ci: trigger the PR checks on a new head

Restore the historical OSS audit blocker text and add a dated status
update for #219. README and the maintainer roadmap now describe the
SDL-sourced fence and signer-plus-binding markers.

Cargo.lock

@@ -770,6 +770,23 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
+ "ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
+ "ark-serialize 0.6.0",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "educe",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-asm"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -800,6 +817,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-asm"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
+dependencies = [
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-ff-macros"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -838,6 +865,19 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn 2.0.117",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-ff-macros"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-bigint",
+ "num-traits",
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-serialize"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -871,6 +911,30 @@ dependencies = [
  "num-bigint",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
+dependencies = [
+ "ark-serialize-derive",
+ "ark-std 0.6.0",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+ "num-bigint",
+ "serde_with",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-serialize-derive"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "ark-std"
 version = "0.3.0"
@@ -901,6 +965,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand 0.8.6",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "ark-std"
+version = "0.6.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
+dependencies = [
+ "num-traits",
+ "rand 0.8.6",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "arrayref"
 version = "0.3.9"
@@ -3300,19 +3374,22 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "libc",
  "mockito",
  "reqwest",
+ "tempfile",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-attest"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "base64",
  "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3329,7 +3406,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-core"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -3350,13 +3427,14 @@ dependencies = [
  "sha2",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
+ "url",
  "uuid",
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gitlawb-node"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
@@ -3412,10 +3490,11 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "gl"
-version = "0.5.1"
+version = "0.7.1"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy",
  "anyhow",
+ "base64",
  "chrono",
  "clap",
  "dirs",
@@ -3464,9 +3543,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "h2"
-version = "0.4.13"
+version = "0.4.18"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2f44da3a8150a6703ed5d34e164b875fd14c2cdab9af1252a9a1020bde2bdc54"
+checksum = "839c0e8a181239723652be9062bb56ca5bf5f64011f73b623f6f4fc59086a228"
 dependencies = [
  "atomic-waker",
  "bytes",
@@ -3785,7 +3864,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
  "percent-encoding",
  "pin-project-lite",
- "socket2 0.6.3",
+ "socket2 0.5.10",
  "tokio",
  "tower-service",
  "tracing",
@@ -3821,6 +3900,7 @@ version = "0.4.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "gitlawb-core",
+ "mockito",
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
@@ -5352,7 +5432,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "quinn-udp",
  "rustc-hash",
  "rustls",
- "socket2 0.6.3",
+ "socket2 0.5.10",
  "thiserror 2.0.18",
  "tokio",
  "tracing",
@@ -5389,7 +5469,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "cfg_aliases",
  "libc",
  "once_cell",
- "socket2 0.6.3",
+ "socket2 0.5.10",
  "tracing",
  "windows-sys 0.52.0",
 ]
@@ -5739,14 +5819,15 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "ruint"
-version = "1.17.2"
+version = "1.20.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
+checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
 dependencies = [
  "alloy-rlp",
  "ark-ff 0.3.0",
  "ark-ff 0.4.2",
  "ark-ff 0.5.0",
+ "ark-ff 0.6.0",
  "bytes",
  "fastrlp 0.3.1",
  "fastrlp 0.4.0",

README.md

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Known limitations:
 - Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
 - Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
 - Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
-- GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID) but are limited to the agent-task queue; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
+- GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID), are limited to the agent-task queue, and are covered by a CI completeness fence that requires signer acquisition and actor binding on every registered mutation; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
 - Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
 
 See:

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/mod.rs

@@ -313,15 +313,32 @@ mod authz_guard {
     ///      from the SDL AST, not from this scrape.
     #[test]
     fn every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate() {
-        // (Rust snake name, schema field in camelCase, expected gate marker). The
-        // four are Bucket C signer-self (`did_matches(`); a repo-write would be
-        // Bucket A (`require_repo_owner(`). Same-named REST rows live in the guard
-        // above against `api/tasks.rs`.
-        let registered: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
-            ("create_task", "createTask", "did_matches("),
-            ("claim_task", "claimTask", "did_matches("),
-            ("complete_task", "completeTask", "did_matches("),
-            ("fail_task", "failTask", "did_matches("),
+        // (Rust snake name, schema field in camelCase, expected gate markers). The
+        // four are Bucket C signer-self: `/graphql` uses optional_signature, so each
+        // resolver must call `require_signer(ctx)?` and bind the acting DID with
+        // `did_matches(`. A repo-write would be Bucket A (`require_repo_owner(`).
+        // Same-named REST rows live in the guard above against `api/tasks.rs`.
+        let registered: &[(&str, &str, &[&str])] = &[
+            (
+                "create_task",
+                "createTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+            (
+                "claim_task",
+                "claimTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+            (
+                "complete_task",
+                "completeTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
+            (
+                "fail_task",
+                "failTask",
+                &["require_signer(ctx)?", "did_matches("],
+            ),
         ];
 
         // Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check against the REAL schema (#219),
@@ -341,14 +358,16 @@ mod authz_guard {
         }
 
         // Marker present (source scrape; the vacuity limit, backstopped by the
-        // adversarial tests): each resolver body carries its bucket marker.
+        // adversarial tests): each resolver body carries every required gate marker.
         let masked = mask_comments(include_str!("../graphql/mutation.rs"));
-        for (snake, _, marker) in registered {
+        for (snake, _, markers) in registered {
             let body = resolver_body(&masked, snake);
-            assert!(
-                body.contains(marker),
-                "GraphQL mutation `{snake}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}`: gate removed"
-            );
+            for marker in *markers {
+                assert!(
+                    body.contains(marker),
+                    "GraphQL mutation `{snake}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}`: gate removed"
+                );
+            }
         }
     }
 

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mutation.rs

@@ -186,57 +186,78 @@ mod tests {
             .join("; ")
     }
 
-    /// N2: GraphQL mutations require a verified signer and bind the acting DID to
-    /// it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
+    /// N2: every GraphQL mutation requires a verified signer and binds the acting
+    /// DID to it. Unsigned is rejected; a signer other than the claimed actor is
     /// rejected; the matching signer passes the auth gate.
     #[sqlx::test]
-    async fn mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
+    async fn each_mutation_requires_and_binds_signer(pool: PgPool) {
         let state = crate::test_support::test_state(pool).await;
         let schema = state.graphql_schema.as_ref();
-        let assignee = "did:key:zASSIGNEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
-        let q = format!(
-            r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{assignee}") {{ id }} }}"#
-        );
+        let actor = "did:key:zGQLACTORAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+        let other = "did:key:zGQLOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
+        let cases: Vec<(&str, String)> = vec![
+            (
+                "createTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ createTask(delegatorDid: "{actor}", input: {{ kind: "build", capability: "repo:write" }}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "claimTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ claimTask(id: "no-such-task", assigneeDid: "{actor}") {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "completeTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ completeTask(id: "no-such-task", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+            (
+                "failTask",
+                format!(
+                    r#"mutation {{ failTask(id: "no-such-task", byDid: "{actor}", input: {{}}) {{ id }} }}"#
+                ),
+            ),
+        ];
 
-        // 1. Unsigned → rejected before any DB work.
-        let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(&q)).await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
-            "unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
+        for (name, q) in &cases {
+            let resp = schema.execute(Request::new(q.as_str())).await;
+            assert!(
+                errors(&resp).contains("authentication required"),
+                "{name}: unsigned mutation must be rejected: {}",
+                errors(&resp)
+            );
 
-        // 2. Signed as someone other than the claimed assignee → rejected.
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(
-                "did:key:zOTHERBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB".into(),
-            )))
-            .await;
-        assert!(
-            errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
-            errors(&resp)
-        );
+            let resp = schema
+                .execute(Request::new(q.as_str()).data(AuthenticatedDid(other.into())))
+                .await;
+            assert!(
+                errors(&resp).contains("authenticated signer"),
+                "{name}: DID mismatch must be rejected: {}",
+                errors(&resp)
+            );
 
-        // 3. Signed as the claimed assignee → passes the auth gate. The missing
-        //    task is a business error from claim_task, not a sqlx fault, so the
-        //    actionable message must survive (not the opaque DB string) (#250).
-        let resp = schema
-            .execute(Request::new(&q).data(AuthenticatedDid(assignee.into())))
-            .await;
-        let errs = errors(&resp);
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
-            "matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            errs.contains("task not claimable"),
-            "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
-        );
-        assert!(
-            !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
-            "business error must not be rewritten as opaque DB error: {errs}"
-        );
+            let resp = schema
+                .execute(Request::new(q.as_str()).data(AuthenticatedDid(actor.into())))
+                .await;
+            let errs = errors(&resp);
+            assert!(
+                !errs.contains("authentication required") && !errs.contains("authenticated signer"),
+                "{name}: matching signer must pass the auth gate: {errs}"
+            );
+            if *name == "claimTask" {
+                assert!(
+                    errs.contains("task not claimable"),
+                    "claim race / missing task must keep its business message: {errs}"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    !errs.contains(crate::graphql::GRAPHQL_DB_ERROR_MESSAGE),
+                    "business error must not be rewritten as opaque DB error: {errs}"
+                );
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     /// #250: mutation DB faults must be opaque; create_task hits agent_tasks.

docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Owner focus: protocol/auth.
 - Close default-open repo write authorization and wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository permissions.
 - Close the remaining visibility gaps: restrict or document task, pin, and anchor metadata routes, and publish an irreversible-publication policy.
 - Add UCAN revocation or blocklisting, with an emergency compromised-key runbook.
-- GraphQL mutations require a verified signer (shipped, #87). Keep the surface limited to the agent-task queue; do not expose an owner-gated repo-write mutation over GraphQL without its owner-gate and REST parity. The `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` fence forces any new mutation to be classified in its table (discovered from the schema, so none can slip in unlisted); the owner-gate and REST parity themselves stay the INV-1 review check, not something the fence proves.
+- GraphQL mutations require a verified signer (shipped, #87). Keep the surface limited to the agent-task queue; do not expose an owner-gated repo-write mutation over GraphQL without its owner-gate and REST parity. The `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` fence forces any new mutation to be classified in its table (discovered from the schema SDL, with an introspection cross-check for hidden fields, so none can slip in unlisted) and requires `require_signer` plus actor binding in each registered resolver; the owner-gate and REST parity themselves stay the INV-1 review check, not something the fence proves.
 - Harden peer registration and outbound peer calls against SSRF and peer-list poisoning.
 - After all live peers upgrade, enable signed peer writes by default.
 

docs/OSS-READINESS-AUDIT.md

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Fixed or staged in this pass:
 
 Live-network blockers to prioritize:
 
-- GraphQL mutations now require a verified signer bound to the acting DID (#87), and the surface stays limited to the agent-task queue, so there is no public repo-write GraphQL API to gate. Queries remain open by design. (Resolved; kept here as posture, not a live blocker.)
+- GraphQL POST is still open for compatibility; GraphQL mutations should get mutation-aware auth before it becomes a public write API surface.
 - Push authorization is still not capability-complete. A valid DID signature is authentication, not authorization. Owner checks are now enforced on every branch, protected or not (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`, on by default); what remains is that a UCAN `git/push` capability is not yet honored, so a delegated or CI key cannot push.
 - UCAN chain validation is incomplete and UCAN revocation/blocklisting is not implemented as an operator feature.
 - Private repository reads are not enforced. `is_public` and `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ` exist, but per-repository private-read behavior is not wired.
@@ -151,3 +151,11 @@ Risks:
 4. Harden peer registration and outbound fetch behavior against SSRF and peer-list poisoning.
 5. Add Docker/installer/release smoke tests to CI.
 6. Label PoS/economics docs consistently with the current live contract and rewards status.
+
+## Status updates (post-snapshot)
+
+These entries record security-posture changes after the 2026-05-28 inspection above. They do not rewrite that snapshot's command output or test counts.
+
+### 2026-08-30: GraphQL mutation auth and completeness fence (#87, #219)
+
+At `main` from `bfc44f92` onward, GraphQL mutations require a verified signer bound to the acting DID. The surface stays limited to the agent-task queue; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL. PR #219 adds `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate`, a CI completeness fence that discovers mutations from the built schema SDL (with an introspection cross-check for hidden fields) and requires signer acquisition plus actor binding in each registered resolver.