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+93 -12
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@@ -770,6 +770,23 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f7a806ac6c8307b929df4645776290a50ee2aac754ad09d8bdf73391309e43af"
dependencies = [
"ark-ff-asm 0.6.0",
"ark-ff-macros 0.6.0",
"ark-serialize 0.6.0",
"ark-std 0.6.0",
"digest 0.10.7",
"educe",
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-asm"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -800,6 +817,16 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-asm"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1479009684adc073dff49a1025d3a7065b317a9ead25aaaca38cdc70058ba8a2"
dependencies = [
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-macros"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -838,6 +865,19 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-ff-macros"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4a0691ed21ef00ef89c1e9bda832eba493dda3ec2f8d892fb25b705f73f06bb8"
dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
"num-traits",
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -871,6 +911,30 @@ dependencies = [
"num-bigint",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a74dd304fd536fb95d0a328e72be759209cc496a9da094c5bc56e5fea4f9e86b"
dependencies = [
"ark-serialize-derive",
"ark-std 0.6.0",
"digest 0.10.7",
"num-bigint",
"serde_with",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-serialize-derive"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4f153690697a2b91e5e1251ff98411ee5371500a111a0fd317a70e588eb300f9"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.117",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-std"
version = "0.3.0"
@@ -901,6 +965,16 @@ dependencies = [
"rand 0.8.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "ark-std"
version = "0.6.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "367c9c827ed431bff6868b7aa926e05b16eb46603cc8b6e768e4a5553fa1d155"
dependencies = [
"num-traits",
"rand 0.8.6",
]
[[package]]
name = "arrayref"
version = "0.3.9"
@@ -3300,19 +3374,22 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "git-remote-gitlawb"
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.7.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gitlawb-core",
"libc",
"mockito",
"reqwest",
"tempfile",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-attest"
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.7.1"
dependencies = [
"base64",
"ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3329,7 +3406,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-core"
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.7.1"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
@@ -3350,13 +3427,14 @@ dependencies = [
"sha2",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"url",
"uuid",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "gitlawb-node"
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.7.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
@@ -3412,10 +3490,11 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "gl"
version = "0.5.1"
version = "0.7.1"
dependencies = [
"alloy",
"anyhow",
"base64",
"chrono",
"clap",
"dirs",
@@ -3464,9 +3543,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "h2"
version = "0.4.13"
version = "0.4.18"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2f44da3a8150a6703ed5d34e164b875fd14c2cdab9af1252a9a1020bde2bdc54"
checksum = "839c0e8a181239723652be9062bb56ca5bf5f64011f73b623f6f4fc59086a228"
dependencies = [
"atomic-waker",
"bytes",
@@ -3785,7 +3864,7 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
"percent-encoding",
"pin-project-lite",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"tokio",
"tower-service",
"tracing",
@@ -3821,6 +3900,7 @@ version = "0.4.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gitlawb-core",
"mockito",
"reqwest",
"serde",
"serde_json",
@@ -5352,7 +5432,7 @@ dependencies = [
"quinn-udp",
"rustc-hash",
"rustls",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"tokio",
"tracing",
@@ -5389,7 +5469,7 @@ dependencies = [
"cfg_aliases",
"libc",
"once_cell",
"socket2 0.6.3",
"socket2 0.5.10",
"tracing",
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
@@ -5739,14 +5819,15 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ruint"
version = "1.17.2"
version = "1.20.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c141e807189ad38a07276942c6623032d3753c8859c146104ac2e4d68865945a"
checksum = "f5e99bff0393163bb25029a6af25d3d8d202ba5b5438a74d1bd8789f5c822970"
dependencies = [
"alloy-rlp",
"ark-ff 0.3.0",
"ark-ff 0.4.2",
"ark-ff 0.5.0",
"ark-ff 0.6.0",
"bytes",
"fastrlp 0.3.1",
"fastrlp 0.4.0",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Known limitations:
- Agent lifecycle revocation is not enforced by HTTP Signature authorization; do not rely on removing or revoking an agent record to block a compromised signer.
- Read visibility is not a blanket data-classification boundary: task, IPFS-pin, and Arweave-anchor listings are not repository-gated; withheld path names can be visible to a root reader; and later visibility changes cannot retract content already announced or externally anchored.
- Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
- GraphQL mutations require a signed identity (a verified signer bound to the acting DID) but are limited to the agent-task queue; repo writes are not exposed over GraphQL and remain REST-only.
- Current GraphQL mutations require an authenticated signer, but there is no mutation-specific guardrail that prevents a future mutation from omitting that check.
- Pull-request review comments do not yet have threaded line-level anchors, and merges do not enforce approval requirements.
See:
+285 -6
View File
@@ -287,8 +287,10 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
// this into one POST deadlocks a multi-round fetch (#117).
//
// git-receive-pack (push):
// Git sends ref-update commands + the complete PACK blob, then closes its
// write pipe. read_to_end is safe and correct here, a single POST.
// Git sends the ref-update command list (pkt-lines ending in a flush),
// then the complete PACK blob only when a command has a non-zero new-oid.
// A delete-only push sends no pack, and git holds its write pipe open for
// the report-status response, so EOF cannot delimit the request (#369).
let post_url = format!("{}/{}", repo_base, service);
@@ -296,10 +298,7 @@ fn handle_connect<R: Read>(
return negotiate_upload_pack(&client, &post_url, service, signing_key, stdin, &mut stdout);
}
let mut request_body = Vec::new();
stdin
.read_to_end(&mut request_body)
.context("reading receive-pack request")?;
let request_body = read_receive_pack_request(stdin)?;
tracing::debug!("pack request: {} bytes from git", request_body.len());
if request_body.is_empty() {
@@ -535,6 +534,108 @@ fn read_upload_pack_round<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, RoundEnd)>
}
}
/// Read one git-receive-pack request: optional `shallow` lines, then EITHER a
/// command list (pkt-lines terminated by a flush) or a push-cert block
/// (pkt-lines terminated by a "push-cert-end" line), then the negotiated
/// push-options block, then the pack ONLY when a command carries a non-zero
/// new-oid.
///
/// A delete-only push sends no pack, and git holds its write pipe open waiting
/// for the report-status response, so a plain read_to_end deadlocks the two
/// (#369). A signed push is the other trap: when the client sends a push-cert
/// it sends NO command list at all (the commands live inside the cert), so the
/// request starts with a "push-cert" line and no flush ever arrives. The
/// negotiated capability list is on the push-cert line, or on the first
/// command line after its NUL when there is no cert. EOF at any point also
/// ends the read, covering git versions that close the pipe early.
fn read_receive_pack_request<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
/// Read one pkt-line into `body` (length prefix + data), returning its data
/// or `None` on flush or EOF. Malformed lengths bail rather than collapse
/// into a synthesized flush (#192 F5).
fn read_pkt<R: Read>(stdin: &mut R, body: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
let mut len_bytes = [0u8; 4];
match stdin.read_exact(&mut len_bytes) {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => return Ok(None),
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
}
let Ok(len_hex) = std::str::from_utf8(&len_bytes) else {
bail!("malformed pkt-line length prefix: non-UTF-8 bytes {len_bytes:02x?}");
};
let Ok(pkt_len) = usize::from_str_radix(len_hex, 16) else {
bail!("malformed pkt-line length prefix: non-hex {len_hex:?}");
};
body.extend_from_slice(&len_bytes);
if pkt_len == 0 {
return Ok(None);
}
if pkt_len < 4 {
bail!("invalid pkt-line length: {pkt_len}");
}
let mut data = vec![0u8; pkt_len - 4];
stdin
.read_exact(&mut data)
.context("reading pkt-line data")?;
body.extend_from_slice(&data);
Ok(Some(data))
}
/// "<40-hex old> <40-hex new> <refname>" — the command shape, whether it
/// appears in a command list or inside a push-cert.
fn is_command(data: &[u8]) -> bool {
data.len() >= 82
&& data[..40].iter().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& data[40] == b' '
&& data[41..81].iter().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& data[81] == b' '
}
let mut body = Vec::new();
let mut caps = String::new();
let mut pack_expected = false;
let mut in_cert = false;
loop {
let Some(data) = read_pkt(stdin, &mut body)? else {
// Flush ends a command list; EOF ends anything. A cert has no
// legal flush inside it, so the same break covers malformed
// input without hanging.
break;
};
if !in_cert && data.starts_with(b"push-cert") {
in_cert = true;
if let Some(nul) = data.iter().position(|&b| b == 0) {
caps = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data[nul + 1..]).into_owned();
}
continue;
}
if in_cert && data == b"push-cert-end\n" {
break;
}
if is_command(&data) {
if caps.is_empty() {
if let Some(nul) = data.iter().position(|&b| b == 0) {
caps = String::from_utf8_lossy(&data[nul + 1..]).into_owned();
}
}
if data[41..81].iter().any(|&b| b != b'0') {
pack_expected = true;
}
}
}
// When both are negotiated the push-options block follows the cert; when
// only options are negotiated it follows the command flush. Either way it
// is pkt-lines to a flush.
if caps.split(' ').any(|c| c.starts_with("push-options")) {
while read_pkt(stdin, &mut body)?.is_some() {}
}
if pack_expected {
stdin
.read_to_end(&mut body)
.context("reading receive-pack pack")?;
}
Ok(body)
}
/// POST one self-contained stateless-RPC request body and stream the response to
/// `stdout`. Signs the request when `signing_key` is present, so every round of a
/// private-repo fetch carries the caller's signature (the node visibility-gates
@@ -2017,6 +2118,184 @@ mod tests {
assert!(help.ends_with('\n'));
}
// ── #369 delete-only push deadlock ───────────────────────────────────────
/// A delete-only receive-pack request ends at the command flush; git then
/// holds the write pipe open for the report and sends no pack. A reader that
/// blocks after the command list reproduces the hang that a Cursor (EOF)
/// hides. The read must return at the flush, inside the timeout.
#[test]
fn delete_only_receive_pack_request_returns_at_command_flush() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let zero = "0".repeat(40);
let mut seed = Vec::new();
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!("{old} {zero} refs/heads/gone\n")));
seed.extend_from_slice(b"0000"); // command-list flush; git then blocks
let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<()>();
let mut reader = BlockAfterSeed {
seed: io::Cursor::new(seed),
gate: rx,
};
let (done_tx, done_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = done_tx.send(read_receive_pack_request(&mut reader).unwrap());
});
let got = done_rx.recv_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2));
let _ = tx.send(()); // unblock the reader so the thread can exit
let _ = handle.join();
let body = got.expect(
"read_receive_pack_request blocked past the command flush waiting for \
a pack a delete-only push never sends (#369)",
);
assert!(
body.ends_with(b"0000"),
"the request body keeps the command list and its flush terminator"
);
}
/// A push carrying objects still reads the pack through to EOF, and the
/// command flush sits between the commands and the pack in the body.
#[test]
fn receive_pack_request_with_pack_reads_through_eof() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let new = "b".repeat(40);
let mut stream = Vec::new();
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!(
"{old} {new} refs/heads/main\0 report-status-v2\n"
)));
stream.extend_from_slice(b"0000");
stream.extend_from_slice(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack");
let mut stdin = io::Cursor::new(stream);
let body = read_receive_pack_request(&mut stdin).unwrap();
let pos = body.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"0000").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
&body[pos + 4..],
b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack",
"a non-zero new-oid means the pack follows the flush"
);
}
/// A signed delete-only push sends NO command list: the request starts
/// with the "push-cert" line, the commands live inside the cert, and the
/// cert ends with a "push-cert-end" pkt-line (not a flush). The reader
/// must return after push-cert-end without waiting on the pipe.
#[test]
fn signed_delete_only_push_returns_after_push_cert_end() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let zero = "0".repeat(40);
let mut seed = Vec::new();
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("push-cert\0 report-status-v2 push-cert\n"));
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("certificate version 0.1\n"));
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("pusher did:key:z6Mk\n"));
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("\n")); // empty line ends the headers
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!("{old} {zero} refs/heads/gone\n")));
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("sig-line\n"));
seed.extend_from_slice(&pkt("push-cert-end\n"));
// git now blocks for the report; the pipe stays open.
let (tx, rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<()>();
let mut reader = BlockAfterSeed {
seed: io::Cursor::new(seed),
gate: rx,
};
let (done_tx, done_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = done_tx.send(read_receive_pack_request(&mut reader).unwrap());
});
let got = done_rx.recv_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2));
let _ = tx.send(());
let _ = handle.join();
let body = got.expect(
"read_receive_pack_request blocked past push-cert-end on a signed \
delete-only push (#369)",
);
assert!(
body.windows(6).any(|w| w == b"pusher"),
"the cert block is part of the request body"
);
}
/// A signed pack-bearing push: cert with the commands inside, then the
/// pack. Everything must land in the body.
#[test]
fn signed_pack_push_keeps_cert_and_pack() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let new = "b".repeat(40);
let mut stream = Vec::new();
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("push-cert\0 report-status-v2 push-cert\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("certificate version 0.1\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!("{old} {new} refs/heads/main\n")));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("push-cert-end\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack");
let mut stdin = io::Cursor::new(stream);
let body = read_receive_pack_request(&mut stdin).unwrap();
assert!(
body.windows(5).any(|w| w == b"PACK\x00"),
"the pack follows the cert into the body"
);
}
/// A negotiated push-options block is pkt-lines ending in its own flush.
/// With no cert it follows the command flush; with a cert it follows
/// push-cert-end.
#[test]
fn receive_pack_request_consumes_a_push_options_block() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let new = "b".repeat(40);
let mut stream = Vec::new();
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!(
"{old} {new} refs/heads/main\0 report-status-v2 push-options\n"
)));
stream.extend_from_slice(b"0000"); // command flush
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("ci.skip\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(b"0000"); // options flush
stream.extend_from_slice(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack");
let mut stdin = io::Cursor::new(stream);
let body = read_receive_pack_request(&mut stdin).unwrap();
assert!(body.windows(7).any(|w| w == b"ci.skip"), "options survived");
assert!(
body.ends_with(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack"),
"the pack lands after the options block"
);
}
/// Cert and options together: the cert comes first and the options block
/// sits between push-cert-end and the pack.
#[test]
fn signed_push_with_options_reads_cert_then_options_then_pack() {
let old = "a".repeat(40);
let new = "b".repeat(40);
let mut stream = Vec::new();
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt(
"push-cert\0 report-status-v2 push-cert push-options\n",
));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("certificate version 0.1\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt(&format!("{old} {new} refs/heads/main\n")));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("push-cert-end\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(&pkt("ci.skip\n"));
stream.extend_from_slice(b"0000"); // options flush
stream.extend_from_slice(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack");
let mut stdin = io::Cursor::new(stream);
let body = read_receive_pack_request(&mut stdin).unwrap();
assert!(body.windows(7).any(|w| w == b"ci.skip"), "options survived");
assert!(
body.ends_with(b"PACK\x00\x00\x00\x02fakepack"),
"the pack lands after the options block"
);
}
// ── #117 multi-round fetch negotiation ───────────────────────────────────
/// Encode a git pkt-line: 4-byte hex length (incl. the 4 bytes) + data.
@@ -95,6 +95,36 @@ fn upload_pack(repo: &Path, advertise: bool, input: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
out.stdout
}
/// Run `git receive-pack --stateless-rpc [--advertise-refs] <repo>`, optionally
/// feeding `input` on stdin. Returns raw stdout (the wire bytes). The receive
/// half of `upload_pack`, used so the shim can serve a real push.
fn receive_pack(repo: &Path, advertise: bool, input: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.arg("receive-pack").arg("--stateless-rpc");
if advertise {
cmd.arg("--advertise-refs");
}
cmd.arg(repo)
.stdin(Stdio::piped())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped());
let mut child = cmd.spawn().expect("spawn git receive-pack");
let mut stdin = child.stdin.take().unwrap();
let input = input.to_vec();
let writer = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = stdin.write_all(&input);
// drop closes stdin
});
let out = child.wait_with_output().expect("wait receive-pack");
writer.join().ok();
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"git receive-pack failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
out.stdout
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum ShimMode {
/// Faithful v0 serving: pipe each POST to `git upload-pack --stateless-rpc`.
@@ -218,7 +248,21 @@ fn handle_conn(stream: TcpStream, repo: &Path, mode: ShimMode, posts: &AtomicUsi
reader.read_exact(&mut body).ok();
}
let (content_type, payload) = if method == "GET" && target.contains("/info/refs") {
let (content_type, payload) = if method == "GET" && target.contains("service=git-receive-pack")
{
// Receive-pack advertisement, same wrapper shape as upload-pack.
let adv = receive_pack(repo, true, b"");
let mut wrapped = pkt(b"# service=git-receive-pack\n");
wrapped.extend_from_slice(b"0000");
wrapped.extend_from_slice(&adv);
("application/x-git-receive-pack-advertisement", wrapped)
} else if method == "POST" && target.ends_with("/git-receive-pack") {
posts.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
(
"application/x-git-receive-pack-result",
receive_pack(repo, false, &body),
)
} else if method == "GET" && target.contains("/info/refs") {
// v0 advertisement, wrapped exactly as the node's info_refs does.
let adv = upload_pack(repo, true, b"");
let mut wrapped = pkt(b"# service=git-upload-pack\n");
@@ -293,6 +337,34 @@ fn fetch_with_helper(clone: &Path, node_url: &str) -> (bool, std::process::Outpu
run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
}
/// Run `git push` in `local` through the helper, same wiring and hard timeout as
/// [`fetch_with_helper`]. `args` carries the push spec, e.g.
/// `["--delete", "doomed"]`.
fn push_with_helper(local: &Path, node_url: &str, args: &[&str]) -> (bool, std::process::Output) {
let helper_bin = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_git-remote-gitlawb"));
let helper_dir = helper_bin.parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
let path_env = match std::env::var_os("PATH") {
Some(p) => {
let mut dirs = vec![helper_dir.clone()];
dirs.extend(std::env::split_paths(&p));
std::env::join_paths(dirs).unwrap()
}
None => helper_dir.clone().into_os_string(),
};
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.arg("-C")
.arg(local)
.arg("push")
.arg("origin")
.args(args)
.env("PATH", path_env)
.env("LC_ALL", "C")
.env("GITLAWB_NODE", node_url)
.env("GITLAWB_KEY", "/nonexistent-key-for-anon-push");
run_bounded(cmd, Duration::from_secs(30))
}
/// A synthetic non-success `ExitStatus` used only on the unix timeout path, where
/// `reap_group` has already consumed the child and the later `wait` returns ECHILD.
/// The timeout branch already reports `completed == false`, so the exact status is
@@ -1242,3 +1314,77 @@ fn run_bounded_bounds_join_when_leader_exits_leaving_a_pipe_holder() {
held pipes do not stall the joins)"
);
}
/// #369 end-to-end: a real `git push --delete` through the helper completes.
/// The receive-pack request for a delete-only push is commands + flush with NO
/// pack, and git holds its write pipe open for the report — so a helper that
/// reads stdin to EOF deadlocks against it. The shim pipes the POST to a real
/// `git receive-pack --stateless-rpc`, so the branch actually has to be deleted
/// server-side for the assertions to pass.
#[test]
fn real_git_push_delete_completes() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let server = dir.path().join("server.git");
let local = dir.path().join("local");
// A bare repo holding the doomed branch, plus a live one.
git(
dir.path(),
&[
"init",
"--bare",
server.to_str().unwrap(),
"--initial-branch=main",
],
);
let work = dir.path().join("work");
git(
dir.path(),
&["init", work.to_str().unwrap(), "--initial-branch=main"],
);
git(&work, &["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
git(&work, &["config", "user.name", "t"]);
std::fs::write(work.join("f"), "x").unwrap();
git(&work, &["add", "f"]);
git(&work, &["commit", "-m", "c"]);
git(&work, &["branch", "doomed"]);
git(&work, &["push", server.to_str().unwrap(), "main", "doomed"]);
// The pusher: a local repo whose origin is the gitlawb remote pointing at
// the shim. Nothing needs to be fetched first; git takes the old-oid from
// the receive-pack advertisement.
git(
dir.path(),
&["init", local.to_str().unwrap(), "--initial-branch=main"],
);
git(
&local,
&["remote", "add", "origin", "gitlawb://did:key:z6MkTest/repo"],
);
let shim = start_shim(server.clone(), ShimMode::Normal);
let (completed, out) = push_with_helper(&local, &shim.base_url, &["--delete", "doomed"]);
let posts = shim.posts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
assert!(
completed,
"git push --delete did not complete within the timeout (deadlock signature). stderr:\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
assert!(
out.status.success(),
"git push --delete failed. stderr:\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
);
assert_eq!(posts, 1, "a delete-only push is exactly one POST");
let gone = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&server)
.args(["rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", "refs/heads/doomed"])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(
!gone.status.success(),
"refs/heads/doomed must be deleted in the server repo"
);
}
-548
View File
@@ -279,554 +279,6 @@ mod authz_guard {
}
}
/// Completeness fence over the GraphQL mutation surface: the mirror of
/// `every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate` for `graphql/mutation.rs`. Kept a
/// SEPARATE guard with its own table (never folded into the REST rows above):
/// a guard over a heterogeneous set must classify per member, and these
/// same-named task rows belong to the GraphQL surface, not `api/tasks.rs`.
///
/// COMPLETENESS comes from the engine's own SDL (`schema.sdl()`), parsed as a
/// structured AST (#219), NOT introspection and NOT a text parse of source.
/// This matters: async-graphql OMITS `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields from
/// introspection while leaving them executable, so an introspection-sourced fence
/// could be defeated by a hidden mutation. SDL includes those fields, so no
/// visibility flag (and, via the AST parse, no brace-in-description quirk) can hide
/// a live mutation. The SDL field set must equal the registered set: a new field with
/// no row fails (a repo-write cannot slip in unlisted); a registered name absent from
/// the schema fails (renamed or removed). The set is also cross-checked against
/// introspection, so any field present in SDL but hidden from introspection fails
/// named as a forbidden hidden mutation.
///
/// The MARKER check is the only source-scraped part, and it is not the
/// completeness guarantee. Three honest limits, so a green check is not misread
/// as full authorization coverage:
/// 1. A present marker is not load-bearingness (the gate may not redden on a
/// hostile probe: the #203 present-but-vacuous case). The adversarial tests
/// in `graphql/mutation.rs` are the load-bearing layer.
/// 2. A present marker is not gate-correctness (it may be the wrong bucket for
/// the operation's resource: a repo-write registered as signer-self would
/// pass, so INV-1 review remains the defense).
/// 3. The marker check scrapes the comment-masked, brace-bounded resolver body;
/// a `{`/`}` or a `did_matches(` inside a STRING literal is not masked, so it
/// could mis-slice that body or satisfy the marker vacuously (the same
/// vacuous-marker class as limit 1). Completeness is unaffected: it comes
/// from the SDL AST, not from this scrape.
#[test]
fn every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate() {
// (Rust snake name, schema field in camelCase, expected gate marker). The
// four are Bucket C signer-self (`did_matches(`); a repo-write would be
// Bucket A (`require_repo_owner(`). Same-named REST rows live in the guard
// above against `api/tasks.rs`.
let registered: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
("create_task", "createTask", "did_matches("),
("claim_task", "claimTask", "did_matches("),
("complete_task", "completeTask", "did_matches("),
("fail_task", "failTask", "did_matches("),
];
// Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check against the REAL schema (#219),
// delegated to the generic `assert_mutation_fence` so the SDL sourcing and the
// cross-check are ALSO exercised by a synthetic hidden schema in
// `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation` (INV-21). Because the real MutationRoot has no
// hidden field today, that synthetic test — not a hypothetical production canary —
// is what turns reverting the SDL source or deleting the cross-check RED.
{
use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
let schema =
async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
let registered_camel: Vec<&str> = registered.iter().map(|(_, c, _)| *c).collect();
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &registered_camel);
}
// Marker present (source scrape; the vacuity limit, backstopped by the
// adversarial tests): each resolver body carries its bucket marker.
let masked = mask_comments(include_str!("../graphql/mutation.rs"));
for (snake, _, marker) in registered {
let body = resolver_body(&masked, snake);
assert!(
body.contains(marker),
"GraphQL mutation `{snake}` is missing its gate marker `{marker}`: gate removed"
);
}
}
/// Version-safety self-check (#219, INV-21): the fence's completeness guarantee rests
/// on `schema.sdl()` INCLUDING `visible = false` fields while introspection omits
/// them. That is observed async-graphql behavior, not a documented contract, so pin
/// it here: a synthetic schema with a hidden mutation must have that field in its
/// SDL-derived set and NOT in its introspection-derived set. If a future
/// async-graphql upgrade ever filters SDL by visibility, the first assertion flips
/// RED — the assumption is load-bearing, not trusted.
#[test]
fn sdl_source_sees_hidden_mutations_that_introspection_omits() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(visible = false)]
async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// SDL source (the fix): includes the hidden field.
let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
assert!(
sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"SDL-sourced set MUST include the visible=false mutation; if this is RED, \
async-graphql started filtering SDL by visibility and the fence's \
completeness guarantee is broken: {sdl_fields:?}"
);
// Introspection (the fence's own helper): OMITS the hidden field. This is the
// exact gap the fix closes — an introspection-sourced fence never sees `hiddenMut`.
let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(&schema);
assert!(
!introspected.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"introspection is expected to OMIT the visible=false mutation (that is the \
gap the SDL source closes); got {introspected:?}"
);
// The exact diff the fence computes: hidden ∈ (sdl \ introspection).
let hidden: Vec<&String> = sdl_fields
.iter()
.filter(|f| !introspected.iter().any(|i| i == *f))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
hidden,
vec!["hiddenMut"],
"the SDL-vs-introspection diff must surface exactly the hidden mutation"
);
}
/// INV-21 wiring guard (#219): drives the generic `assert_mutation_fence` — the SAME
/// helper the real fence calls — against a synthetic schema whose mutation is
/// `visible = false` and IS registered, so completeness passes and ONLY the
/// hidden-from-introspection cross-check can fail. This is what makes the fence's SDL
/// sourcing load-bearing without a production canary: reverting the source to
/// introspection (the hidden field then absent from the SDL set) or deleting the
/// cross-check removes this panic (or changes its message), turning the
/// `should_panic` test RED. The real MutationRoot has no hidden field, so nothing on
/// the real schema could catch that regression.
#[test]
#[should_panic(expected = "hidden from introspection")]
fn fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(visible = false)]
async fn hidden_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// Both fields registered, so completeness passes and only the cross-check fires.
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "hiddenMut"]);
}
/// Deprecated-mutation guard (#219): a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]` mutation is
/// executable and present in SDL, but GraphQL introspection omits it by default. The
/// fence's introspection helper uses `includeDeprecated: true`, so a deprecated (but
/// visible) mutation is NOT mistaken for a hidden one. With it registered, the fence
/// must NOT panic. Remove `includeDeprecated: true` and this goes RED — the deprecated
/// field would look hidden and false-red as a forbidden visible=false mutation.
#[test]
fn fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation() {
use async_graphql::{EmptySubscription, Object, Schema};
struct Q;
#[Object]
impl Q {
async fn ping(&self) -> i32 {
0
}
}
struct M;
#[Object]
impl M {
async fn visible_mut(&self) -> i32 {
1
}
#[graphql(deprecation = "use visibleMut")]
async fn deprecated_mut(&self) -> i32 {
2
}
}
let schema = Schema::build(Q, M, EmptySubscription).finish();
// Must not panic: the deprecated field is visible (present in introspection with
// includeDeprecated) and registered, so it is neither hidden nor unclassified.
assert_mutation_fence(&schema, &["visibleMut", "deprecatedMut"]);
}
/// Completeness + hidden-mutation cross-check for a BUILT schema (#219). Generic over
/// the schema type so the real fence AND the synthetic `fence_rejects_a_hidden_mutation`
/// / `fence_admits_a_deprecated_mutation` tests drive the SAME sourcing and cross-check.
/// Completeness is sourced from SDL (which includes `visible = false` fields); the
/// cross-check fails any SDL field hidden from introspection. This genericity is the
/// INV-21 fix: because the real MutationRoot has no hidden field, only a synthetic
/// hidden schema through THIS helper makes reverting the SDL source or removing the
/// cross-check RED, rather than leaving the class latent behind a production canary.
fn assert_mutation_fence<Q, M, S>(
schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
registered_camel: &[&str],
) where
Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
{
let sdl_fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl());
let introspected = introspection_mutation_fields(schema);
// No SDL field may be hidden from introspection (a visible=false mutation).
for f in &sdl_fields {
assert!(
introspected.iter().any(|i| i == f),
"GraphQL mutation `{f}` is in the schema but hidden from introspection \
(a `#[graphql(visible = false)]` field): hidden mutations are forbidden \
by this fence — make it visible so its classification is enforceable, or \
remove it"
);
}
// Completeness both directions against the registered (camelCase) set.
for f in &sdl_fields {
assert!(
registered_camel.contains(&f.as_str()),
"unclassified GraphQL mutation `{f}`: add it to \
every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate with a deliberate gate \
(`require_repo_owner(` for a repo-write, `did_matches(` for a task op)"
);
}
for c in registered_camel {
assert!(
sdl_fields.iter().any(|f| f == c),
"registered GraphQL mutation `{c}` is not in the schema \
(renamed or removed); update the table"
);
}
}
/// The mutation field names via the engine's introspection, run against a passed
/// schema. STRUCTURED (names arrive as data). Uses `fields(includeDeprecated: true)`:
/// GraphQL's default omits `@deprecated` fields, but a `#[graphql(deprecation = "...")]`
/// mutation is still executable and present in SDL, so without this the cross-check
/// above would false-red a deprecated mutation as a hidden (visible=false) one. Only a
/// real visibility filter should trip that arm; deprecation is a lifecycle marker.
fn introspection_mutation_fields<Q, M, S>(
schema: &async_graphql::Schema<Q, M, S>,
) -> Vec<String>
where
Q: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
M: async_graphql::ObjectType + 'static,
S: async_graphql::SubscriptionType + 'static,
{
use async_graphql::Value;
let resp = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new()
.expect("tokio runtime")
.block_on(schema.execute(
"{ __schema { mutationType { fields(includeDeprecated: true) { name } } } }",
));
assert!(
resp.errors.is_empty(),
"schema introspection failed: {:?}",
resp.errors
);
let mut names = Vec::new();
if let Value::Object(root) = &resp.data {
if let Some(Value::Object(sc)) = root.get("__schema") {
if let Some(Value::Object(mt)) = sc.get("mutationType") {
if let Some(Value::List(field_list)) = mt.get("fields") {
for field in field_list {
if let Value::Object(fo) = field {
if let Some(Value::String(n)) = fo.get("name") {
names.push(n.clone());
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
names
}
/// The mutation field names sourced from the built schema's SDL — the completeness
/// source (#219). Builds the same DB-free schema as the introspection helper and runs
/// its `.sdl()` (sync, no runtime needed) through [`mutation_field_names_from_sdl`].
/// SDL includes `#[graphql(visible = false)]` fields, so this source cannot be
/// defeated by hiding a mutation from introspection.
fn graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl() -> Vec<String> {
use crate::graphql::mutation::MutationRoot;
use crate::graphql::query::QueryRoot;
use crate::graphql::subscription::SubscriptionRoot;
let schema =
async_graphql::Schema::build(QueryRoot, MutationRoot, SubscriptionRoot).finish();
mutation_field_names_from_sdl(&schema.sdl())
}
/// The mutation type's field names extracted from an async-graphql SDL string via
/// the engine's OWN parser AST (`async_graphql::parser::parse_schema`), NOT
/// introspection. This is the completeness source (#219): unlike introspection,
/// which async-graphql filters by `visible` (a `#[graphql(visible = false)]`
/// mutation is executable but ABSENT from introspection), `schema.sdl()` includes
/// every registered field, so a hidden mutation still appears here and must carry a
/// classified row. Parsing the AST (not a brace/line text scan) means a `}` inside a
/// field description cannot mis-slice the type block. camelCase, as async-graphql
/// emits. An empty result on a navigation miss is safe: the set-equality in
/// `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` turns "no fields" into a loud failure for
/// every registered name, never a vacuous pass.
fn mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl: &str) -> Vec<String> {
use async_graphql::parser::parse_schema;
use async_graphql::parser::types::{TypeKind, TypeSystemDefinition};
let doc = parse_schema(sdl).expect("async-graphql SDL must parse");
// The mutation root type name: from the `schema { mutation: X }` block if
// present, else the GraphQL default "Mutation".
let mutation_type = doc
.definitions
.iter()
.find_map(|def| match def {
TypeSystemDefinition::Schema(s) => s
.node
.mutation
.as_ref()
.map(|m| m.node.as_str().to_string()),
_ => None,
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| "Mutation".to_string());
// The fields of that object type.
doc.definitions
.iter()
.find_map(|def| match def {
TypeSystemDefinition::Type(t) if t.node.name.node.as_str() == mutation_type => {
match &t.node.kind {
TypeKind::Object(obj) => Some(
obj.fields
.iter()
.map(|f| f.node.name.node.as_str().to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
),
_ => None,
}
}
_ => None,
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_includes_a_hidden_visible_false_field() {
// A field that would be hidden from introspection must still be listed from SDL.
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
type MutationRoot { createTask: Int! hiddenMut: Int! }\n";
let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask"),
"visible field must be listed: {fields:?}"
);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "hiddenMut"),
"a visible=false field (present in SDL, hidden from introspection) MUST be \
listed by the completeness source: {fields:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_is_not_fooled_by_a_brace_in_a_field_description() {
// A `}` inside a field description must not truncate the type block (the AST
// parse is immune to the text-parse quirk the old design feared).
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot mutation: MutationRoot }\n\
type QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n\
type MutationRoot {\n\
\"\"\"a description with a } brace and { another\"\"\"\n\
createTask: Int!\n\
claimTask: Int!\n\
}\n";
let fields = mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl);
assert!(
fields.iter().any(|f| f == "createTask") && fields.iter().any(|f| f == "claimTask"),
"both fields must be extracted despite a brace in a description: {fields:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn sdl_extractor_returns_empty_for_a_query_only_schema() {
let sdl = "schema { query: QueryRoot }\ntype QueryRoot { ping: Int! }\n";
assert!(
mutation_field_names_from_sdl(sdl).is_empty(),
"a schema with no mutation root yields no mutation fields (no panic)"
);
}
/// The comment-masked body of `async fn <snake>` in `graphql/mutation.rs`, bounded
/// to the resolver's OWN braces (its `{ .. }`), for the marker check. Brace-matching
/// on the comment-masked source means a `}` in a trailing helper cannot extend the
/// body and a comment marker does not count. A `{`/`}` inside a STRING literal is
/// not masked, a documented marker-check-only residual (limit 3); completeness does
/// not use this.
fn resolver_body(masked_src: &str, snake: &str) -> String {
let needle = format!("async fn {snake}(");
let start = masked_src.find(&needle).unwrap_or_else(|| {
panic!("resolver `async fn {snake}(` not found in graphql/mutation.rs")
});
let open = start
+ masked_src[start..]
.find('{')
.expect("resolver body opening brace");
let mut depth = 0i32;
let mut end = masked_src.len();
for (i, c) in masked_src[open..].char_indices() {
match c {
'{' => depth += 1,
'}' => {
depth -= 1;
if depth == 0 {
end = open + i + 1;
break;
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
masked_src[open..end].to_string()
}
/// `src` with `//` line comments and `/* */` block comments (nested) blanked to
/// spaces, WITHOUT opening a comment inside a `"..."` string (so a `"https://"` does
/// not erase the rest of its line). String CONTENTS are left intact, so a brace or
/// a gate marker inside a string is not masked; for the marker check that is a
/// documented vacuity residual (limit 3), and completeness does not use this at
/// all. Char literals and raw/byte strings are not tracked (absent in resolver
/// bodies); a `'"'` char or a raw string is the remaining narrow residual.
fn mask_comments(src: &str) -> String {
let chars: Vec<char> = src.chars().collect();
let mut out = String::with_capacity(src.len());
let mut i = 0;
let mut block_depth = 0usize;
let mut in_string = false;
while i < chars.len() {
let c = chars[i];
let next = chars.get(i + 1).copied();
if block_depth > 0 {
if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
block_depth += 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else if c == '*' && next == Some('/') {
block_depth -= 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else {
out.push(if c == '\n' { '\n' } else { ' ' });
i += 1;
}
} else if in_string {
out.push(c);
if c == '\\' {
if let Some(n) = next {
out.push(n);
i += 2;
} else {
i += 1;
}
} else {
if c == '"' {
in_string = false;
}
i += 1;
}
} else if c == '"' {
in_string = true;
out.push('"');
i += 1;
} else if c == '/' && next == Some('/') {
while i < chars.len() && chars[i] != '\n' {
out.push(' ');
i += 1;
}
} else if c == '/' && next == Some('*') {
block_depth = 1;
out.push_str(" ");
i += 2;
} else {
out.push(c);
i += 1;
}
}
out
}
/// The SDL field set (the completeness source of truth, #219) is exactly the
/// registered mutations. If async-graphql adds or renames a field, this reddens
/// and forces the `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` table to be updated. Uses
/// SDL, not introspection: introspection omits `visible = false` fields, so an
/// introspection-based pin here would go green while a hidden mutation existed.
#[test]
fn schema_lists_exactly_the_registered_mutations() {
let mut fields = graphql_mutation_fields_from_sdl();
fields.sort();
assert_eq!(
fields,
vec!["claimTask", "completeTask", "createTask", "failTask"],
"the SDL mutation field set is the authoritative discovered set"
);
}
/// The marker check is bounded to a resolver's OWN body and is comment- and
/// string-aware: a `//` inside a `"https://"` string does not erase a real gate on
/// that line (no false-red), and a trailing module helper's `did_matches(` does not
/// rescue a resolver whose own gate was removed (no false-green).
#[test]
fn resolver_body_is_bounded_and_comment_and_string_aware() {
let src = "\
impl MutationRoot {
async fn ok(&self) -> Result<u32> {
let _ = (\"see https://x/y\", did_matches(a, b)); // URL string then gate, one line
Ok(0)
}
async fn last(&self) -> Result<u32> {
// did_matches( only in a comment
Ok(0)
}
}
fn helper() { let _ = did_matches(z, z); }
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests { async fn t() { let _ = did_matches(x, y); } }
";
let masked = mask_comments(src);
assert!(
resolver_body(&masked, "ok").contains("did_matches("),
"a `//` inside a string must not erase the real gate on that line"
);
assert!(
!resolver_body(&masked, "last").contains("did_matches("),
"the marker check must be bounded to the resolver's own body (a trailing \
helper's marker must not rescue a resolver whose gate was removed)"
);
}
/// Proves the comment-stripping that GUARD-1 added: a marker that appears only
/// in a full-line comment (the real `replicas.rs` false-pass shape) must NOT
/// satisfy a row.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Owner focus: protocol/auth.
- Close default-open repo write authorization and wire trusted UCAN delegation into repository permissions.
- Close the remaining visibility gaps: restrict or document task, pin, and anchor metadata routes, and publish an irreversible-publication policy.
- Add UCAN revocation or blocklisting, with an emergency compromised-key runbook.
- GraphQL mutations require a verified signer (shipped, #87). Keep the surface limited to the agent-task queue; do not expose an owner-gated repo-write mutation over GraphQL without its owner-gate and REST parity. The `every_graphql_mutation_has_its_gate` fence forces any new mutation to be classified in its table (discovered from the schema, so none can slip in unlisted); the owner-gate and REST parity themselves stay the INV-1 review check, not something the fence proves.
- Add mutation-aware GraphQL auth before GraphQL becomes a public write API surface.
- Harden peer registration and outbound peer calls against SSRF and peer-list poisoning.
- After all live peers upgrade, enable signed peer writes by default.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Fixed or staged in this pass:
Live-network blockers to prioritize:
- GraphQL mutations now require a verified signer bound to the acting DID (#87), and the surface stays limited to the agent-task queue, so there is no public repo-write GraphQL API to gate. Queries remain open by design. (Resolved; kept here as posture, not a live blocker.)
- GraphQL POST is still open for compatibility; GraphQL mutations should get mutation-aware auth before it becomes a public write API surface.
- Push authorization is still not capability-complete. A valid DID signature is authentication, not authorization. Owner checks are now enforced on every branch, protected or not (`GITLAWB_ENFORCE_OWNER_PUSH`, on by default); what remains is that a UCAN `git/push` capability is not yet honored, so a delegated or CI key cannot push.
- UCAN chain validation is incomplete and UCAN revocation/blocklisting is not implemented as an operator feature.
- Private repository reads are not enforced. `is_public` and `GITLAWB_PUBLIC_READ` exist, but per-repository private-read behavior is not wired.