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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 beardthelion
|
6143c2ebb0 |
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+6
-6
@@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ version = "3.1.1"
|
||||
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "faf9468729b8cbcea668e36183cb69d317348c2e08e994829fb56ebfdfbaac34"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
||||
"windows-sys 0.48.0",
|
||||
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
|
||||
]
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||||
|
||||
[[package]]
|
||||
@@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "7ab67060fc6b8ef687992d439ca0fa36e7ed17e9a0b16b25b601e8757df720de"
|
||||
dependencies = [
|
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"data-encoding",
|
||||
"syn 1.0.109",
|
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"syn 2.0.117",
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]
|
||||
|
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[[package]]
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@@ -5779,16 +5779,16 @@ dependencies = [
|
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|
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[[package]]
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name = "quinn-udp"
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version = "0.5.16"
|
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version = "0.5.14"
|
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
|
||||
checksum = "af66907df18639dcf4db56ca65490cabc4b27a97dbadd96f2926cca73298f016"
|
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checksum = "addec6a0dcad8a8d96a771f815f0eaf55f9d1805756410b39f5fa81332574cbd"
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dependencies = [
|
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"cfg_aliases",
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"libc",
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"once_cell",
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"socket2",
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"tracing",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@@ -7959,7 +7959,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
|
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dependencies = [
|
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"windows-sys 0.48.0",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ pub mod replicas;
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pub mod repos;
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pub mod resolve;
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pub mod stars;
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pub mod status;
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pub mod task_cursor;
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pub mod tasks;
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pub mod visibility;
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@@ -69,12 +68,6 @@ pub(crate) async fn authorize_repo_read(
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/// representation only within `did:key`; never let a bare id match across methods —
|
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/// `did:web` / `did:gitlawb` share the base58 space with `did:key`, so a
|
||||
/// trailing-segment compare would treat `did:key:X` and `did:gitlawb:X` as equal.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The collapse itself lives in exactly one place, [`crate::db::normalize_owner_key`],
|
||||
/// which is also the function the stored `owner_did` / `authorizing_did` columns
|
||||
/// are normalized through and which `OWNER_KEY_CASE_SQL` mirrors byte for byte.
|
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/// Two identities match when they normalize to the same key; a second copy of the
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/// rule here is how the Rust gate and the SQL filters would drift apart.
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pub(crate) fn did_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
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// One implementation, shared with `gl` and `git-remote-gitlawb` through core:
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||||
// every boundary that compares a DID applies the same collapse rule.
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@@ -212,7 +205,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
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let events = include_str!("events.rs");
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let tasks = include_str!("tasks.rs");
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let stars = include_str!("stars.rs");
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let status = include_str!("status/mod.rs");
|
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let protect = include_str!("protect.rs");
|
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let visibility = include_str!("visibility.rs");
|
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let profiles = include_str!("profiles.rs");
|
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@@ -238,13 +230,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
|
||||
// (existence hiding) and require_repo_owner guards the owner half.
|
||||
(webhooks, "list_webhooks", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
(webhooks, "list_webhooks", "require_repo_owner("),
|
||||
// Same two-half shape as list_webhooks: authorize_repo_read runs
|
||||
// first (a quarantined or unreadable repo gets the missing-repo
|
||||
// not-found, never a 403 that would confirm existence), then
|
||||
// require_repo_owner 403s a non-owner of a readable repo. Both halves
|
||||
// are pinned, because dropping either changes what a stranger learns.
|
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(status, "create_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
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(status, "create_status", "require_repo_owner("),
|
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(labels, "add_label", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
(labels, "add_label", "require_repo_owner("),
|
||||
(labels, "remove_label", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
@@ -276,19 +261,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
|
||||
(protect, "list_protected_branches", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
(labels, "list_labels", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
(events, "list_repo_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
// The catch-up poll surface gates before any push-event row is read,
|
||||
// so a stranger cannot use it to learn that a private repo exists or
|
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// is being pushed to.
|
||||
(events, "list_repo_push_events", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
// The status read gates before any claim data is loaded, so its deny
|
||||
// is the repo's own not-found rather than an existence oracle over
|
||||
// which commits were reported on.
|
||||
(status, "commit_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
// The rollup gates on the same helper before the pull request row is
|
||||
// loaded, so a caller who cannot read the repo cannot learn which
|
||||
// pull request numbers exist on it — and the fallback's branch
|
||||
// resolve and head persist sit behind that same gate.
|
||||
(status, "pull_request_status", "authorize_repo_read("),
|
||||
// Bucket C — signer-self: the acting DID is matched/bound to auth.0
|
||||
(tasks, "create_task", "did_matches("),
|
||||
// #496: create_task is signer-self AND owner-when-repo-scoped — a
|
||||
@@ -1199,7 +1171,6 @@ mod tests { async fn t() { let _ = did_matches(x, y); } }
|
||||
(include_str!("replicas.rs"), "replicas.rs"),
|
||||
(include_str!("repos.rs"), "repos.rs"),
|
||||
(include_str!("stars.rs"), "stars.rs"),
|
||||
(include_str!("status/mod.rs"), "status/mod.rs"),
|
||||
(include_str!("visibility.rs"), "visibility.rs"),
|
||||
(include_str!("webhooks.rs"), "webhooks.rs"),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
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@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ pub async fn create_pr(
|
||||
status: "open".to_string(),
|
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merged_by_did: None,
|
||||
merged_at: None,
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
created_at: now.clone(),
|
||||
updated_at: now,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -227,15 +226,6 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
|
||||
let disk_path = guard.path().to_path_buf();
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||||
let merger_did = auth.0;
|
||||
|
||||
// The source head this merge is about to consume, read under the write lock.
|
||||
// The PR row above was loaded before the lock, so a push landing in between
|
||||
// already moved the branch and the row's own `head_commit` is stale; the
|
||||
// value frozen on the merged PR has to be what was merged. `None` when the
|
||||
// ref cannot be resolved, which leaves whatever the push path last stored.
|
||||
let merged_source_head =
|
||||
store::read_ref(&disk_path, &store::local_branch_ref(&pr.source_branch))
|
||||
.ok()
|
||||
.flatten();
|
||||
// Snapshot the target ref's pre-merge OID so a refused durable upload can
|
||||
// rewind the local merge, mirroring the close_issue / create_issue
|
||||
// compensating pattern. A read failure or an absent ref (a first-commit
|
||||
@@ -284,10 +274,7 @@ pub async fn merge_pr(
|
||||
|
||||
let merge_sha = merge_result.map_err(|e| AppError::Git(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.merge_pr(&pr.id, &merger_did, merged_source_head.as_deref())
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
state.db.merge_pr(&pr.id, &merger_did).await?;
|
||||
let _ = state.db.touch_repo(&record.id).await;
|
||||
|
||||
webhooks::fire_event(
|
||||
@@ -337,36 +324,7 @@ pub async fn close_pr(
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Same refusal merge_pr gives, before the head is resolved: a repeated close
|
||||
// must not store the branch's current tip on a historical pull request.
|
||||
if pr.status != "open" {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!("PR is already {}", pr.status)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Freeze the head this close decided against, the same snapshot merge_pr
|
||||
// takes on its path: a closed pull request's rollup serves only the stored
|
||||
// head, so a PR closed before its first status read would report
|
||||
// head_resolved=false forever. The recorded push for the branch is the
|
||||
// canonical answer; the disk read covers a push whose event write failed.
|
||||
// A failed lookup fails the close, leaving the pull request open to retry:
|
||||
// it must not read as an absent head. An unresolvable head keeps whatever
|
||||
// the push path last stored.
|
||||
let branch_ref = store::local_branch_ref(&pr.source_branch);
|
||||
let closed_head = if pr.head_commit.is_some() {
|
||||
None
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.latest_push_sha_for_ref(&record.id, &branch_ref)
|
||||
.await?
|
||||
.or_else(|| {
|
||||
store::read_ref(std::path::Path::new(&record.disk_path), &branch_ref)
|
||||
.ok()
|
||||
.flatten()
|
||||
})
|
||||
.map(|sha| sha.to_ascii_lowercase())
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.db.close_pr(&pr.id, closed_head.as_deref()).await?;
|
||||
state.db.close_pr(&pr.id).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
webhooks::fire_event(
|
||||
std::sync::Arc::clone(&state.db),
|
||||
@@ -512,243 +470,6 @@ pub async fn list_comments(
|
||||
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "comments": comments })))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use axum::body::Body;
|
||||
use axum::http::{Method, StatusCode};
|
||||
use axum::routing::post;
|
||||
use axum::Router;
|
||||
use std::process::Command;
|
||||
use tower::ServiceExt;
|
||||
|
||||
const OWNER_DID: &str = "did:key:z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH";
|
||||
const STALE_SHA: &str = "9999999999999999999999999999999999999999";
|
||||
|
||||
fn git(dir: &std::path::Path, args: &[&str]) {
|
||||
let out = Command::new("git")
|
||||
.args(args)
|
||||
.current_dir(dir)
|
||||
.env("GIT_AUTHOR_NAME", "t")
|
||||
.env("GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL", "[email protected]")
|
||||
.env("GIT_COMMITTER_NAME", "t")
|
||||
.env("GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL", "[email protected]")
|
||||
.output()
|
||||
.expect("git runs");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
out.status.success(),
|
||||
"git {args:?} failed: {}",
|
||||
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A bare repo with `main` and a `feature` branch one commit ahead.
|
||||
/// Returns the bare path and the real `feature` tip.
|
||||
fn bare_repo_with_feature(
|
||||
root: &std::path::Path,
|
||||
owner_slug: &str,
|
||||
) -> (std::path::PathBuf, String) {
|
||||
let work = root.join("work");
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&work).unwrap();
|
||||
git(&work, &["init", "-q", "-b", "main", "."]);
|
||||
std::fs::write(work.join("a.txt"), "one").unwrap();
|
||||
git(&work, &["add", "."]);
|
||||
git(&work, &["commit", "-qm", "one"]);
|
||||
git(&work, &["checkout", "-qb", "feature"]);
|
||||
std::fs::write(work.join("b.txt"), "two").unwrap();
|
||||
git(&work, &["add", "."]);
|
||||
git(&work, &["commit", "-qm", "two"]);
|
||||
git(&work, &["checkout", "-q", "main"]);
|
||||
|
||||
let bare_dir = root.join(owner_slug);
|
||||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&bare_dir).unwrap();
|
||||
let bare = bare_dir.join("demo.git");
|
||||
git(
|
||||
root,
|
||||
&[
|
||||
"clone",
|
||||
"-q",
|
||||
"--bare",
|
||||
work.to_str().unwrap(),
|
||||
bare.to_str().unwrap(),
|
||||
],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let tip = Command::new("git")
|
||||
.args(["rev-parse", "refs/heads/feature"])
|
||||
.current_dir(&bare)
|
||||
.output()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let tip = String::from_utf8_lossy(&tip.stdout).trim().to_string();
|
||||
assert_eq!(tip.len(), 40, "feature tip must resolve");
|
||||
(bare, tip)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Merging freezes the stored head at the source commit the merge actually
|
||||
/// consumed. The PR row is loaded before the write lock is taken, so a push
|
||||
/// that lands in between leaves the row's own `head_commit` stale; seeding a
|
||||
/// value that matches nothing on disk stands in for that race, and the
|
||||
/// merged PR must still come out pointing at the real `feature` tip.
|
||||
#[sqlx::test]
|
||||
async fn merge_stamps_the_source_head_it_merged_over_a_racing_value(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
|
||||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||||
let owner_slug = OWNER_DID.replace([':', '/'], "_");
|
||||
let (bare, feature_tip) = bare_repo_with_feature(tmp.path(), &owner_slug);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
|
||||
state.repo_store =
|
||||
crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), pool);
|
||||
|
||||
let now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
name: "demo".into(),
|
||||
owner_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
|
||||
description: None,
|
||||
is_public: true,
|
||||
default_branch: "main".into(),
|
||||
created_at: now,
|
||||
updated_at: now,
|
||||
disk_path: bare.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
|
||||
forked_from: None,
|
||||
machine_id: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = PullRequest {
|
||||
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
title: "add b".into(),
|
||||
body: None,
|
||||
author_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
|
||||
source_branch: "feature".into(),
|
||||
target_branch: "main".into(),
|
||||
status: "open".into(),
|
||||
merged_by_did: None,
|
||||
merged_at: None,
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
created_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
|
||||
updated_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.db.create_pr(&pr).await.unwrap();
|
||||
// The stale value the racing push scenario leaves on the row.
|
||||
state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.set_open_pr_heads(&repo.id, "feature", STALE_SHA)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let db = state.db.clone();
|
||||
let app = Router::new()
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge",
|
||||
post(merge_pr),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.with_state(state);
|
||||
|
||||
let response = app
|
||||
.oneshot(crate::test_support::signed_request_as(
|
||||
OWNER_DID,
|
||||
Method::POST,
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH/demo/pulls/1/merge",
|
||||
Body::empty(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
|
||||
|
||||
let merged = db.get_pr(&repo.id, 1).await.unwrap().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(merged.status, "merged");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
merged.head_commit,
|
||||
Some(feature_tip),
|
||||
"the merge must stamp the source head it consumed, not the racing value"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A failed head lookup is not an absent head. With the push-event table
|
||||
/// unreadable, the close must fail while the pull request is still open, so
|
||||
/// the caller can retry. Closing with a NULL head would leave the rollup
|
||||
/// unresolved for good, since a closed pull request serves only the stored
|
||||
/// head. The branch exists on disk, so a swallowed error would also close
|
||||
/// successfully through the disk fallback: that is the case this pins.
|
||||
#[sqlx::test]
|
||||
async fn close_fails_open_when_the_head_lookup_errors(pool: sqlx::PgPool) {
|
||||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||||
let owner_slug = OWNER_DID.replace([':', '/'], "_");
|
||||
let (bare, _tip) = bare_repo_with_feature(tmp.path(), &owner_slug);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool.clone()).await;
|
||||
state.repo_store =
|
||||
crate::git::repo_store::RepoStore::for_testing(tmp.path().to_path_buf(), pool.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
let now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let repo = crate::db::RepoRecord {
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
name: "demo".into(),
|
||||
owner_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
|
||||
description: None,
|
||||
is_public: true,
|
||||
default_branch: "main".into(),
|
||||
created_at: now,
|
||||
updated_at: now,
|
||||
disk_path: bare.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
|
||||
forked_from: None,
|
||||
machine_id: None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.unwrap();
|
||||
let pr = PullRequest {
|
||||
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
title: "add b".into(),
|
||||
body: None,
|
||||
author_did: OWNER_DID.into(),
|
||||
source_branch: "feature".into(),
|
||||
target_branch: "main".into(),
|
||||
status: "open".into(),
|
||||
merged_by_did: None,
|
||||
merged_at: None,
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
created_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
|
||||
updated_at: now.to_rfc3339(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.db.create_pr(&pr).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
sqlx::query("ALTER TABLE repo_push_events RENAME TO repo_push_events_gone")
|
||||
.execute(&pool)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let db = state.db.clone();
|
||||
let app = Router::new()
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/close",
|
||||
post(close_pr),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.with_state(state);
|
||||
let response = app
|
||||
.oneshot(crate::test_support::signed_request_as(
|
||||
OWNER_DID,
|
||||
Method::POST,
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/z6MkpTHR8VNsBxYAAWHut2Geadd9jSwuBV8xRoAnwWsdvktH/demo/pulls/1/close",
|
||||
Body::empty(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
response.status().is_server_error(),
|
||||
"a failed head lookup must fail the close, got {}",
|
||||
response.status()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let after = db.get_pr(&repo.id, 1).await.unwrap().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(after.status, "open", "the pull request must stay open");
|
||||
assert_eq!(after.head_commit, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod merge_rollback_tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
@@ -852,7 +573,6 @@ mod merge_rollback_tests {
|
||||
status: "open".to_string(),
|
||||
merged_by_did: None,
|
||||
merged_at: None,
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
created_at: now.clone(),
|
||||
updated_at: now,
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -923,7 +643,6 @@ mod lock_pool_shed_tests {
|
||||
state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.create_pr(&PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo_id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -1,665 +0,0 @@
|
||||
//! Commit status claims: the write path and the combined read.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/statuses/:sha — append one claim (owner only)
|
||||
//! GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/commits/:sha/status — the combined projection
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Claims are append-only: a producer reporting twice for the same context
|
||||
//! leaves both rows and the visible status is a projection over the history.
|
||||
//! Reporting twice means two REQUESTS, though. An exact repeat of one already
|
||||
//! accepted is answered with 200 and the row it wrote, not a second row: the
|
||||
//! projection elects the highest `seq`, so a replayed claim would not duplicate
|
||||
//! a verdict but overturn the one that superseded it.
|
||||
|
||||
use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, State};
|
||||
use axum::http::StatusCode;
|
||||
use axum::Json;
|
||||
use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
use uuid::Uuid;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::auth::AuthenticatedDid;
|
||||
use crate::db::StatusClaim;
|
||||
use crate::error::{AppError, Result};
|
||||
use crate::state::AppState;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Claims for one (repo, commit, producer, context). Generous for a real
|
||||
/// producer; a producer past it is misbehaving.
|
||||
const MAX_CLAIMS_PER_TUPLE: i64 = 100;
|
||||
/// Distinct contexts for one (repo, commit). The context string is caller-chosen
|
||||
/// and free-form, so the tuple cap alone bounds nothing.
|
||||
const MAX_CONTEXTS_PER_COMMIT: i64 = 50;
|
||||
/// Claim rows for one repo within the trailing window the db layer counts over.
|
||||
/// The commit SHA is caller-chosen and never existence-checked, so a writer at
|
||||
/// the two caps above can still fan out over fresh 40-hex strings without this
|
||||
/// one. It bounds the RATE of that fan-out rather than a lifetime total, because
|
||||
/// nothing prunes the table: a lifetime bound would close the surface on a repo
|
||||
/// permanently while answering with a status every client retries.
|
||||
const MAX_CLAIMS_PER_REPO_PER_WINDOW: i64 = 10_000;
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct CreateStatusRequest {
|
||||
/// Payload format version. The signature covers these bytes, so the
|
||||
/// field set is the signed format: `deny_unknown_fields` keeps a future
|
||||
/// producer's claim from silently reading as this one, and `v` names the
|
||||
/// version explicitly so a later revision has somewhere to live. Absent
|
||||
/// means 1.
|
||||
pub v: Option<u32>,
|
||||
pub state: String,
|
||||
pub context: String,
|
||||
pub target_url: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub description: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The wire state set (KTD-1): GitHub's four commit-status states, so absence
|
||||
/// stays distinguishable without a fifth value no client understands.
|
||||
const CLAIM_STATES: [&str; 4] = ["error", "failure", "pending", "success"];
|
||||
|
||||
/// Bounds on the signature material this write path persists verbatim. Every one
|
||||
/// of the four is caller-influenced: the headers come off the request, the
|
||||
/// signing string grows with the component list the caller's Signature-Input
|
||||
/// chose, and the body is the caller's. Without a bound the claim log's row size
|
||||
/// is set by whoever writes to it, so these are explicit and generous rather than
|
||||
/// implicit and absent. A conforming `sign_request` produces roughly 100, 200 and
|
||||
/// 400 bytes for the first three.
|
||||
const MAX_SIGNATURE_CHARS: usize = 512;
|
||||
const MAX_SIGNATURE_INPUT_CHARS: usize = 1024;
|
||||
const MAX_SIGNING_STRING_CHARS: usize = 4096;
|
||||
/// The body is a `CreateStatusRequest`, whose own fields are already capped at
|
||||
/// roughly 3.3 KB in total by the three limits below; this leaves room for JSON
|
||||
/// framing and nothing more.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Enforced twice, at two different moments, because the handler's check alone
|
||||
/// is not the bound it advertises: `require_signature` buffers the whole body
|
||||
/// before any handler runs, so by the time [`create_status`] measures it the
|
||||
/// allocation has already happened. `build_router` applies the same number as a
|
||||
/// `RequestBodyLimitLayer` at the transport, outside the auth layers, which is
|
||||
/// what makes it a bound on what is ALLOCATED and not only on what is STORED.
|
||||
/// The handler keeps its own check regardless — it is the one that holds for a
|
||||
/// handler reached by any other route table, and it is what the material size
|
||||
/// tests drive.
|
||||
pub(crate) const MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES: usize = 8192;
|
||||
|
||||
const MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS: usize = 255;
|
||||
const MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS: usize = 2048;
|
||||
const MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS: usize = 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
/// The 201 body for an accepted claim: what the client needs to identify the row
|
||||
/// it just wrote, and nothing else.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Deliberately not the stored [`StatusClaim`]. That struct carries the signature
|
||||
/// material, and serializing it echoed the signature, the signing string and the
|
||||
/// whole request body back on every write — the body as a JSON array of integers.
|
||||
/// Write-time provenance belongs in the row, not on the wire, which is the same
|
||||
/// line [`StatusEntry`] draws on the read side.
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize)]
|
||||
pub struct CreatedStatus {
|
||||
pub id: String,
|
||||
pub repo_id: String,
|
||||
pub commit_sha: String,
|
||||
pub state: String,
|
||||
pub context: String,
|
||||
pub target_url: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub description: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub producer_did: String,
|
||||
pub created_at: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl CreatedStatus {
|
||||
fn from_claim(claim: StatusClaim) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
id: claim.id,
|
||||
repo_id: claim.repo_id,
|
||||
commit_sha: claim.commit_sha,
|
||||
state: claim.state,
|
||||
context: claim.context,
|
||||
target_url: claim.target_url,
|
||||
description: claim.description,
|
||||
producer_did: claim.producer_did,
|
||||
created_at: claim.created_at,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/statuses/:sha
|
||||
pub async fn create_status(
|
||||
State(state): State<AppState>,
|
||||
Extension(auth): Extension<AuthenticatedDid>,
|
||||
Path((owner, name, sha)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
|
||||
material: Option<Extension<crate::auth::SignatureMaterial>>,
|
||||
Json(req): Json<CreateStatusRequest>,
|
||||
) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<CreatedStatus>)> {
|
||||
// Read-visibility first, then owner, and the order is the security property.
|
||||
// authorize_repo_read denies a quarantined repo before the visibility gate and
|
||||
// answers with the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing repo, so
|
||||
// a caller who cannot read the repo cannot learn it exists. Loading the repo
|
||||
// and comparing the owner would answer 403 there, turning this endpoint into
|
||||
// an existence oracle. require_repo_owner then 403s a non-owner of a repo the
|
||||
// caller can read, where existence is not secret.
|
||||
let (record, _rules) =
|
||||
crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, Some(&auth.0), "/").await?;
|
||||
crate::api::require_repo_owner(&record, &auth.0)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let commit_sha = normalize_sha(&sha)?;
|
||||
if req.v.is_some_and(|v| v != 1) {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
|
||||
"unsupported status payload version".into(),
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let claim_state = validate_state(&req.state)?;
|
||||
let context = validate_context(&req.context)?;
|
||||
let target_url = validate_target_url(req.target_url.as_deref())?;
|
||||
let description = validate_description(req.description.as_deref())?;
|
||||
|
||||
// KTD-5: the signature material is captured here because the request carries
|
||||
// the only copy, and `signing_string` is the exact byte sequence the
|
||||
// middleware verified. Its absence means this handler was reached without
|
||||
// `require_signature` — a server misconfiguration (a route group that lost
|
||||
// its auth layer, a handler mounted somewhere new), not anything the client
|
||||
// did, so it is a 500 and no row is written. Storing an empty payload instead
|
||||
// would leave every claim from that moment on unverifiable with nothing going
|
||||
// red, which is exactly the absence-renders-as-success shape.
|
||||
let Some(Extension(material)) = material else {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"status claim write reached without verified signature material — \
|
||||
the route is not behind require_signature"
|
||||
)));
|
||||
};
|
||||
// The body is carried only behind the `PersistsSignedBody` marker, which
|
||||
// this route's group applies outside the auth layers. Its absence means the
|
||||
// marker did not reach the middleware, because the layer was dropped or
|
||||
// reordered. That is the same class of misconfiguration as the branch above
|
||||
// and gets the same answer. Storing an empty body instead would write claims
|
||||
// that carry a signature over a digest of bytes nobody kept, which is
|
||||
// exactly the case `stored_claim_re_verifies_and_a_tampered_row_does_not`
|
||||
// exists to make impossible.
|
||||
let Some(body) = material.body.clone() else {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"status claim write reached with signature material carrying no request body: \
|
||||
the route lost its persist-body marker or applied it inside the auth layers"
|
||||
)));
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Bounded before anything is written. The material is verified, which says
|
||||
// the caller holds the key, not that what they signed is a reasonable size.
|
||||
bound("signature", material.signature.len(), MAX_SIGNATURE_CHARS)?;
|
||||
bound(
|
||||
"signature_input",
|
||||
material.signature_input.len(),
|
||||
MAX_SIGNATURE_INPUT_CHARS,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
bound(
|
||||
"signing_string",
|
||||
material.signing_string.len(),
|
||||
MAX_SIGNING_STRING_CHARS,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
bound("request body", body.len(), MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES)?;
|
||||
// After the bounds, so the scan below walks a signing string of known size.
|
||||
require_body_bound_signature(&material, &body)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let digest = request_digest(&material, &body);
|
||||
let (signature, signature_input, signing_string, request_body) = (
|
||||
material.signature,
|
||||
material.signature_input,
|
||||
material.signing_string,
|
||||
body.to_vec(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let claim = StatusClaim {
|
||||
id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
// Ignored on insert: the database assigns the ordering key (KTD-3).
|
||||
seq: 0,
|
||||
repo_id: record.id.clone(),
|
||||
commit_sha,
|
||||
state: claim_state,
|
||||
context,
|
||||
target_url,
|
||||
description,
|
||||
// Both are the owner identity today (KTD-5); they split when delegated
|
||||
// capabilities land.
|
||||
producer_did: auth.0.clone(),
|
||||
authorizing_did: auth.0,
|
||||
signature,
|
||||
signature_input,
|
||||
signing_string,
|
||||
request_body,
|
||||
request_digest: digest,
|
||||
created_at: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let caps = crate::db::ClaimCaps {
|
||||
per_tuple: MAX_CLAIMS_PER_TUPLE,
|
||||
contexts_per_commit: MAX_CONTEXTS_PER_COMMIT,
|
||||
per_repo_window: MAX_CLAIMS_PER_REPO_PER_WINDOW,
|
||||
};
|
||||
match state.db.insert_status_claim_capped(&claim, &caps).await? {
|
||||
crate::db::ClaimInsert::Inserted(_) => {
|
||||
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(CreatedStatus::from_claim(claim))))
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Already recorded, so 200 and the original row rather than 201 and a
|
||||
// second one. The claim the caller gets back is the stored one, id
|
||||
// included, which is what makes a retry safe to treat as success.
|
||||
crate::db::ClaimInsert::AlreadyRecorded(existing) => {
|
||||
Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(CreatedStatus::from_claim(*existing))))
|
||||
}
|
||||
crate::db::ClaimInsert::CapExceeded(which) => Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(format!(
|
||||
"claim limit reached for {which}"
|
||||
))),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Refuse a claim whose signature does not cover the body about to be stored.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A claim IS provenance, so the signature stored beside it has to bind the
|
||||
/// bytes stored beside it. It does not do that directly: `signing_string`
|
||||
/// reaches the body only through a `content-digest` line. And a caller can sign
|
||||
/// a content-digest the request then never carries. `require_signature` rebuilds
|
||||
/// the covered values from the request, so an ABSENT `Content-Digest` header
|
||||
/// makes the covered digest the empty string on the signing side and the
|
||||
/// verifying side alike; the Ed25519 check passes over method, path and an empty
|
||||
/// digest, and any body at all rides along. The row that write produces asserts
|
||||
/// a provenance that cannot be re-verified: the signing string covers a digest
|
||||
/// of bytes that are not the ones in `request_body`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The predicate here is the write-time form of the one `re_verify` runs against
|
||||
/// a stored row in the tests — recompute the digest of the bytes about to be
|
||||
/// persisted and require the signing string to carry exactly that line — so what
|
||||
/// this route accepts and what a third party can later re-verify are the same
|
||||
/// question, asked at both ends.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is a route property, checked where the claim becomes history, and it is
|
||||
/// deliberately not the only line of defence: requiring the header in
|
||||
/// `require_signature` closes the same hole one layer earlier and for every
|
||||
/// signed route, and that change belongs there rather than here because no other
|
||||
/// route's correctness should depend on the status handler. The two agree and
|
||||
/// neither substitutes for the other — without the middleware's requirement the
|
||||
/// empty digest is still accepted everywhere else, and without this one a later
|
||||
/// relaxation of the middleware would silently resume writing unverifiable
|
||||
/// history.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A 400, not a 500: the material is exactly what the client signed, and what
|
||||
/// they signed does not cover what they sent.
|
||||
fn require_body_bound_signature(
|
||||
material: &crate::auth::SignatureMaterial,
|
||||
body: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let covered = format!(
|
||||
"\"content-digest\": {}",
|
||||
gitlawb_core::http_sig::compute_content_digest(body)
|
||||
);
|
||||
// Line-exact rather than a substring search: `build_signing_string` emits one
|
||||
// component per line, and a `contains` would also be satisfied by the digest
|
||||
// appearing INSIDE some other covered component's value, which proves
|
||||
// nothing about what the signature covered.
|
||||
if material.signing_string.lines().any(|line| line == covered) {
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(AppError::BadRequest(
|
||||
"the signature does not cover this request body: send a Content-Digest header \
|
||||
computed over the body and name \"content-digest\" among the signature's covered \
|
||||
components"
|
||||
.into(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The identity of one signed write, as a hex sha-256.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// All four inputs together, because a replay is the same bytes arriving twice:
|
||||
/// the signature, the input that names what it covers, the canonical string it
|
||||
/// was verified over, and the body that string covers through a content-digest.
|
||||
/// The signature alone would nearly do (it covers the other three transitively),
|
||||
/// but hashing what is actually stored means the digest describes the row rather
|
||||
/// than a claim about it.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Each field is length-prefixed so no two different requests can concatenate to
|
||||
/// the same bytes: without it, a signature ending in some prefix of the next
|
||||
/// field would collide with the shorter signature that absorbed it.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// This is not a nonce, and deliberately so. A nonce table needs pruning and a
|
||||
/// pruning window is a second replay window; the claim row IS the record of what
|
||||
/// was accepted, so uniqueness on it is self-maintaining.
|
||||
fn request_digest(material: &crate::auth::SignatureMaterial, body: &[u8]) -> String {
|
||||
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
|
||||
let mut h = Sha256::new();
|
||||
for part in [
|
||||
material.signature.as_bytes(),
|
||||
material.signature_input.as_bytes(),
|
||||
material.signing_string.as_bytes(),
|
||||
body,
|
||||
] {
|
||||
h.update((part.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
h.update(part);
|
||||
}
|
||||
format!("{:x}", h.finalize())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One reported context in the combined response. Signature material is
|
||||
/// deliberately absent: it is write-time provenance, not read-surface data.
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize)]
|
||||
pub struct StatusEntry {
|
||||
pub state: String,
|
||||
pub context: String,
|
||||
pub target_url: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub description: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub producer_did: String,
|
||||
pub created_at: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The combined commit status. `state` never leaves the four-value set (KTD-1),
|
||||
/// so absence is carried by `total_count` 0 with the pending state rather than a
|
||||
/// fifth value, and `reported_only` (R19) says out loud that the state covers the
|
||||
/// contexts that reported, not every check a caller expected.
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize)]
|
||||
pub struct CombinedStatus {
|
||||
pub state: String,
|
||||
pub sha: String,
|
||||
pub total_count: usize,
|
||||
pub statuses: Vec<StatusEntry>,
|
||||
pub reported_only: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/commits/:sha/status
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The auth extension is optional and MUST be last in the extractor list: the
|
||||
/// route group carries `optional_signature`, so an unsigned caller reaches here
|
||||
/// with no `AuthenticatedDid` at all and a public repo still answers.
|
||||
pub async fn commit_status(
|
||||
State(state): State<AppState>,
|
||||
Path((owner, name, sha)): Path<(String, String, String)>,
|
||||
auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Json<CombinedStatus>> {
|
||||
let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|Extension(a)| a.0.as_str());
|
||||
// The gate runs first and on the requested path, before any claim data is
|
||||
// touched. Its deny is the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing
|
||||
// repo, so the status surface cannot answer "does this repo exist".
|
||||
let (record, _rules) =
|
||||
crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let commit_sha = normalize_sha(&sha)?;
|
||||
let statuses = project_claims(&state, &record, &commit_sha).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(CombinedStatus {
|
||||
state: combined_state(&statuses).to_string(),
|
||||
sha: commit_sha,
|
||||
total_count: statuses.len(),
|
||||
statuses,
|
||||
reported_only: true,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The projection, in one place. Both read surfaces call it, so R3's "the rollup
|
||||
/// is derived by the same projection as the commit read" holds by construction
|
||||
/// rather than by two implementations happening to agree.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// KTD-5: current authorization, not write-time authorization. An ownership
|
||||
/// transfer drops the prior owner's claims from the projection while the
|
||||
/// append-only history keeps them.
|
||||
async fn project_claims(
|
||||
state: &AppState,
|
||||
record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
|
||||
commit_sha: &str,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<StatusEntry>> {
|
||||
let claims = state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.latest_status_claims(&record.id, commit_sha, &record.owner_did)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
Ok(claims
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|c| StatusEntry {
|
||||
state: c.state,
|
||||
context: c.context,
|
||||
target_url: c.target_url,
|
||||
description: c.description,
|
||||
producer_did: c.producer_did,
|
||||
created_at: c.created_at,
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The pull request head rollup (R11). `state` stays inside the four wire values
|
||||
/// whatever happened to the head (KTD-1): an unresolvable head is carried by
|
||||
/// `head_resolved`, alongside the pull request's own state, so a client can tell
|
||||
/// "the head could not be resolved" from "the head resolved and nothing reported"
|
||||
/// without a fifth state value no client understands.
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize)]
|
||||
pub struct PullRequestStatus {
|
||||
pub number: i64,
|
||||
/// The pull request's own state: open, closed, or merged.
|
||||
pub pull_request_state: String,
|
||||
pub head_resolved: bool,
|
||||
/// The target commit, absent exactly when `head_resolved` is false.
|
||||
pub sha: Option<String>,
|
||||
pub state: String,
|
||||
pub total_count: usize,
|
||||
pub statuses: Vec<StatusEntry>,
|
||||
pub reported_only: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// GET /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/pulls/:number/status
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Same optional-auth shape as the commit read, and the auth extension MUST stay
|
||||
/// last in the extractor list.
|
||||
pub async fn pull_request_status(
|
||||
State(state): State<AppState>,
|
||||
Path((owner, name, number)): Path<(String, String, i64)>,
|
||||
auth: Option<Extension<AuthenticatedDid>>,
|
||||
) -> Result<Json<PullRequestStatus>> {
|
||||
let caller = auth.as_ref().map(|Extension(a)| a.0.as_str());
|
||||
// The gate runs first, on the requested path, before the pull request row is
|
||||
// loaded. Its deny is the repo's own not-found, byte-identical to a missing
|
||||
// repo. Once it passes, a missing pull request number is the plain not-found:
|
||||
// existence is no longer secret.
|
||||
let (record, _rules) =
|
||||
crate::api::authorize_repo_read(&state, &owner, &name, caller, "/").await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.get_pr(&record.id, number)
|
||||
.await?
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound(format!("PR #{number} not found")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let head = rollup_head(&state, &record, &pr).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let statuses = match &head {
|
||||
Some(sha) => project_claims(&state, &record, sha).await?,
|
||||
None => Vec::new(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(PullRequestStatus {
|
||||
number: pr.number,
|
||||
pull_request_state: pr.status,
|
||||
head_resolved: head.is_some(),
|
||||
sha: head,
|
||||
state: combined_state(&statuses).to_string(),
|
||||
total_count: statuses.len(),
|
||||
statuses,
|
||||
reported_only: true,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Branch-head lookups performed by the rollup fallback, counted so a test can
|
||||
/// assert WORK DONE rather than only the answer returned. A fallback that
|
||||
/// re-resolved on every read and then discarded the answer would be invisible in
|
||||
/// the response and visible here.
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
pub(crate) static BRANCH_RESOLVES: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize =
|
||||
std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The rollup's target commit (KTD-4).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The stored head wins whenever it is set. It is frozen at close or merge, so a
|
||||
/// closed or merged pull request keeps the commit the decision was made against,
|
||||
/// and only an OPEN pull request with no stored head falls back to the branch.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The fallback is one database read: the latest push this node recorded for the
|
||||
/// pull request's source branch, from `repo_push_events`. It deliberately does
|
||||
/// NOT go through `git::store` ref listing, which needs an acquired repository
|
||||
/// path — on a cold node that downloads the whole repository from object storage,
|
||||
/// and this read group carries no rate limiter, so an anonymous caller could
|
||||
/// drive repeated downloads with a URL.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `repo_push_events` is the source rather than `branch_cids` because
|
||||
/// `record_push_events` writes it for every ref update unconditionally, whereas
|
||||
/// the sole writer of `branch_cids` sits behind a pin CID. A node with no object
|
||||
/// pinning configured never writes that table, so a resolve keyed on it could
|
||||
/// never answer there and every open pull request without a stored head reported
|
||||
/// `head_resolved: false` forever. The residual limit is that only pushes taken
|
||||
/// after this shipped have rows, so a branch last pushed before then still does
|
||||
/// not resolve.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The resolved head is persisted, which makes an unauthenticated GET write. That
|
||||
/// is only acceptable because the write is self-limiting: it fires exactly when
|
||||
/// `head_commit` is absent and it fills it, and the fill is conditioned on that
|
||||
/// same absence in SQL, so the PERSIST happens at most once per pull request.
|
||||
/// The resolve attempt itself is not once-only — a pull request whose branch does
|
||||
/// not resolve stores nothing, so there is nothing to short-circuit on and the
|
||||
/// lookup runs again on every read until it succeeds.
|
||||
async fn rollup_head(
|
||||
state: &AppState,
|
||||
record: &crate::db::RepoRecord,
|
||||
pr: &crate::db::PullRequest,
|
||||
) -> Result<Option<String>> {
|
||||
if let Some(stored) = pr.head_commit.clone() {
|
||||
return Ok(Some(stored));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if pr.status != "open" {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The push path records the full ref while a pull request stores the bare
|
||||
// branch name, the same mismatch `crate::api::repos::branch_from_ref`
|
||||
// reconciles on the write side; this is that mapping run backwards. The empty
|
||||
// branch is excluded for the same reason it is there: `refs/heads/` is not a
|
||||
// branch and nothing can have written it.
|
||||
if pr.source_branch.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let ref_name = crate::git::store::local_branch_ref(&pr.source_branch);
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
BRANCH_RESOLVES.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
|
||||
let resolved = state
|
||||
.db
|
||||
.latest_push_sha_for_ref(&record.id, &ref_name)
|
||||
.await?
|
||||
// A recorded head that is not a commit SHA is no target at all, and
|
||||
// storing it would leave the rollup pointing at nothing forever.
|
||||
.and_then(|sha| normalize_sha(&sha).ok());
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(sha) = resolved else {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Best effort, and deliberately not `?`. The head is already resolved and the
|
||||
// response does not depend on this write landing, so a transient database
|
||||
// failure here must not turn a served read into a 500; the next read resolves
|
||||
// again and re-attempts the fill. Same catch-and-log the sibling writes on the
|
||||
// push path use (`update_open_pr_heads`, `record_push_events`).
|
||||
if let Err(e) = state.db.set_pr_head_if_absent(&pr.id, &sha).await {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
err = %e,
|
||||
pr_id = %pr.id,
|
||||
"failed to persist a resolved pull request head; serving the resolved head anyway"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(Some(sha))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// KTD-1's fold: any error or failure yields failure, else any pending yields
|
||||
/// pending, else success. An empty set is pending, never success — total absence
|
||||
/// of a verdict is its own state and must not read as a pass (R10).
|
||||
fn combined_state(statuses: &[StatusEntry]) -> &'static str {
|
||||
if statuses.is_empty() {
|
||||
return "pending";
|
||||
}
|
||||
if statuses
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.any(|s| s.state == "error" || s.state == "failure")
|
||||
{
|
||||
"failure"
|
||||
} else if statuses.iter().any(|s| s.state == "pending") {
|
||||
"pending"
|
||||
} else if statuses.iter().all(|s| s.state == "success") {
|
||||
"success"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// A stored state outside the vocabulary is not a pass: an
|
||||
// unrecognized verdict folds toward failure, never silently to success.
|
||||
"failure"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 40 hex characters, lowercased. The SHA is never existence-checked (KTD-7):
|
||||
/// a claim describes a commit object, and the object may not have arrived yet.
|
||||
fn normalize_sha(sha: &str) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
if crate::api::repos::is_hex_sha(sha) {
|
||||
Ok(sha.to_ascii_lowercase())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(AppError::BadRequest(
|
||||
"commit sha must be exactly 40 hexadecimal characters".into(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One size bound on persisted signature material, measured in bytes.
|
||||
fn bound(what: &str, len: usize, max: usize) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
if len > max {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
|
||||
"{what} must be at most {max} bytes"
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn validate_state(state: &str) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
if CLAIM_STATES.contains(&state) {
|
||||
Ok(state.to_string())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
|
||||
"state must be one of {}",
|
||||
CLAIM_STATES.join(", ")
|
||||
)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The context is the projection key, so it is trimmed, bounded, and required to
|
||||
/// be free of control characters.
|
||||
fn validate_context(context: &str) -> Result<String> {
|
||||
let trimmed = context.trim();
|
||||
if trimmed.is_empty() || trimmed.chars().count() > MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
|
||||
"context must be 1 to {MAX_CONTEXT_CHARS} characters"
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if trimmed.chars().any(char::is_control) {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
|
||||
"context must not contain control characters".into(),
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(trimmed.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn validate_target_url(url: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
|
||||
let Some(url) = url else { return Ok(None) };
|
||||
if url.chars().count() > MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS {
|
||||
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
|
||||
"target_url must be at most {MAX_TARGET_URL_CHARS} characters"
|
||||
)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let lower = url.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
||||
if lower.starts_with("http://") || lower.starts_with("https://") {
|
||||
Ok(Some(url.to_string()))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(AppError::BadRequest(
|
||||
"target_url must be an http or https URL".into(),
|
||||
))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn validate_description(description: Option<&str>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
|
||||
match description {
|
||||
Some(d) if d.chars().count() > MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS => Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
|
||||
"description must be at most {MAX_DESCRIPTION_CHARS} characters"
|
||||
))),
|
||||
other => Ok(other.map(str::to_string)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests;
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -17,53 +17,6 @@ use crate::state::AppState;
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct AuthenticatedDid(pub String);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The RFC 9421 material this request was actually verified against, injected
|
||||
/// alongside [`AuthenticatedDid`] by `require_signature`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A handler that records a signed claim as history has to store it: the header
|
||||
/// values and the canonical signing string are gone once the request ends, and a
|
||||
/// stored claim nobody can re-verify is not history. `signing_string` is the exact
|
||||
/// byte sequence the Ed25519 verification succeeded over, not a rebuild — a
|
||||
/// handler reconstructing it from headers would be verifying a different string
|
||||
/// than the middleware did.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct SignatureMaterial {
|
||||
/// The `Signature` header value.
|
||||
pub signature: String,
|
||||
/// The `Signature-Input` header value.
|
||||
pub signature_input: String,
|
||||
/// The canonical bytes the signature covered.
|
||||
pub signing_string: String,
|
||||
/// The buffered request body, on the routes that persist it. The signing
|
||||
/// string covers it only through the content-digest, so without these bytes
|
||||
/// a stored claim can be shown to carry *a* valid signature over *some*
|
||||
/// digest and nothing more. Carried here because the body is consumed
|
||||
/// downstream by the extractor and cannot be recovered afterwards.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `Option`, and populated only behind [`PersistsSignedBody`], because a
|
||||
/// route that never stores the body has no use for a second handle to it.
|
||||
/// The unlike-sized field is this one: the three above are header-derived
|
||||
/// and bounded by the server's header limit, while a receive-pack POST
|
||||
/// carries up to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (2 GB by default). `Bytes`, not
|
||||
/// `Vec<u8>`, so the handle the marked routes do take is a refcount bump
|
||||
/// over the buffer the middleware already holds rather than a copy.
|
||||
pub body: Option<axum::body::Bytes>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Marks a route group whose handler persists the signed request body.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Applied as an extension layer OUTSIDE the auth layers, so it is on the
|
||||
/// request before [`require_signature`] decides whether to carry the body. A
|
||||
/// marker applied inside them is never seen, and the failure is silent: the
|
||||
/// handler still compiles, tests that inject material by hand still pass, and
|
||||
/// production stores nothing. The status write handler refuses an absent body
|
||||
/// for that reason.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// A marker rather than a path check because `require_signature` must not learn
|
||||
/// which URL persists claims; that knowledge belongs at the route table.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
|
||||
pub struct PersistsSignedBody;
|
||||
|
||||
/// A UCAN that passed full chain validation, with the root issuer the chain
|
||||
/// rests on. Inserted into request extensions by [`require_ucan_chain`] when
|
||||
/// `X-Ucan` is present; absent when the header is.
|
||||
@@ -422,28 +375,10 @@ async fn verify_signature(limit: usize, request: Request, next: Next) -> Respons
|
||||
|
||||
tracing::info!(did = %sig.key_id, "✓ authenticated request");
|
||||
|
||||
// The body travels only where it is stored. On every other signed route the
|
||||
// middleware's handle would keep the buffer alive for the rest of the layer
|
||||
// chain, until the handler's own extractor consumes the request.
|
||||
let body = parts
|
||||
.extensions
|
||||
.get::<PersistsSignedBody>()
|
||||
.map(|_| body_bytes.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
let material = SignatureMaterial {
|
||||
signature: sig_header,
|
||||
signature_input: sig_input,
|
||||
signing_string,
|
||||
body,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut request = Request::from_parts(parts, Body::from(body_bytes));
|
||||
request
|
||||
.extensions_mut()
|
||||
.insert(AuthenticatedDid(sig.key_id.to_string()));
|
||||
// Carry the verified material forward for handlers that persist a signed
|
||||
// claim; none of it can be recovered once the request is gone.
|
||||
request.extensions_mut().insert(material);
|
||||
next.run(request).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -863,109 +798,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Reports what the signature middleware put in `SignatureMaterial.body`,
|
||||
/// so a test can tell "captured" from "deliberately not captured" apart
|
||||
/// from "the middleware never ran".
|
||||
async fn report_body(material: Option<axum::Extension<SignatureMaterial>>) -> String {
|
||||
match material {
|
||||
Some(axum::Extension(m)) => match m.body {
|
||||
Some(bytes) => format!("captured:{}", bytes.len()),
|
||||
None => "absent".to_string(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
None => "no-material".to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn signed_post(path: &str, body: &[u8]) -> Request {
|
||||
let kp = Keypair::generate();
|
||||
let signed = gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request(&kp, "POST", path, body);
|
||||
Request::builder()
|
||||
.method("POST")
|
||||
.uri(path)
|
||||
.header("content-digest", signed.content_digest)
|
||||
.header("signature-input", signed.signature_input)
|
||||
.header("signature", signed.signature)
|
||||
.body(axum::body::Body::from(body.to_vec()))
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The body handle travels only on a route that asked for it.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Both arms drive a genuinely signed request through `require_signature`;
|
||||
/// the only difference is the [`PersistsSignedBody`] marker layer. A
|
||||
/// middleware that captured unconditionally would make both arms read
|
||||
/// `captured`, and one that never read the marker would make both read
|
||||
/// `absent`, so the pair pins the decision rather than the mechanism.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_body_is_carried_only_when_the_route_marks_itself_as_persisting_it() {
|
||||
let body = br#"{"state":"success"}"#;
|
||||
|
||||
// The marker layer is added AFTER the middleware layer, which is what
|
||||
// makes it the outer of the two and therefore the one that runs first.
|
||||
// This is the same relative position `build_router` uses on the status
|
||||
// write group, where the marker sits outside `add_auth_layers`.
|
||||
let marked = Router::new()
|
||||
.route("/", axum::routing::post(report_body))
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
|
||||
crate::auth::SignatureBodyLimit(65536),
|
||||
require_signature,
|
||||
))
|
||||
.layer(axum::Extension(PersistsSignedBody));
|
||||
let resp = marked.oneshot(signed_post("/", body)).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
|
||||
let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
|
||||
format!("captured:{}", body.len()),
|
||||
"a route carrying the persist marker must receive the buffered body"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let unmarked = Router::new()
|
||||
.route("/", axum::routing::post(report_body))
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
|
||||
crate::auth::SignatureBodyLimit(65536),
|
||||
require_signature,
|
||||
));
|
||||
let resp = unmarked.oneshot(signed_post("/", body)).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
|
||||
let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
|
||||
"absent",
|
||||
"a signed route that never persists the body must not be handed a handle to it"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The marker is read from the request the middleware was given, and the
|
||||
/// request it hands downstream still carries it. Both halves matter: the
|
||||
/// first is the capture decision, the second is that rebuilding the request
|
||||
/// from its parts does not drop extensions a later layer may want.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn the_marker_survives_the_request_rebuild() {
|
||||
async fn report_marker(marker: Option<axum::Extension<PersistsSignedBody>>) -> String {
|
||||
match marker {
|
||||
Some(_) => "marked".to_string(),
|
||||
None => "unmarked".to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let app = Router::new()
|
||||
.route("/", axum::routing::post(report_marker))
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
|
||||
crate::auth::SignatureBodyLimit(65536),
|
||||
require_signature,
|
||||
))
|
||||
.layer(axum::Extension(PersistsSignedBody));
|
||||
let resp = app.oneshot(signed_post("/", b"{}")).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
|
||||
let seen = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 2048).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
String::from_utf8(seen.to_vec()).unwrap(),
|
||||
"marked",
|
||||
"the marker must reach the handler, so the middleware saw it too"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn require_ucan_chain_no_header_passes_through() {
|
||||
let state = make_test_state(Keypair::generate().did());
|
||||
|
||||
+11
-2225
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -1285,38 +1285,6 @@ async fn run_effect_bundle(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 7a. Commit-status surfaces: the stored pull-request heads and the
|
||||
// catch-up poll feed are durable accounting like everything else
|
||||
// in this bundle, so they ride the same proven-landing authority —
|
||||
// derived from the accepted transition rows, never from a live
|
||||
// parse, and a landing reconcile proves only later still emits
|
||||
// them here on the drain pass. Head writes check each branch's
|
||||
// current tip before moving it: this executor runs after the repo
|
||||
// write lock is released, so a newer push may already have moved
|
||||
// the branch and only the still-current landing may win the head.
|
||||
let landed: Vec<crate::api::repos::RefUpdate> = accepted_children
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(|c| crate::api::repos::RefUpdate {
|
||||
old_sha: c.old_sha.clone(),
|
||||
new_sha: c.new_sha.clone(),
|
||||
ref_name: c.ref_name.clone(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
let heads =
|
||||
crate::api::repos::heads_still_at_tip(std::path::Path::new(&repo.disk_path), &landed)?;
|
||||
if let Err(e) = crate::api::repos::update_open_pr_heads(&state.db, &req.repo_id, &heads).await {
|
||||
return Ok(EffectsOutcome::Retry {
|
||||
last_error: format!("stored pr heads: {e}"),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Err(e) =
|
||||
crate::api::repos::record_push_events(&state.db, &req.id, accepted_children).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Ok(EffectsOutcome::Retry {
|
||||
last_error: format!("push events: {e}"),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 8. Per-ref certs and anchor jobs. Each accepted child gets one
|
||||
// of each. Failures are accumulated; the first one is
|
||||
// returned as the Retry reason. Anchor identity is by occurrence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -379,16 +379,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A 429 does not advertise a retry interval: the status-claim caps behind
|
||||
/// it are per-commit and append-only, so a client honoring a 1s hint would
|
||||
/// retry a request that can never succeed.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn too_many_requests_carries_no_retry_after() {
|
||||
let resp = AppError::TooManyRequests("x".into()).into_response();
|
||||
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS);
|
||||
assert!(resp.headers().get("retry-after").is_none());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// #226: raw sqlx/DB detail must never appear in the Internal 500 body.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn internal_error_body_is_opaque() {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -683,14 +683,12 @@ pub fn list_refs(repo_path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
|
||||
/// a 40-char SHA-1 hex string. The reconcile compares two hex
|
||||
/// strings.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `show-ref --verify` matches the exact ref name — unlike `rev-parse`,
|
||||
/// which peels expressions, so it is the right primitive when the name is
|
||||
/// caller-adjacent. Most production callers use [`read_ref_bounded`]; this
|
||||
/// unbounded form also serves test harnesses that stage markers without a
|
||||
/// timeout budget.
|
||||
/// Production callers use [`read_ref_bounded`]; this unbounded form is kept
|
||||
/// for test harnesses that stage markers without a timeout budget.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub fn read_ref(repo_path: &Path, ref_name: &str) -> Result<Option<String>> {
|
||||
// allow-unbounded-git: exact-name resolution; callers that need a timeout
|
||||
// budget use read_ref_bounded.
|
||||
// allow-unbounded-git: #[allow(dead_code)] harness form; production
|
||||
// callers use read_ref_bounded.
|
||||
let output = Command::new("git")
|
||||
.args(["show-ref", "--verify", "--hash", ref_name])
|
||||
.current_dir(repo_path)
|
||||
@@ -1579,7 +1577,7 @@ fn guard_refs(target_branch: &str, source_branch: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Stored short branch names are passed to git as explicit local-branch refs so a
|
||||
/// syntax-valid name cannot be reinterpreted as a revision shorthand at the sink.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn local_branch_ref(short_name: &str) -> String {
|
||||
fn local_branch_ref(short_name: &str) -> String {
|
||||
format!("refs/heads/{short_name}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use tracing::Level;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::api::{
|
||||
agents, arweave, bounties, certs, changelog, events, ipfs, issues, labels, peers, profiles,
|
||||
protect, pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, status, tasks, visibility, webhooks,
|
||||
protect, pulls, register, replicas, repos, resolve, stars, tasks, visibility, webhooks,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use crate::auth;
|
||||
use crate::rate_limit;
|
||||
@@ -317,68 +317,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
)
|
||||
.write_braked(&write_ip_limiter);
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Status claim writes — signature, plus the per-DID throttle AND the
|
||||
// per-IP flood brake `creation_routes` carries. Not in `write_routes`, which
|
||||
// has neither: every call here appends a row, so an unthrottled writer grows
|
||||
// the claim log on demand and the three per-repo caps would be the only bound.
|
||||
let status_write_routes = add_auth_layers(
|
||||
Router::new()
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
|
||||
post(status::create_status),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_did))
|
||||
.layer(axum::Extension(state.rate_limiter.clone())),
|
||||
state.clone(),
|
||||
SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT,
|
||||
)
|
||||
// The route's advertised body bound, applied at the transport. It sits
|
||||
// OUTSIDE the auth layers because `require_signature` collects and hashes
|
||||
// the whole body before any handler runs: the handler's own check measures
|
||||
// an allocation that has already happened, so without this layer the 8 KiB
|
||||
// figure bounded what gets stored and not what gets buffered, and
|
||||
// concurrent requests multiplied exactly the cost it was written to
|
||||
// prevent. It sits INSIDE the rate limiters so an oversized request is
|
||||
// still counted by the per-IP brake before it is refused.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A declared Content-Length over the limit is answered 413 without reading
|
||||
// a byte; a body that declares nothing (or understates) is truncated at the
|
||||
// limit and fails where it is read, which `require_signature` reports as an
|
||||
// unreadable body.
|
||||
.layer(RequestBodyLimitLayer::new(status::MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES))
|
||||
// The one route that persists the signed request body, so the one route
|
||||
// whose signature material carries it. Applied OUTSIDE `add_auth_layers`
|
||||
// (outermost = runs first) because `require_signature` reads this marker to
|
||||
// decide whether to carry the body; a layer added inside the auth pair runs
|
||||
// after the middleware and is never seen. `create_status` refuses an absent
|
||||
// body rather than storing an empty column, so getting this order wrong
|
||||
// fails loudly instead of quietly writing unverifiable claims.
|
||||
.layer(axum::Extension(auth::PersistsSignedBody))
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn(rate_limit::rate_limit_by_ip))
|
||||
.layer(axum::Extension(rate_limit::IpRateLimiter {
|
||||
limiter: state.create_ip_rate_limiter.clone(),
|
||||
trust: state.push_limiter_trust,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Status claim reads — open, behind `optional_signature` so the handler
|
||||
// sees the caller when one signs and still answers a public repo for an
|
||||
// anonymous reader. Without the layer the handler's optional auth extension
|
||||
// is None for EVERY caller, including the owner, and every private repo
|
||||
// reads as not-found.
|
||||
let status_read_routes = Router::new()
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/status",
|
||||
get(status::commit_status),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/status",
|
||||
get(status::pull_request_status),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(
|
||||
auth::SignatureBodyLimit(SIGNED_BODY_LIMIT),
|
||||
auth::optional_signature,
|
||||
));
|
||||
|
||||
// Body limit is raised to GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES (default 2 GB) for git
|
||||
// routes only — all other API routes keep axum's default 2 MB cap.
|
||||
// HTTP Signature is enforced on receive-pack (push) — the git-remote-gitlawb
|
||||
@@ -640,10 +578,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/events",
|
||||
get(events::list_repo_events),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.route(
|
||||
"/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push-events",
|
||||
get(events::list_repo_push_events),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.route("/api/v1/agents", get(agents::list_agents))
|
||||
.route("/api/v1/agents/{did}", get(agents::show_agent))
|
||||
.route("/api/v1/agents/{did}/trust", get(agents::get_trust))
|
||||
@@ -749,8 +683,6 @@ pub fn build_router(state: AppState) -> Router {
|
||||
.merge(profile_write_routes)
|
||||
.merge(creation_routes)
|
||||
.merge(write_routes)
|
||||
.merge(status_write_routes)
|
||||
.merge(status_read_routes)
|
||||
.merge(git_write_routes)
|
||||
.merge(git_read_routes)
|
||||
.merge(issue_write_routes)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -398,7 +398,6 @@ impl TestNode {
|
||||
status: "open".to_string(),
|
||||
merged_by_did: None,
|
||||
merged_at: None,
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
created_at: now.clone(),
|
||||
updated_at: now,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -184,153 +184,6 @@ pub(crate) fn signed_request_as(did: &str, method: Method, uri: &str, body: Body
|
||||
.expect("request builder")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Slice a region out of a module's own source (obtained with `include_str!`)
|
||||
/// and drop full-line `//` comments from it.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Several guards in `api/` assert that a piece of PRODUCTION code does or does
|
||||
/// not contain something: that the receive-pack handler really calls the
|
||||
/// push-event recorder, that the status module never acquires the repository.
|
||||
/// Each guard carried its own copy of this parse, and three copies of a parser
|
||||
/// is three places for the slicing to drift apart while every guard still reads
|
||||
/// green.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// `start` and `end` are literal anchors. The region runs from the first
|
||||
/// occurrence of `start` (inclusive; the top of the file when `None`) to the
|
||||
/// next occurrence of `end` (exclusive; end of file when `None`).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Returns `None` when an anchor is missing, rather than silently falling back
|
||||
/// to a larger or empty region. Each caller supplies its own message for that
|
||||
/// case and keeps its own assertion that the region really covers what it claims
|
||||
/// to, which is what stops a bug in this one helper from turning every guard
|
||||
/// that uses it into a vacuous pass.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Comment lines are stripped so that a doc comment naming the very call a guard
|
||||
/// searches for cannot stand in for the call itself.
|
||||
pub(crate) fn scrape_source_region(
|
||||
src: &str,
|
||||
start: Option<&str>,
|
||||
end: Option<&str>,
|
||||
) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
let from = match start {
|
||||
Some(anchor) => src.find(anchor)?,
|
||||
None => 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let rest = &src[from..];
|
||||
let to = match end {
|
||||
// Search past the first CHARACTER, so an `end` anchor that also matches
|
||||
// at the very start of the region cannot collapse it to nothing. A fixed
|
||||
// one-byte skip does the same job on ASCII and lands mid-character on a
|
||||
// multibyte first character, where the slice fails and the helper answers
|
||||
// `None`, which is indistinguishable, to every caller, from a missing
|
||||
// anchor.
|
||||
Some(anchor) => {
|
||||
let skip = rest.chars().next().map_or(0, char::len_utf8);
|
||||
rest.get(skip..)?.find(anchor)? + skip
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => rest.len(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
Some(
|
||||
rest[..to]
|
||||
.lines()
|
||||
.filter(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("//"))
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
.join("\n"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod scrape_source_region_tests {
|
||||
use super::scrape_source_region;
|
||||
|
||||
const SRC: &str = "prelude line\nfn target() {\n // calls_the_thing()\n calls_the_thing();\n}\nfn later() {\n calls_the_thing();\n}\n";
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn stops_at_the_end_anchor_so_a_later_function_cannot_satisfy_a_guard() {
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(SRC, Some("fn target()"), Some("\n}")).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(body.contains("calls_the_thing();"));
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!body.contains("fn later()"),
|
||||
"the region must stop at the first column-zero brace, got: {body}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn strips_full_line_comments_so_a_doc_comment_cannot_stand_in_for_code() {
|
||||
let commented = "fn target() {\n // calls_the_thing();\n}\n";
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(commented, Some("fn target()"), Some("\n}")).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!body.contains("calls_the_thing"),
|
||||
"a commented-out call must not survive the scrape, got: {body}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn no_start_anchor_reads_from_the_top_of_the_file() {
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(SRC, None, Some("fn later()")).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(body.starts_with("prelude line"));
|
||||
assert!(!body.contains("fn later()"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn no_end_anchor_reads_to_the_end_of_the_file() {
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(SRC, Some("fn later()"), None).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(body.trim_end().ends_with('}'));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A missing anchor is None, never a silently wider or empty region: that is
|
||||
/// what lets each caller keep its own "the thing I meant to scan is gone"
|
||||
/// message instead of asserting against whatever the fallback produced.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_missing_anchor_is_none_rather_than_a_fallback_region() {
|
||||
assert!(scrape_source_region(SRC, Some("fn absent()"), Some("\n}")).is_none());
|
||||
assert!(scrape_source_region(SRC, Some("fn target()"), Some("~absent~")).is_none());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A region whose first character is multibyte is scraped, not reported
|
||||
/// missing.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The end-anchor search skips the region's first CHARACTER. Skipping a
|
||||
/// fixed byte instead lands mid-character here, the slice fails, and the
|
||||
/// helper answers `None`, which every caller reads as "the anchor is gone"
|
||||
/// and reports as a missing region. A guard that says "not found"
|
||||
/// for input that is present is worse than one that fails loudly, and the
|
||||
/// five callers sharing this helper all inherit it.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_multibyte_first_character_does_not_read_as_a_missing_anchor() {
|
||||
let src = "é prelude\nfn target() {\n body();\n}\nfn later() {}\n";
|
||||
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(src, None, Some("\n}"))
|
||||
.expect("a region starting on a multibyte character must be scraped");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
body.starts_with("é prelude") && body.contains("body();"),
|
||||
"the region must cover the multibyte start through the end anchor, got: {body}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!body.contains("fn later()"),
|
||||
"the region must still stop at the end anchor, got: {body}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// The same through a multibyte START anchor, so the skip is measured
|
||||
// from the region rather than from the top of the file.
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(src, Some("é"), Some("\n}"))
|
||||
.expect("a multibyte start anchor must be scraped");
|
||||
assert!(body.starts_with('é'), "got: {body}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The end anchor is searched past the region's first character, so a
|
||||
/// region whose own start also matches the end anchor is not collapsed to
|
||||
/// nothing.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn an_end_anchor_matching_at_the_start_does_not_collapse_the_region() {
|
||||
let src = "\n}\nfn target() {\n body();\n}\n";
|
||||
let body = scrape_source_region(src, None, Some("\n}")).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
body.contains("fn target()") && body.contains("body();"),
|
||||
"got: {body}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A local endpoint whose TCP accept succeeds instantly but that never writes an
|
||||
/// HTTP response, so any request against it stalls deterministically until the
|
||||
/// caller's own timeout. (A non-routable address hangs only if the network
|
||||
@@ -338,6 +191,7 @@ mod scrape_source_region_tests {
|
||||
/// test pass for the wrong reason.) The accepted sockets are parked in the
|
||||
/// spawned task, which dies with the test's runtime, so the peer never sees a
|
||||
/// close mid-test.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn silent_http_endpoint() -> String {
|
||||
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let endpoint = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
|
||||
@@ -350,71 +204,6 @@ pub(crate) async fn silent_http_endpoint() -> String {
|
||||
endpoint
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The response body decoded as JSON.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)] // shared response helper for api test mods
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn body_json(resp: axum::response::Response) -> serde_json::Value {
|
||||
let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("body bytes");
|
||||
serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).expect("json body")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Status plus the full response body, for the byte-identical deny comparison.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)] // shared response helper for api test mods
|
||||
pub(crate) async fn status_and_bytes(
|
||||
resp: axum::response::Response,
|
||||
) -> (axum::http::StatusCode, Vec<u8>) {
|
||||
let status = resp.status();
|
||||
let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), usize::MAX)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.to_vec();
|
||||
(status, bytes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A `PendingRefTransition` test row in `applied` state: the fields the
|
||||
/// commit-status effect writers read (`ref_name`, `new_sha`, `ordinal`,
|
||||
/// `repo_id`) are the parameters, the rest is inert filler matching the
|
||||
/// shape `insert_pending_ref_transitions` writes. `applied_at` stays None
|
||||
/// so the recorded event falls back to the per-push timestamp the writer
|
||||
/// computes once for the whole batch — the shape a real push produces.
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)] // commit-status surface tests across api modules
|
||||
pub(crate) fn pending_child(
|
||||
request_id: &str,
|
||||
repo_id: &str,
|
||||
ref_name: &str,
|
||||
old_sha: &str,
|
||||
new_sha: &str,
|
||||
ordinal: i32,
|
||||
) -> crate::db::PendingRefTransition {
|
||||
crate::db::PendingRefTransition {
|
||||
id: crate::db::deterministic_id(&[
|
||||
"pending_ref_transition",
|
||||
request_id,
|
||||
repo_id,
|
||||
ref_name,
|
||||
old_sha,
|
||||
new_sha,
|
||||
]),
|
||||
request_id: request_id.to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo_id.to_string(),
|
||||
ref_name: ref_name.to_string(),
|
||||
old_sha: old_sha.to_string(),
|
||||
new_sha: new_sha.to_string(),
|
||||
pusher_did: "did:key:z6pusher".to_string(),
|
||||
node_did: "did:key:z6node".to_string(),
|
||||
signature_header: String::new(),
|
||||
signature_input: String::new(),
|
||||
content_digest: String::new(),
|
||||
state: crate::db::pending_state::APPLIED.to_string(),
|
||||
created_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
|
||||
applied_at: None,
|
||||
cancelled_at: None,
|
||||
ordinal,
|
||||
git_target_kind: Some("update".to_string()),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Body of the `for-each-ref` arm of a fake-git fixture in the
|
||||
/// COLUMN SHAPE `blob_paths` phase 2 parses. The caller is
|
||||
/// responsible for wrapping this in a full `case "$1" in ... esac`
|
||||
@@ -2493,7 +2282,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// Insert the poisoned row DIRECTLY, as a pre-fix row or an ungated writer would.
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -2852,7 +2640,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -2971,7 +2758,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3096,7 +2882,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3213,7 +2998,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3398,7 +3182,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3525,7 +3308,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3694,7 +3476,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -3859,7 +3640,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -4050,7 +3830,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
state.db.create_repo(&repo).await.expect("seed repo");
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
@@ -4203,7 +3982,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&pwn);
|
||||
|
||||
let pr = crate::db::PullRequest {
|
||||
head_commit: None,
|
||||
id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
||||
repo_id: repo.id.clone(),
|
||||
number: 1,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -915,7 +915,6 @@ fn fill(path: &str, fixture: &Fixture, repo: &str, id_source: IdSource) -> Strin
|
||||
};
|
||||
path.replace("{owner}", &fixture.owner_did)
|
||||
.replace("{repo}", repo)
|
||||
.replace("{sha}", "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa")
|
||||
.replace("{number}", "1")
|
||||
.replace("{id}", id)
|
||||
.replace("{label}", "bug")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -234,23 +234,6 @@ pub fn deny_bearing_routes() -> &'static [Row] {
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// create_status: signed non-owner on a public repo passes the read
|
||||
// gate and hits `require_repo_owner` — a plain owner-gate 403. The
|
||||
// body is a minimal valid claim (the request is body-bound signed, so
|
||||
// the probe's RFC-9421 content-digest coverage is load-bearing: a
|
||||
// signer that did not cover the body would 400 before the gate).
|
||||
Row {
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
|
||||
gate: GateClass::OwnerGate,
|
||||
handler: "status::create_status",
|
||||
body: Some(r#"{"state":"pending","context":"ci/build"}"#),
|
||||
needs: NO_ENTITY,
|
||||
reach: Reach::None,
|
||||
principals: NO_PRINCIPAL,
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// #195 (F1): close_pr / close_issue are owner-OR-author gates (pulls.rs:276,
|
||||
// issues.rs:255). A plain OwnerGate tests only the owner arm, so reverting
|
||||
// the author arm is invisible. MultiPrincipalGate drives BOTH arms.
|
||||
@@ -801,50 +784,6 @@ pub fn deny_bearing_routes() -> &'static [Row] {
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// pull_request_status: the seeded PRIVATE PR #1 is the reach target, so
|
||||
// the owner twin gets a 200 rollup, not the absent-entity 404 the gate's
|
||||
// own existence-hiding would make indistinguishable.
|
||||
Row {
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/status",
|
||||
gate: GateClass::ReadGate,
|
||||
handler: "status::pull_request_status",
|
||||
body: None,
|
||||
needs: &["priv_pr"],
|
||||
reach: Reach::ReaderReads,
|
||||
principals: NO_PRINCIPAL,
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// commit_status / list_repo_push_events: repo-scoped optional-auth reads
|
||||
// whose deny is the repo's own existence-hiding 404. Neither needs a
|
||||
// seeded entity — a status rollup over zero claims and an empty
|
||||
// push-event page are both valid 2xx responses, so the owner twin
|
||||
// proving the gate is the repo lookup, not the data.
|
||||
Row {
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/status",
|
||||
gate: GateClass::ReadGate,
|
||||
handler: "status::commit_status",
|
||||
body: None,
|
||||
needs: NO_ENTITY,
|
||||
reach: Reach::ReaderReads,
|
||||
principals: NO_PRINCIPAL,
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
Row {
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push-events",
|
||||
gate: GateClass::ReadGate,
|
||||
handler: "events::list_repo_push_events",
|
||||
body: None,
|
||||
needs: NO_ENTITY,
|
||||
reach: Reach::ReaderReads,
|
||||
principals: NO_PRINCIPAL,
|
||||
id_source: IdSource::Fixed,
|
||||
anon_read: AnonRead::Deny404,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// get_cert: id-keyed by a real ref-certificate issued by an owner push to
|
||||
// the private repo. No cert-content marker is seeded: get_cert read-gates
|
||||
// the repo on "/" and 404s a non-reader BEFORE fetching the cert, so cert
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user