Merge pull request #281 from Gitlawb/release-please--branches--main--components--gitlawb-node

chore(main): release 0.7.1

.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ on:
   # result before it lands. Guards against semantic merge races where two
   # individually-green PRs break main in combination (#113 + #145 → #229).
   merge_group:
+  # Release-branch heads are created and pushed by GITHUB_TOKEN (release-please
+  # and the lock-sync job), and GitHub's recursion guard means those pushes
+  # trigger no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented carve-out that
+  # GITHUB_TOKEN CAN trigger, so the release flow dispatches this workflow at
+  # the release branch to attach check runs to its head. Read-only workflow
+  # (contents: read), so the dispatch surface adds no privilege.
+  workflow_dispatch:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
@@ -46,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
         run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
 
       - name: cargo clippy
-        run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+        run: cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
 
   test:
     name: test (${{ matrix.toolchain }})
@@ -94,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: cargo test
         env:
           DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/gitlawb_test
-        run: cargo test --workspace
+        run: cargo test --locked --workspace
 
   build-release:
     name: build --release
@@ -117,7 +124,7 @@ jobs:
           key: release
 
       - name: cargo build --release
-        run: cargo build --release --workspace
+        run: cargo build --locked --release --workspace
 
   audit:
     name: cargo audit
@@ -199,7 +206,7 @@ jobs:
           key: msrv
 
       - name: cargo check on MSRV
-        run: cargo check --workspace --all-targets
+        run: cargo check --locked --workspace --all-targets
 
   docker-build:
     name: Docker build smoke test
@@ -246,7 +253,7 @@ jobs:
           key: windows
 
       - name: cargo test (shipped Windows crates)
-        run: cargo test -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+        run: cargo test --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
   # gitlawb-core is embedded by every consumer (gl, git-remote-gitlawb, the node
   # daemon), so it must stay lean. This gate fails if gitlawb-core's normal

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ jobs:
       release_created: ${{ steps.release.outputs.release_created }}
       tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
       version: ${{ steps.release.outputs.version }}
+      pr: ${{ steps.release.outputs.pr }}
     steps:
       - name: Run release-please
         id: release
@@ -48,6 +49,143 @@ jobs:
         with:
           token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
+  # The release PR bumps the workspace crate versions in the Cargo.tomls but
+  # release-please cannot update Cargo.lock, so without this job every release
+  # merge ships a tag whose lockfile disagrees with its manifests (a --locked
+  # build from the tag fails, and pr-checks builds --locked). Sync the lock on
+  # the release branch so the tagged tree is internally consistent.
+  #
+  # Runs on every push-triggered release run, not only when release-please
+  # reports the PR: the `pr` output is set only on runs that CREATE or UPDATE
+  # the release PR, so gating on it would leave an already-open release PR
+  # (opened before this job existed, or untouched by a non-releasable push)
+  # permanently without the sync and without check runs. The resolve step
+  # discovers any open release-please PR itself and no-ops when there is none.
+  sync-release-lock:
+    name: Sync Cargo.lock on the release PR
+    needs: release-please
+    if: ${{ !cancelled() && github.repository == 'Gitlawb/node' && github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      pull-requests: read
+      # actions: write lets the final step dispatch pr-checks on the release
+      # branch. Note this grant is repo-wide dispatch rights (GitHub cannot
+      # scope it to one workflow); acceptable here because reaching this job's
+      # steps already requires write to main. Needed because every push to the
+      # release branch (release-please's and the lock sync below) is made with
+      # GITHUB_TOKEN, which triggers no workflow runs, so without an explicit
+      # dispatch the release PR's head carries no check runs and the --locked
+      # gate never validates it.
+      actions: write
+    steps:
+      # Prefer the fresh `pr` output when this run just created/updated the
+      # release PR; otherwise fall back to querying for an open release-please
+      # branch (prefix match: the branch carries `--components--` suffixes).
+      - name: Resolve the open release PR branch
+        id: resolve
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          OWNER: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
+          BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT: ${{ needs.release-please.outputs.pr && fromJSON(needs.release-please.outputs.pr).headBranchName || '' }}
+        run: |
+          branch="$BRANCH_FROM_OUTPUT"
+          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
+            # The branch name alone is not a trust signal. `gh pr list` includes
+            # fork PRs, and a fork's headRefName is bare (no owner prefix), so a
+            # prefix match by itself lets any fork nominate the branch this job
+            # checks out, commits to, and dispatches checks on. Require the head
+            # repo to be THIS repository and the author to be the release-please
+            # app, so neither a fork nor a same-repo human branch named
+            # `release-please--*` can be selected. Then take the highest PR
+            # number: `[0]` depended on gh's default ordering, which is not a
+            # documented guarantee, and picking a stable one keeps a second
+            # (component) release PR from making the choice flap between runs.
+            branch=$(gh pr list --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --state open \
+              --json headRefName,headRepositoryOwner,number,author \
+              --jq '[ .[]
+                      | select(.headRepositoryOwner.login == env.OWNER)
+                      | select(.author.login == "app/github-actions")
+                      | select(.headRefName | startswith("release-please--"))
+                    ] | max_by(.number).headRefName // empty')
+          fi
+          if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
+            echo "no open release PR; nothing to sync"
+          fi
+          echo "branch=$branch" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Checkout release branch
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
+
+      # Resolve on a declared toolchain instead of whatever Rust the runner
+      # image happens to ship, so the lock this job writes comes off the same
+      # stable channel the other cargo jobs use. Not a claim of identical
+      # resolution: `stable` still moves between runs, and the MSRV gate
+      # checks this same lock on 1.91 (pr-checks.yml). It only removes the
+      # runner image as an undeclared input.
+      - name: Install Rust toolchain
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@b3b07ba8b418998c39fb20f53e8b695cdcc8de1b # stable
+        with:
+          toolchain: stable
+
+      - name: Sync workspace crate versions into Cargo.lock
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        run: cargo update --workspace
+
+      - name: Commit and push when the lock changed
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        run: |
+          if git diff --quiet Cargo.lock; then
+            echo "Cargo.lock already in sync"
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+          git add Cargo.lock
+          git commit -m "chore: sync Cargo.lock with the release version bump"
+          git push
+
+      # Every push to the release branch is made with GITHUB_TOKEN (release-
+      # please's own pushes and the lock sync above), and events created by
+      # GITHUB_TOKEN start no workflow runs. workflow_dispatch is the documented
+      # exception GITHUB_TOKEN may trigger, so dispatch pr-checks at the release
+      # branch to attach check runs to its current head. Unconditional (also on
+      # the already-in-sync path) because the branch's ORIGINAL head has the
+      # same no-runs problem. Loud on failure by design: a silent fallback
+      # would recreate the checkless-head problem, and a job rerun is safe
+      # (sync no-ops, dispatch retries). Loop-safe: pr-checks is read-only and
+      # dispatches nothing. Runs after the push ack, so the dispatched ref tip
+      # is the sync commit. Merge-queue note: this validates the branch tip;
+      # the enforced merge queue's merge_group run still re-validates the true
+      # merged result before landing.
+      - name: Dispatch PR checks on the release branch
+        if: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch != '' }}
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          BRANCH: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.branch }}
+        run: |
+          # Every dispatch failure fails the job, including the 422 a release
+          # branch cut before pr-checks gained its workflow_dispatch trigger
+          # returns ("does not have a workflow_dispatch trigger", reported
+          # against the dispatched ref's copy of the file). An earlier revision
+          # tolerated exactly that 422 on the theory that release-please would
+          # rewrite the branch and heal it, but a rewrite only happens when a
+          # later releasable commit lands: an open release PR nobody touches is
+          # never rewritten. Tolerating it therefore left the lock-sync commit
+          # this job had just pushed sitting on the release head with no
+          # --locked validation, which is the precise state this workflow exists
+          # to prevent. The tolerance is also no longer needed: once this lands,
+          # every release branch is cut from a main that already carries the
+          # trigger, so the only branch that could 422 is one open at merge time
+          # (there is none), and a job rerun after a manual rebase is safe (the
+          # sync no-ops, the dispatch retries).
+          gh api "repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/actions/workflows/pr-checks.yml/dispatches" \
+            -f "ref=$BRANCH"
+
   # Each architecture builds NATIVELY (amd64 on ubuntu-latest, arm64 on
   # ubuntu-24.04-arm) and pushes by digest; docker-manifest below stitches the
   # digests into the tagged multi-arch image. No QEMU: emulating the arm64
@@ -308,7 +446,7 @@ jobs:
           set -euo pipefail
           args=""
           for b in $BINS; do args="$args -p $b"; done
-          cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
+          cargo build --release --locked --target ${{ matrix.target }} $args
 
       # Run each packaged binary's --version so a broken release artifact fails the
       # build instead of shipping. Every target builds on a matching-arch runner,

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "0.7.0"
+  ".": "0.7.1"
 }

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,31 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [0.7.1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.7.0...v0.7.1) (2026-08-03)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([99b2b9a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/99b2b9a16662761a3959a2941798e6823621bda5))
+* **ci:** make the docker dependency cache work and unbreak Dockerfile.bins ([a49e04d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/a49e04ddcd23f3b666421486ae60c3c4329e2242)), closes [#265](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/265) [#266](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/266)
+* **db:** pin profile DID matching with lone non-key fixture and boundary matrix ([b4016dc](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/b4016dce9d1fe450603173f9d92bd880127620fa)), closes [#298](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/298)
+* **node:** add a shared owner/name slug validator ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([51d82de](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/51d82ded57a776d9c7e2fe65895efdbf9e227dc8))
+* **node:** bound the slug owner by NAME_MAX, not the DID limit ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([27b0495](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/27b0495a6f7edeecddbe62b0f075a7e3b1ef5053))
+* **node:** fail a sync row terminally when a non-directory holds the owner path ([2e664b7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/2e664b7885036ee72ce175af95bb567b18222583))
+* **node:** make a stalled sync queue visible, and fix two test claims ([9aa4c17](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9aa4c17aefd1885d134b1334b54551366cdd8ef0))
+* **node:** move the attempted_at migration to v17, clear of two open branches ([fbc5868](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/fbc5868bd16946ea184dad26abcdb0e89d68e99a))
+* **node:** prove the mirror path is inside repos_dir before running git ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([3ca9473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/3ca94739ed7b90e4c265a0947025dc3b50e7583b))
+* **node:** reject a malformed slug at the notify boundary ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c587a40](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c587a40a508acea9f74c3468d42ff037397c75d0))
+* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([1964f88](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/1964f88378fe6942ffca5836de3a092b5b8f67b4))
+* **node:** reset a peer's reachability gate when an announce changes its http_url ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([e2560ee](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/e2560ee46c28e4e966d87867a86dc4bad4ca7a3a))
+* **node:** stamp every dequeued sync row so a stuck one yields the batch ([6e64d0d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/6e64d0d0a7fdd38ef3a56820c1808dd7c9bbd658))
+* **node:** stop a peer-supplied repo slug from escaping repos_dir ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([c70b1df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/c70b1df42d5c3f70ec4c272886c85fcc16ed92d1))
+* **node:** validate the queued slug before the worker derives a path ([#272](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/272)) ([9f00e24](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9f00e24aec217e4b8256dd437cff4741b1478b96))
+* **review:** correct two comment claims and guard two more wrong shapes ([#270](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/issues/270)) ([811ad50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/811ad504bc268c8e9cddac93822adcd00bfe9ff8))
+* **review:** stop the dequeue overclaiming, and pin the starvation premise ([457be11](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/457be11d728a2a34775cf96be2bc5af9a58cb250))
+* strict DID matching in get_profile ([acb4714](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/acb47145beec8ce7b20b7a2479f7a55ed68e2a89))
+* strict DID matching in get_profile ([13b565b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/13b565bcac09f075a7fd555a6e9acdd27de6c7bb))
+* target stored did on profile update aliases ([9836c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/commit/9836c3a21bc96a2ce95cb1fd12bd84b22142787d))
+
 ## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/node/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-07-22)
 
 

Cargo.lock

@@ -770,6 +770,23 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
+ "ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
+ "ark-serialize 0.6.0",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "educe",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-asm"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -800,6 +817,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-asm"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
+dependencies = [
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-macros"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -838,6 +865,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-macros"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-serialize"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -871,6 +911,30 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-bigint",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-serialize-derive",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "serde_with",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize-derive"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-std"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -901,6 +965,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand 0.8.6",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-std"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-traits",
+ "rand 0.8.6",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayref"
 version = "0.3.9"
@@ -2556,7 +2630,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7ab67060fc6b8ef687992d439ca0fa36e7ed17e9a0b16b25b601e8757df720de"
 dependencies = [
  "data-encoding",
- "syn 1.0.109",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -2928,7 +3002,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
 dependencies = [
  "libc",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -3300,7 +3374,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
@@ -3312,7 +3386,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3329,7 +3403,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -3356,7 +3430,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3412,10 +3486,11 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
+ "base64",
  "chrono",
  "clap",
  "dirs",
@@ -5740,14 +5815,15 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "ruint"
-version = "1.17.2"
+version = "1.20.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
+checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy-rlp",
  "ark-ff 0.3.0",
  "ark-ff 0.4.2",
  "ark-ff 0.5.0",
+ "ark-ff 0.6.0",
  "bytes",
  "fastrlp 0.3.1",
  "fastrlp 0.4.0",
@@ -5821,7 +5897,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "errno",
  "libc",
  "linux-raw-sys",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -6715,7 +6791,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "getrandom 0.4.2",
  "once_cell",
  "rustix",
- "windows-sys 0.52.0",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

Dockerfile

@@ -8,20 +8,33 @@ FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 
 WORKDIR /build
 
-# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds
+# Cache dependencies first for faster rebuilds.
+# EVERY workspace member's manifest must be copied here, not just the ones this
+# image ships: cargo loads the whole workspace before it resolves anything, so a
+# missing member's Cargo.toml (or a path dependency pointing at one) aborts the
+# layer before a single crate is fetched.
 COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
 COPY crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-core/
 COPY crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-node/
 COPY crates/gl/Cargo.toml crates/gl/
 COPY crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml crates/git-remote-gitlawb/
+COPY crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml crates/gitlawb-attest/
+COPY crates/icaptcha-client/Cargo.toml crates/icaptcha-client/
 
-# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change)
-RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src && \
+# Fetch deps (this layer caches until Cargo.{toml,lock} change).
+# No `|| true`: this layer is expected to succeed, and swallowing its exit code
+# is what let it sit dead from the moment gl gained a path dependency on
+# icaptcha-client. A failure here should stop the build, not silently turn every
+# image build into a cold one.
+RUN mkdir -p crates/gitlawb-core/src crates/gitlawb-node/src crates/gl/src \
+        crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src crates/gitlawb-attest/src crates/icaptcha-client/src && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gitlawb-node/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/gl/src/main.rs && \
     echo 'fn main() {}' > crates/git-remote-gitlawb/src/main.rs && \
     echo '' > crates/gitlawb-core/src/lib.rs && \
-    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb || true
+    echo '' > crates/gitlawb-attest/src/lib.rs && \
+    echo '' > crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs && \
+    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # Now copy real sources and build for real.
 # Force-bump mtimes so cargo's fingerprint check rebuilds — without this,
@@ -34,7 +47,7 @@ RUN find crates -name "*.rs" -exec touch {} + && \
     rm -rf target/release/.fingerprint/gitlawb-node-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/gl-* \
            target/release/.fingerprint/git-remote-gitlawb-* && \
-    cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
+    cargo build --release --locked -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb && \
     strip target/release/gitlawb-node target/release/gl target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
 
 # ── Runtime stage ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Dockerfile.bins

@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@
 # Used by scripts/build-bins.sh — not used for node deployment.
 ARG TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
 
-FROM rust:1.85-bookworm AS builder
+# Must stay at or above the workspace `rust-version` in Cargo.toml. An unmet
+# MSRV is a hard cargo error, and nothing in CI builds this file, so a stale
+# base image here fails only when someone runs scripts/build-bins.sh.
+FROM rust:1.91-bookworm AS builder
 ARG TARGET
 
 WORKDIR /build
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ COPY crates/ crates/
 # Configure cross-linker for aarch64
 ENV CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_MUSL_LINKER=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
 
-RUN cargo build --release --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+RUN cargo build --release --locked --target "$TARGET" -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
 
 FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 ARG TARGET

crates/git-remote-gitlawb/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
 description = "Git remote helper — enables 'git clone gitlawb://did:gitlawb:...'"
-version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-attest/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
 description = "External Attestation v1: pluggable provenance attachments for gitlawb ref-update certs"
-version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
 description = "Core cryptographic primitives for the gitlawb network: DIDs, CIDs, UCAN, HTTP Signatures, ref-update certificates"
-version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-node/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
 description = "The gitlawb node daemon — git hosting over HTTP with DID auth"
-version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/peers.rs

@@ -381,6 +381,14 @@ pub async fn notify_sync(
         )));
     }
 
+    // #272: the slug reaches a PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where an extra
+    // separator or a traversal segment places the mirror outside repos_dir. Reject
+    // it here, before the queue row and the ref-update row are written. The message
+    // names the field and nothing about where repos live on disk.
+    if let Err(e) = crate::git::repo_store::validate_repo_slug(&req.repo) {
+        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("invalid repo field: {e}")));
+    }
+
     state
         .db
         .enqueue_sync(&req.repo, &req.node_did, &req.ref_name, &req.new_sha, None)
@@ -584,7 +592,9 @@ mod tests {
         state.config = Arc::new(cfg);
     }
 
-    const NOTIFY_BODY: &str = r#"{"repo":"demo","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","new_sha":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","node_did":"PEER_DID"}"#;
+    // The slug must be a well-formed owner/name (#272); these brake tests are about
+    // the rate limiter, so the body carries a valid slug and reaches the brake.
+    const NOTIFY_BODY: &str = r#"{"repo":"z6Mkfoo/hello","ref_name":"refs/heads/main","new_sha":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","node_did":"PEER_DID"}"#;
 
     // ── trigger: mandatory signature ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -866,6 +876,265 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    // ── notify: repo slug validation (#272) ───────────────────────────────────
+    //
+    // An unsigned caller who has announced their own DID is a "known peer", so
+    // the slug they send reaches the sync worker's path join. `a//tmp/probe`
+    // resolved to /tmp/probe.git, outside repos_dir entirely. notify must reject
+    // anything that is not a well-formed owner/name slug before it is queued.
+
+    /// Every slug shape the boundary must refuse. `a//tmp/gitlawb-probe` is the
+    /// verified escape; the rest are the traversal and empty-half neighbours.
+    const MALFORMED_SLUGS: [&str; 9] = [
+        "a//tmp/gitlawb-probe",
+        "../hello",
+        "./hello",
+        "../../etc/evil",
+        "a/../../x",
+        "..",
+        "demo",
+        "/hello",
+        "z6Mkfoo/",
+    ];
+
+    fn notify_body(repo: &str, peer_did: &str) -> String {
+        serde_json::json!({
+            "repo": repo,
+            "ref_name": "refs/heads/main",
+            "new_sha": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+            "node_did": peer_did,
+        })
+        .to_string()
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejects_malformed_repo_slugs(pool: PgPool) {
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        for (i, slug) in MALFORMED_SLUGS.iter().enumerate() {
+            // Distinct source IPs so the per-IP brake never masks the 400.
+            let ip = format!("198.51.100.{}:5000", i + 1);
+            let resp = router
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                    "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                    &notify_body(slug, &peer_did),
+                    &ip,
+                ))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                resp.status(),
+                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                "slug {slug:?} must be rejected"
+            );
+        }
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            queued.is_empty(),
+            "no malformed slug may be queued, got {:?}",
+            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejection_body_names_field_not_path(pool: PgPool) {
+        // R3: the client learns which field was bad, never where repos live on
+        // disk. A message carrying the resolved path would hand an unsigned
+        // caller the server's layout.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let repos_dir = state.config.repos_dir.display().to_string();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.20:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        assert!(body.contains("repo"), "body must name the field: {body}");
+        assert!(
+            !body.contains(&repos_dir),
+            "body must not leak repos_dir ({repos_dir}): {body}"
+        );
+        for trimmed in repos_dir.trim_start_matches("./").split('/') {
+            assert!(
+                trimmed.is_empty() || !body.contains(trimmed),
+                "body must not leak a repos_dir segment ({trimmed}): {body}"
+            );
+        }
+        // A rooted path is a leading '/' with something after it. A bare quoted
+        // '/' is the separator the message is allowed to talk about.
+        assert!(
+            !body
+                .split(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '"' || c == '\'')
+                .any(|tok| tok.starts_with('/') && tok.len() > 1),
+            "body must not contain a rooted filesystem path: {body}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_rejection_writes_no_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The second half of R1: the ref-update feed row sits after enqueue_sync,
+        // so the early return must skip it too. Asserted, not argued.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.21:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates")
+            .fetch_one(&pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            count, 0,
+            "a rejected notify must not seed the ref-update feed"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_accepts_valid_slug_and_records_ref_update(pool: PgPool) {
+        // must-not-break, and the control that keeps the two negative assertions
+        // above from being vacuous: a well-formed slug still queues and still
+        // writes its ref-update row.
+        let state = test_state(pool.clone()).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let peer_did = seed_peer(&state).await;
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("z6Mkfoo/hello", &peer_did),
+                "198.51.100.22:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(queued.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(queued[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/hello");
+        let count: i64 =
+            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM received_ref_updates WHERE repo = $1")
+                .bind("z6Mkfoo/hello")
+                .fetch_one(&pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            count, 1,
+            "the valid path must still write the ref-update row"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn sync_notify_unknown_peer_wins_over_malformed_slug(pool: PgPool) {
+        // Ordering: the slug check sits after the peer gate, so an unknown peer
+        // still gets the unknown-peer message rather than a slug complaint.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let stranger = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe", &stranger),
+                "198.51.100.23:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let body = String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            body.contains("unknown peer DID"),
+            "peer gate must still fire first: {body}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn unsigned_announce_then_notify_cannot_queue_a_repos_dir_escape(pool: PgPool) {
+        // The reachability case for #272, committed in its attack form. Two
+        // unsigned requests through the shipped router, no signature and no
+        // config change: announce the attacker's own DID (which is what makes
+        // them a "known peer"), then notify with `a/<abs>/gitlawb-probe`. That
+        // slug used to reach PathBuf::join in the sync worker, where the
+        // absolute second component discarded repos_dir and planted a mirror at
+        // /<abs>/gitlawb-probe.git. The notify must now be refused outright.
+        //
+        // This has to run over crate::server::build_router rather than a
+        // directly mounted handler: the point of the test is that the default
+        // layer stack (optional_signature, not require_signature) leaves the
+        // route open, so mounting the handler alone would assert nothing about
+        // reachability.
+        let state = test_state(pool).await;
+        let db = state.db.clone();
+        let attacker = Keypair::generate().did().to_string();
+        let router = crate::server::build_router(state);
+
+        let announce =
+            format!(r#"{{"did":"{attacker}","http_url":"https://attacker.example.com"}}"#);
+        let resp = router
+            .clone()
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/peers/announce",
+                &announce,
+                "198.51.100.40:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // Asserted, not assumed: this plan does not change announce, and the
+        // whole attack rests on an unsigned announce still succeeding.
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "unsigned announce still admits an attacker-generated DID"
+        );
+
+        let outside = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let escape_dir = outside.path().join("gitlawb-probe");
+        let slug = format!("a/{}", escape_dir.display());
+        let resp = router
+            .oneshot(unsigned_post(
+                "/api/v1/sync/notify",
+                &notify_body(&slug, &attacker),
+                "198.51.100.41:5000",
+            ))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            resp.status(),
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            "notify must refuse the escaping slug {slug:?}"
+        );
+
+        let queued = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(100).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            queued.is_empty(),
+            "sync_queue must stay empty, got {:?}",
+            queued.iter().map(|q| &q.repo).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !escape_dir.with_extension("git").exists(),
+            "nothing may be written at the escape target"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[sqlx::test]
     async fn announce_still_accepts_unsigned_in_default_mode(pool: PgPool) {
         // must-not-over-reach: adding the brake must not tighten announce's

crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -883,6 +883,24 @@ const MIGRATIONS: &[Migration] = &[
             "ALTER TABLE received_ref_updates ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS owner_did TEXT",
         ],
     },
+    // Reservation: v17, deliberately not main's current_max + 1 (which is 12).
+    // The runner keys the applied set on the integer alone, so a version another
+    // in-flight branch also claims is skipped in full on whichever side merges
+    // second — no error, no warning, and schema_migrations still reads healthy
+    // while the column is simply absent. Two open branches already claim into
+    // this range: #135/#173 holds through 14 (15 once it rebases past v11), and
+    // #253 took 16. 17 clears both. Gaps are harmless: the runner iterates the
+    // array and never requires contiguity.
+    Migration {
+        version: 17,
+        name: "sync_queue_attempted_at",
+        stmts: &[
+            // Scheduling key for dequeue_pending_syncs: when the row was last
+            // handed to a worker. Null until first dequeued, which is why the
+            // ordering coalesces onto enqueued_at.
+            "ALTER TABLE sync_queue ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS attempted_at TEXT",
+        ],
+    },
 ];
 
 // ── Repos ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -899,6 +917,10 @@ pub(crate) fn normalize_owner_key(did: &str) -> &str {
 /// drift apart. If you change `normalize_owner_key`, update this const too.
 const OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL: &str = "CASE WHEN owner_did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(owner_did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(owner_did, 9) ELSE owner_did END";
 
+/// SQL CASE expression byte-identical to `normalize_owner_key`, but for columns
+/// named `did` (like in agent_profiles) instead of `owner_did`.
+const PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL: &str = "CASE WHEN did LIKE 'did:key:%' AND position(':' in substr(did, 9)) = 0 THEN substr(did, 9) ELSE did END";
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod normalize_owner_key_tests {
     use super::normalize_owner_key;
@@ -1637,13 +1659,46 @@ impl Db {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Take up to `limit` pending syncs — the least recently attempted ones —
+    /// and stamp each with the time it was handed out.
+    ///
+    /// Selecting and stamping in one statement is deliberate. A row the worker
+    /// cannot make progress on stays `pending` so it is retried, and if its
+    /// ordering key never moved it would remain among the oldest rows forever,
+    /// holding a fixed-size window against every healthy repo behind it.
+    /// Stamping on the way out makes the key "least recently handed out", so a
+    /// stuck row rotates to the back instead. Doing it here rather than at each
+    /// deferral branch in the worker is what makes that hold by construction:
+    /// no call site can forget it, and a batch that dies mid-loop still leaves
+    /// its rows stamped. `enqueued_at` is left alone so backlog age stays
+    /// measurable.
+    ///
+    /// Two things this deliberately does not promise. The returned rows are the
+    /// right *set*, in no particular order — `RETURNING` does not sort, and
+    /// nothing in `process_batch` depends on the order within a batch. And this
+    /// is not a claim: the rows stay `pending` with no row lock held past the
+    /// statement, so two workers against one database can still be handed the
+    /// same batch. Single-worker deployment is the existing assumption;
+    /// `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` is what would change that, and it is not here.
+    ///
+    /// Errors surface to the caller, which logs and skips the poll. That is
+    /// worth knowing now that this writes: it can fail for reasons a plain
+    /// SELECT could not, such as a read-only transaction or a lock timeout.
     pub async fn dequeue_pending_syncs(&self, limit: i64) -> Result<Vec<SyncQueueItem>> {
         let rows = sqlx::query(
-            "SELECT id, repo, node_did, ref_name, new_sha, cid, status, enqueued_at
-             FROM sync_queue WHERE status = 'pending'
-             ORDER BY enqueued_at ASC LIMIT $1",
+            // The outer `status = 'pending'` is not redundant with the
+            // subquery's: between the two, a concurrent worker can settle a row,
+            // and without it the UPDATE would still stamp and return a row that
+            // had already left the pending set.
+            "UPDATE sync_queue SET attempted_at = $2
+             WHERE status = 'pending' AND id IN (
+                 SELECT id FROM sync_queue WHERE status = 'pending'
+                 ORDER BY COALESCE(attempted_at, enqueued_at) ASC LIMIT $1
+             )
+             RETURNING id, repo, node_did, ref_name, new_sha, cid, status, enqueued_at",
         )
         .bind(limit)
+        .bind(Utc::now().to_rfc3339())
         .fetch_all(&self.pool)
         .await?;
         Ok(rows
@@ -2089,10 +2144,46 @@ impl Db {
             anyhow::bail!("refusing to register non-public peer http_url: {http_url}");
         }
         let now = Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
+        // A changed URL drops the reachability gate, so a repointed peer does
+        // not inherit a probe the previous host earned. In the DO UPDATE branch
+        // `peers.http_url` is the existing pre-update row (the proposed value is
+        // $2), and the comparison runs under the conflict row lock, so
+        // concurrent announces for one DID serialize instead of racing a
+        // read-then-write. That orders announces against each other and nothing
+        // more: mark_peer_ping writes by DID with no http_url predicate, so a
+        // probe of the previous URL that lands after a reset can still re-grant
+        // the flag until the next round.
+        //
+        // Comparison is exact. http_url is stored as announced, so a cosmetic
+        // difference such as a trailing slash also clears the flag; the peer
+        // re-earns it on a later gossip round, provided no further announce
+        // lands first. Normalizing instead would mean canonicalizing the stored
+        // value, this comparison, and the existing trim_end_matches call sites.
+        //
+        // last_ping_ok is NOT a trust signal. An unauthenticated caller can
+        // clear it by announcing a different URL, and until #248 lands can also
+        // set it through the unauthenticated GET /api/v1/peers/{did}/ping, which
+        // writes mark_peer_ping from the stored URL's own probe response. Do not
+        // build a new consumer on this flag as if it were attacker-resistant.
+        //
+        // Only the federated repo fan-out in api/repos.rs gates on this flag.
+        // Four consumers act on a repointed http_url regardless of it (sync.rs's
+        // origin resolve, the post-receive notify fan-out, trigger_sync, and the
+        // public resolve route), and two read surfaces republish it as
+        // `reachable` (api/resolve.rs, api/peers.rs), which is where a reset
+        // becomes externally visible. So this bounds the automatic inheritance
+        // rather than closing the rewrite. Binding a DID to its first-seen
+        // announcing key is what closes it: #273.
         sqlx::query(
             "INSERT INTO peers (did, http_url, last_seen, last_ping_ok, announced_at)
              VALUES ($1, $2, $3, FALSE, $3)
-             ON CONFLICT(did) DO UPDATE SET http_url = $2, last_seen = $3",
+             ON CONFLICT(did) DO UPDATE SET
+               http_url = $2,
+               last_seen = $3,
+               last_ping_ok = CASE
+                 WHEN peers.http_url IS DISTINCT FROM $2 THEN FALSE
+                 ELSE peers.last_ping_ok
+               END",
         )
         .bind(did)
         .bind(http_url)
@@ -3367,6 +3458,9 @@ impl Db {
             let new_website = website.or(existing.website.as_deref());
             let new_socials = socials.or(existing.socials.as_deref());
 
+            // get_profile equates bare short ids with did:key:<id>. UPDATE must target
+            // the stored row identity (existing.did), not the caller's raw input form,
+            // or a did:key: alias against a bare-stored profile updates zero rows.
             sqlx::query(
                 "UPDATE agent_profiles
                  SET display_name=$1, bio=$2, avatar_url=$3, website=$4, socials=$5, updated_at=$6
@@ -3378,12 +3472,12 @@ impl Db {
             .bind(new_website)
             .bind(new_socials)
             .bind(&now)
-            .bind(did)
+            .bind(&existing.did)
             .execute(&self.pool)
             .await?;
 
             Ok(ProfileRecord {
-                did: did.to_string(),
+                did: existing.did,
                 display_name: new_name.map(String::from),
                 bio: new_bio.map(String::from),
                 avatar_url: new_avatar.map(String::from),
@@ -3424,14 +3518,20 @@ impl Db {
     }
 
     pub async fn get_profile(&self, did: &str) -> Result<Option<ProfileRecord>> {
-        let row = sqlx::query(
+        // Same owner-key contract as get_repo: strip `did:key:` only when the
+        // remainder is a bare key id. The old `LIKE '%:' || $1` matched any DID
+        // method that shared a suffix and could resolve the wrong profile.
+        let did_key = normalize_owner_key(did);
+        let sql = format!(
             "SELECT did, display_name, bio, avatar_url, website, socials, profile_cid, created_at, updated_at
              FROM agent_profiles
-             WHERE did = $1 OR did LIKE '%:' || $1",
-        )
-        .bind(did)
-        .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
-        .await?;
+             WHERE ({key}) = $1",
+            key = PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL
+        );
+        let row = sqlx::query(&sql)
+            .bind(did_key)
+            .fetch_optional(&self.pool)
+            .await?;
 
         Ok(row.map(|r| ProfileRecord {
             did: r.get("did"),
@@ -3447,10 +3547,17 @@ impl Db {
     }
 
     pub async fn set_profile_cid(&self, did: &str, cid: &str) -> Result<()> {
-        sqlx::query("UPDATE agent_profiles SET profile_cid = $1, updated_at = $2 WHERE did = $3")
+        // Same did:key / bare equivalence as get_profile so a full did:key: form
+        // updates a profile stored under the bare short id.
+        let did_key = normalize_owner_key(did);
+        let sql = format!(
+            "UPDATE agent_profiles SET profile_cid = $1, updated_at = $2 WHERE ({key}) = $3",
+            key = PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL
+        );
+        sqlx::query(&sql)
             .bind(cid)
             .bind(Utc::now().to_rfc3339())
-            .bind(did)
+            .bind(did_key)
             .execute(&self.pool)
             .await?;
         Ok(())
@@ -3654,6 +3761,186 @@ mod migration_tests {
         // (d) Re-run: idempotent — ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS must not error.
         db.migrate().await.unwrap();
     }
+
+    // ── sync_queue scheduling (attempted_at, v17) ────────────────────────────
+
+    async fn enqueue_one(db: &super::Db, repo: &str) {
+        db.enqueue_sync(
+            repo,
+            "did:key:zPEER",
+            "refs/heads/main",
+            &"0".repeat(40),
+            None,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    async fn attempted_at_of(db: &super::Db, repo: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT attempted_at FROM sync_queue WHERE repo = $1")
+            .bind(repo)
+            .fetch_one(&db.pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// Upgrade-path test: simulate a node already at v11 and let the real
+    /// migration entry point apply v17, rather than hand-copying its SQL.
+    ///
+    /// This is the test that catches the column being added to the v1
+    /// statement array instead of a new migration. v1 never re-runs on an
+    /// existing install, so that mistake breaks every deployed node's dequeue
+    /// while staying invisible to every other test here, since `#[sqlx::test]`
+    /// hands out a fresh database that runs the whole chain.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn migration_v17_adds_sync_queue_attempted_at(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = super::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+
+        // Roll back to v11: drop the column and forget the version.
+        sqlx::query("ALTER TABLE sync_queue DROP COLUMN attempted_at")
+            .execute(&db.pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = 17")
+            .execute(&db.pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // A row written by the old node, before the column existed.
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/legacy").await;
+
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+
+        let col: (String, String) = sqlx::query_as(
+            "SELECT data_type, is_nullable
+             FROM information_schema.columns
+             WHERE table_name = 'sync_queue' AND column_name = 'attempted_at'",
+        )
+        .fetch_one(&db.pool)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(col.0, "text");
+        assert_eq!(col.1, "YES", "attempted_at must be nullable");
+
+        let recorded: (i64,) =
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations WHERE version = 17")
+                .fetch_one(&db.pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(recorded.0, 1, "v17 must be recorded as applied");
+
+        // The pre-existing row survives with a null key and is still dequeued.
+        assert_eq!(attempted_at_of(&db, "z6Mkfoo/legacy").await, None);
+        let items = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(10).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(items.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(items[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/legacy");
+
+        // Idempotent re-run.
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn dequeue_stamps_attempted_at_on_every_row_it_hands_out(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        // The stamp is what stops a deferred row from holding the window, and
+        // it happens here rather than at the deferral branches so no call site
+        // can forget it.
+        let db = super::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/a").await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            attempted_at_of(&db, "z6Mkfoo/a").await,
+            None,
+            "a freshly enqueued row has no attempt yet"
+        );
+
+        let items = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(10).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(items.len(), 1);
+        assert!(
+            attempted_at_of(&db, "z6Mkfoo/a").await.is_some(),
+            "dequeue must stamp the row it returns, whatever the worker does next"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn dequeue_orders_by_last_attempt_then_enqueue_time(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        let db = super::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/older").await;
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/newer").await;
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE sync_queue SET enqueued_at = $1 WHERE repo = $2")
+            .bind("2026-07-29T00:00:00Z")
+            .bind("z6Mkfoo/older")
+            .execute(&db.pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        sqlx::query("UPDATE sync_queue SET enqueued_at = $1 WHERE repo = $2")
+            .bind("2026-07-29T00:00:01Z")
+            .bind("z6Mkfoo/newer")
+            .execute(&db.pool)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        // Never-attempted rows fall back to enqueue order.
+        let first = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(1).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(first[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/older");
+
+        // Having been attempted, it now sorts behind the untried row.
+        let second = db.dequeue_pending_syncs(1).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            second[0].repo, "z6Mkfoo/newer",
+            "an attempted row must yield to one that has never been tried"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn dequeue_leaves_enqueued_at_untouched(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        // enqueued_at keeps meaning enqueue time, so backlog age stays
+        // measurable; that is the reason attempted_at is a separate column.
+        let db = super::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/a").await;
+        let before: String =
+            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT enqueued_at FROM sync_queue WHERE repo = 'z6Mkfoo/a'")
+                .fetch_one(&db.pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+
+        db.dequeue_pending_syncs(10).await.unwrap();
+
+        let after: String =
+            sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT enqueued_at FROM sync_queue WHERE repo = 'z6Mkfoo/a'")
+                .fetch_one(&db.pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(before, after);
+    }
+
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn dequeue_does_not_touch_settled_rows(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
+        // The stamping UPDATE must not reach a row that already left the
+        // pending set, or a terminal row could be dragged back into rotation.
+        let db = super::Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.migrate().await.unwrap();
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/failed").await;
+        enqueue_one(&db, "z6Mkfoo/done").await;
+        let ids: Vec<(String, String)> =
+            sqlx::query_as("SELECT repo, id FROM sync_queue ORDER BY repo")
+                .fetch_all(&db.pool)
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+        for (repo, id) in &ids {
+            if repo.ends_with("failed") {
+                db.mark_sync_failed(id).await.unwrap();
+            } else {
+                db.mark_sync_done(id).await.unwrap();
+            }
+        }
+
+        assert!(db.dequeue_pending_syncs(10).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(attempted_at_of(&db, "z6Mkfoo/failed").await, None);
+        assert_eq!(attempted_at_of(&db, "z6Mkfoo/done").await, None);
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -4404,6 +4691,103 @@ mod dedup_db_tests {
         assert!(!got.is_public, "non-key row's is_public must be preserved");
     }
 
+    /// get_profile must not resolve a non-key DID (e.g. did:gitlawb:) when
+    /// queried with the bare short id. The old `LIKE '%:' || $1` clause was too
+    /// broad and could return the wrong profile row.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn get_profile_does_not_match_non_key_did(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let short = "z6Mkprof1";
+
+        // Seed only a non-key DID row first. When queried with the bare short ID,
+        // get_profile must return None (lone non-key fixture test).
+        db.upsert_profile(
+            &format!("did:gitlawb:{short}"),
+            Some("other-method"),
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+            None,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let got = db.get_profile(short).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            got.is_none(),
+            "bare short id must not resolve a lone non-key DID profile"
+        );
+
+        // Now seed the canonical bare key profile row as well.
+        db.upsert_profile(short, Some("canonical"), None, None, None, None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let got = db
+            .get_profile(short)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("bare short id should resolve the key-form profile");
+        assert_eq!(got.did, short);
+        assert_eq!(got.display_name.as_deref(), Some("canonical"));
+
+        let got = db
+            .get_profile(&format!("did:key:{short}"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("did:key form should also resolve the key-form profile");
+        assert_eq!(got.did, short);
+
+        let got = db
+            .get_profile(&format!("did:gitlawb:{short}"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("full non-key DID should resolve its own profile");
+        assert_eq!(got.did, format!("did:gitlawb:{short}"));
+        assert_eq!(got.display_name.as_deref(), Some("other-method"));
+    }
+
+    /// upsert_profile must update a bare-stored profile when called with the
+    /// full did:key: form. get_profile equates the two, so the UPDATE has to
+    /// target existing.did rather than the raw input.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn upsert_profile_updates_via_did_key_alias(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        let short = "z6Mkprof2";
+
+        db.upsert_profile(short, Some("before"), None, None, None, None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let updated = db
+            .upsert_profile(
+                &format!("did:key:{short}"),
+                Some("after"),
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(updated.did, short, "preserve the stored did form on update");
+        assert_eq!(updated.display_name.as_deref(), Some("after"));
+
+        let got = db
+            .get_profile(short)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .expect("profile should still resolve by bare short id");
+        assert_eq!(got.did, short);
+        assert_eq!(got.display_name.as_deref(), Some("after"));
+
+        db.set_profile_cid(&format!("did:key:{short}"), "bafytestcid")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let got = db.get_profile(short).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(got.profile_cid.as_deref(), Some("bafytestcid"));
+    }
+
     /// Verify that the Rust `normalize_owner_key` and the `OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL`
     /// expression agree on every boundary value in the owner-key normalization
     /// set. A mismatch would let the Rust code bind a different key than the SQL
@@ -4453,6 +4837,49 @@ mod dedup_db_tests {
             );
         }
     }
+
+    /// Verify that `PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL` (which aliases the column `did`) also
+    /// agrees with Rust `normalize_owner_key` across the full boundary matrix.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn profile_did_case_sql_matches_normalize_owner_key(pool: PgPool) {
+        let boundary_values = [
+            "did:key:z6Mkfoo",
+            "z6Mkfoo",
+            "did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo",
+            "did:web:example.com:alice",
+            "did:key:did:gitlawb:z6Mkfoo",
+            "",
+            "did:key:",
+            "DID:KEY:z6Mkfoo",
+        ];
+
+        let values_sql: String = boundary_values
+            .iter()
+            .map(|v| format!("('{}'::text)", v))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join(", ");
+        let sql = format!(
+            "WITH data(did) AS (VALUES {values_sql})
+             SELECT did, ({key}) AS normalized FROM data ORDER BY did",
+            key = super::PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL
+        );
+
+        let rows: Vec<(String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(&sql).fetch_all(&pool).await.unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            rows.len(),
+            boundary_values.len(),
+            "every boundary value must produce a row"
+        );
+
+        for (val, sql_result) in &rows {
+            let rust_result = super::normalize_owner_key(val);
+            assert_eq!(
+                sql_result, rust_result,
+                "PROFILE_DID_CASE_SQL(\"{val}\") mismatch: Rust = \"{rust_result}\", SQL CASE = \"{sql_result}\""
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /// Exercises the iCaptcha single-use proof ledger (`icaptcha_consumed_proofs`),
@@ -5681,3 +6108,170 @@ mod ref_update_db_tests {
         assert_eq!(all[0].new_sha, "gggg");
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod peer_reachability_tests {
+    use super::Db;
+    use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+    const VICTIM_DID: &str = "did:key:z6MkvictimPeerFixture";
+    const HONEST_URL: &str = "https://honest-peer.example.com";
+    const ATTACKER_URL: &str = "https://attacker.example.com";
+
+    async fn db(pool: PgPool) -> Db {
+        let db = Db::for_testing(pool);
+        db.run_migrations().await.unwrap();
+        db
+    }
+
+    /// Read the row back through `list_peers`, the same surface the federated
+    /// fan-out filters on, rather than issuing raw SQL from the test.
+    async fn peer(db: &Db, did: &str) -> (String, bool) {
+        let row = db
+            .list_peers()
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .into_iter()
+            .find(|p| p.did == did)
+            .expect("seeded peer row is missing");
+        (row.http_url, row.last_ping_ok)
+    }
+
+    /// Parsed rather than string-compared, so the ordering assertion does not
+    /// depend on the stored timestamp's textual precision.
+    async fn last_seen(db: &Db, did: &str) -> chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc> {
+        let row = db
+            .list_peers()
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .into_iter()
+            .find(|p| p.did == did)
+            .expect("seeded peer row is missing");
+        chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(&row.last_seen.expect("last_seen is set by upsert"))
+            .expect("last_seen is rfc3339")
+            .with_timezone(&chrono::Utc)
+    }
+
+    /// Seed a peer that has earned reachability, asserting the seed took so a
+    /// later case cannot pass vacuously on a row that was never written.
+    async fn seed_reachable(db: &Db) {
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+        db.mark_peer_ping(VICTIM_DID, true).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            peer(db, VICTIM_DID).await,
+            (HONEST_URL.to_string(), true),
+            "seed did not take"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Repointing an existing peer's URL must drop the reachability gate: the
+    /// new host has not been probed, so it cannot inherit the old host's
+    /// earned `last_ping_ok`.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn url_change_clears_reachability(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_reachable(&db).await;
+
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, ATTACKER_URL).await.unwrap();
+
+        let (url, reachable) = peer(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+        assert_eq!(url, ATTACKER_URL, "the URL should still be rewritten");
+        assert!(
+            !reachable,
+            "a repointed peer must re-earn reachability, not inherit it"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A plain liveness re-announce carries the same URL and must not cost an
+    /// honest peer its place in the federated fan-out. Guards against a fix
+    /// that clears the flag on every conflict instead of only on a change.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn same_url_reannounce_keeps_reachability(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_reachable(&db).await;
+
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+
+        let (url, reachable) = peer(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+        assert_eq!(url, HONEST_URL);
+        assert!(
+            reachable,
+            "an unchanged-URL re-announce must not drop the gate"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The must-not-grant direction. An unchanged URL preserves the flag as it
+    /// stands, which means FALSE stays FALSE: reachability is earned by a probe,
+    /// never by announcing. This is the only case that fails if the conditional
+    /// is flattened to `last_ping_ok = (peers.http_url IS NOT DISTINCT FROM $2)`,
+    /// which would let any unsigned same-URL re-announce set the flag TRUE.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn same_url_reannounce_does_not_grant_reachability(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(peer(&db, VICTIM_DID).await, (HONEST_URL.to_string(), false));
+
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+
+        let (_, reachable) = peer(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+        assert!(
+            !reachable,
+            "announcing must never grant reachability without a probe"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A first insert stays out of the fan-out until a probe confirms it. Guards
+    /// against the conditional leaking into the INSERT branch.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn fresh_peer_inserts_unreachable(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+
+        db.upsert_peer("did:key:z6MkfreshPeerFixture", HONEST_URL)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let (_, reachable) = peer(&db, "did:key:z6MkfreshPeerFixture").await;
+        assert!(!reachable, "a never-probed peer must insert unreachable");
+    }
+
+    /// Comparison is exact, by decision: http_url is stored as announced and
+    /// nothing normalizes it, so a trailing slash is a different remote as far
+    /// as this row is concerned and clears the gate. Pins that decision against
+    /// a future normalizing comparison, which every other case here would pass
+    /// because they only ever compare identical or wholly different hosts.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn cosmetic_url_difference_counts_as_a_change(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        seed_reachable(&db).await;
+
+        let with_slash = format!("{HONEST_URL}/");
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, &with_slash).await.unwrap();
+
+        let (url, reachable) = peer(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+        assert_eq!(url, with_slash);
+        assert!(
+            !reachable,
+            "comparison is exact, so a cosmetic difference clears the gate too"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The reset must ride the existing UPDATE, not gate it. Hoisting the
+    /// condition to a statement-level WHERE would leave every case above green
+    /// while silently skipping the whole update on a same-URL re-announce, so
+    /// liveness would stop advancing and the peer would age out on last_seen.
+    #[sqlx::test]
+    async fn same_url_reannounce_still_advances_last_seen(pool: PgPool) {
+        let db = db(pool).await;
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+        let first = last_seen(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+
+        db.upsert_peer(VICTIM_DID, HONEST_URL).await.unwrap();
+
+        let second = last_seen(&db, VICTIM_DID).await;
+        assert!(
+            second > first,
+            "a same-URL re-announce is a liveness signal and must still \
+             advance last_seen: {first} then {second}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/repo_store.rs

@@ -303,6 +303,131 @@ fn validate_path_components(owner_did: &str, repo_name: &str) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Validate a peer-supplied `owner/name` sync slug and return its two halves.
+///
+/// The sync queue carries a single `repo` string that peers control, and the
+/// worker turns it into a filesystem path. `PathBuf::join` does not normalize,
+/// and an absolute second component replaces the accumulated path, so an
+/// unvalidated `a//tmp/x` resolved to `/tmp/x.git` outside `repos_dir` (#272).
+///
+/// The halves are checked with the same validators that guard
+/// `RepoStore::local_path`, so there is one owner rule and one name rule in the
+/// crate. The one rule added here is the leading `.`/`-` check on the owner
+/// half: `validate_owner_did` has no such rule (it also serves full DIDs, which
+/// always start with `d`), and without it an owner half of `.` puts a
+/// peer-controlled mirror at the `repos_dir` root, which canonicalizes back
+/// inside the root and so passes containment.
+pub(crate) fn validate_repo_slug(slug: &str) -> Result<(&str, &str)> {
+    let mut parts = slug.split('/');
+    let (Some(owner), Some(name)) = (parts.next(), parts.next()) else {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must be 'owner/name'");
+    };
+    if parts.next().is_some() {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug must contain exactly one '/'");
+    }
+    if owner.is_empty() || name.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug has an empty owner or name");
+    }
+    if owner.starts_with('.') || owner.starts_with('-') {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner must not start with '.' or '-'");
+    }
+    // The owner half becomes one path component, so it is bounded by NAME_MAX
+    // (255), not by the DID column's 256. The two differ by exactly one, and
+    // that one length is the gap that matters: validate_owner_did accepts 256,
+    // create_dir_all then fails with ENAMETOOLONG on every attempt, and the
+    // worker leaves such a row pending, so it is re-picked forever. Rejecting
+    // it here means an undeliverable slug never enters the queue at all.
+    if owner.len() > 255 {
+        anyhow::bail!("repo slug owner exceeds 255 chars");
+    }
+    validate_owner_did(owner)?;
+    validate_repo_name(name)?;
+    Ok((owner, name))
+}
+
+/// The answer from [`path_within_root`].
+///
+/// Three-valued rather than a bool because the two negative answers call for
+/// opposite handling. `Outside` is a deterministic verdict about a hostile or
+/// misconfigured path: the same input fails the same way forever, so the caller
+/// can retire the work. `IoError` says the question could not be answered at
+/// all (EACCES, an unmounted root), which is transient, so the caller must keep
+/// the work and try again rather than permanently retire a legitimate repo.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub(crate) enum Containment {
+    /// The candidate resolves inside the root.
+    Contained,
+    /// The candidate resolves outside the root.
+    Outside,
+    /// The filesystem could not answer the question.
+    IoError(std::io::Error),
+}
+
+/// Does `candidate` canonically resolve inside `root`?
+///
+/// The third layer of path defence, after the character allowlist and the
+/// component walk on `RepoStore::local_path`. Those two read the path as text
+/// and cannot see a symlink standing between the root and the target (#272).
+///
+/// One contract covers both the clone and the fetch branch. `symlink_metadata`
+/// decides which:
+///
+///   * The candidate exists (including as a symlink), so the candidate itself is
+///     canonicalized. That resolves the link and catches a mirror path that is a
+///     symlink to a bare repo outside the root, which a parent-only check misses
+///     entirely: the parent canonicalizes clean, `exists()` follows the link, and
+///     the fetch then writes through it.
+///   * The candidate does not exist, so its parent is canonicalized instead.
+///     This is the first-clone case. Canonicalizing the candidate unconditionally
+///     would reject every first clone, since `canonicalize` errors on a path that
+///     does not exist.
+///
+/// Pure: it reads the filesystem and never creates, moves, or removes anything.
+/// Callers that need the parent directory to exist create it themselves before
+/// asking, because a predicate that created a directory as a side effect of
+/// being asked would be wrong for a caller asking about a path it is about to
+/// delete.
+pub(crate) fn path_within_root(candidate: &Path, root: &Path) -> Containment {
+    let root = match root.canonicalize() {
+        Ok(p) => p,
+        // A root that cannot be resolved is an operator condition, never a
+        // verdict on the candidate, so every error kind is retryable here.
+        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+    };
+
+    let resolved = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(candidate) {
+        // The candidate exists as an entry: resolve it, links and all. A failure
+        // now (a dangling symlink, a permission change mid-flight) is an I/O
+        // answer, since the entry was there a moment ago.
+        Ok(_) => match candidate.canonicalize() {
+            Ok(p) => p,
+            Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+        },
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+            let Some(parent) = candidate.parent() else {
+                return Containment::Outside;
+            };
+            match parent.canonicalize() {
+                Ok(p) => p,
+                // A parent that is not there is a real answer about where this
+                // path sits; anything else is the filesystem failing to answer.
+                Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+                    return Containment::Outside;
+                }
+                Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+            }
+        }
+        // Neither "it is there" nor "it is not there": we cannot tell.
+        Err(e) => return Containment::IoError(e),
+    };
+
+    if resolved.starts_with(&root) {
+        Containment::Contained
+    } else {
+        Containment::Outside
+    }
+}
+
 fn validate_owner_did(owner_did: &str) -> Result<()> {
     if owner_did.is_empty() {
         anyhow::bail!("owner_did is empty");
@@ -405,6 +530,251 @@ fn advisory_lock_key(owner_slug: &str, repo_name: &str) -> i64 {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    // ── sync slug validation (#272) ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_accepts_owner_and_name() {
+        let (owner, name) = validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello").expect("valid slug");
+        assert_eq!(owner, "z6Mkfoo");
+        assert_eq!(name, "hello");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_traversal_in_owner_half() {
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../hello").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_only_the_did_validator_catches() {
+        // These are the cases that isolate the `validate_owner_did` delegation.
+        // `../hello` does NOT: the leading-character rule above rejects it
+        // first, so deleting the delegation leaves that case green. Each owner
+        // half here has exactly one separator, a non-empty name, and a leading
+        // character the slug rules allow, so only the delegation can reject it.
+        for bad in [
+            "a..b/hello",    // interior `..` sequence
+            "a%2e%2e/hello", // percent-encoded, disallowed `%`
+            "own\\er/hello", // backslash
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_extra_separator() {
+        // The verified #272 escape: `a//tmp/x` joined to an absolute
+        // `/tmp/x.git` outside repos_dir.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a//tmp/gitlawb-probe").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("../../etc/evil").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("a/../../x").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_trailing_segment_only_the_separator_count_catches() {
+        // The case that isolates the separator-count rule. Every slug in
+        // `slug_rejects_extra_separator` is caught by some earlier rule
+        // instead: `a//tmp/...` has an empty name half, `../../etc/evil` trips
+        // the leading-character rule, and `a/../../x` has `..` as its name. Here
+        // both halves are individually valid, so only the count can reject it.
+        // It matters because the worker would otherwise join
+        // `repos_dir/z6Mkfoo/hello.git` while composing the remote URL from the
+        // full three-segment slug, silently mirroring one repo under another's
+        // path.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug("z6Mkfoo/hello/extra").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_missing_separator() {
+        for bad in ["..", "demo", ""] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_empty_half() {
+        for bad in ["/hello", "z6Mkfoo/"] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_leading_dot_or_dash_owner() {
+        // `./hello` would otherwise resolve to a mirror at the repos_dir root,
+        // which the containment check would approve.
+        for bad in ["./hello", "-owner/hello"] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_bad_name_half() {
+        for bad in [
+            "z6Mkfoo/he\0llo",
+            "z6Mkfoo/.hidden",
+            "z6Mkfoo/-dash",
+            "z6Mkfoo/a..b",
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_repo_slug(bad).is_err(), "{bad:?} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_overlong_halves() {
+        let long_owner = format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(257));
+        let long_name = format!("z6Mkfoo/{}", "n".repeat(101));
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_owner).is_err());
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&long_name).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn slug_rejects_owner_half_at_the_filesystem_name_limit() {
+        // The owner half becomes a single path component, and Linux NAME_MAX is
+        // 255, so 256 is accepted by validate_owner_did (which bails only above
+        // 256) but can never be created on disk. That made the sync row
+        // permanently un-runnable: create_dir_all failed with ENAMETOOLONG on
+        // every pass and the worker left the row pending, so ten unsigned
+        // requests could hold the whole oldest-first batch forever.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(256))).is_err());
+        // 255 is the largest creatable component and must still be accepted, so
+        // the bound is not quietly over-tightened.
+        assert!(validate_repo_slug(&format!("{}/hello", "z".repeat(255))).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    // ── canonical containment (#272) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_accepts_a_path_inside_the_root() {
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let inside = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&inside).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&inside.join("hello.git"), root.path()),
+            Containment::Contained
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_sibling_outside_the_root() {
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let sibling = base.path().join("other");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&sibling).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&sibling, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_directory_inside_the_root() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
+        let link = root.join("owner");
+        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_symlinked_file_inside_the_root() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        let outside = base.path().join("secret.txt");
+        std::fs::write(&outside, b"x").unwrap();
+        let link = root.join("hello.git");
+        symlink(&outside, &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_accepts_a_missing_candidate_whose_parent_is_inside() {
+        // The first-clone case: the mirror path does not exist yet, so only the
+        // parent can be canonicalized. Rejecting this is total loss of mirroring.
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let owner = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&owner).unwrap();
+        let candidate = owner.join("hello.git");
+        assert!(!candidate.exists());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, root.path()),
+            Containment::Contained
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_rejects_a_missing_candidate_under_a_symlinked_parent() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("root");
+        let outside = base.path().join("outside");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
+        symlink(&outside, root.join("z6Mkfoo")).unwrap();
+        let candidate = root.join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
+            Containment::Outside
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_a_dangling_symlink() {
+        // The link entry exists, so the candidate is the thing to resolve, and
+        // resolving it fails. That is an I/O answer, not a verdict of Outside:
+        // the worker must retry rather than permanently retire the row.
+        use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let link = root.path().join("hello.git");
+        symlink(root.path().join("nothing-here"), &link).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&link, root.path()),
+            Containment::IoError(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_reports_io_error_for_an_uncanonicalizable_root() {
+        // A repos_dir that cannot be resolved is an operator condition (an
+        // unmounted volume, a bad config), not a hostile path.
+        let base = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let root = base.path().join("not-mounted");
+        let candidate = base.path().join("not-mounted").join("hello.git");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            path_within_root(&candidate, &root),
+            Containment::IoError(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn containment_creates_nothing_on_disk() {
+        // The predicate is pure: the admin purge path asks it about directories
+        // it is about to delete, so creating one as a side effect would be wrong.
+        let root = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let candidate = root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").join("hello.git");
+        let _ = path_within_root(&candidate, root.path());
+        assert!(!candidate.exists());
+        assert!(!root.path().join("z6Mkfoo").exists());
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_dir(root.path()).unwrap().count(), 0);
+    }
+
     // ── repo_name validation ───────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     #[test]

crates/gitlawb-node/src/metrics.rs

@@ -235,7 +235,11 @@ pub fn record_auth_failure(route: &str, reason: &str) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped}.
+/// Record one sync_queue item outcome. `status` ∈ {done, failed, skipped,
+/// rejected, deferred}. `rejected` is terminal and caused by a guard (a
+/// malformed slug, or a path resolving outside repos_dir); `deferred` leaves
+/// the row pending for a later pass, so a queue stalled on an operator
+/// condition is visible rather than looking idle.
 pub fn record_sync_processed(status: &str) {
     if let Some(c) = SYNC_PROCESSED.get() {
         c.with_label_values(&[status]).inc();

crates/gl/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 [package]
 name = "gl"
 description = "The gitlawb CLI — identity management, node control, MCP server"
-version = "0.7.0" # x-release-please-version
+version = "0.7.1" # x-release-please-version
 edition.workspace = true
 rust-version.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true

crates/icaptcha-client/src/lib.rs

@@ -550,4 +550,174 @@ mod tests {
         );
         assert!(key_trusted, "key stays trusted with operator origin");
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn new_withholds_key_from_untrusted_origin_but_attaches_for_operator() {
+        let guard = ICAPTCHA_ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap();
+        let prev_key = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY");
+        let prev_op = std::env::var_os("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
+        std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY", "secret-bearer");
+
+        // Arm 1: No operator configured, node advertises an attacker origin.
+        // The key has no trusted destination; the advert is rejected.
+        std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL");
+        let untrusted =
+            IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", Some("https://evil.example".into()), None);
+
+        // Arm 1b: No operator configured, no URL advertised. The fallback goes
+        // to the default public origin, and with no operator to trust, the key
+        // must not ride.
+        let no_operator_no_advert = IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", None, None);
+
+        // Arm 2: Operator origin configured and advertised — key attached.
+        std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", "https://icap.mynode.example");
+        let operator_match = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icap.mynode.example/v1".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Arm 3: Operator configured, default host advertised. The default host
+        // is allowlisted and selected, but its origin differs from the
+        // operator's, so key must not ride.
+        let default_advert = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Arm 4: Operator configured, no URL advertised (the node sent only
+        // x-icaptcha-level, not x-icaptcha-url). resolve_solver_url falls back
+        // to the operator origin and marks the key trusted. This is the common
+        // API-key deployment path — a regression that additionally required
+        // url.is_some() for key attachment would leave all current tests green
+        // but make these fallback challenge/answer requests omit Authorization
+        // and fail against the protected operator service.
+        let operator_fallback = IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", None, Some(3));
+
+        // Arm 5: Operator configured, node advertises an attacker origin.
+        // The advert is rejected and the solver falls back to the operator's
+        // own origin, which keeps the key trusted — this is the exfiltration
+        // scenario the test name describes (withhold key from *untrusted*
+        // origin, not from the operator's fallback).
+        let operator_hostile_advert =
+            IcaptchaCfg::new("did:key:zTEST", Some("https://evil.example".into()), None);
+
+        // Arm 6: Operator configured, same host but different port.
+        // origin_key includes the port, so :8443 must not match the
+        // operator origin at the default :443 — the advert is rejected
+        // and the solver falls back to the operator origin.
+        let operator_diff_port = IcaptchaCfg::new(
+            "did:key:zTEST",
+            Some("https://icap.mynode.example:8443/evil".into()),
+            None,
+        );
+
+        // Restore env and release the lock BEFORE asserting, so a failing
+        // assertion can't poison the shared lock or cascade into a sibling.
+        match prev_key {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY", v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY"),
+        }
+        match prev_op {
+            Some(v) => std::env::set_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL", v),
+            None => std::env::remove_var("GITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL"),
+        }
+        drop(guard);
+
+        let mut failures: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+
+        if untrusted.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1 (no operator, attacker advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                untrusted.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if untrusted.url != DEFAULT_URL {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1 (no operator, attacker advert): expected url={DEFAULT_URL}, got {}",
+                untrusted.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if no_operator_no_advert.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1b (no operator, no advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                no_operator_no_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if no_operator_no_advert.url != DEFAULT_URL {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 1b (no operator, no advert): expected url={DEFAULT_URL}, got {}",
+                no_operator_no_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_match.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 2 (operator match): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_match.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_match.url != "https://icap.mynode.example/v1" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 2 (operator match): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example/v1, got {}",
+                operator_match.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if default_advert.api_key.is_some() {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 3 (operator + default advert): expected api_key=None, got {:?}",
+                default_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if default_advert.url != "https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 3 (operator + default advert): expected url=https://icaptcha.gitlawb.com/v2, got {}",
+                default_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_fallback.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 4 (operator fallback, no advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_fallback.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_fallback.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 4 (operator fallback, no advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_fallback.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_hostile_advert.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 5 (operator + hostile advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_hostile_advert.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_hostile_advert.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 5 (operator + hostile advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_hostile_advert.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if operator_diff_port.api_key.as_deref() != Some("secret-bearer") {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 6 (operator + different port advert): expected api_key=Some(\"secret-bearer\"), got {:?}",
+                operator_diff_port.api_key
+            ));
+        }
+        if operator_diff_port.url != "https://icap.mynode.example" {
+            failures.push(format!(
+                "arm 6 (operator + different port advert): expected url=https://icap.mynode.example, got {}",
+                operator_diff_port.url
+            ));
+        }
+
+        assert!(failures.is_empty(), "\n{}", failures.join("\n"));
+    }
 }

infra/fly/gitlawb-node-2.fly.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# fly.toml app configuration file generated for gitlawb-node-2 on 2026-07-22T09:47:18+08:00
+#
+# See https://fly.io/docs/reference/configuration/ for information about how to use this file.
+#
+
+app = 'gitlawb-node-2'
+primary_region = 'sjc'
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = '../../Dockerfile'
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = 'true'
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = 'https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node3.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_HOST = '0.0.0.0'
+  GITLAWB_KEY = '/data/keys/identity.pem'
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = '524288000'
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = '7546'
+  GITLAWB_PORT = '7545'
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = 'https://node2.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = '/data/repos'
+  ICAPTCHA_MODE = 'enforce'
+  ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY = 'xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8'
+  ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL = '3'
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = 'gitlawb_data'
+  destination = '/data'
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = 'off'
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = 'connections'
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+  [[http_service.checks]]
+    interval = '15s'
+    timeout = '5s'
+    grace_period = '30s'
+    method = 'GET'
+    path = '/ready'
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = 'udp'
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = 'shared-cpu-1x'
+  memory = '1024'
+
+[[metrics]]
+  port = 9091
+  path = '/metrics'

infra/fly/gitlawb-node-3.fly.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# fly.toml app configuration file generated for gitlawb-node-3 on 2026-07-22T09:47:19+08:00
+#
+# See https://fly.io/docs/reference/configuration/ for information about how to use this file.
+#
+
+app = 'gitlawb-node-3'
+primary_region = 'nrt'
+
+[build]
+  dockerfile = '../../Dockerfile'
+
+[env]
+  GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC = 'true'
+  GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS = 'https://node.gitlawb.com,https://node2.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_HOST = '0.0.0.0'
+  GITLAWB_KEY = '/data/keys/identity.pem'
+  GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES = '524288000'
+  GITLAWB_P2P_PORT = '7546'
+  GITLAWB_PORT = '7545'
+  GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL = 'https://node3.gitlawb.com'
+  GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR = '/data/repos'
+  ICAPTCHA_MODE = 'enforce'
+  ICAPTCHA_PUBKEY = 'xjyPNqIbvc9U-kwXW6u9mDqRJ7E2UUMOaJdUWhpEXq8'
+  ICAPTCHA_REQUIRED_LEVEL = '3'
+
+[[mounts]]
+  source = 'gitlawb_data'
+  destination = '/data'
+
+[http_service]
+  internal_port = 7545
+  force_https = true
+  auto_stop_machines = 'off'
+  auto_start_machines = true
+  min_machines_running = 1
+
+  [http_service.concurrency]
+    type = 'connections'
+    hard_limit = 500
+    soft_limit = 400
+
+  [http_service.http_options]
+    idle_timeout = 120
+
+  [[http_service.checks]]
+    interval = '15s'
+    timeout = '5s'
+    grace_period = '30s'
+    method = 'GET'
+    path = '/ready'
+
+[[services]]
+  protocol = 'udp'
+  internal_port = 7546
+
+  [[services.ports]]
+    port = 7546
+
+[[vm]]
+  size = 'shared-cpu-1x'
+  memory = '1024'
+
+[[metrics]]
+  port = 9091
+  path = '/metrics'

scripts/build-bins.sh

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ build_darwin_arm64() {
   echo "==> Building darwin-arm64 (native cargo)..."
   cd "$ROOT"
   export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
-  cargo build --release -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
+  cargo build --release --locked -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb
   cp target/release/gl "$OUT/gl-darwin-arm64"
   cp target/release/git-remote-gitlawb "$OUT/git-remote-gitlawb-darwin-arm64"
   chmod +x "$OUT/gl-darwin-arm64" "$OUT/git-remote-gitlawb-darwin-arm64"

scripts/check-gitlawb-core-deps.sh

@@ -23,11 +23,15 @@ if [ ! -f "$ALLOW" ]; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-# `cargo tree` resolves like the build/test jobs (no --locked): the committed
-# Cargo.lock can lag the manifests, and --locked would red this gate for
-# lock-staleness reasons unrelated to gitlawb-core's dependencies. Resolving can
-# refresh Cargo.lock as a side effect, so snapshot and restore it — this check
-# must never leave the working tree dirty when run locally.
+# `cargo tree` resolves WITHOUT --locked on purpose, unlike the blocking cargo
+# jobs in pr-checks. This gate answers one question, whether gitlawb-core's
+# dependency closure gained something unallowlisted, and a stale Cargo.lock
+# would red it for a reason that has nothing to do with that closure. Lock
+# staleness is already caught by the --locked cargo jobs, so it does not need a
+# second gate here.
+#
+# Resolving can refresh Cargo.lock as a side effect, so snapshot and restore
+# it: this check must never leave the working tree dirty when run locally.
 lock_backup="$(mktemp)"
 cp "$ROOT/Cargo.lock" "$lock_backup"
 restore_lock() { cp "$lock_backup" "$ROOT/Cargo.lock"; rm -f "$lock_backup"; }