chore(main): release 0.8.0 (#896)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

.release-please-manifest.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{".":"0.7.0"}
+{".":"0.8.0"}

AGENTS.md

@@ -111,3 +111,42 @@ These classes drive multi-round reviews. Fix them before requesting review:
   shipped. Wire advertised entry points or shrink the claim. Do not bundle
   unrelated fixes. Do not widen security allowlists by name alone; check
   classification and side effects too.
+- **Host tool version floors:** Zero shells out to `git` and other host tools,
+  and the project does not declare a minimum version for any of them. A flag,
+  subcommand, or config key that is not long-established therefore raises that
+  floor silently, and the failure on an older host is an unhelpful usage error
+  rather than a clear message. Before adding one, check when it landed and say
+  so where a caller would look. Record the floor for the exact subcommand you
+  call, not for the flag in general: `--end-of-options` reached Git's shared
+  parser in 2.24, but `git rev-parse` only accepted it from 2.30, and
+  `git checkout` and `git reset` later still. Likewise `--show-current` is
+  `git branch` 2.22, and `branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit` is 2.35. Then either
+  keep a fallback for older versions or gate the call. A test that depends on a
+  newer feature must skip below its floor instead of failing, and say which
+  version it needs.
+- **Prove the test fails without the change:** A regression test earns its
+  place only if it fails on the unfixed code, for the reason it claims. Run it
+  both ways and quote the failure in the PR. The recurring miss is not a
+  missing test but a test that never reaches the behavior it names, because an
+  earlier guard rejects the input first, so it passes with and without the fix.
+  When a test targets a specific layer, call that layer directly rather than
+  relying on a public entry point that may refuse earlier.
+- **Hermetic tests:** Tests must not read or write the developer's real config,
+  cache, or state directories. Redirect every root the code under test
+  resolves, not just config. `os.UserConfigDir` and `os.UserCacheDir` read
+  `XDG_CONFIG_HOME` and `XDG_CACHE_HOME` only on Linux and the BSDs. On macOS
+  they derive from `HOME`, and on Windows from `%AppData%` and `%LocalAppData%`.
+  Setting the XDG variables alone still leaves a macOS run writing to the real
+  home, so set `HOME` as well, or take the directory as a parameter. Apply it to
+  every test that reaches the same storage, not only the one where it was first
+  needed; a test that passes on a clean machine and pollutes a real one is a
+  blocker.
+- **Error codes vary by platform and by flag combination:** A check written
+  against the code one target returns can be silently inert on another while
+  still looking correct. `openat(O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW)` on a symlink may
+  report `ENOTDIR` or `ELOOP` depending on the platform, because the kernel can
+  reject the directory mismatch before it ever resolves the link; accept both
+  rather than assuming the one POSIX names. On Windows, `\\?\` and `\\.\`
+  prefixes are not UNC paths, and an `NtCreateFile` information class must match
+  the struct actually passed. Confirm the code each supported target returns
+  instead of reasoning from the man page.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,27 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 aims to follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html) once the first release is
 tagged. Until then, source builds report the version `dev`.
 
+## [0.8.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0) (2026-08-21)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **security:** path-jail primitive, credential-store locking, worktree git hardening ([#891](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/891)) ([060d38c](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/060d38ce716feb7c5b6657b082cd35cb8dda3d75))
+* **update:** recognise Homebrew installs and add mise, go install docs ([#910](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/910)) ([01c3498](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/01c3498205e69d26e5f929225f9455b276444f39))
+* use Exa as default search provider ([#926](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/926)) ([1ec7219](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/1ec7219aee7b2840481ab0905f131644e27d2a4e))
+* **zerogit:** auto-create a conventional branch before push/pr on default branch ([#671](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/671)) ([d065467](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/d065467cd3ec3ed91c5dc60554c36fc4b4d6de4c))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **acp:** three defects a desktop ACP client hits ([#915](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/915)) ([a78c6c3](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/a78c6c357e1d21146d7cd2e8030a754e06f7f1f5))
+* bump Go to 1.26.6 for stdlib vulnerability fixes ([#903](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/903)) ([dc15e82](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/dc15e822987d8d7de467c62c375518f435b74d8c))
+* **daemon:** clean up child after startup timeout ([#774](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/774)) ([9c29209](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/9c292092a26c9092fd873d072b0af1b0d9d39ef0))
+* **dictation:** redact API keys from streaming transcriber errors ([#852](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/852)) ([64a783b](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/64a783b08caa2c7b21f188033b9ed84a14e00e84))
+* **modelregistry:** expose reasoning effort for DeepSeek V4 models ([#931](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/931)) ([90dcfd1](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/90dcfd127e8a6d9902ec9f4e72f6d03fef1a0fc6))
+* **providers:** discover ChatGPT capabilities ([#890](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/890)) ([2d2450e](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/2d2450e9a744349f0d01b1d4e9ba29c24ba5650d))
+* **sandbox:** normalize launcher names before the command-prefix denylist ([#934](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/issues/934)) ([6edf9a8](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/commit/6edf9a8b78dc030dc44598919db1c7fa9d4f809a))
+
 ## [0.7.0](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/compare/v0.6.0...v0.7.0) (2026-08-10)
 
 

README.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 <p align="center">
   <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
-  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
+  <img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
   <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
   <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
   <br>
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
 
 ### From source
 
-Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
+Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
 
 ```bash
 git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git

README_ZH.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 <p align="center">
   <a href="LICENSE"><img alt="license" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue"></a>
-  <img alt="Go 1.26.5+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.5+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
+  <img alt="Go 1.26.6+" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Go-1.26.6+-00ADD8?logo=go&logoColor=white">
   <img alt="25+ providers" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/providers-25+-34E2EA">
   <a href="https://discord.gg/CaQDS6wdFn"><img alt="Discord" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white"></a>
   <br>
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
 
 ### 从源码构建
 
-源码构建需要 Go 1.26.5+。
+源码构建需要 Go 1.26.6+。
 
 ```bash
 git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero.git

SECURITY.md

@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ Please include, where possible:
   depend on a user explicitly disabling the sandbox (`--skip-permissions-unsafe`), are generally
   out of scope — but please report anything you are unsure about.
 - Zero sends no telemetry. Network calls go to the model/tool providers you configure (and, for
-  keyless web search, to the documented Firecrawl endpoint — see the README).
+  keyless web search, to Exa's hosted MCP endpoint at `https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp`).

docs/INSTALL.md

@@ -1,14 +1,30 @@
 # Installing Zero
 
-Zero is distributed as:
+Pick whichever fits how you already install things. None of these is the
+blessed one.
 
-- an npm package, `@gitlawb/zero`
-- release archives on GitHub Releases
-- source builds with Go 1.26.5+
+| Method | Command | Self-update |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Install script (Linux, macOS) | `curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.sh \| bash` | `zero upgrade` |
+| Install script (Windows) | `irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Gitlawb/zero/main/scripts/install.ps1 \| iex` | `zero upgrade` |
+| npm | `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero` | `zero upgrade` (runs npm) |
+| Release archive | download from [Releases](https://github.com/Gitlawb/zero/releases) | `zero upgrade` |
+| mise | `mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero` | `mise upgrade` |
+| `go install` | `go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest` | rerun the command |
+| Source | `go build -o zero ./cmd/zero` | rebuild |
 
-The install scripts download a platform-specific release archive and require a
-published GitHub Release for the requested version. The npm package is
-self-contained: the platform binary installs from the npm registry.
+`zero upgrade` follows whatever owns the binary, with one exception it cannot
+detect. It delegates to npm for an npm install, refuses outright for a Homebrew
+keg and names `brew upgrade zero`, and replaces the binary in place for
+everything else — including a mise-managed one, which is the exception.
+
+mise is the one case it cannot detect: a mise-managed binary is an ordinary
+standalone install on disk, so `zero upgrade` will replace it and leave mise
+describing a version that is no longer there. Use `mise upgrade` instead.
+
+Release archives are the substrate for most of the above: the install scripts
+and the npm fallback both download a platform archive from a published GitHub
+Release and verify its checksum.
 
 ## npm
 
@@ -111,6 +127,45 @@ Defaults:
 - Version: latest GitHub release
 - Install path: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\zero\bin\zero.exe`
 
+## mise
+
+[mise](https://mise.jdx.dev/) installs Zero straight from the GitHub Release
+archives through its `ubi` backend, so there is nothing extra to publish and no
+registry in the middle:
+
+```bash
+mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/zero
+```
+
+Pin a version the same way you would any other tool:
+
+```bash
+mise use -g ubi:Gitlawb/[email protected]
+```
+
+Updates come from `mise upgrade`. `zero upgrade` also works, because a
+mise-managed binary is an ordinary standalone install, but then mise's records
+describe a version that is no longer on disk. Prefer `mise upgrade`.
+
+## go install
+
+```bash
+go install github.com/Gitlawb/zero/cmd/zero@latest
+```
+
+This builds from source, so it needs Go 1.26.6+ and it does not go through the
+release archives. Two consequences worth knowing before you pick it:
+
+- On Linux you also need the sandbox helper, which is a separate binary and is
+  not installed by this command. See
+  [Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds](#sandbox-helpers-for-source-builds).
+  Without it, native sandboxing is unavailable.
+- `zero upgrade` treats the result as a standalone install and will replace the
+  binary with a release build rather than rebuilding from source. If you chose
+  `go install` deliberately, rerun it instead.
+
+macOS and Windows need no extra helper.
+
 ## From Source
 
 ```bash
@@ -125,7 +180,7 @@ Build a local binary:
 go build -o zero ./cmd/zero
 ```
 
-Source builds require Go 1.26.5+.
+Source builds require Go 1.26.6+.
 
 ### Sandbox Helpers For Source Builds
 
@@ -242,3 +297,23 @@ zero upgrade
 ```
 
 See the [update guide](UPDATE.md) for update modes, flags, and platform details.
+
+`zero upgrade` behaves differently depending on how Zero was installed, because
+overwriting a binary a package manager owns leaves that manager describing a
+version that is no longer there:
+
+- **npm**: runs `npm install -g @gitlawb/zero@latest` for you.
+- **Homebrew**: refuses, and tells you to run `brew upgrade zero`. Replacing the
+  keg binary directly would be reverted by the next `brew upgrade` or
+  `brew reinstall`.
+- **everything else**: downloads the verified release archive and replaces the
+  binary in place.
+
+Homebrew is detected by the binary living inside a Cellar keg that carries
+Homebrew's own `INSTALL_RECEIPT.json`. The keg shape alone is not enough: a
+directory tree you built yourself can have exactly that shape, and refusing to
+update an install Homebrew never touched would be a real cost for a made-up
+reason. The receipt is the thing only Homebrew writes.
+
+An ordinary install under `/usr/local/bin` is left alone even on an Intel Mac
+where that is also the Homebrew prefix.

go.mod

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 module github.com/Gitlawb/zero
 
-go 1.26.5
+go 1.26.6
 
 require (
 	charm.land/bubbles/v2 v2.1.1
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/charmbracelet/x/term v0.2.2
 	github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.15
 	github.com/ledongthuc/pdf v0.0.0-20250511090121-5959a4027728
-	golang.org/x/image v0.44.0
+	golang.org/x/image v0.45.0
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
 	mvdan.cc/sh/v3 v3.13.1
 )

go.sum

@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976 h1:X8Hz2ImujgbmetVuW+w2YkyZC
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20260611194520-c48552f49976/go.mod h1:vnf4pv9iKZXY58sQE1L86zmNWJ4159e1RkcWiLCkeEY=
 golang.org/x/image v0.44.0 h1:+tDekMZED9+LrtB3G5xzRggpVh9CARjZqROla3R3R+I=
 golang.org/x/image v0.44.0/go.mod h1:V8K3KE9KKKE+pLpQDOeN18w9oacNSvy1tDOirTu4xtY=
+golang.org/x/image v0.45.0 h1:FMb1nTbH5H9vF55SriQHgFw5GnNL9Jg6L25BwXKzhB0=
+golang.org/x/image v0.45.0/go.mod h1:n62x/7RqlwXDvGsSU4u6IUTUf6KghUZ9Bt7cG/T9Fx4=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=

internal/acp/agent.go

@@ -296,6 +296,16 @@ func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
 		if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
 			return StopCancelled, nil
 		}
+		// A CLIENT THAT CANCELLED A PERMISSION PROMPT DID NOT FAIL. Only
+		// context.Canceled was matched here, so dismissing a permission dialog —
+		// a deliberate action, and for apply_patch the only refusal a client is
+		// offered — came back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel
+		// text. Editors and the desktop app both render that as a crashed turn,
+		// so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over. It is a
+		// cancellation, and StopCancelled is what ACP has for saying so.
+		if errors.Is(err, agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
+			return StopCancelled, nil
+		}
 		return "", err
 	}
 	if result.FinishReason == "length" {
@@ -311,10 +321,14 @@ func stopReasonFor(result agent.Result, err error) (string, error) {
 // session/request_permission request and maps the outcome back. Failure to reach
 // the client fails closed to deny.
 func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req agent.PermissionRequest) (agent.PermissionDecision, error) {
+	// Built ONCE and used for both halves. Sending one list and validating the
+	// reply against another is the defect this whole path had; see
+	// decisionFromOutcome.
+	options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
 	params := RequestPermissionParams{
 		SessionID: sessionID,
 		ToolCall:  permissionToolCall(req),
-		Options:   buildPermissionOptions(req),
+		Options:   options,
 	}
 	var result RequestPermissionResult
 	if err := a.conn.Call(ctx, MethodSessionRequestPerm, params, &result); err != nil {
@@ -323,7 +337,7 @@ func (a *Agent) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, req age
 		}
 		return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission request failed: " + err.Error()}, nil
 	}
-	return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, req.AvailableDecisions), nil
+	return decisionFromOutcome(result.Outcome, options), nil
 }
 
 func (a *Agent) emitPlan(registry *tools.Registry, note *notifier) {

internal/acp/desktopinterop_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+package acp
+
+// desktopinterop_test.go covers three defects found by driving the real `zero
+// acp` binary from a desktop ACP client. Each is a case where ZERO and a
+// conforming client disagreed about the wire, and none of them failed loudly —
+// they produced a silent denial, a spurious crash, or two buttons the user
+// could not tell apart.
+//
+// A fourth, session/load restoring history without replaying it, is fixed by
+// #914 rather than here: that one also gives the replayed messages stable ids
+// and keeps session/resume replay-free, which this did not.
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/agent"
+)
+
+// ---- an offered option is an acceptable answer ----
+
+// The list the options were BUILT from and the list the answer was CHECKED
+// against were different whenever ZERO did not enumerate: the client was sent
+// Allow and Reject, and its reply was validated against an empty slice, so
+// every button it could possibly show failed closed to deny. The user clicked
+// Allow and ZERO recorded a denial, with nothing on screen to say so.
+func TestAnOfferedOptionIsAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	// No AvailableDecisions: the fallback path, which is every permission event
+	// that is not a prompt.
+	req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
+
+	options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
+	if len(options) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no options were offered")
+	}
+
+	for _, option := range options {
+		decision := decisionFromOutcome(
+			RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
+			buildPermissionOptions(req),
+		)
+		if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
+			t.Fatalf("option %q was answered with %q (%s) — an offered option must be accepted",
+				option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The narrowing this validation exists for still holds: a client must not be
+// able to return a broader grant than it was shown.
+func TestAnOptionThatWasNotOfferedIsStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	req := agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "bash"}
+
+	decision := decisionFromOutcome(
+		RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow)},
+		buildPermissionOptions(req),
+	)
+	if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
+		t.Fatalf("an unoffered broader grant was accepted as %q", decision.Action)
+	}
+}
+
+// The resolver is the single source of truth for both sides, which is what
+// makes the two agree by construction rather than by being kept in step.
+func TestOfferedDecisionsMatchWhatWasSent(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, req := range []agent.PermissionRequest{
+		{ToolName: "bash"},
+		{ToolName: "bash", AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
+		}},
+	} {
+		offered := buildPermissionOptions(req)
+		for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
+			if !actionOffered(option.OptionID, offered) {
+				t.Fatalf("option %q was sent but is not in the offered set %v", option.OptionID, offered)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- two options the user can tell apart ----
+
+// request_permissions offers plain allow and strict-review allow together, and
+// both were labelled "Allow". The label is the only thing an ACP client shows,
+// so the panel presented two identical buttons where one silently enabled
+// strict auto-review of what was granted.
+func TestEveryOfferedOptionHasADistinctLabel(t *testing.T) {
+	req := agent.PermissionRequest{
+		ToolName: "request_permissions",
+		AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
+		},
+	}
+
+	seen := map[string]string{}
+	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(req) {
+		if previous, clash := seen[option.Name]; clash {
+			t.Fatalf("options %q and %q share the label %q — a user cannot tell them apart",
+				previous, option.OptionID, option.Name)
+		}
+		seen[option.Name] = option.OptionID
+	}
+}
+
+// The two remain distinct decisions: the label changed, the round trip did not.
+func TestStrictAllowStillRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
+	req := agent.PermissionRequest{
+		ToolName: "request_permissions",
+		AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict,
+		},
+	}
+	decision := decisionFromOutcome(
+		RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict)},
+		buildPermissionOptions(req),
+	)
+	if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict {
+		t.Fatalf("strict allow round-tripped as %q", decision.Action)
+	}
+}
+
+// ---- cancelling a permission is a cancellation, not a crash ----
+
+// Only context.Canceled was recognised, so dismissing a permission dialog came
+// back as JSON-RPC -32603 carrying the internal sentinel text. Clients render
+// that as a failed turn, so declining a tool looked like ZERO falling over —
+// and for apply_patch, dismissing is the ONLY refusal a client is offered.
+func TestCancellingAPermissionEndsTheTurnAsCancelled(t *testing.T) {
+	canceled := fmt.Errorf("%w for apply_patch", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled)
+
+	reason, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, canceled)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor returned an error for a cancellation: %v", err)
+	}
+	if reason != StopCancelled {
+		t.Fatalf("stop reason = %q, want %q", reason, StopCancelled)
+	}
+}
+
+// A genuine failure must still be an error. Mapping too much to cancelled would
+// hide real faults behind a clean ending, which is the opposite mistake.
+func TestARealFailureIsStillAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	failure := errors.New("provider exploded")
+
+	if _, err := stopReasonFor(agent.Result{}, failure); !errors.Is(err, failure) {
+		t.Fatalf("stopReasonFor(%v) = %v, want the failure preserved", failure, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The sentinel is matched through errors.Is, so it survives the wrapping every
+// return site applies — each one adds the tool name.
+func TestPermissionCancellationSurvivesWrapping(t *testing.T) {
+	if !errors.Is(fmt.Errorf("%w for bash", agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
+		t.Fatal("a wrapped permission cancellation was not recognised")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(errors.New("something else"), agent.ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
+		t.Fatal("an unrelated error was reported as a permission cancellation")
+	}
+}
+
+// A decision that never became an option cannot be selected.
+//
+// PermissionDecisionCancel is the case that exists today: optionKindFor drops
+// it because ACP expresses cancellation through the outcome, yet ZERO
+// enumerates it in AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch. While
+// the reply was validated against the DECISIONS rather than the sent options, a
+// client could return {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"} — an id it was
+// never shown — and abort the whole turn.
+//
+// Written over every option-less decision rather than over "cancel", so a
+// future action that optionKindFor declines to render is covered the day it is
+// added rather than the day someone remembers this test.
+func TestADecisionThatIsNotAnOptionCannotBeSelected(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, toolName := range []string{"bash", "apply_patch"} {
+		req := agent.PermissionRequest{
+			ToolName: toolName,
+			AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+				agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+				agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
+				agent.PermissionDecisionCancel,
+			},
+		}
+		options := buildPermissionOptions(req)
+
+		for _, action := range req.AvailableDecisions {
+			if actionOffered(string(action), options) {
+				continue // it was sent; selecting it is legitimate
+			}
+			decision := decisionFromOutcome(
+				RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: string(action)},
+				options,
+			)
+			if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionDeny {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: %q was never sent as an option but was accepted as %q",
+					toolName, action, decision.Action)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Cancelling is still reachable — through the outcome, which is where ACP puts
+// it. Closing the selected-id route must not close the real one.
+func TestCancellingThroughTheOutcomeStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
+	options := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{ToolName: "apply_patch"})
+
+	decision := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, options)
+	if decision.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
+		t.Fatalf("outcome=cancelled gave %q, want cancel", decision.Action)
+	}
+}

internal/acp/permission.go

@@ -15,14 +15,7 @@ import (
 // PermissionOptions. Only the actions ZERO actually presented (AvailableDecisions)
 // are surfaced; the optionId is the ZERO action string for a clean round-trip.
 func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
-	actions := req.AvailableDecisions
-	if len(actions) == 0 {
-		// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
-		actions = []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
-			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
-			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
-		}
-	}
+	actions := offeredDecisions(req)
 	options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(actions))
 	for _, action := range actions {
 		kind, name := optionKindFor(action, req.PrefixApprovalEscalates)
@@ -38,6 +31,32 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 	return options
 }
 
+// offeredDecisions resolves what this request actually offers the client.
+//
+// ONE RESOLVER, USED BY BOTH SIDES, and that is the entire point of it existing.
+// The fallback below used to live inside buildPermissionOptions while
+// requestPermission validated the client's answer against the raw
+// req.AvailableDecisions. When ZERO did not enumerate — which is every
+// permission event that is not a prompt, and includes a shell call whose sandbox
+// decision came back deny — the two disagreed completely: the client was sent
+// "Allow" and "Reject", and validation was performed against an EMPTY list, so
+// every option the client could possibly click failed closed to deny with
+// "permission option was not offered".
+//
+// The user clicked Allow and ZERO recorded a denial. Nothing surfaced it,
+// because a denial is a legitimate answer — the tool was simply refused and the
+// turn carried on as though the user had rejected it.
+func offeredDecisions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []agent.PermissionDecisionAction {
+	if len(req.AvailableDecisions) > 0 {
+		return req.AvailableDecisions
+	}
+	// Sensible default if ZERO didn't enumerate: allow once / reject.
+	return []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+		agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+		agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
+	}
+}
+
 // optionKindFor maps a ZERO decision action to an ACP PermissionOptionKind and a
 // human label. Returns an empty kind for actions that ACP expresses through the
 // outcome rather than an option (cancel).
@@ -49,8 +68,16 @@ func buildPermissionOptions(req agent.PermissionRequest) []PermissionOption {
 // disclosure cannot be TUI-only.
 func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind, name string) {
 	switch action {
-	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow, agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
+	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllow:
 		return PermAllowOnce, "Allow"
+	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowStrict:
+		// SPLIT FROM PLAIN ALLOW because the label is the only thing an ACP
+		// client shows. Both were labelled "Allow", and request_permissions
+		// offers them together — so the panel presented two identical buttons,
+		// and whichever the user picked looked the same while one of them
+		// silently turned on strict auto-review of what was granted. The option
+		// id carries no room for the distinction, so it has to be in the name.
+		return PermAllowOnce, "Allow with strict review"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowForSession:
 		return PermAllowAlways, "Allow for this session"
 	case agent.PermissionDecisionAllowPrefix:
@@ -70,19 +97,31 @@ func optionKindFor(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, escalates bool) (kind,
 
 // decisionFromOutcome maps the client's permission outcome back to a ZERO
 // decision. A cancelled outcome cancels the run; a selected option id is the ZERO
-// action verbatim (validated against what was offered); anything unrecognized
-// fails closed to deny.
-func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) agent.PermissionDecision {
+// action verbatim (validated against what was actually sent); anything
+// unrecognized fails closed to deny.
+//
+// IT TAKES THE OPTIONS THAT WERE SENT, not the decisions the request offered,
+// and the two are not the same list. Some actions never become options —
+// PermissionDecisionCancel is dropped by optionKindFor because ACP expresses
+// cancellation through the outcome instead — yet it IS enumerated in
+// AvailableDecisions for shell commands and apply_patch, the two commonest
+// prompts. Validating against the decisions therefore accepted
+// {"outcome":"selected","optionId":"cancel"}: an identifier no client was ever
+// shown, aborting the whole turn.
+//
+// Passing the sent options makes "what we offered" and "what we accept" the
+// same slice rather than two things kept in step, so anything optionKindFor
+// declines to render is excluded structurally instead of by name.
+func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []PermissionOption) agent.PermissionDecision {
 	switch outcome.Outcome {
 	case OutcomeCancelled:
 		return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}
 	case OutcomeSelected:
-		action := agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)
 		// Bind to what was actually offered for THIS call: a client must not be able
 		// to return a broader grant (always_allow / allow_for_session) that wasn't
 		// presented. Anything not offered fails closed to deny.
-		if actionOffered(action, offered) {
-			return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: action}
+		if actionOffered(outcome.OptionID, offered) {
+			return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionAction(outcome.OptionID)}
 		}
 		return agent.PermissionDecision{Action: agent.PermissionDecisionDeny, Reason: "permission option was not offered"}
 	default:
@@ -90,9 +129,9 @@ func decisionFromOutcome(outcome RequestPermissionOutcome, offered []agent.Permi
 	}
 }
 
-func actionOffered(action agent.PermissionDecisionAction, offered []agent.PermissionDecisionAction) bool {
-	for _, a := range offered {
-		if a == action {
+func actionOffered(optionID string, offered []PermissionOption) bool {
+	for _, option := range offered {
+		if option.OptionID == optionID {
 			return true
 		}
 	}

internal/acp/permission_escalation_test.go

@@ -56,10 +56,11 @@ func TestACPPrefixOptionsStaySilentWithoutEscalation(t *testing.T) {
 // what was offered, so decorating it would fail every prefix approval closed.
 func TestACPDisclosureDoesNotDisturbTheOptionIDRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	request := escalationRequest(true)
-	for _, option := range buildPermissionOptions(request) {
+	options := buildPermissionOptions(request)
+	for _, option := range options {
 		decision := decisionFromOutcome(
 			RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeSelected, OptionID: option.OptionID},
-			request.AvailableDecisions,
+			options,
 		)
 		if string(decision.Action) != option.OptionID {
 			t.Errorf("option id %q round-tripped to %q (%s)", option.OptionID, decision.Action, decision.Reason)

internal/acp/permission_test.go

@@ -39,11 +39,14 @@ func TestBuildPermissionOptionsDefault(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestDecisionFromOutcome(t *testing.T) {
-	offered := []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
-		agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
-		agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
-		agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
-	}
+	offered := buildPermissionOptions(agent.PermissionRequest{
+		ToolName: "bash",
+		AvailableDecisions: []agent.PermissionDecisionAction{
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAllow,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionAlwaysAllow,
+			agent.PermissionDecisionDeny,
+		},
+	})
 	if d := decisionFromOutcome(RequestPermissionOutcome{Outcome: OutcomeCancelled}, offered); d.Action != agent.PermissionDecisionCancel {
 		t.Errorf("cancelled -> %q, want cancel", d.Action)
 	}

internal/agent/command_prefix_test.go

@@ -99,6 +99,43 @@ func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// The launcher denylist is only worth anything if it holds on the path a user
+// actually sees. A model naming its own prefix_rule is that path: before
+// launcher names were normalized, "python3.11" was offered as a one-token
+// grant, and hasStringPrefix then matched every later python3.11 invocation.
+func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsLauncherSpellingsInRequestedPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, testCase := range []struct {
+		command string
+		rule    []any
+	}{
+		{"python3.11 script.py", []any{"python3.11"}},
+		{"python.exe script.py", []any{"python.exe"}},
+		{"node.exe app.js", []any{"node.exe"}},
+		{"cmd /c whoami", []any{"cmd"}},
+		{"busybox sh -c id", []any{"busybox"}},
+		{"uv run main.py", []any{"uv", "run"}},
+		{"python3.11 -c import_os", []any{"python3.11", "-c"}},
+	} {
+		got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
+			"command":     testCase.command,
+			"prefix_rule": testCase.rule,
+		})
+		if got != nil {
+			t.Errorf("prefix_rule %v for %q was offered as %#v, want rejected", testCase.rule, testCase.command, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProposedCommandPrefixStillOffersOrdinaryCommands(t *testing.T) {
+	got := proposedCommandPrefix("bash", map[string]any{
+		"command":     "cargo build --release",
+		"prefix_rule": []any{"cargo", "build"},
+	})
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "cargo" || got[1] != "build" {
+		t.Fatalf("ordinary prefix rule = %#v, want [cargo build]", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestProposedCommandPrefixRejectsUnsafeShellForms(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []string{
 		"cat < in > out",

internal/agent/loop.go

@@ -40,7 +40,15 @@ const (
 	toolResultControlSpecReview = "spec_review_required"
 )
 
-var errPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
+// ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled ends a run because the caller cancelled a
+// permission prompt, rather than because anything failed.
+//
+// EXPORTED FOR THE SURFACES. A cancel is a normal ending and each surface says
+// so its own way — the TUI unwinds, and ACP has a "cancelled" stop reason for
+// exactly this. While it was unexported ACP could not distinguish it from a
+// fault and reported it as an internal error, so declining a tool looked like
+// the agent crashing.
+var ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled = errors.New("permission approval cancelled")
 
 // isImageRejectionError reports whether err is a provider 400 that rejects
 // image/multimodal content. This is checked BEFORE the compaction-retry path
@@ -1364,7 +1372,7 @@ func executeToolCall(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCal
 			}
 		case PermissionDecisionCancel:
 			emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
-			return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
+			return canceledPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
 		default:
 			emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, decisionReason)
 			return deniedPermissionResult(call, decisionReason, requestEvent), nil
@@ -1548,7 +1556,7 @@ func maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(ctx context.Context, registry
 	case PermissionDecisionCancel:
 		emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
 		canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
-		return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
+		return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
 	default:
 		emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
 		denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -1596,7 +1604,7 @@ func maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(ctx context.Context, registry *tool
 	case PermissionDecisionCancel:
 		emitCanceledPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
 		canceled := canceledPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
-		return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", errPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
+		return result, &canceled, true, decision.Action, reason, fmt.Errorf("%w for %s", ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled, call.Name)
 	default:
 		emitDeniedPermission(options, call, requestEvent, reason)
 		denied := deniedPermissionResult(call, reason, requestEvent)
@@ -3087,13 +3095,15 @@ func partitionToolsCached(registry *tools.Registry, permissionMode PermissionMod
 	// Deferral may activate only when tool_search is actually runnable; otherwise
 	// the loop would hide deferred tools behind a loader the dispatch gate rejects
 	// — an inescapable dead-end. "Runnable" mirrors executeToolCall's gate:
-	// registered, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the current permission
-	// mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not advertised). The
+	// registered, model-visible, not in DisabledTools, and advertised in the
+	// current permission mode (e.g. not spec-draft, where tool_search is not
+	// advertised). The
 	// EnabledTools allowlist is intentionally NOT checked here — tool_search is
 	// exempt from the allowlist at dispatch, so an allowlist that omits it must
 	// not disable deferral.
 	loader, loaderFound := registry.Get(tools.ToolSearchToolName)
 	loaderUsable := loaderFound &&
+		tools.ModelVisible(loader) &&
 		!containsToolName(options.DisabledTools, tools.ToolSearchToolName) &&
 		ToolAdvertised(loader, permissionMode)
 
@@ -3208,7 +3218,9 @@ func runtimeToolDefinition(tool tools.Tool) zeroruntime.ToolDefinition {
 }
 
 func ToolVisible(tool tools.Tool, permissionMode PermissionMode, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {
-	return ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) && ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
+	return tools.ModelVisible(tool) &&
+		ToolAllowedByFilters(tool.Name(), enabledTools, disabledTools) &&
+		ToolAdvertised(tool, permissionMode)
 }
 
 func ToolAllowedByFilters(name string, enabledTools []string, disabledTools []string) bool {

internal/agent/loop_test.go

@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ func TestRunAbortsWhenPermissionRequestCanceled(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	})
 
-	if !errors.Is(err, errPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected permission approval cancel error, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if result.FinalAnswer != "" {
@@ -4340,3 +4340,95 @@ func TestPlanModeHonorsBeforeToolVeto(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected tool result to mention the beforeTool veto, got %q", combined)
 	}
 }
+
+// A cancelled permission on either sandbox-retry path must abort the run with a
+// recognisable cancellation, and must not run the escalated retry.
+//
+// BOTH PATHS, because both wrap ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled and each is
+// reached by a different kind of denial: one by an unrestricted platform denial
+// asking for approval, the other by an external-network denial. Surfaces map
+// this sentinel onto their own idea of a cancel — ACP returns stopReason
+// "cancelled" for it — so a path that produced a bare error instead would show
+// the user a crash where they had simply declined.
+func TestCancellingASandboxRetryAbortsWithoutRetrying(t *testing.T) {
+	denial := func(capability execution.CapabilityKind, scope string) tools.Result {
+		return tools.Result{
+			Status: tools.StatusError,
+			ExecutionOutcome: &execution.Outcome{
+				State: execution.StateDenied,
+				Kind:  execution.OutcomeEnforcementDenied,
+				Denial: &execution.Denial{
+					Capability:  execution.Capability{Kind: capability, Scope: scope},
+					Source:      execution.DenialSourcePlatformSandbox,
+					Reason:      "denied by the sandbox",
+					Recoverable: true,
+					NextAction:  execution.DenialNextActionRequestApproval,
+				},
+			},
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, testCase := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		result tools.Result
+		run    func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, ToolCall, tools.Tool, map[string]any, tools.Result, Options) error
+	}{
+		{
+			name:   "unsandboxed retry",
+			result: denial(execution.CapabilityUnrestricted, "host"),
+			run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
+				_, _, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryUnsandboxedAfterSandboxRestriction(
+					ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
+				return abortErr
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "network retry",
+			result: denial(execution.CapabilityExternalNetwork, ""),
+			run: func(ctx context.Context, registry *tools.Registry, call ToolCall, tool tools.Tool, args map[string]any, result tools.Result, options Options) error {
+				_, _, _, _, _, abortErr := maybeRetryWithNetworkAfterSandboxDenial(
+					ctx, registry, call, tool, args, result, PermissionModeAsk, options, nil)
+				return abortErr
+			},
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			retryTool := &sandboxNamespaceLimitedRetryTool{}
+			registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+			registry.Register(retryTool)
+
+			asked := 0
+			options := Options{
+				Registry:       registry,
+				PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+				Autonomy:       "medium",
+				Sandbox: sandbox.NewEngine(sandbox.EngineOptions{
+					WorkspaceRoot: t.TempDir(),
+					Policy:        sandbox.DefaultPolicy(),
+				}),
+				OnPermissionRequest: func(context.Context, PermissionRequest) (PermissionDecision, error) {
+					asked++
+					return PermissionDecision{Action: PermissionDecisionCancel, Reason: "client cancelled"}, nil
+				},
+			}
+
+			call := ToolCall{ID: "call-1", Name: "bash", Arguments: `{"command":"curl example.com"}`}
+			args := map[string]any{"command": "curl example.com"}
+
+			abortErr := testCase.run(context.Background(), registry, call, retryTool, args, testCase.result, options)
+
+			if asked != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("permission was requested %d times, want exactly 1", asked)
+			}
+			if !errors.Is(abortErr, ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled) {
+				t.Fatalf("abort error = %v, want it to match ErrPermissionApprovalCanceled", abortErr)
+			}
+			// The escalated retry is the thing the permission was gating. A
+			// cancelled prompt that still ran it would have run the command the
+			// user just declined.
+			if len(retryTool.calls) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("the escalated retry ran %d times after a cancel: %+v", len(retryTool.calls), retryTool.calls)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/agent/prompt_budget_test.go

@@ -67,3 +67,21 @@ func TestEagerToolSchemaTokenBudget(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("eager tool schemas are %d tokens, over the %d ceiling — trim a schema, drop a core tool, or raise the ceiling deliberately (deferring will NOT help: this test disables deferral)", got, maxEagerToolSchemaTokens)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAgentAdvertisesPatchInsteadOfAmbiguousStringReplacement(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
+	for _, tool := range tools.CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil) {
+		registry.Register(tool)
+	}
+	exposed, _ := partitionTools(registry, PermissionModeAsk, Options{}, map[string]bool{})
+	names := make(map[string]bool, len(exposed))
+	for _, definition := range exposed {
+		names[definition.Name] = true
+	}
+	if !names["apply_patch"] {
+		t.Fatal("agent must retain apply_patch for existing-file changes")
+	}
+	if names["edit_file"] {
+		t.Fatal("agent must not receive the ambiguous string-replacement tool")
+	}
+}

internal/agent/system_prompt.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ work.
 
 - Choose the narrowest tool that safely accomplishes the step. Prefer native
   file tools - read_file, read_minified_file, list_directory, glob, grep,
-  write_file, edit_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
+  write_file, apply_patch - over shelling out to
   cat/sed/awk/python for file operations.
   They are safer, reviewable, and produce clean diffs.
 - Prefer read_minified_file when initially exploring source code; it preserves
@@ -61,10 +61,11 @@ work.
 - Keep edits focused and reviewable. A single patch may update several related
   files when they form one coherent change; do not hide unrelated edits in a
   bulk shell or script rewrite.
-- For edits to existing files, prefer edit_file or apply_patch with minimal,
-  targeted diffs. Match the existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the
-  file's comment density: do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or
-  the code is already comment-dense.
+- For edits to existing files, prefer apply_patch with minimal, targeted hunks
+  and enough unchanged context to identify the intended location. Match the
+  existing indentation, imports, and idioms. Match the file's comment density:
+  do not add explanatory comments unless the user asks or the code is already
+  comment-dense.
 - Solve the problem as posed, not a more general version of it. Add no
   speculative abstraction, configurability, or handling for cases that cannot
   occur, and nothing the user did not ask for. A small diff can still be
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ work.
   you need to clean up a running foreground command yourself, use write_stdin.
 - write_stdin's session_id is only ever an id returned by a still-running
   exec_command; never guess or probe ids. If you have no such session, start one
-  with exec_command, or use write_file/edit_file/apply_patch for file changes.
+  with exec_command, or use write_file/apply_patch for file changes.
 - write_stdin with empty input polls an existing exec_command session, and
   `\u0003` interrupts it. Sending other stdin bytes may require approval because
   it can drive the running process beyond the original command. Non-tty sessions

internal/agent/system_prompt_models.go

@@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ const openAIPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
   longer answers, fenced code blocks for code, and ` + "`inline code`" + ` for paths,
   commands, and symbols.
 - Strongly prefer the native file tools (read_file, list_directory, grep, glob,
-  write_file, edit_file, apply_patch) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
+  write_file, apply_patch) over shelling out to cat/sed/awk/python for
   file work. Make one tool call per file; do not batch file writes into a script.
 - Persist until the task is fully handled this turn: gather context, implement,
   run the validators, and report — do not stop at a partial result.
 </model_guidance>`
 
 const geminiPromptAddendum = `<model_guidance>
-- Prefer the dedicated tools (read_file, grep, glob, edit_file, apply_patch) over
+- Prefer the dedicated tools (read_file, grep, glob, apply_patch) over
   equivalent shell commands; they are safer and produce cleaner diffs.
 - Be concise and concrete. When you run a shell command with side effects, state
   in one short clause why it is needed.

internal/agent/system_prompt_test.go

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func TestCoreSystemPromptIncludesCodingQualityRules(t *testing.T) {
 		"inspect the target file",
 		"plan then act",
 		"choose the narrowest tool",
-		"prefer edit_file or apply_patch",
+		"for edits to existing files, prefer apply_patch",
 		"verify after edits",
 		"honor the active permission mode",
 		"avoid broad refactors",

internal/agenteval/trace.go

@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ func ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout string) []string {
 	return keys
 }
 
-func TraceEventKeys(stdout string) []string {
-	return ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout)
-}
-
 func MissingTraceEvents(required []string, stdout string) []string {
 	seen := map[string]bool{}
 	for _, key := range ParseTraceEventKeys(stdout) {

internal/background/manager.go

@@ -453,7 +453,12 @@ func (manager *Manager) normalizeLoadedTask(fileTaskID string, task Task) (Task,
 	}
 	outputFile, err := manager.outputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
 	if err != nil {
-		return Task{}, false, err
+		var migrated bool
+		outputFile, migrated = manager.migrateLegacyOutputFile(task.ID, task.OutputFile)
+		if !migrated {
+			return Task{}, false, err
+		}
+		changed = true
 	}
 	if outputFile != task.OutputFile {
 		changed = true
@@ -562,6 +567,32 @@ func (manager *Manager) outputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, err
 	return path, nil
 }
 
+// migrateLegacyOutputFile recovers task metadata written under a previous home
+// or XDG data root. It accepts only the canonical per-task output
+// name in the historic zero/background layout, and only when the corresponding
+// regular file already exists inside the active manager root.
+func (manager *Manager) migrateLegacyOutputFile(taskID string, requested string) (string, bool) {
+	requested = strings.TrimSpace(requested)
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(requested) {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	requested = filepath.Clean(requested)
+	expectedName := taskID + ".ndjson"
+	if filepath.Base(requested) != expectedName {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	legacyRoot := filepath.Dir(requested)
+	if filepath.Base(legacyRoot) != "background" || filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(legacyRoot)) != "zero" {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	canonical := filepath.Join(manager.rootDir, expectedName)
+	info, err := os.Lstat(canonical)
+	if err != nil || !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return canonical, true
+}
+
 func validTaskID(taskID string) bool {
 	return taskIDPattern.MatchString(strings.TrimSpace(taskID))
 }

internal/background/manager_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package background
 
 import (
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -191,6 +192,88 @@ func TestManagerSkipsInvalidPersistedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestManagerMigratesLegacyOutputPathWhenCanonicalOutputExists(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	const taskID = "legacy_task"
+	canonicalOutput := filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(canonicalOutput, []byte("legacy output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
+	}
+	legacyOutput := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "background", taskID+".ndjson")
+	metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
+		ID:         taskID,
+		Type:       "specialist",
+		Status:     StatusCompleted,
+		OutputFile: legacyOutput,
+		StartedAt:  time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal legacy metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write legacy metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	manager, err := NewManager(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	task, ok := manager.Get(taskID)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("manager did not load migrated task")
+	}
+	if task.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
+		t.Fatalf("migrated output file = %q, want %q", task.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
+	}
+	if warnings := manager.LoadWarnings(); len(warnings) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("migration produced load warnings: %#v", warnings)
+	}
+
+	persisted, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read migrated metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+	var saved Task
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(persisted, &saved); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode migrated metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+	if saved.OutputFile != canonicalOutput {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted output file = %q, want %q", saved.OutputFile, canonicalOutput)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestManagerRejectsUnrelatedAbsoluteOutputPathDuringMigration(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	const taskID = "legacy_task"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".ndjson"), []byte("output\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write canonical output: %v", err)
+	}
+	metadata, err := json.Marshal(Task{
+		ID:         taskID,
+		Type:       "specialist",
+		Status:     StatusCompleted,
+		OutputFile: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), taskID+".ndjson"),
+		StartedAt:  time.Date(2026, 8, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, taskID+".json"), append(metadata, '\n'), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write metadata: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	manager, err := NewManager(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewManager returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := manager.Get(taskID); ok {
+		t.Fatal("manager loaded task with an unrelated absolute output path")
+	}
+	if warnings := strings.Join(manager.LoadWarnings(), "\n"); !strings.Contains(warnings, "output file must be inside") {
+		t.Fatalf("load warnings = %q, want containment rejection", warnings)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestManagerMarksReloadedRunningTaskNonKillable(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	manager, err := NewManager(root)

internal/background/process_posix.go

@@ -39,3 +39,21 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {
 func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
 	return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
 }
+
+// terminateOwnedProcess terminates cmd's process group directly when its launch
+// configuration proves it was made a group leader. This avoids fragile Getpgid
+// rediscovery after an owned leader exits. Ordinary commands fall back to the
+// safe PID/tree path rather than assuming their PID is also a process-group ID.
+//
+// The Setpgid && Pgid == 0 guard only recognizes ConfigureChildProcessGroup's
+// own convention. A command made its own session leader via Setsid (as opposed
+// to Setpgid) is also its own process-group leader in practice, but takes the
+// slower rediscovery path here since Setsid isn't checked. Harmless today
+// because TerminateCommand has exactly one caller in this codebase; worth
+// covering explicitly if Setsid-configured commands start using this path too.
+func terminateOwnedProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (bool, error) {
+	if cmd.SysProcAttr != nil && cmd.SysProcAttr.Setpgid && cmd.SysProcAttr.Pgid == 0 {
+		return false, execution.TerminateProcessGroup(cmd.Process.Pid, terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval)
+	}
+	return false, terminateProcess(cmd.Process.Pid)
+}

internal/background/process_posix_test.go

@@ -147,11 +147,12 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("terminateProcess: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// The forked child must be gone too (poll until reaped by init).
+	// The forked child must no longer be running. An orphaned zombie is already
+	// dead but may remain visible briefly until the platform's init reaps it.
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	// Only ESRCH proves the child is gone; any other error (e.g. EPERM) would
-	// wrongly pass the test, so treat it as still-present and keep polling.
-	for !errors.Is(syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+	// processStopped treats only ESRCH or an observed zombie state as stopped;
+	// other errors (for example EPERM) remain live and keep polling.
+	for !processStopped(childPID) {
 		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
 			_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
 			t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived terminateProcess — group kill failed", childPID)
@@ -159,3 +160,73 @@ func TestTerminateProcessKillsForkedChildren(t *testing.T) {
 		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestTerminateCommandStopsUnconfiguredCommand(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("sleep", "30")
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+			_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
+		}
+	})
+
+	if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unconfigured command was not reaped")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTerminateCommandKillsChildAfterLeaderExits(t *testing.T) {
+	grace, poll := terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval
+	terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = 2*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond
+	t.Cleanup(func() { terminationGracePeriod, terminationPollInterval = grace, poll })
+
+	// The leader exits immediately after launching the child. TerminateCommand
+	// must capture and signal the process group before Wait reaps the leader and
+	// makes its group identity unavailable.
+	cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "sleep 300 & echo $!; exit 0")
+	ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd)
+	stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout pipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read forked child pid: %v", err)
+	}
+	childPID, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse forked child pid %q: %v", line, err)
+	}
+
+	if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
+	for !processStopped(childPID) {
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			_ = syscall.Kill(childPID, syscall.SIGKILL)
+			t.Fatalf("forked child %d survived TerminateCommand", childPID)
+		}
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+}
+
+func processStopped(pid int) bool {
+	if errors.Is(syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH) {
+		return true
+	}
+	state, err := exec.Command("ps", "-o", "stat=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.Is(syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.Signal(0)), syscall.ESRCH)
+	}
+	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(string(state)), "Z")
+}

internal/background/process_windows.go

@@ -3,11 +3,20 @@
 package background
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"os/exec"
 
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
 )
 
+// stillActiveExitCode is the documented GetExitCodeProcess value for a process
+// that has not terminated. x/sys/windows does not expose Windows' STILL_ACTIVE
+// constant.
+const stillActiveExitCode uint32 = 259
+
+var terminateProcessForTest = terminateProcess
+
 // ConfigureChildProcessGroup is a no-op on Windows: process-tree termination is
 // delegated to execution.TerminateProcessTree, so no launch-time process-group
 // setup is required (the POSIX build sets Setpgid here instead).
@@ -16,3 +25,28 @@ func ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) { execution.ConfigureProcessGroup
 func terminateProcess(pid int) error {
 	return execution.TerminateProcessTree(pid, 0, 0)
 }
+
+// terminateOwnedProcess asks taskkill /T to terminate the tree rooted at cmd,
+// with KillProcessTree's direct Process.Kill fallback if taskkill fails. taskkill
+// can discover descendants only while the root PID still exists; unlike a POSIX
+// process group, a Windows tree has no independently addressable identity after
+// its root exits.
+func terminateOwnedProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) (bool, error) {
+	var (
+		alreadyExited bool
+		terminateErr  error
+	)
+	err := cmd.Process.WithHandle(func(handle uintptr) {
+		var exitCode uint32
+		if windows.GetExitCodeProcess(windows.Handle(handle), &exitCode) == nil {
+			alreadyExited = exitCode != stillActiveExitCode
+		}
+		// Keep the exact process identity pinned while the PID-based taskkill
+		// operation runs, preventing the PID from being recycled underneath it.
+		terminateErr = terminateProcessForTest(cmd.Process.Pid)
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("pin process %d for termination: %w", cmd.Process.Pid, err)
+	}
+	return alreadyExited, terminateErr
+}

internal/background/process_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package background
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"errors"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestTerminateCommandReturnsTreeFailureAfterRootFallbackReaps(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", "Start-Sleep -Seconds 300")
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	treeErr := errors.New("taskkill /T failed")
+	originalTerminateProcess := terminateProcessForTest
+	terminateProcessForTest = func(pid int) error {
+		if err := cmd.Process.Kill(); err != nil {
+			return errors.Join(treeErr, err)
+		}
+		return treeErr
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { terminateProcessForTest = originalTerminateProcess })
+
+	err := TerminateCommand(cmd)
+	if !errors.Is(err, treeErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand error = %v, want tree failure", err)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+		t.Fatal("root process was not reaped")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTerminateCommandReapsExitedLeader(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("cmd.exe", "/c", "exit", "0")
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Let the child exit without calling Wait so cleanup exercises the Windows
+	// taskkill/TerminateProcess race while it still owns the process handle.
+	time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	// jatmn's #774 finding: taskkill /T racing an already-exited PID (and the
+	// Process.Kill fallback) both fail here, but the reap below still succeeds —
+	// the process-handle exit-code check proves the leader was already gone, so
+	// TerminateCommand must not surface the expected kill-attempt error.
+	if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v, want nil (leader was already gone and got reaped)", err)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+		t.Fatal("exited process was not reaped")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTerminateCommandDeadLeaderCannotIdentifyDescendantTree(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command",
+		`$p = Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList '-NoProfile','-Command','Start-Sleep -Seconds 300' -PassThru; $p.Id`)
+	stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout pipe: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	line, err := bufio.NewReader(stdout).ReadString('\n')
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read descendant pid: %v", err)
+	}
+	descendantPID, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse descendant pid %q: %v", line, err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = exec.Command("taskkill.exe", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(descendantPID)).Run()
+	})
+
+	// Wait until the leader is observably exited but deliberately leave it
+	// unreaped, matching the POSIX regression's ordering.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for processExistsOnWindows(cmd.Process.Pid) {
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Fatal("leader did not exit")
+		}
+		time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if err := TerminateCommand(cmd); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateCommand: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Windows has no persistent group ID analogous to POSIX: once the leader is
+	// gone, taskkill /T cannot rediscover this descendant. Assert that platform
+	// distinction rather than claiming TerminateCommand can provide it here.
+	if !processExistsOnWindows(descendantPID) {
+		t.Fatal("descendant unexpectedly stopped after its root exited")
+	}
+}
+
+func processExistsOnWindows(pid int) bool {
+	return exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command",
+		"Get-Process -Id "+strconv.Itoa(pid)+" -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null").Run() == nil
+}

internal/background/terminate.go

@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 package background
 
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os/exec"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const commandReapTimeout = 3 * time.Second
+
 // TerminateProcess stops a background process by PID — on Windows its process
 // tree; on POSIX its whole process group when the PID leads its own group (the
 // invariant ConfigureChildProcessGroup establishes for processes started through
@@ -12,3 +21,69 @@ package background
 func TerminateProcess(pid int) error {
 	return terminateProcess(pid)
 }
+
+// TerminateCommand stops a started command and reaps its leader. The caller must
+// have exclusive ownership of cmd: it must not have previously called Wait or
+// Process.Release, and no goroutine may call either concurrently. On POSIX it
+// stops the whole group when the command was configured as its leader; ordinary
+// commands safely fall back to PID/tree discovery. On Windows, success for a
+// leader that was already dead confirms only that the leader was reaped;
+// descendants may survive because Windows cannot rediscover a tree from a dead
+// root. `zero daemon start` needs this operation when readiness times out: it
+// launched the child, so it must both stop the tree and collect the leader.
+//
+// The order matters: the tree is signalled first, because Wait releases the
+// leader's PID and a later group lookup could then resolve to nothing (or, worse,
+// to a recycled PID). Termination stays in the shared execution lifecycle
+// primitives rather than introducing a second platform-specific killer.
+//
+// If the bounded reap times out, the Wait call already started by this function
+// continues in its goroutine. From that point onward the caller must not access
+// cmd at all, including ProcessState, because that would race with Wait.
+func TerminateCommand(cmd *exec.Cmd) error {
+	if cmd == nil || cmd.Process == nil {
+		return errors.New("terminate command: process was never started")
+	}
+	leaderAlreadyExited, terminateErr := terminateOwnedProcess(cmd)
+	reapErr := waitForTerminatedCommandWithin(cmd, commandReapTimeout)
+	if reapErr != nil {
+		if terminateErr != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("%v (reap failed: %w)", terminateErr, reapErr)
+		}
+		return reapErr
+	}
+	if terminateErr != nil && !leaderAlreadyExited {
+		return terminateErr
+	}
+	// Only discard a termination error when the platform demonstrated before
+	// attempting termination that the leader had already exited. A successful
+	// reap alone says nothing about whether a live descendant tree was stopped.
+	return nil
+}
+
+// classifyWaitError treats a non-zero exit status as success: a process being
+// terminated is expected to report one (or a signal), so the only interesting
+// failure is Wait itself not working.
+func classifyWaitError(waitErr error) error {
+	var exitErr *exec.ExitError
+	if waitErr != nil && !errors.As(waitErr, &exitErr) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("reap process: %w", waitErr)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// waitForTerminatedCommandWithin bounds the reap so a child that somehow survives
+// termination cannot hang the caller — the daemon-start cleanup path runs while a
+// user waits at the CLI. On timeout its Wait goroutine is intentionally left to
+// finish: exec.Cmd permits only one Wait call, and abandoning it without a reaper
+// would leak the child once it eventually exits.
+func waitForTerminatedCommandWithin(cmd *exec.Cmd, timeout time.Duration) error {
+	waitDone := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { waitDone <- cmd.Wait() }()
+	select {
+	case waitErr := <-waitDone:
+		return classifyWaitError(waitErr)
+	case <-time.After(timeout):
+		return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not reap after termination", cmd.Process.Pid)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/app.go

@@ -64,38 +64,53 @@ type appDeps struct {
 	// getenv reads a process environment variable (production: os.Getenv, set in
 	// defaultAppDeps — deliberately NOT filled by fillAppDeps, so tests are hermetic
 	// against ambient vars like ZERO_PROVIDER unless they inject it). nil ⇒ empty.
-	getenv                 func(string) string
-	probeProviderHealth    func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
-	discoverProviderModels func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
-	detectLocalRuntimes    func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
-	openRouterLogin        func(context.Context, provideroauth.OpenRouterOptions) (string, error)
-	newSessionStore        func() *sessions.Store
-	loadPlugins            func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
-	loadHooks              func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
-	skillsDir              func() string
-	pluginsDir             func() string
-	toolsDir               func() string
-	newMCPStore            func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
-	newMCPTokenStore       func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
-	newSandboxStore        func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
-	selectSandboxBackend   func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
-	runSandboxSetupHelper  func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
-	registerMCPTools       func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
-	prepareWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
-	releaseWorktree        func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error
-	detectVerifyPlan       func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
-	runVerify              func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
-	runSelfVerify          func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
-	runAgentEval           func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
-	inspectChanges         func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
-	commitChanges          func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
-	pushChanges            func(context.Context, zerogit.PushOptions) (zerogit.PushResult, error)
-	createPR               func(context.Context, zerogit.PROptions) (zerogit.PRResult, error)
-	runTUI                 func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
-	runEditor              func(string) error
-	checkUpdate            func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
-	applyUpdate            func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error)
-	now                    func() time.Time
+	getenv                       func(string) string
+	probeProviderHealth          func(context.Context, providerhealth.Options) providerhealth.Result
+	discoverProviderModels       func(context.Context, config.ProviderProfile) ([]providermodeldiscovery.Model, error)
+	detectLocalRuntimes          func(context.Context, provideronboarding.LocalDetectOptions) []provideronboarding.DetectedLocalRuntime
+	openRouterLogin              func(context.Context, provideroauth.OpenRouterOptions) (string, error)
+	newSessionStore              func() *sessions.Store
+	loadPlugins                  func(plugins.LoadOptions) (plugins.LoadResult, error)
+	loadHooks                    func(hooks.LoadOptions) (hooks.LoadResult, error)
+	skillsDir                    func() string
+	pluginsDir                   func() string
+	toolsDir                     func() string
+	newMCPStore                  func() (*mcp.PermissionStore, error)
+	newMCPTokenStore             func() (*mcp.TokenStore, error)
+	newSandboxStore              func() (*sandbox.GrantStore, error)
+	selectSandboxBackend         func(sandbox.BackendOptions) sandbox.Backend
+	runSandboxSetupHelper        func(path string, args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) error
+	registerMCPTools             func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error)
+	prepareWorktree              func(context.Context, worktrees.Options) (worktrees.Result, error)
+	releaseWorktree              func(context.Context, worktrees.Options, string) error
+	detectVerifyPlan             func(string) (verify.Plan, error)
+	runVerify                    func(context.Context, verify.Plan, verify.RunOptions) verify.Report
+	runSelfVerify                func(context.Context, verify.Plan, selfverify.Options) selfverify.Report
+	runAgentEval                 func(context.Context, agentEvalOptions) (agentEvalReport, error)
+	inspectChanges               func(context.Context, zerogit.InspectOptions) (zerogit.ChangeSummary, error)
+	commitChanges                func(context.Context, zerogit.CommitOptions) (zerogit.CommitResult, error)
+	pushChanges                  func(context.Context, zerogit.PushOptions) (zerogit.PushResult, error)
+	createPR                     func(context.Context, zerogit.PROptions) (zerogit.PRResult, error)
+	createBranch                 func(context.Context, zerogit.BranchOptions) (zerogit.BranchResult, error)
+	isDefaultBranch              func(context.Context, zerogit.DefaultBranchOptions) (bool, string, string, error)
+	currentGitUser               func(context.Context, string) string
+	headCommitSubject            func(context.Context, string) string
+	commitsAhead                 func(context.Context, string, string, string) (int, error)
+	isUnbornRemote               func(context.Context, string, string) (bool, error)
+	refreshTrackingRef           func(context.Context, string, string, string) error
+	branchUpstreamRemote         func(context.Context, string, string) string
+	branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge func(context.Context, string, string) (string, string)
+	resolveRemoteBranchTip       func(context.Context, string, string, string) (string, error)
+	remoteHasBranch              func(context.Context, string, string, string) (bool, error)
+	currentGitBranch             func(context.Context, string) string
+	currentBranchTip             func(context.Context, string) string
+	deleteBranch                 func(context.Context, string, string, string) error
+	resetBranchRef               func(context.Context, string, string, string, string) error
+	runTUI                       func(context.Context, tui.Options) int
+	runEditor                    func(string) error
+	checkUpdate                  func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.Result, error)
+	applyUpdate                  func(context.Context, update.Options) (update.ApplyResult, error)
+	now                          func() time.Time
 }
 
 type mcpToolRuntime interface {
@@ -198,11 +213,52 @@ func defaultAppDeps() appDeps {
 		commitChanges:    zerogit.Commit,
 		pushChanges:      zerogit.Push,
 		createPR:         zerogit.CreatePR,
-		runTUI:           tui.Run,
-		runEditor:        openEditor,
-		checkUpdate:      update.Check,
-		applyUpdate:      update.Apply,
-		now:              time.Now,
+		createBranch:     zerogit.CreateBranch,
+		isDefaultBranch:  zerogit.IsDefaultBranch,
+		currentGitUser: func(ctx context.Context, cwd string) string {
+			return zerogit.CurrentGitUser(ctx, cwd, nil)
+		},
+		headCommitSubject: func(ctx context.Context, cwd string) string {
+			return zerogit.HeadCommitSubject(ctx, cwd, nil)
+		},
+		commitsAhead: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, remote, branch string) (int, error) {
+			return zerogit.CommitsAhead(ctx, cwd, remote, branch, nil)
+		},
+		isUnbornRemote: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, remote string) (bool, error) {
+			return zerogit.IsUnbornRemote(ctx, cwd, remote, nil)
+		},
+		refreshTrackingRef: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, remote, branch string) error {
+			return zerogit.RefreshTrackingRef(ctx, cwd, remote, branch, nil)
+		},
+		branchUpstreamRemote: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, branch string) string {
+			return zerogit.UpstreamRemote(ctx, cwd, branch, nil)
+		},
+		branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, branch string) (string, string) {
+			return zerogit.UpstreamRemoteAndMergeBranch(ctx, cwd, branch, nil)
+		},
+		resolveRemoteBranchTip: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, remote, branch string) (string, error) {
+			return zerogit.ResolveRemoteBranchTip(ctx, cwd, remote, branch, nil)
+		},
+		remoteHasBranch: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, remote, branch string) (bool, error) {
+			return zerogit.RemoteHasBranch(ctx, cwd, remote, branch, nil)
+		},
+		currentGitBranch: func(ctx context.Context, cwd string) string {
+			return zerogit.CurrentBranch(ctx, cwd, nil)
+		},
+		currentBranchTip: func(ctx context.Context, cwd string) string {
+			return zerogit.CurrentBranchTip(ctx, cwd, nil)
+		},
+		deleteBranch: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, fallbackBranch, branchToDelete string) error {
+			return zerogit.DeleteBranch(ctx, cwd, fallbackBranch, branchToDelete, nil)
+		},
+		resetBranchRef: func(ctx context.Context, cwd, branch, newTip, expectedOld string) error {
+			return zerogit.ResetBranchRef(ctx, cwd, branch, newTip, nil, expectedOld)
+		},
+		runTUI:      tui.Run,
+		runEditor:   openEditor,
+		checkUpdate: update.Check,
+		applyUpdate: update.Apply,
+		now:         time.Now,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -562,6 +618,45 @@ func fillAppDeps(deps appDeps) appDeps {
 	if deps.createPR == nil {
 		deps.createPR = defaults.createPR
 	}
+	if deps.createBranch == nil {
+		deps.createBranch = defaults.createBranch
+	}
+	if deps.isDefaultBranch == nil {
+		deps.isDefaultBranch = defaults.isDefaultBranch
+	}
+	if deps.currentGitUser == nil {
+		deps.currentGitUser = defaults.currentGitUser
+	}
+	if deps.headCommitSubject == nil {
+		deps.headCommitSubject = defaults.headCommitSubject
+	}
+	if deps.commitsAhead == nil {
+		deps.commitsAhead = defaults.commitsAhead
+	}
+	if deps.isUnbornRemote == nil {
+		deps.isUnbornRemote = defaults.isUnbornRemote
+	}
+	if deps.refreshTrackingRef == nil {
+		deps.refreshTrackingRef = defaults.refreshTrackingRef
+	}
+	if deps.branchUpstreamRemote == nil {
+		deps.branchUpstreamRemote = defaults.branchUpstreamRemote
+	}
+	if deps.branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge == nil {
+		deps.branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge = defaults.branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge
+	}
+	if deps.remoteHasBranch == nil {
+		deps.remoteHasBranch = defaults.remoteHasBranch
+	}
+	if deps.currentGitBranch == nil {
+		deps.currentGitBranch = defaults.currentGitBranch
+	}
+	if deps.currentBranchTip == nil {
+		deps.currentBranchTip = defaults.currentBranchTip
+	}
+	// resolveRemoteBranchTip, deleteBranch, and resetBranchRef stay nil when
+	// unset so unit tests that mock createBranch without a real git tree do not
+	// hit real git restore/delete commands.
 	if deps.runTUI == nil {
 		deps.runTUI = defaults.runTUI
 	}
@@ -761,7 +856,7 @@ func runInteractiveTUIWithSetup(stderr io.Writer, deps appDeps, permissionMode a
 	// A server that could not be reached or validated is skipped, not fatal (one
 	// bad MCP server must not abort startup) — surface each so a missing tool set is
 	// explained rather than silently absent. A built-in default the user never
-	// configured (e.g. keyless Firecrawl with no credentials) is the exception: it
+	// configured (e.g. keyless Exa with no credentials) is the exception: it
 	// was never asked for, so its failure is not worth a startup warning — only
 	// servers the user actually configured warn on failure (issue #552).
 	for _, skipped := range mcpRuntime.Skipped() {

internal/cli/app_test.go

@@ -211,12 +211,12 @@ func TestTUIStartupSuppressesWarningForUnconfiguredDefaultServer(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 		resolveMCPConfig: func(workspaceRoot string, excludeProject bool) (config.MCPConfig, error) {
 			return config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-				"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
+				"exa": config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
 			}}, nil
 		},
 		registerMCPTools: func(context.Context, *tools.Registry, config.MCPConfig, mcp.RegisterOptions) (mcpToolRuntime, error) {
 			return fakeMCPRuntimeWithSkips{skipped: []mcp.SkippedServer{
-				{Name: "firecrawl", Err: errors.New("returned HTTP 401"), UnconfiguredDefault: true},
+				{Name: "exa", Err: errors.New("returned HTTP 401"), UnconfiguredDefault: true},
 			}}, nil
 		},
 		runTUI: func(ctx context.Context, options tui.Options) int {
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ func TestTUIStartupSuppressesWarningForUnconfiguredDefaultServer(t *testing.T) {
 	if exitCode != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("exitCode = %d stderr=%s", exitCode, stderr.String())
 	}
-	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "firecrawl") {
+	if strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "exa") {
 		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q, want no warning for an unconfigured default server", stderr.String())
 	}
 }

internal/cli/daemon.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package cli
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
@@ -160,20 +161,61 @@ func runDaemonStartDetached(paths daemon.Paths, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writ
 	cmd.Stdout = logFile
 	cmd.Stderr = logFile
 	background.ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd) // own process group: outlives this shell
-	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+	if err := startAndAwaitDaemonProcess(cmd, func() bool { return daemonReachable(paths) }, 5*time.Second, 25*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errDaemonStartTimeout) {
+			return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error()+"; see "+logPath, exitCrash)
+		}
 		return writeAppError(stderr, err.Error(), exitCrash)
 	}
-	_ = cmd.Process.Release()
+	fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero daemon started (socket %s)\n", paths.Socket)
+	return exitSuccess
+}
 
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		if daemonReachable(paths) {
-			fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "zero daemon started (socket %s)\n", paths.Socket)
-			return exitSuccess
-		}
-		time.Sleep(25 * time.Millisecond)
+var errDaemonStartTimeout = errors.New("daemon did not come up within timeout")
+
+func startAndAwaitDaemonProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd, reachable func() bool, timeout time.Duration, pollInterval time.Duration) error {
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		return err
 	}
-	return writeAppError(stderr, "daemon did not come up within timeout; see "+logPath, exitCrash)
+	if waitForDaemonReadiness(reachable, timeout, pollInterval) {
+		if err := cmd.Process.Release(); err != nil {
+			cleanupErr := terminateAndReapDaemonProcess(cmd)
+			if cleanupErr != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("release daemon process: %w (cleanup failed: %v)", err, cleanupErr)
+			}
+			return fmt.Errorf("release daemon process: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := terminateAndReapDaemonProcess(cmd); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w; cleanup failed: %v", errDaemonStartTimeout, err)
+	}
+	return errDaemonStartTimeout
+}
+
+func waitForDaemonReadiness(reachable func() bool, timeout time.Duration, pollInterval time.Duration) bool {
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
+	for {
+		if reachable() {
+			return true
+		}
+		remaining := time.Until(deadline)
+		if remaining <= 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(min(pollInterval, remaining))
+	}
+	// The loop's last reachable() call already ran immediately before this one
+	// (right after the final Sleep, with the same deadline check separating
+	// them), so this adds no extra waiting time and is not a grace window for a
+	// slow-starting daemon — it only re-checks the same instant in case
+	// reachable() itself is non-deterministic. To tolerate a genuinely slow
+	// start, raise the timeout passed to startAndAwaitDaemonProcess instead.
+	return reachable()
+}
+
+func terminateAndReapDaemonProcess(cmd *exec.Cmd) error {
+	return background.TerminateCommand(cmd)
 }
 
 func runDaemonStop(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer) int {

internal/cli/daemon_test.go

@@ -2,8 +2,15 @@ package cli
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/background"
 )
 
 // isolateDaemonPaths points DefaultPaths at a temp dir so the test never touches
@@ -121,3 +128,84 @@ func TestDaemonSubcommandsRejectExtraArgs(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+func TestWaitForDaemonReadinessChecksTimeoutBoundary(t *testing.T) {
+	checks := 0
+	ready := waitForDaemonReadiness(func() bool {
+		checks++
+		return checks == 2
+	}, 0, time.Millisecond)
+	if !ready {
+		t.Fatal("daemon that became reachable at the timeout boundary was not detected")
+	}
+	if checks != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("reachability checks = %d, want initial and final checks", checks)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTerminateAndReapDaemonProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := daemonDetachedChildCommand("hang")
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start helper process: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := terminateAndReapDaemonProcess(cmd); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("terminate and reap helper process: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("helper process was not reaped: state=%v", cmd.ProcessState)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState.Success() {
+		t.Fatalf("helper process unexpectedly exited successfully: %v", cmd.ProcessState)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStartAndAwaitDaemonProcessTimeoutTerminatesAndReaps(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := daemonDetachedChildCommand("hang")
+	if err := startAndAwaitDaemonProcess(cmd, func() bool { return false }, 0, time.Millisecond); !errors.Is(err, errDaemonStartTimeout) {
+		t.Fatalf("start and await error = %v, want timeout", err)
+	}
+	if cmd.ProcessState == nil {
+		t.Fatal("timed-out helper process was not reaped")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStartAndAwaitDaemonProcessReleasesReadyChild(t *testing.T) {
+	marker := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child-finished")
+	cmd := daemonDetachedChildCommand("mark", "ZERO_TEST_DAEMON_CHILD_MARKER="+marker)
+	if err := startAndAwaitDaemonProcess(cmd, func() bool { return true }, time.Second, time.Millisecond); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start and await ready helper: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(marker); err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatal("released helper process did not remain alive to write its marker")
+}
+
+func daemonDetachedChildCommand(mode string, extraEnv ...string) *exec.Cmd {
+	cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=TestDaemonDetachedChildProcess")
+	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "ZERO_TEST_DAEMON_DETACHED_CHILD="+mode)
+	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, extraEnv...)
+	background.ConfigureChildProcessGroup(cmd)
+	return cmd
+}
+
+func TestDaemonDetachedChildProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	switch os.Getenv("ZERO_TEST_DAEMON_DETACHED_CHILD") {
+	case "":
+		return
+	case "mark":
+		if err := os.WriteFile(os.Getenv("ZERO_TEST_DAEMON_CHILD_MARKER"), []byte("ready"), 0o600); err != nil {
+			os.Exit(2)
+		}
+		os.Exit(0)
+	}
+	for {
+		time.Sleep(time.Hour)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/mcp_default_test.go

@@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/config"
 )
 
-// `zero mcp disable firecrawl` must work even though firecrawl is a built-in
+// `zero mcp disable exa` must work even though exa is a built-in
 // default that is not written to the user's config file until overridden.
-func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRunMCPDisableSeededExaDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "zero", "config.json")
-	// A config with no firecrawl entry — the default lives in code, not the file.
+	// A config with no Exa entry — the default lives in code, not the file.
 	writeMCPCommandRawConfig(t, configPath, `{"activeProvider":"fast"}`)
 
 	var out, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "disable", "firecrawl", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, appDeps{
+	code := runWithDeps([]string{"mcp", "disable", "exa", "--json"}, &out, &errBuf, appDeps{
 		userConfigPath: func() (string, error) { return configPath, nil },
 	})
 	if code != exitSuccess {
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("decode disable JSON: %v\n%s", err, out.String())
 	}
-	if payload.ServerName != "firecrawl" || !payload.Disabled || !payload.Changed {
-		t.Fatalf("disable payload = %#v, want firecrawl disabled+changed", payload)
+	if payload.ServerName != "exa" || !payload.Disabled || !payload.Changed {
+		t.Fatalf("disable payload = %#v, want exa disabled+changed", payload)
 	}
 
 	// End-to-end: resolving that config now turns the default off.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func TestRunMCPDisableSeededFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !cfg.Servers["firecrawl"].Disabled {
-		t.Fatal("expected `mcp disable firecrawl` to turn the seeded default off in the resolved config")
+	if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatal("expected `mcp disable exa` to turn the seeded default off in the resolved config")
 	}
 }

internal/cli/workflows.go

@@ -2,9 +2,12 @@ package cli
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"path"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -602,18 +605,20 @@ func parseChangesArgs(args []string, command string) (changesCommandOptions, boo
 			return options, false, execUsageError{fmt.Sprintf("unexpected changes argument %q", arg)}
 		}
 	}
-	if command != "commit" && options.message != "" {
+	if command != "commit" && options.hasMessage {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--message is only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
 	}
-	if command != "commit" && (options.hasMessage || options.dryRun || options.auto) {
-		return options, false, execUsageError{"--message, --dry-run, and --auto are only valid with `zero changes commit`"}
-	}
 	if command == "commit" && options.hasMessage && options.auto {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"cannot specify both --message and --auto"}
 	}
 	if command != "commit" && command != "push" && options.dryRun {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--dry-run is only valid with commit or push"}
 	}
+	// --auto on push/pr is the explicit opt-in for LLM branch naming (see
+	// ensureFeatureBranch); on commit it opts into the LLM commit message.
+	if command != "commit" && command != "push" && command != "pr" && options.auto {
+		return options, false, execUsageError{"--auto is only valid with commit, push, or pr"}
+	}
 	if command != "inspect" && options.baseRef != "" {
 		return options, false, execUsageError{"--base is only valid with `zero changes inspect`"}
 	}
@@ -934,8 +939,7 @@ Flags:
       --fill              Automatically populate PR title and body from commits
       --draft             Create PR as a draft
       --yes               Confirm pushing to a default/protected branch
-  -a, --auto              Auto-generate commit message using LLM (use --dry-run to preview)
-      --dry-run           Preview commit metadata without mutating git state
+  -a, --auto              Use the LLM: commit generates the message, push/pr name the auto-created branch (sends the diff to the provider)
       --json              Print JSON output
   -h, --help              Show this help
 `)
@@ -958,11 +962,31 @@ func runChangesPush(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appD
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
 	}
 
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	branch, remote, created, err := ensureFeatureBranch(ctx, stdout, workspaceRoot, options.remote, featureBranchOptions{
+		JSONMode:           options.json,
+		AllowDefaultBranch: options.yes,
+		DryRun:             options.dryRun,
+		AutoNaming:         options.auto,
+		MaxDiffBytes:       options.maxDiffBytes,
+	}, deps)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	// context.Background() is deliberate: the 2-minute ctx above is the
+	// feature-branch preflight (inspection, remote probes, branch creation).
+	// The push itself must not be cancelled mid-transfer just because the
+	// preflight budget elapsed; a large push can legitimately take longer.
 	result, err := deps.pushChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.PushOptions{
 		Cwd:                    workspaceRoot,
-		Remote:                 options.remote,
+		Remote:                 firstNonEmptyString(options.remote, remote),
+		Branch:                 branch,
 		Force:                  options.force,
 		DryRun:                 options.dryRun,
+		RequireNewRemoteBranch: created,
 		AllowPushDefaultBranch: options.yes,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1010,15 +1034,62 @@ func runChangesPR(args []string, stdout io.Writer, stderr io.Writer, deps appDep
 		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
 	}
 
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	branch, remote, created, err := ensureFeatureBranch(ctx, stdout, workspaceRoot, options.remote, featureBranchOptions{
+		JSONMode:           options.json,
+		AllowDefaultBranch: options.yes,
+		DryRun:             false,
+		AutoNaming:         options.auto,
+		MaxDiffBytes:       options.maxDiffBytes,
+	}, deps)
+	if err != nil {
+		return writeExecUsageError(stderr, err.Error())
+	}
+
+	// Resolve the target remote for the unborn-remote check. Explicit --remote wins,
+	// followed by the remote resolved by ensureFeatureBranch. When --yes is set,
+	// fall back to the branch upstream or "origin".
+	targetRemote := strings.TrimSpace(options.remote)
+	if targetRemote == "" {
+		targetRemote = remote
+	}
+	if targetRemote == "" {
+		currentBranch := ""
+		if deps.currentGitBranch != nil {
+			currentBranch = deps.currentGitBranch(context.Background(), workspaceRoot)
+		}
+		if deps.branchUpstreamRemote != nil && currentBranch != "" {
+			targetRemote = deps.branchUpstreamRemote(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, currentBranch)
+		}
+		if targetRemote == "" {
+			targetRemote = "origin"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Probe errors are intentionally ignored so the flow can continue; if the
+	// probe fails, the subsequent push or PR operation provides fail-closed behavior.
+	if deps.isUnbornRemote != nil {
+		if unborn, unbornErr := deps.isUnbornRemote(context.Background(), workspaceRoot, targetRemote); unbornErr == nil && unborn {
+			return writeExecUsageError(stderr, fmt.Sprintf("cannot create pull request on unborn remote %s: push the initial default branch first", targetRemote))
+		}
+	}
+
 	if !options.json {
 		if _, err := fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Pushing current branch to set upstream..."); err != nil {
 			return exitCrash
 		}
 	}
+	// context.Background() is deliberate here too: runChangesPR reuses the
+	// 2-minute ctx for preflight (branch creation and remote probes), but the
+	// push must not be cancelled mid-transfer if that budget elapsed.
 	pushResult, err := deps.pushChanges(context.Background(), zerogit.PushOptions{
 		Cwd:                    workspaceRoot,
-		Remote:                 options.remote,
+		Remote:                 firstNonEmptyString(options.remote, remote),
+		Branch:                 branch,
 		Force:                  options.force,
+		RequireNewRemoteBranch: created,
 		AllowPushDefaultBranch: options.yes,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1100,3 +1171,462 @@ func generateAutoCommitMessage(ctx context.Context, provider zeroruntime.Provide
 	}
 	return msg, nil
 }
+
+type featureBranchOptions struct {
+	JSONMode           bool
+	AllowDefaultBranch bool
+	DryRun             bool
+	AutoNaming         bool
+	MaxDiffBytes       int
+}
+
+// branchPushPlan holds the resolved parameters for a push or PR workflow
+// before any branches are created or refs mutated. Separating plan resolution
+// from mutation allows tests to assert the resolution matrix directly without
+// touching a git repository.
+type branchPushPlan struct {
+	ShouldBranch           bool
+	CurrentBranch          string
+	PushRemote             string
+	RequireNewRemoteBranch bool
+	TrackingRemote         string
+	TrackingBranch         string
+	RestoreTip             string
+	PublishabilityBase     string
+	Summary                zerogit.ChangeSummary
+	Slug                   string
+}
+
+// resolveBranchPushPlan resolves the branch, remotes, restore tip, and naming
+// slug for changes push / pr workflows. It performs all checks (clean working
+// tree, unborn remote detection, ahead count, restore tip resolution) but
+// executes no mutation (no branch creation, ref resets, or deletions).
+func resolveBranchPushPlan(ctx context.Context, stdout io.Writer, workspaceRoot string, requestedRemote string, opts featureBranchOptions, deps appDeps) (branchPushPlan, error) {
+	if opts.AllowDefaultBranch || opts.DryRun {
+		return branchPushPlan{
+			ShouldBranch:           false,
+			PushRemote:             strings.TrimSpace(requestedRemote),
+			RequireNewRemoteBranch: false,
+		}, nil
+	}
+
+	if deps.isDefaultBranch == nil {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("isDefaultBranch dependency missing")
+	}
+	isDefault, currentBranch, remote, err := deps.isDefaultBranch(ctx, zerogit.DefaultBranchOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot, Remote: requestedRemote})
+	if err != nil {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, err
+	}
+	if !isDefault {
+		// Whether this push needs the nonexistence lease is decided by one
+		// live check against the destination remote, not by inference from
+		// local git state (upstream config, a generated-branch marker):
+		// every local signal that stood in for that check turned out to be
+		// wrong in some ordering (inherited config from checkout -b, a
+		// config write that failed after a successful push, a push aimed at
+		// a different remote than the one local config describes). A branch
+		// missing on the remote gets the nonexistence lease, protecting a
+		// concurrent creator of the same name; a branch already there gets a
+		// plain push, and git's own fast-forward check is the safety net —
+		// if the remote history isn't ours, the push fails with a clear
+		// non-fast-forward error instead of an attempted silent recovery.
+		if deps.remoteHasBranch == nil {
+			return branchPushPlan{
+				ShouldBranch:           false,
+				CurrentBranch:          currentBranch,
+				PushRemote:             remote,
+				RequireNewRemoteBranch: true,
+			}, nil
+		}
+		targetRemote := firstNonEmptyString(requestedRemote, remote)
+		exists, existsErr := deps.remoteHasBranch(ctx, workspaceRoot, targetRemote, currentBranch)
+		if existsErr != nil {
+			return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot check whether %s already exists on remote %s: %w", currentBranch, targetRemote, existsErr)
+		}
+		return branchPushPlan{
+			ShouldBranch:           false,
+			CurrentBranch:          currentBranch,
+			PushRemote:             remote,
+			RequireNewRemoteBranch: !exists,
+		}, nil
+	}
+
+	// CreateBranch and Push publish commits only. A dirty working tree would
+	// leave uncommitted edits behind under a branch/PR that does not include
+	// them, so refuse until the tree is clean (commit or stash first).
+	workingTree, err := deps.inspectChanges(ctx, zerogit.InspectOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot})
+	if err != nil {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to inspect working tree: %w", err)
+	}
+	if !workingTree.Clean {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("working tree has uncommitted changes; commit or stash them before pushing from the default branch")
+	}
+
+	// Capture the source default branch's own upstream before refreshing or
+	// leaving it. --remote selects the push destination; restore must not
+	// rewrite local main to upstream/main when main still tracks origin/main
+	// (fork setups), and refreshing must update the exact tracking ref that
+	// will supply both the ahead count and the restore target.
+	trackingRemote := remote
+	trackingBranch := currentBranch
+	if deps.branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge != nil {
+		if r, m := deps.branchUpstreamRemoteAndMerge(ctx, workspaceRoot, currentBranch); r != "" && m != "" {
+			trackingRemote = r
+			trackingBranch = m
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Refresh the local remote-tracking ref before trusting it: IsDefaultBranch
+	// already contacted the remote for its symref check, but the tracking ref
+	// commitsAhead reads from is only a local cache (written at clone or the
+	// last fetch) and can sit behind the remote's live tip. Left stale, a real
+	// publishable range could look like zero commits ahead, and the diff
+	// derived below (which reuses this same ref as its base) would be stale
+	// too. A failure here (offline, or a genuinely unborn remote with no such
+	// ref to fetch yet) is folded into the same fail-closed path as an
+	// unresolvable ahead count below.
+	var fetchErr error
+	if deps.refreshTrackingRef != nil {
+		fetchErr = deps.refreshTrackingRef(ctx, workspaceRoot, trackingRemote, trackingBranch)
+	}
+
+	// The ahead check gates on the source upstream (trackingRemote), but the
+	// feature branch is pushed to `pushRemote`, which can be a different
+	// destination (--remote on a fork). Refuse to auto-branch onto an unborn
+	// destination: without an initial default branch the new feature branch
+	// becomes the destination's first ref and its HEAD is left pointing at it.
+	// This is checked once, here, against the push destination, before resolving
+	// commit tips or creating any branches.
+	pushRemote := firstNonEmptyString(requestedRemote, remote)
+	if deps.isUnbornRemote != nil {
+		if unbornDest, unbornDestErr := deps.isUnbornRemote(ctx, workspaceRoot, pushRemote); unbornDestErr == nil && unbornDest {
+			return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("remote %s has no branches yet; push the initial default branch first with --yes (`zero changes push --yes`), then use auto-branching for subsequent work", pushRemote)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Branching off the default branch only makes sense when HEAD carries a
+	// commit that is not already on the remote default branch. A clean,
+	// up-to-date default branch would otherwise publish a feature branch at the
+	// exact default tip. If the ahead count cannot be determined (for example
+	// the remote-tracking ref was never fetched), fail rather than guess. When
+	// the remote is confirmed unborn, refuse auto-branching entirely: the
+	// initial default branch must be established first (changes push --yes)
+	// so the remote has a real HEAD before any feature branch is published.
+	ahead, aheadErr := deps.commitsAhead(ctx, workspaceRoot, trackingRemote, trackingBranch)
+	if fetchErr != nil || aheadErr != nil {
+		var unbornRemote bool
+		var unbornErr error
+		if deps.isUnbornRemote != nil {
+			unbornRemote, unbornErr = deps.isUnbornRemote(ctx, workspaceRoot, trackingRemote)
+		}
+		if unbornErr == nil && unbornRemote {
+			return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("remote %s has no branches yet; push the initial default branch first with --yes (`zero changes push --yes`), then use auto-branching for subsequent work", trackingRemote)
+		}
+		cause := aheadErr
+		if cause == nil {
+			cause = fetchErr
+		}
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot determine whether HEAD is ahead of %s/%s: %w; fetch the remote tracking branch first", trackingRemote, trackingBranch, cause)
+	}
+	if ahead == 0 {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("no changes to publish: HEAD is not ahead of %s/%s; commit your work before pushing", trackingRemote, trackingBranch)
+	}
+
+	// Resolve the restore tip to a concrete commit before creating any branch.
+	// It must never be a bare local branch name: resolving "main" yields the
+	// very commit the feature branch is about to own, so restore becomes a
+	// silent no-op and the publishable commits stay on the default branch. A
+	// named remote resolves through its just-refreshed remote-tracking ref; a
+	// direct URL or path asks the remote itself. Fail closed rather than
+	// substitute a local branch name.
+	restoreTip := ""
+	if deps.resolveRemoteBranchTip != nil {
+		tip, tipErr := deps.resolveRemoteBranchTip(ctx, workspaceRoot, trackingRemote, trackingBranch)
+		if tipErr != nil {
+			return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot resolve restore tip for %s/%s: %w", trackingRemote, trackingBranch, tipErr)
+		}
+		restoreTip = tip
+	}
+	if restoreTip == "" {
+		restoreTip = trackingRemote + "/" + trackingBranch
+	}
+
+	// Name the branch (and, with --auto, send the provider) from what HEAD is
+	// actually ahead of the resolved remote branch by, using the same ref
+	// commitsAhead just checked. A working-tree snapshot can describe edits a
+	// commit-only push will never include.
+	baseRef := restoreTip
+	summary, err := deps.inspectChanges(ctx, zerogit.InspectOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot, BaseRef: baseRef, MaxDiffBytes: opts.MaxDiffBytes})
+	if err != nil {
+		return branchPushPlan{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to inspect changes: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	slug := fallbackBranchSlug(summary)
+	if len(summary.Files) == 0 {
+		// An empty commit (or one whose only content the diff omits) leaves
+		// nothing to derive a slug from; name the branch from the commit
+		// subject instead.
+		if subject := deps.headCommitSubject(ctx, workspaceRoot); subject != "" {
+			slug = zerogit.SlugifyBranchComponent(subject)
+		}
+	}
+	if opts.AutoNaming && strings.TrimSpace(summary.Diff) != "" {
+		llmSlug := ""
+		if resolved, cfgErr := deps.resolveConfig(workspaceRoot, config.Overrides{}); cfgErr == nil && config.HasProviderProfile(resolved.Provider) {
+			if provider, provErr := deps.newProvider(resolved.Provider); provErr == nil {
+				if !opts.JSONMode {
+					fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "Generating branch name using LLM...")
+				}
+				genCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 60*time.Second)
+				generated, genErr := generateAutoBranchSlug(genCtx, provider, resolved.Provider.Model, redactChangeSummary(summary))
+				cancel()
+				if genErr == nil && generated != "" {
+					llmSlug = generated
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if llmSlug != "" {
+			slug = llmSlug
+		} else if !opts.JSONMode {
+			// Cover resolveConfig failures, missing provider profiles,
+			// newProvider errors, generation errors, and empty results so the
+			// user is not left guessing after "Generating..." or silence.
+			fmt.Fprintln(stdout, "LLM branch naming unavailable; using deterministic name.")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return branchPushPlan{
+		ShouldBranch:           true,
+		CurrentBranch:          currentBranch,
+		PushRemote:             pushRemote,
+		RequireNewRemoteBranch: true,
+		TrackingRemote:         trackingRemote,
+		TrackingBranch:         trackingBranch,
+		RestoreTip:             restoreTip,
+		PublishabilityBase:     baseRef,
+		Summary:                summary,
+		Slug:                   slug,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ensureFeatureBranch is the branch-naming step `zero changes push`/`pr` run
+// before pushing: pushing straight to the default branch is refused deeper in
+// zerogit.Push, so rather than surface that as a dead end, create and switch
+// to a conventionally named "<user>/<slug>" branch first. It returns the
+// branch push/pr should target, or "" to mean "current HEAD branch, unchanged"
+// (zerogit.Push already treats an empty Branch that way), plus the remote the
+// preflight resolved (requestedRemote, then the original branch's configured
+// upstream, then "origin"), plus whether Push should require that branch not
+// already exist on that remote. Callers must pass the remote to Push: a
+// freshly created branch has no tracking configuration, so Push's own
+// fallback would silently retarget "origin" even when the work came from a
+// branch tracking a different remote. Callers must also pass that third value
+// through as Push's RequireNewRemoteBranch: CreateBranch's own
+// remote-collision probe runs before this returns, and closing that race
+// requires Push's push itself to assert the destination is still new. That
+// requirement also carries across a retry: if the current branch is already
+// non-default (this call didn't create it) but has not been successfully
+// published to the exact target remote under the same branch name, keep the
+// nonexistence lease. branch.<name>.remote alone is not enough: with
+// branch.autoSetupMerge=inherit, checkout -b copies remote=origin from the
+// source branch before any push. After a successful create, the original
+// default branch ref is moved back to its own upstream tip (not necessarily
+// the push destination) so the feature branch exclusively owns the
+// publishable commits; a failed restore rolls the feature branch back.
+// allowDefaultBranch (the --yes flag) and dryRun both opt out via the ""
+// branch / false return, leaving Push's own guard/preview behavior on the
+// default branch unaffected.
+//
+// autoNaming gates the LLM naming path (--auto): these commands were
+// git-only, and sending the change diff to a configured provider on every
+// default-branch push would silently export source code nobody asked to
+// share. Without the opt-in the name comes from deterministic local
+// information only. maxDiffBytes caps the committed-range diff Inspect
+// returns, so a user who passed --diff-bytes to bound the proprietary source
+// sent for LLM naming has that cap honored here just as the commit path does.
+// The working tree must be clean and HEAD must be ahead of the resolved
+// remote branch; both are verified before any branch is created. The
+// inspectChanges, commitsAhead, headCommitSubject, currentGitUser, and
+// createBranch dependencies are required on the default-branch path and are
+// called without nil guards; fillAppDeps populates all of them. The
+// refreshTrackingRef, resolveRemoteBranchTip, isUnbornRemote, resetBranchRef,
+// and deleteBranch dependencies are optional and are skipped when nil.
+func ensureFeatureBranch(ctx context.Context, stdout io.Writer, workspaceRoot string, requestedRemote string, opts featureBranchOptions, deps appDeps) (string, string, bool, error) {
+	plan, err := resolveBranchPushPlan(ctx, stdout, workspaceRoot, requestedRemote, opts, deps)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", false, err
+	}
+	if !plan.ShouldBranch {
+		return plan.CurrentBranch, plan.PushRemote, plan.RequireNewRemoteBranch, nil
+	}
+
+	expectedRestoreTip := ""
+	if deps.currentBranchTip != nil {
+		expectedRestoreTip = deps.currentBranchTip(ctx, workspaceRoot)
+	}
+
+	name := zerogit.BuildBranchName(deps.currentGitUser(ctx, workspaceRoot), plan.Slug)
+	result, err := deps.createBranch(ctx, zerogit.BranchOptions{Cwd: workspaceRoot, Name: name, Remote: plan.PushRemote})
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("failed to create branch: %w", err)
+	}
+	// The normal flow commits on the default branch first, then creates the
+	// feature branch at the same HEAD. Without moving the original default
+	// ref back, local main keeps the pre-squash commits and diverges from
+	// its upstream after a squash-merge (and a later pull/push can re-publish
+	// them). Once the feature branch owns those commits, restore the default
+	// branch to the source branch's own upstream tip captured above.
+	// Failure-safe: if the restore fails, delete the feature branch and
+	// check the default branch back out so the tree is not left half-moved.
+	if deps.resetBranchRef != nil {
+		if err := deps.resetBranchRef(ctx, workspaceRoot, plan.CurrentBranch, plan.RestoreTip, expectedRestoreTip); err != nil {
+			// A compare-and-swap conflict means the default branch moved
+			// while we were branching, so restoreTip is no longer the tip we
+			// meant to restore. The rollback below deletes the branch that
+			// now exclusively owns the user's commits, which would destroy
+			// work to recover from a race we can simply report. Keep the
+			// branch and let the user reconcile the default branch.
+			if errors.Is(err, zerogit.ErrCompareAndSwapConflict) {
+				return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("failed to restore default branch %s to %s after auto-branching: %w; generated branch %s was preserved because the default branch changed concurrently", plan.CurrentBranch, plan.RestoreTip, err, result.Branch)
+			}
+			var rollbackErr error
+			if deps.deleteBranch != nil {
+				rollbackErr = deps.deleteBranch(ctx, workspaceRoot, plan.CurrentBranch, result.Branch)
+			}
+			if rollbackErr != nil {
+				return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("failed to restore default branch %s to %s after auto-branching: %w; rollback of %s also failed: %v", plan.CurrentBranch, plan.RestoreTip, err, result.Branch, rollbackErr)
+			}
+			return "", "", false, fmt.Errorf("failed to restore default branch %s to %s after auto-branching: %w", plan.CurrentBranch, plan.RestoreTip, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if !opts.JSONMode {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stdout, "Created branch %s (was on %s)\n", result.Branch, plan.CurrentBranch)
+	}
+	return result.Branch, plan.PushRemote, true, nil
+}
+
+// fallbackBranchSlug derives a deterministic branch-name slug from a change
+// summary without calling an LLM, so ensureFeatureBranch still works when no
+// provider is configured.
+func fallbackBranchSlug(summary zerogit.ChangeSummary) string {
+	switch len(summary.Files) {
+	case 0:
+		return "changes"
+	case 1:
+		// Git paths are always slash-separated regardless of platform, so
+		// path.Base (not filepath.Base) extracts the filename portably.
+		return zerogit.SlugifyBranchComponent(path.Base(summary.Files[0].Path))
+	default:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("update-%d-files", len(summary.Files))
+	}
+}
+
+// generateAutoBranchSlug asks the model for a short kebab-case slug
+// describing the diff, mirroring generateAutoCommitMessage's prompt shape.
+func generateAutoBranchSlug(ctx context.Context, provider zeroruntime.Provider, model string, summary zerogit.ChangeSummary) (string, error) {
+	var promptBuilder strings.Builder
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Analyze the following git diff and generate a short git branch name slug for it.\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("The slug must be 2 to 5 lowercase words separated by hyphens (kebab-case), using only letters, digits, and hyphens, with no prefix like \"feature/\" or \"fix/\" and no surrounding quotes.\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Output ONLY the raw slug text, nothing else.\n\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString("Git Diff:\n")
+	promptBuilder.WriteString(summary.Diff)
+
+	request := zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{
+			{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: promptBuilder.String()},
+		},
+	}
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(ctx, request)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	collected := zeroruntime.CollectStream(ctx, stream)
+	if collected.Error != "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%s", collected.Error)
+	}
+
+	slug := zerogit.SlugifyBranchComponent(extractBranchSlug(collected.Text))
+	if slug == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("provider returned empty branch slug")
+	}
+	return slug, nil
+}
+
+// slugLineRe matches a line that already reads as a kebab-case slug (letters,
+// digits, and internal single hyphens only). extractBranchSlug prefers such a
+// line so a preamble sentence is never mistaken for the slug.
+var slugLineRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]+(-[a-zA-Z0-9]+)*$`)
+
+func isPreambleText(s string) bool {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s))
+	if strings.HasSuffix(lower, ":") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, "!") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, "?") {
+		return true
+	}
+	preambles := []string{
+		"here is", "here's", "below is", "below are", "sure", "certainly",
+		"i suggest", "suggested branch", "branch name", "recommended branch",
+		"how about", "you could use",
+	}
+	for _, p := range preambles {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(lower, p) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// extractBranchSlug pulls the intended slug out of a model response that didn't
+// follow the "output only the raw slug" instruction exactly. It drops Markdown
+// code-fence lines, then prefers a line that already looks like a kebab-case
+// slug: that skips a leading preamble such as "Here is a suggested branch
+// name:" in favor of the "add-login-page" line that follows it. One-word
+// acknowledgements that happen to match the slug regex ("Sure", "Certainly")
+// are filtered as preamble before the early return, so "Sure\nadd login page"
+// yields the real suggestion. Inline labeled forms ("Branch name: add-login-page")
+// still work: the preamble check runs on the extracted value after the label
+// is stripped. If no line is strictly kebab-cased, it prefers a plausible
+// non-preamble line so plain multi-word replies still slugify correctly.
+func extractBranchSlug(text string) string {
+	var firstLine string
+
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "```") {
+			continue
+		}
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(line, `"'`))
+		if line == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		candidate := line
+		if idx := strings.Index(line, ":"); idx != -1 {
+			after := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(line[idx+1:], `"'`))
+			if after != "" {
+				candidate = after
+			}
+		}
+		// Models often terminate a suggestion with sentence punctuation;
+		// strip it so "add login page." is recovered as the slug rather than
+		// rejected as preamble (isPreambleText treats a trailing '.' as a
+		// full sentence). True preamble lines still match the prefix list.
+		candidate = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimRight(candidate, ".!?"))
+		if candidate == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// Preamble classification runs before accepting a slug-shaped line so
+		// "Sure" does not win over a later "add-login-page". The check is on
+		// candidate (post label-strip) so "Branch name: add-login-page" still
+		// returns the extracted slug.
+		if slugLineRe.MatchString(candidate) && !isPreambleText(candidate) {
+			return candidate
+		}
+
+		if firstLine == "" && !isPreambleText(candidate) {
+			firstLine = candidate
+		}
+	}
+
+	return firstLine
+}

internal/config/command_test.go

@@ -105,7 +105,17 @@ func TestLoadProviderCommandTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 //
 // This is a hang-breaker, not a tuned margin. Nothing in a healthy run waits on
 // it, since both tests return about one WaitDelay after the fixture exits.
-const providerCommandTestBudget = 60 * time.Second
+const (
+	providerCommandTestBudget        = 90 * time.Second
+	providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts = 45
+)
+
+func TestProviderCommandBudgetLeavesCleanupMargin(t *testing.T) {
+	readyWaitCeiling := time.Duration(providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts) * time.Second
+	if providerCommandTestBudget < 2*readyWaitCeiling {
+		t.Fatalf("provider command test budget %s leaves less than one readiness window for cleanup after %s", providerCommandTestBudget, readyWaitCeiling)
+	}
+}
 
 // backgroundChildLifetime must exceed providerCommandTestBudget so that a child
 // dying of old age is unobservable: any run where runProviderCommand has not
@@ -341,15 +351,15 @@ func writeCommand(t *testing.T, script commandScript) string {
 			// assertion fail is far more diagnosable than blocking until the
 			// timeout fires and reporting an unrelated error. Each iteration is
 			// about a second, since `ping -n 2` sleeps between its two echoes,
-			// so the ceiling is roughly 15s: far longer than any cold PowerShell
-			// start seen on a runner, and far shorter than
-			// providerCommandTestBudget, so giving up surfaces a legible
+			// so the ceiling is roughly 45s: enough for a heavily loaded Windows
+			// runner while leaving the other half of providerCommandTestBudget for
+			// process exit, PID-file verification, and cleanup. Giving up surfaces a legible
 			// PID-file failure rather than a timeout that hides the real cause.
 			lines = append(lines,
 				":zeroWaitReady",
 				"if exist \""+readyFile+"\" goto zeroReady",
 				"set /a ZERO_READY_TRIES+=1",
-				"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ 15 goto zeroReady",
+				"if %ZERO_READY_TRIES% GEQ "+itoa(providerCommandReadyWaitAttempts)+" goto zeroReady",
 				"ping -n 2 127.0.0.1 >nul",
 				"goto zeroWaitReady",
 				":zeroReady",

internal/config/mcp_defaults.go

@@ -5,22 +5,20 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 )
 
-// DefaultMCPServers returns the MCP servers Zero ships ENABLED by default so web
-// search and scraping work out of the box with no setup and no API key. They are
-// seeded before user/project config is merged (see ResolveMCP), so a user can
-// override any field — for example point firecrawl at a self-hosted instance, or
-// add an API-key header to lift the free-tier limit — or disable it entirely with
+// DefaultMCPServers returns the MCP servers Zero ships ENABLED by default so
+// web search and page fetching work out of the box with no setup and no API
+// key. They are seeded before user/project config is merged (see ResolveMCP),
+// so a user can override any field — for example add an API-key header to lift
+// Exa's anonymous rate limit — or disable it entirely with
 // `zero mcp disable <name>` (which writes `"disabled": true`).
 //
-// Keyless Firecrawl routes requests through firecrawl.dev (1,000 free credits per
-// month, no account). Self-host Firecrawl (AGPL-3.0) for unlimited and private
-// use. Zero only calls it over the network, so Firecrawl's license never reaches
-// into Zero's own code.
+// Exa's hosted MCP server works anonymously with rate limits. Users can add an
+// Exa API key for higher limits.
 func DefaultMCPServers() map[string]MCPServerConfig {
 	return map[string]MCPServerConfig{
-		"firecrawl": {
+		"exa": {
 			Type: "http",
-			URL:  "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp",
+			URL:  "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp",
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -35,13 +33,13 @@ func IsDefaultMCPServer(name string) bool {
 
 // IsUnconfiguredDefault reports whether server is one of Zero's built-in
 // defaults that the user never wrote an entry for in their config — i.e. it is
-// running with whatever Zero ships (e.g. keyless Firecrawl, no credentials).
+// running with whatever Zero ships (e.g. keyless Exa, no credentials).
 //
 // Both conditions below must hold:
 //   - !server.configured: the user's JSON never declared an object for this
 //     server key at all (set by MCPServerConfig.UnmarshalJSON only when it
 //     actually ran for this key). Any explicit action — including a
-//     disable/enable toggle like `zero mcp enable firecrawl` that leaves the
+//     disable/enable toggle like `zero mcp enable exa` that leaves the
 //     resolved value unchanged — sets configured, so it always counts as
 //     user-configured, even though the value comparison below could not tell
 //     the difference on its own.
@@ -58,3 +56,90 @@ func IsUnconfiguredDefault(name string, server MCPServerConfig) bool {
 	def, ok := DefaultMCPServers()[strings.TrimSpace(name)]
 	return ok && !server.configured && reflect.DeepEqual(def, server)
 }
+
+// retiredDefaultMCPServer describes a built-in default Zero no longer ships.
+type retiredDefaultMCPServer struct {
+	// successor is the default that replaced it.
+	successor string
+	// shipped is the value Zero used to seed for this name. A user entry
+	// written while the default was still shipped may name only an override
+	// (a header, say) and rely on these fields for the rest, so they have to
+	// outlive the default itself.
+	shipped MCPServerConfig
+}
+
+// retiredDefaultMCPServers maps a retired built-in default to what replaced it
+// and to the value Zero used to ship for it.
+var retiredDefaultMCPServers = map[string]retiredDefaultMCPServer{
+	"firecrawl": {
+		successor: "exa",
+		shipped: MCPServerConfig{
+			Type: "http",
+			URL:  "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp",
+		},
+	},
+}
+
+// migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers keeps an upgrade across a default-provider
+// swap from changing what the user's config means. It handles the two ways a
+// rename can break a config written against the old default:
+//
+//   - A user who ran `zero mcp disable <old default>` made an explicit choice
+//     not to open that outbound connection. Without carrying that decision to
+//     the successor, the upgrade re-opens it under the new name — and because
+//     the replacement looks like an untouched default, even the startup
+//     warning stays quiet (see IsUnconfiguredDefault and issue #552).
+//   - A user who customized the old default could name only the field they
+//     were changing, because the seeded default supplied the transport. Once
+//     the default stops being seeded that entry resolves to a server with no
+//     type, url, or command, which fails NormalizeConfig and takes the whole
+//     startup down rather than just that one server.
+//
+// It runs immediately after the user layer merges (see ResolveMCP), which
+// scopes it to user-level decisions — the only scope whose disable is sticky.
+// The carried-over disable applies only when the user never declared the
+// successor themselves: an explicit `exa` entry wins whether it enables or
+// disables. Because the disable is recorded as a user-level decision, the
+// lower-trust project layer cannot lift it, while `zero mcp enable exa` still
+// can (the CLI override scope merges with canReenable=true).
+func migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers(cfg *MCPConfig) {
+	for name, retired := range retiredDefaultMCPServers {
+		entry, ok := cfg.Servers[name]
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if inheritsRetiredTransport(entry) {
+			// Re-seed what Zero used to ship underneath the user's fields, so a
+			// partial entry still resolves to the complete server it named when
+			// it was written. Their own values still win — this only fills the
+			// gap the retired default used to cover.
+			entry = mergeMCPServer(retired.shipped, entry, true)
+			cfg.Servers[name] = entry
+		}
+		if !entry.disabledSet || !entry.Disabled {
+			continue
+		}
+		replacement, ok := cfg.Servers[retired.successor]
+		if !ok || replacement.configured {
+			continue
+		}
+		replacement.Disabled = true
+		replacement.disabledSet = true
+		cfg.Servers[retired.successor] = replacement
+	}
+}
+
+// inheritsRetiredTransport reports whether entry named no transport of its own
+// — no type, url, command, or args — and so relied entirely on the retired
+// default to supply one.
+//
+// Anything else is a complete definition the user owns (a self-hosted url, a
+// stdio command) and must be left alone: grafting the retired default's http
+// type onto an entry that names a command produces a server that is rejected
+// outright, turning a working config into a startup failure.
+func inheritsRetiredTransport(entry MCPServerConfig) bool {
+	return strings.TrimSpace(entry.Type) == "" &&
+		strings.TrimSpace(entry.URL) == "" &&
+		strings.TrimSpace(entry.Command) == "" &&
+		len(entry.Args) == 0
+}

internal/config/mcp_defaults_test.go

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import (
 )
 
 func TestIsDefaultMCPServer(t *testing.T) {
-	if !IsDefaultMCPServer("firecrawl") {
-		t.Fatal("firecrawl should be a built-in default")
+	if !IsDefaultMCPServer("exa") {
+		t.Fatal("exa should be a built-in default")
 	}
-	if IsDefaultMCPServer("  firecrawl  ") == false {
+	if IsDefaultMCPServer("  exa  ") == false {
 		t.Fatal("IsDefaultMCPServer should trim whitespace")
 	}
 	if IsDefaultMCPServer("not-a-default") {
@@ -18,45 +18,45 @@ func TestIsDefaultMCPServer(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestResolveMCPSeedsEnabledFirecrawlDefault(t *testing.T) {
+func TestResolveMCPSeedsEnabledExaDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
-	firecrawl, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
+	exa, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]
 	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("expected the firecrawl default to be seeded with no user config")
+		t.Fatal("expected the exa default to be seeded with no user config")
 	}
-	if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected firecrawl default: %#v", firecrawl)
+	if exa.Type != "http" || exa.URL != "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected exa default: %#v", exa)
 	}
-	if firecrawl.Disabled {
-		t.Fatal("the firecrawl default must be enabled out of the box")
+	if exa.Disabled {
+		t.Fatal("the exa default must be enabled out of the box")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestResolveMCPUserCanDisableDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !cfg.Servers["firecrawl"].Disabled {
+	if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
 		t.Fatal("a user must be able to disable the default by writing over it")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestIsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	if !IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"]) {
-		t.Fatal("an untouched firecrawl default should be reported as unconfigured")
+	if !IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", DefaultMCPServers()["exa"]) {
+		t.Fatal("an untouched exa default should be reported as unconfigured")
 	}
-	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "http://localhost:3002/mcp"}) {
+	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://example.com/mcp"}) {
 		t.Fatal("a server overriding the default URL is no longer unconfigured")
 	}
-	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp", Auth: "bearer"}) {
+	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", MCPServerConfig{Type: "http", URL: "https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp", Auth: "bearer"}) {
 		t.Fatal("a server with credentials added is no longer unconfigured")
 	}
 	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("not-a-default", MCPServerConfig{}) {
@@ -65,57 +65,173 @@ func TestIsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestResolveMCPExplicitReenableIsNotUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	// `zero mcp enable firecrawl` after a prior disable writes {"disabled":false}
+	// `zero mcp enable exa` after a prior disable writes {"disabled":false}
 	// explicitly. The resolved value is identical to the untouched default (both
 	// enabled, no credentials), but the user DID take an explicit action here, so
 	// IsUnconfiguredDefault must not treat it as untouched (issue #563 review).
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
-	firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
-	if firecrawl.Disabled {
-		t.Fatalf("explicit re-enable should leave the server enabled: %#v", firecrawl)
+	exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
+	if exa.Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit re-enable should leave the server enabled: %#v", exa)
 	}
-	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", firecrawl) {
+	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
 		t.Fatal("an explicit enable/disable toggle must count as user-configured, even though the resolved value matches the default")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestResolveMCPExplicitRedeclareOfDefaultValuesIsNotUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	// A user who copies firecrawl's exact default type/url into their config
+	// A user who copies Exa's exact default type/url into their config
 	// (e.g. from an example file, planning to add credentials later) produces a
-	// resolved value byte-identical to DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"] — the
+	// resolved value byte-identical to DefaultMCPServers()["exa"] — the
 	// same trap TestResolveMCPExplicitReenableIsNotUnconfiguredDefault covers for
 	// the disabled toggle. IsUnconfiguredDefault must still treat this as
 	// user-configured because the user's JSON declared an entry for it, even
 	// though a plain resolved-value comparison could not tell the difference.
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"type":"http","url":"https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"type":"http","url":"https://mcp.exa.ai/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
-	firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
-	want := DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"]
-	if firecrawl.Type != want.Type || firecrawl.URL != want.URL || firecrawl.Disabled != want.Disabled {
-		t.Fatalf("expected the resolved value to match the default's fields exactly: %#v", firecrawl)
+	exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
+	want := DefaultMCPServers()["exa"]
+	if exa.Type != want.Type || exa.URL != want.URL || exa.Disabled != want.Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the resolved value to match the default's fields exactly: %#v", exa)
 	}
-	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("firecrawl", firecrawl) {
+	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
 		t.Fatal("redeclaring the default's exact values is still an explicit user configuration, not an untouched default")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestResolveMCPUserCanOverrideDefaultURLKeepingOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	// Point firecrawl at a self-hosted instance; the default's Type must survive.
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"url":"http://localhost:3002/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+	// Point Exa at a proxy; the default's Type must survive.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"url":"https://example.com/mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
+	if exa.URL != "https://example.com/mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("user override of the default URL did not apply: %#v", exa)
+	}
+	if exa.Type != "http" {
+		t.Fatalf("override should keep the default's other fields (type), got %#v", exa)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPCarriesLegacyDefaultDisableToSuccessor(t *testing.T) {
+	// Upgrade path: the user disabled the firecrawl default Zero used to ship.
+	// Swapping the default to exa must not re-open an outbound connection they
+	// explicitly switched off.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("a prior disable of the retired default must carry to its replacement: %#v", cfg.Servers["exa"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPExplicitSuccessorBeatsLegacyDefaultDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	// The user disabled the old default but has since explicitly configured exa.
+	// Their newer, explicit choice wins — the migration must not override it.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true},"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	exa := cfg.Servers["exa"]
+	if exa.Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("an explicit exa entry must survive the legacy-disable migration: %#v", exa)
+	}
+	if IsUnconfiguredDefault("exa", exa) {
+		t.Fatal("an explicitly configured exa is not an untouched default")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPLegacyDefaultLeftEnabledDoesNotDisableSuccessor(t *testing.T) {
+	// A user who configured firecrawl without disabling it (e.g. added a header)
+	// never opted out of the default search server, so exa stays enabled.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatal("only an explicit disable of the retired default should carry over")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPLegacyDefaultDisableIsLiftableByOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	// The carried-over disable is a user-level decision, not a permanent one:
+	// `zero mcp enable exa` merges through the CLI override scope, which is the
+	// one layer allowed to re-enable.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	enabled := MCPServerConfig{Disabled: false, disabledSet: true}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{
+		UserConfigPath: path,
+		Overrides:      Overrides{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]MCPServerConfig{"exa": enabled}}},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("an explicit enable must lift the carried-over disable: %#v", cfg.Servers["exa"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPLegacyDisableSurvivesProjectReenable(t *testing.T) {
+	// The project layer is lower-trust and must not lift the carried-over
+	// user-level disable — the same guard a direct `zero mcp disable exa` gets.
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	userPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(userPath, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	projectPath := filepath.Join(dir, "project.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(projectPath, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"exa":{"disabled":false}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: userPath, ProjectConfigPath: projectPath})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatal("project config must not re-enable a server the user disabled")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPKeepsRetiredDefaultTransportForPartialEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	// A user who added an API key to the firecrawl default wrote only the header
+	// — the seeded default supplied the http type and URL. Retiring the default
+	// must not strip those out from under them and leave an unusable server.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
@@ -123,10 +239,55 @@ func TestResolveMCPUserCanOverrideDefaultURLKeepingOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
 	}
 	firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
-	if firecrawl.URL != "http://localhost:3002/mcp" {
-		t.Fatalf("user override of the default URL did not apply: %#v", firecrawl)
+	if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("a partial entry must keep the retired default's transport: %#v", firecrawl)
 	}
-	if firecrawl.Type != "http" {
-		t.Fatalf("override should keep the default's other fields (type), got %#v", firecrawl)
+	if firecrawl.Headers["Authorization"] != "Bearer k" {
+		t.Fatalf("the user's own field must still win: %#v", firecrawl)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPDoesNotGraftRetiredDefaultOntoOwnTransport(t *testing.T) {
+	// A self-hosted firecrawl over stdio is a complete definition the user owns.
+	// Re-seeding the retired http default under it would produce an http server
+	// carrying a command, which NormalizeConfig rejects outright.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"command":"firecrawl-mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
+	if firecrawl.Type != "" || firecrawl.URL != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("an entry naming its own transport must be left alone: %#v", firecrawl)
+	}
+	if firecrawl.Command != "firecrawl-mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("the user's command must survive: %#v", firecrawl)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveMCPDisabledRetiredEntryStaysReEnableable(t *testing.T) {
+	// The disable carries to exa, and the retired entry itself keeps a usable
+	// transport so a later `zero mcp enable firecrawl` does not resolve to a
+	// server with no type, url, or command.
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveMCP(ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	firecrawl := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]
+	if !firecrawl.Disabled {
+		t.Fatalf("the retired entry must stay disabled: %#v", firecrawl)
+	}
+	if firecrawl.Type != "http" || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("a disabled retired entry should still carry a usable transport: %#v", firecrawl)
+	}
+	if !cfg.Servers["exa"].Disabled {
+		t.Fatal("the disable must still carry to the successor")
 	}
 }

internal/config/resolve_mcp_exclude_project_test.go

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ func TestResolveMCPExcludeProjectDropsProjectServers(t *testing.T) {
 		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["user-srv"]; !ok {
 			t.Fatal("the user server must always be present")
 		}
-		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]; !ok {
+		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]; !ok {
 			t.Fatal("the built-in default must always be present")
 		}
 	})
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func TestResolveMCPExcludeProjectDropsProjectServers(t *testing.T) {
 		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["user-srv"]; !ok {
 			t.Fatal("the user server must survive when the project layer is dropped")
 		}
-		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["firecrawl"]; !ok {
+		if _, ok := cfg.Servers["exa"]; !ok {
 			t.Fatal("the built-in default must survive when the project layer is dropped")
 		}
 	})

internal/config/resolver.go

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func Resolve(options ResolveOptions) (ResolvedConfig, error) {
 }
 
 func ResolveMCP(options ResolveOptions) (MCPConfig, error) {
-	// Seed Zero's built-in default MCP servers (e.g. keyless Firecrawl for free,
+	// Seed Zero's built-in default MCP servers (e.g. keyless Exa for free,
 	// no-setup web search/scrape) BEFORE merging user/project config, so the user
 	// can override any field or disable a default by writing over it.
 	cfg := FileConfig{MCP: MCPConfig{Servers: DefaultMCPServers()}}
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ func ResolveMCP(options ResolveOptions) (MCPConfig, error) {
 		// server the user disabled (a user-level disable is sticky, but the user
 		// scope itself may lift it).
 		mergeMCPConfig(&cfg.MCP, fileConfig.MCP, true)
+		// Reconcile config written against a default Zero has since retired,
+		// here while the user layer is the only one merged — so a carried-over
+		// disable counts as a user-level decision the project layer cannot lift.
+		migrateRetiredDefaultMCPServers(&cfg.MCP)
 	}
 	// Drop the project layer when the workspace is untrusted, so a cloned repo's
 	// ./.zero/config.json cannot register (and spawn) MCP servers. Fail-closed:

internal/config/types.go

@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ type KeyBindingsConfig struct {
 	ToggleMouse KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleMouse,omitempty"`
 	// CycleReasoning cycles through reasoning effort levels (default: ctrl+t).
 	CycleReasoning KeyBindingDef `json:"cycleReasoning,omitempty"`
-	// TogglePlan toggles the plan panel expansion (default: ctrl+p).
+	// TogglePlan is retained for configuration compatibility. Plan updates render
+	// in the transcript and no longer have a persistent panel to toggle.
 	TogglePlan KeyBindingDef `json:"togglePlan,omitempty"`
 	// ToggleSidebar toggles the right context sidebar (default: ctrl+b).
 	ToggleSidebar KeyBindingDef `json:"toggleSidebar,omitempty"`
@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ type MCPServerConfig struct {
 	// fields it set or what values they hold. A built-in default seeded by
 	// DefaultMCPServers() is never unmarshaled from JSON, so it starts false;
 	// any explicit entry in the user/project file — even one that happens to
-	// repeat a default's exact field values (e.g. re-declaring firecrawl's
+	// repeat a default's exact field values (e.g. re-declaring Exa's
 	// default URL) — sets it true. IsUnconfiguredDefault checks this alongside
 	// a resolved-value comparison, so redeclaring default values verbatim still
 	// counts as user-configured.

internal/credstore/concurrency_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+package credstore
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func fileStore(t *testing.T, dir string) *Store {
+	t.Helper()
+	store, err := New(Options{Dir: dir, Storage: "file"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New: %v", err)
+	}
+	return store
+}
+
+// THE REPRODUCTION, kept as the regression. Before the lock this reliably kept
+// 1 of 100: every writer read the same map, added its own provider, and the
+// last rename published a file missing all the others.
+func TestConcurrentSetKeepsEveryKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	store := fileStore(t, dir)
+
+	const n = 100
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	errs := make(chan error, n)
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			if err := store.Set(fmt.Sprintf("p%03d", i), fmt.Sprintf("k%03d", i)); err != nil {
+				errs <- err
+			}
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(errs)
+	for err := range errs {
+		t.Fatalf("Set: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := store.Providers()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Providers: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != n {
+		t.Fatalf("kept %d of %d concurrent writes", len(got), n)
+	}
+	// ...and every value is the one its own writer wrote, not a neighbour's.
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		key, ok, err := store.Get(fmt.Sprintf("p%03d", i))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Get: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !ok || key != fmt.Sprintf("k%03d", i) {
+			t.Fatalf("p%03d = %q (present=%v); a writer's own value must survive", i, key, ok)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// DELETE RACES SET, and an unlocked delete loses the other writer's key.
+//
+// A first version of this only checked that keys nobody deleted survived — and
+// every reader sees those, so it passed with the lock removed from Delete. The
+// case that actually breaks is a Delete whose stale read predates a concurrent
+// Set: it writes back a map that never contained the new key, and the Set is
+// gone. So the assertion is on the SETS surviving, not on the bystanders.
+func TestADeleteCannotClobberAConcurrentSet(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	store := fileStore(t, dir)
+
+	// Throwaway keys for the deleters to remove, written first so a delete
+	// always has something to do.
+	const churn = 40
+	for i := 0; i < churn; i++ {
+		if err := store.Set(fmt.Sprintf("churn%02d", i), "v"); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	const adds = 60
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < adds; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			_ = store.Set(fmt.Sprintf("added%02d", i), "v")
+		}(i)
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < churn; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			_, _ = store.Delete(fmt.Sprintf("churn%02d", i))
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	got, err := store.Providers()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	survivors := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, name := range got {
+		survivors[name] = true
+	}
+	missing := []string{}
+	for i := 0; i < adds; i++ {
+		name := fmt.Sprintf("added%02d", i)
+		if !survivors[name] {
+			missing = append(missing, name)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(missing) > 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d of %d concurrent Set calls were clobbered by a racing Delete: %v",
+			len(missing), adds, missing)
+	}
+	// ...and every churn key really was removed, so the deletes were not
+	// no-ops that would make the check above vacuous.
+	for i := 0; i < churn; i++ {
+		if survivors[fmt.Sprintf("churn%02d", i)] {
+			t.Fatalf("churn%02d survived; the deletes did nothing and this test proves nothing", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// ACROSS PROCESSES, which is the case that matters: a plan running with
+// max_workers > 1 spawns child PROCESSES, and an in-process mutex would not
+// have helped any of them. The race detector cannot see this one either — it is
+// two OS processes — so it is driven for real.
+func TestConcurrentSetAcrossProcesses(t *testing.T) {
+	if testing.Short() {
+		t.Skip("spawns processes")
+	}
+	helper := os.Getenv("ZERO_CREDSTORE_HELPER_DIR")
+	if helper != "" {
+		// Child mode: write our slice of the keys and exit.
+		store, err := New(Options{Dir: helper, Storage: "file"})
+		if err != nil {
+			os.Exit(3)
+		}
+		prefix := os.Getenv("ZERO_CREDSTORE_HELPER_PREFIX")
+		for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
+			if err := store.Set(fmt.Sprintf("%s%02d", prefix, i), "v"); err != nil {
+				os.Exit(4)
+			}
+		}
+		os.Exit(0)
+	}
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	const children = 4
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	failures := make(chan string, children)
+	for c := 0; c < children; c++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(c int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			cmd := exec.Command(os.Args[0], "-test.run=TestConcurrentSetAcrossProcesses", "-test.v")
+			cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
+				"ZERO_CREDSTORE_HELPER_DIR="+dir,
+				fmt.Sprintf("ZERO_CREDSTORE_HELPER_PREFIX=c%d_", c),
+			)
+			if out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+				failures <- fmt.Sprintf("child %d: %v\n%s", c, err, out)
+			}
+		}(c)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	close(failures)
+	for failure := range failures {
+		t.Fatal(failure)
+	}
+
+	store := fileStore(t, dir)
+	got, err := store.Providers()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != children*25 {
+		t.Fatalf("kept %d of %d keys written by %d concurrent processes", len(got), children*25, children)
+	}
+}
+
+// The lock lives BESIDE the data file, never on it. write publishes by rename,
+// so a lock taken on the data file would be attached to an inode the next
+// writer has already replaced — every writer would appear to hold it.
+func TestTheLockIsNotTheDataFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	store := fileStore(t, dir)
+	if store.lockPath() == store.file {
+		t.Fatal("the lock is the data file; rename would carry it away")
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Base(store.lockPath()), filepath.Base(store.file)) {
+		t.Fatalf("lock %q is not beside the data file %q", store.lockPath(), store.file)
+	}
+	if err := store.Set("p", "k"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(store.lockPath()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("the lock file was not created: %v", err)
+	}
+	// ...and it survives a write, since the rename replaces only the data file.
+	if err := store.Set("q", "k"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(store.lockPath()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("the lock file did not survive a write: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The lock is a security boundary, so the path where it CANNOT be taken needs
+// coverage too: an operation that could not lock must report that, never proceed
+// unserialized and never report success. Replacing the credential directory with
+// a regular file makes the lock's MkdirAll fail on every platform.
+func TestOperationsFailWhenTheLockCannotBeAcquired(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	dir := filepath.Join(base, "creds")
+	store := fileStore(t, dir)
+	// Where the store expects its directory, put a regular file.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(dir, []byte("not a directory"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if err := store.Set("openai", "sk-test"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Set reported success although the lock could not be acquired")
+	}
+	if _, err := store.Delete("openai"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Delete reported success although the lock could not be acquired")
+	}
+	if _, _, err := store.Get("openai"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Get reported success although the lock could not be acquired")
+	}
+	if _, err := store.Providers(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Providers reported success although the lock could not be acquired")
+	}
+	// And nothing may have been written through the failed path.
+	if raw, err := os.ReadFile(dir); err != nil || string(raw) != "not a directory" {
+		t.Errorf("the blocking file was modified: %q (err %v)", raw, err)
+	}
+}

internal/credstore/credstore.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ package credstore
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -125,14 +126,27 @@ func (s *Store) Backend() string { return s.backend }
 func (s *Store) Encrypted() bool { return s.backend == "keyring" || s.backend == "encrypted-file" }
 
 // Set stores (or overwrites) the API key for provider.
-func (s *Store) Set(provider, key string) error {
+func (s *Store) Set(provider, key string) (err error) {
 	provider = normalizeProvider(provider)
 	if provider == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("credstore: provider is required")
 	}
 	if s.backend == "keyring" {
+		// The OS keyring serializes its own writes; the file lock guards the
+		// file backends only.
 		return s.kr.Set(keyringService, keyringPrefix+provider, key)
 	}
+	// READ AND WRITE UNDER ONE LOCK. Separately locking each half would still
+	// lose keys: two writers would each read the same map, each add their own
+	// provider, and the second rename would publish a file missing the first.
+	// Measured before this existed: 1 of 100 concurrent Set calls survived.
+	release, err := s.acquireFileLock(true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Joined, not chosen between: a release failure annotates the result instead
+	// of masking the write error that actually explains what went wrong.
+	defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, release()) }()
 	data, err := s.read()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -142,7 +156,7 @@ func (s *Store) Set(provider, key string) error {
 }
 
 // Get returns the API key for provider and whether one is stored.
-func (s *Store) Get(provider string) (string, bool, error) {
+func (s *Store) Get(provider string) (value string, found bool, err error) {
 	provider = normalizeProvider(provider)
 	if provider == "" {
 		return "", false, nil
@@ -150,6 +164,15 @@ func (s *Store) Get(provider string) (string, bool, error) {
 	if s.backend == "keyring" {
 		return s.kr.Get(keyringService, keyringPrefix+provider)
 	}
+	// A shared lock, so a read serializes against a writer's publish. On unix
+	// the rename is atomic and this only prevents reading an empty file mid-swap;
+	// on Windows an unsynchronized reader holding the file open would block the
+	// writer's rename outright, so readers must coordinate through the same lock.
+	release, err := s.acquireFileLock(false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", false, err
+	}
+	defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, release()) }()
 	data, err := s.read()
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", false, err
@@ -159,7 +182,7 @@ func (s *Store) Get(provider string) (string, bool, error) {
 }
 
 // Delete removes the API key for provider, reporting whether one existed.
-func (s *Store) Delete(provider string) (bool, error) {
+func (s *Store) Delete(provider string) (existed bool, err error) {
 	provider = normalizeProvider(provider)
 	if provider == "" {
 		return false, nil
@@ -167,6 +190,13 @@ func (s *Store) Delete(provider string) (bool, error) {
 	if s.backend == "keyring" {
 		return s.kr.Delete(keyringService, keyringPrefix+provider)
 	}
+	// The same lock as Set: a delete is a read-modify-write too, and one racing
+	// a set would otherwise resurrect or erase an unrelated provider.
+	release, err := s.acquireFileLock(true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, release()) }()
 	data, err := s.read()
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
@@ -179,17 +209,22 @@ func (s *Store) Delete(provider string) (bool, error) {
 }
 
 // Providers lists providers with a stored key (sorted), for display/audit.
-func (s *Store) Providers() ([]string, error) {
+func (s *Store) Providers() (names []string, err error) {
 	if s.backend == "keyring" {
 		// The OS keyring has no enumerate-by-prefix in our minimal surface; callers
 		// that need a list pass known provider names to Get. Return empty here.
 		return nil, nil
 	}
+	release, err := s.acquireFileLock(false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer func() { err = errors.Join(err, release()) }()
 	data, err := s.read()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	names := make([]string, 0, len(data))
+	names = make([]string, 0, len(data))
 	for name := range data {
 		names = append(names, name)
 	}
@@ -264,6 +299,15 @@ func (s *Store) write(data map[string]string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// lockPath is the advisory lock guarding a read-modify-write of the credential
+// file. Beside the data file, never the data file itself — write publishes by
+// rename and would carry the lock away with the old inode.
+func (s *Store) lockPath() string { return s.file + ".lock" }
+
+// filepathDir is filepath.Dir, named locally so the two platform lock files can
+// share it without either importing path/filepath for one call.
+func filepathDir(path string) string { return filepath.Dir(path) }
+
 func normalizeProvider(provider string) string {
 	return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(provider))
 }

internal/credstore/filelock_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package credstore
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+)
+
+// acquireFileLock takes an exclusive advisory lock (flock) so a read-modify-write
+// of the credential file is serialized against every other one — across
+// processes AND across goroutines, since flock is held per open file
+// description and two opens in one process contend exactly as two processes do.
+//
+// THE LOCK FILE IS SEPARATE FROM THE DATA FILE, and that is not tidiness. write
+// publishes by os.Rename, which replaces the inode; a lock taken on the data
+// file would be attached to an inode that the next writer has already replaced,
+// so every writer would appear to hold it. The lock lives on a file nothing
+// renames.
+func (s *Store) acquireFileLock(exclusive bool) (func() error, error) {
+	path := s.lockPath()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepathDir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: lock dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: open lock: %w", err)
+	}
+	// Writers take LOCK_EX; readers take LOCK_SH so they run concurrently with
+	// each other but still serialize against a writer's publish (see Get).
+	how := unix.LOCK_SH
+	if exclusive {
+		how = unix.LOCK_EX
+	}
+	if err := unix.Flock(int(file.Fd()), how); err != nil {
+		_ = file.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: lock: %w", err)
+	}
+	return func() error {
+		// Close alone drops the flock, so the explicit unlock is belt-and-braces —
+		// but its failure is reported rather than swallowed, because a cleanup that
+		// did not complete must not be indistinguishable from one that did. The
+		// callers join this into their result, so it annotates a successful write
+		// instead of masking it.
+		unlockErr := unix.Flock(int(file.Fd()), unix.LOCK_UN)
+		closeErr := file.Close()
+		if err := errors.Join(unlockErr, closeErr); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("credstore: release lock: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}, nil
+}

internal/credstore/filelock_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package credstore
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// acquireFileLock takes an exclusive OS lock (LockFileEx) so a read-modify-write
+// of the credential file is serialized, matching the flock behaviour on unix.
+//
+// The lock file is SEPARATE from the data file for the same reason: write
+// publishes by rename, and a lock on the renamed file would be attached to
+// something the next writer has already replaced.
+func (s *Store) acquireFileLock(exclusive bool) (func() error, error) {
+	path := s.lockPath()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepathDir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: lock dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: open lock: %w", err)
+	}
+	handle := windows.Handle(file.Fd())
+	overlapped := new(windows.Overlapped)
+	// A fixed 1-byte region, blocking (no LOCKFILE_FAIL_IMMEDIATELY) so a
+	// waiter queues rather than failing the operation. Writers pass
+	// LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK; readers omit it (a shared lock) so they still
+	// serialize against a writer's publish — which matters more on Windows,
+	// where an unsynchronized reader holding the file open blocks the rename.
+	flags := uint32(0)
+	if exclusive {
+		flags = windows.LOCKFILE_EXCLUSIVE_LOCK
+	}
+	if err := windows.LockFileEx(handle, flags, 0, 1, 0, overlapped); err != nil {
+		_ = file.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("credstore: lock: %w", err)
+	}
+	return func() error {
+		// Reported rather than swallowed, for the same reason as the unix side: a
+		// cleanup that did not complete must not look identical to one that did.
+		// It matters more here — on Windows the handle staying open is what blocks
+		// the next writer's rename, so a failed release has a visible consequence.
+		unlockErr := windows.UnlockFileEx(handle, 0, 1, 0, overlapped)
+		closeErr := file.Close()
+		if err := errors.Join(unlockErr, closeErr); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("credstore: release lock: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}, nil
+}

internal/dictation/transcriber_deepgram.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
 	"github.com/coder/websocket"
 )
 
@@ -60,7 +61,15 @@ func (d *deepgramTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks <-cha
 		HTTPHeader: http.Header{"Authorization": {"Token " + d.cfg.APIKey}},
 	})
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("connecting to Deepgram: %w", err)
+		// Preserve the context.Canceled sentinel (it carries no key) so an
+		// Esc-abort during dial still matches the UI's errors.Is check. Key
+		// on ctx.Err() itself rather than unwrapping err: a cancellation can
+		// surface as a plain transport error (e.g. "closed network
+		// connection") rather than context.Canceled directly.
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return "", ctx.Err()
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("connecting to Deepgram: %s", providerio.Redact(err.Error(), d.cfg.APIKey))
 	}
 	defer conn.CloseNow()
 
@@ -68,15 +77,26 @@ func (d *deepgramTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks <-cha
 	// so no conversion (unlike sherpa-onnx, which wants float32).
 	writeErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
-		for chunk := range chunks {
-			if err := conn.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageBinary, chunk); err != nil {
-				writeErrCh <- err
+		// Select on ctx.Done() while waiting for the next chunk so a cancelled
+		// session does not leave this goroutine blocked on an open idle channel.
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				writeErrCh <- ctx.Err()
 				return
+			case chunk, ok := <-chunks:
+				if !ok {
+					// CloseStream flushes any buffered audio and returns final
+					// results before Deepgram closes the socket.
+					writeErrCh <- conn.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(`{"type":"CloseStream"}`))
+					return
+				}
+				if err := conn.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageBinary, chunk); err != nil {
+					writeErrCh <- err
+					return
+				}
 			}
 		}
-		// CloseStream flushes any buffered audio and returns final results before
-		// Deepgram closes the socket.
-		writeErrCh <- conn.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(`{"type":"CloseStream"}`))
 	}()
 
 	// Deepgram results are per-utterance segments, not cumulative: accumulate the
@@ -100,7 +120,18 @@ func (d *deepgramTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks <-cha
 				}
 			default:
 			}
-			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("Deepgram stream error: %w", err) //nolint:staticcheck // Preserve established user-facing error text.
+			// A user abort cancels the streaming context; the UI matches it
+			// with errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), so return the sentinel
+			// itself (it carries no key) instead of a flat redacted string.
+			// Key on ctx.Err() rather than unwrapping err: the writeErrCh
+			// swap above can replace err with a plain transport error (e.g.
+			// "closed network connection") that doesn't itself unwrap to
+			// context.Canceled even though the cancellation is what caused it.
+			if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			}
+			//nolint:staticcheck // Preserve established user-facing error text.
+			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("Deepgram stream error: %s", providerio.Redact(err.Error(), d.cfg.APIKey))
 		}
 		if typ != websocket.MessageText {
 			continue

internal/dictation/transcriber_deepgram_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+package dictation
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/coder/websocket"
+)
+
+// Non-cancellation dial failure: handshake returns 101 with an Upgrade header
+// equal to the API key so the dial error embeds the key and redaction must strip it.
+func TestDeepgramDialFailureRedactsKey(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "sk-test-dial-key-abcdef"
+	baseURL := dialFailServerWithUpgrade(t, key)
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: key, BaseURL: baseURL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, nil)
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected dial failure")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("dial failure should not be context.Canceled: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), key) {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked from dial failure: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "connecting to Deepgram") {
+		t.Errorf("expected dial-path error prefix, got: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// dialFailServerWithUpgrade returns a ws URL whose handshake responds 101 with
+// Upgrade set to upgradeValue (not "websocket"), so websocket.Dial fails with
+// that value in the error string. Hijacks and closes immediately to avoid the
+// library's 3s body-drain timeout on failed dials.
+func dialFailServerWithUpgrade(t *testing.T, upgradeValue string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		hj, ok := w.(http.Hijacker)
+		if !ok {
+			http.Error(w, "hijack not supported", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		conn, bufrw, err := hj.Hijack()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		defer conn.Close()
+		_, _ = bufrw.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n")
+		_, _ = bufrw.WriteString("Connection: Upgrade\r\n")
+		_, _ = bufrw.WriteString("Upgrade: " + upgradeValue + "\r\n\r\n")
+		_ = bufrw.Flush()
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return "ws" + strings.TrimPrefix(srv.URL, "http")
+}
+
+func TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction(t *testing.T) {
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		// Drain the client's audio frames, then wait for CloseStream so the
+		// client has flushed its writes before we reject the connection. Closing
+		// immediately (before CloseStream) risks the client failing on a write
+		// error and never observing this API-key-bearing close reason.
+		for {
+			typ, data, err := c.Read(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if typ == websocket.MessageText && strings.Contains(string(data), "CloseStream") {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		c.Close(websocket.StatusPolicyViolation, "invalid key sk-test-key")
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 320)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "sk-test-key") {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	firstFrame := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		// Hold the connection open, never answering, so the client blocks in
+		// Read until its context is cancelled (the Esc-abort path).
+		var once sync.Once
+		for {
+			if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			once.Do(func() { close(firstFrame) })
+		}
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	defer close(chunks)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 320)
+	// The channel stays open: the session is live when the user aborts.
+	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+		errCh <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-firstFrame:
+		cancel()
+		ferr := <-errCh
+		if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("cancelled stream error lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case ferr := <-errCh:
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe failed early instead of blocking: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Esc can cancel while the WebSocket dial is still pending. The dial error is
+// redacted with %s, so we must return ctx.Err() rather than a flat string.
+func TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeDialCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{
+		APIKey:  "sk-test-key",
+		BaseURL: "ws://127.0.0.1:1", // never reached; ctx is already cancelled
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte)
+	defer close(chunks)
+
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+	if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("dial-cancel lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Esc right after accept can race the first write or the first Read; both
+// setup/write redaction sites must still yield context.Canceled.
+func TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeStartupCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	accepted := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		close(accepted)
+		for {
+			if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	defer close(chunks)
+	// No frames yet: the writer blocks on chunks or the reader blocks on Read.
+	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+		errCh <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-accepted:
+		cancel()
+		ferr := <-errCh
+		if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("startup-cancel lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case ferr := <-errCh:
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe failed before accept: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDeepgramStreamErrorRedactsHeaderShapedKey exercises the same stream-error
+// redaction path as TestDeepgramStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction, with a close
+// reason that embeds the key next to an X-Api-Key-shaped header label.
+func TestDeepgramStreamErrorRedactsHeaderShapedKey(t *testing.T) {
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		for {
+			typ, data, err := c.Read(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if typ == websocket.MessageText && strings.Contains(string(data), "CloseStream") {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		c.Close(websocket.StatusPolicyViolation, "X-Api-Key: sk-custom-secret-key-1234567890 failed")
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: "sk-custom-secret-key-1234567890", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 320)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "sk-custom-secret-key-1234567890") {
+		t.Errorf("Custom header API key leaked: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeepgramSinglePassRedaction(t *testing.T) {
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		for {
+			typ, data, err := c.Read(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if typ == websocket.MessageText && strings.Contains(string(data), "CloseStream") {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		c.Close(websocket.StatusPolicyViolation, "error with sk-key1234567890abcdef1234")
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewDeepgramTranscriber(DeepgramConfig{APIKey: "sk-key1234567890abcdef1234", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 320)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error")
+	}
+	got := ferr.Error()
+	if strings.Contains(got, "sk-key1234567890abcdef1234") {
+		t.Fatalf("API key leaked into stream error: %q", got)
+	}
+	// One key occurrence must produce exactly one redaction marker (no double wrap).
+	if strings.Count(got, "[REDACTED]") != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("redaction markers in %q: want exactly 1 [REDACTED]", got)
+	}
+}

internal/dictation/transcriber_openai_realtime.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers/providerio"
 	"github.com/coder/websocket"
 )
 
@@ -22,6 +23,10 @@ type OpenAIRealtimeConfig struct {
 	Model  string // default "gpt-4o-transcribe"
 	// BaseURL overrides the wss endpoint (tests point it at a fake server).
 	BaseURL string
+	// writeErrInjector, when set, is consulted before each JSON websocket write.
+	// Used by same-package tests to force controllable write failures that embed
+	// secrets; production callers leave it nil.
+	writeErrInjector func() error
 }
 
 type openAIRealtimeTranscriber struct {
@@ -59,7 +64,15 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 		},
 	})
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("connecting to OpenAI Realtime: %w", err)
+		// Preserve the context.Canceled sentinel (it carries no key) so an
+		// Esc-abort during dial still matches the UI's errors.Is check. Key
+		// on ctx.Err() itself rather than unwrapping err: a cancellation can
+		// surface as a plain transport error (e.g. "closed network
+		// connection") rather than context.Canceled directly.
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return "", ctx.Err()
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("connecting to OpenAI Realtime: %s", providerio.Redact(err.Error(), o.cfg.APIKey))
 	}
 	defer conn.CloseNow()
 
@@ -73,24 +86,53 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 			},
 		},
 	}
-	if err := writeJSON(ctx, conn, sessionUpdate); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("configuring OpenAI Realtime session: %w", err)
+	if err := o.writeJSON(ctx, conn, sessionUpdate); err != nil {
+		// Same cancellation short-circuit as the dial above: an Esc-abort
+		// while the session update is in flight must stay context.Canceled.
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return "", ctx.Err()
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("configuring OpenAI Realtime session: %s", providerio.Redact(err.Error(), o.cfg.APIKey))
 	}
 
 	writeErrCh := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
-		for chunk := range chunks {
-			appendMsg := map[string]any{
-				"type":  "input_audio_buffer.append",
-				"audio": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(chunk),
-			}
-			if err := writeJSON(ctx, conn, appendMsg); err != nil {
-				writeErrCh <- err
+		// Select on ctx.Done() while waiting for the next chunk so a cancelled
+		// session does not leave this goroutine blocked on an open idle channel.
+		for {
+			select {
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				writeErrCh <- ctx.Err()
 				return
+			case chunk, ok := <-chunks:
+				if !ok {
+					// Commit the buffered audio to force final transcription.
+					if err := o.writeJSON(ctx, conn, map[string]any{"type": "input_audio_buffer.commit"}); err != nil {
+						writeErrCh <- err
+						// Unblock the reader: without a close, conn.Read stays
+						// parked on a silent peer and the error is never drained
+						// from writeErrCh. CloseNow aborts instead of waiting on
+						// the close handshake, which a silent peer never answers.
+						conn.CloseNow()
+						return
+					}
+					writeErrCh <- nil
+					return
+				}
+				appendMsg := map[string]any{
+					"type":  "input_audio_buffer.append",
+					"audio": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(chunk),
+				}
+				if err := o.writeJSON(ctx, conn, appendMsg); err != nil {
+					writeErrCh <- err
+					// Same unblocking close as the commit path: a server that
+					// goes silent after session setup would otherwise leave the
+					// reader blocked in conn.Read with the error undrained.
+					conn.CloseNow()
+					return
+				}
 			}
 		}
-		// Commit the buffered audio to force final transcription of the utterance.
-		writeErrCh <- writeJSON(ctx, conn, map[string]any{"type": "input_audio_buffer.commit"})
 	}()
 
 	// OpenAI deltas are incremental (append), unlike Deepgram/sherpa's cumulative
@@ -113,7 +155,17 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 				}
 			default:
 			}
-			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("OpenAI Realtime stream error: %w", err)
+			// A user abort cancels the streaming context; the UI matches it
+			// with errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), so return the sentinel
+			// itself (it carries no key) instead of a flat redacted string.
+			// Key on ctx.Err() rather than unwrapping err: the writeErrCh
+			// swap above can replace err with a plain transport error (e.g.
+			// "closed network connection") that doesn't itself unwrap to
+			// context.Canceled even though the cancellation is what caused it.
+			if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			}
+			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("OpenAI Realtime stream error: %s", providerio.Redact(err.Error(), o.cfg.APIKey))
 		}
 		if typ != websocket.MessageText {
 			continue
@@ -125,6 +177,12 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 			if onPartial != nil {
 				onPartial(compose(), false)
 			}
+			// onPartial may deliver the partial that makes the TUI cancel
+			// (Esc). Observe that before the next Read, which can already
+			// have a racing OpenAI error frame buffered.
+			if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			}
 		case realtimeCompleted:
 			// A completed item replaces the in-progress delta buffer with the
 			// server's authoritative transcript for that segment.
@@ -138,6 +196,9 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 			if onPartial != nil {
 				onPartial(compose(), true)
 			}
+			if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			}
 			// Once we've committed the buffer (user stopped) and the server has
 			// returned a completed transcription, the utterance is done.
 			if committed {
@@ -147,7 +208,15 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 		case realtimeCommitted:
 			committed = true
 		case realtimeError:
-			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("OpenAI Realtime error: %s", evt.text)
+			// Esc can race an incoming error event: conn.Read may already have
+			// the OpenAI error in hand by the time cancellation lands. Key on
+			// ctx.Err() first, same as every other return point in this loop,
+			// so a cancel that wins the race still surfaces as context.Canceled
+			// instead of a spurious redacted failure alongside it.
+			if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			}
+			return compose(), fmt.Errorf("OpenAI Realtime error: %s", providerio.Redact(evt.text, o.cfg.APIKey))
 		}
 		// The writer signals commit completion out of band; observe it so a
 		// stop with no further audio still flips `committed`.
@@ -155,6 +224,10 @@ func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) StreamTranscribe(ctx context.Context, chunks
 		case werr := <-writeErrCh:
 			if werr == nil {
 				committed = true
+			} else if ctx.Err() != nil {
+				return compose(), ctx.Err()
+			} else {
+				return compose(), fmt.Errorf("OpenAI Realtime stream error: %s", providerio.Redact(werr.Error(), o.cfg.APIKey))
 			}
 		default:
 		}
@@ -201,6 +274,15 @@ func parseRealtimeEvent(data []byte) realtimeEvent {
 	return realtimeEvent{kind: realtimeOther}
 }
 
+func (o *openAIRealtimeTranscriber) writeJSON(ctx context.Context, conn *websocket.Conn, v any) error {
+	if o.cfg.writeErrInjector != nil {
+		if err := o.cfg.writeErrInjector(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return writeJSON(ctx, conn, v)
+}
+
 func writeJSON(ctx context.Context, conn *websocket.Conn, v any) error {
 	data, err := json.Marshal(v)
 	if err != nil {

internal/dictation/transcriber_openai_realtime_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+package dictation
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/coder/websocket"
+)
+
+// Non-cancellation dial failure: handshake returns 101 with an Upgrade header
+// equal to the API key so the dial error embeds the key and redaction must strip it.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeDialFailureRedactsKey(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "sk-test-dial-key-abcdef"
+	baseURL := dialFailServerWithUpgrade(t, key)
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: key, BaseURL: baseURL})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, nil)
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected dial failure")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("dial failure should not be context.Canceled: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), key) {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked from dial failure: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "connecting to OpenAI Realtime") {
+		t.Errorf("expected dial-path error prefix, got: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Session-configuration write fails after dial: inject a write error that embeds
+// the API key (peer close cannot reach this path reliably — the session write
+// always lands in the kernel buffer first) and assert redaction.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeSessionConfigFailureRedactsKey(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "sk-test-session-key-abcdef"
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		// Hold open; the client fails on the injected session write before reading.
+		<-ctx.Done()
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{
+		APIKey:  key,
+		BaseURL: url,
+		writeErrInjector: func() error {
+			return errors.New("invalid API key " + key)
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, nil)
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected session-config failure")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("session-config failure should not be context.Canceled: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), key) {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked from session-config failure: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "configuring OpenAI Realtime session") {
+		t.Errorf("expected session-config error prefix, got: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Asynchronous writer failure: session update succeeds, then the audio writer
+// injects a key-bearing write error. The server keeps the connection open and
+// emits a delta so the reader loop observes writeErrCh (not a peer close).
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeWriterFailureRedactsKey(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "sk-test-writer-key-abcdef"
+	sessionDone := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		close(sessionDone)
+		// Keep reading and emit a delta so the client processes an event and
+		// drains writeErrCh while the connection is still open.
+		_ = c.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(
+			`{"type":"conversation.item.input_audio_transcription.delta","delta":"hi"}`,
+		))
+		for {
+			if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	var writes atomic.Int32
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{
+		APIKey:  key,
+		BaseURL: url,
+		writeErrInjector: func() error {
+			// First write is session.update; fail subsequent audio/commit writes.
+			if writes.Add(1) == 1 {
+				return nil
+			}
+			return errors.New("invalid API key " + key)
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	// Leave open after the first frame so the writer hits the injected error
+	// on that append rather than a clean commit.
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+		done <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	var ferr error
+	select {
+	case ferr = <-done:
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		close(chunks)
+		t.Fatal("StreamTranscribe did not complete after writer failure")
+	}
+	close(chunks)
+
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected writer failure")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("writer failure should not be context.Canceled: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), key) {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked from writer failure: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "OpenAI Realtime stream error") {
+		t.Errorf("expected stream/writer error prefix, got: %v", ferr)
+	}
+	select {
+	case <-sessionDone:
+	default:
+		// Session may race the injected audio write; prefix assertion above is enough.
+	}
+}
+
+// Writer failure with a silent server: the peer never sends a frame after
+// session setup, so the reader is parked in conn.Read. The writer must close
+// the connection on failure or the writeErrCh error is never observed and
+// StreamTranscribe blocks forever.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeWriterFailureUnblocksSilentServer(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "sk-test-silent-writer-key-abcdef"
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		// Hold the connection open without ever writing a frame.
+		<-ctx.Done()
+	})
+
+	var writes atomic.Int32
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{
+		APIKey:  key,
+		BaseURL: url,
+		writeErrInjector: func() error {
+			// First write is session.update; fail the subsequent append write.
+			if writes.Add(1) == 1 {
+				return nil
+			}
+			return errors.New("invalid API key " + key)
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	// Leave the channel open: the writer must fail on the append, not the commit.
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+		done <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case ferr := <-done:
+		if ferr == nil {
+			t.Fatal("expected writer failure")
+		}
+		if errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("writer failure should not be context.Canceled: %v", ferr)
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), key) {
+			t.Errorf("API key leaked from writer failure: %v", ferr)
+		}
+		if !strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "OpenAI Realtime stream error") {
+			t.Errorf("expected stream/writer error prefix, got: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		close(chunks)
+		t.Fatal("StreamTranscribe did not unblock after writer failure with a silent server")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRedaction(t *testing.T) {
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		defer c.Close(websocket.StatusNormalClosure, "")
+		for {
+			typ, _, err := c.Read(ctx)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if typ != websocket.MessageText {
+				continue
+			}
+			_ = c.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(`{"type":"error","error":{"message":"invalid API key sk-test-key"}}`))
+		}
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	close(chunks)
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(context.Background(), chunks, func(string, bool) {})
+	if ferr == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error")
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(ferr.Error(), "sk-test-key") {
+		t.Errorf("API key leaked: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	firstFrame := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		// Hold the connection open, never answering, so the client blocks in
+		// Read until its context is cancelled (the Esc-abort path).
+		var once sync.Once
+		for {
+			if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			once.Do(func() { close(firstFrame) })
+		}
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	defer close(chunks)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	// The channel stays open: the session is live when the user aborts.
+	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+		errCh <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-firstFrame:
+		cancel()
+		ferr := <-errCh
+		if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("cancelled stream error lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case ferr := <-errCh:
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe failed early instead of blocking: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Esc can cancel while the WebSocket dial is still pending. The dial error is
+// redacted with %s, so we must return ctx.Err() rather than a flat string.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeDialCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{
+		APIKey:  "sk-test-key",
+		BaseURL: "ws://127.0.0.1:1", // never reached; ctx is already cancelled
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte)
+	defer close(chunks)
+
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+	if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("dial-cancel lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Esc right after accept can hit the session-update write or the first Read;
+// both redaction sites must still yield context.Canceled.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeStartupCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	accepted := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		close(accepted)
+		// Do not read: leave the client in session-update write or first Read.
+		<-ctx.Done()
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	defer close(chunks)
+	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+		errCh <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-accepted:
+		cancel()
+		ferr := <-errCh
+		if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("startup-cancel lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case ferr := <-errCh:
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe failed before accept: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Cancel while the writer is blocked on more chunks. Whichever path observes
+// the cancellation first (the blocked conn.Read or the writeErrCh drain) must
+// return context.Canceled rather than a redacted flat string.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeWriteCancelKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	sessionReceived := make(chan struct{})
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		close(sessionReceived)
+		for {
+			if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	defer close(chunks)
+
+	errCh := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, nil)
+		errCh <- ferr
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case <-sessionReceived:
+		cancel()
+		ferr := <-errCh
+		if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+			t.Fatalf("write-path cancel lost the context.Canceled sentinel: %v", ferr)
+		}
+	case ferr := <-errCh:
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe failed early instead of blocking: %v", ferr)
+	}
+}
+
+// Esc can race an incoming OpenAI error event. conn.Read may already have
+// the error frame in hand by the time the cancellation lands. The server
+// fires a delta immediately followed by the error, back to back. Cancel from
+// inside the delta callback (same path the TUI uses when a partial triggers
+// Esc handling) so the cancel is observed before the next event is processed.
+// The returned error must still be context.Canceled, not the redacted OpenAI
+// error.
+func TestOpenAIRealtimeStreamTranscribeErrorRaceKeepsSentinel(t *testing.T) {
+	url := wsTestServer(t, func(ctx context.Context, c *websocket.Conn) {
+		if _, _, err := c.Read(ctx); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		_ = c.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(
+			`{"type":"conversation.item.input_audio_transcription.delta","delta":"hi"}`,
+		))
+		_ = c.Write(ctx, websocket.MessageText, []byte(
+			`{"type":"error","error":{"message":"invalid API key sk-test-key"}}`,
+		))
+		<-ctx.Done()
+	})
+
+	tr, err := NewOpenAIRealtimeTranscriber(OpenAIRealtimeConfig{APIKey: "sk-test-key", BaseURL: url})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+	chunks := make(chan []byte, 1)
+	defer close(chunks)
+	chunks <- make([]byte, 480)
+	var once sync.Once
+	_, ferr := tr.StreamTranscribe(ctx, chunks, func(string, bool) {
+		// Cancel synchronously from the partial callback, before the
+		// stream loop continues to the already-buffered error frame.
+		once.Do(cancel)
+	})
+	if !errors.Is(ferr, context.Canceled) {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamTranscribe error = %v, want context.Canceled (cancel must win over a racing OpenAI error event)", ferr)
+	}
+}

internal/execution/contracts.go

@@ -9,7 +9,16 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 )
 
-const PolicyVersion = 1
+// PolicyVersion is the version of the approval policy that recorded grants were
+// evaluated under. Bump it whenever a change narrows what may be approved: the
+// grant store then backs the file up, keeps deny grants, invalidates prior
+// approvals, and tells the user once, instead of silently honoring approvals
+// that the current rules would have refused.
+//
+// v2 tightened command-prefix validation so a launcher spelled with a version
+// or an executable extension ("python3.11", "python.exe") can no longer be
+// approved as an ordinary command.
+const PolicyVersion = 2
 
 type Origin string
 

internal/execution/process_unix.go

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os/exec"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -38,12 +40,45 @@ func KillProcessTree(pid int) error {
 // TerminateProcessTree requests graceful termination, then force-kills the
 // process tree after grace. Callers retain their distinct persistence models;
 // this function owns only the OS lifecycle primitive.
+//
+// The signal target is REDISCOVERED here via processSignalTarget(pid), which
+// asks the OS for pid's current group. A caller that already knows pid was
+// configured as its own group leader at launch (e.g. via ConfigureProcessGroup)
+// should use TerminateProcessGroup instead — see its doc comment for why this
+// rediscovery is fragile once the leader may have already exited.
 func TerminateProcessTree(pid int, grace, poll time.Duration) error {
 	target, err := processSignalTarget(pid)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	alive := func() bool { return syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)) == nil }
+	return terminateTarget(pid, target, grace, poll)
+}
+
+// TerminateProcessGroup is like TerminateProcessTree, but for a caller that
+// already knows pid is (or was, at launch) its own process-group leader — e.g.
+// a command started after ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd), which sets Setpgid so
+// cmd.Process.Pid always leads its own group at the moment it is signalled.
+//
+// TerminateProcessTree instead rediscovers the group via syscall.Getpgid(pid)
+// at call time. On Darwin, that lookup can return ESRCH once an unreaped group
+// leader has already exited, even though live descendants remain in the group
+// it configured — TerminateProcessTree would then silently fall back to
+// signalling only the (already dead) leader PID and leave those descendants
+// running. Skipping rediscovery in favor of the launch-time invariant avoids
+// that: the negative PID is used directly, regardless of whether the leader is
+// still alive to be looked up.
+func TerminateProcessGroup(pid int, grace, poll time.Duration) error {
+	if pid <= 1 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to signal invalid pid %d", pid)
+	}
+	return terminateTarget(pid, -pid, grace, poll)
+}
+
+// terminateTarget signals target (an individual PID or, negative, a process
+// group) with SIGTERM then, after grace, SIGKILL. reportPid identifies the
+// original process in error messages regardless of which form target takes.
+func terminateTarget(reportPid, target int, grace, poll time.Duration) error {
+	alive := func() bool { return signalTargetRunning(target) }
 	if err := syscall.Kill(target, syscall.SIGTERM); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
 			return nil
@@ -77,11 +112,91 @@ func TerminateProcessTree(pid int, grace, poll time.Duration) error {
 		time.Sleep(poll)
 	}
 	if alive() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not exit after SIGKILL", pid)
+		return fmt.Errorf("process %d did not exit after SIGKILL", reportPid)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
+// signalTargetRunning reports whether the signal target still has a process that
+// is actually RUNNING, as opposed to one waiting to be reaped.
+//
+// kill(2) with signal 0 succeeds for a zombie: the PID still exists until its
+// parent collects it. That matters because the target here is usually a process
+// GROUP, and a terminated leader's child is briefly a zombie before init/launchd
+// reaps it. Treating that window as "still alive" made termination sit through
+// both grace periods, SIGKILL an already-dead group, and then report
+// "did not exit after SIGKILL" for a tree that had in fact stopped — turning a
+// successful cleanup into a spurious failure (and a flaky one, since it depends on
+// reap timing).
+//
+// Zombie detection goes through ps, which is available on every Unix we target and
+// avoids a /proc dependency Darwin does not have. It is only consulted when the
+// cheap kill check says something is still there, so the common path costs nothing
+// extra. If ps cannot be run or its output cannot be parsed, the conservative
+// pre-existing answer (the kill result) stands.
+func signalTargetRunning(target int) bool {
+	if syscall.Kill(target, syscall.Signal(0)) != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	// A negative target is a process GROUP: check whether any member is
+	// non-zombie. A positive target is an individual PID that is NOT its own
+	// group leader (processSignalTarget's fallback) — its actual PGID differs
+	// from its own PID, so matching rows by PGID here would look for a group
+	// that doesn't exist and always report "unknown" (conservatively alive).
+	// Check its own PID's state instead.
+	var running, ok bool
+	if target < 0 {
+		running, ok = processGroupHasRunningMember(-target)
+	} else {
+		running, ok = processIsRunning(target)
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		return true
+	}
+	return running
+}
+
+// processGroupHasRunningMember reports whether any member of pgid is in a state
+// other than zombie. ok is false when the group's states could not be determined.
+func processGroupHasRunningMember(pgid int) (running bool, ok bool) {
+	return processTableStateMatches(func(_, rowPgid int) bool { return rowPgid == pgid })
+}
+
+// processIsRunning reports whether pid itself is in a state other than zombie.
+// ok is false when pid's state could not be determined.
+func processIsRunning(pid int) (running bool, ok bool) {
+	return processTableStateMatches(func(rowPid, _ int) bool { return rowPid == pid })
+}
+
+// processTableStateMatches scans the process table once, via ps, and reports
+// whether any row satisfying match is non-zombie, and whether at least one
+// matching row was found at all (ok). No rows found means either the process
+// (or group) genuinely doesn't exist (a race with exit) or ps's output was
+// unparseable/restricted; either way, the caller should not claim knowledge.
+func processTableStateMatches(match func(pid, pgid int) bool) (running bool, ok bool) {
+	output, err := exec.Command("ps", "-A", "-o", "pid=,pgid=,stat=").Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	found := false
+	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(string(output), "\n") {
+		fields := strings.Fields(line)
+		if len(fields) < 3 {
+			continue
+		}
+		rowPid, errPid := strconv.Atoi(fields[0])
+		rowPgid, errPgid := strconv.Atoi(fields[1])
+		if errPid != nil || errPgid != nil || !match(rowPid, rowPgid) {
+			continue
+		}
+		found = true
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(fields[2], "Z") {
+			return true, true
+		}
+	}
+	return false, found
+}
+
 func processSignalTarget(pid int) (int, error) {
 	if pid <= 1 {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("refusing to signal invalid pid %d", pid)
@@ -91,10 +206,14 @@ func processSignalTarget(pid int) (int, error) {
 		if pgid == pid {
 			target = -pid
 		}
-	} else if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
-		// Preserve the individual target; the signal call below treats ESRCH as
-		// already gone, which is a successful lifecycle outcome.
-		return pid, nil
+	} else {
+		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
+			// Preserve the individual target; the signal call below treats ESRCH as
+			// already gone, which is a successful lifecycle outcome.
+			return pid, nil
+		}
+		// Conservatively retain the individual PID after other lookup failures;
+		// guessing and signalling a process group could affect unrelated processes.
 	}
 	return target, nil
 }

internal/execution/process_unix_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package execution
+
+import (
+	"os/exec"
+	"strconv"
+	"syscall"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited is the regression test for
+// counting unreaped processes as alive: kill(2) with signal 0 succeeds for a
+// zombie, so a group whose only remaining member is waiting to be reaped used to
+// sit through both grace periods, take a pointless SIGKILL, and then be reported
+// as "did not exit after SIGKILL" — a spurious cleanup failure whose timing
+// depended on when the reaper ran.
+func TestTerminateProcessTreeTreatsZombieGroupAsExited(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
+	ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	pid := cmd.Process.Pid
+	// Deliberately do NOT Wait: the child stays a zombie in its own group, which
+	// is exactly the state a terminated tree passes through.
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Wait() })
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		if zombie, ok := processIsZombie(pid); ok && zombie {
+			break
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Skip("child did not reach the zombie state; ps output is unavailable in this environment")
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	if syscall.Kill(-pid, syscall.Signal(0)) != nil {
+		t.Skip("the zombie group is no longer signalable; cannot exercise the case")
+	}
+
+	if signalTargetRunning(-pid) {
+		t.Fatal("a group holding only a zombie must not count as running")
+	}
+	if err := TerminateProcessTree(pid, 50*time.Millisecond, 10*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateProcessTree on an already-exited tree: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup is the positive control: a group with
+// a live member must still be seen as running and then actually stopped, so the
+// zombie tolerance above cannot degrade into ignoring real processes.
+func TestTerminateProcessTreeStopsRunningGroup(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "sleep 30")
+	ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd)
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	pid := cmd.Process.Pid
+	defer func() { _ = cmd.Wait() }()
+
+	if !signalTargetRunning(-pid) {
+		t.Fatal("a group with a live member must count as running")
+	}
+	if err := TerminateProcessTree(pid, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("TerminateProcessTree: %v", err)
+	}
+	if running, ok := processGroupHasRunningMember(pid); ok && running {
+		t.Fatal("the group still has a running member after termination")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSignalTargetRunningTreatsZombieIndividualPIDAsExited is the regression
+// test for jatmn's second #774 finding: signalTargetRunning's zombie check
+// matched the individual-PID fallback target (a process that is NOT its own
+// group leader — processSignalTarget's positive-PID case) against process-table
+// rows by PGID. That target's actual PGID differs from its own PID by
+// definition (that's exactly why processSignalTarget fell back to the
+// individual PID instead of a negative group target), so no row ever matched,
+// "unknown" resulted every time, and signalTargetRunning conservatively (and
+// incorrectly) treated a zombie individual-PID target as still running.
+func TestSignalTargetRunningTreatsZombieIndividualPIDAsExited(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 0")
+	// Deliberately do NOT call ConfigureProcessGroup: the child inherits this
+	// test process's group, so it is not its own leader and processSignalTarget
+	// falls back to the individual (positive) PID.
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start: %v", err)
+	}
+	pid := cmd.Process.Pid
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cmd.Wait() })
+
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+	for {
+		if zombie, ok := processIsZombie(pid); ok && zombie {
+			break
+		}
+		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
+			t.Skip("child did not reach the zombie state; ps output is unavailable in this environment")
+		}
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+
+	target, err := processSignalTarget(pid)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("processSignalTarget: %v", err)
+	}
+	if target != pid {
+		t.Skip("child unexpectedly became its own group leader; cannot exercise the individual-PID fallback")
+	}
+	if signalTargetRunning(target) {
+		t.Fatal("a zombie individual-PID target must not count as running")
+	}
+}
+
+// processIsZombie reports a process's zombie state via ps. ok is false when the
+// state could not be read.
+func processIsZombie(pid int) (zombie bool, ok bool) {
+	output, err := exec.Command("ps", "-o", "stat=", "-p", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	state := string(output)
+	for len(state) > 0 && (state[0] == ' ' || state[0] == '\n' || state[0] == '\t') {
+		state = state[1:]
+	}
+	if state == "" {
+		return false, false
+	}
+	return state[0] == 'Z', true
+}

internal/execution/process_windows.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 package execution
 
 import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -12,10 +14,34 @@ import (
 
 func ConfigureProcessGroup(cmd *exec.Cmd) {}
 
+// KillProcessTree asks taskkill /T to kill pid and descendants it can still
+// discover from that live root. If taskkill fails, it falls back to killing pid
+// alone but still returns the tree error because descendants may have survived.
+// Neither path can recover descendants after the root has exited.
 func KillProcessTree(pid int) error {
-	if err := exec.Command(taskkillPath(), "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run(); err == nil {
+	return killProcessTree(pid, runTaskkill, killRootProcess)
+}
+
+func killProcessTree(pid int, killTree, killRoot func(int) error) error {
+	treeErr := killTree(pid)
+	if treeErr == nil {
 		return nil
 	}
+	rootErr := killRoot(pid)
+	if rootErr != nil {
+		return errors.Join(
+			fmt.Errorf("kill process tree rooted at %d: %w", pid, treeErr),
+			fmt.Errorf("kill root process %d: %w", pid, rootErr),
+		)
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("kill process tree rooted at %d (root process killed directly): %w", pid, treeErr)
+}
+
+func runTaskkill(pid int) error {
+	return exec.Command(taskkillPath(), "/T", "/F", "/PID", strconv.Itoa(pid)).Run()
+}
+
+func killRootProcess(pid int) error {
 	process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err

internal/execution/process_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package execution
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestKillProcessTreeRetainsTreeErrorWhenRootFallbackSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
+	treeErr := errors.New("taskkill failed")
+	err := killProcessTree(42, func(int) error { return treeErr }, func(int) error { return nil })
+	if !errors.Is(err, treeErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("killProcessTree error = %v, want tree error", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "root process killed directly") {
+		t.Fatalf("killProcessTree error = %q, want fallback context", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKillProcessTreeJoinsTreeAndRootErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	treeErr := errors.New("taskkill failed")
+	rootErr := errors.New("root kill failed")
+	err := killProcessTree(42, func(int) error { return treeErr }, func(int) error { return rootErr })
+	if !errors.Is(err, treeErr) || !errors.Is(err, rootErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("killProcessTree error = %v, want both failures", err)
+	}
+}

internal/mcp/config.go

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type Server struct {
 	// credential lookup uses it to avoid reusing legacy user tokens by name.
 	ProjectConfigured bool
 	// UnconfiguredDefault is true when this server is one of Zero's built-in
-	// defaults (e.g. keyless Firecrawl) that the user never touched in their
+	// defaults (e.g. keyless Exa) that the user never touched in their
 	// config — no credentials, no overrides. Callers use it to avoid warning
 	// loudly when a server nobody configured fails to connect.
 	UnconfiguredDefault bool

internal/mcp/config_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package mcp
 
 import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ func TestNormalizeConfigValidatesTransportBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestNormalizeConfigFlagsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-		"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
+		"exa": config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
 		"web": {
 			Type: "http",
 			URL:  "https://example.com/mcp",
@@ -107,8 +109,8 @@ func TestNormalizeConfigFlagsUnconfiguredDefault(t *testing.T) {
 		byName[server.Name] = server
 	}
 
-	if !byName["firecrawl"].UnconfiguredDefault {
-		t.Fatal("an untouched firecrawl default should be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
+	if !byName["exa"].UnconfiguredDefault {
+		t.Fatal("an untouched exa default should be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
 	}
 	if byName["web"].UnconfiguredDefault {
 		t.Fatal("a server the user configured must not be flagged UnconfiguredDefault")
@@ -240,3 +242,116 @@ func TestCopyStringMapTrimsKeysAndPreservesValues(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("copied[TOKEN] = %q, want value preserved verbatim", copied["TOKEN"])
 	}
 }
+
+// Startup behavior for the firecrawl -> exa default migration: a user who
+// disabled the retired default must end up with no Exa server to connect to,
+// not merely a disabled entry in the resolved config.
+func TestNormalizeConfigSkipsExaAfterLegacyFirecrawlDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"disabled":true}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, server := range servers {
+		if server.Name == "exa" {
+			t.Fatalf("exa must not be started after the user disabled the default it replaced: %#v", server)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The same path with no legacy disable still starts Exa, so the migration
+// cannot quietly switch off the default for everyone else.
+func TestNormalizeConfigStartsExaWithoutLegacyDisable(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NormalizeConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, server := range servers {
+		if server.Name == "exa" {
+			if !server.UnconfiguredDefault {
+				t.Fatalf("an untouched exa default should be flagged unconfigured: %#v", server)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	t.Fatal("expected the exa default to be started out of the box")
+}
+
+// The failure path CodeRabbit flagged: a firecrawl entry that named only a
+// header relied on the retired default for its transport. Resolving it must
+// still produce a complete server — an incomplete one fails NormalizeConfig,
+// which takes down every other server's startup with it, not just this one.
+func TestNormalizeConfigResolvesPartialRetiredDefaultEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer k"}}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a header-only legacy entry must not break startup: %v", err)
+	}
+	var firecrawl *Server
+	var sawExa bool
+	for i := range servers {
+		switch servers[i].Name {
+		case "firecrawl":
+			firecrawl = &servers[i]
+		case "exa":
+			sawExa = true
+		}
+	}
+	if firecrawl == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the customized firecrawl server to survive: %#v", servers)
+	}
+	if firecrawl.Type != ServerTypeHTTP || firecrawl.URL != "https://mcp.firecrawl.dev/v2/mcp" {
+		t.Fatalf("firecrawl lost the transport its entry relied on: %#v", *firecrawl)
+	}
+	if firecrawl.Headers["Authorization"] != "Bearer k" {
+		t.Fatalf("firecrawl lost the user's header: %#v", *firecrawl)
+	}
+	if !sawExa {
+		t.Fatal("the new exa default should still start alongside it")
+	}
+}
+
+// The mirror case: an entry that names its own stdio transport must not have
+// the retired http default grafted onto it, which would be rejected outright.
+func TestNormalizeConfigLeavesRetiredEntryWithOwnTransportAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(`{"mcp":{"servers":{"firecrawl":{"command":"firecrawl-mcp"}}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := config.ResolveMCP(config.ResolveOptions{UserConfigPath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ResolveMCP: %v", err)
+	}
+	servers, err := NormalizeConfig(cfg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a self-hosted stdio entry must keep working: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, server := range servers {
+		if server.Name != "firecrawl" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if server.Type != ServerTypeStdio || server.Command != "firecrawl-mcp" {
+			t.Fatalf("the user's own stdio transport was corrupted: %#v", server)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	t.Fatalf("expected the self-hosted firecrawl server to survive: %#v", servers)
+}

internal/mcp/registry_test.go

@@ -153,16 +153,16 @@ func TestRegisterToolsSkipsUnreachableServerAndKeepsOthers(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestRegisterToolsFlagsUnconfiguredDefaultOnSkip(t *testing.T) {
-	// firecrawl is seeded by config.DefaultMCPServers with no credentials; when a
-	// user never configures it, a connect failure (e.g. the real HTTP 401 from
-	// issue #552) must be recorded as UnconfiguredDefault so callers can avoid
+	// Exa is seeded by config.DefaultMCPServers with no credentials; when a
+	// user never configures it, a connect failure must be recorded as
+	// UnconfiguredDefault so callers can avoid
 	// warning about a server the user never asked for. "custom" is configured by
 	// the user and must NOT be flagged even though it also fails to connect.
 	registry := tools.NewRegistry()
 
 	runtime, err := RegisterTools(context.Background(), registry, config.MCPConfig{Servers: map[string]config.MCPServerConfig{
-		"firecrawl": config.DefaultMCPServers()["firecrawl"],
-		"custom":    {Type: "stdio", Command: "custom-mcp"},
+		"exa":    config.DefaultMCPServers()["exa"],
+		"custom": {Type: "stdio", Command: "custom-mcp"},
 	}}, RegisterOptions{
 		ClientFactory: func(_ context.Context, server Server) (ToolClient, error) {
 			return nil, errors.New(server.Name + " connect failed")
@@ -177,12 +177,12 @@ func TestRegisterToolsFlagsUnconfiguredDefaultOnSkip(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, skipped := range runtime.Skipped() {
 		byName[skipped.Name] = skipped
 	}
-	firecrawl, ok := byName["firecrawl"]
+	exa, ok := byName["exa"]
 	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("Skipped() = %#v, want an entry for firecrawl", runtime.Skipped())
+		t.Fatalf("Skipped() = %#v, want an entry for exa", runtime.Skipped())
 	}
-	if !firecrawl.UnconfiguredDefault {
-		t.Fatalf("Skipped()[firecrawl] = %#v, want UnconfiguredDefault", firecrawl)
+	if !exa.UnconfiguredDefault {
+		t.Fatalf("Skipped()[exa] = %#v, want UnconfiguredDefault", exa)
 	}
 	custom, ok := byName["custom"]
 	if !ok {

internal/modelregistry/catalog.go

@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ func reasoningEffortsForModelName(name string) []ReasoningEffort {
 		// the gateway's translation concern — unknown fields are ignored, so the
 		// worst case is a silent no-op rather than a 400.
 		return []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}
+	case strings.Contains(n, "deepseek"):
+		// DeepSeek V4 (deepseek-v4-flash / deepseek-v4-pro) exposes thinking-mode
+		// effort control through the OpenAI-compatible reasoning_effort parameter.
+		// The API accepts low/high/max and maps medium/xhigh onto high, so only
+		// the three distinct tiers are advertised.
+		return []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}
 	default:
 		return nil
 	}

internal/modelregistry/effort_fallback_test.go

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ func TestReasoningEffortsFallbackForGPT5AndOSeries(t *testing.T) {
 		{"hy3", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}},
 		{"hunyuan-t1", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}},
 		{"openai/o3-mini", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortMedium, ReasoningEffortHigh}}, // github-style vendor/ id
+		{"deepseek-v4-flash", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
+		{"deepseek-v4-pro", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
+		{"deepseek-reasoner", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
+		{"deepseek-chat", []ReasoningEffort{ReasoningEffortLow, ReasoningEffortHigh, ReasoningEffortMax}},
 		{"gpt-4.1", nil}, // non-reasoning, registered: stays empty
 		{"gpt-4o-mini", nil},
 		{"ollama/llama3.1", nil},

internal/pathjail/pathjail.go

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// Package pathjail confines file operations to a directory tree.
+//
+// It exists because the obvious guard does not work. Checking a path with
+// Lstat and then handing the same string to MkdirAll, CreateTemp, Rename or
+// Remove is two independent resolutions with a gap between them, and every
+// operation after the check re-resolves the ANCESTORS as well. A store that
+// verified only its own directory and file was therefore writable outside its
+// tree whenever any component above them was a link: the check passed, and the
+// syscall that followed went somewhere else.
+//
+// On Windows the same guard failed for a second, independent reason. A junction
+// is a reparse point but NOT a symlink, so os.Lstat reports it as ModeIrregular
+// with ModeSymlink clear, and a guard testing only ModeSymlink returns "not a
+// link" when pointed straight at one. Junctions also need no privilege to
+// create, unlike Windows symlinks, so this is reachable by exactly the
+// unprivileged user a workspace guard is meant to contain.
+//
+// The fix for both is to stop naming things by path. Open a handle on the root
+// once and address everything below it relative to that handle, so the kernel
+// resolves each component against an object that cannot be swapped underneath.
+// os.Root is that handle: it refuses any component that would escape, including
+// a Windows reparse point, and it is the same idea the sandbox uses for ACL
+// materialization.
+package pathjail
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io/fs"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ErrEscapes reports a target that is not inside the root it was confined to.
+// Returned before anything is opened, so a caller cannot act on the path first.
+var ErrEscapes = errors.New("path escapes its root")
+
+// ErrReparse reports a link or reparse point where a real file or directory was
+// required.
+var ErrReparse = errors.New("refusing to write through a link")
+
+// Open confines dir to root and returns a handle on root plus dir expressed
+// relative to it. The caller closes the handle.
+//
+// root is resolved normally, because it is the boundary the caller chose and
+// trusts (a workspace the operator opened, say, which may legitimately sit under
+// a link). Everything BELOW it is resolved against the returned handle and
+// cannot escape.
+func Open(root, dir string) (*os.Root, string, error) {
+	// Only a genuinely EMPTY value is treated as missing; every other spelling is
+	// used verbatim. Testing TrimSpace(...) == "" instead would retarget the very
+	// paths this guards: " " is a legal directory name on unix, so trimming would
+	// reject it as "no root" or silently swap dir for root, which is the same
+	// retargeting bug as trimming "root " down to "root".
+	if root == "" {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: no root to confine %q to", ErrEscapes, dir)
+	}
+	if dir == "" {
+		dir = root
+	}
+	// Rel before Open, so an escaping target is refused without opening
+	// anything. filepath.Rel is lexical, which is the right test here: it says
+	// what the caller ASKED for, and the handle enforces what actually happens.
+	relative, err := filepath.Rel(root, dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q against %q: %v", ErrEscapes, dir, root, err)
+	}
+	if relative == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(relative, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q is outside %q", ErrEscapes, dir, root)
+	}
+	// The root is created if it is missing, by ordinary pathname, because it is
+	// the boundary the caller declared rather than anything being confined. The
+	// stores this replaced called MkdirAll on the whole tree, so this creates
+	// strictly less by pathname than before, and everything BELOW root is opened
+	// relative to the handle.
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o700); err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("create %s: %w", root, err)
+	}
+	handle, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", root, err)
+	}
+	return handle, relative, nil
+}
+
+// RefuseReparse fails when relative names a link or reparse point.
+//
+// Absent is fine: a name that does not exist yet is what a create is for.
+//
+// This is belt to os.Root's braces. The handle already refuses to traverse a
+// reparse point, so this exists to give the FINAL component a clear error
+// instead of an "escapes from parent" one, and to keep the refusal explicit at
+// the point a reader looks for it.
+//
+// ModeIrregular is tested alongside ModeSymlink deliberately: that is what a
+// Windows junction reports, and a guard checking only ModeSymlink lets one
+// straight through.
+func RefuseReparse(handle *os.Root, relative string) error {
+	// A trailing separator makes os.Root.Lstat resolve the terminal component on
+	// Windows (doInRootAlwaysResolveTerminalSlash), so a junction named with a
+	// trailing slash would be stat'd as its target and wave through as "not a
+	// link". Strip it so the final component itself is the thing inspected.
+	//
+	// os.IsPathSeparator rather than a literal `/\` set, because backslash is a
+	// separator only on Windows: on unix it is an ordinary filename character, and
+	// trimming it would inspect "linked" when asked about a symlink genuinely
+	// named `linked\` — reporting "not a link" for one that is.
+	if trimmed := trimTrailingSeparators(relative); trimmed != "" {
+		relative = trimmed
+	}
+	info, err := handle.Lstat(relative)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("inspect %s: %w", relative, err)
+	}
+	if info.Mode()&(os.ModeSymlink|os.ModeIrregular) != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrReparse, relative)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// trimTrailingSeparators drops the path separators at the end of a name, using
+// the ACTIVE platform's definition of one: `/` and `\` on Windows, `/` only on
+// unix, where a backslash is a legal character in a filename.
+func trimTrailingSeparators(path string) string {
+	end := len(path)
+	for end > 0 && os.IsPathSeparator(path[end-1]) {
+		end--
+	}
+	return path[:end]
+}
+
+// randomBytes fills b with cryptographic randomness. A variable rather than a
+// direct crypto/rand call so a test can force the name collision that exercises
+// the O_EXCL retry below — the branch that matters, and one a real random source
+// will not reach on demand.
+var randomBytes = rand.Read
+
+// CreateTemp makes an O_EXCL temp file named prefix.<random>suffix inside dir,
+// relative to handle, and returns it with its relative path.
+//
+// O_EXCL rather than a fixed name: a link planted at a predictable temp path
+// between the check and the create is the same race this package exists to
+// close, and O_EXCL makes the kernel refuse it rather than us.
+func CreateTemp(handle *os.Root, dir, prefix, suffix string) (*os.File, string, error) {
+	// prefix and suffix are NAME fragments, not path fragments. A separator or a
+	// "."/".." in either would relocate the file out of dir — a prefix of
+	// "../escaped", or a suffix of ".tmp/../evil" that also erases the random
+	// component and with it the O_EXCL unpredictability the file relies on.
+	// Reject them up front so the file lands where dir promises.
+	for _, fragment := range []string{prefix, suffix} {
+		if strings.ContainsAny(fragment, `/\`) || fragment == "." || fragment == ".." {
+			return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("%w: temporary name fragment %q must be a single path component", ErrEscapes, fragment)
+		}
+	}
+	for attempt := 0; attempt < 10; attempt++ {
+		noise := make([]byte, 8)
+		if _, err := randomBytes(noise); err != nil {
+			return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("generate a temporary name: %w", err)
+		}
+		relative := filepath.Join(dir, prefix+"."+hex.EncodeToString(noise)+suffix)
+		file, err := handle.OpenFile(relative, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+		if err == nil {
+			return file, relative, nil
+		}
+		if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrExist) {
+			continue
+		}
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	return nil, "", errors.New("could not create a temporary file with an unused name")
+}

internal/pathjail/pathjail_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+package pathjail
+
+import (
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// linkDir points link at target, using whatever kind of link this platform lets
+// an unprivileged process create.
+//
+// On Windows that is a JUNCTION, not a symlink, and the difference is the whole
+// reason this package exists twice over. A symlink needs
+// SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, which an ordinary account does not hold, so a
+// test written with os.Symlink silently skips on Windows and proves nothing
+// there. A junction needs no privilege at all, so it is both the reachable
+// attack and the only one that can be tested.
+func linkDir(t *testing.T, target, link string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		if out, err := exec.Command("cmd", "/c", "mklink", "/J", link, target).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+			t.Skipf("cannot create a junction: %v %s", err, out)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("cannot create a symlink: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The reported defect: a link in an ANCESTOR of the target, not at the target
+// itself. Every guard that checked only the final directory and file passed
+// this, because the components it checked were genuinely not links; the ones
+// the syscall then traversed were.
+func TestAnAncestorLinkCannotRedirectAWrite(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	outside := filepath.Join(base, "outside")
+	workspace := filepath.Join(base, "workspace")
+	for _, dir := range []string{outside, workspace} {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	linkDir(t, outside, filepath.Join(workspace, ".zero"))
+
+	handle, relative, err := Open(workspace, filepath.Join(workspace, ".zero", "store"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Open should confine, not refuse outright: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	if err := handle.MkdirAll(relative, 0o700); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("created a directory through a linked ancestor, so a write can still leave the workspace")
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(outside, "store")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Errorf("something was created outside the workspace, stat error = %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// RefuseReparse has to catch a junction, which is the case os.ModeSymlink alone
+// misses. Asserted through the exported helper rather than by reading the mode,
+// so the test fails if the predicate is ever narrowed back.
+func TestRefuseReparseCatchesAJunctionNotJustASymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(base, "target")
+	inside := filepath.Join(base, "inside")
+	for _, dir := range []string{target, inside} {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	linkDir(t, target, filepath.Join(inside, "linked"))
+
+	handle, relative, err := Open(inside, inside)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	err = RefuseReparse(handle, filepath.Join(relative, "linked"))
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrReparse) {
+		t.Fatalf("RefuseReparse(link) = %v, want ErrReparse; on Windows a junction reports ModeIrregular, so a ModeSymlink-only check returns nil here", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A name that does not exist yet is what a create is for, so it must not be
+// refused. Without this the guard above would be satisfied by refusing
+// everything.
+func TestRefuseReparseAllowsAnAbsentName(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	handle, relative, err := Open(base, base)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+	if err := RefuseReparse(handle, filepath.Join(relative, "not-there.md")); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("an absent name was refused: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := RefuseReparse(handle, relative); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("an ordinary directory was refused: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Open refuses a target outside its root before opening anything, so a caller
+// cannot act on the path first.
+func TestOpenRefusesATargetOutsideTheRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	inside := filepath.Join(base, "inside")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(inside, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, target := range []string{
+		filepath.Join(base, "sibling"),
+		filepath.Join(inside, "..", "..", "escape"),
+	} {
+		if _, _, err := Open(inside, target); !errors.Is(err, ErrEscapes) {
+			t.Errorf("Open(%q, %q) = %v, want ErrEscapes", inside, target, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, _, err := Open("", filepath.Join(base, "anything")); !errors.Is(err, ErrEscapes) {
+		t.Error("an empty root was accepted; a boundary is not optional")
+	}
+}
+
+// CreateTemp must use O_EXCL and an unpredictable name, so a link planted at a
+// guessable temp path is refused by the kernel rather than followed.
+func TestCreateTempIsExclusiveAndUnpredictable(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	handle, relative, err := Open(base, base)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		file, name, err := CreateTemp(handle, relative, "note", ".tmp")
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		file.Close()
+		if seen[name] {
+			t.Fatalf("CreateTemp reused the name %q, so two concurrent writes would stomp each other", name)
+		}
+		seen[name] = true
+		if filepath.Ext(name) != ".tmp" {
+			t.Errorf("temp name %q lost its suffix, so a listing may pick it up as real content", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A legitimate directory whose name carries a space must be confined as spelled.
+// Trimming it would open a different filesystem object.
+//
+// A LEADING space, deliberately: Win32 normalizes a component's trailing spaces
+// and dots away, so "root " and "root" are one object there and a trailing-space
+// case cannot express the bug on Windows. A leading space survives on every
+// platform, so this runs everywhere rather than being gated to unix.
+// The path is RELATIVE, under t.Chdir, so the leading space sits at the start of
+// the whole string. An absolute filepath.Join(base, " root") would put the space
+// in the middle, where TrimSpace cannot reach it — the test would then pass
+// against the very guard it exists to catch, on every platform.
+func TestOpenPreservesSpaceInPaths(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	t.Chdir(base)
+	const spaced = " root" // the leading space is part of the name
+
+	handle, relative, err := Open(spaced, spaced)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	// Write through the handle, then confirm the bytes landed under the spelling
+	// the caller asked for — the property that actually matters, and one
+	// handle.Name() alone would not prove.
+	file, _, err := CreateTemp(handle, relative, "probe", ".tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	name := file.Name()
+	if err := file.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(base, spaced, filepath.Base(name))); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("a file created through the handle is not under %q: %v — the leading space was trimmed away", spaced, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(base, "root")); err == nil {
+		t.Error(`a trimmed "root" was created instead of the requested " root"`)
+	}
+}
+
+// A whitespace-only name is a legal directory on unix, so it must be confined as
+// given rather than treated as "no root" or silently swapped for the root.
+func TestOpenAcceptsAWhitespaceOnlyComponent(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("Win32 normalizes a whitespace-only component away; the name is not expressible there")
+	}
+	// The path must be whitespace-only IN FULL for this to bite, so it has to be
+	// relative: an absolute path ending in " " still has a non-empty TrimSpace and
+	// would sail past the old guard, making the test prove nothing.
+	t.Chdir(t.TempDir())
+	handle, _, err := Open(" ", " ")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("a whitespace-only path was rejected as missing: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+	if _, err := os.Stat(" "); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("the whitespace-only directory was not created as spelled: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// prefix and suffix are name fragments. A separator or traversal in either must
+// be refused, or the file lands outside dir and (for a suffix erasing the random
+// component) loses the O_EXCL unpredictability it depends on.
+func TestCreateTempRejectsPathFragmentsThatEscapeTheDir(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	inside := filepath.Join(base, "inside")
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(inside, 0o700); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// root is base, dir is the subdirectory: a "../escaped" fragment lands in
+	// base — still inside the os.Root, so os.Root does NOT catch it — but outside
+	// the dir CreateTemp promised. This is the case the reviewers reproduced.
+	handle, relative, err := Open(base, inside)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+	cases := []struct{ prefix, suffix string }{
+		{"../escaped", ".tmp"},
+		{`..\sibling`, ".tmp"},
+		{"note", ".tmp/../evil"},
+		{"note", ".."},
+		{"..", ".tmp"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if _, _, err := CreateTemp(handle, relative, c.prefix, c.suffix); !errors.Is(err, ErrEscapes) {
+			t.Errorf("CreateTemp(prefix=%q, suffix=%q) = %v, want ErrEscapes", c.prefix, c.suffix, err)
+		}
+	}
+	// Nothing may have leaked into base above the promised dir.
+	entries, _ := os.ReadDir(base)
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		if entry.Name() != "inside" {
+			t.Errorf("a temp fragment escaped into the parent: %q", entry.Name())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A junction named with a trailing separator must still be refused. On Windows
+// os.Root.Lstat resolves the terminal component when the name ends in a
+// separator, so without trimming it the link is stat'd as its target and waved
+// through.
+func TestRefuseReparseCatchesALinkNamedWithATrailingSeparator(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(base, "target")
+	inside := filepath.Join(base, "inside")
+	for _, dir := range []string{target, inside} {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	linkDir(t, target, filepath.Join(inside, "linked"))
+	handle, relative, err := Open(inside, inside)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+	name := filepath.Join(relative, "linked") + string(filepath.Separator)
+	if err := RefuseReparse(handle, name); !errors.Is(err, ErrReparse) {
+		t.Fatalf("RefuseReparse(%q) = %v, want ErrReparse", name, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The O_EXCL retry is the branch that protects an existing file, and a real
+// random source will not collide on demand — so force it. The first two draws
+// return the same bytes: the name is pre-created, CreateTemp must refuse to
+// reuse it, leave its contents alone, and come back with a different name.
+func TestCreateTempRetriesWithoutClobberingAnExistingName(t *testing.T) {
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	handle, relative, err := Open(base, base)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	draws := [][]byte{
+		{1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, // collides with the pre-created file
+		{1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, // and again, so the retry must keep trying
+		{2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2}, // finally a free name
+	}
+	previous := randomBytes
+	t.Cleanup(func() { randomBytes = previous })
+	call := 0
+	randomBytes = func(b []byte) (int, error) {
+		copy(b, draws[min(call, len(draws)-1)])
+		call++
+		return len(b), nil
+	}
+
+	taken := filepath.Join(base, "note."+hex.EncodeToString(draws[0])+".tmp")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(taken, []byte("do not clobber me"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	file, name, err := CreateTemp(handle, relative, "note", ".tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer file.Close()
+
+	if filepath.Base(name) == filepath.Base(taken) {
+		t.Fatalf("CreateTemp returned the name that was already taken (%q), so O_EXCL did not protect it", name)
+	}
+	kept, err := os.ReadFile(taken)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if string(kept) != "do not clobber me" {
+		t.Errorf("the pre-existing file was overwritten: %q", kept)
+	}
+	if call < 2 {
+		t.Errorf("the random source was drawn %d time(s); the collision path never ran", call)
+	}
+}
+
+// On unix a backslash is an ordinary filename character, not a separator, so a
+// link genuinely named `linked\` must still be refused. Trimming backslashes
+// unconditionally would inspect "linked" instead and report "not a link" for one
+// that is.
+func TestRefuseReparseKeepsABackslashInAUnixName(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip(`backslash is a separator on Windows, so this name is not expressible there`)
+	}
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(base, "target")
+	inside := filepath.Join(base, "inside")
+	for _, dir := range []string{target, inside} {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	linkDir(t, target, filepath.Join(inside, `linked\`))
+
+	handle, relative, err := Open(inside, inside)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer handle.Close()
+
+	name := filepath.Join(relative, `linked\`)
+	if err := RefuseReparse(handle, name); !errors.Is(err, ErrReparse) {
+		t.Fatalf("RefuseReparse(%q) = %v, want ErrReparse — the backslash is part of the name here, not a separator", name, err)
+	}
+}

internal/peermsg/private_dir_windows.go

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func windowsTokenOwner(token windows.Token) (*windows.SID, error) {
 	}
 	owner := (*windowsTokenOwnerInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(&buffer[0])).owner
 	if owner == nil {
-		return nil, errors.New("Windows access token has no default owner")
+		return nil, errors.New("windows access token has no default owner")
 	}
 	return owner.Copy()
 }

internal/providermodelcatalog/remote.go

@@ -184,6 +184,10 @@ func parseOpenAIStyleModelList(body []byte) ([]remoteModel, error) {
 
 func ModelsDevProviderID(provider providercatalog.Descriptor) string {
 	switch strings.TrimSpace(provider.ID) {
+	case "chatgpt":
+		// ChatGPT authenticates against the Codex backend, while its public
+		// model metadata is published under the OpenAI provider on models.dev.
+		return "openai"
 	case "dashscope":
 		return "alibaba"
 	case "github":

internal/providermodelcatalog/remote_test.go

@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ func TestPublicLiveCatalog(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestModelsDevProviderIDMapsZeroAliases(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := map[string]string{
+		"chatgpt":      "openai",
 		"github":       "github-models",
 		"moonshot":     "moonshotai",
 		"nvidia-nim":   "nvidia",

internal/providermodeldiscovery/discovery.go

@@ -539,7 +539,8 @@ func mergeLiveModels(provider providercatalog.Descriptor, liveModels []Model, ca
 	hasCatalog := len(byID) > 0
 	// Aggregators publish the live list as the source of truth. Keep live-only
 	// ids even when a remote catalog also loaded, instead of intersecting.
-	preferLive := providermodelcatalog.PublicLiveCatalog(provider.ID) ||
+	preferLive := provider.Local ||
+		providermodelcatalog.PublicLiveCatalog(provider.ID) ||
 		providercatalog.NormalizeID(provider.ID) == "chatgpt"
 	result := make([]Model, 0, len(liveModels))
 	for _, live := range liveModels {

internal/providermodeldiscovery/discovery_test.go

@@ -139,6 +139,68 @@ func TestMergeChatGPTModelsKeepsLiveOnlyEntries(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestDiscoverCatalogChatGPTMergesOpenAIModelsDevMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch r.URL.Path {
+		case "/api.json":
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
+				"openai": {"models": {
+					"gpt-5.6-sol": {
+						"id": "gpt-5.6-sol",
+						"name": "GPT-5.6 Sol",
+						"description": "Frontier coding model",
+						"tool_call": true,
+						"reasoning": true,
+						"reasoning_efforts": ["low", "high", "max"],
+						"limit": {"context": 1050000},
+						"modalities": {"input": ["text", "image", "pdf"], "output": ["text"]}
+					}
+				}}
+			}`))
+		case "/backend-api/codex/models":
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-5.6-sol"}]}`))
+		default:
+			t.Errorf("unexpected request path %q", r.URL.Path)
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+			return
+		}
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	provider, ok := providercatalog.Get("chatgpt")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("ChatGPT provider missing from catalog")
+	}
+	models, err := DiscoverCatalog(context.Background(), provider, config.ProviderProfile{
+		Name:         "chatgpt",
+		CatalogID:    "chatgpt",
+		ProviderKind: config.ProviderKindOpenAICompatible,
+		BaseURL:      server.URL + "/backend-api/codex",
+	}, Options{
+		HTTPClient:   server.Client(),
+		ModelsDevURL: server.URL + "/api.json",
+		OAuthResolver: func(context.Context, bool) (string, string, bool, error) {
+			return "Authorization", "Bearer test", true, nil
+		},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("DiscoverCatalog returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(models) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("models = %#v, want one ChatGPT live model", models)
+	}
+	model := models[0]
+	if model.ID != "gpt-5.6-sol" || model.ContextWindow != 1050000 || !model.ToolCall || !model.Reasoning {
+		t.Fatalf("merged ChatGPT model = %#v, want models.dev metadata", model)
+	}
+	if got := strings.Join(model.InputModalities, ","); got != "text,image,pdf" {
+		t.Fatalf("input modalities = %q, want text,image,pdf", got)
+	}
+	if got := strings.Join(model.ReasoningEfforts, ","); got != "low,high,max" {
+		t.Fatalf("reasoning efforts = %q, want low,high,max", got)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestMergeLiveModelsUsesLiveDefaultsAndReasoningCapability(t *testing.T) {
 	models := mergeLiveModels(
 		providercatalog.Descriptor{ID: "chatgpt"},
@@ -164,6 +226,29 @@ func TestMergeLiveModelsUsesLiveDefaultsAndReasoningCapability(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestMergeLocalModelsKeepsLiveOnlyEntries(t *testing.T) {
+	models := mergeLiveModels(
+		providercatalog.Descriptor{ID: "lmstudio", Local: true},
+		[]Model{
+			{ID: "qwen3-coder-30b", ContextWindow: 32768},
+			{ID: "text-embedding-local"},
+			{ID: "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct", Description: "live description"},
+		},
+		[]Model{{ID: "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct", Description: "catalog description", ToolCall: true}},
+	)
+
+	if got, want := strings.Join(modelIDs(models), ","), "qwen3-coder-30b,qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("models = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	for _, model := range models {
+		if model.ID == "qwen2.5-coder-32b-instruct" {
+			if model.Description != "catalog description" || !model.ToolCall {
+				t.Fatalf("merged catalog metadata = %#v", model)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDiscoverCatalogOpenGatewayUsesLiveListWithoutKey(t *testing.T) {
 	// Catalog and live endpoints return distinct payloads so the merge must keep
 	// live-only ids that are absent from the remote catalog response.

internal/providers/openai/provider.go

@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
 				Function: toolFunction{
 					Name:        tool.Name,
 					Description: tool.Description,
-					Parameters:  tool.Parameters,
+					Parameters:  normalizeToolParameters(tool.Parameters),
 				},
 			})
 		}
@@ -494,6 +494,21 @@ func (provider *Provider) openAIRequest(request zeroruntime.CompletionRequest) c
 	return mapped
 }
 
+// normalizeToolParameters keeps schemas accepted by strict OpenAI-compatible
+// servers such as LM Studio. No-argument tools still need an object-valued
+// parameters.properties field instead of an omitted field.
+func normalizeToolParameters(parameters map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	normalized := make(map[string]any, len(parameters)+1)
+	for key, value := range parameters {
+		normalized[key] = value
+	}
+	properties, ok := normalized["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok || properties == nil {
+		normalized["properties"] = map[string]any{}
+	}
+	return normalized
+}
+
 // promptCacheKeyDisabled reports whether the ZERO_DISABLE_PROMPT_CACHE_KEY
 // kill switch is set to a truthy value. "0" and "false" (any case) are
 // no-ops, matching how ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE parses boolean flags, so an

internal/providers/openai/provider_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package openai
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"reflect"
@@ -105,6 +106,72 @@ func TestStreamCompletionPostsChatCompletionRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	if tool["type"] != "function" {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected tool wrapper: %#v", tool)
 	}
+	functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
+	parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
+	properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStreamCompletionSerializesTypedNilPropertiesAsEmptyObject locks in the
+// normalizeToolParameters fix: a tool whose parameters carry a typed-nil
+// properties map must serialize "properties":{} on the wire, never
+// "properties":null, because strict OpenAI-compatible servers (LM Studio)
+// reject the null form.
+func TestStreamCompletionSerializesTypedNilPropertiesAsEmptyObject(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotBody map[string]any
+	var gotRaw []byte
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		raw, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		gotRaw = raw
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &gotBody); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[]}`)
+		writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	provider, err := New(Options{
+		APIKey:  "sk-secret",
+		BaseURL: server.URL + "/",
+		Model:   "gpt-test",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
+		Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
+			Name:        "no_args",
+			Description: "Takes no arguments",
+			Parameters:  map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": map[string]any(nil)},
+		}},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	drain(stream)
+
+	if !strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":{}`) {
+		t.Fatalf("request body must serialize properties as an empty object, got: %s", gotRaw)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":null`) {
+		t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as null, got: %s", gotRaw)
+	}
+	tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
+	tool := tools[0].(map[string]any)
+	functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
+	parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
+	properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
+	}
 }
 
 func TestNewRequiresModelButNotAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1479,3 +1546,66 @@ func TestOpenAIRequestPreservesCacheablePrefixAcrossTurns(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("wire prompt cache key must remain stable: first=%#v second=%#v", first["prompt_cache_key"], second["prompt_cache_key"])
 	}
 }
+
+// TestStreamCompletionSerializesNonMapPropertiesAsEmptyObject locks in the
+// normalizeToolParameters type-assert branch: when a tool's parameters carry a
+// `properties` field whose value is a non-map (e.g., an empty slice), it must
+// be normalized to "properties":{} on the wire, never "properties":[] or
+// "properties":null.
+func TestStreamCompletionSerializesNonMapPropertiesAsEmptyObject(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotBody map[string]any
+	var gotRaw []byte
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		raw, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		gotRaw = raw
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &gotBody); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("decode request body: %v", err)
+		}
+		writeSSE(w, `{"choices":[]}`)
+		writeSSE(w, `[DONE]`)
+	}))
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	provider, err := New(Options{
+		APIKey:  "sk-secret",
+		BaseURL: server.URL + "/",
+		Model:   "gpt-test",
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("New returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	stream, err := provider.StreamCompletion(context.Background(), zeroruntime.CompletionRequest{
+		Messages: []zeroruntime.Message{{Role: zeroruntime.MessageRoleUser, Content: "hi"}},
+		Tools: []zeroruntime.ToolDefinition{{
+			Name:        "no_args",
+			Description: "Takes no arguments",
+			Parameters:  map[string]any{"type": "object", "properties": []any{}},
+		}},
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StreamCompletion returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	drain(stream)
+
+	if !strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":{}`) {
+		t.Fatalf("request body must serialize properties as an empty object, got: %s", gotRaw)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":null`) {
+		t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as null, got: %s", gotRaw)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(string(gotRaw), `"properties":[]`) {
+		t.Fatalf("request body must not serialize properties as an empty array, got: %s", gotRaw)
+	}
+	tools := gotBody["tools"].([]any)
+	tool := tools[0].(map[string]any)
+	functionDefinition := tool["function"].(map[string]any)
+	parameters := functionDefinition["parameters"].(map[string]any)
+	properties, ok := parameters["properties"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok || len(properties) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("parameters.properties = %#v, want empty object", parameters["properties"])
+	}
+}

internal/providers/providerio/export_test.go

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-// Test seams: helpers only test code uses, kept out of the production binary.
-package providerio
-
-import (
-	"bufio"
-	"io"
-)
-
-// ScanSSEData parses Server-Sent Event data fields from a streaming response.
-func ScanSSEData(reader io.Reader, handle func(data string) bool) error {
-	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(reader)
-	scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 4096), maxSSELineBytes)
-	return scanSSEPayloads(scanner, handle, nil)
-}

internal/sandbox/command_prefix.go

@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ func unsafeCommandPrefix(prefix []string) bool {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
+	normalized := append([]string(nil), prefix...)
+	normalized[0] = normalizeLauncherName(normalized[0])
 	for _, banned := range bannedCommandPrefixSuggestions {
-		if sameStringSlice(prefix, banned) {
+		if sameStringSlice(prefix, banned) || sameStringSlice(normalized, banned) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
@@ -165,25 +167,118 @@ func unsafeCommandPrefixPart(part string) bool {
 }
 
 func unsafeCommandPrefixLauncher(program string) bool {
-	program = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(program))
-	if strings.ContainsAny(program, `/\`) {
+	// A path is already refused. ":" and "~" are refused for the same reason:
+	// on Windows they introduce names that resolve to a different file than the
+	// one matched here, and no list can keep up with them. "PYTHON~1.EXE" is
+	// python.exe under an 8.3 short name, and 8.3 truncates the stem, so
+	// "POWERS~1.EXE" cannot be recognized by name at all; "python.exe::$DATA"
+	// names the same executable through its default stream. Refusing the shape
+	// costs a permission prompt on names no real command uses.
+	if strings.ContainsAny(program, `/\:~`) {
 		return true
 	}
-	switch program {
-	case "bash", "sh", "zsh", "/bin/bash", "/bin/zsh",
-		"pwsh", "powershell", "powershell.exe",
-		"env", "sudo", "doas", "su", "run0", "osascript",
+	name := normalizeLauncherName(program)
+	return bannedLauncherName(name) || bannedLauncherName(strings.TrimRight(name, "0123456789"))
+}
+
+func bannedLauncherName(name string) bool {
+	switch name {
+	case "bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "ash", "ksh", "csh", "tcsh", "fish", "busybox",
+		"pwsh", "powershell", "cmd", "wsl",
+		"env", "sudo", "sudoedit", "doas", "su", "run0", "osascript",
 		"command", "eval", "exec", "time",
 		"find", "xargs", "timeout", "nice", "nohup", "watch", "setsid", "stdbuf", "ionice",
-		"ssh", "make", "npm", "npx",
-		"python", "python3", "py", "pythonw", "pyw", "pypy", "pypy3",
-		"node", "perl", "ruby", "php", "lua", "deno", "bun":
+		"ssh", "make", "npm", "npx", "pnpm", "yarn", "bunx",
+		"python", "py", "pythonw", "pyw", "pypy", "uv", "uvx",
+		"node", "nodejs", "perl", "ruby", "php", "lua", "deno", "bun":
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false
 	}
 }
 
+// normalizeLauncherName reduces a program name to the launcher it actually runs
+// so the list above cannot be stepped around by spelling the same interpreter
+// differently: "python3.11", "python.exe" and "PYTHON3" all reach it as a name
+// the list matches. internal/agent's commandName already normalizes case and
+// Windows executable extensions on the allow side; this side matched raw, so
+// every versioned or .exe-suffixed launcher validated as an ordinary command
+// and persisted as a prefix grant that auto-allows every later invocation.
+//
+// A name is only ever narrowed toward an existing entry, so the failure
+// direction is an extra permission prompt, never a silent grant.
+func normalizeLauncherName(program string) string {
+	name := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(program))
+	// Windows discards trailing dots and spaces when resolving a filename, so
+	// "python." starts python.exe. Drop them before anything matches on the
+	// result, on every platform: the deny side must not depend on which OS is
+	// reading the grant, since the grants file travels with a synced home
+	// directory.
+	name = strings.TrimRight(name, ". ")
+	for _, suffix := range []string{".exe", ".cmd", ".bat", ".com", ".ps1"} {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(name, suffix) {
+			name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, suffix)
+			name = strings.TrimRight(name, ". ")
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return trimLauncherVersion(trimLauncherABISuffix(trimLauncherBuildSuffix(name)))
+}
+
+// trimLauncherBuildSuffix drops the build-channel suffixes distributions and
+// upstreams append to an otherwise unchanged interpreter, so "python3.11-dbg",
+// "bash-static" and "pwsh-preview" are the launchers they say they are. The set
+// is closed on purpose: a general "-word" strip would also swallow
+// "node-gyp", "python3-config" and "ruby-lsp", which are ordinary tools a user
+// should still be able to approve.
+func trimLauncherBuildSuffix(name string) string {
+	for _, suffix := range []string{"-dbg", "-debug", "-static", "-nightly", "-preview", "-beta"} {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(name, suffix) {
+			return strings.TrimSuffix(name, suffix)
+		}
+	}
+	return name
+}
+
+// trimLauncherABISuffix drops CPython's ABI flags from a versioned interpreter
+// name, so "python3.7m" and "python3.6dm" reduce to their version, and the
+// free-threaded builds "python3.13t" and "python3.13td" reduce to theirs. The
+// flags are only removed when a digit sits underneath them, which leaves
+// ordinary names that happen to end in those letters alone: "sha256sum" keeps
+// its "sum", "zstd" its "td", "cat" its "t".
+func trimLauncherABISuffix(name string) string {
+	trimmed := strings.TrimRight(name, "dmut")
+	if trimmed == name || trimmed == "" {
+		return name
+	}
+	if last := trimmed[len(trimmed)-1]; last < '0' || last > '9' {
+		return name
+	}
+	return trimmed
+}
+
+// trimLauncherVersion drops a trailing "<separator><digits>" version from a
+// program name, so "python3.11" becomes "python3" and "python2.7" becomes
+// "python2". Digits without a separator are part of the name, which keeps
+// "base64", "7z" and "sha256sum" intact; the caller handles the "python3" shape
+// by also testing the digit-stripped form.
+func trimLauncherVersion(name string) string {
+	for {
+		trimmed := strings.TrimRight(name, "0123456789")
+		if trimmed == name || trimmed == "" {
+			return name
+		}
+		if !strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, ".") && !strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, "-") {
+			return name
+		}
+		next := trimmed[:len(trimmed)-1]
+		if next == "" {
+			return name
+		}
+		name = next
+	}
+}
+
 func sameStringSlice(left []string, right []string) bool {
 	if len(left) != len(right) {
 		return false

internal/sandbox/command_prefix_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package sandbox
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestUnsafeCommandPrefixLauncherIgnoresVersionAndExtension(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, program := range []string{
+		"python3", "python", "node", "git", "sh", "bash", "sudo",
+		"python3.11", "python3.12", "python2.7", "python3.13.1",
+		"python.exe", "python3.exe", "node.exe", "git.exe", "bash.exe",
+		"PYTHON3.11", "Node.EXE",
+		"cmd", "cmd.exe", "wsl", "wsl.exe",
+		// Windows resolves these to the same executable.
+		"python.", "python3.", "python3.11.", "python.exe.", "PYTHON.",
+		"python.cmd", "python.bat", "python.com", "python.ps1",
+		"PYTHON~1.EXE", "POWERS~1.EXE", "python.exe::$DATA",
+		// Versioned and ABI-suffixed interpreters.
+		"python3.7m", "python3.6dm", "pythonw3.11", "python-3.11",
+		// Free-threaded CPython (PEP 703) ships beside the GIL build.
+		"python3.13t", "python3.13t.exe", "python3.14t", "python3.13td",
+		// Distribution and build-channel spellings of the same interpreter.
+		"nodejs", "nodejs.exe", "node-nightly", "python3-dbg", "python3.11-dbg",
+		"python3.13t-dbg", "python3-debug", "python3.11-debug", "node-beta",
+		"pwsh-preview", "bash-static", "sudoedit",
+		// Twins of npm and npx, which the list already refuses.
+		"pnpm", "yarn", "bunx", "pnpm.cmd", "yarn.exe",
+		"perl5.36", "ruby3.2", "php8", "lua5.4", "node22.exe", "bash5",
+	} {
+		if !unsafeCommandPrefix([]string{program}) {
+			t.Errorf("unsafeCommandPrefix([%q]) = false, want true", program)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUnsafeCommandPrefixKeepsOrdinaryCommandsGrantable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, prefix := range [][]string{
+		{"cargo", "build"},
+		{"go", "test"},
+		{"ls", "-la"},
+		{"rg", "--json"},
+		{"7z", "l"},
+		{"base64", "-d"},
+		{"kubectl", "get", "pods"},
+		{"docker", "ps"},
+		{"sha256sum", "file"},
+		{"gcc-13", "-c"},
+		{"node-gyp", "build"},
+		{"python3-config", "--includes"},
+		{"s3cmd", "ls"},
+		{"cat", "file"},
+		{"zstd", "-d"},
+		{"sqlite3", "db"},
+		{"yt-dlp", "url"},
+		{"perl-doc", "-h"},
+		{"php-fpm", "-t"},
+		{"ruby-lsp", "--version"},
+		{"lua-language-server", "--check"},
+		{"nodemon", "app.js"},
+	} {
+		if unsafeCommandPrefix(prefix) {
+			t.Errorf("unsafeCommandPrefix(%q) = true, want false", prefix)
+		}
+	}
+}
+func TestNormalizeLauncherName(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, testCase := range []struct{ in, want string }{
+		{"python3.11", "python3"},
+		{"python2.7", "python2"},
+		{"pypy3", "pypy3"},
+		{"node.exe", "node"},
+		{"POWERSHELL.EXE", "powershell"},
+		{"7z", "7z"},
+		{"base64", "base64"},
+		{"sha256sum", "sha256sum"},
+		{"python.", "python"},
+		{"python3.11.exe.", "python3"},
+		{"python3.7m", "python3"},
+		{"python3.6dm", "python3"},
+		{"python3.13t", "python3"},
+		{"python3.13td", "python3"},
+		{"python3.11-dbg", "python3"},
+		{"node-nightly", "node"},
+		{"node-gyp", "node-gyp"},
+		{"python3-config", "python3-config"},
+		{"zstd", "zstd"},
+		{"cat", "cat"},
+		{"cargo", "cargo"},
+		{"", ""},
+	} {
+		if got := normalizeLauncherName(testCase.in); got != testCase.want {
+			t.Errorf("normalizeLauncherName(%q) = %q, want %q", testCase.in, got, testCase.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Session-scoped grants are the agent's other entry point (loop.go grants them
+// for a single turn without touching the store), so they must refuse the same
+// launcher spellings the persisted path does.
+func TestGrantCommandPrefixForSessionRefusesLauncherVariants(t *testing.T) {
+	engine := &Engine{commandPrefixes: newCommandPrefixGrantSet()}
+	engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"cargo", "build"})
+	if _, ok := engine.LookupCommandPrefixForSession("bash", []string{"cargo", "build", "--release"}); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("CONTROL BROKEN: an ordinary session prefix grant did not match")
+	}
+	for _, prefix := range [][]string{
+		{"python3.11", "-c"},
+		{"python.exe", "-c"},
+		{"cmd", "/c"},
+	} {
+		engine.GrantCommandPrefixForSession("bash", prefix)
+		command := append(append([]string(nil), prefix...), "whatever")
+		if _, ok := engine.LookupCommandPrefixForSession("bash", command); ok {
+			t.Errorf("session grant %q matched %q, want refused", prefix, command)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/sandbox/engine_test.go

@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ func TestEngineAutoAllowsWorkspaceFileMutationTools(t *testing.T) {
 		{name: "write_file", args: map[string]any{"path": "notes.txt"}},
 		{name: "edit_file", args: map[string]any{"path": "notes.txt"}},
 		{name: "apply_patch", args: map[string]any{"patch": "diff --git a/notes.txt b/notes.txt\n"}},
+		{name: "apply_patch", args: map[string]any{"patch": "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: notes.txt\n+x\n*** End Patch\n"}},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			decision := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
@@ -315,6 +316,27 @@ func TestEngineDeniesApplyPatchEscapesFromPatchBody(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestEngineDeniesStructuredApplyPatchEscapesFromPatchBody(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	engine := NewEngine(EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: root, Policy: DefaultPolicy()})
+
+	for _, patch := range []string{
+		"*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: ../escape.txt\n+x\n*** End Patch\n",
+		"*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: ..\\escape.txt\n+x\n*** End Patch\n",
+	} {
+		decision := engine.Evaluate(context.Background(), Request{
+			ToolName:       "apply_patch",
+			SideEffect:     SideEffectWrite,
+			Permission:     PermissionPrompt,
+			PermissionMode: PermissionModeAsk,
+			Args:           map[string]any{"patch": patch},
+		})
+		if decision.Action != ActionDeny || decision.Block == nil || decision.Block.Code != BlockOutsideWorkspace {
+			t.Fatalf("escaping structured apply_patch decision = %#v, want outside-workspace deny", decision)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestEngineSessionGrantDoesNotMatchSiblingFile(t *testing.T) {
 	root := t.TempDir()
 	engine := NewEngine(EngineOptions{WorkspaceRoot: root, Policy: promptWorkspaceWritePolicy()})

internal/sandbox/grants_test.go

@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@ package sandbox
 
 import (
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/execution"
 )
 
 func TestGrantStorePersistsListsRevokesAndClears(t *testing.T) {
@@ -343,7 +346,8 @@ func TestGrantStoreMigratesExactV1GrantAndReportsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read rewritten grant file: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"schemaVersion": 3`) || !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"policyVersion": 1`) || !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"write_file": [`) {
+	policyLine := fmt.Sprintf(`"policyVersion": %d`, execution.PolicyVersion)
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"schemaVersion": 3`) || !strings.Contains(string(raw), policyLine) || !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"write_file": [`) {
 		t.Fatalf("grant file was not rewritten as a versioned grant store:\n%s", raw)
 	}
 	backup, err := os.ReadFile(path + ".v1.backup")
@@ -406,6 +410,62 @@ func TestGrantStorePolicyChangePreservesDeniesAndInvalidatesApprovals(t *testing
 	}
 }
 
+// A prefix grant recorded before launcher-name normalization existed (a
+// versioned or .exe-suffixed interpreter) no longer validates. It must reach
+// the user through the policy migration — backup, denies preserved, one notice
+// — and never make the whole grants file unreadable, which would silently drop
+// their persisted deny grants too.
+func TestGrantStoreMigratesPreNormalizationPrefixInsteadOfRejectingTheFile(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sandbox-grants.json")
+	original := `{"schemaVersion":3,"policyVersion":1,"grants":{"bash":[{"toolName":"bash","decision":"deny","approvedAt":"2026-06-05T14:30:00Z"}]},"commandPrefixes":{"bash":[{"toolName":"bash","prefix":["python3.11","-c"],"approvedAt":"2026-06-05T14:30:00Z"},{"toolName":"bash","prefix":["cargo","build"],"approvedAt":"2026-06-05T14:30:00Z"}]}}`
+	if err := writeText(path, original); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	store, err := NewGrantStore(StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	grants, err := store.List()
+	if err != nil || len(grants) != 1 || grants[0].Decision != GrantDeny {
+		t.Fatalf("grants after migration = %#v err=%v, want the deny preserved", grants, err)
+	}
+	prefixes, err := store.ListCommandPrefixes()
+	if err != nil || len(prefixes) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("prefixes after migration = %#v err=%v, want all re-approved", prefixes, err)
+	}
+	if notice, err := store.ConsumeMigrationNotice(); err != nil || !strings.Contains(notice, "invalidated 2") {
+		t.Fatalf("notice = %q err=%v", notice, err)
+	}
+	if backup, err := os.ReadFile(path + ".policy-v1.backup"); err != nil || string(backup) != original {
+		t.Fatalf("backup = %q err=%v", backup, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The legacy-schema path is a separate migration from the policy bump above and
+// prunes per grant rather than wholesale, so a pre-normalization prefix must be
+// dropped there while the valid prefix beside it survives.
+func TestGrantStoreLegacyMigrationDropsOnlyThePreNormalizationPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sandbox-grants.json")
+	original := `{"schemaVersion":2,"grants":{},"commandPrefixes":{"bash":[{"toolName":"bash","prefix":["python3.11","-c"],"approvedAt":"2026-06-05T14:30:00Z"},{"toolName":"bash","prefix":["git","status"],"approvedAt":"2026-06-05T14:30:00Z"}]}}`
+	if err := writeText(path, original); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	store, err := NewGrantStore(StoreOptions{FilePath: path})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	prefixes, err := store.ListCommandPrefixes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ListCommandPrefixes after legacy migration returned error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(prefixes) != 1 || !sameStringSlice(prefixes[0].Prefix, []string{"git", "status"}) {
+		t.Fatalf("prefixes = %#v, want only [git status]", prefixes)
+	}
+	if notice, err := store.ConsumeMigrationNotice(); err != nil || !strings.Contains(notice, "migrated 1, invalidated 1") {
+		t.Fatalf("notice = %q err=%v", notice, err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestGrantStorePersistsCommandPrefixes(t *testing.T) {
 	store, err := NewGrantStore(StoreOptions{
 		FilePath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "sandbox-grants.json"),
@@ -481,6 +541,11 @@ func TestGrantStoreRejectsUnsafeCommandPrefixes(t *testing.T) {
 		{"python", "script.py"},
 		{"./script.sh"},
 		{"git"},
+		{"python3.11", "-c"},
+		{"python.exe", "-c"},
+		{"node.exe", "-e"},
+		{"git.exe"},
+		{"cmd", "/c"},
 	} {
 		if _, err := store.GrantCommandPrefix(CommandPrefixInput{ToolName: "bash", Prefix: prefix}); err == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("GrantCommandPrefix(%#v) succeeded, want validation error", prefix)

internal/sandbox/risk.go

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ func applyPatchRequestPaths(args map[string]any) []string {
 	}
 	cwd := firstArgString(args, "cwd")
 	var paths []string
-	for _, path := range patchHeaderPaths(patch) {
+	for _, path := range applyPatchPaths(patch) {
 		if path == "" || path == "/dev/null" {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ func applyPatchPathBlock(request Request) *pathBlock {
 	if patch == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
-	for _, path := range patchHeaderPaths(patch) {
+	for _, path := range applyPatchPaths(patch) {
 		if path == "" || path == "/dev/null" {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -296,6 +296,34 @@ func applyPatchPathBlock(request Request) *pathBlock {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func applyPatchPaths(patch string) []string {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(patch, "\ufeff")), "*** Begin Patch") {
+		return structuredPatchHeaderPaths(patch)
+	}
+	return patchHeaderPaths(patch)
+}
+
+// structuredPatchHeaderPaths is intentionally a small, conservative scanner for
+// the sandbox boundary. The executor validates the complete hunk grammar before
+// writing; the sandbox only needs every possible target path so it can reject an
+// unsafe request before the tool runs.
+func structuredPatchHeaderPaths(patch string) []string {
+	var paths []string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(strings.ReplaceAll(patch, "\r\n", "\n"), "\n") {
+		trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		for _, prefix := range []string{"*** Add File: ", "*** Delete File: ", "*** Update File: ", "*** Move to: "} {
+			if path, ok := strings.CutPrefix(trimmed, prefix); ok {
+				path = strings.ReplaceAll(filepath.ToSlash(strings.TrimSpace(path)), "\\", "/")
+				if path != "" {
+					paths = append(paths, path)
+				}
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return paths
+}
+
 func patchHeaderPaths(patch string) []string {
 	var paths []string
 	oldRemaining, newRemaining := 0, 0

internal/tools/apply_patch.go

@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@ func NewScopedApplyPatchTool(workspaceRoot string, scope PathScope) Tool {
 	return applyPatchTool{
 		baseTool: baseTool{
 			name:        "apply_patch",
-			description: "Apply a unified diff patch inside the workspace or an explicitly granted extra write root.",
+			description: "Apply a patch inside the workspace or an explicitly granted extra write root.",
 			parameters: Schema{
 				Type: "object",
 				Properties: map[string]PropertySchema{
-					"patch": {Type: "string", Description: "Unified diff patch to apply."},
+					"patch": {Type: "string", Description: "A unified diff or a structured *** Begin Patch patch to apply."},
 					"cwd":   {Type: "string", Description: "Directory where the patch should be applied. Relative paths stay in the workspace; use an absolute path to target a granted extra write root. Defaults to workspace root.", Default: "."},
 				},
 				Required:             []string{"patch"},
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ func (tool applyPatchTool) RunWithOptions(ctx context.Context, args map[string]a
 	if err != nil {
 		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
 	}
+	if isStructuredPatch(patch) {
+		return tool.runStructuredPatch(applyRoot, relativeRoot, patch, options)
+	}
 	if err := validatePatchPaths(applyRoot, patch); err != nil {
 		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
 	}

internal/tools/capabilities.go

@@ -162,11 +162,3 @@ func ValidateCapabilities(name string, caps ToolCapabilities) []string {
 	}
 	return problems
 }
-
-// ValidateToolCapabilities validates CapabilitiesOf(tool) for a registered tool.
-func ValidateToolCapabilities(tool Tool) []string {
-	if tool == nil {
-		return []string{"<nil tool>"}
-	}
-	return ValidateCapabilities(tool.Name(), CapabilitiesOf(tool))
-}

internal/tools/capabilities_test.go

@@ -231,6 +231,25 @@ func TestApplyPatchResourceKeysFromDiffAndCwd(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestApplyPatchResourceKeysFromStructuredPatchAndCwd(t *testing.T) {
+	patch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: old.go\n*** Move to: new.go\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\n"
+	keys := applyPatchResourceKeys(map[string]any{"patch": patch, "cwd": "pkg"})
+	want := map[string]bool{
+		ResourceKeyDirectory + "pkg":   true,
+		ResourceKeyFile + "pkg/old.go": true,
+		ResourceKeyFile + "pkg/new.go": true,
+	}
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		if !want[key] {
+			t.Fatalf("unexpected key %q in %v", key, keys)
+		}
+		delete(want, key)
+	}
+	if len(want) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("missing keys %v from %v", want, keys)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestDeclaredMutatorThreadSafeIsReportedByCatalogValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	// Runtime CapabilitiesOf clears ThreadSafe on mutators; catalog validation
 	// must still see the raw declaration so miswired constructors fail the gate.

internal/tools/file_safety_test.go

@@ -221,6 +221,112 @@ func TestApplyPatchCompleteCreationCreditsSuppliedFile(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestStructuredPatchDoesNotCreditUnreadFileForOverwrite(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "f.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("alpha\nbeta\ngamma\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry := safetyRegistry(t, dir)
+	registry.Register(NewScopedApplyPatchTool(dir, nil))
+	tracker := NewFileTracker()
+	opts := grantedOpts(tracker)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: f.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-beta",
+		"+updated",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	if result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": patch}, opts); result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	trackedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if tracker.SeenWhole(trackedPath) {
+		t.Fatal("a partial structured patch credited the unread file as fully seen")
+	}
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "write_file", map[string]any{
+		"path": "f.txt", "content": "blind overwrite\n", "overwrite": true,
+	}, opts)
+	if result.Status != StatusError || !strings.Contains(result.Output, "has not been read exactly") {
+		t.Fatalf("blind overwrite after a partial patch was not refused: %#v", result)
+	}
+	if got, want := mustReadTestFile(t, path), "alpha\nupdated\ngamma\n"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("file = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchPreservesWholeFileObservation(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "f.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("alpha\nbeta\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	registry := safetyRegistry(t, dir)
+	registry.Register(NewScopedApplyPatchTool(dir, nil))
+	tracker := NewFileTracker()
+	opts := grantedOpts(tracker)
+	if result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "read_file", map[string]any{"path": "f.txt"}, opts); result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("read_file failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: f.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-alpha",
+		"+updated",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+	if result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": patch}, opts); result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	trackedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !tracker.SeenWhole(trackedPath) {
+		t.Fatal("structured patch discarded an existing whole-file observation")
+	}
+	result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "write_file", map[string]any{
+		"path": "f.txt", "content": "known overwrite\n", "overwrite": true,
+	}, opts)
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("overwrite after a whole-file read was refused: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchCreationCreditsSuppliedFile(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	registry := safetyRegistry(t, dir)
+	registry.Register(NewScopedApplyPatchTool(dir, nil))
+	tracker := NewFileTracker()
+	opts := grantedOpts(tracker)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Add File: created.txt",
+		"+supplied",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+	if result := registry.RunWithOptions(context.Background(), "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": patch}, opts); result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	path, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(filepath.Join(dir, "created.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !tracker.SeenWhole(path) {
+		t.Fatal("a fully supplied structured add was not credited as fully seen")
+	}
+}
+
 func TestWriteFileOverwriteRefusedWhenChangedOnDisk(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := filepath.Join(dir, "f.txt")

internal/tools/format_on_write.go

@@ -78,14 +78,16 @@ func maybeFormatWrittenFile(ctx context.Context, absolutePath string, writtenCon
 	if !ok {
 		return writtenContent
 	}
-	if _, err := exec.LookPath(command[0]); err != nil {
+	binaryPath, err := exec.LookPath(command[0])
+	if err != nil {
 		return writtenContent
 	}
 	formatCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, formatOnWriteTimeout)
 	defer cancel()
 	arguments := append(append([]string(nil), command[1:]...), absolutePath)
-	formatter := exec.CommandContext(formatCtx, command[0], arguments...)
+	formatter := exec.CommandContext(formatCtx, binaryPath, arguments...)
 	formatter.Dir = filepath.Dir(absolutePath)
+	formatter.Stdin = strings.NewReader("")
 	if err := formatter.Run(); err != nil {
 		return writtenContent
 	}

internal/tools/format_on_write_test.go

@@ -102,3 +102,17 @@ func TestFormatOnWriteSkipsUnknownExtensions(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("unknown extension must pass through: %q", content)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestFormatOnWriteFormatterLookupFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("ZERO_FORMAT_ON_WRITE", "1")
+	t.Setenv("PATH", t.TempDir())
+	targetPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "a.go")
+	uglyContent := "package a\n\nfunc  A( ) {   }\n"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(targetPath, []byte(uglyContent), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	content := maybeFormatWrittenFile(context.Background(), targetPath, uglyContent)
+	if content != uglyContent {
+		t.Fatalf("missing formatter must return written content, got %q", content)
+	}
+}

internal/tools/model_visibility.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+package tools
+
+// ModelVisible reports whether a registered tool is advertised to an agent.
+// edit_file remains implemented for compatibility with existing integrations,
+// but its text-only replacement contract cannot safely disambiguate repeated
+// source fragments. Agents use apply_patch for contextual existing-file edits.
+func ModelVisible(tool Tool) bool {
+	return tool != nil && tool.Name() != "edit_file"
+}

internal/tools/model_visibility_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package tools
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestToolSearchDoesNotSurfaceLegacyStringReplacement(t *testing.T) {
+	registry := NewRegistry()
+	registry.Register(NewScopedEditFileTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
+	registry.Register(NewScopedApplyPatchTool(t.TempDir(), nil))
+	search := NewToolSearchTool(registry).(toolSearchTool)
+
+	eager := search.visibleEagerToolNames(nil, nil, "ask")
+	if eager["edit_file"] {
+		t.Fatal("tool_search must not describe edit_file as available to the model")
+	}
+	if !eager["apply_patch"] {
+		t.Fatal("tool_search must retain apply_patch as the available edit tool")
+	}
+}

internal/tools/mutation_targets.go

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 package tools
 
+import "path/filepath"
+
 // MutationTargets returns the workspace-relative paths a tool call will write to,
 // so the session layer can snapshot their before-state for safe rewind. It is a
 // pure helper (no I/O beyond path resolution) and returns nil for read-only tools
@@ -36,6 +38,19 @@ func MutationTargets(workspaceRoot string, name string, args map[string]any) []s
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil
 		}
+		if isStructuredPatch(patch) {
+			operations, err := parseStructuredPatch(patch)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil
+			}
+			paths := structuredPatchOperationPaths(operations)
+			for _, path := range paths {
+				if _, _, err := resolveWorkspaceTargetPath(applyRoot, path); err != nil {
+					return nil
+				}
+			}
+			return prefixPatchPaths(relativeRoot, paths)
+		}
 		// Enforce the same workspace confinement apply_patch applies (against the
 		// resolved apply dir), so a patch with a traversal path (../x) never yields
 		// an out-of-workspace target.
@@ -51,3 +66,22 @@ func MutationTargets(workspaceRoot string, name string, args map[string]any) []s
 		return nil
 	}
 }
+
+func prefixPatchPaths(relativeRoot string, paths []string) []string {
+	if len(paths) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	seen := make(map[string]bool)
+	var out []string
+	for _, path := range paths {
+		workspacePath := path
+		if relativeRoot != "" && relativeRoot != "." {
+			workspacePath = filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Join(relativeRoot, path))
+		}
+		if !seen[workspacePath] {
+			seen[workspacePath] = true
+			out = append(out, workspacePath)
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}

internal/tools/mutation_targets_test.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ func TestMutationTargets(t *testing.T) {
 		{"write_file", map[string]any{"path": "a/b.txt", "content": "x"}, []string{"a/b.txt"}},
 		{"edit_file", map[string]any{"path": "c.txt", "old_string": "x", "new_string": "y"}, []string{"c.txt"}},
 		{"apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": "--- a/d.txt\n+++ b/d.txt\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-x\n+y\n"}, []string{"d.txt"}},
+		{"apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: nested/new.txt\n+x\n*** Update File: old.txt\n*** Move to: moved.txt\n@@\n-old\n+new\n*** End Patch\n"}, []string{"nested/new.txt", "old.txt", "moved.txt"}},
 		{"bash", map[string]any{"command": "echo hi"}, nil},
 		{"read_file", map[string]any{"path": "e.txt"}, nil},
 		{"grep", map[string]any{"pattern": "x"}, nil},
@@ -62,6 +63,10 @@ func TestMutationTargetsRejectsEscapingPaths(t *testing.T) {
 	if got := MutationTargets(root, "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": escapePatch}); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("expected no targets for escaping apply_patch, got %v", got)
 	}
+	structuredEscapePatch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: ../escape.txt\n+x\n*** End Patch\n"
+	if got := MutationTargets(root, "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": structuredEscapePatch}); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected no targets for escaping structured apply_patch, got %v", got)
+	}
 }
 
 // Finding 3: with cwd != ".", apply_patch's MutationTargets must return
@@ -82,6 +87,12 @@ func TestMutationTargetsApplyPatchPrefixesCwd(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("got %v, want %v", got, want)
 	}
 
+	structuredPatch := "*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: d.txt\n@@\n-x\n+y\n*** End Patch\n"
+	got = MutationTargets(root, "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": structuredPatch, "cwd": "sub/dir"})
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("structured cwd: got %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+
 	// cwd "." (the default) must keep paths unprefixed.
 	got = MutationTargets(root, "apply_patch", map[string]any{"patch": patch, "cwd": "."})
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []string{"d.txt"}) {

internal/tools/resource_keys.go

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func applyPatchResourceKeys(args map[string]any) []string {
 	keys = append(keys, multiFileResourceKeys(args)...)
 	cwd := firstStringArg(args, "cwd", "workdir")
 	patch := firstStringArg(args, "patch", "diff")
-	for _, p := range pathsFromUnifiedDiff(patch) {
+	for _, p := range pathsFromApplyPatch(patch) {
 		joined := joinUnderResourceCwd(cwd, p)
 		if n := NormalizeResourcePath(joined); n != "" {
 			keys = append(keys, ResourceKeyFile+n)
@@ -191,6 +191,17 @@ func applyPatchResourceKeys(args map[string]any) []string {
 	return keys
 }
 
+func pathsFromApplyPatch(patch string) []string {
+	if !isStructuredPatch(patch) {
+		return pathsFromUnifiedDiff(patch)
+	}
+	operations, err := parseStructuredPatch(patch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return structuredPatchOperationPaths(operations)
+}
+
 // joinUnderResourceCwd joins a relative path under cwd for resource keys only.
 // Absolute paths are left unchanged. Empty cwd or "." leaves rel as-is.
 // Never touches the filesystem.

internal/tools/structured_patch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+package tools
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/pathjail"
+)
+
+const (
+	structuredPatchBegin  = "*** Begin Patch"
+	structuredPatchEnd    = "*** End Patch"
+	structuredAddFile     = "*** Add File: "
+	structuredDeleteFile  = "*** Delete File: "
+	structuredUpdateFile  = "*** Update File: "
+	structuredMoveTo      = "*** Move to: "
+	structuredEndOfFile   = "*** End of File"
+	structuredHunkContext = "@@ "
+)
+
+type structuredPatchKind uint8
+
+const (
+	structuredPatchAdd structuredPatchKind = iota
+	structuredPatchDelete
+	structuredPatchUpdate
+)
+
+type structuredPatchOperation struct {
+	kind     structuredPatchKind
+	path     string
+	movePath string
+	contents string
+	chunks   []structuredPatchChunk
+	line     int
+}
+
+type structuredPatchChunk struct {
+	context          string
+	hasContext       bool
+	old              []string
+	new              []string
+	newSourceOffsets []int
+	endOfFile        bool
+}
+
+type structuredPatchTarget struct {
+	requested string
+	absolute  string
+	relative  string
+}
+
+type structuredPatchChange struct {
+	kind   structuredPatchKind
+	from   structuredPatchTarget
+	to     structuredPatchTarget
+	before string
+	after  string
+	mode   os.FileMode
+}
+
+func isStructuredPatch(patch string) bool {
+	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(patch, "\ufeff")), structuredPatchBegin)
+}
+
+func (tool applyPatchTool) runStructuredPatch(applyRoot, relativeRoot, patch string, options RunOptions) Result {
+	operations, err := parseStructuredPatch(patch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(applyRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	changes, err := planStructuredPatch(workspace, operations, options.FileTracker)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	wholeBefore := make(map[string]bool, len(changes))
+	if options.FileTracker != nil {
+		for _, change := range changes {
+			if change.kind == structuredPatchUpdate {
+				wholeBefore[change.from.absolute] = options.FileTracker.SeenWhole(change.from.absolute)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if err := applyStructuredPatchChanges(workspace, changes, options.FileTracker); err != nil {
+		return errorResult("Error applying patch: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	for _, change := range changes {
+		switch change.kind {
+		case structuredPatchDelete:
+			options.FileTracker.Forget(change.from.absolute)
+		case structuredPatchAdd:
+			recordStructuredPatchFile(options.FileTracker, change.to.absolute, true, true)
+		case structuredPatchUpdate:
+			wasWhole := wholeBefore[change.from.absolute]
+			options.FileTracker.Forget(change.from.absolute)
+			recordStructuredPatchFile(options.FileTracker, change.to.absolute, false, wasWhole)
+		}
+	}
+
+	summary := "Patch applied successfully."
+	if relativeRoot != "." {
+		summary = "Patch applied successfully in " + relativeRoot + "."
+	}
+	result := okResult(summary)
+	result.ChangedFiles = changedFilesFromStructuredPatch(relativeRoot, changes)
+	result.Display = Display{Summary: summary, Kind: "diff", Preview: structuredPatchPreview(changes)}
+	return result
+}
+
+func parseStructuredPatch(patch string) ([]structuredPatchOperation, error) {
+	normalized := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ReplaceAll(patch, "\r\n", "\n"), "\ufeff"))
+	if normalized == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("structured patch is empty")
+	}
+	lines := strings.Split(normalized, "\n")
+	if strings.TrimSpace(lines[0]) != structuredPatchBegin {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("the first line of a structured patch must be %q", structuredPatchBegin)
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(lines[len(lines)-1]) != structuredPatchEnd {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("the last line of a structured patch must be %q", structuredPatchEnd)
+	}
+
+	var operations []structuredPatchOperation
+	for index := 1; index < len(lines)-1; {
+		header := strings.TrimSpace(lines[index])
+		lineNumber := index + 1
+		if header == "" {
+			index++
+			continue
+		}
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(header, structuredAddFile):
+			path, err := structuredPatchPath(header, structuredAddFile, lineNumber)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			op := structuredPatchOperation{kind: structuredPatchAdd, path: path, line: lineNumber}
+			index++
+			var content []string
+			for index < len(lines)-1 && !isStructuredPatchHeader(lines[index]) {
+				if !strings.HasPrefix(lines[index], "+") {
+					return nil, structuredPatchLineError(index+1, "added-file contents must start with '+'")
+				}
+				content = append(content, strings.TrimPrefix(lines[index], "+"))
+				index++
+			}
+			if len(content) > 0 {
+				op.contents = strings.Join(content, "\n") + "\n"
+			}
+			operations = append(operations, op)
+		case strings.HasPrefix(header, structuredDeleteFile):
+			path, err := structuredPatchPath(header, structuredDeleteFile, lineNumber)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			operations = append(operations, structuredPatchOperation{kind: structuredPatchDelete, path: path, line: lineNumber})
+			index++
+		case strings.HasPrefix(header, structuredUpdateFile):
+			path, err := structuredPatchPath(header, structuredUpdateFile, lineNumber)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			op := structuredPatchOperation{kind: structuredPatchUpdate, path: path, line: lineNumber}
+			index++
+			if index < len(lines)-1 && strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(lines[index]), structuredMoveTo) {
+				op.movePath, err = structuredPatchPath(strings.TrimSpace(lines[index]), structuredMoveTo, index+1)
+				if err != nil {
+					return nil, err
+				}
+				index++
+			}
+			for index < len(lines)-1 && !isStructuredPatchHeader(lines[index]) {
+				line := lines[index]
+				trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
+				if trimmed == structuredEndOfFile {
+					if len(op.chunks) == 0 || (!hasStructuredPatchContent(op.chunks[len(op.chunks)-1])) {
+						return nil, structuredPatchLineError(index+1, "*** End of File must follow an update hunk")
+					}
+					op.chunks[len(op.chunks)-1].endOfFile = true
+					index++
+					continue
+				}
+				if trimmed == "@@" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, structuredHunkContext) {
+					chunk := structuredPatchChunk{}
+					if trimmed != "@@" {
+						chunk.context = strings.TrimPrefix(trimmed, structuredHunkContext)
+						chunk.hasContext = true
+					}
+					op.chunks = append(op.chunks, chunk)
+					index++
+					continue
+				}
+				if len(op.chunks) == 0 {
+					op.chunks = append(op.chunks, structuredPatchChunk{})
+				}
+				chunk := &op.chunks[len(op.chunks)-1]
+				switch {
+				case line == "":
+					sourceOffset := len(chunk.old)
+					chunk.old = append(chunk.old, "")
+					chunk.new = append(chunk.new, "")
+					chunk.newSourceOffsets = append(chunk.newSourceOffsets, sourceOffset)
+				case strings.HasPrefix(line, " "):
+					content := strings.TrimPrefix(line, " ")
+					sourceOffset := len(chunk.old)
+					chunk.old = append(chunk.old, content)
+					chunk.new = append(chunk.new, content)
+					chunk.newSourceOffsets = append(chunk.newSourceOffsets, sourceOffset)
+				case strings.HasPrefix(line, "+"):
+					chunk.new = append(chunk.new, strings.TrimPrefix(line, "+"))
+					chunk.newSourceOffsets = append(chunk.newSourceOffsets, -1)
+				case strings.HasPrefix(line, "-"):
+					chunk.old = append(chunk.old, strings.TrimPrefix(line, "-"))
+				default:
+					return nil, structuredPatchLineError(index+1, "update lines must start with ' ', '+', or '-'")
+				}
+				index++
+			}
+			if len(op.chunks) == 0 || !allStructuredPatchChunksHaveContent(op.chunks) {
+				return nil, structuredPatchLineError(lineNumber, "update file hunk is empty")
+			}
+			operations = append(operations, op)
+		default:
+			return nil, structuredPatchLineError(lineNumber, "expected an Add File, Delete File, or Update File header")
+		}
+	}
+	if len(operations) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("structured patch contains no file operations")
+	}
+	return operations, nil
+}
+
+func structuredPatchPath(header, prefix string, line int) (string, error) {
+	path := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(header, prefix))
+	if path == "" {
+		return "", structuredPatchLineError(line, "file path is required")
+	}
+	return path, nil
+}
+
+func isStructuredPatchHeader(line string) bool {
+	return line == structuredPatchEnd || strings.HasPrefix(line, structuredAddFile) || strings.HasPrefix(line, structuredDeleteFile) || strings.HasPrefix(line, structuredUpdateFile)
+}
+
+func structuredPatchLineError(line int, message string) error {
+	return fmt.Errorf("invalid structured patch at line %d: %s", line, message)
+}
+
+func hasStructuredPatchContent(chunk structuredPatchChunk) bool {
+	return len(chunk.old) > 0 || len(chunk.new) > 0
+}
+
+func allStructuredPatchChunksHaveContent(chunks []structuredPatchChunk) bool {
+	for _, chunk := range chunks {
+		if !hasStructuredPatchContent(chunk) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func structuredPatchOperationPaths(operations []structuredPatchOperation) []string {
+	seen := make(map[string]bool)
+	var paths []string
+	for _, operation := range operations {
+		for _, path := range []string{operation.path, operation.movePath} {
+			if path == "" || seen[path] {
+				continue
+			}
+			seen[path] = true
+			paths = append(paths, path)
+		}
+	}
+	return paths
+}
+
+func planStructuredPatch(root *os.Root, operations []structuredPatchOperation, tracker *FileTracker) ([]structuredPatchChange, error) {
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
+	var changes []structuredPatchChange
+	for _, operation := range operations {
+		from, err := resolveStructuredPatchTarget(root.Name(), operation.path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		to := from
+		if operation.movePath != "" {
+			to, err = resolveStructuredPatchTarget(root.Name(), operation.movePath)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		}
+		targets := []structuredPatchTarget{from}
+		if to.absolute != from.absolute {
+			targets = append(targets, to)
+		}
+		for _, target := range targets {
+			if _, exists := seen[target.absolute]; exists {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("structured patch changes %q more than once", target.relative)
+			}
+			seen[target.absolute] = struct{}{}
+		}
+
+		change := structuredPatchChange{kind: operation.kind, from: from, to: to, mode: 0o644}
+		switch operation.kind {
+		case structuredPatchAdd:
+			if _, err := root.Lstat(to.relative); err == nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot add %s because it already exists", to.relative)
+			} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			change.after = operation.contents
+		case structuredPatchDelete, structuredPatchUpdate:
+			info, err := root.Stat(from.relative)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("stating %s: %w", from.relative, err)
+			}
+			change.mode = info.Mode()
+			content, err := root.ReadFile(from.relative)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading %s: %w", from.relative, err)
+			}
+			if err := tracker.CheckConflict(from.absolute, content); err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s", fileConflictMessage(from.relative))
+			}
+			change.before = string(content)
+			if operation.kind == structuredPatchUpdate {
+				updated, err := applyStructuredPatchUpdate(change.before, from.relative, operation.chunks)
+				if err != nil {
+					return nil, err
+				}
+				change.after = updated
+				if from.absolute != to.absolute {
+					if _, err := root.Lstat(to.relative); err == nil {
+						return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot move %s to %s because the destination already exists", from.relative, to.relative)
+					} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		changes = append(changes, change)
+	}
+	return changes, nil
+}
+
+func resolveStructuredPatchTarget(root, path string) (structuredPatchTarget, error) {
+	if filepath.IsAbs(path) || path == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(filepath.ToSlash(path), "../") {
+		return structuredPatchTarget{}, fmt.Errorf("patch path %q must stay inside the workspace", path)
+	}
+	absolute, relative, err := resolveWorkspaceTargetPath(root, path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return structuredPatchTarget{}, err
+	}
+	return structuredPatchTarget{requested: path, absolute: absolute, relative: relative}, nil
+}
+
+func applyStructuredPatchUpdate(content, path string, chunks []structuredPatchChunk) (string, error) {
+	lineEnding := structuredPatchLineEnding(content)
+	if lineEnding == "\r\n" {
+		content = strings.ReplaceAll(content, "\r\n", "\n")
+	}
+	lines := strings.Split(content, "\n")
+	trailingNewline := content != "" && len(lines) > 0 && lines[len(lines)-1] == ""
+	if len(lines) > 0 && lines[len(lines)-1] == "" {
+		lines = lines[:len(lines)-1]
+	}
+	replacements := make([]structuredReplacement, 0, len(chunks))
+	lineIndex := 0
+	for _, chunk := range chunks {
+		if chunk.hasContext {
+			index, ambiguous := findStructuredPatchSequence(lines, []string{chunk.context}, lineIndex, false)
+			if ambiguous {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("context %q is ambiguous in %s; provide a more specific hunk header", chunk.context, path)
+			}
+			if index < 0 {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("could not find context %q in %s", chunk.context, path)
+			}
+			lineIndex = index + 1
+		}
+		if len(chunk.old) == 0 {
+			// A context anchor identifies the line immediately before a pure
+			// insertion. Only an explicit end-of-file hunk (or an unanchored
+			// insertion) belongs at the file end.
+			start := lineIndex
+			if chunk.endOfFile || !chunk.hasContext {
+				start = len(lines)
+			}
+			if start > len(lines) {
+				start = len(lines)
+			}
+			replacement, err := structuredPatchReplacement(chunk, lines, start)
+			if err != nil {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("building replacement for %s: %w", path, err)
+			}
+			replacements = append(replacements, structuredReplacement{start: start, replacement: replacement})
+			lineIndex = start
+			continue
+		}
+		index, ambiguous := findStructuredPatchSequence(lines, chunk.old, lineIndex, chunk.endOfFile)
+		if ambiguous {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("expected lines are ambiguous in %s; provide more surrounding context:\n%s", path, strings.Join(chunk.old, "\n"))
+		}
+		if index < 0 {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("could not find expected lines in %s:\n%s", path, strings.Join(chunk.old, "\n"))
+		}
+		replacement, err := structuredPatchReplacement(chunk, lines, index)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("building replacement for %s: %w", path, err)
+		}
+		replacements = append(replacements, structuredReplacement{start: index, length: len(chunk.old), replacement: replacement})
+		lineIndex = index + len(chunk.old)
+	}
+	for index := 1; index < len(replacements); index++ {
+		previous := replacements[index-1]
+		current := replacements[index]
+		if current.start < previous.start+previous.length {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("overlapping or out-of-order hunks in %s; provide non-overlapping context", path)
+		}
+	}
+	for index := len(replacements) - 1; index >= 0; index-- {
+		replacement := replacements[index]
+		lines = append(lines[:replacement.start], append(replacement.replacement, lines[replacement.start+replacement.length:]...)...)
+	}
+	if len(lines) == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	updated := strings.Join(lines, lineEnding)
+	if trailingNewline {
+		updated += lineEnding
+	}
+	return updated, nil
+}
+
+func structuredPatchReplacement(chunk structuredPatchChunk, source []string, start int) ([]string, error) {
+	if len(chunk.newSourceOffsets) != len(chunk.new) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("context mapping has %d entries for %d output lines", len(chunk.newSourceOffsets), len(chunk.new))
+	}
+	replacement := append([]string(nil), chunk.new...)
+	for outputIndex, sourceOffset := range chunk.newSourceOffsets {
+		if sourceOffset < 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		sourceIndex := start + sourceOffset
+		if sourceIndex < 0 || sourceIndex >= len(source) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("context source index %d is outside the matched file", sourceIndex)
+		}
+		replacement[outputIndex] = source[sourceIndex]
+	}
+	return replacement, nil
+}
+
+func structuredPatchLineEnding(content string) string {
+	if strings.Contains(content, "\r\n") && !strings.Contains(strings.ReplaceAll(content, "\r\n", ""), "\n") {
+		return "\r\n"
+	}
+	return "\n"
+}
+
+type structuredReplacement struct {
+	start       int
+	length      int
+	replacement []string
+}
+
+func findStructuredPatchSequence(lines, wanted []string, start int, endOfFile bool) (int, bool) {
+	if len(wanted) == 0 {
+		return start, false
+	}
+	if len(wanted) > len(lines) {
+		return -1, false
+	}
+	searchStart := start
+	if endOfFile {
+		searchStart = len(lines) - len(wanted)
+		if searchStart < start {
+			searchStart = start
+		}
+	}
+	for _, equal := range []func(string, string) bool{
+		func(left, right string) bool { return left == right },
+		func(left, right string) bool {
+			return strings.TrimRight(left, " \t") == strings.TrimRight(right, " \t")
+		},
+		func(left, right string) bool { return strings.TrimSpace(left) == strings.TrimSpace(right) },
+	} {
+		match := -1
+		for index := searchStart; index+len(wanted) <= len(lines); index++ {
+			matched := true
+			for offset, line := range wanted {
+				if !equal(lines[index+offset], line) {
+					matched = false
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if matched {
+				if match >= 0 {
+					return -1, true
+				}
+				match = index
+			}
+		}
+		if match >= 0 {
+			return match, false
+		}
+	}
+	return -1, false
+}
+
+func applyStructuredPatchChanges(root *os.Root, changes []structuredPatchChange, tracker *FileTracker) error {
+	mutated := false
+	for _, change := range changes {
+		committed, err := applyStructuredPatchChange(root, change)
+		mutated = mutated || committed
+		if err != nil {
+			forgetStructuredPatchFiles(tracker, changes)
+			if mutated {
+				return fmt.Errorf("%w; structured patch was partially applied; re-read affected files before retrying", err)
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func forgetStructuredPatchFiles(tracker *FileTracker, changes []structuredPatchChange) {
+	if tracker == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, change := range changes {
+		tracker.Forget(change.from.absolute)
+		if change.to.absolute != change.from.absolute {
+			tracker.Forget(change.to.absolute)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func applyStructuredPatchChange(root *os.Root, change structuredPatchChange) (bool, error) {
+	switch change.kind {
+	case structuredPatchDelete:
+		if err := root.Remove(change.from.relative); err != nil {
+			return false, fmt.Errorf("deleting %s: %w", change.from.relative, err)
+		}
+		return true, nil
+	case structuredPatchAdd:
+		return writeStructuredPatchFile(root, change.to, change.after, change.mode, true)
+	case structuredPatchUpdate:
+		moving := change.from.absolute != change.to.absolute
+		committed, err := writeStructuredPatchFile(root, change.to, change.after, change.mode, moving)
+		if err != nil {
+			return committed, err
+		}
+		if moving {
+			if err := root.Remove(change.from.relative); err != nil {
+				return true, fmt.Errorf("removing moved source %s: %w", change.from.relative, err)
+			}
+		}
+		return true, nil
+	}
+	return false, fmt.Errorf("unsupported structured patch operation")
+}
+
+func writeStructuredPatchFile(root *os.Root, target structuredPatchTarget, content string, mode os.FileMode, createOnly bool) (bool, error) {
+	parent := filepath.Dir(target.relative)
+	if err := root.MkdirAll(parent, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("creating parent directory for %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	temp, tempName, err := pathjail.CreateTemp(root, parent, "zero-patch", ".tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = removeStructuredPatchTemp(root, tempName) }()
+	if _, err := temp.WriteString(content); err != nil {
+		_ = temp.Close()
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	if err := temp.Chmod(mode.Perm()); err != nil {
+		_ = temp.Close()
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	if err := temp.Close(); err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	if createOnly {
+		return publishStructuredPatchNoReplace(root, tempName, target.relative, mode)
+	}
+	if err := root.Rename(tempName, target.relative); err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", target.relative, err)
+	}
+	return true, nil
+}
+
+func publishStructuredPatchNoReplace(root *os.Root, source, target string, mode os.FileMode) (bool, error) {
+	return publishStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(root, source, target, mode, root.Link)
+}
+
+func publishStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(root *os.Root, source, target string, mode os.FileMode, link func(string, string) error) (bool, error) {
+	if linkErr := link(source, target); linkErr == nil {
+		cleanupErr := removeStructuredPatchTemp(root, source)
+		chmodErr := root.Chmod(target, mode.Perm())
+		if cleanupErr != nil || chmodErr != nil {
+			return true, fmt.Errorf("publishing %s: %w", target, errors.Join(cleanupErr, chmodErr))
+		}
+		return true, nil
+	} else if errors.Is(linkErr, os.ErrExist) {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("creating %s: %w", target, linkErr)
+	} else {
+		committed, copyErr := copyStructuredPatchNoReplace(root, source, target, mode)
+		if copyErr != nil {
+			return committed, fmt.Errorf("creating %s without overwrite: hard link failed: %w; exclusive-copy fallback failed: %w", target, linkErr, copyErr)
+		}
+		return committed, nil
+	}
+}
+
+func copyStructuredPatchNoReplace(root *os.Root, source, target string, mode os.FileMode) (bool, error) {
+	return copyStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(root, source, target, mode, io.Copy, removeStructuredPatchTemp)
+}
+
+func copyStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(
+	root *os.Root,
+	source, target string,
+	mode os.FileMode,
+	copyFile func(io.Writer, io.Reader) (int64, error),
+	cleanup func(*os.Root, string) error,
+) (bool, error) {
+	sourceFile, err := root.Open(source)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	sourceClosed := false
+	defer func() {
+		if !sourceClosed {
+			_ = sourceFile.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+	targetFile, err := root.OpenFile(target, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	committed := true
+	cleanupTarget := func(cause error) (bool, error) {
+		_ = targetFile.Close()
+		if cleanupErr := cleanup(root, target); cleanupErr == nil {
+			return false, cause
+		} else {
+			return committed, errors.Join(cause, fmt.Errorf("cleaning partial target: %w", cleanupErr))
+		}
+	}
+	if _, err := copyFile(targetFile, sourceFile); err != nil {
+		return cleanupTarget(err)
+	}
+	if err := sourceFile.Close(); err != nil {
+		sourceClosed = true
+		return cleanupTarget(err)
+	}
+	sourceClosed = true
+	if err := targetFile.Chmod(mode.Perm()); err != nil {
+		return cleanupTarget(err)
+	}
+	if err := targetFile.Close(); err != nil {
+		if cleanupErr := cleanup(root, target); cleanupErr == nil {
+			return false, err
+		} else {
+			return true, errors.Join(err, fmt.Errorf("cleaning target after close failure: %w", cleanupErr))
+		}
+	}
+	if err := cleanup(root, source); err != nil {
+		return true, fmt.Errorf("removing published source: %w", err)
+	}
+	return true, nil
+}
+
+func removeStructuredPatchTemp(root *os.Root, name string) error {
+	chmodErr := root.Chmod(name, 0o600)
+	if os.IsNotExist(chmodErr) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	removeErr := root.Remove(name)
+	if os.IsNotExist(removeErr) {
+		removeErr = nil
+	}
+	if removeErr == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return errors.Join(chmodErr, removeErr)
+}
+
+func recordStructuredPatchFile(tracker *FileTracker, absolute string, created, seenWhole bool) {
+	if tracker == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(absolute)
+	if err != nil {
+		tracker.Forget(absolute)
+		return
+	}
+	info, _ := os.Stat(absolute)
+	tracker.Record(absolute, content, info)
+	if seenWhole {
+		lines := lineCount(string(content))
+		tracker.RecordSeenRange(absolute, 1, lines, lines)
+	}
+	if created {
+		tracker.RecordCreated(absolute)
+	}
+}
+
+func changedFilesFromStructuredPatch(relativeRoot string, changes []structuredPatchChange) []string {
+	seen := make(map[string]bool)
+	var paths []string
+	for _, change := range changes {
+		targets := []structuredPatchTarget{change.to}
+		if change.from.absolute != change.to.absolute {
+			targets = append([]structuredPatchTarget{change.from}, targets...)
+		}
+		for _, target := range targets {
+			path := target.relative
+			if relativeRoot != "" && relativeRoot != "." {
+				path = filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Join(relativeRoot, path))
+			}
+			if !seen[path] {
+				seen[path] = true
+				paths = append(paths, path)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return paths
+}
+
+func structuredPatchPreview(changes []structuredPatchChange) string {
+	var preview strings.Builder
+	for _, change := range changes {
+		path := change.to.relative
+		if change.kind == structuredPatchDelete {
+			path = change.from.relative
+		}
+		before, after := change.before, change.after
+		if change.kind == structuredPatchDelete {
+			after = ""
+		}
+		diff := boundedUnifiedDiff(path, before, after)
+		if diff == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if preview.Len()+len(diff)+1 > maxToolPreviewBytes {
+			break
+		}
+		if preview.Len() > 0 {
+			preview.WriteByte('\n')
+		}
+		preview.WriteString(diff)
+	}
+	return capPreviewDiff(preview.String())
+}

internal/tools/tool_search.go

@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ func (tool toolSearchTool) visibleDeferredTools(enabled []string, disabled []str
 	var deferred []Tool
 	if tool.registry != nil {
 		for _, candidate := range tool.registry.All() {
+			if !ModelVisible(candidate) {
+				continue
+			}
 			if !IsDeferred(candidate) {
 				continue
 			}
@@ -158,6 +161,9 @@ func (tool toolSearchTool) visibleEagerToolNames(enabled []string, disabled []st
 		return names
 	}
 	for _, candidate := range tool.registry.All() {
+		if !ModelVisible(candidate) {
+			continue
+		}
 		if IsDeferred(candidate) || candidate.Name() == ToolSearchToolName {
 			continue
 		}

internal/tools/write_tools_test.go

@@ -2,12 +2,23 @@ package tools
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 )
 
+func mustReadTestFile(t *testing.T, path string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return string(content)
+}
+
 func TestCoreToolsExposeWriteAndPlanTools(t *testing.T) {
 	toolset := CoreToolsScoped(t.TempDir(), nil)
 	byName := make(map[string]Tool, len(toolset))
@@ -513,6 +524,532 @@ func TestApplyPatchToolAppliesUnifiedDiff(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestApplyPatchToolAppliesStructuredPatch(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"), "hello\nold\n")
+
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: hello.txt",
+		"@@",
+		" hello",
+		"-old",
+		"+new",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch should apply, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got := strings.ReplaceAll(string(content), "\r\n", "\n"); got != "hello\nnew\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch content = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolAppliesStructuredAddAndMove(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "old.txt"), "old\n")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Add File: nested/new.txt",
+		"+created",
+		"*** Update File: old.txt",
+		"*** Move to: moved.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-old",
+		"+moved",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch should apply, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	if got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "nested", "new.txt")); err != nil || string(got) != "created\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("added file = %q, err = %v", got, err)
+	}
+	if got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "moved.txt")); err != nil || string(got) != "moved\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("moved file = %q, err = %v", got, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "old.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("old source should be removed, stat err = %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := result.ChangedFiles; strings.Join(got, ",") != "nested/new.txt,old.txt,moved.txt" {
+		t.Fatalf("ChangedFiles = %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchMatchesWhitespaceTolerantly(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"), "  hello   \n")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: hello.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-hello",
+		"+goodbye",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch should tolerate surrounding whitespace, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "hello.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got := string(content); got != "goodbye\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch content = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchPreservesWhitespaceTolerantContext(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.go")
+	original := "func f() {\n\tif cond {\n\t\tdoWork()\n\t\tlogIt()\n\t}\n}\n"
+	writeTestFile(t, path, original)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.go",
+		"@@",
+		"     if cond {",
+		"         doWork()",
+		"-\t\tlogIt()",
+		"+\t\tlogIt(ctx)",
+		"     }",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	want := "func f() {\n\tif cond {\n\t\tdoWork()\n\t\tlogIt(ctx)\n\t}\n}\n"
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, path); got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch rewrote unchanged context:\n got %q\nwant %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchPreservesMixedContextLineEndings(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.txt")
+	original := "alpha\r\n\tcontext\r\n\told\nomega\r\n"
+	writeTestFile(t, path, original)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.txt",
+		"@@",
+		" alpha",
+		"     context",
+		"-\told",
+		"+\tnew",
+		" omega",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	want := "alpha\r\n\tcontext\r\n\tnew\nomega\r\n"
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, path); got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch rewrote context line endings:\n got %q\nwant %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchInsertsAtContext(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "example.txt"), "anchor\nmiddle\nremove\n")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.txt",
+		"@@ anchor",
+		"+inserted",
+		"@@ middle",
+		"-remove",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured insertion failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, "example.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got, want := string(content), "anchor\ninserted\nmiddle\n"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured insertion content = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchRejectsAmbiguousMatch(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.go")
+	original := "func a() {\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc b() {\n\treturn nil\n}\n"
+	writeTestFile(t, path, original)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.go",
+		"@@",
+		"-\treturn nil",
+		"+\treturn errNotFound",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusError || !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(result.Output), "ambiguous") {
+		t.Fatalf("ambiguous structured patch should be refused, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, path); got != original {
+		t.Fatalf("ambiguous structured patch changed the file: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchPreservesCRLF(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.txt")
+	writeTestFile(t, path, "alpha\r\nbravo\r\ncharlie\r\n")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-bravo",
+		"+BRAVO",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	if got, want := mustReadTestFile(t, path), "alpha\r\nBRAVO\r\ncharlie\r\n"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch content = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchPreservesMissingFinalNewline(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.txt")
+	writeTestFile(t, path, "alpha\nbravo")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-alpha",
+		"+ALPHA",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	if got, want := mustReadTestFile(t, path), "ALPHA\nbravo"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch content = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchKeepsInsertedEmptyFileWithoutFinalNewline(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "empty.txt")
+	writeTestFile(t, path, "")
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: empty.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"+content",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch failed: %s", result.Output)
+	}
+	if got, want := mustReadTestFile(t, path), "content"; got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("structured patch content = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolStructuredPatchRejectsOutOfOrderEndHunk(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "example.txt")
+	original := "alpha\nbravo\ncharlie\ndelta\necho\n"
+	writeTestFile(t, path, original)
+	patch := strings.Join([]string{
+		"*** Begin Patch",
+		"*** Update File: example.txt",
+		"@@",
+		"-delta",
+		"+DELTA",
+		"@@",
+		"-delta",
+		"-echo",
+		"+tail",
+		"*** End of File",
+		"*** End Patch",
+		"",
+	}, "\n")
+
+	result := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil).Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+	if result.Status != StatusError {
+		t.Fatalf("out-of-order structured patch should be refused, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, path); got != original {
+		t.Fatalf("out-of-order structured patch changed the file: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchAddDoesNotOverwriteRacedDestination(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "created.txt")
+	writeTestFile(t, targetPath, "other writer\n")
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	change := structuredPatchChange{
+		kind:  structuredPatchAdd,
+		to:    structuredPatchTarget{absolute: targetPath, relative: "created.txt"},
+		after: "patch content\n", mode: 0o644,
+	}
+
+	err = applyStructuredPatchChanges(workspace, []structuredPatchChange{change}, nil)
+	if err == nil || !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
+		t.Fatalf("raced add destination = %v, want os.ErrExist", err)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exclusive-copy fallback") {
+		t.Fatalf("existing destination should be reported directly: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, targetPath); got != "other writer\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("raced add overwrote another writer's file: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchFailedDeleteDoesNotRecreateMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	missingPath := filepath.Join(root, "missing.txt")
+	change := structuredPatchChange{
+		kind:   structuredPatchDelete,
+		from:   structuredPatchTarget{absolute: missingPath, relative: "missing.txt"},
+		before: "removed by another writer\n", mode: 0o644,
+	}
+
+	err = applyStructuredPatchChanges(workspace, []structuredPatchChange{change}, nil)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("delete of an already removed file should fail")
+	}
+	if _, statErr := os.Stat(missingPath); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("failed delete recreated the missing file: %v", statErr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchMoveFailureLeavesPublishedDestination(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	sourcePath := filepath.Join(root, "source.txt")
+	destinationPath := filepath.Join(root, "destination.txt")
+	change := structuredPatchChange{
+		kind:   structuredPatchUpdate,
+		from:   structuredPatchTarget{absolute: sourcePath, relative: "source.txt"},
+		to:     structuredPatchTarget{absolute: destinationPath, relative: "destination.txt"},
+		before: "removed source\n", after: "moved content\n", mode: 0o644,
+	}
+
+	err = applyStructuredPatchChanges(workspace, []structuredPatchChange{change}, nil)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "partially applied") {
+		t.Fatalf("move with a missing source = %v, want partial-application error", err)
+	}
+	if _, statErr := os.Stat(sourcePath); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("failed move recreated a missing source: %v", statErr)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, destinationPath); got != "moved content\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("published move destination = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchCreateOnlyFallsBackWhenHardLinksUnsupported(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	sourcePath := filepath.Join(root, "source.tmp")
+	writeTestFile(t, sourcePath, "complete content\n")
+	if err := workspace.Chmod("source.tmp", 0o444); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	committed, err := publishStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(
+		workspace,
+		"source.tmp",
+		"target.txt",
+		0o444,
+		func(string, string) error { return errors.New("hard links unsupported") },
+	)
+	if err != nil || !committed {
+		t.Fatalf("fallback publish = committed %v, error %v", committed, err)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")); got != "complete content\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("fallback target content = %q", got)
+	}
+	if _, statErr := os.Stat(sourcePath); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("read-only source was not cleaned up: %v", statErr)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchCopyFailureReportsSurvivingPartialTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+	sourcePath := filepath.Join(root, "source.tmp")
+	writeTestFile(t, sourcePath, "complete content\n")
+	copyErr := errors.New("injected copy failure")
+	cleanupErr := errors.New("injected target cleanup failure")
+	committed, err := copyStructuredPatchNoReplaceWith(
+		workspace,
+		"source.tmp",
+		"target.txt",
+		0o644,
+		func(destination io.Writer, _ io.Reader) (int64, error) {
+			written, writeErr := io.WriteString(destination, "partial")
+			if writeErr != nil {
+				return int64(written), writeErr
+			}
+			return int64(written), copyErr
+		},
+		func(root *os.Root, name string) error {
+			if name == "target.txt" {
+				return cleanupErr
+			}
+			return removeStructuredPatchTemp(root, name)
+		},
+	)
+	if !committed || !errors.Is(err, copyErr) || !errors.Is(err, cleanupErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("copy failure = committed %v, error %v", committed, err)
+	}
+	targetPath := filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, targetPath); got != "partial" {
+		t.Fatalf("partial target content = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStructuredPatchPartialFailureLeavesCompletedChangeAndClearsTrackedState(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	trackedPath := filepath.Join(root, "tracked.txt")
+	writeTestFile(t, trackedPath, "original\n")
+	workspace, err := os.OpenRoot(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer workspace.Close()
+
+	trackedPath, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(trackedPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	info, err := os.Stat(trackedPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	tracker := NewFileTracker()
+	tracker.Record(trackedPath, []byte("original\n"), info)
+	tracker.RecordSeenRange(trackedPath, 1, 1, 1)
+	trackedTarget := structuredPatchTarget{absolute: trackedPath, relative: "tracked.txt"}
+	blockedPath := filepath.Join(root, "blocked")
+	if err := os.Mkdir(blockedPath, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	writeTestFile(t, filepath.Join(blockedPath, "sentinel"), "keep\n")
+	changes := []structuredPatchChange{
+		{
+			kind: structuredPatchUpdate, from: trackedTarget, to: trackedTarget,
+			before: "original\n", after: "updated\n", mode: 0o644,
+		},
+		{
+			kind:  structuredPatchAdd,
+			to:    structuredPatchTarget{absolute: blockedPath, relative: "blocked"},
+			after: "cannot replace a non-empty directory\n", mode: 0o644,
+		},
+	}
+
+	err = applyStructuredPatchChanges(workspace, changes, tracker)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "partially applied") {
+		t.Fatalf("second change = %v, want partial-application error", err)
+	}
+	if got := mustReadTestFile(t, trackedPath); got != "updated\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("completed change was unexpectedly altered: %q", got)
+	}
+	if _, tracked := tracker.Version(trackedPath); tracked || tracker.SeenWhole(trackedPath) {
+		t.Fatal("partial failure retained stale file-tracker state")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestApplyPatchToolRejectsMalformedOrEscapingStructuredPatchBeforeWriting(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	tool := NewScopedApplyPatchTool(root, nil)
+	for name, patch := range map[string]string{
+		"empty update": strings.Join([]string{
+			"*** Begin Patch",
+			"*** Update File: target.txt",
+			"*** End Patch",
+		}, "\n"),
+		"escape": strings.Join([]string{
+			"*** Begin Patch",
+			"*** Add File: ../outside.txt",
+			"+nope",
+			"*** End Patch",
+		}, "\n"),
+	} {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := tool.Run(context.Background(), map[string]any{"patch": patch})
+			if result.Status != StatusError {
+				t.Fatalf("expected error, got %s: %s", result.Status, result.Output)
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(result.Output, "No valid patches") {
+				t.Fatalf("structured patch should fail before git apply, got %q", result.Output)
+			}
+			if name == "empty update" {
+				if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "target.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+					t.Fatalf("empty update must not write target file, stat err = %v", err)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(root), "outside.txt")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("escaping patch must not write outside workspace, stat err = %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // A hunk-body line that removes content beginning with "-- " appears in the diff
 // as "--- ..."; it must NOT be mistaken for a file header (which previously made
 // apply_patch reject a valid patch as targeting an outside path).

internal/tui/add_dir.go

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func (m model) handleAddDirCommand(arg string) model {
 	if err != nil {
 		return m.appendSystemNotice("add-dir: " + err.Error())
 	}
-	return m.appendSystemNotice("write access added: " + root + " (this session only)")
+	return m.showTransientNoticeInline("Write access added: "+root+" (this session only).", transientNoticeSuccess)
 }
 
 // appendSystemNotice appends a system transcript line and returns the updated

internal/tui/add_dir_test.go

@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ func TestHandleAddDirCommand(t *testing.T) {
 	if roots := scope.Roots(); len(roots) != initialRootCount+1 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected one additional write root after grant, got %#v", roots)
 	}
-	notice := lastTranscriptText(next)
-	if !strings.Contains(notice, "write access added") || !strings.Contains(notice, "session only") {
+	notice := next.transientNotice.text
+	if !strings.Contains(notice, "Write access added") || !strings.Contains(notice, "session only") {
 		t.Fatalf("grant notice = %q, want it to mention the grant and its session-only lifetime", notice)
 	}
 

internal/tui/assistant_markdown.go

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ const (
 	markdownTableRuleBodyRows    = 4
 	markdownBoldStart            = "\x1b[1m"
 	markdownBoldEnd              = "\x1b[22m"
+	markdownCodeStart            = "\x1b[7m"
+	markdownCodeEnd              = "\x1b[27m"
 )
 
 type markdownDisplayStyle int
@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ type markdownDisplayStyle int
 const (
 	markdownDisplayNormal markdownDisplayStyle = iota
 	markdownDisplayBold
+	markdownDisplayCode
 	markdownDisplayRule
 )
 
@@ -262,6 +265,8 @@ func styleAssistantMarkdownLine(line string, base lipgloss.Style) string {
 		case markdownDisplayBold:
 			// Emphasis is weight-only (no colour) — dark-mode-friendly and calm.
 			builder.WriteString(zeroTheme.ink.Bold(true).Render(text))
+		case markdownDisplayCode:
+			builder.WriteString(inlineCodeStyle().Render(text))
 		case markdownDisplayRule:
 			builder.WriteString(zeroTheme.lineStrong.Render(text))
 		default:
@@ -282,6 +287,16 @@ func styleAssistantMarkdownLine(line string, base lipgloss.Style) string {
 			style = markdownDisplayNormal
 			index += len(markdownBoldEnd)
 			continue
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line[index:], markdownCodeStart):
+			flush()
+			style = markdownDisplayCode
+			index += len(markdownCodeStart)
+			continue
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line[index:], markdownCodeEnd):
+			flush()
+			style = markdownDisplayNormal
+			index += len(markdownCodeEnd)
+			continue
 		case line[index] == '\x1b':
 			// Already-styled input (highlighted code, headings, tables) carries real
 			// ANSI. Emit each escape verbatim instead of treating its bytes as runes
@@ -313,6 +328,13 @@ func styleAssistantMarkdownLine(line string, base lipgloss.Style) string {
 	return builder.String()
 }
 
+func hasMarkdownDisplayControls(line string) bool {
+	return strings.Contains(line, markdownBoldStart) ||
+		strings.Contains(line, markdownBoldEnd) ||
+		strings.Contains(line, markdownCodeStart) ||
+		strings.Contains(line, markdownCodeEnd)
+}
+
 func hasExternalANSIStyle(line string) bool {
 	for index := 0; index < len(line); {
 		if line[index] != '\x1b' {
@@ -325,7 +347,7 @@ func hasExternalANSIStyle(line string) bool {
 			continue
 		}
 		seq := line[index:end]
-		if seq != markdownBoldStart && seq != markdownBoldEnd {
+		if seq != markdownBoldStart && seq != markdownBoldEnd && seq != markdownCodeStart && seq != markdownCodeEnd {
 			return true
 		}
 		index = end
@@ -334,6 +356,9 @@ func hasExternalANSIStyle(line string) bool {
 }
 
 func markdownDisplayStyleForRune(r rune, current markdownDisplayStyle) markdownDisplayStyle {
+	if current == markdownDisplayCode {
+		return current
+	}
 	switch r {
 	case '│', '─', '┼', '╭', '╮', '╰', '╯', '├', '┤', '┬', '┴':
 		return markdownDisplayRule
@@ -980,6 +1005,7 @@ func renderMarkdownStandaloneLine(line string) string {
 type markdownInlineSegment struct {
 	text string
 	bold bool
+	code bool
 }
 
 func wrapMarkdownInline(text string, measure int) []string {
@@ -1028,7 +1054,7 @@ func wrapMarkdownInlineWithPrefixes(firstPrefix string, continuationPrefix strin
 				flush()
 			}
 			head, tail := splitAtWidth(word.text, available)
-			lines = append(lines, prefix+renderMarkdownInlineSegment(markdownInlineSegment{text: head, bold: word.bold}))
+			lines = append(lines, prefix+renderMarkdownInlineSegment(markdownInlineSegment{text: head, bold: word.bold, code: word.code}))
 			word.text = tail
 			prefix = continuationPrefix
 			available = maxInt(1, measure-lipgloss.Width(prefix))
@@ -1063,8 +1089,14 @@ func wrapMarkdownInlineWithPrefixes(firstPrefix string, continuationPrefix strin
 func markdownInlineWords(segments []markdownInlineSegment) []markdownInlineSegment {
 	words := []markdownInlineSegment{}
 	for _, segment := range segments {
+		if segment.code {
+			if segment.text != "" {
+				words = append(words, segment)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
 		for _, word := range strings.Fields(segment.text) {
-			words = append(words, markdownInlineSegment{text: word, bold: segment.bold})
+			words = append(words, markdownInlineSegment{text: word, bold: segment.bold, code: segment.code})
 		}
 	}
 	return words
@@ -1078,6 +1110,9 @@ func renderMarkdownInlineSegment(segment markdownInlineSegment) string {
 	if segment.text == "" {
 		return ""
 	}
+	if segment.code {
+		return markdownCodeStart + segment.text + markdownCodeEnd
+	}
 	if segment.bold {
 		return renderMarkdownBoldText(segment.text)
 	}
@@ -1107,7 +1142,7 @@ func parseMarkdownInline(text string) []markdownInlineSegment {
 		if builder.Len() == 0 {
 			return
 		}
-		segments = append(segments, markdownInlineSegment{text: builder.String(), bold: bold && !code})
+		segments = append(segments, markdownInlineSegment{text: builder.String(), bold: bold && !code, code: code})
 		builder.Reset()
 	}
 

internal/tui/attachment_preview.go

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+package tui
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/terminalpet"
+)
+
+const (
+	attachmentImageID             = uint32(0xC0E0)
+	attachmentPreviewCols         = 10
+	attachmentPreviewRows         = 4
+	attachmentPreviewHeightPixels = 64
+	attachmentPreviewMaxImages    = 4
+)
+
+// attachmentThumbnailVisible deliberately has a conservative layout gate. The
+// image is an enhancement to the existing attachment chips, not a reason to
+// crowd a narrow or modal surface.
+func (m model) attachmentThumbnailVisible(width int) bool {
+	if len(m.attachmentRenderers) == 0 || !m.altScreen ||
+		m.height < attachmentPreviewRows+10 || width < attachmentPreviewCols+28 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if m.pendingPermission != nil || m.pendingAskUser != nil || m.pendingSpecReview != nil ||
+		m.providerWizard != nil || m.mcpAddWizard != nil || m.mcpManager != nil || m.picker != nil ||
+		m.sttKeyPrompt != nil || m.renamePrompt != nil || m.setup.visible || m.helpOverlay || m.leaderHelpOverlay {
+		return false
+	}
+	for index := 0; index < m.attachmentThumbnailSlots(width); index++ {
+		if index < len(m.pendingImageThumbnails) && m.pendingImageThumbnails[index] != nil &&
+			index < len(m.attachmentRenderers) && m.attachmentRenderers[index].Support().Supported() {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (m model) attachmentThumbnailSlots(width int) int {
+	innerWidth := maxInt(1, width-m.petComposerReservedColumns(width)-4)
+	slots := maxInt(1, innerWidth/(attachmentPreviewCols+1))
+	return min(attachmentPreviewMaxImages, min(slots, len(m.attachmentRenderers)))
+}
+
+func (m model) attachmentThumbnailLines(width int) []string {
+	left := strings.Repeat(" ", attachmentPreviewCols+1)
+	lines := make([]string, attachmentPreviewRows)
+	for index := range lines {
+		lines[index] = left
+	}
+	for index, line := range lines {
+		lines[index] = fitStyledLine(line, width)
+	}
+	return lines
+}
+
+func (m model) attachmentThumbnailSupplementalChips() string {
+	if len(m.pendingImageLabels) <= 1 && len(m.pendingDocuments) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return renderAttachmentChips(m.pendingImageLabels, m.pendingDocuments)
+}
+
+func (m model) attachmentComposerPrefixRows(width int) int {
+	if m.attachmentThumbnailVisible(width) {
+		rows := attachmentPreviewRows
+		if m.attachmentThumbnailSupplementalChips() != "" {
+			rows++
+		}
+		return rows
+	}
+	if renderAttachmentChips(m.pendingImageLabels, m.pendingDocuments) != "" {
+		return 1
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// attachmentImageDraw places one gallery thumbnail inside the reserved top rows
+// of the composer. The position comes from the same footer layout used for mouse
+// input, so it follows sidebar changes and terminal resizes instead of relying on
+// a brittle absolute bottom-right calculation.
+func (m model) attachmentImageDraw(index int) *terminalpet.ImageDraw {
+	width := m.chatColumnWidth()
+	if !m.attachmentThumbnailVisible(width) || index < 0 || index >= m.attachmentThumbnailSlots(width) ||
+		index >= len(m.pendingImageThumbnails) || m.pendingImageThumbnails[index] == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	frame := m.scrollableTranscriptFrame(m.pinnedTitleBar(width), m.footerView(width))
+	if frame.composerRect.height < attachmentPreviewRows+2 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &terminalpet.ImageDraw{
+		ID:           attachmentImageID + uint32(index),
+		Animation:    m.pendingImageThumbnails[index],
+		State:        terminalpet.Idle,
+		X:            frame.composerRect.x + 2 + index*(attachmentPreviewCols+1),
+		Y:            frame.composerRect.y + 1,
+		Columns:      attachmentPreviewCols,
+		Rows:         attachmentPreviewRows,
+		HeightPixels: attachmentPreviewHeightPixels,
+	}
+}
+
+func attachmentPreviewImageIDs() []uint32 {
+	ids := make([]uint32, attachmentPreviewMaxImages)
+	for index := range ids {
+		ids[index] = attachmentImageID + uint32(index)
+	}
+	return ids
+}

internal/tui/attachment_preview_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+package tui
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"image"
+	"image/color"
+	"image/png"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/terminalpet"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/zeroruntime"
+)
+
+func previewImageBlock(t *testing.T) zeroruntime.ImageBlock {
+	t.Helper()
+	frame := image.NewNRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 8, 6))
+	for y := 0; y < 6; y++ {
+		for x := 0; x < 8; x++ {
+			frame.Set(x, y, color.NRGBA{R: 60, G: 170, B: 220, A: 255})
+		}
+	}
+	var encoded bytes.Buffer
+	if err := png.Encode(&encoded, frame); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return zeroruntime.ImageBlock{MediaType: "image/png", Data: encoded.Bytes()}
+}
+
+func TestAttachmentThumbnailRendersInsideComposerWhenSupported(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
+	m.width, m.height = 100, 30
+	m.altScreen = true
+	m.headerPrinted = true
+	m.attachmentRenderers = []*terminalpet.ImageRenderer{terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty})}
+	m.pendingImages = []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{previewImageBlock(t)}
+	m.pendingImageLabels = []string{"diagram.png"}
+	m.refreshPendingImageThumbnail()
+	if len(m.pendingImageThumbnails) != 1 || m.pendingImageThumbnails[0] == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected staged image thumbnail")
+	}
+
+	view := m.View()
+	plain := plainRender(t, view.Content)
+	if strings.Contains(plain, "[Image #1]") {
+		t.Fatalf("supported terminal should use thumbnail strip, got:\n%s", plain)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(plain, "Image #1 attached") {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail strip should not duplicate a text attachment label, got:\n%s", plain)
+	}
+
+	var output bytes.Buffer
+	if err := m.attachmentRenderers[0].Render(&output); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got := output.String(); !strings.Contains(got, "_Ga=T,t=d,f=100,c=10,r=4") {
+		t.Fatalf("thumbnail did not schedule a compact Kitty image: %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAttachmentThumbnailKeepsAdditionalImagesVisibleWhenSupported(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
+	m.width, m.height = 100, 30
+	m.altScreen = true
+	m.attachmentRenderers = []*terminalpet.ImageRenderer{
+		terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty}),
+		terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty}),
+	}
+	m.pendingImages = []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{previewImageBlock(t), previewImageBlock(t)}
+	m.pendingImageLabels = []string{"first.png", "second.png"}
+	m.refreshPendingImageThumbnail()
+
+	plain := plainRender(t, m.composerBox(m.width))
+	if !strings.Contains(plain, "[Image #2]") {
+		t.Fatalf("a supported terminal must keep a second staged image visible, got:\n%s", plain)
+	}
+	_ = m.View()
+	for index, renderer := range m.attachmentRenderers {
+		var output bytes.Buffer
+		if err := renderer.Render(&output); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		id := "i=" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(attachmentImageID+uint32(index)), 10)
+		if !strings.Contains(output.String(), id) {
+			t.Fatalf("thumbnail %d was not rendered, got %q", index+1, output.String())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAttachmentThumbnailFallsBackToChipsWithoutTerminalGraphics(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
+	m.width, m.height = 100, 30
+	m.altScreen = true
+	m.pendingImages = []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{previewImageBlock(t)}
+	m.pendingImageLabels = []string{"diagram.png"}
+	m.refreshPendingImageThumbnail()
+
+	plain := plainRender(t, m.composerBox(m.width))
+	if !strings.Contains(plain, "[Image #1]") {
+		t.Fatalf("unsupported terminal should retain text attachment chip, got:\n%s", plain)
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(plain, "Image #1 attached") {
+		t.Fatalf("unsupported terminal should not reserve thumbnail rows, got:\n%s", plain)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAttachmentThumbnailClearsWithPendingImage(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newModel(context.Background(), Options{})
+	m.width, m.height = 100, 30
+	m.altScreen = true
+	m.headerPrinted = true
+	m.attachmentRenderers = []*terminalpet.ImageRenderer{terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty})}
+	m.pendingImages = []zeroruntime.ImageBlock{previewImageBlock(t)}
+	m.pendingImageLabels = []string{"diagram.png"}
+	m.refreshPendingImageThumbnail()
+	_ = m.View()
+	var first bytes.Buffer
+	if err := m.attachmentRenderers[0].Render(&first); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	m.pendingImages = nil
+	m.pendingImageLabels = nil
+	m.pendingImageThumbnails = nil
+	_ = m.View()
+	var cleared bytes.Buffer
+	if err := m.attachmentRenderers[0].Render(&cleared); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(cleared.String(), "a=d,d=I,i=49376") {
+		t.Fatalf("clearing pending image should delete its Kitty placement, got %q", cleared.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPetOutputCompositesAttachmentAndPetInOneFrame(t *testing.T) {
+	animation, err := terminalpet.ThumbnailAnimation(image.NewNRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 2, 2)))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	pet := terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty})
+	attachment := terminalpet.NewImageRenderer(terminalpet.ImageSupport{Protocol: terminalpet.ImageProtocolKitty})
+	pet.Set(&terminalpet.ImageDraw{ID: petAmbientImageID, Animation: animation, State: terminalpet.Idle, Columns: 4, Rows: 3})
+	attachment.Set(&terminalpet.ImageDraw{ID: attachmentImageID, Animation: animation, State: terminalpet.Idle, Columns: 10, Rows: 4})
+	sink, err := os.CreateTemp(t.TempDir(), "image-output-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = sink.Close() })
+	if _, err := newPetImageOutput(sink, pet, attachment).Write([]byte(terminalSyncStart + "frame" + terminalSyncEnd)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(sink.Name())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	got := string(data)
+	if strings.Count(got, terminalSyncStart) != 1 || strings.Count(got, terminalSyncEnd) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("graphics should share Bubble Tea's synchronized frame: %q", got)
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{"i=49374", "i=49376"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(got, id) {
+			t.Fatalf("missing image placement %s: %q", id, got)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/tui/btw.go

@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ func (m model) handleBTWCommand(question string) (model, tea.Cmd) {
 	if question == "" {
 		side.pendingImages = nil
 		side.pendingImageLabels = nil
+		side.pendingImageThumbnails = nil
 		side.pendingDocuments = nil
 	}
 	side.loops = nil

internal/tui/clipboard.go

@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ func (m model) routePaste(content string) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
 			return m, nil
 		}
 		m.picker.appendQuery([]rune(sanitizeComposerInput(content)))
-		m.previewSelectedTheme()
 		if m.picker.kind == pickerPet {
 			return m.schedulePetPreview()
 		}

internal/tui/collapse_tools_test.go

@@ -121,3 +121,59 @@ func TestToolResultRowExposesClickToggle(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("tool result visible body/footer must stay selectable, got %#v", selectable)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAlwaysExpandedToolResultHeaderIsNotToggleable(t *testing.T) {
+	m := transcriptViewTestModel()
+	for _, tool := range []string{"edit_file", "apply_patch", "write_file"} {
+		row := transcriptRow{
+			kind:   rowToolResult,
+			id:     "diff",
+			tool:   tool,
+			status: tools.StatusOK,
+			detail: "--- a/example.go\n+++ b/example.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new",
+		}
+		_, selectable := m.renderSelectableToolResultRow(0, row, m.width, buildRowContext(nil), 0)
+		if len(selectable) == 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: expected a visible diff result row", tool)
+		}
+		if selectable[0].toggle {
+			t.Fatalf("%s header must not advertise a collapse toggle: %#v", tool, selectable[0])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestToolResultOutputCannotCreateToggle(t *testing.T) {
+	m := transcriptViewTestModel()
+	row := transcriptRow{
+		kind:   rowToolResult,
+		id:     "custom",
+		tool:   "custom_tool",
+		status: tools.StatusOK,
+		detail: "the file literally says: click to expand",
+	}
+	_, selectable := m.renderSelectableToolResultRow(0, row, m.width, buildRowContext(nil), 0)
+	if len(selectable) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected a visible tool result row")
+	}
+	if selectable[0].toggle {
+		t.Fatalf("tool-output text must not create a header toggle: %#v", selectable[0])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCollapsedExploreToolResultHeaderIsToggleable(t *testing.T) {
+	m := transcriptViewTestModel()
+	row := transcriptRow{
+		kind:   rowToolResult,
+		id:     "read",
+		tool:   "read_file",
+		status: tools.StatusOK,
+		detail: numberedLines(cardBodyMaxLines + 5),
+	}
+	_, selectable := m.renderSelectableToolResultRow(0, row, m.width, buildRowContext(nil), 0)
+	if len(selectable) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected a visible explore result row")
+	}
+	if !selectable[0].toggle {
+		t.Fatalf("collapsed explore card header must remain toggleable: %#v", selectable[0])
+	}
+}

internal/tui/command_center.go

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/doctor"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/modelregistry"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/oauth"
+	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providercatalog"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providermodelcatalog"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/providers"
 	"github.com/Gitlawb/zero/internal/redaction"
@@ -731,14 +732,16 @@ func (m model) resolveModelSwitchTarget(registry modelregistry.Registry, args st
 		}, true
 	}
 	if provider, ok := m.activeProviderDescriptor(); ok {
-		for _, model := range m.modelPickerLiveByProvider[provider.ID] {
-			if strings.EqualFold(model.ID, strings.TrimSpace(args)) {
-				return modelSwitchTarget{modelID: model.ID}, true
+		for _, candidate := range providerModelSwitchCandidates(provider.ID, args) {
+			for _, model := range m.modelPickerLiveByProvider[provider.ID] {
+				if strings.EqualFold(model.ID, candidate) {
+					return modelSwitchTarget{modelID: model.ID}, true
+				}
 			}
-		}
-		for _, model := range providermodelcatalog.Models(provider) {
-			if strings.EqualFold(model.ID, strings.TrimSpace(args)) {
-				return modelSwitchTarget{modelID: model.ID}, true
+			for _, model := range providermodelcatalog.Models(provider) {
+				if strings.EqualFold(model.ID, candidate) {
+					return modelSwitchTarget{modelID: model.ID}, true
+				}
 			}
 		}
 		if genericProviderCatalogID(provider.ID) && strings.TrimSpace(args) != "" {
@@ -748,6 +751,24 @@ func (m model) resolveModelSwitchTarget(registry modelregistry.Registry, args st
 	return modelSwitchTarget{}, false
 }
 
+// providerModelSwitchCandidates preserves provider-owned model IDs while
+// accepting the models.dev OpenAI namespace for ChatGPT subscription models.
+// The ChatGPT backend itself publishes bare model IDs (for example,
+// "gpt-5.6-sol"); gateway providers may legitimately require "openai/..."
+// as part of their model ID, so the alias is deliberately provider-specific.
+func providerModelSwitchCandidates(providerID string, input string) []string {
+	requested := strings.TrimSpace(input)
+	candidates := []string{requested}
+	const openAIPrefix = "openai/"
+	if providercatalog.NormalizeID(providerID) != "chatgpt" || len(requested) <= len(openAIPrefix) || !strings.EqualFold(requested[:len(openAIPrefix)], openAIPrefix) {
+		return candidates
+	}
+	if bare := strings.TrimSpace(requested[len(openAIPrefix):]); bare != "" {
+		candidates = append(candidates, bare)
+	}
+	return candidates
+}
+
 func (m model) requestCompactionBeforeModelSwitch(request modelSwitchCompactionRequest, title string) (model, string, bool) {
 	if modelSwitchCompactionGuard == nil {
 		return m, "", false

internal/tui/composer.go

@@ -269,10 +269,7 @@ func (m model) composerPositionAtMouse(msg tea.MouseMsg) (int, bool) {
 	if width < 8 {
 		return m.composerPositionAtVisualCell(localX, localY, width)
 	}
-	contentY := localY - 1
-	if renderAttachmentChips(m.pendingImageLabels, m.pendingDocuments) != "" {
-		contentY--
-	}
+	contentY := localY - 1 - m.attachmentComposerPrefixRows(width)
 	if contentY < 0 {
 		return 0, false
 	}

internal/tui/dictation.go

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ type dictationController struct {
 	browseVariants []dictation.ModelVariant
 
 	// in-flight session state
+	sessionID   int64
 	streaming   bool
 	recorder    Recorder
 	transcriber Transcriber
@@ -101,13 +102,17 @@ type dictationController struct {
 }
 
 // dictationStartedMsg reports the outcome of Recorder.Start().
+// sessionID must match the dictation controller's current session so a late
+// start result after cancel/reset cannot reset a newer recording.
 type dictationStartedMsg struct {
-	err error
+	sessionID int64
+	err       error
 }
 
 // dictationTranscribedMsg carries the final transcript of a batch (or a
 // completed streaming) recording.
 type dictationTranscribedMsg struct {
+	sessionID int64
 	text      string
 	err       error
 	submit    bool
@@ -125,6 +130,7 @@ func newDictationController(opts Options) dictationController {
 		platform:       dictation.DetectPlatform(),
 		downloadRoot:   opts.STTDownloadRoot,
 		userConfigPath: opts.UserConfigPath,
+		sessionID:      1,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -195,13 +201,13 @@ func (m model) toggleVoiceMode() (model, tea.Cmd) {
 	}
 	m.dictation.voiceModeEnabled = !m.dictation.voiceModeEnabled
 	if m.dictation.voiceModeEnabled {
-		return m.appendSystemNotice("Voice mode on (" + m.dictation.currentModelLabel() + ") — hold Space to dictate, release to transcribe. Run /voice again to turn it off (so Space types normally)."), nil
+		return m.showTransientNoticeInline("Voice mode on — hold Space to dictate; run /voice again to turn it off.", transientNoticeSuccess), nil
 	}
 	// Turning voice off is the "done dictating" signal, so release the warm sherpa
 	// streaming server — otherwise a loaded model keeps idling in RAM (and holding
 	// its port) until the app exits. It respawns lazily on the next streaming
 	// recording. Skip while a recording is still in flight so we don't kill it.
-	next := m.appendSystemNotice("Voice mode off.")
+	next := m.showTransientNoticeInline("Voice mode off.", transientNoticeInfo)
 	if next.dictation.active() {
 		return next, nil
 	}
@@ -262,7 +268,7 @@ func (m model) startDictation() (model, tea.Cmd) {
 	if streaming {
 		return m.startStreamingDictation()
 	}
-	return m, startBatchRecordingCmd(rec)
+	return m, startBatchRecordingCmd(m.dictation.sessionID, rec)
 }
 
 // stopDictation ends a recording. For batch it triggers Stop()+Transcribe(); for
@@ -276,7 +282,7 @@ func (m model) stopDictation() (model, tea.Cmd) {
 		}
 		return m, nil // final text arrives via the streaming command already running
 	}
-	return m, transcribeBatchCmd(m.dictation.ctx, m.dictation.recorder, m.dictation.transcriber, m.dictation.cfg.AutoSubmitEnabled())
+	return m, transcribeBatchCmd(m.dictation.sessionID, m.dictation.ctx, m.dictation.recorder, m.dictation.transcriber, m.dictation.cfg.AutoSubmitEnabled())
 }
 
 // cancelDictation aborts an in-flight recording without transcribing. Bound to
@@ -293,7 +299,7 @@ func (m model) cancelDictation() (model, tea.Cmd) {
 	}
 	m = m.discardDictationRegion()
 	m.dictation.reset()
-	return m.appendSystemNotice("Dictation cancelled."), nil
+	return m.showTransientNoticeInline("Dictation cancelled.", transientNoticeInfo), nil
 }
 
 // wantStreaming decides whether this recording uses the streaming pipeline:
@@ -311,6 +317,7 @@ func (d dictationController) maxDuration() time.Duration {
 }
 
 func (d *dictationController) reset() {
+	d.sessionID++
 	d.phase = dictIdle
 	d.recorder = nil
 	d.transcriber = nil
@@ -326,31 +333,36 @@ func (d *dictationController) reset() {
 
 // startBatchRecordingCmd starts the record-to-file capture off the UI goroutine
 // (Start spawns a subprocess and may briefly block or fail on a missing tool).
-func startBatchRecordingCmd(rec Recorder) tea.Cmd {
+func startBatchRecordingCmd(sessionID int64, rec Recorder) tea.Cmd {
 	return func() tea.Msg {
-		return dictationStartedMsg{err: rec.Start()}
+		return dictationStartedMsg{sessionID: sessionID, err: rec.Start()}
 	}
 }
 
 // transcribeBatchCmd stops the recording, transcribes the audio, and reports the
 // final text. Runs off the UI goroutine — Stop waits on the capture tool and
 // Transcribe does a network round-trip or a local exec.
-func transcribeBatchCmd(ctx context.Context, rec Recorder, transcriber Transcriber, submit bool) tea.Cmd {
+func transcribeBatchCmd(sessionID int64, ctx context.Context, rec Recorder, transcriber Transcriber, submit bool) tea.Cmd {
 	if ctx == nil {
 		ctx = context.Background()
 	}
 	return func() tea.Msg {
 		audio, err := rec.Stop()
 		if err != nil {
-			return dictationTranscribedMsg{err: err}
+			return dictationTranscribedMsg{sessionID: sessionID, err: err}
 		}
 		text, err := transcriber.Transcribe(ctx, audio)
-		return dictationTranscribedMsg{text: text, err: err, submit: submit}
+		return dictationTranscribedMsg{sessionID: sessionID, text: text, err: err, submit: submit}
 	}
 }
 
 // handleDictationStarted transitions to recording (or reports a start failure).
 func (m model) handleDictationStarted(msg dictationStartedMsg) (model, tea.Cmd) {
+	if msg.sessionID != m.dictation.sessionID {
+		// Stale startup from a cancelled session must not reset or re-arm a
+		// newer recording that already owns the controller.
+		return m, nil
+	}
 	if msg.err != nil {
 		m = m.discardDictationRegion()
 		m.dictation.reset()
@@ -375,6 +387,9 @@ func (m model) handleDictationStarted(msg dictationStartedMsg) (model, tea.Cmd)
 // handleDictationTranscribed inserts the final transcript into the composer (or
 // submits it when stt.autoSubmit is on), then returns to idle.
 func (m model) handleDictationTranscribed(msg dictationTranscribedMsg) (tea.Model, tea.Cmd) {
+	if msg.sessionID != m.dictation.sessionID {
+		return m, nil
+	}
 	streaming := m.dictation.streaming || msg.streaming
 	m = m.commitDictationRegion()
 	// A streaming session can end via a transcriber error (not just a user stop), so
@@ -392,7 +407,17 @@ func (m model) handleDictationTranscribed(msg dictationTranscribedMsg) (tea.Mode
 	}
 	m.dictation.reset()
 
-	if msg.err != nil && !errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) {
+	if errors.Is(msg.err, context.Canceled) {
+		// cancelDictation already discarded the live region, reset the
+		// session, and posted "Dictation cancelled." A streaming transcriber
+		// can still race a buffered event past that cancel and report back a
+		// nonempty compose()+context.Canceled; treat that as terminal here,
+		// before the auto-submit branch below, so Esc can never fall through
+		// to msg.submit and fire the composer's restored pre-existing text.
+		return m, nil
+	}
+
+	if msg.err != nil {
 		// A cloud auth failure (missing/invalid key) is fixable in place: reopen the
 		// API-key prompt for the current provider so the user can paste a key and
 		// retry, instead of hitting a dead-end "run zero auth" line.
@@ -413,7 +438,7 @@ func (m model) handleDictationTranscribed(msg dictationTranscribedMsg) (tea.Mode
 		if streaming {
 			return m, nil // streaming already rendered live; nothing to add
 		}
-		return m.appendSystemNotice("No speech detected."), nil
+		return m.showTransientNoticeInline("No speech detected.", transientNoticeInfo), nil
 	}
 	if !streaming {
 		m = m.insertDictatedText(msg.text)