its own copy of the queue record
qry = "UPDATE msg_queues SET fixed_data = ?, user_data = ?, link_id = ? WHERE recipient_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL AND (sender_key IS NULL OR queue_mode = ?)"
deleteQueueLinkData :: PostgresQueueStore q -> q -> IO (Either ErrorType ())
deleteQueueLinkData st sq =
@@ -824,6 +825,10 @@ instance ToField EncDataBytes where toField (EncDataBytes s) = toField (Binary s
deriving newtype instance FromField EncDataBytes
instance ToField MsgId where toField = toField . Binary . unMsgId
instance FromField MsgId where fromField = blobFieldDecoder mkMsgId
deriving newtype instance ToField (RoundedSystemTime t)
deriving newtype instance FromField (RoundedSystemTime t)
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ serverSchemaMigrations =
("20250903_store_messages", m20250903_store_messages, Just down_m20250903_store_messages),
("20250915_queue_ids_hash", m20250915_queue_ids_hash, Just down_m20250915_queue_ids_hash),
("20260916_prometheus_indexes", m20260916_prometheus_indexes, Just down_m20260916_prometheus_indexes),
("20260917_msg_queues_hot", m20260917_msg_queues_hot, Just down_m20260917_msg_queues_hot)
("20260917_msg_queues_hot", m20260917_msg_queues_hot, Just down_m20260917_msg_queues_hot),
("20260918_expire_messages", m20260918_expire_messages, Just down_m20260918_expire_messages)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
@@ -734,3 +735,504 @@ ALTER TABLE msg_queues RESET (fillfactor, autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor, autova
ALTER TABLE messages RESET (autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor, autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor, toast.autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor);
ALTER TABLE services RESET (fillfactor, autovacuum_vacuum_threshold, autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor);
|]
m20260918_expire_messages :: Text
m20260918_expire_messages =
[r|
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_expire ON messages (msg_ts, recipient_id) WHERE NOT msg_quota;
DROP INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts;
DROP INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire;
DROP PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(bigint, integer);
CREATE PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_size integer, OUT r_expired_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_queues bigint)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_ts BIGINT := -1;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
next_ts BIGINT;
next_rid BYTEA;
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
-- The page is scanned in (msg_ts, recipient_id) order, so its last row is the next
-- keyset cursor. Advancing it past every row read, including queues left unexpired
-- because delete_expired_msgs skipped a locked row or raised, is what terminates the
-- loop; re-reading from the start instead would repeat those queues forever.
SELECT array_agg(DISTINCT recipient_id),
(array_agg(msg_ts ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1],
(array_agg(recipient_id ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1]
INTO rids, next_ts, next_rid
FROM (
SELECT msg_ts, recipient_id
FROM messages
WHERE NOT msg_quota
AND msg_ts < p_old_ts
AND (msg_ts, recipient_id) > (last_ts, last_rid)
ORDER BY msg_ts ASC, recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) m;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
BEGIN
del_count := delete_expired_msgs(rid, p_old_ts);
total_deleted := total_deleted + del_count;
EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
END LOOP;
COMMIT;
last_ts := next_ts;
last_rid := next_rid;
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
r_stored_msgs_count := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM messages);
r_stored_queues := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM msg_queues WHERE deleted_at IS NULL);
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION delete_expired_msgs(p_recipient_id bytea, p_old_ts bigint) RETURNS bigint
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
keep_min_id BIGINT;
del_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED;
IF NOT FOUND OR q_size = 0 THEN
RETURN 0;
END IF;
SELECT MIN(message_id) INTO keep_min_id
FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_ts >= p_old_ts AND msg_quota = FALSE;
IF keep_min_id IS NULL THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
ELSE
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND message_id < keep_min_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
END IF;
GET DIAGNOSTICS del_count = ROW_COUNT;
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN del_count;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION write_message(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea, p_msg_ts bigint, p_msg_quota boolean, p_msg_ntf_flag boolean, p_msg_body bytea, p_quota integer) RETURNS TABLE(quota_written boolean, was_empty boolean)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_can_write BOOLEAN;
q_size BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_can_write, msg_queue_size INTO q_can_write, q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF q_can_write OR q_size = 0 THEN
quota_written := p_msg_quota OR q_size >= p_quota;
was_empty := q_size = 0;
INSERT INTO messages(recipient_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body)
VALUES (p_recipient_id, p_msg_id, p_msg_ts, quota_written, p_msg_ntf_flag AND NOT quota_written, CASE WHEN quota_written THEN '' :: BYTEA ELSE p_msg_body END);
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (quota_written, was_empty);
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_peek_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
msg_deleted BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
msg_deleted := FOUND;
IF msg_deleted THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
SELECT msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF FOUND THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSE
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END;
$$;
ALTER TABLE msg_queues DROP COLUMN msg_queue_expire;
|]
down_m20260918_expire_messages :: Text
down_m20260918_expire_messages =
[r|
ALTER TABLE msg_queues ADD COLUMN msg_queue_expire boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
-- ADD COLUMN already defaulted every row to FALSE, so the backfill only needs the rows
-- that become TRUE, which avoids rewriting the whole table. The flag is only read to pick
-- queues for delete_expired_msgs, and that returns 0 without deleting when msg_queue_size
-- is 0, so excluding empty queues here cannot change what expires.
UPDATE msg_queues q
SET msg_queue_expire = TRUE
WHERE msg_queue_size > 0
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages m WHERE m.recipient_id = q.recipient_id AND NOT m.msg_quota);
CREATE INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire ON msg_queues (recipient_id) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND msg_queue_expire;
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts ON messages (recipient_id, msg_ts);
DROP INDEX idx_messages_expire;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION delete_expired_msgs(p_recipient_id bytea, p_old_ts bigint) RETURNS bigint
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
keep_min_id BIGINT;
del_count BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED;
IF NOT FOUND OR q_size = 0 THEN
RETURN 0;
END IF;
SELECT MIN(message_id) INTO keep_min_id
FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_ts >= p_old_ts AND msg_quota = FALSE;
IF keep_min_id IS NULL THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
ELSE
DELETE FROM messages WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND message_id < keep_min_id AND msg_quota = FALSE;
END IF;
GET DIAGNOSTICS del_count = ROW_COUNT;
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > del_count AND keep_min_id IS NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN del_count;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION write_message(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea, p_msg_ts bigint, p_msg_quota boolean, p_msg_ntf_flag boolean, p_msg_body bytea, p_quota integer) RETURNS TABLE(quota_written boolean, was_empty boolean)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_can_write BOOLEAN;
q_size BIGINT;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_can_write, msg_queue_size INTO q_can_write, q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF q_can_write OR q_size = 0 THEN
quota_written := p_msg_quota OR q_size >= p_quota;
was_empty := q_size = 0;
INSERT INTO messages(recipient_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body)
VALUES (p_recipient_id, p_msg_id, p_msg_ts, quota_written, p_msg_ntf_flag AND NOT quota_written, CASE WHEN quota_written THEN '' :: BYTEA ELSE p_msg_body END);
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_expire = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (quota_written, was_empty);
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END IF;
END;
$$;
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION try_del_peek_msg(p_recipient_id bytea, p_msg_id bytea) RETURNS TABLE(r_msg_id bytea, r_msg_ts bigint, r_msg_quota boolean, r_msg_ntf_flag boolean, r_msg_body bytea)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
q_size BIGINT;
msg RECORD;
msg_deleted BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
SELECT msg_queue_size INTO q_size
FROM msg_queues
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id AND deleted_at IS NULL
FOR UPDATE;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
RETURN;
END IF;
SELECT message_id, msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF NOT FOUND THEN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
RETURN;
END IF;
IF msg.msg_id = p_msg_id THEN
DELETE FROM messages WHERE message_id = msg.message_id;
msg_deleted := FOUND;
IF msg_deleted THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
SELECT msg_id, msg_ts, msg_quota, msg_ntf_flag, msg_body
INTO msg
FROM messages
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id
ORDER BY message_id ASC LIMIT 1;
IF FOUND THEN
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSE
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
END IF;
END;
$$;
DROP PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(bigint, integer);
CREATE PROCEDURE expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_size integer, OUT r_expired_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_msgs_count bigint, OUT r_stored_queues bigint)
LANGUAGE plpgsql
AS $$
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
SELECT array_agg(recipient_id)
INTO rids
FROM (
SELECT recipient_id
FROM msg_queues
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
AND msg_queue_expire = TRUE
AND recipient_id > last_rid
ORDER BY recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) qs;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL OR cardinality(rids) = 0;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
BEGIN
del_count := delete_expired_msgs(rid, p_old_ts);
total_deleted := total_deleted + del_count;
EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
COMMIT;
END LOOP;
last_rid := rids[cardinality(rids)];
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
r_stored_msgs_count := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM messages);
r_stored_queues := (SELECT COUNT(1) FROM msg_queues WHERE deleted_at IS NULL);
END;
$$;
|]
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ BEGIN
IF del_count > 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= del_count,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > del_count AND keep_min_id IS NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - del_count, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -63,24 +62,33 @@ CREATE PROCEDURE smp_server.expire_old_messages(IN p_old_ts bigint, IN batch_siz
DECLARE
rids BYTEA[];
rid BYTEA;
last_ts BIGINT := -1;
last_rid BYTEA := '\x';
next_ts BIGINT;
next_rid BYTEA;
del_count BIGINT;
total_deleted BIGINT := 0;
BEGIN
LOOP
SELECT array_agg(recipient_id)
INTO rids
-- The page is scanned in (msg_ts, recipient_id) order, so its last row is the next
-- keyset cursor. Advancing it past every row read, including queues left unexpired
-- because delete_expired_msgs skipped a locked row or raised, is what terminates the
-- loop; re-reading from the start instead would repeat those queues forever.
SELECT array_agg(DISTINCT recipient_id),
(array_agg(msg_ts ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1],
(array_agg(recipient_id ORDER BY msg_ts DESC, recipient_id DESC))[1]
INTO rids, next_ts, next_rid
FROM (
SELECT recipient_id
FROM msg_queues
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
AND msg_queue_expire = TRUE
AND recipient_id > last_rid
ORDER BY recipient_id ASC
SELECT msg_ts, recipient_id
FROM messages
WHERE NOT msg_quota
AND msg_ts < p_old_ts
AND (msg_ts, recipient_id) > (last_ts, last_rid)
ORDER BY msg_ts ASC, recipient_id ASC
LIMIT batch_size
) qs;
) m;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL OR cardinality(rids) = 0;
EXIT WHEN rids IS NULL;
FOREACH rid IN ARRAY rids
LOOP
@@ -91,9 +99,11 @@ BEGIN
RAISE WARNING 'STORE, expire_old_messages, error expiring queue %: %', encode(rid, 'base64'), SQLERRM;
CONTINUE;
END;
COMMIT;
END LOOP;
last_rid := rids[cardinality(rids)];
COMMIT;
last_ts := next_ts;
last_rid := next_rid;
END LOOP;
r_expired_msgs_count := total_deleted;
@@ -195,7 +205,6 @@ BEGIN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -207,7 +216,6 @@ BEGIN
IF FOUND THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
RETURN QUERY VALUES (msg.msg_id, msg.msg_ts, msg.msg_quota, msg.msg_ntf_flag, msg.msg_body);
@@ -245,7 +253,6 @@ BEGIN
IF q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -271,14 +278,12 @@ BEGIN
IF msg_deleted THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = msg_can_write OR msg_queue_size <= 1,
msg_queue_expire = msg_queue_size > 1,
msg_queue_size = GREATEST(msg_queue_size - 1, 0)
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
ELSIF msg_deleted OR q_size != 0 THEN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = TRUE,
msg_queue_expire = FALSE,
msg_queue_size = 0
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
END IF;
@@ -348,7 +353,6 @@ BEGIN
UPDATE msg_queues
SET msg_can_write = NOT quota_written,
msg_queue_expire = TRUE,
msg_queue_size = msg_queue_size + 1
WHERE recipient_id = p_recipient_id;
@@ -440,7 +444,6 @@ CREATE TABLE smp_server.msg_queues (
rcv_service_id bytea,
ntf_service_id bytea,
msg_can_write boolean DEFAULT true NOT NULL,
msg_queue_expire boolean DEFAULT false NOT NULL,
msg_queue_size bigint DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL
)
WITH (fillfactor='80', autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor='0.02', autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor='0.01', autovacuum_vacuum_cost_limit='1000');
@@ -485,6 +488,10 @@ ALTER TABLE ONLY smp_server.services
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_expire ON smp_server.messages USING btree (msg_ts, recipient_id) WHERE (NOT msg_quota);
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_message_id ON smp_server.messages USING btree (recipient_id, message_id);
@@ -493,14 +500,6 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_quota ON smp_server.messages USING bt
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_recipient_id_msg_ts ON smp_server.messages USING btree (recipient_id, msg_ts);
CREATE INDEX idx_msg_queues_expire ON smp_server.msg_queues USING btree (recipient_id) WHERE ((deleted_at IS NULL) AND msg_queue_expire);
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_msg_queues_link_id ON smp_server.msg_queues USING btree (link_id);
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ instance StoreQueueClass q => QueueStoreClass q (STMQueueStore q) where
rId = recipientId sq
qr = queueRec sq
add q = case queueData q of
_ | isSecuredMsgQueue q -> pure $ Left AUTH
Nothing -> addLink
Just (lnkId', d') | lnkId' == lnkId && fst d' == fst d -> addLink
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+8
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ data ServerStats = ServerStats
ntfServices :: ServiceStats,
rcvServicesSubMsg :: IORef Int,
rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: IORef Int,
authDelayExceeded :: IORef Int,
qCount :: IORef Int,
msgCount :: IORef Int,
ntfCount :: IORef Int,
@@ -190,6 +191,7 @@ data ServerStatsData = ServerStatsData
_rcvServices :: ServiceStatsData,
_rcvServicesSubMsg :: Int,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate :: Int,
_authDelayExceeded :: Int,
_qCount :: Int,
_msgCount :: Int,
_ntfCount :: Int,
@@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ newServerStats ts = do
ntfServices <- newServiceStats
rcvServicesSubMsg <- newIORef 0
rcvServicesSubDuplicate <- newIORef 0
authDelayExceeded <- newIORef 0
qCount <- newIORef 0
msgCount <- newIORef 0
ntfCount <- newIORef 0
@@ -315,6 +318,7 @@ newServerStats ts = do
ntfServices,
rcvServicesSubMsg,
rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
authDelayExceeded,
qCount,
msgCount,
ntfCount,
@@ -378,6 +382,7 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
_ntfServices <- getServiceStatsData $ ntfServices s
_rcvServicesSubMsg <- readIORef $ rcvServicesSubMsg s
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate <- readIORef $ rcvServicesSubDuplicate s
_authDelayExceeded <- readIORef $ authDelayExceeded s
_qCount <- readIORef $ qCount s
_msgCount <- readIORef $ msgCount s
_ntfCount <- readIORef $ ntfCount s
@@ -439,6 +444,7 @@ getServerStatsData s = do
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate,
_authDelayExceeded,
_qCount,
_msgCount,
_ntfCount,
@@ -503,6 +509,7 @@ setServerStats s d = do
setServiceStats (ntfServices s) $! _ntfServices d
writeIORef (rcvServicesSubMsg s) $! _rcvServicesSubMsg d
writeIORef (rcvServicesSubDuplicate s) $! _rcvServicesSubDuplicate d
writeIORef (authDelayExceeded s) $! _authDelayExceeded d
writeIORef (qCount s) $! _qCount d
writeIORef (msgCount s) $! _msgCount d
writeIORef (ntfCount s) $! _ntfCount d
@@ -705,6 +712,7 @@ instance StrEncoding ServerStatsData where
_ntfServices,
_rcvServicesSubMsg = 0,
_rcvServicesSubDuplicate = 0,
_authDelayExceeded = 0,
_qCount,
_msgCount = 0,
_ntfCount = 0,
+17 -17
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
minServerSMPRelayVersion,
currentClientSMPRelayVersion,
currentServerSMPRelayVersion,
shortLinksSMPVersion,
serviceCertsSMPVersion,
newNtfCredsSMPVersion,
clientNoticesSMPVersion,
@@ -54,6 +53,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
namesSMPVersion,
serverInfoSMPVersion,
nameAvailSMPVersion,
fwdNoncesSMPVersion,
simplexMQVersion,
smpBlockSize,
TransportConfig (..),
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ smpBlockSize = 16384
-- 20 - public namespaces resolver, RSLV command (6/20/2026)
-- 21 - server public information in handshake (7/5/2026)
-- 22 - RNAME answers name availability as well as the record (7/25/2026)
-- 23 - version in forwarded command nonce, random nonce in forwarded responses (10/2/2026)
data SMPVersion
@@ -189,11 +190,8 @@ type VersionRangeSMP = VersionRange SMPVersion
pattern VersionSMP :: Word16 -> VersionSMP
pattern VersionSMP v = Version v
_proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
_proxyServerHandshakeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 14
shortLinksSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
shortLinksSMPVersion = VersionSMP 15
_shortLinksSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
_shortLinksSMPVersion = VersionSMP 15
serviceCertsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
serviceCertsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 16
@@ -218,29 +216,32 @@ serverInfoSMPVersion = VersionSMP 21
nameAvailSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
nameAvailSMPVersion = VersionSMP 22
fwdNoncesSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
fwdNoncesSMPVersion = VersionSMP 23
minClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
minClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 15
minServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 14
minServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 15
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
currentServerSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
currentServerSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
-- Max SMP protocol version to be used in e2e encrypted connection between
-- client and server, as defined by SMP proxy. Normally set below the current
-- version to prevent client version fingerprinting by the destination relays
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (22)
-- for this release because a proxied RSLV only carries availability from
-- nameAvailSMPVersion (22), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 22.
-- when clients upgrade at different times. Pinned to the current version (23)
-- for this release because forwarded commands use the nonces from
-- fwdNoncesSMPVersion (23), so the one-version anti-fingerprinting buffer does
-- not apply yet; it reappears once the current version advances past 23.
proxiedSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 22
proxiedSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 23
-- minimal supported protocol version is 14
-- minimal supported protocol version is 15
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
supportedClientSMPRelayVRange = mkVersionRange minClientSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion
@@ -865,7 +866,6 @@ forceCertChain :: CertChainPubKey -> CertChainPubKey
forceCertChain cert@(CertChainPubKey (X.CertificateChain cc) signedKey) = length (show cc) `seq` show signedKey `seq` cert
{-# INLINE forceCertChain #-}
-- This function is only used with v >= 8, so currently it's a simple record update.
-- * Note: it requires updating version-based parameters, to be consistent with smpTHandle_.
smpTHParamsSetVersion :: VersionSMP -> THandleParams SMPVersion p -> THandleParams SMPVersion p
smpTHParamsSetVersion v params =
+5 -2
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
-- for tests only
sendRCPacket,
receiveRCPacket,
findRCCtrlPairing,
) where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Time.Clock.System (getSystemTime)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
import Data.Tuple (swap)
import Data.Word (Word16)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
@@ -395,8 +396,10 @@ findRCCtrlPairing :: NonEmpty RCCtrlPairing -> RCEncInvitation -> ExceptT RCErro
findRCCtrlPairing pairings RCEncInvitation {dhPubKey, nonce, encInvitation} = do
(pairing, signedInvStr) <- liftEither $ decrypt (L.toList pairings)
signedInv <- liftEitherWith RCESyntax $ strDecode signedInvStr
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
inv@(RCVerifiedInvitation RCInvitation {dh = invDh, ts}) <- maybe (throwE RCEInvitation) pure $ verifySignedInvitation signedInv
unless (invDh == dhPubKey) $ throwE RCEInvitation
now <- systemSeconds <$> liftIO getSystemTime
unless (now - 3660 <= systemSeconds ts && systemSeconds ts <= now + 3600) $ throwE RCEInvitation
pure (pairing, inv)
where
decrypt :: [RCCtrlPairing] -> Either RCErrorType (RCCtrlPairing, ByteString)
+12 -8
View File
@@ -122,18 +122,22 @@ closeListener subscribers sock =
joinMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
joinMulticast subscribers sock group = do
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
when (now == 0) $ do
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
if now == 0
then
setMembership sock group True >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now + 1)
partMulticast :: TMVar Int -> N.Socket -> N.HostAddress -> IO ()
partMulticast subscribers sock group = do
now <- atomically $ takeTMVar subscribers
when (now == 1) $
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers now) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
if now == 1
then
setMembership sock group False >>= \case
Left e -> atomically (putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)) >> logError ("setMembership failed " <> tshow e)
Right () -> atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (now - 1)
else atomically $ putTMVar subscribers (max 0 (now - 1))
listenerHostAddr4 :: UDP.ListenSocket -> N.HostAddress
listenerHostAddr4 sock = case UDP.mySockAddr sock of
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ module AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests
import AgentTests.EqInstances ()
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Either (isLeft)
import Network.HTTP.Types (urlEncode)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
@@ -285,6 +287,9 @@ connectionRequestTests =
contactAddressV6 #== ("https://simplex.chat/contact#/?v=1-2&smp=" <> url queueStr) -- adjusted to v6
contactAddressV6 #== ("https://simplex.chat/contact#/?v=2-2&smp=" <> url queueStr)
contactAddressClientData #==# ("simplex:/contact#/?v=6-8&smp=" <> url queueStr <> "&data=" <> url "{\"type\":\"group_link\", \"group_link_id\":\"abc\"}")
it "should reject KEM ciphertext without KEM key in e2e params" $
strDecode @(RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448) (strEncode testE2ERatchetParams <> "&kem_ct=" <> strEncode (B.replicate 1039 '\0'))
`shouldSatisfy` isLeft
it "should serialize / parse queue address, connection invitations and contact addresses as binary" $ do
smpEncodingTest queue
smpEncodingTest queueNoQM -- this passes, no queue mode patch in SMPQueueUri encoding
@@ -357,6 +362,10 @@ connectionRequestTests =
smpEncodingTest $ AgentServiceRequest [qInfo] Nothing "service request payload"
smpEncodingTest $ AgentServiceResponse "service response payload"
smpEncodingTest $ AgentRejection "rejected: not allowed"
it "should serialize and parse ratchet key info" $ do
smpDecode "R" `shouldBe` Right (AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash = Nothing})
smpDecode "R1\3abcdef" `shouldBe` Right (AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash = Just "abc"})
smpEncodingTest $ AgentRatchetInfo RatchetInfo {answeredKeyHash = Just "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"}
where
smpEncodingTest :: (Encoding a, Eq a, Show a, HasCallStack) => a -> Expectation
smpEncodingTest a = smpDecode (smpEncode a) `shouldBe` Right a
+17 -3
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ doubleRatchetTests = do
it "should propose KEM during agreement, but no shared secret" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhProposeInReply
it "should agree shared secret using KEM" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhProposeAccept
it "should reject proposed KEM in reply" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhProposeReject
it "should agree different PQ associated data with substituted KEM key" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhSubstitutedKem
it "should allow second proposal in reply" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhProposeAgain
describe "hybrid KEM key agreement errors" $ do
it "should fail if reply contains acceptance without proposal" $ testAlgs testPqX3dhAcceptWithoutProposalError
@@ -362,6 +363,7 @@ testDecodeV2RatchetJSON :: IO ()
testDecodeV2RatchetJSON = do
let v2RatchetJSON = "{\"rcVersion\":[2,2],\"rcAD\":\"2GEJrq48TmQse6NR16I-hrI0tSySZQ57E_g46nDceAPRAiF6j0drq26RTE7be6X7uiB4RaGJGf4QRXzcYuVtWw==\",\"rcDHRs\":\"TUM0Q0FRQXdCUVlESzJWdUJDSUVJRkNYbUxtSHQ3SUNfeHpGTi1Qb3ZqTVQ3S2p6XzZlZlBjOG9fRFY2RWxKOQ==\",\"rcRK\":\"BOX2X7YW5qDSp2XknY_lqacSrtDqQNPvS6iJlZIs3G0=\",\"rcNs\":0,\"rcNr\":0,\"rcPN\":0,\"rcNHKs\":\"IMouSkXUvzT_mo0WM-pqEUK09-HTLk9WOTCFQglyQxU=\",\"rcNHKr\":\"g-tus1clYPV0rGlzkf5a959tUqDYQVZ1FpcPeXdKwxI=\"}"
Right (r :: Ratchet X25519) <- pure $ J.eitherDecodeStrict' v2RatchetJSON
rcVCPQ r `shouldBe` Nothing
rcSupportKEM r `shouldBe` PQSupportOff
rcEnableKEM r `shouldBe` PQEncOff
rcSndKEM r `shouldBe` PQEncOff
@@ -417,6 +419,18 @@ testPqX3dhProposeAccept _ = do
Right paramsAlice <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pksAlice e2eBob
paramsAlice `compatibleRatchets` paramsBob
testPqX3dhSubstitutedKem :: forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> IO ()
testPqX3dhSubstitutedKem _ = do
g <- C.newRandom
let v = currentE2EEncryptVersion
(pksAlice@(_, _, Just _), e2eAlice) <- liftIO $ generateRcvE2EParams @a g v PQSupportOn
(_, E2ERatchetParams _ _ _ (Just (RKParamsProposed mallorysKem))) <- liftIO $ generateRcvE2EParams @a g v PQSupportOn
(pksBob@(_, _, Just _), AE2ERatchetParams _ e2eBob) <- liftIO $ generateSndE2EParams @a g v (Just $ AUseKEM SRKSAccepted $ AcceptKEM mallorysKem)
Right (paramsBob, _) <- pure $ pqX3dhSnd pksBob e2eAlice
Right (paramsAlice, _) <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pksAlice e2eBob
assocData paramsAlice `shouldBe` assocData paramsBob
rcVerifyCodePQ paramsAlice `shouldNotBe` rcVerifyCodePQ paramsBob
testPqX3dhProposeReject :: forall a. (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> IO ()
testPqX3dhProposeReject _ = do
g <- C.newRandom
@@ -459,9 +473,9 @@ testPqX3dhProposeAgain _ = do
compatibleRatchets :: (RatchetInitParams, x) -> (RatchetInitParams, x) -> Expectation
compatibleRatchets
(RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, _)
(RatchetInitParams {assocData = ad, ratchetKey = rk, sndHK = shk, rcvNextHK = rnhk, kemAccepted = ka}, _) = do
assocData == ad && ratchetKey == rk && sndHK == shk && rcvNextHK == rnhk `shouldBe` True
(RatchetInitParams {assocData, rcVerifyCodePQ, ratchetKey, sndHK, rcvNextHK, kemAccepted}, _)
(RatchetInitParams {assocData = ad, rcVerifyCodePQ = vcPQ, ratchetKey = rk, sndHK = shk, rcvNextHK = rnhk, kemAccepted = ka}, _) = do
assocData == ad && rcVerifyCodePQ == vcPQ && ratchetKey == rk && sndHK == shk && rcvNextHK == rnhk `shouldBe` True
case (kemAccepted, ka) of
(Just RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRr, rcPQRss, rcPQRct}, Just RatchetKEMAccepted {rcPQRr = pqk, rcPQRss = pqss, rcPQRct = pqct}) ->
pqk /= rcPQRr && pqss == rcPQRss && pqct == rcPQRct `shouldBe` True
+408 -92
View File
@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Either (isRight)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (find, isPrefixOf, isSuffixOf)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.List (find, isInfixOf, isPrefixOf, isSuffixOf)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.Map as M
import Data.Maybe (isJust, isNothing)
import qualified Data.Set as S
@@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent hiding (acceptContact, createConnection, deleteConnection, deleteConnections, getConnShortLink, joinConnection, sendMessage, setConnShortLink, subscribeConnection, suspendConnection)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ProtocolTestFailure (..), ProtocolTestStep (..), ServerQueueInfo (..), UserNetworkInfo (..), UserNetworkType (..), waitForUserNetwork)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ProtocolTestFailure (..), ProtocolTestStep (..), ServerQueueInfo (..), UserNetworkInfo (..), UserNetworkType (..), sendAgentMessage, waitForUserNetwork)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig (..), Env (..), InitialAgentServers (..), createAgentStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol hiding (CON, CONF, INFO, REQ, SENT)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store (Connection' (..), SomeConn' (..), StoredRcvQueue (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore (getConn)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore (deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired, getConn, getConnIds, getRatchetX3dhKeys)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Common (DBStore (..), withTransaction)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Interface
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB as DB
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types (SMSType (..), SQSType (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.QueueInfo
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLogRecord (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ASrvTransport, SMPVersion, VersionSMP, currentServerSMPRelayVersion, minClientSMPRelayVersion, minServerSMPRelayVersion, alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ASrvTransport, SMPVersion, VersionSMP, currentServerSMPRelayVersion, minClientSMPRelayVersion, minServerSMPRelayVersion, alpnSupportedSMPHandshakes)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, diffToMicroseconds)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (VersionRange (..))
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ pattern INFO :: ConnInfo -> AEvent 'AEConn
pattern INFO connInfo = A.INFO PQSupportOn connInfo
pattern REQ :: InvitationId -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> AEvent e
pattern REQ invId srvs connInfo <- A.REQ invId PQSupportOn srvs connInfo _
pattern REQ invId srvs connInfo <- A.REQ invId PQSupportOn srvs connInfo _ _
pattern CON :: AEvent 'AEConn
pattern CON = A.CON PQEncOn
@@ -231,7 +231,11 @@ pattern Rcvd' :: AgentMsgId -> AgentMsgId -> AEvent 'AEConn
pattern Rcvd' aMsgId rcvdMsgId <- RCVD MsgMeta {integrity = MsgOk, recipient = (aMsgId, _)} [MsgReceipt {agentMsgId = rcvdMsgId, msgRcptStatus = MROk}]
smpCfgVPrev :: ProtocolClientConfig SMPVersion
smpCfgVPrev = (smpCfg agentCfg) {serverVRange = prevRange $ serverVRange $ smpCfg agentCfg}
smpCfgVPrev =
(smpCfg agentCfg)
{ serverVRange = prevRange $ serverVRange $ smpCfg agentCfg,
proxiedRelayVRange = prevRange $ proxiedRelayVRange $ smpCfg agentCfg
}
-- ntfCfgVPrev :: ProtocolClientConfig NTFVersion
-- ntfCfgVPrev = (ntfCfg agentCfg) {clientALPN = Nothing, serverVRange = V.mkVersionRange (VersionNTF 1) (VersionNTF 1)}
@@ -293,7 +297,7 @@ createConnection c userId enableNtfs cMode clientData subMode = do
joinConnection :: AgentClient -> UserId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> SubscriptionMode -> AE (ConnId, SndQueueSecured)
joinConnection c userId enableNtfs cReq connInfo subMode = do
connId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin c userId enableNtfs cReq PQSupportOn
(connId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin c userId enableNtfs cReq PQSupportOn
sndSecure <- A.joinConnection c NRMInteractive userId connId enableNtfs cReq connInfo PQSupportOn subMode
pure (connId, sndSecure)
@@ -367,6 +371,10 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
testAddDRViaSetConnShortLink ps
it "should resume DR accept after a transient failure (reuse the send queue and ratchet)" $
testAcceptContactDRResumeAfterOffline ps
it "should store the ratchet when DR accept is prepared" $
withSmpServer ps $ testAcceptContactDRPrepared False
it "should create the ratchet at DR accept when the prepared connection has none" $
withSmpServer ps $ testAcceptContactDRPrepared True
it "should support rejecting contact request" $
withSmpServer ps testRejectContactRequest
it "should communicate rejection reason via double ratchet" $
@@ -411,13 +419,16 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
describe "should connect via 1-time short link with async join" $ testProxyMatrix ps testInvitationShortLinkAsync
describe "should connect via contact short link" $ testProxyMatrix ps testContactShortLink
describe "should add short link to existing contact and connect" $ testProxyMatrix ps testAddContactShortLink
xdescribe "try to create 1-time short link with prev versions" $ testProxyMatrixWithPrev ps testInvitationShortLinkPrev
describe "server restart" $ do
it "should get 1-time link data after restart" $ testInvitationShortLinkRestart ps
it "should connect via contact short link after restart" $ testContactShortLinkRestart ps
it "should connect via added contact short link after restart" $ testAddContactShortLinkRestart ps
it "should create and get short links with the old contact queues" $ testOldContactQueueShortLink ps
it "should connect via prepared connection link" $ testPrepareCreateConnectionLink ps
it "should connect via prepared invitation link" $ testPrepareCreateInvitationLink ps
it "should not create connection for prepared invitation link with too large data" $ testPrepareInvitationLinkTooLarge ps
it "should not create connection for prepared contact link with too large data" $ testPrepareContactLinkTooLarge ps
it "should connect via short link prepared for existing contact connection" $ testPrepareConnShortLink ps
describe "Message delivery" $ do
describe "update connection agent version on received messages" $ do
it "should increase if compatible, shouldn'ps decrease" $
@@ -442,6 +453,9 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
it "should expire multiple messages" $ testExpireManyMessages ps
it "should expire one message if quota is exceeded" $ testExpireMessageQuota ps
it "should expire multiple messages if quota is exceeded" $ testExpireManyMessagesQuota ps
describe "joining a full contact address" $ do
it "should retry joining until the address has space" $ testJoinFullContactAsync ps
it "should fail joining after quota exceeded timeout" $ testJoinFullContactAsyncExpire ps
it "should drop message after too many receive attempts" $ testDropMsgAfterRcvAttempts ps
#if !defined(dbPostgres)
-- TODO [postgres] restore from outdated db backup (we use copyFile/renameFile for sqlite)
@@ -456,6 +470,16 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
testRatchetSyncSuspendForeground ps
it "should synchronize ratchets when clients start synchronization simultaneously" $
testRatchetSyncSimultaneous ps
it "should ignore replayed ratchet key after expired hashes are deleted" $
testRatchetSyncReplayedKey ps
it "should synchronize ratchets when synchronization is forced again" $
testRatchetSyncRepeated ps
it "should not mark ratchet key as processed when ratchet recreation fails" $
testRatchetSyncFailedKeyNotProcessed ps
it "should not store reply ratchet key when ratchet recreation fails" $
testRatchetSyncFailedRecreationNoReply ps
it "should not store ratchet key when starting synchronization fails" $
testRatchetSyncStartFailedNoKey ps
#endif
describe "Subscription mode OnlyCreate" $ do
it "messages delivered only when polled" $
@@ -534,6 +558,10 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
testServerMatrix2 ps testFastSwitchConnection
it "should switch delivery to the new queue when the old server is down" $
testFastSwitchDeadOldServer ps
it "should drain the old queue after QEND on the new queue" $
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueue ps
it "should drain the old queue after QEND on the new queue and restart" $
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueueRestart ps
describe "should switch delivery to the new queue" $
testServerMatrix2 ps testSwitchConnection
describe "should switch to new queue asynchronously" $
@@ -581,9 +609,9 @@ functionalAPITests ps = do
it "should pass with correct password" $ testSMPServerConnectionTest ps auth (srv auth) `shouldReturn` Right (Just (Right testServerInformation))
it "should fail without password" $ testSMPServerConnectionTest ps auth (srv Nothing) `shouldReturn` Left authErr
it "should fail with incorrect password" $ testSMPServerConnectionTest ps auth (srv $ Just "wrong") `shouldReturn` Left authErr
describe "getRatchetAdHash" $
it "should return the same data for both peers" $
withSmpServer ps testRatchetAdHash
describe "getConnectionVerifyCodes" $
it "should return the same codes for both peers" $
withSmpServer ps testConnectionVerifyCodes
describe "Delivery receipts" $ do
it "should send and receive delivery receipt" $ withSmpServer ps testDeliveryReceipts
it "send delivery receipts concurrently with messages" $ testDeliveryReceiptsConcurrent ps
@@ -660,19 +688,6 @@ testProxyMatrix ps runTest = do
it "2 servers, directly" $ withSmpServers2 ps $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfg, initAgentServers) (agentCfg, initAgentServers2) $ runTest False
it "2 servers, via proxy" $ withSmpServersProxy2 ps $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfg, initAgentServersProxy) (agentCfg, initAgentServersProxy2) $ runTest True
testProxyMatrixWithPrev :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> (Bool -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> IO ()) -> Spec
testProxyMatrixWithPrev ps@(t, msType@(ASType qs _ms)) runTest = do
it "2 servers, directly, curr clients, prev servers" $ withSmpServers2Prev $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfg, initAgentServers) (agentCfg, initAgentServers2) $ runTest False True
it "2 servers, via proxy, curr clients, prev servers" $ withSmpServersProxy2Prev $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfg, initAgentServersProxy) (agentCfg, initAgentServersProxy2) $ runTest True True
it "2 servers, directly, prev clients, curr servers" $ withSmpServers2 ps $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfgVPrevPQ, initAgentServers) (agentCfgVPrevPQ, initAgentServers2) $ runTest False False
it "2 servers, via proxy, prev clients, curr servers" $ withSmpServersProxy2 ps $ withAgentClientsServers2 (agentCfgVPrevPQ, initAgentServersProxy) (agentCfgVPrevPQ, initAgentServersProxy2) $ runTest True False
where
prev cfg' = updateCfg cfg' $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {smpServerVRange = prevRange supportedServerSMPRelayVRange}
withSmpServers2Prev a = withServers2 (prev $ cfgMS msType) (prev $ cfgJ2QS qs) a
withSmpServersProxy2Prev a = withServers2 (prev $ proxyCfgMS msType) (prev $ proxyCfgJ2QS qs) a
withServers2 cfg1 cfg2 a =
withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg1 testPort $ \_ -> withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg2 testPort2 $ \_ -> a
testPQMatrix2 :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> (HasCallStack => (AgentClient, InitialKeys) -> (AgentClient, PQSupport) -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()) -> Spec
testPQMatrix2 = pqMatrix2_ True
@@ -755,7 +770,7 @@ runAgentClientTestPQ :: HasCallStack => Bool -> (AgentClient, InitialKeys) -> (A
runAgentClientTestPQ viaProxy (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) baseId =
runRight_ $ do
(bobId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMInvitation Nothing Nothing aPQ False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo bPQ
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo bPQ
sqSecured' <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured' `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
@@ -984,12 +999,12 @@ runAgentClientContactTestPQ :: HasCallStack => SndQueueSecured -> Bool -> (Agent
runAgentClientContactTestPQ sqSecured viaProxy (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) baseId =
runRight_ $ do
(_, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact Nothing Nothing aPQ False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo bPQ
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo bPQ
sqSecuredJoin <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredJoin `shouldBe` False -- joining via contact address connection
("", _, A.REQ invId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
liftIO $ pqSup' `shouldBe` PQSupportOn
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ)
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ)
sqSecured' <- acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured' `shouldBe` sqSecured
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup'' _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
@@ -1053,7 +1068,7 @@ runAgentClientContactDRTest_ asyncAccept asyncJoin addrIK useDR bPQ ps = withSmp
Nothing -> expectationFailure "address must advertise DR ratchet keys"
-- classic (non-DR) join drops the address keys from the request
let connReqJoin = if useDR then connReq' else case connReq' of CRContactUri d _ -> CRContactUri d Nothing
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReqJoin bPQ
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReqJoin bPQ
if asyncJoin
then do
A.joinConnectionAsync bob "join" False aliceId True connReqJoin "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
@@ -1061,9 +1076,9 @@ runAgentClientContactDRTest_ asyncAccept asyncJoin addrIK useDR bPQ ps = withSmp
else do
sqSecuredJoin <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReqJoin "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredJoin `shouldBe` False
("", _, A.REQ invId reqPQ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId reqPQ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
liftIO $ reqPQ `shouldBe` PQSupportOn
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
if asyncAccept
then do
acceptContactAsync alice "accept" bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK) SMSubscribe
@@ -1093,10 +1108,10 @@ runCreateConnectionDRTest_ asyncNew addrIK bPQ ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgent
liftIO $ case addrKeys_ of
Just (_, CR.E2ERatchetParamsUri _ _ _ kem_) -> isJust kem_ `shouldBe` supportPQ (CR.initialPQEncryption False addrIK)
Nothing -> expectationFailure "createConnection must advertise DR ratchet keys"
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq bPQ
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq bPQ
void $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
void $ acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK) SMSubscribe
("", _, A.CONF confId _ _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConfirmGreet alice bobId bob aliceId confId addrIK pqEnc
@@ -1118,10 +1133,10 @@ testContactDRMatrix ps = do
joinContactDR :: HasCallStack => AgentClient -> AgentClient -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> InitialKeys -> PQEncryption -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
joinContactDR alice requester connReq addrIK pqEnc = do
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin requester 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin requester 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection requester NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
reqId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
(reqId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
void $ acceptContact alice 1 reqId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK) SMSubscribe
("", _, A.CONF confId _ _ "alice's connInfo") <- get requester
allowConfirmGreet alice reqId requester aliceId confId addrIK pqEnc
@@ -1149,7 +1164,7 @@ testAddressKeyRotation ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients3 $ \alice bob ca
joinContactDR alice carol connReq2 addrIK pqEnc
void $ A.setConnShortLink alice NRMInteractive addrConnId SCMContact userLinkData Nothing True (Just addrIK)
void $ A.setConnShortLink alice NRMInteractive addrConnId SCMContact userLinkData Nothing True (Just addrIK)
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq1 PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq1 PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aId True connReq1 "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
get alice =##> \case ("", _, A.ERR _) -> True; _ -> False
@@ -1192,11 +1207,11 @@ testAddressUpdatePreservesDRKeys ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \al
liftIO $ shortLink' `shouldBe` shortLink
(_, ContactLinkData _ updated, connReq') <- getConnShortLink bob 1 shortLink
liftIO $ ratchetKeys updated `shouldBe` ratchetKeys published
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq' bPQ
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq' bPQ
sqSecuredJoin <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq' "bob's connInfo" bPQ SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredJoin `shouldBe` False
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
_ <- acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK) SMSubscribe
("", _, A.CONF confId _ _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConfirmGreet alice bobId bob aliceId confId addrIK pqEnc
@@ -1216,10 +1231,10 @@ testAcceptContactDRResumeAfterOffline ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(ccLink@(CCLink _ (Just shortLink)), preparedParams) <- A.prepareConnectionLink alice 1 rootKey linkEntId True Nothing connIK True Nothing
_ <- A.createConnectionForLink alice NRMInteractive 1 True ccLink preparedParams (UserContactLinkData userCtData) SMSubscribe
(_, _, connReq') <- getConnShortLink bob 1 shortLink
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq' PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq' PQSupportOn
_ <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aId True connReq' "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
bId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
(bId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption addrIK)
pure (bId, invId, aId)
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet alice
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet bob
@@ -1234,6 +1249,30 @@ testAcceptContactDRResumeAfterOffline ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
("", _, A.CONF confId _ _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConfirmGreet alice bobId bob aliceId confId addrIK pqEnc
testAcceptContactDRPrepared :: HasCallStack => Bool -> IO ()
testAcceptContactDRPrepared ratchetDeleted =
withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> runRight_ $ do
let userLinkData = UserContactLinkData UserContactData {direct = True, owners = [], relays = [], userData = UserLinkData "test user data", ratchetKeys = Nothing}
pqEnc = PQEncryption $ pqConnectionMode IKPQOn PQSupportOn
(_, CCLink connReq _) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact (Just userLinkData) Nothing IKPQOn True SMSubscribe
(aliceId, CRBRatchet codes) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" (CRBRatchet reqCodes) _) <- get alice
(bobId, CRBRatchet acceptCodes) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
liftIO $ do
reqCodes `shouldBe` codes
acceptCodes `shouldBe` codes
if ratchetDeleted
then do
liftIO $ withTransaction (store $ agentEnv alice) (`DB.execute_` "DELETE FROM ratchets")
Left (CONN NOT_FOUND _) <- tryError $ getConnectionVerifyCodes alice bobId
pure ()
else getConnectionVerifyCodes alice bobId >>= liftIO . (`shouldBe` codes)
void $ acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.CONF confId _ _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConfirmGreet alice bobId bob aliceId confId IKPQOn pqEnc
getConnectionVerifyCodes alice bobId >>= liftIO . (`shouldBe` codes)
runAgentClientContactTestPQ3 :: HasCallStack => Bool -> (AgentClient, InitialKeys) -> (AgentClient, PQSupport) -> (AgentClient, PQSupport) -> AgentMsgId -> IO ()
runAgentClientContactTestPQ3 viaProxy (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) (tom, tPQ) baseId = runRight_ $ do
(_, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact Nothing Nothing aPQ False SMSubscribe
@@ -1244,12 +1283,12 @@ runAgentClientContactTestPQ3 viaProxy (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) (tom, tPQ) baseId
where
msgId = subtract baseId . fst
connectViaContact b pq qInfo = do
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True qInfo pq
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True qInfo pq
sqSecuredJoin <- A.joinConnection b NRMInteractive 1 aId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" pq SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredJoin `shouldBe` False -- joining via contact address connection
("", _, A.REQ invId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
liftIO $ pqSup' `shouldBe` PQSupportOn
bId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ)
(bId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ)
sqSecuredAccept <- acceptContact alice 1 bId True invId "alice's connInfo" (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredAccept `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup'' _ "alice's connInfo") <- get b
@@ -1290,10 +1329,10 @@ testRejectContactRequest :: HasCallStack => IO ()
testRejectContactRequest =
withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> runRight_ $ do
(_addrConnId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact Nothing Nothing IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
sqSecured <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured `shouldBe` False -- joining via contact address connection
("", _, A.REQ invId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
Left (A.CMD PROHIBITED _) <- tryError $ rejectContact alice NRMInteractive 1 invId (Just "no rejection without double ratchet")
rejectContact alice NRMInteractive 1 invId Nothing
liftIO $ noMessages bob "nothing delivered to bob"
@@ -1303,9 +1342,9 @@ testRejectContactRequestDR =
withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> runRight_ $ do
let userLinkData = UserContactLinkData UserContactData {direct = True, owners = [], relays = [], userData = UserLinkData "test user data", ratchetKeys = Nothing}
(_addrConnId, CCLink connReq _) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact (Just userLinkData) Nothing IKPQOn True SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
rejectContact alice NRMInteractive 1 invId (Just "not now")
("", _, A.RJCT "not now") <- get bob
pure ()
@@ -1315,9 +1354,9 @@ testRejectContactRequestDRAsync =
withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> runRight_ $ do
let userLinkData = UserContactLinkData UserContactData {direct = True, owners = [], relays = [], userData = UserLinkData "test user data", ratchetKeys = Nothing}
(_addrConnId, CCLink connReq _) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact (Just userLinkData) Nothing IKPQOn True SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get alice
("", _, A.REQ invId _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
rejectContactAsync alice "1" 1 invId (Just "not now")
("", _, A.RJCT "not now") <- get bob
pure ()
@@ -1430,7 +1469,7 @@ testUpdateConnectionUserId =
(connId, qInfo) <- createConnection alice 1 True SCMInvitation Nothing SMSubscribe
newUserId <- createUser alice False [noAuthSrvCfg testSMPServer] [noAuthSrvCfg testXFTPServer]
_ <- changeConnectionUser alice 1 connId newUserId
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
sqSecured' <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured' `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
@@ -1589,7 +1628,7 @@ testInvitationErrors ps restart = do
b <- getAgentB
(bId, cReq) <- withServer1 ps $ runRight $ createConnection a 1 True SCMInvitation Nothing SMSubscribe
("", "", DOWN _ [_]) <- nGet a
aId <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True cReq PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True cReq PQSupportOn
-- fails to secure the queue on testPort
BROKER srv (NETWORK _) <- runLeft $ A.joinConnection b NRMInteractive 1 aId True cReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
(testPort `isSuffixOf` srv) `shouldBe` True
@@ -1659,7 +1698,7 @@ testContactErrors ps restart = do
b <- getAgentB
(contactId, cReq) <- withServer1 ps $ runRight $ createConnection a 1 True SCMContact Nothing SMSubscribe
("", "", DOWN _ [_]) <- nGet a
aId <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True cReq PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True cReq PQSupportOn
-- fails to create queue on testPort2
BROKER srv2 (NETWORK _) <- runLeft $ A.joinConnection b NRMInteractive 1 aId True cReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
(testPort2 `isSuffixOf` srv2) `shouldBe` True
@@ -1681,10 +1720,10 @@ testContactErrors ps restart = do
Right r -> error $ "unexpected result " <> show r
Left _ -> putStrLn "retrying send" >> threadDelay 200000 >> loopSend
loopSend
("", _, A.REQ invId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo" _) <- get a
("", _, A.REQ invId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get a
pure invId
("", "", DOWN _ [_]) <- nGet a
bId <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bId, _) <- runRight $ A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
withServer2 ps $ do
("", "", UP _ [_]) <- nGet b''
let loopSecure = do
@@ -1764,7 +1803,7 @@ testInvitationShortLink viaProxy a b =
testJoinConn_ :: Bool -> Bool -> AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentClient -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
testJoinConn_ viaProxy sndSecure a bId b connReq = do
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
sndSecure' <- A.joinConnection b NRMInteractive 1 aId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure' `shouldBe` sndSecure
("", _, CONF confId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
@@ -1774,14 +1813,6 @@ testJoinConn_ viaProxy sndSecure a bId b connReq = do
get b ##> ("", aId, CON)
exchangeGreetingsViaProxy viaProxy a bId b aId
testInvitationShortLinkPrev :: HasCallStack => Bool -> Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> IO ()
testInvitationShortLinkPrev viaProxy sndSecure a b = runRight_ $ do
let userData = UserLinkData "some user data"
newLinkData = UserInvLinkData userData
-- can't create short link with previous version
(bId, CCLink connReq Nothing) <- A.createConnection a NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMInvitation (Just newLinkData) Nothing CR.IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
testJoinConn_ viaProxy sndSecure a bId b connReq
testInvitationShortLinkAsync :: HasCallStack => Bool -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> IO ()
testInvitationShortLinkAsync viaProxy a b = do
let userData = UserLinkData "some user data"
@@ -1792,7 +1823,7 @@ testInvitationShortLinkAsync viaProxy a b = do
connReq' `shouldBe` connReq
linkUserData connData' `shouldBe` userData
runRight $ do
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True connReq PQSupportOn
A.joinConnectionAsync b "123" False aId True connReq "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
get b =##> \case ("123", c, JOINED sndSecure) -> c == aId && sndSecure; _ -> False
("", _, CONF confId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
@@ -1834,7 +1865,7 @@ testContactShortLink viaProxy a b =
(aId, sndSecure) <- joinConnection b 1 True connReq "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure `shouldBe` False
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
bId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
sndSecure' <- acceptContact a 1 bId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure' `shouldBe` True
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get b
@@ -1887,7 +1918,7 @@ testAddContactShortLink viaProxy a b =
(aId, sndSecure) <- joinConnection b 1 True connReq "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure `shouldBe` False
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
bId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
sndSecure' <- acceptContact a 1 bId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure' `shouldBe` True
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get b
@@ -2046,7 +2077,7 @@ testPrepareCreateConnectionLink ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \a b
(bId, sndSecure) <- joinConnection b 1 True connReq' "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure `shouldBe` False
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
aId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
sndSecure' <- acceptContact a 1 aId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure' `shouldBe` True
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get b
@@ -2056,6 +2087,64 @@ testPrepareCreateConnectionLink ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \a b
get b ##> ("", bId, CON)
exchangeGreetings a aId b bId
testPrepareCreateInvitationLink :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testPrepareCreateInvitationLink ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \a b -> do
let userData = UserLinkData "test user data"
runRight_ $ do
(preparedReq, preparedParams@PreparedLinkParams {plpLinkKey}) <- A.prepareInvitationLink a 1 CR.IKPQOn Nothing
(bId, CCLink connReq (Just shortLink@(CSLInvitation _ _ _ linkKey))) <- A.createInvitationForLink a NRMInteractive 1 True preparedReq preparedParams (UserInvLinkData userData) SMSubscribe
liftIO $ linkKey `shouldBe` plpLinkKey
(_, connData', connReq') <- getConnShortLink b 1 shortLink
liftIO $ connReq' `shouldBe` preparedReq
liftIO $ connReq `shouldNotBe` preparedReq
liftIO $ linkUserData connData' `shouldBe` userData
testJoinConn_ False True a bId b connReq
testPrepareInvitationLinkTooLarge :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testPrepareInvitationLinkTooLarge ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
runRight_ $ do
(preparedReq, preparedParams) <- A.prepareInvitationLink a 1 CR.IKPQOn Nothing
Left (A.CMD LARGE _) <- tryError $ A.createInvitationForLink a NRMInteractive 1 True preparedReq preparedParams (UserInvLinkData $ UserLinkData $ B.replicate 14000 'a') SMSubscribe
pure ()
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv a) getConnIds `shouldReturn` []
testPrepareContactLinkTooLarge :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testPrepareContactLinkTooLarge ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
let userCtData = UserContactData {direct = True, owners = [], relays = [], userData = UserLinkData $ B.replicate 14000 'a', ratchetKeys = Nothing}
g <- C.newRandom
rootKey <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
linkEntId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 32 g
runRight_ $ do
(ccLink, preparedParams) <- A.prepareConnectionLink a 1 rootKey linkEntId True Nothing CR.IKPQOn True Nothing
Left (A.CMD LARGE _) <- tryError $ A.createConnectionForLink a NRMInteractive 1 True ccLink preparedParams (UserContactLinkData userCtData) SMSubscribe
pure ()
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv a) getConnIds `shouldReturn` []
testPrepareConnShortLink :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testPrepareConnShortLink ps = withSmpServer ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \a b -> do
let userCtData = UserContactData {direct = True, owners = [], relays = [], userData = UserLinkData "test user data", ratchetKeys = Nothing}
runRight_ $ do
(contactId, CCLink _ Nothing) <- A.createConnection a NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact Nothing Nothing CR.IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
shortLink <- A.prepareConnShortLink a contactId Nothing
shortLink' <- A.prepareConnShortLink a contactId Nothing
liftIO $ shortLink' `shouldBe` shortLink
shortLink'' <- A.setConnShortLink a NRMInteractive contactId SCMContact (UserContactLinkData userCtData) Nothing False Nothing
liftIO $ shortLink'' `shouldBe` shortLink
(_, ContactLinkData _ userCtData', connReq) <- getConnShortLink b 1 shortLink
liftIO $ userCtData' `shouldBe` userCtData
(aId, sndSecure) <- joinConnection b 1 True connReq "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure `shouldBe` False
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get a
(bId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept a 1 True invId PQSupportOn
sndSecure' <- acceptContact a 1 bId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sndSecure' `shouldBe` True
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get b
allowConnection b aId confId "bob's connInfo"
get a ##> ("", bId, INFO "bob's connInfo")
get a ##> ("", bId, CON)
get b ##> ("", aId, CON)
exchangeGreetings a bId b aId
connReqWithKeys :: BinaryConnectionRequestUri m -> Maybe AddressRatchetKeys -> ConnectionRequestUri m
connReqWithKeys cr rk = case cr of
BCRInvitationUri crData e2eParams -> CRInvitationUri crData e2eParams
@@ -2484,6 +2573,49 @@ testExpireManyMessagesQuota (t, msType) = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg' testPort
where
cfg' = updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 1, maxJournalMsgCount = 2}
testJoinFullContactAsync :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testJoinFullContactAsync (t, msType) = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg' testPort $ \_ -> do
(contactId, qInfo) <- fillContactAddress
withAgent 2 agentCfg {commandQuotaRetryInterval = fastRetryInterval} initAgentServers testDB2 $ \bob -> do
aliceId <- runRight $ do
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
A.joinConnectionAsync bob "2" False aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
pure aliceId
threadDelay 500000
noMessages bob "joining should be retried while the address is full"
withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \alice -> runRight_ $ do
subscribeConnection alice contactId
("", _, A.REQ _ _ _ "carol's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
get bob =##> \case ("2", c, JOINED False) -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
("", _, A.REQ _ _ _ "bob's connInfo" _ _) <- get alice
pure ()
where
cfg' = updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 1, maxJournalMsgCount = 2}
testJoinFullContactAsyncExpire :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testJoinFullContactAsyncExpire (t, msType) = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg' testPort $ \_ -> do
(_, qInfo) <- fillContactAddress
withAgent 2 agentCfg {quotaExceededTimeout = 2, commandQuotaRetryInterval = fastRetryInterval} initAgentServers testDB2 $ \bob -> do
aliceId <- runRight $ do
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
A.joinConnectionAsync bob "2" False aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
pure aliceId
threadDelay 500000
noMessages bob "joining should be retried until quota exceeded timeout"
get bob =##> \case ("2", c, ERR (SMP _ QUOTA)) -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
where
cfg' = updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 1, maxJournalMsgCount = 2}
fillContactAddress :: HasCallStack => IO (ConnId, ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact)
fillContactAddress = do
(contactId, qInfo) <- withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \alice -> runRight $ do
(contactId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMContact Nothing Nothing IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
pure (contactId, qInfo)
withAgent 3 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB3 $ \carol -> runRight_ $ do
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin carol 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
void $ A.joinConnection carol NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "carol's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
pure (contactId, qInfo)
testDropMsgAfterRcvAttempts :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testDropMsgAfterRcvAttempts ps =
withSmpServerStoreLogOn ps testPort $ \_ -> do
@@ -2698,6 +2830,117 @@ testRatchetSyncSimultaneous ps = do
disposeAgentClient bob
disposeAgentClient bob2
testRatchetSyncReplayedKey :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testRatchetSyncReplayedKey ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(aliceId, bobId, bob2) <- withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ ->
setupDesynchronizedRatchet alice bob
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet alice
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet bob2
_ <- runRight $ synchronizeRatchet bob2 aliceId PQSupportOn False
Right pks <- withTransaction (store $ agentEnv bob2) (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` aliceId)
Right (SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ _ (sq :| _))) <- withTransaction (store $ agentEnv bob2) (`getConn` aliceId)
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ -> do
concurrently_
(getInAnyOrder alice [ratchetSyncP' bobId RSAgreed, serverUpP])
(getInAnyOrder bob2 [ratchetSyncP' aliceId RSAgreed, serverUpP])
get alice =##> ratchetSyncP bobId RSOk
get bob2 =##> ratchetSyncP aliceId RSOk
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv alice) $ \db -> deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db 0 100
let keyMsg = AgentRatchetKey {agentVersion = currentSMPAgentVersion, e2eEncryption = CR.mkRcvE2ERatchetParams CR.currentE2EEncryptVersion pks, info = ""}
Right _ <- runReaderT (runExceptT $ sendAgentMessage bob2 sq SMP.noMsgFlags $ smpEncode keyMsg) (agentEnv bob2)
runRight_ $ exchangeGreetingsMsgIds alice bobId 10 bob2 aliceId 7
disposeAgentClient bob2
testRatchetSyncRepeated :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testRatchetSyncRepeated ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(aliceId, bobId, bob2) <- startRatchetSyncOffline ps alice bob
ConnectionStats {ratchetSyncState = rss2} <- runRight $ synchronizeRatchet bob2 aliceId PQSupportOn True
rss2 `shouldBe` RSStarted
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ -> do
concurrently_
(getInAnyOrder alice [ratchetSyncP' bobId RSAgreed, serverUpP])
(getInAnyOrder bob2 [ratchetSyncP' aliceId RSAgreed, serverUpP])
runRight_ $ do
get alice =##> ratchetSyncP bobId RSAgreed
get alice =##> ratchetSyncP bobId RSOk
get bob2 =##> ratchetSyncP aliceId RSOk
msgId <- sendMessage alice bobId SMP.noMsgFlags "hello"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT msgId)
get bob2 =##> \case ("", c, Msg "hello") -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
ackMessage bob2 aliceId 8 Nothing
map fst <$> processedRatchetKeyHashes bob2 `shouldReturn` [aliceId, aliceId]
disposeAgentClient bob2
testRatchetSyncFailedKeyNotProcessed :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testRatchetSyncFailedKeyNotProcessed ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(aliceId, bobId, bob2) <- startRatchetSyncOffline ps alice bob
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv bob2) $ \db ->
DB.execute_ db "UPDATE ratchets SET x3dh_priv_key_1 = NULL"
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ ->
concurrently_
(getInAnyOrder alice [ratchetSyncP' bobId RSAgreed, serverUpP])
(getInAnyOrder bob2 [x3dhKeysNotFoundP aliceId, serverUpP])
map fst <$> processedRatchetKeyHashes alice `shouldReturn` [bobId]
processedRatchetKeyHashes bob2 `shouldReturn` []
disposeAgentClient bob2
where
x3dhKeysNotFoundP :: ConnId -> ATransmission -> Bool
x3dhKeysNotFoundP cId = \case
(_, cId', AEvt SAEConn (ERR (A.INTERNAL e))) -> cId' == cId && "SEX3dhKeysNotFound" `isPrefixOf` e
_ -> False
testRatchetSyncFailedRecreationNoReply :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testRatchetSyncFailedRecreationNoReply ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(_, bobId, bob2) <- startRatchetSyncOffline ps alice bob
aliceSndMsgs <- sndMessages alice
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv alice) $ \db ->
DB.execute_ db "CREATE TRIGGER fail_ratchet_insert BEFORE INSERT ON ratchets BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'ratchet insert failed'); END"
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ ->
concurrently_
(getInAnyOrder alice [ratchetInsertFailedP bobId, serverUpP])
(getInAnyOrder bob2 [serverUpP])
processedRatchetKeyHashes alice `shouldReturn` []
sndMessages alice `shouldReturn` aliceSndMsgs
disposeAgentClient bob2
where
ratchetInsertFailedP :: ConnId -> ATransmission -> Bool
ratchetInsertFailedP cId = \case
(_, cId', AEvt SAEConn (ERR (A.INTERNAL e))) -> cId' == cId && "ratchet insert failed" `isInfixOf` e
_ -> False
testRatchetSyncStartFailedNoKey :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testRatchetSyncStartFailedNoKey ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob -> do
(aliceId, _, bob2) <- withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ ->
setupDesynchronizedRatchet alice bob
bobSndMsgs <- sndMessages bob2
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv bob2) $ \db ->
DB.execute_ db "CREATE TRIGGER fail_ratchet_update BEFORE UPDATE ON ratchets BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'ratchet update failed'); END"
Left (A.INTERNAL e) <- runExceptT $ synchronizeRatchet bob2 aliceId PQSupportOff False
e `shouldContain` "ratchet update failed"
ConnectionStats {ratchetSyncState} <- runRight $ getConnectionServers bob2 aliceId
ratchetSyncState `shouldBe` RSRequired
withTransaction (store $ agentEnv bob2) (`DB.query_` "SELECT conn_id, pq_support FROM connections") `shouldReturn` [(aliceId, PQSupportOn)]
sndMessages bob2 `shouldReturn` bobSndMsgs
disposeAgentClient bob2
startRatchetSyncOffline :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> AgentClient -> AgentClient -> IO (ConnId, ConnId, AgentClient)
startRatchetSyncOffline ps alice bob = do
(aliceId, bobId, bob2) <- withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn ps testPort $ \_ ->
setupDesynchronizedRatchet alice bob
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet alice
("", "", DOWN _ _) <- nGet bob2
ConnectionStats {ratchetSyncState} <- runRight $ synchronizeRatchet bob2 aliceId PQSupportOn False
ratchetSyncState `shouldBe` RSStarted
pure (aliceId, bobId, bob2)
processedRatchetKeyHashes :: AgentClient -> IO [(ConnId, ByteString)]
processedRatchetKeyHashes c = withTransaction (store $ agentEnv c) (`DB.query_` "SELECT conn_id, hash FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes")
sndMessages :: AgentClient -> IO [(ConnId, Int64)]
sndMessages c = withTransaction (store $ agentEnv c) (`DB.query_` "SELECT conn_id, internal_id FROM snd_messages ORDER BY conn_id, internal_id")
getMsg :: AgentClient -> ConnId -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO a -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO a
getMsg c cId action = do
liftIO $ noMessages c "nothing should be delivered before GET"
@@ -2749,7 +2992,7 @@ makeConnectionForUsers = makeConnectionForUsers_ PQSupportOn
makeConnectionForUsers_ :: HasCallStack => PQSupport -> AgentClient -> UserId -> AgentClient -> UserId -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO (ConnId, ConnId)
makeConnectionForUsers_ pqSupport alice aliceUserId bob bobUserId = do
(bobId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive aliceUserId True True SCMInvitation Nothing Nothing (IKLinkPQ pqSupport) False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob bobUserId True qInfo pqSupport
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob bobUserId True qInfo pqSupport
sqSecured' <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive bobUserId aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" pqSupport SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured' `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
@@ -3031,7 +3274,7 @@ testAsyncCommands alice bob baseId =
createConnectionAsync alice "1" bobId True SCMInvitation IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
("1", bobId', INV (ACR _ qInfo)) <- get alice
liftIO $ bobId' `shouldBe` bobId
aliceId <- prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
joinConnectionAsync bob "2" False aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("2", aliceId', JOINED sqSecured') <- get bob
liftIO $ do
@@ -3101,7 +3344,7 @@ testSetConnShortLinkAsync ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob ->
-- complete connection via contact address
(aliceId, _) <- joinConnection bob 1 True qInfo "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
_ <- acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConnection bob aliceId confId "bob's connInfo"
@@ -3129,7 +3372,7 @@ testGetConnShortLinkAsync ps = withAgentClients2 $ \alice bob ->
liftIO $ aliceId' `shouldBe` aliceId
-- complete connection
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
bobId <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bobId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
_ <- acceptContact alice 1 bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
allowConnection bob aliceId confId "bob's connInfo"
@@ -3159,7 +3402,7 @@ testAcceptContactAsync alice bob baseId =
(aliceId, sqSecuredJoin) <- joinConnection bob 1 True qInfo "bob's connInfo" SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecuredJoin `shouldBe` False -- joining via contact address connection
("", _, REQ invId _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
bobId <- prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
(bobId, _) <- prepareConnectionToAccept alice 1 True invId PQSupportOn
acceptContactAsync alice "1" bobId True invId "alice's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
get alice =##> \case ("1", c, JOINED sqSecured') -> c == bobId && sqSecured' == True; _ -> False
("", _, CONF confId _ "alice's connInfo") <- get bob
@@ -3440,7 +3683,7 @@ testJoinConnectionAsyncReplyError ps@(t, ASType qsType _) = do
createConnectionAsync a "1" bId True SCMInvitation IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
("1", bId', INV (ACR _ qInfo)) <- get a
liftIO $ bId' `shouldBe` bId
aId <- prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aId, _) <- prepareConnectionToJoin b 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
joinConnectionAsync b "2" False aId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ threadDelay 500000
ConnectionStats {rcvQueuesInfo = [], sndQueuesInfo = [SndQueueInfo {}]} <- getConnectionServers b aId
@@ -3580,7 +3823,7 @@ testFastSwitchDeadOldServer :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO
testFastSwitchDeadOldServer ps@(t, ASType qsType _) = do
let bServers = initAgentServers {smp = userServers [testSMPServer2]}
withSmpServerConfigOn t (cfgJ2QS qsType) testPort2 $ \_ ->
withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a ->
withAgent 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a ->
withAgent 2 agentCfg bServers testDB2 $ \b -> do
(aId, bId) <- withSmpServerStoreLogOn ps testPort $ \_ -> runRight $ do
(aId, bId) <- makeConnection a b
@@ -3596,7 +3839,10 @@ testFastSwitchDeadOldServer ps@(t, ASType qsType _) = do
queuedReceived <- drainSwitchCompletedRcvMsg a bId "queued while down"
liftIO $ queuedReceived `shouldBe` True
drainSwitchCompleted b aId QDSnd
waitOneRcvQueue a bId
exchangeGreetingsMsgId 7 a bId b aId
where
aCfg = agentCfg {initialCleanupDelay = 10000, cleanupInterval = 10000, deleteErrorCount = 3}
-- drains switch and network events until the connection reports SPCompleted in the given direction,
-- tolerating DOWN/UP and intermediate phases (the old server is stopped mid-rotation)
@@ -3616,6 +3862,69 @@ drainSwitchCompletedRcvMsg c connId body = go False
(_, connId', AEvt SAEConn (Msg' mId _ body')) | connId' == connId && body' == body -> ackMessage c connId' mId Nothing >> go True
_ -> go seen
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueue :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueue ps =
withSmpServers2 ps $ withAgentClients2 $ \a b -> runRight_ $ do
(aId, bId, aM1Id) <- endSwitchOnNewQueue a b
ackMessage a bId aM1Id Nothing
drainOldQueue a bId b aId
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueueRestart :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> IO ()
testFastSwitchDrainOldQueueRestart ps =
withSmpServers2 ps $
withAgent 2 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB2 $ \b -> do
(aId, bId, _) <- withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> runRight $ endSwitchOnNewQueue a b
withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> runRight_ $ do
subscribeConnection a bId
drainOldQueue a bId b aId
endSwitchOnNewQueue :: HasCallStack => AgentClient -> AgentClient -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO (ConnId, ConnId, AgentMsgId)
endSwitchOnNewQueue a b = do
(aId, bId) <- makeConnection a b
exchangeGreetings a bId b aId
liftIO $ setProtocolServers a 1 [noAuthSrvCfg testSMPServer2]
m1Id <- sendMessage b aId SMP.noMsgFlags "m1"
get b ##> ("", aId, SENT m1Id)
("", c, Msg' aM1Id _ "m1") <- get a
liftIO $ c `shouldBe` bId
m2Id <- sendMessage b aId SMP.noMsgFlags "m2"
get b ##> ("", aId, SENT m2Id)
_ <- switchConnectionAsync a "" bId
fastSwitchComplete a bId b aId
stats <- getConnectionServers a bId
liftIO $ rcvSwchStatuses' stats `shouldMatchList` [Nothing, Just RSReceivedQEND]
pure (aId, bId, aM1Id)
drainOldQueue :: HasCallStack => AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentClient -> ConnId -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
drainOldQueue a bId b aId = do
("", c, MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (aM2Id, _)} _ "m2") <- get a
liftIO $ c `shouldBe` bId
ackMessage a bId aM2Id Nothing
waitOneRcvQueue a bId
bMsgId <- sendMessage b aId SMP.noMsgFlags "hello"
get b ##> ("", aId, SENT bMsgId)
("", c', MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (aMsgId, _)} _ "hello") <- get a
liftIO $ c' `shouldBe` bId
ackMessage a bId aMsgId Nothing
aMsgId' <- sendMessage a bId SMP.noMsgFlags "hello too"
get a ##> ("", bId, SENT aMsgId')
("", c'', MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (bMsgId', _)} _ "hello too") <- get b
liftIO $ c'' `shouldBe` aId
ackMessage b aId bMsgId' Nothing
liftIO $ noMessages a "nothing else should be delivered to alice"
liftIO $ noMessages b "nothing else should be delivered to bob"
waitOneRcvQueue :: HasCallStack => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
waitOneRcvQueue c connId = go (300 :: Int)
where
go n = do
stats <- getConnectionServers c connId
case rcvSwchStatuses' stats of
[Nothing] -> pure ()
statuses
| n > 0 -> liftIO (threadDelay 100000) >> go (n - 1)
| otherwise -> liftIO $ expectationFailure $ "old receive queue was not deleted: " <> show statuses
phaseRcv :: AgentClient -> ByteString -> SwitchPhase -> [Maybe RcvSwitchStatus] -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
phaseRcv c connId p swchStatuses = phase c connId QDRcv p (\stats -> rcvSwchStatuses' stats `shouldMatchList` swchStatuses)
@@ -4023,13 +4332,23 @@ testServerInformation =
serverCountry = Nothing
}
testRatchetAdHash :: HasCallStack => IO ()
testRatchetAdHash =
testConnectionVerifyCodes :: HasCallStack => IO ()
testConnectionVerifyCodes =
withAgentClients2 $ \a b -> runRight_ $ do
(aId, bId) <- makeConnection a b
ad1 <- getConnectionRatchetAdHash a bId
ad2 <- getConnectionRatchetAdHash b aId
liftIO $ ad1 `shouldBe` ad2
codes1 <- getConnectionVerifyCodes a bId
codes2 <- getConnectionVerifyCodes b aId
liftIO $ do
codes1 `shouldBe` codes2
codePQ codes1 `shouldNotBe` Nothing
liftIO $ withTransaction (store $ agentEnv a) $ \db ->
DB.execute_ db "UPDATE ratchets SET rc_verify_code_ad = NULL, rc_verify_code_pq = NULL"
codes1' <- getConnectionVerifyCodes a bId
liftIO $ codes1' `shouldBe` codes1
liftIO $ withTransaction (store $ agentEnv a) $ \db ->
DB.execute_ db "UPDATE ratchets SET ratchet_state = NULL"
codes1'' <- getConnectionVerifyCodes a bId
liftIO $ codes1'' `shouldBe` codes1
testDeliveryReceipts :: HasCallStack => IO ()
testDeliveryReceipts =
@@ -4618,8 +4937,7 @@ testServerMultipleIdentities =
testE2ERatchetParams12
testWaitForUserNetwork :: IO ()
testWaitForUserNetwork = do
a <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB
testWaitForUserNetwork = withAgent 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
noNetworkDelay a
setUserNetworkInfo a $ UserNetworkInfo UNNone False
networkDelay a 100000
@@ -4636,8 +4954,7 @@ testWaitForUserNetwork = do
aCfg = agentCfg {userNetworkInterval = 100000, userOfflineDelay = 0}
testDoNotResetOnlineToOffline :: IO ()
testDoNotResetOnlineToOffline = do
a <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB
testDoNotResetOnlineToOffline = withAgent 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
noNetworkDelay a
setUserNetworkInfo a $ UserNetworkInfo UNWifi False
networkDelay a 100000
@@ -4658,8 +4975,7 @@ testDoNotResetOnlineToOffline = do
aCfg = agentCfg {userNetworkInterval = 100000, userOfflineDelay = 0.1}
testResumeMultipleThreads :: IO ()
testResumeMultipleThreads = do
a <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB
testResumeMultipleThreads = withAgent 1 aCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
noNetworkDelay a
setUserNetworkInfo a $ UserNetworkInfo UNNone False
vs <-
@@ -4705,7 +5021,7 @@ testServerQueueInfo = do
Just srvMsgId <- checkMsgQ bob aliceId 1
get bob =##> \case
("", c, MSG MsgMeta {integrity = MsgOk, broker = (smId, _), recipient = (mId, _), pqEncryption = PQEncOn} _ "hello") ->
c == aliceId && decodeLatin1 (B64.encode smId) == srvMsgId && mId == msgId
c == aliceId && decodeLatin1 (B64.encode $ SMP.unMsgId smId) == srvMsgId && mId == msgId
_ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId msgId Nothing
liftIO $ threadDelay 200000
@@ -4736,9 +5052,9 @@ testServerQueueInfo = do
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' mId PQEncOn "hello 4") -> c == aliceId && mId == msgId4; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId msgId4 Nothing
liftIO $ threadDelay 200000
Just _ <- checkMsgQ bob aliceId 1 -- the one that did not fit now accepted
get alice ##> ("", bobId, QCONT)
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT msgId5)
Just _ <- checkMsgQ bob aliceId 1 -- the one that did not fit now accepted
liftIO $ threadDelay 200000
Just _srvMsgId <- checkQ bob aliceId True (Just QNoSub) 1 (Just MTMessage)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg' mId PQEncOn "hello: quota exceeded") -> c == aliceId && mId == msgId5 + 1; _ -> False
+13 -13
View File
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ testNotificationToken apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a tkn
deleteNtfToken a tkn
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ testNtfTokenRepeatRegistration apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
NTRegistered <- registerNtfToken a tkn NMPeriodic
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData'}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
@@ -273,14 +273,14 @@ testNtfTokenSecondRegistration apns =
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce verification
NTRegistered <- registerNtfToken a' tkn NMPeriodic
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData'}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification' <- ntfData' .-> "verification"
nonce' <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData' .-> "nonce"
nonce' <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData' .-> "nonce"
-- at this point the first token is still active
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a tkn
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ testNtfTokenServerRestart t apns = do
-- so that repeat verification happens without restarting the clients, when notification arrives
withNtfServer t $ runRight_ $ do
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a' tkn nonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a' tkn
pure ()
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ testNtfTokenServerRestartReverify t apns = do
pure ntfData
runRight_ $ do
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
Left (BROKER _ (NETWORK _)) <- tryE $ verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce verification
pure ()
threadDelay 1500000
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ testNtfTokenServerRestartReverifyTimeout t apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce verification
pure (nonce, verification)
-- this emulates the situation when server verified token but the client did not receive the response
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ testNtfTokenServerRestartReregister t apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a' tkn nonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a' tkn
pure ()
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ testNtfTokenServerRestartReregisterTimeout t apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a' tkn nonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a' tkn
pure ()
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ testNtfTokenMultipleServers t apns = do
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a tkn
-- shut down the "other" server
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ testNotificationSubscriptionExistingConnection apns baseId alice@AgentClient {ag
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn
verification <- ntfData .-> "verification"
vNonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
vNonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken alice tkn vNonce verification
NTActive <- checkNtfToken alice tkn
-- send message
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ registerTestToken a token mode apns = do
Just APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData'}} <-
timeout 1000000 $ getMockNotification apns tkn
verification' <- ntfData' .-> "verification"
nonce' <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData' .-> "nonce"
nonce' <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData' .-> "nonce"
verifyNtfToken a tkn nonce' verification'
NTActive <- checkNtfToken a tkn
pure tkn
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ messageNotification apns tkn = do
500000 `timeout` getMockNotification apns tkn >>= \case
Nothing -> error "no notification"
Just APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSMutableContent {}, notificationData = Just ntfData}} -> do
nonce <- C.cbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
nonce <- C.unsafeCbNonce <$> ntfData .-> "nonce"
message <- ntfData .-> "message"
pure (nonce, message)
_ -> error "bad notification"
+48 -5
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@@ -20,12 +20,13 @@ import Control.Concurrent.Async (concurrently_)
import Control.Concurrent.MVar
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Exception (SomeException)
import Control.Monad (replicateM_)
import Control.Monad (forM_, replicateM_)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.List (isInfixOf)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
import Data.Time
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (pattern IKPQOn)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet as CR
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EntityId (..), QueueMode (..), SubscriptionMode (..), pattern VersionSMPC)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
@@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ storeTests = do
testCreateRcvMsg
testCreateSndMsg
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs
describe "deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired" testDeleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired
it "should keep only the newest skipped message keys" testGetSkippedMsgKeys
describe "Work items" $ do
it "should getPendingQueueMsg" testGetPendingQueueMsg
it "should getPendingServerCommand" testGetPendingServerCommand
@@ -509,7 +513,7 @@ hw = encodeUtf8 "Hello world!"
ts :: UTCTime
ts = UTCTime (fromGregorian 2021 02 24) (secondsToDiffTime 0)
mkRcvMsgData :: InternalId -> InternalRcvId -> ExternalSndId -> BrokerId -> MsgHash -> RcvMsgData
mkRcvMsgData :: InternalId -> InternalRcvId -> ExternalSndId -> ByteString -> MsgHash -> RcvMsgData
mkRcvMsgData internalId internalRcvId externalSndId brokerId internalHash =
RcvMsgData
{ internalRcvId,
@@ -518,7 +522,7 @@ mkRcvMsgData internalId internalRcvId externalSndId brokerId internalHash =
{ integrity = MsgOk,
recipient = (unId internalId, ts),
sndMsgId = externalSndId,
broker = (brokerId, ts),
broker = (SMP.unsafeMsgId $ mconcat (replicate 24 brokerId), ts),
pqEncryption = CR.PQEncOn
},
msgType = AM_A_MSG_,
@@ -599,6 +603,42 @@ testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs =
testCreateSndMsg_ db "snd_hash_1" connId sq $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 5) (InternalSndId 2) "snd_hash_2"
testCreateSndMsg_ db "snd_hash_2" connId sq $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 6) (InternalSndId 3) "snd_hash_3"
testDeleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired :: SpecWith DBStore
testDeleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired =
it "should delete expired ratchet key hashes except the newest in each connection" . withStoreTransaction $ \db -> do
g <- C.newRandom
Right connId <- createNewConn db g cData1 {connId = ""} SCMInvitation
Right connId' <- createNewConn db g cData1 {connId = ""} SCMContact
let hashes = ["h1", "h2", "h3", "h4", "h5", "h6"]
forM_ hashes $ addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId
forM_ (take 4 hashes) $ addProcessedRatchetKeyHash db connId'
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db 86400 4
mapM (checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId) hashes `shouldReturn` replicate 6 True
deleteRatchetKeyHashesExpired db 0 4
mapM (checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId) hashes `shouldReturn` [False, False, True, True, True, True]
mapM (checkRatchetKeyHashExists db connId') (take 4 hashes) `shouldReturn` replicate 4 True
testGetSkippedMsgKeys :: DBStore -> Expectation
testGetSkippedMsgKeys st = do
g <- C.newRandom
withTransaction st $ \db -> do
Right connId <- createNewConn db g cData1 {connId = ""} SCMInvitation
Right connId' <- createNewConn db g cData1 {connId = ""} SCMInvitation
createSkippedKeys db connId'
createSkippedKeys db connId
M.map M.keys <$> getSkippedMsgKeys db connId 4
`shouldReturn` M.singleton (C.Key "header_key") [1, 2, 3, 4]
getMsgNs db connId `shouldReturn` [1 .. 4]
getMsgNs db connId' `shouldReturn` [1 .. 10]
where
createSkippedKeys :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO ()
createSkippedKeys db connId = do
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO ratchets (conn_id) VALUES (?)" (Only connId)
forM_ ([10, 9 .. 1] :: [Int]) $ \msgN ->
DB.execute db "INSERT INTO skipped_messages (conn_id, header_key, msg_n, msg_key) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)" (connId, "header_key" :: ByteString, msgN, smpEncode ("key" :: ByteString, "iv" :: ByteString))
getMsgNs :: DB.Connection -> ConnId -> IO [Int]
getMsgNs db connId = map fromOnly <$> DB.query db "SELECT msg_n FROM skipped_messages WHERE conn_id = ? ORDER BY msg_n" (Only connId)
testCloseReopenStore :: IO ()
testCloseReopenStore = do
st <- createStore'
@@ -648,7 +688,7 @@ hasMigrations :: DBStore -> Expectation
hasMigrations st = getMigrations st `shouldReturn` True
errorGettingMigrations :: DBStore -> Expectation
errorGettingMigrations st = getMigrations st `shouldThrow` \(e :: SomeException) -> "ErrorMisuse" `isInfixOf` show e
errorGettingMigrations st = getMigrations st `shouldThrow` \(e :: SomeException) -> "withTransaction: database closed" `isInfixOf` show e
testGetPendingQueueMsg :: DBStore -> Expectation
testGetPendingQueueMsg st = do
@@ -743,9 +783,11 @@ testGetNextRcvChunkToDownload st = do
withTransaction st $ \db -> do
Right Nothing <- getNextRcvChunkToDownload db xftpServer1 86400
Right _ <- createRcvFile db g 1 rcvFileDescr1 "filepath" "filepath" (CryptoFile "filepath" Nothing) True
Right fId1 <- createRcvFile db g 1 rcvFileDescr1 "filepath" "filepath" (CryptoFile "filepath" Nothing) True
Right _ <- startPreparedRcvFile db fId1
DB.execute_ db "UPDATE rcv_file_chunk_replicas SET replica_key = cast('bad' as blob) WHERE rcv_file_chunk_replica_id = 1"
Right fId2 <- createRcvFile db g 1 rcvFileDescr1 "filepath" "filepath" (CryptoFile "filepath" Nothing) True
Right _ <- startPreparedRcvFile db fId2
Left e <- getNextRcvChunkToDownload db xftpServer1 86400
show e `shouldContain` "ConversionFailed"
@@ -783,6 +825,7 @@ testGetNextSndFileToPrepare st = do
-- Right _ <- createSndFile db g 1 (CryptoFile "filepath" Nothing) 1 "filepath" testFileSbKey testFileCbNonce Nothing
-- DB.execute_ db "UPDATE snd_files SET status = 'new', num_recipients = 'bad' WHERE snd_file_id = 1"
Right fId2 <- createSndFile db g 1 (CryptoFile "filepath" Nothing) 1 "filepath" testFileSbKey testFileCbNonce Nothing Nothing
Right _ <- startPreparedSndFile db fId2
DB.execute_ db "UPDATE snd_files SET status = 'new' WHERE snd_file_id = 2"
-- Left e <- getNextSndFileToPrepare db 86400
+36 -1
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@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ schemaDumpTest = do
it "verify strict tables" testVerifyStrict
it "should NOT create user record for new database" testUsersMigrationNew
it "should create user record for old database" testUsersMigrationOld
it "should remove duplicate ratchet key hashes before adding unique index" testRatchetKeyHashesUniqueMigration
it "should clear received_qend switch status on downgrade" testRcvSwitchStatusDowngrade
testVerifySchemaDump :: IO ()
testVerifySchemaDump = do
@@ -114,12 +116,45 @@ testUsersMigrationOld = do
`shouldReturn` ([Only (1 :: Int)])
closeDBStore st'
testRatchetKeyHashesUniqueMigration :: IO ()
testRatchetKeyHashesUniqueMigration = do
let beforeUnique = takeWhile (("m20260929_ratchet_indexes" /=) . name) appMigrations
Right st <- createDBStore (DBOpts testDB [] "" False True TQOff) beforeUnique (MigrationConfig MCError Nothing)
withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO users (user_id) VALUES (1)"
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO connections (conn_id, conn_mode, user_id) VALUES (x'01', 'INV', 1), (x'02', 'INV', 1)"
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO processed_ratchet_key_hashes (conn_id, hash) VALUES (x'01', x'aa'), (x'01', x'aa'), (x'01', x'bb'), (x'02', x'aa'), (x'01', x'aa')"
closeDBStore st
Right st' <- createDBStore (DBOpts testDB [] "" False True TQOff) appMigrations (MigrationConfig MCYesUp Nothing)
withTransaction' st' (`SQL.query_` "SELECT processed_ratchet_key_hash_id FROM processed_ratchet_key_hashes ORDER BY processed_ratchet_key_hash_id")
`shouldReturn` [Only (1 :: Int), Only 3, Only 4]
closeDBStore st'
testRcvSwitchStatusDowngrade :: IO ()
testRcvSwitchStatusDowngrade = do
Right st <- createDBStore (DBOpts testDB [] "" False True TQOff) appMigrations (MigrationConfig MCError Nothing)
withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO users (user_id) VALUES (1)"
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO connections (conn_id, conn_mode, user_id) VALUES (x'01', 'INV', 1)"
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO servers (host, port, key_hash) VALUES ('localhost', '5001', x'00')"
SQL.execute_ db "INSERT INTO rcv_queues (host, port, rcv_id, conn_id, rcv_private_key, rcv_dh_secret, e2e_priv_key, snd_id, status, rcv_queue_id, rcv_primary, switch_status) VALUES ('localhost', '5001', x'01', x'01', x'00', x'00', x'00', x'01', 'active', 1, 0, 'received_qend'), ('localhost', '5001', x'02', x'01', x'00', x'00', x'00', x'02', 'active', 2, 1, 'sending_qadd')"
closeDBStore st
let beforeRcvSwitchStatus = takeWhile (("m20261008_rcv_switch_status" /=) . name) appMigrations
Right st' <- createDBStore (DBOpts testDB [] "" False True TQOff) beforeRcvSwitchStatus (MigrationConfig MCYesUpDown Nothing)
withTransaction' st' (`SQL.query_` "SELECT switch_status FROM rcv_queues ORDER BY rcv_queue_id")
`shouldReturn` [Only (Nothing :: Maybe Text), Only (Just "sending_qadd")]
closeDBStore st'
skipComparisonForDownMigrations :: [String]
skipComparisonForDownMigrations =
[ -- on down migration idx_messages_internal_snd_id_ts index moves down to the end of the file
"m20230814_indexes",
-- snd_secure and last_broker_ts columns swap order on down migration
"m20250322_short_links"
"m20250322_short_links",
-- on down migration idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_hash index moves down to the end of the file
"m20260929_ratchet_indexes",
-- sqlite_sequence moves after commands table after VACUUM
"m20261005_commands_autoincrement"
]
getSchema :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO String
+1 -3
View File
@@ -71,9 +71,7 @@ initServers =
}
testChooseDifferentOperator :: IO ()
testChooseDifferentOperator = do
c <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg initServers testDB
runRight_ $ do
testChooseDifferentOperator = withAgent 1 agentCfg initServers testDB $ \c -> runRight_ $ do
-- chooses the only operator with storage role
srv1 <- withAgentEnv c $ getNextServer c 1 storageSrvs []
liftIO $ srv1 == testOp1Srv1 || srv1 == testOp1Srv2 `shouldBe` True
+29 -5
View File
@@ -14,11 +14,13 @@ import Control.Monad
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.ByteString as B
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.ByteString.Unsafe (unsafeUseAsCString)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime, getSystemTime)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import qualified Data.X509.CertificateStore as XS
import qualified Data.X509.File as XF
import Foreign.Ptr (plusPtr)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -40,6 +42,8 @@ batchingTests = do
it "should batch subscription responses with message" testBatchSubResponses
it "should break on message that does not fit" testClientBatchWithMessage
it "should break on large message" testClientBatchWithLargeMessage
describe "tDecodeServer" $
it "should copy IDs out of received block" testDecodeServerCopiesIds
testBatchSubscriptions :: IO ()
testBatchSubscriptions = do
@@ -166,6 +170,26 @@ testClientBatchWithLargeMessage = do
(length rs1', length rs2') `shouldBe` (75, 135)
all lenOk [s1', s2'] `shouldBe` True
testDecodeServerCopiesIds :: IO ()
testDecodeServerCopiesIds = do
sessId <- atomically . C.randomBytes 32 =<< C.newRandom
subs <- replicateM 2 $ randomSUB sessId
let thParams = testTHandleParams sessId
[TBTransmissions s 2 _] <- pure $ batchTransmissions thParams $ L.fromList subs
forM_ (tParse thParams s) $ \t -> do
let (corrId, entId, _) = tDecodeClient @SMPVersion @ErrorType @Cmd thParams t
Right (_, _, (corrId', entId', _)) <- pure $ tDecodeServer @SMPVersion @ErrorType @Cmd (testTHandleParams sessId) t
(corrId', entId') `shouldBe` (corrId, entId)
sharesBuffer s (bs corrId) `shouldReturn` True
sharesBuffer s (unEntityId entId) `shouldReturn` True
sharesBuffer s (bs corrId') `shouldReturn` False
sharesBuffer s (unEntityId entId') `shouldReturn` False
sharesBuffer :: ByteString -> ByteString -> IO Bool
sharesBuffer block s =
unsafeUseAsCString block $ \blockPtr -> unsafeUseAsCString s $ \ptr ->
pure $ ptr >= blockPtr && ptr < blockPtr `plusPtr` B.length block
testClientStub :: IO (ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg)
testClientStub = do
g <- C.newRandom
@@ -183,7 +207,7 @@ randomSUB sessId = do
thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth g rKey
let thParams = testTHandleParams sessId
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, EntityId rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ True (Just rpKey) nonce tForAuth
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ True (Just rpKey) (Just nonce) tForAuth
randomSUBCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
randomSUBCmd c = do
@@ -202,7 +226,7 @@ randomNMSGCmd :: SystemTime -> IO (Transmission BrokerMsg)
randomNMSGCmd ts = do
g <- C.newRandom
nId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
msgId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
msgId <- atomically $ randomMsgId 24 g
(k, pk) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
let msgMeta = NMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs = ts}
@@ -221,7 +245,7 @@ randomMSG = do
g <- C.newRandom
corrId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
rId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
msgId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
msgId <- atomically $ randomMsgId 24 g
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
pure (CorrId corrId, EntityId rId, MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody msg})
@@ -235,9 +259,9 @@ randomSEND sessId len = do
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes len g
let thParams = testTHandleParams sessId
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, EntityId sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ False (Just spKey) nonce tForAuth
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ False (Just spKey) (Just nonce) tForAuth
testTHandleParams :: ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient
testTHandleParams :: ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion p
testTHandleParams sessionId =
THandleParams
{ sessionId,
+29 -1
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
module CoreTests.CryptoTests (cryptoTests) where
import Control.Concurrent (forkIO, newEmptyMVar, putMVar, takeMVar)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Exception (evaluate)
import Control.Exception (bracket, evaluate)
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -22,9 +23,12 @@ import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..))
import qualified Data.Text.Lazy as LT
import qualified Data.Text.Lazy.Encoding as LE
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Word (Word8)
import qualified Data.X509 as X
import qualified Data.X509.CertificateStore as XS
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import Foreign (FunPtr, allocaBytes, fillBytes, freeHaskellFunPtr, nullPtr)
import Foreign.C.Types (CInt, CSize (..))
import qualified SMPClient
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
@@ -32,9 +36,12 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.BBS
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Entitlement
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI (c_sntrup761_keypair)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGFunc)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Large (..), smpDecode, smpEncode)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strDecode, strEncode)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
import System.Timeout (timeout)
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck (modifyMaxSuccess)
import Test.QuickCheck hiding (Large)
@@ -113,6 +120,7 @@ cryptoTests = do
describe "sntrup761" $ do
it "should enc/dec key" testSNTRUP761
it "should reject malformed KEM encodings" testSNTRUP761RejectsMalformedEncodings
it "should fail key generation with degenerate RNG" testSNTRUP761KeypairDegenerateRNG
describe "BBS+" $ do
it "should sign and verify" testBBSSignVerify
it "should derive public key from secret key" testBBSPublicKeyDerivation
@@ -298,6 +306,26 @@ testSNTRUP761 = do
KEMSharedKey k' <- sntrup761Dec c sk
k' `shouldBe` k
foreign import ccall "wrapper"
mkRNGFunc :: RNGFunc -> IO (FunPtr RNGFunc)
testSNTRUP761KeypairDegenerateRNG :: IO ()
testSNTRUP761KeypairDegenerateRNG = do
-- constant byte 0 draws invertible g = -(1 + x + ... + x^760), byte 0x20 draws g = 0
keypairWithConstantRNG 0 `shouldReturn` Just 0
keypairWithConstantRNG 0x20 `shouldReturn` Just (-1)
where
keypairWithConstantRNG :: Word8 -> IO (Maybe CInt)
keypairWithConstantRNG b = do
result <- newEmptyMVar
-- timeout cannot interrupt a foreign call, so the call runs in another thread
_ <- forkIO $
bracket (mkRNGFunc $ \_ sz buf -> fillBytes buf b (fromIntegral sz)) freeHaskellFunPtr $ \rng ->
allocaBytes c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
allocaBytes c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE $ \skPtr ->
c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr nullPtr rng >>= putMVar result
timeout 10000000 $ takeMVar result
testSNTRUP761RejectsMalformedEncodings :: IO ()
testSNTRUP761RejectsMalformedEncodings = do
smpDecode @KEMPublicKey (smpEncode $ Large shortPublicKey) `shouldSatisfy` isLeft
+91 -25
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
import SMPClient (testStoreLogFile, testStoreMsgsDir, testStoreMsgsDir2, testStoreMsgsFile, testStoreMsgsFile2)
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (pattern MaxLenBS)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EntityId (..), ErrorType, LinkId, Message (..), QueueLinkData, RecipientId, SParty (..), noMsgFlags)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EncDataBytes (..), EntityId (..), ErrorType (..), LinkId, Message (..), QueueLinkData, RecipientId, SParty (..), noMsgFlags, randomMsgId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (exportMessages, importMessages, printMessageStats)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (MsgStore (..), journalMsgStoreDepth, readWriteQueueStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration (ExpirationConfig (..), expireBeforeEpoch)
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.QueueInfo
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (closeStoreLog, logCreateQueue)
import System.Directory (copyFile, createDirectoryIfMissing, listDirectory, removeFile, renameFile)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
@@ -57,7 +58,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Common
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Postgres
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Types
import SMPClient (postgressBracket, testServerDBConnectInfo, testStoreDBOpts)
#endif
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ msgStoreTests = do
someMsgStoreTests
it "should correctly update message counts and canWrite flag" testUpdateMessageCounts
it "tryDelPeekMsg (ACK not from NSE) should reset message counts when queue is empty" testResetMessageCounts
it "should expire messages across commit batches" testExpireMessagesInBatches
#endif
describe "Journal message store: queue state backup expiration" $ do
it "should remove old queue state backups" testRemoveQueueStateBackups
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ msgStoreTests = do
it "should get queue and store/read messages" testGetQueue
it "should write/ack messages" testWriteAckMessages
it "should not fail on EOF when changing read journal" testChangeReadJournal
it "should not add link data to secured messaging queue" testLinkDataSecuredQueue
-- TODO constrain to STM stores?
withMsgStore :: MsgStoreClass s => MsgStoreConfig s -> (s -> IO ()) -> IO ()
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ mkMessage :: MonadIO m => ByteString -> m Message
mkMessage body = liftIO $ do
g <- C.newRandom
msgTs <- getSystemTime
msgId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
msgId <- atomically $ randomMsgId 24 g
pure Message {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags = noMsgFlags, msgBody = C.unsafeMaxLenBS body}
pattern Msg :: ByteString -> Maybe Message
@@ -266,6 +268,33 @@ testChangeReadJournal ms = do
(Msg "message 5", Nothing) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId5
void $ ExceptT $ deleteQueue ms q
testLinkDataSecuredQueue :: MsgStoreClass s => s -> IO ()
testLinkDataSecuredQueue ms = do
g <- C.newRandom
(sKey, _) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
let st = queueStore ms
ld = (EncDataBytes "fixed data", EncDataBytes "user data")
rndId = atomically $ EntityId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
(rId, qr) <- testNewQueueRec g QMMessaging
(cId, cqr) <- testNewQueueRec g QMContact
lnkId <- rndId
cLnkId <- rndId
runRight_ $ do
q <- ExceptT $ addQueue ms rId qr
-- the handle is read before SKEY, as in a command that raced with it
staleQ <- ExceptT $ getQueue ms SRecipient rId
ExceptT $ secureQueue st q sKey
liftIO $ addQueueLinkData st staleQ lnkId ld `shouldReturn` Left AUTH
freshQ <- ExceptT $ getQueue ms SRecipient rId
liftIO $ getQueueLinkData st freshQ lnkId `shouldReturn` Left AUTH
cq <- ExceptT $ addQueue ms cId cqr
ExceptT $ secureQueue st cq sKey
ExceptT $ addQueueLinkData st cq cLnkId ld
ld' <- ExceptT $ getQueueLinkData st cq cLnkId
liftIO $ ld' `shouldBe` ld
void $ ExceptT $ deleteQueue ms q
void $ ExceptT $ deleteQueue ms cq
testExportImportStore :: JournalMsgStore 'QSMemory -> IO ()
testExportImportStore ms = do
g <- C.newRandom
@@ -327,35 +356,34 @@ testUpdateMessageCounts ms = do
q <- ExceptT $ addQueue ms rId qr
let write s = writeMsg ms q True =<< mkMessage s
hasSize = checkQueueSize ms
q `hasSize` (0, True, False)
q `hasSize` (0, True)
Just (Message {msgId = mId1}, True) <- write "message 1"
q `hasSize` (1, True, True)
q `hasSize` (1, True)
Just (Message {msgId = mId2}, False) <- write "message 2"
q `hasSize` (2, True, True)
q `hasSize` (2, True)
Just (Message {msgId = mId3}, False) <- write "message 3"
q `hasSize` (3, True, True)
q `hasSize` (3, True)
Nothing <- write "message 4"
q `hasSize` (4, False, True)
q `hasSize` (4, False)
Msg "message 1" <- tryPeekMsg ms q
q `hasSize` (4, False, True)
q `hasSize` (4, False)
Msg "message 1" <- tryDelMsg ms q mId1
q `hasSize` (3, False, True)
q `hasSize` (3, False)
Msg "message 2" <- tryPeekMsg ms q
(Msg "message 2", Msg "message 3") <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId2
q `hasSize` (2, False, True)
q `hasSize` (2, False)
(Msg "message 3", Just MessageQuota {msgId = mId4}) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId3
q `hasSize` (1, False, True)
q `hasSize` (1, False)
(Just MessageQuota {}, Nothing) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId4
q `hasSize` (0, True, False)
q `hasSize` (0, True)
checkQueueSize :: PostgresMsgStore -> PostgresQueue -> (Int64, Bool, Bool) -> ExceptT ErrorType IO ()
checkQueueSize ms q (size, canWrt, expire) = liftIO $ do
[(size', canWrt', expire')] <-
checkQueueSize :: PostgresMsgStore -> PostgresQueue -> (Int64, Bool) -> ExceptT ErrorType IO ()
checkQueueSize ms q (size, canWrt) = liftIO $ do
[(size', canWrt')] <-
withTransaction (dbStore $ queueStore ms) $ \db ->
DB.query db "SELECT msg_queue_size, msg_can_write, msg_queue_expire FROM msg_queues WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only (recipientId q))
DB.query db "SELECT msg_queue_size, msg_can_write FROM msg_queues WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only (recipientId q))
size' `shouldBe` size
canWrt' `shouldBe` canWrt
expire' `shouldBe` expire
testResetMessageCounts :: PostgresMsgStore -> IO ()
testResetMessageCounts ms = do
@@ -369,25 +397,63 @@ testResetMessageCounts ms = do
Just (Message {msgId = mId2}, False) <- write "message 2"
Just (Message {msgId = mId3}, False) <- write "message 3"
Nothing <- write "message 4"
q `hasSize` (4, False, True)
q `hasSize` (4, False)
liftIO $ setIncorrectSize q (10, True)
Nothing <- write "message 5"
q `hasSize` (11, False, True)
q `hasSize` (11, False)
(Msg "message 1", Msg "message 2") <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId1
q `hasSize` (10, False, True)
q `hasSize` (10, False)
(Msg "message 2", Msg "message 3") <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId2
q `hasSize` (9, False, True)
q `hasSize` (9, False)
(Msg "message 3", Just MessageQuota {msgId = mId4}) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId3
q `hasSize` (8, False, True)
q `hasSize` (8, False)
(Just MessageQuota {}, Just MessageQuota {msgId = mId5}) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId4
q `hasSize` (7, False, True)
q `hasSize` (7, False)
(Just MessageQuota {}, Nothing) <- tryDelPeekMsg ms q mId5
q `hasSize` (0, True, False) -- reset
q `hasSize` (0, True) -- reset
where
setIncorrectSize :: PostgresQueue -> (Int64, Bool) -> IO ()
setIncorrectSize q (size, canWrt) =
void $ withTransaction (dbStore $ queueStore ms) $ \db ->
DB.execute db "UPDATE msg_queues SET msg_queue_size = ?, msg_can_write = ? WHERE recipient_id = ?" (size, canWrt, recipientId q)
testExpireMessagesInBatches :: PostgresMsgStore -> IO ()
testExpireMessagesInBatches ms = do
g <- C.newRandom
emptiedQs <- replicateM emptiedCount $ newQueue g
partialQs <- replicateM partialCount $ newQueue g
overQuotaQs <- replicateM overQuotaCount $ newQueue g
quotaMsgs <- runRight $ do
forM_ (emptiedQs <> partialQs) $ \q -> void $ write q "old 1"
forM_ emptiedQs $ \q -> void $ write q "old 2"
mapM fillPastQuota overQuotaQs
-- msg_ts has second granularity, so the recent messages need a new second to be kept
threadDelay 1100000
boundary <- systemSeconds <$> getSystemTime
runRight_ $ forM_ partialQs $ \q -> void $ write q "recent"
MessageStats {expiredMsgsCount, storedMsgsCount, storedQueues} <- expireOldMessages False ms boundary 0
expiredMsgsCount `shouldBe` (emptiedCount * 2 + partialCount + sum quotaMsgs)
storedMsgsCount `shouldBe` (partialCount + overQuotaCount) -- recent messages and quota markers
storedQueues `shouldBe` (emptiedCount + partialCount + overQuotaCount)
runRight_ $ do
forM_ emptiedQs $ \q -> checkQueueSize ms q (0, True)
forM_ partialQs $ \q -> checkQueueSize ms q (1, True)
-- the quota marker is never expired, and the queue stays blocked until it is acked
forM_ overQuotaQs $ \q -> checkQueueSize ms q (1, False)
where
-- expire_old_messages pages through expired messages and commits per page, so these
-- counts put a page boundary inside each group of queues.
emptiedCount = 120 :: Int
partialCount = 40 :: Int
overQuotaCount = 10 :: Int
newQueue g = do
(rId, qr) <- testNewQueueRec g QMMessaging
runRight $ ExceptT $ addQueue ms rId qr
write q s = writeMsg ms q True =<< mkMessage s
fillPastQuota q = go 0
where
go n = write q "fill" >>= maybe (pure n) (const $ go (n + 1))
#endif
testQueueState :: JournalMsgStore s -> IO ()
+16 -10
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ import Util
retryIntervalTests :: Spec
retryIntervalTests = do
describe "Retry interval with 2 modes and lock" $ do
testRetryIntervalSameMode
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode
testRetryIntervalSameMode withRetryNewLock2
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode withRetryNewLock2
describe "Retry interval with 2 modes" $ do
testRetryIntervalSameMode withRetryInterval2
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode withRetryInterval2
describe "Foreground retry interval" $ do
testRetryForeground
testRetryToBackground
@@ -41,14 +44,18 @@ testFastRI =
maxInterval = 40000
}
testRetryIntervalSameMode :: Spec
testRetryIntervalSameMode =
type WithRetry2 = RetryInterval2 -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> IO ()) -> IO ()) -> IO ()
withRetryNewLock2 :: WithRetry2
withRetryNewLock2 ri action = newEmptyTMVarIO >>= \lock -> withRetryLock2 ri lock action
testRetryIntervalSameMode :: WithRetry2 -> Spec
testRetryIntervalSameMode withRetry =
it "should increase elapased time and interval when the mode stays the same" $ do
lock <- newEmptyTMVarIO
intervals <- newTVarIO []
reportedIntervals <- newTVarIO []
ts <- newTVarIO =<< getCurrentTime
withRetryLock2 testRI lock $ \(RI2State slow fast) loop -> do
withRetry testRI $ \(RI2State slow fast) loop -> do
ints <- addInterval intervals ts
atomically $ modifyTVar' reportedIntervals ((slow, fast) :)
when (length ints < 9) $ loop RIFast
@@ -65,14 +72,13 @@ testRetryIntervalSameMode =
(20000, 40000)
]
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode :: Spec
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode =
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode :: WithRetry2 -> Spec
testRetryIntervalSwitchMode withRetry =
it "should increase elapased time and interval when the mode switches" $ do
lock <- newEmptyTMVarIO
intervals <- newTVarIO []
reportedIntervals <- newTVarIO []
ts <- newTVarIO =<< getCurrentTime
withRetryLock2 testRI lock $ \(RI2State slow fast) loop -> do
withRetry testRI $ \(RI2State slow fast) loop -> do
ints <- addInterval intervals ts
atomically $ modifyTVar' reportedIntervals ((slow, fast) :)
when (length ints < 11) $ loop $ if length ints <= 5 then RIFast else RISlow
+18 -1
View File
@@ -2,15 +2,18 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module CoreTests.SOCKSSettings where
import Network.Socket (SockAddr (..), tupleToHostAddress)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ipAddressProtected)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType, pattern SMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import Util
@@ -19,6 +22,7 @@ socksSettingsTests :: Spec
socksSettingsTests = do
describe "hostMode and requiredHostMode settings" testHostMode
describe "socksMode setting, independent of hostMode setting" testSocksMode
describe "ipAddressProtected, consistent with chosen host and socksMode" testIPAddressProtected
describe "socks proxy address encoding" testSocksProxyEncoding
testPublicHost :: TransportHost
@@ -94,6 +98,19 @@ testSocksMode = do
let TransportClientConfig {socksProxy} = transportClientConfig cfg NRMInteractive host False Nothing
in socksProxy
testIPAddressProtected :: Spec
testIPAddressProtected = do
it "should be protected if SOCKS proxy is used for the chosen host" $ do
protected SMAlways HMOnionViaSocks [testPublicHost] `shouldBe` True
protected SMOnion HMOnionViaSocks [testPublicHost, testOnionHost] `shouldBe` True
protected SMOnion HMPublic [testOnionHost] `shouldBe` True
it "should not be protected if SOCKS proxy is not used for the chosen host" $ do
protected SMOnion HMOnionViaSocks [testPublicHost] `shouldBe` False
protected SMOnion HMPublic [testPublicHost, testOnionHost] `shouldBe` False
where
protected socksMode hostMode hosts =
ipAddressProtected defaultNetworkConfig {socksProxy = Just defaultSocksProxyWithAuth, socksMode, hostMode} (SMPServer hosts "" (C.KeyHash ""))
testSocksProxyEncoding :: Spec
testSocksProxyEncoding = do
it "should decode SOCKS proxy with isolate-by-auth mode" $ do
+14 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
import SMPClient
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store (FileRec (..), FileRecipient (..), FileStoreClass (..), RoundedFileTime, STMFileStore (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (FileStoreLogRecord (..), readWriteFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (FileStoreLogRecord (..), readWriteFileStore, serverFileName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SMPServiceRole (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials (genCredentials)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import Util
@@ -269,6 +270,18 @@ fileStoreLogTests = do
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt Nothing EntityActive, BlockFile sId blockedWithNotice],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt Nothing (EntityBlocked blockedWithNotice)],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Nothing, EntityBlocked blockedWithNotice))]
},
SLTC
{ name = "put file with wrong file name",
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId "/etc/passwd"],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Just expiresAt, EntityActive))]
},
SLTC
{ name = "put file in another directory",
saved = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId ("/srv/xftp" </> serverFileName sId)],
compacted = [AddFile sId file createdAt (Just expiresAt) EntityActive, PutFile sId ("/srv/xftp" </> serverFileName sId)],
state = M.fromList [(sId, (file, createdAt, Just expiresAt, EntityActive))]
}
]
+4 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore, importFileStore, exportFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (closeStoreLog, readWriteFileStore, writeFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog (closeStoreLog, readWriteFileStore, serverFileName, writeFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo (..), BlockingReason (..), EntityId (..))
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (openWriteStoreLog)
import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime (RoundedSystemTime (..))
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import UnliftIO.STM
import Util
@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ testMigrationRoundTrip = do
sId2 = EntityId "migration_file_2"
rId1 = EntityId "migration_rcp_1_"
addFile stmStore sId1 fileInfo1 testCreatedAt (Just testExpiresAt) EntityActive `shouldReturn` Right ()
void $ setFilePath stmStore sId1 "/tmp/file1"
void $ setFilePath stmStore sId1 ("/tmp" </> serverFileName sId1)
addRecipient stmStore sId1 (FileRecipient rId1 rcpKey1) `shouldReturn` Right ()
let testBlockInfo = BlockingInfo {reason = BRSpam, notice = Nothing}
addFile stmStore sId2 fileInfo2 testCreatedAt Nothing (EntityBlocked testBlockInfo) `shouldReturn` Right ()
@@ -289,7 +290,7 @@ testMigrationRoundTrip = do
case result1 of
Right (FileRec {fileInfo = fi, filePath, expiresAt, fileStatus}, _) -> do
size fi `shouldBe` 128000
readTVarIO filePath `shouldReturn` Just "/tmp/file1"
readTVarIO filePath `shouldReturn` Just ("/tmp" </> serverFileName sId1)
expiresAt `shouldBe` Just testExpiresAt
readTVarIO fileStatus `shouldReturn` EntityActive
Left e -> expectationFailure $ "getFile sId1 failed: " <> show e
+11 -11
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
let dhSecret = C.dh' ntfDh dhPriv
decryptCode nd =
let Right verification = nd .-> "verification"
Right nonce = C.cbNonce <$> nd .-> "nonce"
Right nonce = C.cbNonce =<< nd .-> "nonce"
Right pt = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce verification
in NtfRegCode pt
let code = decryptCode ntfData
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
-- receive notification
APNSMockRequest {notification} <- getMockNotification apns tkn
let APNSNotification {aps = APNSMutableContent {}, notificationData = Just ntfData'} = notification
Right nonce' = C.cbNonce <$> ntfData' .-> "nonce"
Right nonce' = C.cbNonce =<< ntfData' .-> "nonce"
Right message = ntfData' .-> "message"
Right ntfDataDecrypted = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce' message
Right pnMsgs1 = parse pnMessagesP (AP.INTERNAL "error parsing PNMessageData") ntfDataDecrypted
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
notifierId `shouldBe` nId
-- receive message
Resp "" _ (MSG RcvMessage {msgId = mId1, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body}) <- tGet1 rh
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgTs = mTs, msgBody} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret (C.cbNonce mId1) body)
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgTs = mTs, msgBody} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret mId1 body)
mId1 `shouldBe` msgId
mTs `shouldBe` msgTs
(msgBody, "hello") #== "delivered from queue"
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
APNSMockRequest {notification = APNSNotification {aps = APNSBackground _, notificationData = Just ntfData2}} <-
getMockNotification apns tkn'
let Right verification2 = ntfData2 .-> "verification"
Right nonce2 = C.cbNonce <$> ntfData2 .-> "nonce"
Right nonce2 = C.cbNonce =<< ntfData2 .-> "nonce"
Right code2 = NtfRegCode <$> C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce2 verification2
RespNtf "8" _ NROk <- signSendRecvNtf nh tknKey ("8", tId, TVFY code2)
RespNtf "8a" _ (NRTkn NTActive) <- signSendRecvNtf nh tknKey ("8a", tId, TCHK)
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
Resp "9" _ OK <- signSendRecv sh sKey ("9", sId, _SEND' "hello 2")
APNSMockRequest {notification = notification3} <- getMockNotification apns tkn'
let APNSNotification {aps = APNSMutableContent {}, notificationData = Just ntfData3} = notification3
Right nonce3 = C.cbNonce <$> ntfData3 .-> "nonce"
Right nonce3 = C.cbNonce =<< ntfData3 .-> "nonce"
Right message3 = ntfData3 .-> "message"
Right ntfDataDecrypted3 = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce3 message3
Right pnMsgs2 = parse pnMessagesP (AP.INTERNAL "error parsing PNMessageData") ntfDataDecrypted3
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
smpServer3 `shouldBe` srv
notifierId3 `shouldBe` nId
Resp "" _ (MSG RcvMessage {msgId = mId2, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body2}) <- tGet1 rh
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 2"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret (C.cbNonce mId2) body2)
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 2"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret mId2 body2)
Resp "10" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("10", rId, ACK mId2)
q2 <- createQueue rh sPub nPub
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
Resp "14" _ OK <- signSendRecv sh sKey ("14", sId, _SEND' "hello 3")
APNSMockRequest {notification = notification4} <- getMockNotification apns tkn'
let APNSNotification {aps = APNSMutableContent {}, notificationData = Just ntfData4} = notification4
Right nonce4 = C.cbNonce <$> ntfData4 .-> "nonce"
Right nonce4 = C.cbNonce =<< ntfData4 .-> "nonce"
Right message4 = ntfData4 .-> "message"
Right ntfDataDecrypted4 = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce4 message4
Right pnMsgs4 = parse pnMessagesP (AP.INTERNAL "error parsing PNMessageData") ntfDataDecrypted4
@@ -226,14 +226,14 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
smpServer4 `shouldBe` srv
notifierId4 `shouldBe` nId
Resp "" _ (MSG RcvMessage {msgId = mId3, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body3}) <- tGet1 rh
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 3"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret (C.cbNonce mId3) body3)
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 3"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret mId3 body3)
Resp "15" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("15", rId, ACK mId3)
-- deliver to queue with ntf sub created while SMP was offline
Resp "16" _ OK <- signSendRecv sh sKey ("16", sId', _SEND' "hello 4")
APNSMockRequest {notification = notification5} <- getMockNotification apns tkn'
let APNSNotification {aps = APNSMutableContent {}, notificationData = Just ntfData5} = notification5
Right nonce5 = C.cbNonce <$> ntfData5 .-> "nonce"
Right nonce5 = C.cbNonce =<< ntfData5 .-> "nonce"
Right message5 = ntfData5 .-> "message"
Right ntfDataDecrypted5 = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce5 message5
Right pnMsgs5 = parse pnMessagesP (AP.INTERNAL "error parsing PNMessageData") ntfDataDecrypted5
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ testNotificationSubscription (ATransport t, msType) createQueue =
smpServer5 `shouldBe` srv
notifierId5 `shouldBe` nId'
Resp "" _ (MSG RcvMessage {msgId = mId4, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body4}) <- tGet1 rh
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 4"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret' (C.cbNonce mId4) body4)
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody = "hello 4"} <- pure $ parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret' mId4 body4)
Resp "17" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey' ("17", rId', ACK mId4)
pure ()
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ registerToken nh apns token = do
let dhSecret = C.dh' ntfDh dhPriv
decryptCode nd =
let Right verification = nd .-> "verification"
Right nonce = C.cbNonce <$> nd .-> "nonce"
Right nonce = C.cbNonce =<< nd .-> "nonce"
Right pt = C.cbDecrypt dhSecret nonce verification
in NtfRegCode pt
let code = decryptCode ntfData
+2 -2
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations as Migrations
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (Migration (..), MigrationConfig (..), MigrationConfirmation (..), MigrationsToRun (..), toDownMigration)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, whenM)
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile)
import System.Info (os)
import System.Process (readCreateProcess, shell)
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
import Util
@@ -57,14 +58,13 @@ postgresSchemaDumpTest migrations skipComparisonForDownMigrations testDBOpts@DBO
getSchema :: FilePath -> IO String
getSchema schemaPath = do
ci <- envCI
let cmd =
("pg_dump " <> B.unpack connstr <> " --schema " <> B.unpack testDBSchema)
<> " --schema-only --no-owner --no-privileges --no-acl --no-subscriptions --no-tablespaces > "
<> schemaPath
void $ readCreateProcess (shell cmd) ""
threadDelay 20000
let sed = (if ci then "sed -i" else "sed -i ''")
let sed = (if os == "linux" then "sed -i" else "sed -i ''")
void $ readCreateProcess (shell $ sed <> " '/^--/d; /^\\\\restrict/d; /^\\\\unrestrict/d' " <> schemaPath) ""
sch <- readFile schemaPath
sch `deepseq` pure sch
+27 -2
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@@ -9,13 +9,15 @@ module RemoteControl where
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (runRight)
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad (void)
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (runExceptT)
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.List (stripPrefix)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TSbChainKeys (..))
@@ -24,8 +26,10 @@ import qualified Simplex.RemoteControl.Client as HC (RCHostClient (action))
import qualified Simplex.RemoteControl.Client as RC
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Discovery (mkLastLocalHost, preferAddress)
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Invitation
( RCInvitation (..),
( RCEncInvitation (..),
RCInvitation (..),
RCSignedInvitation,
signInvitation,
verifySignedInvitation,
)
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types
@@ -45,6 +49,7 @@ remoteControlTests = do
it "should connect to existing pairing" testExistingPairing
describe "Multicast discovery" $ do
it "should find paired host and connect" testMulticast
it "should accept announcement only within timestamp window" testAnnouncementTimestamp
testPreferAddress :: Spec
testPreferAddress = do
@@ -244,6 +249,26 @@ testMulticast = do
Nothing -> fail "timeout"
Just _ -> pure ()
testAnnouncementTimestamp :: IO ()
testAnnouncementTimestamp = do
drg <- C.newRandom
RCHostPairing {caKey, caCert, idPrivKey} <- RC.newRCHostPairing drg
(hostDhPubKey, dhPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 drg
(skey, sessPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.Ed25519 drg
(dh, ctrlDhPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 drg
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce drg
now <- systemSeconds <$> getSystemTime
let pairing = RCCtrlPairing {caKey, caCert, ctrlFingerprint = C.KeyHash "test-ca", idPubKey = C.publicKey idPrivKey, dhPrivKey, prevDhPrivKey = Nothing}
announce offset = do
let inv = RCInvitation {ca = C.KeyHash "test-ca", host = "127.0.0.1", port = 5223, v = supportedRCPVRange, app = J.String "app", ts = MkSystemTime (now + offset) 0, skey, idkey = C.publicKey idPrivKey, dh}
encInvitation <- either (fail . show) pure $ C.cbEncrypt (C.dh' hostDhPubKey ctrlDhPrivKey) nonce (strEncode $ signInvitation sessPrivKey idPrivKey inv) 900
runExceptT . void $ RC.findRCCtrlPairing (pairing :| []) RCEncInvitation {dhPubKey = dh, nonce, encInvitation}
announce 0 `shouldReturn` Right ()
announce (-3600) `shouldReturn` Right ()
announce 3500 `shouldReturn` Right ()
announce (-3700) `shouldReturn` Left RCEInvitation
announce 3700 `shouldReturn` Left RCEInvitation
runCtrl :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> Bool -> RCHostPairing -> MVar RCSignedInvitation -> IO (Async RCHostPairing)
runCtrl drg multicast hp invVar = async . runRight $ do
(_found, inv, hc, r) <- RC.connectRCHost drg hp (J.String "app") multicast Nothing Nothing
+14
View File
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ cfgMS msType = withStoreCfg (testServerStoreConfig msType) $ \serverStoreCfg ->
prometheusMetricsFile = testPrometheusMetricsFile,
pendingENDInterval = 500000,
ntfDeliveryInterval = 200000,
authErrorDelay = 20000,
smpCredentials =
ServerCredentials
{ caCertificateFile = Just "tests/fixtures/ca.crt",
@@ -316,6 +317,9 @@ prevRange vr = vr {maxVersion = max (minVersion vr) (prevVersion $ maxVersion vr
prevVersion :: Version v -> Version v
prevVersion (Version v) = Version (v - 1)
nextVersion :: Version v -> Version v
nextVersion (Version v) = Version (v + 1)
proxyCfg :: AServerConfig
proxyCfg = proxyCfgMS (ASType SQSMemory SMSJournal)
@@ -346,6 +350,16 @@ proxyCfgShortTimeout =
nt = NetworkTimeout {backgroundTimeout = 4_000000, interactiveTimeout = 4_000000}
in cfg' {smpAgentCfg = aCfg {smpCfg = cCfg {networkConfig = (networkConfig cCfg) {tcpConnectTimeout = nt}}}}
proxyCfgVPrev :: AStoreType -> AServerConfig
proxyCfgVPrev msType =
updateCfg (proxyCfgMS msType) $ \cfg' ->
let aCfg = smpAgentCfg cfg'
cCfg = smpCfg aCfg
in cfg'
{ smpServerVRange = prevRange $ smpServerVRange cfg',
smpAgentCfg = aCfg {smpCfg = cCfg {serverVRange = prevRange $ serverVRange cCfg}}
}
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => (ASrvTransport, AStoreType) -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn (t, msType) =
withSmpServerConfigOn t $ updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg' -> cfg' {storeNtfsFile = Just testStoreNtfsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}
+65 -6
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient
import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, sendRecv)
import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, responseTime, sendRecv)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent hiding (createConnection, joinConnection, sendMessage)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig (..), InitialAgentServers (..))
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ smpProxyTests = do
xit "no SMP service at host/port" todo
xit "bad SMP fingerprint" todo
xit "batching proxy requests" todo
it "relay rejects forwarded command with changed version" $ \_ ->
testChangedFwdVersion
it "proxy rejects forwarded correlation ID that is not 24 bytes" $ \_ ->
testFwdCorrIdSize
it "relay delays AUTH errors to forwarded commands" $ \_ ->
testForwardedAuthErrorDelay
describe "deliver message via SMP proxy" $ do
let srv1 = SMPServer testHost testPort testKeyHash
srv2 = SMPServer testHost2 testPort2 testKeyHash
@@ -95,6 +101,11 @@ smpProxyTests = do
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd25519 msg1 msg2
it "max message size, X25519 keys" . twoServersFirstProxy $
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SX25519 msg1 msg2
describe "version compatibility" $ do
let deliver clientVR = deliverMessagesViaProxyVR clientVR srv1 srv2 C.SEd448 ["hello 1"] ["hello 2"]
it "prev client" . twoServersFirstProxy $ deliver (prevRange supportedClientSMPRelayVRange)
it "prev proxy" . twoServersPrevProxy $ deliver supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
it "prev relay" . twoServersPrevRelay $ deliver supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
describe "stress test 1k" $ do
let deliver n = deliverMessagesViaProxy srv1 srv2 C.SEd448 [] (map bshow [1 :: Int .. n])
it "1x1000" . twoServersFirstProxy $ deliver 1000
@@ -155,6 +166,9 @@ smpProxyTests = do
twoServersFirstProxy test msType = twoServers_ (proxyCfgMS msType) (updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 128, maxJournalMsgCount = 256}) test msType
twoServersMoreConc test msType = twoServers_ (updateCfg (proxyCfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {serverClientConcurrency = 128}) (updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 128, maxJournalMsgCount = 256}) test msType
twoServersNoConc test msType = twoServers_ (updateCfg (proxyCfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {serverClientConcurrency = 1}) (updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {msgQueueQuota = 128, maxJournalMsgCount = 256}) test msType
twoServersPrevProxy test msType = twoServers_ (proxyCfgVPrev msType) (cfgMS msType) test msType
twoServersPrevRelay test msType = twoServers_ (proxyCfgMS msType) (prevServerVRange $ cfgMS msType) test msType
prevServerVRange cfg' = updateCfg cfg' $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {smpServerVRange = prevRange $ smpServerVRange cfg_}
twoServers_ :: AServerConfig -> AServerConfig -> IO () -> AStoreType -> IO ()
twoServers_ cfg1 cfg2 runTest (ASType qsType _) =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg1 testPort $ \_ ->
@@ -167,11 +181,14 @@ deliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SM
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg msg msg' = deliverMessagesViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg [msg] [msg']
deliverMessagesViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> [ByteString] -> [ByteString] -> IO ()
deliverMessagesViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg unsecuredMsgs securedMsgs = do
deliverMessagesViaProxy = deliverMessagesViaProxyVR $ mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion
deliverMessagesViaProxyVR :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => VersionRangeSMP -> SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> [ByteString] -> [ByteString] -> IO ()
deliverMessagesViaProxyVR clientVR proxyServ relayServ alg unsecuredMsgs securedMsgs = do
g <- C.newRandom
-- set up proxy
ts <- getCurrentTime
pc' <- getProtocolClient g NRMInteractive (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange minServerSMPRelayVersion currentClientSMPRelayVersion} [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
pc' <- getProtocolClient g NRMInteractive (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = clientVR, proxiedRelayVRange = clientVR} [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
pc <- either (fail . show) pure pc'
THAuthClient {} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams pc
-- set up relay
@@ -191,6 +208,8 @@ deliverMessagesViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg unsecuredMsgs securedMsgs = do
forM_ unsecuredMsgs $ \msg -> do
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Right ()
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess {prSessionId = "bad session"} Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Left (ProxyProtocolError $ SMP.PROXY SMP.NO_SESSION)
forM_ ([prevVersion minServerSMPRelayVersion, nextVersion currentServerSMPRelayVersion] :: [VersionSMP]) $ \v ->
runExceptT' (proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess {prVersion = v} Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg) `shouldReturn` Left (ProxyProtocolError $ SMP.PROXY $ SMP.PROTOCOL $ SMP.PROXY $ SMP.BROKER $ SMP.TRANSPORT TEVersion)
-- receive 1
(_tSess, _, [(_entId, STEvent (Right (SMP.MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody})))]) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
@@ -229,7 +248,7 @@ agentDeliverMessageViaProxy aTestCfg@(aSrvs, _, aViaProxy) bTestCfg@(bSrvs, _, b
withAgent 1 aCfg (servers aTestCfg) testDB $ \alice ->
withAgent 2 aCfg (servers bTestCfg) testDB2 $ \bob -> runRight_ $ do
(bobId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMInvitation Nothing Nothing CR.IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
sqSecured <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
@@ -285,7 +304,7 @@ agentDeliverMessagesViaProxyConc agentServers msgs =
-- otherwise the CONF messages would get mixed with MSG
prePair alice bob = do
(bobId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- runExceptT' $ A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMInvitation Nothing Nothing CR.IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- runExceptT' $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- runExceptT' $ A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
sqSecured <- runExceptT' $ A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured `shouldBe` True
confId <-
@@ -344,7 +363,7 @@ agentViaProxyRetryOffline = do
withServer $ \_ -> do
(aliceId, bobId) <- withServer2 $ \_ -> runRight $ do
(bobId, CCLink qInfo Nothing) <- A.createConnection alice NRMInteractive 1 True True SCMInvitation Nothing Nothing CR.IKPQOn False SMSubscribe
aliceId <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
(aliceId, _) <- A.prepareConnectionToJoin bob 1 True qInfo PQSupportOn
sqSecured <- A.joinConnection bob NRMInteractive 1 aliceId True qInfo "bob's connInfo" PQSupportOn SMSubscribe
liftIO $ sqSecured `shouldBe` True
("", _, A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
@@ -446,6 +465,46 @@ requestRelaySession =
testSMPClient_ "localhost" testPort supportedServerSMPRelayVRange Nothing $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) ->
(\(_, _, reply) -> reply) <$> sendRecv th (Nothing, "1", NoEntity, SMP.PRXY testSMPServer2 Nothing)
testChangedFwdVersion :: IO ()
testChangedFwdVersion =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg testPort $ \_ -> do
g <- C.newRandom
ts <- getCurrentTime
rc <- either (fail . show) pure =<< getProtocolClient g NRMInteractive (1, testSMPServer, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams rc
(cmdPubKey, cmdPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
let v = currentClientSMPRelayVersion
et <- either (fail . show) (pure . SMP.EncTransmission) $ C.cbEncrypt (C.dh' peerServerPubKey cmdPrivKey) (SMP.encTransmissionNonce v nonce) "" SMP.paddedProxiedTLength
let forward fwdVersion = forwardSMPTransmission rc (either error id $ C.corrCbNonce corrId) fwdVersion cmdPubKey et
_ <- runExceptT' $ forward v
runExceptT (forward $ prevVersion v) `shouldReturn` Left (PCEProtocolError SMP.CRYPTO)
testFwdCorrIdSize :: IO ()
testFwdCorrIdSize =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgJ2 testPort2 $ \_ ->
testSMPClient_ "localhost" testPort supportedServerSMPRelayVRange Nothing $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
(_, _, Right (SMP.PKEY sessId _ _)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "1", NoEntity, SMP.PRXY testSMPServer2 Nothing)
g <- C.newRandom
(cmdPubKey, _) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
forM_ (["", "2", "3333333333333333333333333"] :: [ByteString]) $ \corrId -> do
(_, _, reply) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, corrId, SMP.EntityId sessId, SMP.PFWD currentClientSMPRelayVersion cmdPubKey (SMP.EncTransmission ""))
reply `shouldBe` Right (SMP.ERR $ SMP.CMD SMP.SYNTAX)
testForwardedAuthErrorDelay :: IO ()
testForwardedAuthErrorDelay =
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) (updateCfg cfgJ2 $ \cfg_ -> cfg_ {authErrorDelay = 500000}) testPort2 $ \_ -> do
g <- C.newRandom
ts <- getCurrentTime
pc <- either (fail . show) pure =<< getProtocolClient g NRMInteractive (1, testSMPServer, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig [] Nothing ts (\_ -> pure ())
sess <- runExceptT' $ connectSMPProxiedRelay pc NRMInteractive testSMPServer2 Nothing
(sendTime, Left (PCEProtocolError SMP.AUTH)) <- responseTime $ runExceptT $ proxySMPMessage pc NRMInteractive sess Nothing (SMP.EntityId "1234") noMsgFlags "hello"
(getLinkTime, Left (PCEProtocolError SMP.AUTH)) <- responseTime $ runExceptT $ proxyGetSMPQueueLink pc NRMInteractive sess (SMP.EntityId "1234")
sendTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
getLinkTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
-- Shared "phase 2" of the reconnection tests: start a healthy relay, confirm it is reachable
-- directly (PING, not via the proxy) so a proxy failure can only mean the proxy didn't reconnect,
-- let any stored connection error expire, then require the proxy to establish the session (PKEY).
+66 -38
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.List (isPrefixOf)
import Data.Maybe (catMaybes)
import Data.String (IsString (..))
import Data.Time.Clock (NominalDiffTime, diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
import Data.Type.Equality
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
@@ -58,7 +59,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (whenM)
import System.Directory (doesDirectoryExist, doesFileExist, removeDirectoryRecursive, removeFile)
import System.IO (IOMode (..), withFile)
import System.TimeIt (timeItT)
import System.Timeout
import Test.HUnit
import Test.Hspec hiding (fit, it)
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ serverTests = do
describe "Restore messages (old / v2)" testRestoreExpireMessages
describe "Save prometheus metrics" testPrometheusMetrics
describe "Timing of AUTH error" testTiming
describe "Delay of AUTH error" testAuthErrorDelay
describe "Message notifications" $ do
testMessageNotifications
testMessageServiceNotifications
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ signSend_ h@THandle {params} (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) serviceKey_ (corrId, qId,
authorize t = (,(`C.sign'` t) <$> serviceKey_) <$> case a of
C.SEd25519 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd25519 $ C.sign' pk t'
C.SEd448 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd448 $ C.sign' pk t'
C.SX25519 -> (\THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k} -> TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t') <$> thAuth params
C.SX25519 -> (\THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = k} -> TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.unsafeCbNonce corrId) t') <$> thAuth params
#if !MIN_VERSION_base(4,18,0)
_sx448 -> undefined -- ghc8107 fails to the branch excluded by types
#endif
@@ -194,12 +195,12 @@ _SEND = SEND noMsgFlags
_SEND' :: MsgBody -> Command 'Sender
_SEND' = SEND MsgFlags {notification = True}
decryptMsgV2 :: C.DhSecret 'C.X25519 -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Either C.CryptoError ByteString
decryptMsgV2 dhShared = C.cbDecrypt dhShared . C.cbNonce
decryptMsgV2 :: C.DhSecret 'C.X25519 -> MsgId -> ByteString -> Either C.CryptoError ByteString
decryptMsgV2 = C.cbDecrypt
decryptMsgV3 :: C.DhSecret 'C.X25519 -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Either String MsgBody
decryptMsgV3 :: C.DhSecret 'C.X25519 -> MsgId -> ByteString -> Either String MsgBody
decryptMsgV3 dhShared nonce body =
case parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt dhShared (C.cbNonce nonce) body) of
case parseAll clientRcvMsgBodyP =<< first show (C.cbDecrypt dhShared nonce body) of
Right ClientRcvMsgBody {msgBody} -> Right msgBody
Right ClientRcvMsgQuota {} -> Left "ClientRcvMsgQuota"
Left e -> Left e
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ testCreateDelete =
Resp "dabc" _ err8 <- sendRecv sh ("", "dabc", sId, _SEND "hello")
(err8, ERR AUTH) #== "rejects unsigned SEND too when deleted"
Resp "abcd" _ err11 <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcd", rId, ACK "")
Resp "abcd" _ err11 <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcd", rId, ACK mId2)
(err11, ERR AUTH) #== "rejects ACK when conn deleted - the second message is deleted"
Resp "bcda" _ err9 <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("bcda", rId, OFF)
@@ -609,7 +610,7 @@ testGetSubCommands =
Resp "4" _ (Msg mId2 msg2) <- signSendRecv rh1 rKey ("4", rId, ACK mId1)
(dec mId2 msg2, Right "hello 2") #== "received from queue via SUB"
-- bad msgId returns error
Resp "5" _ (ERR NO_MSG) <- signSendRecv rh2 rKey ("5", rId, ACK "1234")
Resp "5" _ (ERR NO_MSG) <- signSendRecv rh2 rKey ("5", rId, ACK mId2)
-- already ACK'd by subscriber, but still returns OK when msgId matches
Resp "5a" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh2 rKey ("5a", rId, ACK mId1)
-- msg2 is not lost - even if subscriber does not ACK it, it is delivered to getter
@@ -904,7 +905,7 @@ testServiceSubsTotalCount =
_ -> pure Nothing
]
threadDelay 1500000
readFile testPrometheusMetricsFile >>= \m -> readServiceSubsMetric m `shouldBe` Just 2
B.readFile testPrometheusMetricsFile >>= \m -> readServiceSubsMetric (B.unpack m) `shouldBe` Just 2
-- Phase 2: associate 1 more queue via SUB, reconnect with SUBS 3, check metric = 3
(rPub3, rKey3) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
@@ -934,7 +935,7 @@ testServiceSubsTotalCount =
_ -> pure Nothing
]
threadDelay 1500000
readFile testPrometheusMetricsFile >>= \m -> readServiceSubsMetric m `shouldBe` Just 3
B.readFile testPrometheusMetricsFile >>= \m -> readServiceSubsMetric (B.unpack m) `shouldBe` Just 3
readServiceSubsMetric :: String -> Maybe Int
readServiceSubsMetric content =
@@ -1274,21 +1275,21 @@ testTiming =
smpTest2Cfg (cfgMS msType) supportedServerSMPRelayVRange t $ \rh sh ->
testSameTiming rh sh tst msType
where
testName :: (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int) -> String
testName (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg, _) = unwords ["queue key:", show goodKeyAlg, "/ used key:", show badKeyAlg]
timingTests :: [(C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int)]
testName :: (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg) -> String
testName (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg) = unwords ["queue key:", show goodKeyAlg, "/ used key:", show badKeyAlg]
timingTests :: [(C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg)]
timingTests =
[ (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, 200), -- correct key type
-- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150),
-- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200),
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, 200),
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150), -- correct key type
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, 200),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200) -- correct key type
[ (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519), -- correct key type
-- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448),
-- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519),
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519),
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448), -- correct key type
(C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448),
(C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519) -- correct key type
]
timeRepeat n = fmap fst . timeItT . forM_ (replicate n ()) . const
timeRepeat = fmap fst . responseTime . replicateM_ 5
similarTime t1 t2 msType
| t1 <= t2 = abs (1 - t1 / t2) < diff
| otherwise = similarTime t2 t1 msType
@@ -1297,14 +1298,14 @@ testTiming =
diff = case msType of
ASType SQSPostgres _ -> 0.45
_ -> 0.3
testSameTiming :: forall c. Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int) -> AStoreType -> Expectation
testSameTiming rh sh (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg, n) msType = do
testSameTiming :: forall c. Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg) -> AStoreType -> Expectation
testSameTiming rh sh (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg) msType = do
g <- C.newRandom
(rPub, rKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair goodKeyAlg g
(dhPub, dhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
Resp "abcd" NoEntity (Ids rId sId srvDh) <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcd", NoEntity, New rPub dhPub)
Resp "abcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcd" NoEntity (Ids rId sId srvDh) <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcd", NoEntity, New rPub dhPub)
let dec = decryptMsgV3 $ C.dh' srvDh dhPriv
Resp "cdab" _ resp <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("cdab", rId, SUB)
Resp "cdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdab" _ resp <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("cdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdab", rId, SUB)
case resp of
OK -> pure ()
SOK Nothing -> pure ()
@@ -1314,9 +1315,9 @@ testTiming =
runTimingTest rh badKey rId SUB
(sPub, sKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair goodKeyAlg g
Resp "dabc" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("dabc", rId, KEY sPub)
Resp "dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc", rId, KEY sPub)
Resp "bcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv sh sKey ("bcda", sId, _SEND "hello")
Resp "bcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv sh sKey ("bcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcda", sId, _SEND "hello")
Resp "" _ (Msg mId msg) <- tGet1 rh
(dec mId msg, Right "hello") #== "delivered from queue"
@@ -1325,17 +1326,17 @@ testTiming =
runTimingTest :: PartyI p => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> Command p -> IO ()
runTimingTest h badKey qId cmd = do
threadDelay 100000
_ <- timeRepeat n $ do
_ <- timeRepeat $ do
-- "warm up" the server
Resp "dabc" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("dabc", EntityId "1234", cmd)
Resp "dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc", EntityId "1234", cmd)
return ()
threadDelay 100000
timeWrongKey <- timeRepeat n $ do
Resp "cdab" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("cdab", qId, cmd)
timeWrongKey <- timeRepeat $ do
Resp "cdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdab" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("cdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdab", qId, cmd)
return ()
threadDelay 100000
timeNoQueue <- timeRepeat n $ do
Resp "dabc" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("dabc", EntityId "1234", cmd)
timeNoQueue <- timeRepeat $ do
Resp "dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("dabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabc", EntityId "1234", cmd)
return ()
let ok = similarTime timeNoQueue timeWrongKey msType
unless ok . putStrLn . unwords $
@@ -1347,6 +1348,33 @@ testTiming =
]
ok `shouldBe` True
testAuthErrorDelay :: SpecWith (ASrvTransport, AStoreType)
testAuthErrorDelay =
it "should send AUTH errors after the delay and other responses without it" $ \(ATransport t, msType) ->
smpTest2Cfg (updateCfg (cfgMS msType) $ \cfg' -> cfg' {authErrorDelay = 500000}) supportedClientSMPRelayVRange t $ \rh sh -> do
g <- C.newRandom
(rPub, rKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
(dhPub, _ :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
Resp "1" NoEntity (Ids rId sId _) <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("1", NoEntity, New rPub dhPub)
(_, badKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
(wrongKeyTime, Resp "2" _ (ERR AUTH)) <- responseTime $ signSendRecv rh badKey ("2", rId, SUB)
(noQueueTime, Resp "3" _ (ERR AUTH)) <- responseTime $ signSendRecv rh badKey ("3", EntityId "1234", SUB)
(noLinkTime, Resp "4" _ (ERR AUTH)) <- responseTime $ sendRecv sh ("", "4", EntityId "1234", LGET)
(subTime, Resp "5" _ (SOK Nothing)) <- responseTime $ signSendRecv rh rKey ("5", rId, SUB)
Resp "6" _ OK <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("6", rId, OFF)
(suspendedTime, Resp "7" _ (ERR AUTH)) <- responseTime $ sendRecv sh ("", "7", sId, _SEND "hello")
wrongKeyTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
noQueueTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
suspendedTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
noLinkTime `shouldSatisfy` (>= 0.5)
subTime `shouldSatisfy` (< 0.5)
responseTime :: IO a -> IO (NominalDiffTime, a)
responseTime action = do
t <- getCurrentTime
r <- action
(,r) . (`diffUTCTime` t) <$> getCurrentTime
testMessageNotifications :: SpecWith (ASrvTransport, AStoreType)
testMessageNotifications =
it "should create simplex connection, subscribe notifier and deliver notifications" $ \(ATransport t, msType) -> do
@@ -1814,10 +1842,10 @@ serverSyntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
it "no parameters" $ (sampleSig, "abcd", "12345678", SEND_) >#> ("", "abcd", "12345678", ERR $ CMD SYNTAX)
it "no queue ID" $ (sampleSig, "bcda", "", (SEND_, ' ', noMsgFlags, ' ', "hello" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "bcda", "", ERR $ CMD NO_ENTITY)
describe "ACK" $ do
it "valid syntax" $ (sampleSig, "cdab", "12345678", (ACK_, ' ', "1234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "cdab", "12345678", ERR AUTH)
it "valid syntax" $ (sampleSig, "cdab", "12345678", (ACK_, ' ', "123456789012345678901234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "cdab", "12345678", ERR AUTH)
it "no parameters" $ (sampleSig, "abcd", "12345678", ACK_) >#> ("", "abcd", "12345678", ERR $ CMD SYNTAX)
it "no queue ID" $ (sampleSig, "bcda", "", (ACK_, ' ', "1234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "bcda", "", ERR $ CMD NO_AUTH)
it "no signature" $ ("", "cdab", "12345678", (ACK_, ' ', "1234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "cdab", "12345678", ERR $ CMD NO_AUTH)
it "no queue ID" $ (sampleSig, "bcda", "", (ACK_, ' ', "123456789012345678901234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "bcda", "", ERR $ CMD NO_AUTH)
it "no signature" $ ("", "cdab", "12345678", (ACK_, ' ', "123456789012345678901234" :: ByteString)) >#> ("", "cdab", "12345678", ERR $ CMD NO_AUTH)
describe "PING" $ do
it "valid syntax" $ ("", "abcd", "", PING_) >#> ("", "abcd", "", PONG)
describe "broker response not allowed" $ do
+2 -1
View File
@@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ main = do
describe "SMP server schema dump" $
postgresSchemaDumpTest
serverMigrations
[ "20250320_short_links" -- snd_secure moves to the bottom on down migration
[ "20250320_short_links", -- snd_secure moves to the bottom on down migration
"20260918_expire_messages" -- msg_queue_expire moves to the bottom on down migration
] -- skipComparisonForDownMigrations
testStoreDBOpts
"src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/Postgres/server_schema.sql"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ instance Example a => Example (TestWrapper a) where
ci <- envCI
runTest `E.catches` [E.Handler (onTestFailure ci), E.Handler (onTestException ci)]
where
tt = 120
tt = 300
runTest =
timeout (tt * 1000000) (evaluateExample action params hooks state) `finally` callCommand "sync" >>= \case
Just r -> pure r
+53 -1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (AFStoreType, XFTPServerConfig (..), defa
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store (STMFileStore)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (AUTH))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types (RcvFileId, SndFileId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent (AgentClient, testProtocolServer, xftpDeleteRcvFile, xftpDeleteSndFileInternal, xftpDeleteSndFileRemote, xftpReceiveFile, xftpSendDescription, xftpStartWorkers)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent (AgentClient, testProtocolServer, xftpDeleteRcvFile, xftpDeleteSndFileInternal, xftpDeleteSndFileRemote, xftpPrepareReceiveFile, xftpPrepareSendFile, xftpReceiveFile, xftpSendDescription, xftpStartReceiveFile, xftpStartSendFile, xftpStartWorkers)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent as XA
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client (ProtocolTestFailure (..), ProtocolTestStep (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (AgentConfig, xftpCfg)
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ xftpAgentTests =
it "should send and receive with encrypted local files" testXFTPAgentSendReceiveEncrypted
it "should send and receive large file with a redirect" testXFTPAgentSendReceiveRedirect
it "should send and receive small file without a redirect" testXFTPAgentSendReceiveNoRedirect
it "should receive prepared file only after it is started" testXFTPAgentPrepareReceive
it "should send prepared file only after it is started" testXFTPAgentPrepareSend
it "should extend storage time with an entitlement proof and report the granted expiry" $ \_ -> testXFTPAgentEntitlement
describe "sending and receiving with version negotiation" $ beforeWith (const (pure ())) testXFTPAgentSendReceiveMatrix
it "should resume receiving file after restart" $ \_ -> testXFTPAgentReceiveRestore
@@ -278,6 +280,56 @@ testXFTPAgentSendReceiveNoRedirect = withXFTPServer $ do
inBytes <- B.readFile filePathIn
B.readFile out `shouldReturn` inBytes
testXFTPAgentPrepareReceive :: HasCallStack => AFStoreType -> IO ()
testXFTPAgentPrepareReceive = withXFTPServer $ do
filePath <- createRandomFile
(_, _, rfd1, rfd2) <- withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \sndr -> runRight $ testSend sndr filePath
rfId2 <- withAgent 2 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB2 $ \rcp -> runRight $ do
xftpStartWorkers rcp (Just recipientFiles)
rfId1 <- xftpReceiveFile rcp 1 rfd1 Nothing True
rfId2 <- xftpPrepareReceiveFile rcp 1 rfd2 Nothing True
rfProgress rcp $ mb 18
("", rfId1', RFDONE _) <- rfGet rcp
liftIO $ do
rfId1' `shouldBe` rfId1
timeout 300000 (rfGet rcp) `shouldReturn` Nothing
pure rfId2
withAgent 3 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB2 $ \rcp' -> runRight_ $ do
xftpStartWorkers rcp' (Just recipientFiles)
liftIO $ timeout 300000 (rfGet rcp') `shouldReturn` Nothing
xftpStartReceiveFile rcp' rfId2
rfProgress rcp' $ mb 18
("", rfId2', RFDONE path) <- rfGet rcp'
liftIO $ do
rfId2' `shouldBe` rfId2
file <- B.readFile filePath
B.readFile path `shouldReturn` file
testXFTPAgentPrepareSend :: HasCallStack => AFStoreType -> IO ()
testXFTPAgentPrepareSend = withXFTPServer $ do
filePath1 <- createRandomFile' "testfile1"
filePath2 <- createRandomFile' "testfile2"
sfId2 <- withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \sndr -> runRight $ do
xftpStartWorkers sndr (Just senderFiles)
sfId1 <- xftpSendFile sndr 1 (CF.plain filePath1) 1
sfId2 <- xftpPrepareSendFile sndr 1 (CF.plain filePath2) 1 Nothing
sfProgress sndr $ mb 18
("", sfId1', SFDONE _ _) <- sfGet sndr
liftIO $ do
sfId1' `shouldBe` sfId1
timeout 300000 (sfGet sndr) `shouldReturn` Nothing
pure sfId2
rfd <- withAgent 2 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \sndr' -> runRight $ do
xftpStartWorkers sndr' (Just senderFiles)
liftIO $ timeout 300000 (sfGet sndr') `shouldReturn` Nothing
xftpStartSendFile sndr' sfId2
sfProgress sndr' $ mb 18
("", sfId2', SFDONE _ [rfd]) <- sfGet sndr'
liftIO $ sfId2' `shouldBe` sfId2
pure rfd
withAgent 3 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB2 $ \rcp ->
runRight_ . void $ testReceive rcp rfd filePath2
testXFTPAgentSendReceiveMatrix :: Spec
testXFTPAgentSendReceiveMatrix = do
describe "old server" $ do

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