Preserve task objective across repeated compaction

Keep the immutable run objective when plan calls have been elided, while admitting mutable task fields only when plan parity still matches the transcript. Make plan parsing match update_plan rejection semantics, coalesce and cap task-state trace events, rename parity to its plan-only scope, use explicit nilable dependencies, and remove confirmable objective fingerprints from traces. Tested: make fmt-check Tested: go vet ./... Tested: go test ./... Tested: go test -race ./internal/agent ./internal/trace Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release build Tested: go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke Tested: govulncheck ./... (no vulnerabilities found) Advisory: pinned golangci-lint reports only unrelated pre-existing findings Tested: git diff HEAD --check
Add transcript-grounded structured task state
2026-11-08 09:49:34 -10:00 · 2026-07-19 21:25:37 +05:30 · 2026-07-19 20:55:19 +05:30
571 changed files with 6831 additions and 57373 deletions
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-*.go text eol=lf
-*.mod text eol=lf
-*.sum text eol=lf
@@ -30,36 +30,6 @@ jobs:
          go-version-file: go.mod
          cache: true

-      - name: Install Make on Windows
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        shell: pwsh
-        run: choco install make --no-progress -y
-
-      - name: Validate quality targets with stock macOS Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'macos-latest'
-        env:
-          GIT_CONFIG_COUNT: 1
-          GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0: grep.patternType
-          GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0: fixed
-        run: make -n vulncheck
-
-      - name: Check vulnerabilities through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make vulncheck
-
-      - name: Check dead code through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        continue-on-error: true
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make deadcode
-
-      - name: Run static lint through native Windows Make
-        if: matrix.os == 'windows-latest'
-        continue-on-error: true
-        shell: cmd
-        run: make lint-static
-
      - name: Check formatting
        if: matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest'
        shell: bash
@@ -130,18 +100,27 @@ jobs:
          go-version-file: go.mod
          cache: true

+      # govulncheck, deadcode, and golangci-lint each resolve a toolchain from
+      # their own modules, which can drop below the version go.mod requires and
+      # then fail to load our packages. Pin GOTOOLCHAIN to the go.mod toolchain
+      # so all three run under it.
+      - name: Pin toolchain from go.mod
+        run: |
+          toolchain="$(awk '/^toolchain /{print $2}' go.mod)"
+          echo "GOTOOLCHAIN=${toolchain:-auto}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
      # Hard gate: fails the build when code reaches a known vulnerability. A stdlib
      # CVE is cleared by a toolchain bump (see go.mod). May also flag a newly
      # published advisory on an unrelated PR — intentional: do not ship known vulns.
      - name: govulncheck
-        run: make vulncheck
+        run: go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...

      # Advisory: reports functions unreachable from any cmd/* main so dormant
      # code is visible in CI. Non-blocking while the dormant subsystems are
      # still being wired or removed.
      - name: deadcode (advisory)
        continue-on-error: true
-        run: make deadcode
+        run: go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/[email protected] -test=false ./...

      # Advisory: catches what deadcode's whole-program reachability analysis
      # doesn't, unused private functions/assignments reachable within a
@@ -151,4 +130,4 @@ jobs:
      # the repo are cleaned up incrementally (see #527).
      - name: golangci-lint (advisory)
        continue-on-error: true
-        run: make lint-static
+        run: go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"0.7.0"}
+{".":"0.4.0"}
@@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ request, or completing an implementation task:
   or run focused tests with `-race`, when concurrency is affected.
 4. **Build**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release build`.
 5. **Smoke test**: `go run ./cmd/zero-release smoke`.
-6. **Advisory lint**: `make lint-static`.
-7. **Security**: `make vulncheck`.
+6. **Advisory lint**:
+   `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
+7. **Security**:
+   `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.
 8. **Diff hygiene**: `git diff HEAD --check` (covers staged and unstaged
   tracked changes).

@@ -67,47 +69,3 @@ requirements. If a related check fails, fix it. If a required check cannot run
 because of the environment or fails for an unrelated external reason, report
 the exact failure and obtain maintainer direction rather than silently ignoring
 it.
-
-## 4. Common Review Blockers
-
-These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
-
- **Fresh base:** Rebase onto the current PR base (`main` or stacked target)
-  before review. A stale head that rolls back mainline commits is a hard
-  blocker, not a merge-time detail. Resolve conflicts by keeping upstream
-  behavior unless the PR intentionally changes it.
- **Platform truth:** Code and tests must pass on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
-  Compare paths after canonicalization (physical/`EvalSymlinks` form); never
-  assert raw `t.TempDir()` spellings (`/var` vs `/private/var` on macOS, short
-  paths on Windows). Prefer one cross-platform function with small `GOOS`
-  checks over duplicated helpers that drift.
- **Security edges:** Keep secrets out of argv, env dumps, and logs. Redact
-  success and error paths (including stderr). Fail closed on ownership, lease,
-  and permission checks. Do not rely on pre-open path resolution
-  (`EvalSymlinks` then open) for containment: that is a check-to-use race.
-  Bind containment at open/use time with rooted or handle-relative,
-  traversal-resistant APIs. If a no-follow API is used, apply it to every
-  traversed component and enforce the platform's reparse-point protections;
-  final-component-only no-follow is insufficient. On multi-step setup, roll back
-  only what this run created; never destroy pre-existing resources you did
-  not create; never report success when cleanup or unlock failed.
- **Normalize before matching:** Any transform that REMOVES bytes without
-  leaving a gap is also a reassembler, so it has to run before whatever matches
-  on the result. Redacting by shape and then stripping control bytes lets a
-  credential split by a NUL, an ESC or a C1 byte pass the patterns as two
-  fragments and be rejoined on the way out; comparing a path against a form
-  produced by the same resolver the kernel just used makes a redirect agree with
-  itself. Strip, decode, or canonicalize first, then match. The unsplit value
-  passing is not evidence, so the test needs a split case.
- **Atomic shared state:** Write a complete temporary file, then atomically
-  replace the destination so concurrent readers never see a partial write.
-  Exclusive create or a write lock alone is not enough for readers. Serialize
-  the full read-modify-write sequence for lockfiles and shared stores.
- **Tests match the claim:** Every behavior or security-boundary change needs a
-  regression test, including the failure path. Path-sensitive logic needs at
-  least one non-Linux path case (or a hermetic fake that exercises the same
-  normalization).
- **Honest scope:** PR description, help text, and comments must match what
-  shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
-  unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
-  classification and side effects too.
@@ -6,120 +6,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
 tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.

-## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **agent:** add PermissionModePlan for interactive read-only planning ([#853](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/853)) ([0176ee4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/0176ee49ffddcff6f7edf6ae2ade4967e5b22cc3))
-* **providers:** live model lists for OpenRouter and OpenGateway ([#860](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/860)) ([fb4f293](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fb4f293c20eb860ca388a10d22fd566ce282ba1f))
-* **tools:** give tool results an image channel and add view_image ([#843](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/843)) ([cd0eb19](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cd0eb194e4df4b844785796c0701216740a56344))
-* **tui:** replace /retitle with local /rename ([#826](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/826)) ([5886354](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/588635487f22ef4d62d350140a219b7b8bb24119))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **agent:** end the additional_permissions retry loop ([#864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/864)) ([4ca4fa7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4ca4fa75d31b139dbe55a3badf17da86892ab001))
-* **agent:** tell the user a prefix approval leaves the sandbox ([#885](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/885)) ([2ec5c3a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2ec5c3ae6b8fb543887bdeafdb34c4da057b8d36))
-* **cli:** report MCP servers that failed to start ([#822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/822)) ([#827](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/827)) ([021281e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/021281ebbab3f2bbe6a77b2dab4bf121bcfe6b52))
-* **lsp:** dispatch notifications off read loop ([#759](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/759)) ([936aa4e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/936aa4e77cf49738560a89395b8ba4d22263a396))
-* **mcp:** name the non-text blocks a tool result drops ([#874](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/874)) ([027a670](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/027a67080bea511b876c284bc911ef011eceb308))
-* **sandbox:** deny reads of Zero credential stores ([#681](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/681)) ([55fa05f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/55fa05f0ab5a01b495345d43464606cd19a31b4f))
-* **sandbox:** stop the Windows write jail honouring Everyone-granted paths ([#865](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/865)) ([91b413c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/91b413c514cc1607d5b4e7936780d40569239814))
-* **secrets,worktrees:** fix secret redaction leakage and prune stale worktrees ([#855](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/855)) ([ff62f73](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ff62f73b7f4dc5e2472db21acba43cf6140c06d1))
-* **specialist:** make overwrites atomic ([#757](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/757)) ([30f6d8f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30f6d8f591a0b81638b4182ff56c86c8a50a5c70))
-* suppress gosec G204 warning for trusted local config commands ([#848](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/848)) ([c52db05](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/c52db055b0b213758a33c5c5627a411e052f8de4))
-* **tui:** a copied NUL byte no longer panics the TUI on Windows ([#876](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/876)) ([cae0269](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/cae0269e77e7a0a493cf799b41c653c9ff9a19de)), closes [#875](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/875)
-* **tui:** exclude permission waits from turn time ([#820](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/820)) ([15eb16f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15eb16f736f903c94203207032f98aacbcf06318))
-* **tui:** fall back to CellMotion where AllMotion is unreliable ([#872](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/872)) ([7fbd864](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/7fbd864e91433441489902571ea394ebc5b7bd0d))
-* **tui:** fill alt-screen frame with theme panel background ([#850](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/850)) ([020c28e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/020c28eaf95e2f38853f99fc06a13cd1568bf3c9))
-* **tui:** hide unavailable sidebar shortcut ([#821](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/821)) ([845df6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/845df6c7d28e02f475e90acfe838733eb37e6aa2))
-* use OAuth credentials in provider health checks ([#828](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/828)) ([d37de92](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d37de9214b1ba86542f4f5ef3b060bb96849763b))
-
-
-### Performance Improvements
-
-* compact common test output ([#846](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/846)) ([edf660a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/edf660ab85131f90a452cee51dc2c3a5cf62d632))
-* improve harness context efficiency ([#838](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/838)) ([8e26679](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8e266797a8305e689806eadcf9698da2796481ab))
-
-## [0.6.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.5.0...v0.6.0) (2026-07-29)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* add persistent session goals ([#803](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/803)) ([5d1869e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5d1869e7bc193c97e07418b57b823905c1151d5d))
-* **providers:** add Fireworks AI provider preset ([#772](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/772)) ([58daea7](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/58daea7a482927e5ab35afaf97761c60bb35e113))
-* **skills:** report hash drift in skill info ([#795](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/795)) ([9fbdc34](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fbdc341551601c13434cf7b9b6f5e4ea4c483b1))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **acp:** interrupt idle reads on cancellation ([#782](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/782)) ([15b7a54](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/15b7a5475cfeefddbc59634551451a8872b996b7))
-* **cli:** include plugins info in shell completions ([#794](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/794)) ([fa8734f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fa8734f17927de8832dfe041e043cfb86f93d12a))
-* **config:** kill provider-command process tree via job object on Windows ([#690](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/690)) ([5c58256](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5c58256abc29c185b449f8ce79647eb3fae61882))
-* **config:** make the provider-command timeout an upper bound ([#811](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/811)) ([#813](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/813)) ([1c38e8c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1c38e8cba50db255f3cda8b7cf4298712b2933e1))
-* **config:** stop billing provider-command fixtures to the 5s timeout ([#810](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/810)) ([f5fa4ff](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f5fa4ffc64537897aa78a56edca36d8f1dacd021))
-* **cron:** reserve job IDs atomically ([#686](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/686)) ([d9b882e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d9b882eb0a94f38de8447cb54b57860ccd8ed053))
-* **lint:** resolve static analysis baseline ([#769](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/769)) ([583e653](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/583e6530bd849a8efcb2b88bbe8c297e8592e62c))
-* **providers:** retry provably pre-send transport failures ([#447](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/447)) ([#750](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/750)) ([8acd42a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8acd42a3bd743a35807d762f23a33fb61c171839))
-* **sandbox:** add platform-specific write lock around grant state file ([#752](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/752)) ([#755](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/755)) ([88fb7b6](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/88fb7b6192c1ac8173089967d5e9119f92d7a101))
-* **sandbox:** clarify scoped permission prompts ([#798](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/798)) ([9fe02ae](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9fe02ae52e3234cb9dae76e0c5594a287ccbb52a))
-* **sandbox:** deny reads of git's credential stores ([#815](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/815)) ([#816](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/816)) ([33c94ec](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/33c94ec7a3e7987e6e36b5fd5e037ff4e6e84c26))
-* **sandbox:** preserve user config and retry denied writes ([#801](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/801)) ([81a5e6c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/81a5e6cb716ba4b7ecf7ff3ff261dfa51fd01098))
-* **sandbox:** scrub the daemon token file pointer ([#677](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/677)) ([#818](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/818)) ([3e7692d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3e7692d8f0885d346809869935c81a9cf055d89e))
-* **swarm:** close lifecycle admission on shutdown ([#776](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/776)) ([bdbda89](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/bdbda89f3e42d93e8058ab3e1e9ef402659530cd))
-* **tui:** fix rendering corruption over multipass + Windows Terminal ([#709](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/709)) ([5bb1bc1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/5bb1bc11c3188dcea7709ff07c8b25dda3541de8))
-* **tui:** paste clipboard images with Ctrl+V ([#534](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/534)) ([#807](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/807)) ([ec3b822](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ec3b8225050eb62f0f41a9582ed2881d2f9dcc8e))
-* **tui:** reset quiet clock for new runs ([#799](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/799)) ([a4a805a](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a4a805a6c82c51cb255e909bd87ca183c8805cf2))
-* **windows:** use PowerShell for command execution ([#804](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/804)) ([518d2e5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/518d2e53ba3fa073090a9b41c278face85b59b64))
-
-## [0.5.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0) (2026-07-22)
-
-
-### Features
-
-* **plugins:** add zero plugins info command ([#773](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/773)) ([2479884](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2479884dea49580c853a53536c3bbab22ce8a2bf))
-* **sandbox:** disable the sandbox via config ([#687](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/687)) ([#746](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/746)) ([a21a052](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a21a052a4a32ce9cb3c93c94350cd24e138532cd))
-* **sandbox:** unify command execution and enforcement ([#781](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/781)) ([96859c9](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/96859c9bd16f6dad4e332efc7e68178b9116118a))
-* **tui:** add /undo as an alias for /rewind ([#698](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/698)) ([#747](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/747)) ([8c6d302](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/8c6d3022bd7801eaad6a0440bb21a27221887297))
-* **tui:** add isolated /btw conversations ([#748](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/748)) ([2e267bd](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2e267bdbee4a77813e93a7ab51f0c575b66cee8c))
-* **tui:** permission prompt takes free-text feedback inline ([#780](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/780)) ([3967d49](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3967d49d64998341af8ef6d7523fc63aeb2a5a7a))
-
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-* **agent:** stop write_stdin session_id probing thrash ([#702](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/702)) ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749)) ([fbf8598](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/fbf85984f679058125951fe2d5e4f200e09a3e2f))
-* **cli:** warn when ZERO_PROVIDER overrides a providers-use selection ([#767](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/767)) ([3524f79](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/3524f795e5fdbb827166a84f03351cedfc9eba30))
-* **doctor:** detect missing native binary during runtime checks ([#450](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/450)) ([7796022](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/77960229b839dca856616f846839aa773f2923f7))
-* **lsp:** make the real-gopls check opt-in so a broken gopls can't fail the suite ([#684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/684)) ([#766](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/766)) ([b1f4173](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b1f41735a7f6b7928a1875e986a4dca39d106cb9))
-* make extension installs transactional ([#762](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/762)) ([baa4be1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/baa4be13ac5321da4e9f53e864dd1cd395481200))
-* **oauth:** refuse redirects on credential POSTs ([#729](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/729)) ([#741](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/741)) ([974fc03](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/974fc036c2f9a194722f2e8fddbb4fdbf797effe))
-* **oauth:** validate discovered endpoints before merge/use ([#511](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/511)) ([#739](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/739)) ([ce4a996](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/ce4a996ffac4482e704f0fd61b3e442398fb2401))
-* **perfbench:** absolutize the bench binary and make errored tasks first-class ([#730](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/730)) ([dbd9443](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dbd94430143df6754d68551d1028ad8f15b82f1b))
-* **perfbench:** grant write tools so mutating tasks measure real edits ([#763](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/763)) ([e1975c1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e1975c1b396b3236ed648870230b4f85863b1d03))
-* **perfbench:** keep the stamped answer file out of negative oracle greps ([#737](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/737)) ([015452c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/015452c1c98a39eabb021324182094e188a8bd47))
-* **providers:** stop "provider not found" for env-derived profiles ([#716](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/716)) ([4cbd144](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4cbd144d11e5cb67bc5fea46f5b294562dac7a1a))
-* **sandbox:** AST second opinion for interactive-command bypasses ([#473](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/473)) ([#745](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/745)) ([f079b90](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/f079b90f82dac7b7ae0864b279dc9094e31a6627))
-* **sandbox:** bind Windows elevated ACL setup to one no-follow handle ([#765](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/765)) ([4945684](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/4945684fa26aa5994eda59dcabedc817423c535d))
-* **sandbox:** don't auto-allow shell when re-entrancy skips wrapping ([#727](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/727)) ([#744](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/744)) ([6849011](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/684901165d1b7f50a8bb4af31b1c1951e6926a79))
-* **tools:** give write_stdin's invalid-session errors the same recovery guidance ([#749](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/749) follow-up) ([#768](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/768)) ([da9fb50](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/da9fb50f549f6701eb136fc99f6178d0772d9334))
-* **tools:** read_file recovers a backwards line range instead of erroring ([#779](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/779)) ([89bdc67](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/89bdc6719a1e1b3a3ef0e36b91a7839b3efdfba9))
-* **tui:** cache settled alt-screen transcript ([#647](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/647)) ([d74ceb1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d74ceb11271ed68a21c19248210e098f411805fb))
-* **tui:** model rows labelled by id when the description is prose; keep the sidebar under the / palette ([#775](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/775)) ([b30c397](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/b30c3971b40b06ba52ad649ba9dc0ad560d4be4c))
-* **tui:** stop the permission card clashing on cool themes ([#778](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/778)) ([722bb31](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/722bb3121682d9cd9cd4bc6c127e9014d719262a))
-
-
-### Performance Improvements
-
-* **agent:** concurrent read-only tool batches via capability gate ([#715](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/715)) ([31d45d5](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/31d45d5f14e915acb9946e8b8eb81632c48f126a))
-* **agent:** execution profiles with one-shot posture escalation (PR10b+PR10c) ([#740](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/740)) ([378d538](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/378d538e240c289e57821e9f9628f76034419d01))
-* **agent:** posture-escalation signals and controller (PR10a) ([#736](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/736)) ([af875df](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/af875df58775484304fc65586bd6c74552ad01a2))
-* **agent:** preserve prompt cache prefixes ([#760](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/760)) ([739a47e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/739a47e3eac92c3decc8734f52a4d99c7480c3ca))
-* **openai:** optimized turn session — background prewarm and prefix telemetry (PR8) ([#723](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/723)) ([60dc84e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/60dc84e7a38c5544ebc047f3cfaf4625dd1e83b5))
-* **output:** add token-aware semantic output budgeting (PR11) ([#717](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/717)) ([e5670c4](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/e5670c427ff39c628fb0822fd5c9317ee2174583))
-* **providers:** provider capabilities and default turn-session adapter (PR7) ([#720](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/720)) ([30e2c3f](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/30e2c3f7ffa1d5e487bd10b59d4e823cda191d48))
-* **turn-bench:** Phase 0 — strengthen oracles so pass rate can't be misread as correctness ([#712](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/712)) ([727ad4d](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/727ad4d321fab45d0cf40f8535522e3d94e55c4a))
-
 ## [0.4.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0) (2026-07-17)


@@ -67,28 +67,6 @@ An approved issue means only that the specific issue has been accepted for work.
 It does not approve unrelated future work, future pull requests, or future issues
 from the same author. Each issue is reviewed case by case.

-## Contribution Volume and Batching
-
-To keep triage and review sustainable while the project stabilizes, please keep
-your contribution flow to a size the core team can realistically work through:
-
- One issue per bug. File each defect as its own issue with its own
-  reproduction. Please do not bundle several unrelated findings into a single
-  "audit" issue; separate issues are far easier to triage, approve, and close
-  individually.
- Keep only a few items open at a time. If you already have several issues or
-  pull requests awaiting review, let those move through the queue before opening
-  more. A large simultaneous burst from one contributor slows review for
-  everyone, even when each item is valid.
- AI-assisted contributions are welcome, held to the same bar. Automated audits
-  and generated patches are fine, but each issue and pull request must be
-  individually verified, scoped, and reproducible before you open it. Please do
-  not post bulk machine-generated findings unfiltered.
-
-These apply to all contributors and are about review bandwidth, not the value of
-any single report. Maintainers may ask you to consolidate, split, or hold
-submissions to keep the queue manageable.
-
 ## Pull Request Requirements

 Before opening a community pull request, make sure all of the following are true:
@@ -1,13 +1,7 @@
-# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says to build and run quality checks
-# with `make` — these targets back those instructions.
+# Zero build/test/lint targets. AGENTS.md says "Build with `make`" and "Run `make
+# lint` before opening a PR" — these targets back those instructions.
 .DEFAULT_GOAL := build
-GO_VERSION = $(word 2,$(shell git grep -G -h "^go[[:space:]]" -- go.mod))
-GO_TOOLCHAIN = go$(GO_VERSION)
-DEADCODE_VERSION := v0.46.0
-GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION := v2.12.2
-GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.3.0
-
-.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint lint-static deadcode vulncheck tidy clean baseline help
+.PHONY: build build-all test test-race vet fmt fmt-check lint tidy clean baseline help

 # Build the main CLI binary into ./zero.
 build:
@@ -39,22 +33,6 @@ fmt-check:
 # Lint = formatting check + vet (no extra tooling required).
 lint: fmt-check vet

-# Versioned tools select the toolchain from their own modules when invoked with
-# package@version. Read this module's go directive directly, without invoking
-# the possibly stale Go toolchain or consulting a multi-module GOWORK. git grep
-# works with both POSIX shells and cmd.exe, including GNU Make 3.81 on macOS.
-# The target-specific export is shell-independent.
-lint-static deadcode vulncheck: export GOTOOLCHAIN = $(GO_TOOLCHAIN)
-
-lint-static:
-	go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/golangci-lint@$(GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION) run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...
-
-deadcode:
-	go run golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode@$(DEADCODE_VERSION) -test=false ./...
-
-vulncheck:
-	go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
-
 tidy:
 	go mod tidy

@@ -77,4 +55,4 @@ baseline: build
 		--output internal/perfbench/reports/baseline.json

 help:
-	@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, lint-static, deadcode, vulncheck, tidy, clean, baseline"
+	@echo "Targets: build (default), build-all, test, test-quick, vet, fmt, fmt-check, lint, tidy, clean, baseline"
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
  <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
  <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
-  <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
  <br>
  <strong>English</strong> | <a href="README_ZH.md">中文</a>
 </p>
@@ -132,7 +131,6 @@ export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=...
 export GEMINI_API_KEY=...
 export AIMLAPI_API_KEY=...
 export LONGCAT_API_KEY=...
-export FIREWORKS_API_KEY=...
 export MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
 export MINIMAXI_API_KEY=...
 ```
@@ -149,12 +147,6 @@ To configure Meituan LongCat (LongCat-2.0) directly, run:
 zero providers setup longcat --set-active
 ```

-To configure Fireworks AI directly, run:
-
-```bash
-zero providers setup fireworks --set-active
-```
-
 MiniMax presets use the Anthropic-compatible endpoints for the global and China
 regions:

@@ -213,7 +205,6 @@ Common slash commands:
 | `/spec`, `/plan` | draft and review a plan before building |
 | `/image` | attach an image for vision-capable models |
 | `/resume`, `/rewind` | continue or roll back local sessions |
-| `/new` | start a fresh session in place (previous session stays on disk) |
 | `/btw [question]` | ask in an isolated fork without adding the side conversation to the main session |
 | `/loop` | repeat a prompt or custom `/command` on an interval (`/loop 5m /babysit-prs`) or self-paced |
 | `/compact`, `/context` | manage context usage |
@@ -310,8 +301,7 @@ zero verify           detect and run local verification checks
 zero changes          inspect and commit local git changes
 zero usage            token usage and estimated cost
 zero cron             scheduled agent jobs
-zero update --check   check for newer releases
-zero upgrade          download, verify, and install the latest release
+zero update           check for newer releases
 ```

 ## Extending Zero
@@ -377,24 +367,21 @@ variable unset and set.

 ### Code Quality and Security Checks

-Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. The `make` targets below pin each tool to this module's Go version, so they load correctly even when your default `go` toolchain is older — running the plain `go run ...@version` form yourself can select the tool module's own (older) toolchain and fail to load this module instead.
+Before committing any changes, ensure all Go code quality and security checks pass. Pinned `go run` commands matching CI constraints can be used directly without prior installation:

-1. **Formatting**: Run `make fmt` (or `go fmt ./...`).
-2. **Vetting**: Run `make vet` (or `go vet ./...`).
-3. **Linting**: Run `make lint-static`.
-4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `make vulncheck`.
+1. **Formatting**: Run `go fmt ./...` (or `make fmt`).
+2. **Vetting**: Run `go vet ./...` (or `make vet`).
+3. **Linting**: Run `go run github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected] run --enable-only unused,ineffassign,staticcheck ./...`.
+4. **Vulnerability Scan**: Run `go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected] ./...`.

-Use the repository-managed targets rather than globally installed binaries:
-the targets apply the module's required Go toolchain as well as the reviewed,
-pinned tool versions.
-
-The installed binaries land in `$GOBIN` when it is set, otherwise in
-`$GOPATH/bin` (default `~/go/bin`). That directory must be on your `PATH` to
-run them directly. If it isn't, add it:
+If you prefer to install these tools globally on your path, you can run:

 ```bash
-gobin="$(go env GOBIN)"; [ -z "$gobin" ] && gobin="$(go env GOPATH)/bin"
-case ":$PATH:" in *":$gobin:"*) ;; *) export PATH="$PATH:$gobin" ;; esac
+# Install golangci-lint
+go install github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/v2/cmd/[email protected]
+
+# Install govulncheck
+go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/[email protected]
 ```

 ### Cross-Compile Examples
@@ -418,8 +405,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero

 ## Community

-Real-time chat happens on the [Discord server](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn).
-
 Questions, setup help, ideas, and sharing all live in
 [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions):

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
  <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
  <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
-  <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
  <br>
  <a href="README.md">English</a> | <strong>中文</strong>
 </p>
@@ -142,7 +141,6 @@ zero
 | `/spec`、`/plan` | 在构建之前起草和审查计划 |
 | `/image` | 为视觉模型附加图片 |
 | `/resume`、`/rewind` | 继续或回滚本地会话 |
-| `/new` | 原地开始一个新会话（之前的会话仍保留在磁盘上） |
 | `/compact`、`/context` | 管理上下文使用 |
 | `/permissions`、`/tools` | 检查可用工具和策略 |
 | `/add-dir` | 为此会话授予额外的写入目录 |
@@ -228,8 +226,7 @@ zero verify           检测和运行本地验证检查
 zero changes          检查和提交本地 Git 变更
 zero usage            Token 使用量和估算成本
 zero cron             定时智能体任务
-zero update --check   检查更新版本
-zero upgrade          下载、验证并安装最新版本
+zero update           检查更新版本
 ```

 ## 外观和无障碍
@@ -272,20 +269,6 @@ go run ./cmd/zero-release build --goos windows --goarch amd64 --output dist/zero
 - [性能](docs/PERFORMANCE.md)
 - [智能体评估](docs/AGENT_EVALS.md)

-## 社区
-
-实时交流在 [Discord 服务器](https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn) 进行。
-
-提问、安装帮助、想法和分享都在
-[GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions)：
-
-| 分类 | 用途 |
-|---|---|
-| [Q&A](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/q-a) | 安装帮助、提供商/模型配置、"如何做"类问题 |
-| [Ideas](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/ideas) | 功能提议和 PR 之前的设计讨论 |
-| [Show and tell](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/show-and-tell) | 你的技能、插件、MCP 配置、主题和工作流 |
-| [Announcements](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/discussions/categories/announcements) | 维护者发布的版本和项目动态 |
-
 ## 贡献

 欢迎贡献。阅读 [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)，运行相关测试，然后提交一个聚焦的拉取请求。
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ Discovery roots (earlier wins on name collisions):
 2. **Shared multi-agent dir** — `~/.agents/skills/` when present (read-only discovery; never an install target)
 3. **Plugin skill roots** — skills bundled by active plugins (section 6)

-A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skill add` / `zero skill remove`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`. `skill info` reports lock source/hash when present and whether the on-disk `SKILL.md` has drifted from the recorded hash.
+A missing directory is fine — Zero just omits it. Management commands (`zero skills add` / `remove` / `lock`) always write to the primary Zero dir only; `list` / `info` search primary + `~/.agents/skills`.

 ```text
-~/.local/share/zero/skills/          # primary (install/remove target)
+~/.local/share/zero/skills/          # primary (install/remove/lock target)
  run-benchmarks/
    SKILL.md
  write-changelog/
@@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ Install and manage:
 ```bash
 zero plugins add ./github-pr-review      # copy into ~/.config/zero/plugins/ or ./.zero/plugins/
 zero plugins list
-zero plugins info github-pr-review       # show manifest path, enabled state, lock metadata
 zero plugins remove github-pr-review    # alias: rm
 ```

@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ flowchart TD
 - **Plugins** can add tools, hooks, and skill roots. Bootstrap always registers a
  multi-root skill tool: primary Zero skills dir, optional `~/.agents/skills`,
  then plugin skill roots (earlier wins). `internal/skills` owns that merge via
-  `LoadFromRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
+  `LoadFromRoots` / `DiscoveryRoots`; single-root `Load` remains for install/write.
 - **Hooks** can observe or block tool lifecycle events.

 ## End-to-End Data Flow
@@ -234,11 +234,10 @@ directory.

 ## Updating

-Check for a newer release, then download, verify, and install it in place:
+Check for a newer release:

 ```bash
 zero update --check
-zero upgrade
 ```

-See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
+Then reinstall with npm or rerun the install script for the version you want.
@@ -138,45 +138,3 @@ output or stop a still-running task by id.
 If Zero is restarted while a background task is still marked `running`, the new
 manager marks that task `error` and clears its PID. This avoids sending
 `TaskStop` to a stale PID that may now belong to an unrelated process.
-
-## Recovering an Interrupted Overwrite
-
-Zero writes and flushes a complete temporary file before publishing an overwrite,
-so a write failure before publication leaves the existing manifest unchanged
-instead of truncating it. On Unix, publication uses a same-directory rename and
-preserves the existing file's permission bits.
-
-On Windows, Zero uses `ReplaceFileW` to preserve the destination DACL instead of
-silently replacing it with the temporary file's inherited DACL. `ReplaceFileW`
-is not observer-atomic: another process can briefly observe the destination path
-as absent during replacement. Zero serializes specialist loads and managed
-mutations within one process, but cannot synchronize external processes or
-editors.
-
-Windows errors 1176 (`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT`) and 1177
-(`ERROR_UNABLE_TO_MOVE_REPLACEMENT_2`) are partial replacement failures. With
-Zero's managed backup, 1176 leaves the original names intact and needs no manual
-recovery. For 1177, Zero has moved the original aside and tries to move it back.
-That rollback almost always succeeds, and the failed write changes nothing.
-
-If the rollback itself fails — typically because another process is holding a
-lock on the file — the original is not lost, but it is left under a name Zero
-does not read:
-
-```text
-<specialist dir>/.zero-replace-<random>.backup
-```
-
-Only `*.md` files are loaded as specialists, so until that file is renamed the
-specialist will not appear in `zero specialist list` or resolve by name. Zero's
-error message includes both the backup path and destination path. Recover by
-closing whatever holds the lock and renaming the backup back:
-
-```powershell
-Move-Item .zero-replace-<random>.backup <name>.md
-```
-
-A `.zero-replace-*.backup` can also linger after a *successful* overwrite if the
-backup could not be deleted afterward. That case is reported as a warning rather
-than an error — the new manifest is already in place, and the leftover file is
-safe to delete.
@@ -1,23 +1,16 @@
 # Update Flow

 `zero update --check` checks the latest GitHub release and compares it with the
-local CLI version. `zero update --apply` (or its shorthand, `zero upgrade`)
-downloads, verifies, and installs it.
+local CLI version.

 ```bash
 zero update --check
 zero update --check --json
 zero update --check --repo Gitlawb/zero
 zero update --check --target windows-x64
-
-zero upgrade
-zero update --apply
 ```

-`--check` and `--apply` are mutually exclusive. `zero update` requires one of
-them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
-
-`--check` is check-only:
+The command is intentionally check-only:

 - It does not replace the running binary.
 - It exits with code `0` when the check succeeds, even when an update is
@@ -26,35 +19,14 @@ them explicitly; `zero upgrade` is `zero update` with `--apply` implied.
 - `--json` prints the same result in a machine-readable format for scripts and
  CI.

-`--apply` installs the update in place:
-
- npm installs delegate to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest`.
- Standalone installs download the release archive, verify its checksum,
-  extract it, and atomically replace the running binary plus any installed
-  optional sandbox helpers.
- On Windows, the running executable is renamed aside and cleaned up on the
-  next `zero update --apply` or `zero upgrade`, since it can't be overwritten
-  while running.
- `--target` cannot be combined with `--apply`; it only applies to `--check`,
-  since applying always installs onto the current machine.
- `--repo` and `--endpoint` are ignored when applying to an npm-managed
-  install: that path delegates to `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` and
-  takes its release from the npm registry, not from GitHub. They still apply to
-  `--check` there.
- `--json` serializes Zero's final result. For npm-managed installs, npm may
-  also write progress output to stdout, so neither
-  `zero update --apply --json` nor `zero upgrade --json` is guaranteed to
-  produce a single parseable JSON document. Use `--check --json` for
-  machine-readable automation.
-
 Useful flags:

 | Flag | Purpose |
 |---|---|
-| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Use another GitHub repository for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
-| `--endpoint <url\|owner/repo>` | Use a specific release API URL or repository slug for `--check` and `--apply`/`upgrade`. Ignored by an npm-managed apply. |
+| `--repo <owner/repo>` | Check another GitHub repository. |
+| `--endpoint <url|owner/repo>` | Check a specific release API URL or repository slug. |
 | `--timeout <duration>` | Override the default release check timeout. |
-| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target (`--check` only). |
+| `--target <platform-arch>` | Validate release metadata for another supported target. |

 Supported targets are `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64`, `macos-x64`, `macos-arm64`,
 `windows-x64`, and `windows-arm64`. Without `--target`, Zero checks the current
@@ -68,45 +40,5 @@ Endpoint resolution order:
 4. `https://api.github.com/repos/Gitlawb/zero/releases/latest`

 Installer scripts download the matching release asset for the local platform and
-verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero upgrade`
-instead of reinstalling.
-
-## Windows recovery state (standalone installs)
-
-This section describes Windows only. On Linux and macOS a standalone update
-renames the staged file directly over the executable path through the
-installation directory's file descriptor, so the replacement is atomic and no
-aside copy, marker, or recovery record is ever created — a failed update leaves
-the previous binary in place and nothing to resolve.
-
-On Windows, a running executable cannot be replaced in place, so the previous
-binary is moved aside to `<binary>.zero-update-<random>.old` first. The updater
-records that exact file — bound to its filesystem identity, in per-user state
-outside the installation directory — and deletes only that recorded copy after
-the next update is verified in place. Backups it did not create are never
-removed, so a file such as `zero.exe.before-manual-patch.old` is left alone. A
-recorded copy that something else holds open (an on-access scanner, an editor)
-stays recorded and is removed by a later update instead.
-
-An update **refuses to run** while unresolved recovery state exists beside the
-binary:
-
-| State on disk | Meaning |
-|---|---|
-| `<binary>.old` (or `<binary>.<suffix>.old`) plus a `.keep` marker | A previous update could not restore the original binary. The `.old` file may be the last binary the updater verified; the installed one may be unverified. |
-| `<binary>.…old.<suffix>.recovery` | A previous update could not even write the marker, so it moved the last verified binary to that name. |
-| The binary is missing and one or more `*.old` files exist | The previous attempt was interrupted between moves. |
-
-The refusal names the paths involved and the two moves that end the state:
-either move the recovery binary back over the executable path, or — if the
-installed binary is the one you want — delete the `.keep` marker (or the
-`.recovery` copy, once you have verified the installed binary) and update again.
-
-This is deliberately fail-closed and differs from older releases, which deleted
-`<binary>.old` and proceeded. The trade-off is that anyone who can write in the
-installation directory can plant `<binary>.old` and `<binary>.old.keep` there
-and make every subsequent update refuse until an operator clears them. That is
-the safe direction: the alternative is an update that overwrites the only
-verified copy of the previous binary. If updates start refusing, inspect those
-files before removing them — an installation directory that a lower-privileged
-account can write to is itself worth fixing.
+verify its `.sha256` file. If Zero is already installed, run `zero update --check`
+before reinstalling.
@@ -6,22 +6,20 @@ require (
 	charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
 	charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8
 	charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5
-	github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
 	github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff v0.4.1
 	github.com/charmbracelet/colorprofile v0.4.3
-	github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/ansi v0.11.7
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
 	github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
 	github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
-	golang.org/x/image v0.44.0
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
 	mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
 )

 require (
+	github.com/charmbracelet/ultraviolet v0.0.0-20260703014108-f5a850f9c2b7 // indirect
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/exp/golden v0.0.0-20260615092313-b57e5e6d29bb // indirect
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/termios v0.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/windows v0.2.2 // indirect
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8 h1:SxTJMhCAI3lbPmy4SgX5LWZ24AdINr4I6UEqzZvYJuY=
 charm.land/bubbletea/v2 v2.0.8/go.mod h1:2SkdgoTXluXJHOUwAoRlRXF/28vklb1rFl6GcgV1/ss=
 charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5 h1:kbNxgeeUOYv5J0YdpxFjfvf3dFvqH8Aci4zB6xqFtrY=
 charm.land/lipgloss/v2 v2.0.5/go.mod h1:9oqhxt4yxIMe6q5A4kHr44DremZk7J9UNh74GlWa5nc=
-github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
-github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
 github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0 h1:2Q9r3ki8+JYXvGsDyBXwH3LcJ+WK5D0gc5E8vS6K3D0=
 github.com/alecthomas/assert/v2 v2.11.0/go.mod h1:Bze95FyfUr7x34QZrjL+XP+0qgp/zg8yS+TtBj1WA3k=
 github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2 v2.27.0 h1:FodwmyOBgJULFYmDqibcp9pvfDLWdtPRh9v/r5BXYZs=
@@ -64,8 +62,6 @@ github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e h1:JVG44RsyaB9T2KIHavM
 github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e/go.mod h1:RbqR21r5mrJuqunuUZ/Dhy/avygyECGrLceyNeo4LiM=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZChE3cBpZi2P158rTG9M=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
-golang.org/x/image v0.44.0 h1:+tDekMZED9+LrtB3G5xzRggpVh9CARjZqROla3R3R+I=
-golang.org/x/image v0.44.0/go.mod h1:V8K3KE9KKKE+pLpQDOeN18w9oacNSvy1tDOirTu4xtY=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -26,10 +23,9 @@ import (
 // means the editor only hosts the thread — ZERO owns BYOK and telemetry-free
 // operation.
 type Deps struct {
-	ResolveConfig  func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
-	DiscoverModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
-	NewProvider    func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
-	RunAgent       func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
+	ResolveConfig func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error)
+	NewProvider   func(profile config.ProviderProfile) (zeroruntime.Provider, error)
+	RunAgent      func(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error)
 	// BuildWorkspace builds the SCOPED tool registry and the sandbox engine for a
 	// validated workspace root, so ACP shell tools (bash/exec_command) are confined
 	// exactly like the exec surface — never run unconfined on the host.
@@ -64,16 +60,13 @@ type acpSession struct {
 	// turnMu serializes prompt turns for one session: concurrent session/prompt
 	// calls run one at a time so they can't interleave history or clobber the
 	// single cancel slot.
-	turnMu  sync.Mutex
-	modelMu sync.Mutex
+	turnMu sync.Mutex

-	mu             sync.Mutex
-	mode           agent.PermissionMode
-	model          string
-	models         []SessionConfigOptionValue
-	restrictModels bool
-	cancel         context.CancelFunc
-	history        []turnRecord
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	mode    agent.PermissionMode
+	model   string // override; "" => config default
+	cancel  context.CancelFunc
+	history []turnRecord
 }

 // NewAgent builds the ACP server and registers its method handlers on conn.
@@ -90,6 +83,9 @@ func NewAgent(conn *Conn, deps Deps) *Agent {
 	return a
 }

+// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
+func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
+
 // ---- initialize ----

 func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -124,7 +120,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleInitialize(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any

 // ---- session lifecycle ----

-func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
+func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
 	var p NewSessionParams
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/new params")
@@ -133,23 +129,18 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionNew(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, err.Error())
 	}
-	model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
-	}
-	meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root, ModelID: model})
+	meta, err := a.deps.Store.Create(sessions.CreateInput{Title: "ACP session", Cwd: root})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "create session: "+err.Error())
 	}
-	sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil, model, models, restrictModels)
+	sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, nil)
 	return NewSessionResult{
-		SessionID:     sess.id,
-		ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
-		Modes:         a.modeState(sess),
+		SessionID: sess.id,
+		Modes:     a.modeState(sess),
 	}, nil
 }

-func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
+func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
 	var p LoadSessionParams
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(params, &p); err != nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "invalid session/load params")
@@ -170,17 +161,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (
 	// a half-initialized session (registerSession sets history under the lock and
 	// reuses an already-live session rather than orphaning its in-flight turn).
 	history, historyErr := a.loadHistory(meta.SessionID)
-	model, models, restrictModels, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, root)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, RPCError(codeInternalError, "config: "+err.Error())
-	}
-	if persistedModel := strings.TrimSpace(meta.ModelID); persistedModel != "" && (!restrictModels || modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel)) {
-		model = persistedModel
-		if !modelChoiceExists(models, persistedModel) {
-			models = append(models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: persistedModel, Name: persistedModel})
-		}
-	}
-	sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history, model, models, restrictModels)
+	sess := a.registerSession(meta.SessionID, root, history)
 	a.warnPersistence(
 		&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id},
 		"load session history",
@@ -188,8 +169,7 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSessionLoad(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (
 		historyErr,
 	)
 	return LoadSessionResult{
-		ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess),
-		Modes:         a.modeState(sess),
+		Modes: a.modeState(sess),
 	}, nil
 }

@@ -349,11 +329,9 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetMode(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, e
 	if sess == nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
 	}
-	sess.turnMu.Lock()
-	defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
 	mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.ModeID)
 	switch mode {
-	case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
+	case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk:
 		sess.setMode(mode)
 		(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
 		return SetSessionModeResult{}, nil
@@ -376,31 +354,11 @@ func (a *Agent) handleSetConfigOption(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
 	if sess == nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
 	}
-	switch p.ConfigID {
-	case configIDModel:
-		model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Value)
-		if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, sess.restrictModels); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	case configIDMode:
-		// Same turnMu as handleSetMode so the two advertised mode doors (session
-		// set_mode and set_config_option) serialize mode flips consistently.
-		sess.turnMu.Lock()
-		defer sess.turnMu.Unlock()
-		mode := agent.PermissionMode(p.Value)
-		switch mode {
-		case agent.PermissionModeAuto, agent.PermissionModeAsk, agent.PermissionModePlan:
-			sess.setMode(mode)
-			(&notifier{conn: a.conn, sessionID: sess.id}).currentMode(string(mode))
-		case agent.PermissionModeUnsafe:
-			return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "mode not permitted over ACP: "+p.Value)
-		default:
-			return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown mode: "+p.Value)
-		}
-	default:
+	if p.ConfigID != configIDModel {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown config option: "+p.ConfigID)
 	}
-	return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{ConfigOptions: a.configOptions(sess)}, nil
+	sess.setModel(p.Value)
+	return SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}, nil
 }

 func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
@@ -412,24 +370,8 @@ func (a *Agent) handleZeroSetModel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) (a
 	if sess == nil {
 		return nil, RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown session: "+p.SessionID)
 	}
-	model := strings.TrimSpace(p.Model)
-	if err := a.updateModel(sess, model, false); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: model}, nil
-}
-
-func (a *Agent) updateModel(sess *acpSession, model string, restrictModels bool) error {
-	sess.modelMu.Lock()
-	defer sess.modelMu.Unlock()
-	if restrictModels && !sess.hasModel(model) {
-		return RPCError(codeInvalidParams, "unknown model: "+model)
-	}
-	if _, err := a.deps.Store.UpdateModel(sess.id, model); err != nil {
-		return RPCError(codeInternalError, "save model selection: "+err.Error())
-	}
-	sess.setModel(model)
-	return nil
+	sess.setModel(p.Model)
+	return ZeroSetModelResult{Model: p.Model}, nil
 }

 func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
@@ -445,91 +387,17 @@ func (a *Agent) handleCancel(_ context.Context, params json.RawMessage) {
 // ---- advertising helpers ----

 func (a *Agent) modeState(s *acpSession) *SessionModeState {
-	// auto/ask/plan are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
-	// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access. Plan
-	// only narrows what a client can do (read-only, no write/shell tools), so
-	// unlike Unsafe there is no elevation risk in letting a client select it.
+	// Only auto/ask are offered over ACP; Unsafe is gated to the operator (see
+	// handleSetMode) so a client can't grant itself no-prompt host access.
 	return &SessionModeState{
 		CurrentModeID: string(s.currentMode()),
 		AvailableModes: []SessionMode{
 			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
 			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
-			{ID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan), Name: "Plan", Description: "Read-only planning; write and shell tools are hidden."},
 		},
 	}
 }

-// resolveModelChoices advertises authenticated live models when discovery is
-// available. The configured model is always retained as the sole fallback.
-func (a *Agent) resolveModelChoices(ctx context.Context, cwd string) (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, bool, error) {
-	resolved, err := a.deps.ResolveConfig(cwd, config.Overrides{})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", nil, false, err
-	}
-	selected := strings.TrimSpace(resolved.Provider.Model)
-	options := make([]SessionConfigOptionValue, 0, 8)
-	seen := make(map[string]bool)
-	add := func(id, description string) {
-		id = strings.TrimSpace(id)
-		if id == "" || seen[id] {
-			return
-		}
-		seen[id] = true
-		options = append(options, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: id, Name: id, Description: description})
-	}
-	add(selected, "")
-	descriptor, knownProvider := providercatalog.Get(resolved.Provider.CatalogID)
-	restrictModels := knownProvider && !descriptor.Custom
-	if a.deps.DiscoverModels != nil {
-		discovered, discoverErr := a.deps.DiscoverModels(ctx, resolved.Provider)
-		if ctx.Err() != nil {
-			return "", nil, false, ctx.Err()
-		}
-		if discoverErr == nil && len(discovered) > 0 {
-			for _, model := range discovered {
-				if providermodelcatalog.ModelIDAllowedForProvider(resolved.Provider.CatalogID, model.ID) {
-					add(model.ID, model.Description)
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return selected, options, restrictModels, nil
-}
-
-func modelChoiceExists(models []SessionConfigOptionValue, model string) bool {
-	for _, option := range models {
-		if option.Value == model {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func (a *Agent) configOptions(s *acpSession) []SessionConfigOption {
-	model, models, mode := s.configState()
-	return []SessionConfigOption{{
-		ID:           configIDModel,
-		Name:         "Model",
-		Description:  "Model used for this session.",
-		Category:     configCategoryModel,
-		Type:         configOptionTypeSelect,
-		CurrentValue: model,
-		Options:      models,
-	}, {
-		ID:           configIDMode,
-		Name:         "Mode",
-		Description:  "Permission mode used for this session.",
-		Category:     configCategoryMode,
-		Type:         configOptionTypeSelect,
-		CurrentValue: string(mode),
-		Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{
-			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto), Name: "Auto", Description: "Run safe tools automatically; ask before risky ones."},
-			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk), Name: "Ask", Description: "Ask before every tool that changes state."},
-			{Value: string(agent.PermissionModePlan), Name: "Plan", Description: "Read-only planning; write and shell tools are hidden."},
-		},
-	}}
-}
-
 // ---- persistence + continuity ----

 func (a *Agent) persistTurn(sess *acpSession, user, assistant string) error {
@@ -657,13 +525,13 @@ func promptImages(blocks []ContentBlock) []zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
 // session is returned unchanged rather than orphaning its turn or resetting its
 // mode/model. history is set BEFORE publishing so no concurrent prompt can read a
 // half-initialized session.
-func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord, model string, models []SessionConfigOptionValue, restrictModels bool) *acpSession {
+func (a *Agent) registerSession(id, cwd string, history []turnRecord) *acpSession {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 	if existing := a.sessions[id]; existing != nil {
 		return existing
 	}
-	sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, model: model, models: models, restrictModels: restrictModels, history: history}
+	sess := &acpSession{id: id, cwd: cwd, mode: agent.PermissionModeAuto, history: history}
 	a.sessions[id] = sess
 	return sess
 }
@@ -702,18 +570,7 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentMode() agent.PermissionMode {
 }

 func (s *acpSession) setModel(model string) {
-	model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
 	s.mu.Lock()
-	found := false
-	for _, option := range s.models {
-		if option.Value == model {
-			found = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !found && model != "" {
-		s.models = append(s.models, SessionConfigOptionValue{Value: model, Name: model})
-	}
 	s.model = model
 	s.mu.Unlock()
 }
@@ -724,24 +581,6 @@ func (s *acpSession) currentModel() string {
 	return s.model
 }

-func (s *acpSession) hasModel(model string) bool {
-	model = strings.TrimSpace(model)
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	for _, option := range s.models {
-		if option.Value == model {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func (s *acpSession) configState() (string, []SessionConfigOptionValue, agent.PermissionMode) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	return s.model, append([]SessionConfigOptionValue(nil), s.models...), s.mode
-}
-
 func (s *acpSession) appendHistory(rec turnRecord) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	s.history = append(s.history, rec)
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package acp
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
@@ -14,7 +13,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
@@ -139,12 +137,6 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
 	if newRes.Modes == nil || newRes.Modes.CurrentModeID != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected auto mode, got %+v", newRes.Modes)
 	}
-	if len(newRes.ConfigOptions) != 2 || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].ID != configIDModel || newRes.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "fake-model" {
-		t.Fatalf("model config option = %+v, want fake-model fallback", newRes.ConfigOptions)
-	}
-	if newRes.ConfigOptions[1].ID != configIDMode || newRes.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
-		t.Fatalf("mode config option = %+v", newRes.ConfigOptions[1])
-	}

 	// session/prompt
 	var promptRes PromptResult
@@ -164,201 +156,6 @@ func TestACPEndToEndPrompt(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestACPModelConfigOptionsCatalogSelectionAndLoad(t *testing.T) {
-	deps := testDeps(t)
-	deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-		model := "gpt-5.5"
-		if o.Provider.Model != "" {
-			model = o.Provider.Model
-		}
-		return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
-			Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: model,
-		}}, nil
-	}
-	deps.DiscoverModels = func(_ context.Context, _ config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
-		return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{
-			{ID: " gpt-5.4-mini ", Description: "Fast"},
-			{ID: "gpt-5.5", Description: "duplicate configured model"},
-		}, nil
-	}
-	h := newHarness(t, deps)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var created NewSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
-	}
-	option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
-	if option.CurrentValue != "gpt-5.5" || len(option.Options) < 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("new model option = %+v", option)
-	}
-	for _, choice := range option.Options {
-		if choice.Name != choice.Value {
-			t.Fatalf("model choice name = %q, want model id %q", choice.Name, choice.Value)
-		}
-	}
-	var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: "  gpt-5.4-mini  ",
-	}, &selected); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_config_option: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
-		t.Fatalf("selected model = %q", got)
-	}
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: "not-advertised",
-	}, &SetSessionConfigOptionResult{}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("unknown standard model selection was accepted")
-	}
-	h.stop()
-	h = newHarness(t, deps)
-	defer h.stop()
-	var loaded LoadSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(loaded.ConfigOptions) != 2 || loaded.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue != "gpt-5.4-mini" {
-		t.Fatalf("load model option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions)
-	}
-	if loaded.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
-		t.Fatalf("load mode option = %+v", loaded.ConfigOptions[1])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPModelDiscoveryFailureUsesConfiguredFallbackOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	deps := testDeps(t)
-	deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, _ config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-		return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
-			Name: "ChatGPT", CatalogID: "chatgpt", Model: " configured-model ",
-		}}, nil
-	}
-	deps.DiscoverModels = func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery unavailable")
-	}
-	h := newHarness(t, deps)
-	defer h.stop()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var created NewSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
-	}
-	option := created.ConfigOptions[0]
-	if option.CurrentValue != "configured-model" || len(option.Options) != 1 || option.Options[0].Value != "configured-model" {
-		t.Fatalf("fallback model option = %+v", option)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPCustomProviderAllowsUnadvertisedModel(t *testing.T) {
-	deps := testDeps(t)
-	deps.ResolveConfig = func(_ string, o config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-		model := "configured-model"
-		if o.Provider.Model != "" {
-			model = o.Provider.Model
-		}
-		return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
-			Name: "Custom", CatalogID: "custom-openai-compatible", Model: model,
-		}}, nil
-	}
-	h := newHarness(t, deps)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var created NewSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir()}, &created); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
-	}
-	var selected SetSessionConfigOptionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: created.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDModel, Value: " vendor/model ",
-	}, &selected); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set custom model: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := selected.ConfigOptions[0].CurrentValue; got != "vendor/model" {
-		t.Fatalf("custom model = %q", got)
-	}
-	h.stop()
-	h = newHarness(t, deps)
-	defer h.stop()
-	var loaded LoadSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionLoad, LoadSessionParams{SessionID: created.SessionID}, &loaded); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/load: %v", err)
-	}
-	option := loaded.ConfigOptions[0]
-	if option.CurrentValue != "vendor/model" || !modelChoiceExists(option.Options, "vendor/model") {
-		t.Fatalf("loaded custom model option = %+v", option)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPModelDiscoveryFiltersProviderIncompatibleModels(t *testing.T) {
-	a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
-		ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{
-				CatalogID: "opencode-go-anthropic-compatible", Model: "minimax-m3",
-			}}, nil
-		},
-		DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
-			return []providermodeldiscovery.Model{{ID: "qwen3.7-plus"}, {ID: "claude-sonnet-4.5"}}, nil
-		},
-	}}
-	_, options, restricted, err := a.resolveModelChoices(context.Background(), t.TempDir())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !restricted || !modelChoiceExists(options, "qwen3.7-plus") || modelChoiceExists(options, "claude-sonnet-4.5") {
-		t.Fatalf("filtered model options = %+v, restricted=%v", options, restricted)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPModelDiscoveryHonorsCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-	a := &Agent{deps: Deps{
-		ResolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{Provider: config.ProviderProfile{Model: "configured-model"}}, nil
-		},
-		DiscoverModels: func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
-			return nil, context.Canceled
-		},
-	}}
-	if _, _, _, err := a.resolveModelChoices(ctx, t.TempDir()); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("resolve error = %v, want context canceled", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPConfigOptionWireSchema(t *testing.T) {
-	b, err := json.Marshal(SessionConfigOption{
-		ID: "model", Name: "Model", Description: "desc", Category: "model",
-		Type: configOptionTypeSelect, CurrentValue: "m1",
-		Options: []SessionConfigOptionValue{{Value: "m1", Name: "m1", Description: "choice"}},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	var wire map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &wire); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	for _, key := range []string{"type", "category", "currentValue", "options"} {
-		if _, ok := wire[key]; !ok {
-			t.Errorf("wire field %q absent: %s", key, b)
-		}
-	}
-	if _, ok := wire["value"]; ok {
-		t.Errorf("obsolete option value field present: %s", b)
-	}
-	if _, ok := wire["values"]; ok {
-		t.Errorf("obsolete values field present: %s", b)
-	}
-	choice := wire["options"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)
-	if choice["value"] != "m1" {
-		t.Errorf("options[].value = %#v", choice["value"])
-	}
-}
-
 func TestACPUnknownSessionPromptErrors(t *testing.T) {
 	h := newHarness(t, testDeps(t))
 	defer h.stop()
@@ -384,41 +181,6 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeAsk)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("set_mode ask: %v", err)
 	}
-	var configured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModeAuto),
-	}, &configured); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_config_option mode: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := configured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModeAuto) {
-		t.Fatalf("configured mode = %q", got)
-	}
-	// Plan is accepted: it only narrows capability (read-only), so unlike Unsafe
-	// there is no elevation risk in letting a client select it.
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_mode plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	// Configuration path is a separate contract from MethodSessionSetMode: the
-	// mode option is advertised via configOptions and applied by handleSetConfigOption.
-	var planConfigured SetSessionConfigOptionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetConfigOption, SetSessionConfigOptionParams{
-		SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ConfigID: configIDMode, Value: string(agent.PermissionModePlan),
-	}, &planConfigured); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_config_option plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got := planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].CurrentValue; got != string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
-		t.Fatalf("configured mode after plan = %q, want plan", got)
-	}
-	hasPlanOption := false
-	for _, opt := range planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].Options {
-		if opt.Value == string(agent.PermissionModePlan) {
-			hasPlanOption = true
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !hasPlanOption {
-		t.Fatalf("config mode options missing plan: %#v", planConfigured.ConfigOptions[1].Options)
-	}
 	// Unsafe must be rejected over ACP — a client can't self-grant no-prompt host access.
 	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModeUnsafe)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected Unsafe mode to be rejected over ACP")
@@ -429,37 +191,6 @@ func TestACPSetModeUpdatesSession(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// TestACPPlanModeWiresPermissionModeIntoAgentOptions confirms selecting "plan"
-// over ACP actually reaches agent.Options.PermissionMode for the next turn —
-// the same gap this test's TUI counterpart covers for /plan on.
-func TestACPPlanModeWiresPermissionModeIntoAgentOptions(t *testing.T) {
-	deps := testDeps(t)
-	var captured agent.Options
-	deps.RunAgent = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ zeroruntime.Provider, opts agent.Options) (agent.Result, error) {
-		captured = opts
-		return agent.Result{FinalAnswer: "ok"}, nil
-	}
-
-	h := newHarness(t, deps)
-	defer h.stop()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	var newRes NewSessionResult
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionNew, NewSessionParams{Cwd: t.TempDir(), McpServers: []McpServer{}}, &newRes); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/new: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionSetMode, SetSessionModeParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, ModeID: string(agent.PermissionModePlan)}, &SetSessionModeResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("set_mode plan: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := h.client.Call(ctx, MethodSessionPrompt, PromptParams{SessionID: newRes.SessionID, Prompt: []ContentBlock{TextBlock("plan it out")}}, &PromptResult{}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("session/prompt: %v", err)
-	}
-	if captured.PermissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
-		t.Fatalf("agent.Options.PermissionMode = %q, want plan", captured.PermissionMode)
-	}
-}
-
 // TestACPRunTurnWiresSandboxAndScopedRegistry proves the sandbox engine and the
 // scoped registry from BuildWorkspace actually reach agent.Options — i.e. ACP
 // shell tools run confined, not unconfined on the host.
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
-package acp
-
-import "context"
-
-// Serve runs the connection read loop until the stream closes or ctx is done.
-func (a *Agent) Serve(ctx context.Context) error { return a.conn.Serve(ctx) }
-
-func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
-	return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
-}
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 )

 // JSON-RPC 2.0 standard error codes.
@@ -81,9 +80,8 @@ type NotifyFunc func(ctx context.Context, params json.RawMessage)
 // requests/notifications — needed because ACP is bidirectional (the agent calls
 // the client for session/request_permission, fs/*, terminal/*).
 type Conn struct {
-	rawReader    io.Reader // wrapped lazily in Serve, once ctx is known — see interruptibleReader
-	readerCloser io.Closer
-	w            io.Writer
+	reader *bufio.Reader
+	w      io.Writer

 	writeMu sync.Mutex // serializes all writes to w

@@ -98,15 +96,10 @@ type Conn struct {
 	wg sync.WaitGroup // tracks in-flight inbound handlers
 }

-// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w. This
-// Conn does not own r: cancelling Serve's context cannot forcibly close it, so
-// a Read on r that's genuinely idle (never returns on its own) leaves Serve
-// blocked until r itself produces something — e.g. a test that closes r's own
-// write side to unblock it. Use NewOwnedConn when this Conn should own r's
-// lifetime.
+// NewConn builds a peer reading ndjson from r and writing ndjson to w.
 func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
 	return &Conn{
-		rawReader: r,
+		reader:    bufio.NewReader(r),
 		w:         w,
 		handlers:  make(map[string]HandlerFunc),
 		notifiers: make(map[string]NotifyFunc),
@@ -114,18 +107,6 @@ func NewConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
 	}
 }

-// NewOwnedConn is like NewConn but declares that this Conn exclusively owns r:
-// if r implements io.Closer, Serve closes it on context cancellation to
-// interrupt an otherwise-idle blocking Read. Only pass a reader whose lifetime
-// this Conn should control — e.g. the process's own stdin — never a reader a
-// caller retains or shares elsewhere, since cancellation tears it down
-// permanently for every consumer, not just this Conn.
-func NewOwnedConn(r io.Reader, w io.Writer) *Conn {
-	c := NewConn(r, w)
-	c.readerCloser, _ = r.(io.Closer)
-	return c
-}
-
 // Handle registers a request handler for method.
 func (c *Conn) Handle(method string, fn HandlerFunc) { c.handlers[method] = fn }

@@ -147,36 +128,17 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
 		c.wg.Wait()
 	}()

-	interruptible := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, c.rawReader, c.readerCloser)
-	reader := bufio.NewReader(interruptible)
-
 	for {
 		// One ndjson value per line. Framing per line (rather than streaming the
 		// decoder) keeps a single malformed line from making the whole connection
 		// unrecoverable — we report -32700 and continue.
-		//
-		// generation brackets this SPECIFIC ReadBytes call: bufio may invoke
-		// interruptible.Read zero or more times underneath it (zero when the
-		// answer is already sitting in bufio's own buffer — including a
-		// previously-buffered, not-yet-surfaced error: bufio can return a
-		// complete line with a nil error while quietly caching an error it
-		// received ALONGSIDE that line's bytes, which then surfaces on the VERY
-		// NEXT call with no further contact with interruptible.Read at all). The
-		// generation only advances inside interruptible.Read's own cancellation
-		// branch, so "unchanged across this call" is proof this call's outcome
-		// didn't pass through that branch — whether because it was answered from
-		// the buffer or because it raced ctx.Done() and won. Only that proof
-		// makes it safe to call the outcome genuine.
-		before := interruptible.generation()
-		line, err := reader.ReadBytes('\n')
-		interrupted := interruptible.generation() != before
-
+		line, err := c.reader.ReadBytes('\n')
 		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(line)) > 0 {
 			c.handleLine(ctx, line)
 		}
 		if err != nil {
 			c.failAllPending(err)
-			if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || interrupted {
+			if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || ctx.Err() != nil {
 				return nil
 			}
 			return err
@@ -184,100 +146,6 @@ func (c *Conn) Serve(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}
 }

-// interruptibleReader wraps a reader so a context cancellation can unblock a
-// currently in-flight Read without ever discarding — or misattributing — the
-// real outcome of a call that wasn't actually blocked.
-//
-// Each Read runs the underlying call on its own goroutine and races it against
-// ctx.Done(). If the underlying call finishes first, its result is returned
-// exactly as received; ctx being cancelled a moment later has no bearing on a
-// call that already had its answer. If ctx.Done() fires first, closer (when
-// non-nil) is closed to nudge a genuinely blocked read, the generation counter
-// is bumped, and the call STILL waits for and returns the underlying call's own
-// result — never a synthesized one — since closing a reader's outcome is
-// whatever the reader itself reports for it, not ours to invent.
-//
-// The counter is what lets Serve tell a call that was actually raced against
-// cancellation apart from one merely answered while cancellation happened to be
-// pending — the distinction the read loop's own doc comment explains.
-type interruptibleReader struct {
-	inner  io.Reader
-	closer io.Closer
-	ctx    context.Context
-
-	closeOnce sync.Once
-	gen       atomic.Int64
-}
-
-func newInterruptibleReader(ctx context.Context, inner io.Reader, closer io.Closer) *interruptibleReader {
-	return &interruptibleReader{inner: inner, closer: closer, ctx: ctx}
-}
-
-func (r *interruptibleReader) generation() int64 { return r.gen.Load() }
-
-type interruptibleReadResult struct {
-	n   int
-	err error
-}
-
-// interruptibleReadDecision arbitrates whether an underlying Read completed or
-// cancellation claimed it first. Completion is recorded before the result is
-// published so cancellation cannot misclassify a finished read merely because
-// its goroutine has not sent the result yet.
-type interruptibleReadDecision struct {
-	once sync.Once
-}
-
-func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) complete() { d.once.Do(func() {}) }
-
-func (d *interruptibleReadDecision) interrupt() (claimed bool) {
-	d.once.Do(func() { claimed = true })
-	return claimed
-}
-
-// readInner records completion in the Read call's deferred epilogue. It also
-// converts a reader panic into a terminal error so the helper goroutine always
-// publishes a result for Read to join.
-func (r *interruptibleReader) readInner(p []byte, decision *interruptibleReadDecision) (res interruptibleReadResult) {
-	defer func() {
-		if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
-			res = interruptibleReadResult{err: fmt.Errorf("acp: reader panicked: %v", recovered)}
-		}
-		decision.complete()
-	}()
-	res.n, res.err = r.inner.Read(p)
-	return res
-}
-
-func (r *interruptibleReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
-	var decision interruptibleReadDecision
-	go func() {
-		resultCh <- r.readInner(p, &decision)
-	}()
-	select {
-	case res := <-resultCh:
-		return res.n, res.err
-	case <-r.ctx.Done():
-		// resultCh may not be readable yet even when inner.Read has returned: its
-		// goroutine can be descheduled between recording completion and publishing
-		// the result. Only interrupt a call that cancellation actually claims.
-		if decision.interrupt() {
-			r.gen.Add(1)
-			if r.closer != nil {
-				r.closeOnce.Do(func() { _ = r.closer.Close() })
-			}
-		}
-		// Wait for the real result rather than returning synthetically: p is
-		// still being written by the goroutine above until it does, so returning
-		// early would race that write, and the actual error (whatever closing
-		// the reader produced, or whatever the reader was already about to
-		// report) is what the caller should see.
-		res := <-resultCh
-		return res.n, res.err
-	}
-}
-
 // handleLine decodes and dispatches one ndjson frame. A parse failure replies
 // with -32700 (id null) and keeps the connection alive.
 func (c *Conn) handleLine(ctx context.Context, line []byte) {
@@ -3,30 +3,11 @@ package acp
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"io"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 )

-type testReadCloser struct {
-	read  func([]byte) (int, error)
-	close func() error
-}
-
-func (r testReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r.read(p) }
-func (r testReadCloser) Close() error               { return r.close() }
-
-type testReader func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (r testReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
-
-type testWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (w testWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
-
 // connPair wires two Conns together over in-memory pipes and serves both.
 func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -44,275 +25,6 @@ func connPair(t *testing.T) (a, b *Conn, stop func()) {
 	}
 }

-func TestConnServeCancellationInterruptsIdleRead(t *testing.T) {
-	pipeReader, writer := io.Pipe()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = writer.Close() })
-	// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: interruptibleReader retries each
-	// underlying Read on its own goroutine, so if bufio ever calls this more than
-	// once, a close() here would panic on the second call.
-	readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 2)
-	reader := testReadCloser{
-		read: func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-			select {
-			case readStarted <- struct{}{}:
-			default:
-			}
-			return pipeReader.Read(p)
-		},
-		close: func() error {
-			closeCalls <- struct{}{}
-			return pipeReader.Close()
-		},
-	}
-	conn := NewOwnedConn(reader, io.Discard)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-	<-readStarted
-	cancel()
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v after cancellation, want nil", err)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after cancelling an idle connection")
-	}
-	if got := len(closeCalls); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 1", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConnServePreservesTerminalReadErrorDuringCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, closable := range []bool{false, true} {
-		name := "non-closable"
-		if closable {
-			name = "closable"
-		}
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-			read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-				return copy(p, "not json"), wantErr
-			})
-			closeCalls := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-			var reader io.Reader = read
-			if closable {
-				reader = testReadCloser{
-					read: read,
-					close: func() error {
-						closeCalls <- struct{}{}
-						return nil
-					},
-				}
-			}
-			// Buffered + non-blocking send, not close: a later change adding a
-			// second write (e.g. an additional error frame) must not panic on a
-			// repeated close of an already-closed channel.
-			writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-			releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-			writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-				select {
-				case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
-				default:
-				}
-				<-releaseWrite
-				return len(p), nil
-			})
-			newConn := NewConn
-			if closable {
-				// Ownership matters here: this case exists to prove that even a
-				// Conn entitled to close its reader on cancellation still
-				// preserves a terminal error that was already decided.
-				newConn = NewOwnedConn
-			}
-			conn := newConn(reader, writer)
-			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-			done := make(chan error, 1)
-			go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-			<-writeStarted
-			cancel()
-			close(releaseWrite)
-			select {
-			case err := <-done:
-				if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-					t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
-				}
-			case <-time.After(time.Second):
-				t.Fatal("Serve did not return after terminal read error")
-			}
-			if got := len(closeCalls); got != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("reader Close calls = %d, want 0 after terminal read", got)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine is the deterministic
-// regression test for jatmn's #782 finding: a real, non-EOF ReadBytes failure can
-// be DECIDED before cancellation ever happens, yet only SURFACE afterward, and
-// must still be reported rather than swallowed as a clean shutdown.
-//
-// bufio.Reader can obtain data AND a terminal error from ONE underlying Read call
-// (io.Reader explicitly permits returning (n>0, err) together). If a delimiter is
-// found within that data, ReadBytes returns the line with a nil error for THIS
-// call, but bufio caches the error internally and returns it — WITHOUT calling the
-// underlying reader again — on the very next ReadBytes call. This test forces that
-// exact sequence: the underlying reader hands back one complete, validly-framed
-// line together with wantErr in a SINGLE call (asserted below to be its ONLY
-// call), the loop dispatches that line through a synchronous path that blocks the
-// read loop, cancellation is asserted to have happened before the loop attempts
-// its next read, and only then is the block released. By the time the read loop
-// asks for more input, cancellation is already in effect and the underlying
-// reader is never touched again — so if Serve attributed the resulting error to
-// cancellation merely because ctx was already done, it would incorrectly return
-// nil. It must instead recognize that this read was answered entirely from
-// bufio's own cache, never raced against ctx.Done(), and report wantErr.
-func TestConnServePreservesReadErrorBufferedAlongsideAPriorLine(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	var readCalls atomic.Int32
-	read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		readCalls.Add(1)
-		// An unsupported jsonrpc version with an id takes the SYNCHRONOUS
-		// writeError path in handleLine (not a dispatched goroutine), giving this
-		// test a reliable blocking point between processing this line and the
-		// loop's next ReadBytes call.
-		return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
-	})
-	writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-	var releaseWriteOnce sync.Once
-	release := func() { releaseWriteOnce.Do(func() { close(releaseWrite) }) }
-	t.Cleanup(release)
-	writer := testWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		select {
-		case writeStarted <- struct{}{}:
-		default:
-		}
-		<-releaseWrite
-		return len(p), nil
-	})
-	conn := NewConn(read, writer)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(ctx) }()
-
-	// The synchronous write confirms the first (and, per the panic guard above,
-	// only) read has already returned and is being processed — cancelling now
-	// lands squarely in the gap between that read and the loop's next one, never
-	// racing an in-flight interruptibleReader.Read call.
-	select {
-	case <-writeStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not reach the synchronous write")
-	}
-	cancel()
-	release()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want the buffered terminal read error %v", err, wantErr)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after the buffered terminal read error")
-	}
-	if got := readCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("underlying Read calls = %d, want exactly 1 (bufio must have served the second ReadBytes from its cache)", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation is the regression
-// test for jatmn's second #782 finding: interruptibleReader.Read's select
-// between resultCh and ctx.Done() chooses pseudo-randomly when both are ready,
-// so a real, already-decided outcome (e.g. a terminal transport error) could be
-// misattributed to cancellation purely because ctx also happened to be done by
-// the time the select ran. Each iteration lets the underlying Read return (so
-// resultCh already holds the real outcome) before cancelling, maximizing the
-// odds of landing exactly in that ambiguous window; the generation counter must
-// never advance when the real, already-decided result is what gets returned.
-func TestInterruptibleReaderPrefersDecidedResultOverCancellation(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
-		resultReady := make(chan struct{})
-		read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-			defer close(resultReady)
-			return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
-		})
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-		r := newInterruptibleReader(ctx, read, nil)
-
-		readDone := make(chan interruptibleReadResult, 1)
-		go func() {
-			n, err := r.Read(make([]byte, 8))
-			readDone <- interruptibleReadResult{n, err}
-		}()
-
-		<-resultReady
-		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond) // bias resultCh's send ahead of cancel
-		cancel()
-
-		res := <-readDone
-		if !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
-			t.Fatalf("iteration %d: Read returned %v, want %v", i, res.err, wantErr)
-		}
-		if got := r.generation(); got != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("iteration %d: generation = %d, want 0 (a decided result must never be attributed to cancellation)", i, got)
-		}
-		cancel()
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication exercises the
-// actual inner-read wrapper at the handoff between the underlying Read and the
-// helper goroutine's result publication. Cancellation must not reclassify a
-// result returned by this wrapper as interrupted.
-func TestInterruptibleReadCompletionWinsBeforeResultPublication(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errors.New("read failed")
-	read := testReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		return copy(p, "x"), wantErr
-	})
-	r := newInterruptibleReader(context.Background(), read, nil)
-	var decision interruptibleReadDecision
-	readComplete := make(chan struct{})
-	resultCh := make(chan interruptibleReadResult)
-	go func() {
-		res := r.readInner(make([]byte, 8), &decision)
-		close(readComplete)
-		resultCh <- res
-	}()
-
-	<-readComplete
-	if decision.interrupt() {
-		t.Fatal("cancellation claimed a read that completed before result publication")
-	}
-	res := <-resultCh
-	if res.n != 1 || !errors.Is(res.err, wantErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("inner read result = (%d, %v), want (1, %v)", res.n, res.err, wantErr)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConnServeReportsReaderPanicAsTerminalError(t *testing.T) {
-	read := testReader(func([]byte) (int, error) {
-		panic("boom")
-	})
-	conn := NewConn(read, io.Discard)
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() { done <- conn.Serve(context.Background()) }()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		const want = "acp: reader panicked: boom"
-		if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
-			t.Fatalf("Serve returned %v, want %q", err, want)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Serve did not return after reader panic")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestConnRequestResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	a, b, stop := connPair(t)
 	defer stop()
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 	}
 	options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
 	for _, action := range actions {
-		kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
+		kind, name := optionKindFor(action)
 		if kind == "" {
 			continue // skip actions that have no clean ACP option (e.g. cancel)
 		}
@@ -41,24 +41,18 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 // optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
 // human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
 // outcome rather than an option (cancel).
-//
-// escalates reports that approving a command prefix will also run the command
-// outside the sandbox. The two prefix options say so in their label, since the
-// label is all an ACP client shows and the option id carries no room for it. An
-// editor user is deciding on exactly the same terms as a terminal user, so the
-// disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
-func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
+func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction) (kind, name string) {
 	switch action {
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
 		return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
 		return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
-		return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Allow this command for the session", escalates)
+		return PermAllowAlways, "Allow this command for the session"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow:
 		return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix:
-		return PermAllowAlways, withSandboxEscalationNote("Always allow this command", escalates)
+		return PermAllowAlways, "Always allow this command"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionDeny:
 		return PermRejectOnce, "Reject"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionCancel:
@@ -129,13 +123,3 @@ func rawInputBytes(data []byte) json.RawMessage {
 	}
 	return json.RawMessage(data)
 }
-
-// withSandboxEscalationNote appends the escalation disclosure to a prefix
-// option's label. Kept parallel to the TUI's wording so the same consequence is
-// not described two different ways depending on which client the user runs.
-func withSandboxEscalationNote(name string, escalates bool) string {
-	if !escalates {
-		return name
-	}
-	return name + " (runs outside the sandbox)"
-}
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-package acp
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
-)
-
-func escalationRequest(escalates bool) agent.PermissionRequest {
-	return agent.PermissionRequest{
-		ToolName: "bash",
-		AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		},
-		PrefixApprovalEscalates: escalates,
-	}
-}
-
-// An ACP client renders only Name, so if the escalation is not in the label the
-// editor user approves it blind. They face exactly the outcome a terminal user
-// faces, so the disclosure has to reach both clients or it is not a fix.
-func TestACPPrefixOptionsDiscloseLeavingTheSandbox(t *testing.T) {
-	found := 0
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(true)) {
-		action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(option.OptionID)
-		if action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix && action != agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix {
-			if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
-				t.Errorf("option %q carries the disclosure but does not escalate", option.Name)
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		found++
-		if !strings.Contains(option.Name, "outside the sandbox") {
-			t.Errorf("prefix option %q does not say the command leaves the sandbox", option.Name)
-		}
-	}
-	if found != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected both prefix options, saw %d", found)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(escalationRequest(false)) {
-		if strings.Contains(option.Name, "sandbox") {
-			t.Errorf("option %q warns about the sandbox when approving would not leave it", option.Name)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// The disclosure must live in the label only. The option id is the decision
-// action round-tripped verbatim, and decisionFromOutcome matches it against
-// what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
-func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	request := escalationRequest(true)
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(request) {
-		decision := decisionFromOutcome(
-			RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
-			request.AvailableDecisions,
-		)
-		if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
-			t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
-		}
-	}
-}
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ type ContentBlock struct {

 func TextBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} }

+func ImageBlock(base64Data, mimeType string) ContentBlock {
+	return ContentBlock{Type: "image", Data: base64Data, MimeType: mimeType}
+}
+
 // ---- sessions ----

 // McpServer mirrors the editor-provided MCP server entry. ZERO owns its own MCP
@@ -229,6 +233,10 @@ func ToolContent(block ContentBlock) ToolCallContent {
 	return ToolCallContent{Type: "content", Content: &block}
 }

+func ToolDiff(path, oldText, newText string) ToolCallContent {
+	return ToolCallContent{Type: "diff", Path: path, OldText: oldText, NewText: newText}
+}
+
 type ToolCallLocation struct {
 	Path string `json:"path"`
 	Line *int   `json:"line,omitempty"`
@@ -329,22 +337,19 @@ type SetSessionModeParams struct {

 type SetSessionModeResult struct{}

-// ---- session config options ----
+// ---- session config options (model selection) ----

 type SessionConfigOptionValue struct {
-	Value       string `json:"value"`
-	Name        string `json:"name"`
-	Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
+	ID   string `json:"id"`
+	Name string `json:"name"`
 }

 type SessionConfigOption struct {
-	ID           string                     `json:"id"`
-	Name         string                     `json:"name"`
-	Description  string                     `json:"description,omitempty"`
-	Category     string                     `json:"category,omitempty"`
-	Type         string                     `json:"type"`
-	CurrentValue string                     `json:"currentValue"`
-	Options      []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"options"`
+	ID          string                     `json:"id"`
+	Name        string                     `json:"name"`
+	Description string                     `json:"description,omitempty"`
+	Value       string                     `json:"value"`
+	Values      []SessionConfigOptionValue `json:"values,omitempty"`
 }

 type SetSessionConfigOptionParams struct {
@@ -368,11 +373,6 @@ type ZeroSetModelResult struct {
 	Model string `json:"model"`
 }

-const (
-	configIDModel = "model"
-	configIDMode  = "mode"
-
-	configOptionTypeSelect = "select"
-	configCategoryModel    = "model"
-	configCategoryMode     = "mode"
-)
+// configIDModel is the SessionConfigOption id ZERO uses to expose model choice
+// through the standard session/set_config_option method.
+const configIDModel = "model"
@@ -5,29 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 )

-type normalizationRecordingShellTool struct {
-	calls []map[string]any
-}
-
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Name() string { return "bash" }
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Description() string {
-	return "record normalized shell arguments"
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: true}
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectShell, Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
-}
-func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	tool.calls = append(tool.calls, cloneArgs(args))
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK}
-}
-
 // A shell call that sets sandbox_permissions: with_additional_permissions but
 // omits (or malforms) additional_permissions can never succeed: the same
 // validation runs again at grant time regardless of the user's decision. It
@@ -36,7 +16,7 @@ func (tool *normalizationRecordingShellTool) Run(_ context.Context, args map[str
 func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))

 	promptCalls := 0
 	result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -71,7 +51,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsMissingAdditionalPermissionsBeforePrompt(t *testi
 func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))

 	promptCalls := 0
 	result, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -108,7 +88,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsAdditionalPermissionsWithoutFlagBeforePrompt(t *t
 func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))

 	result, err := executeToolCall(
 		context.Background(),
@@ -127,7 +107,9 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
 	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, `{"network": {"enabled": true}}`) {
 		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want a concrete additional_permissions example", result.Output)
 	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "missing additional_permissions", result.Output)
+	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "omit sandbox_permissions") {
+		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want guidance that the flag can simply be omitted", result.Output)
+	}
 }

 // A well-formed additional_permissions payload must still reach the normal
@@ -135,7 +117,7 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallMissingAdditionalPermissionsErrorIsActionable(t *testing
 func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedBashTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewBashTool(root))

 	promptCalls := 0
 	_, err := executeToolCall(
@@ -162,237 +144,3 @@ func TestExecuteToolCallStillPromptsForValidAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T)
 		t.Fatalf("OnPermissionRequest called %d times, want exactly 1 for a valid elevation request", promptCalls)
 	}
 }
-
-// runShellCall drives one shell tool call through the real registry (and so
-// through Registry.RunWithOptions) exactly as the agent loop would.
-func runShellCall(t *testing.T, root string, arguments string) ToolResult {
-	t.Helper()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedExecCommandTool(root, nil, nil))
-	result, err := executeToolCall(
-		context.Background(),
-		registry,
-		ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: arguments},
-		PermissionModeUnsafe,
-		Options{Cwd: root},
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-// TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge is the regression guard for
-// #845/#847. A model that attaches a permission object to a command needing
-// none used to be told only "set sandbox_permissions", which pushed it into the
-// OTHER invalid shape (flag set, payload empty) and its "include a permission"
-// error pushed it straight back — the reported loop that burned turns on
-// `git branch --show-current`.
-//
-// The contract this pins is convergence, not tolerance: both shapes are still
-// REJECTED (nothing here grants access), but each rejection must name the one
-// follow-up call that works, and that follow-up must actually succeed.
-func TestAdditionalPermissionsRejectionsConverge(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	const readOnly = `"cmd":"git --version"`
-
-	// Step 1 of the reported loop: a permission object with no flag.
-	first := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"additional_permissions":{"network":{"enabled":true}}}`)
-	if first.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("unflagged additional_permissions status = %q, want error (rejecting is correct)", first.Status)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "unflagged additional_permissions", first.Output)
-
-	// Step 2 of the reported loop: the model keeps the flag but empties the
-	// payload. This must not be the dead end it was.
-	second := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`,"sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions"}`)
-	if second.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("flag without payload status = %q, want error", second.Status)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flag without payload", second.Output)
-
-	// The call both errors point at must actually work.
-	converged := runShellCall(t, root, `{`+readOnly+`}`)
-	if converged.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("the call both errors instruct the model to make failed: status=%q output=%q", converged.Status, converged.Output)
-	}
-}
-
-// assertNamesOmitRemedy pins the actionable half of the error text: the message
-// must spell out that BOTH fields can simply be dropped. "Set the flag" or
-// "include a permission" alone is what made the two errors chase each other.
-func assertNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T, label string, output string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if !strings.Contains(output, "omit both sandbox_permissions and additional_permissions") {
-		t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to say to omit both fields entirely", label, output)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(output, "retry") {
-		t.Fatalf("%s error = %q, want it to tell the model to retry", label, output)
-	}
-}
-
-// The empty-payload rejection carries the same remedy. It is pinned on the
-// validator directly because normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions absorbs the
-// empty payload before executeToolCall reaches this branch;
-// inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile is still the shared source of truth that
-// buildPermissionEvent and the grant path re-run, so its text must converge too.
-func TestEmptyAdditionalPermissionsErrorNamesOmitRemedy(t *testing.T) {
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"cmd":                 "git --version",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"network":     map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-			"file_system": map[string]any{"read": []any{}, "write": []any{}},
-		},
-	}
-	_, requested, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, t.TempDir())
-	if !requested {
-		t.Fatal("requested = false, want true for an explicit with_additional_permissions call")
-	}
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("an empty additional_permissions payload was accepted; it must still be rejected")
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "empty payload", err.Error())
-}
-
-// A provider that materializes every optional property may send
-// "additional_permissions": null. That grants nothing and carries no flag, so it
-// is the field omitted — rejecting it stalled an ordinary command behind an
-// error the model could not act on.
-func TestExecuteToolCallTreatsNullAdditionalPermissionsAsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
-	result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(), `{"cmd":"git --version","additional_permissions":null}`)
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("null additional_permissions was rejected: status=%q output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
-	}
-}
-
-// A null payload alongside the flag must still be rejected, and must land on
-// the same error as an absent payload rather than being quietly downgraded.
-func TestExecuteToolCallRejectsFlaggedNullAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	result := runShellCall(t, t.TempDir(),
-		`{"cmd":"git --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions","additional_permissions":null}`)
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusError {
-		t.Fatalf("flagged null status = %q, want error", result.Status)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "no additional_permissions object was provided") {
-		t.Fatalf("output = %q, want the missing-payload error", result.Output)
-	}
-	assertNamesOmitRemedy(t, "flagged null", result.Output)
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, mode := range []string{
-		string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault),
-		string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-	} {
-		args := map[string]any{
-			"command":             "./zero --version",
-			"sandbox_permissions": mode,
-			"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-				"file_system": map[string]any{
-					"deny_read": []any{},
-					"entries":   []any{},
-					"read":      []any{},
-					"write":     []any{},
-				},
-				"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-			},
-		}
-		normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
-		if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-			t.Fatalf("mode %q retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", mode, args)
-		}
-		if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-			t.Fatalf("mode %q normalized to %q, want use_default", mode, got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExecuteToolCallNormalizesProviderExpandedEmptyAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	tool := &normalizationRecordingShellTool{}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tool)
-
-	result, err := executeToolCall(
-		context.Background(),
-		registry,
-		ToolCall{
-			ID:   "c1",
-			Name: "bash",
-			Arguments: `{"command":"./zero --version","sandbox_permissions":"with_additional_permissions",` +
-				`"additional_permissions":{"file_system":{"deny_read":[],"entries":[],"read":[],"write":[]},"network":{"enabled":false}}}`,
-		},
-		PermissionModeAuto,
-		Options{Cwd: t.TempDir()},
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", err)
-	}
-	if result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("provider-expanded empty permissions were rejected: %s", result.Output)
-	}
-	if len(tool.calls) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("shell tool calls = %d, want 1", len(tool.calls))
-	}
-	args := tool.calls[0]
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall retained empty additional_permissions: %#v", args)
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode = %q, want use_default", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsPreservesRealRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
-		},
-	}
-	normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, t.TempDir(), nil)
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; !exists {
-		t.Fatal("non-empty additional_permissions was removed")
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNormalizeAdditionalPermissionsRemovesWorkspaceReadAlreadyCoveredBySandbox(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	engine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
-		WorkspaceRoot: root,
-		Policy:        sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
-	})
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"command":             "./zero --version",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"file_system": map[string]any{
-				"entries": []any{
-					map[string]any{
-						"access": "read",
-						"path": map[string]any{
-							"type": "path",
-							"path": ".",
-						},
-					},
-				},
-				"deny_read": []any{},
-				"read":      []any{},
-				"write":     []any{},
-			},
-			"network": map[string]any{"enabled": false},
-		},
-	}
-
-	normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, root, engine)
-
-	if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
-		t.Fatalf("already-covered additional_permissions was retained: %#v", args)
-	}
-	if got := args["sandbox_permissions"]; got != string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault) {
-		t.Fatalf("sandbox mode changed to %q", got)
-	}
-}
@@ -501,3 +501,15 @@ func hasStringPrefix(values []string, prefix []string) bool {
 	}
 	return true
 }
+
+func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
+	if len(left) != len(right) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for index := range left {
+		if left[index] != right[index] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ const compactionTriggerRatio = 0.7
 // transcript (and so tests can assert on it).
 const summaryLabel = "[Summary of earlier conversation]"

-// CompactionSummaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to both automatic
-// and manually requested compaction summarizers.
-const CompactionSummaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
+// summaryInstructions is the system prompt handed to the summarizer model.
+const summaryInstructions = "You are compacting a coding-assistant conversation to save context. " +
 	"Write a dense, factual summary of the conversation so far. Preserve: the user's goals and explicit constraints; " +
 	"decisions made and why; files created or modified (with paths) and key code changes; commands run and their important " +
 	"results; and anything still in progress or unresolved. Omit pleasantries. Use terse bullet points. Do not invent details. " +
@@ -76,12 +75,6 @@ type CompactionResult struct {
 	// summary message also includes summaryLabel and any preserved structured
 	// state needed by later compactions.
 	SummaryText string
-	// ProjectedChars is the text content sent to the summarizer after semantic
-	// projection, excluding provider protocol framing.
-	ProjectedChars int
-	// Truncated reports whether projection dropped content to satisfy its
-	// bounded brief or previous-summary limits.
-	Truncated bool
 	// Compacted reports whether Messages contains an injected summary.
 	Compacted bool
 }
@@ -223,11 +216,11 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
 		}, nil
 	}

-	summaryResult, err := SummarizeCompactionMessages(middle, opts.Summarize)
+	summary, err := opts.Summarize(middle)
 	if err != nil {
 		return CompactionResult{}, err
 	}
-	summary := summaryResult.SummaryText
+	summary = strings.TrimSpace(summary)

 	// Preserve structured state (active plan + loaded skills) from the elided
 	// middle verbatim, so it is not lost or paraphrased away by the prose summary.
@@ -245,53 +238,10 @@ func CompactMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, opts CompactionOptions) (Co
 		RemovedCount:   len(middle),
 		PreservedCount: len(messages) - len(middle),
 		SummaryText:    summary,
-		ProjectedChars: summaryResult.ProjectedChars,
-		Truncated:      summaryResult.Truncated,
 		Compacted:      true,
 	}, nil
 }

-// CompactionSummaryResult describes the shared summarization input and output.
-type CompactionSummaryResult struct {
-	SummaryText    string
-	ProjectedChars int
-	Truncated      bool
-}
-
-// SummarizeCompactionMessages applies the shared semantic projection before
-// invoking a caller-supplied summarizer. Automatic context-pressure compaction
-// and manual session compaction both use this path.
-func SummarizeCompactionMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message, summarize func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error)) (CompactionSummaryResult, error) {
-	if summarize == nil {
-		return CompactionSummaryResult{}, errors.New("compaction requires a Summarize function")
-	}
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	summaryInput := projection.messages
-	if len(summaryInput) == 0 {
-		summaryInput = messages
-	}
-	summary, err := summarize(summaryInput)
-	if err != nil {
-		return CompactionSummaryResult{}, err
-	}
-	return CompactionSummaryResult{
-		SummaryText:    strings.TrimSpace(summary),
-		ProjectedChars: compactionMessageChars(summaryInput),
-		Truncated:      projection.truncated,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func compactionMessageChars(messages []zeroruntime.Message) int {
-	total := 0
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		total += len(message.Content)
-		for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
-			total += len(call.Name) + len(call.Arguments)
-		}
-	}
-	return total
-}
-
 // safeSuffixBoundary walks the preserve boundary backward (toward systemEnd) so
 // the preserved suffix begins on a user or assistant message rather than a
 // tool/tool_result message. A tool result with no preceding assistant tool call
@@ -381,8 +331,6 @@ type compactionState struct {
 	// but its token COST must still be counted so usage reports and budgets include it.
 	onUsage func(Usage)
 	task    *taskState
-	planner *contextPlanner
-	trace   *trace.Recorder

 	// calibrationRatio scales the raw byte/4 token estimate toward the provider's
 	// real prompt-token count. ApproxTextTokens over-counts code-heavy content by
@@ -429,8 +377,6 @@ func newCompactionState(options Options, task *taskState) *compactionState {
 		preserveLast: options.CompactionPreserveLast,
 		onUsage:      options.OnUsage,
 		task:         task,
-		planner:      newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: options.ContextWindow, serviceTier: options.ServiceTier}),
-		trace:        options.Trace,
 	}
 	return state
 }
@@ -467,14 +413,6 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(
 	// the bodies of old, large tool results (the model has already acted on
 	// them). If that brings us back under threshold, skip the paid summarizer
 	// entirely and preserve recent turns verbatim.
-	if pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages); reclaimed > 0 {
-		messages = pruned
-		size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
-		if size <= state.threshold {
-			state.lowWaterMark = size
-			return messages
-		}
-	}
 	if pruned, reclaimed := pruneStaleToolOutput(messages, state.preserveLast); reclaimed > 0 {
 		messages = pruned
 		size = state.calibratedTokens(estimateTokens(messages) + toolTokens)
@@ -486,7 +424,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) maybeCompact(

 	compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
-		Summarize:    state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
+		Summarize:    summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
 		taskState:    state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -537,7 +475,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(

 	result, compactErr := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: state.preserveLast,
-		Summarize:    state.summarizeClosure(ctx, provider),
+		Summarize:    summarizeClosure(ctx, provider, state.onUsage),
 		taskState:    state.task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
 	})
 	if compactErr != nil {
@@ -571,12 +509,9 @@ func (state *compactionState) recover(
 // provider call. The summary stream intentionally does NOT forward OnText (so
 // compaction stays invisible on the user-facing surface), but it DOES forward
 // OnUsage so the summarizer's token cost is still counted by usage/budgeting.
-func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-	if state.planner == nil {
-		state.planner = newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{})
-	}
+func summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, onUsage func(Usage)) func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
 	return func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-		return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, toSummarize, state.onUsage, state.planner, state.trace)
+		return summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, toSummarize, onUsage)
 	}
 }

@@ -588,11 +523,7 @@ func (state *compactionState) summarizeClosure(ctx context.Context, provider Pro
 // Non-context-limit errors (and a single message that still won't fit) surface
 // to the caller unchanged.
 func summarizeWithFallback(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
-	return summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{}), nil)
-}
-
-func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
-	summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	summary, err := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, messages, onUsage)
 	if err == nil {
 		return summary, nil
 	}
@@ -601,11 +532,11 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 	}

 	mid := len(messages) / 2
-	left, leftErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	left, leftErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[:mid], onUsage)
 	if leftErr != nil {
 		return "", leftErr
 	}
-	right, rightErr := summarizeWithPlanner(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	right, rightErr := summarizeWithFallback(ctx, provider, messages[mid:], onUsage)
 	if rightErr != nil {
 		return "", rightErr
 	}
@@ -618,7 +549,7 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 	combined := strings.TrimSpace(left + "\n\n" + right)
 	reduced, reduceErr := summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx, provider, []zeroruntime.Message{
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: combined},
-	}, onUsage, planner, recorder)
+	}, onUsage)
 	if reduceErr != nil {
 		if isContextLimitError(reduceErr.Error()) {
 			// Even the two combined partials don't fit (extreme): fall back to the
@@ -634,15 +565,15 @@ func summarizeWithPlanner(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zer
 }

 // summarizeMessagesOnce performs a single tool-less summarization call.
-func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage), planner *contextPlanner, recorder *trace.Recorder) (string, error) {
-	requestMessages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: CompactionSummaryInstructions},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
+func summarizeMessagesOnce(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, onUsage func(Usage)) (string, error) {
+	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: summaryInstructions},
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Summarize this conversation:\n\n" + renderTranscript(messages)},
+		},
+		// No tools: this is a plain text summarization call.
 	}
-	parts := systemPromptParts{prompt: CompactionSummaryInstructions, baseInstructions: CompactionSummaryInstructions}
-	plan := planner.planWithPromptParts(requestMessages, nil, "", parts)
-	recordContextPlanTrace(recorder, plan)
-	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, plan.Request)
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
@@ -43,14 +43,8 @@ func TestCompactMessagesReturnsMetadataForManualCompaction(t *testing.T) {
 	if result.SummaryText != "manual summary" {
 		t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want trimmed summary", result.SummaryText)
 	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
-	}
-	if result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatal("Truncated = true for a projection within its limits")
-	}
-	if len(captured) != 1 || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "first question") || !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, "second question") {
-		t.Fatalf("summarized projection = %#v, want intent from the non-preserved middle", captured)
+	if len(captured) != 3 || captured[0].Content != "first question" || captured[2].Content != "second question" {
+		t.Fatalf("summarized middle = %#v, want the three non-preserved non-system messages", captured)
 	}
 	if len(result.Messages) != 4 {
 		t.Fatalf("compacted message count = %d, want 4", len(result.Messages))
@@ -102,46 +96,11 @@ func TestCompactMessagesNoopReturnsUncompactedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 	if result.SummaryText != "" {
 		t.Fatalf("SummaryText = %q, want empty", result.SummaryText)
 	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != 0 || result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("no-op projection metadata = (%d, %t), want zero values", result.ProjectedChars, result.Truncated)
-	}
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Messages, messages) {
 		t.Fatalf("Messages changed on no-op: %#v", result.Messages)
 	}
 }

-func TestCompactMessagesReturnsTruncatedProjectionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}}
-	for index := range 20 {
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
-			Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
-			Content: strings.Repeat("contextword ", 256) + string(rune('a'+index)),
-		})
-	}
-	messages = append(messages,
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "recent answer"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "latest question"},
-	)
-
-	var captured []zeroruntime.Message
-	result, err := CompactMessages(messages, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize: func(toSummarize []zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) {
-			captured = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), toSummarize...)
-			return "bounded summary", nil
-		},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !result.Compacted || !result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("compaction metadata = compacted %t, truncated %t; want both true", result.Compacted, result.Truncated)
-	}
-	if result.ProjectedChars != compactionMessageChars(captured) || result.ProjectedChars == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("ProjectedChars = %d, want %d", result.ProjectedChars, compactionMessageChars(captured))
-	}
-}
-
 func TestCompactMessagesPropagatesSummarizeError(t *testing.T) {
 	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ type skillEntry struct {
 	body string
 }

-// recentEdits returns files mutated by editing calls in messages
+// recentEdits returns the files mutated by write_file/edit_file calls in messages
 // — latest note per path, in last-seen order — as skillEntry{name: path, body:
 // note}. After compaction elides the editing turns, this tells the model WHAT it
 // changed in each file (from the tool's result) so it need not re-read to
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ type skillEntry struct {
 // rather than an earlier, now-stale entry.
 func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
 	pathByID := map[string]string{}
-	noteByPath := map[string]string{}
 	sequence := make([]string, 0)
 	for _, message := range messages {
 		for _, call := range message.ToolCalls {
@@ -130,24 +129,12 @@ func recentEdits(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []skillEntry {
 			sequence = append(sequence, path)
 		}
 	}
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || len(message.ChangedFiles) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, path := range message.ChangedFiles {
-			path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
-			if path == "" {
-				continue
-			}
-			sequence = append(sequence, path)
-			noteByPath[path] = editNote(message.Content)
-		}
-	}
 	order := lastSeenOrder(sequence)
 	if len(order) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}

+	noteByPath := map[string]string{}
 	for _, message := range messages {
 		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || message.ToolCallID == "" {
 			continue
@@ -438,20 +425,15 @@ type preservedState struct {
 }

 type preservedTaskState struct {
-	Objective           string              `json:"objective"`
-	Status              taskStatus          `json:"status,omitempty"`
-	Pending             int                 `json:"pending,omitempty"`
-	InProgress          int                 `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
-	Completed           int                 `json:"completed,omitempty"`
-	Failed              int                 `json:"failed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationPassed  int                 `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationFailed  int                 `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
-	VerificationOutcome Outcome             `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
-	Constraints         []string            `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
-	ChangedFiles        []string            `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
-	UnresolvedFailures  []taskFailureState  `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
-	Approvals           []taskApprovalState `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
-	Artifacts           []taskArtifactState `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
+	Objective           string     `json:"objective"`
+	Status              taskStatus `json:"status,omitempty"`
+	Pending             int        `json:"pending,omitempty"`
+	InProgress          int        `json:"in_progress,omitempty"`
+	Completed           int        `json:"completed,omitempty"`
+	Failed              int        `json:"failed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationPassed  int        `json:"verification_passed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationFailed  int        `json:"verification_failed,omitempty"`
+	VerificationOutcome Outcome    `json:"verification_outcome,omitempty"`
 }

 type preservedEdit struct {
@@ -486,12 +468,7 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 	task := priorState.Task
 	if taskSnapshot != nil {
 		task = &preservedTaskState{
-			Objective:          capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
-			Constraints:        mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskConstraints(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Constraints, maxTaskConstraints),
-			ChangedFiles:       mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskChangedFiles(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.ChangedFiles, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
-			UnresolvedFailures: mergeTaskFailures(priorTaskFailures(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.UnresolvedFailures, taskSnapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys),
-			Approvals:          mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskApprovals(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Approvals, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
-			Artifacts:          mergeBoundedComparable(priorTaskArtifacts(priorState.Task), taskSnapshot.Artifacts, maxTaskEvidenceEntries),
+			Objective: capTaskObjective(taskSnapshot.Objective),
 		}
 		// Plan parity corroborates only the mutable task projection. The objective
 		// comes directly from the run prompt and is immutable, so it must survive
@@ -507,13 +484,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 			task.VerificationOutcome = taskSnapshot.Verification.LastOutcome
 		}
 	}
-	freshConstraints := explicitConstraintsFromMessages(middle)
-	if len(freshConstraints) > 0 {
-		if task == nil {
-			task = &preservedTaskState{}
-		}
-		task.Constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(task.Constraints, freshConstraints, maxTaskConstraints)
-	}

 	// Plan: a fresh update_plan in middle is authoritative; otherwise carry the
 	// plan preserved by an earlier compaction.
@@ -547,95 +517,6 @@ func appendPreservedState(summary string, middle []zeroruntime.Message, taskSnap
 	return summary
 }

-func explicitConstraintsFromMessages(messages []zeroruntime.Message) []string {
-	var constraints []string
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser || strings.Contains(message.Content, preservedStateLabel) {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, body := projectInstructionBlock(message.Content); body != "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		constraints = mergeBoundedComparable(constraints, extractExplicitConstraints(message.Content), maxTaskConstraints)
-	}
-	return constraints
-}
-
-func priorTaskConstraints(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Constraints
-}
-
-func priorTaskChangedFiles(task *preservedTaskState) []string {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.ChangedFiles
-}
-
-func priorTaskFailures(task *preservedTaskState) []taskFailureState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.UnresolvedFailures
-}
-
-func priorTaskApprovals(task *preservedTaskState) []taskApprovalState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Approvals
-}
-
-func priorTaskArtifacts(task *preservedTaskState) []taskArtifactState {
-	if task == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return task.Artifacts
-}
-
-func mergeTaskFailures(older, newer []taskFailureState, resolved []string) []taskFailureState {
-	resolvedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(resolved))
-	for _, key := range resolved {
-		resolvedSet[key] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	merged := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
-	for _, failure := range append(append([]taskFailureState(nil), older...), newer...) {
-		if _, ok := resolvedSet[failure.Key]; ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		withoutSameKey := make([]taskFailureState, 0, len(merged))
-		for _, existing := range merged {
-			if existing.Key != failure.Key {
-				withoutSameKey = append(withoutSameKey, existing)
-			}
-		}
-		merged = append(withoutSameKey, failure)
-	}
-	if len(merged) > maxTaskEvidenceEntries {
-		merged = merged[len(merged)-maxTaskEvidenceEntries:]
-	}
-	return merged
-}
-
-func mergeBoundedComparable[T comparable](older, newer []T, limit int) []T {
-	merged := make([]T, 0, len(older)+len(newer))
-	seen := make(map[T]struct{}, len(older)+len(newer))
-	for _, value := range append(append([]T(nil), older...), newer...) {
-		if _, ok := seen[value]; ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[value] = struct{}{}
-		merged = append(merged, value)
-	}
-	if len(merged) > limit {
-		merged = merged[len(merged)-limit:]
-	}
-	return merged
-}
-
 func capTaskObjective(objective string) string {
 	objective = strings.TrimSpace(objective)
 	if len(objective) <= maxTaskObjectiveBytes {
@@ -729,6 +610,15 @@ func formatPreservedState(plan string, task *preservedTaskState, edits, tools, s
 	return preservedStateLabel + "\n" + string(encoded)
 }

+// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
+// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
+// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
+// malformed.
+func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
+	state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
+	return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
+}
+
 func parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent string) preservedState {
 	idx := strings.LastIndex(summaryContent, preservedStateLabel)
 	if idx < 0 {
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"unicode/utf8"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
 )

@@ -65,9 +64,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
 	objective := strings.Repeat("世", maxTaskObjectiveBytes)
 	task := newTaskState(objective, nil)
 	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"write code","status":"in_progress"},{"content":"add tests","status":"pending"}]}`})
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/db.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "apply_patch", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"},
-	}})
 	messages := stateConversation()
 	compacted, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
 		PreserveLast: 2,
@@ -84,69 +80,6 @@ func TestCompactPreservesBoundedTaskContext(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(state.Task.Objective) > maxTaskObjectiveBytes || !utf8.ValidString(state.Task.Objective) {
 		t.Fatalf("objective was not safely bounded: %d bytes %q", len(state.Task.Objective), state.Task.Objective)
 	}
-	if len(state.Task.ChangedFiles) != 1 || state.Task.ChangedFiles[0] != "internal/db.go" {
-		t.Fatalf("changed files were not preserved: %#v", state.Task.ChangedFiles)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCompactPreservesRuntimeEvidenceAcrossRepeatedCompaction(t *testing.T) {
-	task := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.", nil)
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests failed",
-		Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
-	}})
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
-		ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession, Scope: "/tmp",
-	}})
-	messages := stateConversation()
-
-	first, err := Compact(messages, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize:    func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "FIRST", nil },
-		taskState:    task.snapshotForCompaction(messages),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./..."}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence",
-		Meta: map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/tests.txt"},
-	}})
-	secondInput := append(append([]zeroruntime.Message{}, first...),
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Never add background memory models."},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "understood"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "continue"},
-		zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working"},
-	)
-	second, err := Compact(secondInput, CompactionOptions{
-		PreserveLast: 2,
-		Summarize:    func([]zeroruntime.Message) (string, error) { return "SECOND", nil },
-		taskState:    task.snapshotForCompaction(secondInput),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	state := parsePreservedStateBlock(second[1].Content)
-	if state.Task == nil || len(state.Task.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || len(state.Task.Approvals) != 1 || len(state.Task.Artifacts) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("runtime evidence did not survive repeated compaction: %#v", state.Task)
-	}
-	if got := state.Task.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary; got != "Error: tests still fail with newer evidence" {
-		t.Fatalf("newer failure evidence did not replace the older summary: %#v", state.Task.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never add background memory models."} {
-		if !containsString(state.Task.Constraints, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("constraint %q missing after repeated compaction: %#v", want, state.Task.Constraints)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value == want {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
 }

 func TestCompactPreservesObjectiveAfterPlanParityMismatch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-const (
-	compactionUserWordBudget       = 256
-	compactionAssistantWordBudget  = 200
-	compactionToolCallsPerTurn     = 8
-	compactionToolArgumentBytes    = 120
-	compactionErrorBytes           = 150
-	compactionResultBytes          = 1200
-	compactionPreviousSummaryBytes = 16 * 1024
-	compactionBriefMaxBytes        = 24 * 1024
-)
-
-var compactionWordPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[\p{L}\p{N}]+`)
-
-type compactionProjection struct {
-	messages  []zeroruntime.Message
-	truncated bool
-}
-
-// projectCompactionInput removes reconstructible tool output before the model
-// summary call. It retains a bounded transcript of user intent, assistant
-// decisions, tool actions, and concise errors. Exact durable state is appended
-// separately from the original messages after the summary returns.
-func projectCompactionInput(messages []zeroruntime.Message) compactionProjection {
-	sections := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
-	previousSummary := ""
-	truncated := false
-	for index, message := range messages {
-		switch message.Role {
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser:
-			content := message.Content
-			if marker := strings.Index(content, preservedStateLabel); marker >= 0 {
-				content = content[:marker]
-			}
-			trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(content)
-			if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel) {
-				fullSummary := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, summaryLabel))
-				previousSummary = clipHeadTailBytes(fullSummary, compactionPreviousSummaryBytes)
-				truncated = truncated || len(fullSummary) > compactionPreviousSummaryBytes
-				continue
-			}
-			if content = clipInformativeWords(content, compactionUserWordBudget); content != "" {
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user #%d]\n%s", index, content))
-			}
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant:
-			lines := make([]string, 0, 1+len(message.ToolCalls))
-			if content := clipInformativeWords(message.Content, compactionAssistantWordBudget); content != "" {
-				lines = append(lines, content)
-			}
-			calls := message.ToolCalls
-			omitted := 0
-			if len(calls) > compactionToolCallsPerTurn {
-				omitted = len(calls) - compactionToolCallsPerTurn
-				calls = calls[omitted:]
-			}
-			if omitted > 0 {
-				lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("* (%d earlier tool calls omitted)", omitted))
-			}
-			for _, call := range calls {
-				lines = append(lines, compactionToolCallLine(call))
-			}
-			if len(lines) > 0 {
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[assistant #%d]\n%s", index, strings.Join(lines, "\n")))
-			}
-		case zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool:
-			// New tool-result messages carry the execution status directly, as the
-			// source ToolResult does. Keep the text check for older session history
-			// created before Message exposed IsError.
-			name := toolNameForResult(messages, index)
-			mustPreserve := name == "ask_user" || len(message.ChangedFiles) > 0
-			if !mustPreserve && !message.IsError && !isLikelyToolError(message.Content) {
-				continue
-			}
-			if name == "" {
-				name = "tool"
-			}
-			switch {
-			case message.IsError || isLikelyToolError(message.Content):
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_error #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
-			case name == "ask_user":
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[user_answer #%d] %s\n%s", index, name, clipBytes(message.Content, compactionResultBytes)))
-			default:
-				sections = append(sections, fmt.Sprintf("[tool_result #%d] %s changed %s\n%s", index, name,
-					clipBytes(strings.Join(message.ChangedFiles, ", "), compactionToolArgumentBytes), clipBytes(firstLine(message.Content), compactionErrorBytes)))
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if len(sections) == 0 && previousSummary == "" {
-		return compactionProjection{}
-	}
-	brief, briefTruncated := capCompactionBrief(strings.Join(sections, "\n\n"))
-	truncated = truncated || briefTruncated
-	if previousSummary != "" {
-		brief = "[previous summary]\n" + previousSummary + "\n\n" + brief
-	}
-	return compactionProjection{
-		messages:  []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: strings.TrimSpace(brief)}},
-		truncated: truncated,
-	}
-}
-
-func capCompactionBrief(brief string) (string, bool) {
-	if len(brief) <= compactionBriefMaxBytes {
-		return brief, false
-	}
-	marker := "\n\n...[middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget]...\n\n"
-	available := compactionBriefMaxBytes - len(marker)
-	// Keep both chronological edges: the oldest material has not necessarily
-	// been summarized before, while the newest material is most actionable.
-	headBytes := available * 2 / 5
-	tailBytes := available - headBytes
-	head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(brief, headBytes)
-	tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(brief, tailBytes)
-	return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail), true
-}
-
-func compactionToolCallLine(call zeroruntime.ToolCall) string {
-	detail := ""
-	var arguments map[string]any
-	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments)), &arguments) == nil {
-		for _, key := range []string{"file_path", "path", "url", "query", "pattern", "prompt", "description", "question"} {
-			if value, ok := arguments[key].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(value) != "" {
-				detail = value
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if detail == "" && call.Name == "ask_user" {
-			detail = askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments)
-		}
-		if detail == "" && call.Name == "apply_patch" {
-			if patch, ok := arguments["patch"].(string); ok {
-				detail = strings.Join(patchPaths(patch), ", ")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = commandFromArguments(call.Arguments)
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		return "* " + call.Name
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("* %s %q", call.Name, clipBytes(detail, compactionToolArgumentBytes))
-}
-
-func isLikelyToolError(content string) bool {
-	prefix := strings.TrimSpace(content)
-	if len(prefix) > compactionErrorBytes {
-		prefix = prefix[:compactionErrorBytes]
-	}
-	lower := strings.ToLower(prefix)
-	for _, prefix := range []string{"error:", "tool error:", "failed:", "permission denied", "command failed"} {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(lower, prefix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func clipInformativeWords(text string, limit int) string {
-	flat := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
-	if flat == "" || limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	count := 0
-	for _, location := range compactionWordPattern.FindAllStringIndex(flat, -1) {
-		word := strings.ToLower(flat[location[0]:location[1]])
-		if compactionStopWords[word] {
-			continue
-		}
-		count++
-		if count > limit {
-			end := location[0]
-			return strings.TrimSpace(flat[:end]) + "...(truncated)"
-		}
-	}
-	return flat
-}
-
-func clipBytes(text string, limit int) string {
-	text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	if limit <= 3 {
-		end := limit
-		for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-			end--
-		}
-		return text[:end]
-	}
-	end := limit - 3
-	for end > 0 && end < len(text) && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		end--
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(text[:end]) + "..."
-}
-
-func clipHeadTailBytes(text string, limit int) string {
-	text = strings.TrimSpace(text)
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	marker := "\n...[middle omitted]...\n"
-	if limit <= len(marker) {
-		return clipBytes(text, limit)
-	}
-	available := limit - len(marker)
-	head := clipPrefixAtBoundary(text, available/2)
-	tail := clipSuffixAtBoundary(text, available-available/2)
-	return strings.TrimSpace(head) + marker + strings.TrimSpace(tail)
-}
-
-func clipPrefixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	end := limit
-	for end > 0 && text[end]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		end--
-	}
-	if boundary := strings.LastIndex(text[:end], "\n\n["); boundary > 0 {
-		end = boundary
-	}
-	return text[:end]
-}
-
-func clipSuffixAtBoundary(text string, limit int) string {
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if len(text) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	start := len(text) - limit
-	for start < len(text) && text[start]&0xc0 == 0x80 {
-		start++
-	}
-	if boundary := strings.Index(text[start:], "\n\n["); boundary >= 0 {
-		start += boundary + 2
-	}
-	return text[start:]
-}
-
-func askUserQuestionsDetail(arguments map[string]any) string {
-	raw, ok := arguments["questions"].([]any)
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	questions := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
-	for _, item := range raw {
-		object, ok := item.(map[string]any)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if question, ok := object["question"].(string); ok && strings.TrimSpace(question) != "" {
-			questions = append(questions, strings.TrimSpace(question))
-		}
-	}
-	return strings.Join(questions, " | ")
-}
-
-func patchPaths(patch string) []string {
-	var paths []string
-	seen := map[string]bool{}
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(patch, "\n") {
-		for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
-			if !strings.HasPrefix(line, prefix) {
-				continue
-			}
-			path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, prefix))
-			if path != "" && !seen[path] {
-				seen[path] = true
-				paths = append(paths, path)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return paths
-}
-
-var compactionStopWords = map[string]bool{
-	"a": true, "an": true, "the": true, "is": true, "are": true, "was": true, "were": true,
-	"be": true, "been": true, "being": true, "have": true, "has": true, "had": true,
-	"do": true, "does": true, "did": true, "will": true, "would": true, "could": true,
-	"should": true, "may": true, "might": true, "shall": true, "can": true, "need": true, "must": true,
-	"to": true, "of": true, "in": true, "for": true, "on": true, "with": true, "at": true,
-	"by": true, "from": true, "as": true, "into": true, "through": true, "during": true,
-	"before": true, "after": true, "above": true, "below": true, "between": true, "under": true, "over": true,
-	"and": true, "but": true, "or": true, "nor": true, "not": true, "so": true, "yet": true,
-	"both": true, "either": true, "neither": true, "each": true, "every": true, "all": true,
-	"any": true, "few": true, "more": true, "most": true, "other": true, "some": true, "such": true, "no": true,
-	"that": true, "this": true, "these": true, "those": true, "it": true, "its": true,
-	"i": true, "me": true, "my": true, "we": true, "our": true, "you": true, "your": true,
-	"he": true, "him": true, "his": true, "she": true, "her": true, "they": true, "them": true, "their": true,
-	"who": true, "which": true, "what": true, "if": true, "then": true, "than": true,
-	"when": true, "where": true, "how": true, "just": true, "also": true,
-}
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"unicode/utf8"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-func TestClipBytesHandlesTinyLimitsOnRuneBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, limit := range []int{0, 1, 2, 3} {
-		if clipped := clipBytes("世界", limit); len(clipped) > limit || !utf8.ValidString(clipped) {
-			t.Fatalf("clipBytes limit %d returned invalid result %q", limit, clipped)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBoundaryClippersHandleNonPositiveLimits(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, clip := range []func(string, int) string{clipPrefixAtBoundary, clipSuffixAtBoundary} {
-		for _, limit := range []int{-1, 0} {
-			if got := clip("世界", limit); got != "" {
-				t.Fatalf("clipper limit %d = %q, want empty", limit, got)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputDropsRecoverableToolBodies(t *testing.T) {
-	largeBody := strings.Repeat("recoverable source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Inspect the parser and preserve its current behavior."},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "I will inspect before editing.", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "read", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/parser.go"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "read", Content: largeBody},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "test", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/parser"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "test", Content: "Error: parser regression\nlong diagnostic details"},
-	}
-
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	projected := projection.messages
-	if len(projected) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("projection = %#v, want one compact message", projected)
-	}
-	content := projected[0].Content
-	for _, want := range []string{"Inspect the parser", `read_file "internal/parser.go"`, `exec_command "go test ./internal/parser"`, "Error: parser regression"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
-		}
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(content, "recoverable source line") || strings.Contains(content, "long diagnostic details") {
-		t.Fatalf("projection retained reconstructible or overlong tool output: %q", content)
-	}
-	if estimateTokens(projected)*20 >= estimateTokens(messages) {
-		t.Fatalf("projection did not materially reduce tokens: before=%d after=%d", estimateTokens(messages), estimateTokens(projected))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsStructurallyMarkedToolErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "git", Name: "exec_command", Arguments: `{"cmd":"git status"}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "git", Content: "fatal: not a git repository", IsError: true},
-	}
-
-	projected := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages
-	if len(projected) != 1 || !strings.Contains(projected[0].Content, "fatal: not a git repository") {
-		t.Fatalf("structured tool error was dropped from projection: %#v", projected)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputRetainsAskUserExchangeAndSemanticArguments(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "ask", Name: "ask_user", Arguments: `{"questions":[{"question":"Which database should remain?"}]}`}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "ask", Content: "Which database should remain?: Postgres only; do not touch MySQL."},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
-			{ID: "patch", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: internal/db.go\n*** End Patch"}`},
-			{ID: "fetch", Name: "web_fetch", Arguments: `{"url":"https://example.com/spec"}`},
-			{ID: "task", Name: "task", Arguments: `{"prompt":"Inspect the Windows implementation"}`},
-		}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "patch", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/db.go"}},
-	}
-
-	content := projectCompactionInput(messages).messages[0].Content
-	for _, want := range []string{"Which database should remain?", "Postgres only; do not touch MySQL", "internal/db.go", "https://example.com/spec", "Inspect the Windows implementation"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projection missing %q: %q", want, content)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputCapsToolCallsPerTurn(t *testing.T) {
-	calls := make([]zeroruntime.ToolCall, 12)
-	for index := range calls {
-		calls[index] = zeroruntime.ToolCall{Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"file.go"}`}
-	}
-	projected := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: calls}}).messages
-	content := projected[0].Content
-	if strings.Count(content, "* read_file") != compactionToolCallsPerTurn || !strings.Contains(content, "4 earlier tool calls omitted") {
-		t.Fatalf("tool-call tail was not bounded: %q", content)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputCarriesPreviousSummaryOutsideBriefCap(t *testing.T) {
-	previous := "keep the earlier architecture decision\n" + strings.Repeat("prior detail ", 2000) + "\nkeep the newest prior decision"
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: summaryLabel + "\n" + previous + "\n\n" + preservedStateLabel + "\n{}"}}
-	for index := range 500 {
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: strings.Repeat("later transcript detail ", 20)})
-		messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "later request " + strings.Repeat("context ", 20) + string(rune('a'+index%26))})
-	}
-
-	projection := projectCompactionInput(messages)
-	content := projection.messages[0].Content
-	if !strings.Contains(content, "[previous summary]\nkeep the earlier architecture decision") || !strings.Contains(content, "keep the newest prior decision") {
-		t.Fatalf("previous summary was lost when the brief tail was capped: %q", content)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(content, "middle transcript omitted to fit compaction budget") {
-		t.Fatalf("oversized brief was not head/tail capped: %q", content)
-	}
-	if !projection.truncated {
-		t.Fatal("projection did not structurally report truncation")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProjectCompactionInputDoesNotInferTruncationFromUserText(t *testing.T) {
-	projection := projectCompactionInput([]zeroruntime.Message{{
-		Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "Keep this literal marker: [middle omitted]",
-	}})
-	if projection.truncated {
-		t.Fatal("literal user text produced a false truncation signal")
-	}
-}
@@ -20,15 +20,11 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 			{ID: "e2", Name: "edit_file", Arguments: `{"path":"internal/bar.go","old_string":"a","new_string":"b"}`},
 		}},
 		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "Applied edit to internal/bar.go"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{
-			{ID: "e3", Name: "apply_patch", Arguments: `{"patch":"*** Update File: internal/baz.go"}`},
-		}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e3", Content: "Done!", ChangedFiles: []string{"internal/baz.go"}},
 	}

 	edits := recentEdits(messages)
-	if len(edits) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected 3 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
+	if len(edits) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 edited files, got %d: %#v", len(edits), edits)
 	}
 	if edits[0].name != "internal/foo.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[0].body, "12 lines") {
 		t.Fatalf("first edit = %#v, want foo.go with its note", edits[0])
@@ -36,9 +32,6 @@ func TestRecentEditsExtractsPathsAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	if edits[1].name != "internal/bar.go" || !strings.Contains(edits[1].body, "Applied edit") {
 		t.Fatalf("second edit = %#v, want bar.go with its note", edits[1])
 	}
-	if edits[2].name != "internal/baz.go" || edits[2].body != "Done!" {
-		t.Fatalf("third edit = %#v, want apply_patch changed file with its note", edits[2])
-	}
 }

 // After compaction elides the editing turns, the preserved-state block still
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
 )

@@ -59,15 +58,12 @@ func TestCompactKeepsSystemAndPreservedSuffix(t *testing.T) {
 	if last.Content != "most recent question" {
 		t.Fatalf("expected most recent message preserved, got %q", last.Content)
 	}
-	// The summarizer receives a compact semantic projection of the middle rather
-	// than reconstructible raw tool output.
-	if len(captured) != 1 || captured[0].Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
-		t.Fatalf("expected one projected summary input, got %#v", captured)
+	// The summarized middle excludes system and preserved suffix.
+	if len(captured) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 3 summarized messages, got %d: %#v", len(captured), captured)
 	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"[user #0]", "first question", "[assistant #1]", "first answer", "second question"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(captured[0].Content, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("projected summary input missing %q: %q", want, captured[0].Content)
-		}
+	if captured[0].Content != "first question" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected oldest non-system message first, got %#v", captured[0])
 	}
 	// Compaction must shrink the conversation.
 	if estimateTokens(result) >= estimateTokens(messages) {
@@ -340,7 +336,7 @@ func TestRunProactiveCompactionTriggers(t *testing.T) {
 	}

 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))

 	result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
 		Registry:               registry,
@@ -368,7 +364,7 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))

 	_, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("y", 8000), provider, Options{
 		Registry:       registry,
@@ -383,43 +379,6 @@ func TestRunNoCompactionWhenContextWindowZero(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestMaybeCompactStopsAfterSupersededReadsReachThreshold(t *testing.T) {
-	body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
-	}
-	pruned, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed <= 0 {
-		t.Fatal("test setup did not reclaim superseded read output")
-	}
-	prunedSize := estimateTokens(pruned)
-	if estimateTokens(messages) <= prunedSize {
-		t.Fatal("test setup does not cross the compaction threshold")
-	}
-
-	provider := &summarizeRecordingProvider{}
-	state := &compactionState{
-		enabled:      true,
-		threshold:    prunedSize,
-		preserveLast: 2,
-	}
-	got := state.maybeCompact(context.Background(), provider, messages, nil)
-
-	if provider.summarizeCalls != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("cheap pruning should avoid the summarizer, got %d calls", provider.summarizeCalls)
-	}
-	if state.lowWaterMark != prunedSize {
-		t.Fatalf("lowWaterMark = %d, want %d", state.lowWaterMark, prunedSize)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(got[2].Content, "superseded identical") || got[4].Content != body {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected pruned messages: %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
 // reactiveProvider builds up history with a tool call on turn 1, then errors
 // with a context-limit message on turn 2 (once the history is large enough that
 // compaction can shrink it), then succeeds on the same-turn retry. Summary
@@ -429,7 +388,6 @@ type reactiveProvider struct {
 	summarizeCalls int
 	turnRequests   int
 	failedOnce     bool
-	connectError   bool
 	bigText        string
 	finalText      string
 }
@@ -451,9 +409,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
 		return streamEvents(toolTurnWithText(provider.bigText, "1", "read_file", `{"path":"x"}`)), nil
 	case provider.turnRequests == 2 && !provider.failedOnce:
 		provider.failedOnce = true
-		if provider.connectError {
-			return nil, errors.New("context_length_exceeded")
-		}
 		return streamEvents([]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
 			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventError, Error: "This model's maximum context length is 1000 tokens. Please reduce the length of the messages."},
 		}), nil
@@ -462,39 +417,6 @@ func (provider *reactiveProvider) StreamCompletion(ctx context.Context, request
 	}
 }

-func TestRunConnectErrorCompactionRecordsReplacementPlan(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := &reactiveProvider{
-		connectError: true,
-		bigText:      strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
-		finalText:    "recovered",
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
-	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("connect-compaction", "run-1", "test")
-	var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
-		Registry:               registry,
-		PermissionMode:         PermissionModeUnsafe,
-		ContextWindow:          10_000_000,
-		CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
-		Trace:                  recorder,
-		OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
-			contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
-		},
-	})
-	if err != nil || result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
-		t.Fatalf("connect-error compaction failed: result=%#v err=%v", result, err)
-	}
-	if len(contextPlans) != 3 || contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("replacement request context not reported: %#v", contextPlans)
-	}
-	gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
-	if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 || gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("replacement request trace not recorded: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	provider := &reactiveProvider{
 		bigText:   strings.Repeat("b", 6000),
@@ -505,9 +427,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	// the compaction closure. read_file also returns a sizeable result that
 	// bloats the history.
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
-	recorder := trace.NewRecorder("reactive-compaction", "run-1", "test")
-	var contextPlans []ContextBreakdown
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))

 	// ContextWindow large enough that proactive compaction never triggers, so
 	// only the reactive path can save the run.
@@ -516,10 +436,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 		PermissionMode:         PermissionModeUnsafe,
 		ContextWindow:          10_000_000,
 		CompactionPreserveLast: 2,
-		Trace:                  recorder,
-		OnContext: func(breakdown ContextBreakdown) {
-			contextPlans = append(contextPlans, breakdown)
-		},
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("expected reactive compaction to recover the run, got error: %v", err)
@@ -530,25 +446,6 @@ func TestRunReactiveCompactionRecovers(t *testing.T) {
 	if provider.summarizeCalls == 0 {
 		t.Fatal("expected reactive compaction to invoke the summarizer")
 	}
-	if len(contextPlans) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("main request context callbacks = %d, want initial turns plus compacted retry", len(contextPlans))
-	}
-	if contextPlans[2].MessageTokens >= contextPlans[1].MessageTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("retry context was not updated after compaction: before=%d after=%d", contextPlans[1].MessageTokens, contextPlans[2].MessageTokens)
-	}
-	gotTrace := recorder.Finish()
-	if len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes) != 4 {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix evidence count = %d, want two turns, compaction, and retry: %#v", len(gotTrace.PrefixHashes), gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-	if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[0].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].InvalidationReason != "initial" ||
-		gotTrace.PrefixHashes[3].InvalidationReason != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected request-specific invalidation evidence: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
-	if gotTrace.PrefixHashes[2].CompletePrefixHash == gotTrace.PrefixHashes[1].CompletePrefixHash {
-		t.Fatalf("compaction fingerprint reused the main request prefix: %#v", gotTrace.PrefixHashes)
-	}
 }

 // midStreamReactiveProvider forwards some text BEFORE surfacing a context-limit
@@ -594,7 +491,7 @@ func TestRunReactiveRetryDoesNotDoubleEmitText(t *testing.T) {
 		finalText:   "recovered",
 	}
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(t.TempDir()))

 	var deltas []string
 	result, err := Run(context.Background(), strings.Repeat("z", 6000), provider, Options{
@@ -23,24 +23,6 @@ type ContextBreakdown struct {
 	TotalTokens   int     // SystemTokens + ToolTokens + MessageTokens
 	ContextWindow int     // model context window; 0 when unknown
 	UsedFraction  float64 // TotalTokens / ContextWindow; 0 when window unknown
-	// Blocks explain why each model-visible category is present without exposing
-	// its content. The planner currently preserves all three categories.
-	Blocks []ContextBlock
-	// CompletePrefixHash identifies the provider-visible system+tool prefix.
-	CompletePrefixHash string
-	// PrefixInvalidationReason is "initial", "unchanged", or a stable comma-
-	// separated list of changed prefix categories.
-	PrefixInvalidationReason string
-}
-
-// ContextBlock is content-free evidence for one model-visible context category.
-type ContextBlock struct {
-	Kind        string
-	Tokens      int
-	CacheClass  string
-	Authority   string
-	Recoverable bool
-	Reason      string
 }

 // MeasureContext estimates the per-category token footprint of a request: the
@@ -59,24 +41,6 @@ func MeasureContext(messages []zeroruntime.Message, tools []zeroruntime.ToolDefi
 		ContextWindow: contextWindow,
 	}
 	breakdown.TotalTokens = breakdown.SystemTokens + breakdown.ToolTokens + breakdown.MessageTokens
-	if breakdown.SystemTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "system", Tokens: breakdown.SystemTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
-			Authority: "required", Reason: "instructions, workspace policy, and safety policy",
-		})
-	}
-	if breakdown.ToolTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "tools", Tokens: breakdown.ToolTokens, CacheClass: "stable_prefix",
-			Authority: "capability", Reason: "currently permitted and selected tool definitions",
-		})
-	}
-	if breakdown.MessageTokens > 0 {
-		breakdown.Blocks = append(breakdown.Blocks, ContextBlock{
-			Kind: "conversation", Tokens: breakdown.MessageTokens, CacheClass: "dynamic_tail",
-			Authority: "transcript", Reason: "valid provider replay history and current task context",
-		})
-	}
 	if contextWindow > 0 {
 		breakdown.UsedFraction = float64(breakdown.TotalTokens) / float64(contextWindow)
 	}
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ func TestMeasureContextSplitsByCategory(t *testing.T) {
 	if breakdown.UsedFraction != wantFraction {
 		t.Fatalf("UsedFraction = %v, want %v", breakdown.UsedFraction, wantFraction)
 	}
-	if len(breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("Blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", breakdown.Blocks)
-	}
 }

 func TestMeasureContextUnknownWindowHasZeroFraction(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-type contextPlannerConfig struct {
-	contextWindow  int
-	promptCacheKey string
-	serviceTier    string
-	promptParts    systemPromptParts
-}
-
-// contextPlanner is the single seam for constructing model-visible requests.
-// Planning is deterministic and does not retrieve content, execute tools, or
-// change permissions. The initial implementation deliberately preserves every
-// message and tool definition while making composition and cache drift
-// inspectable; later selection policies must continue to cross this seam.
-type contextPlanner struct {
-	config          contextPlannerConfig
-	previousPrefix  prefixFingerprint
-	hasPrevious     bool
-	toolSnapshotKey string
-	toolSnapshot    []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition
-}
-
-type contextPlan struct {
-	Request           zeroruntime.CompletionRequest
-	Breakdown         ContextBreakdown
-	PrefixFingerprint prefixFingerprint
-}
-
-func newContextPlanner(config contextPlannerConfig) *contextPlanner {
-	return &contextPlanner{config: config}
-}
-
-// Plan returns a provider request snapshot plus content-free accounting.
-// It intentionally performs no relevance filtering: preserving current model
-// capability is the baseline contract for future planner policies.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) Plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string) contextPlan {
-	return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, planner.config.promptParts)
-}
-
-// planWithPromptParts plans a request whose stable system sections differ from
-// the planner's configured main-run prompt, such as a compaction summary call.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) planWithPromptParts(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
-	return planner.plan(messages, toolDefs, reasoningEffort, parts)
-}
-
-func (planner *contextPlanner) plan(messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, reasoningEffort string, parts systemPromptParts) contextPlan {
-	requestMessages := copyMessages(messages)
-	requestSystemPrompt := leadingSystemContent(requestMessages)
-	if parts.prompt != requestSystemPrompt {
-		// Component boundaries from a different request would make the detailed
-		// invalidation reason misleading. Retain the exact request prefix and
-		// classify it conservatively as an unstructured system prompt instead.
-		parts = systemPromptParts{prompt: requestSystemPrompt}
-	}
-	fingerprint := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(parts, toolDefs))
-	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
-		Messages:        requestMessages,
-		Tools:           planner.snapshotTools(toolDefs, fingerprint),
-		ReasoningEffort: reasoningEffort,
-		ServiceTier:     planner.config.serviceTier,
-		PromptCacheKey:  planner.config.promptCacheKey,
-	}
-	breakdown := MeasureContext(request.Messages, request.Tools, planner.config.contextWindow)
-	breakdown.CompletePrefixHash = fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash
-	var previous *prefixFingerprint
-	if planner.hasPrevious {
-		previous = &planner.previousPrefix
-	}
-	breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason = explainPrefixChange(previous, fingerprint)
-	planner.previousPrefix = fingerprint
-	planner.hasPrevious = true
-	return contextPlan{
-		Request:           request,
-		Breakdown:         breakdown,
-		PrefixFingerprint: fingerprint,
-	}
-}
-
-// snapshotTools freezes provider-visible tool definitions when their semantic
-// fingerprint changes. Stable turns reuse the frozen schemas instead of
-// recursively cloning every map and slice for every request.
-func (planner *contextPlanner) snapshotTools(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, fingerprint prefixFingerprint) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
-	key := fingerprint.ToolsHash + "\x00" + fingerprint.SchemaHash
-	if planner.toolSnapshotKey != key {
-		planner.toolSnapshot = copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs)
-		planner.toolSnapshotKey = key
-	}
-	return planner.toolSnapshot
-}
-
-func copyToolDefinitions(toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition) []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
-	if toolDefs == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	copied := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, len(toolDefs))
-	for index, definition := range toolDefs {
-		copied[index] = definition
-		copied[index].Parameters = copySchemaMap(definition.Parameters)
-	}
-	return copied
-}
-
-func copySchemaMap(schema map[string]any) map[string]any {
-	if schema == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	copied := make(map[string]any, len(schema))
-	for key, value := range schema {
-		copied[key] = copySchemaValue(value)
-	}
-	return copied
-}
-
-func copySchemaValue(value any) any {
-	switch typed := value.(type) {
-	case map[string]any:
-		return copySchemaMap(typed)
-	case []any:
-		copied := make([]any, len(typed))
-		for index, item := range typed {
-			copied[index] = copySchemaValue(item)
-		}
-		return copied
-	case []string:
-		return append([]string(nil), typed...)
-	default:
-		return value
-	}
-}
-
-func leadingSystemContent(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
-	contents := make([]string, 0, 1)
-	for _, message := range messages {
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem {
-			break
-		}
-		contents = append(contents, message.Content)
-	}
-	return strings.Join(contents, "\n\n")
-}
-
-func explainPrefixChange(previous *prefixFingerprint, current prefixFingerprint) string {
-	if previous == nil {
-		return "initial"
-	}
-	if previous.CompletePrefixHash == current.CompletePrefixHash {
-		return "unchanged"
-	}
-	reasons := make([]string, 0, 3)
-	if previous.SystemPromptHash != current.SystemPromptHash {
-		parts := make([]string, 0, 4)
-		if previous.BaseInstructionsHash != current.BaseInstructionsHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "base_instructions")
-		}
-		if previous.ConfirmationPolicyHash != current.ConfirmationPolicyHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "confirmation_policy")
-		}
-		if previous.ProjectContextHash != current.ProjectContextHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "project_context")
-		}
-		if previous.SkillsHash != current.SkillsHash {
-			parts = append(parts, "skills")
-		}
-		if len(parts) == 0 {
-			parts = append(parts, "system_prompt")
-		}
-		reasons = append(reasons, parts...)
-	}
-	if previous.ToolsHash != current.ToolsHash {
-		reasons = append(reasons, "tools")
-	}
-	if previous.SchemaHash != current.SchemaHash {
-		reasons = append(reasons, "schema")
-	}
-	if len(reasons) == 0 {
-		return "prefix_changed"
-	}
-	return strings.Join(reasons, ",")
-}
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-func TestContextPlannerPreservesProviderRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "inspect this", Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: "image/png", Data: []byte{1, 2, 3}}}},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant, Content: "working", ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: "call-1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"main.go"}`}}, Reasoning: []zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{{Provider: "test", Type: "thinking", Signature: "sig"}}},
-	}
-	toolDefs := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
-		Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file",
-		Parameters: map[string]any{
-			"type":       "object",
-			"required":   []string{"path"},
-			"properties": map[string]any{"path": map[string]any{"type": "string"}},
-			"anyOf":      []any{map[string]any{"type": "object"}},
-		},
-	}}
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
-		contextWindow:  128_000,
-		promptCacheKey: "session-1",
-		serviceTier:    "priority",
-		promptParts:    systemPromptParts{prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "system"},
-	})
-
-	plan := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	want := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
-		Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
-		Tools:           toolDefs,
-		ReasoningEffort: "medium",
-		ServiceTier:     "priority",
-		PromptCacheKey:  "session-1",
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(plan.Request, want) {
-		t.Fatalf("planned request changed provider input:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.Request, want)
-	}
-	stable := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	if &stable.Request.Tools[0] != &plan.Request.Tools[0] {
-		t.Fatal("stable tool fingerprint rebuilt the immutable schema snapshot")
-	}
-
-	// A plan owns its request snapshot; later caller mutation cannot change its
-	// messages or its recursively nested tool schema.
-	messages[1].Content = "changed"
-	messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] = 9
-	toolDefs[0].Name = "changed_tool"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] = "other"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] = "integer"
-	toolDefs[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] = "array"
-	if plan.Request.Messages[1].Content != "inspect this" || plan.Request.Messages[1].Images[0].Data[0] != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("planned messages alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Messages[1])
-	}
-	if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["required"].([]string)[0] != "path" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)["path"].(map[string]any)["type"] != "string" ||
-		plan.Request.Tools[0].Parameters["anyOf"].([]any)[0].(map[string]any)["type"] != "object" {
-		t.Fatalf("planned tools alias caller state: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
-	}
-
-	next := planner.Plan(messages, toolDefs, "medium")
-	if next.PrefixFingerprint == plan.PrefixFingerprint || next.Request.Tools[0].Name != "changed_tool" {
-		t.Fatalf("changed tool schema did not refresh snapshot: %#v", next)
-	}
-	if plan.Request.Tools[0].Name != "read_file" {
-		t.Fatalf("refresh mutated earlier request: %#v", plan.Request.Tools[0])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerReportsInspectableBlocks(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{contextWindow: 100_000})
-	plan := planner.Plan([]zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: filler(400)},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: filler(200)},
-	}, []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read a file"}}, "")
-
-	if plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason != "initial" || plan.Breakdown.CompletePrefixHash == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix evidence = %#v", plan.Breakdown)
-	}
-	if len(plan.Breakdown.Blocks) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("blocks = %#v, want system/tools/conversation", plan.Breakdown.Blocks)
-	}
-	wantKinds := []string{"system", "tools", "conversation"}
-	total := 0
-	for index, block := range plan.Breakdown.Blocks {
-		if block.Kind != wantKinds[index] || block.Tokens <= 0 || block.Reason == "" || block.Authority == "" || block.CacheClass == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("block %d = %#v", index, block)
-		}
-		total += block.Tokens
-	}
-	if total != plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens {
-		t.Fatalf("block tokens = %d, want total %d", total, plan.Breakdown.TotalTokens)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerFingerprintsActualRequestSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
-		prompt: "configured system", baseInstructions: "configured system",
-	}})
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "request-specific system"},
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"},
-	}
-
-	plan := planner.Plan(messages, nil, "")
-	want := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(
-		systemPromptParts{prompt: "request-specific system"}, nil,
-	))
-	if plan.PrefixFingerprint != want {
-		t.Fatalf("fingerprint describes configured prompt instead of request:\n got: %#v\nwant: %#v", plan.PrefixFingerprint, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestContextPlannerExplainsPrefixInvalidation(t *testing.T) {
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{promptParts: systemPromptParts{
-		prompt: "system", baseInstructions: "base", projectContext: "project",
-	}})
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleSystem, Content: "system"}, {Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "task"}}
-	tools := []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{Name: "read_file", Description: "Read", Parameters: map[string]any{"type": "object"}}}
-
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "initial" {
-		t.Fatalf("first reason = %q, want initial", got)
-	}
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "unchanged" {
-		t.Fatalf("stable reason = %q, want unchanged", got)
-	}
-	tools[0].Description = "Read an exact file"
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "tools" {
-		t.Fatalf("tool reason = %q, want tools", got)
-	}
-	tools[0].Parameters["required"] = []any{"path"}
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "schema" {
-		t.Fatalf("schema reason = %q, want schema", got)
-	}
-	planner.config.promptParts.prompt = "system with changed project"
-	planner.config.promptParts.projectContext = "changed project"
-	messages[0].Content = "system with changed project"
-	if got := planner.Plan(messages, tools, "").Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason; got != "project_context" {
-		t.Fatalf("project reason = %q, want project_context", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExplainPrefixChangeNamesEveryChangedComponent(t *testing.T) {
-	baseline := prefixFingerprint{
-		SystemPromptHash:       "system",
-		BaseInstructionsHash:   "base",
-		ConfirmationPolicyHash: "policy",
-		ProjectContextHash:     "project",
-		SkillsHash:             "skills",
-		ToolsHash:              "tools",
-		SchemaHash:             "schema",
-		CompletePrefixHash:     "complete",
-	}
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		mutate func(*prefixFingerprint)
-		want   string
-	}{
-		{name: "base instructions", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.BaseInstructionsHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "base_instructions"},
-		{name: "confirmation policy", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.ConfirmationPolicyHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "confirmation_policy"},
-		{name: "project context", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) {
-			value.SystemPromptHash, value.ProjectContextHash = "changed", "changed"
-		}, want: "project_context"},
-		{name: "skills", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash, value.SkillsHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "skills"},
-		{name: "unclassified system prompt", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.SystemPromptHash = "changed" }, want: "system_prompt"},
-		{name: "tools and schema", mutate: func(value *prefixFingerprint) { value.ToolsHash, value.SchemaHash = "changed", "changed" }, want: "tools,schema"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			current := baseline
-			test.mutate(&current)
-			current.CompletePrefixHash = "changed"
-			if got := explainPrefixChange(&baseline, current); got != test.want {
-				t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %q", got, test.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func assertNoDeferredDiscoveryMessage(t *testing.T, request zeroruntime.Completi
 func TestPartitionToolsInactiveIsByteIdenticalAndDropsToolSearch(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__a", desc: "tool a"})
 	registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})

@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveExcludesDisabledDeferredFromDiscoveryAndExposed(t *
 func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred builtin
-	registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})                   // non-deferred, must stay exposed
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred builtin
+	registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})        // non-deferred, must stay exposed
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha tool"})
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta tool"})

@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveHidesUnloadedExposesLoaded(t *testing.T) {
 	if search.Description != discovery || !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp") {
 		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must carry discovery source, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
-		t.Fatalf("stable tool_search catalog must retain already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
+	if strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__alpha") {
+		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must not list already-loaded tool names, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(search.Description, "mcp__srv__beta") {
 		t.Fatalf("tool_search description must list exact hidden tool names, got %q", search.Description)
 	}
 }

-func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenEmptyReminder(t *testing.T) {
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -368,8 +368,9 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveNothingHiddenKeepsStableCatalog(t *testing.T) {
 	if !exposedNames["tool_search"] {
 		t.Fatalf("expected tool_search exposed on active path, got %#v", exposed)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__alpha") || !strings.Contains(reminder, "mcp__srv__beta") {
-		t.Fatalf("stable catalog must retain all deferred names after loading, got %q", reminder)
+	// No hidden tools means no dynamic discovery text is needed.
+	if reminder != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected empty discovery text when nothing is hidden, got %q", reminder)
 	}
 }

@@ -797,98 +798,3 @@ func TestDisabledToolSearchFallsBackToEager(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("deferred tool must be callable under eager fallback, got status=%s output=%q", result.Status, result.Output)
 	}
 }
-
-// fakeDeferredMutatorTool is a deferred-eligible tool with mutating Safety
-// (SideEffectWrite), standing in for a real write/mutator MCP tool that would
-// be hidden behind tool_search once deferral activates.
-type fakeDeferredMutatorTool struct{ name string }
-
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Name() string        { return t.name }
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Description() string { return "mutates the workspace, deferred" }
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", AdditionalProperties: false}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{SideEffect: tools.SideEffectWrite, Permission: tools.PermissionPrompt, Reason: "mutates"}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Run(_ context.Context, _ map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "mutated"}
-}
-func (t fakeDeferredMutatorTool) Deferred() bool { return true }
-
-// TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema guards the concern
-// raised in PR #642 review (jatmn, P2): that tool_search filters deferred
-// candidates only by EnabledTools/DisabledTools, not by plan-mode visibility,
-// so a plan-mode model could call `tool_search select:<deferred write tool>`
-// and receive that tool's full schema even though a direct call to it is
-// correctly denied the following turn.
-//
-// tool_search's own Safety is SideEffectNone, and ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode (the
-// same gate executeToolCall uses to deny a direct call) requires
-// SideEffect==Read to advertise a tool in plan mode. That means tool_search
-// itself is never advertised, never activates deferral (loaderUsable in
-// partitionToolsCached requires ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)), and
-// is denied at dispatch like any other hidden tool if a stale/adversarial
-// call reaches it anyway — so a deferred mutator's schema can never reach the
-// model through tool_search while in plan mode. This test pins that
-// end-to-end: tool_search is absent from the advertised tool list, and a
-// forced call to it is denied before rendering any tool schema.
-func TestPlanModeToolSearchNeverLeaksDeferredMutatorSchema(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate"})
-	registry.Register(fakeDeferredMutatorTool{name: "mcp__srv__mutate2"})
-	registry.Register(tools.NewToolSearchTool(registry))
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{ // turn 1: force a call to tool_search even though it should not be advertised.
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: tools.ToolSearchToolName},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{"query":"select:mcp__srv__mutate"}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{ // turn 2: final answer.
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-	}}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "plan", provider, Options{
-		Registry:       registry,
-		PermissionMode: PermissionModePlan,
-		DeferThreshold: 2, // 2 deferred mutators registered => eligible for deferral.
-		MaxTurns:       2,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	// tool_search (and the deferred mutators) must not be advertised in plan
-	// mode's turn 1 tool list at all.
-	for _, def := range provider.requests[0].Tools {
-		if def.Name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise tool_search, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
-		}
-		if def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate" || def.Name == "mcp__srv__mutate2" {
-			t.Fatalf("plan mode must not advertise a deferred mutator, got %#v", provider.requests[0].Tools)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// The forced call must be denied outright, never a loaded-schema result:
-	// the tool result must not mention the mutator's name or carry a
-	// load_tools signal.
-	var toolMessage string
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolMessage = message.Content
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(toolMessage, "not available in plan mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected tool_search call denied in plan mode, got %q", toolMessage)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(toolMessage, "mcp__srv__mutate") {
-		t.Fatalf("denial must not leak the deferred mutator's name/schema, got %q", toolMessage)
-	}
-}
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
 func TestExecuteToolCallCategorizesFilteredDenial(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))

 	result, _ := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{ID: "c1", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"x"}`}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
 		DisabledTools: []string{"read_file"},
@@ -144,10 +144,9 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	var switchedTo string
 	switchCount := 0
 	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", firstProvider, Options{
-		Registry:    registry,
-		Model:       "claude-sonnet-4.5",
-		ServiceTier: "priority",
-		MaxTurns:    4,
+		Registry: registry,
+		Model:    "claude-sonnet-4.5",
+		MaxTurns: 4,
 		ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, modelID string) (Provider, error) {
 			switchCount++
 			switchedTo = modelID
@@ -168,15 +167,9 @@ func TestRunSwitchesProviderOnEscalationRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(firstProvider.requests) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected first provider to handle exactly the escalation turn, got %d requests", len(firstProvider.requests))
 	}
-	if got := firstProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
-		t.Fatalf("initial request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
-	}
 	if len(secondProvider.requests) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected second provider to handle the post-switch turn, got %d requests", len(secondProvider.requests))
 	}
-	if got := secondProvider.requests[0].ServiceTier; got != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("post-switch request retained service tier %q", got)
-	}
 	if result.FinalAnswer != "answered on the upgraded model" {
 		t.Fatalf("expected final answer from the swapped provider, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
 	}
@@ -218,10 +211,9 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
 	provider := &mockProvider{turns: escalateThenAnswerTurns("recovered")}

 	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "go", provider, Options{
-		Registry:    registry,
-		Model:       "claude-sonnet-4.5",
-		ServiceTier: "priority",
-		MaxTurns:    4,
+		Registry: registry,
+		Model:    "claude-sonnet-4.5",
+		MaxTurns: 4,
 		ModelSwitcher: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (Provider, error) {
 			return nil, errors.New("provider build blew up")
 		},
@@ -233,9 +225,6 @@ func TestRunEscalationSwitcherErrorIsNonFatal(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(provider.requests) != 2 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected the run to continue on the original provider, got %d requests", len(provider.requests))
 	}
-	if got := provider.requests[1].ServiceTier; got != "priority" {
-		t.Fatalf("failed-switch request service tier = %q, want priority", got)
-	}
 	if result.FinalAnswer != "recovered" {
 		t.Fatalf("expected final answer after non-fatal switch error, got %q", result.FinalAnswer)
 	}
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-func equalStringSlices(left []string, right []string) bool {
-	if len(left) != len(right) {
-		return false
-	}
-	for index := range left {
-		if left[index] != right[index] {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// parsePreservedState recovers the plan + skills from a prior summary's preserved
-// block. JSON escaping makes this lossless even when a skill body contains
-// markdown headings, code fences, or quotes. Returns ("", nil) when absent or
-// malformed.
-func parsePreservedState(summaryContent string) (string, []skillEntry) {
-	state := parsePreservedStateBlock(summaryContent)
-	return state.Plan, preservedSkillsToEntries(state.Skills)
-}
-
-// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
-// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
-// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
-// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
-// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
-// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
-// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
-// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
-// so the inactive path is stable.
-func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
-	return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
-}
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))

 	provider := &mockProvider{
 		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -169,37 +169,6 @@ func TestRunResetsEmptyTurnCounterOnToolCall(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-// The whole point of #702's fix: the unknown-session error's normalized
-// signature must not vary with the session id, so a model probing ids 1, 2,
-// 3, … produces one repeated signature the failure guard can count. If the id
-// leaked into the first 80 normalized chars, each probe would reset the streak
-// and the halt would never fire.
-func TestUnknownExecSessionErrorSignatureIsIDInvariant(t *testing.T) {
-	a := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(1))
-	b := errorSignature(tools.UnknownExecSessionError(999999))
-	if a != b {
-		t.Fatalf("unknown-session signature varies with id:\n  %q\n  %q", a, b)
-	}
-}
-
-// End to end: with an id-invariant signature, probing a different unknown id
-// each turn now trips the repeated-failure halt at toolFailureStopAt, where
-// before the fix it never would.
-func TestUnknownExecSessionProbingTripsFailureHalt(t *testing.T) {
-	var state guardState
-	var stoppedAt int
-	for i := 1; i <= toolFailureStopAt; i++ {
-		out := state.observeToolResult(tools.WriteStdinToolName, true, tools.UnknownExecSessionError(i))
-		if out.Stop {
-			stoppedAt = i
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if stoppedAt != toolFailureStopAt {
-		t.Fatalf("probing distinct unknown ids stopped at %d, want %d", stoppedAt, toolFailureStopAt)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestGuardStateResetsToolOnlyStreakOnEmptyNonToolTurn(t *testing.T) {
 	var state guardState
 	toolOnly := zeroruntime.CollectedStream{
@@ -260,7 +229,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsPlanNotCalledReminderForMultiStepTask(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))

 	provider := &mockProvider{
 		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -291,7 +260,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectPlanReminderForTrivialTask(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))

 	provider := &mockProvider{
 		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -319,7 +288,7 @@ func TestRunDoesNotInjectNotCalledReminderWhenPlanUsed(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
 	registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())

 	provider := &mockProvider{
@@ -349,7 +318,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsStalePlanReminderAfterManyToolCalls(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
 	registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())

 	// Turn 1 calls update_plan (so the not-called reminder never triggers), then
@@ -383,7 +352,7 @@ func TestRunStalePlanReminderIsOneShotPerInterval(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
 	registry.Register(tools.NewUpdatePlanTool())

 	turns := [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
@@ -418,7 +387,7 @@ func TestRunInjectsToolOnlyProgressReminder(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	writeAgentTestFile(t, root+"/notes.txt", "alpha")
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil))
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))

 	turns := make([][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent, 0, toolOnlyProgressReminderAt+1)
 	for i := 0; i < toolOnlyProgressReminderAt; i++ {
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -183,23 +182,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 	defer runPermissions.cleanup()

 	promptParts := buildSystemPromptParts(options)
-	planner := newContextPlanner(contextPlannerConfig{
-		contextWindow:  options.ContextWindow,
-		promptCacheKey: options.SessionID,
-		serviceTier:    options.ServiceTier,
-		promptParts:    promptParts,
-	})
 	messages := zeroruntime.SeedMessagesWithImages(promptParts.prompt, prompt, options.Images)

 	guards := newGuardState()
 	task := newTaskState(prompt, options.Trace)
-	onPermission := options.OnPermission
-	options.OnPermission = func(event PermissionEvent) {
-		task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: event})
-		if onPermission != nil {
-			onPermission(event)
-		}
-	}
 	compactor := newCompactionState(options, task)
 	defer func() {
 		// A final transcript comparison is observational. It records drift but
@@ -280,6 +266,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			})
 		}

+		// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
+		// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
+		// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
+		// the messages, so computing it before compaction is safe.
 		// Build the per-turn tool list first so proactive compaction can include
 		// the tool-definition tokens (they ride on every request) in its estimate.
 		// partitionTools depends only on registry/permissions/options/loaded, not on
@@ -288,15 +278,42 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		exposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
 		toolPartitionSpan.End()

+		// Fingerprint the exact system prompt built at run start plus this turn's
+		// provider-visible tool definitions in their emitted order. Reusing the
+		// retained prompt parts avoids rebuilding workspace context while ensuring
+		// the trace describes the same bytes carried by the request.
+		if options.Trace != nil {
+			fp := computePrefixFingerprint(buildPromptSubstringsFromParts(promptParts, exposed))
+			options.Trace.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
+				SystemPromptHash:       fp.SystemPromptHash,
+				BaseInstructionsHash:   fp.BaseInstructionsHash,
+				ConfirmationPolicyHash: fp.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
+				ProjectContextHash:     fp.ProjectContextHash,
+				SkillsHash:             fp.SkillsHash,
+				ToolsHash:              fp.ToolsHash,
+				SchemaHash:             fp.SchemaHash,
+				CompletePrefixHash:     fp.CompletePrefixHash,
+			})
+		}
+
 		// PROACTIVE compaction: if the history is approaching the model's
 		// context window, summarize the oldest middle before building the
 		// request. A no-op when ContextWindow == 0 (compaction disabled).
 		compactionSpan := options.Trace.Span(trace.SpanCompaction)
 		messages = compactor.maybeCompact(ctx, provider, messages, exposed)
 		compactionSpan.End()
-		plan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-		request := plan.Request
-		recordContextPlan(options, plan)
+		request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+			Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+			Tools:           exposed,
+			ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+			PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+		}
+
+		// Report the per-category context budget for this turn so a surface can
+		// show utilization. Opt-in: a no-op when OnContext is unset.
+		if options.OnContext != nil {
+			options.OnContext(MeasureContext(messages, request.Tools, options.ContextWindow))
+		}

 		// A transient upstream disconnect on the initial connect is retried with
 		// backoff (before any content is forwarded, so no OnText is duplicated);
@@ -321,9 +338,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// on registry+loaded, not on the messages, so they stay valid after
 				// compaction. Using the bare toolDefinitions here would route through an
 				// empty-loaded partition, re-hiding every already-loaded deferred tool.
-				retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-				request = retryPlan.Request
-				recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+				request = zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+					Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+					Tools:           exposed,
+					ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+					PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+				}
 				// Pre-content connect after a context-limit compaction: route through the
 				// reconnect helper so a transient upstream hiccup here doesn't fail the
 				// whole run and re-burn every token (AUDIT-L1).
@@ -407,9 +427,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// Reuse the SAME active-mode partition (exposed) from this turn rather
 				// than the bare toolDefinitions: exposed depends on registry+loaded (not
 				// the messages), so it stays valid after compaction.
-				retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-				retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
-				recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+				retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+					Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+					Tools:           exposed,
+					ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+					PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+				}
 				retryStream, retryStreamErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 				if retryStreamErr != nil {
 					return collected, retryStreamErr
@@ -467,9 +490,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, err
 			}
-			retryPlan := planner.Plan(messages, exposed, options.ReasoningEffort)
-			retryRequest := retryPlan.Request
-			recordContextPlan(options, retryPlan)
+			retryRequest := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+				Messages:        copyMessages(messages),
+				Tools:           exposed,
+				ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+				PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+			}
 			retryStream, retryErr := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, retryRequest, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 			if retryErr != nil {
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
@@ -633,13 +659,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		// between tool_results breaks strict provider replay) — same after-batch
 		// rationale as turnRequestedModel above.
 		var changedFilesThisBatch []string
-		// Images produced by tools this turn, held until every tool_result is
-		// recorded. They travel as user messages, and a user message between two
-		// tool_results breaks strict provider replay — Anthropic coalesces them
-		// into one user block list and requires the tool_result blocks first, so
-		// interleaving yields [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and a 400.
-		// Same reason the self-correction feedback below is deferred.
-		var toolImageMessages []zeroruntime.Message
 		// Parallel read-ahead state: results for calls[precomputedStart:precomputedEnd]
 		// executed concurrently, consumed strictly in order below.
 		var precomputed []precomputedToolResult
@@ -675,7 +694,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			}
 			options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterToolCalls, 1)
 			recordOutputBudgetTrace(options.Trace, toolResult)
-			task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: call.Arguments, toolResult: toolResult})
+			task.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, toolResult: toolResult})
 			if options.OnToolResult != nil {
 				options.OnToolResult(toolResult)
 			}
@@ -689,22 +708,10 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				turnRequestedModel = toolResult.RequestedModel
 			}
 			messages = append(messages, zeroruntime.Message{
-				Role:         zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
-				Content:      toolResult.ModelOutput(),
-				ToolCallID:   toolResult.ToolCallID,
-				IsError:      toolResult.Status == tools.StatusError,
-				ChangedFiles: append([]string(nil), toolResult.ChangedFiles...),
+				Role:       zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
+				Content:    toolResult.Output,
+				ToolCallID: toolResult.ToolCallID,
 			})
-			// Images ride a following USER message rather than the tool result
-			// above. Every provider drops images on a tool-role message —
-			// Anthropic's tool_result content is a string, Gemini's is a
-			// functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user role
-			// — so attaching them there would silently deliver nothing. A separate
-			// message also keeps the one-tool-result-per-tool-call pairing intact,
-			// which the providers validate.
-			if imageMessage, ok := toolResultImageMessage(toolResult); ok {
-				toolImageMessages = append(toolImageMessages, imageMessage)
-			}

 			// A tool may demand the run ABORT — a canceled/timed-out ask_user prompt
 			// returns context.Canceled rather than fabricating a headless answer. Stop
@@ -715,14 +722,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			}
 			if abortErr != nil {
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, abortErr
 			}
 			if stopReason := stopReasonFromToolResult(toolResult); stopReason != "" {
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
-				result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.ModelOutput()
+				result.FinalAnswer = toolResult.Output
 				result.StopReason = stopReason
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, nil
@@ -735,7 +740,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 			// aren't fixed by reformatting the call, so a "match this schema" hint
 			// would misdirect the model toward JSON shape or blocked behavior.
 			retriableFailure := isRetriableToolError(toolResult)
-			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.ModelOutput())
+			outcome := guards.observeToolResult(call.Name, retriableFailure, toolResult.Output)
 			posture.observeToolOutcome(outcome, toolResult)
 			if outcome.Stop {
 				// The assistant message advertised EVERY collected tool call, but
@@ -745,13 +750,12 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				// messages stay valid for a strict provider replay (Anthropic
 				// rejects a tool_use with no answering tool_result).
 				messages = appendAbortedToolResults(messages, collected.ToolCalls[index+1:])
-				messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
 				result.FinalAnswer = toolFailureStopAnswer(call.Name, outcome.Count)
 				result.Messages = copyMessages(messages)
 				return result, nil
 			}
 			if outcome.InjectHint && failureHint == "" {
-				failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.ModelOutput())
+				failureHint = toolFailureHint(call.Name, toolSchemaJSON(registry, call.Name), toolResult.Output)
 			}

 			// Collect the files this successful mutating tool changed. Self-correct
@@ -764,10 +768,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 				postEditDiagnostics.enqueue(ctx, toolResult.ChangedFiles)
 			}
 		}
-		// Every tool_result for this turn is now recorded, including aborted
-		// placeholders, so the images can follow without splitting them.
-		messages = append(messages, toolImageMessages...)
-		toolImageMessages = nil

 		// Run post-edit self-correction once over the union of files this turn
 		// changed, then append any feedback after every tool_result is recorded so
@@ -830,11 +830,6 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 					_ = session.Prewarm(ctx)
 					provider = sessionProvider{session: session}
 					options.Model = turnRequestedModel
-					// Service tiers are model capabilities. A successful escalation may
-					// target a model that does not support the tier selected before the
-					// switch, so let the destination use its default.
-					options.ServiceTier = ""
-					planner.config.serviceTier = ""
 					options.Trace.Counter(trace.CounterModelSwitches, 1)
 					// KNOWN LIMITATION (deferred): the compactor's context-window budget
 					// is fixed at run start from options.ContextWindow and is NOT updated
@@ -904,7 +899,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, prompt string, provider Provider, options Options)
 		})
 	}
 	finalExposed, _ := partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, toolDefCache)
-	if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, planner, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
+	if answer, finalMessages, finishReason := finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx, provider, messages, finalExposed, options); strings.TrimSpace(answer) != "" {
 		result.FinalAnswer = answer
 		result.FinishReason = finishReason
 		result.Messages = copyMessages(finalMessages)
@@ -928,21 +923,6 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
 	if recorder == nil || result.Meta["output_budget_category"] == "" {
 		return
 	}
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		diagnostics := result.Outcome.Diagnostics
-		recorder.EmitOutputBudget(trace.OutputBudgetEvent{
-			Tool:                    result.Name,
-			Category:                diagnostics.Category,
-			OriginalBytes:           diagnostics.OriginalBytes,
-			RetainedBytes:           diagnostics.ModelBytes,
-			EstimatedOriginalTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedOriginalTokens,
-			EstimatedRetainedTokens: diagnostics.EstimatedModelTokens,
-			Truncated:               diagnostics.Truncated,
-			Reason:                  diagnostics.Reason,
-			SpillCreated:            result.Outcome.Artifact != nil,
-		})
-		return
-	}
 	parseInt := func(key string) int {
 		value, _ := strconv.Atoi(result.Meta[key])
 		return value
@@ -961,32 +941,7 @@ func recordOutputBudgetTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, result ToolResult) {
 	})
 }

-func recordContextPlan(options Options, plan contextPlan) {
-	recordContextPlanTrace(options.Trace, plan)
-	if options.OnContext != nil {
-		options.OnContext(plan.Breakdown)
-	}
-}
-
-func recordContextPlanTrace(recorder *trace.Recorder, plan contextPlan) {
-	if recorder == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	fingerprint := plan.PrefixFingerprint
-	recorder.EmitPrefixHash(trace.PrefixHash{
-		SystemPromptHash:       fingerprint.SystemPromptHash,
-		BaseInstructionsHash:   fingerprint.BaseInstructionsHash,
-		ConfirmationPolicyHash: fingerprint.ConfirmationPolicyHash,
-		ProjectContextHash:     fingerprint.ProjectContextHash,
-		SkillsHash:             fingerprint.SkillsHash,
-		ToolsHash:              fingerprint.ToolsHash,
-		SchemaHash:             fingerprint.SchemaHash,
-		CompletePrefixHash:     fingerprint.CompletePrefixHash,
-		InvalidationReason:     plan.Breakdown.PrefixInvalidationReason,
-	})
-}
-
-func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *contextPlanner, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
+func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, messages []zeroruntime.Message, toolDefs []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, options Options) (string, []zeroruntime.Message, string) {
 	finalMessages := copyMessages(messages)
 	finalMessages = append(finalMessages, zeroruntime.Message{
 		Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
@@ -995,9 +950,12 @@ func finalAnswerAfterMaxTurns(ctx context.Context, provider Provider, planner *c
 	// The max-turns final-answer call is a pre-content connect, often after a long
 	// autonomous/cron run — route it through the reconnect helper so a single
 	// transient hiccup doesn't drop the final summary (AUDIT-L1).
-	plan := planner.Plan(finalMessages, toolDefs, options.ReasoningEffort)
-	recordContextPlan(options, plan)
-	stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, plan.Request, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
+	stream, err := streamWithReconnect(ctx, provider, zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages:        copyMessages(finalMessages),
+		Tools:           toolDefs,
+		ReasoningEffort: options.ReasoningEffort,
+		PromptCacheKey:  options.SessionID,
+	}, reconnectNoticeFor(options))
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", messages, ""
 	}
@@ -1121,9 +1079,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			}, nil
 		}
 	}
-	if isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
-		normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args, options.Cwd, options.Sandbox)
-	}
 	// tool_search is the gateway to the allowlisted deferred tools, so a non-empty
 	// EnabledTools allowlist that omits it must NOT reject the call — otherwise the
 	// discovery tool exposed to the model rejects at dispatch time (an inescapable
@@ -1140,13 +1095,12 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		}, nil
 	}
 	tool, toolFound := registry.Get(call.Name)
-	if (permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan) && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
-		modeName := string(permissionMode)
+	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft && toolFound && !ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode) {
 		return ToolResult{
 			ToolCallID:   call.ID,
 			Name:         call.Name,
 			Status:       tools.StatusError,
-			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + modeName + ` mode.`,
+			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in spec-draft mode.`,
 			DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
 		}, nil
 	}
@@ -1216,17 +1170,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			decisionCommandPrefix = grant.Prefix
 		}
 	}
-	// An explicit additional-permissions request is an elevation only when it
-	// expands the current effective policy. If the same capability was already
-	// approved for this session, reuse that grant across equivalent commands
-	// instead of prompting again merely because their command prefixes differ.
-	if toolFound && !permissionGranted && isShellCommandTool(call.Name) && options.Sandbox != nil {
-		if profile, requested, profileErr := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); profileErr == nil && requested && options.Sandbox.CoversRequestPermissions(profile) {
-			permissionGranted = true
-			decisionAction = PermissionDecisionAllowForSession
-			decisionReason = "requested sandbox capabilities already granted for this session"
-		}
-	}

 	var preflightDecision *sandbox.Decision
 	if toolFound && options.Sandbox != nil {
@@ -1403,8 +1346,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
 		// Per-session file version tracker so write_file/edit_file refuse to clobber
 		// a file that changed on disk outside Zero since it was last read.
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
+		FileTracker: options.FileTracker,
 		// Post-edit diagnostics are NOT forwarded to the tools: they used to run
 		// synchronously inside edit_file/write_file and block every mutating tool
 		// call on the language server (≥300ms debounce floor, 10s cap). The loop
@@ -1456,7 +1398,6 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			result = registry.RebudgetAfterHook(call.Name, args, result)
 		}
 	}
-	result = registry.CommitFileObservation(result, options.FileTracker)
 	// Stamp the sandbox risk classification for this EXECUTED call so run-policy
 	// observers can see the risk of an allowed mutation. Prefer the preflight
 	// decision's classification when the sandbox evaluated the call; otherwise
@@ -1475,20 +1416,17 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 	// the agent loop and the MCP server pass through), so result.Output is
 	// already redacted here and result.Redacted reflects whether it changed.
 	return ToolResult{
-		Risk:            executedRisk,
-		ToolCallID:      call.ID,
-		Name:            call.Name,
-		Status:          result.Status,
-		Output:          result.ModelOutput(),
-		Truncated:       result.Truncated,
-		Meta:            result.Meta,
-		Images:          result.Images,
-		Redacted:        result.Redacted,
-		ChangedFiles:    result.ChangedFiles,
-		ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
-		Display:         result.HumanDisplay(),
-		Outcome:         result.Outcome,
-		LoadedTools:     loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
+		Risk:         executedRisk,
+		ToolCallID:   call.ID,
+		Name:         call.Name,
+		Status:       result.Status,
+		Output:       result.Output,
+		Truncated:    result.Truncated,
+		Meta:         result.Meta,
+		Redacted:     result.Redacted,
+		ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
+		Display:      result.Display,
+		LoadedTools:  loadedToolsFromResult(result.Meta),
 		// A tool may signal a mid-run model escalation by carrying the target id
 		// in Meta["escalate_to_model"]. Lift it into the typed loop-level field;
 		// the Run turn loop performs the actual provider switch. Empty for every
@@ -1608,15 +1546,8 @@ func sandboxDeniedNetworkRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, resu
 	if options.Sandbox == nil || !isShellCommandTool(call.Name) {
 		return false
 	}
-	if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
-		denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
-		if denial == nil || denial.Capability.Kind != execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork {
-			return false
-		}
-	} else {
-		if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
-			return false
-		}
+	if result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] != "true" || result.Meta[tools.SandboxDenialKindMeta] != tools.SandboxDenialKindNetwork {
+		return false
 	}
 	if value, _ := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated) {
 		return false
@@ -1669,17 +1600,6 @@ func sandboxRestrictedShellRetryCandidate(call ToolCall, args map[string]any, re
 }

 func sandboxDeniedShellResult(result tools.Result) bool {
-	if result.ExecutionOutcome != nil {
-		// Only a typed platform denial that explicitly requests unrestricted
-		// recovery may enter the legacy retry path. Narrow capability denials
-		// remain on their exact capability path.
-		denial := result.ExecutionOutcome.Denial
-		return denial != nil &&
-			denial.Source == execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox &&
-			denial.Capability.Kind == execution.CapabilityUnrestricted &&
-			denial.Recoverable &&
-			denial.NextAction == execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval
-	}
 	return result.Status == tools.StatusError && result.Meta[tools.SandboxLikelyDeniedMeta] == "true"
 }

@@ -1743,21 +1663,20 @@ func sandboxRestrictionRetryReason(result tools.Result) string {

 func runToolForNetworkRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
 	return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, cloneArgs(args), tools.RunOptions{
-		PermissionGranted:          true,
-		PermissionMode:             string(permissionMode),
-		Autonomy:                   options.Autonomy,
-		Sandbox:                    options.Sandbox,
-		ToolCallID:                 toolCallID,
-		SessionID:                  options.SessionID,
-		Model:                      options.Model,
-		ReasoningEffort:            options.ReasoningEffort,
-		Depth:                      options.Depth,
-		Cwd:                        options.Cwd,
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
-		EnabledTools:               options.EnabledTools,
-		DisabledTools:              options.DisabledTools,
-		Progress:                   progressCallback,
+		PermissionGranted: true,
+		PermissionMode:    string(permissionMode),
+		Autonomy:          options.Autonomy,
+		Sandbox:           options.Sandbox,
+		ToolCallID:        toolCallID,
+		SessionID:         options.SessionID,
+		Model:             options.Model,
+		ReasoningEffort:   options.ReasoningEffort,
+		Depth:             options.Depth,
+		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
+		FileTracker:       options.FileTracker,
+		EnabledTools:      options.EnabledTools,
+		DisabledTools:     options.DisabledTools,
+		Progress:          progressCallback,
 	})
 }

@@ -1772,21 +1691,20 @@ func unsandboxedRetryArgs(args map[string]any) map[string]any {

 func runToolForUnsandboxedRetry(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, name string, toolCallID string, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, progressCallback func(streamjson.Event)) tools.Result {
 	return registry.RunWithOptions(ctx, name, args, tools.RunOptions{
-		PermissionGranted:          true,
-		PermissionMode:             string(permissionMode),
-		Autonomy:                   options.Autonomy,
-		Sandbox:                    options.Sandbox,
-		ToolCallID:                 toolCallID,
-		SessionID:                  options.SessionID,
-		Model:                      options.Model,
-		ReasoningEffort:            options.ReasoningEffort,
-		Depth:                      options.Depth,
-		Cwd:                        options.Cwd,
-		FileTracker:                options.FileTracker,
-		DeferFileObservationCommit: true,
-		EnabledTools:               options.EnabledTools,
-		DisabledTools:              options.DisabledTools,
-		Progress:                   progressCallback,
+		PermissionGranted: true,
+		PermissionMode:    string(permissionMode),
+		Autonomy:          options.Autonomy,
+		Sandbox:           options.Sandbox,
+		ToolCallID:        toolCallID,
+		SessionID:         options.SessionID,
+		Model:             options.Model,
+		ReasoningEffort:   options.ReasoningEffort,
+		Depth:             options.Depth,
+		Cwd:               options.Cwd,
+		FileTracker:       options.FileTracker,
+		EnabledTools:      options.EnabledTools,
+		DisabledTools:     options.DisabledTools,
+		Progress:          progressCallback,
 	})
 }

@@ -1810,46 +1728,23 @@ func toolResultFromPrePermissionReject(call ToolCall, result tools.Result) ToolR
 	}

 	return ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID:      call.ID,
-		Name:            call.Name,
-		Status:          result.Status,
-		Output:          output,
-		Truncated:       result.Truncated,
-		Meta:            meta,
-		Redacted:        result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
-		ChangedFiles:    result.ChangedFiles,
-		ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
-		Display:         display,
-		LoadedTools:     loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
-		RequestedModel:  meta["escalate_to_model"],
+		ToolCallID:     call.ID,
+		Name:           call.Name,
+		Status:         result.Status,
+		Output:         output,
+		Truncated:      result.Truncated,
+		Meta:           meta,
+		Redacted:       result.Redacted || outputRedacted || summaryRedacted || metaRedacted,
+		ChangedFiles:   result.ChangedFiles,
+		Display:        display,
+		LoadedTools:    loadedToolsFromResult(meta),
+		RequestedModel: meta["escalate_to_model"],
 	}
 }

-// hooksSuppressed reports whether advisory (non-veto) hooks must not run for
-// this run's permission mode. Plan mode promises a read-only turn, but
-// sessionStart/sessionEnd/afterTool hooks execute configured host commands
-// outside the advertised-tool and sandbox gates, so dispatching them would let
-// merely starting a plan session or finishing a read mutate the workspace.
-//
-// beforeTool is intentionally NOT suppressed: a non-zero exit is a deny gate,
-// and skipping it fails open (operators who block secret-file reads via
-// beforeTool would lose that protection under /plan on). See dispatchBeforeTool.
-//
-// Spec-draft keeps the existing trust-gated hook model: project hooks still
-// fire when the workspace (or its worktree trust root) is trusted. That is
-// intentional; trust inheritance for --use-spec --worktree is covered by
-// TestExecSpecWorktreeInheritsTrustEndToEnd.
-func hooksSuppressed(options Options) bool {
-	return options.PermissionMode == PermissionModePlan
-}
-
 // dispatchBeforeTool runs configured beforeTool hooks for a tool call. A hook
 // that exits non-zero vetoes the call: the returned bool is true and the tool
 // must not run. A nil dispatcher (no hooks wired) is a no-op.
-//
-// Unlike advisory hooks, beforeTool still runs under plan mode. Suppressing it
-// would fail open: a project policy that blocks reads of secrets via
-// beforeTool would silently stop applying the moment permission mode is plan.
 func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any) (hooks.DispatchOutcome, bool) {
 	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return hooks.DispatchOutcome{}, false
@@ -1874,7 +1769,7 @@ func dispatchBeforeTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, arg
 // returns any advisory output (e.g. a formatter or vet result) to surface back
 // to the model. afterTool hooks never block. A nil dispatcher is a no-op.
 func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, result tools.Result) string {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return ""
 	}
 	outcome := options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -1898,7 +1793,7 @@ func dispatchAfterTool(ctx context.Context, options Options, call ToolCall, args
 // model turn. Lifecycle hooks are advisory: dispatcher failures are audited but
 // never block the run.
 func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	options.Hooks.Dispatch(ctx, hooks.DispatchInput{
@@ -1919,7 +1814,7 @@ func dispatchSessionStart(ctx context.Context, options Options) {
 // dispatchSessionEnd runs configured sessionEnd hooks once when the agent run
 // exits, including early error returns. Lifecycle hooks are advisory.
 func dispatchSessionEnd(ctx context.Context, options Options, result Result, runErr error) {
-	if options.Hooks == nil || hooksSuppressed(options) {
+	if options.Hooks == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	payload := map[string]any{
@@ -2103,17 +1998,15 @@ func askUserFallbackResult(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call T
 			Cwd:               options.Cwd,
 		})
 		return ToolResult{
-			ToolCallID:      call.ID,
-			Name:            call.Name,
-			Status:          result.Status,
-			Output:          result.ModelOutput(),
-			Truncated:       result.Truncated,
-			Meta:            result.Meta,
-			Redacted:        result.Redacted,
-			ChangedFiles:    result.ChangedFiles,
-			ChangeSummaries: result.ChangeSummaries,
-			Display:         result.HumanDisplay(),
-			Outcome:         result.Outcome,
+			ToolCallID:   call.ID,
+			Name:         call.Name,
+			Status:       result.Status,
+			Output:       result.Output,
+			Truncated:    result.Truncated,
+			Meta:         result.Meta,
+			Redacted:     result.Redacted,
+			ChangedFiles: result.ChangedFiles,
+			Display:      result.Display,
 		}
 	}
 	return ToolResult{
@@ -2219,20 +2112,6 @@ type requestPermissionsArgs struct {
 }

 func executeRequestPermissions(ctx context.Context, call ToolCall, args map[string]any, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options) (ToolResult, error) {
-	// request_permissions is dispatched by name above, before the registry-based
-	// ToolAdvertised gate runs, so a read-only mode's registry omitting this tool
-	// (rather than registering it as denied) must not fall through to a real
-	// grant. Deny it here unconditionally for spec-draft/plan, independent of
-	// whether the caller's registry happens to contain the tool.
-	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
-		return ToolResult{
-			ToolCallID:   call.ID,
-			Name:         call.Name,
-			Status:       tools.StatusError,
-			Output:       `Error: Tool "` + call.Name + `" is not available in ` + string(permissionMode) + ` mode.`,
-			DenialReason: DenialFiltered,
-		}, nil
-	}
 	parsed, err := parseRequestPermissionsArgs(args)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ToolResult{
@@ -2691,8 +2570,7 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
 	if profile, ok, err := inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args, options.Cwd); ok && err == nil {
 		scopeText = requestPermissionsScope(profile)
 	}
-	decisionReason := strings.TrimSpace(reason)
-	reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason, safety.Reason)
+	reason = userFacingPermissionReason(call.Name, args, reason)

 	return PermissionEvent{
 		ToolCallID:        call.ID,
@@ -2705,7 +2583,6 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
 		Autonomy:          options.Autonomy,
 		SideEffect:        string(safety.SideEffect),
 		Reason:            reason,
-		DecisionReason:    decisionReason,
 		Scope:             scopeText,
 		Risk:              risk,
 		Block:             block,
@@ -2715,31 +2592,18 @@ func buildPermissionEvent(call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, p
 	}, true
 }

-func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string, fallback string) string {
+func userFacingPermissionReason(toolName string, args map[string]any, reason string) string {
 	reason = strings.TrimSpace(reason)
-	if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
+	if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) || !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
 		return reason
 	}
-
-	// Policy and sandbox explanations are authoritative. The tool's static
-	// safety copy is only an internal fallback; presenting it as the reason for
-	// every ordinary shell approval makes prompts generic and obscures the cases
-	// where policy has an actionable explanation.
-	fallback = strings.TrimSpace(fallback)
-	if reason != "" && reason != fallback && reason != "tool requires approval before execution" && reason != sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
-		return reason
+	if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
+		return justification
 	}
-
-	if shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
-		if justification, ok := firstStringArg(args, "justification"); ok {
-			return justification
-		}
+	if reason == "" || reason == sandbox.ReasonEscalatedSandboxRequired {
 		return "This command needs to run outside the sandbox."
 	}
-
-	// Ordinary shell approvals need no invented explanation. The raw fallback is
-	// retained separately as DecisionReason for traces and policy auditing.
-	return ""
+	return reason
 }

 func grantDecisionAction(grant *sandbox.Grant) PermissionDecisionAction {
@@ -2778,36 +2642,9 @@ func permissionRequestFromEvent(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, opti
 		Grant:              event.Grant,
 		CommandPrefix:      append([]string(nil), event.CommandPrefix...),
 		AvailableDecisions: availablePermissionDecisions(event, args, options),
-		// Computed from the SAME conditions shellExecutionArgsForApproval uses,
-		// so the prompt cannot claim an escalation that will not happen or stay
-		// silent about one that will. Keeping the two in step matters more than
-		// the wording: a label that overstates gets ignored, and one that
-		// understates is the bug being fixed.
-		PrefixApprovalEscalates: shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(event.ToolName, args, options),
 	}
 }

-// shellPrefixApprovalEscalates reports whether approving a command prefix would
-// also take this command out of the sandbox.
-//
-// Deliberately mirrors shellExecutionArgsForApproval's guards rather than
-// re-deriving them: same tool test, same sandbox availability test, and the same
-// two opt-outs for a call that already asked for additional permissions or
-// escalation. Those already carry their own disclosure, so labelling them again
-// would be noise.
-func shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(toolName string, args map[string]any, options Options) bool {
-	if !isShellCommandTool(toolName) {
-		return false
-	}
-	if options.Sandbox == nil || !options.Sandbox.UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed() {
-		return false
-	}
-	if shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) || shellCommandRequiresEscalated(args) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
 func availablePermissionDecisions(event PermissionEvent, args map[string]any, options Options) []PermissionDecisionAction {
 	if event.Action != PermissionActionPrompt {
 		return nil
@@ -2867,89 +2704,21 @@ func shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args map[string]any) bool {
 	return strings.TrimSpace(value) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 }

-// normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions treats a provider-expanded empty or
-// already-covered additional_permissions object as if it had been omitted.
-// Some strict-schema providers materialize every optional property and may add
-// a workspace read that the default sandbox already grants; rejecting either
-// no-op makes the model retry an otherwise valid command. Requests that broaden
-// access and malformed payloads are left untouched so validation stays closed.
-func normalizeNoopAdditionalPermissions(args map[string]any, basePath string, engine *sandbox.Engine) {
-	raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]
-	if !exists {
-		return
-	}
-	// An explicit null is the field omitted, not a request: drop the key so the
-	// rest of the pipeline sees the same args a model that omitted it would send.
-	// sandbox_permissions is deliberately left alone — a flagged null must reach
-	// the same "no additional_permissions object was provided" error as a flagged
-	// absent field rather than being silently downgraded to a different outcome.
-	if raw == nil {
-		delete(args, "additional_permissions")
-		return
-	}
-	data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	var profile sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &profile); err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	normalized, err := sandbox.NormalizeRequestPermissionProfile(profile, basePath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	noop := normalized.Empty()
-	if !noop && engine != nil {
-		if grantProfile, grantErr := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized); grantErr == nil {
-			noop = engine.CoversRequestPermissions(grantProfile)
-		}
-	}
-	if !noop {
-		return
-	}
-	delete(args, "additional_permissions")
-	if rawMode, ok := args["sandbox_permissions"].(string); ok &&
-		strings.TrimSpace(rawMode) == string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions) {
-		args["sandbox_permissions"] = string(tools.SandboxPermissionsUseDefault)
-	}
-}
-
-// omitAdditionalPermissionsHint is the one instruction that ends the retry loop
-// in #845/#847. Every additional_permissions rejection must carry it: the model
-// reaches these errors by attaching a permission object to a command that needs
-// none, so "omit it and retry" is the answer in practice, and an error that
-// only explains how to build a VALID permission object sends the model round
-// the loop again with a different invalid shape.
-const omitAdditionalPermissionsHint = "If this command does not need extra sandbox access — ordinary " +
-	"read-only commands such as `git branch --show-current` do not — omit both sandbox_permissions and " +
-	"additional_permissions entirely and retry; that is the fix in almost every case."
-
 func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile, bool, error) {
 	if !shellCommandAdditionalPermissionsRequested(args) {
-		// An explicit null grants nothing and carries no flag, so it is
-		// indistinguishable from an omitted field; rejecting it would be a pure
-		// false positive against providers that materialize every optional
-		// property.
-		if raw, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists && raw != nil {
-			return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
-				"additional_permissions was provided without sandbox_permissions set to %q, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
-					"Only if the command genuinely needs file or network access the sandbox denies, resend with "+
-					`sandbox_permissions: %q AND a non-empty additional_permissions, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}}`,
-				tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
-				omitAdditionalPermissionsHint,
-				tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
+		if _, exists := args["additional_permissions"]; exists {
+			return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, fmt.Errorf("additional_permissions requires sandbox_permissions set to %q", tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 		}
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, false, nil
 	}
 	raw, ok := args["additional_permissions"]
 	if !ok || raw == nil {
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
-			"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. %s "+
-				`Otherwise include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
-				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
-			tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions,
-			omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
+			"sandbox_permissions was set to %q but no additional_permissions object was provided. "+
+				`Include one, for example additional_permissions: {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
+				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}. If this command does not need elevated permissions, `+
+				"omit sandbox_permissions entirely and retry",
+			tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)
 	}
 	data, err := json.Marshal(raw)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -2965,10 +2734,8 @@ func inlineAdditionalPermissionsProfile(args map[string]any, basePath string) (s
 	}
 	if normalized.Empty() {
 		return sandbox.RequestPermissionProfile{}, true, fmt.Errorf(
-			"additional_permissions granted nothing, so it cannot be applied. %s "+
-				`Otherwise include a real permission, for example {"network": {"enabled": true}} or `+
-				`{"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`,
-			omitAdditionalPermissionsHint)
+			"additional_permissions must include at least one of network or file_system, for example " +
+				`{"network": {"enabled": true}} or {"file_system": {"write": ["/path"]}}`)
 	}
 	grantProfile, err := sandbox.RequestPermissionGrantProfile(normalized)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -3057,6 +2824,19 @@ func permissionActionFromSandbox(action sandbox.Action) PermissionAction {
 	}
 }

+// partitionTools builds the per-turn advertised tool list and optional
+// tool_search discovery text. INACTIVE (DeferThreshold <= 0 or the eligible count is
+// below it): every visible tool is exposed with its full schema EXCEPT tool_search
+// (dropped so it is never advertised when it cannot help), and the discovery text is
+// empty — byte-identical to the pre-deferral output. ACTIVE: a deferred-eligible
+// tool is exposed only when loaded[name]; otherwise it is hidden and searchable
+// through tool_search. Non-deferred tools (including tool_search) are always
+// exposed. The exposed slice is alpha-sorted by name, matching the legacy order
+// so the inactive path is stable.
+func partitionTools(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMode, options Options, loaded map[string]bool) ([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, string) {
+	return partitionToolsCached(registry, permissionMode, options, loaded, nil)
+}
+
 // partitionToolsCached is partitionTools with an optional per-tool definition
 // cache. The partitioning itself (visibility, deferral, ordering) is recomputed
 // every call — it must be, because a tool's deferred state can flip mid-run (e.g.
@@ -3127,20 +2907,22 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
 	//   2. tool_search — always present, right after the stable block;
 	//   3. loaded deferred tools, alpha-sorted — APPENDED, so an unloaded->loaded
 	//      transition grows the tail instead of inserting into the eager block.
-	// tool_search's compact catalog also stays byte-stable as tools load, so only
-	// the appended full-schema tail changes.
+	// (tool_search's discovery text still shrinks as tools load, so keeping it and
+	// the loaded tail AFTER the eager block preserves the eager tools' cache across a
+	// load; fully stabilizing the loader's own description is a scoped follow-up.)
 	eager := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0, len(visible))
 	loadedTail := make([]zeroruntime.ToolDefinition, 0)
-	var deferredCatalog []tools.Tool
+	var hiddenTools []tools.Tool
 	for _, tool := range visible {
 		name := tool.Name()
 		if name == tools.ToolSearchToolName {
 			continue // added explicitly between the eager block and the loaded tail
 		}
 		if tools.IsDeferred(tool) {
-			deferredCatalog = append(deferredCatalog, tool)
 			if loaded[name] {
 				loadedTail = append(loadedTail, cachedRuntimeToolDefinition(defCache, tool))
+			} else {
+				hiddenTools = append(hiddenTools, tool)
 			}
 			continue
 		}
@@ -3153,16 +2935,15 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
 		return loadedTail[left].Name < loadedTail[right].Name
 	})

-	// Keep the catalog byte-stable as tools load. tool_search already redirects
-	// requests for an exposed tool back to the current tool list, so retaining
-	// loaded names costs only compact catalog lines and avoids invalidating the
-	// provider cache at the loader definition on every load.
-	discovery := tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(deferredCatalog)
+	discovery := ""
+	if len(hiddenTools) > 0 {
+		discovery = tools.BuildToolSearchDescription(hiddenTools)
+	}

 	// tool_search is guaranteed runnable on the active path, so it is ALWAYS exposed
 	// — even when a non-empty EnabledTools allowlist omits it (the operator
 	// allowlisted the deferred tools, not the loader). It sits right after the stable
-	// eager block and carries the stable deferred-tool catalog.
+	// eager block and carries the discovery list for still-hidden tools.
 	description := loader.Description()
 	if discovery != "" {
 		description = discovery
@@ -3289,17 +3070,11 @@ func propertyToRuntimeMap(property tools.PropertySchema) map[string]any {
 }

 func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
-	// Denied tools are never advertised in any mode. Keep this short-circuit
-	// here so auto/member-auto/ask/unsafe all honor it before mode branches;
-	// tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode repeats it for the tool_search path
-	// which never enters this function.
 	if tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionDeny {
 		return false
 	}
-	// plan/spec-draft policy lives in tools so tool_search and the dispatch
-	// gate cannot drift. PermissionDeny was already checked above.
-	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft || permissionMode == PermissionModePlan {
-		return tools.ToolAdvertisedForPermissionMode(tool, string(permissionMode))
+	if permissionMode == PermissionModeSpecDraft {
+		return toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool)
 	}
 	if permissionMode == PermissionModeAuto {
 		return tool.Safety().Permission == tools.PermissionAllow || tool.Safety().AdvertiseInAuto
@@ -3322,6 +3097,17 @@ func ToolAdvertised(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode) bool {
 	return true
 }

+func toolAdvertisedInSpecDraft(tool tools.Tool) bool {
+	switch tool.Name() {
+	case "ask_user", "submit_spec":
+		return true
+	case "update_plan":
+		return false
+	}
+	safety := tool.Safety()
+	return safety.SideEffect == tools.SideEffectRead && safety.Permission == tools.PermissionAllow
+}
+
 func stopReasonFromToolResult(result ToolResult) StopReason {
 	if result.Meta == nil {
 		return ""
@@ -3360,7 +3146,6 @@ func appendAbortedToolResults(messages []Message, remaining []ToolCall) []Messag
 			Role:       zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool,
 			Content:    abortedToolResultNotice,
 			ToolCallID: call.ID,
-			IsError:    true,
 		})
 	}
 	return messages
@@ -3391,46 +3176,9 @@ func copyMessages(messages []Message) []Message {
 		if message.Reasoning != nil {
 			copied[index].Reasoning = append([]zeroruntime.ReasoningBlock{}, message.Reasoning...)
 		}
-		if message.ChangedFiles != nil {
-			copied[index].ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), message.ChangedFiles...)
-		}
 		// Deep-copy image attachments (slice AND each Data byte slice) so the
 		// raw image bytes are never aliased across history/request/result copies.
 		copied[index].Images = zeroruntime.CloneImageBlocks(message.Images)
 	}
 	return copied
 }
-
-// toolResultImageMessage builds the user message that carries a tool's images
-// to the model, or reports false when the tool produced none.
-//
-// The text names the tool so the model can tell which call an image came from
-// when several ran in one turn — the images arrive detached from their tool
-// result, so nothing else associates them.
-func toolResultImageMessage(result ToolResult) (zeroruntime.Message, bool) {
-	images := make([]zeroruntime.ImageBlock, 0, len(result.Images))
-	for _, image := range result.Images {
-		if len(image.Data) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		mediaType := zeroruntime.NormalizeImageMediaType(image.MediaType)
-		if mediaType == "" {
-			// Outside the provider allow-list. Dropping it beats sending bytes a
-			// provider will reject and failing the whole turn.
-			continue
-		}
-		images = append(images, zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: mediaType, Data: image.Data})
-	}
-	if len(images) == 0 {
-		return zeroruntime.Message{}, false
-	}
-	label := result.Name
-	if label == "" {
-		label = "tool"
-	}
-	return zeroruntime.Message{
-		Role:    zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser,
-		Content: "Image output from " + label + ":",
-		Images:  images,
-	}, true
-}
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package agent
 import (
 	"context"
 	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -20,16 +19,6 @@ type propagationOutputTool struct {

 func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
 	for index, arg := range os.Args {
-		if arg == "--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat" && index+1 < len(os.Args) {
-			repeats, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Args[index+1])
-			if err != nil {
-				os.Exit(2)
-			}
-			if _, err := os.Stdout.WriteString(strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)); err != nil {
-				os.Exit(2)
-			}
-			os.Exit(0)
-		}
 		if arg != "--zero-output-budget-hook" || index+1 >= len(os.Args) {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -41,102 +30,25 @@ func TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func largeOutputBudgetHookDispatcher() *hooks.Dispatcher {
-	return outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("propagation_output", 200)
-}
-
-func outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor(toolName string, repeats int) *hooks.Dispatcher {
-	feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", repeats)
-	hookArgs := []string{
-		"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
-		"--",
-		"--zero-output-budget-hook",
-		feedback,
-	}
-	if repeats > 1_000 {
-		hookArgs = []string{
-			"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
-			"--",
-			"--zero-output-budget-hook-repeat",
-			strconv.Itoa(repeats),
-		}
-	}
+	feedback := strings.Repeat("hook feedback ", 200)
 	return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{Config: hooks.Config{
 		Enabled: true,
 		Hooks: []hooks.Definition{{
 			ID:      "large-feedback",
 			Event:   hooks.EventAfterTool,
-			Matcher: toolName,
+			Matcher: "propagation_output",
 			Command: os.Args[0],
-			Args:    hookArgs,
+			Args: []string{
+				"-test.run=TestOutputBudgetHookHelperProcess",
+				"--",
+				"--zero-output-budget-hook",
+				feedback,
+			},
 			Enabled: true,
 		}},
 	}})
 }

-func TestExecuteToolCallCommitsReadObservationAfterFinalBoundary(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
-	if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-	}
-	resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
-
-	result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
-		ID: "read-small", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
-	}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker})
-	if abortErr != nil || result.Status != tools.StatusOK {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: result=%#v err=%v", result, abortErr)
-	}
-	if !tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
-		t.Fatal("unmodified final read output was not committed as observed")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExecuteToolCallDoesNotCommitReadObservationBeforeHookBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_TOOL_OUTPUT_CEILING_TOKENS", "80")
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte("known content\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	linkPath := filepath.Join(root, "small.txt")
-	if err := os.Symlink(targetPath, linkPath); err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-	}
-	resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(linkPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root))
-	tracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
-
-	result, abortErr := executeToolCall(context.Background(), registry, ToolCall{
-		ID: "read-hook", Name: "read_file", Arguments: `{"path":"small.txt"}`,
-	}, PermissionModeAuto, Options{
-		Cwd: root, FileTracker: tracker, Hooks: outputBudgetHookDispatcherFor("read_file", 20_000),
-	})
-	if abortErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("executeToolCall: %v", abortErr)
-	}
-	if !result.Truncated {
-		t.Fatalf("precondition: hook feedback was not truncated: %#v", result)
-	}
-	if tracker.SeenWhole(resolvedPath) {
-		t.Fatal("read observation committed before hook output was budgeted")
-	}
-}
-
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Name() string        { return "propagation_output" }
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Description() string { return "returns output for propagation tests" }
 func (tool propagationOutputTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestPartitionToolsActiveAppendsLoadedToolAfterEagerBlock(t *testing.T) {
 	// "read_file".
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(tools.NewScopedReadFileTool(root, nil)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
+	registry.Register(tools.NewReadFileTool(root)) // non-deferred, "read_file"
 	registry.Register(fakeToolSearchTool{})
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__alpha", desc: "alpha"})
 	registry.Register(fakeDeferredTool{name: "mcp__srv__beta", desc: "beta"})
@@ -68,61 +68,3 @@ func TestBuildPermissionEventKeepsAllowForOrdinaryAllowedCommand(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("shouldRequestPermission must be false for an ordinary sandbox-allowed command")
 	}
 }
-
-func TestBuildPermissionEventReusesCoveredAdditionalPermissions(t *testing.T) {
-	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_3", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"command":             "npm install",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions),
-		"additional_permissions": map[string]any{
-			"network": map[string]any{"enabled": true},
-		},
-	}
-	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
-
-	if shouldRequestPermission(promptShellTool{}, args, true, decision) {
-		t.Fatal("an already-covered capability must not trigger another prompt")
-	}
-	event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, true, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("covered capability should still produce an auditable allow event")
-	}
-	if event.Action != PermissionActionAllow {
-		t.Fatalf("Action = %q, want allow for an already-covered capability", event.Action)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildPermissionEventOmitsGenericShellReasonFromPrompt(t *testing.T) {
-	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_4", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
-	args := map[string]any{"command": "make test"}
-	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: "runs a shell command"}
-
-	event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("generic shell approval must produce an event")
-	}
-	if event.Reason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want omitted generic tool text", event.Reason)
-	}
-	if event.DecisionReason != "runs a shell command" {
-		t.Fatalf("decision reason = %q, want raw audit reason retained", event.DecisionReason)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildPermissionEventPrefersPolicyReasonOverModelJustification(t *testing.T) {
-	call := ToolCall{ID: "call_5", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{}`}
-	args := map[string]any{
-		"command":             "curl https://example.test",
-		"sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated),
-		"justification":       "Run without sandboxing.",
-	}
-	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionPrompt, Reason: sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked}
-
-	event, ok := buildPermissionEvent(call, promptShellTool{}, args, false, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, decision)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("policy approval must produce an event")
-	}
-	if event.Reason != sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked {
-		t.Fatalf("user-facing reason = %q, want policy reason %q", event.Reason, sandbox.ReasonNetworkBlocked)
-	}
-}
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-)
-
-// escalatingEngine allows unsandboxed escalation: no denied reads, so
-// UnsandboxedExecutionAllowed is true and a prefix approval would rewrite the
-// call to require_escalated.
-func escalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
-	t.Helper()
-	policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
-	policy.DenyRead = nil
-	return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(), Policy: policy})
-}
-
-// nonEscalatingEngine has a denied read, which is exactly the condition under
-// which escalation is refused, so no disclosure should be made.
-func nonEscalatingEngine(t *testing.T) *sandbox.Engine {
-	t.Helper()
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	policy := sandbox.DefaultPolicy()
-	policy.DenyRead = []string{filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt")}
-	return sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: root, Policy: policy})
-}
-
-// THE POINT OF THE FILE. The prompt's disclosure and the args rewrite must
-// agree on every input, because the defect being fixed is precisely that the
-// two disagreed: the rewrite escalated out of the sandbox while the prompt said
-// only "allow command prefix for session".
-//
-// Asserting agreement rather than asserting each side's expected value is what
-// makes this hold up. If someone later widens or narrows the rewrite's guards
-// and forgets the flag, the two diverge here and this fails, which a pair of
-// independent expected-value tests would not catch.
-func TestPrefixEscalationDisclosureMatchesTheArgsRewrite(t *testing.T) {
-	escalating := Options{Sandbox: escalatingEngine(t)}
-	denied := Options{Sandbox: nonEscalatingEngine(t)}
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name     string
-		toolName string
-		args     map[string]any
-		options  Options
-	}{
-		{"plain bash command", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, escalating},
-		{"plain exec_command", "exec_command", map[string]any{"cmd": "go build ./..."}, escalating},
-		{"not a shell tool", "read_file", map[string]any{"path": "go.mod"}, escalating},
-		{"no sandbox configured", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, Options{}},
-		{"escalation refused by denied reads", "bash", map[string]any{"command": "go test ./..."}, denied},
-		{
-			"call already asks for escalation",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsRequireEscalated)},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		{
-			"call already asks for additional permissions",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": string(tools.SandboxPermissionsWithAdditionalPermissions)},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		// An unrecognized value is NOT an opt-out: the rewrite overwrites it, so
-		// the disclosure has to fire. Included because the obvious reading of
-		// the guards says otherwise, and a case asserting the wrong thing here
-		// would have passed silently.
-		{
-			"unrecognized sandbox_permissions value",
-			"bash",
-			map[string]any{"command": "go test ./...", "sandbox_permissions": "all"},
-			escalating,
-		},
-		{"empty args", "bash", map[string]any{}, escalating},
-		{"nil args", "bash", nil, escalating},
-	}
-
-	for _, testCase := range cases {
-		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			disclosed := shellPrefixApprovalEscalates(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, testCase.options)
-
-			// What the user's approval would actually be turned into.
-			rewritten := shellExecutionArgsForApproval(testCase.toolName, testCase.args, PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix, testCase.options)
-			escalates := shellCommandRequiresEscalated(rewritten) && !shellCommandRequiresEscalated(testCase.args)
-
-			if disclosed != escalates {
-				t.Fatalf("prompt discloses escalation=%v but approving actually escalates=%v; the prompt and the rewrite disagree, which is the consent gap this guards", disclosed, escalates)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// The two prefix decisions are the only ones that escalate, so a disclosure
-// attached to a request offering neither would be a false alarm. Checked
-// against the same predicate the rewrite consults.
-func TestOnlyPrefixDecisionsEscalate(t *testing.T) {
-	escalating := map[PermissionDecisionAction]bool{
-		PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:       true,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix: true,
-	}
-	for _, action := range []PermissionDecisionAction{
-		PermissionDecisionAllow,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
-		PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllowPrefix,
-		PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
-		PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		PermissionDecisionCancel,
-	} {
-		if got := shellPrefixApprovalBypassesSandbox(action); got != escalating[action] {
-			t.Errorf("decision %q bypasses sandbox=%v, want %v", action, got, escalating[action])
-		}
-	}
-}
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (c *profileController) maybeEscalate() (PostureEscalation, bool) {
 	if c.policy == nil || c.escalated {
 		return PostureEscalation{}, false
 	}
-	if !c.failureTripped && !c.riskTripped && !c.scTripped && !c.uncertainTrip {
+	if !(c.failureTripped || c.riskTripped || c.scTripped || c.uncertainTrip) {
 		return PostureEscalation{}, false
 	}
 	c.escalated = true
@@ -14,26 +14,13 @@ import (
 // deliberately) or trimmed — the per-turn floor should not creep up silently.
 //
 // Measured baselines (2026-07): base system prompt ~3160 tokens; the tools a normal
-// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~3230 tokens. The tool figure is
-// the auto-mode advertised set, including exec_command: auto mode must expose both
-// process creation and write_stdin process interaction or the latter is unusable
-// without a session id. Higher-risk tools that do not opt into auto remain excluded.
+// (auto permission-mode) interactive turn sends ~2430 tokens. The tool figure is
+// the auto-mode advertised set, not the full core registry — higher-risk tools that
+// only advertise in other modes are excluded, matching what a real turn actually
+// pays.
 const (
 	maxBaseSystemPromptTokens = 3500
-	// Raised deliberately from 3550 on 2026-08-08. view_image (#843) took the set
-	// to 3588, and #867 trimmed it back to 3578: still 28 tokens over.
-	//
-	// The overrun is a rounding error rather than a regression. view_image costs
-	// 82 tokens, the second cheapest tool in the set, against exec_command's 909
-	// and request_permissions' 397; it is simply the one that crossed the line.
-	// Raised rather than paid down because the alternative was trimming a
-	// description to claw back 28 tokens, degrading a tool's usability to satisfy
-	// a line drawn against a 2026-07 measurement that predates two tools.
-	//
-	// The ratchet did its job: it caught the creep and forced a decision instead
-	// of a drift. That is the point of it, so keep raising it deliberately rather
-	// than reflexively.
-	maxEagerToolSchemaTokens = 3650
+	maxEagerToolSchemaTokens  = 2700
 )

 func TestSystemPromptTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
@@ -59,11 +46,6 @@ func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
 	got := estimateToolDefTokens(exposed)
 	t.Logf("eager core tool schemas: %d tokens across %d tools", got, len(exposed))
 	if got > maxEagerToolSchemaTokens {
-		// NOT "defer a tool": this test pins DeferThreshold at 0, so marking a
-		// tool deferred leaves it exposed here and changes nothing. Deferral is
-		// still worth doing for real sessions, it just cannot move this number.
-		// The levers that do are a smaller schema, one fewer core tool, or a
-		// deliberate raise.
-		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
+		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — defer a tool or raise the ceiling deliberately", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
 	}
 }
@@ -123,21 +123,6 @@ func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversEverySystemPromptSection(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestComputePrefixFingerprintCoversTransientSystemPrompt(t *testing.T) {
-	base := Options{Cwd: t.TempDir(), SystemPrompt: "core"}
-	changed := base
-	changed.TransientSystemPrompt = "turn-only guidance"
-
-	fpBase := ComputePrefixFingerprint(base, nil)
-	fpChanged := ComputePrefixFingerprint(changed, nil)
-	if fpBase.SystemPromptHash == fpChanged.SystemPromptHash {
-		t.Fatal("SystemPromptHash must change for transient system guidance")
-	}
-	if fpBase.CompletePrefixHash == fpChanged.CompletePrefixHash {
-		t.Fatal("CompletePrefixHash must cover transient system guidance")
-	}
-}
-
 // TestBuildPromptSubstringsDefaultOptions asserts the invariants of the
 // substrings helper for default Options: which substrings are non-empty,
 // which are empty, and that the substring-to-hash round-trip is lossless.
@@ -121,67 +121,3 @@ func toolNameForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, index int) string {
 func isPrunedPlaceholder(content string) bool {
 	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(content), "[pruned ")
 }
-
-var supersedableReadTools = map[string]bool{
-	"read_file":          true,
-	"read_minified_file": true,
-	"grep":               true,
-	"glob":               true,
-	"list_directory":     true,
-}
-
-// pruneSupersededReadResults removes only older byte-identical results of the
-// same read call. It runs when context pressure already requires a rewrite, so
-// it does not trade a warm provider-cache prefix for a small apparent saving.
-func pruneSupersededReadResults(messages []zeroruntime.Message) ([]zeroruntime.Message, int) {
-	type seenResultKey struct {
-		call    string
-		content string
-	}
-	seen := map[seenResultKey]struct{}{}
-	out := messages
-	reclaimed := 0
-	copied := false
-
-	for index := len(messages) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
-		message := messages[index]
-		if message.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool || isPrunedPlaceholder(message.Content) {
-			continue
-		}
-		call, ok := toolCallForResult(messages, index)
-		if !ok || !supersedableReadTools[call.Name] {
-			continue
-		}
-		key := seenResultKey{
-			call:    call.Name + "\x00" + strings.TrimSpace(call.Arguments),
-			content: message.Content,
-		}
-		if _, exists := seen[key]; exists {
-			placeholder := fmt.Sprintf("[superseded identical %s result — the newer result remains in context]", call.Name)
-			if !copied {
-				out = append([]zeroruntime.Message(nil), messages...)
-				copied = true
-			}
-			out[index].Content = placeholder
-			reclaimed += max(0, ApproxTextTokens(message.Content)-ApproxTextTokens(placeholder))
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[key] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	return out, reclaimed
-}
-
-func toolCallForResult(messages []zeroruntime.Message, resultIndex int) (zeroruntime.ToolCall, bool) {
-	id := messages[resultIndex].ToolCallID
-	if id == "" {
-		return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
-	}
-	for index := resultIndex - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
-		for _, call := range messages[index].ToolCalls {
-			if call.ID == id {
-				return call, true
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return zeroruntime.ToolCall{}, false
-}
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ func toolCallMsg(id, name string) zeroruntime.Message {
 	}
 }

-func toolCallWithArgs(id, name, args string) zeroruntime.Message {
-	return zeroruntime.Message{
-		Role:      zeroruntime.MessageRoleAssistant,
-		ToolCalls: []zeroruntime.ToolCall{{ID: id, Name: name, Arguments: args}},
-	}
-}
-
 func TestPruneSkipsSmallSessions(t *testing.T) {
 	// Total reclaimable is under the gate → no pruning.
 	msgs := []zeroruntime.Message{
@@ -127,69 +120,3 @@ func TestPruneDoesNotMutateInput(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("pruneStaleToolOutput must not mutate the caller's slice")
 	}
 }
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsOnlyDropsIdenticalOlderReads(t *testing.T) {
-	body := strings.Repeat("same source line\n", 1000)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("old", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("different", "read_file", `{"path":"b.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "different", Content: body},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new", Content: body},
-	}
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
-		t.Fatalf("older duplicate was not pruned: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
-	}
-	if out[3].Content != body || out[5].Content != body {
-		t.Fatal("different call and newest result must remain exact")
-	}
-	if messages[1].Content != body {
-		t.Fatal("input slice was mutated")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsKeepsChangedAndMutatingResults(t *testing.T) {
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("r1", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r1", Content: "version one"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("r2", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "r2", Content: "version two"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("e1", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e1", Content: "edited"},
-		toolCallWithArgs("e2", "edit_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "e2", Content: "edited"},
-	}
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-	if reclaimed != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("unsafe results were pruned: %d", reclaimed)
-	}
-	for index := range messages {
-		if out[index].Content != messages[index].Content {
-			t.Fatalf("message %d changed unexpectedly", index)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPruneSupersededReadResultsFindsMatchingBodyAcrossChangedRead(t *testing.T) {
-	bodyA := strings.Repeat("version a\n", 100)
-	bodyB := strings.Repeat("version b\n", 100)
-	messages := []zeroruntime.Message{
-		toolCallWithArgs("old-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "old-a", Content: bodyA},
-		toolCallWithArgs("middle-b", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "middle-b", Content: bodyB},
-		toolCallWithArgs("new-a", "read_file", `{"path":"a.go"}`),
-		{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool, ToolCallID: "new-a", Content: bodyA},
-	}
-
-	out, reclaimed := pruneSupersededReadResults(messages)
-
-	if reclaimed <= 0 || !strings.Contains(out[1].Content, "superseded identical") {
-		t.Fatalf("older matching body was not pruned across a changed result: reclaimed=%d output=%q", reclaimed, out[1].Content)
-	}
-	if out[3].Content != bodyB || out[5].Content != bodyA {
-		t.Fatal("changed middle result and newest matching result must remain exact")
-	}
-}
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestInlineAdditionalPermissionsRequiresPromptUnderAutoAllow(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 	decision := &sandbox.Decision{Action: sandbox.ActionAllow, AutoAllowed: true}
-	if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewScopedBashTool(t.TempDir(), nil), args, false, decision) {
+	if !shouldRequestPermission(tools.NewBashTool(t.TempDir()), args, false, decision) {
 		t.Fatal("inline additional permissions must request approval even when a sandboxed shell would otherwise auto-allow")
 	}
 }
@@ -26,16 +26,6 @@ func TestSpecialistDelegationContext(t *testing.T) {
 	if strings.Contains(got, "nameless") {
 		t.Fatalf("nameless entry should be skipped: %q", got)
 	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"reduce total context", "Do not delegate small direct work", "bounded assignment"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(got, want) {
-			t.Fatalf("missing evidence-driven delegation guidance %q: %q", want, got)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, unwanted := range []string{"delegate to it proactively", "launch several specialists in parallel"} {
-		if strings.Contains(got, unwanted) {
-			t.Fatalf("retained broad delegation guidance %q: %q", unwanted, got)
-		}
-	}
 }

 func TestSystemPromptIncludesDelegationOnlyWithSpecialists(t *testing.T) {
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/repomap"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspaceseed"
 )

@@ -95,9 +94,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
 		core = fallbackSystemPrompt
 	}
 	sections := []string{core}
-	if transient := strings.TrimSpace(options.TransientSystemPrompt); transient != "" {
-		sections = append(sections, transient)
-	}
 	if addendum := modelPromptAddendum(options.Model); addendum != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, addendum)
 	}
@@ -121,9 +117,6 @@ func buildSystemPromptParts(options Options) systemPromptParts {
 	if project != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, project)
 	}
-	if modeCtx := permissionModeContext(options); modeCtx != "" {
-		sections = append(sections, modeCtx)
-	}
 	if delegation := specialistDelegationContext(options); delegation != "" {
 		sections = append(sections, delegation)
 	}
@@ -185,19 +178,21 @@ func approvedCommandPrefixContext(options Options) string {
 	return "## Approved Command Prefixes\n\nThe following command prefixes have already been approved and do not need another permission prompt:\n" + strings.Join(lines, "\n")
 }

-// specialistDelegationContext describes when a specialist earns its extra
-// context and coordination cost. It renders only when specialists are known
-// (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with no
-// delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
+// specialistDelegationContext nudges the orchestrator to offload read-heavy or
+// parallelizable work to a specialist sub-agent via the Task tool, keeping large
+// tool outputs out of the main context. It renders only when specialists are
+// known (which is only where the Task tool is actually registered), so a run with
+// no delegatable specialists produces the previous prompt unchanged.
 func specialistDelegationContext(options Options) string {
 	if len(options.Specialists) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	var b strings.Builder
 	b.WriteString("<specialists>\n")
-	b.WriteString("Use the Task tool when a specialist's focused context, expertise, or an independent parallel subtask is likely to improve quality or reduce total context. ")
-	b.WriteString("Do not delegate small direct work, duplicate exploration, or split sequential steps merely because a specialist is available. ")
-	b.WriteString("When delegating, give a bounded assignment and consume its concise evidence instead of importing a long transcript.\n")
+	b.WriteString("Delegate focused or read-heavy work to a specialist sub-agent with the Task tool instead of doing it inline. ")
+	b.WriteString("When a request matches a specialist's purpose, delegate to it proactively — you do not need the user to ask first. ")
+	b.WriteString("This keeps large tool outputs — searches, file dumps, multi-step exploration — out of your own context, so you stay fast and token-efficient. ")
+	b.WriteString("Prefer delegating codebase search and exploration; for independent subtasks, launch several specialists in parallel. Handle small, direct edits yourself.\n")
 	b.WriteString("Available specialists (call Task with the matching name when the task fits its purpose):\n")
 	for _, info := range options.Specialists {
 		name := strings.TrimSpace(info.Name)
@@ -315,7 +310,11 @@ func workspaceContext(cwd string) string {
 	b.WriteString("<environment>\n")
 	b.WriteString("Working directory: " + cwd + "\n")
 	b.WriteString("Operating system: " + runtime.GOOS + "\n")
-	b.WriteString(tools.HostShellEnvironmentGuidance() + "\n")
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		b.WriteString("Shell syntax: Windows cmd.exe syntax for exec_command/bash tools. To put | & > < etc inside an arg value, use double quotes around the value, not single quotes (single quotes do not protect metachars in cmd.exe): gh --jq \".a | b\", go test -run \"A|B\". Do not pipe to or invoke POSIX coreutils from Git for Windows (usr\\bin head/grep/tail/cat/...): they are MSYS binaries and fail under the write-restricted sandbox; use native Zero tools (grep, read_file, list_directory, glob) or cmd.exe findstr/more instead, or sandbox_permissions require_escalated only when host-level execution is truly required. Prefer the workdir/cwd argument over cd when changing directories.\n")
+	} else {
+		b.WriteString("Shell syntax: /bin/sh syntax for exec_command/bash tools; prefer the workdir/cwd argument instead of cd when changing directories.\n")
+	}
 	if branch := gitBranchForPrompt(cwd); branch != "" {
 		b.WriteString("Git branch: " + branch + "\n")
 	}
@@ -685,12 +684,3 @@ func gitBranchForPrompt(cwd string) string {
 	}
 	return ref
 }
-
-func permissionModeContext(options Options) string {
-	switch options.PermissionMode {
-	case PermissionModePlan:
-		return "Plan mode is active on this session. Your role is read-only exploration and planning: inspect the workspace and shape the plan with update_plan, but do not make changes to files or execute commands."
-	default:
-		return ""
-	}
-}
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@ work.
   read-before-edit discipline: inspect the target file and nearby callers,
   tests, or config before you modify behavior. Never edit a file you have not
   read.
-2. **Plan.** Use update_plan for implementation or investigation that has at
-   least three meaningful dependent steps, then keep it current at milestones.
-   Mark completed work and the next in-progress step together when practical;
-   do not spend separate turns updating it after every file or command. Keep at
-   most one item in_progress. Skip plans for simple lookups, explanations, code
-   navigation, and other short tasks. Never create a plan after the work is
-   already complete merely to describe what you did.
+2. **Plan.** For multi-step work, call update_plan with an ordered checklist and
+   keep it live. The plan bar is the user's progress signal — call update_plan
+   after EACH concrete unit of work (every file written, every command run), not
+   just at coarse milestones: mark the finished item completed and the next one
+   in_progress before you start it. A plan stuck at 0/N while files are landing is
+   a bug, not economy — these calls are cheap, expected, and the update_plan cards
+   are hidden from the transcript, so frequent updates cost the user nothing and
+   never clutter the conversation. Keep at most one item in_progress, and never
+   batch the updates to the end of the turn. Skip the plan for trivial one-step
+   tasks.
 3. **Implement.** Make focused changes that match the surrounding code's style,
   naming, and conventions. Prefer the smallest change that fully solves the
   problem. Avoid broad refactors, unrelated rewrites, dependency churn, and
@@ -51,16 +54,11 @@ work.
 ## Editing discipline

 - Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
-  file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
-  write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
-  cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
+  file tools - read_file, list_directory, glob, grep, write_file, edit_file,
+  apply_patch - over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
  They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
- Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
-  code while removing comments and redundant whitespace. Use read_file when
-  exact text, comments, or line numbers are needed.
- Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
-  files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
-  bulk shell or script rewrite.
+- Make one tool call per file. Do not batch multi-file writes into a single
+  shell or script invocation.
 - For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
  targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
  file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
@@ -102,9 +100,6 @@ work.
 - Use exec_command with `tty: true` for interactive terminal-style commands that
  need stdin beyond Ctrl-C. `/ps` and `/stop` are user-facing TUI commands; when
  you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
- write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
-  exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
-  with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
 - write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
  `\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
  it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions
@@ -71,6 +71,5 @@ const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
  equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
 - Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
  in one short clause why it is needed.
- Use update_plan only for work with at least three meaningful dependent steps;
-  skip it for simple lookups and never create one after the work is complete.
+- Use update_plan for any multi-step task and keep it current.
 </model_guidance>`
@@ -51,16 +51,6 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTransientSystemPromptIsIncludedOnlyWhenProvided(t *testing.T) {
-	const transient = "Handle this peer request under the current session policy."
-	if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{}); strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
-		t.Fatal("ordinary system prompt unexpectedly contains transient instructions")
-	}
-	if prompt := buildSystemPrompt(Options{TransientSystemPrompt: transient}); !strings.Contains(prompt, transient) {
-		t.Fatalf("transient instructions missing from system prompt:\n%s", prompt)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestSystemPromptExplainsSandboxEscalationForHiddenHostState(t *testing.T) {
 	prompt := strings.ToLower(buildSystemPrompt(Options{}))
 	for _, want := range []string{
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
 package agent

 import (
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
 	"reflect"
-	"regexp"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
-	"unicode/utf8"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/trace"
@@ -56,41 +52,17 @@ type taskVerificationState struct {
 	LastOutcome Outcome `json:"last_outcome,omitempty"`
 }

-type taskFailureState struct {
-	Key     string `json:"key,omitempty"`
-	Tool    string `json:"tool"`
-	Command string `json:"command,omitempty"`
-	Summary string `json:"summary"`
-}
-
-type taskApprovalState struct {
-	Tool     string                   `json:"tool"`
-	Decision PermissionDecisionAction `json:"decision,omitempty"`
-	Scope    string                   `json:"scope,omitempty"`
-	Reason   string                   `json:"reason,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type taskArtifactState struct {
-	Tool string `json:"tool"`
-	Path string `json:"path"`
-}
-
 type taskStateSnapshot struct {
-	Revision            int                   `json:"revision"`
-	Objective           string                `json:"objective"`
-	Status              taskStatus            `json:"status"`
-	Plan                taskPlanState         `json:"plan"`
-	Tools               taskToolState         `json:"tools"`
-	Verification        taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
-	ChangedFiles        []string              `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
-	Constraints         []string              `json:"constraints,omitempty"`
-	UnresolvedFailures  []taskFailureState    `json:"unresolved_failures,omitempty"`
-	Approvals           []taskApprovalState   `json:"approvals,omitempty"`
-	Artifacts           []taskArtifactState   `json:"artifacts,omitempty"`
-	ResolvedFailureKeys []string              `json:"-"`
-	CompletionDecision  CompletionDecision    `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
-	CompletionReason    string                `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
-	PlanParity          taskPlanParity        `json:"plan_parity"`
+	Revision           int                   `json:"revision"`
+	Objective          string                `json:"objective"`
+	Status             taskStatus            `json:"status"`
+	Plan               taskPlanState         `json:"plan"`
+	Tools              taskToolState         `json:"tools"`
+	Verification       taskVerificationState `json:"verification"`
+	ChangedFiles       []string              `json:"changed_files,omitempty"`
+	CompletionDecision CompletionDecision    `json:"completion_decision,omitempty"`
+	CompletionReason   string                `json:"completion_reason,omitempty"`
+	PlanParity         taskPlanParity        `json:"plan_parity"`
 }

 type taskStateEventKind int
@@ -100,7 +72,6 @@ const (
 	taskStateEventToolResult
 	taskStateEventVerification
 	taskStateEventCompletion
-	taskStateEventPermission
 )

 type taskStateEvent struct {
@@ -109,7 +80,6 @@ type taskStateEvent struct {
 	toolResult   ToolResult
 	verification Outcome
 	completion   completionEvaluation
-	permission   PermissionEvent
 }

 // taskState is a deterministic projection of facts the loop already observes.
@@ -131,7 +101,6 @@ func newTaskState(objective string, recorder *trace.Recorder) *taskState {
 		},
 		changedFiles: map[string]struct{}{},
 	}
-	state.snapshotValue.Constraints = extractExplicitConstraints(objective)
 	state.recorder = recorder
 	return state
 }
@@ -165,7 +134,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
 			}
 		}
 		state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles = sortedKeys(state.changedFiles)
-		state.observeToolEvidence(event.arguments, event.toolResult)
 		changed = true
 	case taskStateEventVerification:
 		if event.verification == OutcomeDisabled {
@@ -192,10 +160,6 @@ func (state *taskState) observe(event taskStateEvent) bool {
 			state.snapshotValue.Status = taskStatusActive
 		}
 		changed = true
-	case taskStateEventPermission:
-		state.markActive()
-		state.observePermission(event.permission)
-		changed = true
 	}
 	if changed {
 		state.snapshotValue.Revision++
@@ -219,180 +183,9 @@ func (state *taskState) snapshot() taskStateSnapshot {
 	snapshot := state.snapshotValue
 	snapshot.Plan.Items = append([]taskPlanItem(nil), state.snapshotValue.Plan.Items...)
 	snapshot.ChangedFiles = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ChangedFiles...)
-	snapshot.Constraints = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.Constraints...)
-	snapshot.UnresolvedFailures = append([]taskFailureState(nil), state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures...)
-	snapshot.Approvals = append([]taskApprovalState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Approvals...)
-	snapshot.Artifacts = append([]taskArtifactState(nil), state.snapshotValue.Artifacts...)
-	snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys = append([]string(nil), state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys...)
 	return snapshot
 }

-const (
-	maxTaskEvidenceEntries = 8
-	maxTaskEvidenceBytes   = 320
-	maxTaskConstraints     = 10
-)
-
-func (state *taskState) observeToolEvidence(arguments string, result ToolResult) {
-	command := capTaskEvidence(commandFromArguments(arguments))
-	key := taskFailureKey(result.Name, command, arguments)
-	if result.Status == tools.StatusOK {
-		if hasTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key) {
-			state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
-			state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-		}
-	} else {
-		state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys = removeString(state.snapshotValue.ResolvedFailureKeys, key)
-		state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = removeTaskFailure(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, key)
-		state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures = appendBounded(state.snapshotValue.UnresolvedFailures, taskFailureState{
-			Key: key, Tool: result.Name, Command: command, Summary: capTaskEvidence(firstLine(result.Output)),
-		}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-	}
-	for _, metaKey := range []string{"spill_path", "artifact_path"} {
-		if path := strings.TrimSpace(result.Meta[metaKey]); path != "" {
-			state.snapshotValue.Artifacts = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Artifacts,
-				taskArtifactState{Tool: result.Name, Path: capTaskEvidence(path)}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func taskFailureKey(toolName, command, arguments string) string {
-	identity := command
-	if identity == "" {
-		canonical := []byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments))
-		var value any
-		if json.Unmarshal(canonical, &value) == nil {
-			if encoded, err := json.Marshal(value); err == nil {
-				canonical = encoded
-			}
-		}
-		digest := sha256.Sum256(canonical)
-		identity = fmt.Sprintf("args:%x", digest[:8])
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(toolName) + "\x00" + identity
-}
-
-func (state *taskState) observePermission(event PermissionEvent) {
-	decision := event.DecisionAction
-	if decision == "" {
-		decision = PermissionDecisionAction(event.Action)
-	}
-	state.snapshotValue.Approvals = appendBoundedUnique(state.snapshotValue.Approvals, taskApprovalState{
-		Tool: event.ToolName, Decision: decision, Scope: capTaskEvidence(event.Scope),
-		Reason: capTaskEvidence(firstNonEmptyString(event.DecisionReason, event.Reason)),
-	}, maxTaskEvidenceEntries)
-}
-
-func commandFromArguments(arguments string) string {
-	var object map[string]json.RawMessage
-	if json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(arguments)), &object) != nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	for _, key := range []string{"cmd", "command", "script", "shell"} {
-		var command string
-		if raw, ok := object[key]; ok && json.Unmarshal(raw, &command) == nil {
-			return strings.TrimSpace(command)
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func firstLine(value string) string {
-	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	if index := strings.IndexByte(value, '\n'); index >= 0 {
-		value = value[:index]
-	}
-	return value
-}
-
-func capTaskEvidence(value string) string {
-	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	if len(value) <= maxTaskEvidenceBytes {
-		return value
-	}
-	limit := maxTaskEvidenceBytes - 3
-	for limit > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(value[limit]) {
-		limit--
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(value[:limit]) + "..."
-}
-
-var explicitConstraintPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bprefer(?:s|red|ring)?\s+\w`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bdon'?t want\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\balways (?:use|do|run|prefer|keep|make|format|write|add|set|put|prefix|start|include|append)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bnever (?:use|do|run|push|commit|write|ignore|add|set|put|remove|delete|include|deploy)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bplease (?:use|avoid|keep|make|don'?t|do not|format|write)\b`),
-	regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(?:style|format|language|naming)\s*[:=]\s*\S`),
-}
-
-func extractExplicitConstraints(text string) []string {
-	var constraints []string
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
-		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
-		if len(line) < 5 || len(line) > 200 || strings.HasSuffix(line, "?") || strings.Contains(line, "?...") {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, pattern := range explicitConstraintPatterns {
-			if pattern.MatchString(line) {
-				constraints = appendBoundedUnique(constraints, line, maxTaskConstraints)
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if len(constraints) == maxTaskConstraints {
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	return constraints
-}
-
-func appendBounded[T any](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
-	values = append(values, value)
-	if len(values) > limit {
-		values = values[len(values)-limit:]
-	}
-	return values
-}
-
-func appendBoundedUnique[T comparable](values []T, value T, limit int) []T {
-	filtered := values[:0]
-	for _, existing := range values {
-		if existing != value {
-			filtered = append(filtered, existing)
-		}
-	}
-	return appendBounded(filtered, value, limit)
-}
-
-func hasTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) bool {
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value.Key == key {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func removeTaskFailure(values []taskFailureState, key string) []taskFailureState {
-	out := values[:0]
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value.Key != key {
-			out = append(out, value)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func removeString(values []string, target string) []string {
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value != target {
-			out = append(out, value)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 // observePlanParity compares only the latest plan projection with the plan tool
 // calls still present in messages. It mutates the snapshot and emits when the
 // parity value changes; objective, tool, and verification fields are not part of
@@ -115,68 +115,6 @@ func TestTaskStateSnapshotIsImmutable(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTaskStateRecordsDurableRuntimeEvidence(t *testing.T) {
-	state := newTaskState("Please keep the change focused.\nNever commit generated reports.", nil)
-	arguments := `{"cmd":"go test ./internal/agent"}`
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "test-1", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusError,
-		Output: "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed\nfull diagnostic",
-		Meta:   map[string]string{"spill_path": ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt"},
-	}})
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPermission, permission: PermissionEvent{
-		ToolName: "exec_command", DecisionAction: PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
-		Scope: "/tmp", DecisionReason: "write a temporary fixture",
-	}})
-
-	snapshot := state.snapshot()
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(snapshot.Constraints, []string{"Please keep the change focused.", "Never commit generated reports."}) {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected explicit constraints: %#v", snapshot.Constraints)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Command != "go test ./internal/agent" || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: TestResumeRetainsState failed" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected failure evidence: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.Artifacts) != 1 || snapshot.Artifacts[0].Path != ".zero/artifacts/test-1.txt" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected artifact evidence: %#v", snapshot.Artifacts)
-	}
-	if len(snapshot.Approvals) != 1 || snapshot.Approvals[0].Decision != PermissionDecisionAllowForSession || snapshot.Approvals[0].Scope != "/tmp" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected approval evidence: %#v", snapshot.Approvals)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go is unavailable",
-	}})
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"b.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-b", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package b",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 2 || failures[1].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
-		t.Fatalf("success for a different target resolved the wrong failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: arguments, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "test-2", Name: "exec_command", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "ok",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 1 || failures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go is unavailable" {
-		t.Fatalf("successful retry did not resolve only its matching failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a-2", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "package a",
-	}})
-	if failures := state.snapshot().UnresolvedFailures; len(failures) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("successful non-command retry did not resolve its matching failure: %#v", failures)
-	}
-	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventToolResult, arguments: `{"path":"a.go"}`, toolResult: ToolResult{
-		ToolCallID: "read-a-3", Name: "read_file", Status: tools.StatusError, Output: "Error: a.go failed again",
-	}})
-	snapshot = state.snapshot()
-	if len(snapshot.UnresolvedFailures) != 1 || snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Summary != "Error: a.go failed again" {
-		t.Fatalf("a failure recurring after success was hidden: %#v", snapshot.UnresolvedFailures)
-	}
-	for _, key := range snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys {
-		if key == snapshot.UnresolvedFailures[0].Key {
-			t.Fatalf("recurring failure retained a stale resolved key: %#v", snapshot.ResolvedFailureKeys)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestTaskStatePlanParityUsesLatestPlan(t *testing.T) {
 	state := newTaskState("objective", nil)
 	state.observe(taskStateEvent{kind: taskStateEventPlan, arguments: `{"plan":[{"content":"old","status":"completed"}]}`})
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-package agent
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
-)
-
-// imageTool returns a tool result carrying an image, the way a screenshot tool
-// should be able to.
-type imageTool struct {
-	media string
-	data  []byte
-}
-
-func (imageTool) Name() string        { return "capture" }
-func (imageTool) Description() string { return "Captures an image." }
-func (imageTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
-}
-func (imageTool) Safety() tools.Safety {
-	return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow}
-}
-func (t imageTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{
-		Status: tools.StatusOK,
-		Output: "Captured a screenshot.",
-		Images: []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{{MediaType: t.media, Data: t.data}},
-	}
-}
-
-// A tool that produces an image must get that image in front of the model.
-//
-// It cannot ride the tool-result message: every provider drops images there.
-// Anthropic maps a tool result to a tool_result block with string content,
-// Gemini to a functionResponse, and OpenAI guards its image parts to the user
-// role explicitly. So the image has to arrive as a following user message,
-// which is also the only shape that keeps one tool result per tool call.
-func TestRunDeliversToolResultImagesToTheModel(t *testing.T) {
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{
-		turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "call_1", ToolName: "capture"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "call_1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "call_1"},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-			{
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "I can see it."},
-				{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "screenshot please", provider, Options{
-		Registry: registry,
-		MaxTurns: 2,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	var carrier *zeroruntime.Message
-	for index := range result.Messages {
-		if len(result.Messages[index].Images) > 0 {
-			carrier = &result.Messages[index]
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	if carrier == nil {
-		t.Fatal("no message carried the tool's image; the model never saw it")
-	}
-	if carrier.Role != zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser {
-		t.Errorf("image rode a %q message; every provider only serializes images on the user role", carrier.Role)
-	}
-	if got := carrier.Images[0].MediaType; got != "image/png" {
-		t.Errorf("media type = %q, want image/png", got)
-	}
-
-	// The tool-result pairing must be untouched: one tool result per tool call.
-	toolResults := 0
-	for _, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolResults++
-		}
-	}
-	if toolResults != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("got %d tool-result messages for 1 tool call", toolResults)
-	}
-}
-
-// textTool is a second, image-free tool so a turn can carry two calls.
-type textTool struct{}
-
-func (textTool) Name() string        { return "note" }
-func (textTool) Description() string { return "Notes something." }
-func (textTool) Parameters() tools.Schema {
-	return tools.Schema{Type: "object", Properties: map[string]tools.PropertySchema{}}
-}
-func (textTool) Safety() tools.Safety { return tools.Safety{Permission: tools.PermissionAllow} }
-func (textTool) Run(context.Context, map[string]any) tools.Result {
-	return tools.Result{Status: tools.StatusOK, Output: "noted"}
-}
-
-// Tool results for one assistant turn must stay contiguous. The image messages
-// are user-role, and a user message between two tool_results breaks strict
-// provider replay: Anthropic coalesces consecutive user content into one block
-// list and requires tool_result blocks first, so interleaving produces
-// [tool_result, text, image, tool_result] and the request is rejected.
-//
-// The first version of this feature appended each image immediately after its
-// own tool result, which is exactly that shape. A single-tool-call test passed
-// and said nothing about it.
-func TestRunKeepsToolResultsContiguousWhenAToolReturnsAnImage(t *testing.T) {
-	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
-	registry.Register(imageTool{media: "image/png", data: []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\nfake")})
-	registry.Register(textTool{})
-
-	provider := &mockProvider{turns: [][]zeroruntime.StreamEvent{
-		{
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c1", ToolName: "capture"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c1", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c1"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallStart, ToolCallID: "c2", ToolName: "note"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallDelta, ToolCallID: "c2", ArgumentsFragment: `{}`},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventToolCallEnd, ToolCallID: "c2"},
-			{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone},
-		},
-		{{Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventText, Content: "done"}, {Type: zeroruntime.StreamEventDone}},
-	}}
-
-	result, err := Run(context.Background(), "two calls", provider, Options{Registry: registry, MaxTurns: 2})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Two separate ifs rather than a switch: a tool-role message that also
-	// carried images would match only the first arm of a switch, so a regression
-	// that put the image back on the tool result would read as "no image at all"
-	// instead of naming what actually happened.
-	type toolResult struct {
-		index int
-		id    string
-	}
-	var toolResults []toolResult
-	imageIndex := -1
-	for index, message := range result.Messages {
-		if message.Role == zeroruntime.MessageRoleTool {
-			toolResults = append(toolResults, toolResult{index: index, id: message.ToolCallID})
-		}
-		if len(message.Images) > 0 {
-			if imageIndex >= 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("image delivered twice, at %d and %d; recorded %s", imageIndex, index, messageShape(result.Messages))
-			}
-			imageIndex = index
-		}
-	}
-	if imageIndex < 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("the image never reached the model; recorded %s", messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	if len(toolResults) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("got %d tool-result messages for 2 tool calls; recorded %s", len(toolResults), messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	if toolResults[0].id != "c1" || toolResults[1].id != "c2" {
-		t.Errorf("tool results answered %q then %q, want c1 then c2", toolResults[0].id, toolResults[1].id)
-	}
-	// The contract Anthropic enforces: every tool_result block has to come before
-	// any other block in the user message it lands in. Anything wedged between
-	// the two results breaks that, which is the 400 this PR exists to avoid.
-	if toolResults[1].index != toolResults[0].index+1 {
-		t.Errorf("tool results at %d and %d are not adjacent; %q message at %d splits them; recorded %s",
-			toolResults[0].index, toolResults[1].index, result.Messages[toolResults[0].index+1].Role,
-			toolResults[0].index+1, messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-	// Follows the last tool result, deliberately NOT pinned to exactly last+1.
-	// appendUserBlocks coalesces consecutive user-role content, so
-	// [tool_result, tool_result, text, image] still maps to tool_result blocks
-	// first and replays fine; pinning would redden that valid shape for nothing.
-	if imageIndex <= toolResults[1].index {
-		t.Errorf("image message at %d does not follow the last tool result at %d; recorded %s",
-			imageIndex, toolResults[1].index, messageShape(result.Messages))
-	}
-}
-
-// messageShape renders the conversation as a compact role list so a failure says
-// what the ordering actually was instead of dumping whole messages.
-func messageShape(messages []zeroruntime.Message) string {
-	parts := make([]string, 0, len(messages))
-	for index, message := range messages {
-		part := fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", index, message.Role)
-		if message.ToolCallID != "" {
-			part += "(" + message.ToolCallID + ")"
-		}
-		if len(message.Images) > 0 {
-			part += "+image"
-		}
-		parts = append(parts, part)
-	}
-	return "[" + strings.Join(parts, " ") + "]"
-}
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package agent
 import (
 	"context"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/streamjson"
@@ -26,15 +25,6 @@ const (
 	PermissionModeAsk       PermissionMode = "ask"
 	PermissionModeUnsafe    PermissionMode = "unsafe"
 	PermissionModeSpecDraft PermissionMode = "spec-draft"
-	// PermissionModePlan is an interactive, read-only planning mode. It applies
-	// to the CURRENT session (unlike spec-draft, which drafts in a separate
-	// session): the agent may inspect the workspace and shape the plan with
-	// update_plan/ask_user, but no mutating tool is advertised, so it cannot
-	// write files, run shell, or implement while planning. Entry points:
-	// the TUI's /plan on (exit with /plan off, which restores whatever mode
-	// was active before), `zero exec --plan`, and the ACP session mode
-	// selector ("plan").
-	PermissionModePlan PermissionMode = "plan"
 	// PermissionModeMemberAuto is a headless mode for swarm/specialist MEMBERS: it
 	// advertises the in-workspace mutators a member needs to build (write/edit +
 	// shell) on top of the Auto set, while the sandbox engine still gates them at
@@ -77,18 +67,11 @@ type ToolResult struct {
 	Output     string
 	// Truncated reports that the tool's model-visible output omitted content.
 	// The full result may be recoverable through Meta["spill_path"].
-	Truncated bool
-	Meta      map[string]string
-	// Images the tool produced, delivered to the model as a following user
-	// message rather than on this result. See tools.Result.Images.
-	Images       []zeroruntime.ImageBlock
+	Truncated    bool
+	Meta         map[string]string
 	Redacted     bool
 	ChangedFiles []string
-	// ChangeSummaries are non-selectable generated-tree summaries emitted by
-	// command execution; callers must not schedule per-file work from them.
-	ChangeSummaries []execution.Change
-	Display         tools.Display
-	Outcome         tools.ToolOutcome
+	Display      tools.Display
 	// DenialReason categorizes why a tool call was blocked (empty when it ran).
 	// It lets a surface distinguish the cause precisely instead of parsing Output.
 	DenialReason DenialCategory
@@ -109,24 +92,6 @@ type ToolResult struct {
 	RequestedModel string
 }

-// ModelOutput returns the bounded provider-facing result while preserving
-// compatibility with synthetic and restored results created before outcomes
-// were finalized.
-func (result ToolResult) ModelOutput() string {
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		return result.Outcome.ModelView
-	}
-	return result.Output
-}
-
-// HumanDisplay returns the presentation intended for interactive surfaces.
-func (result ToolResult) HumanDisplay() tools.Display {
-	if result.Outcome.Finalized() {
-		return result.Outcome.HumanView
-	}
-	return result.Display
-}
-
 // DenialCategory classifies why a tool call was blocked before it executed.
 type DenialCategory string

@@ -204,22 +169,6 @@ type PermissionRequest struct {
 	Grant              *sandbox.Grant             `json:"grant,omitempty"`
 	CommandPrefix      []string                   `json:"commandPrefix,omitempty"`
 	AvailableDecisions []PermissionDecisionAction `json:"availableDecisions,omitempty"`
-	// PrefixApprovalEscalates reports that approving a command prefix will also
-	// run the command OUTSIDE the sandbox, not merely stop asking about it.
-	//
-	// It exists because that consequence was real but invisible. Approving a
-	// prefix rewrites the call to sandbox_permissions: require_escalated, which
-	// resolves to a nil engine and genuinely unsandboxed execution, and the
-	// engine's own escalation prompt is then satisfied by the approval just
-	// given for the sandboxed form. So the operator authorized one thing and got
-	// a wider one, having been shown only "allow command prefix for session".
-	//
-	// The escalation itself is deliberate and guarded: proposedCommandPrefix
-	// refuses to offer a prefix while any other segment of the command is not
-	// known-safe, precisely so an unreviewed segment cannot ride out of the
-	// sandbox on it. What was missing was telling the person deciding, so this
-	// surfaces it rather than removing it.
-	PrefixApprovalEscalates bool `json:"prefixApprovalEscalates,omitempty"`
 }

 type PermissionDecision struct {
@@ -325,12 +274,8 @@ type Options struct {
 	ProviderName     string
 	Model            string
 	ReasoningEffort  string
-	ServiceTier      string
 	Cwd              string
 	SystemPrompt     string
-	// TransientSystemPrompt adds trusted runtime guidance for this run only.
-	// Empty preserves the ordinary system prompt byte-for-byte.
-	TransientSystemPrompt string
 	// ResponseStyle is the operator-selected reply style from the TUI /style
 	// command (e.g. "concise", "explanatory", "review"). It is rendered into the
 	// system prompt as a short directive. Empty or "balanced" adds nothing — the
@@ -381,11 +326,9 @@ type Options struct {
 	// specialist child process emits while running. The toolCallID identifies
 	// which Task tool call the progress belongs to. nil is a no-op.
 	OnToolProgress func(toolCallID string, event streamjson.Event)
-	// OnContext, when set, is called for each main agent request with its
-	// per-category context budget, including a replacement request after
-	// compaction or a stall retry. Internal summarizer requests are excluded so
-	// surfaces keep showing the active conversation budget. Opt-in like the other
-	// callbacks; nil is a no-op.
+	// OnContext, when set, is called once per turn with the per-category context
+	// budget of the request about to be sent, so a surface (TUI/CLI) can show
+	// context utilization. Opt-in like the other callbacks; nil is a no-op.
 	OnContext func(ContextBreakdown)
 	// ModelSwitcher, when set, lets a tool escalate the run to a stronger model
 	// mid-run: the loop calls it with the requested model id and, on success,
@@ -480,6 +423,13 @@ type Result struct {
 	IncompleteReason string
 }

+// Truncated reports whether the final response ended abnormally (cut off at the
+// output token cap or withheld by a content filter) rather than completing
+// naturally. Callers can use it to warn the user that FinalAnswer is incomplete.
+func (result Result) Truncated() bool {
+	return result.FinishReason != ""
+}
+
 // TruncationNotice returns a user-facing warning when the final response was
 // truncated, or "" for a normal completion. Shared by the CLI and TUI so the
 // wording stays consistent.
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ type AgentRunner interface {

 type AgentRunnerFunc func(context.Context, AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult

+func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
+	return fn(ctx, input)
+}
+
 // defaultAgentOutputLimit caps captured stdout/stderr per stream so a chatty or
 // runaway agent cannot exhaust memory or bloat the benchmark report.
 const defaultAgentOutputLimit = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB per stream
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
-package agenteval
-
-import "context"
-
-func (fn AgentRunnerFunc) Run(ctx context.Context, input AgentRunInput) AgentRunResult {
-	return fn(ctx, input)
-}
@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ func Score(suite Suite, input ScoreInput) Report {
 	if len(task.RequiredTraceEvents) > 0 {
 		report.Results = append(report.Results, scoreTraceEvents(task.RequiredTraceEvents, input))
 	}
-	report.Results = append(report.Results, unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input)...)
+	for _, result := range unknownCommandResults(input.CommandResults, seenCommands, input) {
+		report.Results = append(report.Results, result)
+	}
 	report.finishSummary()
 	return report
 }
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ func FormatFacts(info repoinfo.Info) string {
 	b.WriteString("Pre-computed repository facts (from a local scan — verify and fill gaps):\n")

 	if info.PrimaryLanguage != "" {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount)
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Primary language: %s (of %d detected)\n", info.PrimaryLanguage, info.LanguageCount))
 	}
 	if langs := topLanguages(info.Languages, 5); langs != "" {
 		b.WriteString("- Languages: " + langs + "\n")
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth)
+	b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Size: ~%d files, ~%d LOC, max dir depth %d\n", info.FileCount, info.LOCEstimate, info.MaxDepth))
 	if info.WorkspaceType != "" && info.WorkspaceType != "none" {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount)
+		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("- Workspace: %s (%d packages)\n", info.WorkspaceType, info.WorkspacePackageCount))
 	}
 	if len(info.BuildTools) > 0 {
 		b.WriteString("- Build tools: " + strings.Join(info.BuildTools, ", ") + "\n")
@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 package background

 import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"os/exec"
+	"syscall"
 	"time"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 )

 // terminationGracePeriod is how long a process has to exit after SIGTERM before
@@ -21,7 +22,10 @@ var (
 // the negative PID (the group), so any process the child forks dies with it
 // instead of being orphaned. Must be called before cmd.Start.
 func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
-	execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
+	if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil {
+		cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{}
+	}
+	cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid = true
 }

 // terminateProcess stops a background process. It first asks politely with
@@ -37,5 +41,71 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
 // back to signalling only the individual PID, which also avoids reporting a false
 // success when a non-leader group-signal returns ESRCH.
 func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
-	return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
+	// Guard pid <= 1: kill(-0) would target our OWN process group and kill(-1)
+	// every process we can signal. A real child PID is always > 1, so never let a
+	// bogus 0/1 expand into either.
+	if pid <= 1 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to terminate invalid pid %d", pid)
+	}
+
+	// Signal the whole group only when pid leads its own group; otherwise the
+	// individual process. See the doc comment for why a non-leader is signalled
+	// directly rather than via its (foreign) group.
+	target := pid
+	if pgid, err := syscall.Getpgid(pid); err == nil {
+		if pgid == pid {
+			target = -pid
+		}
+	} else if processGoneError(err) {
+		return nil // already gone
+	}
+
+	alive := func() bool { return syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)) == nil }
+
+	if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil {
+		if processGoneError(err) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Poll liveness so we return promptly once it exits, rather than always
+	// waiting out the full grace period.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if !alive() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
+	}
+	if !alive() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Still alive after the grace period: force-kill.
+	if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGKILL); err != nil && !processGoneError(err) {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// SIGKILL is asynchronous: the kernel may not have reaped it yet. Poll again
+	// so this helper only reports success once the target is actually gone —
+	// otherwise the caller gets nil while descendants are still racing.
+	deadline = time.Now().Add(terminationGracePeriod)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if !alive() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		time.Sleep(terminationPollInterval)
+	}
+	if alive() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not exit after SIGKILL", pid)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// processGoneError reports whether an error means the process group has already
+// exited (so termination is effectively done). syscall.Kill reports ESRCH when
+// no process in the target group remains.
+func processGoneError(err error) bool {
+	return errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH)
 }
@@ -149,9 +149,12 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {

 	// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
-	// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
-	for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+	for {
+		// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
+		// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
+		if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+			break // child no longer exists
+		}
 		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
 			_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
 			t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
@@ -3,16 +3,36 @@
 package background

 import (
+	"os"
 	"os/exec"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
 )

-// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: process-tree termination is
-// delegated to execution.TerminateProcessTree, so no launch-time process-group
+// ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: terminateProcess uses
+// `taskkill /T` to kill the whole process tree, so no launch-time process-group
 // setup is required (the POSIX build sets Setpgid here instead).
-func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) { execution.ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd) }
+func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}

 func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
-	return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, 0, 0)
+	taskkill := taskkillPath()
+	if err := exec.Command(taskkill, "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return process.Kill()
+}
+
+func taskkillPath() string {
+	systemRoot := os.Getenv("SystemRoot")
+	if systemRoot == "" {
+		systemRoot = os.Getenv("windir")
+	}
+	if systemRoot == "" {
+		systemRoot = `C:\Windows`
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(systemRoot, "System32", "taskkill.exe")
 }
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package cli

 import (
-	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
@@ -10,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/acp"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 )
@@ -27,8 +25,6 @@ Usage:
 Not meant to be run interactively — point your editor's ACP / external-agent
 setting at "zero acp".`

-var acpSignalContext = signalContext
-
 // runACP serves ACP over stdio so an editor can drive ZERO's agent core. It
 // speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 (newline-delimited JSON) on stdin/stdout; stderr stays free
 // for human-readable diagnostics. The session lifecycle maps onto ZERO's own
@@ -44,14 +40,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
 		}
 	}

-	// The process's own stdin belongs exclusively to this Conn for the life of
-	// the command, so cancellation may close it to interrupt an idle read.
-	conn := acp.NewOwnedConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
+	conn := acp.NewConn(deps.stdin, stdout)
 	acp.NewAgent(conn, acp.Deps{
 		ResolveConfig: deps.resolveConfig,
-		DiscoverModels: func(ctx context.Context, profile config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error) {
-			return defaultDiscoverProviderModels(ctx, discoveryCredentialProfile(profile))
-		},
 		// deps.newProvider is wrapped in fillAppDeps to apply the stored API key,
 		// so ACP is authenticated for apiKeyStored profiles like every other
 		// surface — no ACP-specific credential handling needed.
@@ -77,9 +68,9 @@ func runACP(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int
 		AgentInfo:            acp.Implementation{Name: "zero", Version: version},
 	})

-	ctx, stop := acpSignalContext()
+	ctx, stop := signalContext()
 	defer stop()
-	if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil {
+	if err := conn.Serve(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, "acp: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
 	return exitSuccess
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-type acpTestReader func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (r acpTestReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return r(p) }
-
-type acpTestWriter func([]byte) (int, error)
-
-func (w acpTestWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w(p) }
-
-func installACPTestContext(t *testing.T) context.CancelFunc {
-	t.Helper()
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	previous := acpSignalContext
-	acpSignalContext = func() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
-		return ctx, cancel
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		cancel()
-		acpSignalContext = previous
-	})
-	return cancel
-}
-
-func TestRunACPCancellationPreservesTerminalReadError(t *testing.T) {
-	cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
-	wantErr := errors.New("transport read failed")
-	reader := acpTestReader(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		return copy(p, `{"jsonrpc":"1.0","id":1}`+"\n"), wantErr
-	})
-	writeStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	releaseWrite := make(chan struct{})
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	writer := acpTestWriter(func(p []byte) (int, error) {
-		writeStarted <- struct{}{}
-		<-releaseWrite
-		return stdout.Write(p)
-	})
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	done := make(chan int, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- runACP(nil, writer, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-writeStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not reach the response write")
-	}
-	// Keep Serve in the synchronous write until cancellation is observable. The
-	// regression requires the genuine read error to win over that cancellation.
-	cancel()
-	close(releaseWrite)
-
-	select {
-	case code := <-done:
-		if code != exitCrash {
-			t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want crash %d", code, exitCrash)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after terminal read error")
-	}
-	if got := stderr.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "acp: "+wantErr.Error()) {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want terminal read error", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunACPIdleCancellationExitsCleanly(t *testing.T) {
-	cancel := installACPTestContext(t)
-	pipeReader, pipeWriter := io.Pipe()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = pipeWriter.Close() })
-	readStarted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	reader := &acpNotifyingReadCloser{ReadCloser: pipeReader, readStarted: readStarted}
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	done := make(chan int, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- runACP(nil, &stdout, &stderr, fillAppDeps(appDeps{stdin: reader}))
-	}()
-
-	select {
-	case <-readStarted:
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not begin reading")
-	}
-	cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case code := <-done:
-		if code != exitSuccess {
-			t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want success %d; stderr: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
-		}
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("ACP did not exit after cancellation")
-	}
-	if stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want empty", stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-type acpNotifyingReadCloser struct {
-	io.ReadCloser
-	readStarted chan<- struct{}
-	once        sync.Once
-}
-
-func (r *acpNotifyingReadCloser) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	r.once.Do(func() { r.readStarted <- struct{}{} })
-	return r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
-}
@@ -515,7 +515,9 @@ func agentEvalReportFromBenchmark(suite agenteval.Suite, report agenteval.Benchm
 		if task.Agent.Truncated {
 			converted.Truncated = true
 		}
-		converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task)...)
+		for _, failure := range agentEvalFailuresFromTaskReport(task) {
+			converted.Failures = append(converted.Failures, failure)
+		}
 	}
 	return converted
 }
@@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/localcontrol"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/observability"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/peermsg"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/plugins"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodeldiscovery"
@@ -60,11 +58,7 @@ type appDeps struct {
 	// config.SetActiveProviderEnv, set in defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled
 	// by fillAppDeps, so tests never mutate the process environment unless they
 	// inject it). nil ⇒ no export.
-	exportActiveProvider func(providerName string)
-	// getenv reads a process environment variable (production: os.Getenv, set in
-	// defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled by fillAppDeps, so tests are hermetic
-	// against ambient vars like ZERO_PROVIDER unless they inject it). nil ⇒ empty.
-	getenv                 func(string) string
+	exportActiveProvider   func(providerName string)
 	probeProviderHealth    func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
 	discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
 	detectLocalRuntimes    func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
@@ -82,7 +76,6 @@ type appDeps struct {
 	runSandboxSetupHelper  func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
 	registerMCPTools       func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
 	prepareWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
-	releaseWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error
 	detectVerifyPlan       func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
 	runVerify              func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
 	runSelfVerify          func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
@@ -125,7 +118,6 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 		stdin:                os.Stdin,
 		userConfigPath:       config.DefaultUserConfigPath,
 		exportActiveProvider: config.SetActiveProviderEnv,
-		getenv:               os.Getenv,
 		resolveConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, overrides config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
 			options, err := config.DefaultResolveOptions(workspaceRoot)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -189,7 +181,6 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 			return mcp.RegisterTools(ctx, registry, cfg, options)
 		},
 		prepareWorktree:  worktrees.Prepare,
-		releaseWorktree:  worktrees.Release,
 		detectVerifyPlan: verify.DetectPlan,
 		runVerify:        verify.Run,
 		runSelfVerify:    selfverify.Run,
@@ -377,8 +368,6 @@ func runWithDeps(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps
 	case "exec":
 		// Forward leading --add-dir occurrences so exec's own parser collects them.
 		return runExec(append(addDirFlagArgs(addDirs), args[1:]...), stdout, stderr, deps)
-	case "completions":
-		return runCompletions(args[1:], stdout, stderr)
 	case "daemon":
 		return runDaemon(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
 	case "config":
@@ -535,9 +524,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	if deps.prepareWorktree == nil {
 		deps.prepareWorktree = defaults.prepareWorktree
 	}
-	if deps.releaseWorktree == nil {
-		deps.releaseWorktree = defaults.releaseWorktree
-	}
 	if deps.detectVerifyPlan == nil {
 		deps.detectVerifyPlan = defaults.detectVerifyPlan
 	}
@@ -591,9 +577,6 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	baseProbeProviderHealth := deps.probeProviderHealth
 	deps.probeProviderHealth = func(ctx context.Context, options providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result {
 		options.Profile = applyStoredProviderKeyAt(options.Profile, userConfigPath)
-		if options.OAuthResolver == nil {
-			options.OAuthResolver, _ = oauthLoginForProfile(options.Profile)
-		}
 		return baseProbeProviderHealth(ctx, options)
 	}
 	return deps
@@ -695,26 +678,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a

 	registry := newCoreRegistryScoped(workspaceRoot, scope)
 	registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
-	executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
-	sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
-	}
-	if notice, err := sandboxStore.ConsumeMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
-		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
-	} else if notice != "" {
-		_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
-	}
-	sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
-	sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
-		WorkspaceRoot:    workspaceRoot,
-		Policy:           applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
-		Store:            sandboxStore,
-		Backend:          sandboxBackend,
-		Scope:            scope,
-		SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
-	})
-	executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
 	specialistRuntime, err := registerSpecialistTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.Swarm.MaxTeamSize)
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize specialist tools: "+err.Error(), 1)
@@ -749,8 +712,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 		mcpRuntime, err = deps.registerMCPTools(context.Background(), registry, mcpConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions{
 			PermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
 			Autonomy:        mcp.AutonomyLow,
-			Execution:       executionRunner,
-			WorkspaceRoot:   workspaceRoot,
 		})
 	}
 	if err != nil {
@@ -777,7 +738,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	// The interactive TUI is not worktree-reassigned, so the trust root is the
 	// launch directory itself.
 	trustRoot := workspaceRoot
-	pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
+	pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
 	// Ask (not Auto) is the interactive default: in Auto, ToolAdvertised exposes
 	// only PermissionAllow tools, so prompt-gated tools (write_file/edit_file/bash/
 	// apply_patch) would never be offered to the model — the TUI could neither edit
@@ -792,26 +753,6 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	if permissionMode == "" {
 		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeAsk
 	}
-	sessionStore := deps.newSessionStore()
-	peerClass := peermsg.PermissionPrompting
-	if permissionMode == agent.PermissionModeUnsafe {
-		peerClass = peermsg.PermissionBypass
-	}
-	peerService, peerErr := peermsg.New(peermsg.Options{
-		Identity: peermsg.Identity{
-			Cwd:             workspaceRoot,
-			PermissionClass: peerClass,
-		},
-		InboundPolicy: peermsg.InboundPolicy(resolved.CrossSessionInbound),
-	})
-	if peerErr != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "warning: cross-session messaging unavailable: %s\n", peerErr)
-		peerService = nil
-	} else {
-		for _, tool := range tools.NewPeerSessionTools(peerService) {
-			registry.Register(tool)
-		}
-	}
 	// Activate deferred MCP-tool loading for the interactive run only when the
 	// VISIBLE deferred-eligible count meets the resolved threshold, matching exec.
 	// The registry is complete (core + specialist + MCP + plugins) here, so the
@@ -819,6 +760,19 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	// unchanged. The interactive surface applies no operator tool filters, so
 	// enabled/disabled are nil — matching the AgentOptions below.
 	registerToolSearchIfEligible(registry, resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold, permissionMode, nil, nil)
+	sandboxStore, err := deps.newSandboxStore()
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to initialize sandbox grants: "+err.Error(), 1)
+	}
+	sandboxBackend := deps.selectSandboxBackend(sandbox.BackendOptions{})
+	sandboxEngine := sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
+		WorkspaceRoot:    workspaceRoot,
+		Policy:           applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(sandbox.DefaultPolicy(), resolved.Sandbox),
+		Store:            sandboxStore,
+		Backend:          sandboxBackend,
+		Scope:            scope,
+		SensitiveEnvKeys: providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved),
+	})
 	lastKnownMCPConfig := mcpConfig
 	fileTracker := tools.NewFileTracker()
 	var scratchBaseline scratchFileBaseline
@@ -835,14 +789,13 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the AgentOptions literal so its trust skip
 	// report can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one
 	// notice when project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
-	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
+	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
 	emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
 	return deps.runTUI(context.Background(), tui.Options{
 		Cwd:                  workspaceRoot,
 		Version:              version,
 		Theme:                theme,
 		SavedTheme:           resolved.Preferences.Theme,
-		SavedPet:             resolved.Preferences.Pet,
 		UserConfigPath:       userConfigPath,
 		DoctorUserConfigPath: doctorUserConfigPath,
 		ProjectConfigPath:    projectConfigPath,
@@ -864,8 +817,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 			return scratchFileWarning(workspaceRoot, scratchBaseline)
 		},
 		Registry:           registry,
-		SessionStore:       sessionStore,
-		PeerService:        peerService,
+		SessionStore:       deps.newSessionStore(),
 		SandboxStore:       sandboxStore,
 		MCPConfig:          mcpConfig,
 		MCPPermissionStore: mcpPermissionStore,
@@ -1205,7 +1157,6 @@ Usage:

 Commands:
  exec       Run a one-shot prompt through the Go agent runtime
-  completions Generate shell completion scripts
  daemon     Manage the local background worker daemon (start/stop/status/run/attach)
  setup      Guide first-run provider setup
  config     Inspect resolved Go configuration without leaking secrets
@@ -1227,8 +1178,7 @@ Commands:
  mcp        Manage MCP backend settings
  auth       Log in to model providers via OAuth
  sandbox    Inspect sandbox policy and persistent grants
-  update     Check or apply Zero CLI updates (requires --check or --apply)
-  upgrade    Download, verify, and install available Zero CLI updates
+  update     Check for Zero CLI updates
  worktrees  Prepare isolated git worktrees
  verify     Detect and run local verification checks
  eval       Validate offline agent eval suites
@@ -1390,10 +1340,6 @@ Flags:
      --spec-model <model>           Override the draft model when --use-spec is set
      --spec-reasoning-effort <effort>
                                    Override draft reasoning effort when --use-spec is set
-      --plan                         Read-only planning mode: write and shell tools are hidden
-      --permission-mode <mode>       Set permission mode directly (plan, spec-draft, auto, member,
-                                    ask, unsafe). Outranks --auto; prefer --plan / --auto for
-                                    interactive use. Used by specialist/swarm child processes.
      --max-turns <number>           Override the maximum agent loop turns
      --exec-profile <name>          Apply an execution profile (balanced, fast, thorough): loop
                                    posture only (turn budget, effort, self-correction, escalation);
@@ -1457,20 +1457,6 @@ func TestRunUpdateHelpDocumentsCheckFlag(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestTopLevelHelpDocumentsRequiredUpdateMode(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if got := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "update     Check or apply Zero CLI updates (requires --check or --apply)") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected top-level help to document required update mode, got %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunUpdateReportsUpToDate(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer
@@ -1674,7 +1660,6 @@ func assertHelpOutput(t *testing.T, args []string) {
 		"mcp",
 		"sandbox",
 		"update",
-		"upgrade",
 		"worktrees",
 		"verify",
 		"serve",
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import (

 func TestRunBackendsJSONUsesLifecycleSnapshotWithoutConnectingMCP(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ func TestRunBackendsTextAndHelp(t *testing.T) {

 func TestRunBackendsDoctorJSONAndTextWithoutConnectingMCP(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("b", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("b", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -1,405 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-type completionNode struct {
-	names    []string
-	flags    []string
-	children []completionNode
-}
-
-type completionContext struct {
-	path        string
-	candidates  []string
-	transitions map[string]string
-}
-
-var completionRoot = completionNode{
-	flags: []string{"-h", "--help", "-v", "--version", "-p", "--prompt", "--add-dir", "--theme", "--skip-permissions-unsafe"},
-	children: []completionNode{
-		{names: []string{"exec"}, flags: []string{
-			"-h", "--help", "-f", "--file", "--image", "--add-dir", "--mode", "-m", "--model",
-			"--use-spec", "--spec-model", "--spec-reasoning-effort", "--plan", "--permission-mode",
-			"--max-turns", "--exec-profile",
-			"--auto", "--enabled-tools", "--disabled-tools", "--list-tools", "--profile", "-r",
-			"--reasoning-effort", "-C", "--cwd", "-w", "--worktree", "--worktree-dir", "-i",
-			"--input-format", "-o", "--output-format", "--prompt", "--resume", "--fork",
-			"--calling-session-id", "--calling-tool-use-id", "--tag", "--depth", "--session-title",
-			"--init-session-id", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "--allow-escalation", "--self-correct",
-			"--notify", "--no-notify", "--no-completion-gate",
-		}},
-		{
-			names:    []string{"completions"},
-			flags:    []string{"-h", "--help"},
-			children: leafNodes("bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish"),
-		},
-		{names: []string{"daemon"}, children: leafNodes("start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach", "serve-remote", "link")},
-		{names: []string{"setup"}},
-		{names: []string{"config"}},
-		{names: []string{"models"}, children: []completionNode{{names: []string{"list", "ls"}}}},
-		{names: []string{"providers"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"current"}}, {names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"catalog"}},
-			{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"use"}},
-			{names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"rename"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}},
-			{names: []string{"detect"}}, {names: []string{"models"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"doctor"}},
-		{names: []string{"context"}},
-		{names: []string{"repo-map", "repomap"}},
-		{names: []string{"search", "find"}},
-		{names: []string{"sessions", "session"}, children: leafNodes("list", "children", "lineage", "tree", "rewind-plan", "rewind", "compact-plan")},
-		{names: []string{"spec"}, children: leafNodes("show", "approve", "reject")},
-		{names: []string{"init"}},
-		{names: []string{"specialists", "specialist"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"show"}}, {names: []string{"create"}},
-			{names: []string{"delete", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"edit"}}, {names: []string{"path"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"plugins", "plugin"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"backends", "backend"}, children: leafNodes("doctor")},
-		{names: []string{"skills", "skill"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"info"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"tools", "tool"}, children: leafNodes("make", "list")},
-		{names: []string{"hooks"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"list"}}, {names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}},
-			{names: []string{"enable"}}, {names: []string{"disable"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"mcp"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"add"}}, {names: []string{"remove", "rm"}}, {names: []string{"enable"}},
-			{names: []string{"disable"}}, {names: []string{"check"}}, {names: []string{"list"}},
-			{names: []string{"permissions"}, children: leafNodes("list", "revoke", "clear")},
-			{names: []string{"tools"}, children: leafNodes("list")},
-			{names: []string{"oauth"}, children: leafNodes("login", "logout", "status")},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"auth"}, children: leafNodes("openrouter", "chatgpt", "login", "logout", "status", "refresh")},
-		{names: []string{"sandbox"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"policy"}}, {names: []string{"setup"}}, {names: []string{"check"}},
-			{names: []string{"grants"}, children: leafNodes("list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"update"}},
-		{names: []string{"upgrade"}},
-		{names: []string{"worktrees", "worktree"}, children: leafNodes("prepare", "release")},
-		{names: []string{"verify"}},
-		{names: []string{"trust"}, children: leafNodes("list", "remove")},
-		{names: []string{"eval"}, children: leafNodes("validate", "run", "bench")},
-		{names: []string{"changes", "change"}, children: []completionNode{
-			{names: []string{"inspect", "status"}}, {names: []string{"commit"}}, {names: []string{"push"}},
-			{names: []string{"pr", "pull-request"}},
-		}},
-		{names: []string{"usage"}, children: leafNodes("report")},
-		{names: []string{"cron"}, children: leafNodes("add", "list", "rm", "pause", "resume", "run")},
-		{names: []string{"repo-info", "repoinfo"}},
-		{names: []string{"serve"}},
-		{names: []string{"acp"}},
-		{names: []string{"help"}},
-		{names: []string{"version"}},
-	},
-}
-
-func leafNodes(names ...string) []completionNode {
-	nodes := make([]completionNode, 0, len(names))
-	for _, name := range names {
-		nodes = append(nodes, completionNode{names: []string{name}})
-	}
-	return nodes
-}
-
-func runCompletions(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {
-	if len(args) == 1 && (args[0] == "-h" || args[0] == "--help" || args[0] == "help") {
-		if err := writeCompletionsHelp(stdout); err != nil {
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-		return exitSuccess
-	}
-	if len(args) == 0 {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "shell required. Use `zero completions <bash|zsh|fish|powershell|elvish>`.")
-	}
-	if len(args) != 1 {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unexpected completions argument %q", args[1]))
-	}
-
-	contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
-	var err error
-	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(args[0])) {
-	case "bash":
-		err = writeBashCompletions(stdout, contexts)
-	case "zsh":
-		err = writeZshCompletions(stdout, contexts)
-	case "fish":
-		err = writeFishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
-	case "powershell":
-		err = writePowerShellCompletions(stdout, contexts)
-	case "elvish":
-		err = writeElvishCompletions(stdout, contexts)
-	default:
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported shell %q; expected bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish", args[0]))
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return exitCrash
-	}
-	return exitSuccess
-}
-
-func writeCompletionsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
-	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Generate shell completion scripts.
-
-Usage:
-  zero completions <shell>
-
-Arguments:
-  <shell>  Target shell: bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish
-
-Examples:
-  source <(zero completions bash)
-  source <(zero completions zsh)
-  zero completions fish > ~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish
-  zero completions powershell >> $PROFILE
-  eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)
-
-Flags:
-  -h, --help  Show this help
-`)
-	return err
-}
-
-func completionContexts(root completionNode) []completionContext {
-	contexts := []completionContext{}
-	var visit func(completionNode, []string)
-	visit = func(node completionNode, paths []string) {
-		candidates := append([]string{}, node.flags...)
-		transitions := map[string]string{}
-		for _, child := range node.children {
-			candidates = append(candidates, child.names...)
-			for _, path := range paths {
-				for _, name := range child.names {
-					childPath := strings.TrimSpace(path + " " + name)
-					transitions[path+"|"+name] = childPath
-				}
-			}
-		}
-		candidates = uniqueStrings(candidates)
-		for _, path := range paths {
-			contexts = append(contexts, completionContext{path: path, candidates: candidates, transitions: transitions})
-		}
-		for _, child := range node.children {
-			childPaths := make([]string, 0, len(paths)*len(child.names))
-			for _, path := range paths {
-				for _, name := range child.names {
-					childPaths = append(childPaths, strings.TrimSpace(path+" "+name))
-				}
-			}
-			visit(child, childPaths)
-		}
-	}
-	visit(root, []string{""})
-	sort.SliceStable(contexts, func(i, j int) bool { return contexts[i].path < contexts[j].path })
-	return contexts
-}
-
-func uniqueStrings(values []string) []string {
-	seen := map[string]bool{}
-	result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		if value == "" || seen[value] {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[value] = true
-		result = append(result, value)
-	}
-	return result
-}
-
-func allTransitions(contexts []completionContext) map[string]string {
-	transitions := map[string]string{}
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		for key, value := range context.transitions {
-			transitions[key] = value
-		}
-	}
-	return transitions
-}
-
-func sortedTransitionKeys(transitions map[string]string) []string {
-	keys := make([]string, 0, len(transitions))
-	for key := range transitions {
-		keys = append(keys, key)
-	}
-	sort.Strings(keys)
-	return keys
-}
-
-func shellWords(values []string) string {
-	return strings.Join(values, " ")
-}
-
-func writeBashCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# bash completion for zero\n_zero() {\n  local cur context token i candidates\n  cur=\"${COMP_WORDS[COMP_CWORD]}\"\n  context=\"\""); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, "  for ((i = 1; i < COMP_CWORD; i++)); do", "    token=\"${COMP_WORDS[i]}\"", "  done"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := writePOSIXCandidateCase(w, contexts, "  "); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "  COMPREPLY=( $(compgen -W \"$candidates\" -- \"$cur\") )\n}\ncomplete -F _zero zero")
-	return err
-}
-
-func writeZshCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "#compdef zero\n_zero() {\n  local context token i\n  local -a candidates\n  context=\"\""); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := writePOSIXContextLoop(w, contexts, "  for ((i = 2; i < CURRENT; i++)); do", "    token=\"${words[i]}\"", "  done"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "  case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "    %q) candidates=(%s) ;;\n", context.path, quotedWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "  esac\n  compadd -- \"${candidates[@]}\"\n}\ncompdef _zero zero")
-	return err
-}
-
-func writePOSIXContextLoop(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, start string, token string, end string) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, start); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, token); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "    case \"$context|$token\" in"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
-	for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "      %q) context=%q ;;\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "    esac"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, end)
-	return err
-}
-
-func writePOSIXCandidateCase(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext, indent string) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"case \"$context\" in"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s  %q) candidates=%q ;;\n", indent, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, indent+"esac")
-	return err
-}
-
-func quotedWords(values []string) string {
-	quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		quoted = append(quoted, fmt.Sprintf("%q", value))
-	}
-	return strings.Join(quoted, " ")
-}
-
-func writeFishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# fish completion for zero\nfunction __zero_completion_context\n    set -l context ''\n    set -l tokens (commandline -opc)"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "    for token in $tokens[2..-1]\n        switch \"$context|$token\""); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
-	for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "            case %q\n                set context %q\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "        end\n    end\n    if test -z \"$context\"\n        echo __root__\n    else\n        echo \"$context\"\n    end\nend"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		path := context.path
-		if path == "" {
-			path = "__root__"
-		}
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "complete -c zero -f -n 'test (__zero_completion_context) = %q' -a %q\n", path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func writePowerShellCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# PowerShell completion for zero\nRegister-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero -ScriptBlock {\n    param($wordToComplete, $commandAst, $cursorPosition)\n    $context = ''\n    $elements = @($commandAst.CommandElements)\n    $limit = $elements.Count\n    if ($wordToComplete -ne '' -and $limit -gt 1) { $limit-- }\n    for ($i = 1; $i -lt $limit; $i++) {\n        $token = $elements[$i].Extent.Text\n        switch (\"$context|$token\") {"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
-	for _, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "            '%s' { $context = '%s'; break }\n", key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "        }\n    }\n    $candidates = switch ($context) {"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "        '%s' { @(%s) }\n", context.path, powershellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "    }\n    $candidates | Where-Object { $_ -like \"$wordToComplete*\" } | ForEach-Object {\n        [System.Management.Automation.CompletionResult]::new($_, $_, 'ParameterValue', $_)\n    }\n}")
-	return err
-}
-
-func powershellWords(values []string) string {
-	quoted := make([]string, 0, len(values))
-	for _, value := range values {
-		quoted = append(quoted, "'"+strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", "''")+"'")
-	}
-	return strings.Join(quoted, ", ")
-}
-
-func writeElvishCompletions(w io.Writer, contexts []completionContext) error {
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "# Elvish completion for zero\nset edit:completion:arg-completer[zero] = {|@args|\n    var context = ''\n    for token $args[1..-1] {"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	transitions := allTransitions(contexts)
-	for index, key := range sortedTransitionKeys(transitions) {
-		keyword := "if"
-		if index > 0 {
-			keyword = "} elif"
-		}
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "        %s (eq $context'|'$token %q) {\n            set context = %q\n", keyword, key, transitions[key]); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "        }\n    }"); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	for index, context := range contexts {
-		keyword := "if"
-		if index > 0 {
-			keyword = "} elif"
-		}
-		if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "    %s (eq $context %q) {\n        put %s\n", keyword, context.path, shellWords(context.candidates)); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "    }\n}")
-	return err
-}
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestCompletionsHelpAndRootHelp(t *testing.T) {
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", "--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("completion help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"zero completions <shell>",
-		"bash, zsh, fish, powershell, or elvish",
-		"source <(zero completions bash)",
-		"~/.config/fish/completions/zero.fish",
-		"eval (zero completions elvish | slurp)",
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
-			t.Errorf("completion help missing %q:\n%s", want, stdout.String())
-		}
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"--help"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("root help exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "completions Generate shell completion scripts") {
-		t.Fatalf("root help does not list completions command:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCompletionsRejectsMissingUnknownAndExtraShellArguments(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		args []string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "missing", args: []string{"completions"}, want: "shell required"},
-		{name: "unknown", args: []string{"completions", "nu"}, want: "unsupported shell"},
-		{name: "extra", args: []string{"completions", "bash", "extra"}, want: "unexpected completions argument"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var stdout bytes.Buffer
-			var stderr bytes.Buffer
-			if code := runWithDeps(test.args, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitUsage {
-				t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitUsage, stderr.String())
-			}
-			if stdout.Len() != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("stdout = %q, want empty", stdout.String())
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), test.want) {
-				t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want substring %q", stderr.String(), test.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCompletionsGeneratesEverySupportedShell(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		shell       string
-		marker      string
-		syntaxShell string
-	}{
-		{shell: "bash", marker: "complete -F _zero zero", syntaxShell: "bash"},
-		{shell: "zsh", marker: "#compdef zero", syntaxShell: "zsh"},
-		{shell: "fish", marker: "complete -c zero"},
-		{shell: "powershell", marker: "Register-ArgumentCompleter -Native -CommandName zero"},
-		{shell: "elvish", marker: "edit:completion:arg-completer[zero]"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.shell, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var stdout bytes.Buffer
-			var stderr bytes.Buffer
-			if code := runWithDeps([]string{"completions", test.shell}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{}); code != exitSuccess {
-				t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d: %s", code, exitSuccess, stderr.String())
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), test.marker) {
-				t.Fatalf("%s completion missing marker %q:\n%s", test.shell, test.marker, stdout.String())
-			}
-			for _, want := range []string{"daemon", "mcp oauth", "sandbox grants", "--output-format"} {
-				if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), want) {
-					t.Errorf("%s completion missing %q", test.shell, want)
-				}
-			}
-			script := stdout.String()
-			switch test.shell {
-			case "fish":
-				assertBalancedFishBlocks(t, script)
-			case "powershell", "elvish":
-				assertBalancedBraces(t, script)
-			}
-			if test.syntaxShell != "" {
-				assertNativeShellSyntax(t, test.syntaxShell, script)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func assertBalancedBraces(t *testing.T, script string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if opens, closes := strings.Count(script, "{"), strings.Count(script, "}"); opens != closes {
-		t.Errorf("unbalanced braces: %d opening, %d closing", opens, closes)
-	}
-}
-
-func assertBalancedFishBlocks(t *testing.T, script string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	depth := 0
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(script, "\n") {
-		fields := strings.Fields(line)
-		if len(fields) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		switch fields[0] {
-		case "function", "for", "switch", "if":
-			depth++
-		case "end":
-			depth--
-			if depth < 0 {
-				t.Fatal("fish completion closes a block before one is opened")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if depth != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("fish completion has %d unclosed blocks", depth)
-	}
-}
-
-func assertNativeShellSyntax(t *testing.T, shell, script string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	path, err := exec.LookPath(shell)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("%s is not installed", shell)
-	}
-	command := exec.Command(path, "-n")
-	command.Stdin = strings.NewReader(script)
-	if output, err := command.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("%s syntax check failed: %v\n%s", shell, err, output)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCompletionTreeCoversAliasesNestingAndCommonFlags(t *testing.T) {
-	contexts := completionContexts(completionRoot)
-	byPath := make(map[string][]string, len(contexts))
-	for _, context := range contexts {
-		byPath[context.path] = context.candidates
-	}
-
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath[""], "sessions", "session", "plugins", "plugin", "worktrees", "worktree", "--add-dir", "--theme", "-p", "--prompt")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["exec"], "--model", "--cwd", "--worktree", "--output-format", "--resume", "--skip-permissions-unsafe")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["worktrees"], "prepare", "release")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["worktree"], "prepare", "release")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["daemon"], "start", "stop", "status", "run", "attach")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["mcp oauth"], "login", "logout", "status")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["sandbox grants"], "list", "allow", "deny", "revoke", "clear")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["completions"], "bash", "zsh", "fish", "powershell", "elvish")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugins"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
-	assertCandidates(t, byPath["plugin"], "list", "add", "info", "remove", "rm")
-}
-
-func assertCandidates(t *testing.T, got []string, wants ...string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	set := make(map[string]bool, len(got))
-	for _, candidate := range got {
-		set[candidate] = true
-	}
-	for _, want := range wants {
-		if !set[want] {
-			t.Errorf("candidates %v do not contain %q", got, want)
-		}
-	}
-}
@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ func runContext(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
 	report, err := contextreport.Build(contextreport.Options{
-		WorkspaceRoot:  workspaceRoot,
-		Provider:       resolved.Provider,
-		Registry:       newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
-		ContextWindow:  modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
-		DeferThreshold: resolved.Tools.DeferThreshold,
+		WorkspaceRoot: workspaceRoot,
+		Provider:      resolved.Provider,
+		Registry:      newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot),
+		ContextWindow: modelContextWindow(modelRegistry, resolved.Provider.Model),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
@@ -77,10 +77,11 @@ func TestRegisterToolSearchIfEligibleSkipsWhenThresholdZero(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestDeferredEligibleCountIncludesOptionalBuiltins(t *testing.T) {
+func TestDeferredEligibleCountIgnoresCoreTools(t *testing.T) {
 	registry := newCoreRegistry(t.TempDir())
-	if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got < 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want at least 2 optional built-ins", got)
+	// newCoreRegistry holds only built-ins; none implement Deferred().
+	if got := deferredEligibleCount(registry, agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil, nil); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("deferredEligibleCount(core) = %d, want 0", got)
 	}
 }

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"

@@ -139,7 +138,6 @@ func runSkillInfo(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer)
 	}
 	if info.Hash != "" {
 		lines = append(lines, "  hash: "+info.Hash)
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
 	}
 	lines = append(lines, "  path: "+info.Skill.Path)
 	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
@@ -254,115 +252,6 @@ func runPluginRemove(args []string, dir string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writ
 	return exitSuccess
 }

-func runPluginInfo(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
-	id, options, help, err := parsePluginInfoArgs(args)
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
-	}
-	if help {
-		if err := writePluginInfoHelp(stdout); err != nil {
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-		return exitSuccess
-	}
-	if id == "" {
-		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, "usage: zero plugins info <id> [--user] [--json]")
-	}
-
-	cwd, err := deps.getwd()
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeAppError(stderr, "failed to resolve workspace: "+err.Error(), exitCrash)
-	}
-	info, err := plugins.Info(plugins.InfoOptions{
-		LoadOptions: pluginLoadOptions(deps, cwd, options.user),
-	}, id)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, plugins.ErrNotInstalled) {
-			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
-		}
-		return writeAppError(stderr, redaction.ErrorMessage(err, redaction.Options{}), exitCrash)
-	}
-
-	if options.json {
-		if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(info, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-		return exitSuccess
-	}
-
-	plugin := info.Plugin
-	lines := []string{fmt.Sprintf("%s (%s) %s", plugin.ID, plugin.Name, plugin.Version)}
-	state := "enabled"
-	if !plugin.Enabled {
-		state = "disabled"
-	}
-	lines = append(lines, "  state: "+state)
-	lines = append(lines, "  source: "+string(plugin.Source))
-	if len(plugin.Tools) > 0 {
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  tools: %d", len(plugin.Tools)))
-	}
-	if len(plugin.Hooks) > 0 {
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  hooks: %d", len(plugin.Hooks)))
-	}
-	if len(plugin.Skills) > 0 {
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  skills: %d", len(plugin.Skills)))
-	}
-	if len(plugin.Prompts) > 0 {
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  prompts: %d", len(plugin.Prompts)))
-	}
-	if info.LockSource != "" {
-		lines = append(lines, "  lock source: "+info.LockSource)
-	}
-	if info.LockHash != "" {
-		lines = append(lines, "  lock hash: "+info.LockHash)
-		lines = append(lines, fmt.Sprintf("  hash drift: %t", info.HashDrift))
-	}
-	lines = append(lines, "  manifest: "+plugin.ManifestPath)
-	if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, redaction.RedactString(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
-		return exitCrash
-	}
-	return exitSuccess
-}
-
-type pluginInfoOptions struct {
-	json bool
-	user bool
-}
-
-func parsePluginInfoArgs(args []string) (string, pluginInfoOptions, bool, error) {
-	options := pluginInfoOptions{}
-	id := ""
-	for _, arg := range args {
-		switch arg {
-		case "-h", "--help", "help":
-			return "", options, true, nil
-		case "--json":
-			options.json = true
-		case "--user":
-			options.user = true
-		default:
-			if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-") {
-				return "", options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unknown plugins info flag %q", arg)}
-			}
-			if id != "" {
-				return "", options, false, execUsageError{"plugins info takes a single id"}
-			}
-			id = arg
-		}
-	}
-	return id, options, false, nil
-}
-
-func pluginLoadOptions(deps appDeps, cwd string, userOnly bool) plugins.LoadOptions {
-	opts := plugins.LoadOptions{Cwd: cwd, ExcludeProject: userOnly}
-	roots := []plugins.Root{{Source: plugins.SourceUser, Path: deps.pluginsDir()}}
-	if !userOnly {
-		roots = append(roots, plugins.Root{Source: plugins.SourceProject, Path: filepath.Join(cwd, ".zero", "plugins")})
-	}
-	opts.Roots = roots
-	return opts
-}
-
 // --- tools make / list ---

 func runTools(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) int {
@@ -678,18 +567,6 @@ Removes an installed plugin directory and its plugins.lock entry.
 	return err
 }

-func writePluginInfoHelp(w io.Writer) error {
-	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
-  zero plugins info <id> [flags]
-
-Flags:
-      --user    Target only user plugins (ignore ./.zero/plugins)
-      --json    Print plugin info as JSON
-  -h, --help    Show this help
-`)
-	return err
-}
-
 func writeToolsHelp(w io.Writer) error {
 	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, `Usage:
  zero tools <command>
@@ -83,48 +83,6 @@ func TestRunSkillAddInfoRemove(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(info, src) || !strings.Contains(info, "sha256:") {
 		t.Fatalf("info missing source/hash:\n%s", info)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(info, "hash drift: false") {
-		t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift status:\n%s", info)
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info --json exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	var beforeJSON map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &beforeJSON); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse skill info json: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if beforeJSON["hashDrift"] != false {
-		t.Fatalf("hashDrift before edit = %#v, want false", beforeJSON["hashDrift"])
-	}
-
-	skillPath := filepath.Join(skillsDir, "confirmation-policy", "SKILL.md")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(skillPath, []byte("---\ndescription: edited\n---\nchanged\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "hash drift: true") {
-		t.Fatalf("info missing hash drift after edit:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-
-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"skill", "info", "confirmation-policy", "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("skill info --json after edit exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	var afterJSON map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &afterJSON); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse skill info json after edit: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if afterJSON["hashDrift"] != true {
-		t.Fatalf("hashDrift after edit = %#v, want true", afterJSON["hashDrift"])
-	}

 	// remove deletes it
 	stdout.Reset()
@@ -219,15 +177,6 @@ func TestRunPluginAddListRemove(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("add output missing id:\n%s", stdout.String())
 	}

-	stdout.Reset()
-	stderr.Reset()
-	if exit := runWithDeps([]string{"plugin", "info", "zero.demo"}, &stdout, &stderr, deps); exit != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("plugin info exit = %d, stderr = %s", exit, stderr.String())
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "zero.demo") || !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "manifest:") {
-		t.Fatalf("info output missing plugin details:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-
 	// remove
 	stdout.Reset()
 	stderr.Reset()
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/errhint"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execprofile"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/imageinput"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/lsp"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
@@ -78,18 +77,11 @@ type execOptions struct {
 	// fill-only-if-unset rule, so precedence is explicit flag > mode > profile.
 	// Distinct from the mode preset also named "fast" (which picks a model) and
 	// from the legacy inert --profile above. See internal/execprofile.
-	execProfile         string
-	reasoningEffort     string
-	useSpec             bool
-	specModel           string
-	specReasoningEffort string
-	// plan selects PermissionModePlan for this run: the same read-only,
-	// in-session planning mode the TUI enters with /plan on. Unlike --use-spec
-	// (a separate draft session with its own review flow), this only swaps the
-	// permission mode for the run already being made — ToolAdvertised gates
-	// write/shell tools generically for any mode, so no other exec plumbing
-	// needs to know about it.
-	plan                  bool
+	execProfile           string
+	reasoningEffort       string
+	useSpec               bool
+	specModel             string
+	specReasoningEffort   string
 	maxTurns              int
 	cwd                   string
 	inputFormat           execInputFormat
@@ -111,7 +103,6 @@ type execOptions struct {
 	worktreeName          string
 	worktreeDir           string
 	skipPermissionsUnsafe bool
-	permissionMode        string
 	// allowEscalation opts the run into mid-run model escalation: it registers
 	// the escalate_model tool and wires agent.Options.ModelSwitcher. Off by
 	// default — a run without the flag is byte-identical to before (no tool, nil
@@ -207,37 +198,14 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 			Name:    options.worktreeName,
 			BaseDir: options.worktreeDir,
 			Now:     deps.now,
-			// The worktree's lifetime is bound to this process (the deferred
-			// release below), so record the PID: if this process dies without
-			// releasing, Clean can expire the lease instead of skipping the
-			// locked worktree forever.
-			LeasePID: os.Getpid(),
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
 		}
 		workspaceRoot = preparedWorktree.Path
-		// When this run's own Prepare call took the worktree lock, its
-		// lifetime is bound to this function: release the lock once it returns
-		// so Clean can reclaim the worktree later if it goes stale. A reused
-		// worktree whose lock an external `zero worktrees prepare` caller
-		// still holds reports LockAcquired=false; releasing it here would
-		// clear that caller's lease and expose its workspace to Clean, so the
-		// matching release stays that caller's responsibility. A failed unlock
-		// leaves a lock Clean will permanently skip, so it must not pass
-		// silently; the run's primary result has already been emitted by the
-		// time the defer runs, so surface it as a diagnostic.
-		if preparedWorktree.LockAcquired {
-			defer func() {
-				if releaseErr := deps.releaseWorktree(context.Background(), worktrees.Options{Cwd: trustRoot}, preparedWorktree.Path); releaseErr != nil {
-					fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "zero: failed to release worktree lock on %s: %s\n", redactCLIString(preparedWorktree.Path), redactCLIString(releaseErr.Error()))
-				}
-			}()
-		}
 	}

 	registry := newCoreRegistry(workspaceRoot)
-	executionRunner := execution.NewRunner(nil)
 	// Register the escalate_model tool only when the run opted into mid-run
 	// escalation. It is registered before --list-tools formatting and
 	// validateExecToolFilters so the tool is both listable and filter-validatable.
@@ -270,16 +238,16 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	if options.useSpec {
 		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft
 	}
-	if options.plan {
-		permissionMode = agent.PermissionModePlan
+	mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err := registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
 	}
-	var mcpRuntime mcpToolRuntime
-	var mcpSkip trustSkip
+	defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
 	// Make local plugins live for this run: register their declared tools into the
 	// registry and collect their hooks + skill roots for the dispatcher and skill
 	// tool below. Done before --list-tools and filter validation so plugin tools
 	// are listable and filter-validatable; it fails OPEN (a bad plugin is skipped).
-	var pluginActivation pluginActivation
+	pluginActivation := activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot)
 	if options.useSpec {
 		specmode.RegisterDraftTools(registry, workspaceRoot, deps.now)
 	}
@@ -322,31 +290,6 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	}
 	var displacedMaxTurns int
 	resolved.MaxTurns, displacedMaxTurns = applyProfileTurnBudget(execProfile, options.maxTurns, resolved.MaxTurns)
-	execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
-	}
-	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
-		registry.Register(tool)
-	}
-	sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
-	if err != nil {
-		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
-	}
-	if notice, err := sandboxEngine.ConsumeGrantMigrationNotice(); err != nil {
-		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", "migrate sandbox grants: "+err.Error())
-	} else if notice != "" {
-		_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(stderr, "[zero] "+notice)
-	}
-	executionRunner.SetPreparer(sandboxEngine)
-	if permissionMode != agent.PermissionModePlan {
-		mcpRuntime, mcpSkip, err = registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, registry, deps, execMCPAutonomy(options), trustRoot, executionRunner)
-		if err != nil {
-			return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "mcp_error", err.Error())
-		}
-		defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)
-	}
-	pluginActivation = activatePlugins(workspaceRoot, registry, deps, stderr, trustRoot, executionRunner)
 	registerLocalControlTools(registry, workspaceRoot, resolved.LocalControl)
 	if err := validateExecToolFilters(options, registry); err != nil {
 		return writeExecFormatUsageError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, err.Error())
@@ -414,6 +357,28 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 		}
 		images = nil
 	}
+	execScope, err := sandbox.NewScope(workspaceRoot, append(append([]string{}, resolved.Sandbox.AdditionalWriteRoots...), options.addDirs...))
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
+	}
+	// Re-register the core tools with the run scope, OVERWRITING the nil-scope
+	// instances registered before config resolve (the registry must exist that
+	// early for --list-tools and tool-filter validation, which run without a
+	// provider). This is safe only while two invariants hold:
+	//   1. Registry.Register replaces by NAME, so every path-confining core
+	//      tool is swapped wholesale; and
+	//   2. nothing between the initial registration and this point captures a
+	//      core-tool INSTANCE (tool_search holds the *Registry* and resolves
+	//      names lazily; --list-tools and filter validation use names only).
+	// A new wrapper that snapshots a core tool before this line would silently
+	// ship nil-scope enforcement — add it below this re-registration instead.
+	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(workspaceRoot, execScope) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+	sandboxEngine, err := buildExecSandboxEngine(workspaceRoot, resolved, deps, execScope)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecProviderError(stdout, stderr, options.outputFormat, "sandbox_error", err.Error())
+	}
 	runReasoningEffort := options.reasoningEffort
 	if options.useSpec && options.specReasoningEffort != "" {
 		runReasoningEffort = options.specReasoningEffort
@@ -613,12 +578,8 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	// warned, so --auto high silently ran without notice.
 	if permissionMode == agent.PermissionModeUnsafe {
 		reason := "--auto high"
-		switch {
-		case options.skipPermissionsUnsafe:
+		if options.skipPermissionsUnsafe {
 			reason = "--skip-permissions-unsafe"
-		case strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "unsafe"),
-			strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "high"):
-			reason = "--permission-mode unsafe"
 		}
 		writer.warning(fmt.Sprintf("Unsafe permissions are active for this run because %s was passed.", reason))
 		if writer.err != nil {
@@ -663,7 +624,7 @@ func runExec(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps) in
 	// Build the hooks dispatcher out of the struct literal so its trust skip report
 	// can be combined with the plugin activation's, and emit at most one notice when
 	// project hooks/plugins were dropped for an untrusted workspace.
-	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot, executionRunner)
+	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, pluginActivation.hooks, trustRoot)
 	emitTrustNotice(stderr, hookSkip, pluginActivation.trustSkip, mcpSkip)
 	result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, agentPrompt, provider, agent.Options{
 		MaxTurns:             resolved.MaxTurns,
@@ -978,12 +939,6 @@ func providerSensitiveEnvKeys(resolved config.ResolvedConfig) []string {
 // applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy overlays every config-sourced sandbox knob onto
 // the default policy.
 func applyConfiguredSandboxPolicy(policy sandbox.Policy, cfg config.SandboxConfig) sandbox.Policy {
-	// An explicit `"sandbox": {"enabled": false}` disables the sandbox: every
-	// request is allowed and commands run unwrapped. Only reachable from global
-	// config / CLI — project config never sets Enabled (see mergeProjectConfig).
-	if cfg.Enabled != nil && !*cfg.Enabled {
-		policy.Mode = sandbox.ModeDisabled
-	}
 	if network := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.Network); network != "" {
 		switch sandbox.NetworkMode(network) {
 		case sandbox.NetworkAllow, sandbox.NetworkDeny:
@@ -20,19 +20,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 		switch {
 		case arg == "-h" || arg == "--help" || arg == "help":
 			return options, true, nil
-		case arg == "--permission-mode":
-			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
-			if err != nil {
-				return options, false, err
-			}
-			options.permissionMode = strings.TrimSpace(value)
-			index = next
-		case strings.HasPrefix(arg, "--permission-mode="):
-			value, err := requiredInlineFlagValue(arg, "--permission-mode")
-			if err != nil {
-				return options, false, err
-			}
-			options.permissionMode = value
 		case arg == "--skip-permissions-unsafe":
 			options.skipPermissionsUnsafe = true
 		case arg == "--list-tools":
@@ -184,8 +171,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 			options.reasoningEffort = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(arg, "--reasoning-effort="))
 		case arg == "--use-spec":
 			options.useSpec = true
-		case arg == "--plan":
-			options.plan = true
 		case arg == "--spec-model":
 			value, next, err := nextFlagValue(args, index, arg)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -452,27 +437,6 @@ func parseExecArgs(args []string) (execOptions, bool, error) {
 	if !options.useSpec && options.specReasoningEffort != "" {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--spec-reasoning-effort requires --use-spec."}
 	}
-	// Plan mode may be entered via --plan or --permission-mode plan. Combination
-	// guards must key off both: otherwise --permission-mode plan bypasses the
-	// worktree/unsafe/use-spec rejects that --plan alone enforces, and worktree
-	// prep mutates the filesystem before the read-only mode is assigned.
-	planMode := options.plan || strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode), "plan")
-	if planMode && options.useSpec {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use either --plan or --use-spec, not both."}
-	}
-	if planMode && options.skipPermissionsUnsafe {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use either --plan or --skip-permissions-unsafe, not both."}
-	}
-	if planMode && options.worktree {
-		// Worktree prep (copying/branching the workspace) runs before the plan
-		// permission mode is assigned, so it would happen even under plan mode's
-		// read-only, no-side-effects promise. Reject the combination outright
-		// rather than let a mutation slip in ahead of the mode gate.
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--plan cannot be combined with --worktree."}
-	}
-	if options.plan && options.permissionMode != "" && strings.ToLower(options.permissionMode) != "plan" {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--plan cannot be combined with --permission-mode=" + options.permissionMode + "."}
-	}
 	if options.initSessionID != "" && (options.resume != "" || options.resumeLatest) {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"Use --init-session-id only when creating or forking a session."}
 	}
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-package cli
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-)
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRecognizesPlanFlag(t *testing.T) {
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parseExecArgs: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !options.plan {
-		t.Fatal("expected --plan to set options.plan")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithUseSpec(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--use-spec", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not both") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--use-spec validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithSkipPermissionsUnsafe(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not both") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--skip-permissions-unsafe validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithWorktree guards against worktree
-// preparation (a filesystem mutation) running ahead of the plan mode gate:
-// options.worktree is processed in runExec before the plan permission mode is
-// assigned, so the combination must be rejected during option validation,
-// before any worktree prep can occur.
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithWorktree(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--worktree", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--worktree") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--worktree validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseExecArgsRejectsPlanWithNonPlanPermissionMode(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--permission-mode=ask", "draft a plan"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "--permission-mode") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan/--permission-mode validation, got %v", err)
-	}
-
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--plan", "--permission-mode=plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan with --permission-mode=plan to succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !options.plan || options.permissionMode != "plan" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected options.plan=true and permissionMode=plan, got plan=%v mode=%q", options.plan, options.permissionMode)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestParseExecArgsPermissionModePlanSharesCombinationGuards ensures the
-// combination rejects that key off --plan also fire for --permission-mode plan,
-// which reaches PermissionModePlan without setting options.plan.
-func TestParseExecArgsPermissionModePlanSharesCombinationGuards(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		args []string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{"worktree", []string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "--worktree", "draft a plan"}, "--worktree"},
-		{"use-spec", []string{"--permission-mode=plan", "--use-spec", "draft a plan"}, "not both"},
-		{"skip-permissions-unsafe", []string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "--skip-permissions-unsafe", "draft a plan"}, "not both"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			_, _, err := parseExecArgs(tc.args)
-			if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want) {
-				t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan / %s validation containing %q, got %v", tc.name, tc.want, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	// Bare --permission-mode plan (no conflicting flags) still parses.
-	options, _, err := parseExecArgs([]string{"--permission-mode", "plan", "draft a plan"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected bare --permission-mode plan to succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if options.permissionMode != "plan" || options.plan {
-		t.Fatalf("expected permissionMode=plan and plan=false, got mode=%q plan=%v", options.permissionMode, options.plan)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRunExecPlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing drives the real --plan
-// flag through runExec (via --list-tools, so no provider is needed) and
-// confirms write_file and bash — advertised under every other mode covered by
-// TestRunExecListToolsAppliesModeBeforeListing-style tests — are hidden,
-// mirroring the TUI /plan on gating end to end from the CLI entry point.
-func TestRunExecPlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing(t *testing.T) {
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--plan", "--list-tools"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	listing := stdout.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "Tools visible to model") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --plan --list-tools to list tools, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "read_file") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode to still list read_file, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	for _, hidden := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash"} {
-		if strings.Contains(listing, hidden) {
-			t.Fatalf("expected --plan to hide %q from the tool listing, got %q", hidden, listing)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRunExecPermissionModePlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing covers the
-// --permission-mode plan entry path, which does not set options.plan and must
-// still hide write and shell tools the same way --plan does.
-func TestRunExecPermissionModePlanHidesWriteAndShellToolsFromListing(t *testing.T) {
-	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"exec", "--permission-mode", "plan", "--list-tools"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return cwd, nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return execResolvedConfig(), nil
-		},
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("expected exit code %d, got %d: %s", exitSuccess, exitCode, stderr.String())
-	}
-	listing := stdout.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "Tools visible to model") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan --list-tools to list tools, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(listing, "read_file") {
-		t.Fatalf("expected plan mode to still list read_file, got %q", listing)
-	}
-	for _, hidden := range []string{"write_file", "edit_file", "apply_patch", "bash"} {
-		if strings.Contains(listing, hidden) {
-			t.Fatalf("expected --permission-mode plan to hide %q from the tool listing, got %q", hidden, listing)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveExecPermissionModePlanOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	options := execOptions{autonomy: "low", plan: true}
-	mode, err := resolveExecPermissionMode(options)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("resolveExecPermissionMode: %v", err)
-	}
-	// resolveExecPermissionMode itself only resolves --auto; the --plan override
-	// is applied by the caller (runExec) afterward, same as --use-spec. This
-	// pins the precondition: --plan must not interfere with autonomy resolution.
-	if mode != agent.PermissionModeAuto {
-		t.Fatalf("resolveExecPermissionMode with --plan = %q, want auto (override applied by the caller)", mode)
-	}
-}
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/notify"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sandbox"
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ func runExecSpecDraft(run execSpecDraftRun) int {
 	// may be a --worktree path; this keeps a --use-spec --worktree run of a trusted
 	// repo trusted. Emit at most one notice when project hooks or the project MCP
 	// layer (registered earlier in runExec, carried in run.mcpSkip) were dropped.
-	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcher(run.workspaceRoot, run.trustRoot, execution.NewRunner(run.sandboxEngine))
+	hookDispatcher, hookSkip := newHookDispatcher(run.workspaceRoot, run.trustRoot)
 	emitTrustNotice(run.stderr, hookSkip, run.mcpSkip)
 	result, err := agent.Run(runCtx, run.prompt, run.provider, agent.Options{
 		MaxTurns:        run.resolved.MaxTurns,
@@ -73,24 +73,6 @@ func toolListContains(names []string, want string) bool {
 }

 func resolveExecPermissionMode(options execOptions) (agent.PermissionMode, error) {
-	if pm := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(options.permissionMode)); pm != "" {
-		switch pm {
-		case "plan":
-			return agent.PermissionModePlan, nil
-		case "spec-draft", "spec_draft":
-			return agent.PermissionModeSpecDraft, nil
-		case "auto":
-			return agent.PermissionModeAuto, nil
-		case "member", "member-auto", "member_auto":
-			return agent.PermissionModeMemberAuto, nil
-		case "ask":
-			return agent.PermissionModeAsk, nil
-		case "unsafe", "high":
-			return agent.PermissionModeUnsafe, nil
-		default:
-			return "", execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("Invalid permission mode %q. Expected plan, spec-draft, auto, member, ask, or unsafe.", options.permissionMode)}
-		}
-	}
 	// Validate --auto first, regardless of --skip-permissions-unsafe, so an
 	// invalid autonomy value is always rejected. (Previously the unsafe path
 	// short-circuited before validation, letting "--auto bogus" slip through
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -25,47 +24,12 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()

 	var heads, posts atomic.Int64
-	// Closed when the prewarm probe lands, so the turn can be held open until it
-	// does. See the POST handler for why that ordering has to be forced.
-	headSeen := make(chan struct{})
-	var headOnce sync.Once
-	var prewarmWaitTimedOut atomic.Bool
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		switch {
 		case r.Method == http.MethodHead:
 			heads.Add(1)
-			headOnce.Do(func() { close(headSeen) })
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
 		case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/chat/completions"):
-			// Hold the turn open until the prewarm probe arrives. The probe is
-			// issued on the run's context, and runExec cancels that context the
-			// moment it returns, because the stop function signalContext hands
-			// back is a CancelFunc. A probe that has not reached the wire by the
-			// end of the run therefore never reaches it at all. That is why the
-			// poll this replaced could not work at any deadline: once the run is
-			// over the probe is cancelled, not merely slow.
-			//
-			// This widens the window, it does not close it. Once the goroutine is
-			// scheduled it still has only prewarmTimeout to dial loopback and
-			// write the request, and that timeout is armed inside the goroutine
-			// itself, so holding the turn here cannot extend it. If this test
-			// ever fails again, prewarmTimeout is where to look, not this hold.
-			//
-			// No self-deadlock: the pinned transport leaves MaxConnsPerHost at 0,
-			// so the HEAD dials its own connection instead of queueing behind
-			// this held POST. Do not set a per-host connection limit there.
-			//
-			// Bounded, so a probe that genuinely never fires fails the assertion
-			// below with a useful message instead of hanging the test.
-			select {
-			case <-headSeen:
-			case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-				// Record it. A probe that shows up after this gave up would still
-				// leave heads at 1, so the count alone proves the probe was
-				// eventually received, not that it was ordered before the turn,
-				// which is the whole claim of this test.
-				prewarmWaitTimedOut.Store(true)
-			}
 			posts.Add(1)
 			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte("data: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"done\"}}]}\n\n"))
@@ -111,13 +75,14 @@ func TestRunExecOptimizedSessionUnderGate(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := posts.Load(); got < 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("server saw %d chat-completions POSTs, want >= 1", got)
 	}
-	// Checked before the count, because the count cannot tell the two apart: a
-	// probe that arrived only after the guard expired still leaves heads at 1.
-	if prewarmWaitTimedOut.Load() {
-		t.Fatal("the turn was not held until the prewarm probe arrived; the probe did not precede it")
+	// The prewarm probe is asynchronous; it fires well before the model turn
+	// finishes, but poll rather than assuming scheduling order. The deadline
+	// exceeds the production prewarmTimeout (3s) so a slow probe cannot flake
+	// this assertion.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for heads.Load() == 0 && time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
 	}
-	// No polling: the turn above could not complete until the probe landed, so
-	// the count is settled by this point.
 	if got := heads.Load(); got != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("server saw %d prewarm HEAD probes, want exactly 1", got)
 	}
@@ -142,15 +142,13 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) checkpoint(event sessions.Event) {
 }

 func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
-	modelOutput := result.ModelOutput()
-	display := result.HumanDisplay()
 	if writer.format == execOutputJSON {
 		payload := map[string]any{
 			"type":         "tool_result",
 			"tool_call_id": result.ToolCallID,
 			"name":         result.Name,
 			"status":       string(result.Status),
-			"output":       modelOutput,
+			"output":       result.Output,
 		}
 		if len(result.Meta) > 0 {
 			payload["meta"] = result.Meta
@@ -164,14 +162,14 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
 		if len(result.ChangedFiles) > 0 {
 			payload["changed_files"] = result.ChangedFiles
 		}
-		if display.Summary != "" || display.Kind != "" {
-			payload["display"] = map[string]string{"summary": display.Summary, "kind": display.Kind}
+		if result.Display.Summary != "" || result.Display.Kind != "" {
+			payload["display"] = map[string]string{"summary": result.Display.Summary, "kind": result.Display.Kind}
 		}
 		writer.writeJSON(payload)
 		return
 	}
 	if writer.format == execOutputStreamJSON {
-		output, surfaceTruncated := truncateForStreamJSONOutput(modelOutput)
+		output, surfaceTruncated := truncateForStreamJSONOutput(result.Output)
 		truncated := result.Truncated || surfaceTruncated
 		event := streamjson.Event{
 			Type:         streamjson.EventToolResult,
@@ -188,13 +186,13 @@ func (writer *execEventWriter) toolResult(result agent.ToolResult) {
 			redacted := true
 			event.Redacted = &redacted
 		}
-		if display.Summary != "" || display.Kind != "" {
-			event.Display = &streamjson.Display{Summary: display.Summary, Kind: display.Kind}
+		if result.Display.Summary != "" || result.Display.Kind != "" {
+			event.Display = &streamjson.Display{Summary: result.Display.Summary, Kind: result.Display.Kind}
 		}
 		writer.writeStreamJSON(event)
 		return
 	}
-	writer.writeStderr("[result] " + truncateForStatus(modelOutput) + "\n")
+	writer.writeStderr("[result] " + truncateForStatus(result.Output) + "\n")
 }

 func (writer *execEventWriter) permission(event agent.PermissionEvent) {
@@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ func runPlugins(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps)
 		return exitSuccess
 	case "add":
 		return runPluginAdd(args[1:], deps.pluginsDir(), stdout, stderr)
-	case "info":
-		return runPluginInfo(args[1:], stdout, stderr, deps)
 	case "remove", "rm":
 		return runPluginRemove(args[1:], deps.pluginsDir(), stdout, stderr)
 	default:
@@ -563,7 +561,6 @@ func writePluginsHelp(w io.Writer) error {

 Commands:
  list                 List local Zero plugins
-  info <id>            Show plugin details and lockfile metadata
  add <git-url|path>   Install a plugin (manifest-validated, pinned in plugins.lock)
  remove <id>          Remove an installed plugin and its lockfile entry
 `)
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func TestRunPluginsListsJSONAndText(t *testing.T) {
 }

 func TestRunHooksListsRedactedJSONAndText(t *testing.T) {
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	result := hooks.LoadResult{
 		Config: hooks.Config{
 			Enabled: true,
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"

-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/hooks"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/workspacetrust"
 )
@@ -57,8 +56,8 @@ func resolveTrust(trustRoot string) (excludeProject bool, trustCheckErrored bool
 //
 // trustRoot is the original launch directory (resolved before any --worktree
 // reassignment); the project layer loads only when that root is trusted.
-func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
-	return newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, nil, trustRoot, runners...)
+func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
+	return newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot, nil, trustRoot)
 }

 // newHookDispatcherWithExtra builds the dispatcher like newHookDispatcher but also
@@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ func newHookDispatcher(workspaceRoot string, trustRoot string, runners ...*execu
 // trust store cannot be read, or the workspace is not trusted (fail-closed). The
 // returned trustSkip lets the caller emit one combined notice; the notice itself
 // is NOT emitted here.
-func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
+func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition, trustRoot string) (*hooks.Dispatcher, trustSkip) {
 	excludeProject, trustCheckErrored := resolveTrust(trustRoot)
 	skip := trustSkip{
 		excludedProjectConfig: excludeProject && projectHooksFileExists(workspaceRoot),
@@ -107,15 +106,10 @@ func newHookDispatcherWithExtra(workspaceRoot string, extra []hooks.Definition,
 		}
 		config.Hooks = merged
 	}
-	var runner *execution.Runner
-	if len(runners) > 0 {
-		runner = runners[0]
-	}
 	return hooks.NewDispatcher(hooks.DispatcherOptions{
-		Config:    config,
-		Audit:     audit,
-		Cwd:       workspaceRoot,
-		Execution: runner,
+		Config: config,
+		Audit:  audit,
+		Cwd:    workspaceRoot,
 	}), skip
 }

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func TestRunHooksAddRejectsUnknownEvent(t *testing.T) {

 func TestRunHooksAddJSONRedactsSecretArgs(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
-	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("z", 23) + "0"
+	secret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("z", 24)
 	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
 	code := runHooksAdd([]string{"h1", "--event", "beforeTool", "--command", "sh", "--arg", "-c", "--arg", "echo " + secret, "--json"}, &stdout, &stderr, hooksManageDeps(cwd))
 	if code != exitSuccess {
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ func TestRunMCPRemovePreservesUnrelatedConfigFields(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRunMCPListRedactsURLCredentialsAndSensitiveQueryParams(t *testing.T) {
 	cwd := t.TempDir()
 	serverURL := "https://user:[email protected]/mcp?access_token=secret-token&api_key=secret-key&safe=value#access_token=fragment-secret"
-	commandSecret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 23) + "0"
+	commandSecret := "sk-proj-" + strings.Repeat("a", 24)
 	deps := appDeps{
 		getwd: func() (string, error) { return cwd, nil },
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
@@ -308,34 +308,6 @@ func runMCPCheck(ctx context.Context, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io
 	}
 	defer closeMCPRuntime(stderr, mcpRuntime)

-	// A connect failure does not come back as err. RegisterTools is deliberately
-	// best-effort so one unreachable server cannot stop Zero launching: it records
-	// the failure on the runtime and returns nil. That is right for startup and
-	// wrong to ignore here, because this is the command a user runs precisely when
-	// a server is misbehaving, and reporting "is reachable" for a server that never
-	// started sends them looking somewhere else.
-	for _, skipped := range mcpRuntime.Skipped() {
-		if skipped.Name != serverName {
-			continue
-		}
-		message := fmt.Sprintf("MCP server %s is not reachable", serverName)
-		if skipped.Err != nil {
-			message = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", message, redaction.ErrorMessage(skipped.Err, redaction.Options{}))
-		}
-		if options.json {
-			payload := struct {
-				ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
-				Status     string `json:"status"`
-				Error      string `json:"error,omitempty"`
-			}{ServerName: serverName, Status: "unreachable", Error: message}
-			if err := writePrettyJSON(stdout, redaction.RedactValue(payload, redaction.Options{})); err != nil {
-				return exitCrash
-			}
-			return exitCrash
-		}
-		return writeAppError(stderr, message, exitCrash)
-	}
-
 	items := mcpToolList(registry)
 	if options.json {
 		payload := struct {
@@ -762,12 +734,14 @@ func (cfg *mcpWritableConfig) setServerDisabled(name string, disabled bool) (boo
 		switch {
 		case legacyFound:
 			raw = legacyRaw
+			found = true
 		case config.IsDefaultMCPServer(name):
 			// A built-in default server isn't written to the file until the user
 			// overrides it. Treat it as present with an empty base so disabling it
 			// writes a minimal {"disabled":true} entry that merges over the default —
 			// letting `zero mcp disable <default>` work even though it lives in code.
 			raw = nil
+			found = true
 		default:
 			return false, false, nil
 		}
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/mcp"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/tools"
 )
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ type mcpToolListItem struct {
 // It returns a trustSkip alongside the runtime so the caller can fold the MCP gate
 // into the one-line trust notice (mirroring the hooks and plugins chokepoints);
 // otherwise a workspace whose only project config is MCP would be gated silently.
-func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, autonomy mcp.PermissionAutonomy, trustRoot string, runners ...*execution.Runner) (mcpToolRuntime, trustSkip, error) {
+func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, registry *tools.Registry, deps appDeps, autonomy mcp.PermissionAutonomy, trustRoot string) (mcpToolRuntime, trustSkip, error) {
 	excludeProject, trustCheckErrored := resolveTrust(trustRoot)
 	skip := trustSkip{
 		excludedProjectConfig: excludeProject && projectMCPConfigExists(workspaceRoot),
@@ -47,15 +46,9 @@ func registerMCPToolsForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceRoot string, reg
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, skip, err
 	}
-	var runner *execution.Runner
-	if len(runners) > 0 {
-		runner = runners[0]
-	}
 	runtime, err := deps.registerMCPTools(ctx, registry, cfg, mcp.RegisterOptions{
 		PermissionStore: store,
 		Autonomy:        autonomy,
-		Execution:       runner,
-		WorkspaceRoot:   workspaceRoot,
 	})
 	return runtime, skip, err
 }
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package cli

 import (
 	"bytes"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -220,81 +219,3 @@ func TestRunMCPCheckNormalizeError(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("want normalize error, got %q", got)
 	}
 }
-
-// TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer covers the case the command exists
-// for: a server that fails to start.
-//
-// RegisterTools is best-effort by design, so a connect failure is recorded on
-// the runtime and registration returns nil. runMCPCheck used to inspect only
-// that nil error and then print "is reachable", which told the user their
-// broken server was fine. The command is spawned for real here rather than
-// stubbed, because the whole failure mode was a mismatch between what
-// registration returns and what it records.
-func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServer(t *testing.T) {
-	setTrustConfigRoot(t)
-	deps := appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
-		resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
-			return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-				"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
-			}}, nil
-		},
-	}
-	var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
-	}
-	if got := out.String(); strings.Contains(got, "is reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check reported a failed server as reachable: %q", got)
-	}
-	if got := errBuf.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "not reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("want an unreachable error naming the server, got %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// The --json contract for an unreachable server, which the text case above does
-// not touch.
-//
-// The JSON branch is a separate return path with its own payload, so a caller
-// parsing it would otherwise be relying on a shape nothing pins: reverting the
-// check leaves it emitting status "ok" with a tool count, which is valid JSON
-// and completely wrong.
-func TestRunMCPCheckReportsUnreachableServerJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	setTrustConfigRoot(t)
-	deps := appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) { return t.TempDir(), nil },
-		resolveMCPConfig: func(_ string, _ bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
-			return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-				"broken": {Type: "stdio", Command: "zero-definitely-not-a-real-binary-xyz"},
-			}}, nil
-		},
-	}
-	var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	if code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "check", "broken", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, deps); code == exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("mcp check --json must fail for a server that did not start; stdout=%q stderr=%q", out.String(), errBuf.String())
-	}
-	var payload struct {
-		ServerName string `json:"serverName"`
-		Status     string `json:"status"`
-		Error      string `json:"error"`
-		ToolCount  int    `json:"toolCount"`
-	}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode mcp check --json output %q: %v", out.String(), err)
-	}
-	if payload.ServerName != "broken" {
-		t.Fatalf("serverName = %q, want the server that was checked", payload.ServerName)
-	}
-	if payload.Status != "unreachable" {
-		t.Fatalf("status = %q, want %q", payload.Status, "unreachable")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(payload.Error, "not reachable") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %q, want it to say the server is not reachable", payload.Error)
-	}
-	// A reachable payload carries a tool count; an unreachable one must not
-	// imply zero tools were found, which reads as a server that simply exposes
-	// none.
-	if payload.ToolCount != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("toolCount = %d, want it absent from an unreachable payload", payload.ToolCount)
-	}
-}
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 package cli

 import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"time"
+
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
 )

@@ -23,5 +28,46 @@ import (
 // ProviderProfile.OAuthLoginCandidates so the runtime resolver, the Codex account
 // resolver, and the onboarding presence check never diverge.
 func oauthLoginForProfile(profile config.ProviderProfile) (providerio.TokenResolver, string) {
-	return providers.OAuthLoginForProfile(profile)
+	candidates := profile.OAuthLoginCandidates()
+	if len(candidates) == 0 {
+		return nil, ""
+	}
+	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ""
+	}
+	_, key, ok := oauth.FirstStored(store, candidates)
+	if !ok {
+		// No login under any candidate (or unreadable/invalid keys) → API-key
+		// auth, no resolver.
+		return nil, ""
+	}
+	manager, err := oauth.NewManager(oauth.ManagerOptions{
+		Store:      store,
+		HTTPClient: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
+		// Refreshing a token the user logged into (possibly a preset provider like
+		// xAI) re-resolves that provider's OAuth config, which needs the preset.
+		AllowPresets: true,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ""
+	}
+	resolver := func(ctx context.Context, forceRefresh bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
+		var token string
+		var rerr error
+		if forceRefresh {
+			token, rerr = manager.Handle401(ctx, key)
+		} else {
+			token, rerr = manager.GetFresh(ctx, key)
+		}
+		if errors.Is(rerr, oauth.ErrNoToken) {
+			// The login was removed since construction → fall back to the API key.
+			return "", "", false, nil
+		}
+		if rerr != nil {
+			return "", "", false, rerr
+		}
+		return "Authorization", "Bearer " + token, true, nil
+	}
+	return resolver, key
 }
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
@@ -14,7 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
-	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providerhealth"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/sessions"
 )
@@ -112,65 +109,6 @@ func TestRunDoctorConnectivityProbesProvider(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

-func TestRunDoctorConnectivityUsesOAuthLogin(t *testing.T) {
-	tokenPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "oauth-tokens.json")
-	t.Setenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME", t.TempDir())
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_STORAGE", "file")
-	t.Setenv("ZERO_OAUTH_TOKENS_PATH", tokenPath)
-	store, err := oauth.NewStore(oauth.StoreOptions{FilePath: tokenPath})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := store.Save(oauth.ProviderKey("xai"), oauth.Token{
-		AccessToken: "oauth-doctor-token",
-		ExpiresAt:   time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("seed OAuth token: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	var gotAuth string
-	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[]}`))
-	}))
-	defer server.Close()
-
-	profile := config.ProviderProfile{
-		Name:         "xai",
-		CatalogID:    "xai",
-		ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
-		BaseURL:      server.URL + "/v1",
-		Model:        "grok-4",
-	}
-	var stdout bytes.Buffer
-	var stderr bytes.Buffer
-	exitCode := runWithDeps([]string{"doctor", "--connectivity"}, &stdout, &stderr, appDeps{
-		getwd: func() (string, error) {
-			return t.TempDir(), nil
-		},
-		resolveConfig: func(string, config.Overrides) (config.ResolvedConfig, error) {
-			return config.ResolvedConfig{
-				Provider:       profile,
-				Providers:      []config.ProviderProfile{profile},
-				ActiveProvider: profile.Name,
-			}, nil
-		},
-		probeProviderHealth: providerhealth.Probe,
-		now:                 fixedCLITime("2026-07-29T20:00:00Z"),
-	})
-
-	if exitCode != exitSuccess {
-		t.Fatalf("doctor exit = %d, want success; stderr=%q\n%s", exitCode, stderr.String(), stdout.String())
-	}
-	if gotAuth != "Bearer oauth-doctor-token" {
-		t.Fatalf("Authorization = %q, want OAuth bearer", gotAuth)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "[pass] provider.connectivity") {
-		t.Fatalf("doctor did not report passing connectivity:\n%s", stdout.String())
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunDoctorConnectivityReportsProviderHealthFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	var stdout bytes.Buffer
 	var stderr bytes.Buffer