mirror of
https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace.git
synced 2026-01-31 00:45:24 +01:00
cf4d7d4e6c
* chore: adjust prettier config, .gitignore and use taplo to format toml files This brings the plugins-workspace repository to the same code style of the main tauri repo * format toml * ignore examples gen dir * add .vscode/extensions.json * remove packageManager field * fmt * fix audit * taplo ignore permissions autogenerated files * remove create dummy dist * fix prettier workflow * install fmt in prettier workflow --------- Co-authored-by: Lucas Nogueira <lucas@tauri.app>
57 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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**Do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.**
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**Please use the [Private Vulnerability Disclosure](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability#privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) feature of GitHub.**
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Include as much of the following information:
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- Type of issue (e.g. improper input parsing, privilege escalation, etc.)
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- The location of the affected source code (tag/branch/commit or direct URL)
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- Any special configuration required to reproduce the issue
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- The distribution affected or used to help us with reproduction of the issue
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- Step-by-step instructions to reproduce the issue
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- Ideally a reproduction repository
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- Impact of the issue, including how an attacker might exploit the issue
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We prefer to receive reports in English.
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## Contact
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Please disclose a vulnerability or security relevant issue here: [https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/security/advisories/new).
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Alternatively, you can also contact us by email via [security@tauri.app](mailto:security@tauri.app).
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## Threat Model
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### Security Assumptions
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- The log file interpreting applications are hardened, as input is not sanitized
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- No log events in the rust core are leaked to the frontend unless explicitly configured to output to the `TargetKind::Webview` component
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- The log events generated in the frontend can be accessed from everywhere in the frontend
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- There is no secret censoring inbuilt and developers need to take care of what they log in their application
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### Threats
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#### Secret Leakage
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One possible threat you need to consider when using this plugin is that secrets
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in logs can theoretically be leaked when the application's frontend gets compromised.
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For this threat to be possible all of the following requirements need to be fulfilled:
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- `TargetKind::Webview` enabled OR secrets stem from frontend logs
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- Frontend application is compromised via something like XSS (cross-site-scripting) OR logs are directly exposed
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- Logs contain secrets or sensitive information
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If these requirements are not met, the leakage should not be possible.
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#### Out Of Scope
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- Any exploits on the log viewer/file viewer accessing the logs
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## Best Practices
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Do not log secrets or sensitive values in your logging and ensure that the upstream crates are not leaking such values in their logging events.
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Ensure that logs are sanitized or trusted before opening them with third party tools.
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