Merge pull request #281 from Gitlawb/release-please--branches--main--components--gitlawb-node

chore(main): release 0.7.1

.env.example

@@ -21,6 +21,23 @@ GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR=/data/repos
 # When using the bundled docker-compose, this is wired automatically.
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb
 
+# ── Database pool & startup resilience ────────────────────────────────────
+# Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. A cap, not a floor —
+# connections open lazily. Size against the DB server's max_connections,
+# remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
+GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS=20
+# Seconds a request waits for a pool connection before failing with 503.
+GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS=5
+# Upper bound on each startup connect+migrate attempt, in seconds. Keep it
+# generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating (the migration
+# advisory lock is held across a deploy); on expiry the attempt is retried.
+GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS=60
+# Startup retry backoff while the database is unavailable: first delay and
+# ceiling, in seconds. The node stays up serving 503s (with a truthful
+# /ready) instead of crash-looping.
+GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS=5
+GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS=60
+
 # ── IPFS pinning (Pinata) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Get a JWT at https://app.pinata.cloud/developers/api-keys
 GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT=
@@ -90,6 +107,46 @@ GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ=true
 # Maximum git smart-HTTP pack request size, in bytes.
 GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES=2147483648
 
+# Max seconds a served git upload-pack / receive-pack (clone / push) may run
+# before it is aborted with a 504. Bounds a hung git that would otherwise pin a
+# worker and, on push, the repo write lock. Does NOT cover the info/refs
+# advertisement or the withheld-blob path, which remain unbounded. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS=600
+
+# ── Push rate limiting (git-receive-pack flood brake) ─────────────────────
+# Max receive-pack requests (info/refs advertisement + push POST) per client
+# IP per hour. 0 disables. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=600
+
+# ── Creation rate limiting (repo/agent/issue/PR flood brake) ──────────────
+# Max creation requests (POST /api/v1/repos, /api/register, fork, issues,
+# pulls) per client IP per hour, in addition to the per-DID limit. The per-DID
+# limit alone is bypassed by a did:key farm (one throwaway identity per repo),
+# which is how spam-repo floods slip past it and the iCaptcha gate; the per-IP
+# brake caps a single-source flood. Uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below to resolve
+# the client IP. 0 disables. Default 120.
+GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=120
+
+# ── Peer-sync rate limiting (per client IP, uses GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY below) ─
+# /api/v1/peers/announce and /api/v1/sync/notify accept unsigned requests from
+# known peers and run at higher frequency, so a generous bucket. Separate from
+# the trigger bucket so an unsigned notify flood can't drain trigger's quota.
+# 0 disables. Default 600.
+GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=600
+# /api/v1/sync/trigger requires a signature and fans out to every peer per call,
+# so it gets a tight bucket. 0 disables. Default 60.
+GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=60
+
+# Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set, used to resolve the real
+# client IP for the push limiter. One of:
+#   (unset) — no trusted proxy: key on the socket peer address, ignore headers.
+#   fly     — behind Fly's edge (trust Fly-Client-IP).
+#   x-forwarded-for — behind a single reverse proxy like Caddy/NGINX (trust the
+#             rightmost X-Forwarded-For hop).
+# Only set this when a proxy you control actually fronts the node; trusting a
+# forwarded header on a directly-exposed node lets clients spoof the key.
+GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=
+
 # ── Sync ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Enable automatic background sync from known peers
 GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC=false

.github/workflows/audit-schedule.yml

@@ -37,7 +37,18 @@ jobs:
         with:
           key: audit-schedule
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (floating; drift canary)
+        # Deliberately UNPINNED, unlike the blocking gate in pr-checks.yml. This
+        # job is cron-only (weekly); it is never pull_request- or push-triggered,
+        # so it NEVER gates a merge no matter what it does. Floating the scanner
+        # here is the drift canary: if a newer cargo-audit regresses, at worst
+        # this weekly run reds (the install step below is unguarded) or its
+        # visibility report changes, and that is exactly the signal that latest
+        # has moved and the pinned gate should not be bumped yet. The scan result
+        # itself never fails the run (the "Full audit report" step is `|| true`
+        # and the only other hard-fail is a Cargo.lock grep). The point is that
+        # drift surfaces here without ever blocking a PR. Do NOT pin to match
+        # pr-checks.yml.
         run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
 
       # Full advisory report with NO suppressions. Run from a scratch dir that

.github/workflows/main-red-alert.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+# Tracks main's CI state as a labeled issue: opens (or updates) a ci-main-red
+# issue when a push-to-main run of PR Checks ends red, and closes it when a
+# subsequent run on main's tip goes green.
+#
+# Why: two individually-green PRs can break main in combination when the
+# second merges on checks that ran against a stale base (semantic merge
+# race — #113 + #145 broke test compilation, found only via #229). A red main
+# is otherwise silent, and release-please PRs inherit the breakage.
+#
+# The alert reflects main's CURRENT STATE, not raw CI events: runs whose
+# commit is no longer main's tip are ignored (a re-run of an old red run
+# after a fix has landed must not cry wolf), and a green run on the tip
+# closes any open alert.
+name: Main red alert
+
+on:
+  workflow_run:
+    workflows: ["PR Checks"]
+    types: [completed]
+    branches: [main]
+
+permissions:
+  issues: write
+  contents: read # getBranch tip check
+
+# Serialize runs: concurrent completions would race the label/issue lookups
+# into duplicates (or 422 on createLabel). queue: max keeps every pending
+# completion instead of letting a later (possibly green-skipped) arrival
+# displace a pending red alert under burst merges; it is only incompatible
+# with cancel-in-progress: true, which we don't use.
+concurrency:
+  group: main-red-alert
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+  queue: max
+
+jobs:
+  track:
+    name: Track main CI state
+    # timed_out (the test job runs 45 min against Postgres) and
+    # startup_failure (malformed workflow) are red too — only cancelled is
+    # excluded as a deliberate human abort. success runs are needed to close
+    # the alert once main recovers.
+    if: >-
+      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
+      contains(fromJSON('["failure", "timed_out", "startup_failure", "success"]'), github.event.workflow_run.conclusion)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Reconcile the broken-main issue with main's current state
+        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
+        with:
+          script: |
+            const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
+            const label = 'ci-main-red';
+
+            // Freshness gate: only the run for main's current tip may open or
+            // close anything. Re-runs of superseded commits are events about
+            // the past, not statements about main's state.
+            const { data: branch } = await github.rest.repos.getBranch({
+              ...context.repo, branch: 'main',
+            });
+            if (branch.commit.sha !== run.head_sha) {
+              core.info(`run ${run.id} is for ${run.head_sha}, main is at ${branch.commit.sha} — ignoring stale run`);
+              return;
+            }
+
+            // listForRepo returns PRs carrying the label too — those must
+            // never be mistaken for the tracking issue.
+            const open = (await github.rest.issues.listForRepo({
+              ...context.repo, state: 'open', labels: label, per_page: 100,
+            })).data.filter(item => !item.pull_request);
+
+            if (run.conclusion === 'success') {
+              const body = `Recovered: [PR Checks](${run.html_url}) is green on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`;
+              for (const issue of open) {
+                await github.rest.issues.createComment({
+                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, body,
+                });
+                await github.rest.issues.update({
+                  ...context.repo, issue_number: issue.number, state: 'closed', state_reason: 'completed',
+                });
+              }
+              return;
+            }
+
+            const headline = run.head_commit?.message?.split('\n')[0] ?? '';
+            const body = [
+              `[PR Checks run](${run.html_url}) concluded \`${run.conclusion}\` on main at \`${run.head_sha}\`.`,
+              '',
+              `> ${headline}`,
+              '',
+              'Likely a semantic merge race: each merged PR was green on a stale base.',
+              'Fix main before merging anything else — release-please PRs inherit this breakage.',
+              '',
+              "This issue closes automatically when a run on main's tip goes green.",
+            ].join('\n');
+
+            try {
+              await github.rest.issues.getLabel({ ...context.repo, name: label });
+            } catch (e) {
+              if (e.status !== 404) throw e;
+              await github.rest.issues.createLabel({
+                ...context.repo,
+                name: label,
+                color: 'b60205',
+                description: 'CI is failing on main',
+              });
+            }
+
+            if (open.length > 0) {
+              await github.rest.issues.createComment({
+                ...context.repo, issue_number: open[0].number, body,
+              });
+            } else {
+              await github.rest.issues.create({
+                ...context.repo,
+                title: 'CI is red on main',
+                body,
+                labels: [label],
+              });
+            }

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -2,6 +2,17 @@ name: PR Checks
 
 on:
   pull_request:
+  # Run in the merge queue so a PR is re-validated against the true merged
+  # result before it lands. Guards against semantic merge races where two
+  # individually-green PRs break main in combination (#113 + #145 → #229).
+  merge_group:
+  # Release-branch heads are created and pushed by GITHUB_TOKEN (release-please
+  # and the lock-sync job), and GitHub's recursion guard means those pushes
+  # trigger no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented carve-out that
+  # GITHUB_TOKEN CAN trigger, so the release flow dispatches this workflow at
+  # the release branch to attach check runs to its head. Read-only workflow
+  # (contents: read), so the dispatch surface adds no privilege.
+  workflow_dispatch:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
@@ -42,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
         run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
 
       - name: cargo clippy
-        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+        run: cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 
   test:
     name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
@@ -90,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: cargo test
         env:
           DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
-        run: cargo test --workspace
+        run: cargo test --locked --workspace
 
   build-release:
     name: build --release
@@ -113,7 +124,7 @@ jobs:
           key: release
 
       - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --release --workspace
+        run: cargo build --locked --release --workspace
 
   audit:
     name: cargo audit
@@ -133,10 +144,30 @@ jobs:
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
         with:
-          key: audit
+          key: audit-0.22.2
 
-      - name: Install cargo-audit
-        run: cargo install --locked cargo-audit
+      - name: Install cargo-audit (pinned)
+        # Pin the scanner on this BLOCKING gate: an unpinned `cargo install`
+        # floats to the latest release, so a regressed cargo-audit could red CI
+        # repo-wide with no code change. Advisory-DB freshness is fetched at scan
+        # time, independent of the binary, so this does not weaken what the gate
+        # catches. The weekly Scheduled Audit (audit-schedule.yml) deliberately
+        # floats to latest as the drift canary; when it shows a newer cargo-audit
+        # behaving differently, bump this version (and the cache key above) as a
+        # deliberate maintainer action. If 0.22.2 is ever yanked from crates.io
+        # this step fails loud until the pin is bumped.
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          cargo install --locked --version 0.22.2 cargo-audit
+          # Assert the pin took effect so an accidental future unpin (or a drift
+          # off 0.22.2) fails loudly here instead of silently running a different
+          # scanner. `cargo audit --version` prints "cargo-audit-audit 0.22.2".
+          installed="$(cargo audit --version)"
+          echo "cargo-audit installed: $installed"
+          echo "$installed" | grep -qE '(^| )0\.22\.2($| )' || {
+            echo "::error::cargo-audit is not the pinned 0.22.2 (got: $installed)"
+            exit 1
+          }
 
       # Hard-fail gate. Suppressions live in .cargo/audit.toml (read automatically
       # from the repo root), each with no available upstream fix. A green check
@@ -175,7 +206,7 @@ jobs:
           key: msrv
 
       - name: cargo check on MSRV
-        run: cargo check --workspace --all-targets
+        run: cargo check --locked --workspace --all-targets
 
   docker-build:
     name: Docker build smoke test
@@ -192,3 +223,63 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Smoke test --version
         run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:ci-test --version
+
+  test-windows:
+    name: test (windows, non-blocking)
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    # Non-blocking, mirroring the informational `beta` lane above. We ship `gl`
+    # and `git-remote-gitlawb` to Windows users (release.yml) with zero Windows
+    # test coverage, so run their suites here to make Windows-only regressions
+    # VISIBLE on the PR without gating merge (#228). These two are the client
+    # CLIs and depend on no database, so no Postgres service is needed (service
+    # containers do not run on windows-latest regardless). `git` is preinstalled
+    # on windows-latest, which the real_git_fetch harness relies on.
+    continue-on-error: true
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: windows
+
+      - name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
+        run: cargo test --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+
+  # gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
+  # daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal
+  # (non-dev, non-build) dependency tree gains any crate not on the allowlist in
+  # ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt. Exhaustive-by-construction: a new heavy
+  # dependency reds CI whether or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist
+  # cannot do. Regen instructions live in the allowlist header.
+  core-deps-purity:
+    name: gitlawb-core dependency purity
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 15
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
+        with:
+          key: core-deps-purity
+
+      - name: Check gitlawb-core dependency allowlist
+        run: bash scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh

.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
     timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: Label and guide
-        uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
+        uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
         with:
           script: |
             const pr = context.payload.pull_request;

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+  # Manual backfill: republish an already-cut release to a channel that
+  # missed it. Fill in only the channel(s) you want — an empty input leaves
+  # that channel's jobs skipped. npm reuses the existing release's binary
+  # assets; docker rebuilds the image from the tag and re-tags the manifest.
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      npm_backfill_tag:
+        description: "Existing release tag to publish to npm (e.g. v0.6.0)"
+        required: false
+        type: string
+      docker_backfill_tag:
+        description: "Existing release tag to publish to ghcr (e.g. v0.6.0)"
+        required: false
+        type: string
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -14,7 +28,10 @@ permissions: {}
 
 jobs:
   release-please:
-    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' }}
+    # Skipped on manual dispatch: a backfill must never create or advance a
+    # release PR as a side effect (npm-publish tolerates the skipped need via
+    # !cancelled(), and every other job gates on release_created == 'true').
+    if: ${{ github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
     name: Release Please
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
@@ -24,6 +41,7 @@ jobs:
       release_created: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
       tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
       version: ${{ steps.release.outputs.version }}
+      pr: ${{ steps.release.outputs.pr }}
     steps:
       - name: Run release-please
         id: release
@@ -31,24 +49,198 @@ jobs:
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-  docker:
-    name: Build & Push Docker Image
+  # The release PR bumps the workspace crate versions in the Cargo.tomls but
+  # release-please cannot update Cargo.lock, so without this job every release
+  # merge ships a tag whose lockfile disagrees with its manifests (a --locked
+  # build from the tag fails, and pr-checks builds --locked). Sync the lock on
+  # the release branch so the tagged tree is internally consistent.
+  #
+  # Runs on every push-triggered release run, not only when release-please
+  # reports the PR: the `pr` output is set only on runs that CREATE or UPDATE
+  # the release PR, so gating on it would leave an already-open release PR
+  # (opened before this job existed, or untouched by a non-releasable push)
+  # permanently without the sync and without check runs. The resolve step
+  # discovers any open release-please PR itself and no-ops when there is none.
+  sync-release-lock:
+    name: Sync Cargo.lock on the release PR
     needs: release-please
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      pull-requests: read
+      # actions: write lets the final step dispatch pr-checks on the release
+      # branch. Note this grant is repo-wide dispatch rights (GitHub cannot
+      # scope it to one workflow); acceptable here because reaching this job's
+      # steps already requires write to main. Needed because every push to the
+      # release branch (release-please's and the lock sync below) is made with
+      # GITHUB_TOKEN, which triggers no workflow runs, so without an explicit
+      # dispatch the release PR's head carries no check runs and the --locked
+      # gate never validates it.
+      actions: write
+    steps:
+      # Prefer the fresh `pr` output when this run just created/updated the
+      # release PR; otherwise fall back to querying for an open release-please
+      # branch (prefix match: the branch carries `--components--` suffixes).
+      - name: Resolve the open release PR branch
+        id: resolve
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          OWNER: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
+          BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.pr && fromJSON(needs.release-please.outputs.pr).headBranchName || '' }}
+        run: |
+          branch="$BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT"
+          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
+            # The branch name alone is not a trust signal. `gh pr list` includes
+            # fork PRs, and a fork's headRefName is bare (no owner prefix), so a
+            # prefix match by itself lets any fork nominate the branch this job
+            # checks out, commits to, and dispatches checks on. Require the head
+            # repo to be THIS repository and the author to be the release-please
+            # app, so neither a fork nor a same-repo human branch named
+            # `release-please--*` can be selected. Then take the highest PR
+            # number: `[0]` depended on gh's default ordering, which is not a
+            # documented guarantee, and picking a stable one keeps a second
+            # (component) release PR from making the choice flap between runs.
+            branch=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open \
+              --json headRefName,headRepositoryOwner,number,author \
+              --jq '[ .[]
+                      | select(.headRepositoryOwner.login == env.OWNER)
+                      | select(.author.login == "app/github-actions")
+                      | select(.headRefName | startswith("release-please--"))
+                    ] | max_by(.number).headRefName // empty')
+          fi
+          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
+            echo "no open release PR; nothing to sync"
+          fi
+          echo "branch=$branch" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Checkout release branch
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
+
+      # Resolve on a declared toolchain instead of whatever Rust the runner
+      # image happens to ship, so the lock this job writes comes off the same
+      # stable channel the other cargo jobs use. Not a claim of identical
+      # resolution: `stable` still moves between runs, and the MSRV gate
+      # checks this same lock on 1.91 (pr-checks.yml). It only removes the
+      # runner image as an undeclared input.
+      - name: Install Rust toolchain
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Sync workspace crate versions into Cargo.lock
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        run: cargo update --workspace
+
+      - name: Commit and push when the lock changed
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        run: |
+          if git diff --quiet Cargo.lock; then
+            echo "Cargo.lock already in sync"
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+          git add Cargo.lock
+          git commit -m "chore: sync Cargo.lock with the release version bump"
+          git push
+
+      # Every push to the release branch is made with GITHUB_TOKEN (release-
+      # please's own pushes and the lock sync above), and events created by
+      # GITHUB_TOKEN start no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented
+      # exception GITHUB_TOKEN may trigger, so dispatch pr-checks at the release
+      # branch to attach check runs to its current head. Unconditional (also on
+      # the already-in-sync path) because the branch's ORIGINAL head has the
+      # same no-runs problem. Loud on failure by design: a silent fallback
+      # would recreate the checkless-head problem, and a job rerun is safe
+      # (sync no-ops, dispatch retries). Loop-safe: pr-checks is read-only and
+      # dispatches nothing. Runs after the push ack, so the dispatched ref tip
+      # is the sync commit. Merge-queue note: this validates the branch tip;
+      # the enforced merge queue's merge_group run still re-validates the true
+      # merged result before landing.
+      - name: Dispatch PR checks on the release branch
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          BRANCH: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
+        run: |
+          # Every dispatch failure fails the job, including the 422 a release
+          # branch cut before pr-checks gained its workflow_dispatch trigger
+          # returns ("does not have a workflow_dispatch trigger", reported
+          # against the dispatched ref's copy of the file). An earlier revision
+          # tolerated exactly that 422 on the theory that release-please would
+          # rewrite the branch and heal it, but a rewrite only happens when a
+          # later releasable commit lands: an open release PR nobody touches is
+          # never rewritten. Tolerating it therefore left the lock-sync commit
+          # this job had just pushed sitting on the release head with no
+          # --locked validation, which is the precise state this workflow exists
+          # to prevent. The tolerance is also no longer needed: once this lands,
+          # every release branch is cut from a main that already carries the
+          # trigger, so the only branch that could 422 is one open at merge time
+          # (there is none), and a job rerun after a manual rebase is safe (the
+          # sync no-ops, the dispatch retries).
+          gh api "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/pr-checks.yml/dispatches" \
+            -f "ref=$BRANCH"
+
+  # Each architecture builds NATIVELY (amd64 on ubuntu-latest, arm64 on
+  # ubuntu-24.04-arm) and pushes by digest; docker-manifest below stitches the
+  # digests into the tagged multi-arch image. No QEMU: emulating the arm64
+  # Rust release build wedged the v0.6.0 run for 3+ hours and, via the
+  # workflow concurrency group, blocked every queued release run behind it.
+  docker:
+    name: Build & Push Docker Image (${{ matrix.arch }})
+    needs: release-please
+    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
+    # (release-please is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()).
+    if: >-
+      ${{ !cancelled() && (
+        needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' ||
+        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.docker_backfill_tag != '')
+      ) }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        include:
+          - arch: amd64
+            os: ubuntu-latest
+            platform: linux/amd64
+          - arch: arm64
+            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
+            platform: linux/arm64
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
     permissions:
       contents: read
       packages: write
     steps:
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        id: rel
+        env:
+          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
+          case "$TAG" in
+            v[0-9]*) ;;
+            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
+          esac
+          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path, and unlike metadata-action,
+          # buildx's `--output name=` does no lowercasing — a mixed-case owner
+          # makes the digest push fail with "invalid reference format".
+          echo "image=ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
       - name: Checkout release tag
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - name: Set up QEMU
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@29109295f81e9208d7d86ff1c6c12d2833863392 # v3.6.0
-
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
 
@@ -59,45 +251,130 @@ jobs:
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
           password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-      - name: Extract metadata
-        id: meta
-        uses: docker/metadata-action@902fa8ec7d6ecbf8d84d538b9b233a880e428804 # v5.7.0
-        with:
-          images: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
-          tags: |
-            type=semver,pattern={{version}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}},value=${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-            type=raw,value=latest
-
       - name: Build and load locally (smoke)
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
+          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
           load: true
           tags: gitlawb-node:smoke
-          cache-from: type=gha
+          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
 
+      # Native runner on both arches, so the built image can always execute.
+      # Assert the released version so a stale artifact fails here, not in prod.
       - name: Smoke test
-        run: docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          out="$(docker run --rm gitlawb-node:smoke --version)"
+          echo "$out"
+          grep -qF "$VERSION" <<<"$out" || {
+            echo "::error::image --version did not report expected version $VERSION (got: $out)"
+            exit 1
+          }
 
-      - name: Build and push (multi-arch)
+      # Push by digest only — tags are applied once by docker-manifest so a
+      # half-finished matrix can never publish a partially-tagged image.
+      # provenance:false keeps each push a plain single-arch manifest, which is
+      # what imagetools create expects to merge.
+      - name: Build and push by digest
+        id: push
         uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.16.0
         with:
           context: .
-          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
-          push: true
-          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
-          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
-          cache-from: type=gha
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
+          platforms: ${{ matrix.platform }}
+          provenance: false
+          outputs: type=image,name=${{ steps.rel.outputs.image }},push-by-digest=true,name-canonical=true,push=true
+          cache-from: type=gha,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=docker-${{ matrix.arch }}
+
+      - name: Export digest
+        env:
+          DIGEST: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          mkdir -p /tmp/digests
+          touch "/tmp/digests/${DIGEST#sha256:}"
+
+      - name: Upload digest
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
+        with:
+          name: docker-digest-${{ matrix.arch }}
+          path: /tmp/digests/*
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 1
+
+  docker-manifest:
+    name: Publish Docker manifest
+    needs: [release-please, docker]
+    if: ${{ !cancelled() && needs.docker.result == 'success' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      packages: write
+    steps:
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        id: rel
+        env:
+          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.docker_backfill_tag }}
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
+          case "$TAG" in
+            v[0-9]*) ;;
+            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
+          esac
+          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Download digests
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@d3f86a106a0bac45b974a628896c90dbdf5c8093 # v4.3.0
+        with:
+          pattern: docker-digest-*
+          path: /tmp/digests
+          merge-multiple: true
+
+      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@b5ca514318bd6ebac0fb2aedd5d36ec1b5c232a2 # v3.10.0
+
+      - name: Log in to GitHub Container Registry
+        uses: docker/login-action@74a5d142397b4f367a81961eba4e8cd7edddf772 # v3.4.0
+        with:
+          registry: ghcr.io
+          username: ${{ github.actor }}
+          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Create and push multi-arch manifest
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # ghcr requires a lowercase repository path.
+          IMAGE="ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}"
+          MAJOR_MINOR="${VERSION%.*}"
+          digests=""
+          for f in /tmp/digests/*; do
+            digests="$digests $IMAGE@sha256:$(basename "$f")"
+          done
+          # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+          docker buildx imagetools create \
+            -t "$IMAGE:$VERSION" \
+            -t "$IMAGE:$MAJOR_MINOR" \
+            -t "$IMAGE:latest" \
+            $digests
+          docker buildx imagetools inspect "$IMAGE:$VERSION"
 
       - name: Release summary
+        env:
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           {
-            echo "## Released ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
+            echo "## Released $TAG"
             echo
-            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}\`"
-            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/tag/${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}"
+            echo "- Image: \`ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY,,}:$VERSION\` (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64)"
+            echo "- GitHub: https://github.com/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/tag/$TAG"
           } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
 
   release-binaries:
@@ -116,10 +393,14 @@ jobs:
         include:
           - target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
             os: ubuntu-latest
+          # Native arm64 runner: cross-compiling this target with the glibc
+          # toolchain broke aws-lc-sys, and native lets the smoke test run.
           - target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
-            os: ubuntu-latest
+            os: ubuntu-24.04-arm
+          # macos-13 (the last plain Intel image) is retired and queues forever;
+          # macos-15-intel is GitHub's supported Intel label.
           - target: x86_64-apple-darwin
-            os: macos-13
+            os: macos-15-intel
           - target: aarch64-apple-darwin
             os: macos-14
           - target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
@@ -137,16 +418,13 @@ jobs:
           toolchain: stable
           targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
 
+      # Both musl targets build natively on a matching-arch runner, so the stock
+      # musl-gcc wrapper is all that's needed (no cross toolchain).
       - name: Install musl tools (linux)
         if: contains(matrix.target, 'linux-musl')
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update
           sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
-          if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-musl" ]; then
-            sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
-            echo "CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-            echo "CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-          fi
 
       - name: Cache cargo
         uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@98c8021b550208e191a6a3145459bfc9fb29c4c0 # v2.8.0
@@ -168,13 +446,12 @@ jobs:
           set -euo pipefail
           args=""
           for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
-          cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
+          cargo build --release --locked --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
 
       # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
-      # build instead of shipping. Skipped for cross-compiled targets that can't run
-      # on the host runner (aarch64 linux on an x86_64 runner).
+      # build instead of shipping. Every target builds on a matching-arch runner,
+      # so all of them can execute here.
       - name: Smoke test binaries
-        if: ${{ matrix.target != 'aarch64-unknown-linux-musl' }}
         shell: bash
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -248,37 +525,62 @@ jobs:
   npm-publish:
     name: Publish to npm
     needs: [release-please, release-binaries]
-    if: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' }}
+    # Runs on a fresh release, or on manual dispatch for an existing tag
+    # (release-binaries is skipped on dispatch, hence !cancelled()). Publishing
+    # auth is npm Trusted Publishing (GitHub OIDC) — no NPM_TOKEN. Each
+    # @gitlawb package must have this repo + workflow (release.yml) configured
+    # as its trusted publisher on npmjs.com, or publish fails loudly here —
+    # deliberately loud: the silent secret-guard skip is how 0.4.x–0.6.0
+    # never reached npm.
+    if: >-
+      ${{ !cancelled() && (
+        (needs.release-please.outputs.release_created == 'true' && needs.release-binaries.result == 'success') ||
+        (github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.npm_backfill_tag != '')
+      ) }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: read
-      id-token: write # npm provenance
+      id-token: write # npm trusted publishing (OIDC) + provenance
     steps:
-      - name: Guard on secret
-        id: guard
+      - name: Resolve release tag
+        id: rel
         env:
-          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
+          DISPATCH_TAG: ${{ inputs.npm_backfill_tag }}
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
         run: |
-          if [ -z "${NPM_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::NPM_TOKEN is not set — skipping npm publish."
-            echo "enabled=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "enabled=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
+          set -euo pipefail
+          TAG="${DISPATCH_TAG:-$RELEASE_TAG}"
+          case "$TAG" in
+            v[0-9]*) ;;
+            *) echo "::error::'$TAG' does not look like a release tag (vX.Y.Z)"; exit 1 ;;
+          esac
+          echo "tag=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "version=${TAG#v}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Checkout release tag
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
         with:
-          ref: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          ref: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
+      # npm >= 11.5.1 performs the OIDC token exchange automatically when the
+      # package has a trusted publisher configured; older npm silently falls
+      # back to (absent) token auth and fails confusingly.
+      - name: Set up Node 24 + OIDC-capable npm
+        uses: actions/setup-node@a0853c24544627f65ddf259abe73b1d18a591444 # v5.0.0
+        with:
+          node-version: "24"
+      - name: Ensure npm supports trusted publishing
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          npm install -g npm@^11.5.1
+          npm --version
+
       - name: Lay in release binaries
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
-          TAG: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.tag_name }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
+          TAG: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.tag }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           # npm platform package -> Rust target triple (unix only; Windows is not
@@ -305,9 +607,8 @@ jobs:
           done
 
       - name: Set versions
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           node -e '
@@ -327,13 +628,12 @@ jobs:
           '
 
       - name: Publish
-        if: ${{ steps.guard.outputs.enabled == 'true' }}
         env:
-          NPM_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
-          VERSION: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.version }}
+          VERSION: ${{ steps.rel.outputs.version }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          echo "//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}" > ~/.npmrc
+          # No token: npm exchanges this job's GitHub OIDC identity with the
+          # registry (trusted publishing); provenance is attested automatically.
           # Platform packages first, then the wrapper (so its optionalDependencies resolve).
           # Skip versions already on the registry so a rerun after a partial publish
           # is idempotent instead of erroring on the first existing package.
@@ -429,6 +729,15 @@ jobs:
               bin.install "git-remote-gitlawb"
             end
 
+            def caveats
+              <<~CAVEATS
+                oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull', which shadows this
+                binary in interactive shells. If \`gl\` prints "fatal: not a git
+                repository", run:
+                  echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
+              CAVEATS
+            end
+
             test do
               assert_match version.to_s, shell_output("#{bin}/gl --version")
             end

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.4.0"
+  ".": "0.7.1"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,99 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [0.7.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.7.0...v0.7.1) (2026-08-03)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([99b2b9a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/99b2b9a16662761a3959a2941798e6823621bda5))
+* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([a49e04d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a49e04ddcd23f3b666421486ae60c3c4329e2242)), closes [#265](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/265) [#266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/266)
+* **db:** pin profile DID matching with lone non-key fixture and boundary matrix ([b4016dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b4016dce9d1fe450603173f9d92bd880127620fa)), closes [#298](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/298)
+* **node:** add a shared owner/name slug validator ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([51d82de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/51d82ded57a776d9c7e2fe65895efdbf9e227dc8))
+* **node:** bound the slug owner by NAME_MAX, not the DID limit ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([27b0495](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/27b0495a6f7edeecddbe62b0f075a7e3b1ef5053))
+* **node:** fail a sync row terminally when a non-directory holds the owner path ([2e664b7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2e664b7885036ee72ce175af95bb567b18222583))
+* **node:** make a stalled sync queue visible, and fix two test claims ([9aa4c17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9aa4c17aefd1885d134b1334b54551366cdd8ef0))
+* **node:** move the attempted_at migration to v17, clear of two open branches ([fbc5868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/fbc5868bd16946ea184dad26abcdb0e89d68e99a))
+* **node:** prove the mirror path is inside repos_dir before running git ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([3ca9473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3ca94739ed7b90e4c265a0947025dc3b50e7583b))
+* **node:** reject a malformed slug at the notify boundary ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c587a40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c587a40a508acea9f74c3468d42ff037397c75d0))
+* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([1964f88](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1964f88378fe6942ffca5836de3a092b5b8f67b4))
+* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([e2560ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e2560ee46c28e4e966d87867a86dc4bad4ca7a3a))
+* **node:** stamp every dequeued sync row so a stuck one yields the batch ([6e64d0d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6e64d0d0a7fdd38ef3a56820c1808dd7c9bbd658))
+* **node:** stop a peer-supplied repo slug from escaping repos_dir ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c70b1df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c70b1df42d5c3f70ec4c272886c85fcc16ed92d1))
+* **node:** validate the queued slug before the worker derives a path ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([9f00e24](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9f00e24aec217e4b8256dd437cff4741b1478b96))
+* **review:** correct two comment claims and guard two more wrong shapes ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([811ad50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/811ad504bc268c8e9cddac93822adcd00bfe9ff8))
+* **review:** stop the dequeue overclaiming, and pin the starvation premise ([457be11](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/457be11d728a2a34775cf96be2bc5af9a58cb250))
+* strict DID matching in get_profile ([acb4714](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/acb47145beec8ce7b20b7a2479f7a55ed68e2a89))
+* strict DID matching in get_profile ([13b565b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/13b565bcac09f075a7fd555a6e9acdd27de6c7bb))
+* target stored did on profile update aliases ([9836c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9836c3a21bc96a2ce95cb1fd12bd84b22142787d))
+
+## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-07-22)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **gl:** actually verify certificate signatures in gl cert show ([b0a2ed8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b0a2ed830821b5a77b0dafdcf5ce4b1ad904ec25))
+* **gl:** doctor warns when a shell alias shadows the gl binary ([0765c42](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/0765c42feff47b29054b9a277881a7cd5bfd9135))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gl:** address review findings — non-fatal DID check, exact-host loopback, detached HEAD, multi-URL remotes, command-aware unalias ([3fa38dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3fa38dce4e435ef017f607d355266c2892161f8d))
+* **gl:** anchor cert --verify to a trusted issuer; pin canonical payload form ([c681af7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c681af70dba3a76b11795d324f2ca0fecf7e42fd))
+* **gl:** detect gitlawb remotes beyond origin in gl status ([2d88937](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2d88937fbabf21013f28debb4d4f93270a4bb8cd))
+* **gl:** doctor treats a reachable local node as configuration, not failure ([94c61f7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/94c61f79421fa26ecc1bdf7c255e0c48e66a2048))
+* **gl:** make gl init's push guidance match the repo's actual state ([cb42a48](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cb42a4830d0d070165e2212f316d009ec716dbee))
+* warn about the oh-my-zsh gl alias at install time ([e3df51d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e3df51d76c0275fde33954ff0af0aab95fd0cb7d))
+
+## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0) (2026-07-22)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **icaptcha-client:** solve the iCaptcha proof-of-work on answer ([#181](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/181)) ([c98b503](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c98b503f90cade54ce9c588bd2373a4e3486f2fc))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **core:** honor wildcard capabilities in Ucan::can, matching is_attenuated_by ([#200](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/200)) ([b6877a6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b6877a65981dbf41c4a7838971eb5c826c7fcaf2))
+* **gl:** point doctor's version check at Gitlawb/node, not the frozen Gitlawb/releases repo ([#198](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/198)) ([98d728c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/98d728c325f68f0ee4a62e473dc484b7dd627504))
+* **node:** carry full owner DID on ref-update wire event ([#144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/144)) ([#145](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/145)) ([69a62e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/69a62e51c2d2f090f9cae88f4d8ce3b9017b7149))
+* **node:** gate /hooks and sibling read surfaces leaking private repo metadata ([#94](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/94)) ([#113](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/113)) ([ee8d7c0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/ee8d7c03b26a0b678cc90b8801aa340fe81da700))
+* strip Cf bidi/format controls in terminal-bound error sanitizers ([#183](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/183)) ([#188](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/188)) ([b07d41e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b07d41ea97569d79d3f545ae5d43c373cd6f0f33))
+
+## [0.5.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1) (2026-07-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **bounties:** add tests for claim_bounty repo-read gate ([#160](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/160)) ([#169](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/169)) ([6bafaa6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6bafaa6dc5f05c0dcd61c708397afddbcf8c2e3f))
+* **deps:** bump crossbeam-epoch to 0.9.20 for RUSTSEC-2026-0204 ([#162](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/162)) ([#163](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/163)) ([67ad2b8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/67ad2b876c8d9a336219d1016968de7a88fc4e75))
+* **node,git:** bound a hung served git with a total-duration timeout ([#62](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/62)) ([#165](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/165)) ([cd67718](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/cd67718f49ec38726a40f6bcf36f539ccdb42969))
+* **node:** bound list_ref_certificates with LIMIT and add upsert to prevent unbounded growth ([#147](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/147)) ([#149](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/149)) ([6b5e5bc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6b5e5bc7aee00a2d03295d3620df1ee4d8c024a2))
+* **node:** gate POST /api/v1/sync/trigger and rate-limit the peer-sync routes ([#82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/82)) ([#161](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/161)) ([d00d89a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/d00d89ae5be992d1f63e95b714ae1bd3735e8457))
+* **node:** rate-limit repo/agent creation per client IP to stop DID-farm spam floods ([#180](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/180)) ([dfcaa22](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/dfcaa22b23ec91be4c75926956aa994ca89de8d5))
+* **release:** build aarch64-musl natively on arm64 runners, replace retired macos-13 ([#155](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/155)) ([6cff528](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6cff5286b436fdee44ad881999e2a5f4bdba18f9))
+* **visibility:** gate repo-scoped read surfaces on visibility ([#120](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/120)) ([#157](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/157)) ([26bc3f6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/26bc3f69870aa77e43c0d92115a5aa59555b7d88))
+
+## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-05)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **gl:** sanctioned iCaptcha client flow + secure git lifecycle ([#138](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/138)) ([06388ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/06388ec26aa29d356ae311276fdb91be054e9ecc))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **gl:** sign the CLI's /ipfs/pins reads under the [#134](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/134) auth gate ([#146](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/146)) ([20d6848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/20d6848846b3a988d604208833167a528b7d8820))
+* **node,git-remote:** gate receive-pack advertisement, sign client fetch/push ([#119](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/119)) ([6f36fc0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6f36fc07b8e10a650c5948b269feac1cb25cae2a))
+* **node,gossip:** route gossip HTTP through the no-redirect client ([#93](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/93)) ([#140](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/140)) ([563c456](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/563c456803bf3e958d63869db424b3940472bc3d))
+* **node:** close two spam-vector root causes (trust upsert + ungated push) ([#152](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/152)) ([2df6ff9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2df6ff9d30de62f754fa41473e85db316021718e))
+* **node:** gate GET /ipfs/{cid} on reachable allowed-set, not deny-set ([#126](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/126)) ([#133](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/133)) ([466a550](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/466a550915edd711856ef32035f9f474e2577c4f))
+* **node:** gate the ref-updates feeds on read visibility ([#112](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/112), [#114](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/114)) ([#143](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/143)) ([4891db3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/4891db38892663326ee0c1417a2db931988be4b5))
+* **node:** prefer canonical repo row over mirror row in get_repo ([#124](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/124)) ([#141](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/141)) ([6c95592](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6c95592d188222ac3446dc23ef8d9befbf82ad6f))
+* **remote:** include HTTP error response body ([#137](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/137)) ([09a0cb2](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/09a0cb23b9f284ccbd69aca6958b70671f3bfb46))
+* **repos:** log the cause when repo create fails ([#103](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/103)) ([2620e97](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2620e973e3cd4835ed42ddd4adcd8183b5b3080e))
+
 ## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.3.9...v0.4.0) (2026-06-30)
 
 

Cargo.lock

@@ -770,6 +770,23 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
+ "ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
+ "ark-serialize 0.6.0",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "educe",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-asm"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -800,6 +817,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-asm"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
+dependencies = [
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-macros"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -838,6 +865,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-macros"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-serialize"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -871,6 +911,30 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-bigint",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-serialize-derive",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "serde_with",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize-derive"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-std"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -901,6 +965,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand 0.8.6",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-std"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-traits",
+ "rand 0.8.6",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayref"
 version = "0.3.9"
@@ -2293,9 +2367,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "crossbeam-epoch"
-version = "0.9.18"
+version = "0.9.20"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5b82ac4a3c2ca9c3460964f020e1402edd5753411d7737aa39c3714ad1b5420e"
+checksum = "2d6914041f254d6e9176c01941b21115dcfb7089e55135a35411081bd106ef3f"
 dependencies = [
  "crossbeam-utils",
 ]
@@ -2556,7 +2630,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7ab67060fc6b8ef687992d439ca0fa36e7ed17e9a0b16b25b601e8757df720de"
 dependencies = [
  "data-encoding",
- "syn 1.0.109",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2928,7 +3002,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3300,10 +3374,11 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
@@ -3311,7 +3386,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3328,7 +3403,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -3355,7 +3430,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3411,14 +3486,16 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.3.9"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
+ "base64",
  "chrono",
  "clap",
  "dirs",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "icaptcha-client",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
@@ -3813,6 +3890,21 @@ dependencies = [
  "cc",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "icaptcha-client"
+version = "0.4.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "anyhow",
+ "gitlawb-core",
+ "mockito",
+ "reqwest",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+ "sha2",
+ "thiserror 2.0.18",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "icu_collections"
 version = "2.1.1"
@@ -5723,14 +5815,15 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "ruint"
-version = "1.17.2"
+version = "1.20.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
+checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy-rlp",
  "ark-ff 0.3.0",
  "ark-ff 0.4.2",
  "ark-ff 0.5.0",
+ "ark-ff 0.6.0",
  "bytes",
  "fastrlp 0.3.1",
  "fastrlp 0.4.0",
@@ -5804,7 +5897,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -6698,7 +6791,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.4.2",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

Cargo.toml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ members = [
     "crates/gl",
     "crates/git-remote-gitlawb",
     "crates/gitlawb-attest",
+    "crates/icaptcha-client",
 ]
 
 [workspace.package]

Dockerfile

@@ -8,20 +8,33 @@ FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 
 WORKDIR /build
 
-# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds
+# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds.
+# EVERY workspace member's manifest must be copied here, not just the ones this
+# image ships: cargo loads the whole workspace before it resolves anything, so a
+# missing member's Cargo.toml (or a path dependency pointing at one) aborts the
+# layer before a single crate is fetched.
 COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
 COPY crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-core/
 COPY crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-node/
 COPY crates/gl/Cargo.toml crates/gl/
 COPY crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml crates/git-remote-gitlawb/
+COPY crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-attest/
+COPY crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml crates/icaptcha-client/
 
-# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change)
-RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src && \
+# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change).
+# No `|| true`: this layer is expected to succeed, and swallowing its exit code
+# is what let it sit dead from the moment gl gained a path dependency on
+# icaptcha-client. A failure here should stop the build, not silently turn every
+# image build into a cold one.
+RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src \
+        crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src crates/gitlawb-attest/src crates/icaptcha-client/src && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gl/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs && \
     echo '' > crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs && \
-    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb || true
+    echo '' > crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs && \
+    echo '' > crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs && \
+    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # Now copy real sources and build for real.
 # Force-bump mtimes so cargo's fingerprint check rebuilds — without this,
@@ -34,7 +47,7 @@ RUN find crates -name "*.rs" -exec touch {} + && \
     rm -rf target/release/.fingerprint/gitlawb-node-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/gl-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/git-remote-gitlawb-* && \
-    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
+    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
     strip target/release/gitlawb-node target/release/gl target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # ── Runtime stage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Dockerfile.bins

@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@
 # Used by scripts/build-bins.sh — not used for node deployment.
 ARG TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 
-FROM rust:1.85-bookworm AS builder
+# Must stay at or above the workspace `rust-version` in Cargo.toml. An unmet
+# MSRV is a hard cargo error, and nothing in CI builds this file, so a stale
+# base image here fails only when someone runs scripts/build-bins.sh.
+FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 ARG TARGET
 
 WORKDIR /build
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ COPY crates/ crates/
 # Configure cross-linker for aarch64
 ENV CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
 
-RUN cargo build --release --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+RUN cargo build --release --locked --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 ARG TARGET

README.md

@@ -185,6 +185,45 @@ git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo
 
 For public-network use, make sure `GITLAWB_NODE` points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.
 
+### Full lifecycle against an iCaptcha-enforcing node
+
+Public nodes (e.g. `node.gitlawb.com`) require two things on writes:
+
+1. **RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures** — every write is signed by your identity key. `gl`
+   and the `git-remote-gitlawb` helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI
+   fails with `401 not_an_agent`; `gl` will tell you to upgrade and register.
+2. **An iCaptcha proof** on the spam-gated writes (**repo create, fork, register**).
+   `gl` solves this for you: on the node's `403 icaptcha_proof_required` it reads the
+   `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` hints, requests a challenge, solves it
+   locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), and **retries the same signed request**
+   with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header — no manual steps, no env vars.
+
+```bash
+gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
+gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
+git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
+git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
+gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- **`requesterId` is always your DID.** The proof's `sub` claim must equal the
+  authenticated signer; `gl`/helper set this automatically and the node enforces
+  `sub == authenticated DID` (so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).
+- **Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use.** If one expires between
+  solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.
+- **What needs what:** create / fork / register are signed **and** iCaptcha-gated;
+  `git push` is **signed-only** (owner signature is the gate — no per-push challenge);
+  reads (clone / fetch / `repo info`) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a
+  clear `404`, never a placeholder.
+- **API-key iCaptcha deployments:** set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` to your iCaptcha
+  origin and `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` to its key. The client only talks to an
+  `https` origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and
+  sends the bearer token **only** to your configured origin — never to a URL a
+  node advertises — so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.
+
 ---
 
 ## Architecture
@@ -263,20 +302,21 @@ POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/...
 POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack
 ```
 
-Peer write routes support staged rollout:
+These peer write routes support staged rollout:
 
 ```txt
 POST /api/v1/peers/announce
 POST /api/v1/sync/notify
-POST /api/v1/sync/trigger
 ```
 
-When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
+When `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false`, unsigned legacy peers are accepted on those two routes, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:
 
 ```bash
 GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true
 ```
 
+`POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.
+
 ---
 
 ## Configuration
@@ -303,6 +343,7 @@ Important node settings:
 | `GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES` | Require signed peer announce/sync writes. |
 | `GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC` | Enable automatic sync from known peers. |
 | `GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES` | Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes. |
+| `GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS` | Max seconds a served git upload-pack/receive-pack may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Does not bound `info/refs` or the withheld-blob path. |
 | `GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET` | Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket. |
 | `GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT` | Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning. |
 | `GITLAWB_IRYS_URL` | Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring. |

ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# Dependency allowlist for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
+#
+# gitlawb-core is the shared-primitives crate every consumer embeds (the `gl`
+# CLI, git-remote-gitlawb, the node daemon). It must stay lean so those
+# consumers do not inherit daemon-weight dependencies. This file is the source
+# of truth for the crates gitlawb-core's NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive
+# dependency closure is allowed to contain. CI (`scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh`,
+# wired into the `core-deps-purity` job in .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml)
+# fails if gitlawb-core's tree contains any crate not listed here.
+#
+# The allowlist is exhaustive-by-construction: a NEW dependency reds CI whether
+# or not anyone thought to ban it, which a denylist cannot do.
+#
+# Measured in-workspace, so feature unification across the workspace can, in
+# rare cases, surface a crate here that gitlawb-core would not pull standalone.
+# An unexpected new entry is a prompt to check what pulled it in, not noise to
+# rubber-stamp.
+#
+# Regenerate (from repo root, after an INTENTIONAL dependency change):
+#   cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none \
+#     | sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
+#     | grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
+#     | sort -u
+# then paste the result below this header block. (The checker snapshots and
+# restores Cargo.lock; a manual regen may refresh it — `git checkout Cargo.lock`
+# afterward if you did not intend that.)
+#
+# Lines starting with `#` and blank lines are ignored by the checker.
+aead
+anyhow
+base-x
+base256emoji
+base64
+base64ct
+block-buffer
+cfg-if
+chacha20
+chacha20poly1305
+chrono
+cid
+cipher
+const-oid
+const-str
+core2
+cpufeatures
+crypto-common
+crypto_box
+crypto_secretbox
+curve25519-dalek
+curve25519-dalek-derive
+data-encoding
+data-encoding-macro
+data-encoding-macro-internal
+der
+digest
+ed25519
+ed25519-dalek
+equivalent
+generic-array
+getrandom
+hashbrown
+hex
+iana-time-zone
+indexmap
+inout
+itoa
+libc
+match-lookup
+memchr
+multibase
+multihash
+multihash-codetable
+multihash-derive
+multihash-derive-impl
+num-traits
+opaque-debug
+pem-rfc7468
+pkcs8
+poly1305
+ppv-lite86
+proc-macro-crate
+proc-macro2
+quote
+rand
+rand_chacha
+rand_core
+salsa20
+serde
+serde_core
+serde_derive
+serde_json
+sha2
+signature
+spki
+subtle
+syn
+synstructure
+thiserror
+thiserror-impl
+toml_datetime
+toml_edit
+toml_parser
+typenum
+unicode-ident
+universal-hash
+unsigned-varint
+uuid
+winnow
+zerocopy
+zeroize
+zeroize_derive
+zmij

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -16,3 +16,6 @@ anyhow = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 tracing = { workspace = true }
 tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+mockito = "1"

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs

@@ -14,7 +14,13 @@
 //! # Protocol flow (connect capability)
 //!   capabilities → "connect\n\n"
 //!   connect git-upload-pack  → GET /info/refs | POST /git-upload-pack
-//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack (+ auth header)
+//!   connect git-receive-pack → GET /info/refs | POST /git-receive-pack
+//! Push (git-receive-pack) is RFC-9421 signed from the first request when an
+//! identity keypair is present, since a push can never be anonymous. Fetch
+//! (git-upload-pack) stays anonymous and is signed only on a single retry, after
+//! the node denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 — so a public clone never
+//! discloses the caller's DID, while a private repo's owner (or an authorized
+//! reader) still authenticates when the node demands it.
 
 use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
@@ -63,7 +69,10 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_base = format!("{}/{}/{}", node_base, short_owner, repo_name);
     tracing::debug!("repo_base: {repo_base}");
 
-    // Load keypair for signing push requests (optional — push still works unsigned in v0.1)
+    // Load keypair for signing requests (optional). Push always signs when a key is
+    // present; fetch signs only if the node 404s the anonymous advertisement, so
+    // public fetches stay anonymous. Absent a key, public fetch still works and push
+    // falls back to unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only).
     let keypair = load_keypair();
 
     run_helper(&repo_base, keypair.as_ref())
@@ -115,7 +124,7 @@ fn help_text() -> String {
          \n\
          ENVIRONMENT:\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_NODE   Node base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:7545)\n\
-         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed pushes (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
+         \x20   GITLAWB_KEY    Identity PEM path for signed fetch/push (default: ~/.gitlawb/identity.pem)\n\
          \x20   GITLAWB_LOG    Log filter (default: warn)\n\
          \n\
          FLAGS:\n\
@@ -179,11 +188,11 @@ fn run_helper(repo_base: &str, keypair: Option<&Keypair>) -> Result<()> {
 
 // ── HTTP proxy for git smart protocol ────────────────────────────────────────
 
-fn handle_connect(
+fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
     repo_base: &str,
     service: &str,
     keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
-    stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>,
+    stdin: &mut R,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     match service {
         "git-upload-pack" | "git-receive-pack" => {}
@@ -198,19 +207,52 @@ fn handle_connect(
     //
     // The server advertises its refs. git reads this to decide what to fetch/push.
 
+    // Signing policy for this exchange, carried through to the Phase-2 POST:
+    //  - git-receive-pack (push): sign from the first request; a push is
+    //    signature-gated and can never be anonymous.
+    //  - git-upload-pack (fetch): start anonymous so a public clone never discloses
+    //    the caller's DID, then escalate to a single signed retry only if the node
+    //    denies the anonymous advertisement with 404 (how it withholds a private
+    //    repo from an unauthenticated reader).
+    let mut signing_key = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        keypair
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
     let refs_url = format!("{}/info/refs?service={}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("GET {refs_url}");
 
-    let refs_resp = client
-        .get(&refs_url)
-        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0")
+    let mut refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
         .send()
         .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url}"))?;
 
+    // Fetch escalation: retry the advertisement signed once when the anonymous try
+    // is denied and we hold an identity. A public repo answers 200 on the first
+    // (anonymous) request and never reaches here, so it stays DID-private.
+    if service == "git-upload-pack"
+        && refs_resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND
+        && keypair.is_some()
+    {
+        tracing::debug!("anonymous info/refs returned 404; retrying signed");
+        signing_key = keypair;
+        refs_resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, signing_key)
+            .send()
+            .with_context(|| format!("GET {refs_url} (signed retry)"))?;
+    }
+
     if !refs_resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = refs_resp.status();
+        let body = read_error_body(refs_resp);
         bail!(
-            "GET /info/refs returned {} — is the repo registered on this node?",
-            refs_resp.status()
+            "{}",
+            http_error_message(
+                "GET",
+                "/info/refs",
+                status,
+                &body,
+                Some("— is the repo registered on this node?")
+            )
         );
     }
 
@@ -266,29 +308,7 @@ fn handle_connect(
     let post_url = format!("{}/{}", repo_base, service);
     tracing::debug!("POST {post_url} ({} bytes)", request_body.len());
 
-    // Extract the URL path for signing (e.g., "/z6Mk.../my-repo/git-receive-pack")
-    let path_for_sig = url_path(&post_url);
-
-    let mut req = client
-        .post(&post_url)
-        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
-        .header("User-Agent", "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0");
-
-    // Add RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth on push operations
-    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
-        if let Some(kp) = keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &path_for_sig, &request_body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-            tracing::debug!("attached RFC 9421 HTTP Signature (DID: {})", kp.did());
-        } else {
-            tracing::warn!(
-                "no identity keypair found — push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)"
-            );
-        }
-    }
+    let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &request_body, signing_key);
 
     // Attach the body after signing so the pack bytes are moved, not cloned —
     // packs can be large and the clone doubled peak memory on push.
@@ -298,7 +318,10 @@ fn handle_connect(
         .with_context(|| format!("POST {post_url}"))?;
 
     if !pack_resp.status().is_success() {
-        bail!("POST /{} returned {}", service, pack_resp.status());
+        let status = pack_resp.status();
+        let body = read_error_body(pack_resp);
+        let path = format!("/{service}");
+        bail!("{}", http_error_message("POST", &path, status, &body, None));
     }
 
     let pack_bytes = pack_resp.bytes().context("reading pack response")?;
@@ -310,6 +333,68 @@ fn handle_connect(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+// ── Smart-protocol request builders ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const USER_AGENT: &str = "git/2.0 git-remote-gitlawb/0.1.0";
+
+/// Build the Phase-1 ref-advertisement GET, signing it when an identity is
+/// present. The node gates the ref advertisement on read visibility for BOTH
+/// services, so a private repo's advertisement is denied (404) to an
+/// unauthenticated caller; without this signature the repo's own owner can
+/// neither fetch (upload-pack) nor push (receive-pack) it. Public repos still
+/// work anonymously (no keypair present, or the gate admits anonymous). Sign over
+/// the path *and* query (?service=...) because the node verifies the signature
+/// over its path_and_query.
+fn build_advertisement_request(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    refs_url: &str,
+    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
+) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
+    let mut req = client.get(refs_url).header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
+    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+        let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", &url_path(refs_url), b"");
+        req = req
+            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        tracing::debug!("signed info/refs advertisement (DID: {})", kp.did());
+    }
+    req
+}
+
+/// Build the Phase-2 pack POST, signing it when an identity is present, for BOTH
+/// services. The node read-gates the git-upload-pack POST with visibility_check
+/// at "/", and separately owner-gates the git-receive-pack POST (signature
+/// required, enforced by middleware). The Phase-1 advertisement signature does
+/// not carry to this separate request, so a private repo's owner must
+/// authenticate here too or their fetch/push is denied.
+/// Public-repo fetch still works anonymously when no keypair is present. The body
+/// is signed (content-digest) but NOT attached here, so the caller can move the
+/// (possibly large) pack bytes into `.body()` rather than clone them.
+fn build_pack_post_request(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    post_url: &str,
+    service: &str,
+    body: &[u8],
+    keypair: Option<&Keypair>,
+) -> reqwest::blocking::RequestBuilder {
+    let mut req = client
+        .post(post_url)
+        .header("Content-Type", format!("application/x-{}-request", service))
+        .header("User-Agent", USER_AGENT);
+    if let Some(kp) = keypair {
+        let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", &url_path(post_url), body);
+        req = req
+            .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+            .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+            .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        tracing::debug!("signed {service} POST (DID: {})", kp.did());
+    } else if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        tracing::warn!("no identity keypair found, push will be unsigned (v0.1 local alpha only)");
+    }
+    req
+}
+
 // ── URL helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// Parse a `gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../repo-name` URL.
@@ -347,7 +432,7 @@ fn parse_gitlawb_url(url: &str) -> Result<(String, String, String)> {
 ///
 /// We also handle the flush-only case (`"0000"`) that git sends when it already
 /// has everything it needs (up-to-date clone).
-fn read_upload_pack_request(stdin: &mut io::BufReader<io::Stdin>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn read_upload_pack_request<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
 
     loop {
@@ -433,6 +518,85 @@ fn url_path(url: &str) -> String {
         .unwrap_or_else(|| "/".to_string())
 }
 
+const MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
+const MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS: usize = 2000;
+
+fn read_error_body(mut response: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
+    let mut body = Vec::new();
+    let mut limited = (&mut response).take(MAX_ERROR_BODY_BYTES);
+
+    if limited.read_to_end(&mut body).is_err() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).into_owned()
+}
+
+fn http_error_message(
+    method: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    status: reqwest::StatusCode,
+    body: &str,
+    empty_body_hint: Option<&str>,
+) -> String {
+    let mut message = format!("{method} {path} returned {status}");
+    let body = safe_error_body_excerpt(body);
+
+    if !body.is_empty() {
+        message.push_str(": ");
+        message.push_str(&body);
+    } else if let Some(hint) = empty_body_hint {
+        message.push(' ');
+        message.push_str(hint);
+    }
+
+    message
+}
+
+fn safe_error_body_excerpt(body: &str) -> String {
+    let mut excerpt = String::new();
+    let mut pending_space = false;
+    let mut kept_chars = 0;
+
+    for ch in body.trim().chars() {
+        if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ch.is_control() {
+            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
+                pending_space = true;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(ch) {
+            // Drop Cf bidi/format controls (INV-6, #183) without marking
+            // pending_space: unlike a newline/tab they are not whitespace, so
+            // "a\u{202e}c" collapses to "ac" with no phantom gap.
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if ch.is_whitespace() {
+            pending_space = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if pending_space && !excerpt.is_empty() {
+            excerpt.push(' ');
+            kept_chars += 1;
+            if kept_chars >= MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        excerpt.push(ch);
+        kept_chars += 1;
+        pending_space = false;
+    }
+
+    excerpt
+}
+
 // ── Keypair loading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 fn load_keypair() -> Option<Keypair> {
@@ -476,6 +640,467 @@ fn resolve_key_path() -> std::path::PathBuf {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use std::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
+    use std::thread::JoinHandle;
+
+    struct TestResponse {
+        request_line: &'static str,
+        status: &'static str,
+        body: &'static str,
+    }
+
+    fn serve_http(responses: Vec<TestResponse>) -> (String, JoinHandle<Vec<String>>) {
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let base_url = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            let mut requests = Vec::new();
+
+            for response in responses {
+                let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
+                let request = read_http_request(&mut stream);
+                assert!(
+                    request.starts_with(response.request_line),
+                    "unexpected request:\n{request}"
+                );
+
+                let response_text = format!(
+                    "HTTP/1.1 {}\r\ncontent-type: application/json\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
+                    response.status,
+                    response.body.len(),
+                    response.body
+                );
+                stream.write_all(response_text.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+                requests.push(request);
+            }
+
+            requests
+        });
+
+        (base_url, handle)
+    }
+
+    fn read_http_request(stream: &mut TcpStream) -> String {
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        let mut chunk = [0u8; 512];
+        let mut header_len = None;
+
+        loop {
+            let n = stream.read(&mut chunk).unwrap();
+            if n == 0 {
+                break;
+            }
+            buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
+
+            if header_len.is_none() {
+                header_len = buf.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n").map(|p| p + 4);
+            }
+
+            if let Some(header_len) = header_len {
+                let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..header_len]);
+                let content_len = header
+                    .lines()
+                    .find_map(|line| {
+                        let (name, value) = line.split_once(':')?;
+                        name.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
+                            .then(|| value.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+                            .flatten()
+                    })
+                    .unwrap_or(0);
+
+                if buf.len() >= header_len + content_len {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).into_owned()
+    }
+
+    /// The regression that round-1 missed: the Phase-2 `git-upload-pack` POST was
+    /// left unsigned, so an owner's fetch of a private repo cleared the (now signed)
+    /// advertisement and then 404'd on the pack POST. Drive BOTH request builders
+    /// against a mock node and assert the RFC-9421 headers actually go out on the
+    /// wire for BOTH services when a keypair is present (the mock only matches when
+    /// the headers exist, so `.assert()` fails if any are dropped).
+    #[test]
+    fn advertisement_and_pack_post_are_signed_for_both_services_with_keypair() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+            let repo_base = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo", server.url());
+
+            let get_mock = server
+                .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let refs_url = format!("{repo_base}/info/refs?service={service}");
+            let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            get_mock.assert();
+
+            let post_mock = server
+                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let post_url = format!("{repo_base}/{service}");
+            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            post_mock.assert();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Without an identity, the pack POST must go out UNSIGNED so public fetch (and
+    /// alpha unsigned push) still work. `Matcher::Missing` matches only when the
+    /// header is absent, so the mock is hit only if NO signature was attached, for
+    /// BOTH services (the receive-pack iteration also exercises the no-keypair warn
+    /// branch and confirms it does not block the request).
+    #[test]
+    fn pack_post_is_unsigned_without_keypair_for_both_services() {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+            let post_url = format!("{}/zOwner/myrepo/{service}", server.url());
+
+            let post_mock = server
+                .mock("POST", mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!("/{service}$")))
+                .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+                .with_status(200)
+                .create();
+            let resp = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, None)
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .send()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+            post_mock.assert();
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Symmetric negative case for Phase 1: with no identity the advertisement GET
+    /// carries no signature, so public clones stay anonymous.
+    #[test]
+    fn advertisement_get_is_unsigned_without_keypair() {
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+        let refs_url = format!(
+            "{}/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            server.url()
+        );
+
+        let get_mock = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/info/refs".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .create();
+        let resp = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, None)
+            .send()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(resp.status().is_success());
+        get_mock.assert();
+    }
+
+    // ── Phase-1 retry-on-404 (P2, #119): fetch stays anonymous until the node
+    //    denies it, then escalates to ONE signed retry. Drives handle_connect end to
+    //    end against the recording mock, asserting what actually goes on the wire.
+    //    A request is "signed" iff it carries the `signature-input` header.
+
+    /// Public fetch: the node serves the anonymous advertisement (200), so the
+    /// client never signs — not the advertisement GET, not the upload-pack POST —
+    /// even though an identity is present. This is the privacy fix: a public clone
+    /// must not disclose the caller's DID.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_public_stays_anonymous_even_with_keypair() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("public fetch should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "public fetch must not retry");
+        assert!(
+            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the advertisement GET must be anonymous for a public fetch"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the upload-pack POST must be anonymous for a public fetch"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch: the anonymous advertisement is denied (404); with an identity
+    /// present the client retries the GET signed and — because Phase 1 needed
+    /// signing — also signs the Phase-2 upload-pack POST. The FIRST request is still
+    /// anonymous: the DID is not disclosed until the node demands authentication.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_private_retries_signed_on_404_and_signs_the_pack_post() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-upload-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0009done\n".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("signed retry should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            requests.len(),
+            3,
+            "expected anon GET, signed GET retry, signed POST"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the first advertisement GET must be anonymous"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the retry advertisement GET must be signed"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[2].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "the upload-pack POST must be signed once the fetch needed auth"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch with no identity: the anonymous advertisement 404s and there is
+    /// no keypair to retry with, so the client surfaces the error after exactly one
+    /// request — no retry, no hang.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_without_keypair_does_not_retry_on_404() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
+            request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+            status: "404 Not Found",
+            body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+        }]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1, "no keypair means no signed retry");
+        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+    }
+
+    /// Private fetch where the SIGNED retry is also denied (caller is not a reader):
+    /// the client retries exactly once, then surfaces the 404 rather than looping.
+    /// Bounds the escalation to a single signed attempt.
+    #[test]
+    fn fetch_signed_retry_still_denied_surfaces_error_once() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+                status: "404 Not Found",
+                body: r#"{"message":"not found"}"#,
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("returned 404 Not Found"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2, "exactly one signed retry, then surface");
+        assert!(!requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+        assert!(requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"));
+    }
+
+    /// Push (git-receive-pack) is unchanged: it signs from the FIRST request — you
+    /// cannot push anonymously — so there is no anonymous-first probe for push.
+    #[test]
+    fn push_advertisement_is_signed_from_the_first_request() {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "0000",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /zOwner/myrepo/git-receive-pack",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+        ]);
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/zOwner/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
+        handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", Some(&kp), &mut stdin)
+            .expect("push should succeed");
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
+        assert!(
+            requests[0].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "push advertisement must be signed from the first request"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            requests[1].to_lowercase().contains("signature-input"),
+            "push POST must be signed"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Cross-crate seam: the signature the CLIENT actually emits (via the real
+    /// request builders) verifies under the SAME `gitlawb_core::http_sig`
+    /// primitives the node's `require_signature` uses, over the `@path` the client
+    /// genuinely transmits (derived from the built reqwest request, exactly as the
+    /// node derives it from `uri.path_and_query()`). A tampered `@path` must fail:
+    /// this is the byte-match the whole A1 client fix depends on, now executed end
+    /// to end (sign here, verify with the node's verifier), not reasoned.
+    #[test]
+    fn client_signature_verifies_under_node_verification_for_both_services() {
+        use gitlawb_core::http_sig::{build_signing_string, compute_content_digest, HttpSignature};
+        use gitlawb_core::identity::verify;
+        use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::new();
+        let body = b"0009done\n".to_vec();
+
+        // Re-implements the node's require_signature verification (auth/mod.rs):
+        // parse headers, recompute content-digest from the body, rebuild the signing
+        // string over @method/@path/content-digest, Ed25519-verify. Ok iff the node
+        // would accept it.
+        let node_verifies = |method: &str,
+                             path_and_query: &str,
+                             body: &[u8],
+                             sig_input: &str,
+                             sig_header: &str,
+                             content_digest: &str|
+         -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+            let sig = HttpSignature::parse(sig_input, sig_header)?;
+            sig.check_created()?;
+            assert!(
+                sig.missing_components().is_empty(),
+                "signature must cover all required components"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(sig.alg, "ed25519");
+            assert_eq!(
+                content_digest,
+                compute_content_digest(body),
+                "content-digest must match the body"
+            );
+            let vk = sig.key_id.to_verifying_key()?;
+            let mut values = HashMap::new();
+            values.insert("@method".to_string(), method.to_uppercase());
+            values.insert("@path".to_string(), path_and_query.to_string());
+            values.insert("content-digest".to_string(), content_digest.to_string());
+            let sig_params_value = sig_input.strip_prefix("sig1=").unwrap_or(sig_input);
+            let components: Vec<&str> = sig.components.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+            let signing_string = build_signing_string(&components, sig_params_value, &values)?;
+            let sig_array: [u8; 64] = sig.signature_bytes.as_slice().try_into()?;
+            verify(&vk, signing_string.as_bytes(), &sig_array)?;
+            Ok(())
+        };
+        // @path exactly as the node reconstructs it from the request it receives.
+        let path_and_query = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request| match req.url().query() {
+            Some(q) => format!("{}?{}", req.url().path(), q),
+            None => req.url().path().to_string(),
+        };
+        let header = |req: &reqwest::blocking::Request, name: &str| {
+            req.headers()
+                .get(name)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing {name}"))
+                .to_str()
+                .unwrap()
+                .to_string()
+        };
+
+        for service in ["git-upload-pack", "git-receive-pack"] {
+            // Phase-1 advertisement GET (empty body).
+            let refs_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/info/refs?service={service}");
+            let req = build_advertisement_request(&client, &refs_url, Some(&kp))
+                .build()
+                .unwrap();
+            node_verifies(
+                "GET",
+                &path_and_query(&req),
+                b"",
+                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                &header(&req, "signature"),
+                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+            )
+            .expect("client GET signature must verify under the node's verifier");
+
+            // Phase-2 pack POST (real body).
+            let post_url = format!("http://node.example/zOwner/myrepo/{service}");
+            let req = build_pack_post_request(&client, &post_url, service, &body, Some(&kp))
+                .body(body.clone())
+                .build()
+                .unwrap();
+            let pq = path_and_query(&req);
+            node_verifies(
+                "POST",
+                &pq,
+                &body,
+                &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                &header(&req, "signature"),
+                &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+            )
+            .expect("client POST signature must verify under the node's verifier");
+
+            // Negative: a tampered @path (the A1 attack surface) must NOT verify.
+            let tampered = pq.replace(service, "git-evil");
+            assert!(
+                node_verifies(
+                    "POST",
+                    &tampered,
+                    &body,
+                    &header(&req, "signature-input"),
+                    &header(&req, "signature"),
+                    &header(&req, "content-digest"),
+                )
+                .is_err(),
+                "a tampered @path must fail verification"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 
     #[test]
     fn parse_standard_url() {
@@ -524,6 +1149,176 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_sanitizes_response_body_controls() {
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "GET",
+            "/info/refs",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            "\u{1b}[2Jrepository\r\nis\tblocked\u{7}",
+            None,
+        );
+
+        assert!(message.contains("repository is blocked"));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\u{1b}'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\u{7}'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\r'));
+        assert!(!message.contains('\n'));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_strips_bidi_format_controls() {
+        // Each Cf bidi class must be stripped (INV-6, #183), not just U+202E:
+        // override (RLO), embedding + pop (LRE/PDF), isolate (LRI/PDI), and marks
+        // (LRM/ALM). Asserted per code point so a partial predicate fails loudly.
+        // The visible words must survive and JOIN with no phantom space at the
+        // strip points: a bidi char is dropped like a control byte, but unlike a
+        // newline/tab it is not whitespace, so it must not set pending_space. The
+        // leading bidi char (index 0) also exercises the empty-excerpt path.
+        let body = "\u{202e}err\u{202a}\u{202c}\u{2066}\u{2069}\u{200e}\u{061c}ok";
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "GET",
+            "/info/refs",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            body,
+            None,
+        );
+        for c in [
+            '\u{202e}', '\u{202a}', '\u{202c}', '\u{2066}', '\u{2069}', '\u{200e}', '\u{061c}',
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !message.contains(c),
+                "bidi U+{:04X} leaked: {message:?}",
+                c as u32
+            );
+        }
+        assert!(
+            message.contains("errok"),
+            "words should join with no phantom space: {message:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_preserves_legitimate_and_rtl_text() {
+        // Must not over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Arabic
+        // U+0627, category Lo), and ZWJ (U+200D, a legitimate Cf char) survive.
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "GET",
+            "/info/refs",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+            "ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b",
+            None,
+        );
+        assert!(
+            message.ends_with("ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b"),
+            "legitimate text was altered: {message:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn http_error_message_truncates_long_response_body() {
+        let body = "x".repeat(MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS + 100);
+        let message = http_error_message(
+            "POST",
+            "/git-receive-pack",
+            reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+            &body,
+            None,
+        );
+        let prefix = "POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden: ";
+
+        assert_eq!(message.len(), prefix.len() + MAX_ERROR_BODY_CHARS);
+        assert!(message.starts_with(prefix));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_get_error_includes_response_body() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
+            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
+            status: "404 Not Found",
+            body: r#"{"message":"repository is not registered on this node"}"#,
+        }]);
+
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        let message = err.to_string();
+
+        assert!(message.contains("GET /info/refs returned 404 Not Found"));
+        assert!(message.contains("repository is not registered on this node"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_error_strips_bidi_from_response_body() {
+        // Transport-path proof: a bidi override in the node's real HTTP error body
+        // must not reach the surfaced error text. Drives the full handle_connect
+        // error path, not just the safe_error_body_excerpt unit boundary (INV-6).
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![TestResponse {
+            request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP/1.1",
+            status: "404 Not Found",
+            body: "not\u{202e}found",
+        }]);
+
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::<u8>::new());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-upload-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        let message = err.to_string();
+
+        assert!(
+            !message.contains('\u{202e}'),
+            "bidi override reached the terminal: {message:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            message.contains("notfound"),
+            "body should survive with the bidi char stripped: {message:?}"
+        );
+        let _ = server.join();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn connect_post_error_includes_response_body() {
+        let (base_url, server) = serve_http(vec![
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "GET /z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
+                status: "200 OK",
+                body: "",
+            },
+            TestResponse {
+                request_line: "POST /z6Mk/myrepo/git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1",
+                status: "403 Forbidden",
+                body: r#"{"error":"forbidden","message":"push rejected: only the repo owner may push"}"#,
+            },
+        ]);
+
+        let repo_base = format!("{base_url}/z6Mk/myrepo");
+        let mut stdin = std::io::Cursor::new(b"0000".to_vec());
+        let err = handle_connect(&repo_base, "git-receive-pack", None, &mut stdin).unwrap_err();
+        let message = err.to_string();
+
+        assert!(message.contains("POST /git-receive-pack returned 403 Forbidden"));
+        assert!(message.contains("push rejected: only the repo owner may push"));
+        let requests = server.join().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(requests.len(), 2);
+        assert!(requests[1].contains("\r\n\r\n0000"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn url_path_preserves_query_for_signed_advertisement() {
+        // The Phase-1 advertisement GET is signed over url_path(refs_url), and the
+        // node verifies the signature over its path_and_query, so the ?service=
+        // query MUST survive verbatim or the signatures will not byte-match.
+        assert_eq!(
+            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"),
+            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            url_path("http://127.0.0.1:7545/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"),
+            "/z6Mk/myrepo/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack"
+        );
+    }
+
     fn args(items: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
         items.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
     }

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ pub mod encrypt;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod http_sig;
 pub mod identity;
+pub mod sanitize;
 pub mod ucan;
 
 pub use error::Error;

crates/gitlawb-core/src/sanitize.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+//! Text sanitization predicates shared across the workspace.
+//!
+//! Untrusted peer/remote bytes that reach an operator's terminal (node error
+//! bodies, node-advertised strings) must be stripped of BOTH `Cc` control bytes
+//! (`char::is_control()`) AND `Cf` bidi/format controls before display: a
+//! right-to-left override or directional isolate can visually reorder the line
+//! and spoof the text (Trojan Source, CWE-451). This is INV-6.
+//!
+//! `is_bidi_format` is the single workspace definition of the second half of
+//! that obligation. It was split out of `gl`'s local copy so the two terminal
+//! sanitizers that shipped with only the `Cc` half (#183) — and any future
+//! sanitizer — reuse one audited predicate instead of re-deriving the set.
+
+/// True for the Unicode bidirectional/directional-isolate format characters
+/// (the reordering subset of category `Cf`) that can visually reorder a terminal
+/// line. These are NOT matched by [`char::is_control()`], which covers `Cc` only.
+///
+/// This is deliberately the reordering subset, not the whole `Cf` category:
+/// legitimate `Cf` characters such as ZWJ (`U+200D`, emoji sequences) and the
+/// soft hyphen (`U+00AD`) are NOT matched, so honest international text passes
+/// through unchanged. Widening this set is a behavior change for every consumer.
+///
+/// Pair it with `!c.is_control()` in a terminal-bound sanitizer (INV-6); see the
+/// wrappers in `gl`, `git-remote-gitlawb`, and `icaptcha-client`.
+pub fn is_bidi_format(c: char) -> bool {
+    matches!(c,
+        '\u{200E}' | '\u{200F}' | '\u{061C}'   // LRM, RLM, ALM
+        | '\u{202A}'..='\u{202E}'              // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
+        | '\u{2066}'..='\u{2069}'              // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strips_every_reordering_code_point() {
+        // Asserted individually so a partial predicate (e.g. one that covers the
+        // marks but not the isolates) fails loudly rather than passing.
+        for c in [
+            '\u{200E}', '\u{200F}', '\u{061C}', // LRM, RLM, ALM
+            '\u{202A}', '\u{202B}', '\u{202C}', '\u{202D}',
+            '\u{202E}', // LRE, RLE, PDF, LRO, RLO
+            '\u{2066}', '\u{2067}', '\u{2068}', '\u{2069}', // LRI, RLI, FSI, PDI
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                is_bidi_format(c),
+                "U+{:04X} must be a bidi-format char",
+                c as u32
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn passes_legitimate_and_control_chars() {
+        // Must NOT over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Lo, not a
+        // format char), ZWJ (legitimate Cf), and soft hyphen (legitimate Cf) are
+        // not bidi-format. ESC is a Cc control char — owned by is_control(), not
+        // this predicate, which is bidi-only.
+        for c in ['a', '\u{0627}', '\u{200D}', '\u{00AD}', '\u{1b}'] {
+            assert!(
+                !is_bidi_format(c),
+                "U+{:04X} must NOT be a bidi-format char",
+                c as u32
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-core/src/ucan.rs

@@ -187,11 +187,17 @@ impl Ucan {
     }
 
     /// Check if this UCAN grants a specific capability on a resource.
+    ///
+    /// Mirrors `Capability::is_attenuated_by`'s wildcard semantics: a stored
+    /// capability of `with: "*"` or `can: "*"` / `"repo/admin"` covers any
+    /// requested resource/action, since a valid delegation chain can produce
+    /// exactly that capability (see `is_attenuated_by`).
     pub fn can(&self, resource: &str, action: &str) -> bool {
-        self.payload
-            .att
-            .iter()
-            .any(|cap| cap.with == resource && cap.can == action)
+        self.payload.att.iter().any(|cap| {
+            let resource_ok = cap.with == resource || cap.with == "*";
+            let action_ok = cap.can == action || cap.can == "*" || cap.can == caps::REPO_ADMIN;
+            resource_ok && action_ok
+        })
     }
 
     /// Encode to a compact JSON string (the wire format).
@@ -312,6 +318,63 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn can_honors_resource_wildcard() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
+            &issuer,
+            audience,
+            vec![Capability::new("*", caps::GIT_PUSH)],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn can_honors_repo_admin_action_wildcard() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
+            &issuer,
+            audience,
+            vec![Capability::new(
+                "gitlawb://repos/test/repo",
+                caps::REPO_ADMIN,
+            )],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
+        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn can_honors_action_wildcard() {
+        let issuer = Keypair::generate();
+        let audience = Keypair::generate().did();
+
+        let ucan = Ucan::issue(
+            &issuer,
+            audience,
+            vec![Capability::new("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", "*")],
+            None,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+        assert!(ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/test/repo", caps::PR_MERGE));
+        assert!(!ucan.can("gitlawb://repos/other/repo", caps::GIT_PUSH));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn bootstrap_ucan() {
         let issuer = Keypair::generate();

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/bounties.rs

@@ -110,19 +110,28 @@ pub async fn create_bounty(
     Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(bounty)))
 }
 
+const MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT: i64 = 200;
+
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/bounties
 pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
+
+    let limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50).clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
     let bounties = state
         .db
         .list_bounties(
             Some(&owner),
             Some(&repo),
             q.status.as_deref(),
-            q.limit.unwrap_or(50),
+            limit,
+            None,
+            None,
         )
         .await?;
 
@@ -133,25 +142,92 @@ pub async fn list_repo_bounties(
 pub async fn list_all_bounties(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Query(q): Query<ListBountiesQuery>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let bounties = state
-        .db
-        .list_bounties(None, None, q.status.as_deref(), q.limit.unwrap_or(50))
-        .await?;
+    let raw_limit = q.limit.unwrap_or(50);
+    let limit = raw_limit.clamp(1, MAX_BOUNTY_LIMIT);
 
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": bounties })))
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let mut memo = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    let mut allowed: Vec<BountyRecord> = Vec::new();
+    let page_size = (limit * 5).clamp(1, 200);
+    let max_scanned = 10_000i64;
+    let mut total_scanned: i64 = 0;
+    let mut cursor: Option<(String, String)> = None;
+
+    while (allowed.len() as i64) < limit {
+        let after = cursor.as_ref().map(|(ts, id)| (ts.as_str(), id.as_str()));
+        let bounties = state
+            .db
+            .list_bounties(
+                None,
+                None,
+                q.status.as_deref(),
+                page_size,
+                after.map(|(ts, _)| ts),
+                after.map(|(_, id)| id),
+            )
+            .await?;
+        if bounties.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        total_scanned += bounties.len() as i64;
+        if total_scanned > max_scanned {
+            return Err(AppError::Incomplete(
+                "too many rows scanned; refine your filters".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        let last = bounties.last().unwrap();
+        for b in &bounties {
+            if (allowed.len() as i64) >= limit {
+                break;
+            }
+            let key = format!("{}/{}", b.repo_owner, b.repo_name);
+            let admitted = if let Some(&result) = memo.get(&key) {
+                result
+            } else {
+                let result = crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+                    &state,
+                    &b.repo_owner,
+                    &b.repo_name,
+                    caller,
+                    "/",
+                )
+                .await
+                .is_ok();
+                memo.insert(key, result);
+                result
+            };
+            if admitted {
+                allowed.push(b.clone());
+            }
+        }
+        cursor = Some((last.created_at.clone(), last.id.clone()));
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "bounties": allowed })))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/bounties/{id}
 pub async fn get_bounty(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path(id): Path<String>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &bounty.repo_owner, &bounty.repo_name, caller, "/")
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
+
     Ok(Json(bounty))
 }
 
@@ -162,11 +238,22 @@ pub async fn claim_bounty(
     Path(id): Path<String>,
     Json(req): Json<ClaimBountyRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<BountyRecord>> {
-    let bounty = state
-        .db
-        .get_bounty(&id)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found")))?;
+    let not_found = || AppError::NotFound(format!("bounty {id} not found"));
+
+    let bounty = state.db.get_bounty(&id).await?.ok_or_else(not_found)?;
+
+    if crate::api::authorize_repo_read(
+        &state,
+        &bounty.repo_owner,
+        &bounty.repo_name,
+        Some(auth.0.as_str()),
+        "/",
+    )
+    .await
+    .is_err()
+    {
+        return Err(not_found());
+    }
 
     if bounty.status != "open" {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/certs.rs

@@ -1,23 +1,44 @@
 //! API handlers for ref certificates.
 
-use axum::extract::{Path, State};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
 use axum::Json;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
-/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs
+/// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs?limit=50
 pub async fn list_certs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let limit = params
+        .get("limit")
+        .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok())
+        .map(|v| v.max(1))
+        .unwrap_or(50)
+        .min(200);
 
-    let certs = state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id).await?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
+
+    // When a prefix is given (short-ID resolution from the CLI) use a
+    // generous limit and delegate to the prefix-matched query so the
+    // caller can resolve IDs regardless of how many certs exist.
+    let prefix = params.get("prefix").filter(|p| !p.is_empty());
+    let certs = if let Some(prefix) = prefix {
+        state
+            .db
+            .list_ref_certificates_by_prefix(&record.id, prefix, 200)
+            .await?
+    } else {
+        state.db.list_ref_certificates(&record.id, limit).await?
+    };
     let certs_json: Vec<serde_json::Value> = certs
         .iter()
         .map(|c| {
@@ -35,20 +56,21 @@ pub async fn list_certs(
         })
         .collect();
 
-    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json })))
+    let count = certs_json.len();
+    Ok(Json(
+        serde_json::json!({ "certificates": certs_json, "count": count }),
+    ))
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/certs/{id}
 pub async fn get_cert(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name, id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    // Verify the repo exists
-    let _record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let cert = state
         .db
@@ -56,6 +78,10 @@ pub async fn get_cert(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")))?;
 
+    if cert.repo_id != record.id {
+        return Err(AppError::NotFound(format!("certificate {id}")));
+    }
+
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
         "id":         cert.id,
         "repo_id":    cert.repo_id,

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use std::str::FromStr;
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
 use crate::git::store;
-use crate::git::visibility_pack::{has_path_scoped_rule, withheld_blob_oids};
+use crate::git::visibility_pack::{allowed_blob_set_for_caller, has_path_scoped_rule};
 use crate::state::AppState;
 use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 
@@ -36,16 +36,24 @@ use crate::visibility::{visibility_check, Decision};
 /// Search all repos on the node for a git object whose SHA-256 hash matches
 /// the given CIDv1, returning its raw content if the caller may read it.
 ///
-/// Visibility (#110): the object is served only from a repo row the caller
-/// passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
+/// Visibility (#110, #126): the object is served only from a repo row the
+/// caller passes. For each iterated row we gate against that row's OWN rules
 /// (`visibility_check` at `"/"`), never re-resolving via `authorize_repo_read`
 /// — `get_repo`'s fuzzy match could otherwise authorize a different physical
-/// row than the one read (KTD2a). When the row carries path-scoped rules, a
-/// blob withheld from the caller (`withheld_blob_oids`) is skipped. Denial and
-/// genuine not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
+/// row than the one read (KTD2a). We check object existence via
+/// `store::object_type` *before* the expensive reachability walk so random-CID
+/// spray cannot trigger full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the
+/// object. When the row carries path-scoped rules (KTD4) the served object
+/// must be either a non-blob (trees/commits are structural; KTD3) OR a blob
+/// in the caller's *reachable* allowed-set (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`).
+/// The reachable allowed-set excludes dangling blobs — a blob written via
+/// `git hash-object -w` and never committed has no path to gate, so it is
+/// fail-closed 404'd under path-scoped rules (#126). Denial and genuine
+/// not-found both fall through to an opaque 404.
 ///
-/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan. A stale-public mirror
-/// row still serves withheld content (tracked separately, #124).
+/// Scope: this closes the direct unauthenticated scan, including the dangling
+/// case. A stale-public mirror row still serves withheld content (tracked
+/// separately, #124).
 pub async fn get_by_cid(
     Path(cid_str): Path<String>,
     State(state): State<AppState>,
@@ -85,11 +93,16 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
         .await
         .map_err(AppError::Internal)?;
 
-    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo withheld set (KTD1). The caller is
-    // constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe, sufficient key —
-    // never a coarse caller "class", which `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID
-    // reader match would make unsafe.
-    let mut withheld_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
+    // Request-scoped memo of the per-repo allowed-blob set (KTD1, #126). The
+    // caller is constant for one request, so `repo.id` alone is a safe,
+    // sufficient key — never a coarse caller "class", which
+    // `visibility_check`'s exact full-DID reader match would make unsafe.
+    //
+    // We flipped from a deny-set (`withheld_blob_oids`) to an allowed-set
+    // (`allowed_blob_set_for_caller`) so dangling blobs — never enumerated by
+    // the reachable walk — fail closed instead of slipping through an empty
+    // deny entry (#126).
+    let mut allowed_memo: HashMap<String, HashSet<String>> = HashMap::new();
 
     for repo in &repos {
         // Repo-level read gate against THIS row's own rules (KTD2a).
@@ -106,9 +119,24 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
             Err(_) => continue,
         };
 
-        // Per-blob withholding only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
-        if has_path_scoped_rule(rules) {
-            if !withheld_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
+        // Check whether the object exists in this repo before any expensive
+        // reachability walk. This prevents random-CID spray from triggering
+        // full-history git walks on repos that don't carry the object.
+        let obj_type = match store::object_type(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
+            Ok(Some(t)) => t,
+            Ok(None) => continue,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error checking git object type");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        // Per-blob gating only applies when a path-scoped rule exists (KTD4).
+        // Without any path-scoped rule, the "/" gate above is the whole story.
+        // Trees/commits are always served under path-scoped rules (KTD3).
+        let path_scoped = has_path_scoped_rule(rules);
+        if path_scoped && obj_type == "blob" {
+            if !allowed_memo.contains_key(&repo.id) {
                 let rp = repo_path.clone();
                 let r = rules.to_vec();
                 let is_public = repo.is_public;
@@ -116,7 +144,13 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
                 let caller_for_walk = caller_owned.clone();
                 // Full-history walk shells out to git — keep it off the async runtime.
                 let walk = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-                    withheld_blob_oids(&rp, &r, is_public, &owner, caller_for_walk.as_deref())
+                    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
+                        &rp,
+                        &r,
+                        is_public,
+                        &owner,
+                        caller_for_walk.as_deref(),
+                    )
                 })
                 .await;
                 // Fail closed on EITHER a task panic (JoinError) or a walk error:
@@ -125,51 +159,50 @@ pub async fn get_by_cid(
                 let set = match walk {
                     Ok(Ok(set)) => set,
                     Ok(Err(e)) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "withheld walk failed; skipping repo");
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk failed; skipping repo");
                         continue;
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
-                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "withheld walk task panicked; skipping repo");
+                        tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "allowed-blob walk task panicked; skipping repo");
                         continue;
                     }
                 };
-                withheld_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
+                allowed_memo.insert(repo.id.clone(), set);
             }
-            if withheld_memo
+            let in_allowed = allowed_memo
                 .get(&repo.id)
-                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex))
-            {
+                .is_some_and(|set| set.contains(&sha256_hex));
+            if !in_allowed {
                 continue;
             }
         }
 
-        match store::read_object(&repo_path, &sha256_hex) {
-            Ok(Some((_obj_type, content))) => {
-                // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
-                let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-                headers.insert(
-                    HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
-                    HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
-                        .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
-                );
-
-                return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
-            }
-            Ok(None) => continue,
+        // Now that we've passed the gate, read the content.
+        let content = match store::read_object_content(&repo_path, &sha256_hex, &obj_type) {
+            Ok(c) => c,
             Err(e) => {
-                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object");
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %repo.name, err = %e, "error reading git object content");
                 continue;
             }
-        }
+        };
+
+        // 3. Return the content with IPFS-style headers
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("content-type"),
+            HeaderValue::from_static("application/octet-stream"),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-content-cid"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&cid_str).unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+        headers.insert(
+            HeaderName::from_static("x-git-hash"),
+            HeaderValue::from_str(&sha256_hex)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("invalid")),
+        );
+
+        return Ok((StatusCode::OK, headers, content).into_response());
     }
 
     // Not found in any repo

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/issues.rs

@@ -90,12 +90,11 @@ pub async fn create_issue(
 pub async fn list_issues(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -120,12 +119,11 @@ pub async fn list_issues(
 pub async fn get_issue(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let disk_path = state
         .repo_store
@@ -191,14 +189,31 @@ pub async fn create_issue_comment(
 pub async fn list_issue_comments(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo, issue_id)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let _record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
-    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&issue_id).await?;
+    let disk_path = state
+        .repo_store
+        .acquire(&record.owner_did, &record.name)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+    // Resolve the full issue ID (accepts 8-char prefix) so the DB fetch
+    // below uses the same canonical id as the git ref.
+    let full_id = match git_issues::resolve_issue_id(&disk_path, &issue_id)
+        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?
+    {
+        Some(id) => id,
+        None => {
+            return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!(
+                "issue {issue_id} not found"
+            )))
+        }
+    };
+
+    let comments = state.db.list_issue_comments(&full_id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
 }
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/labels.rs

@@ -71,15 +71,18 @@ pub async fn remove_label(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/labels
+///
+/// Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's labels stay
+/// anonymously listable; a private repo's label names are hidden (404) from
+/// anyone who cannot read it at the root.
 pub async fn list_labels(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let labels = state.db.list_labels(&record.id).await?;
     Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "labels": labels })))

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ mod did_tests {
         assert!(!did_matches("did:key:zABC", "did:key:zXYZ"));
         assert!(!did_matches("zABC", "zXYZ"));
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_did_matches() {
+        assert!(did_matches("", ""));
+        assert!(did_matches("", "did:key:"));
+    }
 }
 
 /// Drift guard (plan 002 §Gate-type table, Step 5). Every in-scope mutation
@@ -166,6 +172,7 @@ mod authz_guard {
         let issues = include_str!("issues.rs");
         let bounties = include_str!("bounties.rs");
         let replicas = include_str!("replicas.rs");
+        let events = include_str!("events.rs");
         let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
         let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
         let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
@@ -181,6 +188,13 @@ mod authz_guard {
             (pulls, "merge_pr", "require_repo_owner("),
             (webhooks, "create_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
             (webhooks, "delete_webhook", "require_repo_owner("),
+            // Bucket A/B hybrid — list_webhooks is read-visibility THEN owner:
+            // authorize_repo_read 404s a non-reader of a private repo, then
+            // require_repo_owner 403s a non-owner of a public one. Both halves
+            // are pinned: the authorize_repo_read marker guards the read half
+            // (existence hiding) and require_repo_owner guards the owner half.
+            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
             (labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
             (labels, "remove_label", "require_repo_owner("),
             // Bucket A' — owner OR author (did_matches against the author)
@@ -197,6 +211,12 @@ mod authz_guard {
             // get_by_cid gates each iterated repo row directly via visibility_check
             // (KTD2a: it must NOT route through authorize_repo_read's fuzzy re-resolve).
             (ipfs, "get_by_cid", "visibility_check("),
+            // #94 sibling read surfaces: gate private-repo metadata on read
+            // visibility (public repos stay anonymous; private repos 404).
+            (replicas, "list_replicas", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (protect, "list_protected_branches", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (labels, "list_labels", "authorize_repo_read("),
+            (events, "list_repo_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
             // Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
             (tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
             (tasks, "claim_task", "did_matches("),
@@ -324,6 +344,118 @@ mod authz_guard {
         })
     }
 
+    /// Collect `.rs` source files under `dir`. Recursive so the completeness scan
+    /// covers nested API modules (`api/<module>/mod.rs` and deeper), not only the
+    /// immediate `api/*.rs` children.
+    fn collect_rs_files(dir: &std::path::Path) -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
+        let mut out = Vec::new();
+        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("read api dir") {
+            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
+            if path.is_dir() {
+                out.extend(collect_rs_files(&path));
+            } else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
+                out.push(path);
+            }
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// The `.rs` files under `api_root` (as paths RELATIVE to it) that the
+    /// completeness scan must inspect: everything except the top-level `mod.rs` (the
+    /// guard file itself) and the top-level files already covered by the per-handler
+    /// `sources` loop. A nested `api/<module>/<name>.rs` is a distinct source file
+    /// even when its basename matches a listed top-level file, so it stays in scope.
+    fn unlisted_source_files(
+        api_root: &std::path::Path,
+        listed: &std::collections::HashSet<&str>,
+    ) -> Vec<String> {
+        collect_rs_files(api_root)
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|path| {
+                let rel = path
+                    .strip_prefix(api_root)
+                    .ok()?
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/");
+                if rel == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(rel.as_str()) {
+                    None
+                } else {
+                    Some(rel)
+                }
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collect_rs_files_recurses_subdirs() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("a.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("note.txt"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub/deep")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/deep/c.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let names: std::collections::HashSet<String> = collect_rs_files(root)
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| {
+                p.strip_prefix(root)
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .to_string_lossy()
+                    .replace('\\', "/")
+            })
+            .collect();
+        assert!(names.contains("a.rs"));
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/mod.rs"),
+            "nested module file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            names.contains("sub/deep/c.rs"),
+            "deeply nested file must be collected"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !names.iter().any(|n| n.ends_with(".txt")),
+            "non-rs files excluded"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(names.len(), 3);
+    }
+
+    // P3 (#119): the completeness scan must skip already-covered files by their path
+    // RELATIVE to api_root, not by basename. A nested api/<module>/repos.rs is a
+    // distinct source file from the covered top-level repos.rs and must still be
+    // scanned, or a new nested module could smuggle in an ungated repo-scoped handler
+    // behind a colliding filename.
+    #[test]
+    fn unlisted_source_files_scans_nested_file_with_colliding_basename() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = tmp.path();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("mod.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/repos.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(root.join("sub/fresh.rs"), "").unwrap();
+        let listed: std::collections::HashSet<&str> = ["repos.rs"].into_iter().collect();
+
+        let unlisted = unlisted_source_files(root, &listed);
+
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file whose basename matches a listed top-level file must still be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            unlisted.contains(&"sub/fresh.rs".to_string()),
+            "a nested file with a unique name must be scanned"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"repos.rs".to_string()),
+            "the listed top-level file is covered by the per-handler loop"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !unlisted.contains(&"mod.rs".to_string()),
+            "the top-level guard file is skipped"
+        );
+    }
+
     /// Egress gate guard: every repo-scoped handler (`Path<(String, String..)>`)
     /// must carry an authz marker — a read gate (`authorize_repo_read` /
     /// `visibility_check`), or a write gate (`require_repo_owner` / `require_owner`
@@ -376,42 +508,22 @@ mod authz_guard {
                 "read-guard `sources` lists {f} but the file does not exist"
             );
         }
-        for entry in std::fs::read_dir(api_dir).expect("read src/api") {
-            let path = entry.expect("dir entry").path();
-            let fname = path.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
-            if !fname.ends_with(".rs") || fname == "mod.rs" || listed.contains(fname.as_str()) {
-                continue;
-            }
-            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("read api file");
+        let api_root = std::path::Path::new(api_dir);
+        for rel in unlisted_source_files(api_root, &listed) {
+            let src = std::fs::read_to_string(api_root.join(&rel)).expect("read api file");
             let has_repo_handler = handler_names(&src)
                 .iter()
                 .any(|n| is_repo_scoped(&fn_body(&src, n)));
             assert!(
                 !has_repo_handler,
-                "api/{fname} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
+                "api/{rel} declares a repo-scoped handler but is not in the egress \
                  guard `sources` list — add it so its handlers are gate-checked"
             );
         }
 
         // Repo-scoped reads known to be ungated today, each tracked by an issue.
         // Remove an entry the moment its gate lands (the staleness assert enforces it).
-        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
-            // info/refs gates only git-upload-pack today; git-receive-pack
-            // advertisement is ungated until #119 makes the gate unconditional.
-            ("git_info_refs", "#119"),
-            ("list_certs", "#120"),
-            ("get_cert", "#120"),
-            ("list_issues", "#120"),
-            ("get_issue", "#120"),
-            ("list_issue_comments", "#120"),
-            ("list_labels", "#120"),
-            ("list_repo_bounties", "#120"),
-            ("get_star_status", "#120"),
-            ("list_repo_events", "#94 (PR #113)"),
-            ("list_webhooks", "#94 (PR #113)"),
-            ("list_replicas", "PR #113"),
-            ("list_protected_branches", "PR #113"),
-        ];
+        let known_ungated: &[(&str, &str)] = &[];
         let is_known = |n: &str| known_ungated.iter().any(|(k, _)| *k == n);
         // Any one of these = the handler binds the caller to an authz decision: the
         // first two are read gates, the rest are the write/owner/self-binding forms.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ pub async fn trigger_sync(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_js
                 repo.get("name").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
             ) {
                 (Some(owner), Some(name)) => {
-                    // Use short owner (last colon segment) matching DB convention
-                    let short = owner.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner);
+                    // Use short owner (did:key-only normalization) matching DB convention
+                    let short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(owner);
                     format!("{short}/{name}")
                 }
                 _ => continue,
@@ -347,6 +347,10 @@ pub struct NotifyRequest {
     pub timestamp: Option<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub cert_id: Option<String>,
+    /// Full owner DID — added in #144 for DID-aware feed gating.
+    /// Optional for backward compat with older senders.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 pub async fn notify_sync(
@@ -377,6 +381,14 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         )));
     }
 
+    // #272: the slug reaches a PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where an extra
+    // separator or a traversal segment places the mirror outside repos_dir. Reject
+    // it here, before the queue row and the ref-update row are written. The message
+    // names the field and nothing about where repos live on disk.
+    if let Err(e) = crate::git::repo_store::validate_repo_slug(&req.repo) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("invalid repo field: {e}")));
+    }
+
     state
         .db
         .enqueue_sync(&req.repo, &req.node_did, &req.ref_name, &req.new_sha, None)
@@ -391,6 +403,7 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         node_did: req.node_did.clone(),
         pusher_did: req.pusher_did.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
         repo: req.repo.clone(),
+        owner_did: req.owner_did.clone(),
         ref_name: req.ref_name.clone(),
         old_sha: req.old_sha.clone().unwrap_or_default(),
         new_sha: req.new_sha.clone(),
@@ -537,4 +550,719 @@ mod tests {
         // pins the `o[0] == 0` check against an off-by-one into 1.x.
         assert!(is_public_http_url("http://1.0.0.0/"));
     }
+
+    // ── #82: /sync/trigger signature gate + per-IP brake on the peer-sync routes ──
+    //
+    // These drive the FULL production router (crate::server::build_router) so the
+    // route wiring, layer order, and config-mode branching are all under test.
+    // The positive-path and DID-agnostic cases mount the handler directly because
+    // signed_request_as injects only an AuthenticatedDid extension (not a real
+    // RFC-9421 signature), which require_signature rejects on the full router.
+    use crate::rate_limit::{IpRateLimiter, RateLimiter, TrustedProxy};
+    use crate::state::AppState;
+    use crate::test_support::{signed_request_as, test_state};
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+    use axum::http::{header, Method, Request, StatusCode};
+    use axum::routing::post;
+    use axum::{middleware, Extension, Router};
+    use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::net::SocketAddr;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+    use std::time::Duration;
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    fn unsigned_post(uri: &str, body: &str, peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri(uri)
+            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+            .body(Body::from(body.to_string()))
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut()
+            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
+        req
+    }
+
+    fn require_signed_peer_writes(state: &mut AppState) {
+        let mut cfg = (*state.config).clone();
+        cfg.require_signed_peer_writes = true;
+        state.config = Arc::new(cfg);
+    }
+
+    // The slug must be a well-formed owner/name (#272); these brake tests are about
+    // the rate limiter, so the body carries a valid slug and reaches the brake.
+    const NOTIFY_BODY: &str = r#"{"repo":"z6Mkfoo/hello","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","new_sha":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","node_did":"PEER_DID"}"#;
+
+    // ── trigger: mandatory signature ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The hole: with require_signed_peer_writes=false (default), an anonymous
+        // caller reaches the fan-out. Must be 401 regardless of the flag.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                "{}",
+                "203.0.113.1:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rejects_unsigned_in_signed_writes_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The signature requirement must not depend on the flag.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                "{}",
+                "203.0.113.2:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_admits_signed_caller(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-throttle: a signed caller reaches the handler and (with no
+        // peers seeded) gets 200, not 429. Direct-mount because a real signature
+        // cannot be forged through the full router in tests.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
+                limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+            }))
+            .with_state(state);
+        let mut req =
+            signed_request_as(&did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(
+            "203.0.113.3:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap(),
+        ));
+        let resp = app.oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    // ── trigger: IP brake ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_ip_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The brake is outermost, so an over-limit request 429s before it ever
+        // reaches require_signature — an unsigned request suffices to prove it.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer = "203.0.113.4:5000";
+        // Exhaust the single-request budget up front.
+        assert!(
+            state
+                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
+                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
+                .await
+        );
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_brake_is_did_agnostic(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Why per-IP, not per-DID: a DID farm (fresh did:key per request) does not
+        // bypass an IP-keyed brake. Two DISTINCT DIDs from one IP, brake limit 1 →
+        // the second is 429. A per-DID limiter would give each DID its own bucket.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let app = Router::new()
+            .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(super::trigger_sync))
+            .layer(middleware::from_fn(crate::rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(Extension(IpRateLimiter {
+                limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+                trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+            }))
+            .with_state(state);
+        let peer = "203.0.113.5:5000".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap();
+        let mk = |did: &str| {
+            let mut r =
+                signed_request_as(did, Method::POST, "/api/v1/sync/trigger", Body::from("{}"));
+            r.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+            r
+        };
+        let first = app
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let second = app
+            .oneshot(mk(&Keypair::generate().did().to_string()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_forged_forwarded_header_cannot_bypass(pool: PgPool) {
+        // TrustedProxy::None keys on the socket peer, so rotating X-Forwarded-For
+        // from one socket peer does not refill the bucket. limit 1: first request
+        // consumes it (then 401 unsigned), second from the same socket → 429
+        // regardless of a different XFF value.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let mut a = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
+        a.headers_mut()
+            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            router.clone().oneshot(a).await.unwrap().status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+        let mut b = unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", "203.0.113.6:5000");
+        b.headers_mut()
+            .insert("x-forwarded-for", "2.2.2.2".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            router.oneshot(b).await.unwrap().status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_rate_limit_zero_disables_but_signature_holds(pool: PgPool) {
+        // 0 disables the brake (RateLimiter::check early-returns), proving the two
+        // halves are independent: no 429 even under a flood, but the signature gate
+        // still 401s every unsigned request.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                    "/api/v1/sync/trigger",
+                    "{}",
+                    "203.0.113.7:5000",
+                ))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── notify: braked, but signature behavior unchanged ──────────────────────
+
+    async fn seed_peer(state: &AppState) -> String {
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_peer(&did, "https://peer.example.com")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        did
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_unsigned_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // notify still accepts an unsigned known-peer notification (rolling-upgrade
+        // compat), but a flood from one IP is now braked. brake limit 1: first
+        // enqueues (200), second from the same IP → 429.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let first = router
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.8:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(first.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let second = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.8:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(second.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_distinct_ips_are_not_collaterally_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-throttle: per-IP keying means one peer's volume does not
+        // throttle another. brake limit 1, two DIFFERENT source IPs → both 200.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for ip in ["203.0.113.20:5000", "203.0.113.21:5000"] {
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::OK,
+                "distinct IP {ip} must not be throttled"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn notify_flood_does_not_exhaust_trigger_bucket(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Separate buckets: draining peer_write via an unsigned notify flood must
+        // NOT throttle the signed trigger caller from the same IP. After the notify
+        // bucket is spent, an unsigned trigger from that IP hits its own (unspent)
+        // bucket and is rejected by the SIGNATURE gate (401), not the brake (429).
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let body = NOTIFY_BODY.replace("PEER_DID", &peer_did);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let ip = "203.0.113.9:5000";
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/notify", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "peer_write bucket should now be exhausted for this IP"
+        );
+        let trigger = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", ip))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            trigger.status(),
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            "trigger must hit its own bucket (401 from the sig gate), not the drained peer_write bucket (429)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // ── notify: repo slug validation (#272) ───────────────────────────────────
+    //
+    // An unsigned caller who has announced their own DID is a "known peer", so
+    // the slug they send reaches the sync worker's path join. `a//tmp/probe`
+    // resolved to /tmp/probe.git, outside repos_dir entirely. notify must reject
+    // anything that is not a well-formed owner/name slug before it is queued.
+
+    /// Every slug shape the boundary must refuse. `a//tmp/gitlawb-probe` is the
+    /// verified escape; the rest are the traversal and empty-half neighbours.
+    const MALFORMED_SLUGS: [&str; 9] = [
+        "a//tmp/gitlawb-probe",
+        "../hello",
+        "./hello",
+        "../../etc/evil",
+        "a/../../x",
+        "..",
+        "demo",
+        "/hello",
+        "z6Mkfoo/",
+    ];
+
+    fn notify_body(repo: &str, peer_did: &str) -> String {
+        serde_json::json!({
+            "repo": repo,
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "new_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+            "node_did": peer_did,
+        })
+        .to_string()
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejects_malformed_repo_slugs(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for (i, slug) in MALFORMED_SLUGS.iter().enumerate() {
+            // Distinct source IPs so the per-IP brake never masks the 400.
+            let ip = format!("198.51.100.{}:5000", i + 1);
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                    "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                    &notify_body(slug, &peer_did),
+                    &ip,
+                ))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                "slug {slug:?} must be rejected"
+            );
+        }
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            queued.is_empty(),
+            "no malformed slug may be queued, got {:?}",
+            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejection_body_names_field_not_path(pool: PgPool) {
+        // R3: the client learns which field was bad, never where repos live on
+        // disk. A message carrying the resolved path would hand an unsigned
+        // caller the server's layout.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let repos_dir = state.config.repos_dir.display().to_string();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.20:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        assert!(body.contains("repo"), "body must name the field: {body}");
+        assert!(
+            !body.contains(&repos_dir),
+            "body must not leak repos_dir ({repos_dir}): {body}"
+        );
+        for trimmed in repos_dir.trim_start_matches("./").split('/') {
+            assert!(
+                trimmed.is_empty() || !body.contains(trimmed),
+                "body must not leak a repos_dir segment ({trimmed}): {body}"
+            );
+        }
+        // A rooted path is a leading '/' with something after it. A bare quoted
+        // '/' is the separator the message is allowed to talk about.
+        assert!(
+            !body
+                .split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '"' || c == '\'')
+                .any(|tok| tok.starts_with('/') && tok.len() > 1),
+            "body must not contain a rooted filesystem path: {body}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejection_writes_no_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The second half of R1: the ref-update feed row sits after enqueue_sync,
+        // so the early return must skip it too. Asserted, not argued.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.21:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates")
+            .fetch_one(&pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            count, 0,
+            "a rejected notify must not seed the ref-update feed"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_accepts_valid_slug_and_records_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-break, and the control that keeps the two negative assertions
+        // above from being vacuous: a well-formed slug still queues and still
+        // writes its ref-update row.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("z6Mkfoo/hello", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.22:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(queued.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(queued[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/hello");
+        let count: i64 =
+            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates WHERE repo = $1")
+                .bind("z6Mkfoo/hello")
+                .fetch_one(&pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            count, 1,
+            "the valid path must still write the ref-update row"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_unknown_peer_wins_over_malformed_slug(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Ordering: the slug check sits after the peer gate, so an unknown peer
+        // still gets the unknown-peer message rather than a slug complaint.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let stranger = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &stranger),
+                "198.51.100.23:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("unknown peer DID"),
+            "peer gate must still fire first: {body}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn unsigned_announce_then_notify_cannot_queue_a_repos_dir_escape(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The reachability case for #272, committed in its attack form. Two
+        // unsigned requests through the shipped router, no signature and no
+        // config change: announce the attacker's own DID (which is what makes
+        // them a "known peer"), then notify with `a/<abs>/gitlawb-probe`. That
+        // slug used to reach PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where the
+        // absolute second component discarded repos_dir and planted a mirror at
+        // /<abs>/gitlawb-probe.git. The notify must now be refused outright.
+        //
+        // This has to run over crate::server::build_router rather than a
+        // directly mounted handler: the point of the test is that the default
+        // layer stack (optional_signature, not require_signature) leaves the
+        // route open, so mounting the handler alone would assert nothing about
+        // reachability.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let attacker = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+
+        let announce =
+            format!(r#"{{"did":"{attacker}","http_url":"https://attacker.example.com"}}"#);
+        let resp = router
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
+                &announce,
+                "198.51.100.40:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Asserted, not assumed: this plan does not change announce, and the
+        // whole attack rests on an unsigned announce still succeeding.
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "unsigned announce still admits an attacker-generated DID"
+        );
+
+        let outside = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let escape_dir = outside.path().join("gitlawb-probe");
+        let slug = format!("a/{}", escape_dir.display());
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body(&slug, &attacker),
+                "198.51.100.41:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            "notify must refuse the escaping slug {slug:?}"
+        );
+
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            queued.is_empty(),
+            "sync_queue must stay empty, got {:?}",
+            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !escape_dir.with_extension("git").exists(),
+            "nothing may be written at the escape target"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn announce_still_accepts_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-over-reach: adding the brake must not tighten announce's
+        // rolling-upgrade behavior — an unsigned announce with a public URL still
+        // succeeds (it only gains the brake, which a single request is under).
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
+                &body,
+                "203.0.113.10:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+    }
+
+    // Build a request carrying a REAL RFC 9421 signature (not just an injected
+    // extension), so it passes require_signature on the full production router.
+    fn real_signed_trigger(peer: &str) -> Request<Body> {
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        let body = b"{}";
+        let s = sign_request(&kp, "POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger", body);
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri("/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+            .header("content-digest", s.content_digest)
+            .header("signature-input", s.signature_input)
+            .header("signature", s.signature)
+            .body(Body::from(body.to_vec()))
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut()
+            .insert(ConnectInfo(peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()));
+        req
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_admits_real_signature_through_full_router(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The positive path through the REAL gate: a validly-signed trigger passes
+        // require_signature on the full router and reaches the handler (no peers
+        // seeded → 200), in BOTH config modes.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
+            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5000"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "a real signature must reach the handler (default mode)"
+        );
+
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        require_signed_peer_writes(&mut state);
+        let resp = crate::server::build_router(state)
+            .oneshot(real_signed_trigger("203.0.113.30:5001"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "a real signature must reach the handler (signed-writes mode)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn announce_flood_is_throttled(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The peer_write brake covers /peers/announce too (co-benefit): limit 1,
+        // first unsigned announce from an IP is 200, the second from that IP 429.
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.peer_write_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let did = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let body = format!(r#"{{"did":"{did}","http_url":"https://peer.example.com"}}"#);
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let ip = "203.0.113.31:5000";
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::OK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            router
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/peers/announce", &body, ip))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .status(),
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "announce must be braked by the peer_write limiter"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_trigger_429_body_is_generic_not_push(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The shared 429 middleware now serves the sync routes, so its body must
+        // not claim "push" (RED before the message was genericized).
+        let mut state = test_state(pool).await;
+        state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(3600));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = TrustedProxy::None;
+        let peer = "203.0.113.32:5000";
+        assert!(
+            state
+                .sync_trigger_rate_limiter
+                .check(&peer.parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap().ip().to_string())
+                .await
+        );
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", "{}", peer))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let s = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes);
+        assert!(s.contains("rate limit exceeded"), "429 body: {s:?}");
+        assert!(
+            !s.contains("push"),
+            "a 429 on a sync route must not say 'push': {s:?}"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/profiles.rs

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
                     &state.http_client,
                     &state.config.pinata_upload_url,
                     &state.config.pinata_jwt,
-                    &format!("profile-{}", &did),
+                    &format!("profile-{}", did),
                     &profile_json,
                 )
                 .await

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs

@@ -79,12 +79,14 @@ pub async fn unprotect_branch(
 pub async fn list_protected_branches(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    // Read-visibility-gated (INV-2 root listing): a public repo's protected
+    // branches stay anonymously listable; a private repo's branch names are
+    // hidden (404) from anyone who cannot read it at the root.
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let branches = state.db.list_protected_branches(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/replicas.rs

@@ -113,16 +113,17 @@ pub async fn unregister_replica(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/replicas
-/// Public — returns the list of replicas (DID + URL + registration timestamp).
+/// Read-visibility-gated: a PUBLIC repo's replica list stays anonymously
+/// listable (mirror-discovery), but a PRIVATE repo's replica URLs are hidden
+/// (404) from anyone who cannot read the repo at its root.
 pub async fn list_replicas(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let replicas = state.db.list_replicas(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/repos.rs

@@ -211,7 +211,12 @@ pub async fn create_repo(
         .repo_store
         .init(&owner_did, &req.name)
         .await
-        .map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            // `{:#}` walks the anyhow chain to the leaf cause; the other git
+            // handlers log their failures, this one didn't.
+            tracing::error!(owner = %owner_did, repo = %req.name, err = %format!("{e:#}"), "repo create failed");
+            AppError::Git(e.to_string())
+        })?;
 
     let now = Utc::now();
     let record = crate::db::RepoRecord {
@@ -482,14 +487,27 @@ pub async fn get_tree(
 
 // ── Git smart HTTP endpoints ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-/// GET /:owner/:repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack
+fn smart_http_repo_name(repo: &str) -> Result<&str> {
+    // Strip at most one ".git" suffix: trim_end_matches strips repeatedly,
+    // which would misdirect a repo literally named "foo.git" (creatable via
+    // the peer mirror path, which skips API name validation) to repo "foo".
+    let name = repo.strip_suffix(".git").unwrap_or(repo);
+    if name.is_empty() {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest("missing repository name".into()));
+    }
+    Ok(name)
+}
+
+/// GET /:owner/:repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack
 pub async fn git_info_refs(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
     Query(query): Query<InfoRefsQuery>,
+    crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr(peer): crate::rate_limit::PeerAddr,
+    headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
-    let name = repo.trim_end_matches(".git");
+    let name = smart_http_repo_name(&repo)?;
     tracing::info!(owner = %owner, repo = %name, "info/refs request");
     let record = state
         .db
@@ -508,10 +526,14 @@ pub async fn git_info_refs(
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::BadRequest("missing ?service= parameter".into()))?;
     tracing::debug!(service = %service, repo = %name, "info/refs service");
 
-    // Enforce read (clone/fetch) visibility. The push advertisement
-    // (service=git-receive-pack) is authorized separately on the
-    // git-receive-pack POST, so leave it untouched here.
-    if service == "git-upload-pack" {
+    // Enforce read visibility on the ref advertisement, for BOTH services. The
+    // upload-pack (clone/fetch) and receive-pack (push) advertisements expose the
+    // same ref metadata (branch/tag names and commit tips), so a private repo's
+    // advertisement must be withheld from a non-reader regardless of which service
+    // is requested. The push itself stays separately owner-gated on the
+    // git-receive-pack POST; push access implies read access here, so a
+    // legitimate pusher (the owner) always clears this gate.
+    {
         let rules = state.db.list_visibility_rules(&record.id).await?;
         let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
         // Subtree (mode B) rules do not gate the advertisement: refs expose commit
@@ -519,11 +541,28 @@ pub async fn git_info_refs(
         if visibility_check(&rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller, "/")
             == Decision::Deny
         {
-            tracing::debug!(repo = %name, caller = ?caller, "info/refs read denied by visibility");
+            tracing::debug!(repo = %name, caller = ?caller, service = %service, "info/refs read denied by visibility");
             return Err(AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")));
         }
     }
 
+    // Push flood brake on the advertisement phase. A push always hits this
+    // GET first, and for receive-pack it forces a fresh Tigris download below;
+    // throttling only the receive-pack POST would leave the expensive
+    // fresh-acquire reachable unauthenticated and unlimited. Applied before the
+    // acquire so a rejected request does no Tigris work. Same per-IP limiter and
+    // trusted-proxy policy as the POST middleware (shared buckets).
+    if service == "git-receive-pack" {
+        if let Some(key) = crate::rate_limit::client_key(&headers, peer, state.push_limiter_trust) {
+            if !state.push_rate_limiter.check(&key).await {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %name, key = %key, "receive-pack advertisement rate limited");
+                return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
+                    "push rate limit exceeded — try again later".into(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     // For receive-pack (push), download the latest from Tigris so the client
     // sees the same refs that acquire_write() will operate on.
     let disk_path = if service == "git-receive-pack" {
@@ -550,6 +589,26 @@ pub async fn git_info_refs(
         })
 }
 
+/// Map an error from a `smart_http` git service call to the right `AppError`:
+/// [`smart_http::GitServiceTimeout`] to 504, a malformed client request to 400,
+/// anything else to a 500 git error. Pure (no logging) so it is unit-testable;
+/// callers add their own tracing.
+fn git_service_app_error(err: &anyhow::Error) -> AppError {
+    if err
+        .downcast_ref::<smart_http::GitServiceTimeout>()
+        .is_some()
+    {
+        AppError::Timeout("git service timed out".into())
+    } else {
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        if msg.contains("bad line length") || msg.contains("protocol error") {
+            AppError::BadRequest(msg)
+        } else {
+            AppError::Git(msg)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// POST /:owner/:repo.git/git-upload-pack
 pub async fn git_upload_pack(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
@@ -557,7 +616,7 @@ pub async fn git_upload_pack(
     auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
     body: Bytes,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
-    let name = repo.trim_end_matches(".git");
+    let name = smart_http_repo_name(&repo)?;
     let record = state
         .db
         .get_repo(&owner, name)
@@ -587,8 +646,9 @@ pub async fn git_upload_pack(
     // No path-scoped rule can withhold an individual blob, and the whole-repo
     // "/" gate above already enforced repo-level access. Skip the per-blob
     // withheld walk and serve the pack directly.
+    let git_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(state.config.git_service_timeout_secs);
     let resp = if !visibility_pack::has_path_scoped_rule(&rules) {
-        smart_http::upload_pack(&disk_path, body).await
+        smart_http::upload_pack(&disk_path, body, git_timeout).await
     } else {
         // withheld_blob_oids walks every ref with blocking `git ls-tree`; keep
         // that off the async worker thread.
@@ -613,21 +673,22 @@ pub async fn git_upload_pack(
         };
 
         if withheld.is_empty() {
-            smart_http::upload_pack(&disk_path, body).await
+            smart_http::upload_pack(&disk_path, body, git_timeout).await
         } else {
             tracing::info!(repo = %name, caller = ?caller, withheld = withheld.len(), "serving filtered pack");
             smart_http::upload_pack_excluding(&disk_path, body, &withheld).await
         }
     }
     .map_err(|e| {
-        let msg = e.to_string();
-        if msg.contains("bad line length") || msg.contains("protocol error") {
-            tracing::warn!(repo = %name, err = %msg, "git-upload-pack: bad client request");
-            AppError::BadRequest(msg)
-        } else {
-            tracing::error!(repo = %name, err = %msg, "git-upload-pack failed");
-            AppError::Git(msg)
+        let app = git_service_app_error(&e);
+        match &app {
+            AppError::Timeout(_) => tracing::warn!(repo = %name, "git-upload-pack timed out"),
+            AppError::BadRequest(msg) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %name, err = %msg, "git-upload-pack: bad client request")
+            }
+            _ => tracing::error!(repo = %name, err = %e, "git-upload-pack failed"),
         }
+        app
     })?;
     crate::metrics::record_fetch(&format!("{owner}/{name}"));
     crate::metrics::observe_pack_size(body_len as f64);
@@ -711,6 +772,7 @@ async fn notify_peer_of_ref(
     new_sha: &str,
     node_did: &str,
     pusher_did: &str,
+    owner_did: &str,
 ) {
     let body = serde_json::json!({
         "repo": repo_slug,
@@ -720,6 +782,7 @@ async fn notify_peer_of_ref(
         "pusher_did": pusher_did,
         "old_sha": old_sha,
         "timestamp": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+        "owner_did": owner_did,
     });
     let body_bytes = match serde_json::to_vec(&body) {
         Ok(bytes) => bytes,
@@ -767,6 +830,7 @@ async fn notify_peer_of_refs(
     ref_updates: &[(String, String, String)],
     node_did: &str,
     pusher_did: &str,
+    owner_did: &str,
 ) {
     for (ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) in ref_updates {
         notify_peer_of_ref(
@@ -780,6 +844,7 @@ async fn notify_peer_of_refs(
             new_sha,
             node_did,
             pusher_did,
+            owner_did,
         )
         .await;
     }
@@ -792,7 +857,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     body: Bytes,
 ) -> Result<Response> {
-    let name = repo.trim_end_matches(".git");
+    let name = smart_http_repo_name(&repo)?;
     tracing::info!(owner = %owner, repo = %name, "receive-pack request");
     let record = state
         .db
@@ -874,7 +939,8 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
     let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
     tracing::debug!(repo = %name, path = %disk_path.display(), "running git receive-pack");
     let body_len = body.len();
-    let receive_result = smart_http::receive_pack(&disk_path, body).await;
+    let git_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(state.config.git_service_timeout_secs);
+    let receive_result = smart_http::receive_pack(&disk_path, body, git_timeout).await;
 
     // Always release the advisory lock — even on error — to prevent stale locks
     // from blocking subsequent pushes. Only upload to Tigris when the push
@@ -882,8 +948,15 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
     guard.release(receive_result.is_ok()).await;
 
     let result = receive_result.map_err(|e| {
-        tracing::error!(repo = %name, err = %e, "git receive-pack failed");
-        AppError::Git(e.to_string())
+        let app = git_service_app_error(&e);
+        match &app {
+            AppError::Timeout(_) => tracing::warn!(repo = %name, "git receive-pack timed out"),
+            AppError::BadRequest(msg) => {
+                tracing::warn!(repo = %name, err = %msg, "git receive-pack: bad client request")
+            }
+            _ => tracing::error!(repo = %name, err = %e, "git receive-pack failed"),
+        }
+        app
     })?;
 
     // Update the repo's updated_at timestamp after a successful push
@@ -945,11 +1018,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
             .as_deref()
             .unwrap_or("http://127.0.0.1:7545")
             .trim_end_matches('/');
-        let owner_short = record
-            .owner_did
-            .split(':')
-            .next_back()
-            .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+        let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did);
         let clone_url = format!("{}/{}/{}.git", base_url, owner_short, record.name);
 
         for update in &ref_updates {
@@ -1096,7 +1165,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
                     // this push to Arweave, so the oid->cid index survives total
                     // node loss. Best-effort; never fails the push.
                     if !delta.is_empty() && !irys_url.is_empty() {
-                        let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&owner_did);
+                        let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&owner_did);
                         let repo_slug = format!("{owner_short}/{repo_name}");
                         let ts = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
                         let manifest = crate::arweave::EncryptedManifest {
@@ -1141,11 +1210,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
         let node_did_str = state.node_did.to_string();
         let repo_slug = format!(
             "{}/{}",
-            record
-                .owner_did
-                .split(':')
-                .next_back()
-                .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did),
+            crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did),
             record.name
         );
         let ref_updates_clone = ref_updates
@@ -1200,6 +1265,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
                             node_did: node_did_str.clone(),
                             pusher_did: pusher_did_clone.clone(),
                             repo: repo_slug.clone(),
+                            owner_did: Some(record.owner_did.clone()),
                             ref_name: ref_name.clone(),
                             old_sha: old_sha.clone(),
                             new_sha: new_sha.clone(),
@@ -1213,17 +1279,27 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
             }
 
             // Broadcast ref update to GraphQL subscription listeners — one per ref.
+            // Gated on `announce`: /graphql/ws is unauthenticated (mounted after
+            // the optional_signature layer), and the subscription resolver has no
+            // caller to gate against, so only publicly-readable ref updates may
+            // reach anonymous subscribers. Mirrors the gossip (above) and Arweave
+            // (below) sends, which are already `announce`-gated. Without this a
+            // private-repo push would leak live ref metadata over the socket —
+            // the subscription analog of #112/#114.
             let now_ts = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
-            for (ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) in &ref_updates_clone {
-                let _ = ref_update_tx.send(crate::state::RefUpdateBroadcast {
-                    repo: repo_slug.clone(),
-                    ref_name: ref_name.clone(),
-                    old_sha: old_sha.clone(),
-                    new_sha: new_sha.clone(),
-                    pusher_did: pusher_did_clone.clone(),
-                    node_did: node_did_str.clone(),
-                    timestamp: now_ts.clone(),
-                });
+            if announce {
+                for (ref_name, old_sha, new_sha) in &ref_updates_clone {
+                    let _ = ref_update_tx.send(crate::state::RefUpdateBroadcast {
+                        repo: repo_slug.clone(),
+                        ref_name: ref_name.clone(),
+                        old_sha: old_sha.clone(),
+                        new_sha: new_sha.clone(),
+                        pusher_did: pusher_did_clone.clone(),
+                        node_did: node_did_str.clone(),
+                        timestamp: now_ts.clone(),
+                        owner_did: record.owner_did.clone(),
+                    });
+                }
             }
 
             // Arweave permanent anchoring — fire for each ref update.
@@ -1292,6 +1368,7 @@ pub async fn git_receive_pack(
                             &ref_updates_clone,
                             &node_did_str,
                             &pusher_did_clone,
+                            &record.owner_did,
                         )
                         .await;
                     }
@@ -1474,7 +1551,7 @@ pub async fn fork_repo(
     }
 
     // Check no name conflict under the forker's ownership
-    let forker_short = forker_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&forker_did);
+    let forker_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&forker_did);
     if state.db.get_repo(forker_short, &fork_name).await?.is_some() {
         return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
             "you already have a repo named {fork_name}"
@@ -1630,13 +1707,17 @@ fn parse_ref_updates(body: &[u8]) -> Vec<RefUpdate> {
 }
 
 // ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// For a non-key DID owner, `normalize_owner_key` returns the full DID, so
+// `clone_url` becomes `/did:gitlawb:z6.../repo.git`. That resolves through
+// `get_repo`, but the colon-bearing path segment would break the `sync.rs`
+// disk-path join (`owner_slug/repo`). Not reachable today (auth is
+// did:key-only), so this is a forward constraint to handle before non-key
+// ownership lands: the owner-first disk layout must either reject colons or
+// encode them.
 
 fn to_response(record: &crate::db::RepoRecord, state: &AppState, star_count: i64) -> RepoResponse {
-    let owner_short = record
-        .owner_did
-        .split(':')
-        .next_back()
-        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    let owner_short = crate::db::normalize_owner_key(&record.owner_did);
 
     let base_url = state
         .config
@@ -1762,6 +1843,32 @@ mod tests {
     const OWNER_SHORT: &str = "z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH";
     const STRANGER_DID: &str = "did:key:z6Mkffonly5tranger0000000000000000000000000000000";
 
+    #[test]
+    fn git_service_app_error_classifies_timeout_bad_request_and_git() {
+        // GitServiceTimeout carried through anyhow -> 504 Timeout.
+        let timeout_err: anyhow::Error = smart_http::GitServiceTimeout.into();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            git_service_app_error(&timeout_err),
+            AppError::Timeout(_)
+        ));
+        // A malformed client request -> 400.
+        let bad = anyhow::anyhow!("fatal: bad line length character: 0000");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            git_service_app_error(&bad),
+            AppError::BadRequest(_)
+        ));
+        // The `protocol error` marker (with no "bad line length" substring) also
+        // -> 400, exercising the second arm of the classifier independently.
+        let proto = anyhow::anyhow!("fatal: protocol error: unexpected flush packet");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            git_service_app_error(&proto),
+            AppError::BadRequest(_)
+        ));
+        // Anything else -> 500 git error.
+        let other = anyhow::anyhow!("some other git failure");
+        assert!(matches!(git_service_app_error(&other), AppError::Git(_)));
+    }
+
     fn repo_owned_by(owner_did: &str) -> crate::db::RepoRecord {
         let now = chrono::Utc::now();
         crate::db::RepoRecord {
@@ -1779,6 +1886,32 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// `announce` is the single boolean that gates every network-facing emission
+    /// of a push: gossip, Arweave anchoring, and the GraphQL subscription
+    /// broadcast (the last one added in this change). It must be false for a repo
+    /// the anonymous public cannot read, or the unauthenticated `/graphql/ws`
+    /// subscription leaks live private-repo ref metadata. Pin both directions of
+    /// the decision the broadcast now sits behind. No disk access: a non-announce
+    /// repo returns early, and a public repo with no path-scoped rule skips the
+    /// withheld walk.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn replication_announce_false_for_private_true_for_public() {
+        let dummy = std::path::PathBuf::from("/nonexistent");
+
+        // Private: no rules at all.
+        let (announce, _) = replication_withheld_set(None, OWNER_DID, false, dummy.clone()).await;
+        assert!(!announce, "private repo (no rules) must not announce");
+
+        // Private: empty rule set, is_public=false → still not listable at root.
+        let (announce, _) =
+            replication_withheld_set(Some(vec![]), OWNER_DID, false, dummy.clone()).await;
+        assert!(!announce, "private repo (empty rules) must not announce");
+
+        // Public: empty rule set, is_public=true → listable at root, announces.
+        let (announce, _) = replication_withheld_set(Some(vec![]), OWNER_DID, true, dummy).await;
+        assert!(announce, "public repo must announce");
+    }
+
     /// A rejection must be a 403 Forbidden (authenticated but not authorized),
     /// not a 400 — some git/CI clients retry 400s.
     fn assert_forbidden(rejection: Option<AppError>) {
@@ -1788,6 +1921,23 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn smart_http_repo_name_rejects_empty_after_git_suffix() {
+        assert_eq!(smart_http_repo_name("demo.git").unwrap(), "demo");
+        assert_eq!(smart_http_repo_name("demo").unwrap(), "demo");
+        // Only one suffix is stripped: a repo literally named "demo.git"
+        // stays addressable and never aliases to "demo".
+        assert_eq!(smart_http_repo_name("demo.git.git").unwrap(), "demo.git");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            smart_http_repo_name(".git"),
+            Err(AppError::BadRequest(_))
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            smart_http_repo_name(""),
+            Err(AppError::BadRequest(_))
+        ));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn enforced_allows_owner_full_did() {
         let repo = repo_owned_by(OWNER_DID);
@@ -2259,6 +2409,9 @@ mod tests {
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"ref_name":"{ref_a}"}}"#)),
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{old_a}"}}"#)),
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{new_a}"}}"#)),
+                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(
+                    r#"{"owner_did":"did:key:zOwner"}"#.to_string(),
+                ),
             ]))
             .with_status(200)
             .expect(1)
@@ -2270,6 +2423,9 @@ mod tests {
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"ref_name":"{ref_b}"}}"#)),
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{old_b}"}}"#)),
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{new_b}"}}"#)),
+                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(
+                    r#"{"owner_did":"did:key:zOwner"}"#.to_string(),
+                ),
             ]))
             .with_status(200)
             .expect(1)
@@ -2291,6 +2447,7 @@ mod tests {
             &ref_updates,
             "did:key:zNode",
             "did:key:zPusher",
+            "did:key:zOwner",
         )
         .await;
 
@@ -2313,6 +2470,9 @@ mod tests {
             .match_body(mockito::Matcher::AllOf(vec![
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"old_sha":"{zero}"}}"#)),
                 mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(format!(r#"{{"new_sha":"{new_sha}"}}"#)),
+                mockito::Matcher::PartialJsonString(
+                    r#"{"owner_did":"did:key:zOwner"}"#.to_string(),
+                ),
             ]))
             .with_status(200)
             .expect(1)
@@ -2335,9 +2495,152 @@ mod tests {
             &ref_updates,
             "did:key:zNode",
             "did:key:zPusher",
+            "did:key:zOwner",
         )
         .await;
 
         _mock.assert_async().await;
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn to_response_generates_correct_clone_url_slug() {
+        let state = crate::test_support::test_state_lazy();
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now();
+
+        // 1. did:key owner (should strip did:key: prefix)
+        let repo_key = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "uuid-1".into(),
+            name: "my-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:key:z6Mkwbud".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/my-repo".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        let response_key = to_response(&repo_key, &state, 5);
+        assert!(
+            response_key.clone_url.contains("/z6Mkwbud/my-repo.git"),
+            "clone_url should use the bare did:key ID. got: {}",
+            response_key.clone_url
+        );
+
+        // 2. did:gitlawb owner (non-key DID method, should NOT strip)
+        let repo_non_key = crate::db::RepoRecord {
+            id: "uuid-2".into(),
+            name: "other-repo".into(),
+            owner_did: "did:gitlawb:z6Mkwbud".into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public: true,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+            disk_path: "/tmp/other-repo".into(),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        };
+        let response_non_key = to_response(&repo_non_key, &state, 10);
+        assert!(
+            response_non_key
+                .clone_url
+                .contains("/did:gitlawb:z6Mkwbud/other-repo.git"),
+            "clone_url should preserve the full non-key owner DID. got: {}",
+            response_non_key.clone_url
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The receive-pack *advertisement* (`GET info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`)
+    /// must be throttled by the per-IP push limiter BEFORE it does the fresh
+    /// Tigris acquire — otherwise the flood brake on the POST is bypassable via
+    /// the cheaper unauthenticated GET (PR #152 review P1). Pre-filling the
+    /// bucket makes the assertion deterministic and keeps the test off the
+    /// acquire path entirely.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn receive_pack_advertisement_is_rate_limited(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        use axum::body::Body;
+        use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+        use axum::http::{Method, Request, StatusCode};
+        use std::net::SocketAddr;
+        use std::time::Duration;
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        // Tiny limit, keyed on the socket peer (no trusted proxy).
+        state.push_rate_limiter = crate::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None;
+        state
+            .db
+            .upsert_mirror_repo("z6advowner", "adv", "/tmp/adv", None, false)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.55:6000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Exhaust this peer's single-request budget up front.
+        assert!(state.push_rate_limiter.check(&peer.ip().to_string()).await);
+
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::GET)
+            .uri("/z6advowner/adv/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack")
+            .body(Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+
+        let status = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status();
+        assert_eq!(
+            status,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "receive-pack advertisement must be throttled before the Tigris acquire"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Repo creation must be throttled by the per-IP creation limiter BEFORE
+    /// signature verification — otherwise a DID farm (one throwaway did:key per
+    /// repo, each carrying a valid but machine-solved iCaptcha proof) walks past
+    /// the per-DID limiter and floods the network, as in the recurring spam-repo
+    /// incidents. A 429 (not a 401) on an unsigned request from an exhausted IP
+    /// proves the IP brake runs outermost, ahead of auth.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn repo_creation_is_rate_limited_by_ip(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        use axum::body::Body;
+        use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+        use axum::http::{Method, Request, StatusCode};
+        use std::net::SocketAddr;
+        use std::time::Duration;
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+        let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
+        // Tiny limit, keyed on the socket peer (no trusted proxy).
+        state.create_ip_rate_limiter =
+            crate::rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        state.push_limiter_trust = crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None;
+
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.77:7000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Exhaust this peer's single-request budget up front.
+        assert!(
+            state
+                .create_ip_rate_limiter
+                .check(&peer.ip().to_string())
+                .await
+        );
+
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let mut req = Request::builder()
+            .method(Method::POST)
+            .uri("/api/v1/repos")
+            .header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .body(Body::from(r#"{"name":"flood","is_public":true}"#))
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+
+        let status = router.oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status();
+        assert_eq!(
+            status,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "repo creation must be IP-throttled before signature verification"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/stars.rs

@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
 //!
 //! Any authenticated agent can star or unstar a repo.
 //! One agent = one star per repo (enforced by UNIQUE constraint in repo_stars).
-//! Star count is public — no auth required on GET.
+//! Star count is gated on repo read access.
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
 use axum::Json;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
-use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
+use crate::error::Result;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 /// PUT /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
@@ -19,11 +19,8 @@ pub async fn star_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     let inserted = state.db.star_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -54,11 +51,8 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
     Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, Some(auth.0.as_str()), "/").await?;
 
     let caller = &auth.0;
     state.db.unstar_repo(&record.id, caller).await?;
@@ -74,16 +68,15 @@ pub async fn unstar_repo(
 }
 
 /// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/star
-/// Returns star count — unauthenticated.
+/// Returns star count for callers who can read the repo.
 pub async fn get_star_status(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, repo)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &repo)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{repo}")))?;
+    let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|e| e.0 .0.as_str());
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &repo, caller, "/").await?;
 
     let count = state.db.count_stars(&record.id).await?;
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/webhooks.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 //! Webhook CRUD API.
 //!
-//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (auth required)
-//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list
-//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (auth required)
+//! POST   /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — create (owner only)
+//! GET    /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks        — list (owner only; auth required)
+//! DELETE /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/hooks/:id   — delete (owner only)
 
 use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
 use axum::http::StatusCode;
@@ -73,12 +73,26 @@ pub async fn create_webhook(
 pub async fn list_webhooks(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Path((owner, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
+    auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
 ) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
-    let record = state
-        .db
-        .get_repo(&owner, &name)
-        .await?
-        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::RepoNotFound(format!("{owner}/{name}")))?;
+    // This route sits on `optional_signature`, so the DID is optional. Webhook
+    // callback URLs are owner-secret config and there is no anonymous form, so a
+    // headerless caller is rejected before any lookup (401, which fires for an
+    // existing-private and an absent repo alike, so it leaks no existence).
+    let Some(Extension(AuthenticatedDid(caller))) = auth else {
+        return Err(AppError::Unauthorized(
+            "listing webhooks requires authentication".into(),
+        ));
+    };
+
+    // Read-visibility first, then owner. authorize_repo_read returns 404 on a
+    // visibility deny, so a non-reader of a private repo cannot tell it exists
+    // (uniform with the sibling read surfaces); require_repo_owner then yields
+    // 403 only for a non-owner of a public/readable repo, where existence is not
+    // secret.
+    let (record, _rules) =
+        crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(&caller), "/").await?;
+    crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &caller)?;
 
     let hooks = state.db.list_webhooks(&record.id).await?;
     // Redact secrets in list response

crates/gitlawb-node/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -514,6 +514,11 @@ mod tests {
             machine_id: None,
             repo_store: crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), pool),
             rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(100, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(1000, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy::None,
+            sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(60, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
+            peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter::new(600, Duration::from_secs(3600)),
             shutdown_tx: tokio::sync::watch::channel(false).0,
         }
     }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ pub async fn issue_ref_certificate(
         issued_at,
     };
 
-    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await?;
-    Ok(cert)
+    // Persist and return the row as it exists in the database (on a
+    // conflict the existing row survives when it is newer).
+    state.db.insert_ref_certificate(&cert).await
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs

@@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES", default_value_t = 2_147_483_648)]
     pub max_pack_bytes: usize,
 
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger`, in requests per
+    /// hour. `/sync/trigger` requires a signature and drives an O(peers) outbound
+    /// fan-out per call, so it gets a tight bucket. `0` disables. Default: 60.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 60)]
+    pub sync_trigger_rate_limit: usize,
+
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limit for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
+    /// `/sync/notify`), in requests per hour. These accept unsigned requests from
+    /// known peers and run at higher frequency, so the bucket is generous. Keeping
+    /// it separate from the trigger bucket stops an unsigned notify flood from
+    /// draining the signed trigger caller's quota. `0` disables. Default: 600.
+    #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT", default_value_t = 600)]
+    pub peer_write_rate_limit: usize,
+
     /// Optional address to bind a Prometheus `/metrics` exposition endpoint on.
     /// Example: `127.0.0.1:9091`. Leave empty (default) to disable.
     /// Bind to localhost or a private interface — the metrics endpoint is
@@ -152,6 +166,74 @@ pub struct Config {
     /// in flight and exits. Default: 30s.
     #[arg(long, env = "GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS", default_value_t = 30)]
     pub shutdown_grace_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Maximum wall-clock time a single served git operation (upload-pack /
+    /// receive-pack through `run_git_service`) may run before it is aborted and
+    /// its process group torn down, in seconds. Bounds a git that neither
+    /// finishes nor disconnects. Must be positive; set it very large to
+    /// effectively disable the bound. Default: 600s (10 min), generous for large
+    /// clones. Does not cover the ref advertisement (`info/refs`) or the
+    /// withheld-blob fetch path (`upload_pack_excluding`, a blocking
+    /// `spawn_blocking` a tokio timeout cannot cancel); both remain unbounded.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 600,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub git_service_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Maximum connections in the PostgreSQL pool. This is a cap, not a floor
+    /// (connections open lazily). Size against the database server's
+    /// max_connections, remembering admin tooling opens its own pool.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_MAX_CONNECTIONS",
+        default_value_t = 20,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_max_connections: u32,
+
+    /// Maximum time a request waits for a pool connection before failing with
+    /// 503, in seconds. Bounds queueing when the database is slow or down.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 5,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_acquire_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Upper bound on each startup connect-and-migrate attempt, in seconds.
+    /// Migrations wait on a cross-instance advisory lock, so this must be
+    /// generous enough for a peer instance to finish migrating; on expiry the
+    /// attempt is retried (migrations are idempotent).
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 60,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_connect_timeout_secs: u64,
+
+    /// First retry delay when the database is unavailable at startup, in
+    /// seconds. Doubles each attempt up to --db-retry-max-secs.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_INITIAL_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 5,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_retry_initial_secs: u64,
+
+    /// Ceiling on the startup retry delay, in seconds.
+    #[arg(
+        long,
+        env = "GITLAWB_DB_RETRY_MAX_SECS",
+        default_value_t = 60,
+        value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u64).range(1..)
+    )]
+    pub db_retry_max_secs: u64,
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -169,3 +251,25 @@ impl Config {
         PathBuf::from(&self.key_path)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn git_service_timeout_defaults_to_600_and_rejects_zero() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node"]).git_service_timeout_secs,
+            600
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            Config::parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "30"])
+                .git_service_timeout_secs,
+            30
+        );
+        // 0 is a footgun (immediate-504 on every request); clap must reject it.
+        assert!(
+            Config::try_parse_from(["gitlawb-node", "--git-service-timeout-secs", "0"]).is_err()
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/error.rs

@@ -23,24 +23,98 @@ pub enum AppError {
     #[allow(dead_code)]
     Forbidden(String),
 
-    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {0}")]
-    IcaptchaProofRequired(String),
+    #[error("icaptcha proof required: {message}")]
+    IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: String,
+        /// iCaptcha service base URL the client should solve against.
+        url: String,
+        /// Minimum proof level this node requires.
+        level: u32,
+    },
 
     #[error("invalid request: {0}")]
     BadRequest(String),
 
+    #[error("too many requests: {0}")]
+    TooManyRequests(String),
+
+    #[error("incomplete: {0}")]
+    Incomplete(String),
+
     #[error("git error: {0}")]
     Git(String),
 
+    #[error("git service timed out: {0}")]
+    Timeout(String),
+
     #[error("database error: {0}")]
     Db(#[from] sqlx::Error),
 
     #[error("internal error: {0}")]
-    Internal(#[from] anyhow::Error),
+    Internal(anyhow::Error),
+}
+
+/// Shared error code/message for "the database is unreachable", also used by
+/// the degraded startup server (main.rs) and the readiness probe (server.rs)
+/// so clients see one vocabulary for the condition.
+pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE: &str = "db_unavailable";
+pub const DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE: &str = "database is temporarily unavailable";
+
+/// Connection-level sqlx failures that mean the database is unreachable right
+/// now (retryable, 503), as opposed to server-reported query errors.
+fn db_unavailable(e: &sqlx::Error) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        e,
+        sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut
+            | sqlx::Error::PoolClosed
+            | sqlx::Error::Io(_)
+            | sqlx::Error::Tls(_)
+    )
+}
+
+/// The db layer returns `anyhow::Result`, so sqlx errors reach handlers inside
+/// anyhow chains. Downcast them back out so the status mapping below can see
+/// them — without this, every database outage surfaces as a 500 instead of a
+/// 503. anyhow preserves downcastability through `.context()` layers.
+impl From<anyhow::Error> for AppError {
+    fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
+        match err.downcast::<sqlx::Error>() {
+            Ok(sql) => AppError::Db(sql),
+            Err(err) => AppError::Internal(err),
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 impl IntoResponse for AppError {
     fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        // iCaptcha challenges carry structured discovery so clients don't have to
+        // scrape the message: the service URL and required level are returned as
+        // both JSON fields and `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers
+        // (mirroring the header-bearing `human_detected` response in auth/mod.rs).
+        if let AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+            message,
+            url,
+            level,
+        } = &self
+        {
+            use axum::http::HeaderValue;
+            let body = Json(json!({
+                "error": "icaptcha_proof_required",
+                "message": message,
+                "icaptcha_url": url,
+                "required_level": level,
+            }));
+            let mut resp = (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, body).into_response();
+            let headers = resp.headers_mut();
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(url) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-url", v);
+            }
+            if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(&level.to_string()) {
+                headers.insert("x-icaptcha-level", v);
+            }
+            return resp;
+        }
+
         let (status, code, message) = match &self {
             AppError::RepoNotFound(r) => (
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -55,17 +129,24 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
             AppError::NotFound(msg) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Unauthorized(msg) => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not_an_agent", msg.clone()),
             AppError::Forbidden(msg) => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", msg.clone()),
-            // 403, not 401: the caller IS an authenticated agent (credentials are
-            // valid) but is forbidden from this action without a valid, fresh
-            // iCaptcha proof. The distinct `icaptcha_proof_required` code — which
-            // clients branch on — keeps it separable from a plain `forbidden`.
-            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(msg) => (
-                StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
-                "icaptcha_proof_required",
-                msg.clone(),
-            ),
+            // IcaptchaProofRequired is handled above (it carries extra headers/fields).
+            AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired { .. } => unreachable!("handled before this match"),
             AppError::BadRequest(msg) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", msg.clone()),
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(msg) => {
+                (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate_limited", msg.clone())
+            }
+            AppError::Incomplete(msg) => {
+                (StatusCode::UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY, "incomplete", msg.clone())
+            }
             AppError::Git(msg) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "git_error", msg.clone()),
+            // 504, distinct from the 500 git_error and from the read-gate's 404 /
+            // the auth 401, so the client can tell a deadline from a failure.
+            AppError::Timeout(msg) => (StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "git_timeout", msg.clone()),
+            AppError::Db(e) if db_unavailable(e) => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+                DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE.into(),
+            ),
             AppError::Db(e) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "db_error", e.to_string()),
             AppError::Internal(e) => (
                 StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
@@ -84,3 +165,21 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
 }
 
 pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, AppError>;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn timeout_maps_to_504_distinct_from_git_500() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Timeout("x".into()).into_response().status(),
+            StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT
+        );
+        // Guard against a swap with the generic git failure (500).
+        assert_eq!(
+            AppError::Git("x".into()).into_response().status(),
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/repo_store.rs

@@ -303,6 +303,131 @@ fn validate_path_components(owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Validate a peer-supplied `owner/name` sync slug and return its two halves.
+///
+/// The sync queue carries a single `repo` string that peers control, and the
+/// worker turns it into a filesystem path. `PathBuf::join` does not normalize,
+/// and an absolute second component replaces the accumulated path, so an
+/// unvalidated `a//tmp/x` resolved to `/tmp/x.git` outside `repos_dir` (#272).
+///
+/// The halves are checked with the same validators that guard
+/// `RepoStore::local_path`, so there is one owner rule and one name rule in the
+/// crate. The one rule added here is the leading `.`/`-` check on the owner
+/// half: `validate_owner_did` has no such rule (it also serves full DIDs, which
+/// always start with `d`), and without it an owner half of `.` puts a
+/// peer-controlled mirror at the `repos_dir` root, which canonicalizes back
+/// inside the root and so passes containment.
+pub(crate) fn validate_repo_slug(slug: &str) -> Result<(&str, &str)> {
+    let mut parts = slug.split('/');
+    let (Some(owner), Some(name)) = (parts.next(), parts.next()) else {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must be 'owner/name'");
+    };
+    if parts.next().is_some() {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must contain exactly one '/'");
+    }
+    if owner.is_empty() || name.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug has an empty owner or name");
+    }
+    if owner.starts_with('.') || owner.starts_with('-') {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner must not start with '.' or '-'");
+    }
+    // The owner half becomes one path component, so it is bounded by NAME_MAX
+    // (255), not by the DID column's 256. The two differ by exactly one, and
+    // that one length is the gap that matters: validate_owner_did accepts 256,
+    // create_dir_all then fails with ENAMETOOLONG on every attempt, and the
+    // worker leaves such a row pending, so it is re-picked forever. Rejecting
+    // it here means an undeliverable slug never enters the queue at all.
+    if owner.len() > 255 {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner exceeds 255 chars");
+    }
+    validate_owner_did(owner)?;
+    validate_repo_name(name)?;
+    Ok((owner, name))
+}
+
+/// The answer from [`path_within_root`].
+///
+/// Three-valued rather than a bool because the two negative answers call for
+/// opposite handling. `Outside` is a deterministic verdict about a hostile or
+/// misconfigured path: the same input fails the same way forever, so the caller
+/// can retire the work. `IoError` says the question could not be answered at
+/// all (EACCES, an unmounted root), which is transient, so the caller must keep
+/// the work and try again rather than permanently retire a legitimate repo.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) enum Containment {
+    /// The candidate resolves inside the root.
+    Contained,
+    /// The candidate resolves outside the root.
+    Outside,
+    /// The filesystem could not answer the question.
+    IoError(std::io::Error),
+}
+
+/// Does `candidate` canonically resolve inside `root`?
+///
+/// The third layer of path defence, after the character allowlist and the
+/// component walk on `RepoStore::local_path`. Those two read the path as text
+/// and cannot see a symlink standing between the root and the target (#272).
+///
+/// One contract covers both the clone and the fetch branch. `symlink_metadata`
+/// decides which:
+///
+///   * The candidate exists (including as a symlink), so the candidate itself is
+///     canonicalized. That resolves the link and catches a mirror path that is a
+///     symlink to a bare repo outside the root, which a parent-only check misses
+///     entirely: the parent canonicalizes clean, `exists()` follows the link, and
+///     the fetch then writes through it.
+///   * The candidate does not exist, so its parent is canonicalized instead.
+///     This is the first-clone case. Canonicalizing the candidate unconditionally
+///     would reject every first clone, since `canonicalize` errors on a path that
+///     does not exist.
+///
+/// Pure: it reads the filesystem and never creates, moves, or removes anything.
+/// Callers that need the parent directory to exist create it themselves before
+/// asking, because a predicate that created a directory as a side effect of
+/// being asked would be wrong for a caller asking about a path it is about to
+/// delete.
+pub(crate) fn path_within_root(candidate: &Path, root: &Path) -> Containment {
+    let root = match root.canonicalize() {
+        Ok(p) => p,
+        // A root that cannot be resolved is an operator condition, never a
+        // verdict on the candidate, so every error kind is retryable here.
+        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+    };
+
+    let resolved = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(candidate) {
+        // The candidate exists as an entry: resolve it, links and all. A failure
+        // now (a dangling symlink, a permission change mid-flight) is an I/O
+        // answer, since the entry was there a moment ago.
+        Ok(_) => match candidate.canonicalize() {
+            Ok(p) => p,
+            Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+        },
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+            let Some(parent) = candidate.parent() else {
+                return Containment::Outside;
+            };
+            match parent.canonicalize() {
+                Ok(p) => p,
+                // A parent that is not there is a real answer about where this
+                // path sits; anything else is the filesystem failing to answer.
+                Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+                    return Containment::Outside;
+                }
+                Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+            }
+        }
+        // Neither "it is there" nor "it is not there": we cannot tell.
+        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+    };
+
+    if resolved.starts_with(&root) {
+        Containment::Contained
+    } else {
+        Containment::Outside
+    }
+}
+
 fn validate_owner_did(owner_did: &str) -> Result<()> {
     if owner_did.is_empty() {
         anyhow::bail!("owner_did is empty");
@@ -405,6 +530,251 @@ fn advisory_lock_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> i64 {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    // ── sync slug validation (#272) ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_accepts_owner_and_name() {
+        let (owner, name) = validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello").expect("valid slug");
+        assert_eq!(owner, "z6Mkfoo");
+        assert_eq!(name, "hello");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_traversal_in_owner_half() {
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../hello").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_only_the_did_validator_catches() {
+        // These are the cases that isolate the `validate_owner_did` delegation.
+        // `../hello` does NOT: the leading-character rule above rejects it
+        // first, so deleting the delegation leaves that case green. Each owner
+        // half here has exactly one separator, a non-empty name, and a leading
+        // character the slug rules allow, so only the delegation can reject it.
+        for bad in [
+            "a..b/hello",    // interior `..` sequence
+            "a%2e%2e/hello", // percent-encoded, disallowed `%`
+            "own\\er/hello", // backslash
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_extra_separator() {
+        // The verified #272 escape: `a//tmp/x` joined to an absolute
+        // `/tmp/x.git` outside repos_dir.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../../etc/evil").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a/../../x").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_trailing_segment_only_the_separator_count_catches() {
+        // The case that isolates the separator-count rule. Every slug in
+        // `slug_rejects_extra_separator` is caught by some earlier rule
+        // instead: `a//tmp/...` has an empty name half, `../../etc/evil` trips
+        // the leading-character rule, and `a/../../x` has `..` as its name. Here
+        // both halves are individually valid, so only the count can reject it.
+        // It matters because the worker would otherwise join
+        // `repos_dir/z6Mkfoo/hello.git` while composing the remote URL from the
+        // full three-segment slug, silently mirroring one repo under another's
+        // path.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello/extra").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_missing_separator() {
+        for bad in ["..", "demo", ""] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_empty_half() {
+        for bad in ["/hello", "z6Mkfoo/"] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_leading_dot_or_dash_owner() {
+        // `./hello` would otherwise resolve to a mirror at the repos_dir root,
+        // which the containment check would approve.
+        for bad in ["./hello", "-owner/hello"] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_bad_name_half() {
+        for bad in [
+            "z6Mkfoo/he\0llo",
+            "z6Mkfoo/.hidden",
+            "z6Mkfoo/-dash",
+            "z6Mkfoo/a..b",
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_overlong_halves() {
+        let long_owner = format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(257));
+        let long_name = format!("z6Mkfoo/{}", "n".repeat(101));
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_owner).is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_name).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_at_the_filesystem_name_limit() {
+        // The owner half becomes a single path component, and Linux NAME_MAX is
+        // 255, so 256 is accepted by validate_owner_did (which bails only above
+        // 256) but can never be created on disk. That made the sync row
+        // permanently un-runnable: create_dir_all failed with ENAMETOOLONG on
+        // every pass and the worker left the row pending, so ten unsigned
+        // requests could hold the whole oldest-first batch forever.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(256))).is_err());
+        // 255 is the largest creatable component and must still be accepted, so
+        // the bound is not quietly over-tightened.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(255))).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    // ── canonical containment (#272) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_accepts_a_path_inside_the_root() {
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let inside = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&inside).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&inside.join("hello.git"), root.path()),
+            Containment::Contained
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_sibling_outside_the_root() {
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let sibling = base.path().join("other");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&sibling).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&sibling, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_directory_inside_the_root() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
+        let link = root.join("owner");
+        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_file_inside_the_root() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        let outside = base.path().join("secret.txt");
+        std::fs::write(&outside, b"x").unwrap();
+        let link = root.join("hello.git");
+        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_accepts_a_missing_candidate_whose_parent_is_inside() {
+        // The first-clone case: the mirror path does not exist yet, so only the
+        // parent can be canonicalized. Rejecting this is total loss of mirroring.
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let owner = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&owner).unwrap();
+        let candidate = owner.join("hello.git");
+        assert!(!candidate.exists());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, root.path()),
+            Containment::Contained
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_missing_candidate_under_a_symlinked_parent() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
+        symlink(&outside, root.join("z6Mkfoo")).unwrap();
+        let candidate = root.join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_a_dangling_symlink() {
+        // The link entry exists, so the candidate is the thing to resolve, and
+        // resolving it fails. That is an I/O answer, not a verdict of Outside:
+        // the worker must retry rather than permanently retire the row.
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let link = root.path().join("hello.git");
+        symlink(root.path().join("nothing-here"), &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, root.path()),
+            Containment::IoError(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_an_uncanonicalizable_root() {
+        // A repos_dir that cannot be resolved is an operator condition (an
+        // unmounted volume, a bad config), not a hostile path.
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("not-mounted");
+        let candidate = base.path().join("not-mounted").join("hello.git");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
+            Containment::IoError(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_creates_nothing_on_disk() {
+        // The predicate is pure: the admin purge path asks it about directories
+        // it is about to delete, so creating one as a side effect would be wrong.
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let candidate = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
+        let _ = path_within_root(&candidate, root.path());
+        assert!(!candidate.exists());
+        assert!(!root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").exists());
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_dir(root.path()).unwrap().count(), 0);
+    }
+
     // ── repo_name validation ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     #[test]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/smart_http.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ use bytes::Bytes;
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::process::Stdio;
-use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::process::Command;
 
 /// Handle `GET /:owner/:repo/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`
@@ -51,8 +52,13 @@ pub async fn info_refs(repo_path: &Path, service: &str) -> Result<Response> {
 ///
 /// Serves pack data for a clone or fetch. This is stateless — the entire
 /// negotiation happens in a single request/response.
-pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+pub async fn upload_pack(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    request_body: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<Response> {
+    let output =
+        run_git_service("git", "git-upload-pack", repo_path, request_body, timeout).await?;
 
     Ok(Response::builder()
         .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -65,8 +71,13 @@ pub async fn upload_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Respon
 ///
 /// Accepts a push. The caller MUST verify HTTP Signature auth before
 /// calling this function.
-pub async fn receive_pack(repo_path: &Path, request_body: Bytes) -> Result<Response> {
-    let output = run_git_service("git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body).await?;
+pub async fn receive_pack(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    request_body: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<Response> {
+    let output =
+        run_git_service("git", "git-receive-pack", repo_path, request_body, timeout).await?;
 
     Ok(Response::builder()
         .status(StatusCode::OK)
@@ -112,8 +123,87 @@ impl Drop for KillGroupOnDrop {
     }
 }
 
-async fn run_git_service(service: &str, repo_path: &Path, input: Bytes) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut command = Command::new("git");
+/// Error returned when [`run_git_service`] aborts a git op on its timeout.
+///
+/// Carried through the `anyhow` chain so the HTTP handler can `downcast_ref` it
+/// and map to 504 Gateway Timeout, distinct from the generic 500 git error.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[error("git service timed out")]
+pub struct GitServiceTimeout;
+
+/// On a served-git timeout, tear the process group down AND reap the leader
+/// before returning, so a caller that releases a write lock (receive-pack) can't
+/// race a still-live git touching the same repo. SIGTERM first (lets git remove
+/// its `.git/*.lock` files), escalate to SIGKILL if the leader lingers past a
+/// grace, then reap. Bounded, so a git that ignores SIGTERM can't block the
+/// response unboundedly.
+#[cfg(unix)]
+async fn reap_group_on_timeout(child: &mut tokio::process::Child) {
+    let Some(pid) = child.id() else {
+        // Never got a pid; nothing to signal, best-effort reap.
+        let _ = child.wait().await;
+        return;
+    };
+    let pgid = pid as i32;
+    // SAFETY: kill(2) takes only integers and borrows no Rust memory; ESRCH on an
+    // already-gone group is ignored.
+    unsafe {
+        libc::kill(-pgid, libc::SIGTERM);
+    }
+    // Wait for the WHOLE group to exit before returning — not just the leader but
+    // grandchildren (index-pack / pack-objects) that reparent to init and can
+    // still be touching the repo, so a caller releasing a write lock can't race
+    // them. Reap our direct child along the way (`try_wait`, else it lingers as a
+    // zombie) and poll the group's liveness with `kill(-pgid, 0)` (ESRCH once
+    // every member is gone). SIGTERM grace, then SIGKILL, then a hard cap so a
+    // stuck process can never block the response unboundedly.
+    for step in 0..400u32 {
+        let _ = child.try_wait();
+        if unsafe { libc::kill(-pgid, 0) } != 0 {
+            return; // ESRCH: every group member has exited
+        }
+        if step == 200 {
+            // ~2s SIGTERM grace elapsed; force the group down. `step == 200` fires
+            // exactly once in the 0..400 loop, so no re-entry guard is needed.
+            unsafe {
+                libc::kill(-pgid, libc::SIGKILL);
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+    }
+    // ~4s hard cap. Only reached if a group member survives SIGKILL, which means
+    // it is wedged in uninterruptible (D-state) I/O — a fsync on stuck storage, a
+    // hung mount — that no signal interrupts until the kernel returns. Nothing in
+    // userspace can kill it; blocking here (or holding the write lock) would just
+    // re-create the "hung git pins the repo" problem this bounds. Reap best-effort
+    // (tokio's orphan reaper collects it once the syscall unblocks) and return;
+    // git-level quarantine/ref-locking still guards the brief window before the
+    // D-state process finishes.
+    tracing::warn!(
+        pid,
+        "served git survived SIGKILL past the teardown cap (uninterruptible I/O?); \
+         releasing without a confirmed group reap"
+    );
+    let _ = child.try_wait();
+}
+
+/// Run a stateless-rpc git service and return its stdout.
+///
+/// `git_bin` is the git executable to spawn; production callers pass `"git"`
+/// (resolved via `PATH`). It is injectable purely so the process-group teardown
+/// wiring (`process_group(0)` + [`KillGroupOnDrop`]) can be driven end-to-end by
+/// a fake `git` in tests without mutating the process-global `PATH`.
+///
+/// `timeout` bounds the whole child interaction; on expiry the op is aborted with
+/// [`GitServiceTimeout`] and its process group is torn down.
+async fn run_git_service(
+    git_bin: &str,
+    service: &str,
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    input: Bytes,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut command = Command::new(git_bin);
     command
         .arg(service_to_command(service))
         .arg("--stateless-rpc")
@@ -131,33 +221,85 @@ async fn run_git_service(service: &str, repo_path: &Path, input: Bytes) -> Resul
 
     // Arm the group-kill guard for the lifetime of the request. With
     // process_group(0) the child is its own group leader, so pgid == its pid.
+    // This fires on a client disconnect (the whole future is dropped mid-request).
     #[cfg(unix)]
     let mut group_guard = KillGroupOnDrop {
         pgid: child.id().map(|id| id as i32),
     };
 
-    // Write the request body to git's stdin, but don't early-return on a write
-    // error: always reap the child first (below), so the guard only ever fires on
-    // an actual future-drop (client disconnect), never on a pid we just reaped.
-    let write_result: std::io::Result<()> = match child.stdin.take() {
-        Some(mut stdin) => stdin.write_all(&input).await,
-        None => Ok(()),
+    // Own the pipes so `child` stays reap-able after a timeout: wait_with_output
+    // would consume it, but on timeout we must actively reap the group before
+    // returning (see reap_group_on_timeout).
+    let mut stdin = child.stdin.take();
+    let mut stdout = child.stdout.take().context("git stdout was not piped")?;
+    let mut stderr = child.stderr.take().context("git stderr was not piped")?;
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let mut err = Vec::new();
+
+    // Bound the whole child interaction: a git that neither finishes nor
+    // disconnects would otherwise pin the pid forever. Write stdin, drain stdout
+    // and stderr, and wait for the child all concurrently (draining while writing
+    // avoids a pipe deadlock on a large body), under one deadline.
+    let interact = async {
+        // Don't early-return on a write error: the join still waits on the child,
+        // so an error is surfaced only after the child has been waited on.
+        let write = async {
+            match stdin.take() {
+                Some(mut s) => s.write_all(&input).await,
+                None => Ok(()),
+            }
+        };
+        let (write_result, r_out, r_err, status) = tokio::join!(
+            write,
+            stdout.read_to_end(&mut out),
+            stderr.read_to_end(&mut err),
+            child.wait(),
+        );
+        r_out?;
+        r_err?;
+        Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>((write_result, status?))
     };
 
-    let output = child.wait_with_output().await?;
+    let timed = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, interact).await;
+    let (write_result, status) = match timed {
+        Ok(result) => {
+            // The join runs all arms to completion, so the child is reaped: disarm
+            // before surfacing any interaction error (a read/wait error), else the
+            // guard's drop would fire SIGTERM on the reaped, possibly-reused pgid.
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            group_guard.disarm();
+            result?
+        }
+        Err(_elapsed) => {
+            // Timeout: tear the whole group down and reap it before returning so a
+            // caller releasing a write lock can't race a still-live git. Then disarm
+            // the (now redundant) guard so its drop can't hit a reused pgid.
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            {
+                reap_group_on_timeout(&mut child).await;
+                group_guard.disarm();
+            }
+            #[cfg(not(unix))]
+            {
+                let _ = child.start_kill();
+                let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), child.wait()).await;
+            }
+            return Err(GitServiceTimeout.into());
+        }
+    };
 
-    // Child reaped, so its group is gone: disarm before surfacing any error.
-    #[cfg(unix)]
-    group_guard.disarm();
-
-    write_result.context("failed to write to git stdin")?;
-
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
+    // Surface git's own failure (its stderr, which the handler may classify as a
+    // 400) before any stdin-write error: when git rejects a malformed body it
+    // exits non-zero and closes stdin, so the write's EPIPE would otherwise mask
+    // the real cause.
+    if !status.success() {
+        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&err);
         bail!("{service} failed: {stderr}");
     }
 
-    Ok(output.stdout)
+    write_result.context("failed to write to git stdin")?;
+
+    Ok(out)
 }
 
 fn service_to_command(service: &str) -> &str {
@@ -876,4 +1018,499 @@ mod tests {
         let _ = child.kill().await;
         let _ = child.wait().await;
     }
+
+    // ── #62 PR1: end-to-end teardown wiring through run_git_service ─────────
+    //
+    // The kill_group_guard_* tests above build a KillGroupOnDrop by hand and
+    // never call run_git_service, so deleting `process_group(0)` (spawn site) or
+    // the guard-arming, or the post-reap disarm, would leave them green. These
+    // drive the REAL run_git_service via an injected fake `git` (the `git_bin`
+    // seam) and assert the production spawn path actually wires the teardown up.
+    // Faithful to the real invocation: run_git_service spawns
+    // `<git_bin> <cmd> --stateless-rpc <repo_path>` in its own process group.
+
+    /// SIGKILLs the given pids on drop (ignoring all kill errors, e.g. ESRCH for
+    /// an already-dead pid) so a panicking assertion can't leak the fake `git` or
+    /// its grandchild onto the test runner.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    struct ReapOnPanic(Vec<i32>);
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    impl Drop for ReapOnPanic {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            for &pid in &self.0 {
+                unsafe {
+                    libc::kill(pid, libc::SIGKILL);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Write an executable fake `git` (named `git`) into `dir`; return its path.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn write_fake_git(dir: &std::path::Path, body: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
+        let path = dir.join("git");
+        std::fs::write(&path, body).unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
+        path
+    }
+
+    /// Read a two-line `leader\ngrandchild` pidfile once both lines are present.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    fn read_two_pids(pidfile: &std::path::Path) -> Option<(i32, i32)> {
+        let s = std::fs::read_to_string(pidfile).ok()?;
+        let mut lines = s.lines();
+        let leader: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
+        let grandchild: i32 = lines.next()?.trim().parse().ok()?;
+        Some((leader, grandchild))
+    }
+
+    /// Retry policy for the fake-git spawn race, shared by `fake_git_run_with_pids`
+    /// and the drop test's inline loop (which can't use the helper — it must keep
+    /// the winning future pending). `nth` retry waits `n * STEP_MS` ms.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    const FAKE_GIT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: u64 = 12;
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    const FAKE_GIT_BACKOFF_STEP_MS: u64 = 100;
+
+    /// Run a fake-git-based `run` under the parallel test runner, retrying if the
+    /// fake transiently fails to record its pids. Under `cargo test --workspace`
+    /// fork-storm load a freshly-written fake `git` can fail to exec (ETXTBSY: a
+    /// concurrent worker forked while its write fd was still open) or be killed by
+    /// the service timeout before it is scheduled to write its pidfile; both leave
+    /// no pids. These misses are *correlated* (bursty) under fork pressure, so each
+    /// retry backs off (growing) to let a spike subside rather than burning every
+    /// attempt inside one. `pidfile` is removed before each attempt. Returns the
+    /// successful attempt's outcome together with the recorded pids; a genuine
+    /// never-spawns bug still fails loudly after the cap. Retried attempts don't
+    /// leak in practice: a miss almost always means the fake never exec'd (nothing
+    /// to clean up), and a spawn that got far enough is reaped by the timeout/drop
+    /// path before this returns.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    async fn fake_git_run_with_pids<R, F, Fut>(
+        pidfile: &std::path::Path,
+        mut run: F,
+    ) -> (R, (i32, i32))
+    where
+        F: FnMut() -> Fut,
+        Fut: std::future::Future<Output = R>,
+    {
+        for i in 0..FAKE_GIT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS {
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(pidfile);
+            let outcome = run().await;
+            // A successful run writes its pids before it returns, so a short poll
+            // catches them (allowing only for fs-visibility lag).
+            for _ in 0..50 {
+                if let Some(p) = read_two_pids(pidfile) {
+                    return (outcome, p);
+                }
+                tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+            }
+            // Miss: back off before retrying so a bursty fork-pressure spike
+            // subsides (see the doc note on correlated ETXTBSY/EAGAIN failures).
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(
+                FAKE_GIT_BACKOFF_STEP_MS * (i + 1),
+            ))
+            .await;
+        }
+        panic!(
+            "fake git failed to spawn and record its pids after {FAKE_GIT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS} \
+             attempts (persistent failure, not a transient parallel-runner miss)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Dropping the request future mid-flight (client disconnect) must SIGTERM the
+    // whole group so git AND its pack-objects grandchild die together. Goes RED
+    // if `process_group(0)` or the guard-arming is removed: without its own
+    // group, kill(-pgid) hits no group and the grandchild survives.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_tears_down_group_when_future_dropped() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Fork a grandchild (stands in for pack-objects), record leader+grandchild
+        // pids, then hang so run_git_service parks in wait_with_output.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nwait\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        // Retry under fork-storm load: a freshly-written fake `git` can transiently
+        // fail to exec (ETXTBSY) or exit before recording its pids; both leave no
+        // pids and are independent per attempt (see fake_git_run_with_pids). The
+        // winning attempt's future is kept PENDING so the drop below exercises the
+        // client-disconnect teardown. Dropping a losing attempt's future makes its
+        // guard reap anything that spawned, so retries don't leak.
+        let (fut, grandchild) = {
+            let mut attempt = 0u64;
+            loop {
+                attempt += 1;
+                let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&pidfile);
+                let mut fut = Box::pin(run_git_service(
+                    git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                    "git-upload-pack",
+                    tmp.path(),
+                    Bytes::new(),
+                    Duration::from_secs(60),
+                ));
+
+                // Advance the future a slice at a time until the fake records its
+                // pids. `Ok(_)` means run_git_service returned before the pidfile
+                // appeared (spawn error / early exit); stop polling then, since
+                // re-polling a completed future panics with `async fn resumed after
+                // completion`. Read the pidfile first so a fake that wrote its pids
+                // and then exited is still captured.
+                let mut pids = None;
+                for _ in 0..500 {
+                    let finished =
+                        tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10), &mut fut)
+                            .await
+                            .is_ok();
+                    if let Some(p) = read_two_pids(&pidfile) {
+                        pids = Some(p);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    if finished {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+                // Only the grandchild needs panic-cleanup: dropping the future makes
+                // tokio reap the fake leader, and carrying the reaped leader pid
+                // risks SIGKILLing a recycled pid under parallel test load.
+                match pids {
+                    Some((_leader, g)) => break (fut, g),
+                    None => {
+                        // Transient spawn miss: drop the still-armed future so its
+                        // guard reaps anything that spawned, then back off (growing)
+                        // so a bursty fork-pressure spike subsides before retrying.
+                        drop(fut);
+                        assert!(
+                            attempt < FAKE_GIT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS,
+                            "fake git failed to spawn and record its pids after \
+                             {FAKE_GIT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS} attempts (persistent failure, \
+                             not a transient parallel-runner miss)"
+                        );
+                        tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(
+                            FAKE_GIT_BACKOFF_STEP_MS * attempt,
+                        ))
+                        .await;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+        assert!(
+            alive(grandchild),
+            "grandchild should be running before the drop"
+        );
+
+        // Client disconnect: drop the request future. The armed KillGroupOnDrop
+        // must SIGTERM the whole group.
+        drop(fut);
+
+        let mut gone = false;
+        for _ in 0..500 {
+            if !alive(grandchild) {
+                gone = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+        assert!(
+            gone,
+            "grandchild must be torn down via the process group on future-drop \
+             (proves run_git_service sets process_group(0) and arms the guard)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A request that runs to completion must DISARM the guard after reaping, so
+    // no stray group SIGTERM fires. The fake exits non-zero (surfacing as Err)
+    // but leaves a grandchild alive; the grandchild must survive. Goes RED if the
+    // post-reap disarm is removed: the guard would then fire on return and, since
+    // the grandchild still holds the group open, sweep it.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_completion_leaving_group_alive() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // The grandchild is long-lived with stdio redirected to /dev/null:
+        // /dev/null so it doesn't inherit (and hold open) run_git_service's stdout
+        // pipe (which would block wait_with_output until it exits); long-lived so
+        // the "still alive" assertion below can't race the sleep exiting on its own
+        // under a starved scheduler. ReapOnPanic cleans it up.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 1\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        // wait_with_output already reaped the fake leader, so only the grandchild
+        // needs panic-cleanup — SIGKILLing the reaped leader pid could hit a
+        // recycled pid under parallel test load. Retry the run so a transient spawn
+        // miss under fork-storm load doesn't fail the test (see fake_git_run_with_pids).
+        let (result, (_leader, grandchild)) = fake_git_run_with_pids(&pidfile, || {
+            run_git_service(
+                git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                "git-upload-pack",
+                tmp.path(),
+                Bytes::new(),
+                Duration::from_secs(60),
+            )
+        })
+        .await;
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+
+        assert!(result.is_err(), "non-zero git exit must surface as Err");
+        // A mutant that left the guard armed fires SIGTERM on return; poll a short
+        // window so a killed grandchild is reliably observed dead — a single
+        // alive() check can race the SIGTERM+reap and miss it.
+        for _ in 0..30 {
+            assert!(
+                alive(grandchild),
+                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm the guard after \
+                 reaping, not fire a group SIGTERM on the completion path"
+            );
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // The SUCCESS path (exit 0, Ok) must disarm too — the disarm test above only
+    // exercises the exit-1/Err branch. Goes RED if disarm is gated on failure
+    // (e.g. moved inside the `!status.success()` branch): the guard would then
+    // fire after a clean completion and sweep the still-live grandchild.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_disarms_on_success_leaving_group_alive() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Long-lived, stdio to /dev/null (same reasons as the exit-1 test).
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nexit 0\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        // Retry the run so a transient spawn miss under fork-storm load doesn't
+        // fail the test (see fake_git_run_with_pids).
+        let (result, (_leader, grandchild)) = fake_git_run_with_pids(&pidfile, || {
+            run_git_service(
+                git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                "git-upload-pack",
+                tmp.path(),
+                Bytes::new(),
+                Duration::from_secs(60),
+            )
+        })
+        .await;
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+
+        assert!(result.is_ok(), "zero-exit git must surface as Ok");
+        // Poll a short window (see the exit-1 test): a mutant that disarms only on
+        // failure fires the guard on this success path, and a single alive() check
+        // can race the SIGTERM+reap.
+        for _ in 0..30 {
+            assert!(
+                alive(grandchild),
+                "grandchild must survive: run_git_service must disarm on the success \
+                 path too, not fire a group SIGTERM after a clean completion"
+            );
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // A git that hangs (never finishes, never disconnects) must be bounded: it
+    // returns GitServiceTimeout (the handler maps that to 504) and its process
+    // group is torn down. Goes RED if the timeout wrap is removed — the OUTER
+    // bound below then fires instead of run_git_service's own, so the test fails
+    // loudly rather than hanging CI.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_times_out_and_tears_down_a_hung_git() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Fork a grandchild, then hang forever.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nwait\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        // Outer bound well above git_timeout: if run_git_service's own timeout is
+        // broken it hangs, and this fires instead so we assert-fail, not hang.
+        // fake_git_run_with_pids retries a transient spawn/schedule miss under
+        // fork-storm load and returns the pidfile the fake recorded.
+        let git_timeout = Duration::from_millis(1000);
+        let (outcome, (_leader, grandchild)) = fake_git_run_with_pids(&pidfile, || {
+            tokio::time::timeout(
+                Duration::from_secs(5),
+                run_git_service(
+                    git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                    "git-upload-pack",
+                    tmp.path(),
+                    Bytes::new(),
+                    git_timeout,
+                ),
+            )
+        })
+        .await;
+
+        assert!(
+            outcome.is_ok(),
+            "run_git_service must return via its own timeout, not hang"
+        );
+        let err = outcome
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect_err("a hung git must surface as Err");
+        assert!(
+            err.downcast_ref::<GitServiceTimeout>().is_some(),
+            "the error must be GitServiceTimeout (maps to 504), got: {err:#}"
+        );
+
+        // The hung git's group must be torn down (the armed guard fires on the
+        // timeout return), not leaked.
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+        let mut gone = false;
+        for _ in 0..500 {
+            if !alive(grandchild) {
+                gone = true;
+                break;
+            }
+            tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+        }
+        assert!(
+            gone,
+            "a timed-out git's process group must be torn down, not leaked"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // On timeout, run_git_service must REAP the group before returning, so a
+    // caller releasing a write lock (receive-pack) can't race a still-live git.
+    // The fake traps SIGTERM and lingers ~1s (git-cleanup stand-in): with the
+    // reap the call waits for it to exit, so the leader is dead by the time we
+    // return; without it, the call returns while the fake is still mid-trap.
+    // Goes RED if the timeout arm's reap is removed.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_reaps_the_group_before_returning_on_timeout() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let pidfile = tmp.path().join("pids");
+        // Leader traps SIGTERM and exits after ~1s. The grandchild (a sub-shell)
+        // IGNORES SIGTERM entirely (`trap "" TERM`) and sleeps far past the ~4s reap
+        // cap, so nothing but the untrappable SIGKILL escalation can kill it within
+        // the cap. That makes the escalation load-bearing: neuter the SIGKILL and
+        // this test goes RED. (A grandchild that merely trapped-and-slept UNDER the
+        // cap would self-exit and hide a broken escalation.) "Wait for the whole
+        // group" (leader AND grandchild) is observable because both must be dead
+        // before run_git_service returns.
+        let body = format!(
+            "#!/bin/sh\ntrap 'sleep 1; exit 0' TERM\nsh -c 'trap \"\" TERM; sleep 300' >/dev/null 2>&1 &\nprintf '%s\\n%s\\n' \"$$\" \"$!\" > \"{}\"\nwait\n",
+            pidfile.display()
+        );
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), &body);
+
+        // fake_git_run_with_pids retries a transient spawn/schedule miss under
+        // fork-storm load and returns the pids the fake recorded; the outer 10s
+        // bound fires only if run_git_service's own timeout is broken (so we
+        // assert-fail rather than hang), well above the git_timeout plus the
+        // SIGKILL-escalation reap of the SIGTERM-ignoring grandchild.
+        let git_timeout = Duration::from_millis(300);
+        let (outcome, (leader, grandchild)) = fake_git_run_with_pids(&pidfile, || {
+            tokio::time::timeout(
+                Duration::from_secs(10),
+                run_git_service(
+                    git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                    "git-upload-pack",
+                    tmp.path(),
+                    Bytes::new(),
+                    git_timeout,
+                ),
+            )
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert!(outcome.is_ok(), "must return via its own timeout, not hang");
+        assert!(outcome.unwrap().is_err(), "a hung git must surface as Err");
+
+        // The WHOLE group (leader AND the lingering grandchild) must be gone by the
+        // time we get here.
+        let _cleanup = ReapOnPanic(vec![grandchild]);
+        assert!(
+            !alive(leader) && !alive(grandchild),
+            "run_git_service must reap the whole git process group (leader AND \
+             grandchildren) before returning on a timeout, so a write-lock release \
+             can't race a still-live git"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The timeout bounds git-receive-pack too, not just upload-pack: on the push
+    // path a hung git also holds the repo's write lock, so an unbounded receive-pack
+    // pins the repo until the process dies. run_git_service must return
+    // Err(GitServiceTimeout) for the receive-pack service exactly as it does for
+    // upload-pack. Goes RED if the internal timeout is removed (the fake never
+    // exits, so the outer bound trips and the outcome is not Ok).
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_times_out_a_hung_receive_pack() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(tmp.path(), "#!/bin/sh\nsleep 300\n");
+        let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(
+            Duration::from_secs(5),
+            run_git_service(
+                git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+                "git-receive-pack",
+                tmp.path(),
+                Bytes::new(),
+                Duration::from_millis(200),
+            ),
+        )
+        .await;
+        assert!(
+            outcome.is_ok(),
+            "receive-pack must return via its own timeout, not hang"
+        );
+        let err = outcome
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect_err("a hung receive-pack must surface as Err");
+        assert!(
+            err.downcast_ref::<GitServiceTimeout>().is_some(),
+            "a hung receive-pack must time out as GitServiceTimeout (maps to 504); \
+             got: {err:#}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // A malformed request: git exits non-zero with a recognizable pkt-line error
+    // on stderr AND does not read stdin, so a body larger than the pipe buffer
+    // makes the write EPIPE. run_git_service must surface git's stderr (which the
+    // handler classifies as a 400), not the EPIPE write error (a generic 500).
+    // Goes RED if the stdin-write check runs before the exit-status check.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn run_git_service_surfaces_git_stderr_over_a_stdin_epipe() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let git_bin = write_fake_git(
+            tmp.path(),
+            "#!/bin/sh\necho 'fatal: bad line length character: 0000' >&2\nexit 128\n",
+        );
+
+        // Larger than a pipe buffer (~64 KiB) so the write blocks then EPIPEs when
+        // the fake exits without draining stdin, exercising the ordering.
+        let big = Bytes::from(vec![0u8; 256 * 1024]);
+        let result = run_git_service(
+            git_bin.to_str().unwrap(),
+            "git-upload-pack",
+            tmp.path(),
+            big,
+            Duration::from_secs(60),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        let err = result.expect_err("non-zero git must surface as Err");
+        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("bad line length"),
+            "run_git_service must surface git's stderr (a classifiable 400), not the \
+             stdin-write EPIPE (a generic 500); got: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/store.rs

@@ -271,9 +271,8 @@ pub struct TreeEntry {
 /// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
 /// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
 ///
-/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
-pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
-    // First check if the object exists and get its type
+/// Get just the object type. Returns `None` if the object doesn't exist.
+pub fn object_type(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
     let type_output = Command::new("git")
         .args(["cat-file", "-t", sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
@@ -284,13 +283,17 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         return Ok(None);
     }
 
-    let obj_type = String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
-        .trim()
-        .to_string();
+    Ok(Some(
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&type_output.stdout)
+            .trim()
+            .to_string(),
+    ))
+}
 
-    // Read the raw content bytes
+/// Read an object's content if its type is already known.
+pub fn read_object_content(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str, obj_type: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let content_output = Command::new("git")
-        .args(["cat-file", &obj_type, sha256_hex])
+        .args(["cat-file", obj_type, sha256_hex])
         .current_dir(repo_path)
         .output()
         .context("failed to run git cat-file <type>")?;
@@ -300,7 +303,24 @@ pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String,
         bail!("git cat-file failed: {stderr}");
     }
 
-    Ok(Some((obj_type, content_output.stdout)))
+    Ok(content_output.stdout)
+}
+
+/// Read a git object by its SHA-256 hex object ID.
+///
+/// Returns `(object_type, content_bytes)` where `content_bytes` is the raw
+/// object content (without the git framing header). The CID served over
+/// `/ipfs/<cid>` is computed from these same content bytes via
+/// `gitlawb_core::cid::Cid::from_git_object_bytes`.
+///
+/// Returns `None` if the object does not exist in this repo.
+pub fn read_object(repo_path: &Path, sha256_hex: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, Vec<u8>)>> {
+    let obj_type = match object_type(repo_path, sha256_hex)? {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return Ok(None),
+    };
+    let content = read_object_content(repo_path, sha256_hex, &obj_type)?;
+    Ok(Some((obj_type, content)))
 }
 
 /// Get the diff between two branches: changes on source_branch not in target_branch.

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs

@@ -309,11 +309,33 @@ pub fn replicable_blob_set(
     rules: &[VisibilityRule],
     is_public: bool,
     owner_did: &str,
+) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
+    allowed_blob_set_for_caller(repo_path, rules, is_public, owner_did, None)
+}
+
+/// Reachable blob OIDs that visibility ALLOWS `caller` at some path. The
+/// caller-aware generalization of `replicable_blob_set` (which is the anonymous
+/// `caller = None` case). Used by `GET /ipfs/{cid}` to gate fail-closed against
+/// dangling/unreachable blobs (#126): a blob written via `git hash-object -w`
+/// but unreferenced is absent from the reachable walk, so it is never in this
+/// set and the IPFS serve path drops it — even from the owner, who has no path
+/// to authorize the blob at.
+///
+/// A blob reachable at an allowed path is included even when also denied
+/// elsewhere (its content is readable to this caller elsewhere). Trees and
+/// commits are NOT included here; the caller decides per object type whether
+/// the allow-set applies (it does not for trees/commits — KTD3).
+pub fn allowed_blob_set_for_caller(
+    repo_path: &Path,
+    rules: &[VisibilityRule],
+    is_public: bool,
+    owner_did: &str,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
 ) -> Result<HashSet<String>> {
     let pairs = blob_paths(repo_path)?;
     let mut allowed = HashSet::new();
     for (oid, path) in &pairs {
-        if visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, None, path) == Decision::Allow {
+        if visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, path) == Decision::Allow {
             allowed.insert(oid.clone());
         }
     }
@@ -743,6 +765,78 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn allowed_set_excludes_dangling_blob_for_every_caller() {
+        // #126: a blob written via `git hash-object -w` but never referenced has
+        // no path to gate on, so it is absent from the reachable allowed-set —
+        // for anonymous callers, listed readers, AND the owner. The IPFS serve
+        // path relies on this fail-closed property to drop dangling withheld
+        // blobs that the deny-set model leaked.
+        let td = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let work = td.path().join("work");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(work.join("public")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(work.join("public/a.txt"), b"public bytes\n").unwrap();
+        let run = |args: &[&str]| {
+            assert!(
+                Command::new("git")
+                    .args(args)
+                    .current_dir(&work)
+                    .status()
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .success(),
+                "git {args:?} failed"
+            );
+        };
+        run(&["init", "-q"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
+        run(&["config", "user.name", "t"]);
+        run(&["add", "."]);
+        run(&["commit", "-qm", "init"]);
+        let oid_of = |rev: &str| {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["rev-parse", rev])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        let public_oid = oid_of("HEAD:public/a.txt");
+
+        std::fs::write(work.join("orphan.bin"), b"DANGLING SECRET\n").unwrap();
+        let dangling_oid = {
+            let out = Command::new("git")
+                .args(["hash-object", "-w", "orphan.bin"])
+                .current_dir(&work)
+                .output()
+                .unwrap();
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string()
+        };
+        assert!(
+            matches!(dangling_oid.len(), 40 | 64),
+            "precondition: hash-object stored the dangling blob"
+        );
+
+        // Path-scoped rule: /secret/** denied to anon, allowed to a listed reader.
+        let reader = "did:key:zReader";
+        let rules = [rule("/secret/**", &[reader])];
+
+        // Every gate-relevant caller: anonymous, listed reader, owner. None of
+        // them can put the dangling blob in the allowed set — it has no path.
+        for caller in [None, Some(reader), Some(OWNER)] {
+            let allowed = allowed_blob_set_for_caller(&work, &rules, true, OWNER, caller).unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                !allowed.contains(&dangling_oid),
+                "dangling blob must be absent from allowed-set (caller={caller:?})"
+            );
+            // Sanity: the reachable public blob is still in the set for every
+            // caller (the rule does not deny /public/**).
+            assert!(
+                allowed.contains(&public_oid),
+                "reachable public blob must be in allowed-set (caller={caller:?})"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn recipients_are_owner_plus_allowed_readers_only() {
         let (_td, repo, secret_oid, public_oid) = fixture();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/query.rs

@@ -49,16 +49,49 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
         repo: Option<String>,
-        #[graphql(default = 20)] limit: i64,
+        #[graphql(
+            default = 20,
+            desc = "Max 200; larger requests return the newest 200 rows (no continuation cursor)."
+        )]
+        limit: i64,
     ) -> Result<Vec<RefUpdateType>> {
         let db = ctx.data_unchecked::<Arc<Db>>();
-        let updates = db
-            .list_ref_updates_filtered(repo.as_deref(), limit)
+
+        // Gate each row on the same "/" visibility decision the repos resolver
+        // uses, so anonymous callers get no row for a local repo they can't read
+        // (#112). The shared collector applies the fail-closed gate *before* the
+        // limit (paging past dropped private rows) so a small limit still returns
+        // the latest visible events, and keeps this surface byte-identical to the
+        // REST feed (#114). The row slug is peer-supplied, so the pure filter
+        // treats it as untrusted input; remote (no local match) rows pass.
+        let caller = ctx
+            .data::<crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid>()
+            .ok()
+            .map(|d| d.0.as_str());
+        let updates =
+            crate::api::events::collect_visible_ref_updates(db, repo.as_deref(), limit, caller)
+                .await
+                .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
+
+        // Resolve the trusted display owner_did per row, identical to the REST
+        // feed: the stored wire value is untrusted, so it is echoed only when it
+        // matches the canonical owner of the local repo the slug names (#P1);
+        // legacy None rows are attributed via an exact unique local match (#P3).
+        // The batch resolver issues at most one query per distinct local repo
+        // rather than one per event row (#P2).
+        let pairs: Vec<(&str, Option<&str>)> = updates
+            .iter()
+            .map(|u| (u.repo.as_str(), u.owner_did.as_deref()))
+            .collect();
+        let owner_dids = db
+            .resolve_ref_update_owner_dids(&pairs)
             .await
             .map_err(|e| async_graphql::Error::new(e.to_string()))?;
-        Ok(updates
+
+        let resolved: Vec<RefUpdateType> = updates
             .into_iter()
-            .map(|u| RefUpdateType {
+            .zip(owner_dids)
+            .map(|(u, owner_did)| RefUpdateType {
                 repo: u.repo,
                 ref_name: u.ref_name,
                 old_sha: u.old_sha,
@@ -66,8 +99,10 @@ impl QueryRoot {
                 pusher_did: u.pusher_did,
                 node_did: u.node_did,
                 timestamp: u.timestamp,
+                owner_did,
             })
-            .collect())
+            .collect();
+        Ok(resolved)
     }
 
     async fn tasks(
@@ -94,3 +129,294 @@ impl QueryRoot {
         Ok(t.map(AgentTaskType::from))
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use crate::db::{Db, ReceivedRefUpdate, RepoRecord};
+    use chrono::Utc;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+    use std::sync::Arc;
+
+    const OWNER: &str = "did:key:z6MkOwner";
+
+    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Arc<Db> {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        Arc::new(db)
+    }
+
+    fn schema(db: Arc<Db>) -> super::super::GitlawbSchema {
+        let (ref_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        let (task_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel(16);
+        super::super::build_schema(db, ref_tx, task_tx)
+    }
+
+    fn repo(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn ref_row(id: &str, slug: &str) -> ReceivedRefUpdate {
+        ReceivedRefUpdate {
+            id: id.into(),
+            node_did: "did:key:z6MkNode".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:z6MkPusher".into(),
+            repo: slug.into(),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0".repeat(40),
+            new_sha: "a".repeat(40),
+            timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            received_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+            from_peer: "peer1".into(),
+            owner_did: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Count `refUpdates` rows in a GraphQL response.
+    fn count(resp: &async_graphql::Response) -> usize {
+        assert!(resp.errors.is_empty(), "graphql errors: {:?}", resp.errors);
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            panic!("data not an object: {:?}", resp.data);
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").expect("refUpdates key")
+        else {
+            panic!("refUpdates not a list");
+        };
+        rows.len()
+    }
+
+    async fn anon(schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema, query: &str) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema.execute(async_graphql::Request::new(query)).await
+    }
+
+    async fn authed(
+        schema: &super::super::GitlawbSchema,
+        query: &str,
+        did: &str,
+    ) -> async_graphql::Response {
+        schema
+            .execute(
+                async_graphql::Request::new(query)
+                    .data(crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid(did.to_string())),
+            )
+            .await
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 1 — anon must not get a private local repo's row on the
+    // repo:Some branch. This is the load-bearing RED→GREEN case.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // The GraphQL `repo` arg is the raw slug DB filter, so it must equal the
+        // stored slug to select the row at all — this is the exact leak path.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName newSha pusherDid } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 2 — owner still sees their own private repo's row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_private_repo_kept_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkOwner/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(repo: "z6MkOwner/widget") { refName } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, OWNER).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 3 — unfiltered (repo:None): anon gets only the public row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_unfiltered_anon_gets_only_public(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_pub", "z6MkOwner/openrepo"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u_priv", "z6MkOwner/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo refName ownerDid } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 1);
+        // The one row returned must be the public repo's with owner_did echoed.
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(row) = &rows[0] else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            row.get("repo").unwrap(),
+            &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            row.get("ownerDid").unwrap(),
+            &async_graphql::Value::from(OWNER),
+            "ownerDid must fall back to the local record's owner for legacy rows"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 4 — alias fail-closed: private repo's row stored full-DID form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "did:key:zABC/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // repo:None so the slug is not the DB filter key (which is verbatim);
+        // the gate must still drop it.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 5 — truncated-key fail-closed: 8-char-prefix owner form.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zABCDEF/widget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 6 — remote slug (no local match) is returned to anon.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_remote_slug_kept_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("r1", OWNER, "widget", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Row whose slug matches no local repo (different owner + name).
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "zZZZOTHER/gadget"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 1);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 7 (#114 P2) — a small limit must page past the newest rows when
+    // they are private, so the older public rows are still returned. Before the
+    // gate moved ahead of the limit this returned 0 (the newest `limit` rows were
+    // all private and got filtered after the SQL LIMIT). RED→GREEN.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_small_limit_pages_past_newest_private(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("pub", OWNER, "openrepo", true))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.create_repo(&repo("priv", OWNER, "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // 3 older PUBLIC rows …
+        for i in 0..3 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("pub{i}"), "z6MkOwner/openrepo");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:0{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        // … then 5 NEWER PRIVATE rows (the newest in the feed).
+        for i in 0..5 {
+            let mut r = ref_row(&format!("priv{i}"), "z6MkOwner/secret");
+            r.timestamp = format!("2026-07-01T10:00:1{i}+00:00");
+            db.insert_ref_update(&r).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        // limit 3 < the 5 newest (all private): anon must still get 3 public rows.
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates(limit: 3) { repo } }"#;
+        let resp = anon(&schema, q).await;
+        assert_eq!(count(&resp), 3, "paging must reach the older public rows");
+        let async_graphql::Value::Object(obj) = &resp.data else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        let async_graphql::Value::List(rows) = obj.get("refUpdates").unwrap() else {
+            unreachable!()
+        };
+        for row in rows {
+            let async_graphql::Value::Object(r) = row else {
+                unreachable!()
+            };
+            assert_eq!(
+                r.get("repo").unwrap(),
+                &async_graphql::Value::from("z6MkOwner/openrepo"),
+                "every returned row must be the public repo's"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8 — a quarantined mirror is withheld on the GraphQL surface too.
+    // Guards that the resolver keeps delegating to the shared collector (where the
+    // quarantine fold lives); a REST-only test would miss a resolver that stopped.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_mirror_dropped_for_anon(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_mirror_repo("z6MkQuar", "secret", "/tmp/q", None, true)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&anon(&schema, q).await), 0);
+    }
+
+    // Scenario 8b — the GraphQL surface also withholds a quarantined repo from an
+    // authenticated OWNER, not just anon. Without the collector's quarantine drop
+    // the owner short-circuit in visibility_check keeps the row on this surface
+    // too, so the REST owner test alone would not guard the resolver.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn ref_updates_quarantined_repo_dropped_for_owner(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.create_repo(&repo("q1", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        db.set_repo_quarantine("q1", true).await.unwrap();
+        db.insert_ref_update(&ref_row("u1", "z6MkQuar/secret"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let schema = schema(db);
+        let q = r#"{ refUpdates { repo } }"#;
+        assert_eq!(count(&authed(&schema, q, "did:key:z6MkQuar").await), 0);
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ pub struct SubscriptionRoot;
 
 #[Subscription]
 impl SubscriptionRoot {
+    /// Live ref-update stream. `/graphql/ws` is mounted outside the
+    /// `optional_signature` layer, so this resolver has NO caller identity and
+    /// cannot gate per-subscriber — it relays whatever enters the broadcast
+    /// channel to any anonymous client. Its visibility safety therefore rests
+    /// entirely on the WRITE side: the push handler only sends a
+    /// `RefUpdateBroadcast` for repos the anonymous public may read (inside its
+    /// `if announce` block, `api/repos.rs`). This is a single-point invariant —
+    /// any new sender to `ref_update_tx` MUST be `announce`-gated, or private-repo
+    /// ref metadata leaks here to unauthenticated subscribers (#112/#114 class).
     async fn ref_updates(
         &self,
         ctx: &Context<'_>,
@@ -30,6 +39,7 @@ impl SubscriptionRoot {
                     pusher_did: ev.pusher_did,
                     node_did: ev.node_did,
                     timestamp: ev.timestamp,
+                    owner_did: Some(ev.owner_did),
                 }),
                 _ => None,
             }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/types.rs

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ pub struct RefUpdateType {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     pub node_did: String,
     pub timestamp: String,
+    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(SimpleObject, Clone)]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/icaptcha.rs

@@ -237,9 +237,13 @@ impl ProofGuard {
         match self.0 {
             Some(p) => {
                 if !db.consume_proof_jti(&p.jti, p.exp).await? {
-                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(
-                        "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge".to_string(),
-                    ));
+                    let (url, level) = url_and_level();
+                    return Err(AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+                        message: "iCaptcha proof already used (replay); solve a fresh challenge"
+                            .to_string(),
+                        url,
+                        level,
+                    });
                 }
                 Ok(Some(p))
             }
@@ -265,10 +269,23 @@ pub fn verify_request(headers: &HeaderMap, did: &str) -> Result<ProofGuard, AppE
 }
 
 fn reject_error(v: &Verifier, reason: &str) -> AppError {
-    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired(format!(
-        "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
-        v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
-    ))
+    AppError::IcaptchaProofRequired {
+        message: format!(
+            "iCaptcha proof required ({reason}). Solve a challenge at {} for level >= {} and resend with the {} header.",
+            v.url, v.required_level, PROOF_HEADER
+        ),
+        url: v.url.clone(),
+        level: v.required_level,
+    }
+}
+
+/// iCaptcha service url + required level for error responses, read from the
+/// initialized verifier (falls back to defaults if somehow uninitialized).
+fn url_and_level() -> (String, u32) {
+    VERIFIER
+        .get()
+        .map(|v| (v.url.clone(), v.required_level))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| ("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com".to_string(), 3))
 }
 
 /// Mode-aware decision. Pure and IO-free (no DB; clock injected via `now`) so it

crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs

@@ -24,8 +24,14 @@ mod test_support;
 mod visibility;
 mod webhooks;
 
-use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use axum::extract::State;
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::response::IntoResponse;
+use axum::routing::get;
+use axum::{Json, Router};
 use clap::Parser;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio::net::TcpListener;
 use tokio::sync::watch;
@@ -38,6 +44,20 @@ use config::Config;
 use db::Db;
 use state::AppState;
 
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct DegradedState {
+    node_did: String,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+}
+
+/// Two independent counters with no cross-field invariant — atomics, not a
+/// lock, so the retry loop and the degraded handlers never contend.
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct DbStartupStatus {
+    attempts: AtomicU64,
+    next_retry_secs: AtomicU64,
+}
+
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     tracing_subscriber::fmt()
@@ -76,21 +96,101 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")
     );
     info!("╚══════════════════════════════════════════╝");
-    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
-    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "listening");
-
     // Process-wide shutdown signal. One sender lives in AppState (cloned
     // into every handler); main() keeps a clone and flips it on SIGINT
     // or SIGTERM. Tasks that hold a watch::Receiver get notified at
     // their next await point.
     let (shutdown_tx, _shutdown_rx_for_main) = watch::channel(false);
+    spawn_shutdown_signal(shutdown_tx.clone());
 
-    // Connect to PostgreSQL database
-    let db = Arc::new(
-        Db::connect(&config.database_url)
-            .await
-            .context("failed to connect to database")?,
-    );
+    info!(did = %node_did, "node identity");
+    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "binding HTTP listener");
+
+    // Bind HTTP once, before dependency initialization, and keep this socket
+    // for the life of the process. The degraded server accepts on a dup of the
+    // same socket, so the degraded→full handoff never closes the port: while
+    // the full server initializes, connections queue in the shared backlog
+    // instead of being refused.
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
+    let full_std_listener = listener.into_std()?;
+    let degraded_listener = TcpListener::from_std(
+        full_std_listener
+            .try_clone()
+            .context("failed to clone HTTP listener for degraded server")?,
+    )?;
+
+    // Metrics must stay observable during a database outage — the degraded
+    // window is exactly when dashboards need data — so this listener starts
+    // before the DB connects.
+    let metrics_handle = if !config.metrics_addr.is_empty() {
+        match spawn_metrics_server(&config.metrics_addr, shutdown_tx.subscribe()).await {
+            Ok(handle) => {
+                info!(addr = %config.metrics_addr, "metrics endpoint listening");
+                Some(handle)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(err = %e, addr = %config.metrics_addr, "failed to start metrics endpoint — continuing without");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        info!("metrics endpoint disabled (GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR not set)");
+        None
+    };
+
+    let db_startup = Arc::new(DbStartupStatus::default());
+    let (db_ready_tx, db_ready_rx) = watch::channel(false);
+    let mut degraded_handle = tokio::spawn(run_degraded_server(
+        degraded_listener,
+        node_did.to_string(),
+        Arc::clone(&db_startup),
+        db_ready_rx,
+        shutdown_tx.subscribe(),
+    ));
+
+    // Connect to PostgreSQL database. A transient outage or bad secret should
+    // not crash-loop the process and hammer the database provider; permanent
+    // misconfiguration surfaces through error-level logs and the /ready check.
+    let db = tokio::select! {
+        db = connect_db_with_retry(&config, Arc::clone(&db_startup), shutdown_tx.subscribe()) => {
+            match db {
+                Some(db) => db,
+                None => {
+                    // Shutdown requested while waiting for the database. The
+                    // degraded server only serves one-shot 503s — abort it
+                    // rather than drain, so a slow client can't stall exit.
+                    degraded_handle.abort();
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        degraded = &mut degraded_handle => {
+            if *shutdown_tx.borrow() {
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+            return match degraded {
+                Ok(Ok(())) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server stopped before database became ready")),
+                Ok(Err(err)) => Err(err.context("degraded HTTP server failed")),
+                Err(err) => Err(anyhow!("degraded HTTP server task failed: {err}")),
+            };
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Flip the degraded server into graceful shutdown, but do NOT await the
+    // drain: one slow in-flight request must not delay the full server, and
+    // the shared socket means there is no port gap to cover. The drain
+    // finishes (and logs) in the background.
+    db_ready_tx.send(true).ok();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        match degraded_handle.await {
+            Ok(Ok(())) => {}
+            Ok(Err(err)) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server exited with error"),
+            Err(err) => warn!(err = %err, "degraded HTTP server task failed"),
+        }
+    });
+    info!(addr = %config.bind_addr(), "database ready; starting full HTTP server");
 
     // Prune peer rows that point back at this node (stale self-loop entries)
     if let Some(public_url) = config.public_url.as_deref() {
@@ -145,16 +245,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         None
     };
 
-    // Do not follow redirects: this client fans out to peer-supplied URLs
-    // (sync trigger, profile/repo fetches). A peer answering `302 Location:
-    // http://127.0.0.1/` would otherwise bypass the announce-time public-URL
-    // check and turn the redirect into an SSRF.
-    let http_client = Arc::new(
-        reqwest::Client::builder()
-            .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
-            .build()?,
-    );
+    // Shared no-redirect HTTP client. See build_http_client for the SSRF rationale.
+    let http_client = Arc::new(build_http_client()?);
 
     let (ref_update_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::RefUpdateBroadcast>(256);
     let (task_event_tx, _) = tokio::sync::broadcast::channel::<state::TaskEventBroadcast>(256);
@@ -190,7 +282,79 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let repo_store =
         git::repo_store::RepoStore::new(config.repos_dir.clone(), tigris, db.pool().clone());
 
-    let rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
+    // Per-DID limiter for the creation endpoints. Keyed on the authenticated
+    // DID (attacker-varied), so bound its key set to cap memory.
+    let rate_limiter =
+        rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(10, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600), 200_000);
+
+    // Per-client-IP flood brake for the creation endpoints. The per-DID limiter
+    // above is bypassed by a DID farm (one throwaway did:key per repo), which is
+    // exactly how the recurring spam-repo floods get past both it and the
+    // iCaptcha gate. Keyed on the resolved client IP so a single-source flood is
+    // capped regardless of how many identities it mints. Sized well above any
+    // legitimate per-IP creation rate; GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT overrides, 0
+    // disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
+    let create_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(120);
+    let create_ip_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        create_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if create_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_CREATE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP creation rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Push-path flood brake: max git-receive-pack requests per client IP per
+    // hour (counts both the info/refs advertisement and the push POST). Sized
+    // for heavy agent automation while still stopping flood traffic (the June
+    // 2026 attack pushed several times per second per IP). GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT
+    // overrides; 0 disables. Bounded key set — the key is a client-influenced IP.
+    let push_limit = std::env::var("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(600);
+    let push_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        push_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if push_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PUSH_RATE_LIMIT=0 — per-IP push rate limiting disabled");
+    }
+
+    // Which forwarded header the edge is trusted to set. Default None (trust
+    // nothing, key on the socket peer). Fly nodes set GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY=fly;
+    // a node behind Caddy/NGINX sets it to x-forwarded-for.
+    let push_limiter_trust = rate_limit::TrustedProxy::from_env_value(
+        &std::env::var("GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY").unwrap_or_default(),
+    );
+    tracing::info!(trust = ?push_limiter_trust, push_limit, "push rate limiter configured");
+
+    // Peer-sync flood brakes, keyed on the resolved client IP (per-DID is useless
+    // here — a did:key farm self-registers). Two buckets so an unsigned notify
+    // flood can't drain the signed trigger caller's quota (#82). Bounded key sets
+    // (the key is a client-influenced IP); 0 disables each.
+    let sync_trigger_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        config.sync_trigger_rate_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    let peer_write_rate_limiter = rate_limit::RateLimiter::new_bounded(
+        config.peer_write_rate_limit,
+        std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
+        200_000,
+    );
+    if config.sync_trigger_rate_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            "GITLAWB_SYNC_TRIGGER_RATE_LIMIT=0 — /sync/trigger IP rate limiting disabled"
+        );
+    }
+    if config.peer_write_rate_limit == 0 {
+        tracing::warn!("GITLAWB_PEER_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT=0 — peer-write IP rate limiting disabled");
+    }
 
     // Initialize the iCaptcha proof gate (inert unless ICAPTCHA_MODE is set).
     icaptcha::init().await;
@@ -208,6 +372,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         machine_id,
         repo_store,
         rate_limiter,
+        create_ip_rate_limiter,
+        push_rate_limiter,
+        push_limiter_trust,
+        sync_trigger_rate_limiter,
+        peer_write_rate_limiter,
         shutdown_tx: shutdown_tx.clone(),
     };
 
@@ -237,37 +406,13 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         });
     }
 
-    // Spawn a task that flips the shutdown signal on SIGINT or SIGTERM.
-    // On Unix, both signals are handled. On Windows, only Ctrl-C is
-    // supported by tokio::signal::ctrl_c.
-    {
-        let tx = shutdown_tx.clone();
-        tokio::spawn(async move {
-            #[cfg(unix)]
-            {
-                use tokio::signal::unix::{signal as unix_signal, SignalKind};
-                let mut sigterm =
-                    unix_signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("install SIGTERM handler");
-                let mut sigint =
-                    unix_signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("install SIGINT handler");
-                tokio::select! {
-                    _ = sigterm.recv() => info!("SIGTERM received, shutting down"),
-                    _ = sigint.recv()  => info!("SIGINT received, shutting down"),
-                }
-            }
-            #[cfg(not(unix))]
-            {
-                use tokio::signal;
-                let _ = signal::ctrl_c().await;
-                info!("Ctrl-C received, shutting down");
-            }
-            tx.send(true).ok();
-        });
-    }
-
     // Periodic cleanup of expired rate limit entries + consumed-proof ledger
     {
         let rl = state.rate_limiter.clone();
+        let create_ip_rl = state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let push_rl = state.push_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let sync_trigger_rl = state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone();
+        let peer_write_rl = state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone();
         let db = state.db.clone();
         let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
         tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -275,6 +420,10 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
                 tokio::select! {
                     _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(300)) => {
                         rl.cleanup().await;
+                        create_ip_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        push_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        sync_trigger_rl.cleanup().await;
+                        peer_write_rl.cleanup().await;
                         let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
                             .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
                             .map(|d| d.as_secs() as i64)
@@ -294,9 +443,10 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     let router = server::build_router(state.clone());
-    let listener = TcpListener::bind(config.bind_addr())
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind to {}", config.bind_addr()))?;
+    // Re-register the socket bound at startup — same fd, so there was never a
+    // moment with the port closed between the degraded and full servers.
+    let listener = TcpListener::from_std(full_std_listener)
+        .context("failed to re-register HTTP listener with the runtime")?;
 
     info!("✓ node started — did:{}", node_did);
     info!("  repos dir: {}", config.repos_dir.display());
@@ -305,23 +455,6 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         &config.database_url.split('@').next_back().unwrap_or("?")
     );
 
-    // Optional Prometheus metrics listener on a separate port.
-    let metrics_handle = if !config.metrics_addr.is_empty() {
-        match spawn_metrics_server(&config.metrics_addr, state.clone()).await {
-            Ok(handle) => {
-                info!(addr = %config.metrics_addr, "metrics endpoint listening");
-                Some(handle)
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                warn!(err = %e, addr = %config.metrics_addr, "failed to start metrics endpoint — continuing without");
-                None
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        info!("metrics endpoint disabled (GITLAWB_METRICS_ADDR not set)");
-        None
-    };
-
     // Publish our DID record to the Kademlia DHT shortly after startup
     if let Some(p2p) = &state.p2p {
         let did_record = p2p::DidRecord {
@@ -399,19 +532,25 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     let grace = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.shutdown_grace_secs);
     info!(grace_secs = config.shutdown_grace_secs, "axum server ready");
 
-    let serve_result = axum::serve(listener, router)
-        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
-            let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
-            // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
-            // can begin draining.
-            while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
-                if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
-                    // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
-                    break;
-                }
+    // `into_make_service_with_connect_info` exposes the socket peer address as
+    // `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` so the push limiter can key on the real client
+    // when no trusted proxy header applies (see `rate_limit::client_key`).
+    let serve_result = axum::serve(
+        listener,
+        router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+    )
+    .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+        let mut rx = shutdown_signal_for_axum;
+        // Wait until the watcher flips to true, then return so axum
+        // can begin draining.
+        while !*rx.borrow_and_update() {
+            if rx.changed().await.is_err() {
+                // Sender dropped — treat as shutdown.
+                break;
             }
-        })
-        .await;
+        }
+    })
+    .await;
 
     // Server has stopped accepting new connections and drained in-flight
     // requests. Tear the rest of the system down.
@@ -425,12 +564,224 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+fn spawn_shutdown_signal(tx: watch::Sender<bool>) {
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use tokio::signal::unix::{signal as unix_signal, SignalKind};
+            let mut sigterm =
+                unix_signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("install SIGTERM handler");
+            let mut sigint = unix_signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("install SIGINT handler");
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = sigterm.recv() => info!("SIGTERM received, shutting down"),
+                _ = sigint.recv()  => info!("SIGINT received, shutting down"),
+            }
+        }
+        #[cfg(not(unix))]
+        {
+            use tokio::signal;
+            let _ = signal::ctrl_c().await;
+            info!("Ctrl-C received, shutting down");
+        }
+        tx.send(true).ok();
+    });
+}
+
+async fn connect_db_with_retry(
+    config: &Config,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Option<Arc<Db>> {
+    let initial_retry_secs = config.db_retry_initial_secs;
+    let max_retry_secs = config.db_retry_max_secs.max(initial_retry_secs);
+    let acquire_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_acquire_timeout_secs);
+    let attempt_timeout = std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.db_connect_timeout_secs);
+    let mut attempts = 0_u64;
+
+    loop {
+        if *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+            return None;
+        }
+
+        attempts = attempts.saturating_add(1);
+        db_startup.attempts.store(attempts, Ordering::Relaxed);
+
+        // Bound the whole attempt, not just the pool connect: migrations
+        // block on a cross-instance advisory lock, and an unbounded wait
+        // there would wedge this loop — no retries, no logs, no recovery.
+        // Timing out and retrying is safe; migrations are idempotent.
+        let attempt = match tokio::time::timeout(
+            attempt_timeout,
+            Db::connect(
+                &config.database_url,
+                config.db_max_connections,
+                acquire_timeout,
+            ),
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(result) => result,
+            Err(_) => Err(anyhow!(
+                "connect + migrate attempt exceeded {}s (GITLAWB_DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS); \
+                 is another instance holding the migration lock?",
+                attempt_timeout.as_secs()
+            )),
+        };
+
+        match attempt {
+            Ok(db) => {
+                info!(attempts, "database connection established");
+                return Some(Arc::new(db));
+            }
+            Err(err) => {
+                // A bad DATABASE_URL or rejected credentials won't heal on
+                // their own. Still retry (exiting would crash-loop and hammer
+                // the provider — and take liveness down with it), but log at
+                // error level and skip straight to the maximum backoff; the
+                // /ready health check is what surfaces this to deploys.
+                let permanent = is_likely_permanent_db_error(&err);
+                let retry_secs = if permanent {
+                    max_retry_secs
+                } else {
+                    database_retry_delay_secs(initial_retry_secs, max_retry_secs, attempts)
+                };
+                db_startup
+                    .next_retry_secs
+                    .store(retry_secs, Ordering::Relaxed);
+                if permanent {
+                    tracing::error!(
+                        attempts,
+                        retry_secs,
+                        err = %err,
+                        "database rejected our configuration (bad DATABASE_URL or credentials?) — retrying, but operator action is likely required"
+                    );
+                } else {
+                    warn!(
+                        attempts,
+                        retry_secs,
+                        err = %err,
+                        "database unavailable during startup; retrying"
+                    );
+                }
+
+                tokio::select! {
+                    _ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(retry_secs)) => {}
+                    changed = shutdown_rx.changed() => {
+                        if changed.is_err() || *shutdown_rx.borrow() {
+                            return None;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Errors that indicate misconfiguration rather than a transient outage: a
+/// malformed DATABASE_URL, or a server that answered and rejected us —
+/// Postgres error class 28xxx (invalid authorization) or 3D000 (database
+/// does not exist). Best-effort: an error that anyhow can't downcast back to
+/// sqlx just counts as transient.
+fn is_likely_permanent_db_error(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+    match err.downcast_ref::<sqlx::Error>() {
+        Some(sqlx::Error::Configuration(_)) => true,
+        Some(sqlx::Error::Database(db)) => db
+            .code()
+            .map(|c| c.starts_with("28") || c.starts_with("3D"))
+            .unwrap_or(false),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+fn database_retry_delay_secs(initial_secs: u64, max_secs: u64, attempts: u64) -> u64 {
+    // The exponent bound only keeps the u32 cast safe — max_secs is the real
+    // (operator-configurable) cap, and saturating math handles overflow.
+    let exponent = attempts.saturating_sub(1).min(63) as u32;
+    initial_secs
+        .saturating_mul(2_u64.saturating_pow(exponent))
+        .min(max_secs)
+}
+
+async fn run_degraded_server(
+    listener: TcpListener,
+    node_did: String,
+    db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>,
+    mut db_ready_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().ok();
+    let router = build_degraded_router(node_did, db_startup);
+    info!(?addr, "degraded HTTP server ready");
+
+    axum::serve(listener, router)
+        .with_graceful_shutdown(async move {
+            // wait_for resolves on predicate-true or sender-drop; either way
+            // this phase is over.
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = db_ready_rx.wait_for(|ready| *ready) => {}
+                _ = shutdown_rx.wait_for(|stop| *stop) => {}
+            }
+        })
+        .await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn build_degraded_router(node_did: String, db_startup: Arc<DbStartupStatus>) -> Router {
+    let state = DegradedState {
+        node_did,
+        db_startup,
+    };
+    // Everything answers 503 with the same body — including /health and
+    // /ready, so peer pings (which treat any 2xx /health as alive) and
+    // uptime monitors correctly see a node that cannot serve traffic.
+    // `/` additionally carries the node identity for probing peers.
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/", get(degraded_node_info))
+        .fallback(degraded_unavailable)
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+/// One source of truth for the degraded 503 body, sharing the error
+/// vocabulary with error.rs so clients see the same code/message for
+/// "database unavailable" regardless of which phase produced it.
+fn degraded_body(db_startup: &DbStartupStatus) -> serde_json::Value {
+    serde_json::json!({
+        "status": "degraded",
+        "database": "initializing",
+        "error": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+        "message": error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+        "db_attempts": db_startup.attempts.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+        "db_next_retry_secs": db_startup.next_retry_secs.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
+    })
+}
+
+async fn degraded_node_info(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    let mut body = degraded_body(&state.db_startup);
+    if let Some(obj) = body.as_object_mut() {
+        obj.insert("name".into(), "gitlawb-node".into());
+        obj.insert("version".into(), env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").into());
+        obj.insert("did".into(), state.node_did.clone().into());
+    }
+    (StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, Json(body))
+}
+
+async fn degraded_unavailable(State(state): State<DegradedState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    (
+        StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+        Json(degraded_body(&state.db_startup)),
+    )
+}
+
 /// Spawn a small axum router that exposes only `GET /metrics` on its own
 /// listener. Returns the JoinHandle so `main()` can abort it on shutdown.
 /// This is deliberately separate from the main router so the metrics port
 /// can be firewalled differently from the API port — bind to localhost
 /// or a private interface only.
-async fn spawn_metrics_server(addr: &str, state: AppState) -> Result<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
+async fn spawn_metrics_server(
+    addr: &str,
+    mut shutdown_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
+) -> Result<tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> {
     use axum::{response::IntoResponse, routing::get, Router};
 
     async fn metrics_handler() -> impl IntoResponse {
@@ -454,7 +805,6 @@ async fn spawn_metrics_server(addr: &str, state: AppState) -> Result<tokio::task
         }
     }
 
-    let mut shutdown_rx = state.subscribe_shutdown();
     let listener = TcpListener::bind(addr)
         .await
         .with_context(|| format!("failed to bind metrics listener to {addr}"))?;
@@ -515,7 +865,12 @@ async fn gossip_task(
         }
     }
 
-    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
+    // Reuse the shared no-redirect client for every gossip outbound call (the
+    // bootstrap announce POST and the periodic peer /health ping). Peer URLs are
+    // attacker-influenceable, so a 3xx to a private address must not be followed.
+    // Do NOT fall back to reqwest::Client::new(): its default follows redirects
+    // and would reintroduce the SSRF closed here (#93).
+    let client = state.http_client.clone();
     let my_did = state.node_did.to_string();
     let my_url = state.config.public_url.clone().unwrap_or_default();
 
@@ -590,13 +945,7 @@ async fn gossip_task(
                     Err(_) => continue,
                 };
                 for peer in peers {
-                    let url = format!("{}/health", peer.http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
-                    let ok = client
-                        .get(&url)
-                        .send()
-                        .await
-                        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
-                        .unwrap_or(false);
+                    let ok = ping_peer_health(&client, &peer.http_url).await;
                     let _ = state.db.mark_peer_ping(&peer.did, ok).await;
                 }
             }
@@ -610,6 +959,38 @@ async fn gossip_task(
     }
 }
 
+/// Build the shared node HTTP client used for every outbound fan-out (sync
+/// trigger, profile/repo fetches, gossip announce + peer pings).
+///
+/// No redirects: peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a private
+/// address must not be followed (SSRF guard, #78/#93). Do NOT replace with
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()` — its default follows redirects. Kept as a named
+/// builder so tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real client the node
+/// runs, not a hand-rolled equivalent.
+fn build_http_client() -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Client> {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
+        .build()
+}
+
+/// Ping a peer's `/health` endpoint and report whether it answered 2xx.
+///
+/// Takes the client by reference so callers supply the shared, no-redirect
+/// `state.http_client`. Peer URLs are attacker-influenceable, so a `3xx` to a
+/// private address must not be followed. Do NOT call this with a bare
+/// `reqwest::Client::new()`: its default follows redirects and would
+/// reintroduce the SSRF this guards against (#93).
+async fn ping_peer_health(client: &reqwest::Client, http_url: &str) -> bool {
+    let url = format!("{}/health", http_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    client
+        .get(&url)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map(|r| r.status().is_success())
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
     let key_path = config.resolved_key_path();
 
@@ -642,3 +1023,64 @@ fn load_or_create_keypair(config: &Config) -> Result<Keypair> {
         Ok(kp)
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod gossip_ssrf_tests {
+    use super::ping_peer_health;
+
+    // Build the client exactly as production does (super::build_http_client) so
+    // these tests bind the redirect guarantee to the real shared client the
+    // node runs. A regression that makes build_http_client follow redirects
+    // fails ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect.
+    fn production_http_client() -> reqwest::Client {
+        super::build_http_client().expect("failed to build production http client")
+    }
+
+    // A peer answering `/health` with a 302 toward an internal address must not
+    // be followed: the redirect target must never be requested (#93).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_does_not_follow_redirect() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let internal = server
+            .mock("GET", "/internal-metadata")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(302)
+            .with_header("location", &format!("{}/internal-metadata", server.url()))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(!ok, "a 302 must not count as a healthy peer");
+        // expect(0) is enforced only at assert time; this fails if the redirect
+        // was followed to the internal target.
+        internal.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_success_on_200() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _health = server
+            .mock("GET", "/health")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), &server.url()).await;
+
+        assert!(ok, "a 200 /health must count as a healthy peer");
+    }
+
+    // A transport error (nothing listening) must map to unhealthy, never a
+    // spurious healthy — the .unwrap_or(false) arm.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ping_peer_health_reports_unhealthy_on_connection_error() {
+        let ok = ping_peer_health(&production_http_client(), "http://127.0.0.1:1").await;
+        assert!(!ok, "a connection error must count as an unhealthy peer");
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -235,7 +235,11 @@ pub fn record_auth_failure(route: &str, reason: &str) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped}.
+/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped,
+/// rejected, deferred}. `rejected` is terminal and caused by a guard (a
+/// malformed slug, or a path resolving outside repos_dir); `deferred` leaves
+/// the row pending for a later pass, so a queue stalled on an operator
+/// condition is visible rather than looking idle.
 pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = SYNC_PROCESSED.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[status]).inc();

crates/gitlawb-node/src/p2p/mod.rs

@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ pub struct RefUpdateEvent {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     /// Repository identifier (owner/name)
     pub repo: String,
+    /// Full owner DID — added in #144 for display and storage; not yet
+    /// wired into the feed gate matcher. Optional for backward compat with
+    /// older peers that don't include it.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub owner_did: Option<String>,
     /// Git ref that changed (e.g., "refs/heads/main")
     pub ref_name: String,
     /// SHA before the push (all-zeros for new ref)
@@ -307,6 +312,7 @@ pub async fn start(
                                     node_did: event.node_did.clone(),
                                     pusher_did: event.pusher_did.clone(),
                                     repo: event.repo.clone(),
+                                    owner_did: event.owner_did.clone(),
                                     ref_name: event.ref_name.clone(),
                                     old_sha: event.old_sha.clone(),
                                     new_sha: event.new_sha.clone(),
@@ -432,3 +438,67 @@ pub async fn start(
 
     Ok(handle)
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ref_update_event_round_trip_with_owner_did() {
+        let event = RefUpdateEvent {
+            node_did: "did:key:zNode".into(),
+            pusher_did: "did:key:zPusher".into(),
+            repo: "zOwner/myrepo".into(),
+            owner_did: Some("did:key:zOwner".into()),
+            ref_name: "refs/heads/main".into(),
+            old_sha: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000".into(),
+            new_sha: "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa".into(),
+            timestamp: "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z".into(),
+            cert_id: None,
+            cid: None,
+        };
+        let json = serde_json::to_value(&event).unwrap();
+        // owner_did must be present in the serialized output
+        assert_eq!(json["owner_did"], "did:key:zOwner");
+        assert_eq!(json["repo"], "zOwner/myrepo");
+
+        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(json).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, Some("did:key:zOwner".into()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_no_owner_did() {
+        let old_json = serde_json::json!({
+            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
+            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
+            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
+            "cert_id": null,
+            "cid": null
+        });
+        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(old_json).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
+        assert_eq!(deserialized.repo, "zOwner/myrepo");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ref_update_event_backward_compat_null_owner_did() {
+        let with_null = serde_json::json!({
+            "node_did": "did:key:zNode",
+            "pusher_did": "did:key:zPusher",
+            "repo": "zOwner/myrepo",
+            "owner_did": null,
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "old_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+            "new_sha": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
+            "timestamp": "2026-07-02T12:00:00Z",
+            "cert_id": null,
+            "cid": null
+        });
+        let deserialized: RefUpdateEvent = serde_json::from_value(with_null).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(deserialized.owner_did, None);
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
 use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
-use axum::extract::Request;
-use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Request};
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
 use axum::middleware::Next;
 use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
 use tokio::sync::Mutex;
 
 use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
 
+/// Default ceiling on the number of distinct keys a limiter tracks. Bounds the
+/// limiter's own memory so a caller that can vary the key (many DIDs, or a
+/// spoofable IP header) cannot grow the map without limit.
+const DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS: usize = 100_000;
+
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct Window {
     timestamps: Vec<Instant>,
@@ -20,38 +26,98 @@ pub struct RateLimiter {
     state: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Window>>>,
     max_requests: usize,
     window: Duration,
+    /// Hard cap on tracked keys. When full, expired keys are evicted (at most
+    /// once per [`sweep_interval`](Self::sweep_interval), see below); if still
+    /// full, a request under a *new* key is rejected rather than inserted — so
+    /// the map can never exceed this bound and a rejected request never
+    /// allocates a new entry.
+    max_keys: usize,
+    /// Timestamp of the last inline capacity sweep. The eviction scan is
+    /// O(max_keys), so under a distinct-key flood (when the map sits at the
+    /// cap) running it on every miss would serialize all traffic behind a full
+    /// scan. Gating it to at most once per interval amortizes that cost; the
+    /// background [`cleanup`](Self::cleanup) loop still reclaims on its own.
+    last_sweep: Arc<Mutex<Instant>>,
 }
 
 impl RateLimiter {
+    // Retained for tests and callers that don't need a tight key bound;
+    // production limiters use `new_bounded`.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub fn new(max_requests: usize, window: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self::new_bounded(max_requests, window, DEFAULT_MAX_KEYS)
+    }
+
+    /// Like [`new`] but with an explicit cap on the number of distinct keys.
+    /// Production limiters keyed on client-influenced values (per-DID, per-IP)
+    /// set this so the limiter's own state cannot be turned into a
+    /// memory-exhaustion vector.
+    pub fn new_bounded(max_requests: usize, window: Duration, max_keys: usize) -> Self {
         Self {
             state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
             max_requests,
             window,
+            max_keys: max_keys.max(1),
+            last_sweep: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Instant::now())),
         }
     }
 
-    async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
+    /// How often the inline capacity sweep may run: at most once per second, or
+    /// once per window when the window is shorter. Bounds post-flood staleness
+    /// (a full map self-heals within one interval) without paying the O(max_keys)
+    /// scan on every capacity miss.
+    fn sweep_interval(&self) -> Duration {
+        self.window.min(Duration::from_secs(1))
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) async fn check(&self, key: &str) -> bool {
+        // max_requests == 0 means the limiter is disabled, not "block all".
+        if self.max_requests == 0 {
+            return true;
+        }
         let now = Instant::now();
         let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
-        // Look up before inserting so the common case (key already tracked)
-        // doesn't allocate a String per request.
-        if !state.contains_key(key) {
-            state.insert(
-                key.to_string(),
-                Window {
-                    timestamps: Vec::new(),
-                },
-            );
+
+        // Fast path: an already-tracked key never allocates and never grows the
+        // map, so it is unaffected by the key cap.
+        if let Some(window) = state.get_mut(key) {
+            window
+                .timestamps
+                .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+            if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
+                return false;
+            }
+            window.timestamps.push(now);
+            return true;
         }
-        let window = state.get_mut(key).expect("window just ensured");
-        window
-            .timestamps
-            .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
-        if window.timestamps.len() >= self.max_requests {
-            return false;
+
+        // New key. Enforce the cap BEFORE inserting so a flood of distinct keys
+        // cannot grow the map, and a rejected request never allocates an entry.
+        if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+            // Reclaim expired keys, but at most once per sweep interval — the
+            // scan is O(max_keys) and the map sits at the cap precisely during a
+            // distinct-key flood, so sweeping per miss would serialize traffic
+            // behind a full scan. Between sweeps a new key is simply rejected.
+            let mut last_sweep = self.last_sweep.lock().await;
+            if now.duration_since(*last_sweep) >= self.sweep_interval() {
+                state.retain(|_, w| {
+                    w.timestamps
+                        .retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) < self.window);
+                    !w.timestamps.is_empty()
+                });
+                *last_sweep = now;
+            }
+            drop(last_sweep);
+            if state.len() >= self.max_keys {
+                return false;
+            }
         }
-        window.timestamps.push(now);
+        state.insert(
+            key.to_string(),
+            Window {
+                timestamps: vec![now],
+            },
+        );
         true
     }
 
@@ -88,6 +154,136 @@ pub async fn rate_limit_by_did(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
     next.run(request).await
 }
 
+/// Which forwarded header (if any) the operator's edge is trusted to set. Only
+/// a proxy the operator controls may be believed; a raw client can put any
+/// value in `Fly-Client-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For`, so trusting them unconditionally
+/// lets a flooder rotate the header and never fill a bucket. Configured via
+/// `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub enum TrustedProxy {
+    /// No trusted proxy: ignore forwarded headers, key on the socket peer IP.
+    /// Safe default for direct/self-hosted nodes.
+    None,
+    /// Behind Fly's edge, which sets (and overwrites any client-supplied)
+    /// `Fly-Client-IP`.
+    Fly,
+    /// Behind a single reverse proxy (e.g. Caddy on the AWS image) that appends
+    /// the real client as the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` hop.
+    XForwardedFor,
+}
+
+impl TrustedProxy {
+    /// Parse `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`. Unknown/empty → `None` (trust nothing).
+    pub fn from_env_value(s: &str) -> Self {
+        match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+            "fly" | "fly-client-ip" => TrustedProxy::Fly,
+            "xff" | "x-forwarded-for" | "caddy" => TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor,
+            _ => TrustedProxy::None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn trimmed_nonempty(v: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let t = v.trim();
+    (!t.is_empty()).then(|| t.to_string())
+}
+
+/// Resolve the rate-limit key for a request. In a trusted-proxy mode the
+/// operator's edge header is preferred; when that header is missing or empty we
+/// fall back to the socket peer address rather than skipping the limiter (a
+/// malformed header must never disable the brake). With no trusted proxy the
+/// socket peer is always used and forwarded headers are ignored entirely.
+/// Returns `None` only when neither a trusted header nor a peer address is
+/// available (e.g. a synthetic test request with no `ConnectInfo`).
+pub fn client_key(
+    headers: &HeaderMap,
+    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    trust: TrustedProxy,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    let from_header = match trust {
+        TrustedProxy::None => None,
+        TrustedProxy::Fly => headers
+            .get("fly-client-ip")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+        // Rightmost hop = the value appended by the immediately-upstream trusted
+        // proxy. The leftmost hop is client-controlled and must not be trusted.
+        TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor => headers
+            .get("x-forwarded-for")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
+            .and_then(trimmed_nonempty),
+    };
+    from_header.or_else(|| peer.map(|p| p.ip().to_string()))
+}
+
+/// Per-client-IP limiter for the git push path, carrying the trusted-proxy
+/// policy. A newtype so it can live in request extensions (keyed by type)
+/// alongside the per-DID [`RateLimiter`]. Per-DID limits are useless against a
+/// push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the push path
+/// throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct IpRateLimiter {
+    pub limiter: RateLimiter,
+    pub trust: TrustedProxy,
+}
+
+/// Infallible extractor for the socket peer address from `ConnectInfo`. Yields
+/// `None` when the server was started without connect-info (e.g. `oneshot` in
+/// tests), so a handler never 500s on its absence — the limiter simply falls
+/// back per [`client_key`].
+pub struct PeerAddr(pub Option<SocketAddr>);
+
+impl<S: Send + Sync> axum::extract::FromRequestParts<S> for PeerAddr {
+    type Rejection = std::convert::Infallible;
+
+    async fn from_request_parts(
+        parts: &mut axum::http::request::Parts,
+        _state: &S,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        Ok(PeerAddr(
+            parts
+                .extensions
+                .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+                .map(|c| c.0),
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
+/// The shared 429 response for the per-IP flood brakes. Route-agnostic: this
+/// middleware now serves the push path AND the peer-sync routes, so the message
+/// stays generic (the offending path is recorded in the warn log below).
+pub fn too_many_requests() -> Response {
+    (
+        StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+        [("retry-after", "60")],
+        "rate limit exceeded — try again later",
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Throttle the git push path by resolved client IP. The socket peer address is
+/// read from `ConnectInfo` (see `into_make_service_with_connect_info` in
+/// `main`). Only skips the limiter when no key can be resolved at all.
+pub async fn rate_limit_by_ip(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let limiter = request.extensions().get::<IpRateLimiter>().cloned();
+    let peer = request
+        .extensions()
+        .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
+        .map(|c| c.0);
+
+    if let Some(limiter) = limiter {
+        if let Some(key) = client_key(request.headers(), peer, limiter.trust) {
+            if !limiter.limiter.check(&key).await {
+                tracing::warn!(key = %key, path = %request.uri().path(), "per-IP rate limit exceeded");
+                return too_many_requests();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    next.run(request).await
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -134,4 +330,279 @@ mod tests {
         let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
         assert!(state.is_empty());
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn zero_limit_disables() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new(0, Duration::from_secs(60));
+        for _ in 0..1000 {
+            assert!(limiter.check("k").await);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── key-cap / memory-bound (P2) ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn caps_tracked_keys_and_rejects_new_ones_when_full() {
+        // Cap of 2 distinct keys; generous request budget so rejection is due to
+        // the key cap, not the per-key limit.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 2);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await);
+        assert!(limiter.check("b").await);
+        // Third distinct key would grow the map past the cap → rejected.
+        assert!(!limiter.check("c").await);
+        // The map never exceeded the cap, and the rejected key was NOT inserted.
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 2);
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("c"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn known_key_unaffected_by_cap() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(60), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // fills the single slot
+        assert!(limiter.check("a").await); // same key still served
+        assert!(!limiter.check("b").await); // new key rejected — cap full
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn expired_keys_evicted_to_admit_new_when_full() {
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_millis(40), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("old").await);
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55)).await;
+        // "old" is now expired; a new key triggers inline eviction and is admitted.
+        assert!(limiter.check("new").await);
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert!(state.contains_key("new"));
+        assert!(!state.contains_key("old"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn capacity_sweep_is_amortized_within_interval() {
+        // The O(max_keys) eviction scan must not run on every capacity miss.
+        // With a 1s sweep interval, the resident (unexpired) key is never
+        // evicted by a burst of misses, so repeated new keys are all rejected
+        // without disturbing existing state.
+        let limiter = RateLimiter::new_bounded(100, Duration::from_secs(1), 1);
+        assert!(limiter.check("resident").await);
+        for i in 0..100 {
+            assert!(
+                !limiter.check(&format!("flood-{i}")).await,
+                "new key must be rejected while the single slot is held"
+            );
+        }
+        let state = limiter.state.lock().await;
+        assert_eq!(state.len(), 1, "no flood key was ever inserted");
+        assert!(state.contains_key("resident"));
+    }
+
+    // ── client_key / trusted-proxy resolution (P1 + P2) ─────────────────
+
+    fn headers(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        for (k, v) in pairs {
+            h.insert(
+                axum::http::HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()).unwrap(),
+                v.parse().unwrap(),
+            );
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    fn peer(s: &str) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
+        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn none_mode_ignores_headers_and_uses_peer() {
+        // Even a well-formed Fly header is ignored without a trusted proxy.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::None).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_trusts_fly_header() {
+        let h = headers(&[
+            ("fly-client-ip", "203.0.113.7"),
+            ("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"),
+        ]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("203.0.113.7")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fly_mode_empty_header_falls_back_to_peer_not_skip() {
+        // Empty Fly-Client-IP must NOT collapse traffic onto Some("") nor skip
+        // the limiter — it falls back to the real peer.
+        let h = headers(&[("fly-client-ip", "")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::Fly).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_uses_rightmost_hop_not_client_controlled_first() {
+        // Client prepends spoofed hops; only the rightmost (proxy-appended) is trusted.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", "9.9.9.9, 8.8.8.8, 198.51.100.9")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_mode_empty_leading_hop_does_not_disable_brake() {
+        // "X-Forwarded-For: ,1.2.3.4" — rightmost hop is used; never None-skips.
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", ",1.2.3.4")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("10.0.0.1:1"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("1.2.3.4")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_xff_falls_back_to_peer() {
+        let h = headers(&[("x-forwarded-for", " , ")]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            client_key(&h, peer("198.51.100.9:4000"), TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor).as_deref(),
+            Some("198.51.100.9")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trusted_proxy_parsing() {
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("fly"), TrustedProxy::Fly);
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("X-Forwarded-For"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            TrustedProxy::from_env_value("caddy"),
+            TrustedProxy::XForwardedFor
+        );
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value(""), TrustedProxy::None);
+        assert_eq!(TrustedProxy::from_env_value("garbage"), TrustedProxy::None);
+    }
+
+    // ── middleware 429 path ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    /// A minimal router with the push limiter layered over an OK handler,
+    /// driven via `oneshot`. `ConnectInfo` is attached to each request directly
+    /// (as the production make-service does) so the middleware resolves a peer.
+    fn ip_limited_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
+        axum::Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/o/r/git-receive-pack",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::OK }),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
+    }
+
+    async fn post_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
+            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
+            .uri("/o/r/git-receive-pack")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_returns_429_over_limit() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.7:5000".parse().unwrap();
+        // Two requests inside the budget, the third over it (shared Arc state).
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, peer).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn middleware_isolates_distinct_peers() {
+        let router = ip_limited_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let a: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.1:1".parse().unwrap();
+        let b: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.2:1".parse().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, b).await, StatusCode::OK); // independent bucket
+        assert_eq!(post_from(&router, a).await, StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
+    }
+
+    // ── creation-route layering: IP brake runs BEFORE auth ──────────────
+
+    /// A minimal stand-in for the creation route group: an inner "auth" layer
+    /// that rejects every request with 401 (as signature verification would for
+    /// an unsigned caller), wrapped by the per-IP creation limiter as the
+    /// outermost layer — exactly the ordering `server::build_router` applies to
+    /// `/api/v1/repos` et al. Lets us assert the security-relevant property
+    /// (flood traffic is braked before auth burns CPU) without a database, which
+    /// the full `#[sqlx::test]` route test in `api::repos` cannot cover in the
+    /// plain unit-test pass.
+    fn ip_limited_over_auth_router(limiter: IpRateLimiter) -> axum::Router {
+        async fn always_unauthorized(_req: Request, _next: Next) -> Response {
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED.into_response()
+        }
+        axum::Router::new()
+            .route(
+                "/api/v1/repos",
+                axum::routing::post(|| async { StatusCode::CREATED }),
+            )
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(always_unauthorized))
+            .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(rate_limit_by_ip))
+            .layer(axum::Extension(limiter))
+    }
+
+    async fn post_repos_from(router: &axum::Router, peer: SocketAddr) -> StatusCode {
+        use tower::ServiceExt;
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder()
+            .method(axum::http::Method::POST)
+            .uri("/api/v1/repos")
+            .body(axum::body::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        req.extensions_mut().insert(ConnectInfo(peer));
+        router.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap().status()
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn creation_ip_brake_rejects_before_auth() {
+        // A DID farm mints a fresh signature per repo, so the per-DID limiter
+        // never trips; the per-IP brake is what stops the flood. It must run
+        // outermost, ahead of auth, so a flood is rejected with 429 before
+        // signature verification — otherwise every request would reach (and pay
+        // for) auth and merely 401.
+        let router = ip_limited_over_auth_router(IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60)),
+            trust: TrustedProxy::None,
+        });
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "203.0.113.42:7000".parse().unwrap();
+
+        // First request passes the IP brake and reaches the (failing) auth layer.
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+        );
+        // Budget now exhausted: the IP brake short-circuits with 429 *before*
+        // auth — proving the limiter is the outermost layer.
+        assert_eq!(
+            post_repos_from(&router, peer).await,
+            StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+            "an exhausted IP must be braked with 429 before auth runs, not leak to 401"
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs

@@ -81,8 +81,19 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/tasks", get(tasks::list_tasks))
         .route("/api/v1/tasks/{id}", get(tasks::get_task));
 
-    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature + per-DID throttle
+    // ── Rate-limited creation routes — require HTTP Signature, plus a per-DID
+    // throttle AND a per-IP flood brake. The per-DID limiter (inner) caps a
+    // single identity; the per-IP limiter (outer) caps a DID farm that mints a
+    // fresh throwaway did:key per repo to slip past both the per-DID limit and
+    // the iCaptcha gate — the mechanism behind the recurring spam-repo floods.
+    // The per-IP layer wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first) so flood
+    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU, matching the
+    // push path.
     let limiter = state.rate_limiter.clone();
+    let create_ip_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
     let creation_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route("/api/v1/repos", post(repos::create_repo))
@@ -96,7 +107,9 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
             .layer(axum::Extension(limiter)),
         state.clone(),
-    );
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(create_ip_limiter));
 
     // ── Write routes — require HTTP Signature (no rate limit) ─────────────
     let write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -175,6 +188,14 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     // HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
     // helper signs requests with RFC 9421 signatures using the agent's keypair.
     let pack_limit = state.config.max_pack_bytes;
+    // Per-IP throttle wraps the auth layer (outermost = runs first): flood
+    // traffic is rejected before signature verification burns CPU. Per-DID
+    // limiting is deliberately NOT used here — a DID farm (one throwaway
+    // identity per repo, as in the June 2026 push flood) never trips it.
+    let push_limiter = rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.push_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    };
     let git_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
         Router::new()
             .route(
@@ -184,7 +205,9 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             .layer(DefaultBodyLimit::disable())
             .layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(pack_limit)),
         state.clone(),
-    );
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(push_limiter));
 
     // ── IPFS content-addressed retrieval and pin listing ──────────────────
     // `/ipfs/{cid}` carries `optional_signature` so `get_by_cid` sees the caller
@@ -238,7 +261,8 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route(
             "/api/v1/agents/{did}/bounties",
             get(bounties::agent_bounty_stats),
-        );
+        )
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature));
 
     // ── Profile routes (write — require HTTP Signature) ─────────────────
     let profile_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
@@ -267,15 +291,41 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .route("/api/v1/peers", get(peers::list_peers))
         .route("/api/v1/peers/{did}/ping", get(peers::ping_peer));
 
+    // /sync/trigger drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out + per-repo enqueue, so it
+    // ALWAYS requires a signature (both config modes) and carries a tight per-IP
+    // brake. A signature alone does not cap cost — a did:key farm self-registers
+    // (INV-10) — so the IP brake is a separate, load-bearing half. The brake is
+    // outermost (runs before signature verification burns CPU) and is keyed on the
+    // client IP before any DID is read, so DID rotation cannot bypass it.
+    let sync_trigger_routes = add_auth_layers(
+        Router::new().route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync)),
+        state.clone(),
+    )
+    .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+    .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+        limiter: state.sync_trigger_rate_limiter.clone(),
+        trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+    }));
+
+    // announce + notify keep their rolling-upgrade signature behavior (unsigned
+    // accepted until all peers upgrade), but both reach peer-write side effects —
+    // notify hits the same enqueue_sync sink as trigger — so they carry a per-IP
+    // brake too, on a SEPARATE bucket from trigger's, so an unsigned notify flood
+    // cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
     let mut peer_write_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/api/v1/peers/announce", post(peers::announce))
-        .route("/api/v1/sync/trigger", post(peers::trigger_sync))
         .route("/api/v1/sync/notify", post(peers::notify_sync));
     peer_write_routes = if state.config.require_signed_peer_writes {
         add_auth_layers(peer_write_routes, state.clone())
     } else {
         peer_write_routes.layer(middleware::from_fn(auth::optional_signature))
     };
+    let peer_write_routes = peer_write_routes
+        .layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
+        .layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
+            limiter: state.peer_write_rate_limiter.clone(),
+            trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
+        }));
 
     // ── Read routes — open for public repos ───────────────────────────────
     let read_routes = Router::new()
@@ -405,6 +455,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     let meta_routes = Router::new()
         .route("/", get(node_info))
         .route("/health", get(health))
+        .route("/ready", get(ready))
         .route("/api/v1/p2p/info", get(p2p_info))
         .route("/api/v1/stats", get(stats))
         .route("/api/v1/contracts", get(contracts_info));
@@ -424,6 +475,7 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         .merge(read_routes)
         .merge(peer_read_routes)
         .merge(peer_write_routes)
+        .merge(sync_trigger_routes)
         .merge(ipfs_routes)
         .merge(arweave_routes)
         .merge(meta_routes)
@@ -446,6 +498,26 @@ async fn health() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "status": "ok" }))
 }
 
+/// Readiness = "this node can serve real traffic", and every real endpoint
+/// depends on the database, so probe it rather than reporting a constant.
+/// The probe gets its own short bound so a wedged pool can't hang the health
+/// check for the full acquire timeout.
+async fn ready(State(state): State<AppState>) -> axum::response::Response {
+    let probe = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2), state.db.ping()).await;
+    match probe {
+        Ok(Ok(())) => Json(json!({ "status": "ready" })).into_response(),
+        _ => (
+            axum::http::StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            Json(json!({
+                "status": "degraded",
+                "error": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_CODE,
+                "message": crate::error::DB_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+            })),
+        )
+            .into_response(),
+    }
+}
+
 async fn node_info(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     let p2p_peer_id = state.p2p.as_ref().map(|h| h.local_peer_id.to_string());
     Json(json!({

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ pub struct RefUpdateBroadcast {
     pub pusher_did: String,
     pub node_did: String,
     pub timestamp: String,
+    pub owner_did: String,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
@@ -51,6 +52,35 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub repo_store: RepoStore,
     /// Per-DID rate limiter for creation endpoints (repos, issues, PRs)
     pub rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for the same creation endpoints. The per-DID
+    /// limiter above cannot brake a creation flood from a DID farm — one
+    /// throwaway `did:key` per repo means each DID makes a single create call
+    /// and never trips its own bucket. A valid iCaptcha proof does not cap this
+    /// either: the enforced level draws only machine-solvable deterministic
+    /// challenges (and the caller can pin the easy type), so a bot mints a fresh
+    /// DID, solves a proof, and creates a repo unthrottled. Braking on the
+    /// resolved client IP is what actually stops a single-source flood (same
+    /// rationale as `push_rate_limiter`). Keyed by `push_limiter_trust`.
+    pub create_ip_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP rate limiter for git-receive-pack. Per-DID limits cannot
+    /// brake a push flood from a DID farm (one throwaway DID per repo), so the
+    /// push path throttles on the resolved client IP instead.
+    pub push_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Which forwarded header (if any) the edge is trusted to set, for
+    /// resolving the push limiter's client-IP key. See `GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY`.
+    /// Node-wide; also keys the two peer-sync limiters below.
+    pub push_limiter_trust: crate::rate_limit::TrustedProxy,
+    /// Per-client-IP limiter for `POST /api/v1/sync/trigger` (tight). The route
+    /// requires a signature, but a signature does not cap cost (a did:key farm
+    /// self-registers), and its per-call cost is an O(peers) fan-out, so the IP
+    /// brake is a separate, load-bearing half. Its own bucket so an unsigned
+    /// `/sync/notify` flood cannot drain the signed trigger caller's quota.
+    pub sync_trigger_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
+    /// Per-client-IP limiter for the peer-write routes (`/peers/announce`,
+    /// `/sync/notify`) (generous). `/sync/notify` reaches the same `enqueue_sync`
+    /// sink as trigger and accepts unsigned requests from known peers, so it is
+    /// braked too; each peer's distinct IP gets its own bucket.
+    pub peer_write_rate_limiter: RateLimiter,
     /// Process-wide graceful-shutdown signal. Sending `true` causes every
     /// task that holds a `watch::Receiver` to exit at its next await point.
     /// Used by:

crates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 //! based on the repo's visibility rules with a fallback to the legacy
 //! `is_public` flag. It performs no I/O so it is exhaustively unit tested.
 
-use crate::db::VisibilityRule;
+use crate::db::{RepoRecord, VisibilityRule};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
 use unicode_normalization::UnicodeNormalization;
 
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -24,11 +25,12 @@ fn nfc(s: &str) -> String {
     s.nfc().collect()
 }
 
-/// True if `caller` is the repo owner (matches full did:key or its short form),
-/// mirroring the owner-match idiom in `api/protect.rs`.
+/// True if `caller` is the repo owner. Uses [`crate::api::did_matches`] so the
+/// owner check is representation-agnostic within `did:key` (full `did:key:z...`
+/// matches bare `z...` stored by mirror rows) while still denying cross-method
+/// collisions (`did:gitlawb:z...` vs bare `z...`).
 fn is_owner(owner_did: &str, caller: &str) -> bool {
-    let owner_short = owner_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_did);
-    caller == owner_did || caller == owner_short
+    crate::api::did_matches(owner_did, caller)
 }
 
 /// The match prefix for a glob: "/" stays "/", "/secret/**" becomes "/secret".
@@ -127,6 +129,105 @@ pub fn listable_at_root(
     visibility_check(rules, is_public, owner_did, caller, "/") == Decision::Allow
 }
 
+/// Whether a single `received_ref_updates` row (identified by its peer-supplied
+/// `row_repo` slug) should be shown to `caller` (None = anonymous) on the
+/// cross-repo ref-updates feeds (#112 GraphQL, #114 REST).
+///
+/// Pure and I/O-free: both call sites load the deduped local repo set and its
+/// visibility rules once per request and pass them in, so the gate logic lives
+/// here and visibility.rs keeps its "no I/O" property.
+///
+/// The slug is written verbatim from the inbound gossip/notify message, so it is
+/// untrusted input, not a canonical key. The decision is fail-closed by
+/// construction: the only KEEP paths are (a) a slug with no `/` (cannot name a
+/// local `owner/name` pair, so remote by definition), (b) all matched local
+/// records are readable, and (c) no local record matches (remote/gossip-only).
+/// Any local match the caller cannot read at root DROPs the row. There is no
+/// catch-all keep on unexpected state.
+///
+/// Slug/record owner keys are matched prefix-tolerantly (one is a prefix of the
+/// other), covering the exact short-key, the full `did:key:` form, and the
+/// URL-truncated 8-char form. Prefix over-match can only over-drop a genuinely
+/// remote row (fail-safe), never over-serve a private local one.
+///
+/// The live call sites are the #112 (GraphQL) and #114 (REST) feed handlers,
+/// added in the following units; exercised by the unit tests below meanwhile.
+pub fn ref_update_row_visible(
+    deduped: &[RepoRecord],
+    rules_by_repo: &HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>>,
+    caller: Option<&str>,
+    row_repo: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    // A slug with no '/' cannot name a local owner/name pair — remote by
+    // definition (same branch as "matches nothing local") → KEEP.
+    if row_repo.rsplit_once('/').is_none() {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // Match each local record with the shared slug predicate (one matcher, so
+    // this gate and the collector's quarantine drop cannot disagree about which
+    // rows a repo owns), then fail closed on any matched record the caller
+    // cannot read at root.
+    for record in deduped {
+        if !ref_update_row_names_repo(record, row_repo) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let rules = rules_by_repo
+            .get(&record.id)
+            .map(Vec::as_slice)
+            .unwrap_or(&[]);
+        if !listable_at_root(rules, record.is_public, &record.owner_did, caller) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Reached only if every matched local record is readable, or nothing local
+    // matched (remote/gossip-only). Both are the KEEP paths; there is no
+    // default-keep on unexpected state — an unreadable match already returned.
+    true
+}
+
+/// Whether `row_repo`'s peer-supplied slug names the local `record`. The single
+/// match predicate shared by the feed gate ([`ref_update_row_visible`]) and the
+/// quarantine hard-drop in the ref-update collector, so the two cannot diverge
+/// about which rows a repo owns — a second, drifting matcher is exactly the #134
+/// slug-collision class.
+///
+/// A record matches when the slug's `name` half is equal and one owner key is a
+/// prefix of the other (prefix-tolerant: exact short key, full `did:key:` form,
+/// and the URL-truncated 8-char form). Both the slug owner and the record owner
+/// are reduced to their last ':'-delimited segment before comparing. The node's
+/// own emitter builds the wire slug via `normalize_owner_key` (bare short key for
+/// a single-segment `did:key:`, the full DID for every other method; see
+/// api/repos.rs), but the stored slug is UNTRUSTED: a peer can broadcast a row
+/// under any owner form, including a method-stripped `user/name`. Reducing both
+/// sides to the trailing segment matches a repo's own rows whichever form keyed
+/// them, and still catches an attacker-planted short slug.
+///
+/// This intentionally diverges from `did_matches` / `DEDUP_CTE`, which strip only
+/// bare `did:key:` and keep other DID methods whole: those compare trusted,
+/// canonical DIDs, while this slug is untrusted. Applying the keep-whole rule here
+/// would fail open: a hostile `user/name` slug would not prefix-match a private
+/// `did:web:host:user` record and would leak. The price is a fail-SAFE over-match
+/// when a remote owner shares both a trailing segment and a repo name with a local
+/// private repo (negligible for full did:key ids; only did:web / truncated forms
+/// collide): it can hide a genuinely remote row, never serve a private one.
+pub fn ref_update_row_names_repo(record: &RepoRecord, row_repo: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some((owner_part, name)) = row_repo.rsplit_once('/') else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if record.name != name {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let row_key = owner_part.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(owner_part);
+    let record_key = record
+        .owner_did
+        .split(':')
+        .next_back()
+        .unwrap_or(&record.owner_did);
+    record_key.starts_with(row_key) || row_key.starts_with(record_key)
+}
+
 /// The subtree path globs that `caller` (None = anonymous) may NOT read, given
 /// the repo's rules. Whole-repo ("/") rules are excluded: a denied whole-repo
 /// read is handled by the 404 gate before a clone ever starts. Each remaining
@@ -299,6 +400,60 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn non_key_owner_bare_short_does_not_match() {
+        // A non-key DID owner (did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo) probed with the bare last
+        // segment (z6MkFoo) must NOT match — the old is_owner would return true
+        // via split(':').next_back(), which this PR tightens.
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo", Some("z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "bare short must not match a non-key DID owner"
+        );
+        // The full non-key DID still matches itself.
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(
+                &rules,
+                false,
+                "did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo",
+                Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"),
+                "/"
+            ),
+            Decision::Allow,
+            "full non-key DID still matches itself"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // #153 forward guard: is_owner must match across bare-key / full-did:key
+    // representations should someone revert to single-side normalize_owner_key.
+    #[test]
+    fn bare_owner_full_caller_allows_owner() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkOwner", Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"), "/"),
+            Decision::Allow,
+            "bare owner + full did:key caller must match (guard against single-side revert)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // #153 regression: cross-method DID must still be denied even when the
+    // trailing segment collides with a bare owner key.
+    #[test]
+    fn cross_method_did_denied_with_bare_owner() {
+        let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &[])];
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:gitlawb:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "cross-method DID must not match a bare did:key owner"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            visibility_check(&rules, false, "z6MkFoo", Some("did:web:z6MkFoo"), "/"),
+            Decision::Deny,
+            "did:web must not match a bare did:key owner"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn root_rule_allows_listed_reader() {
         let rules = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
@@ -403,6 +558,260 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    // ── ref_update_row_visible (feed gate) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+    fn rec(id: &str, owner_did: &str, name: &str, is_public: bool) -> RepoRecord {
+        RepoRecord {
+            id: id.into(),
+            name: name.into(),
+            owner_did: owner_did.into(),
+            description: None,
+            is_public,
+            default_branch: "main".into(),
+            created_at: Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: Utc::now(),
+            disk_path: format!("/srv/{id}"),
+            forked_from: None,
+            machine_id: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn rules_for(entries: &[(&str, &[VisibilityRule])]) -> HashMap<String, Vec<VisibilityRule>> {
+        entries
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(id, rs)| (id.to_string(), rs.to_vec()))
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_public_local_repo_kept_for_anon() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_local_repo_dropped_for_anon_kept_for_owner() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        // Anonymous → drop.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        // Owner (full DID) → keep.
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkOwner"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_root_rule_reader_reincluded() {
+        // Private repo (is_public=false) with a root rule granting a named
+        // reader. Delegates to listable_at_root: anon and non-reader denied,
+        // named reader allowed.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", OWNER, "widget", false)];
+        let root = [rule("/", VisibilityMode::A, &["did:key:z6MkFriend"])];
+        let rules = rules_for(&[("r1", &root)]);
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkStranger"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            Some("did:key:z6MkFriend"),
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_alias_full_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Owner stored full-DID; slug also carries the full-DID form. Still
+        // matches (row_key normalizes to the short key) → drop. Round 1's
+        // string-match would have leaked this.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABC", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:key:zABC/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_truncated_key_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Slug carries an 8-char URL-truncated prefix of the owner key; still
+        // matches via prefix tolerance → drop. Round 2's get_repo path leaked.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:zABCDEFGH", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zABCDEF/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_mirror_coexistence_private_canonical_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // Pure-level mirror-coexistence: the deduped set contains only the
+        // private canonical record for (owner,name). A matching slug drops for
+        // anon. (DB-level dedup survivor property is pinned separately.)
+        let deduped = [rec("uuid-canonical", "did:key:z6Mkwbud", "nipmod", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6Mkwbud/nipmod"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // Slug "/name": empty owner_part → row_key "" → starts_with("") matches
+        // every same-named record. Fail-safe pin for a private repo.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_one_char_owner_slug_matches_and_drops() {
+        // 1-char owner prefix that the private repo's key starts with → match.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "z/widget"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_remote_slug_no_match_kept() {
+        // Different owner key, no prefix relation → no local match → keep.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "zZZZOTHER/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_private_didweb_short_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private did:web repo must drop its row for anon when the slug arrives
+        // in the short `{last-segment}/{name}` form. Post-#141 the emitter no longer
+        // produces this form for did:web (normalize_owner_key keeps the full DID),
+        // so this is the untrusted/crafted variant a peer can broadcast; the full-DID
+        // variant the emitter now sends is covered by the next test. A did:key-aware
+        // (keep-whole) rule would fail to match `alice` against `did:web:host:alice`
+        // and leak.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:alice", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "alice/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_dropped_for_anon() {
+        // A private repo owned by a multi-segment DID must also fail closed under
+        // the full-DID slug form. Post-#141 this IS the form the emitter broadcasts
+        // (normalize_owner_key keeps non-did:key methods whole), and a peer can craft
+        // it too. The gate drops it: both sides reduce to the last ':' segment
+        // ("user"), so they match. Fail-safe regardless of which form keyed the row.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_multi_segment_did_slug_kept_for_public() {
+        // Symmetric keep-side: a PUBLIC multi-segment-DID repo's row must still be
+        // returned to anon after the last-':'-segment normalization — guards
+        // against a regression that over-drops legitimate did:web rows.
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:web:host:user", "widget", true)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "did:web:host:user/widget"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_malformed_slug_no_slash_kept_no_panic() {
+        let deduped = [rec("r1", "did:key:z6MkOwner", "widget", false)];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "noslug"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn feed_empty_deduped_set_keeps_any_slug() {
+        let deduped: [RepoRecord; 0] = [];
+        let rules = HashMap::new();
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(
+            &deduped,
+            &rules,
+            None,
+            "z6MkOwner/widget"
+        ));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_visible(&deduped, &rules, None, "anything"));
+    }
+
+    // The shared slug matcher underpinning both the feed gate and the collector's
+    // quarantine drop: it must recognize a repo's own row across every owner-DID
+    // form (bare short key, full did:key, URL-truncated prefix) and must not
+    // over-match a different name or an unrelated owner. The quarantine drop calls
+    // this directly, so its match contract is load-bearing for withholding a
+    // quarantined mirror from a caller who matches the mirror's owner_did.
+    #[test]
+    fn names_repo_matches_owner_forms_and_rejects_mismatches() {
+        // Bare short owner key (the form upsert_mirror_repo stores).
+        let bare = rec("m", "z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Full did:key owner; the short-segment slug still matches via last-segment.
+        let full = rec("c", "did:key:z6MkQuar", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&full, "did:key:z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // URL-truncated 8-char prefix slug → prefix-tolerant match.
+        let long = rec("l", "did:key:z6MkQuarLONGKEY", "secret", false);
+        assert!(ref_update_row_names_repo(&long, "z6MkQuar/secret"));
+        // Different name, different owner, and no-slash → no match.
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkQuar/other"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "z6MkOther/secret"));
+        assert!(!ref_update_row_names_repo(&bare, "noslash"));
+    }
+
     // #101: a deny rule must withhold a path that denotes the same characters in
     // a different Unicode normalization form. Without NFC normalization at the
     // matcher seam, an NFC-authored rule byte-compares unequal to an NFD-stored

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 
 [dependencies]
 gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+icaptcha-client = { path = "../icaptcha-client" }
+base64 = { workspace = true }
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }

crates/gl/src/bounty.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
+fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
+    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
+}
+
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct BountyArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -49,6 +53,8 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         status: Option<String>,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show details of a specific bounty
     Show {
@@ -56,6 +62,8 @@ pub enum BountyCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Claim an open bounty
     Claim {
@@ -121,8 +129,13 @@ pub async fn run(args: BountyArgs) -> Result<()> {
             node,
             dir,
         } => cmd_create(repo, title, amount, issue, tx_hash, deadline, node, dir).await,
-        BountyCmd::List { repo, status, node } => cmd_list(repo, status, node).await,
-        BountyCmd::Show { id, node } => cmd_show(id, node).await,
+        BountyCmd::List {
+            repo,
+            status,
+            node,
+            dir,
+        } => cmd_list(repo, status, node, dir).await,
+        BountyCmd::Show { id, node, dir } => cmd_show(id, node, dir).await,
         BountyCmd::Claim {
             id,
             wallet,
@@ -192,8 +205,13 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+async fn cmd_list(
+    repo: Option<String>,
+    status: Option<String>,
+    node: String,
+    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
 
     let url = if let Some(ref repo) = repo {
         let (owner, name) = repo
@@ -214,7 +232,7 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) ->
     };
 
     let resp = client
-        .get(&url)
+        .get_authed(&url)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -237,9 +255,9 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: Option<String>, status: Option<String>, node: String) ->
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let resp = client.get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
+    let resp = client.get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}")).await?;
 
     let status = resp.status();
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -462,7 +480,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list(None, None, server.url()).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(None, None, server.url(), None).await.unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -506,7 +524,7 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url())
+        let err = cmd_show("nonexistent".to_string(), server.url(), None)
             .await
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"));

crates/gl/src/cert.rs

@@ -5,10 +5,15 @@
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
+fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
+    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
+}
+
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct CertArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -23,6 +28,8 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Show a specific ref certificate and verify its signature
     Show {
@@ -32,28 +39,51 @@ pub enum CertCmd {
         id: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
+        /// Exit non-zero unless the Ed25519 signature verifies AND the
+        /// issuing node matches the queried node (or --expect-node)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        verify: bool,
+        /// Expected issuing node DID for --verify. A valid signature alone
+        /// only proves the cert is internally consistent — signed by whatever
+        /// key it names — so --verify also anchors the issuer to a DID you
+        /// trust: this value when given, else the queried node's DID.
+        #[arg(long, requires = "verify")]
+        expect_node: Option<String>,
     },
 }
 
 pub async fn run(args: CertArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        CertCmd::List { repo, node } => cmd_list(repo, node).await,
-        CertCmd::Show { repo, id, node } => cmd_show(repo, id, node).await,
+        CertCmd::List { repo, node, dir } => cmd_list(repo, node, dir).await,
+        CertCmd::Show {
+            repo,
+            id,
+            node,
+            dir,
+            verify,
+            expect_node,
+        } => cmd_show(repo, id, node, dir, verify, expect_node).await,
     }
 }
 
 /// Resolve "repo" into (owner, name) using the caller's DID when no slash is given.
-async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+async fn resolve_repo(
+    repo: &str,
+    node: &str,
+    dir: Option<&std::path::Path>,
+) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     if let Some((owner, name)) = repo.split_once('/') {
         Ok((owner.to_string(), name.to_string()))
     } else {
-        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(None) {
+        let short = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
             let did = kp.did().to_string();
             did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
         } else {
-            let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
+            let client = signed_client(node, dir);
             let info: Value = client
-                .get("/")
+                .get_authed("/")
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await
@@ -65,13 +95,13 @@ async fn resolve_repo(repo: &str, node: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
+async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .json()
         .await
@@ -96,16 +126,23 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node).await?;
+async fn cmd_show(
+    repo: String,
+    id: String,
+    node: String,
+    dir: Option<PathBuf>,
+    require_valid: bool,
+    expect_node: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let id = resolve_cert_id(&client, &owner, &name, &id).await?;
 
     // Fetch the certificate
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs/{id}");
     let resp = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("certificate not found")?;
@@ -130,47 +167,132 @@ async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
     println!("  Signature: {signature}");
     println!();
 
-    // Reconstruct the signing payload and verify
-    // Fetch the node's current public key to verify
-    let info: Value = client
-        .get("/")
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
-    let current_node_did = info["did"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
+    // Verify the Ed25519 signature: rebuild the exact canonical payload the
+    // node signed (see gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate) and
+    // check it against the public key embedded in the certificate's node DID.
+    // This proves the cert is internally authentic — signed by the key it
+    // names; the node-DID comparison below covers *which* node that is.
+    let repo_id = cert["repo_id"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
+    let verdict = verify_signature(
+        repo_id, ref_name, old_sha, new_sha, pusher, node_did, issued_at, signature,
+    );
 
     println!("Signature verification:");
-    println!("  Signing payload would be:");
-    println!("    {{\"repo_id\": ..., \"ref\": \"{ref_name}\", \"old\": \"{old_sha}\",");
-    println!("      \"new\": \"{new_sha}\", \"pusher\": \"{pusher}\",");
-    println!("      \"node\": \"{node_did}\", \"ts\": \"{issued_at}\"}}");
-    println!();
-
-    if current_node_did == node_did {
-        println!("  Node DID matches current node. Signature is an Ed25519/base64url value.");
-        println!("  To verify offline, use the node's Ed25519 public key derived from:");
-        println!("    did:key → {node_did}");
-    } else {
-        println!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match");
-        println!("           current node DID ({current_node_did}).");
-        println!("           This certificate was issued by a different node.");
+    match &verdict {
+        Ok(()) => {
+            println!(
+                "  VALID — Ed25519 signature verified against the key the certificate names ({node_did})"
+            );
+        }
+        Err(reason) => {
+            println!("  INVALID — {reason}");
+        }
     }
 
-    println!();
-    println!("  Signature (base64url): {signature}");
+    // Contextual only — the verdict above stands on its own, so a node-info
+    // hiccup here must not turn a successfully displayed certificate into an
+    // error exit.
+    let current_node_did = match client.get("/").await {
+        Ok(resp) => resp
+            .json::<Value>()
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|info| info["did"].as_str().map(str::to_string)),
+        Err(_) => None,
+    };
+    match current_node_did.as_deref() {
+        Some(current) if current == node_did => {
+            println!("  Issuing node DID matches the node being queried.");
+        }
+        Some(current) => {
+            println!("  WARNING: Certificate node DID ({node_did}) does not match");
+            println!("           current node DID ({current}).");
+            println!("           This certificate was issued by a different node.");
+        }
+        None => {
+            println!("  NOTE: could not fetch current node info — skipping node-DID comparison.");
+        }
+    }
+
+    if require_valid {
+        if let Err(reason) = verdict {
+            anyhow::bail!("certificate signature did not verify: {reason}");
+        }
+        // A valid signature proves internal consistency only: the payload was
+        // signed by whatever key the certificate itself names. A hostile
+        // source can mint a keypair, put its DID in node_did, and self-sign.
+        // --verify therefore also anchors the issuer to a trusted DID:
+        // --expect-node when given, else the DID of the node being queried.
+        let expected = expect_node.as_deref().or(current_node_did.as_deref());
+        match expected {
+            Some(expected) if expected == node_did => {}
+            Some(expected) => anyhow::bail!(
+                "certificate is signed by {node_did}, but the expected issuer is {expected} — \
+                 a valid signature alone proves internal consistency, not a trusted issuer"
+            ),
+            None => anyhow::bail!(
+                "cannot anchor the issuer: node info is unreachable and no --expect-node was given"
+            ),
+        }
+    }
 
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Rebuild the node's canonical signing payload (field order must match
+/// gitlawb-node/src/cert.rs::issue_ref_certificate exactly) and verify the
+/// certificate's Ed25519 signature against the key embedded in `node_did`.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+fn verify_signature(
+    repo_id: &str,
+    ref_name: &str,
+    old_sha: &str,
+    new_sha: &str,
+    pusher: &str,
+    node_did: &str,
+    issued_at: &str,
+    signature_b64: &str,
+) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
+    use base64::{engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD, Engine};
+    use std::str::FromStr;
+
+    let payload = serde_json::json!({
+        "repo_id": repo_id,
+        "ref":     ref_name,
+        "old":     old_sha,
+        "new":     new_sha,
+        "pusher":  pusher,
+        "node":    node_did,
+        "ts":      issued_at,
+    });
+    let payload_bytes =
+        serde_json::to_vec(&payload).map_err(|e| format!("could not serialize payload: {e}"))?;
+
+    let did =
+        gitlawb_core::did::Did::from_str(node_did).map_err(|e| format!("bad node DID: {e}"))?;
+    let verifying_key = did
+        .to_verifying_key()
+        .map_err(|e| format!("cannot derive a public key from {node_did}: {e}"))?;
+
+    let sig_vec = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+        .decode(signature_b64)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("signature is not valid base64url: {e}"))?;
+    let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = sig_vec
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| "signature is not 64 bytes".to_string())?;
+
+    gitlawb_core::identity::verify(&verifying_key, &payload_bytes, &sig_bytes)
+        .map_err(|_| "Ed25519 signature does not match the signed payload".to_string())
+}
+
 async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str) -> Result<String> {
     if id.len() >= 36 {
         return Ok(id.to_string());
     }
 
-    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs");
+    let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/certs?prefix={id}");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .error_for_status()
         .context("failed to list certificates")?
@@ -182,7 +304,6 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
     let matches: Vec<String> = certs
         .iter()
         .filter_map(|cert| cert["id"].as_str())
-        .filter(|cert_id| cert_id.starts_with(id))
         .map(ToString::to_string)
         .collect();
 
@@ -192,3 +313,88 @@ async fn resolve_cert_id(client: &NodeClient, owner: &str, name: &str, id: &str)
         _ => anyhow::bail!("certificate prefix {id} matches multiple certificates"),
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Pins gl's payload reconstruction to the frozen canonical byte form the
+    /// node signs (default serde_json maps = alphabetically ordered keys). If
+    /// serialization drifts — a field added, or a preserve_order feature
+    /// landing anywhere in the workspace (feature unification flips every
+    /// crate at once) — this literal stops matching and the test fails,
+    /// instead of every real certificate silently rendering INVALID.
+    #[test]
+    fn payload_serialization_matches_frozen_canonical_form() {
+        let payload = serde_json::json!({
+            "repo_id": "repo-1",
+            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
+            "old":     "oldsha",
+            "new":     "newsha",
+            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            "node":    "did:key:z6MkNode",
+            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+        });
+        let frozen = concat!(
+            r#"{"new":"newsha","node":"did:key:z6MkNode","old":"oldsha","#,
+            r#""pusher":"did:key:z6MkPusher","ref":"refs/heads/main","#,
+            r#""repo_id":"repo-1","ts":"2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00"}"#,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::to_string(&payload).unwrap(), frozen);
+    }
+
+    /// Signing exactly as the node does must round-trip through
+    /// verify_signature; any field tampering must fail it.
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_signature_round_trip_and_tamper() {
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        let node_did = kp.did().as_str().to_string();
+
+        let payload = serde_json::json!({
+            "repo_id": "repo-1",
+            "ref":     "refs/heads/main",
+            "old":     "0".repeat(40),
+            "new":     "a".repeat(40),
+            "pusher":  "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            "node":    node_did,
+            "ts":      "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+        });
+        let sig = kp.sign_b64(&serde_json::to_vec(&payload).unwrap());
+
+        let ok = verify_signature(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            &"a".repeat(40),
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+            &sig,
+        );
+        assert!(ok.is_ok(), "expected valid signature, got: {ok:?}");
+
+        let tampered = verify_signature(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            &"b".repeat(40), // new_sha changed after signing
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+            &sig,
+        );
+        assert!(tampered.is_err(), "tampered payload must not verify");
+
+        let garbage = verify_signature(
+            "repo-1",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            &"a".repeat(40),
+            "did:key:z6MkPusher",
+            &node_did,
+            "2026-07-22T00:00:00+00:00",
+            "not-base64url!!!",
+        );
+        assert!(garbage.is_err(), "malformed signature must not verify");
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/doctor.rs

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 
 const PUBLIC_NODE: &str = "https://node.gitlawb.com";
+const GITHUB_API_BASE: &str = "https://api.github.com";
 
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct DoctorArgs {
@@ -141,18 +142,20 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 3. GITLAWB_NODE env var ───────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::env::var("GITLAWB_NODE") {
-        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() && !v.contains("127.0.0.1") && !v.contains("localhost") => {
-            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
-        }
-        Ok(v) if v.contains("127.0.0.1") || v.contains("localhost") => {
-            checks.push(Check::fail(
+        // A loopback host is a legitimate setup (self-hosted node, dev
+        // harness) — the connectivity check below fails loudly if it is not
+        // actually reachable, so don't red-flag the configuration itself.
+        Ok(v) if is_loopback_url(&v) => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
                 format!(
-                    "set to local address ({v}) — git push/clone will fail against remote nodes"
+                    "{v} (local node — intentional for self-hosting/dev; unset to target the public network)"
                 ),
-                "export GITLAWB_NODE=https://node.gitlawb.com",
             ));
         }
+        Ok(v) if !v.is_empty() => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass("GITLAWB_NODE", v.to_string()));
+        }
         _ => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
                 "GITLAWB_NODE",
@@ -174,6 +177,19 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
                 "node",
                 format!("{} — v{version} ({short_did}…)", args.node),
             ));
+            // Capability drift: a node newer than this CLI may require features
+            // (RFC 9421 signing, iCaptcha) the CLI doesn't speak.
+            let gl_ver = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
+            if version != "?" && is_newer(version, gl_ver) {
+                checks.push(Check::warn(
+                    "gl version",
+                    format!(
+                        "node is v{version} but gl is v{gl_ver} — your CLI may be missing \
+                         features (signing / iCaptcha) this node requires"
+                    ),
+                    "upgrade gl: curl -sSf https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh",
+                ));
+            }
         }
         Ok(resp) => {
             checks.push(Check::fail(
@@ -191,6 +207,31 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
+    // ── 4b. iCaptcha capability ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // Gated writes (repo create / register / fork) auto-solve a challenge at the
+    // iCaptcha service; check it's reachable so the failure mode is obvious.
+    let icaptcha_url = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_URL.to_string());
+    match NodeClient::new(&icaptcha_url, None).get("/v1/pubkey").await {
+        Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
+            checks.push(Check::pass("iCaptcha", format!("{icaptcha_url} reachable")));
+        }
+        Ok(resp) => {
+            checks.push(Check::warn(
+                "iCaptcha",
+                format!("{icaptcha_url} returned HTTP {}", resp.status()),
+                "gated writes (repo create / register) may fail until iCaptcha is reachable",
+            ));
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            checks.push(Check::warn(
+                "iCaptcha",
+                format!("{icaptcha_url} unreachable: {e}"),
+                "set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL or check connectivity — repo create / register solve a challenge there",
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
     // ── 5. git-remote-gitlawb helper ──────────────────────────────────────
     // Use PATH lookup only — invoking the binary directly triggers git internals
     // that error with "fatal: not a git repository" outside of a git repo.
@@ -204,6 +245,15 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
         ));
     }
 
+    // ── 5b. shell alias shadowing ─────────────────────────────────────────
+    // oh-my-zsh's default `git` plugin aliases gl='git pull', which silently
+    // shadows this binary in every interactive zsh — the classic symptom is
+    // `gl` printing "fatal: not a git repository". Aliases beat PATH, so no
+    // install method can fix it; the user's rc file has to unalias.
+    if let Some(check) = check_shell_alias_shadowing(dirs::home_dir()) {
+        checks.push(check);
+    }
+
     // ── 6. git ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     match std::process::Command::new("git")
         .arg("--version")
@@ -225,7 +275,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 
     // ── 7. Version up to date ─────────────────────────────────────────────
     let current = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
-    checks.push(check_version(current).await);
+    checks.push(check_version(current, GITHUB_API_BASE).await);
 
     // ── Render ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     for check in &checks {
@@ -270,6 +320,83 @@ pub async fn run(args: DoctorArgs) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 /// Check if a binary name exists anywhere on PATH.
+/// True when the rc file contains a real `unalias` command naming `gl` —
+/// not a comment, and not a longer word like `unalias global`. Ordering
+/// relative to oh-my-zsh loading is not modeled (an unalias placed before the
+/// plugin loads would be ineffective); acceptable slack for a warning check.
+fn rc_unaliases_gl(rc: &str) -> bool {
+    rc.lines().any(|line| {
+        let line = line.trim_start();
+        if line.starts_with('#') {
+            return false;
+        }
+        line.split([';', '&', '|']).any(|cmd| {
+            // A trailing comment must not count: `unalias foo  # gl`
+            let cmd = cmd.split('#').next().unwrap_or("");
+            let mut tokens = cmd.split_whitespace();
+            tokens.next() == Some("unalias") && tokens.any(|t| t == "gl")
+        })
+    })
+}
+
+/// True when the URL's host is exactly a loopback address. Substring checks
+/// misclassify hosts like `localhost.example` or URLs with "localhost" in the
+/// path, so parse and compare the actual host.
+fn is_loopback_url(value: &str) -> bool {
+    reqwest::Url::parse(value)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|u| {
+            u.host_str()
+                .map(|h| h == "localhost" || h == "127.0.0.1" || h == "[::1]" || h == "::1")
+        })
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+/// Detect interactive-shell setups where an alias shadows `gl` (aliases beat
+/// PATH, so no install method can fix this). Best-effort heuristic over
+/// ~/.zshrc: an explicit `alias gl=`, or oh-my-zsh's `git` plugin (which
+/// ships gl='git pull'). Returns None when nothing suspicious is found or the
+/// rc file already contains an `unalias gl`.
+fn check_shell_alias_shadowing(home: Option<PathBuf>) -> Option<Check> {
+    let home = home?;
+    let rc = std::fs::read_to_string(home.join(".zshrc")).ok()?;
+    if rc_unaliases_gl(&rc) {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let explicit_alias = rc.lines().any(|l| l.trim_start().starts_with("alias gl="));
+    // Single-line `plugins=(git ...)` is the overwhelmingly common form; a
+    // multi-line plugins array slips past this heuristic, which is acceptable
+    // for a warning-level check.
+    let omz_git_plugin = home.join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git").exists()
+        && rc.lines().any(|l| {
+            let l = l.trim_start();
+            l.starts_with("plugins=")
+                && l.trim_start_matches("plugins=(")
+                    .trim_end_matches(')')
+                    .split_whitespace()
+                    .any(|p| p == "git")
+        });
+
+    if explicit_alias || omz_git_plugin {
+        let source = if explicit_alias {
+            "~/.zshrc defines `alias gl=`"
+        } else {
+            "oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull'"
+        };
+        Some(Check::warn(
+            "shell alias",
+            format!(
+                "{source} — interactive shells run that instead of this binary \
+                 (symptom: `gl` prints \"fatal: not a git repository\")"
+            ),
+            "echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc  (must come after oh-my-zsh loads)",
+        ))
+    } else {
+        None
+    }
+}
+
 fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
     std::env::var_os("PATH")
         .map(|paths| {
@@ -281,8 +408,9 @@ fn which_in_path(name: &str) -> bool {
         .unwrap_or(false)
 }
 
-/// Fetch the latest release tag from gitlawb/releases and compare to current version.
-async fn check_version(current: &'static str) -> Check {
+/// Fetch the latest release tag from Gitlawb/node (the actual release repo — see install.sh's
+/// `GITLAWB_RELEASE_REPO` default) and compare to current version.
+async fn check_version(current: &'static str, github_api_base: &str) -> Check {
     let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
         .user_agent(format!("gl/{current}"))
         .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
@@ -293,7 +421,9 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str) -> Check {
     };
 
     let resp = match client
-        .get("https://api.github.com/repos/gitlawb/releases/releases/latest")
+        .get(format!(
+            "{github_api_base}/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest"
+        ))
         .send()
         .await
     {
@@ -301,6 +431,13 @@ async fn check_version(current: &'static str) -> Check {
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (offline — could not check)")),
     };
 
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return Check::pass(
+            "version",
+            format!("v{current} (GitHub API returned HTTP {})", resp.status()),
+        );
+    }
+
     let body: serde_json::Value = match resp.json().await {
         Ok(v) => v,
         Err(_) => return Check::pass("version", format!("v{current} (invalid response)")),
@@ -344,6 +481,88 @@ fn is_newer(latest: &str, current: &str) -> bool {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    fn fake_home(zshrc: Option<&str>, with_omz_git: bool) -> tempfile::TempDir {
+        let home = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        if let Some(rc) = zshrc {
+            std::fs::write(home.path().join(".zshrc"), rc).unwrap();
+        }
+        if with_omz_git {
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(home.path().join(".oh-my-zsh/plugins/git")).unwrap();
+        }
+        home
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn alias_shadowing_flags_omz_git_plugin() {
+        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\n"), true);
+        let check = check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf()));
+        assert!(check.is_some(), "omz git plugin without unalias must warn");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn alias_shadowing_flags_explicit_alias() {
+        let home = fake_home(Some("alias gl='git pull'\n"), false);
+        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn alias_shadowing_silent_when_unaliased() {
+        let home = fake_home(
+            Some("plugins=(git z)\nsource $ZSH/oh-my-zsh.sh\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n"),
+            true,
+        );
+        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn alias_shadowing_ignores_fake_unaliases() {
+        // None of these actually free `gl` — the warning must survive them.
+        for rc in [
+            "plugins=(git)\n# unalias gl\n",          // commented out
+            "plugins=(git)\nunalias global\n",        // longer word
+            "plugins=(git)\nunalias foo  # gl\n",     // gl only in a comment
+            "plugins=(git)\necho unalias-gl-later\n", // not an unalias command
+        ] {
+            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
+            assert!(
+                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_some(),
+                "must still warn for rc: {rc:?}"
+            );
+        }
+        // Real unalias forms that do free it — all must silence the warning.
+        for rc in [
+            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl\n",
+            "plugins=(git)\nunalias gl 2>/dev/null\n",
+            "plugins=(git)\ntrue; unalias gl\n",
+            "plugins=(git)\nunalias glog gl gst\n",
+        ] {
+            let home = fake_home(Some(rc), true);
+            assert!(
+                check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none(),
+                "must be silent for rc: {rc:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn loopback_url_detection_is_host_exact() {
+        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://127.0.0.1:7545"));
+        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://localhost:7545"));
+        assert!(is_loopback_url("http://[::1]:7545"));
+        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://localhost.example"));
+        assert!(!is_loopback_url("https://node.gitlawb.com/localhost"));
+        assert!(!is_loopback_url("not a url"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn alias_shadowing_silent_without_signals() {
+        let home = fake_home(Some("plugins=(z)\nexport EDITOR=vim\n"), false);
+        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(home.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
+        let no_rc = fake_home(None, false);
+        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(Some(no_rc.path().to_path_buf())).is_none());
+        assert!(check_shell_alias_shadowing(None).is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_is_newer_minor_bump() {
         assert!(is_newer("0.2.0", "0.1.0"));
@@ -379,4 +598,50 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_which_in_path_missing_binary() {
         assert!(!which_in_path("this-binary-does-not-exist-gl-test-12345"));
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_version_queries_gitlawb_node_releases() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v9.9.9"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
+        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Warn));
+        assert!(check.detail.contains("v9.9.9"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_version_up_to_date() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"tag_name":"v0.1.0"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
+        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
+        assert!(check.detail.contains("up to date"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_version_http_error() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/repos/Gitlawb/node/releases/latest")
+            .with_status(403)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let check = check_version("0.1.0", &server.url()).await;
+        assert!(matches!(check.state, CheckState::Ok));
+        assert!(check.detail.contains("GitHub API returned HTTP 403"));
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/http.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
 //! Signed HTTP client for gitlawb API calls (async).
+//!
+//! Writes are signed with RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures. When the node gates a write
+//! behind iCaptcha (HTTP 403 `icaptcha_proof_required`, advertised via the
+//! `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers), the client transparently
+//! solves the challenge and retries the same signed request with the
+//! `x-icaptcha-proof` header — see `crates/icaptcha-client`.
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request;
 use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+use icaptcha_client::IcaptchaCfg;
+
+/// Max times we'll fetch a fresh proof and retry a 403-iCaptcha response
+/// (absorbs proof expiry / first-seen replay).
+const MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES: usize = 2;
 
 pub struct NodeClient {
     inner: reqwest::Client,
@@ -34,6 +45,15 @@ impl NodeClient {
             .with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
     }
 
+    /// GET that signs when a keypair is available; falls back to unsigned for public repos.
+    pub async fn get_authed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        if self.keypair.is_some() {
+            self.get_signed(path).await
+        } else {
+            self.get(path).await
+        }
+    }
+
     /// GET with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth, for owner-only read endpoints.
     /// Signs over the empty body (same shape the node verifies for signed reads).
     pub async fn get_signed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
@@ -52,63 +72,519 @@ impl NodeClient {
         req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
     }
 
-    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    /// GET that signs when an identity keypair is present and falls back to an
+    /// anonymous GET otherwise — for read-visibility endpoints, where a public
+    /// repo is readable anonymously but a private repo requires the owner/reader
+    /// to be authenticated. Mirrors the conditional signing of post/put/delete.
+    pub async fn get_maybe_signed(&self, path: &str) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
+        let mut req = self.inner.get(&url);
+        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, "GET", path, b"");
+            req = req
+                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
+                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
+                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
+        }
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("GET {url}"))
+    }
+
+    /// POST with JSON body + RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn post(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
-        let mut req = self
-            .inner
-            .post(&url)
-            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-            .body(body.to_vec());
-
-        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "POST", path, body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        }
-
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))
+        self.send_signed("POST", path, body).await
     }
 
-    /// PUT with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth (idempotent write).
+    /// PUT with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn put(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
-        let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
-        let mut req = self
-            .inner
-            .put(&url)
-            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
-            .body(body.to_vec());
-
-        if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "PUT", path, body);
-            req = req
-                .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
-                .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
-                .header("Signature", signed.signature);
-        }
-
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("PUT {url}"))
+        self.send_signed("PUT", path, body).await
     }
 
-    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 HTTP Signature auth.
+    /// DELETE with RFC 9421 signing + transparent iCaptcha solve/retry.
     pub async fn delete(&self, path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        self.send_signed("DELETE", path, body).await
+    }
+
+    /// Sign + send a write. On a 403 iCaptcha challenge (detected via the
+    /// `x-icaptcha-*` headers) solve it and retry the same signed request with
+    /// the proof header, up to [`MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES`]. Emits an actionable
+    /// hint on a 401 "not an agent" (the old-CLI / unregistered failure mode).
+    async fn send_signed(
+        &self,
+        method: &str,
+        path: &str,
+        body: &[u8],
+    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
+        let mut proof: Option<String> = None;
+        let mut attempts = 0;
+        loop {
+            let resp = self.send_once(method, path, body, proof.as_deref()).await?;
+            let status = resp.status();
+
+            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED
+                && resp
+                    .headers()
+                    .get("x-gitlawb-error")
+                    .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+                    == Some("human_detected")
+            {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "note: this node requires signed requests (RFC 9421). If writes keep \
+                     failing, your `gl` may be too old — upgrade it — or you're not registered: \
+                     run `gl register`."
+                );
+            }
+
+            if status == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN && attempts < MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES {
+                if let Some(cfg) = self.icaptcha_cfg(resp.headers())? {
+                    attempts += 1;
+                    proof = Some(obtain_proof(cfg).await?);
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            return Ok(resp);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Build, sign, and send one request, optionally attaching a proof header.
+    async fn send_once(
+        &self,
+        method: &str,
+        path: &str,
+        body: &[u8],
+        proof: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<reqwest::Response> {
         let url = format!("{}{}", self.node_url, path);
         let mut req = self
             .inner
-            .delete(&url)
+            .request(method.parse().expect("valid HTTP method"), &url)
             .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
             .body(body.to_vec());
 
         if let Some(kp) = &self.keypair {
-            let signed = sign_request(kp, "DELETE", path, body);
+            let signed = sign_request(kp, method, path, body);
             req = req
                 .header("Content-Digest", signed.content_digest)
                 .header("Signature-Input", signed.signature_input)
                 .header("Signature", signed.signature);
         }
+        if let Some(p) = proof {
+            req = req.header(icaptcha_client::PROOF_HEADER, p);
+        }
 
-        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("DELETE {url}"))
+        req.send().await.with_context(|| format!("{method} {url}"))
+    }
+
+    /// If `headers` describe an iCaptcha 403, build the solve config (binding the
+    /// proof's `sub` to our DID). Returns `None` for a non-iCaptcha 403.
+    fn icaptcha_cfg(&self, headers: &reqwest::header::HeaderMap) -> Result<Option<IcaptchaCfg>> {
+        let url = headers.get("x-icaptcha-url").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+        let level = headers
+            .get("x-icaptcha-level")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok());
+        if url.is_none() && level.is_none() {
+            return Ok(None); // not an iCaptcha challenge
+        }
+        let kp = self
+            .keypair
+            .as_ref()
+            .context("iCaptcha challenge requires an identity keypair (run `gl identity new`)")?;
+        Ok(Some(IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            kp.did().to_string(),
+            url.map(str::to_string),
+            level.and_then(|l| l.parse().ok()),
+        )))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Run the (blocking) iCaptcha solve loop off the async runtime.
+async fn obtain_proof(cfg: IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<String> {
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || icaptcha_client::obtain_proof(&cfg, None))
+        .await
+        .context("iCaptcha solver task panicked")?
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+    use mockito::Server;
+    use std::ffi::OsString;
+    use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
+
+    /// Serializes the two integration tests that touch the process-global
+    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL` / `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE` env vars so they
+    /// never race.
+    static ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
+
+    fn test_keypair() -> Keypair {
+        Keypair::generate()
+    }
+
+    fn headers_from_pairs(pairs: &[(&str, &str)]) -> reqwest::header::HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = reqwest::header::HeaderMap::new();
+        for (k, v) in pairs {
+            h.insert(
+                k.parse::<reqwest::header::HeaderName>().unwrap(),
+                v.parse::<reqwest::header::HeaderValue>().unwrap(),
+            );
+        }
+        h
+    }
+
+    // ── icaptcha_cfg ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_some_when_both_headers_present() {
+        let kp = test_keypair();
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp.clone()));
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[
+            ("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com"),
+            ("x-icaptcha-level", "3"),
+        ]);
+        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cfg.did, kp.did().to_string());
+        assert_eq!(cfg.level, 3);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_defaults_level_when_only_url_present() {
+        let kp = test_keypair();
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp));
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com")]);
+        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cfg.level, icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_LEVEL);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_defaults_url_when_only_level_present() {
+        let kp = test_keypair();
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(kp));
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-level", "5")]);
+        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cfg.level, 5);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_none_without_icaptcha_headers() {
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
+        let headers = reqwest::header::HeaderMap::new();
+        assert!(client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_returns_none_with_unrelated_headers() {
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("content-type", "application/json")]);
+        assert!(client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_errors_when_no_keypair() {
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", None);
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[("x-icaptcha-level", "3")]);
+        let err = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("identity keypair"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn icaptcha_cfg_ignores_unparseable_level() {
+        let client = NodeClient::new("http://localhost", Some(test_keypair()));
+        let headers = headers_from_pairs(&[
+            ("x-icaptcha-url", "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com"),
+            ("x-icaptcha-level", "not-a-number"),
+        ]);
+        let cfg = client.icaptcha_cfg(&headers).unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cfg.level, icaptcha_client::DEFAULT_LEVEL);
+    }
+
+    // ── send_once ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_once_attaches_proof_header_when_provided() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
+            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", "test.proof.token")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body("ok")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
+        let resp = client
+            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", Some("test.proof.token"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_once_omits_proof_header_when_not_provided() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
+            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body("ok")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
+        let resp = client
+            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_once_signs_request_when_keypair_present() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
+            .match_header("Signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("Signature-Input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("Content-Digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body("ok")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_once_does_not_sign_when_no_keypair() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/test")
+            .match_header("Signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("Signature-Input", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .match_header("Content-Digest", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body("ok")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
+        let resp = client
+            .send_once("POST", "/api/test", b"{}", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    // ── send_signed ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_signed_returns_non_icaptcha_403_without_retry() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"forbidden"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 403);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_signed_returns_first_response_on_success() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(201)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"status":"created"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_signed_handles_405_not_icaptcha() {
+        let mut server = Server::new_async().await;
+        let m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(405)
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"method not allowed"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 405);
+        m.assert();
+    }
+
+    // ── send_signed iCaptcha retry (full integration) ────────────────────
+
+    /// Set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL and GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE so the iCaptcha
+    /// client trusts a local mockito HTTP server, restoring any prior values on
+    /// drop so a test run launched with those variables keeps working.
+    /// Holds [`ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK`] for its lifetime so concurrent tests don't
+    /// race on the process-global env vars.
+    struct IcaptchaEnv {
+        _lock: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
+        prev_url: Option<OsString>,
+        prev_insecure: Option<OsString>,
+    }
+
+    impl IcaptchaEnv {
+        fn new(url: &str) -> Self {
+            let lock = ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
+            let prev_url = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
+            let prev_insecure = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE");
+            std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", url);
+            std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", "1");
+            IcaptchaEnv {
+                _lock: lock,
+                prev_url,
+                prev_insecure,
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Drop for IcaptchaEnv {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            match self.prev_url.take() {
+                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", v),
+                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL"),
+            }
+            match self.prev_insecure.take() {
+                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", v),
+                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE"),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Set up a mock iCaptcha server that responds to challenge + answer.
+    /// `hits` sets the expected call count for both endpoints so the test can
+    /// verify the solve loop was entered the correct number of times.
+    struct MockIcaptcha {
+        challenge: mockito::Mock,
+        answer: mockito::Mock,
+        _guard: IcaptchaEnv,
+        url: String,
+    }
+
+    impl MockIcaptcha {
+        async fn new(server: &mut mockito::ServerGuard, hits: usize) -> Self {
+            let url = server.url();
+            let guard = IcaptchaEnv::new(&url);
+            let challenge = server
+                .mock("POST", "/v1/challenge")
+                .with_status(200)
+                .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+                .with_body(
+                    r#"{"challengeId":"c1","type":"arithmetic","difficulty":1,"prompt":"What is 1 + 1?","token":"tk1"}"#,
+                )
+                .expect(hits)
+                .create_async()
+                .await;
+            let answer = server
+                .mock("POST", "/v1/answer")
+                .with_status(200)
+                .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+                .with_body(r#"{"status":"passed","proof":"mock.proof"}"#)
+                .expect(hits)
+                .create_async()
+                .await;
+            Self {
+                challenge,
+                answer,
+                _guard: guard,
+                url,
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_signed_solves_icaptcha_and_retries_to_success() {
+        let mut node = Server::new_async().await;
+        let mut icaptcha = Server::new_async().await;
+        let ic = MockIcaptcha::new(&mut icaptcha, 1).await;
+
+        let n1 = node
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_header("x-icaptcha-url", &ic.url)
+            .with_header("x-icaptcha-level", "3")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"icaptcha_proof_required"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let n2 = node
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .match_header("x-icaptcha-proof", "mock.proof")
+            .with_status(201)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"status":"created"}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let client = NodeClient::new(node.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
+        n1.assert();
+        n2.assert();
+        ic.challenge.assert();
+        ic.answer.assert();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn send_signed_returns_403_after_icaptcha_retries_exhausted() {
+        let mut node = Server::new_async().await;
+        let mut icaptcha = Server::new_async().await;
+        // MAX_ICAPTCHA_RETRIES = 2, so with every call returning 403 with
+        // iCaptcha headers the solve loop runs twice (2 challenge + 2 answer).
+        let ic = MockIcaptcha::new(&mut icaptcha, 2).await;
+
+        // The original + 2 retries = 3 node calls before the loop gives up.
+        let n = node
+            .mock("POST", "/api/register")
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_header("x-icaptcha-url", &ic.url)
+            .with_header("x-icaptcha-level", "3")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"icaptcha_proof_required"}"#)
+            .expect(3)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let client = NodeClient::new(node.url(), Some(test_keypair()));
+        let resp = client
+            .send_signed("POST", "/api/register", b"{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 403);
+        n.assert();
+        ic.challenge.assert();
+        ic.answer.assert();
     }
 }

crates/gl/src/init.rs

@@ -38,13 +38,23 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
     let git_dir = cwd.join(".git");
     if !git_dir.exists() {
         println!("Initializing git repository...");
+        // -b main: the push flow targets `main`; without it a fresh repo uses
+        // the user's init.defaultBranch (often `master`). Older git (<2.28)
+        // lacks the flag, so fall back to a plain init.
         let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
-            .args(["init"])
+            .args(["init", "-b", "main"])
             .current_dir(&cwd)
             .status()
             .context("failed to run git init")?;
         if !status.success() {
-            anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
+            let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
+                .args(["init"])
+                .current_dir(&cwd)
+                .status()
+                .context("failed to run git init")?;
+            if !status.success() {
+                anyhow::bail!("git init failed");
+            }
         }
     } else {
         println!("Git repository detected.");
@@ -165,9 +175,47 @@ pub async fn run(args: InitArgs) -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
 
+    // The hint must match the repo's actual state: with no commits yet, a bare
+    // `git push` fails with "src refspec ... does not match any" — exactly the
+    // trap a zero-to-push command must not set.
+    let has_commits = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args(["rev-parse", "--verify", "HEAD"])
+        .current_dir(&cwd)
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .status()
+        .map(|s| s.success())
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+    // symbolic-ref succeeds on a branch (including an unborn one) and fails
+    // on a detached HEAD — where guessing "main" could push the wrong ref.
+    let branch = std::process::Command::new("git")
+        .args(["symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD"])
+        .current_dir(&cwd)
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .output()
+        .ok()
+        .filter(|o| o.status.success())
+        .and_then(|o| String::from_utf8(o.stdout).ok())
+        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
+
     println!();
-    println!("Ready! Push with:");
-    println!("  git push gitlawb main");
+    match (branch, has_commits) {
+        (Some(branch), true) => {
+            println!("Ready! Push with:");
+            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
+        }
+        (Some(branch), false) => {
+            println!("Ready! Nothing is committed yet — commit, then push:");
+            println!("  git add -A && git commit -m \"initial commit\"");
+            println!("  git push gitlawb {branch}");
+        }
+        (None, _) => {
+            println!("Ready! HEAD is detached — create or switch to a branch, then push:");
+            println!("  git switch -c main");
+            println!("  git push gitlawb main");
+        }
+    }
 
     Ok(())
 }

crates/gl/src/ipfs_cmd.rs

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 //! Communicates with the gitlawb node to list pinned CIDs and retrieve git
 //! objects by their content-addressed CID.
 
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -21,6 +23,9 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
     List {
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Retrieve and display a git object from the node by its CIDv1
     Get {
@@ -33,19 +38,24 @@ pub enum IpfsCmd {
 
 pub async fn run(args: IpfsArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        IpfsCmd::List { node } => cmd_list(node).await,
+        IpfsCmd::List { node, dir } => cmd_list(node, dir).await,
         IpfsCmd::Get { cid, node } => cmd_get(cid, node).await,
     }
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let resp: Value = client
-        .get("/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to parse pins response")?;
+async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    // #134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth: sign the request with the
+    // caller's identity. On no identity, propagate load_keypair_from_dir's
+    // error (it already names `gl identity new`) rather than a bare 401.
+    let keypair = crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
+    let resp = client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
+        anyhow::bail!("node returned {status} for pins listing: {body}");
+    }
+    let resp: Value = resp.json().await.context("failed to parse pins response")?;
 
     let pins = resp["pins"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     let count = resp["count"].as_u64().unwrap_or(pins.len() as u64);
@@ -108,3 +118,121 @@ async fn cmd_get(cid: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Seed a keypair into a temp dir the way `load_keypair_from_dir` expects,
+    /// then return the dir handle (keeps it alive for the test's duration).
+    fn seed_keystore() -> tempfile::TempDir {
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        dir
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_signs_request_and_renders_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        // Happy path: signed GET to /api/v1/ipfs/pins carrying the RFC 9421
+        // signature headers, node returns a populated pins body.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00.123456Z"}],"count":1}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_empty_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_no_identity_errors_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Empty keystore dir: no identity.pem present.
+        let empty = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+        // The endpoint must never be hit when there is no identity.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(empty.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .expect_err("no identity should be an error");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("gl identity new")
+                || err.to_string().contains("no identity found"),
+            "error should name `gl identity new`, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_list_non_success_status_is_error_not_empty() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let keystore = seed_keystore();
+
+        // A signed request the node rejects (401) must surface as an error,
+        // not be silently parsed into an empty pin list.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(server.url(), Some(keystore.path().to_path_buf()))
+            .await
+            .expect_err("non-2xx status should be an error");
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("401"),
+            "error should mention the status, got: {err}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/issue.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
 use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 
+fn signed_client(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> NodeClient {
+    NodeClient::new(node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir).ok())
+}
+
 #[derive(Args)]
 pub struct IssueArgs {
     #[command(subcommand)]
@@ -215,10 +219,10 @@ async fn cmd_create(
 async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues");
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await?
         .json()
         .await
@@ -254,10 +258,10 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
 async fn cmd_show(repo: String, id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
     let path = format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues/{id}");
     let resp = client
-        .get(&path)
+        .get_authed(&path)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let status = resp.status();
@@ -347,10 +351,10 @@ async fn cmd_issue_comments(
     dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = signed_client(&node, dir.as_deref());
 
     let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&format!(
+        .get_authed(&format!(
             "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues/{id}/comments"
         ))
         .await?

crates/gl/src/mcp.rs

@@ -932,13 +932,33 @@ async fn call_tool(
 
         "webhook_list" => {
             let repo = args["repo"].as_str().context("missing 'repo'")?;
-            let owner = resolve_owner(&args, &client).await?;
-            let resp: Value = client
-                .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"))
-                .await?
-                .json()
+            // Owner-gated route: an explicit `owner` arg wins, otherwise default to
+            // the signing keypair's short DID (NOT the node DID). The request is
+            // signed by this keypair, so the path owner must match it or the node
+            // returns 403/404.
+            let owner = if let Some(o) = args.get("owner").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+                o.to_string()
+            } else {
+                let kp = keypair
+                    .as_ref()
+                    .context("no identity found — run `gl identity new` first")?;
+                let did = kp.did().to_string();
+                did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string()
+            };
+            // Owner-gated route: must be signed (get_signed), not a plain get().
+            let resp = client
+                .get_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"))
                 .await?;
-            Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&resp)?)
+            // Check the HTTP status before deserializing: a 401/403/404 JSON error
+            // body (missing identity, wrong owner, private/deleted repo) must fail
+            // the tool call, not be returned as a successful result.
+            let status = resp.status();
+            let body: Value = resp.json().await?;
+            if !status.is_success() {
+                let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+                anyhow::bail!("webhook_list failed ({status}): {msg}");
+            }
+            Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&body)?)
         }
 
         "webhook_delete" => {
@@ -970,14 +990,14 @@ async fn call_tool(
                 }
                 u
             };
-            let resp: Value = client.get(&url).await?.json().await?;
+            let resp: Value = client.get_authed(&url).await?.json().await?;
             Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(&resp)?)
         }
 
         "bounty_show" => {
             let id = args["id"].as_str().context("missing 'id'")?;
             let resp: Value = client
-                .get(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}"))
+                .get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/bounties/{id}"))
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await?;
@@ -1165,7 +1185,7 @@ async fn call_tool(
                 (owner, repo.to_string())
             };
             let resp: Value = client
-                .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues"))
+                .get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/issues"))
                 .await?
                 .json()
                 .await?;
@@ -1825,6 +1845,187 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(parsed["body"], "looks good");
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_webhook_list_via_mcp_signs_the_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        // /hooks is owner-gated, so the MCP webhook_list tool must send a SIGNED
+        // request (get_signed). Requiring the header catches a regression to get().
+        // Passing `owner` in args makes resolve_owner skip the node-root lookup.
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let result = call_tool(
+            "webhook_list",
+            json!({"owner": "alice", "repo": "myrepo"}),
+            &server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_webhook_list_default_owner_is_keypair_not_node_did() {
+        // When `owner` is omitted, the owner segment must come from the signing
+        // keypair's short DID, NOT the node root DID. The "/" mock returns a
+        // different DID; the /hooks mock only matches the keypair's short DID,
+        // so a regression to the node DID would leave the request unmatched.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let _root = server
+            .mock("GET", "/")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"did":"did:key:z6MkNodeRootDid"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let did = kp.did().to_string();
+        let short = did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string();
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!(r"/api/v1/repos/{short}/myrepo/hooks$")),
+            )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let result = call_tool(
+            "webhook_list",
+            json!({"repo": "myrepo"}),
+            &server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_webhook_list_explicit_owner_overrides_keypair() {
+        // An explicit `owner` arg must win over the keypair default and the node
+        // DID. The path must use the supplied owner; "/" must not even be hit.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/api/v1/repos/someoneelse/myrepo/hooks$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let result = call_tool(
+            "webhook_list",
+            json!({"repo": "myrepo", "owner": "someoneelse"}),
+            &server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(result.contains("webhooks"), "got: {result}");
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_webhook_list_non_success_status_errors() {
+        // A 403 (or any non-2xx) JSON error body for a missing identity, wrong
+        // owner, or private/deleted repo must fail the tool call, NOT be returned
+        // as a successful result. Mirrors the `gl webhook list` status check.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"only the repo owner can perform this action"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = call_tool(
+            "webhook_list",
+            json!({"owner": "alice", "repo": "myrepo"}),
+            &server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect_err("non-2xx must error, not return the error body as success");
+        let msg = err.to_string();
+        assert!(msg.contains("webhook_list failed (403"), "got: {msg}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("only the repo owner"),
+            "must surface the node message, got: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_webhook_list_without_keypair_errors() {
+        // No identity loaded and no explicit owner → the tool must error rather
+        // than fall back to the node DID and issue an unsigned, mis-scoped GET.
+        let server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap(); // empty: no identity.pem
+
+        let err = call_tool(
+            "webhook_list",
+            json!({"repo": "myrepo"}),
+            &server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect_err("must error without an identity");
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("no identity found"), "got: {err}");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_tool_count_is_42() {
         let tools = tool_definitions();

crates/gl/src/node.rs

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 
 use anyhow::Result;
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
+use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
 use serde_json::Value;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use crate::http::NodeClient;
+use crate::identity::load_keypair_from_dir;
 use crate::node_stake;
 
 #[derive(Args)]
@@ -20,6 +22,9 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
     Status {
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        /// Identity directory (default: ~/.gitlawb)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Check trust score for a DID
     Trust {
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ pub enum NodeCmd {
 
 pub async fn run(args: NodeArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
-        NodeCmd::Status { node } => cmd_status(node).await,
+        NodeCmd::Status { node, dir } => cmd_status(node, dir).await,
         NodeCmd::Trust { did, node } => cmd_trust(did, node).await,
         NodeCmd::Resolve { did, node } => cmd_resolve(did, node).await,
         NodeCmd::Register {
@@ -177,7 +182,101 @@ async fn try_get_json(client: &NodeClient, path: &str) -> Option<Value> {
     resp.json::<Value>().await.ok()
 }
 
-async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
+/// Outcome of fetching the IPFS pins panel for `gl node status`.
+///
+/// #134 gates `/api/v1/ipfs/pins` behind auth, so this panel signs its request
+/// when an identity is available and otherwise reports that the caller must
+/// sign in. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+enum PinsPanel {
+    /// Signed read succeeded and returned pins (carries the resolved count).
+    Pins(u64),
+    /// Signed read succeeded but the node has no pins recorded.
+    Empty,
+    /// Signed read was rejected (401/other) or errored.
+    Unavailable,
+    /// No identity available; no request was issued.
+    NeedsIdentity,
+    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity; carries the dir
+    /// so the panel can name it instead of the misleading "sign in" prompt.
+    IdentityError(PathBuf),
+}
+
+/// Identity resolved for the signed pins read, decided before the request so the
+/// dashboard can distinguish "no identity at all" from "an explicit `--dir` that
+/// could not be loaded".
+enum PinsAuth {
+    /// A usable keypair; the read will be signed.
+    Keyed(Keypair),
+    /// No identity requested and none in the default keystore.
+    Anonymous,
+    /// An explicit `--dir` was given but held no usable identity (carries the dir).
+    DirUnusable(PathBuf),
+}
+
+/// Resolve the pins-panel identity from an optional `--dir`. Mirrors `gl ipfs
+/// list`'s identity selection: an explicit `--dir` that fails to load is reported
+/// as `DirUnusable` (so the panel names the bad path) rather than collapsing to
+/// the misleading "sign in to view"; a missing default keystore (no `--dir`)
+/// degrades quietly to `Anonymous`.
+fn resolve_pins_auth(dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> PinsAuth {
+    match load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
+        Ok(kp) => PinsAuth::Keyed(kp),
+        Err(_) => match dir {
+            Some(d) => PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d.to_path_buf()),
+            None => PinsAuth::Anonymous,
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fetch the pins panel state. With a keypair, signs the `/api/v1/ipfs/pins`
+/// read and maps the outcome; with no identity it returns `NeedsIdentity`, and
+/// with an unusable explicit `--dir` it returns `IdentityError` — both without
+/// issuing a request. Injectable (node URL + resolved auth) so tests drive it
+/// with a mock server and never touch the default keystore.
+async fn fetch_pins(node: &str, auth: PinsAuth) -> PinsPanel {
+    let kp = match auth {
+        PinsAuth::Keyed(kp) => kp,
+        PinsAuth::Anonymous => return PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity,
+        PinsAuth::DirUnusable(dir) => return PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir),
+    };
+    let client = NodeClient::new(node, Some(kp));
+    let resp = match client.get_signed("/api/v1/ipfs/pins").await {
+        Ok(r) => r,
+        Err(_) => return PinsPanel::Unavailable,
+    };
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
+    }
+    let Ok(body) = resp.json::<Value>().await else {
+        return PinsPanel::Unavailable;
+    };
+    let count = body["count"]
+        .as_u64()
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| body["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
+    if count == 0 {
+        PinsPanel::Empty
+    } else {
+        PinsPanel::Pins(count)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Render the one-line pins-panel status for the `gl node status` dashboard.
+fn pins_status_line(panel: &PinsPanel) -> String {
+    match panel {
+        PinsPanel::Pins(count) => format!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}"),
+        PinsPanel::Empty => "  Pinned CIDs: 0".to_string(),
+        PinsPanel::Unavailable => "  IPFS pins: unavailable".to_string(),
+        PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity => {
+            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)".to_string()
+        }
+        PinsPanel::IdentityError(dir) => {
+            format!("  IPFS pins: no usable identity in {}", dir.display())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn cmd_status(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
 
     // ── Fetch node info (required — bail if unreachable) ──────────────────
@@ -194,13 +293,21 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
     let version = info["version"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
     let network = info["network"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown");
 
+    // The pins panel signs its read (#134 gates /api/v1/ipfs/pins behind auth).
+    // `--dir` selects the same identity directory as `gl ipfs list` (#146); an
+    // explicit --dir that can't be loaded is surfaced in the panel rather than
+    // masquerading as "no identity", while a missing default keystore degrades
+    // quietly. A pins failure never aborts the dashboard.
+    let pins_auth = resolve_pins_auth(dir.as_deref());
+
     // ── Fetch remaining endpoints in parallel ─────────────────────────────
-    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_val) = tokio::join!(
+    // Peers/repos/p2p/events stay anonymous; only pins is signed.
+    let (peers_val, repos_val, p2p_val, events_val, pins_panel) = tokio::join!(
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/peers"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/repos"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/p2p/info"),
         try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/events/ref-updates?limit=5"),
-        try_get_json(&client, "/api/v1/ipfs/pins"),
+        fetch_pins(&node, pins_auth),
     );
 
     // ── Render dashboard ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -307,14 +414,7 @@ async fn cmd_status(node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     // Pins
     println!("Pins");
-    if let Some(ref pins) = pins_val {
-        let count = pins["count"]
-            .as_u64()
-            .unwrap_or_else(|| pins["pins"].as_array().map(|a| a.len() as u64).unwrap_or(0));
-        println!("  Pinned CIDs: {count}");
-    } else {
-        println!("  IPFS not configured");
-    }
+    println!("{}", pins_status_line(&pins_panel));
     println!();
 
     Ok(())
@@ -409,3 +509,270 @@ async fn cmd_resolve(did: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_happy_signs_and_returns_pins() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // A keyed fetch must sign the request (RFC 9421 headers) and, on a
+        // populated 200 body, land in the Pins state carrying the pins.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("content-digest", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"pins":[{"cid":"bafyone","sha256_hex":"abc123","pinned_at":"2026-07-02T12:00:00Z"}],"count":1}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        match panel {
+            PinsPanel::Pins(count) => assert_eq!(count, 1),
+            other => panic!("expected Pins, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_empty_returns_empty() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"pins":[],"count":0}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Empty),
+            "expected Empty, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_keyed_rejected_returns_unavailable() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // Node rejects the signed read (401): the panel must degrade to
+        // Unavailable without panicking, so cmd_status still completes.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"error":"unauthorized"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "expected Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_unkeyed_needs_identity_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+
+        // With no keypair the endpoint must never be hit.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Anonymous).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
+            "expected NeedsIdentity, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_malformed_body_returns_unavailable() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        // 2xx but the body is not valid JSON: must degrade to Unavailable,
+        // never panic.
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body("not json{{{")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "malformed body -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_transport_error_returns_unavailable() {
+        // Bind then drop to obtain a definitely-closed port -> connection
+        // refused -> get_signed Err -> Unavailable (no panic).
+        let port = {
+            let l = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+            l.local_addr().unwrap().port()
+        };
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}"), PinsAuth::Keyed(kp)).await;
+        assert!(
+            matches!(panel, PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "transport error -> Unavailable, got {panel:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_pins_status_line_renders_each_state() {
+        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Pins(3)), "  Pinned CIDs: 3");
+        assert_eq!(pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Empty), "  Pinned CIDs: 0");
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::Unavailable),
+            "  IPFS pins: unavailable"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::NeedsIdentity),
+            "  IPFS pins: sign in to view (run `gl identity new`)"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            pins_status_line(&PinsPanel::IdentityError(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id"))),
+            "  IPFS pins: no usable identity in /tmp/id"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // Adversarial follow-up to jatmn #146 P2: an explicit `--dir` that holds no
+    // usable identity must resolve to DirUnusable (which names the path), NOT the
+    // Anonymous "sign in to view / run `gl identity new`" case — otherwise a user
+    // who did supply an identity dir is misdirected to create one they may have.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_reports_explicit_bad_dir_as_unusable() {
+        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
+        match resolve_pins_auth(Some(&bad)) {
+            PinsAuth::DirUnusable(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
+            _ => panic!("explicit unusable --dir must be DirUnusable, not Anonymous"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Mirror of the above for the absent-`--dir` case: `None` must never resolve to
+    // DirUnusable — it degrades to Anonymous (no default keystore) or Keyed (one
+    // present). Env-independent: only the None->DirUnusable mapping is guarded, so it
+    // holds whether or not the runner has a default `~/.gitlawb` identity.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_none_is_never_dir_unusable() {
+        assert!(
+            !matches!(resolve_pins_auth(None), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(_)),
+            "absent --dir must degrade to Anonymous (or Keyed), never DirUnusable"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // The success wiring for #146: an explicit --dir with a valid identity must
+    // load that key (dir -> load_keypair_from_dir -> Keyed), so the pins read is
+    // signed with the selected identity rather than the default keystore.
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_pins_auth_loads_keyed_identity_from_explicit_dir() {
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let PinsAuth::Keyed(loaded) = resolve_pins_auth(Some(dir.path())) else {
+            panic!("an explicit --dir with a valid identity must resolve to Keyed");
+        };
+        // A bare `Keyed(_)` match would also pass if load fell through to the default
+        // keystore; assert the loaded identity is the one written to --dir so the pins
+        // read signs with the selected key, never the default.
+        assert_eq!(
+            loaded.did(),
+            kp.did(),
+            "must sign with the identity from --dir, not the default keystore"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_fetch_pins_dir_unusable_reports_identity_error_without_request() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // An unusable explicit --dir must render the identity error and never hit
+        // the endpoint (no identity to sign with).
+        let m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/ipfs/pins")
+            .expect(0)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let bad = PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/gl-id-xyz");
+        let panel = fetch_pins(&server.url(), PinsAuth::DirUnusable(bad.clone())).await;
+        match panel {
+            PinsPanel::IdentityError(d) => assert_eq!(d, bad),
+            other => panic!("expected IdentityError, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+
+        m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    // jatmn #146 P2: `gl node status` must accept the same `--dir` identity
+    // selector as `gl ipfs list`, so a user who selected an identity via --dir can
+    // authenticate the status pins panel instead of seeing "sign in to view".
+    #[test]
+    fn status_accepts_dir_identity_selector() {
+        use clap::Parser;
+        #[derive(Parser)]
+        struct TestCli {
+            #[command(flatten)]
+            args: NodeArgs,
+        }
+        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from([
+            "gl",
+            "status",
+            "--node",
+            "http://example",
+            "--dir",
+            "/tmp/id",
+        ])
+        .expect("`node status` must accept --dir");
+        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
+            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(dir, Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/id")));
+
+        // Absent --dir must stay None so the default keystore path is unchanged.
+        let cli = TestCli::try_parse_from(["gl", "status"]).expect("status parses without --dir");
+        let NodeCmd::Status { dir, .. } = cli.args.cmd else {
+            panic!("expected the Status subcommand");
+        };
+        assert_eq!(dir, None);
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/protect.rs

@@ -154,10 +154,12 @@ async fn cmd_remove(
 
 async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_owner_repo(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    // Read-visibility-gated on the node: public repos list anonymously, private
+    // repos need the owner's signature. Sign when an identity is available.
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()).ok());
 
     let resp = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/branches/protected"))
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/branches/protected"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
@@ -307,6 +309,9 @@ mod tests {
                 "GET",
                 mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"branches/protected".to_string()),
             )
+            // An identity is supplied, so get_maybe_signed must sign the request.
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"protected_branches":[],"count":0}"#)
@@ -338,6 +343,8 @@ mod tests {
                 "GET",
                 mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"branches/protected".to_string()),
             )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"protected_branches":["main","release"],"count":2}"#)

crates/gl/src/repo.rs

@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ pub enum RepoCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
 }
 
@@ -203,25 +205,21 @@ pub async fn run(args: RepoArgs) -> Result<()> {
         RepoCmd::ReplicaUnregister { repo, node, dir } => {
             cmd_replica_unregister(repo, node, dir).await
         }
-        RepoCmd::Replicas { repo, node } => cmd_replicas(repo, node).await,
+        RepoCmd::Replicas { repo, node, dir } => cmd_replicas(repo, node, dir).await,
     }
 }
 
 /// Derive the short DID key segment from a keypair, or fall back to the node's DID.
-async fn resolve_owner_did(node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
-    if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir) {
-        let did = kp.did().to_string();
-        return Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string());
-    }
-    let client = NodeClient::new(node, None);
-    let info: Value = client
-        .get("/")
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to fetch node info")?;
-    let did = info["did"].as_str().context("node missing DID")?;
-    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(did).to_string())
+/// Resolve the owner short-DID for a bare repo name from the LOCAL identity.
+/// Never falls back to the node's own DID (that produced bogus "owned by the
+/// node" results for repos that don't exist) — if there's no local identity the
+/// caller must pass an explicit `owner/name`.
+async fn resolve_owner_did(_node: &str, dir: Option<&std::path::Path>) -> Result<String> {
+    let kp = load_keypair_from_dir(dir).context(
+        "no local identity to resolve the repo owner — pass `owner/name`, or run `gl identity new`",
+    )?;
+    let did = kp.did().to_string();
+    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string())
 }
 
 async fn cmd_create(
@@ -306,31 +304,37 @@ async fn cmd_list(node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
 }
 
 async fn cmd_clone(name: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let did = if let Ok(kp) = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()) {
-        kp.did().to_string()
+    // Owner is taken from an explicit `owner/name`, else the LOCAL identity —
+    // never the node's own DID. A missing repo then surfaces as the helper's
+    // clear 404 rather than a clone under an invented owner.
+    let (did, repo_name) = if let Some((owner, rest)) = name.split_once('/') {
+        (owner.to_string(), rest.to_string())
     } else {
-        let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-        let info: Value = client.get("/").await?.json().await?;
-        info["did"]
-            .as_str()
-            .context("node missing DID")?
-            .to_string()
+        // Bare name: derive the SHORT owner key via the same helper the other
+        // commands use, so the URL is `gitlawb://z6Mk.../name` — not the full
+        // `did:key:z6Mk...` form, whose colons in the authority break the helper.
+        (resolve_owner_did(&node, dir.as_deref()).await?, name)
     };
-    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{name}");
+    let url = format!("gitlawb://{did}/{repo_name}");
     println!("  cloning {url}");
     let status = std::process::Command::new("git")
         .arg("clone")
         .arg(&url)
+        // Point the remote helper at the same node the user selected.
+        .env("GITLAWB_NODE", &node)
         .status()
         .context("failed to run git clone — is git installed?")?;
     if !status.success() {
-        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed");
+        anyhow::bail!("git clone failed — does the repo exist on this node?");
     }
     Ok(())
 }
 
 async fn cmd_info(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    // Sign when an identity is available so the read-visibility-gated replica
+    // sub-fetch below resolves for a private repo's owner (public repos still
+    // work anonymously).
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()).ok());
 
     let (owner, name) = if repo.contains('/') {
         let (o, n) = repo.split_once('/').unwrap();
@@ -340,12 +344,27 @@ async fn cmd_info(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
         (short, repo)
     };
 
-    let r: Value = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
-        .await?
-        .json()
+    let resp = client
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
         .await
-        .context("repo not found")?;
+        .context("failed to connect to node")?;
+    // A non-existent (or unreadable/quarantined) repo is a real 404 from the
+    // node — surface it plainly instead of printing a stub card with `?` fields
+    // and a placeholder owner DID.
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        if resp.status().as_u16() == 404 {
+            anyhow::bail!("repository '{owner}/{name}' not found");
+        }
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let msg = resp
+            .json::<Value>()
+            .await
+            .ok()
+            .and_then(|v| v["message"].as_str().map(String::from))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "request failed".to_string());
+        anyhow::bail!("repo info failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
+    let r: Value = resp.json().await.context("parse repo info")?;
 
     let owner_did = r["owner_did"].as_str().unwrap_or(&owner);
     let gitlawb_url = format!("gitlawb://{owner_did}/{name}");
@@ -368,7 +387,7 @@ async fn cmd_info(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()
 
     // Replica count — failure to fetch is non-fatal (older nodes don't expose this).
     if let Ok(resp) = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/replicas"))
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/replicas"))
         .await
     {
         if resp.status().is_success() {
@@ -448,15 +467,17 @@ async fn cmd_replica_unregister(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_replicas(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+async fn cmd_replicas(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = repo
         .split_once('/')
         .map(|(o, n)| (o.to_string(), n.to_string()))
         .context("use owner/repo format")?;
 
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    // Read-visibility-gated: public repos list anonymously, private repos need
+    // the owner's signature. Sign when an identity is available.
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()).ok());
     let resp = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/replicas"))
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/replicas"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let status = resp.status();
@@ -574,7 +595,7 @@ async fn cmd_fork(
 }
 
 /// Returns (owner, repo_name) — if repo contains '/', splits on it; otherwise uses caller's DID.
-async fn resolve_owner_repo_pair(
+pub(crate) async fn resolve_owner_repo_pair(
     repo: &str,
     node: &str,
     dir: Option<&std::path::Path>,
@@ -647,16 +668,23 @@ async fn cmd_label_remove(
 
 async fn cmd_label_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = resolve_owner_repo_pair(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    // Read-visibility-gated like the sibling read surfaces (replicas, protected
+    // branches): sign when an identity is available so a private-repo owner can
+    // read their own labels, while public repos stay anonymously listable.
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()).ok());
 
-    let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/labels"))
-        .await?
-        .json()
+    let resp = client
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/labels"))
         .await
-        .context("invalid JSON")?;
+        .context("failed to connect to node")?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("list labels failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
 
-    let labels = resp["labels"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
+    let labels = body["labels"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
     if labels.is_empty() {
         println!("No labels on {owner}/{name}");
     } else {
@@ -668,17 +696,39 @@ async fn cmd_label_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Res
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Parse the protected-branch list from the node's `GET /branches/protected`
+/// response. The endpoint returns `{"protected_branches": [...], "count": N}`
+/// (see `crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/protect.rs`); each entry may be a plain
+/// branch-name string or an object carrying a `name` field.
+fn parse_protected_branches(val: &Value) -> Vec<String> {
+    val["protected_branches"]
+        .as_array()
+        .map(|arr| {
+            arr.iter()
+                .filter_map(|b| {
+                    b.as_str()
+                        .map(String::from)
+                        .or_else(|| b["name"].as_str().map(String::from))
+                })
+                .collect()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
 async fn cmd_owner(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>, json_out: bool) -> Result<()> {
     let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
     let my_did = keypair.did().to_string();
     let my_short = my_did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&my_did).to_string();
 
     let (owner, name) = resolve_owner_repo_pair(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    // Sign with the loaded identity so the read-visibility-gated protected-branch
+    // fetch below works on the owner's own private repos.
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
 
-    // Fetch repo info
+    // Fetch repo info (get_repo is read-visibility-gated; sign so the owner can
+    // inspect their own private repo).
     let resp = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     if !resp.status().is_success() {
@@ -693,25 +743,14 @@ async fn cmd_owner(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>, json_out: b
         .to_string();
     let is_owner = my_did == owner_did || my_short == owner_short;
 
-    // Fetch protected branches
+    // Fetch protected branches (read-visibility-gated; signed via the client).
     let protected: Vec<String> = match client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/branches/protected"))
+        .get_maybe_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/branches/protected"))
         .await
     {
         Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
             let val: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            val.as_array()
-                .or_else(|| val["branches"].as_array())
-                .map(|arr| {
-                    arr.iter()
-                        .filter_map(|b| {
-                            b.as_str()
-                                .map(String::from)
-                                .or_else(|| b["name"].as_str().map(String::from))
-                        })
-                        .collect()
-                })
-                .unwrap_or_default()
+            parse_protected_branches(&val)
         }
         _ => Vec::new(),
     };
@@ -749,6 +788,20 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_protected_branches_reads_node_shape() {
+        use serde_json::json;
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_protected_branches(&json!({"protected_branches":["main","release"],"count":2})),
+            vec!["main".to_string(), "release".to_string()]
+        );
+        assert!(parse_protected_branches(&json!({"count":0})).is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_protected_branches(&json!({"protected_branches":[{"name":"main"}]})),
+            vec!["main".to_string()]
+        );
+    }
+
     fn write_identity(dir: &TempDir) {
         let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
         let pem = kp.to_pem().unwrap();
@@ -1086,6 +1139,10 @@ mod tests {
                 "GET",
                 mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/myrepo/labels$".to_string()),
             )
+            // Identity is loaded, so get_maybe_signed must sign — requiring the
+            // header guards against a regression back to bare get().
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"labels":[]}"#)
@@ -1112,6 +1169,10 @@ mod tests {
                 "GET",
                 mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/myrepo/labels$".to_string()),
             )
+            // Identity is loaded, so get_maybe_signed must sign — requiring the
+            // header guards against a regression back to bare get().
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"labels":["language:rust","topic:defi"]}"#)
@@ -1127,6 +1188,97 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap();
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_label_list_anonymous_when_no_identity() {
+        // Empty dir → no identity → get_maybe_signed must fall back to an
+        // anonymous GET (the public-repo path). Assert NO signature header.
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/labels$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"labels":[]}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_label_list(
+            "owner/pubrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_label_list_404_errors() {
+        // A non-reader of a private repo gets 404 from the now-gated endpoint.
+        // The client must surface that as an error, not print "No labels" and
+        // exit 0 (the error body has no `labels` key).
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/myrepo/labels$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(404)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repo not found"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_label_list(
+            "myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("list labels failed (404")
+                && err.to_string().contains("repo not found"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_label_list_non_json_error_surfaces_status() {
+        // A non-2xx response with a non-JSON body (e.g. a proxy 502) must still
+        // surface the HTTP status, not collapse to a bare JSON-parse error.
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/myrepo/labels$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(502)
+            .with_header("content-type", "text/html")
+            .with_body("<html>502 Bad Gateway</html>")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_label_list(
+            "myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("list labels failed (502"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_cmd_owner_is_owner() {
         let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
@@ -1137,11 +1289,15 @@ mod tests {
         let short = did.split(':').next_back().unwrap().to_string();
 
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Both fetches are read-visibility-gated; with an identity loaded they
+        // must be signed. Requiring the header guards a regression to get().
         let _repo = server
             .mock(
                 "GET",
                 mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!(r"^/api/v1/repos/{short}/myrepo$")),
             )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(format!(
@@ -1156,9 +1312,11 @@ mod tests {
                     r"^/api/v1/repos/{short}/myrepo/branches/protected$"
                 )),
             )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"["main"]"#)
+            .with_body(r#"{"protected_branches":["main"],"count":1}"#)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -1199,7 +1357,7 @@ mod tests {
             )
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"["main","release"]"#)
+            .with_body(r#"{"protected_branches":["main","release"],"count":2}"#)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -1240,7 +1398,7 @@ mod tests {
             )
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
-            .with_body(r#"["main"]"#)
+            .with_body(r#"{"protected_branches":["main"],"count":1}"#)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
@@ -1281,4 +1439,254 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("not found"), "got: {err}");
     }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_replicas_signs_when_identity_present() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Read-visibility-gated: with an identity the request must be signed.
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/replicas$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"repo":"owner/myrepo","replica_count":0,"replicas":[]}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_replicas(
+            "owner/myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_replicas_anonymous_when_no_identity() {
+        // Empty dir → no identity → get_maybe_signed must fall back to an
+        // anonymous GET (the public-repo path). Assert NO signature header.
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/replicas$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"repo":"owner/pubrepo","replica_count":0,"replicas":[]}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_replicas(
+            "owner/pubrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_info_signs_repo_and_replica_fetches() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        // Both the primary repo fetch and the replica sub-fetch are
+        // read-visibility-gated; with an identity loaded both must be signed.
+        let _repo = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/owner/myrepo$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(
+                r#"{"id":"r1","name":"myrepo","owner_did":"did:key:zOwner","is_public":false,"default_branch":"main"}"#,
+            )
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let _replicas = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/replicas$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"replica_count":0,"replicas":[]}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_info(
+            "owner/myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_info_404_surfaces_error_not_fake_repo() {
+        // A non-reader of a private repo gets a JSON 404 from the now-gated
+        // GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}. The command must surface that as an
+        // error, not parse the error body and print a fabricated repo summary
+        // (owner / "?" / public=true / main) before exiting 0.
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _repo = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/owner/myrepo$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(404)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"repo not found"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_info(
+            "owner/myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        // The merged cmd_info maps a 404 to a generic "not found" (it does not
+        // echo the server's message body on 404), which still surfaces the error
+        // rather than fabricating a repo card, and avoids leaking any
+        // server-provided detail on a private-repo denial.
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string()
+                .contains("repository 'owner/myrepo' not found"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_cmd_info_non_json_error_surfaces_status() {
+        // A non-2xx response with a non-JSON body (e.g. a proxy 502) must still
+        // surface the HTTP status, not collapse to a bare JSON-parse error.
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _repo = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/owner/myrepo$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(502)
+            .with_header("content-type", "text/html")
+            .with_body("<html>502 Bad Gateway</html>")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_info(
+            "owner/myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("repo info failed (502"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// Drives the three deny/negative arms that the merge reconciliation changed but
+// that no existing test executed (they were only reasoned): resolve_owner_did
+// with no identity, cmd_info on an authenticated-but-denied 403, and
+// get_maybe_signed with no keypair. Each asserts the must-not case.
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod vet_merge_deny_arms {
+    use super::*;
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    fn write_identity(dir: &TempDir) {
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        let pem = kp.to_pem().unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(dir.path().join("identity.pem"), pem.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    // No local identity must hard-error, never fall back to the node's own DID.
+    // (Load-bearing: #113's pre-merge resolve_owner_did returned Ok via a node
+    // fetch here; a reintroduced fallback makes this go red.)
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn resolve_owner_did_no_identity_errors_not_fallback() {
+        let empty = TempDir::new().unwrap(); // no identity.pem written
+        let err = resolve_owner_did("http://unused.invalid", Some(empty.path()))
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string()
+                .contains("no local identity to resolve the repo owner"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // An authenticated caller DENIED with a 403 must surface an error, never
+    // render a repo card (deny-as-success is the INV-8 client-contract break).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cmd_info_403_denied_surfaces_error_not_card() {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        write_identity(&dir);
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"^/api/v1/repos/owner/myrepo$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"forbidden"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let err = cmd_info(
+            "owner/myrepo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("repo info failed (403"),
+            "got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // No keypair must send an unsigned GET; the mock only matches when the
+    // Signature header is absent, so a wrongly-signed request fails to match.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn get_maybe_signed_no_keypair_sends_unsigned() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/api/v1/repos/owner/pub")
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Missing)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body("{}")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let client = NodeClient::new(server.url(), None);
+        let resp = client
+            .get_maybe_signed("/api/v1/repos/owner/pub")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            resp.status().is_success(),
+            "unsigned GET should match the Missing-signature mock; got {}",
+            resp.status()
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/gl/src/star.rs

@@ -34,12 +34,14 @@ pub enum StarCmd {
         #[arg(long)]
         dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
-    /// Show star count for a repository (no auth required)
+    /// Show star count for a repository
     Count {
         /// Repository in owner/repo format
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
 }
 
@@ -47,7 +49,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: StarArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
         StarCmd::Add { repo, node, dir } => cmd_add(repo, node, dir).await,
         StarCmd::Remove { repo, node, dir } => cmd_remove(repo, node, dir).await,
-        StarCmd::Count { repo, node } => cmd_count(repo, node).await,
+        StarCmd::Count { repo, node, dir } => cmd_count(repo, node, dir).await,
     }
 }
 
@@ -110,15 +112,15 @@ async fn cmd_remove(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_count(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
+async fn cmd_count(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let (owner, name) = repo
         .split_once('/')
         .map(|(o, n)| (o.to_string(), n.to_string()))
         .context("use owner/repo format for count (e.g. alice/myrepo)")?;
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref()).ok());
 
     let resp = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/star"))
+        .get_authed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/star"))
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
 
@@ -310,16 +312,20 @@ mod tests {
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_count("alice/myrepo".to_string(), server.url())
+        cmd_count("alice/myrepo".to_string(), server.url(), None)
             .await
             .unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_cmd_count_requires_slash() {
-        let err = cmd_count("noslash".to_string(), "http://127.0.0.1:1".to_string())
-            .await
-            .unwrap_err();
+        let err = cmd_count(
+            "noslash".to_string(),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:1".to_string(),
+            None,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
         assert!(err.to_string().contains("owner/repo format"));
     }
 

crates/gl/src/status.rs

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: StatusArgs) -> Result<()> {
             println!("  repo      {short_did}/{repo}");
         }
         None => {
-            println!("  repo      (not in a gitlawb repo — no gitlawb:// origin)");
+            println!("  repo      (not in a gitlawb repo — no gitlawb:// remote)");
         }
     }
 
@@ -143,29 +143,68 @@ fn trust_bar(score: f64) -> String {
     format!("{}{}", "█".repeat(filled), "░".repeat(empty))
 }
 
-/// Parse `gitlawb://<did>/<repo>` from the git origin remote.
+/// Find a `gitlawb://<did>/<repo>` remote in the current repo.
+///
+/// Checks `origin` first (clones), then `gitlawb` (the name `gl init` adds),
+/// then any other remote with a gitlawb:// URL.
 fn detect_gitlawb_remote() -> Option<(String, String)> {
     let out = std::process::Command::new("git")
-        .args(["remote", "get-url", "origin"])
+        .args(["remote"])
         .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
         .output()
         .ok()?;
     if !out.status.success() {
         return None;
     }
-    let url = String::from_utf8(out.stdout).ok()?;
-    let rest = url.trim().strip_prefix("gitlawb://")?;
-    let slash = rest.rfind('/')?;
-    let did = rest[..slash].to_string();
-    let repo = rest[slash + 1..].to_string();
-    if did.is_empty() || repo.is_empty() {
-        return None;
+    let names: Vec<String> = String::from_utf8(out.stdout)
+        .ok()?
+        .lines()
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
+        .map(str::to_string)
+        .collect();
+
+    let preferred = ["origin", "gitlawb"];
+    let ordered = preferred
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|p| names.iter().any(|n| n == *p))
+        .map(|p| p.to_string())
+        .chain(
+            names
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|n| !preferred.contains(&n.as_str()))
+                .cloned(),
+        );
+
+    for name in ordered {
+        // A remote can carry several URLs, and the gitlawb:// one may be a
+        // push URL behind an https fetch URL — check every fetch and push URL.
+        for extra in [&["--all"][..], &["--push", "--all"][..]] {
+            let mut args = vec!["remote", "get-url"];
+            args.extend_from_slice(extra);
+            args.push(&name);
+            let Ok(out) = std::process::Command::new("git")
+                .args(&args)
+                .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
+                .output()
+            else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if !out.status.success() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Ok(urls) = String::from_utf8(out.stdout) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if let Some(parsed) = urls.lines().find_map(parse_gitlawb_url) {
+                return Some(parsed);
+            }
+        }
     }
-    Some((did, repo))
+    None
 }
 
-/// Parse a gitlawb:// URL string into (did, repo) — extracted for testing.
-#[cfg(test)]
+/// Parse a gitlawb:// URL string into (did, repo).
 fn parse_gitlawb_url(url: &str) -> Option<(String, String)> {
     let rest = url.trim().strip_prefix("gitlawb://")?;
     let slash = rest.rfind('/')?;

crates/gl/src/sync.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use anyhow::Result;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
@@ -30,15 +30,39 @@ pub enum SyncCmd {
 pub async fn run(args: SyncArgs) -> Result<()> {
     match args.cmd {
         SyncCmd::Trigger => {
-            let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(args.dir.as_deref()).ok();
-            let client = NodeClient::new(&args.node, keypair);
-            let resp: serde_json::Value = client
-                .post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", b"{}")
-                .await?
-                .json()
-                .await?;
-            let peers = resp["peers_reached"].as_u64().unwrap_or(0);
-            let enqueued = resp["repos_enqueued"].as_u64().unwrap_or(0);
+            // /api/v1/sync/trigger always requires a signature, so a missing or
+            // unreadable identity must fail here, locally, rather than sending an
+            // unsigned request that can only 401 remotely (matches the other
+            // signed CLI writes).
+            let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(args.dir.as_deref())
+                .context("identity not found — run `gl identity new` first")?;
+            let client = NodeClient::new(&args.node, Some(keypair));
+            let resp = client.post("/api/v1/sync/trigger", b"{}").await?;
+            // The node now requires a signature on this route and rate-limits it,
+            // so a denial (401/429/…) is expected. Check the status BEFORE parsing:
+            // otherwise a JSON-ish error body deserializes into a zero-count struct
+            // and prints a fabricated "✓ sync triggered / 0 peers" success.
+            let status = resp.status();
+            if !status.is_success() {
+                // Bound the read: a hostile or broken node must not force an
+                // unbounded allocation just to surface a denial (INV-6, read half).
+                let raw = read_body_capped(resp, 8 * 1024).await;
+                let msg = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&raw)
+                    .ok()
+                    .and_then(|v| {
+                        v.get("message")
+                            .or_else(|| v.get("error"))
+                            .and_then(|m| m.as_str())
+                            .map(str::to_string)
+                    })
+                    .unwrap_or(raw);
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "sync trigger failed ({status}): {}",
+                    sanitize_node_msg(&msg)
+                );
+            }
+            let resp: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await?;
+            let (peers, enqueued) = trigger_counts(&resp);
             println!("✓ sync triggered");
             println!("  peers reached:   {peers}");
             println!("  repos enqueued:  {enqueued}");
@@ -69,3 +93,252 @@ pub async fn run(args: SyncArgs) -> Result<()> {
     }
     Ok(())
 }
+
+/// Extract `(peers_reached, repos_enqueued)` from a successful sync-trigger
+/// response. Split out so the extraction is unit-testable (missing or malformed
+/// fields default to 0 rather than panicking).
+fn trigger_counts(resp: &serde_json::Value) -> (u64, u64) {
+    (
+        resp["peers_reached"].as_u64().unwrap_or(0),
+        resp["repos_enqueued"].as_u64().unwrap_or(0),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Read at most `cap` bytes of a response body. Bounds the allocation from a
+/// hostile or broken node returning a huge error body — the display is capped
+/// separately, but the read itself must not be unbounded (INV-6, read half).
+async fn read_body_capped(mut resp: reqwest::Response, cap: usize) -> String {
+    let mut buf: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+    while buf.len() < cap {
+        match resp.chunk().await {
+            Ok(Some(chunk)) => {
+                let take = (cap - buf.len()).min(chunk.len());
+                buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..take]);
+                if take < chunk.len() {
+                    break; // hit the cap mid-chunk
+                }
+            }
+            _ => break, // end of body or read error — return what we have
+        }
+    }
+    String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf).into_owned()
+}
+
+/// Strip terminal-dangerous characters from (and cap the length of) a
+/// node-supplied error string before surfacing it. The node a caller talks to
+/// could be hostile and embed escape sequences in its error body; those must not
+/// reach the terminal verbatim (INV-6). We drop the C0/C1 control bytes (which
+/// defangs ANSI/OSC escapes) AND the Unicode bidi/format controls (which
+/// `char::is_control` does not cover — they can reorder the displayed line).
+fn sanitize_node_msg(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.chars()
+        .filter(|c| !c.is_control() && !gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(*c))
+        .take(200)
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn trigger_args(node: String) -> (SyncArgs, tempfile::TempDir) {
+        // Seed a real identity so `run` gets past the mandatory-keypair check and
+        // reaches the status-handling path. The mocks below return a fixed status
+        // regardless of the signature, so these tests exercise the client's
+        // status-check-before-parse, not signature verification (that is proved
+        // server-side). Return the TempDir so the caller keeps it alive.
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let kp = gitlawb_core::identity::Keypair::generate();
+        std::fs::write(
+            dir.path().join("identity.pem"),
+            kp.to_pem().unwrap().as_bytes(),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let args = SyncArgs {
+            cmd: SyncCmd::Trigger,
+            node,
+            dir: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        };
+        (args, dir)
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_requires_identity_fails_before_request() {
+        // Empty identity dir → no keypair. `sync trigger` must fail locally with
+        // a clear identity error BEFORE issuing any request. The node URL points
+        // at an unreachable port, so a request attempt would surface a different
+        // (connection) error; getting the identity error proves we never dialed.
+        let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let args = SyncArgs {
+            cmd: SyncCmd::Trigger,
+            node: "http://127.0.0.1:1".to_string(),
+            dir: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        };
+        let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("identity not found"),
+            "expected a local identity error before any request, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_surfaces_401_as_error_not_fake_success() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            // Valid JSON: the parse-without-status-check bug deserializes this
+            // into a zero-count success struct and prints "✓ sync triggered".
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"unauthorized"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let (args, _dir) = trigger_args(server.url());
+        let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("401"),
+            "expected 401 surfaced, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_surfaces_429_as_error() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .with_status(429)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"slow down"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let (args, _dir) = trigger_args(server.url());
+        let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            err.to_string().contains("429"),
+            "expected 429 surfaced, got: {err}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_sanitizes_control_chars_in_node_error() {
+        // A hostile node embeds an ANSI color escape (ESC) and a bell (BEL) in
+        // the JSON message field. The surfaced error must contain neither raw
+        // control byte, while keeping the printable text.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            // Valid JSON whose message carries JSON-escaped ESC (\u001b) and
+            // BEL (\u0007); serde decodes them to real control bytes a naive
+            // client would print. (The status-check bug fake-successes here.)
+            .with_body("{\"message\":\"pwned\\u001b[31m\\u0007bad\"}")
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let (args, _dir) = trigger_args(server.url());
+        let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
+        let s = err.to_string();
+        assert!(!s.contains('\u{1b}'), "ESC leaked to terminal: {s:?}");
+        assert!(!s.contains('\u{07}'), "BEL leaked to terminal: {s:?}");
+        assert!(
+            s.contains("pwned") && s.contains("bad"),
+            "message text dropped: {s:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_ok_prints_counts() {
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"peers_reached":2,"repos_enqueued":5}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let (args, _dir) = trigger_args(server.url());
+        run(args).await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_strips_controls_bidi_and_caps_length() {
+        // C0 (ESC/BEL) and the Cf bidi override (U+202E) are both removed; the
+        // printable text survives. (Note: a stripped ESC leaves any following
+        // "[31m" as inert literal text — that is the point, so the input here
+        // avoids that residue to keep the expectation unambiguous.)
+        let out = sanitize_node_msg("a\u{1b}\u{07}b\u{202e}c");
+        assert!(
+            !out.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()),
+            "control char leaked: {out:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !out.contains('\u{202e}'),
+            "RLO bidi override leaked: {out:?}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(out, "abc");
+        // Length is capped at 200 chars regardless of input size.
+        let long = "x".repeat(250);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_node_msg(&long).chars().count(), 200);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_preserves_legitimate_and_rtl_text() {
+        // Must not over-strip: a plain word, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Arabic
+        // U+0627, category Lo — NOT a format char), and ZWJ (U+200D, a legitimate
+        // Cf char, e.g. emoji sequences) all survive. Guards the shared predicate
+        // against being widened into a blanket Cf stripper.
+        let out = sanitize_node_msg("ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b");
+        assert_eq!(out, "ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn trigger_handles_oversized_error_body_without_unbounded_output() {
+        // A hostile/broken node returns a 2 MB error body. The command must still
+        // surface the denial with a bounded message, not hang or dump the body.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("POST", "/api/v1/sync/trigger")
+            .with_status(401)
+            .with_body("A".repeat(2_000_000))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let (args, _dir) = trigger_args(server.url());
+        let err = run(args).await.unwrap_err();
+        let s = err.to_string();
+        assert!(s.contains("401"), "denial not surfaced: {s:.80?}");
+        assert!(
+            s.len() < 500,
+            "error message not bounded: {} chars",
+            s.len()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn read_body_capped_bounds_the_read() {
+        // The read must stop at the cap — a 2 MB body yields at most `cap` bytes,
+        // not the whole thing (which resp.text() would return).
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", "/big")
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_body("A".repeat(2_000_000))
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+        let resp = reqwest::get(format!("{}/big", server.url())).await.unwrap();
+        let out = read_body_capped(resp, 8192).await;
+        assert!(out.len() <= 8192, "read not bounded: {} bytes", out.len());
+        assert!(!out.is_empty(), "expected some body");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trigger_counts_extracts_both_values() {
+        let v = serde_json::json!({"peers_reached": 2, "repos_enqueued": 5});
+        assert_eq!(trigger_counts(&v), (2, 5));
+        // Missing/malformed fields default to 0, never panic.
+        assert_eq!(trigger_counts(&serde_json::json!({})), (0, 0));
+        assert_eq!(
+            trigger_counts(&serde_json::json!({"peers_reached": "x"})),
+            (0, 0)
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gl/src/webhook.rs

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ pub enum WebhookCmd {
         repo: String,
         #[arg(long, default_value = "https://node.gitlawb.com", env = "GITLAWB_NODE")]
         node: String,
+        #[arg(long)]
+        dir: Option<PathBuf>,
     },
     /// Delete a webhook
     Delete {
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ pub async fn run(args: WebhookArgs) -> Result<()> {
             node,
             dir,
         } => cmd_create(repo, url, events, secret, node, dir).await,
-        WebhookCmd::List { repo, node } => cmd_list(repo, node).await,
+        WebhookCmd::List { repo, node, dir } => cmd_list(repo, node, dir).await,
         WebhookCmd::Delete {
             repo,
             id,
@@ -76,15 +78,6 @@ pub async fn run(args: WebhookArgs) -> Result<()> {
     }
 }
 
-async fn resolve_owner(client: &NodeClient) -> Result<String> {
-    let info: Value = client.get("/").await?.json().await?;
-    let did = info["did"]
-        .as_str()
-        .context("node missing DID")?
-        .to_string();
-    Ok(did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string())
-}
-
 async fn cmd_create(
     repo: String,
     url: String,
@@ -94,8 +87,8 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     dir: Option<PathBuf>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let (owner, name) = crate::repo::resolve_owner_repo_pair(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
-    let owner = resolve_owner(&client).await?;
 
     let event_list: Vec<&str> = events.split(',').map(str::trim).collect();
 
@@ -106,7 +99,7 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     }))?;
 
     let resp = client
-        .post(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"), &payload)
+        .post(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/hooks"), &payload)
         .await
         .context("failed to connect to node")?;
     let status = resp.status();
@@ -143,18 +136,31 @@ async fn cmd_create(
     Ok(())
 }
 
-async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
-    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, None);
-    let owner = resolve_owner(&client).await?;
+async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
+    // The node owner-gates GET /hooks (callback URLs are owner-secret), so the
+    // list request must be signed — anonymous callers get 401.
+    let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let (owner, name) = crate::repo::resolve_owner_repo_pair(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
+    let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
 
-    let resp: Value = client
-        .get(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks"))
-        .await?
-        .json()
-        .await
-        .context("invalid JSON")?;
+    // get_signed (not get) attaches the RFC 9421 signature — plain get() never
+    // signs, and the node owner-gates this route, so an unsigned GET 401s.
+    let resp = client
+        .get_signed(&format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/hooks"))
+        .await?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body: Value = resp.json().await.context("invalid JSON")?;
 
-    let hooks = resp["webhooks"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = body["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown error");
+        anyhow::bail!("list webhooks failed ({status}): {msg}");
+    }
+
+    let hooks = body
+        .get("webhooks")
+        .and_then(Value::as_array)
+        .cloned()
+        .context("node response missing webhooks array")?;
     if hooks.is_empty() {
         println!("No webhooks for {repo}");
         return Ok(());
@@ -185,13 +191,13 @@ async fn cmd_list(repo: String, node: String) -> Result<()> {
 
 async fn cmd_delete(repo: String, id: String, node: String, dir: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
     let keypair = load_keypair_from_dir(dir.as_deref())?;
+    let (owner, name) = crate::repo::resolve_owner_repo_pair(&repo, &node, dir.as_deref()).await?;
     let client = NodeClient::new(&node, Some(keypair));
-    let owner = resolve_owner(&client).await?;
 
     let payload = serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({}))?;
     let resp = client
         .delete(
-            &format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}"),
+            &format!("/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/hooks/{id}"),
             &payload,
         )
         .await
@@ -337,33 +343,170 @@ mod tests {
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_list_webhooks_empty() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, _kp) = tmp_identity();
         let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
 
         let _m = server
             .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            // The route is owner-gated, so the list request must be signed.
+            // Requiring the header here is what catches a regression to plain get().
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[]}"#)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list("my-repo".to_string(), server.url()).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(
+            "my-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_list_webhooks_with_items() {
         let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, _kp) = tmp_identity();
         let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
 
         let _m = server
             .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
             .with_status(200)
             .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
             .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[{"id":"h1","url":"https://a.com","events":["push"],"active":true},{"id":"h2","url":"https://b.com","events":["*"],"active":false}]}"#)
             .create_async()
             .await;
 
-        cmd_list("my-repo".to_string(), server.url()).await.unwrap();
+        cmd_list(
+            "my-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_list_owner_comes_from_keypair_not_node_did() {
+        // The owner segment must be derived from the caller's keypair (loaded
+        // from --dir), NOT the node root DID. mock_root returns a different DID;
+        // if the code regressed to using it, this path mock would not match.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, kp) = tmp_identity();
+        let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
+
+        let did = kp.did().to_string();
+        let short = did.split(':').next_back().unwrap_or(&did).to_string();
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(format!(r"/api/v1/repos/{short}/my-repo/hooks$")),
+            )
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[]}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(
+            "my-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_list_honors_owner_repo_arg() {
+        // An explicit `owner/repo` argument is split and used verbatim.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, _kp) = tmp_identity();
+        let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock(
+                "GET",
+                mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/api/v1/repos/someoneelse/their-repo/hooks$".to_string()),
+            )
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"webhooks":[]}"#)
+            .expect(1)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        cmd_list(
+            "someoneelse/their-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        _m.assert_async().await;
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_list_webhooks_non_success_status_errors() {
+        // A 403 (or any non-2xx) JSON body has no `webhooks` field; cmd_list must
+        // surface the failure, not print "No webhooks" and exit 0.
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, _kp) = tmp_identity();
+        let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            .with_status(403)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"message":"not the owner"}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(
+            "my-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("not the owner"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_list_webhooks_2xx_missing_array_errors() {
+        // A 2xx body without a `webhooks` array signals a node/API contract
+        // regression. cmd_list must error rather than print "No webhooks".
+        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
+        let (dir, _kp) = tmp_identity();
+        let _root = mock_root(&mut server).await;
+
+        let _m = server
+            .mock("GET", mockito::Matcher::Regex(r"/hooks$".to_string()))
+            .match_header("signature", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .match_header("signature-input", mockito::Matcher::Any)
+            .with_status(200)
+            .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+            .with_body(r#"{"ok":true}"#)
+            .create_async()
+            .await;
+
+        let err = cmd_list(
+            "my-repo".to_string(),
+            server.url(),
+            Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(err.to_string().contains("missing webhooks array"));
     }
 
     // ── delete ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+[package]
+name = "icaptcha-client"
+version = "0.4.0" # x-release-please-version
+edition.workspace = true
+rust-version.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+gitlawb-core = { path = "../gitlawb-core" }
+reqwest = { workspace = true }
+serde = { workspace = true }
+serde_json = { workspace = true }
+anyhow = { workspace = true }
+thiserror = { workspace = true }
+tracing = { workspace = true }
+sha2 = { workspace = true }
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+mockito = "1"

crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,723 @@
+//! Client for the iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence service.
+//!
+//! The node gates spam-prone writes (repo create / fork / register) behind an
+//! iCaptcha proof. This crate implements the *sanctioned client flow*: on a
+//! `403 icaptcha_proof_required`, request a challenge for the required level,
+//! solve the deterministic computational types locally, obtain the signed
+//! proof, and hand it back so the caller can retry the original signed request
+//! with the `x-icaptcha-proof` header.
+//!
+//! `requesterId` is always the caller's DID, so the proof's `sub` claim matches
+//! the authenticated signer (the node enforces `sub == authenticated DID`).
+//!
+//! Blocking HTTP (reqwest::blocking) so the git remote helper can use it
+//! directly; `gl` (async) calls it via `tokio::task::spawn_blocking`.
+
+use std::io::Read;
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use serde_json::json;
+
+pub mod pow;
+pub mod solvers;
+
+/// Default iCaptcha service base URL (used when the node doesn't advertise one).
+pub const DEFAULT_URL: &str = "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com";
+/// Default required level (the node's default floor).
+pub const DEFAULT_LEVEL: u32 = 3;
+/// Header the gated write must echo the proof back in.
+pub const PROOF_HEADER: &str = "x-icaptcha-proof";
+
+/// Cap on bytes read from an error response, and characters kept in the excerpt.
+/// The iCaptcha origin is only as trusted as the node that advertised it (a MITM
+/// on the default transport qualifies), so its error bodies are attacker-
+/// influenceable bytes that reach the TTY — they must be bounded and stripped of
+/// control characters before printing (CWE-150, same treatment as #137).
+const MAX_ERR_BYTES: u64 = 4096;
+const MAX_ERR_CHARS: usize = 500;
+
+/// Read a bounded error body and return a control-char-stripped, length-capped
+/// single-line excerpt safe to print to a terminal.
+fn error_excerpt(resp: reqwest::blocking::Response) -> String {
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    if resp.take(MAX_ERR_BYTES).read_to_end(&mut buf).is_err() {
+        return String::new();
+    }
+    sanitize_excerpt(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf))
+}
+
+/// Strip C0/C1 control characters, collapse whitespace runs to single spaces,
+/// and cap the length — so a hostile response body cannot inject terminal
+/// escapes or flood the TTY.
+fn sanitize_excerpt(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let mut pending_space = false;
+    let mut kept = 0;
+    for ch in s.trim().chars() {
+        if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
+            break;
+        }
+        if ch.is_control() {
+            if matches!(ch, '\n' | '\r' | '\t') {
+                pending_space = true;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if gitlawb_core::sanitize::is_bidi_format(ch) {
+            // Drop Cf bidi/format controls (INV-6, #183) without setting
+            // pending_space: they are not whitespace, so stripping leaves no
+            // phantom gap.
+            continue;
+        }
+        if ch.is_whitespace() {
+            pending_space = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if pending_space && !out.is_empty() {
+            out.push(' ');
+            kept += 1;
+            if kept >= MAX_ERR_CHARS {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        out.push(ch);
+        kept += 1;
+        pending_space = false;
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// Whether `u` parses as a trusted URL.
+///
+/// Production trusts only `https`.  When `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE` is set (a
+/// runtime escape hatch for integration tests) the function also trusts
+/// `http://127.0.0.1` and `http://localhost` so the full iCaptcha retry path
+/// can be exercised against a local mockito server.
+fn is_https(u: &str) -> bool {
+    let Ok(parsed) = reqwest::Url::parse(u) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    if parsed.scheme() == "https" {
+        return true;
+    }
+    if std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE").is_some()
+        && parsed.scheme() == "http"
+        && matches!(parsed.host_str(), Some("127.0.0.1" | "localhost"))
+    {
+        return true;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+/// Lowercased origin string (`scheme://host[:port]`) of a URL.
+///
+/// Includes the effective port so that `http://localhost:3000` and
+/// `http://localhost:9000` are treated as distinct origins — a hostile node
+/// cannot redirect the iCaptcha solve to a different loopback port.
+fn origin_key(u: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let parsed = reqwest::Url::parse(u).ok()?;
+    let scheme = parsed.scheme();
+    let host = parsed.host_str()?.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    let port = parsed
+        .port_or_known_default()
+        .map(|p| format!(":{p}"))
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    Some(format!("{scheme}://{host}{port}"))
+}
+
+/// Decide which iCaptcha origin to actually talk to, and whether it is trusted
+/// enough to receive the operator's API key.
+///
+/// The node-advertised `x-icaptcha-url` is untrusted: a hostile node could point
+/// it at an attacker origin (client-side SSRF) or capture a bearer token on the
+/// first hop. So an advertised URL is honored only when it is `https` AND its
+/// host is allowlisted — the public default host, or the operator's own
+/// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`. Otherwise we fall back to the operator/default origin.
+///
+/// The API key is attached only when the resolved origin is the operator's
+/// explicitly-configured host (never a node-discovered one), so a key is never
+/// exfiltrated to an origin the operator did not choose.
+fn resolve_solver_url(advertised: Option<&str>, operator: Option<&str>) -> (String, bool) {
+    let operator = operator.filter(|u| is_https(u));
+    let operator_origin = operator.as_ref().and_then(|u| origin_key(u));
+    let default_origin = origin_key(DEFAULT_URL);
+
+    let allowed = |origin: &Option<String>| -> bool {
+        origin
+            .as_ref()
+            .map(|o| Some(o) == default_origin.as_ref() || Some(o) == operator_origin.as_ref())
+            .unwrap_or(false)
+    };
+
+    let fallback = || {
+        operator
+            .map(String::from)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_URL.to_string())
+    };
+
+    let chosen = match advertised {
+        Some(a) if is_https(a) && allowed(&origin_key(a)) => a.to_string(),
+        Some(a) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                advertised = %a,
+                "ignoring iCaptcha URL advertised by node (must be https with an allowlisted host); using trusted origin"
+            );
+            fallback()
+        }
+        None => fallback(),
+    };
+
+    // Key goes only to the operator's own configured origin.
+    let key_trusted = operator_origin.is_some() && origin_key(&chosen) == operator_origin;
+    (chosen, key_trusted)
+}
+
+/// Computational challenge types this client solves locally. Restricting the
+/// request to these avoids dictionary (anagram/logic) and LLM (wordproblem/
+/// riddle) types, which can't be auto-solved.
+const SOLVABLE_TYPES: [&str; 3] = ["arithmetic", "algebra", "sequence"];
+
+/// Bound on challenge/answer rounds (the service escalates difficulty on a miss;
+/// correct solvers shouldn't escalate, but cap it regardless).
+const MAX_ROUNDS: usize = 8;
+
+/// Where + at what level to solve. `did` becomes the proof's `sub`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct IcaptchaCfg {
+    pub url: String,
+    pub did: String,
+    pub level: u32,
+    /// Optional bearer token for an API-key-protected iCaptcha deployment.
+    pub api_key: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl IcaptchaCfg {
+    /// Build config from the caller DID plus an optionally node-advertised
+    /// url/level (e.g. the `x-icaptcha-url` / `x-icaptcha-level` headers) and
+    /// optional level.
+    ///
+    /// The advertised URL is validated and allowlisted (see [`resolve_solver_url`])
+    /// so a hostile node cannot redirect the solve to an attacker origin. The
+    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY` bearer token is attached only when the resolved
+    /// origin is the operator's own `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL`, never a
+    /// node-discovered one.
+    pub fn new(did: impl Into<String>, url: Option<String>, level: Option<u32>) -> Self {
+        let operator = std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL")
+            .ok()
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
+        let (resolved_url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(url.as_deref(), operator.as_deref());
+        let api_key = if key_trusted {
+            std::env::var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY")
+                .ok()
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+        Self {
+            url: resolved_url,
+            did: did.into(),
+            level: level.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_LEVEL),
+            api_key,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A challenge handed back by the service (mirrors `icaptcha` `Challenge`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct Challenge {
+    pub challenge_id: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub kind: String,
+    pub difficulty: u32,
+    pub prompt: String,
+    pub token: String,
+    /// Proof-of-work to solve and echo back as `powNonce` on the answer. Present
+    /// only when the service has PoW enabled; absent/None means no PoW required.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub pow: Option<pow::PowChallenge>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "status", rename_all = "lowercase")]
+enum AnswerResult {
+    Passed { proof: String },
+    Continue { challenge: Challenge },
+    Failed { reason: String },
+}
+
+/// Solver callback for types this crate can't solve deterministically.
+pub type Solver<'a> = dyn Fn(&Challenge) -> Option<String> + 'a;
+
+/// Run the full challenge → solve → answer loop and return a fresh proof token.
+///
+/// `solver` is consulted for challenge types the built-in solvers don't handle
+/// (anagram/logic/LLM); pass `None` to fall back to an interactive stdin prompt.
+pub fn obtain_proof(cfg: &IcaptchaCfg, solver: Option<&Solver>) -> Result<String> {
+    let client = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .build()
+        .context("build iCaptcha http client")?;
+
+    let mut challenge = request_challenge(&client, cfg)?;
+    for _ in 0..MAX_ROUNDS {
+        let answer = solvers::solve(&challenge.kind, &challenge.prompt)
+            .or_else(|| solver.and_then(|s| s(&challenge)))
+            .or_else(|| interactive_prompt(&challenge))
+            .ok_or_else(|| {
+                anyhow!(
+                    "cannot solve iCaptcha challenge type '{}' automatically; \
+                     set GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY/solver or solve interactively",
+                    challenge.kind
+                )
+            })?;
+
+        // Solve the proof-of-work bound to this challenge, if the service
+        // requires one. A required-but-unsolvable PoW (unknown algorithm or a
+        // difficulty above our cap) is a hard error — submitting without it
+        // would just be rejected.
+        let pow_nonce = match &challenge.pow {
+            Some(p) => Some(pow::solve(p).ok_or_else(|| {
+                anyhow!(
+                    "cannot solve iCaptcha proof-of-work (algorithm '{}', difficulty {})",
+                    p.algorithm,
+                    p.difficulty
+                )
+            })?),
+            None => None,
+        };
+
+        match submit_answer(
+            &client,
+            cfg,
+            &challenge.token,
+            &answer,
+            pow_nonce.as_deref(),
+        )? {
+            AnswerResult::Passed { proof } => return Ok(proof),
+            AnswerResult::Continue { challenge: next } => challenge = next,
+            AnswerResult::Failed { reason } => {
+                bail!("iCaptcha challenge failed: {}", sanitize_excerpt(&reason))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    bail!("iCaptcha not solved within {MAX_ROUNDS} rounds")
+}
+
+fn request_challenge(client: &reqwest::blocking::Client, cfg: &IcaptchaCfg) -> Result<Challenge> {
+    let url = format!("{}/v1/challenge", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    let body = json!({
+        "requesterId": cfg.did,
+        "requiredLevel": cfg.level,
+        "types": SOLVABLE_TYPES,
+    });
+    let mut req = client.post(&url).json(&body);
+    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
+        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
+    }
+    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
+        bail!("iCaptcha challenge request failed ({status}): {text}");
+    }
+    resp.json::<Challenge>().context("parse iCaptcha challenge")
+}
+
+fn submit_answer(
+    client: &reqwest::blocking::Client,
+    cfg: &IcaptchaCfg,
+    token: &str,
+    answer: &str,
+    pow_nonce: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<AnswerResult> {
+    let url = format!("{}/v1/answer", cfg.url.trim_end_matches('/'));
+    let mut body = json!({ "token": token, "answer": answer });
+    if let Some(nonce) = pow_nonce {
+        body["powNonce"] = json!(nonce);
+    }
+    let mut req = client.post(&url).json(&body);
+    if let Some(key) = &cfg.api_key {
+        req = req.bearer_auth(key);
+    }
+    let resp = req.send().with_context(|| format!("POST {url}"))?;
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let text = error_excerpt(resp);
+        bail!("iCaptcha answer request failed ({status}): {text}");
+    }
+    resp.json::<AnswerResult>()
+        .context("parse iCaptcha answer result")
+}
+
+/// Last-resort fallback: show the prompt and read an answer from the terminal.
+/// Returns `None` when stdin isn't a usable interactive source (e.g. an agent),
+/// so the caller surfaces a clear "couldn't auto-solve" error instead.
+fn interactive_prompt(challenge: &Challenge) -> Option<String> {
+    use std::io::{stderr, stdin, Write};
+    let mut err = stderr();
+    let _ = writeln!(
+        err,
+        "iCaptcha challenge ({}, level {}): {}\nAnswer: ",
+        challenge.kind, challenge.difficulty, challenge.prompt
+    );
+    let _ = err.flush();
+    let mut line = String::new();
+    match stdin().read_line(&mut line) {
+        Ok(0) | Err(_) => None,
+        Ok(_) => {
+            let a = line.trim().to_string();
+            if a.is_empty() {
+                None
+            } else {
+                Some(a)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::ffi::OsString;
+    use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
+
+    /// Serializes tests that touch the process-global
+    /// `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE` env var so they never race.
+    static ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
+
+    /// Set `GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE` for the test lifetime, restoring any
+    /// prior value on drop.
+    struct InsecureEnv {
+        _lock: MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
+        prev: Option<OsString>,
+    }
+
+    impl InsecureEnv {
+        fn new() -> Self {
+            let lock = ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
+            let prev = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE");
+            std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", "1");
+            InsecureEnv { _lock: lock, prev }
+        }
+    }
+
+    impl Drop for InsecureEnv {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            match self.prev.take() {
+                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE", v),
+                None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE"),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ── P1: hostile error bodies must not reach the terminal raw ──────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_strips_control_chars_and_escapes() {
+        // ESC-based terminal escape + NUL + bell must all be removed.
+        let hostile = "\x1b[2J\x1b[31mowned\x07\0 done";
+        let clean = sanitize_excerpt(hostile);
+        assert!(!clean.contains('\x1b'), "ESC survived: {clean:?}");
+        assert!(
+            !clean.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()),
+            "control survived: {clean:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(clean.contains("owned") && clean.contains("done"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_strips_bidi_format_controls() {
+        // The Cc-only test above is vacuous for Cf: it passes whether or not bidi
+        // controls survive, which is why this gap shipped (#183). Here every Cf
+        // bidi class is stripped — override (RLO), embedding + pop (LRE/PDF),
+        // isolate (LRI/PDI), marks (LRM/ALM) — asserted per code point, and the
+        // visible words JOIN with no phantom space (a bidi char is dropped like a
+        // control byte, but unlike a newline/tab it is not whitespace). The leading
+        // bidi char (index 0) also exercises the empty-out path.
+        let out = sanitize_excerpt("\u{202e}err\u{202a}\u{202c}\u{2066}\u{2069}\u{200e}\u{061c}ok");
+        for c in [
+            '\u{202e}', '\u{202a}', '\u{202c}', '\u{2066}', '\u{2069}', '\u{200e}', '\u{061c}',
+        ] {
+            assert!(!out.contains(c), "bidi U+{:04X} leaked: {out:?}", c as u32);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(out, "errok");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_preserves_legitimate_and_rtl_text() {
+        // Must not over-strip: plain text, a genuine RTL SCRIPT letter (Arabic
+        // U+0627, category Lo), and ZWJ (U+200D, a legitimate Cf char) survive.
+        assert_eq!(
+            sanitize_excerpt("ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b"),
+            "ok \u{0627}\u{200D}b"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_collapses_whitespace_and_caps_length() {
+        let collapsed = sanitize_excerpt("a\n\n\t  b");
+        assert_eq!(collapsed, "a b");
+        let long = "x".repeat(MAX_ERR_CHARS + 500);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_excerpt(&long).chars().count(), MAX_ERR_CHARS);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_bidi_chars_do_not_consume_the_length_cap() {
+        // A dropped bidi char must not count toward MAX_ERR_CHARS: it is dropped
+        // before `kept` increments, so interleaving bidi controls cannot truncate
+        // the visible output early. MAX_ERR_CHARS + 100 visible 'x', each trailed by
+        // a bidi override, must still yield exactly MAX_ERR_CHARS visible 'x' with
+        // no phantom spaces. (Would regress to fewer 'x' if bidi consumed budget, or
+        // to spaces if the drop branch wrongly set pending_space.)
+        let body = "x\u{202e}".repeat(MAX_ERR_CHARS + 100);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_excerpt(&body), "x".repeat(MAX_ERR_CHARS));
+    }
+
+    // ── P2: never talk to (or hand a key to) an untrusted node-chosen URL ──
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_non_https_advertised_url() {
+        // A plaintext node-advertised URL is ignored; we fall back to default.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("http://evil.example/x"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_https_url_with_non_allowlisted_host() {
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL, "attacker host must not be honored");
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn honors_advertised_default_host_but_withholds_key_without_operator() {
+        // Default public host is allowlisted for talking, but with no operator
+        // origin configured the API key has no trusted destination.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2"), None);
+        assert_eq!(url, "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2");
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_trusted_only_for_operator_configured_origin() {
+        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
+        // Node advertises the operator's own origin → talk there, key allowed.
+        let (url, key_trusted) =
+            resolve_solver_url(Some("https://icap.mynode.example/v1"), Some(op));
+        assert_eq!(url, "https://icap.mynode.example/v1");
+        assert!(key_trusted);
+
+        // Node advertises an attacker origin while an operator is configured →
+        // ignore the advert, fall back to the operator origin, key stays with it.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("https://evil.example"), Some(op));
+        assert_eq!(url, op);
+        assert!(key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_advert_uses_operator_or_default() {
+        let op = "https://icap.mynode.example";
+        assert_eq!(resolve_solver_url(None, Some(op)), (op.to_string(), true));
+        assert_eq!(
+            resolve_solver_url(None, None),
+            (DEFAULT_URL.to_string(), false)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_https_operator_is_not_trusted() {
+        // A misconfigured plaintext operator URL is not a valid key destination.
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(None, Some("http://icap.mynode.example"));
+        assert_eq!(url, DEFAULT_URL);
+        assert!(!key_trusted);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_insecure_advertised_url_on_different_port() {
+        // With GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_INSECURE=1, two loopback URLs on different
+        // ports must be treated as distinct origins so a hostile node cannot
+        // redirect the bearer key to a different listener on localhost.
+        let _env = InsecureEnv::new();
+
+        let op = "http://localhost:3000";
+        let (url, key_trusted) = resolve_solver_url(Some("http://localhost:9000"), Some(op));
+        assert_eq!(
+            url, op,
+            "must fall back to operator origin, not use different port"
+        );
+        assert!(key_trusted, "key stays trusted with operator origin");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn new_withholds_key_from_untrusted_origin_but_attaches_for_operator() {
+        let guard = ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
+        let prev_key = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY");
+        let prev_op = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
+        std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY", "secret-bearer");
+
+        // Arm 1: No operator configured, node advertises an attacker origin.
+        // The key has no trusted destination; the advert is rejected.
+        std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
+        let untrusted =
+            IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", Some("https://evil.example".into()), None);
+
+        // Arm 1b: No operator configured, no URL advertised. The fallback goes
+        // to the default public origin, and with no operator to trust, the key
+        // must not ride.
+        let no_operator_no_advert = IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", None, None);
+
+        // Arm 2: Operator origin configured and advertised — key attached.
+        std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", "https://icap.mynode.example");
+        let operator_match = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icap.mynode.example/v1".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Arm 3: Operator configured, default host advertised. The default host
+        // is allowlisted and selected, but its origin differs from the
+        // operator's, so key must not ride.
+        let default_advert = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Arm 4: Operator configured, no URL advertised (the node sent only
+        // x-icaptcha-level, not x-icaptcha-url). resolve_solver_url falls back
+        // to the operator origin and marks the key trusted. This is the common
+        // API-key deployment path — a regression that additionally required
+        // url.is_some() for key attachment would leave all current tests green
+        // but make these fallback challenge/answer requests omit Authorization
+        // and fail against the protected operator service.
+        let operator_fallback = IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", None, Some(3));
+
+        // Arm 5: Operator configured, node advertises an attacker origin.
+        // The advert is rejected and the solver falls back to the operator's
+        // own origin, which keeps the key trusted — this is the exfiltration
+        // scenario the test name describes (withhold key from *untrusted*
+        // origin, not from the operator's fallback).
+        let operator_hostile_advert =
+            IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", Some("https://evil.example".into()), None);
+
+        // Arm 6: Operator configured, same host but different port.
+        // origin_key includes the port, so :8443 must not match the
+        // operator origin at the default :443 — the advert is rejected
+        // and the solver falls back to the operator origin.
+        let operator_diff_port = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icap.mynode.example:8443/evil".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Restore env and release the lock BEFORE asserting, so a failing
+        // assertion can't poison the shared lock or cascade into a sibling.
+        match prev_key {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY", v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY"),
+        }
+        match prev_op {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL"),
+        }
+        drop(guard);
+
+        let mut failures: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+
+        if untrusted.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1 (no operator, attacker advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                untrusted.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if untrusted.url != DEFAULT_URL {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1 (no operator, attacker advert): expected url={DEFAULT_URL}, got {}",
+                untrusted.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if no_operator_no_advert.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1b (no operator, no advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                no_operator_no_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if no_operator_no_advert.url != DEFAULT_URL {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1b (no operator, no advert): expected url={DEFAULT_URL}, got {}",
+                no_operator_no_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_match.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 2 (operator match): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_match.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_match.url != "https://icap.mynode.example/v1" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 2 (operator match): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example/v1, got {}",
+                operator_match.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if default_advert.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 3 (operator + default advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                default_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if default_advert.url != "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 3 (operator + default advert): expected url=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2, got {}",
+                default_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_fallback.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 4 (operator fallback, no advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_fallback.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_fallback.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 4 (operator fallback, no advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_fallback.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_hostile_advert.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 5 (operator + hostile advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_hostile_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_hostile_advert.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 5 (operator + hostile advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_hostile_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_diff_port.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 6 (operator + different port advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_diff_port.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_diff_port.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 6 (operator + different port advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_diff_port.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        assert!(failures.is_empty(), "\n{}", failures.join("\n"));
+    }
+}

crates/icaptcha-client/src/pow.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+//! Proof-of-work solver for the iCaptcha answer step.
+//!
+//! iCaptcha requires a small proof-of-work with each answer so that minting a
+//! proof costs CPU — a per-proof cost a distributed abuser cannot dodge by
+//! rotating IPs. The work is bound to the per-challenge id: find a `nonce` such
+//! that `sha256("{challenge}:{nonce}")` has at least `difficulty` leading zero
+//! bits. This mirrors `icaptcha/src/pow.ts`.
+//!
+//! At the service default (~20 bits) this is well under a second for a single
+//! solve; we still cap the search so a hostile/misconfigured difficulty can
+//! never hang the client.
+
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+/// PoW parameters advertised by the service in a challenge (mirrors the
+/// service's `PowChallenge`).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct PowChallenge {
+    /// Only `sha256-leading-zero-bits` is understood; other algorithms are
+    /// rejected by [`solve`] rather than silently mis-solved.
+    pub algorithm: String,
+    /// The string to hash against (the per-challenge id).
+    pub challenge: String,
+    /// Required leading zero bits.
+    pub difficulty: u32,
+}
+
+/// Hard cap on nonce search iterations. 2^26 ≈ 67M keeps a ~20-bit target (~1M
+/// expected hashes) comfortably solvable while bounding worst-case work if the
+/// service ever advertises an unexpectedly high difficulty.
+const MAX_ITERS: u64 = 1 << 26;
+
+const ALGORITHM: &str = "sha256-leading-zero-bits";
+
+/// Leading zero bits of a byte slice.
+fn leading_zero_bits(bytes: &[u8]) -> u32 {
+    let mut bits = 0;
+    for &b in bytes {
+        if b == 0 {
+            bits += 8;
+        } else {
+            bits += b.leading_zeros();
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    bits
+}
+
+/// sha256(`{challenge}:{nonce}`).
+fn pow_hash(challenge: &str, nonce: &str) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(challenge.as_bytes());
+    hasher.update(b":");
+    hasher.update(nonce.as_bytes());
+    hasher.finalize().into()
+}
+
+/// Solve the PoW, returning a nonce whose hash meets the difficulty. Returns
+/// `None` for an unknown algorithm or if no nonce is found within the cap (a
+/// difficulty far above what the service uses in practice).
+pub fn solve(pow: &PowChallenge) -> Option<String> {
+    if pow.algorithm != ALGORITHM {
+        tracing::warn!(algorithm = %pow.algorithm, "unknown iCaptcha PoW algorithm; cannot solve");
+        return None;
+    }
+    if pow.difficulty == 0 {
+        return Some("0".to_string());
+    }
+    for i in 0..MAX_ITERS {
+        let nonce = format!("{i:x}");
+        if leading_zero_bits(&pow_hash(&pow.challenge, &nonce)) >= pow.difficulty {
+            return Some(nonce);
+        }
+    }
+    tracing::warn!(
+        difficulty = pow.difficulty,
+        max_iters = MAX_ITERS,
+        "iCaptcha PoW not solved within iteration cap"
+    );
+    None
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn pow(challenge: &str, difficulty: u32) -> PowChallenge {
+        PowChallenge {
+            algorithm: ALGORITHM.to_string(),
+            challenge: challenge.to_string(),
+            difficulty,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn leading_zero_bits_counts_across_bytes() {
+        assert_eq!(leading_zero_bits(&[0xff]), 0);
+        assert_eq!(leading_zero_bits(&[0x7f]), 1);
+        assert_eq!(leading_zero_bits(&[0x01]), 7);
+        assert_eq!(leading_zero_bits(&[0x00, 0xff]), 8);
+        assert_eq!(leading_zero_bits(&[0x00, 0x01]), 15);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn solves_and_the_solution_verifies() {
+        let p = pow("challenge-abc", 12);
+        let nonce = solve(&p).expect("should solve a 12-bit target");
+        assert!(leading_zero_bits(&pow_hash(&p.challenge, &nonce)) >= 12);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn solution_is_bound_to_the_challenge() {
+        // A nonce solving one challenge should (overwhelmingly) not solve another
+        // at the same difficulty — the work is challenge-specific.
+        let nonce = solve(&pow("challenge-A", 12)).unwrap();
+        assert!(leading_zero_bits(&pow_hash("challenge-B", &nonce)) < 12);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_unknown_algorithm() {
+        let mut p = pow("c", 8);
+        p.algorithm = "scrypt".to_string();
+        assert!(solve(&p).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn zero_difficulty_is_trivially_solved() {
+        assert_eq!(solve(&pow("c", 0)).as_deref(), Some("0"));
+    }
+}

crates/icaptcha-client/src/solvers.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+//! Deterministic solvers for the computational iCaptcha challenge types.
+//!
+//! Prompt/answer formats mirror the iCaptcha service generators
+//! (`icaptcha/src/generators/{arithmetic,algebra,sequence}.ts`). The service
+//! grades numerics by value (`Number(a) === Number(b)`), so returning the plain
+//! integer string is sufficient. Anagram/logic (need a dictionary/parser) and
+//! the LLM types are intentionally NOT solved here — the client requests only
+//! these three types and falls back to a hook/interactive prompt otherwise.
+
+/// Solve a challenge of the given `type` from its prompt. Returns `None` for
+/// types we don't solve locally or when the prompt can't be parsed.
+pub fn solve(challenge_type: &str, prompt: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    match challenge_type {
+        "arithmetic" => solve_arithmetic(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        "algebra" => solve_algebra(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        "sequence" => solve_sequence(prompt).map(|n| n.to_string()),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// `What is 12 + 7 - 3?` -> evaluate the additive chain left to right.
+fn solve_arithmetic(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let expr = prompt
+        .trim()
+        .strip_prefix("What is ")?
+        .trim_end_matches('?')
+        .trim();
+    let mut tokens = expr.split_whitespace();
+    let mut acc: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+    while let Some(op) = tokens.next() {
+        let n: i64 = tokens.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+        match op {
+            "+" => acc += n,
+            "-" => acc -= n,
+            _ => return None,
+        }
+    }
+    Some(acc)
+}
+
+/// `Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19` (and the `=`-both-sides and `a(x + b)` variants).
+/// Parses each side into `coeff*x + const`, then x = (cR - cL) / (aL - aR).
+fn solve_algebra(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let eq = prompt.trim().strip_prefix("Solve for x:")?.trim();
+    let (lhs, rhs) = eq.split_once('=')?;
+    let (al, cl) = parse_linear(lhs.trim())?;
+    let (ar, cr) = parse_linear(rhs.trim())?;
+    let denom = al - ar;
+    if denom == 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let num = cr - cl;
+    if num % denom != 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(num / denom)
+}
+
+/// Parse a linear expression in `x` into `(coeff_of_x, constant)`.
+/// Handles `Nx`, `x`, integer constants, and a single `N(x ± M)` product,
+/// with `+`/`-` separators (the formats the generator emits).
+fn parse_linear(s: &str) -> Option<(i64, i64)> {
+    let s = s.trim();
+    // Parenthesized product: a(x ± b)  ->  coeff a, const a*(±b).
+    if let Some(open) = s.find('(') {
+        let a: i64 = s[..open].trim().parse().ok()?;
+        let close = s.find(')')?;
+        let inner = &s[open + 1..close]; // "x + 4" / "x - 4"
+        let mut it = inner.split_whitespace();
+        if it.next()? != "x" {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let (coeff_inner, const_inner) = match it.next() {
+            None => (1, 0),
+            Some(op) => {
+                let m: i64 = it.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+                match op {
+                    "+" => (1, m),
+                    "-" => (1, -m),
+                    _ => return None,
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        return Some((a * coeff_inner, a * const_inner));
+    }
+
+    // Sum of `±`-separated terms.
+    let mut coeff = 0i64;
+    let mut konst = 0i64;
+    let mut sign = 1i64;
+    for tok in s.split_whitespace() {
+        match tok {
+            "+" => sign = 1,
+            "-" => sign = -1,
+            t => {
+                if let Some(cpart) = t.strip_suffix('x') {
+                    let c: i64 = match cpart {
+                        "" | "+" => 1,
+                        "-" => -1,
+                        _ => cpart.parse().ok()?,
+                    };
+                    coeff += sign * c;
+                } else {
+                    let n: i64 = t.parse().ok()?;
+                    konst += sign * n;
+                }
+                sign = 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Some((coeff, konst))
+}
+
+/// `What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?`
+fn solve_sequence(prompt: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let tail = prompt.split_once("sequence?")?.1;
+    let nums: Vec<i64> = tail
+        .split(',')
+        .filter_map(|t| t.trim().parse::<i64>().ok())
+        .collect();
+    if nums.len() < 3 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    next_in_sequence(&nums)
+}
+
+fn next_in_sequence(n: &[i64]) -> Option<i64> {
+    let last = *n.last()?;
+
+    // Arithmetic: constant first difference.
+    let d = n[1] - n[0];
+    if n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == d) {
+        return Some(last + d);
+    }
+
+    // Geometric: constant integer ratio.
+    if n.iter().all(|&v| v != 0) && n[0] != 0 && n[1] % n[0] == 0 {
+        let r = n[1] / n[0];
+        if r != 0 && n.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] * r) {
+            return Some(last * r);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Fibonacci-like: each term is the sum of the two before it.
+    if n.len() >= 3 && (2..n.len()).all(|i| n[i] == n[i - 1] + n[i - 2]) {
+        return Some(n[n.len() - 1] + n[n.len() - 2]);
+    }
+
+    // Squares: all perfect squares with consecutive roots.
+    let roots: Option<Vec<i64>> = n.iter().map(|&v| isqrt_exact(v)).collect();
+    if let Some(roots) = roots {
+        if roots.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] == w[0] + 1) {
+            let nr = roots[roots.len() - 1] + 1;
+            return Some(nr * nr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Alternating sign over an arithmetic magnitude (generator starts positive).
+    let signs_alternate = n
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .all(|(i, &v)| if i % 2 == 0 { v >= 0 } else { v < 0 });
+    let mags: Vec<i64> = n.iter().map(|v| v.abs()).collect();
+    let md = mags[1] - mags[0];
+    if signs_alternate && mags.windows(2).all(|w| w[1] - w[0] == md) {
+        let next_mag = mags[mags.len() - 1] + md;
+        let next_sign = if last >= 0 { -1 } else { 1 };
+        return Some(next_sign * next_mag);
+    }
+
+    None
+}
+
+/// Exact integer square root, or `None` if `v` isn't a perfect square.
+fn isqrt_exact(v: i64) -> Option<i64> {
+    if v < 0 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let r = (v as f64).sqrt().round() as i64;
+    [r - 1, r, r + 1]
+        .into_iter()
+        .find(|&cand| cand >= 0 && cand * cand == v)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn arithmetic_chains() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("arithmetic", "What is 12 + 7 - 3?").as_deref(),
+            Some("16")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(solve("arithmetic", "What is 5?").as_deref(), Some("5"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("arithmetic", "What is 100 - 40 - 35 + 2?").as_deref(),
+            Some("27")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn algebra_linear() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3x + 4 = 19").as_deref(),
+            Some("5")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 5x - 8 = 12").as_deref(),
+            Some("4")
+        );
+        // both sides: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8  -> 3x = 24 -> x=8
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 16 = 5x - 8").as_deref(),
+            Some("8")
+        );
+        // parenthesized: 3(x - 4) = 9 -> x-4=3 -> x=7
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 3(x - 4) = 9").as_deref(),
+            Some("7")
+        );
+        // negative solution: 2x + 10 = 4  -> x=-3
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve("algebra", "Solve for x: 2x + 10 = 4").as_deref(),
+            Some("-3")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sequence_patterns() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("12")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("96")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("36")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            solve(
+                "sequence",
+                "What is the next number in this sequence? 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, ?"
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("8")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unsupported_types_return_none() {
+        assert_eq!(solve("anagram", "Unscramble: tca"), None);
+        assert_eq!(solve("riddle", "What has keys but no locks?"), None);
+    }
+}

crates/icaptcha-client/tests/icaptcha_mock_consumed.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+//! INV-19 guard: the icaptcha flow must actually call the service (consume the
+//! mock), not short-circuit or make a live call. If a future change let
+//! `obtain_proof` skip the network (e.g. a stray `cfg(test)` relaxation, which
+//! INV-19/INV-20 warn is inert across crates), the `.assert()` calls below go
+//! RED because the mocked endpoints were never hit.
+//!
+//! The mock-consumed assertions alone only prove the mock was hit; they cannot
+//! see a request that ALSO leaks the DID / answer / API key to `DEFAULT_URL` or
+//! any other origin (a different host the mock never observes). To make the
+//! "no live call" half of the guard load-bearing, the test blackholes every
+//! non-loopback destination: `NO_PROXY` lets the loopback mock through while a
+//! closed proxy port routes any other host nowhere, so the client contacting
+//! anything but the injected mock fails the request instead of silently
+//! succeeding. Point `cfg.url` at `DEFAULT_URL` and this test goes RED.
+//!
+//! `ALL_PROXY` alone is NOT enough: reqwest honors the scheme-specific
+//! `HTTPS_PROXY` / `https_proxy` (and the http equivalents) OVER `ALL_PROXY`, so
+//! a runner with a working `HTTPS_PROXY` in its environment would route an https
+//! leak to `DEFAULT_URL` (which is https) through that proxy while the loopback
+//! mock is still consumed and this test stayed green. So we blackhole the
+//! scheme-specific variables too. No restore is needed: this file has a single
+//! `#[test]`, so it runs in its own process and the override never races a
+//! sibling test.
+
+use icaptcha_client::{obtain_proof, Challenge, IcaptchaCfg};
+
+#[test]
+fn obtain_proof_consumes_the_mocked_service_and_makes_no_live_call() {
+    // Blackhole every non-loopback origin: the loopback mock bypasses the proxy
+    // (NO_PROXY); any other host is forced through a closed port and fails.
+    // reqwest reads these at client-build time, and obtain_proof builds its
+    // client fresh, so this bounds the transport for the whole flow.
+    //
+    // Set the scheme-specific vars too (both cases), not just ALL_PROXY: reqwest
+    // gives HTTPS_PROXY/https_proxy precedence over ALL_PROXY for https URLs, so
+    // an ALL_PROXY-only blackhole leaves an https leak to DEFAULT_URL open on a
+    // runner whose environment already has a working HTTPS_PROXY.
+    let blackhole = "http://127.0.0.1:1";
+    std::env::set_var("NO_PROXY", "127.0.0.1,localhost");
+    std::env::set_var("no_proxy", "127.0.0.1,localhost");
+    for var in [
+        "ALL_PROXY",
+        "all_proxy",
+        "HTTPS_PROXY",
+        "https_proxy",
+        "HTTP_PROXY",
+        "http_proxy",
+    ] {
+        std::env::set_var(var, blackhole);
+    }
+
+    let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+
+    // The two endpoints the flow hits, each expected exactly once.
+    let challenge = server
+        .mock("POST", "/v1/challenge")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(
+            r#"{"challengeId":"c1","type":"anagram","difficulty":1,"prompt":"listen","token":"tok-1"}"#,
+        )
+        .expect(1)
+        .create();
+
+    let answer = server
+        .mock("POST", "/v1/answer")
+        .with_status(200)
+        .with_header("content-type", "application/json")
+        .with_body(r#"{"status":"passed","proof":"PROOF-XYZ"}"#)
+        .expect(1)
+        .create();
+
+    let cfg = IcaptchaCfg {
+        url: server.url(),
+        did: "did:key:zTEST".to_string(),
+        level: 1,
+        api_key: None,
+    };
+
+    // "anagram" is not a built-in solvable type, so the flow consults this
+    // solver callback. The answer body itself does not matter: the mocked
+    // /v1/answer returns "passed" regardless of what is submitted.
+    let solve = |_c: &Challenge| Some("silent".to_string());
+    let solver: &dyn Fn(&Challenge) -> Option<String> = &solve;
+
+    let proof = obtain_proof(&cfg, Some(solver))
+        .expect("obtain_proof should complete against the mocked service");
+    assert_eq!(proof, "PROOF-XYZ");
+
+    // INV-19: prove the client actually called the mocked endpoints. Had it made
+    // a live call or skipped the network, these would fail (mock never hit).
+    challenge.assert();
+    answer.assert();
+}

docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Positive:
 Risks:
 
 - Many commands default to the public node; `git-remote-gitlawb` defaults to localhost. This split should be called out in README examples.
-- `gl sync trigger` signs the request when a local identity is available and falls back to the legacy unsigned request for live compatibility.
+- `gl sync trigger` requires a local identity and always sends a signed request; the `/api/v1/sync/trigger` route rejects unsigned calls, so the command fails locally when no identity is configured.
 - Several CLI commands parse dynamic JSON responses permissively; good for compatibility, but error messages can hide response-shape regressions.
 
 ## CI and release readiness

infra/aws/compose.yaml.tftpl

@@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ services:
       GITLAWB_P2P_PORT: "${p2p_port}"
       GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR: /data/repos
       GITLAWB_KEY: /data/keys/identity.pem
+      # Only trust X-Forwarded-For when the Caddy sidecar above is actually
+      # deployed (domain_name != ""). Caddy appends the real client as the
+      # rightmost hop, letting the push rate limiter key on the true client IP
+      # rather than Caddy's container address. Without Caddy, this header is
+      # fully client-controlled and must not be trusted.
+      GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY: "${domain_name != "" ? "x-forwarded-for" : ""}"
+      # iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on create/fork/register)
+      ICAPTCHA_MODE: ${icaptcha_mode}
+      ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY: ${icaptcha_pubkey}
+      ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL: "${icaptcha_required_level}"
       GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL: $${GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL}
       GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS: $${GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS}
       GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC: $${GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC}

infra/aws/main.tf

@@ -290,16 +290,19 @@ locals {
   )
 
   compose_yaml = templatefile("${path.module}/compose.yaml.tftpl", {
-    image_repo     = local.image_repo
-    image_tag      = var.image_tag
-    domain_name    = var.domain_name
-    db_host        = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
-    gitlawb_port   = var.gitlawb_port
-    p2p_port       = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
-    metrics_port   = var.metrics_port
-    expose_metrics = local.expose_metrics
-    pg_user        = var.postgres_user
-    pg_db          = var.postgres_db
+    image_repo              = local.image_repo
+    image_tag               = var.image_tag
+    domain_name             = var.domain_name
+    db_host                 = var.use_rds ? aws_db_instance.node[0].address : ""
+    gitlawb_port            = var.gitlawb_port
+    p2p_port                = var.gitlawb_p2p_port
+    metrics_port            = var.metrics_port
+    expose_metrics          = local.expose_metrics
+    pg_user                 = var.postgres_user
+    pg_db                   = var.postgres_db
+    icaptcha_mode           = var.icaptcha_mode
+    icaptcha_pubkey         = var.icaptcha_pubkey
+    icaptcha_required_level = var.icaptcha_required_level
   })
 
   user_data = templatefile("${path.module}/user-data.sh.tftpl", {

infra/aws/variables.tf

@@ -81,6 +81,28 @@ variable "image_tag" {
   default     = "latest"
 }
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# iCaptcha proof-of-intelligence gate (spam protection on writes)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+variable "icaptcha_mode" {
+  description = "iCaptcha gate mode: off | shadow | enforce. The live gitlawb network enforces."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "enforce"
+}
+
+variable "icaptcha_pubkey" {
+  description = "base64url Ed25519 public key of the iCaptcha service, pinned so startup doesn't depend on fetching it. This is the live icaptcha.gitlawb.com key."
+  type        = string
+  default     = "xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8"
+}
+
+variable "icaptcha_required_level" {
+  description = "Minimum iCaptcha proof level required to pass the gate."
+  type        = number
+  default     = 3
+}
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Networking / ingress
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

infra/fly/fly.toml

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ primary_region = "iad"
   GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = "https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node2.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com"
   GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = "true"
   GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = "524288000"
+  # On Fly: the edge sets Fly-Client-IP (overwriting any client-supplied value),
+  # so the push rate limiter keys on the real client. Without this the limiter
+  # would fall back to the socket peer (Fly's proxy) and over-throttle.
+  GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY = "fly"
 
 [http_service]
   internal_port = 7545
@@ -34,6 +38,16 @@ primary_region = "iad"
     # slots (hard_limit) — root factor in the 2026-06-12 prod outage
     idle_timeout = 120
 
+  [[http_service.checks]]
+    # Gate routing (and deploys) on real readiness: /ready probes the DB, so a
+    # node stuck retrying a dead or misconfigured database is never routed to,
+    # and a deploy with a bad DATABASE_URL fails visibly instead of going green.
+    interval = "15s"
+    timeout = "5s"
+    grace_period = "75s"
+    method = "GET"
+    path = "/ready"
+
 [[services]]
   protocol = "udp"
   internal_port = 7546

infra/fly/gitlawb-node-2.fly.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# fly.toml app configuration file generated for gitlawb-node-2 on 2026-07-22T09:47:18+08:00
+#
+# See https://fly.io/docs/reference/configuration/ for information about how to use this file.
+#
+
+app = 'gitlawb-node-2'
+primary_region = 'sjc'
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = '../../Dockerfile'
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = 'true'
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = 'https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_HOST = '0.0.0.0'
+  GITLAWB_KEY = '/data/keys/identity.pem'
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = '524288000'
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = '7546'
+  GITLAWB_PORT = '7545'
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = 'https://node2.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = '/data/repos'
+  ICAPTCHA_MODE = 'enforce'
+  ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY = 'xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8'
+  ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL = '3'
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = 'gitlawb_data'
+  destination = '/data'
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = 'off'
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = 'connections'
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+  [[http_service.checks]]
+    interval = '15s'
+    timeout = '5s'
+    grace_period = '30s'
+    method = 'GET'
+    path = '/ready'
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = 'udp'
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = 'shared-cpu-1x'
+  memory = '1024'
+
+[[metrics]]
+  port = 9091
+  path = '/metrics'

infra/fly/gitlawb-node-3.fly.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# fly.toml app configuration file generated for gitlawb-node-3 on 2026-07-22T09:47:19+08:00
+#
+# See https://fly.io/docs/reference/configuration/ for information about how to use this file.
+#
+
+app = 'gitlawb-node-3'
+primary_region = 'nrt'
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = '../../Dockerfile'
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = 'true'
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = 'https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node2.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_HOST = '0.0.0.0'
+  GITLAWB_KEY = '/data/keys/identity.pem'
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = '524288000'
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = '7546'
+  GITLAWB_PORT = '7545'
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = 'https://node3.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = '/data/repos'
+  ICAPTCHA_MODE = 'enforce'
+  ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY = 'xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8'
+  ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL = '3'
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = 'gitlawb_data'
+  destination = '/data'
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = 'off'
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = 'connections'
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+  [[http_service.checks]]
+    interval = '15s'
+    timeout = '5s'
+    grace_period = '30s'
+    method = 'GET'
+    path = '/ready'
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = 'udp'
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = 'shared-cpu-1x'
+  memory = '1024'
+
+[[metrics]]
+  port = 9091
+  path = '/metrics'

install.sh

@@ -193,5 +193,19 @@ else
   echo "  gl quickstart"
 fi
 
+# oh-my-zsh's default git plugin aliases gl='git pull', which silently shadows
+# the gl binary in every interactive zsh (aliases beat PATH). Detect the common
+# setup and say so now, at install time, instead of letting the first `gl`
+# print git's baffling "fatal: not a git repository".
+if [ -f "$HOME/.zshrc" ] && [ -d "$HOME/.oh-my-zsh/plugins/git" ] \
+  && grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*plugins=\(([^)]*[[:space:]])?git([[:space:]][^)]*)?\)' "$HOME/.zshrc" \
+  && ! grep -Eq '^([^#]*[[:space:];&|])?unalias[[:space:]]+([^;&|#]*[[:space:]])?gl([[:space:]]|$)' "$HOME/.zshrc"; then
+  echo ""
+  echo "NOTE: oh-my-zsh's git plugin aliases gl='git pull', which will shadow"
+  echo "the gl command in interactive shells. To use gl by name, run:"
+  echo ""
+  echo "  echo 'unalias gl 2>/dev/null' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc"
+fi
+
 echo ""
 echo "Docs: https://docs.gitlawb.com"

scripts/build-bins.sh

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ build_darwin_arm64() {
   echo "==> Building darwin-arm64 (native cargo)..."
   cd "$ROOT"
   export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
-  cargo build --release -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+  cargo build --release --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
   cp target/release/gl "$OUT/gl-darwin-arm64"
   cp target/release/git-remote-gitlawb "$OUT/git-remote-gitlawb-darwin-arm64"
   chmod +x "$OUT/gl-darwin-arm64" "$OUT/git-remote-gitlawb-darwin-arm64"

scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Dependency-purity gate for the `gitlawb-core` crate.
+#
+# gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (the gl CLI, git-remote-gitlawb,
+# the node daemon), so it must stay lean. This script recomputes gitlawb-core's
+# NORMAL (non-dev, non-build) transitive dependency set and fails if it contains
+# any crate not present in ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt.
+#
+# Hard-fail direction: a crate present now but NOT allowlisted. That is the case
+# the gate exists to catch (core silently gaining a heavy dependency).
+# Informational only: an allowlisted crate no longer present (stale entry) — a
+# legitimate dependency removal should not red CI, so it is reported, not failed.
+#
+# Runnable from anywhere in the repo.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+ALLOW="$ROOT/ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt"
+
+if [ ! -f "$ALLOW" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: allowlist not found at $ALLOW" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# `cargo tree` resolves WITHOUT --locked on purpose, unlike the blocking cargo
+# jobs in pr-checks. This gate answers one question, whether gitlawb-core's
+# dependency closure gained something unallowlisted, and a stale Cargo.lock
+# would red it for a reason that has nothing to do with that closure. Lock
+# staleness is already caught by the --locked cargo jobs, so it does not need a
+# second gate here.
+#
+# Resolving can refresh Cargo.lock as a side effect, so snapshot and restore
+# it: this check must never leave the working tree dirty when run locally.
+lock_backup="$(mktemp)"
+cp "$ROOT/Cargo.lock" "$lock_backup"
+restore_lock() { cp "$lock_backup" "$ROOT/Cargo.lock"; rm -f "$lock_backup"; }
+trap restore_lock EXIT
+
+# Current normal-dependency closure of gitlawb-core, one crate name per line.
+# Must match the regen command documented in the allowlist header exactly.
+current="$(
+  cargo tree -p gitlawb-core --edges normal --prefix none --manifest-path "$ROOT/Cargo.toml" \
+    | sed -E 's/ v[0-9].*$//' \
+    | grep -v '^gitlawb-core$' \
+    | sort -u
+)"
+
+# Allowlist with comments and blank lines stripped.
+allowed="$(grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' "$ALLOW" | sort -u)"
+
+# comm needs sorted input; both sides are sorted above.
+offenders="$(comm -23 <(printf '%s\n' "$current") <(printf '%s\n' "$allowed"))"
+stale="$(comm -13 <(printf '%s\n' "$current") <(printf '%s\n' "$allowed"))"
+
+if [ -n "$stale" ]; then
+  echo "NOTE: allowlisted crates no longer in gitlawb-core's dependency tree"
+  echo "      (safe to prune from ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt):"
+  printf '  %s\n' $stale
+  echo
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$offenders" ]; then
+  {
+    echo "ERROR: gitlawb-core gained dependencies not on the allowlist:"
+    printf '  %s\n' $offenders
+    echo
+    echo "gitlawb-core must stay embeddable and lean. If a new dependency is"
+    echo "intentional, add it to ci/gitlawb-core-allowed-deps.txt (regen command"
+    echo "is in that file's header). Otherwise, drop the dependency."
+  } >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "gitlawb-core dependency purity: OK ($(printf '%s\n' "$current" | wc -l | tr -d ' ') normal deps, all allowlisted)."