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r323155 | chandlerc | 2018-01-22 23:05:25 +0100 (Mon, 22 Jan 2018) | 133 lines
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
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git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/branches/release_60@324067 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Note:
- X86ISelLowering: setLibcallName(SINCOS) was superfluous as
InitLibcalls() already does it.
- ARMISelLowering: Setting libcallnames for sincos/sincosf seemed
superfluous as in the darwin case it wouldn't be used while for all
other cases InitLibcalls already does it.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@321036 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Shadow stack solution introduces a new stack for return addresses only.
The HW has a Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) that points to the next return address.
If we return to a different address, an exception is triggered.
The shadow stack is managed using a series of intrinsics that are introduced in this patch as well as the new register (SSP).
The intrinsics are mapped to new instruction set that implements CET mechanism.
The patch also includes initial infrastructure support for IBT.
For more information, please see the following:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40223
Change-Id: I4daa1f27e88176be79a4ac3b4cd26a459e88fed4
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@318996 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This adds a new fast gather feature bit to cover all CPUs that support fast gather that we can use independent of whether the AVX512 feature is enabled. I'm only using this new bit to qualify AVX2 codegen. AVX512 is still implicitly assuming fast gather to keep tests working and to match the scatter behavior.
Test command lines have been added for these two cases.
Reviewers: magabari, delena, RKSimon, zvi
Reviewed By: RKSimon
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D40282
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@318983 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
We were handling the non-hidden case in lib/Target/TargetMachine.cpp,
but the hidden case was handled in architecture dependent code and
only X86_64 and AArch64 were covered.
While it is true that some code sequences in some ABIs might be able
to produce the correct value at runtime, that doesn't seem to be the
common case.
I left the AArch64 code in place since it also forces a got access for
non-pic code. It is not clear if that is needed, but it is probably
better to change that in another commit.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@316799 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Turns out we have no patterns on the instructions that were using this feature flag for other reasons. These instructions are slow on all modern CPUs so it seems unlikely that we will spend any effort supporting these instructions going forward. So we might as well just kill of the feature flag and just fix up the comments.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@315862 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
Currently we determine if macro fusion is supported based on the AVX flag as a proxy for the processor being Sandy Bridge".
This is really strange as now AMD supports AVX. It also means if user explicitly disables AVX we disable macro fusion.
This patch adds an explicit macro fusion feature. I've also enabled for the generic 64-bit CPU (which doesn't have AVX)
This is probably another candidate for being in the MI layer, but for now I at least wanted to correct the overloading of the AVX feature.
Reviewers: spatel, chandlerc, RKSimon, zvi
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37280
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@312097 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary: Knights Landing, because it is Atom derived, has slow two memory operand instructions. Mark the Knights Landing CPU model accordingly.
Patch by David Zarzycki.
Reviewers: craig.topper
Reviewed By: craig.topper
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37224
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@311979 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This reverts commit r310425, thus reapplying r310335 with a fix for link
issue of the AArch64 unittests on Linux bots when BUILD_SHARED_LIBS is ON.
Original commit message:
[GlobalISel] Remove the GISelAccessor API.
Its sole purpose was to avoid spreading around ifdefs related to
building global-isel. Since r309990, GlobalISel is not optional anymore,
thus, we can get rid of this mechanism all together.
NFC.
----
The fix for the link issue consists in adding the GlobalISel library in
the list of dependencies for the AArch64 unittests. This dependency
comes from the use of AArch64Subtarget that needs to know how
to destruct the GISel related APIs when being detroyed.
Thanks to Bill Seurer and Ahmed Bougacha for helping me reproducing and
understand the problem.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@310969 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
When the access to a weak symbol is not a call, the access has to be
able to produce the value 0 at runtime.
We were sometimes producing code sequences where that was not possible
if the code was leaded more than 4g away from 0.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@310756 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This reverts commit r310115.
It causes a linker failure for the one of the unittests of AArch64 on one
of the linux bot:
http://lab.llvm.org:8011/builders/clang-ppc64le-linux-multistage/builds/3429
: && /home/fedora/gcc/install/gcc-7.1.0/bin/g++ -fPIC
-fvisibility-inlines-hidden -Werror=date-time -std=c++11 -Wall -W
-Wno-unused-parameter -Wwrite-strings -Wcast-qual
-Wno-missing-field-initializers -pedantic -Wno-long-long
-Wno-maybe-uninitialized -Wdelete-non-virtual-dtor -Wno-comment
-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -O2
-L/home/fedora/gcc/install/gcc-7.1.0/lib64 -Wl,-allow-shlib-undefined
-Wl,-O3 -Wl,--gc-sections
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o -o
unittests/Target/AArch64/AArch64Tests
lib/libLLVMAArch64CodeGen.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMAArch64Desc.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMAArch64Info.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMCodeGen.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMCore.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMMC.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMMIRParser.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMSelectionDAG.so.6.0.0svn
lib/libLLVMTarget.so.6.0.0svn lib/libLLVMSupport.so.6.0.0svn -lpthread
lib/libgtest_main.so.6.0.0svn lib/libgtest.so.6.0.0svn -lpthread
-Wl,-rpath,/home/buildbots/ppc64le-clang-multistage-test/clang-ppc64le-multistage/stage1/lib
&& :
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o:(.toc+0x0):
undefined reference to `vtable for llvm::LegalizerInfo'
unittests/Target/AArch64/CMakeFiles/AArch64Tests.dir/InstSizes.cpp.o:(.toc+0x8):
undefined reference to `vtable for llvm::RegisterBankInfo'
The particularity of this bot is that it is built with
BUILD_SHARED_LIBS=ON
However, I was not able to reproduce the problem so far.
Reverting to unblock the bot.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@310425 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Its sole purpose was to avoid spreading around ifdefs related to
building global-isel. Since r309990, GlobalISel is not optional anymore,
thus, we can get rid of this mechanism all together.
NFC.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@310115 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
With this change, the GlobalISel library gets always built. In
particular, this is not possible to opt GlobalISel out of the build
using the LLVM_BUILD_GLOBAL_ISEL variable any more.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@309990 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
I did this a long time ago with a janky python script, but now
clang-format has built-in support for this. I fed clang-format every
line with a #include and let it re-sort things according to the precise
LLVM rules for include ordering baked into clang-format these days.
I've reverted a number of files where the results of sorting includes
isn't healthy. Either places where we have legacy code relying on
particular include ordering (where possible, I'll fix these separately)
or where we have particular formatting around #include lines that
I didn't want to disturb in this patch.
This patch is *entirely* mechanical. If you get merge conflicts or
anything, just ignore the changes in this patch and run clang-format
over your #include lines in the files.
Sorry for any noise here, but it is important to keep these things
stable. I was seeing an increasing number of patches with irrelevant
re-ordering of #include lines because clang-format was used. This patch
at least isolates that churn, makes it easy to skip when resolving
conflicts, and gets us to a clean baseline (again).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@304787 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ is a new feature set that was published by Intel.
The patch represents the LLVM side of the addition of two new intrinsic based instructions (vpopcntd and vpopcntq).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D33169
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@303858 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
This causes them to be re-computed more often than necessary but resolves
objections that were raised post-commit on r301750.
Reviewers: qcolombet, ab, t.p.northover, rovka, kristof.beyls
Reviewed By: qcolombet
Subscribers: igorb, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32861
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@303418 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
According to Intel's Optimization Reference Manual for SNB+:
" For LEA instructions with three source operands and some specific situations, instruction latency has increased to 3 cycles, and must
dispatch via port 1:
- LEA that has all three source operands: base, index, and offset
- LEA that uses base and index registers where the base is EBP, RBP,or R13
- LEA that uses RIP relative addressing mode
- LEA that uses 16-bit addressing mode "
This patch currently handles the first 2 cases only.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32277
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@303333 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
According to psABI, PLT stub clobbers XMM8-XMM15.
In Regcall calling convention those registers are used for passing parameters.
Thus we need to prevent lazy binding in Regcall.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32430
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@302124 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This patch adds support for the the LightWeight Profiling (LWP) instructions which are available on all AMD Bulldozer class CPUs (bdver1 to bdver4).
Reapplied - this time without changing line endings of existing files.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32769
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@302041 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
Predicate<> now has a field to indicate how often it must be recomputed.
Currently, there are two frequencies, per-module (RecomputePerFunction==0)
and per-function (RecomputePerFunction==1). Per-function predicates are
currently recomputed more frequently than necessary since the only predicate
in this category is cheap to test. Per-module predicates are now computed in
getSubtargetImpl() while per-function predicates are computed in selectImpl().
Tablegen now manages the PredicateBitset internally. It should only be
necessary to add the required includes.
Also fixed a problem revealed by the test case where
constrainSelectedInstRegOperands() would attempt to tie operands that
BuildMI had already tied.
Reviewers: ab, qcolombet, t.p.northover, rovka, aditya_nandakumar
Reviewed By: rovka
Subscribers: kristof.beyls, igorb, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D32491
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@301750 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
when the subtarget has fast strings.
This has two advantages:
- Speed is improved. For example, on Haswell thoughput improvements increase
linearly with size from 256 to 512 bytes, after which they plateau:
(e.g. 1% for 260 bytes, 25% for 400 bytes, 40% for 508 bytes).
- Code is much smaller (no need to handle boundaries).
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@300957 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
Sandy Bridge and later CPUs have better throughput using a SHLD to implement rotate versus the normal rotate instructions. Additionally it saves one uop and avoids a partial flag update dependency.
This patch implements this change on any Sandy Bridge or later processor without BMI2 instructions. With BMI2 we will use RORX as we currently do.
Reviewers: zvi
Reviewed By: zvi
Subscribers: llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D30181
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@295697 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
We only implemented it for one of the 3 HLE instructions and that instruction is also under the RTM flag. Clang only implements the RTM flag from its command line.
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@294562 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
This patch does the following.
1. Adds an Intrinsic int_x86_clzero which works with __builtin_ia32_clzero
2. Identifies clzero feature using cpuid info. (Function:8000_0008, Checks if EBX[0]=1)
3. Adds the clzero feature under znver1 architecture.
4. The custom inserter is added in Lowering.
5. A testcase is added to check the intrinsic.
6. The clzero instruction is added to assembler test.
Patch by Ganesh Gopalasubramanian with a couple formatting tweaks, a disassembler test, and using update_llc_test.py from me.
Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D29385
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@294558 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Summary:
Attaching !absolute_symbol to a global variable does two things:
1) Marks it as an absolute symbol reference.
2) Specifies the value range of that symbol's address.
Teach the X86 backend to allow absolute symbols to appear in place of
immediates by extending the relocImm and mov64imm32 matchers. Start using
relocImm in more places where it is legal.
As previously proposed on llvm-dev:
http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-dev/2016-October/105800.html
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D25878
git-svn-id: https://llvm.org/svn/llvm-project/llvm/trunk@289087 91177308-0d34-0410-b5e6-96231b3b80d8
Hans Wennborg